What the Cārvākas Originally Meant, More on the Commentators on the Cārvākasūtra

8/19/2019 What the Cārvākas Originally Meant, More on the Commentators on the Cārvākasūtra

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What the Cārvākas Originally Meant: More on the Commentators on the "Cārvākasūtra"Author(s): Ramkrishna BhattacharyaSource: Journal of Indian Philosophy, Vol. 38, No. 6 (December 2010), pp. 529-542Published by: SpringerStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/23502237 .

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2/15

J Indian Philos

(2010)

38:529-542

DOI

10.1007/sl0781-010-9103-y

What the

Càrvâkas

Originally

Meant

More

on the

Commentators

on the

Cârvâkasûtra

Ramkrishna

Bhattacharya

Published online: 30 October 2010

©

Springer

Science+Business Media B.V.2010

Abstract This

essay proposes

to review

the

problems

of

reconstructing

and

interpreting

ancient

texts,

particularly philosophical

commentaries,

in the context of

the

Cârvâka/Lokâyata system

of

India.

Following

an overview of the Indian

philosophical

text tradition and the

ontological

and

epistemological positions

of the

Cârvâkas,

three cases are discussed:

(1)

when there is no invariance in the text and the

commentary,

(2)

when commentators differ

among

themselves in their

interpreta

tions,

and

(3)

when

contradictory interpretations

are offered. The

paper

further dis

cusses

why

certain commentaries are to be treated as inconsistent with the base text

and concludes that innovations inconsistent with the intention of the author should be

treated

differently

from

glosses

that seek to

explain

the

author's

original

intentions.

Keywords

Sanskrit

philosophical

literature

•

Commentaries

•

Reconstruction

•

Interpretation

-

Development

•

Inconsistency

Reconstructing

and

Interpreting

Ancient Texts: Two Views

Recently

there has been

a

controversy

on the

task

of

a

modern commentator on an

ancient text. Michael

LaFrague

declared

quite unambiguously:

I

believe that either one is

trying

as best as one can to reconstruct what the

Daode

Jing

meant to its

original

authors and audience or one is not. If one is

not,

there

is no

basis for

placing any

limits

to what can be considered a

legitimate interpretation.

(Qtd.

Goldin

750)

Paul R. Goldin has taken

exception

to this attitude. He writes: While it

is

praise

worthy

... to remind readers that authors and audiences of

the

past

did

not

R.

Bhattacharya

(El)

Pavlov

Institute,

98 Mahatma Gandhi

Road,

Kolkata 700

007,

India

e-mail:

[email protected]; [email protected]

Ô

Spring

er


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3/15

530

R.

Bhattacharya

necessarily

share our modern

world-view,

one cannot

deny

that

twentieth-century

critics such as

Gadamer,

Ricoueur and Derrida

-

whose Hermeneutics

LaFrague

freely grants

are

opposed

to

his own

-

compellingly

demonstrated the limitations of

a

narrowly

historicist

approach.

(Goldin 750)

Goldin

admits that

"historically

informed

reading"

has its merits and can be

defended.

Nevertheless,

in his

view,

it cannot be contended that

"reconstructing

the

author's

original

intent

is the modern reader's

only

legitimate

concern." He con

troverts

LaFrague by

pointing

out: Texts that survive

through

the

ages

do so because

people continually

find new

meanings

in them. Texts that

die,

by

contrast,

are ones

that

have to be read as

though

we

are all

living

in the third

century

B. C.

(Goldin

750).

Goldin

further seeks to refute

LaFrague's

view

by

the

following

observation:

The weakness of the argument is apparent if one tries to apply it to juris

prudence. Lawyers

would

hardly agree

that the

only

two alternatives in con

stitutional law are to

reconstruct the constitution as it would have been

understood

by

its

original

authors and

audience,

or to disavow

any

limits to

what can be considered

a

legitimate

interpretation

(Goldin 750).

This difference of

opinion

obviously

has its

bearings

on ancient texts other than the

Daode

Jing.

I find it

particularly

relevant

to the field of

my

study,

the Cârvâka/

Lokàyata

materialist

system

of

philosophy,

which flourished in

ancient

India

and

totally disappeared

with all its literature after the

twelfth

century.

The whole

system

has to be reconstructed on the basis of fragments, found quoted or paraphrased in

the works of its

opponents.

The task

of reconstruction is made all the more difficult

by

the fact

that its

opponents

did

not

always

follow the rules of fair

play.

Quite

deliberately they

distorted and

misinterpreted

the views of the Cârvâkas

(for

example,

their stand on

inference).

In

spite

of

this,

attempts

made

by

scholars

in the

last two centuries have

resulted in a tentative

reconstruction of the

system

in broad

outline

(Bhattacharya

2009,

pp.

69-104).

Let

me declare at the outset

that I

agree

with

LaFrague

about the task of a

reconstructor

and am

totally

out of

sympathy

with

postmodernist

hermeneutics

which is

avowedly

a-historical.

The case of

jurisprudence

cited

by

Goldin

is

beside

the

point.

No maker of a

country's

constitution can foresee all later

developments.

Some

clauses have to be

reinterpreted

and even

suitably

amended to

keep pace

with

the

changing

times. The case of an

ancient

philosophical

text is

altogether

different.

It

may very

well be so that it had a considerable

number of adherents in the

past

but

is

now as dead as a dodo. It is also evident

that not all adherents stuck to the

original

intention of the author

and

some

reinterpreted

the words of the base text to suit their

own taste or

to

incorporate

new elements

quite

alien to the

system.

Yet it is nec

essary

to know first what

the

system

was

originally

like,

that

is,

what it meant to its

author(s)

and its audience

at the time it had been first

systematized.

Then

and

only

then we can

judge

where

(and

if

possible,

when)

some later adherents turned

away

from the intent of the

author(s)

or

redactor(s).

This of course cannot and should not

be the

only legitimate

concern.

Later

developments,

too,

have to be taken into

consideration.

But unless and until the

original

intent is

fairly

well

understood,

the

study

of later

developments

cannot

be

truly

fruitful.

Ô

Springer




4/15

What the Cârvakas

Originally

Meant 531

The Indian

Philosophical

Tradition:

An Overview

In the Indian tradition the base texts of some systems of philosophy are first

composed

in the form of a collection

of

aphorisms

(sutras).

The

aphorisms

are brief

and

terse

to the

point

of

being incomprehensible

without some

explanation

provided

by

a

guru

or,

in his

absence,

by

a

commentary

written either

by

the author himself or

herself

(auto-commentary)

or

by

some

later author who is not

necessarily

an

adherent to the

system.1

Over the course of time further commentaries and sub-commentaries

and,

in

some

cases,

independent

works

purporting

to elucidate the basic ideas

of the

philosophical

system

(such

as

Jayantabhatta's Nyáyamañjari

)

come

to

be written. The views of the

opponents

too are

sought

to be refuted in these works. This is how a vast literature

consisting of explanatory material is created. The Nyâya system, for instance, has four

such chief

commentaries and sub-commentaries

by

four different authors

writing

in

widely separated

times.

The

non-dualist

Vedânta

system,

initiated

by

Sañkarácárya,

similarly gave

rise to

a

commentary

tradition that continued for centuries. Other

systems

of Vedânta

(dualist,

non-dualist,

modified

non-dualist,

both dualist and non

dualist, etc.)

also offer a

large

number of

secondary

works,

all

claiming

to be rooted in

the

base

text,

the

Brahmasütra

by Bâdarâyana.

Mîmâmsâ,

Vaisesika and

Yoga

systems

too

belong

to this

text-commentary

continuum

tradition.

The

CârVâka/Lokâyata

too

developed along

the same

line. It had a base text on

which more than five commentaries were written.

The

base

text is sometimes

called the

Bárhaspatya-sütra.2

We also read of a Paurandaram sûtram

and

PauramdarTyavrtti,

presumably referring

to

the

aphorisms

of Purandara and his auto

commentary (Bhattacharya

2009,

pp.

109-111).

Whether Purandara recast the old

base text of a now lost work or redacted the base text itself for the first time

is

not known. Did he add new

aphorisms? Again

we do not know. It is

highly

probable

that he was the first to

employ

the name

Cârvâka

to mean a

system

that was

previ

ously

known as

Lokâyata

in

early

Tamil

epics,

such as the Manimekalai

(incidentally,

these Tamil works

and

their

commentaries,

largely neglected

so

far,

testify

to the

existence of

two

other

materialist schools

besides

Lokâyata

in southern

India,

namely,

1

Vâcaspati

Misra

composed

commentaries on the base texts of

Nyâya, Sâmkhya,

Vedânta,

etc. Most

probably

he was a non-dualist Vedântin but

he

is credited

with

being independent

of all

systems

(sarva

tantra-svatantra),

for he is

reputed

to

have

interpreted

the base texts

faithfully

without

introducing

his

own views. How far it is true needs further

verification,

since

it is

difficult,

if not

impossible,

to be

absolutely

neutral in

philosophical questions.

2

Both Shastri

(1944,

1959)

and Mamoru Namai

(1976)

have called their

respective

collections

of

apho

risms

Bârhaspatya(sûtram),

following

the Purânic tradition of

considering Brhaspati,

the

guru

of the

gods,

as the

eponymous

founder of the doctrine.

Jayantabhatta

has indeed used the name

Barhaspatyasütram

once

(NM

2:

196).

Elsewhere too there are references to

brhaspateh

sûtrâni,

"the

aphorisms

of

Brhaspati"

(see

Bhattacharya

2009,

p.

106

for

details).

The name

"Lokayata-Sütra"

occurring

in Jha's translation

of the

TSP

(2: 893)

is not

supported by

the Sanskrit text

(22.1871

in

Baroda

éd.),

which has sütram

only,

not

"Lokâyata-Sutra". However, Cakradhara has once called it so (GrBh 1: 100). But there are reasons to

believe that the materialists in India such as Purandara called themselves

Cârvâkas

(TSP

2: 528. For a

detailed discussion see

Bhattacharya

2009,

p.

76-77).

All writers since

the

eighth century

CE,

when

referring

to

materialism,

indiscriminately employ

all the three names and

many

more,

some

more fanciful

than others

(such

as

bhiitamàtratattvavâda

(Malayagirisüri)

and

niahâbhûtodbhûtacaitanyavâdamata

(Prajñakaragupta),

both

qtd.

In Franco

(1997,

p.

274 and no.

3).

Springer




5/15

532 R.

Bhattacharya

bhütavñdins

and the

Sarvakas.

Vanamamalai

1973,

p.

36).

In

any

case,

excerpts

from

all these

works,

both

aphorisms

and

commentaries,

are found in the works of other

philosophers, mostly

followers

of

non-dualist

Vedânta, Nyâya

and two non-Vedic

systems, Yogâcâra

Buddhism and Jainism. Since the base text and all the

commen

taries

are

lost,

the views of the

Càrvâka/Lokâyata

have to be

reconstructed on the basis

of these available

fragments.

It is not

possible

at the

present

state

of our

knowledge

to

determine how

many aphorisms

there

originally

were.

Only

a

few that were at the

centre of

controversy

are found

quoted

over

and over

again.

It is almost certain that

they

were all taken more or less verbatim from the base text.

Over and above these two sources

(aphorisms

and

commentaries

thereon),

quite

a

number of

epigrams, purporting

to

contain

the

Cârvàka/Lokâyata

view,

have been

cited in several

philosophical digests.

The

best known

of

them is the

Sarva-darsana

samgraha (A compendium of all philosophies). It is possible that not all of these

satirical verses

originated

in the Cârvâka circles. Some of them seem

to have

Buddhist and Jain

origins.

In so far as the anti-Vedic attitude is

concerned,

the

Càrvâkas were

regarded

by

the Vedists to be at one with these two

religious-cum

philosophical

schools.

Nobody

will

deny

that

a

successful

philosophical system

cannot remain the

same,

exactly

as intended

by

its

original proponent

and

understood

by

his

original

audi

ence. New

interpretations

are bound to

arise,

particularly

when the

system

has

to

face criticism from the followers of other

systems.

The commentators of

the base

text of the

Cârvâka/Lokâyata

had to take into account the

criticism leveled

against

their

system by

its

opponents.

The

fragments

of the commentaries of the base text

exhibit how the commentators tried to defend the basic

materialist

position by

means of

arguments

and

examples.

Most of the

fragments

appear

to be verbatim

quotations

from

the

commentaries of

Aviddhakarna,

Udbhatabhatta and Purandara.

Thus,

although

the number of

the

aphorisms

and the

fragments

from the

lost

commentaries are

regrettably

few,

the

fundamental

ontological

and

epistemological

positions

of

the

Cârvâka/Lokâyata

are

fairly

well

documented. At least some con

clusions can be

drawn from the available

fragments.

The

Ontology

and

Epistemology

of the

Cârvâka/Lokâyata

What

are the

ontological

and

epistemological

positions

of the

Cârvâka/Lokâyata?

They may

be

stated as follows:

The

whole

of the

material

world,

including

the

human

body,

is made of four basic

elements,

namely,

earth,

air,

fire and

water;

there

can be no

consciousness

without the

living body;

the

spirit

has no

extracorporeal

existence

and,

far

from

being imperishable,

it

perishes

with the death of the

body.

As a natural

corollary

to this

ontological position,

all

religious

acts,

worship

of the

gods, paying

obeisance

to Brahmin

priests,

performance

of

post-mortem

rites,

etc.

are considered

absolutely

futile.

The

epistemological position clearly supports

this

ontology. Perception

is admitted

to be the

only

valid means of

knowledge.

Inference,

in

so far as it is based on

religious

scriptures

alone,

is

rejected

out of hand because the

scriptures

are not based

on

perception

but on

revelation,

not amenable to verification

by

the

senses,

and thus tend

Ô

Springer




6/15

What the Carvákas

Originally

Meant

533

to

promote

irrational

faith in

the after-life

(rebirth)

and the after-world

(heaven

and

hell),

God,

and the omniscient

being

(like

the

Buddha

or

Mahâvïra)

(Bhattacharya

2010,

pp.

21-34).

In

short,

the

Cârvàka

system appeared

in the Indian

philosophical

scene as

materialismus

militans,

strongly objecting

to and

opposing

all

religious

dogmas

(not

just

Vedism but Buddhism and Jainism as

well).

Its

epistemology

was

fashioned

to

match

its

ontology,

which consisted of a series of

negations.

The

insistence

on

empirical

verification is the hallmark of this

system.

In

fact

one

has

a

feeling

that the

Cârvâkas

first

provided

the

epistemology

to

the

ontology already

current in India at least from the

Buddha's

time,

when

Ajita

Kesakambala had come

out with his

proto-materialistic

ideas.

Commentaries on the Càrvàkasûtra

The

question

is:

Do the commentators of the base

text,

whether or not

they

adhered to

materialism,

always

reflect the intention of the author/redactor? The

aphorisms

in the

base

text,

we must

admit,

are not

self-explanatory;

their

brevity

stands in the

way

of

any

satisfactory understanding. Fortunately,

however,

there are

some

aphorisms,

the

literal

meaning

of

which

is

fairly

transparent.

When a commentator

goes beyond

the

literal

meaning

of

these

aphorisms

and tries to extract some other

significance by

resorting

to

grammatical

and lexical

acrobatics,

there is

every

reason to

suspect

that

he

is not

being

true to the intention of the

author/redactor.

In most

of

the

cases,

however,

the intention of the

aphorism

and its

interpretations given

in

the com

mentaries are at

one,

although

new instances

and

further

arguments

are

provided

to

defend or to elucidate the

position

of the base

text.

Invariance in Intention

and

Interpretation

Here is an

example.

There are two

aphorisms:

(1)

"Perception

indeed is the

(only)

means of

right

knowledge"

,

and

(2)

"Since the means of

right

knowledge

is to be

non-secondary (agauna),

it is difficult to ascertain an

object by

means of

inference"

(III.

1-2.

Bhattacharya

2009,

pp.

80-87).

This has led to a notion that the

Cârvâkas

believed in one and

only

one instrument of

cognition, namely,

sense

perception,

while

other schools

admitted

inference,

word

(verbal

testimony), comparison,

etc.

in

addition to

perception.

This

gave

rise to the obvious criticism that

by denying

inference,

the

Cârvâkas

proved

themselves to be

utterly

naïve and unfit

to be called

logicians

(cf.

NM,

I:

9,

Vâcaspati

Misra,

Bhâmotî on

Brahmasütra,

3.3.53;

C/L

154,

243).

Did the

Cârvâkas

really

hold such a view? A

fragment

from the

commentary by

Purandara

has often been cited to disabuse the critics of this notion.3

Purandara said:

3

Mookeijee (pp. 368-369), Dasgupta (3: 539)

and others

(for instance, Gangopadhyaya, pp. 32,

55

no.l,

56 no.

4,

66 no.

51,

and

Chattopadhyaya, p.

52)

drew attention to this

significant passage

from time to

time,

which however was

completely ignored

or

overlooked

by many

modern

scholars,

as

by

ancient

authors.

They

continued to ascribe the

ont-pramâna position

to the Cârvâkas

(more

appropriate

to

Bhartrhari,

who

considered

agama

(scripture)

to be the one and

only

valid

means

of

knowledge.

See

Bhattacharya

(2009,

pp.

117-118,

152).

Springer




7/15

534

R.

Bhattacharya

"The

Carvakas too

admit

of such

an inference as

is well known in the

world,

but

that which is called inference

[by

some],

transgressing

the

worldly way,

is

pro

hibited

[by

them]."

(qtd.

TSP 2:

528)

Purandara was not the

only

one to

explain

the

aphorism

in

this

way.

Aviddha

karna,

another

commentator,

also said: "It is

true

that

inference is admitted

by

us as

a source of

knowledge,

because it is found to be

so

in

general practice;

(what

we

only

point

out is

that)

the definition of a inferential mark is

illogical" (qtd.

PVSVT

19).

He further

explained:

"A source of

knowledge

means an instrument

which

produces

an awareness

of an

object

not

(already)

cognized

and

therefore,

is not a

source of

knowledge,

because it is not an instrument

for

producing

a definite

awareness of an

object"

(ibid.).

Udbhatabhatta too said

so and

distinguished

be

tween the

(1)

probanses

well established in the

world

(lokaprasidhha-hetu)

and

(2) probanses established in the scriptures (tantrasiddha-hetu) (qtd. SVR 266). He

resorted to the

Nyâya-Vaisesika terminology

to establish

why

inference is to be

regarded

as

secondary.

Some

anonymous

commentator4

further

distinguished

between

two kinds of

inferential

cognition:

(1)

"some in case of which the

inferential

cognition

can be

acquired

by

oneself'

(utpanna-pratîti)

and

(2)

"some in

case of which the

infer

ential

cognition

is to be

acquired

on

somebody

else's advice"

(utpàdya-pratïti)

(NM,

1:

184).

He

thereby

suggests

that the firstkind is

valid,

the second is not.

Did all these commentators then desert the

original position

of the

base text?

Some modern scholars indeed think so

(Frauwallner

trans.,

2:

225;

Franco

1991,

p. 159; Franco and Preisendanz 1998, p. 180). They postulate that the commentators

who

appeared

in the wake of Dharmakïrti were

forced

to

turn

away

from the

original

position

of the

Cârvâkas,

and the admission of inference in

howsoever limited a

way

is a

pointer

to this

Abkehr

(Frauwallner's

word,

2:

308).

What is

proposed

is

that this

acceptance

of inference was a later

development,

not

exactly

consistent with the

intention of the

original

author and his audience.

It

can, however,

be

demonstrated that such a view is not well

founded. When the

philosophers

of other schools

speak

of

inference, word,

comparison,

etc.,

they

never

deny

that

perception

is the foremost

(jyestha)

of all

instruments of

cognition

(cf.

NM,

I:

164).

What

they

indeed assert is that

inference,

etc. are all

independent

means of

knowledge,

on a

par

with

perception,

not subservient to it:

co-ordinate,

not

subordinate.

Yet,

as the

Nyâyasûtra

(1.1.5)

declares,

inference has to be

preceded

by perception.

Hence,

inference not based on

perception

cannot be

admitted.

Vatsyâyana

in his

commentary

on the

very

first

Nyâya aphorism

(1.1.1)

added

"scripture"

to

"perception" (pratyaksâgmâsritam

anumânam,

sa

'nvïksâ,

pratyaksâgamâbhyâmïksitasyânvïksanam

anvïksa),

which is

unwarranted and

amounts to

interpolation pure

and

simple.

The base text never

speaks

of

scripture

in

connection with

inference;

it mentions

perception

alone. The

independent

status

of

4

Jayantabhatta

ascribed this view to "the more learned ones"

(NM

1:

184).

The

use of

plural may

not be

honorific but satirical. The

identity

of this

commentator

(or

commentators)

is not known.

Cakradhara,

however,

mentions

that

by "cunning

Cârvâka" and the "learned ones"

Jayanta

meant Udbhatabhatta

(GrBh

1:

52,

100).

Most

probably

the

designation,

"more learned

ones,"

refers to some

commentator(s)

other than

Udbhata,

signified by

the use of the

comparative degree.

It

may

mean Purandara

and his

followers.

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8/15

What the Càrvakas

Originally

Meant

535

perception

is an admitted fact in all realist

philosophical

systems.

So,

when the

Cârvâkas denied

the

status of inference

as an

independent

means of

knowledge, they

ipso

facto did not

reject

all kinds of inference but

accepted only

such inference as

was found true in

everyday

practice

(lokavyavahara).

Thus,

in the Cârvâka

con

ception perception

includes both what is

sensually apprehended

and

inference

based on such

apprehension. Only

such inferences as derived from the

scripture,

Veda and

Smrti,

are not admitted.

Therefore,

all

the

four

commentators,

Purandara,

Aviddhakarna,

Udbhata

and the

anonymous

one,

were not

deserting

the

original

stand of the base text

by admitting

inference of a

particular

sort but

only explicating

the view of the base text on

inference in relation to

perception.

Other non-Cârvâka

authors too were aware of

this,5

as this

was the view of

earlier,

pre-Cârvâka

Indian

materialists too.

How do we know all this? A passage in the Mbh, Sântiparvan (crit. ed. 211.26;

vulgate

218.27)

says:

The

conclusion based

on

inference

and tradition

-

both are rooted in

per

ception. Perception

and

testimony

(what

we are told to believe

in)

are iden

tical;

reasoned-out truth

(^inference)

too is

nothing

but

perception.6

In

the

Anusâsanaparvan

too

(147.9)

three

instruments of

cognition

are mentioned:

(a)

direct

perception

confirmed

by

the world

(lokatah

siddham

pratyaksam),

(b)

doctrines

propounded by

the

scriptures,

and

(c)

the

practice

of eminent

people

(sista).

Dandekar,

the editor of this

parvan,

observes:

"Presumably,

anumâna is to

be understood to have been included in pratyaksa" (crit. ed., 1119).

It was

only

later,

when the

philosophical

debates between the Vedists and the

non-Vedists

(the

Buddhists

and the Jains in

particular)

were

raging,

that the

question

of

inference as

an

independent

means

of

knowledge along

with word

(scripture)

assumed a focal

position.

Both

Vâtsyâyana

and

Jayantabhatta

spent

much

of

their time and

energy

to establish the

independent

status of inference

(C/L,

pp.

76ff and

128ff).

Inference in fact is the

chief,

if not the

sole,

concern of

the

Nyñyasütra

itself.

Therefore,

the

explication

of the two Cârvâka

aphorisms

(HI. 1-2)

made

by

the

commentators

merely

reiterates and reinforces the

position

of

the

ancient

Indian

materialists,

both

pre-Cârvâka

and the

Cârvâka/Lokâyata.

The

commentators,

regardless

of their differences of

opinion concerning

other

issues,

are

unanimous

in

this

regard: they

do not admit the

independent

status

of inference as a

means

of

knowledge,

and at the same time

they clearly

state that inference based on

per

ception

is

definitely

admissible and is

actually

admitted

by

the Cârvâkas.

Once

we

understand

this,

much of the

lampoon

and

derisive remarks

of its

opponents

such as

Hemacandra

(cf.

AYVD,

v.

20)

and

others

turn out to be mere

calumny.

5 Gunaratna

(TRD

on

SDSam,

v.

83),

Ratnaprabhâ

(on

PNTA 540. See

Bhattacharya

2010,

p.

30),

and the

anonymous

authors of

Avacürni

(on SDSam,

v.

83)

and SMS

(15)

(Bhattacharya

2009,

pp.

116-117,

168)

quite

unambiguously

refer to this

interpretation.

6

Bronkhorst

translates this

verse somewhat

differently (p.

310)

but his

interpretation

too refers to direct

perception

as the root of all true

knowledge.

Ô

Springer




9/15

536

R.

Bhattacharya

When Commentators Differ

So

far,

so

good.

The

position

of

the

Cârvâka/Lokâyata

vis-à-vis inference is made

crystal

clear

by

the commentators. The

problem

arises when the same set of com

mentators differ

in

their

interpretations

of certain

aphorisms.

Udbhata's

interpretation

of the

aphorism,

"Earth,

water,

fire and air are the

principles, nothing

else

(iti)"

(1.2.

Bhattacharya

2009,

p.

80)

is a case in

point.

The

word iti denotes the end.7 Since the

Cârvâkas

accept only

these four

elements,

not

"space"

(âkâsa)

as the

fifth,

s some earlier materialists

(cf.

Bhattacharya

2009,

pp.

33-41 for

sources)

and

many

others

did,

they

are called

four-elementalists

(bhûta-catustaya-vâdins)

as

opposed

to the

five-elementalists

(bhuta-pañcaka

vâdins).

Udbhata, however,

claimed that it was

impossible

to

lay

down

any

fixed

number and essential characteristic of the

sources

of

knowledge (NM,

I:

52),

and

objects

of

knowledge

too are more than

four: 'the

word,

iti,

in the

(aphorism),

"earth,

water,

fire

and air iti"

indicates also the

possibility

of

similar

objects

of

knowledge,

other

than the

earth,

etc.'

(qtd.

GrBh 1:

100).

Vádidevasüri

quotes

more

extensively

from

Udbhata's

commentary:

The

word,

iti,

does not denote the end

(but)

it is illustrative.

There are other

principles

such as

consciousness, sound,

pleasure,

pain,

desire,

aversion,

effort,

mpression

and others

(SVR 1087).

Not satisfied with these

categories,

Udbhata further writes:

"There are also

prior

non-existence of the earth, etc., posterior non-existence, the mutual difference

which are

quite apparent

and distinct

(from

the

principles,

viz.,

earth,

etc.)."

(qtd.

SVR

1087).

Cakradhara

clearly

stated

that

Udbhata

was here

forsaking

the conventional

interpretation

(yathâsrutârtha-tyâgena)

(GrBh

1:

100).

Apparently

Udbhata was

referring

to issues that

are well

known to the

Nyâya

Vaisesikas. He knew full well that iti cannot be

equated

to

ityadi

(etc.).

Yet he

attempted

to fit the Cârvàka

aphorism

into the

Nyâya-Vaisesika

frame.

This

may

be considered

ingenious,

as is his defence of the

Càrvâka

position

of

viewing

inference as

secondary

(see above).

But there is

nothing

to show that the

Cârvâkas ever thought in terms of Nyâya-Vaisesika categories. Udbhata does not

adduce

any

new

argument

in

support

of his novel

explication

(as

he does in relation

to

inference).

On

the

contrary,

he flies in the

face of

the

accepted meaning

of

iti

and,

maybe

with the

best

of

intentions,

introduces

Nyâya-Vaisesika

categories

which are

quite

alien

to

the

original Cârvâka/Lokâyata.

7

Explaining

KA 1.2.10

(sâmkhyam yogo lokâyatam cetyânvîksikï)

Jacobi

says:

"According

to

Kautilya

the essence of

philosophy

lies in

systematic investigation

and

logical

demonstration;

in his

judgement

these conditions are satisfied

only

(iti)

by Sâmkhya, Yoga

and

Lokayata" (p.

102).

Ô

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10/15

What the Cârvakas

Originally

Meant

537

All

this does show marks of what is

sometimes viewed as

"growth"

or "radical

innovation",

but

at

the same time it exhibits alien addition as

well.8

The Cârvâka View on

Inference

in

the SDS

It is well known

that all the

Cârvâka/Lokâyata

works,

the base text

and the com

mentaries,

had

disappeared

from India before the

SDS

was

composed.

Not

a

single

verbatim

quotation

from

any

Cârvâka work is

found

in

the whole of the

SDS,

not

even a

single

name

(excepting

that of

Brhaspati).

Whatever the

author of the first

chapter

of the SDS

(Sâyana-Mâdhava

himself or

someone

else)

knew about the

system

was not based on his

reading

but most

probably

on

what

he had heard from

his guru. (It may be added in parentheses that in ancient India gurumukhTvidya was

sine

qua

non;

no amount of

reading

would

be

considered a

fitting

subsitute for it.

See

Aiyangar

10. Cf. Jha's

regret,

1:

x).

Moreover,

it is doubtful whether the

guru

himself had

ever

glanced

at an authentic Cârvâka work.

Apparently

there

was a

guru-sisya paramparâ

(a

continuum from

preceptors

to

disciples)

and that was the

only

source to learn

anything

about the Cârvâka. Yet a

very cogent argument

is

found in the

SDS

(7-10;

C/L,

pp.

250-251)

to

justify

the

Cârvâka

position regarding

the

admissibility

of

perception

alone as a valid instrument of

cognition, rejecting

summarily

the claims of all others

(inference,

word,

comparison,

and

upâdhi

or

absence of a

condition).

Nevertheless it will not be advisable to accept the passage in the SDS as a

statement

reflecting

the

genuine Cârvâka/Lokâyata

view. The

reason is this: there is

no

supporting

evidence in

favour of such

a

representation.

Since no

authority

is

mentioned,

the

passage

should

be

taken

as

a

formulation made

by

the learned author

of the

SDS,

not

by

a Cârvâka. This is an

instance

in

which the view of the

digest

maker is not to be admitted because of the lack

of

any

corroborative evidence.

Moreover,

no mention is made in the

SDS

of

the limited

validity

of

inference,

as

Purandara and others have

unequivocally

declared

(see above).

This is another

reason

why

the

passage,

like the so-called

Lokâyata aphorisms

in

the Kâmasû

tra,

1.2.26-30,

is

unacceptable

(see

Bhattacharya

2009,

pp.

94-95).

Contradictory Interpretations

Offered

by

Commentators

Now we

come to

an

example

of

contradictory

explanations.

After

stating

that the

principle

is the four elements

and

that

their combination is called the

body,

sense

and

object,

the

base

text

says, probably

in the

very

next

aphorism, tebhyas

(that

is,

8

Karin Preisendanz

(2008)

apparently

does

not

consider such alien additions

to

be of

much

significance.

She classifies commentaries into two kinds:

(i)

creative,

(ii)

philosophically unproductive (pp.

609-611).

In her usage Udbhata would be considered creative in the sense of being "philosophically productive".

But as both Cakradhara and Vâdidevasûri noted

(see below),

Udbhata

was known

to

be an

innovator

and

hence

was contrasted to Bhâvivikta who

apparently

remained true to the

spirit

of the base text

(GrBh

2:

257-258).

Udbhata was not treated on a

par

with Bhâvivikta and

others,

since he did not

represent

the

views of the ancient

(cirantana)

Cârvâka teachers.

Similarly,

when

Solomon

calls

Udbhata "a

progressive

Cârvâka"

(p.

990)

she

implicitly

admits that

he

did

not

adhere

strictly

to the

original

stand of the school.

â

Springer




11/15

538

R.

Bhattacharya

bhiltebhyas)caitanyam

(1.2-4).

Literally

it

appears

to mean: "From them

(the

ele

ments),

consciousness."

As is

evident,

there is no

supplementary

verb to

complete

the sentence

(technically

called

adhyâhâra).

What was in the mind of

the redactor/s

of the base text can

only

be

guessed.

Two different

suggestions

were made

by

two

commentators. One

(anonymous)

said:

the

missing

verb should

be "is

born";

the

other

(again

anonymous) proposed

"is manifested"

(TS

v.

1858,

TSP 2:

633-634).

The two

proposals

are

contradictory,

for,

if

the first is

admitted,

the second

cannot

be true

and vice versa. The first would assert that there can be no

consciousness

prior

to

the

existence

of a

living

human

body.

The

second,

on the other

hand,

would

suggest

that consciousness is

already

existent,

apart

from and

quite

independent

of

the human

body;

it is manifested

when the human

body

is formed and born. The

second

proposal

then would mean desertion of the monistic materialist

position

traditionally ascribed to the Cârvâkas.

This

is

not

all.

Udbhata,

writing

at least a

century

or so after these

two

anonymous

commentators,

reopened

the issue

by challenging

the

common

understanding

of the

word

tebhyah

as "from

these",

taken

in

the

sense

of ablative case

(fifth

declension).

In Sanskrit

tebhyah

can mean "for these" as

well.

Preferring

the second

meaning,

Udbhata

explained

the

aphorism

as: it is

for

the sake

of

the four elements that

consciousness comes into

being.9

He

did not concern himself with the

missing

verb

but

sought

to establish a dualist view that consciousness existed

apart

from and even

prior

to matter. He had

apparently

taken his cue from the second

interpretation

(or

it

may

have been

derived from

Sâmkhya)

and

explained

this

aphorism

as follows:

"Consciousness is for (the sake of) elements; consciousness is independent and aids

the

physical

elements

which

constitute

the

body" (qtd.

GrBh

2:

257).

Udbhata's

interpretation

is not

grammatically

invalid. There is indeed a rule in

Kâtyâyana's

Vârttika

(on

Astâdhyâyï

1.4.44)

that

provides

for the use of the fourth

declension to

suggest purpose

or

intent

(tâdarthye

caturthT

vâcyâ,

Vasu

352).

But

by

saying

that consciousness is

independent

of

the

four elements that constitute the

human

body

Udbhata leaves the door

open

to a non-materialist

position.

The

Cârvâka

position

was

essentially

monistic:

no

body,

no consciousness. Even if we

take Udbhata to be a dualistic

materialist,

it

clearly

involves desertion of

the

original

Cârvâka

position.

All this does show

signs

of

growth

but at the same time

exhibits

a

tendency

to

move

away

from

the

original

doctrine.

Quite

appropriately,

therefore,

Cakradhara

contrasts Udbhata

with Bhâvivikta and other ancient

Cârvâka teachers

(GrBh

2:

257).

Unlike

them,

Udbhata did not

uphold

the

old,

traditionally accepted position.

On another

occasion,

too,

Cakradhara notes that Udbhata

forsook the conventional

interpretation

(GrBh

1:

100).

9

This second

position

is reminiscent of Sri Aurobindo's realist but

anti-materialist stand

regarding

matter vis-à-vis consciousness . Unlike the non-dualist Vedantins like

Sañkara

he

admitted this world to

be real but added:

[T]here

is a

course of life and consciousness

originally

alien to Matter which has

yet

entered into

an

occupied

Matter,

-

perhaps

from another world. From

whence, otherwise,

can it

have come...

nothing

can evolve out of Matter which is not therein

already

contained,

(pp.

96-97).

Sri Aurobindo does not

accept

the dualist

position

of

Sâmkhya

either,

nor

does

he

regard

Sankara's

theory

of illusion as valid

(p.

11).

Springer




12/15

What the Cârvâkas

Originally

Meant

539

Vadidevasüri too

writes,

"This

respectable

veteran twice born

(sc.

Udbhata)

is

revealing

to us a novel

way

of

answering

criticism."

(SVR

764).

Here the assertion made

by

LaFrague

is of seminal

importance. Surely

the

redactor(s)

of the base text

could not have meant all three

interpretations

when

he/

they

framed

the

aphorism.

Since we have no

way

of

knowing

the

author's

mind,

we

must

go

for

a

reasonable

conjecture.

If he had

the second or the third

interpretation

in

mind,

the

very

basis of

the

Cârvâka/Lokâyata

doctrine would be

compromised.

The

first two

aphorisms clearly

state the

primacy

of the four elements as the

principle

(tattva).

If

consciousness were the

principle

or one of the

principles,

the

second

aphorism

would have said so instead of

naming

all

the

four elements indi

vidually

and

stopping

there with a decisive

word,

iti.

So the second and the third

interpretations

of the third

aphorism

are

unacceptable.

What

led

the second and the

third

interpreters

to

defy

the

spirit

of the first

three aphorisms is not known to us.

But

one

point

is

evident: the

aphorisms

could

mean,

both to the author and to his

audience,

only

what the first

interpretation

says.

The second

and

the

third inter

pretations definitely suggest

different lines of

development

away

from

the intention

of the author.

Conclusion

Development

and

growth

are

only

to be

expected

of all

philosophical systems

that

continue to exist over the centuries. Thus we have the development of Sâmkhya,

which

becomes allied to

Yoga

and becomes a

syncretic

theistic

system.

The same

story

is

repeated

when the

atheistic

Nyáya merges

with Vaisesika and becomes a

theistic

system.

Such

syncretic

doctrines doubtless reflect

development

and

growth.

Nevertheless,

they

are not to be identified with

the

original Sâmkhya

or the

original

Nyâya

or the

original

Vaisesika. When we

speak

of

development

and

growth,

which

are

admittedly

inevitable,

we should not turn a blind

eye

to the

fact

that

later works

often

move

away

from the

original position

of

the

system.

It is not the case that all

forms

of

development

and

growth necessarily

reflect the

original

intention of the

author.

The critics of the Cârvâka/Lokâyata, we have seen, knew

only

too well that

Udbhata had

taken a

position

that was

quite

different from the

original

one. Are we

to call this

development?

When new facts and

arguments

are

proposed

to affirm the

contention of

the base text

in

order to reassert its

validity,

as viewed

by

its later

adherents

or

explicators,

such events

may very

well

be called

development.

On

the

other

hand,

when

quite

novel but

contrary positions

are

proposed, presumably

to

support

the

contention of the

aphorisms

in a different

way,

the event cannot but be

called

inconsistency.

Such inconsistencies

may

gain

currency

over the course of

time and become a

part

of the tradition of this or that

system,

but

they

evince

inconsistency

all the same.

This

happened

to

Nyâya,

Mîmâmsâ and other

systems.

The

Brahmasütra

in

fact

has been

interpreted

in a dozen different

ways by

its

commentators,

so much so that

it is

impossible

to assert what

Bâdarâyana,

to

whom

the

authorship

of

the base text

is

attributed,

had in mind. Yet it cannot be denied that he must have had

something

Springer




13/15

540

R.

Bhattacharya

in

his

mind which the commentators in their zeal to establish

their own

philo

sophical systems

have more than once

misused,

sometimes

going against

the

position

he held. After all

Bâdarâyana

could not have been a

dualist,

a

non-dualist,

a

modified

non-dualist,

a

realist,

a

subjective

idealist,

etc. all at

the same time It is

therefore futile to

think

of

the Vedânta doctrine. We

have several Vedânta

doctrines.

That

is all.

Vedânta

is

of course an extreme case. But

Nyâya,

Mïmâmsâ and

the Cârvâka

systems

also exhibit several

different

approaches,

not all of which can be considered

consistent with the view

of

the

original

authors and

their

audiences. In order to

study

these

systems,

instead of

concentrating solely

on the

doctrine,

a

historicist

approach

is essential

in

order to

trace their

developments

and

note where and how some

commentators moved

away

from

the

original position.

Whenever there is a

sign

of

any forced explanation, inconsistent with grammar and conventional use, it has to be

taken as

a

case of

inconsistency.

The

more

the

commentator tries to hold fast to the

words of the

aphorism

but

interprets

them

by

doing

violence to

these two criteria

(grammar

and conventional

use),

the more certain it is that he is

moving away

from

the

original position.

Udbhata's

interpretations

of iti and

tebhyah

are cases in

point.

Polemicists like

Jayantabhatta may

not

distinguish

between the

original position

and

the new

position,

but a student of

philosophy

cannot afford

not to do so.

Having

no

axe

to

grind

either in defense or

reputation

of

any system,10

one should first

ascertain,

as

best

as

one

can,

what the doctrine meant

to its author and its

audience,

and then

proceed

to

study

the

development

of the

system

over the

ages.

No other

approach can do justice to the systems of philosophy in India that flourished and

continued to

hold

sway

over one

or the

other section of the

people

for

several

centuries.

Let me reiterate: there is no

gainsaying

that some

changes

are

inevitable

in

any

system

of

philosophy

because of its constant interface with other

systems.

But

we

should not view all such

changes

on a

par

with one another. Doctrinal or

religious

bias should not make us

forget

that in

pre-modern

India a

master of

philosophy

was

supposed

to be a master of all

philosophical systems, living

or

dead,

the

Cârvâka/

Lokâyata

not

excepted.

Consider,

for

instance,

the

praise

of

Vyomasiva

(or

Vyomasambhu

or

Vyomesa)

in the

Ranode

stone

inscription

(Epigraphia

Indica,

1:

358)

in which

Vyomasiva

is

eulogized

as

lokâyate

sadgurur

bbuddho buddhamate

jinoktisu

jinah,

Sadguru (Brhaspati)

in

the

Lokâyata,

the Buddha in the

doctrine of

the

Buddha,

and Jina

(Mahâvïra)

in

the

sayings

of the Jina

(line

37).

Had it been

otherwise,

the

authors of

philosophical digests

and

compendia

from

Haribhadra

(eighth century)

down to Cimanabhatta

(nineteenth

century)

would

not have included

in their

works

all

systems,

both orthodox and

heterodox,

known

to them.

10

No less

a

savant than Louis de Vallée

Poussin,

because of his

idealist

mindset,

calls

materialists

"philosophers

without

philosophy"

(8: 494).

Speaking

of the

parable

of the

Wolfs

Footprint

(SDSam,

v.

81),

he writes: 'A man who wanted to convert—let us

say "pervert"—a

woman to

his materialist

opinion...' (ibid.). All this in an encyclopaedia article

To cite another

example,

nearer home: B.

Bhattacharya proposed

to

identify

Kambalâsvatara of

the TS

with the Kambalâsvatara mentioned in the

Sargttâloka

on the

following ground:

"It is not at all

strange

that a member of a materialist

sect should devote himself to

music;

disbelieving

in

transmigration

of soul

or in a future life the

cultivation of

pleasure

in this life should seem

logical

and

entirely

proper"

(p.

xxxviii).

Ô

Springer




14/15

What the

Cârvâkas

Originally

Meant

541

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