Who's Afraid of Saddam Hussein

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Whos Afraid of Saddam Hussein?Re-examining the September DossierAffairSteven Kettell

The controversy surrounding the September 2002 dossier on Iraqs alleged weapons of

mass destruction has been pivotal in the decline of trust in the New Labour Government.

The absence of a comprehensive, detailed and diachronic analysis of this episode therefore

stands out as an issue that needs to be addressed. In doing so, this paper diverges from

conventional narratives of the September dossier affair in several respects. It argues that

New Labours desire for regime change in Iraq pre-dated the rise of the neo-conservative

Bush administration and the events of 9/11; that the British Government were fully

willing and active participants in the policy of regime change and that the production of

the dossier was one of the key components of a broader political strategy designed toachieve this aim.

Keywords: September Dossier; Iraq; Weapons of Mass Destruction; Intelligence; Spin; New

Labour

Introduction: The September Dossier Explained?

When the history of New Labour comes to be written, two inextricably linked issues

will undoubtedly define its legacy: spin and Iraq. Throughout the chronic erosion of

trust that has accompanied the final years of the Blair Government, the controversy

over the September 2002 dossier on Iraqs weapons of mass destruction (WMD) standsout, more than any other single cause, as a decisive, totemic turning point in its

fortunes. Amidst the failure to find any WMD following the invasion of March 2003,

ISSN 1361-9462 (print)/ISSN 1743-7997 (online)/08/030407-20

q 2008 Taylor & Francis

DOI: 10.1080/13619460701731939

Steven Kettell is an Associate Professor in the Department of Politics and International Studies at the University of

Warwick. He is the author of Dirty Politics? New Labour, British Democracy and the Invasion of Iraq (Zed, 2006).

He is also a founder and Co-Executive Editor of British Politics (Palgrave Journals). Correspondence to: Steven

Kettell, Department of Politics and International Studies, University of Warwick, Coventry, Warwickshire, CV4

7AL, UK. Email: [email protected]

Contemporary British History

Vol. 22, No. 3, September 2008, pp. 407426


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and with intense controversy surrounding the war ever since (not least concerning the

integrity of the intelligence that was used to justify military action), the September

dossier affair has since entered the annals of national life as the epitome of New Labour

spin and manipulation. While all those involved in the production of the dossier were

subsequently cleared of any wrongdoing during the course of four separate inquiries

into various issues relating to the conflict, and although not all observers would

subscribe to an account of dishonest practice on the part of senior officials, for most,

the impression of governmental deceit nevertheless remains pervasive.

Given the importance of this episode to political developments in Britain during the

early twenty-first century, it is therefore surprising to note (still more so given the wealth

of primary material that has now been uncovered on the issue) that an in-depth and

comprehensive examination of the process by which the dossier came to be producedremains conspicuous by its absence. Scholarly treatment of the affair, for example, has

been largely incidental; regarding the dossier, with varying degrees of brevity, as but a

means to explain a variety of other issues, such as the work of the British Intelligence

Agencies, the activities of the Hutton and Butler inquiries, the nature of government

spin, theinternal machinations of NewLabour itself, the state of the specialrelationship

between Britain andthe United States, andthe post-war dispute over thepoliticisationof

intelligence material.1 Broader narratives covering Blairs leadership and Britains

involvement in the Iraq war more generally are also comparatively thin on the issue,

devoting, at best, a handful of pages to their examination of the relevant events, and, in

themain, being publishedbefore much of the information on the case became available.2

Unsurprisingly, the September dossier affair has also attracted a high degree of

attention from both media and online resources. Yet here too, the absence of anypanoptic analysis is discernible. Though informative, by its very nature the formal

structure of media reporting offers a concise and synchronic examination of events as

they unfold on a day-to-day basis, a format which leaves little room for a more

expansive, overarching and diachronically contextualised examination. A similar

limitation also bedevils online analyses of the dossier. Typically providing a series of

short and generalised snapshots, usually polemic in nature, relating to specific aspects

of the case (such as the infamous 45-minutes warning), these too have yet to provide

more than a rudimentary and partial account of events.3 Beyond this, coverage of the

dossier from the official inquiries set up to deal with the various issues of controversy to

have emerged in the aftermath of the war has also been circumscribed. The limitations

of the inquiries conducted by the Foreign Affairs Committee and the Intelligence and

Security Committee are obvious, given that they were both completed before most ofthe information on the production of the dossier came to light, and given that they

were unable to question the key figures involved in the process. The Hutton and Butler

inquiries, despite having access to this material, fared little better. Completed before

most of the information relating to the strategic decisions to go to war which framed

the background context for the production of the dossier became available, these

inquiries were also constrained in their treatment of the affair by their narrow terms of

reference, which focused, respectively, on the circumstances surrounding the death of

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Dr David Kelly (the Government Scientist whose suicide prompted the establishment

of the Hutton inquiry), and on the discrepancies between the pre-war intelligence and

the post-war findings on Iraqs WMD. Moreover, none of the inquiries either sought or

were able to examine the production of the dossier in relation to the longer term and

broader political context of government policy towards Iraq.4

Analyses of the September dossier to date have thus failed to provide the kind of fully

comprehensive, in-depth and diachronic analysis that its political significance

warrants. The end result is that, for all the information that has now entered the public

domain on the matter, anybody wishing to understand this episode in a full and

rounded way is essentially faced with the task of piecing together the material for

themselves. That this is an undertaking likely to deter all but the most ardent of

explorers provides the first rationale for this paper, namely to provide an analysis of theSeptemberdossier affair that brings together the keydetails of the process by which the

dossier was constructed, with those concerning the governments geo-strategic and

political decision-making in relation to Iraq. Importantly too, however, its content

differs from the various narratives outlined above in several key respects.

Typically, examinations of the September dossier tend to fall into one of two

categories. The first of these posits the construction of the dossier as a well-intentioned

act in which officials sought, in good faith, to highlight the need to deal with the new

security threats that had been exposed by the events of 9/11namely the combined

dangers of WMD, rogue states and international terrorism. Though accepting that the

intelligence contained in the dossier turned out to be wrong, and even that those

involved in its production may have tended at times towards a stronger presentation of

the case against Iraq than caution might have advised, it is not therefore doubted thattheir motivations in doing so were sincere, nor that their convictions were real.5

The second, and far more widespread, interpretation, however, maintains that the New

Labour Government (and the Prime Minister in particular) acted, in varying degrees,

as poodles to the neo-conservative regime in Washington in its post-9/11 pursuit of

US global hegemony. The general belief in this case is that the senior officials involved

in the construction of the September dossier wilfully misrepresented and deliberately

misused intelligence material in order to hype the danger posed by Iraqs WMD, and to

thereby manoeuvre Britain into a war in support of the United States.6

The case presented here diverges from the above in three main respects. First, it is

argued that the dossier was not designed as a response to new security threats emerging

from 9/11, but was part of a longer-term policy of producing regime change in Iraq as a

strategic means of projecting British power and influence on the World stage. Second,given that the policy of regime change pre-dated the election of George W. Bush to the

American Presidency, it is also argued that the British Government did not act out of any

subservience to the United States on the question of Iraq, but, rather, were active,

enthusiastic and willing participants throughout the entire process. Finally, while

concurring with the view that intelligence material was exaggerated for political ends, it

is also maintained that theevents surroundingthe constructionof the Septemberdossier

thus need to be broadly contextualised, as part of a more concerted, deliberate and

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wider-ranging strategy for ensuring the overthrow of Saddam Hussein than has typically

been acknowledged.

Genesis 9/11?

The strength of consensus that surrounds the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 is

such that their transformative impact on global security concerns has now become

axiomatic. Triggering an indefinite war on terror designed, at least rhetorically, to

eliminate the dangers posed by WMD, rogue states and international terrorism, the

events of 9/11 are also widely pinpointed as having been a central trigger for the

subsequent invasion of Iraq. Presenting this as the one place, after Afghanistan(currently sheltering al-Qaeda, the perpetrators of 9/11), where the confluent perils of

the new age were united, the governments of the United States and Britain duly posed

the removal of the Iraqi President, Saddam Hussein, as a necessary part of the campaign

to restore international peace and stability. As Tony Blair explained during a press

conference with President Bush in July 2003, four months after the start of the war:

[W]hen you lead countries, as we both do, and you see the potential for this threat ofterrorism and weapons of mass destruction to come together, I really dont believethat any responsible leader could ignore the evidence that we see, or the threat thatwe face. And thats why weve taken the action that we have, first in Afghanistan, andnow in Iraq.7

Yet to locate the origins of the war in the events of 9/11 is to overlook a cardinal fact;

namely, that insofar as the British Government was concerned, the antecedents ofregime change pre-dated the attacks by some margin. Indeed, New Labour had

assumed power determined to exercise a strong and decisive influence on international

affairs. Central to this was the pursuit of a transatlantic bridge strategy, based on the

assumption that positioning Britain as a pivotal power between Europe and America

would enable its influence within each sphere to be mutually reinforcing, thus elevating

its ability to shape the course of world events. In November 1997, these ambitions were

readily discernible as Blair made his first major foreign policy speech as Prime Minister.

Outlining his intention to make the British presence in the world felt by combining a

strong defence capacity with Britains pattern of historic alliances, Blair declared that

the governments overriding foreign policy objective was to maintain Britains position

as a global player, and warned that we must not reduce our capability to exercise a role

on the international stage. That the question of Iraq would be an issue of some concernin all of this was also apparent. Seen as a major, if potential, node of instability within

the international system, Tony Blair (whose own view was that Iraq, the Middle East,

and by extension the world, would be far better off without Saddam Hussein), insisted

that the governments commitment to enforcing Iraqs compliance with the demands

of the United Nations on WMD disarmament was unshakeable.8

Although the chief cipher of intelligence material for the British Government, the

Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC), believed that the the vast majority of Iraqs WMD

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had been successfully eliminated since the Gulf war of the early 1990s,9 in February

1998 the Prime Minister informed the House of Commons that military action to

secure regime change was being ruled out by the government not on a matter of

principle, but on the grounds of its legal, political and logistical impracticality. As Blair

explained, the problem with setting a military objective to remove Saddam Hussein

was that there was not the authority to do so and that such action would require a

massive commitment of military force.10 Ten months later, following the final

breakdown of the United Nations inspections regime, Britain and the United States

launched a four-day campaign of air strikes known as Operation Desert Fox, ostensibly

designed to degrade Iraqs WMD capacity. While maintaining that the overthrow of

the Iraqi President was not a specific objective of the operation, Blair nevertheless

maintained that a broad objective of our policy is to remove Saddam Hussein, andthat [i]f we can possibly find the means of removing him, we will. 11

The governments objectives towards Iraq in the wake of Desert Fox were set out in a

joint memorandum produced by the Foreign and Defence Secretaries, Robin Cook and

George Robertson, in May 1999. This stated that the short-term aim was to reduce the

threat posed to the Middle East by Saddams WMD programmes (as opposed to his

actual weapons), and that the longer-term ambition was to reintegrate Iraq as a law

abiding member of the international community. To this end, the paper highlighted the

disadvantages of the current policy of containment, pointing out that this was

expensive, diplomatically and militarily cumbersome, did not produce rapid or

decisive results, and was not always easy to justify to public opinion. That said, no

viable alternatives were thought to be available. While abandoning containment would

leave Saddam Hussein free to pose a major threat to regional security and Britishinterests, a policy of trying to topple Saddam was also rejected, though again, not on

the grounds that it would be unlawful or unsafe, but on the basis that it would

command no useful international support. The considered view, then, was that

containment, for all its imperfections, remained the only usable option for achieving

our policy objectives.12

The election of George W. Bush to the US Presidency, and the terrorist attacks of

9/11, effectively dismantled these barriers to the pursuit of regime change. Providing

senior hawks in the Bush administration with the pretext for launching an aggressively

expansive foreign policy under the rubric of the war on terror, and now enabling

them to pursue their own long-standing desire to overthrow Saddam Hussein, the

events of 11 September 2001 also presented Tony Blair with a major opportunity for

using British influence to shape the direction of the new global order. Insisting that theterrorist attacks had opened the world up, and emphasising the need to reorder the

world around us, Blair insisted that active engagement was now the only serious

foreign policy on offer, and, in a scantly observed aside, added that it was now time

for the Saddam-induced suffering of the Iraqi people to be ended. The initial military

response against the Taleban regime in Afghanistan was thus conceived as the opening

act of a much larger saga. The first phase, the Prime Minister augured, is the action in

Afghanistan. The next phase is against international terrorism in all its forms.13



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In March 2002, the governments hardening strategy towards Iraq was further

outlined in a top-secret options paper compiled by the Cabinet Office Overseas and

Defence Secretariat. This argued that the policy objectives set out in the Cook

Robertson paper could not be achieved with Saddam Hussein in power, and that the

only way of removing him would be to invade and impose a new government. Also

noting, however, that regime change had no basis in international law, the paper

maintained that such action would require the express authorisation of the UN Security

Council, and that this would only be obtained if Iraq refused to readmit (or

subsequently expelled) United Nations weapons inspectors or if incontrovertible

proof of large-scale WMD activity could be presented. Given that the current state of

the intelligence was insufficiently robust to meet this criterion, however, the paper

concluded by recommending a multi-faceted strategy. This envisioned upholdingcontainment as the least worst option, while adopting a staged approach based on

establishing international support and initiating a renewed UN inspections process

backed by the risk of military action. Importantly, a means of sensitising the public

would also have to be devised, namely a concerted media campaign to warn of the

dangers that Saddam poses and to prepare public opinion both in the UK and abroad.14

Very Carefully Done

Despite the governments hardening stance towards Iraq, the JICs assessment of its

WMD capacity during the early months of 2002 remained distinctly negative. While

now noting that Iraq may have retained some stocks of chemical and biological

agents and the ability to produce significant quantities within weeks and monthsrespectively, the Committee also pointed out that the intelligence on the subject was

sporadic and patchy, and that there was very little evidence to suggest that any active

chemical, biological or nuclear weapons programmes were being pursued. In addition

to this, it was also felt that Saddam Hussein would not use any WMD he might possess

pre-emptively, but only if his regime were threatened.15

Nonetheless, leaked documents outlining high-level talks between British and US

officials reveal much about the manner in which the governments Iraq policy was now

developing. On 14 March 2002, Sir David Manning, Blairs foreign policy adviser,

dispatched a memo to the Prime Minister describing his discussions with Condoleeza

Rice, a US National Security Advisor, during which he had set out the current position

on Iraq. In this, Rice was reassured that Blair would not budge in his support for

regime change, but was warned that the Prime Minister would need to manage apress, a Parliament and a public opinion that was very different than anything in the

States, and that, as such, the pursuit of this policy needed to be very carefully done. 16

Four days later, Manning himself received a similar memo from Sir Christopher

Meyer, the British Ambassador to the United States. Detailing his discussions with

Paul Wolfowitz, the US Deputy Defence Secretary, this also warned that regime change

would be a tough sell and advised that the British Government would need to develop

an anti-Saddam strategy as a means of public persuasion. We backed regime change,

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he explained, but the plan had to be clever and failure was not an option. 17 These

difficulties were further emphasised by Peter Ricketts, the Political Director of the

Foreign Office. Setting out his concerns in a memo to the Foreign Secretary, Jack

Straw, on 22 March, Ricketts pointed out that there were as-yet no clear and

compelling objectives for military action against Iraq, since even the best surveys of its

WMD capacity would not show much advance in recent years. The stark dilemma

facing the government, then, was that:

To get public and Parliamentary support for military options we have tobe convincing that the threat is so serious/imminent that it is worth sending ourtroops to die for.18

These concerns were subsequently echoed by the Foreign Secretary himself. In a memo

to the Prime Minister three days later, Straw warned Blair that there was a long way togo before Labour MPs would be convinced about the need for action, insisted that the

rationale for a military campaign would need strengthening and suggested that Iraqs

breach of UN resolutions should form the core of a political strategy. To this effect,

Straw also warned that the pursuit of regime change could form part of the method of

any strategy, but not a goal and pointed out that while it would be legallyand politically

beneficial to argue that changing the Iraqi regime was essential in order to remove the

threat of WMD, the latter objective itself would nonetheless have to be the stated end.19

In early April, the Prime Minister convened with Bush for a summit at the

Presidents ranch in Crawford, Texas. According to a leaked Cabinet Office briefing

paper, Blair then informed the President that the UKwould support military action to

bring about regime change on condition that the United States sought to deal with the

issue through the United Nations, a move seen by British officials as a vital pre-

requisite for establishing legal cover and for persuading domestic opinion as to the

legitimacy of taking firmer measures.20 However, while assenting to this request,

the vociferous nature of Bushs rhetoric towards Iraq remained undiminished. At the

ensuing press conference, the President averred that the world would be better off

without Saddam Hussein and described the policy of the US Government as to

support regime change. Blair too, though mindful of his proscribed legal and political

boundaries, remained close behind. Proffering to know that Iraq had been

developing WMD, the Prime Minister warned that all the options were open for

dealing with the matter.21

Further assertions to this effect were made by Blair throughout the spring. In some

of the most notable examples, the Prime Minister told the House of Commons thatIraq was developing WMD which posed a threat not just to the region, but to the

wider world, told journalists that Iraq had actually acquired WMD and that the

threat was not in doubt at all, and told the American television channel NBC that Iraq

was in possession of major amounts of chemical and biological weapons. For good

measure, in May Blair told the BBCs Newsnight programme that the removal of

Saddam would be highly desirable, and affirmed that I certainly endorse the policy of

doing everything we can to get rid of Saddam Hussein if at all possible. 22



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Yet while the governments Iraq policy was now developing at pace, the decision-

making process itself was not being conducted in a clearly structured and collective

manner. Instead, this was driven by an informal, secretive and highly centralised cabal

based around No. 10, Downing Street. Although the question of Iraq was discussed in

Cabinet more than any other topic from spring to autumn, such discussions effectively

amounted to little more than oral briefings by the Foreign Secretary, the Defence

Secretary andthe PrimeMinister, whichwere described by ClareShort (the International

Development Secretary) as a mere series of updates on the situation rather than a

rigorous process of collective engagement.23 Furthermore, while small groupings of

ministerswere briefedon theoutlines of theintelligenceby theChairmanof theJIC,John

Scarlett, the Cabinet itself did not engage in any substantive discussion either of the

underlying risks or of the various alternative diplomatic and military options available,did not discuss the merits or otherwise of the intelligence material in any detail and was

not privy to any of the papers and discussions that had beeninforming the governments

approach.24

The centralised nature of policy-making on Iraq was clearly apparent as the strategic

plan for war was formalised at a meeting of senior officials at Downing Street on 23 July

2002. The central purpose of this meeting, as outlined in the accompanying briefing

paper, was to develop a realistic political strategy for dealing with Iraq centred around

the United Nations, the issue of WMD and a concerted information campaign.

The key to all of this, it was observed, would be to focus on the weapons issue, since, as

Straw had pointed out, focusing on Iraqs possession of such weapons would offer an

indirect means of legitimising any invasion. While regime change was not a proper

basis for military action under international law, the paper explained, it couldnevertheless be presented as a necessary condition for controlling Iraqi WMD.

In strategic terms, then, focusing on the removal of Iraqs WMD would facilitate the

removal of Saddam Hussein himself with fewer legal and political risks than would

otherwise be the case.25 The necessity for such an approach was also becoming readily

apparent. In a YouGov survey conducted at the beginning of July, more than half the

respondents declared themselves to be opposed to any military action against Iraq,

almost half claimed that they did not trust the Prime Minister on the issue and two-

thirds felt that Blair was acting as Bushs poodle.26

The meeting itself began with a summary of the intelligence on Iraq. John Scarlett

reiterated that the only way to overthrow Saddam was likely to be by massive military

action, while Sir Richard Dearlove (the Chief of the Secret Intelligence Service, MI6)

informed those assembled of his belief that, following his discussions in Washington, theBush administration now considered military action to be inevitable, and that

the justification for this was going to be the conjunction of terrorism and WMD. [T]he

intelligence and facts, he maintained, were being fixed around the policy. Following

this, Jack Straw remarked that thecase against Iraq was thin andre-emphasised theneed

to focus on renewed weapons inspections in order to help with the legal justification.

While the Attorney General, Lord Goldsmith, readily concurred, explaining that the

use of force could only be justified on the grounds of self-defence, humanitarian

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intervention or UN authorisation, and that the first two options were not applicable in

this case, it was also pointed outthat relying on previous UN resolutions for therequisite

authority for an invasion would prove to be difficult. The expressed view of the Prime

Minister, however, was also in accord with the need for a UN-based approach, observing

that it would make a big difference politically and legally if Saddam refused to allow in

the UN inspectors. Further maintaining that [i]f the political context were right, people

would support regime change, the Prime Minister concluded that: The two key issues

were whether the military plan worked and whether we had the political strategy to give

the military plan the space to work. The meeting itself was concluded on the working

assumption that the UK would take part in any military action.27

Drafting Changes

By the time the governments Iraq strategy was being finalised, the process of compiling

the September dossier was already underway. This had been initiated in mid-February

with theproduction of a paperby the Overseas and DefenceSecretariat focusing on WMD

proliferation in four countries (including Iraq), although this was not deemed to be

suitable for public consumption and in mid-March the decision was made to limit its

focus to Iraq.28 In mid-June a further document prepared by the Assessments Staff

combined three existing internal papers on Iraqs WMD programmes, its history of UN

weapons inspections and Saddam Husseins human rights abuses. On 3 September 2002,

Blair announcedthat thegovernmentsassessmentof Iraqs WMDwould be published in a

matter of weeks.29

The official line on the rationale for producing the dossier was that it was driven by

the open, transparent and responsive nature of the government on a central issue of

public concern. As Blair put it, the purpose was to respond to the call to disclose the

intelligence that we knew. The dossier was not designed to make the case for war,

he explained, but was merely making the case for the issue to be dealt with.30

Accordingly, the motives for disclosing the intelligence were presented as having

derived from a combination of the tremendous amount of information and evidence

on Iraqs WMD flowing across the Prime Ministers desk, and from a renewed sense of

urgency in the way in which the issue was being publicly debated. However, while

Jack Straw also insisted that the aim of the dossier was to meet the demand for

intelligence-based information about Iraq and to make a case for the world to

recognise the importance of the issue, further comments by the Foreign Secretary lendcredence to an interpretation that seems more consistent with the governments

internal discussions on the question of Iraq thus far. As he put it:

if we were going to be able to make out a case for war against Iraq, we were going tohave to publish the material . . . otherwise we would have just faced day in and dayout a constant complaint that we had no basis, that we had no proper reason. 31

While the Prime Minister later asserted that the reason the dossier, as it currently

stood, had not yet been published was that such a move would have sent the issue



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of Iraq rocketing up the agenda,32 a more pertinent reason was that the dossier as yet

lacked the necessary gravitas for convincing domestic opinion as to the need for

adopting a militaristic stance. Peter Ricketts, for instance, later revealed that

publication had been delayed so that the government could build up a fuller picture,

while John Scarlett disclosed that publication had been held back because the dossier

lacked sufficient detail and information to explain the assessment judgements which

were in it. A further, more mundane, reason was also flagged up by Alastair Campbell,

the governments Director of Communications and Strategy, who noted simply that

the dossier was not terribly good.33

Production onwhatwould prove to be the final version of the dossier began in earnest

in early September. Two days after Blairs initial announcement, an informal, un-

minuted and ad hocgathering of intelligence officers and government officials met todiscuss presentational aspects relating to the project. Chaired by Campbell, whose own

view was that the existing dossier would need a substantial rewrite to make it suitable

for public consumption, the meeting charged Scarlett with the task of drawing up an

entirely new version.34 At a further meeting on 9 September, Campbell insisted that it

was fundamentally important for the credibility of the dossier that it must be seento be

the work of the JIC. At the same time, however, the Director of Communications was

also acutely aware that the publication needed to be revelatory. As he later explained,

we needed to show it was new and informative and part of a bigger case. 35

But the intelligence picture on Iraqs WMD had changed relatively little during the

summer. In August, the JIC noted that there had been little intelligence on Iraqs

chemical and biological weapons since 1998, maintained that Saddam Hussein would

face difficulties in using such weapons due to the availability of sufficient material andquestions over the loyalty of his commanders, and restated its view that the pre-

emptive use of WMD by Iraq was unlikely since it would provide a justification for US

action.36 While new intelligence received at the end of August indicated that Iraq could

possibly launch a chemical or biological weapons attack within an average timescale of

between 20 and 45 minutes, this information (a second-hand claim made by a single

unverified source), remained vague, was far from certain and was secretly withdrawn

by the intelligence agencies in July 2003 on the grounds of its unreliability.37

While a JIC assessment of 5 September 2002 duly observed that intelligence indicates

that chemical or biological weapons could be ready for firing within 45 minutes,38 the

view among analysts was that the information referred to battlefield weapons as opposed

to large-scale WMD (a distinction that Blair later purported to have been unaware of

despite it being common knowledge to virtually all other senior officials involved in theproduction of the dossier).39 As Scarlett himself later told the Hutton inquiry, the

accepted view in intelligence circles was that the information (which he omitted to

mentionhad recently beenwithdrawn) related to munitions, whichwe hadinterpretedto

mean battlefield mortar shells or small calibre weaponry, quite different from missiles.40

Moreover, while another JIC assessment produced on 9 September maintained that Iraq

had WMD, the capacity to produce more and the ability to fire chemical and biological

munitions within 45 minutes, this also pointed out that the intelligence remained

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limited, and emphasised that many of the JICs claims on Iraqs WMD were necessarily

based on judgement and assessments. To complicate matters still more, the JIC further

maintained thatIraq had probably dispersed any special weaponsthat it might possess,

thereby hampering the effectiveness with which they could be used.41

The following day Scarlett produced his first draft version of the dossier, which, in his

words, had now been significantly recast and was more assertive in its language.42

Belying the lack of any new and substantive intelligence material, this now espoused a

more forceful linethan any of theJICs previousreports,notingthat intelligence confirms

that Iraq has a usable chemical and biological weapons capability, that it was able to add

to this capability despite sanctions, and that it was continuing to work on developing

nuclear weapons (adding too that uranium for this purpose has been procured from

Africa). The draft also maintained that Iraq possessed banned ballistic missiles and wasdeveloping longer-range versions, thatits military planningspecifically envisioned theuse

of chemical and biological weapons and that intelligence had suggested that it could fire

WMD within 45 minutes. Importantly, too, the draft dossier also contained none of the

qualifications and caveats about the generally limited nature of the intelligence and made

no mention of the JICs view that a pre-emptive attack by Iraq was unlikely.43

Yet despite this linguistic hardening in comparison with previous JIC assessments,

New Labour apparatchiks harboured deep concerns about the dossiers suitability as a

tool of public persuasion. Oneof thePrime Ministers official spokesmen, GodricSmith,

for instance, maintained that it was a bit of a muddle, while his counterpart, Tom Kelly,

argued that it required a more direct argument on why containment is breaking down,

did not do enough to differentiate between capacity and intent and needed to show

more convincingly that Saddam intended to use WMD aggressively rather than in self-defence.44More colourfully, Phillip Bassett (a senior special advisor working for Alastair

Campbell) maintained that the dossier was too journalistic, intelligence-lite and read

like a series of unevidencedassertions. Calling for the use of more convincing material,

for example by printing some of it . . . with names, identifiers etc. blanked out, Bassett

concluded that the dossier needed more weight and that the government were in a lot

of trouble as it presently stood.45 A similar view was held by Daniel Pruce, a

Government Press Officer, who complained that much of the evidence in thedossier was

largely circumstantial and that some drafting changes would be useful in order to

convey the impression that Iraq had been actively pursuing WMD. Like Bassett, Pruce

also suggested using copies of original documentation, if necessary with parts blanked

out, to add to the feeling that we are presenting real evidence.46

Jack Straw and Geoff Hoon, the Defence Secretary, were also critical of the dossier.The former called for the inclusion of a killer paragraph on Iraqs defiance of the

United Nations in order to bolster the case against Saddam, while Hoon later

explained that in a political sense the draft was insufficiently dramatic to make our

case as strongly as I would have liked it to be made. Although Alastair Campbell later

dismissed such comments as nothing more than office chatter, the governments

Director of Communications himself was now placed in charge of a team to supervise

the production of the dossier from a presentational point of view, and to make



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recommendations and suggestions to Scarlett about ways in which it could be

improved. With the publication of the dossier also designed to coincide with the

production of a similar document in the United States, Campbell further noted that it

needed to be one that complements rather than conflicts with the assessments of the

US Government.47

A Major Problem

With Campbell in place, the search for useful information to go in the dossier was

intensified. On 11 September 2002 those involved in its production were issued with a

last(!) call for any items of intelligence that agencies think can and should be included,

and were reminded in a circular email that No. 10 wanted the dossier to be as strong aspossible. According to John Morrison, a former Deputy Chief of the Defence

Intelligence Staff (DIS), this was now a clear sign that the government were scraping the

bottom of the barrel intheir bid to strengthenthe case against Iraq. Oras Dr DavidKelly

put it, the officials involved were desperate for information.48 As luck would have it,

however, right on cue a piece of new intelligence duly arrived. Notwithstanding the fact

that this came from a highly sensitive and trial source within Iraq, the new information

was taken to support the view that Saddams WMD programme was now accelerating

and to uphold the veracity of the 45-minute claim.49 The following day, Richard

Dearlove visited Tony Blair in person to inform him of the new development, though

added that the source was unproven and that the case remained developmental.50

On 16 September, Scarlett produced a new draft version of the dossier, entitled Iraqs

Programme for Weapons of Mass Destruction. Again claiming that Iraq possesseda usable chemical and biological weapons capability, and that it was attempting to

develop nuclear weapons (though now only alleging that Iraq had sought to acquire

uranium from Africa), the dossier also maintained that intelligence shows that Iraq

attached great importance to the possession of WMD, and that it had plans to use

them militarily. Despite acknowledging, in line with the previously stated JIC view

about the lack of a pre-emptive danger, that Saddam Hussein would use his WMD if

he believes his regime is under threat, the executive summary now asserted that Iraq

could fire WMD within 45 minutes, a claim that was substantially stronger than the

main text, which merely asserted that it may be able to do so. 51

By this time, the process of constructing the dossier was proving to be a source of

distinct unease within the intelligence community. An unnamed complainant from the

DIS had already remarked that the 10 September dossier had a lot of spin on it,52 whilea further complaint from within the DIS about the executive summary for the latest

draft pointed out that its claims about Iraqs continued production of chemical and

biological agents were too strong and that the 45-minute claim was rather strong

given the single-sourced nature of the intelligence.53 David Kelly, too, observed that

many analysts were now concerned about the way in which comments on earlier drafts

had largely not been reflected in the later drafts, while Dr Bryan Jones, the head of the

nuclear, chemical and biological warfare division of the DIS, was even more critical.

418 S. Kettell


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Complaining that the claims being made about Iraqs possession of WMD were far too

strong, and deriding the 45-minute claim as nebulous and vague, Jones later attested

that the intelligence services did not have a high degree of confidence in the evidence

concerning Iraqs WMD, and that Blairs claim to know that they were in possession

of such weapons was simply not true. As Morrison put it, the Prime Ministers

promulgations were being greeted throughout Whitehall by a collective raspberry.54

Such misgivings though were summarily dismissed by senior officials. Geoff Hoon,

for instance, later claimed that the concerns related merely to technical amendments,

while Blair proposed that the linguistic nuances used to present the governments claims

about Iraqs WMD were of hardly earth shattering significance.55 More importantly

still, on 20 September Bryan Jones was informed by his line manager that other

intelligence that effectively neutralised his concerns had now come to light, but that histeam would not be permitted to see it due to its highly sensitive nature. Jones was

assured, however, that the evidence had been thoroughly assessed by Richard Dearlove

and his Deputy, Martin Howard (despite what he described as their lack of high-level

experience in chemical and biological weapons analysis), and that the intelligence had

been judged to be satisfactory. On this basis, Jones was told that no further complaints

were now to be submitted and that the matter was effectively closed.56

For all these concerns, though, senior figures still deemed the dossier to be

insufficiently persuasive. As Jonathan Powell (the Prime Ministers Chief of Staff)

remarked, while the dossier was good and convincing for those who are prepared to be

convinced, the main problem was the continued absence of any compelling evidence to

show that Saddam constituted an immediate danger. [I]t shows he has the means, he

explained, but it does not demonstrate he has the motive to attack his neighbourslet alone the west. The threat argument, he warned, will be a major problem. 57

Likewise, both Blair and Campbell also harboured concerns. According to the

Director of Communications, the Prime Minister felt that Scarlett had done a very

good job and that the dossier was convincing, but that it could still benefit from a

little rewriting. Chapter three, on the development of Iraqs WMD capability since

1998, for example, was thought to need some reordering to build towards the

conclusions through details, and Blair also wondered whether the dossier could

contain more pictures and more on human rights in order to drive home the nature

of the Iraqi regime. Both Campbell and Blair also expressed concerns about the way in

which the nuclear issue was being presented, with the Prime Minister keen to make

more of the no civil nuclear point in order to highlight the suspicious nature of

Saddams attempted acquisition of nuclear-related material, and with Campbellwanting the dossier to emphasise the view that with help the Iraqi President could

obtain a radiological device in months and a nuclear weapon in one or two years.

In addition to this, Campbell also presented Scarlett with a list of suggested revisions

to the current text of the dossier. Among these, he observed that it would be useful to

make more of Saddams current concealment plans, that the executive summary

would be stronger if it could be emphasised that Iraq had made real progress on

WMD despite the policy of containment, and that the dossier as a whole would



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be improved if it could be stated (as per the earlier version) that Iraq had actually

secured, rather than sought, uranium from Africa for possible use in a nuclear

weapons programme. The head of the JIC was also informed that the dossier would be

stronger if it could be more explicit about the details of the intelligence reports given

to the Prime Minister, clearer on the distances by which Saddam was attempting to

extend Iraqs ballistic missile range, could provide more clarity on the amount of Iraqs

illicit earnings and if it could contain more details on the quantities of shells that Iraq

was believed to have available for delivering chemical and biological agents. Campbell

also put it to Scarlett that the use of the word might in relation to claims about Iraqs

production of VX nerve gas read very weakly, asked if it would be possible to change

the word could to capable of being used in a line referring to the capacity of dual-use

facilities to support the production of chemical agent, wondered if it would bepossible to drop the word probable from a reference to Iraqs renovation of a

vaccination plant, and queried the use of the word may to describe Iraqs ability to

deploy WMD within 45 minutes. Although Campbell later claimed that in all of this he

was not actually making a suggestion but was simply making an observation,

Scarletts view was that the recommendations were of a more pressing nature.

Campbell, he believed, was making requests, really, for changes, and was asking if, on

the basis of the intelligence could it be strengthened?58

The following day, in his response to Campbell, Scarlett informed the Director of

Communications that he had been unable to incorporate a number of his suggestions

into the dossier. Blairs request for a reworking of Chapter 3, for example, had been

rebuffed since the restructured text had less impact than the original, his desire for

more pictures had been turned down since the intelligence agencies had nothing thatadds usefully to the text and Campbells references to an improvised nuclear device

had also been dropped because there was no intelligence to support the claim.

The governments chief spin doctor was further informed that the agreed

interpretation of the intelligence on the procurement of uranium from Africa

would only allow the use of the word sought, that more precise figures on the quantity

of shells available for delivering chemical and biological agents could not be listed

since we do not have intelligence allowing this, and that the dossier cannot improve

on the use of the word might concerning the production of VX nerve gas.59

On the other hand, however, Scarlett was able to confirm that in most cases

Campbells requests had been taken up along the lines proposed at the expense of

some of the more cautious suggestions that had now been fed in by the DIS. Among

the various changes, he noted, the absence of a civil nuclear capacity in Iraq had beengiven a much improved impact by the use of box and bullet points, the issue of

human rights had been given a little more prominence in the executive summary, and

a figure on the procurement of aluminium tubes being presented by the government

for use in a nuclear weapons programme had also been included. In addition, the new

dossier contained more clarity on missile ranges and on Iraqs illicit earnings, the word

probable had been removed from the reference to the renovated vaccine plant, the

proposal to replace could with capable of being used in relation to dual-use facilities

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had been incorporated and, as Scarlett put it, the language concerning the 45-minute

claim had been tightened, with references to may having now been expunged. With

these changes in place, the JIC met on 18 September to formally (albeit briefly) discuss

the dossier for the last time, and a final draft version was circulated to its members the

next morning.60

Conclusion: Perfectly Justified

At the same time, however, Jonathan Powell was raising further concerns about the

dossier in an email to Campbell and Scarlett. Reminding Campbell of the need to

consider the kind of headline they wished to see in the London Evening Standard

following publication of the dossier, Powell recommended a further change in itscontent. According to the Chief of Staff, the dossiers current description of Saddams

willingness to use WMD if he believes his regime is under threat was still a bit of a

problem, since it would support the argument that there was in fact no prevailing

WMD threat and that we will only create one if we attack him. As such, Powells

suggestion that Scarlett should redraft the relevant paragraph was subsequently taken

up, and by the time the final version of the dossier had been produced the next day the

offending text had been duly struck out. For good measure, a concluding section

admitting that the governments knowledge of the situation in Iraq was partial, and

that Saddam Hussein would only use WMD to protect his power and eventually to

project it when he feels strong enough to do so was also dropped. The title of the

dossier, too, was changed, from Iraqs Programme for Weapons of Mass Destruction to

the more assertively named Iraqs Weapons of Mass Destruction. Although none of thesechanges were brought to the attention of, let alone discussed by, the JIC, Richard

Dearlove later insisted that none of this amounted to any substantive changes, and,

thus concluded, ownership of the document duly passed over to No. 10.61

On 24 September 2002, the dossier was finally published. This claimed that Iraqs

possession of WMD had been established beyond doubt, that Iraq had existing and

active military plans for their use and that some of these were deployable within 45

minutes of an order to use them, a point that was reiterated no less than four times and

which was later described by Charles Duelfer, the head of the post-war Iraq Survey

Group, as the most striking intelligence contained in the dossier.62 In addition, the

dossier also alleged that Iraq was potentially just one or two years away from

producing a nuclear weapon, that it had tried to obtain a significant amount of

uranium from Africa for this purpose, that it was concealing its ballistic missiles whileactively developing longer-range versions, and, despite offering no supporting

evidence, asserted that Iraq placed great importance on the possession of WMD.

Insisting that Saddam Hussein does not regard them only as weapons of last resort,

the threat, as Blair insisted in the dossiers foreword, was serious and current.63

On the same day these claims were repeated by Blair in an emergency session of

Parliament. The Prime Minister declared that the intelligence picture contained in the

dossier was extensive, detailedand authoritative, that Iraqs WMD programme had been



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shown to be active, detailed and growing and that the policy of containment was

therefore clearly no longer working. Drawing attention to Iraqs ongoing concealment

efforts, the Prime Minister warned that any failure to act would now undermine the

credibility of the international community at the risk of global instability and insisted

that therewas noway inwhich Saddam could begin a conflict using such weapons and the

conflict not engulf the whole world. The history and the present threat, he posed, were

both very real.64

As seen, however, such apocalyptic visions did not quite convey the full picture. Some

of the specific claims, especially those concerning uranium-from-Africa and the ability

to fire WMD within 45 minutes, were subsequently found to have been based, at best,

on deeply flawed intelligence. The International Atomic Energy Agency dismissed the

former as having derived from forged documentation, and although the governmenthas continued to insist that it had other and more credible intelligence to support the

claim, the evidence for this has yet to be produced despite the lack of any national

security rationale for continuing to withhold it.65 The latterassertion, roundly criticised

by the Foreign Affairs Committee, the Intelligence and Security Committee, the Hutton

report and the Butler review, also formed one of the key bases for the post-war

controversy about the alleged misuse of intelligence material. Adding to this sensation

was the fact that the final version of the dossier incorporated none of the qualifications,

caveats, and uncertainties that had been highlighted by the JIC in its intelligence

assessments, but instead presented the material as being definitive and incontrovertible.

Further still, the close involvement of the JIC with the production of the dossier was

later criticised by the Butler inquiry as having put its members under strain, and as

having made it more difficult for them to maintain their normal standards of neutraland objective assessment. This, Butler concluded, had ultimately led to the creation of a

dossier purporting to contain fuller and firmer intelligence behind the judgements

than was the case. While the Prime Minister has insisted that the government described

the intelligence in a way that was perfectly justified, Lord Butlers view was that the

intelligence on which the dossier was based was characterised by relative thinness (with

around two-thirds of MI6 reports having derived from just two main human inputs),

had been taken to the outer limits and subjected to more weight . . . than it could

bear.66 Even the notoriously circumspect Hutton report later acknowledged that John

Scarlett and the JICcould have beensubconsciously influenced by Blairs desire to have

a dossier that was as strong as possible and to have thus made its wording somewhat

stronger than that contained in a normal JIC report.67

Nevertheless, despite a flurry of media headlines, the dossier was widely criticisedfor failing to provide any new information, and the majority of public and

parliamentary opinion remained convinced that war would only be justified with the

express authorisation of the United Nations. Of course, as history now records, in the

event the weight of public opinion proved to be no barrier to Britains participation in

the invasion, and virtually all the claims made by the dossier concerning Iraqs WMD

proved to be spectacularly wrong. Within a matter of months, the governments pre-

war strategy for securing regime change, based around the issue of WMD, the United

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Nations and a concerted media campaign designed to sensitise the public, had been

superseded by an equally concerted post-war campaign designed to breathe some

legitimacy into the war by redefining it as a battle for freedom and democracy. With

the fallout from conflict still plaguing the government on what is now an almost

routine basis, however, the issues raised by the September dossier affair have continued

to resonate for far longer than anyone could have anticipated. While New Labours

ultimate legacy still remains to be seen, the shadow cast upon it by these events will

undoubtedly endure for long after the Blair Government has gone.

Notes

[1] See Bluth The British Road to War; Doig and Pythian, The National Interest, 368 76;The Hutton Inquiry, 1048; Dumbrell, Working with Allies, 45272; Freedman, War in

Iraq, 750; Glees, Evidence-Based Policy, 13855; Humphreys, The Iraq Dossier, 15670;

McLean and Patterson, A Precautionary Approach, 351 67; Pythian, Hutton and Scott, 124

37, Still a Matter of Trust, 653 81; Ramsay and Cliffe, Comment, 349 59; Riddell, Hug Them

Close; Williams and Roach, Security, Territorial Borders . . . , 1 23; Yeung, Regulating

Government Communications, 5391.

[2] For instance see Coates and Krieger, Blairs War; Kampfner, Blairs Wars; Naughtie,

The Accidental American; Seldon, Blair; Stephens, Tony Blair; for an exception see Kettell, Dirty

Politics?

[3] Among the most notable websites include: j-n-v.org (justice not vengeance); spinwatch.org;

labouragainsthewar.org.uk; stopwar.org.uk (stop the war coalition); impeachblair.org; and

iraqwatch.org

[4] Foreign Affairs Select Committee, The Decision to Go to War in Iraq, Ninth Report of Session

2002 03, HC 813 (hereafter FAC Report), HMSO, London; Intelligence and SecurityCommittee, Iraqi Weapons of Mass Destruction: Intelligence and Assessments, Cm.5972

(hereafter ISC Report). HMSO, London; Report of the Inquiry into the Circumstances

Surrounding the Death of Dr David Kelly, Lord Hutton, January 2004, HC 247, (hereafter

Hutton Report), HMSO, London; Review of Intelligence on Weapons of Mass Destruction, HC

898, (hereafter Butler Report), HMSO, London.

[5] See for example Bluth, The British Road to War, 851 72; Coates and Krieger, Blairs War;

Glees, Evidence-Based Policy, 138 55; Hoggett, Iraq, 418 28; Kampfner, Blairs Wars;

Riddell, Hug Them Close; Seldon, Blair.

[6] See for example Cook, Point of Departure; Rangwala and Plesch, A Case to Answer; Sands,

Lawless World; Short, An Honourable Deception?; Yeung, Regulating Government

Communications, 5391.

[7] Press Conference with George W. Bush, 17 July 2003.

[8] Tony Blair speech at the Lord Mayors Banquet, 10 November 1997.

[9] Butler Report, section 5.2.

[10] Tony Blair statement in the House of Commons, 24 Feburary 1998.

[11] Remarks by Tony Blair in the House of Commons, 17 December 1998.

[12] Cited in the Butler Report (2004), paras 21317.

[13] Tony Blair speech at the Lord Mayors Banquet, 17 November 2001; Interview in the Observer,

14 October 2001.

[14] Iraq: Options Paper, 8 March 2002.

[15] Butler Report, sections 5.3, 5.4 and Annex B.

[16] Memo. from Manning to Blair, 14 March 2002.



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[17] Memo. from Meyer to Manning, 18 March 2002.

[18] Memo. from Ricketts to Straw, 22 March 2002.

[19] Memo. from Straw to Blair, 25 March 2002.

[20] Iraq: Conditions for Military Action, Cabinet Office briefing paper, 21 July 2002. Reprinted in

The Sunday Times, 12 June 2005.

[21] Joint Press Conference by George W. Bush and Tony Blair, 6 April 2002.

[22] Tony Blair Statement to the House of Commons, 10 April 2002; Joint Press Conference with

Dick Cheney, 11 March 2002; Interview with NBC, 4 April 2002; Interview for Newsnight.

BBC2, 15 May 2002.

[23] Short, An Honourable Deception?, 150.

[24] Oral evidence from Clare Short to the Inquiry of the Foreign Affairs Select Committee

(hereafter FAC Evidence), 17 June 2003. The Hutton Inquiry (hereafter THI) FAC2/150.

[25] Iraq: Conditions for Military Action, Cabinet Office briefing paper, 21 July 2002. Reprinted in

The Sunday Times, 12 June 2005.[26] J. Hardy, Blair in the Doghouse, Daily Mirror, 3 July 2002.

[27] Memo. from Matthew Rycroft to Manning. Published in The Sunday Times, 1 May 2005.

[28] ISC Report, 23.

[29] R. Norton-Taylor and J. Borger, Secrets of Saddams Hidden Arsenal, The Guardian,

5 September 2002.

[30] Oral Evidence from Tony Blair to the Hutton Inquiry (hereafter THI Evidence), 28 August 2003,

para 17.

[31] Ibid., paras 1, 2, 9, 17; Butler Report, para 316.

[32] Remarks by Tony Blair to the House of Commons Liaison Committee, 16 July 2002.

[33] Remarks to the FAC Inquiry by Ricketts, 24 June 2003. THI:FAC2/208 248. Q.742; THI

Evidence (Campbell), 19 August 2003, para 88; and (Scarlett), 26 August 2003, para 33.

[34] S. Powell (on behalf of Campbell) to J. Powell, 5 September 2002. THI:CAB11/17. The draft

dossier as it presently stood was entitled: Iraqi Chemical, Biological and Nuclear Programmesthe Current Threat. THI:CAB23/514.

[35] THI Evidence (Campbell) 19 August 2003, paras 10, 123; Campbell to Scarlett 9 September

2002. THI:CAB6/2 4.

[36] Government Briefing Papers on Iraq, 20 June 2002. THI:CAB23/1667; JIC Extracts.

THI:CAB17/25; Butler Report, paras 289307, and Annex B.

[37] ISC Report, paras 4957; Butler Report, section 6.5; JIC Papers. THI:CAB17/25; THI Evidence

(Dearlove) 15 September 2003.

[38] JIC Papers for Lord Hutton. THI:CAB17/2 5.

[39] See THI Evidence (Hoon), 22 September 2003, paras 801; (Dearlove), 15 September 2003;

FAC Evidence (Cook), 17 June 2003. THI:FAC2/150.

[40] THI Evidence (Scarlett), 26 August 2003, para 144.

[41] JIC Assessment, 9 September 2002. Extracts cited in the Butler Report, Annex B.

[42] THI Evidence (Scarlett) 26 August 2003, paras 58 60; Scarlett to Campbell, 10 September 2002.

THI:CAB23/2.[43] Draft Dossier, 10 September 2002. THI:DOS2/2 57.

[44] Smith to Pruce and Campbell, 11 September 2002. THI:CAB11/23 24; Kelly to Campbell

11 September 2002. THI:CAB11/27.

[45] Bassett to Smith, Pruce, and Campbell, 11 September 2002. THI:CAB11/23 26.

[46] Pruce to MM, 10 September 2002. THI:CAB11/21; Pruce to Campbell, 11 September 2002.

THI:CAB11/2526.

[47] Sedwill to various, 11 September 2002. THI:CAB11/34; Campbell to Scarlett, 9 September

2002. THI:CAB6/2 4; THI Evidence (Campbell) 19 August 2003.

424 S. Kettell


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[48] Anonymous email, 11 September 2003. THI:CAB23/15; Morrison in A Failure of Intelligence,

Panorama. BBC1, 11 July 2004; David Kelly Conversation with Susan Watts, 30 May 2003.

THI:BBC1/5863.

[49] BBC News, 11 July 2004; THI Evidence (Anthony Cragg, former Deputy Chief of Defence

Intelligence), 15 September 2003, passim.

[50] Butler Report, paras 573 8.

[51] Draft Dossier, 16 September 2002, THI:DOS2/58106; draft executive summary, 16 September

2002. THI:CAB11/141 143.

[52] Anonymous memo. 10 September 2002, THI:CAB3/21.

[53] Unnamed DIS Document, 17 September 2002. CAB33/116.

[54] David Kelly Conversation with Susan Watts, 30 May 2003. THI:BBC1/58 63; Note on Iraq

Dossier (unnamed), 20 September 2002. THI:CAB33/114 115; Anonymous document,

19 September 2002. THI:MOD22/12; Bryan Jones interviews in the Independent, 4 Feburary

2004, 10 Feburary 2004; Panorama. BBC1, 11 July 2004.[55] THI Evidence (Hoon), 22 September 2003, para 85; Blair Remarks in the House of Commons,

4 Feburary 2004.

[56] Panorama. BBC1, 11 July 2004; Bryan Jones interviews in the Independent, 4 Feburary 2004,

21 July 2004.

[57] Powell to Scarlett, 17 September 2002. THI:CAB11/69; Powell to Campbell and Manning,

17 September 2002. THI:CAB11/53; Powell to Campbell and Scarlett, 18 September 2002.

THI:CAB11/77.

[58] Campbell to Scarlett, 17 September 2002. THI:CAB11/66 68; THI Evidence (Campbell),

19 August 2003; (Scarlett), 26 August 2003, paras 75, 82 4.

[59] Scarlett to Campbell, 18 September 2002. THI:CAB11/70 71.

[60] Ibid. and 19 September 2002. THI:CAB23/1; Draft Dossier, 19 September 2002.

THI:CAB3/2278.

[61] Powell to Campbell and Scarlett, 19 September 2002. THI:CAB11/103; THI Evidence

(Dearlove), 15 September 2003, para 95; Iraqs Weapons of Mass destruction, final draft dossier,20 September 2002. THI:CAB33/56113.

[62] N. Watt, Weapons Claim: The Dossier, the PM, and the Headlines, The Guardian, 6 Feburary

2004.

[63] Iraqs Weapons of Mass Destruction: The Assessment of the British Government, 24 September

2002.

[64] Tony Blair Statement to House of Commons, 24 September 2002.

[65] N. Rufford, and N. Fielding, Tracked Down: The Man Who Fooled the WorldAnd was

Duped Himself, The Sunday Times, 1 August 2004.

[66] THI Evidence (Blair), 28 August 2003, para 16; Butler Report(2004), paras 225, 304, 327, 331.

[67] Hutton Report, para 228.

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Who's Afraid of Saddam Hussein

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