Richard Nixon Presidential LibraryWhite House Special Files CollectionFolder List

Box Number Folder Number Document Date Document Type Document Description

32 25 10061968 Memo From Dick McCormack re LBJ Peace moves 1pg

32 25 090919 Memo From McCormack to RV Allen draft copy of Biafra Statement concerning Nigerias civil war 1pg

32 25 10021968 Memo From Agnes Waldron to PJM Buchanan cc GreenspanAllen re Administration Actions to Influence the 1966 Election 2 pgs

32 25 093019 Memo From McCormack to Buchanan proposed statement by Nixon in respect to Vice President Humphreys bomb stop proposal 2 pgs

32 25 090819 Memo From McCormack to Richard Allen re Vietnam Status Inquiries in Washington 4 pgs

32 25 110219 Memo From McCormack to Ray Price re AAs Proposed Task Force 2 pgs

Tuesday August 05 2008 Page 1 of 2

Box Number Folder Number Document Date Document Type Document Description

32 25 110219 Memo From McCormack to Price re Vietnam Task Force for the Transition Period 4 pgs

Tuesday August 05 2008 Page 2 of 2

Octaber 6 1968

MEMO FROM nICK McCORMACK

BE JOHNSON PEACE MOVES

Reports from Pars i~1dicQc tho t Harrirtm 31d Vance are privately Inforaing tha press trt troy favor a speedy bombing pause

Other reports fron UshirctOtliI includng JSlCS Reston 1 s collhlil in todaymiddot s Sunday Times) SUCco3t that SCCTetaxJ of Defense ClIfford favors such a paunc

Valce has just retucod from Paris reportedly to recomshymend this course of act1c~ to LBJ

Laaks from such ildividu13 llh not likely rlitout Presidential blcGslng Quite flOB llly prc1Uudc en rno~1ceshyment frcr Johnson that he 1Iiill go one stop farther in lt~1ch for peace

I think that this is quie likely and tr~t to occur very soon probably withLn s2-e context of a CclYpeheniv0 progress report on Vietnam to the people

Probably the benbing poitzc offer 11111 be cOl~~d a threat to resume bonJJing over ell rorth Vietl1 1 _u

no p~ogrcss in Par1s 1litl1in a (rtLl1 tir~JI or if the 7oth Vletnanese talcc adlcntaee of tr~ hal t to lEtmc~middot rew LlCmiddot CtS in or around the DHZ cch nay a1eo crlOms another peace search rr trip to SOU1 Asia Eugone and the Secretary of the HDVmiddotJl~ SC)t-t but purallel jcmiddot to tr-Lis area may have been for the PUlPC38 of setting tri1go 1)

Box Number Folder Number Document Date Document Type Document Description

32 25 110219 Memo From McCormack to Price re Vietnam Task Force for the Transition Period 4 pgs

Tuesday August 05 2008 Page 2 of 2

Octaber 6 1968

MEMO FROM nICK McCORMACK

BE JOHNSON PEACE MOVES

Reports from Pars i~1dicQc tho t Harrirtm 31d Vance are privately Inforaing tha press trt troy favor a speedy bombing pause

Other reports fron UshirctOtliI includng JSlCS Reston 1 s collhlil in todaymiddot s Sunday Times) SUCco3t that SCCTetaxJ of Defense ClIfford favors such a paunc

Valce has just retucod from Paris reportedly to recomshymend this course of act1c~ to LBJ

Laaks from such ildividu13 llh not likely rlitout Presidential blcGslng Quite flOB llly prc1Uudc en rno~1ceshyment frcr Johnson that he 1Iiill go one stop farther in lt~1ch for peace

I think that this is quie likely and tr~t to occur very soon probably withLn s2-e context of a CclYpeheniv0 progress report on Vietnam to the people

Probably the benbing poitzc offer 11111 be cOl~~d a threat to resume bonJJing over ell rorth Vietl1 1 _u

no p~ogrcss in Par1s 1litl1in a (rtLl1 tir~JI or if the 7oth Vletnanese talcc adlcntaee of tr~ hal t to lEtmc~middot rew LlCmiddot CtS in or around the DHZ cch nay a1eo crlOms another peace search rr trip to SOU1 Asia Eugone and the Secretary of the HDVmiddotJl~ SC)t-t but purallel jcmiddot to tr-Lis area may have been for the PUlPC38 of setting tri1go 1)

Octaber 6 1968

MEMO FROM nICK McCORMACK

BE JOHNSON PEACE MOVES

Reports from Pars i~1dicQc tho t Harrirtm 31d Vance are privately Inforaing tha press trt troy favor a speedy bombing pause

Other reports fron UshirctOtliI includng JSlCS Reston 1 s collhlil in todaymiddot s Sunday Times) SUCco3t that SCCTetaxJ of Defense ClIfford favors such a paunc

Valce has just retucod from Paris reportedly to recomshymend this course of act1c~ to LBJ

Laaks from such ildividu13 llh not likely rlitout Presidential blcGslng Quite flOB llly prc1Uudc en rno~1ceshyment frcr Johnson that he 1Iiill go one stop farther in lt~1ch for peace

I think that this is quie likely and tr~t to occur very soon probably withLn s2-e context of a CclYpeheniv0 progress report on Vietnam to the people

Probably the benbing poitzc offer 11111 be cOl~~d a threat to resume bonJJing over ell rorth Vietl1 1 _u

no p~ogrcss in Par1s 1litl1in a (rtLl1 tir~JI or if the 7oth Vletnanese talcc adlcntaee of tr~ hal t to lEtmc~middot rew LlCmiddot CtS in or around the DHZ cch nay a1eo crlOms another peace search rr trip to SOU1 Asia Eugone and the Secretary of the HDVmiddotJl~ SC)t-t but purallel jcmiddot to tr-Lis area may have been for the PUlPC38 of setting tri1go 1)

BIAFRA STATElf1ENpound

During the past few weeks we have witnesoed Nigerias civil

war assume ever more tragic proportions Biafran fears of atrocishy

ties and genocide and Central Government obsession with total

victory have brought efforts to extend meaningful assistance to the

thousands of Ibo children starving daily to a complete standstill

The Red Cross and other concerned relief agencies have rushed

mountains of baby ~ood and other protein rich nourishments to the

borders of beleaguered Biafra where it rotsmiddot while 6000 100 youngshy-sters perish every day with thousands more children sufferiLg pe~-

manent physical and mental impairmen~bull

On Monday Sept 9 the Organization of African Unity will mee v

_ ___in exe~utive session in Algiers to try once again to search for r

African solution to this catas~rophy They will try to succeed at

what Biafran and Central Government negotiations in Addis Ababa have

failed for months to accomplish a humane and just compromise Tnus

far this senseless delay has cost the lives of hundreds of thousands

of Ibo children Humanity can tolerate no further delay

at the expense of these innocents

The time for token gesmiddottures platitudes and other meaningless

declarations of concern and regret is long past Conscience dem~ds

that our Government bring immediate and direct pressure upon both

Biafra and the Central Government to permit the distri~ution of I

relief food to thse now needlessly dying in the agony of starvation ~

Our own vast airlift capacity can greatly contribute to tmiddot~z task 1shyj1l1tJy 1Iv 71a VoftItfTJ)YlY i~)ltJ( 7i1J~ ol Pt-J-middot ~ilt _

Such an act by our Government might well break the presc~t

diplomatic log jam and create the atmosphere for ~eneral comproshy

mise settlement bull

~imiddotlO TO P J H Buchanan October 2 1968

FROH Agnes 1aldron cc GreenspanAlleu

RE Administratlon Actions to Influence the 1266 Election

The follmving rna terial was prepared by Dick HcCormack bull

1 August 11 President ToM[loll sssie~lJd H~7llrn~ to CltJCCO t~1 Eu1d all Signs of peaceful intentions by Hanoi no matter hogt fairt

2 August 24 JO~1son endorsed proposals for an all Asianconfe~shyence to settle the Vietnam war but cautions that lIye do rct Hant to make it appear that we are trying to direct it 0 force it1I

3 Sept 5 Johnson saidmiddotthat a us troov vithdravTal from South Vietnam is dependant upon a pufl-out of Communist forces

If Sept 11 South Vietnam voters (808 of those eligible) electGd a 117 member constituent assembly to draft a nev constiutiol ard pave the way for restoration of civilian rule in 1967

Sept 14 Encouraged by hat he called a vote of cCirfidece il

fom the people of South Vietnam~ resident JO~1son haiLEQ ccay the real progress and grmling momentuo in that nation IS eccshynomic and social rehabilitation Jor~~son also made public ~~ 18000 word report by Robert Komer reviewing the accoillplis~ent in non-military programs run Jointly by the US ard S Vietnaese

o Sept 22 Ambassador Goldberg stated that the US will halt

the bombing of North Vietnam when it received assurances privately or otherwise that Hanoi ouldrespcnd by a reduction of its wa effort The US would then be prepared to participate in a r4utual rlithdrawal of military Qrces u-lder internationalmiddot surervisicnbull

middot7 Sept 27 President Johnson anrJoU1ced that he had accepted themiddot invitation of President Marcosmiddot of thePhilippines to attend a heads of government conference in Manila to discuss the VieGnam conflict

8 October 4 Official leaks reported that French Foreign Minister Couve de Murville had told President Jornson that Korth Vie-vra

no longermiddot believes it can achieve a D~litary victory but that 1 t as not yet in a mood for negotiations) (Probably came from a State Dept backgrounder) l

9 October 3 Johnson ruled out ending the bombing of Xortt V~e~n~ wi trout an indication that Hanoi will in turn deesca~ ts military activities in South Vietnau

i

10 October 6 Jo~~son left for a l7-day tr1p to the Fa~ E3stmiddot~0 ~~~f 7 - - inclUde attendirg the middot1-1anila Conference~ Also vis~ed ~ ec_~L

r- -) Australia Tha11w1dKorea Malasia and South Vic ise 1 f

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~imiddotlO TO P J H Buchanan October 2 1968

FROH Agnes 1aldron cc GreenspanAlleu

RE Administratlon Actions to Influence the 1266 Election

The follmving rna terial was prepared by Dick HcCormack bull

1 August 11 President ToM[loll sssie~lJd H~7llrn~ to CltJCCO t~1 Eu1d all Signs of peaceful intentions by Hanoi no matter hogt fairt

2 August 24 JO~1son endorsed proposals for an all Asianconfe~shyence to settle the Vietnam war but cautions that lIye do rct Hant to make it appear that we are trying to direct it 0 force it1I

3 Sept 5 Johnson saidmiddotthat a us troov vithdravTal from South Vietnam is dependant upon a pufl-out of Communist forces

If Sept 11 South Vietnam voters (808 of those eligible) electGd a 117 member constituent assembly to draft a nev constiutiol ard pave the way for restoration of civilian rule in 1967

Sept 14 Encouraged by hat he called a vote of cCirfidece il

fom the people of South Vietnam~ resident JO~1son haiLEQ ccay the real progress and grmling momentuo in that nation IS eccshynomic and social rehabilitation Jor~~son also made public ~~ 18000 word report by Robert Komer reviewing the accoillplis~ent in non-military programs run Jointly by the US ard S Vietnaese

o Sept 22 Ambassador Goldberg stated that the US will halt

the bombing of North Vietnam when it received assurances privately or otherwise that Hanoi ouldrespcnd by a reduction of its wa effort The US would then be prepared to participate in a r4utual rlithdrawal of military Qrces u-lder internationalmiddot surervisicnbull

middot7 Sept 27 President Johnson anrJoU1ced that he had accepted themiddot invitation of President Marcosmiddot of thePhilippines to attend a heads of government conference in Manila to discuss the VieGnam conflict

8 October 4 Official leaks reported that French Foreign Minister Couve de Murville had told President Jornson that Korth Vie-vra

no longermiddot believes it can achieve a D~litary victory but that 1 t as not yet in a mood for negotiations) (Probably came from a State Dept backgrounder) l

9 October 3 Johnson ruled out ending the bombing of Xortt V~e~n~ wi trout an indication that Hanoi will in turn deesca~ ts military activities in South Vietnau

i

10 October 6 Jo~~son left for a l7-day tr1p to the Fa~ E3stmiddot~0 ~~~f 7 - - inclUde attendirg the middot1-1anila Conference~ Also vis~ed ~ ec_~L

r- -) Australia Tha11w1dKorea Malasia and South Vic ise 1 f

j bullbull ( J ~bull~ - ~ ~ ~

~

bull 4 ~

-2shy

visit to Cam Ranh Bay IlHi th700 correspondents crrc-iclir the mutual back-scratching vIi th Asian politicians tre finr-yhoned joint commu1iques the not so secret rbacLerour~d b-efshyings 1

I

there can be no doubt that Jon1S0n vill dominatE tre American headlines for two weeks 11 (Carl Rovran 101966)

In the background briefings the IIpeace search aspect of the JOMson journey received heavy emphasisIIBut one official accompanying the President noted that lot truch time was available for plunliing tho mission or for id~ntifying the areas where real movement is 1ike1y1I (Star 111966)

11 October 18 IIJohnson Sees Asia at ITurning Point bullbullbullVoices Confidence at First Stop of 17-Day Tour of the Far Eastll OiY)Jorillson speech reasserted the United States pledge of militaryaid to the area II as long as dangel threatens II bull But it_ (hisspeech) renounced again all interest in special statusprivi16geterritory or perpetual base rights It looked ahead to the cay

___middotThen Asia1s vauld provide more and more for their otm defense 1 shy

(101866) 11IT Speech pfferedolive bra1cn to com~unist China -

12 October 26 Johnson pledges troops at~Cam Ra1h Bay He sr a never let you dovm nor your fighting comrades nor the 15 million people of South Vietnam nor the hu1dreds of mil~cns of Asians ho are counting on us to show here - here in Soutr middot Vietnam that aggression doesntt pay and that aggression cant succeed 1I

At the Manila Conference itself the co~~~~ique mentioned that liThe Government of Vietnam described the significant militay progress being made against aggression II

Both Ky and Vlestmore1and made optimistic hutlanitarian speechesabout progress in Vietnam

13 November 5 Secretary McNamara flevl to the Texas v1hite HOise to arillounce a dramatic reduction in draft calls three daysbefore the e16ctioni Thi~ in fact ~ook place In Octobcr~ 49000 men were drafted in November 37600 December 12100 McNamara also annott1ced that the nuuoer ofmiddot troops in VietnaJ would continue to gro~ at a lower rate tharamp in 1966

~

~ 1 ~ l

FliRT-ER AI1PLIFICATION ON ATY OF THESE ~POIlTS CJJ BE PaOVIDED WITHIN A FEW HOURS ~l 1 __r _ bull

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TO (cIT 3UC-PNI~N

FlO~middot 01 Cl ~ICCO~1jgtlC(

EOOSED ST~TEErJT BY NI XON 0[] middotriElEi~Y S BC~m STOP ~~_Pf]SL

I j D2ZLY S DDENSD TON I GET TO LEfIN OF VI CE PEES I mT cnDjH~S t S WILLI~GNESS TO T~ADE YOUNG AMERICAN LIVESIN VIETNAM IN SW~~ FOR A E~ CREA~ POLITICAL POINTS

~~~OtJLD TEr1l 7EE ~(11~N I~JHAt~OI TO r)~G T-rIS JAR O~~J ~ ~-v bull - ~ ~ _-shy

TO GET A SETTE DpoundpL OUT OF N2 Jfgt J f 1 TODAY T3Y ~NNOU~GI ~G THET HE ~WULD STOP TEE gOf1BEG C

VIET1c~ I HE IS ELECTED ~1p H~j[PtmEY IS DOInG EXACLY ~f-UT I

W~ bull ~LE1)clD HS lOULD NOT DO Hi is CJ(middotPLET2LYClJTTING THE (3OG~)

cJUSDE~Q(LS~TE OiLgt EGOTI6TORS IN Pcmiddot~IS

r~OR 110NTES NOtmiddot JUR NEGGTIATO1S HAVE O~middotmiddotEgtE1) TO STOP T~~ ZJ_~lt _cj IJ~TE JIET~IA~middot~ ~ IF HAlJO lJOtjLD OFEi~ S0~~~ =ECI1JRf)CAL DES~C~-~A -~- s~12

INDICPTION THAT THE LEVEL Or- r~middotrTI~G rrmiddotst)trtH iJIETAmiddotj SUIi) I~

REDUCED TJ-JiS THE NOETH VUTlY2SE lVE COJSISTEgtmiddotjTLYEEJD - T ~F HiRmiddotPHEY IS AHARE THAT ~ -14Jpound ~L~E4DY USPENED T~E DO I

OF l02T~ VI-Ti-JMj EIGHT TIMES OlCE FO t-cmE TEC FIVE 7nE-~ 0 ~ J T-ESE Bor13ItG PAtJSES BAS BF-~OUGr1T ijE~CE iSJE~D Et~C-i -~s 3pound_~ -0IH--I 3yen THE NO~TH VI ETNAi1ESC TO RUSH TRCK THUCK LOADS OF TROOPS 10middot)0 pmiddotr -- ~ TO THE BORDERS OF SOUTH VI ETNMi

ON trARCH 3L THE PRESIDpoundNT LlyjQ~(-ED A 30~1~E~GSUSPE~lSI(j~ (jh~shy

MORE THAN 75 5 OF NORTH VIETX~Mts TERRIROTIYHANOIS O~LY R~CTQ TO THIS HASBEEN TO DOUBLE THE RAT= 07 SGLIES AND WAR XA7E~IPL a~I~~

~VfIN T~~OUGH THE ~TOF RPIHONG ANn TO STE THEIR ATACY~S -

TERRa I S[j 11 TH SOUTH OR SOmiddotjE TIIvJE IO NORTH VIETif-1 rIPS ATEiPiED TD ~1tSS smiddotu-

TROOPS AND AMMUNITON ACROSS THE DEMILITARIZED ZONE ~0 LAUNCE A ~~SSIVE ATTPCK ON SOUTH VI ETNAtlS i-JORTHER~J 70 P2GVI )CES THUS -foJZ ~ -Jpound BEEN ABLE TO FORESTALL THIS BY AGRESSIVELY 30~BING ALL SGCH THC~~P~~IL~B UPS ~middot-purmiddot1PHREY NO PROPOSES TO G I V~ TEE CEH VI ETNnJCSE r~ jEI) SA0TlCTRY FO-1 lmiddotTrICH TO LAUNCH ATTACiS fG6NSL~ OUR ME JGdNG I

CLEAR NDTI CE TH6T ALL THEY hllVE TO DO ISH I T MD THEY~JI LL GET ~ -~o ~~

rAE BEEN DEifAKDI NG FOR r-lANY[lONTES IN lK IS u[DER TEESE C IPGlj~ST gtC5~ E C4N HARDLY EXPECT THE NORTH V I ETNAtIESE TO NEGOTIATE SEi IOLjSY ~mJ

SUR ~lO T1middot~S F~Ot~ NO tf I F rlECTED i~J~gt~=~-Y IS G 11 f~G T1-r i ~~-~~~~4~

~1~1J~~ 1-- r Gr~osgt~~1 I~ 1S)O~)SIgtL~~middot~ f~~rTIrU)l~OLlt ft17 FJIr 1middot i ~~~

~o p~TS TG nE-~ PlESTDil ( T-~~ UI) STATES I C middotk E~ 10

OSITIG~] O-~ VITTtgtOtCl~ 6C1P ~ bull i RjfRcCT HIS TE~n END OF PROPOSED STATSME~~ I SUGGEST ThAT WE TREAT THIS AS~CT OF THE HUMPHREY SPEECH

sue SFPAR-TELY ~ pl1) HtVE SOrlE OThH H ~WN SP01ESt1AN DEAL ~n Ttl THE REST OF HIS COVMENTS ~ND DISTO~TIO~S

I1 C 0 ~y J bull

USGENT r1ENO FOR PAT BUCV-shy

0 1middot1middot Rich 11~ ~

bull Co ch d PcCorrnnc

_~_S middot Ju ~ - qNlr_ as -t 0TopiC Vi

y i ti 1 con e_fhticr ~

surri 1n~ conclu ion

of uta ~alC in

2

o~~1cir_ Ith a

c ~~ectod

OnJltie cnd that the~l

lirlO

concrete potitical or rrdlitu~y CVC~t3 i~ Sc~th Vict~~l

Tl1icu GovernL~ent

succcs~ thus ~ar

i

Pice and I i

I 1 oould plw~ge cut of si~ht in the event ot anotherI

rcgulate the black mru~et I1ice of the doller in SliOll

clearly contributed

1~ lmiddotC3 middotctsobout Ilc -

to the scrm~blc tor liquidity by SaieonS merch~~t

rolD-ted

lt1011ity to COP) Wi tl1 the VC 1h16 lCCC-t iflaticnary

treld therefore mUi3t be clo~ly lltcbed

in Victnampm with me tOl arl how 011 qUGlltions such tli

hat aeas of pollcy and J~lct1ce one Should cha120 to

so th~t he and his colleaQ~cs could preparo a rull ar~d

concidered ~~swer

two aotions were one acccleuticn of the ~~ming c~

groups throu8hout the COu1trJ I expect Roan ill111

J plcvldc us lith Some politically lseful information in

) the gtreeks to COlle

j I j

Colonel Robert Cutlafl Congless1onal Liaison DOD

offered to set up regular ztutus bricfircs on Viet~cp

follodng receipt of a lettcl of intloduct1on ftom tra 1xon

Head~uarters

roposed follol-ll activitics

(a) Before my next visit to Wasr~ngton bull

in a series of detailed briefi~~3 on the status o~ a

alao revisit ry initial cont~ta(c)

Liat of Contacts

~r~~r2l rO~l Choe d lffuires E~ibiY of Vietnam

Ea~~ld Isl1~l-l B~~dyfs Assistant in churo of ~~1n nCGotiatio~ccordir~ticn

Lec~~rd Sullivan Dtrcctcr of ODDRE Southecmiddot~ jsia DOD

Colonel Robelt 01JtlaT bullCongressional LiaiGon DOD

~()V bull 2

from Dick McCormack

re AAs Proposed Task ForcG

I spent this morninG at AAs ho~e scussing his ideas 0 middot

a task ro1le

orca to

Vietna~ for ten days to fwctiOl [s s oyal 00(-s8io

~s Qlal CUY1gt a 1shyCI JL J _ J

diplomat~c luninaries

- - _ -He adced trat since He are 8nyvay on the o ~ Igt~

te group -vouldn I t exactly function as a fact fir-cling Jody

by morc than a daca~a( ~~ ~a3

J 1 d 1 bull I I~ ~~a a1sco E 01 e ~middotcur11g )--) J

shy01 us 1ceas

that I strongly felt that we nested to apply some first clas~

ta13nt to tbe proble~ of Vi ~na~ but was uncertain how ~s~f~l

ip to Saigon would ~e

whole operation mig~t degenerate into a Gobile press confs~encG

~

this 1izht 1ell be a nost inauspiciollts beeirig

middot-- --- lcAt this point v~ cl)toI ttG

could best fu~ctionas un

~ - shy~ told hin tcat this L ~ l 1811

p~omise arid tha t he lould b8

te Staf I

has subsequently C811GC~ ~0 ~o sa~r

funtions of his group sbould ba d8~ide~ a week or so

te election

An apparently very corpetot 0-8 Jeputr to

-lno retumiddot _ ulgtd VJ middot4 01j ~ 01--l) Y~O+1~ 1 ~ ~ rmiddoto from VJ e)na ~~ - 0middot 06~ Cl

been vor1til1g 1Ilith anothe gCOill) to sJucy the problGYs f2~~-

t~e President t regarding Vi0tna~ bull

~ ~ l -1 D~ l ev (1 -olrI i [ 1 v~Ii ltr )1 J ~ 1J~1 J ~ 1J1) ~I - c d

and rerorts Jseful sLIzgestions ATi tin ton cluys uter te

He can be reached

~el 202 2965000

0 1middot1middot Rich 11~ ~

bull Co ch d PcCorrnnc

_~_S middot Ju ~ - qNlr_ as -t 0TopiC Vi

y i ti 1 con e_fhticr ~

surri 1n~ conclu ion

of uta ~alC in

2

o~~1cir_ Ith a

c ~~ectod

OnJltie cnd that the~l

lirlO

concrete potitical or rrdlitu~y CVC~t3 i~ Sc~th Vict~~l

Tl1icu GovernL~ent

succcs~ thus ~ar

i

Pice and I i

I 1 oould plw~ge cut of si~ht in the event ot anotherI

rcgulate the black mru~et I1ice of the doller in SliOll

clearly contributed

1~ lmiddotC3 middotctsobout Ilc -

to the scrm~blc tor liquidity by SaieonS merch~~t

rolD-ted

lt1011ity to COP) Wi tl1 the VC 1h16 lCCC-t iflaticnary

treld therefore mUi3t be clo~ly lltcbed

in Victnampm with me tOl arl how 011 qUGlltions such tli

hat aeas of pollcy and J~lct1ce one Should cha120 to

so th~t he and his colleaQ~cs could preparo a rull ar~d

concidered ~~swer

two aotions were one acccleuticn of the ~~ming c~

groups throu8hout the COu1trJ I expect Roan ill111

J plcvldc us lith Some politically lseful information in

) the gtreeks to COlle

j I j

Colonel Robert Cutlafl Congless1onal Liaison DOD

offered to set up regular ztutus bricfircs on Viet~cp

follodng receipt of a lettcl of intloduct1on ftom tra 1xon

Head~uarters

roposed follol-ll activitics

(a) Before my next visit to Wasr~ngton bull

in a series of detailed briefi~~3 on the status o~ a

alao revisit ry initial cont~ta(c)

Liat of Contacts

~r~~r2l rO~l Choe d lffuires E~ibiY of Vietnam

Ea~~ld Isl1~l-l B~~dyfs Assistant in churo of ~~1n nCGotiatio~ccordir~ticn

Lec~~rd Sullivan Dtrcctcr of ODDRE Southecmiddot~ jsia DOD

Colonel Robelt 01JtlaT bullCongressional LiaiGon DOD

~()V bull 2

from Dick McCormack

re AAs Proposed Task ForcG

I spent this morninG at AAs ho~e scussing his ideas 0 middot

a task ro1le

orca to

Vietna~ for ten days to fwctiOl [s s oyal 00(-s8io

~s Qlal CUY1gt a 1shyCI JL J _ J

diplomat~c luninaries

- - _ -He adced trat since He are 8nyvay on the o ~ Igt~

te group -vouldn I t exactly function as a fact fir-cling Jody

by morc than a daca~a( ~~ ~a3

J 1 d 1 bull I I~ ~~a a1sco E 01 e ~middotcur11g )--) J

shy01 us 1ceas

that I strongly felt that we nested to apply some first clas~

ta13nt to tbe proble~ of Vi ~na~ but was uncertain how ~s~f~l

ip to Saigon would ~e

whole operation mig~t degenerate into a Gobile press confs~encG

~

this 1izht 1ell be a nost inauspiciollts beeirig

middot-- --- lcAt this point v~ cl)toI ttG

could best fu~ctionas un

~ - shy~ told hin tcat this L ~ l 1811

p~omise arid tha t he lould b8

te Staf I

has subsequently C811GC~ ~0 ~o sa~r

funtions of his group sbould ba d8~ide~ a week or so

te election

An apparently very corpetot 0-8 Jeputr to

-lno retumiddot _ ulgtd VJ middot4 01j ~ 01--l) Y~O+1~ 1 ~ ~ rmiddoto from VJ e)na ~~ - 0middot 06~ Cl

been vor1til1g 1Ilith anothe gCOill) to sJucy the problGYs f2~~-

t~e President t regarding Vi0tna~ bull

~ ~ l -1 D~ l ev (1 -olrI i [ 1 v~Ii ltr )1 J ~ 1J~1 J ~ 1J1) ~I - c d

and rerorts Jseful sLIzgestions ATi tin ton cluys uter te

He can be reached

~el 202 2965000

lirlO

concrete potitical or rrdlitu~y CVC~t3 i~ Sc~th Vict~~l

Tl1icu GovernL~ent

succcs~ thus ~ar

i

Pice and I i

I 1 oould plw~ge cut of si~ht in the event ot anotherI

rcgulate the black mru~et I1ice of the doller in SliOll

clearly contributed

1~ lmiddotC3 middotctsobout Ilc -

to the scrm~blc tor liquidity by SaieonS merch~~t

rolD-ted

lt1011ity to COP) Wi tl1 the VC 1h16 lCCC-t iflaticnary

treld therefore mUi3t be clo~ly lltcbed

in Victnampm with me tOl arl how 011 qUGlltions such tli

hat aeas of pollcy and J~lct1ce one Should cha120 to

so th~t he and his colleaQ~cs could preparo a rull ar~d

concidered ~~swer

two aotions were one acccleuticn of the ~~ming c~

groups throu8hout the COu1trJ I expect Roan ill111

J plcvldc us lith Some politically lseful information in

) the gtreeks to COlle

j I j

Colonel Robert Cutlafl Congless1onal Liaison DOD

offered to set up regular ztutus bricfircs on Viet~cp

follodng receipt of a lettcl of intloduct1on ftom tra 1xon

Head~uarters

roposed follol-ll activitics

(a) Before my next visit to Wasr~ngton bull

in a series of detailed briefi~~3 on the status o~ a

alao revisit ry initial cont~ta(c)

Liat of Contacts

~r~~r2l rO~l Choe d lffuires E~ibiY of Vietnam

Ea~~ld Isl1~l-l B~~dyfs Assistant in churo of ~~1n nCGotiatio~ccordir~ticn

Lec~~rd Sullivan Dtrcctcr of ODDRE Southecmiddot~ jsia DOD

Colonel Robelt 01JtlaT bullCongressional LiaiGon DOD

~()V bull 2

from Dick McCormack

re AAs Proposed Task ForcG

I spent this morninG at AAs ho~e scussing his ideas 0 middot

a task ro1le

orca to

Vietna~ for ten days to fwctiOl [s s oyal 00(-s8io

~s Qlal CUY1gt a 1shyCI JL J _ J

diplomat~c luninaries

- - _ -He adced trat since He are 8nyvay on the o ~ Igt~

te group -vouldn I t exactly function as a fact fir-cling Jody

by morc than a daca~a( ~~ ~a3

J 1 d 1 bull I I~ ~~a a1sco E 01 e ~middotcur11g )--) J

shy01 us 1ceas

that I strongly felt that we nested to apply some first clas~

ta13nt to tbe proble~ of Vi ~na~ but was uncertain how ~s~f~l

ip to Saigon would ~e

whole operation mig~t degenerate into a Gobile press confs~encG

~

this 1izht 1ell be a nost inauspiciollts beeirig

middot-- --- lcAt this point v~ cl)toI ttG

could best fu~ctionas un

~ - shy~ told hin tcat this L ~ l 1811

p~omise arid tha t he lould b8

te Staf I

has subsequently C811GC~ ~0 ~o sa~r

funtions of his group sbould ba d8~ide~ a week or so

te election

An apparently very corpetot 0-8 Jeputr to

-lno retumiddot _ ulgtd VJ middot4 01j ~ 01--l) Y~O+1~ 1 ~ ~ rmiddoto from VJ e)na ~~ - 0middot 06~ Cl

been vor1til1g 1Ilith anothe gCOill) to sJucy the problGYs f2~~-

t~e President t regarding Vi0tna~ bull

~ ~ l -1 D~ l ev (1 -olrI i [ 1 v~Ii ltr )1 J ~ 1J~1 J ~ 1J1) ~I - c d

and rerorts Jseful sLIzgestions ATi tin ton cluys uter te

He can be reached

~el 202 2965000

rolD-ted

lt1011ity to COP) Wi tl1 the VC 1h16 lCCC-t iflaticnary

treld therefore mUi3t be clo~ly lltcbed

in Victnampm with me tOl arl how 011 qUGlltions such tli

hat aeas of pollcy and J~lct1ce one Should cha120 to

so th~t he and his colleaQ~cs could preparo a rull ar~d

concidered ~~swer

two aotions were one acccleuticn of the ~~ming c~

groups throu8hout the COu1trJ I expect Roan ill111

J plcvldc us lith Some politically lseful information in

) the gtreeks to COlle

j I j

Colonel Robert Cutlafl Congless1onal Liaison DOD

offered to set up regular ztutus bricfircs on Viet~cp

follodng receipt of a lettcl of intloduct1on ftom tra 1xon

Head~uarters

roposed follol-ll activitics

(a) Before my next visit to Wasr~ngton bull

in a series of detailed briefi~~3 on the status o~ a

alao revisit ry initial cont~ta(c)

Liat of Contacts

~r~~r2l rO~l Choe d lffuires E~ibiY of Vietnam

Ea~~ld Isl1~l-l B~~dyfs Assistant in churo of ~~1n nCGotiatio~ccordir~ticn

Lec~~rd Sullivan Dtrcctcr of ODDRE Southecmiddot~ jsia DOD

Colonel Robelt 01JtlaT bullCongressional LiaiGon DOD

~()V bull 2

from Dick McCormack

re AAs Proposed Task ForcG

I spent this morninG at AAs ho~e scussing his ideas 0 middot

a task ro1le

orca to

Vietna~ for ten days to fwctiOl [s s oyal 00(-s8io

~s Qlal CUY1gt a 1shyCI JL J _ J

diplomat~c luninaries

- - _ -He adced trat since He are 8nyvay on the o ~ Igt~

te group -vouldn I t exactly function as a fact fir-cling Jody

by morc than a daca~a( ~~ ~a3

J 1 d 1 bull I I~ ~~a a1sco E 01 e ~middotcur11g )--) J

shy01 us 1ceas

that I strongly felt that we nested to apply some first clas~

ta13nt to tbe proble~ of Vi ~na~ but was uncertain how ~s~f~l

ip to Saigon would ~e

whole operation mig~t degenerate into a Gobile press confs~encG

~

this 1izht 1ell be a nost inauspiciollts beeirig

middot-- --- lcAt this point v~ cl)toI ttG

could best fu~ctionas un

~ - shy~ told hin tcat this L ~ l 1811

p~omise arid tha t he lould b8

te Staf I

has subsequently C811GC~ ~0 ~o sa~r

funtions of his group sbould ba d8~ide~ a week or so

te election

An apparently very corpetot 0-8 Jeputr to

-lno retumiddot _ ulgtd VJ middot4 01j ~ 01--l) Y~O+1~ 1 ~ ~ rmiddoto from VJ e)na ~~ - 0middot 06~ Cl

been vor1til1g 1Ilith anothe gCOill) to sJucy the problGYs f2~~-

t~e President t regarding Vi0tna~ bull

~ ~ l -1 D~ l ev (1 -olrI i [ 1 v~Ii ltr )1 J ~ 1J~1 J ~ 1J1) ~I - c d

and rerorts Jseful sLIzgestions ATi tin ton cluys uter te

He can be reached

~el 202 2965000

alao revisit ry initial cont~ta(c)

Liat of Contacts

~r~~r2l rO~l Choe d lffuires E~ibiY of Vietnam

Ea~~ld Isl1~l-l B~~dyfs Assistant in churo of ~~1n nCGotiatio~ccordir~ticn

Lec~~rd Sullivan Dtrcctcr of ODDRE Southecmiddot~ jsia DOD

Colonel Robelt 01JtlaT bullCongressional LiaiGon DOD

~()V bull 2

from Dick McCormack

re AAs Proposed Task ForcG

I spent this morninG at AAs ho~e scussing his ideas 0 middot

a task ro1le

orca to

Vietna~ for ten days to fwctiOl [s s oyal 00(-s8io

~s Qlal CUY1gt a 1shyCI JL J _ J

diplomat~c luninaries

- - _ -He adced trat since He are 8nyvay on the o ~ Igt~

te group -vouldn I t exactly function as a fact fir-cling Jody

by morc than a daca~a( ~~ ~a3

J 1 d 1 bull I I~ ~~a a1sco E 01 e ~middotcur11g )--) J

shy01 us 1ceas

that I strongly felt that we nested to apply some first clas~

ta13nt to tbe proble~ of Vi ~na~ but was uncertain how ~s~f~l

ip to Saigon would ~e

whole operation mig~t degenerate into a Gobile press confs~encG

~

this 1izht 1ell be a nost inauspiciollts beeirig

middot-- --- lcAt this point v~ cl)toI ttG

could best fu~ctionas un

~ - shy~ told hin tcat this L ~ l 1811

p~omise arid tha t he lould b8

te Staf I

has subsequently C811GC~ ~0 ~o sa~r

funtions of his group sbould ba d8~ide~ a week or so

te election

An apparently very corpetot 0-8 Jeputr to

-lno retumiddot _ ulgtd VJ middot4 01j ~ 01--l) Y~O+1~ 1 ~ ~ rmiddoto from VJ e)na ~~ - 0middot 06~ Cl

been vor1til1g 1Ilith anothe gCOill) to sJucy the problGYs f2~~-

t~e President t regarding Vi0tna~ bull

~ ~ l -1 D~ l ev (1 -olrI i [ 1 v~Ii ltr )1 J ~ 1J~1 J ~ 1J1) ~I - c d

and rerorts Jseful sLIzgestions ATi tin ton cluys uter te

He can be reached

~el 202 2965000

~()V bull 2

from Dick McCormack

re AAs Proposed Task ForcG

I spent this morninG at AAs ho~e scussing his ideas 0 middot

a task ro1le

orca to

Vietna~ for ten days to fwctiOl [s s oyal 00(-s8io

~s Qlal CUY1gt a 1shyCI JL J _ J

diplomat~c luninaries

- - _ -He adced trat since He are 8nyvay on the o ~ Igt~

te group -vouldn I t exactly function as a fact fir-cling Jody

by morc than a daca~a( ~~ ~a3

J 1 d 1 bull I I~ ~~a a1sco E 01 e ~middotcur11g )--) J

shy01 us 1ceas

that I strongly felt that we nested to apply some first clas~

ta13nt to tbe proble~ of Vi ~na~ but was uncertain how ~s~f~l

ip to Saigon would ~e

whole operation mig~t degenerate into a Gobile press confs~encG

~

this 1izht 1ell be a nost inauspiciollts beeirig

middot-- --- lcAt this point v~ cl)toI ttG

could best fu~ctionas un

~ - shy~ told hin tcat this L ~ l 1811

p~omise arid tha t he lould b8

te Staf I

has subsequently C811GC~ ~0 ~o sa~r

funtions of his group sbould ba d8~ide~ a week or so

te election

An apparently very corpetot 0-8 Jeputr to

-lno retumiddot _ ulgtd VJ middot4 01j ~ 01--l) Y~O+1~ 1 ~ ~ rmiddoto from VJ e)na ~~ - 0middot 06~ Cl

been vor1til1g 1Ilith anothe gCOill) to sJucy the problGYs f2~~-

t~e President t regarding Vi0tna~ bull

~ ~ l -1 D~ l ev (1 -olrI i [ 1 v~Ii ltr )1 J ~ 1J~1 J ~ 1J1) ~I - c d

and rerorts Jseful sLIzgestions ATi tin ton cluys uter te

He can be reached

~el 202 2965000

middot-- --- lcAt this point v~ cl)toI ttG

could best fu~ctionas un

~ - shy~ told hin tcat this L ~ l 1811

p~omise arid tha t he lould b8

te Staf I

has subsequently C811GC~ ~0 ~o sa~r

funtions of his group sbould ba d8~ide~ a week or so

te election

An apparently very corpetot 0-8 Jeputr to

-lno retumiddot _ ulgtd VJ middot4 01j ~ 01--l) Y~O+1~ 1 ~ ~ rmiddoto from VJ e)na ~~ - 0middot 06~ Cl

been vor1til1g 1Ilith anothe gCOill) to sJucy the problGYs f2~~-

t~e President t regarding Vi0tna~ bull

~ ~ l -1 D~ l ev (1 -olrI i [ 1 v~Ii ltr )1 J ~ 1J~1 J ~ 1J1) ~I - c d

and rerorts Jseful sLIzgestions ATi tin ton cluys uter te

He can be reached

~el 202 2965000

i

- ~ shybull 1shy

_ J - _ _ c J

5middot -

situct ior a

- - r - - V J ~ - middot ~C _ bull bull _ _ _ J

~

1- ~~r ~ middot ~ ~ J shy __ _

~ - _ bull bull ~ a -o0 -middot _ v c _ 1 _ I

that - l2 _- -

r- r- to play tte task force o~f ~ E a~~stt~2 ~ -- - - - -- -- - shy

middot~r - - thus Dr ev e t-_g - --

III - - - t v ____ ~-

j

~ -- - -shy

to

full cont rol of the si~~atio~ na c amp~ ~~e~

S22urity cl Garanca

be stressed

5 To prevent misunderstandings the group should coordinate regu1ara1y

with the Embassy and l1ACV I think a member of the E~bassy staff

should be included on all official visits-with South Vietnamese

lead~IS

6 Any grQUp igtrhich lacks a ratherthorough faMiliarity with the

situation in Vietnal i11 unavoidably become a victi1 of the

slick briefings which all American agencies in Vietnam have

developed to cope [i th the hoard of VIP visitors which

come to Vietnam for varyine periods

7 Any group thich comes to Vietnal tT~t)1 very strong viels either

hakish or dovish and only remains for a ten day or tTNO TJleek

period can not be expected to return to the United States

vith anything lore profound or useful than a strengthening

of previous prejudices The task force in any case should

renain at least a month in Vietnam and keep control of their

schedule lest they be taken on a circuit of the best refugee

camps the most successfu11v pacified ha~ets and elite

AIN units

8 Host of the professionals associated igtTith Vietnam have

been with the present Administration in one capacity or another

In our search tior 11 fresh Objectivethhnking~=ShOU1d beware

of the pitfalls of Amateurism

9 Vi thin a 1argG diverse Group there t1ay be a temptation for

those TJe1bers l-lho feel that their opinions are not being Given sufficient weight to atte~pt to win their case

through the press

r

Ny mrn feelines are that i10 should COlVene a 871al1 oup

of knmvledgable people includlhng at least one person 1110

knotvs mr very 1vell ane in r10n Rl col1plete confideDe to

begin an irJ1nediato study of the si tiorl ~n

~h thin a very feI Wee~s this ou shoul~l

be sent to Vietnam Ii thout coraproising our ability to influence

the Government of South lietnan1 by a o~atur8 unqualifi

promise of support the head of this task force should do

Ihat he can to restore self confido1ce to the Government of

President Thieu Thieu lost an i~~enso aMount of face

as a result of the Johnson declaration and the ppreceding I

confrorltations betl1een Bunlcer and Thien It is extr8mely

importantl that all the careful work of consoli~ating power I

Presidentl

Thieu not b(~ in vain Tllf3 American people rill not i

give us the ti~e to repeat this process in event of another coup I

Unti~ this can be done to restore self confidence I

to resumei negotiations in Paris (middotlOuld be very u1Trise Thieu I

has been irrlade to look lile an American puppet Trhich is of cou1s

hmgt Hanoi has be8n attemptine to portray him for years I

So nuch face has been lost that it might well be wise

to 8ncou~age the Jnuhnson Adminisfratio~ to petmit the South I

Vietnar1e~e to stall for a number of l(3e~s

Th~ President 2lect by spea1dng out or 1vi tbholdinG -orn181t

has a significant eapon to influoL1e tba Johnson administration

I think lttt very least he should at the outset der-1and a basic

veto on ~ajor policy questionSllhich come up betveen election

and Jan ~O Johnson l s apparent obs( 0) 1JIith his place in

vlell lead hil to follm um-lise policies

to solve Vietna~ese problem Such hasty or c Gred

action by during these next vital t~1re8 ronths could

not only imrlensely complicate t16 t~2S of the 18- esid

but also so compromise our negotiati~g position as to p

a com~unist takeover

I

)

be stressed

5 To prevent misunderstandings the group should coordinate regu1ara1y

with the Embassy and l1ACV I think a member of the E~bassy staff

should be included on all official visits-with South Vietnamese

lead~IS

6 Any grQUp igtrhich lacks a ratherthorough faMiliarity with the

situation in Vietnal i11 unavoidably become a victi1 of the

slick briefings which all American agencies in Vietnam have

developed to cope [i th the hoard of VIP visitors which

come to Vietnam for varyine periods

7 Any group thich comes to Vietnal tT~t)1 very strong viels either

hakish or dovish and only remains for a ten day or tTNO TJleek

period can not be expected to return to the United States

vith anything lore profound or useful than a strengthening

of previous prejudices The task force in any case should

renain at least a month in Vietnam and keep control of their

schedule lest they be taken on a circuit of the best refugee

camps the most successfu11v pacified ha~ets and elite

AIN units

8 Host of the professionals associated igtTith Vietnam have

been with the present Administration in one capacity or another

In our search tior 11 fresh Objectivethhnking~=ShOU1d beware

of the pitfalls of Amateurism

9 Vi thin a 1argG diverse Group there t1ay be a temptation for

those TJe1bers l-lho feel that their opinions are not being Given sufficient weight to atte~pt to win their case

through the press

r

Ny mrn feelines are that i10 should COlVene a 871al1 oup

of knmvledgable people includlhng at least one person 1110

knotvs mr very 1vell ane in r10n Rl col1plete confideDe to

begin an irJ1nediato study of the si tiorl ~n

~h thin a very feI Wee~s this ou shoul~l

be sent to Vietnam Ii thout coraproising our ability to influence

the Government of South lietnan1 by a o~atur8 unqualifi

promise of support the head of this task force should do

Ihat he can to restore self confido1ce to the Government of

President Thieu Thieu lost an i~~enso aMount of face

as a result of the Johnson declaration and the ppreceding I

confrorltations betl1een Bunlcer and Thien It is extr8mely

importantl that all the careful work of consoli~ating power I

Presidentl

Thieu not b(~ in vain Tllf3 American people rill not i

give us the ti~e to repeat this process in event of another coup I

Unti~ this can be done to restore self confidence I

to resumei negotiations in Paris (middotlOuld be very u1Trise Thieu I

has been irrlade to look lile an American puppet Trhich is of cou1s

hmgt Hanoi has be8n attemptine to portray him for years I

So nuch face has been lost that it might well be wise

to 8ncou~age the Jnuhnson Adminisfratio~ to petmit the South I

Vietnar1e~e to stall for a number of l(3e~s

Th~ President 2lect by spea1dng out or 1vi tbholdinG -orn181t

has a significant eapon to influoL1e tba Johnson administration

I think lttt very least he should at the outset der-1and a basic

veto on ~ajor policy questionSllhich come up betveen election

and Jan ~O Johnson l s apparent obs( 0) 1JIith his place in

vlell lead hil to follm um-lise policies

to solve Vietna~ese problem Such hasty or c Gred

action by during these next vital t~1re8 ronths could

not only imrlensely complicate t16 t~2S of the 18- esid

but also so compromise our negotiati~g position as to p

a com~unist takeover

I

)

r

Ny mrn feelines are that i10 should COlVene a 871al1 oup

of knmvledgable people includlhng at least one person 1110

knotvs mr very 1vell ane in r10n Rl col1plete confideDe to

begin an irJ1nediato study of the si tiorl ~n

~h thin a very feI Wee~s this ou shoul~l

be sent to Vietnam Ii thout coraproising our ability to influence

the Government of South lietnan1 by a o~atur8 unqualifi

promise of support the head of this task force should do

Ihat he can to restore self confido1ce to the Government of

President Thieu Thieu lost an i~~enso aMount of face

as a result of the Johnson declaration and the ppreceding I

confrorltations betl1een Bunlcer and Thien It is extr8mely

importantl that all the careful work of consoli~ating power I

Presidentl

Thieu not b(~ in vain Tllf3 American people rill not i

give us the ti~e to repeat this process in event of another coup I

Unti~ this can be done to restore self confidence I

to resumei negotiations in Paris (middotlOuld be very u1Trise Thieu I

has been irrlade to look lile an American puppet Trhich is of cou1s

hmgt Hanoi has be8n attemptine to portray him for years I

So nuch face has been lost that it might well be wise

to 8ncou~age the Jnuhnson Adminisfratio~ to petmit the South I

Vietnar1e~e to stall for a number of l(3e~s

Th~ President 2lect by spea1dng out or 1vi tbholdinG -orn181t

has a significant eapon to influoL1e tba Johnson administration

I think lttt very least he should at the outset der-1and a basic

veto on ~ajor policy questionSllhich come up betveen election

and Jan ~O Johnson l s apparent obs( 0) 1JIith his place in

vlell lead hil to follm um-lise policies

to solve Vietna~ese problem Such hasty or c Gred

action by during these next vital t~1re8 ronths could

not only imrlensely complicate t16 t~2S of the 18- esid

but also so compromise our negotiati~g position as to p

a com~unist takeover

I

)

vlell lead hil to follm um-lise policies

to solve Vietna~ese problem Such hasty or c Gred

action by during these next vital t~1re8 ronths could

not only imrlensely complicate t16 t~2S of the 18- esid

but also so compromise our negotiati~g position as to p

a com~unist takeover

I

)