who identifies with europe? a multiâ€level analysis of european
Transcript of who identifies with europe? a multiâ€level analysis of european
WHOIDENTIFIESWITHEUROPE?AMULTI‐LEVELANALYSISOF
EUROPEANIDENTITYANDPOLITICALSUPPORTFORAEUROPEANCOMMUNITY
by
AndreaNuesserBachelorofArts,Heinrich‐Heine‐Universität,2008
PROJECTSUBMITTEDINPARTIALFULFILLMENTOFTHEREQUIREMENTSFORTHEDEGREEOF
MASTEROFARTS
IntheDepartmentofPoliticalScience
©AndreaNuesser2010
SIMONFRASERUNIVERSITY
Spring2010
Allrightsreserved.However,inaccordancewiththeCopyrightActofCanada,thisworkmaybereproduced,withoutauthorization,undertheconditionsforFairDealing.
Therefore,limitedreproductionofthisworkforthepurposesofprivatestudy,research,criticism,reviewandnewsreportingislikelytobeinaccordancewiththelaw,
particularlyifcitedappropriately.
ii
APPROVAL
Name: AndreaNuesser
Degree: MasterofArts
TitleofThesis: WhoidentifieswithEurope?Amulti‐levelanalysisofEuropeanidentityandpoliticalsupportforaEuropeancommunity
ExaminingCommittee:
Chair: Dr.PaulDelanyChair,DepartmentofPoliticalScience,SFU
___________________________________________
Dr.SteveWeldonSeniorSupervisorAssistantProfessor,DepartmentofPoliticalScience,SFU
___________________________________________
Dr.MarkPickupSupervisorAssistantProfessor,DepartmentofPoliticalScience,SFU
___________________________________________
Dr.DavidLaycockInternalExaminerProfessor,DepartmentofPoliticalScience,SFU
DateDefended/Approved: __________13 April, 2010________________________
Last revision: Spring 09
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iii
ABSTRACT
Intoday’sEuropeanpolitics,Europeanintegrationandfurtherenlargementsof
theEuropeanUnion(EU)aretwoofthemostsalientissuesonthepoliticalagenda.
PublicopinionisbecomingincreasinglydecisiveforEUpolicy‐making,anditiscrucialto
identifythefactorsthatshapeEuropeanidentityandpublicopinionaboutthe
integrationprocessinordertounderstandandpredictthedynamicsofEuropean
integration.IargueaEuropeanidentitythatindicatessupportfortheEUisa“civic”or
“political”identitythatreflectseconomicandpoliticalvaluesandprinciplespromoted
byEUinstitutions.Employingsurveydatafromthe2005‐2006WorldValuesSurveyfor
17Europeancountries,Ievaluatetheeffectsofutilitarianandnationalidentityfactors
onEuropeanidentity.Theresultsofthemultiple,multi‐levellinearregressionanalysis
indicatethateconomicandpoliticalfactorsonboththemacroandmicrolevelshape
EuropeanidentityandsupportforEuropeanintegration.
Keywords:Europeanintegration;Europeanidentity;publicopinion;EuropeanUnion;hierarchicallinearmodel.
iv
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
ThankyoutoeveryonewhomademytimeatSFUthefantasticexperiencethatit
hasbeen.Iamparticularlythankfultomyseniorsupervisor,Dr.SteveWeldon,forhis
endlessadvice,encouragement,andsupportoverthelastyearandahalf.Hehastaught
mealot,notonlyaboutresearchbutalsoaboutallaspectsofmycareer.Icouldnot
haveaskedforabettersupervisor.
Specialthanksgotomysecondsupervisor,Dr.MarkPickup,andmyinternal
examiner,Dr.DavidLaycock.AlthoughhewasnotdirectlyinvolvedinmyMAproject,I
alsowanttosay“mercibeaucoup”toDr.Jean‐FrançoisGodbout.Allofyouhavebeen
excellentadvisors,pushingmetobethebestthatIcouldbe.Iappreciatetheresearch
opportunitiesthatyouhaveprovided,whichallowedmetoworkwithyouasa
colleagueandgaininvaluableresearchexperience.
IwouldalsoliketothankDr.PaulDelanyfortakingthetimetochairthe
examiningcommittee,andDr.DouglasRossandthedepartmentalsupportstaffforall
theirhelpwiththeformalities.
Iamluckytohaveafamilyandfriendswhoarealwaysthereformeandsupport
meineverythingIdo.Thankyou.
v
TABLEOFCONTENTS
Approval .......................................................................................................................................... iiAbstract .......................................................................................................................................... iiiAcknowledgements ........................................................................................................................ ivTableofContents ............................................................................................................................ vListofFigures ................................................................................................................................ viiListofTables................................................................................................................................. viii
Introduction............................................................................................................................. 1
WhatisEuropeanidentityandwhydoesitmatter?................................................................. 5Europeanidentity:Ameaningfulconceptoran“emptycategory”? .............................................. 5Europeanidentity:MeasureofdiffusepoliticalsupportfortheEuropeanUnion.......................... 8
TheoriesofEuropeanidentityandEuropeanintegration ....................................................... 12Theutilitarianperspective ............................................................................................................ 12
Micro‐leveltheories ............................................................................................................. 13Macro‐leveltheories ............................................................................................................ 15
Thenationalidentityperspective.................................................................................................. 17Micro‐leveltheories ............................................................................................................. 17Macro‐leveltheories ............................................................................................................ 20
Methodologyanddata .......................................................................................................... 22Researchdesign............................................................................................................................. 22Data ............................................................................................................................................. 23Variablesandmeasures ................................................................................................................ 25
Resultsanddiscussion ........................................................................................................... 27EuropeansidentifywiththeEU..................................................................................................... 27Macro‐levelfactors:nationaleconomicandpoliticaldevelopment............................................. 31Amulti‐levelmodelofEuropeanidentity ..................................................................................... 35
Economicfactors .................................................................................................................. 36Politicalfactors..................................................................................................................... 40
Conclusion:WhoidentifieswithEurope?............................................................................... 44
Appendices ............................................................................................................................ 48AppendixA:Listofvariables ......................................................................................................... 48
Dependentvariable.............................................................................................................. 48Independentvariables:Country‐levelfactors ...................................................................... 48
vi
Independentvariables:Individual‐levelfactors ................................................................... 48AppendixB:Additionaltables ....................................................................................................... 50
ReferenceList ........................................................................................................................ 55
Notes..................................................................................................................................... 59
vii
LISTOFFIGURES
Figure1: BarplotofEuropeanidentity......................................................................................... 28Figure2: RelationshipbetweennationaleconomicdevelopmentandEuropeanidentity.......... 32Figure3: RelationshipbetweennationaldemocraticdevelopmentandEuropean
identity.......................................................................................................................... 34Figure4: RelationshipbetweenexclusiveandinclusivenationalidentityandEuropean
identity.......................................................................................................................... 41
viii
LISTOFTABLES
Table1: Countriesincludedintheanalysis ................................................................................ 24Table2: Microandmacro‐levelpredictorsofEuropeanidentity............................................... 26Table3: Cross‐nationaldifferencesinEuropeanidentity........................................................... 29Table4: Amultiple,multi‐levellinearregressionmodelofEuropeanidentity .......................... 37Table5: Effectsofmicro‐levelpredictorsbycountry(bivariatecorrelations) ........................... 39Table6: Bivariatecorrelations:educationandEuropeanidentity,cross‐national
differences .................................................................................................................... 50Table7: Bivariatecorrelations:incomeandEuropeanidentity,cross‐national
differences .................................................................................................................... 50Table8: Bivariatecorrelations:profession(worker)andEuropeanidentity,cross‐
nationaldifferences ...................................................................................................... 50Table9: Bivariatecorrelations:profession(manager)andEuropeanidentity,cross‐
nationaldifferences ...................................................................................................... 51Table10:Bivariatecorrelations:marketeconomyandEuropeanidentity,cross‐national
differences .................................................................................................................... 51Table11:Bivariatecorrelations:welfarestateandEuropeanidentity,cross‐national
differences .................................................................................................................... 51Table12:Cross‐nationaldifferencesinnationalidentity ............................................................. 52Table13:Cross‐nationaldifferencesinexclusivenationalidentity.............................................. 52Table14:Bivariatecorrelations:nationalandEuropeanidentity,cross‐national
differences .................................................................................................................... 52Table15:Bivariatecorrelations:democracyandEuropeanidentity,cross‐national
differences .................................................................................................................... 53Table16:Bivariatecorrelations:ethnicdiversityandEuropeanidentity,cross‐national
differences .................................................................................................................... 53Table17:Bivariatecorrelations:postmaterialismandEuropeanidentity,cross‐national
differences .................................................................................................................... 53Table18:Bivariatecorrelations:confidenceinEUandEuropeanidentity,cross‐national
differences .................................................................................................................... 54
1
INTRODUCTION
Intoday’sEuropeanpolitics,Europeanintegrationandfurtherenlargementsof
theEuropeanUnion(EU)aretwoofthemostsalientissuesonthepoliticalagenda.
While,atthebeginning,theEuropeanUnionwasconsideredaneliteproject,andpublic
supportforeconomicintegrationcouldbetakenforgranted,publicopinionabout
Europeanintegrationisbecomingincreasinglydecisiveforpolicy‐makingonthe
Europeanlevel(DaltonandEichenberg,1993;NiedermayerandSinnott,1995).Since
theTreatyofMaastricht,theEUhasceasedtobemerelyaneconomicentity;instead,it
hasmovedforwardwiththepoliticalintegrationprocessandgraduallyexpandedits
politicalpower.EUcitizensarebeingmoredirectlyaffectedbyEuropeanUnionpolitics
and,asaresult,EuropeanUnionmattersarebecomingincreasinglypoliticized(Hooghe
andMarks,2006).Hence,inordertounderstandandpredictthedynamicsofEuropean
integration,itiscrucialtocomprehendthenatureofEuropeanidentityandthefactors
thatdrivepublicopinionabouttheEUandtheintegrationprocess.
TheinterestinEuropeanidentityandsupportforEuropeanintegrationhas
producedanextensiveliteraturethatisdominatedbytwotheories:autilitarian
(economic)andanationalidentity(political)perspective.Authorswithintheutilitarian
approachclaimthatcitizensaremorelikelytosupportintegrationifitresultsinanet
benefittotheirpersonaleconomicsituationortheircountry’snationaleconomy
(EichenbergandDalton,1993;AndersonandReichert,1995;GabelandPalmer,1995;
2
Gabel1998).Proponentsofthenationalidentityorpoliticalperspectivehighlightthe
importanceofdomesticpoliticsandfeelingsofidentityinshapingsupportforEuropean
integration(Carey,2002;McLaren,2002;Luedtke,2005).Recentstudieshaveshown
thatbothutilitarianmotivesandnationalidentityareimportantdeterminantsof
supportforEuropeanintegration(HoogheandMarks,2004,2005;deVriesandvan
Kersbergen,2007).
Mostpriorstudies,however,havefocusedon“old”EUmemberstates—theEU’s
sixfoundingmembersortheEUfifteen.Fewstudiesinclude“new”membersthatwere
admittedin2004orthereafter.Yet,theaccessionofcountriesfromtheformerEastern
blochasfundamentallychangedtheEU—andEuropeasawhole—andislikelytohave
affectedEuropeanidentityandpublicsupportforEuropeanintegration.Inorderto
assessthecurrentstateandidentifythedeterminantsofEuropeanidentityandpublic
opiniononEuropeanintegration,weneedtoexpandthescopeofanalysisandinclude
thesenewmembers.Inaddition,weshouldincorporatepossiblefuturemembersas
wellasotherEuropeancountries.Why?Europeanintegrationisacomplexand
multifacetedprojectthatisbuiltaround—butnotlimitedto—theEU.Onewayor
another,EuropeanintegrationaffectseverycountryinEurope—notonlyEUmember
states.
Iseektofillthisgapintheliterature.MyanalysisofEuropeanidentityincludes
17Europeancountries,whichcanbegroupedascurrentEUmembers,candidate
countries(futuremembers)andotherEuropeancountries(non‐members).Basedon
surveydatafromthe2005‐2006WorldValuesSurvey,Itestutilitarianandnational
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identitytheoriesofEuropeanidentitytofindoutwhetherornottheystillholdforthe
EUpost2004.Furthermore,Iseektoanswerthefollowingresearchquestions:After
fiftyyearsofEuropeanintegration,isaEuropeanidentityformingamongthecitizensof
EuropethatcanbeinterpretedaspublicsupportforEuropeanintegration?Ifso,what
arethecharacteristicsofthisEuropeanidentity,andhowcanweexplaininter‐and
intra‐countrydifferences?Aretheresystematicdifferencesinthestrengthandnatureof
EuropeanidentitybetweenEUcitizensandresidentsofnon‐EUcountries?
InordertostudyEuropeanidentityasameasureofpoliticalsupportfora
EuropeancommunityandanindicatorofdiffusepublicsupportfortheEuropean
integrationprocessweneedtodistinguishbetweenthe“civic”and“cultural”
componentofthiscollectiveidentity.Iargue,thereisadifferencebetweenfeeling
attachedtoEuropeandsupportingtheEU;feelingEuropeanisamatterofgeographical
locationwhilefeelinglikepartoftheEUisamatterofpoliticaldecision.AEuropean
identitythatisindicativeofsupportfortheEuropeanUnionisa“civic”or“political”
identitythatreflectsthevaluesandprinciplespromotedbyEUinstitutionssuchas
democracy,humanrights,multiculturalism,amarketeconomy,andcommitmenttothe
ruleoflaw.WhetherornotEuropeansdevelopasenseofEuropeanidentitydependson
politicalandeconomicfactorsonboththeindividualandthecountrylevel.
Thispaperisstructuredasfollows:Ifirstestablishthetheoreticalcontextformy
analysisandreviewtherelevantliteratureonEuropeanidentityandEuropean
integration.Basedonpreviousworks,Idevelopmyhypothesesaboutthenatureand
strengthofEuropeanidentityasanexpressionofpoliticalsupportforaEuropean
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community.Employingsurveydatafromthe2005‐2006WorldValuesSurvey(WVS),I
thentestmyhypothesesbasedonasampleof17Europeancountries,includingcurrent
EUmembers,futuremembers,andnon‐members.Finally,inafullyintegrated,multi‐
levelmultiplelinearregressionmodel,Iexaminehowaggregateandindividuallevel
factorsshapeEuropeanidentityandpoliticalsupportforaEuropeancommunity.Inmy
conclusion,Irelatemyfindingstothebiggerpictureandspeculateaboutthemeaning
ofmyresultsintermsofsupportfortheEuropeanUnionandthefutureofthe
integrationprocess.
5
WHATISEUROPEANIDENTITYANDWHYDOESITMATTER?
SincethebeginningoftheUnion,scholarshaveclaimedthataEuropeandemos
isnecessaryforasuccessfulEuropeanintegrationprocessandthedemocratic
legitimacyoftheEuropeanUnion(Deutschetal.,1957;Haas,1958;Habermas,1994).
OnecharacteristicandkeymeasureofaEuropeanpeopleisasharedsenseofidentity
amongitsmembers.EarlierresearchontheEUfifteenhasshownthat,overthelast50
yearsofEuropeanintegration,EuropeanshavedevelopedanattachmenttoEuropeand
asenseofEuropeanidentity(Herrmannetal.,2004;Fligstein,2008;HoogheandMarks,
2005,2008).WhetherornotthisEuropeanidentityisameaningfulconceptandreflects
asharedsenseofbelongingtoaEuropeanpeopleiscontested.
Europeanidentity:Ameaningfulconceptoran“emptycategory”?
InviewofEurope’sculturaldiversity,lackofterritoriallimits,andheterogeneity
ofEuropeannationstates,somescholarsaredoubtfulthataEuropeandemoswitha
meaningfulcollectiveidentityispossible.Theyargue,“Europe’sidentities[…]existin
theplural.ThereisnooneEuropeanidentity,justasthereisnooneEurope”
(KatzensteinandCheckel,2009,213).Inotherwords,Europeanidentityisas
multifacetedastheEuropeancontinent.Ithasadifferentmeaningtoeachperson
dependingonherorhisnational,cultural,social,orethnicalbackground.Proponentsof
thisviewargue,ontheelitelevelandincontrasttoothergeographicalunits,Europeis
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perceivedasacommunityofsharedvalues.“Yet,atthelevelofmasssociety,
‘European’oftenmeanslittleelsethangeographicexpansionofaspecificnational
identity—asupranationalnationalism—ontoEuropeanbeachesandintoEuropean
soccerarenas”(KatzensteinandCheckel,2009,214).Consequently,theyquestionthe
meaningofEuropeanidentityasanexpressionofasenseofbelongingtoaEuropean
communityanddescribeitasan“emptycategory”(Meinhof,2004;Breakwell,2004).
OtherresearchersapproachthestudyofEuropeanidentityfromadifferent
angle.Theyagreethatacollectiveidentitycanonlydeveloponthebasisofshared
valuesandprinciplesamongthemembersofacommunitybuttheyarelessdemanding
astowhatthisentails.“Weassumethathomogenizingthepluralityofnationalcultures
toformaEuropeannationisaprojectthatisneitherpracticablenoruseful.Fora
EuropeandemosbeforewhichtheEUregimecanbelegitimatedandwhichparticipates
inthedemocraticprocessinEurope,commonpoliticalvaluesandbehavioursare
presumablyquitesufficient”(FuchsandKlingemann,2002,20).
Thisdistinctionbetweenculturalandpoliticalelementsissupportedbyempirical
works,whichfindthatthereisadifferencebetweenfeelingattachedtoEuropeand
feelinglikeapartoftheEU(Bruter,2004).Inviewofthat,feelingEuropeanisamatter
ofgeographicallocationwhilefeelinglikeaEUcitizenisamatterofpoliticaldecision.It
isthusimportanttodistinguishbetween“identityelementsderivedfromhavingasense
ofbeingEuropeanandthosederivedfrombeingacitizenofacountrythatispartofthe
EU”(Breakwell,2004,25).
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Bruter(2004)definesEuropeanidentityasaconceptwithtwocomponents:a
“civic”anda“cultural”one.TheculturalcomponentappliestofeelingEuropeanand
encompasseshistory,ethnicity,civilization,heritage,andothersocialsimilarities.
Culturalidentityformsthecoreofcitizens’identificationwithEuropeasawhole.In
contrast,theciviccomponentreferstotheidentificationofcitizenswiththepolitical
structureoftheEU(Bruter,2004).InhispreliminaryresearchBruterfindsthatpeople
systematicallydistinguishbetweenthesetwodimensions.Otherworkscorroborate
Bruter’sfindings;theyprovideevidencethatidentificationwiththeEUcentersarounda
civicidentityofliberalvaluessuchashumanrights,democracy,amarketeconomy,and
thewelfarestate(Laffan,2004;CitrinandSides,2004).Thedistinctionbetweencivic
andculturalidentityisanimportanttheoreticalconcept.“[It]allowsustodifferentiate
betweenidentificationwiththeEUasadistinctcivicandpoliticalentity,ontheone
hand,andalargerEuropeasaculturallyandhistoricallydefinedsocialspace,onthe
other”(Risse,2004,256).Thus,Europeanidentitybecomesameaningfulconceptand
indicatorofsupportfortheEUwhenweseparatetheculturalorgeographical
component—attachmenttoEuropeasawhole—andnarrowitdowntothecivicor
politicalcomponent—identificationwiththeEU.
Yet,previousresearchhasexaminedEuropeanidentityonthebasisofpeople’s
attachmentto“Europe”withoutspecifyingwhat“Europe”entails—ageographical,
cultural,orpoliticalconcept.However,onlythelatteraspectmattersfortheanalysisof
EuropeanidentityasameasureofpoliticalsupportforaEuropeancommunity.In
consequence,forthepurposeofthispaper,IfocusonEuropeandtheEuropeanUnion
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aspolitical(notgeographical)unitsandanalyzeEuropeanidentitysolelyintermsofa
“civic”or“political”identity(Easton,1965;FuchsandKlingemann,2002;Bruter,2004).
Europeanidentity:MeasureofdiffusepoliticalsupportfortheEuropeanUnion
Justlikeanyotherpoliticalsystem,theEuropeanUnionreliesonthepolitical
supportorsolidarityfromitsmembers.AccordingtoEaston’sconceptofpoliticallife,a
politicalsystemconsistsofthreedistinctpoliticalobjectstowardswhichpolitical
supportcanbeexpressed:thepoliticalcommunity,theregime,andtheauthorities.A
minimumofsupportforeachofthethreepoliticalobjectsisvitalforthepersistenceof
apoliticalsystem.However,membersofapoliticalsystemdonotnecessarilyfeelthe
samelevelofsupportforeachpoliticalobject.Itis,forexample,possibleforamember
tofeelconnectedtothepoliticalsocietybutdisagreewiththepoliticalelites.Thus,
supportfordifferentobjectsmayvaryindependently.Politicalsystemscansustain
fluctuationsinsupport,thoughthecompletelossofsupportforeitherobjectmight
resultinthecollapseofthesystem(Easton,1965,1975).
Whileallthreeobjectsarevitalpartsofapoliticalsystem,therearequalitative
differencesinthetypeofsupportexpressedtowardthem.Thepoliticalcommunityis
themostbasicobjectofsupport,andthekindofsupportthatisexpressedtowardsitis
“diffuse”and“affective.”Incontrast,supportforthepoliticalregimeandtheauthorities
ismore“specific”and“evaluative”(Easton,1965;Norris,1999).Affectivepolitical
beliefsapplytotheacceptanceoforidentificationwithapoliticalentity,while
evaluativebeliefsarejudgmentsabouttheperformanceorappropriatenessofthe
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object.Putdifferently,diffusesupportdescribesadeep‐seatedsetofattitudestowards
politicsandthepoliticalsystem.Theseattitudesarerelativelyresistanttochangeand
canbeinterpretedasmeasuringthelegitimacyofapoliticalsystemorpolitical
institutions(Dalton,1999,58).Specificsupport,ontheotherhand,iscloselyrelatedto
actionsandperformancesofthegovernmentorthepoliticalelites.“Democraticpolitical
systemsmustkeepthesupportoftheircitizensiftheyaretoremainviable”(Dalton,
1999,59).Inparticular,areservoirofdiffusesupport,likesupportforthepolitical
community,iscrucialtoendureperiodsofpoliticaldiscontent.Diffusesupportfora
EuropeanpoliticalcommunityisagoodmeasureforthelegitimacyoftheEU.As
comparedtosupportforthepoliticalregimeandtheauthorities,itisrelativelystable
andresistanttoperformance‐basedfluctuations.
Centraltotheconceptofpoliticalcommunityistheideathatthemembersofa
politicalsystemparticipateina“divisionofpoliticallabour,”whichformsthestructural
connectionamongthem.However,“theremustbesomecohesivecement—asenseor
feelingofcommunityamongstthemembers.Unlesssuchsentimentemerges,the
politicalsystemitselfmaynevertakeshapeorifitdoes,itmaynotsurvive”(Easton,
1965,176).Thiscollectiveidentityorfeelingsofcommunityindicatetheextenttowhich
thememberssupportthecontinuationoftheexistingpoliticalcommunity.Atfirst,a
politicalsystemcanemergeandexistwithoutasharedsenseofpoliticalcommunity.It
isevenconceivablethatforconsiderableperiodsoftime,thesenseofpolitical
communitymaybelowornon‐existent.Infact,asenseofcommunitymaydevelop
afterthesystemhasbeenfounded,andaworkingsystemmighthelpestablishaffective
10
tiesamongmembers(Deutschetal.,1957;Haas,1958).“Butifasenseofcommunity
failstoemergeanddeepenovertime,asasourceofsupport,itmayleaveasystem
extremelyvulnerabletostress”(Easton,1965,187).
Easton’sconceptillustrateswhyaEuropeancommunity,andasenseof
Europeanidentityasthebindinggluebetweenitsmembers,isvitalforthepersistence
oftheEuropeanUnion.ItalsoilluminateswhystudyingEuropeanidentity,asacivicor
politicalidentity,isvaluableforourunderstandingofEuropeanintegrationandthe
futureoftheEU.First,acivicEuropeanidentityisameasureofdiffusesupportfora
politicalcommunityontheEuropeanlevel.OperationalizingEuropeanidentityinthis
way,wecanmeasurethelevelofdiffusesupportforEuropeanintegration.Second,
publicopinionisincreasinglydecisiveforthedirectionandspeedoftheintegration
process.ThepublicrejectionoftheConstitutionalTreatyinFranceandtheNetherlands
isanexampleofhowinfluentialpublicopinionhasbecome.Inordertomake
predictionsaboutthedynamicsoftheintegrationprocess,itisthusimportanttoknow
whetherEuropeancitizensaresupportiveoforopposedtoaunifiedEuropebasedon
economicreasoning,attachmenttotheirnation,politicalvalues,or“ageneralgoodwill
intheformofwhathasbeentermedapermissiveconsensus”(Anderson,1998,570).
Theimplicationsofthisconceptareimportant.Europeanidentityisanindicator
ofthestrengthofpoliticalsupportforaEuropeancommunity.However,sincesupport
canvarybetweenthethreepoliticalobjects,Europeanidentityshouldnotpersebe
mistakenforanindicatorofsupportfortheEUingeneral.Thesupportforcertain
policiesanddecisionsregardingtheEuropeanintegrationprocessmightvary.Inthat
11
sense,Europeanidentityisanecessarybutnotasufficientconditionforasuccessful
integrationprocessandthefutureoftheEuropeanUnion.
12
THEORIESOFEUROPEANIDENTITYANDEUROPEANINTEGRATION
Overthelastdecades,thevividinterestinEuropeanidentityandpublicsupport
forEuropeanintegrationhasproducedanextensiveliteraturethatoffersinteresting
explanationsforwhyorwhynotpeoplemightsupportEuropeanintegrationandforma
senseofbelongingtotheEU.Withinthisliterature,twodominantperspectiveshave
emerged:theutilitarianself‐interestapproach,emphasizingeconomicmotives,andthe
nationalidentityperspective,whichstressestheimportanceofattachmenttoone’s
nation(HoogheandMarks,2005).
Theutilitarianperspective
Utilitariantheoriesarelargelydeductedfromliberaltradeandneofunctionalist
theories.Theypositthatcitizensevaluatetheintegrationprocessintermsofcostsand
benefits.Citizensaremorelikelytosupportintegrationifitresultsinanetbenefitto
theirpersonaleconomicsituationortheircountry’snationaleconomy(Eichenbergand
Dalton,1993;AndersonandReichert,1995;GabelandPalmer,1995;Gabel,1998).In
otherwords,citizenssupportEuropeanintegrationiftheyfeelthatEUmembershipisin
harmonywiththeireconomicinterest.Thislogicappliestoboththeirpersonal(micro‐
level)andtheircountry’scollectiveeconomicsituation(macro‐level).
13
Micro‐leveltheories
TheTreatyofRomesettheconstitutionalframeworkforacommonmarket,and
accordingtotheEU’swebsite,“thesinglemarketisoneoftheEuropeanUnion’s
greatestachievements”(EuropeanUnion).Fromthebeginning,theEuropeanUnionhas
focusedoncreatingasingleEuropeanmarket,andtradebarriersbetweenmember
countrieshavegraduallybeeneliminatedoverthelast50years.Asaresult,average
standardsoflivinghaveincreased.Still,noteveryonebenefits,andtheintegration
processsystematicallyproduceseconomicwinnersandlosers.
EuropeanintegrationcreatesdifferentialeconomicbenefitsforEuropean
citizensandimposesnewformsofcompetitionforjobsandcapital(Andersonand
Reichert,1995;GabelandPalmer,1995;Gabel,1998).“Citizensderivevaryingeconomic
benefitsandlossesfromEUmembershipdependingontheirabilitytoexploiteconomic
opportunitiescreatedbymarketliberalization”(Gabel,1998,938).AsingleEuropean
marketenforcesinternationalexchangeandallowsinternationalfirmstoshift
productionacrossbordersinordertofindthemostprofitablelocationwiththebest
locationfactors.Thisdevelopmentgenerallyadvantagescitizenswithrelativelyhigh
levelsofhumancapital(Fligstein,2008;HoogheandMarks,2005).Atthesametime,it
isincreasinglydifficultforgovernmentstoprotectnationalcompanies.Thisincreases
jobinsecurityespeciallyforworkersandputspressureonnationalwelfaresystems
(Gabel,1998;Inglehart,1970).
FortheEUfifteen,thereisevidencethathigherlevelsofhumancapitaland
socio‐economicstatusfacilitateEuropeanidentityandsupportforEuropeanintegration
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(Gabel,1998;Anderson,1998;AndersonandReichert,1995;Fligstein,2008;Hooghe
andMarks,2004,2005).Peoplewithhighereducation,white‐collarworkers,managers
andprofessionalsidentifywiththeEuropeanUnionmoreoftenthanblue‐collarand
serviceworkers.However,thepositiverelationshipbetweeneducation,professionand
incomeasfoundintheEUfifteendoesnotinevitablyapplytonewmembersor
countriesoutsideoftheEU.Comparedtothenewmembers,theEUfifteenarewealthy,
capital‐richcountries.ManagersandprofessionalsaremostsupportiveofEuropean
integrationbecausetheyaretheeconomicwinners.Theeffectmaybereversedin
poorer,labour‐richcountries,whereworkersaretheonesbenefitingfromeconomic
integration.Itisthereforelikelythatworkersinnewandfuturemembercountriesare
moresupportivetowardsEuropeanintegrationthanworkersinthe“old”EUmember
states.Forthesamereasons,theymaywellbemoresupportivethanmanagersand
professionalsandthusshowhigherlevelsofidentification(HoogheandMarks,2004,
2005).
Fromapolicyperspective,thebasiclineofconflictwithregardtoeconomic
integrationis:tradeliberalizationandcreationofamarketeconomyversusprotection
ofthesocialwelfarestate.Economicintegrationintermsoftradeliberalizationis
advanced,whileotherareaslikesocialsecurity,healthandworkersafety,educationand
culturearelessintegrated.“Attitudestoward‘policyintegration’suggestthattheseare
thepolicyareasthatcitizenswishtoprotectfromUnioncontrol”(Eichenbergand
Dalton,2007,144).Accordingly,proponentsofamarketeconomyarelikelytosupport
Europeanintegration,whileadvocatesofthewelfarestatearemorelikelytoopposeto
15
it.ThisshouldleadtohigherlevelsofEuropeanidentityfortheformerandlowerlevels
forthelattergroup.Whatismore,itisplausiblethatthereisalinkbetweenaperson’s
attitudetowardsmarketeconomyandwelfarestateandherpersonaleconomic
situation.Peoplelocatedtowardsthelowerendoftheeconomicspectrumareexpected
tobeadvocatesofthewelfarestateastheyarethemostlikelybeneficiaries.The
oppositeappliestosupportforamarketeconomy.
Macro‐leveltheories
Inadditiontotheirpersonaleconomicsituation,Europeancitizensmayalsobe
sensitivetotheircollectiveeconomicsituation—theircountry’snationaleconomy.
PreviousworkshaveshownthatsupportforEuropeanintegrationvariesinaccordance
withpatternsofmacroeconomicperformance:levelsofsupportfortheintegration
processarehigherwhendomesticeconomicconditionsaregood(Eichenbergand
Dalton,1993;AndersonandKaltenthaler,1996;GabelandWhitten,1997).
TheEUactivelypromoteseconomicprosperityand,toputitinAndersonand
Kaltenthaler’swords,“[o]neoftheprimesellingpointsofEuropeanintegrationhas
beenthatmembershipwillmakethememberstatesbetteroffeconomically”(Anderson
andKaltenthaler,1996,176).Basedontheperceivedbenefitsofacommonmarket,
citizensexpecttheircountry’snationaleconomytoimproveonceitbecomesamember
oftheEU.Consequently,EUcitizensframetheirsupportforintegrationinreferenceto
howthenationaleconomyisperforming.
16
Furthermore,economicallyadvancedcountriesmightbenefitmorefrom
economicintegrationthanlessdevelopedcountries.Theservicessectoristhemost
importantsectorintheEU,accountingfor71.9percentoftheUnion’sGDP,compared
tothemanufacturingindustry(25.9percent)andagriculture(2.1percent)(CIAWorld
FactBook).Acountry’slevelofeconomicdevelopmentisareflectionofitslevelof
industrialization,andeconomicallyadvancedcountrieswithhighlydevelopedservice
sectorsmightbebetterabletoexploittheeconomicpossibilitiesofferedbytheEU’s
singlemarketthanotherlessdevelopedcountries.
Moreover,theEUpromiseseconomicprosperityandincreasedstandardsof
living(AndersonandKaltenthaler,1996).PrecedingstudieshaveshownthatEuropean
citizensaretypicallynotwellinformedaboutEuropeanintegration(Janssen,1991;
Anderson,1998).Withregardtoeconomicintegration,theyknowlittleabouttheir
country’sactualeconomicbenefitsfromEuropeanintegration.Theydo,however,feel
theabsolutestateoftheeconomy,whichisreflectedinthestandardofliving.Citizens
ofeconomicallyadvancedcountriesmightattributetheircountry’swealthtotheEU.
TheyidentifywiththeEU’sclaimsbecausetheircountryiswelloff.Thatmakesthem
feellikeapartoftheproject.
Contrarytothishypothesisistheexpectationthatfiscaltransfershavethe
oppositeeffect.Thelevelofeconomicdevelopmentdeterminesacountry’sroleinthe
EUasanetcontributorornetrecipient.WithintheEU—notunlikemanyfederal
states—fundsareredistributedfromrichtopoorcountries.Itisreasonabletoexpect
thatcitizensofnetrecipientcountrieswouldsupportEuropeanintegration,while
17
residentsofdonorcountriesopposetoit(AndersonandReichert,1996;DiezMedrano,
2003).
Asmyfirstsetofhypotheses,Iproposeeconomicfactorsareimportant
predictorsforEuropeanidentityandpublicsupportforEuropeanintegration.Onthe
individuallevel,IexpectEuropeanidentitytoincreasewithaperson’slevelofhuman
capitalandeconomicstatus(H1).Theeffectmightbestrongerineconomicallymore
advancedcountries.Positiveattitudestowardmarketeconomyarepositivelycorrelated
withsupportfortheEU,whiletherelationshipisreversedforEuropeanidentityand
attitudestowardsthewelfarestate(H2).Onthecountrylevel,Europeanidentity
increaseswiththelevelofnationaleconomicdevelopment(H3).
Thenationalidentityperspective
Theutilitarianapproachischallengedbytheoriesthathighlighttheimportance
offeelingsofidentityinshapingsupportforEuropeanintegration(Carey,2002;
McLaren,2002;Luedtke,2005).Whilethesetheoriesagreethattheattachmenttoone’s
nationplaysanimportantrolefortheformationofEuropeanidentityandsupportfor
Europeanintegration,thedirectionoftheeffectiscontested.
Micro‐leveltheories
Thefundamentalquestioninregardstonationalidentityvis‐à‐visEuropean
identityis:IsnationalidentityanobstacleorcatalystofEuropeanidentity?Whereas
somestudiesarguethatregionalornationalidentityisconsistentwithEuropean
identityandsupportforEuropeanintegration(DuchesneandFrognier,1995;Marinotti
18
andSteffanizzi,1995;Marks,1999;CitrinandSides,2004;Castano,2004),other
researchassertsthatnationalattachmentcombinedwithnationalpridehasasignificant
negativeeffectonsupportforEuropeanintegration(Carey,2002).Howcanthatbe,and
whoisright?
CareyarguesstrongnationalidentityisanobstacleforEuropeanintegration
basedonconflictsoverpowerandsovereignty.“Thestrongerthebondthatan
individualfeelstowardthenation,thelesslikelythatindividualwillapproveof
measuresthatdecreasenationalinfluenceovereconomicsandpolitics”(Carey,2002,
391).Otherstudiesconfirmthatnationalidentityisthestrongesttypeofgeographical
identityandcanbeextremelypowerfulinshapingviewstowardspoliticalobjects(Sears,
1993;HoogheandMarks,2004,2005).
However,moreimportantthanthestrengthofnationalattachmentisthe
definitionofnationalidentityanditsrelationtoothergeographicalandpolitical
identities(HerrmannandBrewer,2004).Previousresearchhasshownthataperson’s
attachmenttotheEUdependsonherunderstandingofEuropeanandnationalloyalties,
as“compatible”or“conflicting”,“inclusive”or“exclusive”ofothergeographical
identities(CitrinandSides,2004;HoogheandMarks,2005,2008;Risse,2005).While
nationalidentitythatisinclusiveofothertypesofgeographicalandpoliticalidentitiesis
positivelycorrelatedwithEuropeanidentity,theoppositeistrueforexclusivenational
identity.IndividualsexclusivelyattachedtotheirnationfearalossofidentityintheEU’s
multi‐levelgovernancesystem.Thus,whetherornotnationalidentityisanobstaclefor
19
theformationofEuropeanidentitydependsonhowindividualsfillanddefineeach
concept.
UnderwhatconditionsdoEuropeancitizensperceivetheirnationalidentityas
compatiblewithEuropeanidentityandsupportforEuropeanintegration?Basedon
findingsthattheEuropeanpublicisfairlyignorantaboutissuesofEuropeanUnion
politicsandEuropeanintegration,Anderson(1998)argues,“attitudesaboutthe
advantagesanddisadvantagesofintegrationarelikelytoreflectother,morefirmlyheld
andextensivelydeveloped,politicalbeliefsthataretheresultofcitizens’experiences
withdomesticpoliticalreality”(Anderson,1998,573).Inotherwords,citizensusethe
contextofdomesticpoliticstoformopinionsabouttheEuropeanintegrationprocess.If
thenationalcontextandthevaluespromotedwithinitcorrespondtoEuropeanvalues,
citizensshouldnotfeelthreatenedbytheEuropeanintegrationprocess.Infact,ifthese
valuesarecongruent,theEuropeanintegrationwillstrengthenthesevalues.Inthis
constellation,nationalandEuropeanidentityarecompatibleinsteadofconflicting.
Whatarethesevalues?Inordertoattaindemocraticlegitimacyandovercome
thediscussionabouttheEU’sdemocraticdeficitaEuropeandemoswithacollective
identityneedstotakeshape.AnecessaryconditionforsuchaEuropeancommunityis
thesharedsupportfordemocraticrulesandprinciples(FuchsandKlingemann,2002).
Europeaninstitutionsandelitesaimtoconstructsuchapost‐nationalcivicidentityby
promotingliberalvaluessuchasdemocracy,humanrights,commitmenttotheruleof
law,marketeconomy,andculturaldiversity(Habermas,1994;Laffan,2004;Katzenstein
andCheckel,2009).ThesevalueshavebecomeconstitutivefortheEUsincecountries
20
cannotbecomememberswithoutsubscribingtothem.Byembeddingthesevaluesin
thepracticeofpolitics,theEUactsasaculturalforceinpromotingcivicstatehoodin
Europe.Citizenswhovalueprincipleslikedemocracyandculturaldiversityshould
thereforebemorelikelytoidentifywiththeEUthanothers.
AccordingtoRonaldInglehart(1977),anothersetofpoliticalvalues,namely
postmaterialvalueorientations,islikelytoincreasesupportforEuropeanintegration.
Individualswithmaterialistpriorities,whoareprimarilyconcernedwitheconomicand
physicalsecurity,mightperceiveEuropeanintegrationasathreattotheirpersonaland
theircountry’swellbeing.Postmaterialists,ontheotherhand,whogiveprioritytoself‐
expression,personalfreedom,humanism,andtheenvironment,tendtobemore
cosmopolitanandperceivethenationstateasconstrictingandtoomaterialist.
FollowingInglehart’sargument,Iexpectapositiverelationshipbetweenpostmaterial
valuesandapost‐nationalEuropeanidentity.
Macro‐leveltheories
Citizensacquirethesevaluesinthenationalcontext.Asaconsequence,the
nationalpoliticalcontexthasanimpactonanindividual’spoliticalvaluesandattitudes.
TheEUinturnshapesthisnationalcontext.Itisfoundedonasystemofvaluesand
beliefsabout“civicstatehood”,andofficialEUtreatiesstatetheimportanceofasetof
commonvalues:therespectforhumandignity,liberty,democracy,equality,theruleof
law,andhumanrights(Laffan,2004).EuropeancountrieswishingtojointheEUmust
respectthesevaluesinordertobeconsideredeligibleforadmission.However,the
21
commitmentdoesnotendatacountry’sadmissiontotheEU.Memberstatesare
expectedtorespectandpromotethesevalues,andfailuretodosomayleadtothe
suspensionofthatcountry’smembership(EuropeanConvention).Thus,theEUreflects
and,atthesametime,shapesthevaluesoftheparticipatingmembercountries.I
thereforeexpectapositiverelationshipbetweenacountry’slevelofdemocratic
developmentandthelevelofEuropeanidentityandsupportforEuropeanintegration.
Derivedfromthenationalidentityperspective,Iproposethefollowing
hypotheses.WhethernationalidentityisanobstacleorcatalystofEuropeanidentity
dependsonthedefinitionofbothconcepts.Iexpectapositiverelationshipbetween
nationalidentitythatisinclusiveofothergeographicalidentitiesandsupportfor
Europeanintegration(H4).Ontheindividuallevel,politicalattitudesandvaluesshapea
person’ssenseofEuropeanidentity.Supportfordemocraticprinciples,culturaldiversity,
andpostmaterialvaluesleadtohigherlevelsofEuropeanidentity(H5).Onthemacro‐
level,thelevelofEuropeanidentityincreaseswithacountry’slevelofdemocratic
development(H6).
Followingpreviousstudiesthattreatutilitarianandnationalidentity
explanationsascompatibleratherthancompetingtheories,Iexpecttofindthatboth
utilitarianreasoningandnationalidentityareimportantdeterminantsofEuropean
identityandpublicsupportforEuropeanintegration(Anderson,1998;Hoogheand
Marks,2005;deVriesandvanKeesbergen,2007).
22
METHODOLOGYANDDATA
Researchdesign
Theprevioussectionshaveestablishedthecontextandtheoreticalbackground
forthefollowingempiricalanalysisofEuropeanidentityandpoliticalsupportfora
Europeancommunity.Whilemyanalysisbuildsonpreviousworks,itdiffersfromearlier
studiesintwoways.
First,mosttheoreticalandempiricalworksonEuropeanidentityhave
concentratedontheEU’ssixfoundingmembersortheEUfifteen—thefifteenWestern
EuropeancountriesthatformedtheEuropeanUnionfrom1995to2004.However,
todaytheEUisnotwhatitusedtobe.RecentenlargementshavechangedtheEUas
wellasitspoliticalenvironment.Theseprocesseshavealteredtheobjectofanalysis,
andIbelieveitisimportanttoacknowledgethisinourresearch.Forthatreason,Igo
beyondtheEUfifteenandincludenewmembersaswellasfuturemembersandnon‐
membersinmyanalysisofEuropeanidentity.
Second,previousresearchhasexaminedEuropeanidentityonthebasisof
people’sattachmentto“Europe”—nottheEU.Asarguedearlierinthepaper,European
identityhasaculturalandacivicorpoliticalcomponent.InordertostudyEuropean
identityasanexpressionofsupportforaEuropeancommunity,oneneedstodistinguish
betweenattachmenttoEuropeandasenseofbelongingtotheEU.Feelinglikeapartof
theEUisanexpressionofcivicidentity,whileattachmenttoEuroperepresentsa
23
culturalidentity.Intheempiricalanalysis,Iexaminethecivicorpoliticalcomponentof
Europeanidentity.
Evenwhenfocusingexclusivelyonitspoliticalcomponent,Europeanidentity
remainsacomplexissue.Duetoitscomplexity,Iexpectanumberoffactorstohavean
effectonitsformation.Amultipleregressionmodelthereforeappearssuitableto
systematicallytestthehypotheseslaidoutintheprevioussectionsandsingleout
factorsandtheireffectsonEuropeanidentity.ThesurveydataIusefortheanalysisare
measuredattwolevels:thecountrylevelandtheindividuallevel,whichisembeddedin
thecountrylevel.Amulti‐levelmodelaccountsforthishierarchicalstructureofthedata
anddetermineshowbothlayersinteractandimpactthedependentvariable.Thistype
ofmodelthusallowsmetoanalyzemicroandmacro‐levelfactorsinonemodelandgain
comprehensiveunderstandingofwhichfactorsshapeEuropeanidentityonthecountry
andindividuallevel(RaudenbushandBryk,2002;SteenbergenandBradford,2002).i
Data
FortheempiricalanalysisIemploysurveydatafromtheWorldValuesSurvey
2005‐2006(wavefive).ThefifthwaveoftheWorldValuesSurvey(WVS)isauniquedata
setthatallowsmetoexamineEuropeanidentityasanexpressionofattachmenttothe
EU.Unlikeothersurveys,theWVSincludesaquestionthatasksrespondentswhetheror
nottheyseethemselvesaspartoftheEuropeanUnion.Othersurveysaskmore
generallyifrespondentsfeelanattachmenttoEurope.iiThus,formyresearchpurpose,
thequestionwordingintheWVSpresentsanadvantagetoothersurveys.
24
Moreover,itisoneofthefirstsurveysthatincludedataconcerningEuropean
identityfortheformerEasternbloccountries.Thequestion,whetherornotpeoplefeel
likecitizensoftheEU,hasbeenaskedinthreegroupsofcountries:(1)currentEU
memberstates,(2)candidatecountries(futuremembers),and(3)otherEuropean
countries(non‐members).Thisallowsmetosystematicallycompareamongmember
states(new/Eastvs.old/West)aswellasbetweencurrentEUmembers,future
membersandnon‐members.
OnelimitationofthedatasetistheincompletenumberofEuropeancountries
thatarecovered.Ofthe25EUmemberstatesonlyeighthaveansweredthequestion
aboutEuropeanidentity.Inaddition,BulgariaandRomania,whichwerefuture
membersatthetimeoftheinterviews,andsevennon‐membersansweredtheentire
survey.Asaresult,myanalysisislimitedto17countries—eightcurrentandtwofuture
membersoftheEuropeanUnionandsevennon‐members(seeTable1).
Table1:Countriesincludedintheanalysis
CurrentEUmembercountries(members)
Candidatecountries(futuremembers)
OtherEuropeancountries(non‐members)
Cyprus Bulgaria AndorraFinland Romania GeorgiaGermany MoldovaItaly NorwayPoland SerbiaSlovenia SwitzerlandSpain UkraineSweden
Source:WorldValuesSurvey2005‐2006,V2.
25
Variablesandmeasures
MydependentvariableisEuropeanidentity.Thequestioninthe2005‐2006WVS
thattapsintoasenseofEuropeanidentityis:“Peoplehavedifferentviewsabout
themselvesandhowtheyrelatetotheworld.Wouldyoutellmehowstronglyyouagree
ordisagreewitheachofthefollowingstatementsabouthowyouseeyourself?Isee
myselfaspartoftheEuropeanUnion.”Possibleanswercategoriesrangefrom“Strongly
disagree”to“Stronglyagree”andwerecodedasfollowstoformadiscretenumerical
variablewithatheoreticalmeanof0:“Stronglydisagree”(‐2),“Disagree”(‐1),“Agree”
(1),and“Stronglyagree”(2).
Inthebivariateandmultivariateanalyses,Itesttheeffectsof11independent
variables(seeTable2).Theyfallintotwocategories:economicorutilitarianandpolitical
ornationalidentityfactors.Bothcanbefoundontheindividualandthecountrylevel.
Economicfactorsareprimarilyconcernedwithaperson’ssocio‐economicsituation.On
theindividuallevel,thisappliestoincomeandhumancapital(educationand
profession);arelevantmacro‐levelfactorisacountry’slevelofeconomicdevelopment.
Otherutilitarianfactorsontheindividuallevelincludeaperson’sattitudetowards
marketeconomyandwelfarestate.
Politicalfactorsattheindividuallevelencompassaperson’sattachmenttoher
country(nationalidentity),aswellasattitudestowardsdemocracy,culturaldiversity,
andpostmaterialism.Onthecountrylevel,thelevelofdemocraticdevelopmentis
expectedtoshapeEuropeanidentityandpublicsupportforEuropeanintegration.
26
Table2:Microandmacro‐levelpredictorsofEuropeanidentity
Individual‐levelfactors Country‐levelfactorsEconomicfactors Education(H1) Economicdevelopment(H3) Income(H1) Profession(H1) MarketEconomy(H2) WelfareState(H2) Politicalfactors NationalIdentity(H4) Democraticdevelopment(H6) Democracy(H5) Multiculturalism(H5) Postmaterialism(H5)
Source:WorldValuesSurvey2005‐2006.Note:ForadetailedlistofvariablesandmeasuresseeAppendix.
27
RESULTSANDDISCUSSION
Inthefollowingsections,Ipresentanddiscusstheresultsoftheempirical
analysis.IbeginbymeasuringthelevelofEuropeanidentity.Ifirstdescribeifandto
whatextentEuropeansseethemselvesaspartoftheEUandpointoutinterestingcross‐
nationaldifferences.Secondly,IillustratetherelationshipbetweenEuropeanidentity
andtwomacro‐levelfactors:economicandpoliticaldevelopment.Finally,Ipresentthe
findingsaboutthecharacteristicsofEuropeanidentitybasedontheresultsofa
multiple,multi‐levelmodelofEuropeanidentity.
EuropeansidentifywiththeEU
PreviousresearchhasshownthatEuropeans—atleastcitizensoftheEU
fifteen—feelattachedtoEurope(CitrinandSides,2004;HoogheandMarks,2004,2005;
Fligstein,2008).Thenagain,identifyingwithEuropeisnotthesameasfeelingasenseof
belongingtotheEU.Themoreimportantquestionforthepurposeofthispaperis:do
EuropeansidentifywiththeEuropeanUnion?Intheinterviewsforthe2005‐2006World
ValuesSurvey(WVS)respondentswereaskedtoreacttothefollowingstatement:“Isee
myselfaspartoftheEuropeanUnion.”Twothirds(65.5percent)oftherespondentsin
thesampleagreed(44.6percent)orstronglyagreed(20.9percent)withthestatement.
OnlyaboutonethirdstatedtheydonotseethemselvesaspartoftheEU(24.3percent
disagreedand10.2percentstronglydisagreed)(seeFigure1foragraphicalillustration).
28
Figure1:BarplotofEuropeanidentity
Source:WorldValuesSurvey2005‐2006,V213C.
ThepercentageofpeoplewhoidentifywiththeEUroughlycorrespondstothe
shareofcurrentandfutureEUmemberstatesinthesample(10outof17).Citizensof
thesecountriesare—orsoonwillbe—EUcitizensandthuspartoftheUnion.However,
theyarenottheonlyonesidentifyingwiththeEU.Despitetheircountry’sofficialstatus,
citizensofnon‐membercountriesalsoexpressasenseofbelongingtotheEU.Infact,in
someofthenon‐membercountries,theshareofcitizenswhofeellikepartoftheEUis
higherthanincurrentorfuturemembercountries.
Table3presentstheshareofpeopleineachcountrywhoseethemselvesaspart
oftheEU.ThecountriesaregroupedaccordingtotheirstatusofEUmembership.On
average,theshareofcitizenswhoidentifywiththeEUishighestincurrentEUmember
countries(68.5percent).However,theshareofcitizensinnon‐membercountrieswho
29
identifywiththeEUispracticallyasbig(68.1percent).Incontrast,thepercentageofEU
identifiersinthetwocandidatecountriesissignificantlylower(46.3percent).
Table3:Cross‐nationaldifferencesinEuropeanidentity
EUmembercountries Candidatecountries OtherEuropeancountries % Strength % Strength % Strength
Cyprus 71.2 .64 Bulgaria 50.0 ‐.12 Andorra 77.4 .64Finland 74.6 .69 Romania 47.1 ‐.12 Georgia 51.2 .06Germany 41.0 ‐.31 Moldova 64.1 .43Italy 67.2 .49 Norway 93.9 1.43Poland 82.2 .85 Serbia 73.4 .70Slovenia 78.2 .70 Switzerland 72.6 .60Spain 85.8 .86 Ukraine 46.2 ‐.11Sweden 73.4 .56 Mean 68.5 .47 Mean 46.3 ‐.12 Mean 68.1 .53
Source:WorldValuesSurvey2005‐2006,V213C.Note:Europeanidentityisadiscretenumericalvariablethatrunsfrom‐2to2andhasatheoreticalmeanof0.
Thecategorizationinmembers,candidatesandnon‐membersdisguisesfurther
variationbetweenthecountriesineachgroup.Lookingateachcountryseparately,Ifind
interestingcross‐nationaldifferences.InspiteofbeingafoundingmemberoftheEU,
GermanyhasthelowestpercentageofEUidentifiersoverall.Lessthanhalfofthe
population(41percent)feelliketheyarepartoftheEU.Thereisalargegapbetween
GermanyandItaly(67.2percent),theEUmembercountrywiththesecondlowest
identificationrate.Theonlyothercountriesthatdisplayidentificationrateslowerthan
50percentare:Romania(47.1percent)andUkraine(46.2percent).Inallother
countries,themajorityofthepopulationfeelslikeapartoftheEU.Interestingly,
despitethefactthatitisnotamemberstate,Norwayisthecountrywiththehighest
percentageofcitizensidentifyingwiththeEU(93.9percent).Onlyintwoother
countriesistheshareofEUidentifiersabove80percent:Spain(85.8percent)and
30
Poland(82.2percent).BotharemembersoftheEU;Spainjoinedin1986andis
consideredan“old”member,whereasPolandbecamea“new”memberin2004.
InadditiontothepercentageofpeoplewhoidentifywithEurope,Table3also
showsthestrengthofthisattachment.Althoughtheexplanatorypowerofthefiguresis
limitedduetothesmallnumberofcategories,itnonethelessshowsinteresting
differences.Withascoreof0.42,theaveragestrengthispositiveandabovethe
theoreticalmeanof0.Infourcountries—Germany,Bulgaria,RomaniaandUkraine—the
averageattachmentisnegative.Thisispartlyduetothefactthatthemajorityof
residentsinthesecountriesdonotfeelliketheyarepartoftheEU.ThecaseofBulgaria
showsthateventhoughthecountryisevenlysplitintoidentifiersandnon‐identifiers,
theattachmenttoEuropeisnegative.Incontrast,Norwayshowsthestrongest
attachmenttoEurope.Anaverageof1.43indicatesthatafairshareofthepopulation
notjustagreesbutstronglyagreestobepartoftheEU.
Theseresults,especiallythecaseofNorway,arepuzzling.Norwayisnota
memberoftheEU,yetalmosttheentireNorwegianpopulationstatestheysee
themselvesaspartoftheEU.Howcanthatbe?ItisimportanttonotethatEuropean
integrationisnotlimitedtotheEuropeanUnion.Nevertheless,becausetheEUisthe
mainorganizationassociatedwiththeEuropeanintegrationprocess,peopleoftentalk
abouttheEuropeanUnionwhentheyarereallyreferringtoEuropeanintegration.iii
AlthoughnotaEUmemberstate,NorwayisapartofthesingleEuropeanmarket
throughitsmembershipintheEuropeanEconomicArea.Inaddition,itparticipatesin
theEuropeanFreeTradeAssociationandtheSchengenArea.BasedonNorway’s
31
involvementintheseinstitutions,NorwegiancitizensexperiencetheimpactofEuropean
integration.ThishelpsexplainwhyNorwayhassuchahighrateofEuropeanidentity.
ThefactthatEuropeanintegrationdoesnotendatthebordersoftheEUmight
alsohelpexplainwhyothernonmembercountriesidentifywiththeEU.Allcountries
includedintheanalysisaremembersoftheCouncilofEurope.Inaddition,Andorraand
Switzerland—bothcountrieswithaboveaveragesharesofEUidentifiers—havespecial
relationshipswiththeEU.AndorraisamemberintheEUCustomsUnionandusesthe
Euroasitsofficialnationalcurrency.ivLikeNorway,Switzerlandisamemberofthe
singleEuropeanmarketbasedonbilateraltreatieswiththeEUandpartoftheSchengen
Area.
Macro‐levelfactors:nationaleconomicandpoliticaldevelopment
ArethereotherfactorsthatcanhelpexplainthepeculiarcaseofNorwayaswell
asothercross‐nationaldifferences?Obviously,thecategorizationofcountriesaccording
totheirmembershipstatusintheEUonlyyieldslimitedexplanatorypower.Instead,
Table3providesevidencethatcountrieswithhighereconomicanddemocratic
developmentshowhigherratesofEuropeanidentity.Duetothecollinearityofboth
factors(r=0.94)IexaminetheireffectonEuropeanidentityseparately.
Figure2graphicallyillustratestherelationshipbetweenacountry’seconomic
developmentanditslevelofEuropeanidentity.Nationaleconomicdevelopmentis
measuredinGDPpercapitacalculatedaspurchasingpowerparity(PPP)inconstant
US$.Theslopeanddirectionoftheregressionlineindicatethatthereisapositive
32
relationshipbetweeneconomicdevelopmentandEuropeanidentity(r=0.14).Thislends
supporttothehypothesisthatthelevelofEuropeanidentityincreaseswithacountry’s
levelofeconomicdevelopment(H3).
Figure2:RelationshipbetweennationaleconomicdevelopmentandEuropeanidentity
Source:WorldValuesSurvey2005‐2006,UNDPHumanDevelopmentReport.Note:GDPpercapita/PPPismeasuredinconstantUSD/1000.Thevariableislogged.
Atfirstglance,economicdevelopmentappearstodisguisestatusandlengthof
EUmembership.AllcurrentEUmemberstatesareontherightsideofthegraph;they
allhavereachedcomparativelyhighlevelsofeconomicdevelopment.However,the
countrieswiththehighestGDPpercapitaareNorway(36,6000)andSwitzerland
(30,010)—twonon‐members.Whiletheireconomicdevelopmentisfairlysimilar,there
33
isasignificantgapbetweentheirlevelsofEuropeanidentification.Othercountrieswith
similarGDPspercapitaareFinland(26,190),Germany(27,100),Italy(26,430)and
Sweden(26,050)—allEUmemberstates.WhileFinland,Italy,SwedenandSwitzerland
fallclosetotheline,NorwayandGermanyareinterestingoutliers.Bothcountries
produceahighGDPpercapita,buttheyrankatoppositeendsoftheEuropeanidentity
spectrum.Moldova,Georgia,Ukraine,BulgariaandRomaniaaresomewhatseparate
fromtheothercountries.Nevertheless,thereisadifferencebetweenthesecountries.
WhileGeorgiafallsrightontotheline,Moldovaisclearlyabove.Althoughitisthe
economicallyleastdevelopedcountryinthesample,itshowsaveragelevelsof
Europeanidentity.Whileeconomicallymoreadvanced,Ukraine,RomaniaandBulgaria
haveidentificationratesthatarebelowaverage.
Figure3illustratestherelationshipofacountry’slevelofdemocratic
developmentinrelationtoitslevelofEuropeanidentity.Itpaintsapicturethatisvery
similartotherelationshipbetweeneconomicdevelopmentandEuropeanidentity.A
country’sdemocraticdevelopmentanditslevelofEuropeanidentificationarepositively
related(r=0.12).Onaverage,moredemocraticcountriesshowhigherlevelsof
identificationwiththeEU.Thisaffirmsthehypothesisthatdemocraticdevelopmentand
Europeanidentityarepositivelycorrelated(H6).
34
Figure3:RelationshipbetweennationaldemocraticdevelopmentandEuropeanidentity
Source:WorldValuesSurvey2005‐2006,WorldBankRuleofLawEstimate.
Again,allEUmemberstatesarelocatedontherightsideofthegraphandhave
positivescoresontheWorldBank’sRuleofLawEstimate.Thisisnottoosurprising;
beingademocracyandrespectingdemocraticvaluesisaconditionformembershipin
theEU.However,SwitzerlandandAndorraarenotmembersoftheEUbutscorehighon
theRuleofLawindex.Whatismore,theyidentifywiththeEUonasimilarlevelas
Sweden,Finland,andCyprus.Again,NorwayandGermanyareoutliers.Alongwith
Georgia,Ukraine,RomaniaandBulgaria,Germanyfallsbelowtheline.Inrelationto
theirdemocraticdevelopment,allfivecountriesshowcomparativelylowlevelsof
Europeanidentity.
35
Amulti‐levelmodelofEuropeanidentity
Theprevioussectionshowsthat,onthemacro‐level,economicanddemocratic
developmentcanexplainpartofthecross‐nationalvariance.Still,howcanweexplain
whysomepeoplewithinacountryidentifywiththeEUwhileothersdonot?Inorderto
evaluatetheireffectsonEuropeanidentity,Iincorporatethemacroandmicro‐level
predictorsdescribedearlierintoasinglemultilevelanalysis(hierarchicallinearmodel).I
aminterestedinexaminingvariationattheindividualandthecountrylevel,anda
multilevelmodelprovidesatestforthegeneralizabilityofindividual‐levelfindings
acrossdifferentnationalcontexts.Italsoaccountsforthehierarchicalstructureofthe
data.TheWVSsampleincludesresponsesfromindividualsin17differentcountries;
individualresponsesthataresampledfromthesamecontextshouldnotbetreatedas
independentobservations.
Inthefirststep,Iestimateabaselinemodelthatincludesonlytheindividual‐
levelpredictors(Model1).Thefirstfourvariablesmeasureeconomicfactorslike
attitudestowardsthewelfarestateandmarketeconomyaswellasfactorsindicativeof
aperson’slevelofsocio‐economicstatusandhumancapital.Thesecondsetof
predictorsincludespoliticalfactorsthatcaptureaperson’sattachmenttohernationas
wellaspoliticalattitudeandvalues.Inthenextsteps,Iaddthecountrylevelvariables.
Becauseofthehighcollinearitybetweeneconomicanddemocraticdevelopment,Irun
twoseparatemodelstoevaluatetheeffectofeconomicdevelopment(Model2)and
democraticdevelopment(Model3)individually.
36
Asexplainedinthetheoreticalpart,Iexpectsomeindividualleveleffects—
namelyeducation,profession,andincome—tovarybetweencountries.Iexpect
educationandincometobepositivelycorrelatedwithEuropeanidentityin“old”EU
memberstatesandothercountrieswithhighlevelsofeconomicdevelopment.The
effectmightbeweakerorevenreversedin“new”andnon‐memberstatesand
countrieswithlowerGDPs.Theeffectofone’sprofessionmightalsovarybetween
countries.Whilemanagersandprofessionalsareexpectedtoexpressrelativelyhigher
levelsofEuropeanidentityinrichcountries,thesameappliestoworkersinpoor
countries.v
Inordertobetterevaluatethecross‐nationalvarianceofindividual‐level
predictors,Irunbivariatecorrelationanalyses(Pearson’sr)separatelyforeachofthe17
countriesinthesampleinadditiontothemultilevelanalysis.Foreverycountry,Table5
showswhetherornotthereisarelationshipbetweenEuropeanidentityandthe
individuallevelvariablesaswellasthedirectionoftheeffect.vi
Economicfactors
Utilitariantheoriesproposethatpeoplewithhigherlevelsofhumancapitalare
theoneswhobenefiteconomicallyfromEuropeanintegration.Europeanidentityis
expectedtoincreasewiththelevelofeducationandincome.Theresultspresentedin
Table4lendsupporttothisclaim.Inallthreemodels,educationandincomeare
positivelyrelatedtoEuropeanidentity.Althoughtherelationshipdoesnotturnout
statisticallysignificantineachcountrytheeffectisalwayspositive.vii
37
Table4:Amultiple,multi‐levellinearregressionmodelofEuropeanidentity
Model1 Model2 Model3Intercept ‐1.133**(.229) ‐2.235**(.262) ‐1.217**(.216)Mirco‐LevelEffects Education 0.035**(.012) 0.038**(.012) 0.034**(.011)Income 0.044**(.016) 0.046**(.017) 0.044**(.016)MarketEconomy 0.020**(.004) 0.019**(.004) 0.021**(.004)WelfareState ‐0.013*(.006) ‐0.014*(.007) ‐0.013*(.006)NationalID 0.330**(.020) 0.344**(.020) 0.330**(.020)Democracy 0.034**(.009) 0.035**(.007) 0.034**(.009)Multiculturalism 0.044**(0.11) 0.045**(.013) 0.044**(.011)Postmaterialism 0.031.(.017) 0.033.(.019) 0.031.(.017)Macro‐LevelEffects Economicdevelopment 0.407**(.058) Democraticdevelopment 0.117*(.050)VarianceComponents Education 0.001** 0.001** 0.001**Income 0.004** 0.004** 0.004**MarketEconomy 0.000** 0.000** 0.000**WelfareState 0.000** 0.001** 0.000**NationalID 0.004** 0.003** 0.004**Democracy 0.001** 0.000** 0.001**Multiculturalism 0.002** 0.002** 0.002**Postmaterialism 0.004** 0.004** 0.004**AIC 44550 39999 44555(N) 14106/17 12610/15 14106/17
Source:WorldValuesSurvey2005‐2006.Note:**indicatessignificanceat.01level,*indicatessignificanceat.05level,and.indicatesborderlinesignificanceat0.1level.ReportedNsareforthemicro‐andmacro‐levelsrespectively.MultilevelmodelinZeligdevelopedbyBaileyandAlimadhi(2007).
Athirdindicatorofhumancapitalisaperson’sprofession.viiiTheresultsofthe
bivariatecorrelationanalysisshowthat,overall,workersareslightlylesslikelyto
identifywiththeEUthanpeoplewithotherprofessions,whiletheoppositeistruefor
managersandprofessionals.Theresults,however,donotapplyineverycountryinthe
sample.Professionmattersonlyinabouthalfofthecountries.Interestinglythough,
beingaworkerispositivelyrelatedtoEuropeanidentityinCyprus,andSlovenia,while
theoppositeistrueforGermany,Italy,Sweden,GeorgiaandMoldova.Beingamanager
38
orprofessionalonlyappliestonineoutof17countries.Theeffectispositiveforall
countries.
Althoughpreviousresearchhasfocusedonsocio‐economicfactorsasthemain
predictorsforeconomicmotives,Ialsotestifandtowhatextentattitudestowards
marketeconomyandwelfarestatematter.Thereisalinkbetweenone’ssocio‐
economicstatusandherattitudestowardsintegrationpolicies.Peoplewithhighlevels
ofhumancapitalareexpectedtosupportamarketeconomy,whilepeoplewithlower
educationandincomearelikelytosupportthewelfarestate.Thisrelationship,
however,isonlymoderate.ixTheresultsinTable4showthatpeoplewhobelieveina
liberalmarketaremorelikelytoidentifywiththeEU.Supportforamarketeconomyhas
apositiveeffectonEuropeanidentityinallcurrentEUmemberstatesexceptone
(Spain).
Thenextpredictor,welfarestate,yieldsinterestingresults.AlthoughtheEU
activelypromotesthewelfarestate,itseffectonEuropeanidentityisnegative.It
appearsthatEuropeansdonotrecognizetheEUandthewelfarestateascongruent
concepts.Instead,citizensseeEuropeanintegrationasathreattothenationalwelfare
stateandturntotheirnationalgovernmentstoprotectit(EichenbergandDalton,
2007).Table4showsthatsupportersofthewelfarestatearelesslikelytoidentifywith
theEU.Theeffect,however,issmallandappliesmoretocurrentandfuturemember
countriesthannon‐EUcountries.
39
Table5:Effectsofmicro‐levelpredictorsbycountry(bivariatecorrelations) Ed
ucation
Income
Worker
Man
ager
Market
Econ
omy
Welfare
State
Nationa
liden
tity
Dem
ocracy
Multi‐
culturalism
Postma‐
terialism
Cyprus + + + + + Finland + + + + + + Germany + + ‐ + + ‐ + + + Italy + + ‐ + + ‐ + + + +Poland + + + + ‐ + + + Slovenia + ‐ + + Spain + + NA NA + + + Sweden + + ‐ + + ‐ + + + ‐Bulgaria + + + ‐ + + + +Romania + + + ‐ + + + +Andorra + + + Georgia + + ‐ ‐ + + +Moldova + ‐ + + + +Norway + + ‐ + +Serbia + + + + + + + Switzerland NA NA + + + +Ukraine + + + + ‐ + + +
Source:WorldValuesSurvey2005‐2006.Note:Factorsincludedshowatleastborderlinesignificance(0.1).
InModel2,Iaddthefirstmacro‐levelfactor(levelofeconomicdevelopment)to
theindividual‐levelfactors.TheresultsinTable4showthattheeconomiccontexthasa
substantialimpactonEuropeanidentity.Thereisapositiverelationshipbetween
nationaleconomicdevelopmentandEuropeanidentity:higherlevelsofeconomic
developmentleadtohigherlevelsofEuropeanidentity.Thisconfirmsthetrend
detectedfromthebivariateanalysisaspresentedgraphicallyintheprevioussection
(Figure2)andprovidesfurtherevidenceforthethirdhypothesis(H3).
Insummary,economicfactorsbothatthemacroandmicro‐levelshape
Europeanidentity.Ontheindividuallevel,aperson’ssocio‐economicstatusandlevelof
humancapitalmatter:higherincomeandhighereducationfacilitateEuropeanidentity.
40
Thesefindingsprovideempiricalevidenceformyfirsthypothesis(H1).Inaddition,
attitudestowardsthewelfarestateandmarketeconomyhaveaneffectonEuropean
identity.Asexpected,supportofthewelfarestateleadstolowerlevelsofEuropean
identity.Proponentsofamarketeconomy,ontheotherhand,aremorelikelytoidentify
withtheEU(H2).Onthecountrylevel,ahighlydevelopednationaleconomyisa
predictorforEuropeanidentity(H3).Whiletheseresultsgenerallyconfirmthefirstsetof
hypothesesandtheutilitariantheoriesitisbasedon,theyalsoattestcross‐national
differences.ThefitisbetterforcurrentandfutureEUmemberstates.Noneofthe
economicfactorsisrelevantinSwitzerland,andincomeistheonlyfactorthatturnsout
statisticallysignificantforNorway.
Politicalfactors
Oftheindividual‐levelvariablesincludedinthemodels,nationalidentityisthe
strongestpredictorforEuropeanidentity(seeTable4).Inaccordancewithprevious
research,thepositiveeffectconfirmsthatEuropeanandnationalidentityare
compatible.Infact,peoplewithastrongattachmenttotheirnationaremorelikelythan
otherstoidentifywiththeEU.Thisrelationshipispositiveeverywhere,butthestrength
variesamongcountries.Onaverage,thecorrelationisstrongerformembercountries
(r=0.29)thanforcandidate(r=0.26)andnon‐membercountries(r=0.16).x
Aspointedoutearlier,moreimportantthanthestrengthisthedefinitionof
nationalidentityanditsrelationshiptoothergeographicalandpoliticalidentities.The
overalleffectofnationalidentityonEuropeanidentityispositive,becausemostpeople
41
haveaninclusiveunderstandingoftheirnationalattachment;only3.5percentofall
respondentsinthesamplereportanexclusivenationalidentity.Anexclusive
understandingofnationalidentityisanindicatorofEuroscepticismandnegatively
correlatedwithEuropeanidentity.Figure4illustratesthedifferenteffectsofinclusive
andexclusivenationalidentityonEuropeanidentitygraphically.xiThenegative
correlationcoefficient(r=‐0.16)indicatesthatanexclusivenationalidentityleadsto
lowerlevelsofEuropeanidentity.Anincreaseininclusivenationalidentity,ontheother
hand,leadstoanincreaseinEuropeanidentity—orviceversa(r=0.24).
Figure4:RelationshipbetweenexclusiveandinclusivenationalidentityandEuropeanidentity
Source:WorldValuesSurvey2005‐2006,V212andV213C.
42
TheEUactivelypromotesvalueslikedemocracyandculturaldiversity.Iexpecta
EuropeanidentitythatcanbeinterpretedaspoliticalsupportforaEuropeancommunity
toreflectthesevalues.Thus,mythirdhypothesissuggeststhatsupportforbothshould
bepositivelyrelatedtoEuropeanidentity.Table4confirmsthatthereisinfacta
positiverelationship.Supportfordemocraticprinciplesleadstohigherlevelsof
Europeanidentity.Likewise,peoplewhobelievethatculturalandethnicdiversity
enrichestheirlivesaremorelikelytoidentifywiththeEUthanothers.Ialsoexpect
postmaterialvaluestoleadtohigherlevelsofEuropeanidentity.Thispredictor,
however,isnotstatisticallysignificant.
Model3teststheeffectofdemocraticdevelopmentinadditiontotheindividual
factors.Itshowsthatthedomesticpoliticalcontexthasaconsiderableimpacton
Europeanidentity.TherelationshipbetweendemocraticdevelopmentandEuropean
identityispositive.Overall,countriesthatscorehighontheRuleofLawindexshow
higherlevelsofEuropeanidentitythancountrieswithlowerscores.Thisfinding
providesfurtherempiricalevidenceforthelasthypothesis(H6).
Iconcludefromthemultilevelanalysisthatpoliticalfactorsontheindividualand
thecountrylevelshapeEuropeanidentity.Ontheindividuallevel,nationalidentityhas
astrongpositiveeffectonEuropeanidentity.Whilethisfindinginitselfdoesnotprovide
sufficientevidencetosupportmyfourthhypothesisabouttherelationshipbetween
nationalandEuropeanidentity,additionalanalysisshowsthataninclusive
understandingofnationalidentityfacilitatestheformationofEuropeanidentity,while
exclusivenationalidentityisanobstacle(H4).Twooutofthreepredictorsofpolitical
43
attitudes—democracy,andculturaldiversity—havestatisticallysignificantpositive
effectsonEuropeanidentity.Postmaterialismistheonlyfactorthatshowsonly
borderlinesignificance.Thesefindingspresentempiricalevidenceformyhypothesis
thatpoliticalattitudesandvaluesmatterfortheformationofEuropeanidentity.
CitizenswhosupportthevaluespromotedbytheEuropeanUnionanditsinstitutions
aremorelikelytofeellikeapartoftheEUthanothers(H5).Onthecountry‐level,these
resultsconfirmthatdemocraticdevelopmentispositivelyrelatedtoEuropeanidentity
(H6).
44
CONCLUSION:WHOIDENTIFIESWITHEUROPE?
AtthebeginningofthispaperIformulatedthreeresearchquestionsthatIset
outtoanswer.First,afterfiftyyearsofEuropeanintegration,isaEuropeanidentity
formingamongthecitizensofEuropethatcanbeinterpretedaspublicsupportfor
Europeanintegration?Fortheanalysis,IhavefocusedonEuropeanidentityasacivicor
politicalidentity.BasedonworksbyDavidEaston(1965)andPippaNorris(1999)Iuse
EuropeanidentityasameasureofdiffusepoliticalsupportforEuropeanintegration.My
empiricalresultsshowthatthemajorityofEuropeancitizensfeelasenseofbelonging
totheEU.Interestingly,thisappliestocitizensofEUmemberstatesaswellasto
residentsofcandidatecountriesandnon‐members.Inregardstothefirstquestion,I
conclude,withtwothirdsoftheEuropeanpopulationidentifyingwiththeEU,thereisa
solidbaseofdiffusesupportforaEuropeancommunity.
However,asEaston(1965)pointsout,anindividualcanexpresssupport
independentlyforthepoliticalcommunity,thepoliticalregime,andthepolitical
authorities.Thus,wehavetobecarefulwithgeneralizationsandpredictions.Whilethe
availabledatadoesnotallowmetosystematicallytesttherelationshipbetween
supportforthepoliticalcommunity,theregimeandtheauthorities,itenablesmeto
testtherelationshipbetweenEuropeanidentityandconfidenceintheEU.xiiBothfactors
shouldbepositivelycorrelatedifEuropeanidentitywasanindicatorofsupportnotonly
foraEuropeancommunitybuttheEUandtheintegrationprocessingeneral.
45
Theresultsofthebivariateanalysisshowthatthereisinfactapositive
relationshipbetweenEuropeanidentityandconfidenceintheEU.Thus,anincreasein
EuropeanidentityleadstoanincreaseinconfidenceintheEU—orviceversa.The
relationshipismoderate(r=0.24)anddiffersinstrengthbetweenmembercountries
(r=0.32),candidatecountries(r=0.25)andnon‐members(r=0.19).xiiiIhavepreviously
arguedthatEuropeanidentityshouldnotpersebemistakenforsupportfortheEU.This
fairlyweakrelationshipunderpinsmyargument.
Second,ifEuropeansfeelanattachmenttotheEU,whatarethecharacteristics
ofthisEuropeanidentityandhowcanweexplaininter‐andintra‐countrydifferences?
Theresultsofthemultilevelanalysisconfirmthateconomicandpoliticalfactorsonthe
macroandmicro‐leveldeterminewhetherornotindividualsdevelopasenseof
Europeanidentity.NationallevelsofEuropeanidentityincreasewithacountry’s
economicanddemocraticdevelopment.EconomicfactorsthatfacilitateEuropean
identityontheindividuallevelarehigherincome,highereducationandsupportfora
marketeconomy.PoliticalfactorsthatarepositivelycorrelatedwithEuropeanidentity
aredemocracyandculturaldiversity.WithregardtoEuropeanidentityvis‐à‐visnational
identity,theresultsverifythatformostpeople,nationalandEuropeanidentityare
compatible.Thus,thiscivicorpoliticalEuropeanidentityreflectsthevaluespromoted
bytheEuropeanUnionanditsinstitutions.
Third,aretheresystematicdifferencesinthestrengthandnatureofEuropean
identitybetweenEUcitizensandresidentsofnon‐EUcountries?Thestrengthof
attachmenttotheEUdoesnotdiffersystematicallybetweenEUcitizensandresidents
46
ofothernon‐EUcountries.Nevertheless,therearesomeinterestingcross‐national
differences.Althoughmyresultsconfirmtheimportanceofbotheconomicandpolitical
factors,economicfactorsaremorerelevantinEUmemberstatesandcandidate
countriesthaninnon‐membercountries.InNorwayandSwitzerlandeconomicmotives
arepracticallyirrelevant.Forpoliticalfactorsthedifferencesarelessclear‐cut.
WhatdotheseresultstellusabouttheEUanditsfuture?Europeansdoidentify
withtheEUandexpressasenseofbelongingtoaEuropeancommunity.More
importantly,notonlypeoplelivinginEUmemberstatesfeelthatway,alsopeople
outsideoftheEUseethemselvesaspartoftheEU.ThatmeansEuropeanintegration
affectsEuropeasawhole,notjustitsmembers.Putdifferently,Europeanintegration
hasspreadbeyondthebordersoftheEU.Theempiricalresultsderivedfromthe
multilevelanalysisareareflectionofthecomplicatedstructureofEuropeanintegration
andsupporttheclaimthatatleastonthemacro‐level,theidentity‐buildingmeasuresof
theEUhavebeensuccessful,asEurope“increasinglydenotesthepoliticalandsocial
spaceoccupiedbytheEU”(Risse,2004,255;Laffan,2004).
Furthermore,thissenseofEuropeanidentityisnotlimitedtoelites;thepublic
alsoidentifieswiththeEUasitmoreandmorenoticestheconsequencesofeconomic,
political,andsocialintegration.Asaresult,Europeancitizenshavebecomemorealert
andcriticaltowardscertainpoliciesrelatedtoEuropeanintegrationandincreasingly
expressthiscriticism.TouseHoogheandMarksformulation,publicopinionon
Europeanintegrationhasshiftedfroma“permissiveconsensus”toa“constraining
dissensus”(HoogheandMarks,2005,2008;EichenbergandDalton,2007).This,
47
however,doesnotnecessarilymeanthatEuropeancitizensarenotsupportiveof
Europeanintegration;theyjustwishtohaveasayinmattersofEuropeanUnionpolitics.
ThisdevelopmentmaybeinterpretedasanindicationthattheEUisbecomingmore
democratic.
IbelievemyanalysisbringsaboutnewandinterestinginsightsaboutEuropean
identityamongoldandnewmembers,futuremembersandnon‐members.
Nonetheless,Ileaveanumberofquestionsunanswered.Europeanidentityisacomplex
issueandIconcentrateonlyonthecivicorpoliticalcomponentofit.Yet,European
identityalsohasaculturalcomponentthatmayverywellinteractwiththecivic
component.Myanalysis,however,doesnotrevealanythingaboutthecharacteristicsof
theculturalpart.Furthermore,mymodelcanonlyexplainpartoftheinter‐andintra‐
nationalvariance.Thus,futureresearchshouldincludeadditionalpredictorstoexplain
Europeanidentity.Myanalysisisalsolimitedto17Europeancountries.Theinclusionof
additionalcountriesmightleadtobetterandmoresignificantresults.Atimeseries
analysiswouldbebetterabletodocumentchangesanddevelopmentovertime.
48
APPENDICES
AppendixA:Listofvariables
Dependentvariable
Europeanidentity:“Peoplehavedifferentviewsaboutthemselvesandhowtheyrelatetotheworld.Wouldyoutellmehowstronglyyouagreeordisagreewitheachofthefollowingstatementsabouthowyouseeyourself?”Iseemyselfaspartofthe[EuropeanUnion].Thevariablerunsfrom‐2(“Stronglydisagree”)to2(“Stronglyagree”).Source:WVS2005‐2006,V213C.
Independentvariables:Country‐levelfactors
Economicdevelopment(GDP/PPP):GDPpercapitaatpurchasingpowerparity(constantUSD).Forthecountriesincludedintheanalysis,itrunsfrom1,470forMoldovato36,600forNorway.Source:QualityofGovernmentcross‐sectiondata(version17June2009),UNDP–HumanDevelopmentReport(undp_gdp).Politicaldevelopment(Ruleoflaw):TheWorldBank’s“RuleofLaw–Estimate”includesseveralindicators,measurethesuccessofasocietyindevelopinganenvironmentinwhichfairandpredictablerulesformthebasisforeconomicandsocialinteractionsandtheextenttowhichpropertyrightsareprotected.TheWorldBank’s“ruleoflaw”indexisastandardizedcontinuousvariablewithatheoreticalmeanof0.Forthecountriesincludedintheanalysis,itrunsfrom‐1.24forGeorgiato1.94forSwitzerland.Source:QualityofGovernmentcross‐sectiondata(version17June2009),WorldBankRuleofLaw–Estimate(wbgi_rle).
Independentvariables:Individual‐levelfactors
Education:Thevariablemeasuresagewhencompletedfull‐timeeducationona6‐pointscale.Source:WVS2005‐2006,V239.Income:Measuredona10‐pointscale:1=“Lowestdecile”to10=“highestdecile”.Source:WVS2005‐2006,V263.
49
Worker:Dummyvariable:1=worker(Agriculturalworker,Unskilledmanualworker,Skilledmanualworker,Semi‐skilledmanualworker),0=otherprofession.Source:WVS2005‐2006,V242.Manager:Dummyvariable:1=managerorprofessional(Employer/managerofestablishmentwith10ormoreemployees,Employer/managerofestablishmentwithlessthan10employees,Professionalworkerlawyer,accountant,teacheretc.),0=otherprofession.Source:WVS2005‐2006,V242.Marketeconomy:Indexvariablecombiningquestionsaboutprivatizationandcompetition.20‐pointscalerangingfrom0=“Governmentownershipofbusinessandindustryshouldbeincreased/Competitionisharmful.Itbringsouttheworstinpeople”to20=“Privateownershipofbusinessandindustryshouldbeincreased/Competitionisgood.Itstimulatespeopletoworkhardanddevelopnewideas.”Source:WVS2005‐2006,V117andV119.Welfarestate:Variablemeasuringanindividual’sattitudetowardsthewelfarestate.10‐pointscalerangingfrom1=“Peopleshouldtakemoreresponsibilitytoprovideforthemselves”to10=“Thegovernmentshouldtakemoreresponsibilitytoensurethateveryoneisprovidedfor.”Source:WVS2005‐2006,V118.Nationalidentity:“Peoplehavedifferentviewsaboutthemselvesandhowtheyrelatetotheworld.Wouldyoutellmehowstronglyyouagreeordisagreewitheachofthefollowingstatementsabouthowyouseeyourself?Iseemyselfaspartofthe[country]nation.”Source:WVS2005‐2006,V212.Democracy:Variablemeasuringanindividual’sattitudetowardsdemocraticprinciples.12‐pointscalerangingfrom1=democracyisverybad/notatallimportantto12=democracyisverygood/absolutelyimportant.Source:WVS2005‐2006,V151andV162.Multiculturalism:“Withwhichofthefollowingviewsdoyouagree?”“Ethnicdiversityerodesacountry’sunity–Ethnicdiversityenricheslife”.10‐pointscale.Source:WVS2005‐2006,V221.Postmaterialism:Measurespostmaterialvalueorientationsona6‐pointscale,rangingfromMaterialist(1)toPostmaterialist(6).Source:WVS2005‐2006,Y001.
50
AppendixB:Additionaltables
Table6:Bivariatecorrelations:educationandEuropeanidentity,cross‐nationaldifferences
EUmembers Candidatecountries
OtherEuropeancountries
Cyprus 0.14** Bulgaria 0.12** Andorra ‐‐Finland 0.12** Romania 0.08** Georgia 0.07*Germany 0.14** Moldova 0.10**Italy 0.13** Norway ‐‐Poland 0.12* Serbia 0.12**Slovenia ‐‐ Switzerland ‐‐Spain 0.09** Ukraine 0.11**Sweden 0.06.
Source:WorldValuesSurvey2005‐2006.
Table7:Bivariatecorrelations:incomeandEuropeanidentity,cross‐nationaldifferences
EUmembers Candidatecountries
OtherEuropeancountries
Cyprus 0.22** Bulgaria 0.15** Andorra ‐‐Finland 0.13** Romania 0.08** Georgia 0.15**Germany 0.14** Moldova ‐‐Italy 0.17** Norway 0.08*Poland 0.07. Serbia 0.14**Slovenia ‐‐ Switzerland ‐‐Spain 0.17** Ukraine 0.28**Sweden 0.09*
Source:WorldValuesSurvey2005‐2006.
Table8:Bivariatecorrelations:profession(worker)andEuropeanidentity,cross‐nationaldifferences
EUmembers Candidatecountries
OtherEuropeancountries
Cyprus 0.06* Bulgaria ‐‐ Andorra ‐‐Finland ‐‐ Romania ‐‐ Georgia ‐0.07*Germany ‐0.07** Moldova ‐0.10**Italy ‐0.06. Norway ‐‐Poland 0.08** Serbia ‐‐Slovenia ‐‐ Switzerland ‐‐Spain ‐‐ Ukraine ‐‐Sweden ‐0.16**
Source:WorldValuesSurvey2005‐2006.
51
Table9:Bivariatecorrelations:profession(manager)andEuropeanidentity,cross‐nationaldifferences
EUmembers Candidatecountries
OtherEuropeancountries
Cyprus ‐‐ Bulgaria ‐‐ Andorra ‐‐Finland 0.08* Romania ‐‐ Georgia ‐‐Germany 0.08** Moldova 0.09**Italy 0.12** Norway 0.09**Poland ‐‐ Serbia 0.08**Slovenia ‐‐ Switzerland ‐‐Spain ‐‐ Ukraine 0.07*Sweden 0.13**
Source:WorldValuesSurvey2005‐2006.
Table10:Bivariatecorrelations:marketeconomyandEuropeanidentity,cross‐nationaldifferences
EUmembers Candidatecountries
OtherEuropeancountries
Cyprus 0.06. Bulgaria 0.10** Andorra 0.12**Finland 0.09** Romania 0.12** Georgia ‐‐Germany 0.10** Moldova ‐‐Italy 0.09** Norway ‐‐Poland 0.08* Serbia 0.21**Slovenia 0.13** Switzerland ‐‐Spain ‐‐ Ukraine 0.16**Sweden 0.22**
Source:WorldValuesSurvey2005‐2006.
Table11:Bivariatecorrelations:welfarestateandEuropeanidentity,cross‐nationaldifferences
EUmembers Candidatecountries
OtherEuropeancountries
Cyprus ‐‐ Bulgaria ‐0.08* Andorra ‐‐Finland ‐‐ Romania ‐0.09** Georgia ‐0.09**Germany ‐0.06* Moldova ‐‐Italy ‐0.10** Norway ‐0.06.Poland ‐0.14** Serbia ‐‐Slovenia ‐0.12** Switzerland ‐‐Spain ‐‐ Ukraine ‐0.16**Sweden ‐0.11**
Source:WorldValuesSurvey2005‐2006.
52
Table12:Cross‐nationaldifferencesinnationalidentity
EUmembers
% Strength Candidatecountries
% Strength OtherEuropeancountries
% Strength
Cyprus 95.7 1.51 Bulgaria 91.4 1.35 Andorra 85.2 0.91Finland 98.8 1.71 Romania 91.5 1.32 Georgia 99.5 1.80Germany 84.4 1.03 Moldova 96.6 1.45Italy 93.2 1.34 Norway 98.2 1.72Poland 98.4 1.54 Serbia 90.4 1.27Slovenia 95.9 1.35 Switzerland 89.3 1.41Spain 96.1 1.41 Ukraine 92.6 1.37Sweden 99.0 1.44 Mean 94.0 1.38 91.5 1.33 93.3 1.40
Source:WorldValuesSurvey2005‐2006.
Table13:Cross‐nationaldifferencesinexclusivenationalidentity
EUmembers Candidatecountries
OtherEuropeancountries
Cyprus 2.7 Bulgaria 7.6 Andorra 0.8Finland 2.0 Romania 5.4 Georgia 2.1Germany 4.4 Moldova 1.3Italy 2.8 Norway 0.4Poland 2.1 Serbia 3.4Slovenia 2.0 Switzerland 1.9Spain 2.5 Ukraine 16.6Sweden 0.7 Mean 2.6 6.2 3.6
Source:WorldValuesSurvey2005‐2006.
Table14:Bivariatecorrelations:nationalandEuropeanidentity,cross‐nationaldifferences
EUmembers Candidatecountries
OtherEuropeancountries
Cyprus 0.13** Bulgaria 0.30** Andorra 0.22**Finland 0.18** Romania 0.23** Georgia 0.07**Germany 0.26* Moldova 0.19**Italy 0.33** Norway 0.25**Poland 0.24** Serbia 0.21**Slovenia 0.35** Switzerland 0.22**Spain 0.20** Ukraine 0.17**Sweden 0.18**
Source:WorldValuesSurvey2005‐2006.
53
Table15:Bivariatecorrelations:democracyandEuropeanidentity,cross‐nationaldifferences
EUmembers Candidatecountries
OtherEuropeancountries
Cyprus ‐‐ Bulgaria 0.11** Andorra 0.06.Finland ‐‐ Romania 0.16** Georgia 0.12**Germany 0.13** Moldova 0.23**Italy 0.22** Norway ‐‐Poland 0.14** Serbia 0.15**Slovenia 0.19** Switzerland 0.14**Spain 0.12** Ukraine 0.08*Sweden 0.09**
Source:WorldValuesSurvey2005‐2006.
Table16:Bivariatecorrelations:ethnicdiversityandEuropeanidentity,cross‐nationaldifferences
EUmembers Candidatecountries
OtherEuropeancountries
Cyprus ‐‐ Bulgaria 0.10** Andorra ‐‐Finland 0.18** Romania 0.18** Georgia ‐‐Germany 0.23** Moldova ‐‐Italy 0.21** Norway ‐‐Poland 0.10** Serbia 0.11**Slovenia ‐‐ Switzerland 0.24**Spain 0.08* Ukraine ‐‐Sweden 0.15**
Source:WorldValuesSurvey2005‐2006.
Table17:Bivariatecorrelations:postmaterialismandEuropeanidentity,cross‐nationaldifferences
EUmembers Candidatecountries
OtherEuropeancountries
Cyprus ‐‐ Bulgaria 0.08* Andorra ‐‐Finland ‐‐ Romania 0.08** Georgia 0.12**Germany ‐‐ Moldova 0.09**Italy 0.11** Norway 0.06.Poland ‐‐ Serbia ‐‐Slovenia ‐‐ Switzerland 0.12**Spain ‐‐ Ukraine 0.09**Sweden ‐0.11**
Source:WorldValuesSurvey2005‐2006.
54
Table18:Bivariatecorrelations:confidenceinEUandEuropeanidentity,cross‐nationaldifferences
EUmembers Candidatecountries
OtherEuropeancountries
Cyprus 0.23** Bulgaria 0.24** Andorra 0.27**Finland 0.34** Romania 0.25** Georgia 0.16**Germany 0.35** Moldova 0.18**Italy 0.35** Norway 0.13**Poland 0.26** Serbia 0.18**Slovenia 0.22** Switzerland 0.37**Spain 0.18** Ukraine 0.40**Sweden 0.47**
Source:WorldValuesSurvey2005‐2006.
55
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NOTES
iMyanalysisisasnapshotofEuropeanidentityin2005asitislimitedtoonepointintime.Atime‐seriesanalysisincludingseveraltimepointswouldbethesuitableinstrumenttosystematicallystudyhowEuropeanidentityhaschangedovertime,thatis,sincethebeginningoftheintegrationprocess.Unfortunately,thedataforthiskindofanalysisisonlyavailablefor“old”EUmembercountries.Eurobarometersurveys,theEuropeanValuesStudyandtheWorldValuesSurveyhavejuststartedtoaskquestionsaboutEuropeanidentityinformerEasternbloccountriesandothercountriesoutsideoftheEU.Thus,atime‐seriesanalysis,whichcapturestheidentityformationprocessandchangesovertime,willbefeasibleoncethesenewdatasetsaremadeavailable.iiThemostcommonlyusedquestiontomeasureEuropeanidentityisfromEurobarometersurveys:From1982to1992thequestionasked:“Doyoueverthinkofyourselfnotonlyas(a)French/German(citizen)butalsoasEuropean(citizenofEurope)?”From1992to1999thequestionasked:“Inthenearfuturedoyouseeyourselfas…?1(Nationality)only,2(Nationality)andEuropean,3Europeanand(Nationality),4Europeanonly,5DK.”AsecondseriesofEurobarometerquestionsaskspeopleabouttheirattachmenttotheirtown,region,country,andEuropewithoutforcingthemtoprioritizeorordertheiridentities.However,theyaskaboutEuropeingeneralanddonotdistinguishbetweenEuropeandtheEU.iiiInascholarlycontextseeforexampleAnderson(1998).ivForadetailedaccountofhowtheEuroaffectsEuropeanidentityseeRisse(2003).vProfessionisnotincludedinthemulti‐levelmodelsincetheinformationismissingforrespondentsinSpainandSwitzerland.Ionlytestthisrelationshipfortheothercountriesbasedonbivariatecorrelationanalysis.viOnlyeffectswithatleastborderlinesignificance(0.1level)areshowninthetable.viiForcross‐nationalvariationofeconomicfactorsseeTable5andTables6–11intheAppendix.viiiInordertotestwhetherworkersarelesslikelytoidentifywiththeEUthanmanagersandprofessionalsIcreatedtwodummyvariables.Thevariablesarenotincludedinthemulti‐levelanalysisbecausedataforSpainandSwitzerlandaremissingfromthedataset.ixPearsoncorrelationsbetweenincomeandwelfarestate:r=‐0.19;incomeandmarketeconomy:r=0.14);educationandwelfarestate:r=‐0.11;educationandmarketeconomy:r=0.09.xForcross‐nationaldifferencesofpoliticalfactorsseeTable5andTables12–17intheAppendix.xiThecorrelationbetweennationalandEuropeanidentityissomewhatdifficultbecauseendogenous.xiiOverall,47.6percentoftherespondentsinthesamplesaytheyhave“quitealot”(40.6percent)or“agreatdeal”(7percent)ofconfidenceintheEU.38percenthave“notverymuch”confidenceand14.4percent“noneatall.”Perhapssurprisingly,onaverage,confidenceintheEU(1.4)ishigherthaninnationalgovernment(1.22)ornationalparliament(1.15).xiiiForadetailedlistandcross‐nationaldifferencesbycountryseeTable18intheAppendix.