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WhatLenaKnows:

AnInvariantistInterpretationofContextualistCases

Abstract

“Thebestgroundsforacceptingcontextualism”,accordingtoKeithDeRose“comefromhowknowledge-attributing(andknowledge-denying)sentencesareusedinordinary,non-philosophicaltalk.”InwayofprovidingsuchgroundshepresentsthestoryofThelma,LouiseandLena,protagonistsinthe“officecase”.Hethenappealstoourintuitivereactionstoknowledgeattributionsanddenialsmadewithinthatcase.InthispaperIpresentaninvariantistinterpretationofthoseintuitions.Accordingtoit,wecan’tcoherentlybeinterpretedasintuitingthatbothattributionanddenialaretrue.Andalthoughwedoperhapsintuitthattheyareappropriate,thatintuitionisexplicablebyappealtowhatDeRosecalls“secondarypropriety”derivingfromtheknowledgeruleofassertion,whichexplanationiscompatiblewithinvariantism.

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WhatLenaKnows:

AnInvariantistInterpretationofContextualistCases

1.Stories,Intuitions,Interpretations

“Thebestgroundsforacceptingcontextualism”,accordingtoKeithDeRose,“comefromhowknowledge-attributing(andknowledge-denying)sentencesareusedinordinary,non-philosophicaltalk.”(DeRose2009,46)Thismightbetakentomotivateanempiricalstudyofknowledgeattributionsanddenialsinactual,non-philosophicaldiscourse;butDeRoseandothercontextualistsproceedinamoreindirect,yetmorefamiliarlyphilosophical,fashion.Theyfirsttellcarefullystructuredtalesinwhichoneprotagonistattributesknowledgeandanotherdeniesitoftheverysameperson.Theythenappealtoourintuitions.Theymightsuggestthatwedirectlyintuitthatbothattributionanddenialaretrue.Contextualismthenfollowsswiftlyifthatintuitioniscorrect,solongasthecaseiswellconstructed.1Morecautiously,theywillsuggestthatweatleastintuitthatbothattributionanddenialareappropriate,andthenarguethatitisverydifficulttomakesenseoftheirbeingsounlesscontextualismistrue.

Inhis2009,DeRosepresentsaverycarefullyconstructedstory:thatofThelma,Louise,andLena,protagonistsinthe“officecase”.Thiscasemanifestscertainvirtues(fromthecontextualiststandpoint,ofcourse)notsharedbyhisearlier“bank”casesandStewartCohen’s“airport”case,andmuchofhisargumentinhis2009restsuponit.2Iwilltaketheofficecasetorepresentthestateofthecontextualistcase-buildingart.

InthispaperIwillpresentaninvariantistinterpretationoftheofficecase(andofvariationsofthatcasethatwillbepresentedalongtheway)thatis,sofarasIam

1Inparticular,ifitisconstructedinsuchawayastodistinguishtheintuitionspredictedbycontextualismfromthosepredictedbycompetitorviewssuchassubject-sensitiveinvariantism.Seesection7below.2ThebankcasewasintroducedinDeRose1992,Cohen’sairportcaseinhis1999.Thevirtuesinquestionincludethefollowing:thecaseinvolvesthird-person(vs.first-person)knowledgeattributionanddenial;itdoesnotinvolvedisputebetweenattributoranddenier;itdoesnotinvolveashiftfromattributiontodenial(orviceversa)bythesameperson;the“high-standards”contextmanifestsanincreaseinboththestakesandsalienceofanerror-possibility;andnoexceedinglyhigh,“philosophical”standardsareinvolved.SeeDeRose2009,Ch.2.

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aware,distinctfromotherinvariantistinterpretationsalreadyonthetable.Accordingtoit,wecan’tcoherentlybeinterpretedasintuitingthatbothattributionanddenialaretrue.Andalthoughwedoperhapsintuitthattheyareappropriate,thatintuitionisexplicablebyappealtowhatDeRosecalls“secondarypropriety”derivingfromtheknowledgeruleofassertion(thathefavors),whichexplanationiscompatiblewithinvariantism.

2.Thelma,Louise,Lena

DeRose’spresentationoftheofficecasefillsalmosttwofullpagesofDeRose2009.Insteadofpresentingitinfulltoreaderswhoarelikelyalreadyfamiliarwithit,Iwillattempttosummarizethemostimportantfeatures.

Thelma,Louise,andLenaworkinanofficewithJohnandFrank.Johnisoftenabsent.Butintheirlongexperience,ifhishatwashangingonthehookinthehallway,Johnwasinvariablythereaswell.Allthreeseethatitishangingonthehooktoday.TheyalsohearFrankshoutingtoanothercolleaguethatheshouldclearsomethingwithJohn.ThelmaandLouiseareawarethatthisistheonlyevidenceanyofthemhaveofJohn’spresence.Thelmagoestoatavern,whereshemeetsafriendwithwhomshehadbet$5thatJohnwouldbeintheoffice.Sheandherfriendtakehertohavewonthebet.ThelmasaysthatLena,whomadethesamebet,“knows,too”thatJohnwasintheoffice.

Meanwhile,Louiseencountersthepolicewhoareconductinganextremelyimportantinvestigationofsomehorriblecrime.TheyhavesomereasontobelieveJohnwasatwork,butareseekingtoverifythathewasthere.TheyaskLouisewhethershecouldtestifythathewasatwork.Louisesaysthatshecould“testifythatIsawhishathanginginthehall,whichisaveryreliablesignthathe’satwork.”ShealsoindicatesthatsheheardFrank’sshout.ButshesupposesthatJohncouldhavelefthishatonthehookovernight,andthatFrankmightnotactuallyhaveseenJohn.ThepoliceaskherwhetherLenaknowsthatJohnwasin.Shereplies:“No.Shewasattheofficeverybriefly,withme,anddidn’tseeJohn,either.ShehasthesamereasonsIhaveforthinkingJohnwasthere,but,likeme,shedoesn’tknowthatJohnwasthere.”

WearealsotoldthatJohnwasindeedattheoffice,thatthepolicelaterverifythiswithFrankandsomeotherworkers,andthatThelmaassertedthat“She[Lena]knows,too”atthesametimethatLouiseasserted“she[Lena]doesn’tknowthatJohnwasthere”.3

3Thecaseispresentedon4-5ofDeRose2009.

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3.Alterations

Iwillmaketwoalterationstothecasebeforeproceeding.Idon’tthinkeitherunderminesDeRose’sargumentsasgroundedonthiscase.

First,forsheersimplicityIwillremoveFrankandhisshouttohiscolleague,sothattheonlydirectevidenceThelma,Louise,andLenahaveisthepresenceofJohn’shat.PerhapsDeRoseintroducedFrankbecauseheworriedthatthepresenceofJohn’shataloneistoolittleevidencetolicenseevenThelma’sknowledgeattribution.Ifthereadersharesthatconcern,thecommentarytofollowcanberevisedtore-introduceFrankwithoutchangingthesubstanceorconclusions.

ThesecondchangepertainstoDeRose’shavingthepoliceaskLouisewhethershecouldtestifythatJohnwasatwork.Louise(andwe)mightreasonablythinkthatshecanonlylegitimatelysotestifyifsheactuallysawhimintheoffice.Thatdoesnotimplythatsheisemployinghigher,ratherthanmorespecificstandards:shemightreasonablybelievethatonecanonlytestifytoPifoneisawitnesstoP,evenifonehasothersourcesofknowledgeforP.

Ifso,thequestionwhethersheandLenacantestifyisnotreallythequestionwhethertheyknowthatJohnwasintheoffice,butinsteadthemorespecificquestionwhethertheyknowthisinvirtueofhavingseenhim.Itistruethat,attheendoftherelevantpassage,LouisedeniesthatsheandLenaknow(andnotmerelythatneithercantestify).Giventhatthepossibilityoftestifyingisintheair,however,itwouldbenosurpriseifLouisethoughtthatassertingthatsheandLenaknowwouldbetantamounttoclaimingthattheysawhim.

DeRose’scasedoesnotrequirethatthepolicementiontestifying.Theyareonlyattemptingto“verify”thatwhichtheyhavesomereasontobelieve—thatJohnwasintheoffice—inthecourseofaninvestigation.PresumablythepolicewillhaveconveyedenoughoftheseriousnessoftheissuethatLouiserecognizesthestakesinvolved.

Sosupposethepolicedon’tmentionthepossibilityoftestifying:they’reconductinga“preliminaryinvestigation”andjustaskingwhatsheknows.Thepolicedostilltellherthattheinvestigationconcernsahorriblecrime,andinlightofthissheremainsdisinclinedtosaythatsheknowsthatJohnwasthereinvirtuehavingseenhishat.

4.Non-GettierizationasImplicitFictionalTruth

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DeRoseexplicitlyindicatesthat“Johnwasattheofficetoday”istrue.4Andsoheshould.Theseare,afterall,fictions.Knowledgebeingfactive,ifthestoryDeRosetellsleavesitunsettledwhetherJohnwasinfactattheofficethenwe,thereaders,areinnopositiontoaffirmordenythattheknowledgeclaimsmadebythespeakersaboutthesubjectaretrue.

Butwearetold:Johnwasattheoffice.WearethentointuitwhetherThelmaandLouisespeakthetruth.Theimplicitsuggestionisthattherestofthestorywillprovideus,thereaders,withthewherewithaltointuitcorrectly.Afterall,ifmorewereneeded—ifwecouldnotreasonablybeexpectedtoconsiderwhetherthespeakers’knowledgeattributionsanddenialsweretrueunlessothercrucialdetailsarefilledin—thenweshouldreservejudgment,aswouldbeappropriateifDeRosewereunwillingtotellusthatJohnwasintheoffice.

ButthereissomethingoddinthesuggestionthattherestoftheinformationDeRoseprovidesaboutthecaseisadequateinthisway.Thatinformationfallsintotwocategories:thatpertainingtothestakesandsalienceofanerror-possibility;andthatpertainingtotheevidenceavailabletothespeakers.Giventhatthesecasesaredesignedtopersuadeusofthetruthofcontextualism,theformerinformationistobeexpected.Theodditypertainstothelatterinformation.

Intheofficecase,thethreeprotagonistssharethesameevidence:theyallsawJohn’shathunginthehallattheoffice,whichhasbeena“sure-fire”indicationofhispresenceinthepast.Butonalmostnobody’sviewdoesthisconstituteenoughinformationtodeterminewhetherthespeakersspeaktrulywhentheyaffirmanddenythatthesubjectknows,notevenwhensupplementedbytheinformationthatJohnwasintheoffice.5FortheinformationthatDeRoseprovidesdoesnottellusthattheprotagonistsarenotGettiered.ItisconsistentwiththeofficecaseasDeRosepresentsitthatJohnhadbeenattheofficeandhadlefthishatovernight.6

4Healsosays,inthebankcase,thatthebankwillinfactbeopenonSaturday(inbothhis1992and2009).HoweverCohendoesnot,inhisdescriptionoftheairportcase,explicitlysaythatthereisinfactastopoverinChicago.5Sartwell1991isanexception.6Varioustheoriesofknowledge—especiallythosewithan“externalist”slant—willalso,ofcourse,imposeotherconditions.ThereisnothingintheofficecasethatensuresthatLena’sbeliefiseithersensitiveorsafe,forexample.ItmaybethatherhavingseenJohn’shatcontributestothesensitivityand/orsafetyofLena’sbelief:ifheweren’tthere,perhaps,neitherwouldithavebeen(andsoLenawouldn’tbelievehewas),andthereare,perhaps,nonearbypossibleworldsinwhichhewouldhavebeenabsentandhishatpresent.Butperhapsnot:nothingintheofficecaseasDeRosepresentsitensuresthattheseconditionshold.Indeed,ifLenaisGettiered,herbeliefisassuredlyneithersensitivenorsafe.ThatshecouldbeGettieredconsistentlywiththeinformationDeRosehasprovidedthereforeimpliesthatherbeliefcouldbeinsensitiveand/orunsafe.

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Butifthat’swhatactuallyhappened—thatis,whatactuallyhappenedinthestory—thenalthoughJohnwasintheoffice,intuitivelynoneoftheprotagonistsknowthathewas(notevenThelma).Sowe,wellawareofthethreatofGettierization,shouldrefusetoformulateanopinionastowhetherthespeakers’knowledgeattributionsanddenialsarecorrectonthegroundsthatinadequateinformationhasbeenprovided,justaswewouldifDeRosehadnottoldusthatJohnwasintheoffice.7

DeRosemightcounterthatthereisalwaysmorethatistrue“inthestory”thanisexplicitlymentioned.Indeed,attheendofhispresentationofthebankcasesDeRosetellsustoassume“thatthereisnothingunusualabouteither[high-standardorlow-standardscenario]thathasnotbeenincludedinmydescriptioninit”(DeRose2009,2).Nosuchinstructionisexplicitlystatedwithrespecttotheofficecase;butperhapsitisimplicitthatitisexplicitly(?)statedtheretoo.OrperhapsDeRosethinksthatnoexplicitstatementisrequiredbecauseoneshouldgenerallyassumethatfictionaltruthsincludethosethatrenderthestoryasusualaspossible.SinceGettierizationis,althoughoccasionallyrealized,neverthelessunusual,itisanimplicitfictionaltruththatthestories’protagonistsarenotGettiered,whichwethenassumewhileintuiting.

5.MakingitExplicit

IfitisanimplicitfictionaltruththattheprotagonistsarenotGettiered,thenmakingitexplicitshouldeitherhavenoeffectatallorreinforcetheintuitionsoriginallyelicitedwhenitwasimplicit,sincedoingsomerelyconfirmsanassumptionwe,thereaders,madewhenarrivingatthoseintuitions.

Butthoseintuitionsseeminsteadtodissolve,oratleastweaken,whenthatassumptionismadeexplicit.Considertheofficecasewiththisinformation

Iwillneverthelessconcentratedirectlyonthenon-Gettierconditionitselfinwhatfollows,sinceit(orwhateveritturnsouttobe)isvirtuallyuniversallyrecognizedtobeatruth-conditionofknowledge.7DeRosedoestakeseriouslythepossibilitythatacontext’sstandardscouldbelowenoughthatmeretruebeliefcountsasknowledge,althoughhedoesn’tultimatelyendorseit(DeRose2009,13-18).HealsociteswhathetakestobeaplausibleinstanceofGettieredknowledge(originatinginHawthorne2000,203).ButhepresumablydoesnotsuggestthatThelmaoccupiessoliberalacontext.CertainlyitisveryunintuitivethatThelma’sassertionthat“Lenaknowshewasintheoffice”wouldstillbetrueifJohnhadlefthishatovernight.FromhereonIwillassumethatnotbeingGettieredisatruth-conditionofknowledge.Thosewhodemur—including,possibly,DeRose,forsomecontexts—canrestrictthatassumptiontothecontextsoccupiedbyThelma,Louise,andtheprotagonistsoftheotherstandardcasesofferedinsupportofcontextualism,withoutdamagetotheargumentsbelow.

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emphasized:itisnowpartoftheexplicitlystatedbackstorythatJohndidindeedtakehishatwhenhelefttheoffice,andthatnootherGettier-generatingscenariowasrealized.(Nobodyintheofficehasanidenticalhat,forexample.)8WethereadersarenowfullyawarethatthepossibilitythatworriedLouiseandledhertodenythatLenaknows—thatJohnmighthavelefthishatovernight—isnotrealized:thehat’spresenceisasindicativeofhispresencetodayasithasalwaysbeeninthepast.Callthisthe“no-Gettiervariation”oftheofficecase.

Inolongersharetheintuitionthat,whenLouisesaysthat“Lenadoesn’tknowthatJohnwasintheoffice”,whatshesaysistrue.Herassertionmightstillseemappropriate,giventhatsheisnotprivytothisnewinformationconcerningJohn’shat.9ButInolongerfindmyselfclearlyinclinedtoagreewithherwiththatinformationinhand.CertainlyIamconsiderablylesscomfortabledoingsothanwhenthetalewasoriginallytoldwiththisdetailleftout.

TheinformationtowhichwehavebecomeprivywhenthisismadeexplicitdoesputusinamuchbetterpositionthanisLouisewithrespecttothequestionwhetherLenaknows.WecanbeconfidentthatthepossibilitythatworriedLouise,andledhertodenythatLenaknows,isnotrealized,intheinfalliblewaythatareadercanknowthatapropositionexplicitlystatedbytheauthorisafictionaltruth.

Butthenit’sallthemoredifficulttoseewhyourmoreenviablepositionshouldinclineustoaffirmwhatshesays.ThepossibilitythatJohnlefthishatisnaturallydescribedasathreattoLena’sknowingthathewasintheofficeonthebasisofitspresence.10Wenowknowthatthisthreatisdefused.It’shardtoseewhyweshouldneverthelessendorseLouise’sclaimthat“Lenadoesn’tknow”.

Whyshouldincludingthisinformationhavethiseffectonourintuitions?Oneexplanationsuggestsitself(tobedevelopedinmoredetailbelow).BeforetheinformationthatJohndidn’tleavehishatovernightisprovided,wethereadersshareLouise’suncertainty:wedonottakeittobeaclearfictionaltruththatthisobstacletoLena’sknowingisoutoftheway.TheinformationthatwedohaveisthatsharedbyLouise,Thelma,andLena:someevidencethatLenaknows,butwhichevidenceiscompatiblewithhernotknowingifthatobstacleisinplace.

We(andLouise)mightreasonablyassumethatJohndidn’tleavehishatovernight.Weknow(becausewe’vebeentold)thatthepresenceofhishathasinvariablybeenaccompaniedbyJohn’sownpresenceinthepast.SoperhapsitisafictionaltruththatJohnprobablydidn’tleavehishatyesterday.Butthatdoesnotimplythatitisafictionaltruththathedidnotinfactdoso.

8FromhereonIwillassumethattheonlyplausiblethreatofGettierizationisJohn’shavinglefthishat.9Seesections13-16below.10Thisisaninterestingfeatureofeachofthecontextualists’cases.Seesection14below.

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PerhapsthedifferencebetweenThelmaandLouiseisthatThelmaassumes,whereLouisedoesnot,thatJohndidnotleavehishatwhenconsideringtheevidenceinsupportoftheclaimthatLenaknows.Andperhapsthereasonabilityofthatassumptionisitselfafunctionofthestakesand/orsalienceofalternatives,sothatitisreasonableforThelmatosoassume,butnotforLouise.Perhaps,finally,whetherLenadoesinfactknowissolelyafunctionofwhetherJohnactuallylefthishatovernight,whichisnot,intheoriginalcase,afictionaltruth.11

Sounderstood,thecontextualistisrighttofocusonthedifferenceinstakesand/orsaliencebetweenThelma’sandLouise’scontexts.Butwhatthatdifferenceimpactsisnotthetruth-conditionsoftheirclaimsconcerningLena’sknowing,butthereasonabilityoftheirtakingLenatoknowgiventheevidenceavailabletothemconcerningthepropositionthatsheknowsandwhattheycanreasonablyassume.12

ToexplicitlyindicatethatJohndidn’tleavehishatis,sounderstood,tochangethestory,fromonewithinwhichthiswasnotanimplicitorexplicitfictionaltruthtooneinwhichitis.Intheno-Gettiervariation,Louiseisnotprivytothatinformation,butweare.Whilehercautionremainslaudable,wearenowassured—intheomniscientfashionavailabletoreadersofexplicitlystatedfictionaltruths—thatLenaknows.13WearecorrespondinglyunwillingtoendorseLouise’sassertionthatLenadoesn’tknowastrue.Thisexplanationiscompatiblewithinvariantism.

6.FromProprietytoTruth

Iwillpresentthatexplanationinmoredetailinsections11-16below.Beforedoingso,wemustcontendwithDeRose’ssecondintuition-based,ordinary-languageargumentforcontextualism.Thefirst,whichwehavebeendiscussing,runsfromthe(supposed)intuitionthattheknowledge-attributionanddenialmadebyThelmaandLouise,respectively,aretrue.Thesecondargumentrunsinsteadfromthe(moreplausible)intuitionthattheyareappropriate,andthenutilizesabridgeprincipleconcerningproperassertionfromthatintuitiontotheconclusiontheyaretrue.

[G]enerally(thoughtherearesomeexceptions),onecannotproperlyclaimsomethingthatfromone’spointofview(givenone’sbeliefsabouttheunderlyingmattersoffactrelevanttotheclaimsin

11Norisitafictionalfalsehood.Failureofbivalenceisarguablyquitecommoninfictions.(WasSherlockHolmes’maternalgreat-grandmotherleft-handed?)12Iwillformulatethisbelowmoreprecisely,andcautiously,asconcerningthereasonabilityofThelma’sandLouise’sreasonablytakingthemselvestoknowthatLenaknows.13DeRosewillundoubtedlyhastentopointoutthatLouiseisinfactincautious:shedoesnotonlyrefusetoassertthatLenaknows,butpositivelyassertsthatshedoesn’tknow.Seesections13-16below.

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question)isfalse.So,sincethecontextualist’scasesdonotinvolvespeakerswhoareinvolvedinsomemistakenbeliefaboutarelevantunderlyingmatteroffact,thereisgoodreasontothinkthattheirclaims,whicharemadewithperfectpropriety,aretrue….(DeRose2009,50-51).

Callthisthe“argumentfromproperassertability”.Hereisarepresentationofit.

1.Thelma’sandLouise’sassertionsconcerningwhatLenaknowsareappropriate.(Intuition)

2.Typically,ifaspeaker’sassertionisfalsegivenherbeliefsaboutunderlyingmattersoffactrelevanttotheclaimsinquestion,thenthatspeaker’sassertionisnotappropriate.(Generalpresumptionconcerningassertion)

3.IfThelma’sandLouise’sassertionsarefalsegiventheirbeliefsaboutunderlyingmattersoffactrelevanttotheirassertions,thentheirassertionsarenotappropriate.(2,UI)

4.Therefore,Thelma’sandLouise’sassertionsarenotfalsegiventheirbeliefsaboutunderlyingmattersoffact.(1,3MT)

5.Thelma’sandLouise’sbeliefsaboutunderlyingmattersoffactareallcorrect.(Stipulation)

6.Therefore,Thelma’sandLouise’sassertionsarenotfalse.(4,5MP)

7.Therefore,Thelma’sandLouise’sassertionsaretrue.(6,Bivalence)

Premise4,however,isambiguousbetween“ItisnotthecasethatThelma’sandLouise’sassertionsarefalsegiventheirbeliefsaboutunderlyingmattersoffact”and“GivenThelma’sandLouise’sbeliefsaboutunderlyingmattersoffact,theirassertionsarenotfalse.”Calltheformerthenegationreading(becausethenegationhaswidestscope)andthelattertheimplicationreading(becausetheimplicationrelationhaswidestscope).Thesereadingsaredistinctbecauseone’sunderlyingbeliefsmightimplyneitherthattheassertionistruenorthatitisfalse.Ifso,4istrueunderthenegationreadingbutfalseundertheimplicationreading.

For1and3toimply4byMT,4mustbetheantecedentof3.Butthatantecedentis“Thelma’sandLouise’sassertionsarefalsegiventheirbeliefsaboutunderlyingmattersoffactrelevanttotheirassertions”,thenegationofwhich(deliveredbyMT)isclearlythenegationreading,nottheimplicationreading,of4.Soasitstands,either1and3don’timply4(ontheimplicationreadingof4)or4and5don’timply6(onthenegationreadingof4).Theargument,sorepresented,isinvalid.

Inorderfortheargumenttogothrough,2mustberewrittenasfollows:

2*.Typically,ifaspeaker’sassertionisappropriate,thenitistruegivenherbeliefsaboutunderlyingmattersoffact.

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2isundoubtedlymoreplausiblethan2*.2essentiallysaysthat,generallyspeaking,youshouldn’tgoaboutassertingpropositionswhosedenialsfollowfrom,andsoareincompatiblewith,yourotherbeliefs.Thisisintuitive,andexpectableonvirtuallyeveryproposed“rule”ofassertion.14Ifthatruleis“youshouldassertPonlyifPistrue”(the“truthrule”)thensincePisfalsegivenyourbackgroundbeliefs,thosebackgroundbeliefsalsoimplythatyoucannotsatisfythisrulewithrespecttoP.15Iftheruleis“youshouldassertPonlyifyouknowP”(the“knowledgerule”favoredbyDeRoseandmanyothers),thensinceyourotherbeliefsimplythatPisfalsetheyalsoimplythatyoucannotknowit,knowledgebeingfactive.16Andiftheruleis“youshouldassertPonlyifitisreasonableforyoutobelieveP”(the“reasonabilityrule”)then,assumingyoutypicallycan’treasonablybelievePwhenyourbackgroundbeliefsimplythatPisfalse,thosebackgroundbeliefsimplythatyoucan’treasonablybelieveP.17

2*bycontrastrequiresthat,typically,onecannotproperlyassertPunlessone’sunderlyingbeliefsdoimplythatPistrue,sothatonecannotproperlyassertPifone’sunderlyingbeliefseitherimplythatPisfalseordonotimplyeitherthatitistrueorfalse.Thatis,onitsface,muchmoredemanding,anddoesnotobviouslyfollowfromanyoftheproposedrulesofassertion.

Itisalsoimplausible,atleastasageneralprinciple.Itrequiresthat,typically,onecanonlyproperlyassertthatwhichfollowsfromone’sotherbeliefs.Thiswouldprohibittheassertionofpropositionsthatarethoroughly,albeitnon-deductively,supportedbythoseunderlyingbeliefs,aswellasthosethebelievingofwhichdoesnotdependonotherbeliefs(andsothosethatmanyinternalistsandexternalistsalikemightregardasbasic).Theresultisakindofassertoricskepticism:manyassertionsthatareintuitivelyproper—thosethatareeitherbasicornon-deductivelysupportedbytheasserter’sotherbeliefs—arenotinfactproper.18

2*ismoreplausible,however,ifwecountasamongone’srelevantunderlyingbeliefsthosethatencompasstheassertion’struth-conditions;fortheydoimplythattheassertionistrue.DeRoseismobilizingtheintuitionconcerningwhethertheassertionisappropriate,afterall,inordertomakethosetruth-conditions(oratleastaninterestingcharacteristicofthoseconditions,namely,theircontextualvariability)explicit.Thatmobilizationsucceeds,ifitdoes,becausethoseintuitions

14“Virtually”,becausethethreerulestofollowarenotexhaustiveofsuchrulesintheliterature.Theyare,however,thethreeprimaryapproachesaroundwhichotherrulescluster,andsothattheysufficientlyresembleformypurposehere.15See,e.g.,Weiner2005.16See,e.g.,Williamson2000andDeRose2009.17See,e.g.,Lackey,2007.18Notethatweakening2*to“typically,ifaspeaker’sassertionisappropriate,thenitisprobablytruegivenherbeliefsaboutunderlyingmattersoffact”won’tmitigateassertoricskepticismwithrespecttobasicbeliefs.

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arecausedby,andsoaresymptomsof,theintuiter’simplicitgraspofthosetruth-conditions.

Foronetointuitthatanassertionisappropriateis,sounderstood,foronetointuitthattheassertion’struth-conditionsaresatisfiedontheassumptionthattheassertor’sunderlyingbeliefsaretrue.Ifwearetheninformedthatthosebeliefsaretrue,wecanconcludethatthetruth-conditionsaresatisfied,andsothattheassertionisindeedtrue,asDeRosesuggests.Wecanthenusethatinformationtoclarifywhatthetruth-conditionsactuallyare.

Sounderstood,2*isnotobviouslyunreasonable.Itessentiallysaysthatyoushouldn’tassertPwhenyourunderlyingbeliefsdon’tencompassP’struth-conditions.It’snotcrazytosuggestthatyoucanonlyassertPifyourworldviewincludesthosestatesofaffairsthatwouldhavetoberealizedinorderforPtobetrue.19Forexample,someonewhoasserts“PandQ”butwhodoesn’tbelieveP,orwhoasserts“Bobisabachelor”butdoesn’tbelievethatBobisunmarried,hasintuitivelymadeaninappropriateassertion.

PresumablythisisthestrategythatDeRosereallymeanstoemploy.20WeintuitthatThelma’sandLouise’sassertionsareappropriate.Wealsoknowatleastthismuchabouttheirrelevantunderlyingbeliefs,atleastasexplicitlypresentedinthestory:ThelmaandLouisesharethem.Weknow,moreover—becausethisisstipulated—thatthesebeliefsaretrue.Andourintuitionstellus(ontheviewweareconsidering)that,ifthoseunderlyingbeliefsaretrue,theirassertions’truth-conditionsaresatisfied.SowhenThelmasaysthat“Lenaknows”andLouisethat“Lenadoesn’tknow”theyarebothcorrect.

Buttheirassertionsare,primafacie,incompatible:oneseemstobeaffirmingwhattheotherdenies.Sothetruth-conditionsof“Lenaknows”mustbedifferentwhenThelmaaffirmsandLouisedeniesit,despitethecommonformofwords.Sothatformofwordscanencodedistincttruth-conditionsindistinctcircumstancesofassertion.Thisvariationintruth-conditionsmustbeafunctionoftheonlyremainingdifferenceintheircircumstances:thesalienceand/orstakesinvolved.Socontextualismistrue.

19Therearestillproblemswiththisprinciple.Itappearstorequirethatthetruth-conditionsofanyassertionAmustbeexpressiblebypropositionsthatdonotemployanyoftheterms(oratleasttheessentialterms)inA,sothatitispossibleforthewould-bebelievertobelieveinthose“underlying,relevant”truthconditionswithoutalreadybelievingin,andasserting,A.Thatthisissoisfarfromtrivial,evenwithrespecttoterminologyconcerning“knows”.(Thosewhoconsiderthistobeaprimitivetermmightobject,forexample.)Butputthatconcernasidefornow.20Ifnot,thenIseenorepresentationofitthatbothisvalidandhasplausiblepremises.

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7.WhatLouiseBelieves

Thelma’srelevant,underlyingbeliefsmustthenincludethebeliefthatJohnwasintheoffice,sincehisbeingsoisanobvioustruth-conditionofherassertionthat“Lenaknows”.GiventhatshetakesLenatoknowthathewasthereinvirtueofhavingseenhishat,shemustalsobelievethathedidn’tleaveitovernight.Ifshedidn’tbelievethesethings,herunderlying,relevantbeliefswouldnotencompassthetruth-conditionsfor“Lenaknows”,andsoherassertionwould(by2*)beinappropriate.21Inintuitingthatherassertionisappropriate,wemustthenbeattributingthesebeliefstoher.

Louisemustbelievethesepropositionsaswell.Forotherwise,sheandThelmawouldhavedifferentunderlyingrelevantbeliefs,whichdifferencecouldthenaccountforourintuitingthattheirapparentlycontradictoryassertionsarebothappropriate.22

MakingitexplicitthatLouisehastheseunderlyingbeliefs—and,moreover,fleshingoutthestoryinsuchawayastoensurethatshedoes—shouldonlystrengthentheargumentfromproperassertability,sinceitassuresusthatLouise’sunderlyingrelevantbeliefsdoencompasstherequisitetruth-conditionsasrequiredbythatargument.

Sosupposethat,aftershevoicesherconcerntothepolicethatJohnmighthavelefthishat,thepoliceindicatethatthey’vehadtheofficeundersurveillancebyclose-circuitvideo,andshowherlastevening’sfootageinwhichJohntakeshishatwithhim.(Sadly,thevideoshortedoutjustwhenworkbeganandsodoesn’tindicatewhetherhewastheretoday.)Louiseisconvinced:thehatwouldonlyhavebeenonitshookifJohnhadindeedcometotheoffice.Thisisthe“videovariation”oftheofficecase.

DeRoseshouldpreferthisversionofthestorybecauseitavoidsaproblemwiththeoriginal.IfLouiseweretoattributeknowledgetoLena,she’dintuitivelyhaveto21Tobeclear,I’mnotsuggestingthat“Johndidn’tleavehishatovernight”isatruth-conditionfor“LenaknowsthatJohnwasthere”ingeneral.Itisn’t;shecouldhavelearnedthatJohnwastherebyhavingseenhimevenifhehadlefthishat.Rather,thepointisthat,giventhattheonlywayinwhichLenacouldknowunderthecircumstancesisinvirtueofhavingseenthehat(sothatifJohnhadleftitovernightLenawouldhavebeenGettiered)hisnothavinglefthishatisnowaconditionofherknowing.22IfLouisebelieved,reasonablyyetincorrectly,thatJohnwasn’tintheoffice,thenobviouslythefactthatherassertionthatLenadoesn’tknowisappropriate—becauseitistruegiventhatfalseyetreasonablebelief—wouldhardlyconstituteevidenceforthetruthofcontextualism

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attributeittoherself.Thisisbecausethereisapragmaticincoherenceinattributingknowledgetosomeoneelsewhiledenyingitofoneself.23Butasaresult,oneofcontexualism’scompetitors,subject-sensitiveinvariantism(SSI),willalsoaffirmthatLouisedoesnotknow.Andyet,DeRoseconstructedtheofficestory—inwhichthird-personattributionsareinvolved—inparttodistinguishthepredictionsofthesetwoviews.

AccordingtoSSI,whetherasubjectknowsdepends(inpart)onthepracticalsituationofthesubject.24SinceLouiseisinahigh-stakessituation,herself-ascriptionrequiresthatshemeetquitehighstandards.Butshedoesnotmeetthosestandardsintheoriginalversionoftheofficecase.SoSSIpredictsthatshewillnotself-ascribeknowledge.ShewillalsonotascribesuchknowledgetoLena.ThisisnotbecauseitisLouise’spracticalsituationthatisrelevanttothatascriptionratherthanLena’s—accordingtoSSIitwouldbethelatter—butbecauseshewouldotherwisebepragmaticallyincoherentinthemannersketchedabove.SoLouise’sunwillingnesstoattributeknowledgetoLenaispredictablebybothcontextualismandSSI;theexampledoesn’tdiscriminatebetweenthoseviews.25

Inthevideovariation,however,Louisemeetstherelevantstandardsandsoshouldself-attributeknowledge(onbothviews).ShethereforeneednotavoidattributingknowledgetoLenaforfearofpragmaticincoherence.However,onthecontextualistaccount—butnotontheSSIaccount—sheshouldneverthelessstickwithherdenialthatLenaknows.Forwhileshemeetsthehighstandardsetbyhercontextinvirtueofthenewinformationshehasobtained,Lenadoesnot(sinceherevidenceremainsunchanged).

However,ifLouisestillinsiststhat“Lenadoesn’tknow”afterseeingthevideo,herdoingsodoesnotseem(tome,atleast)tobeobviouslyappropriate.Quitethecontrary,itseemsacceptableforhertosay,“OK,then,Johnreallywasintheofficeifhishatwastheretoday,asbefore.Well,then,IcanassureyouthatJohnwasintheoffice,sinceIdidseehishat.Lenasawitthereaswell,sosheknowshewasintheofficetoo.”

Notice,however,thatLouise’saffirmingthatLenaknowsisdistinctfromherrecommendingthatthepoliceshouldquestionLenaaftertheyarefinishedwithher.Therewouldbelittlepointintheirdoingso.26TheyknowthatLouisesawthehat,23Thatis,itisincoherenttosay“SknowsthatP,butIdon’t.”Theknowledgerulecanexplainthis.Icanproperlyassert“SknowsthatP”onlyifIknowthatSknowsthatP.ButthenIknowthatPistrue(knowledgebeingfactive),whichcontradictsthesecondconjunct.24Hawthorne2004.JasonStanleyoffersessentiallythesameview,callingit“Interest-RelativeInvariantism”,inhis2005.25DeRosewillagainhastentopointoutthatthisdoesn’texplainLouise’swillingnesstoassertthatLenadoesn’tknow(aswellasherbeingunwillingtoassertthatshedoes).Seesections13-16below.26Unless,Isuppose,theywantedmorewitnessestothepresenceofJohn’shat.

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andalsoknow(thankstothevideo)thatitwouldonlybethereifJohnwas.SotheyalreadyknowthatJohnwasthere.

Louisemightthereforeworrythathersaying“Lenaknows”,atleastwithoutqualification—“inthesamewaythatIdo,byseeingthehat”,say—mightsuggesttothemthatLenaisinpossessionofadditionalevidencewhich,evenwithoutseeingthevideo,wouldallowhertoreasonablyclaimknowledgeifthepoliceweretoquestionheraswell.

ButLouiseiswellawarethatLena’sevidentialcircumstancesarepreciselythesameaswereLouise’sbeforebeingshownthevideo,andsothatLenaisinnobetterpositiontoclaimsuchknowledgeiftheyweretoquestionherthanwasLouise,whetherornotLenadoesinfactknow.Backgroundconversationalcircumstances—thatthepolicearewonderingwhethertoquestionLenaaswell—mightthenexplainanyresidualhesitationonLouise’spartbeforeassertingthatLenaknows.Shemightwellworrythatdoingsowouldbe,althoughtrue,misleading;itmightsuggest,incorrectly,thattheycangetsomethingevidentiallyrelevantoutofLenathattheyhaven’talreadygotoutofher.

8.OnlyLenaLooks

DeRoseemphasizesthatitiscompatiblewithcontextualismthattheattributor’scontextsometimesselectsthesubject’spracticalsituationasrelevantforthedeterminationoftheepistemicstandardthataputativeknowermustmeet.Thisiswhatwouldbeexpectediftheattributorwereconsideringtherationalityoftheactionstakenbythesubject.Thisisincontrasttotheattributor’sconsideringthesubjectasapotentialsourceofinformationwithrespecttothepropositionputativelyknown,whereinwewouldexpecttheattributor’scontexttosetastandardinlightofherownsituation.27

SolongasLouiseiscarefultoindicatetothepolicethat,insaying“Lenaknows”,shedoesnotmeantosuggestthatLenahasaccesstoasourceofinformationdistinctfromthatavailabletoLouise,perhapswethenendorseherassertionbecauseweselectLena’sownpracticalcircumstancesasrelevant.AssumingLenaisherselfinalow-stakessituation,Louise’sassertionisconsistentwiththisflexiblecharacterizationofcontextualism.

Butnowconsideranothervariationofthecase.Supposethat,whentheywereallintheoffice,onlyLenalookedtoseewhetherJohn’shatwasthere.LouiseandThelmawereawarethatLenadidso,buttheynevergotaroundtoaskingaftertheresultbeforetheyparted.ThepolicelateraskLouiseifLenaknowsthatJohnwasintheoffice.LouiseraisestheconcernthatJohnmighthavelefthishatovernight,andthe27DeRoseexploitsthisflexibilityinchapter7ofhis2009.

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policereassureherthathedidnotbythevideofootageasinthevideovariation.Callthisthe“onlyLenalooks”variation.

Louise’sinsisting,nevertheless,thatLenadoesn’tknowwhetherJohnwasintheofficenowsoundsveryodd.Louiseisassuredthat,ifthepolicedoconsultLenaasaninformanttodeterminethatwhichneitherLouisenortheyknow—whetherJohn’shatwasonthehook,andsowhetherJohnwasintheoffice—whatshewouldtellthemwouldbecorrect,becauseshewouldbeappealingtoevidencethatisa“sure-fire”indicationofJohn’spresence,bothinthepastand,crucially,today.ItseemsreasonableforLouisetosay,afterviewingthevideo,“OK,good;LenadoesknowwhetherJohnwasintheoffice.Youshouldgoaskher”,andbizarreforhertosay“LenacheckedwhetherJohn’shatwasthere;ithas,assheknows,beenasure-fireindicatorofhispresenceinthepast;anditwasasure-fireindicatorofhispresencetoday.Sowhatevershesaysonthematterwillbecorrect.Butshedoesn’tknowwhetherhewasintheoffice.”

Andyetthisisthesortofcasethatshouldelicit,ifanything,astrongerintuitionthatLouise’sassertionthatLenadoesn’tknowistrueonDeRose’saccount.LouiseisclearlyconsideringthequestionwhetherLenaknowsinacontextthatconsidersLenaasapotentialsourceofinformation.28Thisis,then,preciselythesortofcontextthatshouldselectLouise’sownsituationasrelevanttothedeterminationofthetruth-conditionsofknowledge-claims,sothat“know”inhermouthisgovernedbythehighstandardsofhercontext.SheshouldthenapplythatstandardtoLenaand,sinceLenahasnotseenthevideofootage,decidethatLenadoesn’tknow.Butagain,thatattributionseemsinappropriate(andincorrect).Ourintuitionsareshiftingintheoppositedirectionfromthatpredictedbycontextualism.

Thereisageneralpatternhere.DeRose’sargumentrequiresthatevidencecommonlyavailabletoThelmaandLouisedoesnotmerelyconstituteevidencepertainingtotheassertion“Lenaknows”intheirrespectivemouths,butalsosatisfies(orfailstosatisfy)atruth-conditionforthepropositionsasserted.Foronlythenwillourintuitionswithrespecttotheproprietyofthoseassertionsgiventhatevidenceberelevanttotheevaluationofcontextualism,whichispreciselyathesisconcerningthosetruth-conditions.Butthenexplicitintroductionintothestoryoftruth-conditionsthatarevirtuallyuniversallyrecognizedassuch—thatthepropositionistrue,andthatthesubjectisnotGettiered—shouldeitherhavenoeffectorstrengthenthoseintuitions.Fordoingsoonlyensuresthatourintuitionsarerespondingonlytothevariationintheevidence-relatedtruth-condition(assumingittobesuch)thattheexamplesaremeanttoemphasize.Andyet,theoppositehappens:ourintuitionthatLouise’sassertionthat“Lenadoesn’tknow”istrueorappropriateweakens,ordissolves,whenthoseotherconditionsare

28Ofcourse,sheisconsideringLenaassuchasource,notsomuchforherself,asforthepolice.Butsheiswellawarethatthestakesforthepolicearehigh;that’spreciselywhytheyarehighforheraswell.Sothisshouldn’tmatter.

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explicitlyintroduced.29Thissuggestsingeneralthatthoseintuitionsarerespondingtothatevidenceonlyasevidencewarrantingtheassertionthatthesubjectknows(ornot)ratherthanaspartofthetruth-conditionsoftheassertiontherebywarranted.

9.KnowledgeRules

DeRosemightattemptamoredirectapproach.Accordingtotheknowledgeruleofassertion,whichhefavors,oneshouldonlyassertthatwhichoneknows.Thissuggeststhefollowingswiftargument:

1)One’sassertionisappropriateonlyifoneknowsthepropositionasserted.(KnowledgeRule)

2)Thelma’sassertionthat“Lenaknows”andLouise’sassertionthat“Lenadoesn’tknow”arebothappropriate.(Intuition)

3)Thelmaknows“Lenaknows”inhermouthandLouiseknows“Lenadoesn’tknow”inhers.(1,2)

4)Ifbothassertionsareknown,theyarebothtrue.(Facticityof“know”)

5)Theycan’tbothbetrueifthetruth-conditionsof“Lenaknows”arethesameinboththeirmouths.(Theywouldbecontradictory.)

6)Therefore,thetruth-conditionsof“Lenaknows”aredistinctintheirmouths.(4,5MP)

7)Therefore,contextualismistrue.

Callthisthe“knowledgeruleargument”.Theknowledgeruleisbothstrongerandweakerthanthecorrespondingprinciple2*intheargumentfromproperassertability.Itisweakerbecause2*requiredthat“Lenaknows”followsfromThelma’sotherbeliefs(and,inparticular,thosebeliefsthatencompasstheassertion’struth-conditions),andcorrespondinglyforLouiseand“Lenadoesn’tknow”.Itis,however,atleastnotobviousthatThelma’sandLouise’sknowing“Lenaknows”and“Lenadoesn’tknow”,respectively,demandsthismuch.Perhapsthe

29Thispatterncontinues,moreover,whenmoretheory-specificconditions—suchassensitivityandsafety—areintroduced.Suppose,forexample,thatnotonlydidJohnnotleavehishatinfact,there’sabsolutelynothreatthathewoulddosobecauseheisutterlyobsessivewhenitcomestohispossessions.SupposefurtherthatthepolicesuccessfullyassureLouisethathehasthistrait.Itseemsevenmoreinappropriateforhertoneverthelessinsistthat“Lenadoesn’tknow”thatJohnwasintheofficeinvirtueofhavingseenhishat.

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evidencetheyhave—thatLenasawJohn’shatonitshook—providesenoughnon-deductiveevidenceforthemtoknowthesethings(giventheircontexts).

However,theknowledgeruleisstrongerinthatitrequiresthat“Lenaknows”beknownbyThelma,andsoalsotrue.2*didnotrequireeither;itonlyrequiredthat“Lenaknows”betruegivenThelma’sotherbeliefs.(Wearethenindependentlygiventhatthosebeliefsaretrue.)Itisthereforecompatiblewith2*,butnottheknowledgerule,that“Lenaknows”inThelma’smouthisappropriatebutfalse.TheknowledgerulethenalsorequiresthatJohndidn’tleavehishat,sincethismustbethecasefor“Lenaknows”tobetrue,andsoforThelmatoknowthatitistrue.

Andinthislatterrespecttheknowledgeruleisimplausible,atleastaswieldedintheaboveargument.Consideranothervariationoftheofficecase.Intheoriginalversion,DeRoseexplicitlyindicatedthatJohnwasintheoffice.Supposeinsteadthathewasn’t,buthadlefthishatintheofficeovernight.(Callthisthe“no-Johnvariation”.)FromThelma’sstandpoint,ofcourse,nothinghaschanged;shehaswhatseemstobepreciselythesameevidencethatledhertoassert“Lenaknows”.Soshewillassertitasbefore.

SofarasIcanintuit,Thelma’sassertionisasappropriateasintheoriginalversion.ButobviouslyLenadoesn’tknowthatJohnwasintheoffice(sincehewasn’t).SoThelma’sassertion—“Lenaknows”—isfalse.SoThelmadoesn’tknowit.SoThelma’sassertionisappropriatedespitehernotknowingit,inapparentviolationoftheknowledgerule.

10.SecondaryPropriety

DeRosewilllikelypointoutthatherecognizesa“secondary”kindofproprietyandimproprietyarisingfromtheknowledgerule.

Whilethosewhoassertappropriately(withrespecttothisrule)inaprimarysensewillbethosewhoactuallyobeyit,aspeakerwhobrokethisruleinablamelessfashion,byassertingsomethingshedidn’tknowbutreasonablythoughtshedidknow,wouldinsomesecondarysensebeassertingproperly,andaspeakerwhoassertedsomethingshereasonablythoughtshedidnotknow,butinfactdidknow(ifthisispossible),wouldbeassertingimproperlyinthatsecondarysense.(Derose2009,94)

PerhapsThelma’sassertionintheno-Johnversionoftheofficecaseisappropriateinthissecondarysense.30Sounderstood,Thelmareasonablybelievesthatshe

30Onemightinsistthatthereisonlyonekindofpropriety,orwarrant,andthatwhatDeRosecallssecondaryproprietyshouldinsteadbecharacterizedasjustified

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knows“LenaknowsthatJohnwasintheoffice”,althoughshedoesn’tinfactknowthis.Butifso,therestoftheargumentdoesn’tgothrough.AllthatfollowsisthatThelmareasonablybelievesthatsheknows“Lenaknows”.Thetruthofthatassertiondoesnotfollow(andcan’t,sinceThelma’sisfalse),andsoneitherdoescontextualism.

11.InvariantistInterpretation

Wecannowdiscernanalternativetothecontextualistaccountoftheintuitionsinvokedintheofficeandsimilarcases,onefoundedonthesameknowledgerulethatDeRosefavors(andforeshadowedattheendofsections5and8above).

DeRoseisrighttoemphasizetheimpactthatcontexthasonthestandardsrelevanttotheproprietyofknowledgeattributions.Thisisnot,however,becausethosestandardsarerelevanttothetruth-conditionsofthoseattributions,butbecauseashiftinstandardsaffectswhetheritisreasonableforthespeakertotakeherselftoknowthatthoseattributionsaretrue.Inaword,theintuitionstrackchangesinthesecondaryproprietyoftheattributions,nottheirprimarypropriety.Butitisconsistentwithanattribution’sbeingsecondarilyproperthatitisfalse,andsothat(atleast)oneofthetwoattributorsintheofficeandsimilarcasesisincorrect.Theintuitionsarethenconsistentwithinvariantism.

OthershavesuggestedthattakingoneselftoknowPis,inpart,totreatthequestionwhetherPassettled,inthesensethatoneassignsthatpropositiontoone’sbackgroundworldviewagainstwhichincomingclaimsareevaluatedandpossiblecoursesofactionassessed,atleastuntilsomethingcomesalongthatpromptsre-examination.Thereissurelymoreinvolvedintakingoneselftoknowthanthis.Butthattakingoneselftoknowinvolvesatleastthismuchisveryintuitive;itexplains,forexample,theinfelicityinsaying“IknowthatP,butneedtoinvestigatefurtherwhetherP.”31

Anagent’ssubsequentbeliefsandcoursesofactionarethereforeafunction,inpart,ofthepropositionsthatarealreadysettledforher.Whetherthosebeliefsarecorrectoractionssuccessfulmightnotmattermuchtothebelievingandactingagent.Butorexcusable,andyetimproperorunwarranted,assertion.(SeeWilliamson2000,Ch.11andLackey2007,forexample.)Thisstrikesmeaslittlemorethanaterminologicaldispute.Thereseemssomethingwrongwithone’sassertingsomethingonedoesn’tknow.Andyet,thereisalsoasenseinwhichitisacceptableforonetoassertthatwhichonedoesn’tknow,solongasonereasonablytakesoneselftoknowit.Nothingofsubstanceseemstometohingeonwhetheronecallsthelatteranimproperbutexcusableorblamelessassertionorasecondarilyproperassertion,atleastforpresentpurposes.31See,e.g.,Cohen1999,58-59.

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thenagainitmight:perhapstheagentwillsubstantiallybenefitifthosepropositionsaretrueand/orbegreatlyharmedifnot.WhethersheshouldtakePtobesettled—howmuchevidenceforPsheshouldrequirebeforetakingittobesettled,andwhatshecanlegitimatelyassumeinevaluatingthatevidence—thereforeis,arguably,afunctioninpartofhowpracticallysignificanttheconsequencesare,forher,ofP’sbeingtrue(orfalse),thatis,ofthestakesinvolved.

Thisdoesinvolveakindofpragmaticencroachment;notonthetruthofP,noronthequantityorqualityofevidenceforP,butontheagent’sreasonablytakingPtobesettledinlightofthatevidencewhenengaginginsubsequentdoxasticandpracticalreasoning.Itthereforealsoimpliesakindofcontextualism:variationinthestakesimpactsthereasonabilityoftheagent’stakingPtobesettled,sothatitmightbereasonableforoneagenttotakePtobesettledandyetanothernottodoso,despitetheirsharingthesameevidence.Butthisiscompatiblewithinvariantismwithrespecttothetruth-conditionsofP,sinceitdoesnotimplyacorrespondingvariationinthosetruth-conditions.

NowsupposewithDeRosethat,typically,onecanproperlyassertPinthesecondarysenseonlyifonereasonablytakesoneselftoknowP.Then,thehigherthestakes,themoreevidencetheagentneedsthatPistruetoproperlyassertPinthatsense.

Hereisarepresentationoftheargument.

1)OnecanproperlyassertPonlyifitisreasonabletotakeoneselftoknowP.

(Knowledgeruleforsecondarypropriety)

2)TotakeoneselftoknowPis,inpart,totreatPassettled.

(Intuitionconcerningtakingoneselftoknow)

3)OnecanproperlyassertPonlyifitisreasonabletotreatPassettled.

(1,2)

4)ThehigherthestakesinvolvedinP’sbeingtrue,themoreevidenceisrequiredthatPbetruebeforeonecanreasonablytreatPassettled(perhapsbecausesomebackgroundassumptionsthatarelegitimateinlow-stakescontextsarenotlegitimateinhigher-stakescontexts).

(ReflectionuponthepotentialconsequencesoftreatingPassettledinrelationtothestakes)

5)ThehigherthestakesinvolvedinP’sbeingtrue,themoreevidenceisrequiredthatPbetruebeforeonecanproperlyassertP.

(3,4)

Nowruntheargumentover,with“SknowsthatR”asP.Theconclusionwillthenbe:

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4*)Thehigherthestakesinvolvedin“SknowsthatR”’sbeingtrue,themoreevidenceisrequiredthat“SknowsthatR”istruebeforeonecanproperlyassert“SknowsthatR”.

Wenowhaveanexplanationforwhywewouldintuitthattheassertion“LenaknowsthatJohnisintheoffice”isproperforThelmabutnotforLouiseintheoriginalofficecase.Louisecanonlyproperlyassert,inthesecondarysense,that“LenaknowsthatJohnwasintheoffice”ifshereasonablytakesherselftoknowthis.Takingherselftoknowthisinvolves,inpart,hertaking“Lenaknows”tobesettled.TotakethisassettledisalsototakeassettledthatJohnisintheoffice(knowledgebeingfactive).Thatbeingsettled,shewouldtellthepolicethathewasintheoffice,thatsheknowsthis,andthatLenaknowsthisaswell.

ButifshedoessoandJohnwasnotintheoffice—sothatLenadoesn’tknowthathewas—thecostwillbehigh:itwillimpactsignificantlyonthesuccessofanimportantcriminalinvestigation.LouisecannotthereforeblithelyassumethatJohndidn’tleavehishatasshemighthaveotherwisebeeninclinedtoassume.SosheneedscorrespondinglymoreevidencebeforeshecanlegitimatelytakeherselftoknowthatLenaknowsthatJohnwasintheoffice,andsoproperlyassertthatshedoes.ButLouisedoesn’thaveanyotherevidence.Soshecan’tproperlyassertthatLenaknowsthatJohnwasintheoffice.

ForThelma,however,itmatterslittlewhetherJohnwasintheoffice,andcorrespondinglylittlewhethershetakes“LenaknowsthatJohnwasintheoffice”tobesettled.SoshecanproceedontheassumptionthatJohndidn’tleavehishat,inlightofwhichassumptionLenadoesknowthatJohnwasintheoffice.ShethereforecanreasonablytakeherselftoknowthatLenaknowsthis,andproceedtoassertthatshedoes.

Thisnowhereinvokesadifferenceintruth-conditionsfor“Lenaknows”;itisconsistentwiththeentireexplanationthatThelmaisinfactcorrectandLouisenot(or,forthatmatter,viceversa).Sotheexplanationisconsistentwithinvariantism.

12.Primaryvs.SecondaryPropriety

DeRoserecognizesthat,intuitively,theproprietyofallassertions—notjustknowledgeattributions—seemstovaryfromonecontextofassertiontoanother.But,undoubtedly,noteveryassertionhascontextuallyvaryingtruth-conditions.So,onemightargue,contextualvariationinproperassertabilitywithrespecttoknowledgeattributionsinparticularisnoevidencethattheirtruth-conditionssovary.

DeRoserespondstothis“generalityobjection”byappealingtotheconjunctionofcontextualismwiththeknowledgerule.Sincethetruth-conditionsofknowledge-

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attributionsvarywithcontext,andonecanonlyproperlyassertwhatoneknows,whatonecanproperlyassertwillalsovarywithcontext.Socontexualismandtheknowledgeruletogethercanexplainthephenomenontowhichthegeneralityobjectionappeals.32

Thatexplanationappealsinparticulartoprimarypropriety.Theinvariantistinterpretationabovedeliversanalternativeexplanation:ourintuitionstrackvariationinthesecondaryproprietyofassertion.DeRosehimselfpresents(andendorses)thedistinctionbetweenprimaryandsecondarypropriety.Soheshouldalsopresumablyrecognizethatintuitionstrackingsecondaryproprietyaretobeexpected,appealtowhichdeliversthisalternativeexplanation.

Theprimaryproprietyexplanationis,moreover,inconsistentwiththeintuition-shiftshighlightedabove.Onthatexplanation,whenweintuitthatLouise’sassertionthat“Lenadoesn’tknow”isappropriate,weintuitthatLouiseknows“Lenadoesn’tknow”,whichimplies“Lenadoesn’tknow”.Butinthevideoandonly-Lena-looksvariations,weintuit(withincreasingstrength)that“Lenaknows”isappropriateinstead.Tobeprimarilyappropriate,thiswouldagainhavetobetrue.Butonnobody’sviewarebothassertionscorrect.ThestandardssetbyLouise’scontextcertainlydonotfallwhenthesevariationsareintroduced.AndLena’sevidenceispreciselyasitwasintheoriginalcase.

Appealtoprimaryproprietyis,moreover,incapableofhandlingtheintuitionthatThelma’sassertionthat“Lenaknows”isappropriateintheno-Johnvariation.InthatvariationJohnwasn’tintheoffice;soLenadoesn’tknowthathewas;soThelmadoesn’tknowthatLenaknowsthathewas;soitisnotprimarilyproperforThelmatoassertthatLenaknowsthathewas.ButLena’sassertiondoesseemsecondarilyappropriate:itseemsreasonableforhertotakeherselftoknowthatJohnwasintheoffice.

Ingeneral,oneshouldsurelyfavoranexplanationthatdoesnotrequireinvocationofasubtlevariationintruth-conditionsifpossible.Butthesecondaryproprietyexplanationofourintuitions“screensoff”theprimaryproprietyexplanation:wedon’tneedboth.33Theformer,moreover,explainsintuition-shiftsthatthelattercannot.Soweshouldendorsetheformer,invariantistexplanation.34

13.“Lenadoesn’tknow”vs.“Ican’tsaythatLenaknows”

32SeeDeRose2009,Ch.3.33Inthevastmajorityofcases,theywillpresumablycoincide:wetypicallydoreasonablytakeourselvestoknowthatwhichwedoinfactknow,andviceversa.34Primafacie,however,thesecondary-proprietyexplanationdoesnotaccountforourintuitingLouise’sassertionthat“Louisedoesn’tknow”asappropriate(inadditiontoherreluctancetoassert“Louisedoesknow”).SeeDeRose2009,109-117.Foraresponse,readon.

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DeRosewillundoubtedlypointoutthatLouise’scaseismoredifficulttomakesenseofonthisapproach(assumingthatheiscorrectthatweintuitthatherassertionthatLenadoesn’tknowisappropriate).Onthepresentaccount,thehigherstakesofLouise’scontextbarsherfromsecondarilyproperlyassertingthatLenaknows.HoweveritisquiteadifferentmattertosaythatitissecondarilyproperforhertoassertthatLenadoesn’tknow.Thatwouldseemtorequirethatshereasonablytakeherselftoknow“Lenadoesn’tknow”.Butitishardtoseewhythatwouldbereasonable.

It’snotasthoughLouiseassumesthatJohndidleavehishatovernight,orthatJohnwasnotintheoffice,inthefaceofwhichherbelievingthatLenadoesn’tknowwouldbeexpectable.Andevenifshedidassumethese,hertakingherselftoknow“Lenadoesn’tknow”wouldstillintuitivelybeunreasonableevengiventhehighstakesofhercontext.Forthoseassumptionsarethemselvesunreasonable;assheispresumablyaware,afterall,theyarelikelytobefalse.

Thecontextualist,however,seemsbetterpositionedtoexplainthis.Foronthataccount,thetruth-conditionsfor“Lenaknows”includesomeamountofevidence,wheretheamountrequiredisafunctionofthecontext.35Louise,awareoftheevidenceavailabletobothLenaandherself,recognizesthatitisinsufficientforthesatisfactionofthattruth-conditiongiventhestandardsimposedbyherowncontext.ShethereforepositivelyassertsthatsheandLenadon’tknow,bothappropriatelyandcorrectly.

Recall,however,thatwhenLouiselearnsthatJohndidtakehishathomewithhim(inthevideoandonly-Lena-looksvariations),wenolongerintuitthatitisappropriateforhertodenythatLenaknowsand,infact,intuitthatitisappropriate35Itdoesn’tmatterherewhetherpossessionoftherequisiteevidenceisconstruedasanintrinsictruth-condition—thatknowledgeinevitablyrequirespossessionofintrospectivelyaccessibleevidence—orasallowingtheagent’sbelieftomanifestakindof“epistemicstrength”characterizedinotherterms(suchasthedistanceoutintothespaceofpossibleworldsfromtheactualthroughwhichtheagent’sbeliefsmatchthetruth).Regardless,thecontextualistaccountrequiresthatthestrengthofLena’sepistemicposition,howevercharacterized,beinadequateforknowledgegiventheevidenceavailabletoherintheoriginalcase,anditsinadequaciesdon’tchangeinvirtueofLouise’sviewingofthesurveillancevideo.ThatchangesthestrengthofLouise’sepistemicposition,butnotLena’s.(NotethatDeRosecouldnotsuggestthatwhatLouiselearnsfromthevideoisthatLena’sepistemicpositionisinfactstronger,notwithstandingLena’shavingthesameevidenceasbefore.Forthen,beforeLouiseseesthatvideo,shedidnotknowwhetherornotLena’spositionisstrongenough(vs.knowingthatitisn’t),andsoshouldhavereservedjudgmentratherthanpositivelyassertingthatLenadoesn’tknow.DeRose’sargumentrequiresthatwhatLouiseoriginallyknowsaboutLenaandherevidenceisenoughtoinformLouisethatLenadoesnotsatisfytherelevanttruth-condition.)

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forhertoaffirmthatshedoes(whichintuitionisespeciallystrongintheonly-Lena-looksvariation).Thisisinconsistentwiththecontextualistaccount.

Nevertheless,theproblemremains.Ifitisn’treasonableforLouisetotakeherselftoknowthatLenadoesn’tknow,thenwhydoweintuitthatherassertionisappropriate?

Ofcourse,iftheonlyalternativesLenatakestobeavailabletoherinrespondingtothepolicearetoeitheraffirmordenythatLenaknows,thenit’snosurprisethatsheplumpsforthelatter.ThestakesaretoohighforhertoasserttheformerwithoutmoreevidencethatLenadoesknow.Louisehas,however,athirdoption:shecouldhavetoldthepolicethatsheisnotinapositiontoasserteitherthatLenadoesknoworthatshedoesn’t.Andyet,DeRoseclaims,weintuitthatsheislicensedtoinsteadpositivelyassertthatLenadoesn’tknow.

Infact,Iamnotconvincedthatwedosointuit.Aspointedoutearlier,afterall,thepossibilitythatworriesher—thatJohnlefthishatovernight—seemstofunction,ifrealized,asanobstacletoLena’sknowing,theremovalofwhichallowshertoknow.Thankstothestakesinvolved,Louisecannotlegitimatelyassumethattheseobstaclesareremoved,sothatLenaknows;butshealsohasnoreasontoassumethattheyareinplace,sothatLenadoesn’tknow.Iftheoptionofreservingjudgmentisonesheclearlyrecognizes—becausethepoliceexplicitlylistitasanavailableresponse,say—thenitseemspreferableforhertochooseit.

Attheveryleast,itdoesnotstrikemeasintuitivelymoreappropriateforhertorefrainfromchoosingitinfavorofpositivelyassertingthatLenadoesn’tknow.Itseemstomethatshecouldjustasreasonablyhaveresponded:“well,Ican’tsaythatLenadoesknowthatJohnwasthere.Shewouldknowthatifhetookhishatlastnight,sinceitwouldthenonlyhavebeentheretodayifhewasthereaswell.ButIcan’tbesurethathedidtakehishat,andifheleftitovernightthenLenaobviouslydoesn’tknowthathewastherebyseeingit.”

14.“ItissettledthatLenadoesn’tknow”vs.“ItisnotsettledthatLenaknows”

DeRosemightneverthelessinsistthatanexplanationbeprovidedforwhywewouldallowLouisetoassertthatLenadoesn’tknow.Afterall,shecouldhavechosenthemorecautiousassertion.Whyshouldwelicensehermakinganassertion—“Lenadoesn’tknow”—thatshe,Louise,doesn’tknow?Thatviolatestheknowledgerule!36

Inresponse,recallfirstthatwhenLouiseconsidersthequestionwhethertoaffirmthatLenaknows,sheissimultaneouslyconsideringthequestionwhethertoaffirmthatsheherselfknows,sinceonecannotcoherentlytakesomeoneelsetoknowP

36Indeeditviolatesbothprimaryandsecondaryproprietyderivedfromthatrule.

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withouttakingoneselftoknowPaswell.ToassurethepolicethatLenaknowsis,therefore,tantamounttoLouise’sassuringthemthatsheherselfknows,andsothatJohnwasindeedintheoffice.

IsuggestthatLouiseisusingthemoreeasilyexpressiblephrase“I(andLena)don’tknow”inordertosimplyindicatethatshecannotprovidethemwiththatassurance.Thisindeedstrikesmeasacommonphenomenon.Itseemstomethatweoftenuse“Idon’tknowP”toindicatethatwearenotinapositiontoclaimthatweknowP,ratherthanthatweareinapositiontoclaimthatwedon’tknowP.Weare,afterall,verytypicallyprimarilyinterestedinthequestionwhetherwecantreatPassettled,andsomobilizeitinsubsequentthoughtandaction(includingtheactionofassuringthepolice).IfIeithertakemyselftonotknowPortakemyselftobeinapositionsuchthatIcan’taffirmeitherthatIdoordon’tknowP,IwillineithercasetreatPasunsettled.Isuspectweoftenuse“Idon’tknowP”toindicate,notthatitissettledforonethatonedoesnotknowP,butratherthatitisnotsettledforonethatonedoesknowP.

Ofcourse,weoftendohavereasontotakeourselvestoknowthatwedon’tknowP—becausewereasonablytakeourselvestoknowthatPisfalse,forexample—andsoareinapositiontotreatournotknowingPassettled.Butthisis,primafacie,nothowitisintheexamplestowhichDeRoseandothercontextualistsappeal.

Inthoseexamples,thereisaconditionCofthesubject’sacquiringknowledgeintheparticularwaythatthesubjectmighthopetoacquireit.Intheofficecase,Cis“Johndidnotleavehishatovernight”.37Thepersoninthe“high-standards”contextdecidesthat,giventhestakesinvolvedinhercircumstances,sheshouldnotassumethatC—forwhichshehasnodirectevidence—isrealized.TodecidenottoassumeCisnot,primafacie,tobelievesomethingthatimpliesthatthesubjectdoesnotknow(aswouldbebelievingthatCisfalse).38Itisinsteadtofindoneselfwithabodyofinformationthat,withoutC,doesnotdetermineeitherthatthesubjectknowsorthatshedoesn’tknow.

ThissuggeststhatLouiseisalsoutilizing“Lenadoesn’tknow”toindicatethatitis,forher,unsettledwhetherLenadoesknow.Itsuggestsfurtherthatourintuitingthatherassertionisappropriateamountstoourintuitingthatitis,givenhercircumstances,reasonableforhertotreat“Lenaknows”asunsettled.Thisisbecauseitisappropriate,inlightofthestakes,forhertoexcisetheassumptionthatJohndidn’tleavehishatfromherdeliberationsconcerningwhatLenaknows.It

37Inthebankcase,itis“thebankdidnotchangetheirhours”;andinCohen’sairportcase,itis“theitinerarydoesnotcontainamisprint”.38Louisedoesn’tbelievethatJohndidleavehishat;that’snotwhysheasserts“Lenadoesn’tknow”.

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seemstomerevealingthatallofthecasesthatcontextualistshaveconstructed(tomyknowledge)conformtothispattern.39

15.WAMming

Theinvariantistinterpretationofferedhereis,tosomeextent,a“warrantedassertibilitymaneuver”(“WAM”),inthatLouise’sassertion—“Lenadoesn’tknow”—iswarrantedeventhoughLouisedoesnotknowittobetrue(norcanshereasonablytakeherselftoknowittobetrue).ButthisisalongwayfromthesortofWAMsDeRosehasinmindasofferedbyhisinvariantistopponents.AccordingtothoseWAMSwedointuitthatLouise’sassertionthat“Lenadoesn’tknow”isfalse—Lenadoesknow—and,moreover,thatLouiseisherselfwellawarethatitis.WeneverthelessintuitwhatLouisesaystobeappropriatebecausewebelievethatsheiswarrantedinassertingsomethingthatwe—andshe—believetobefalse.SuchWAMmersthenoweanexplanationastowhysheissowarranted.40

Accordingtotheproposalhere,however,wedon’tintuitthat“Lenadoesn’tknow”isfalse.Giventheinformationinthestoryasoriginallypresented,neitherwe,norThelma,norLouise,havebeenprovidedwithenoughinformationtodeterminethatthetruth-conditionsfor“Lenaknows”arerealized.They,andwe,wouldhavetoassumethatJohnhadn’tlefthishat.WhetherThelmaorLouiseshouldsoassumedependsonthestakes.Theybothhavesomereasontodoso:theyareawareofthetrack-recordevidence.ButforLouisetoassumethathedidn’tleavehishat,andconsequentlytreatitassettledthatsheandLenaknowthatJohnwasthere,hasseriousconsequences.CautionthereforedictatesthatshenotassumethatJohntookhishat,andsonottakeherselftoknowthatsheandLenaknowthatJohnwasthere,norsuggestsotothepolice.

SheexpressesthisbysayingthatsheandLenadon’tknowthathewasthere.Takenliterally,thisisn’tquitewhatsheisinapositiontoclaim.Butit’sclose.Itis,indeed,practicallyequivalenttowhatsheisinapositiontosay:thepolicewillrespondin

39Thisseemstometo“cancelout”DeRose’spointthat,asstandardsforassertionrise,wewouldnotlicenseashiftfrom“Johnisintheoffice”to“Johnisnotintheoffice”andyetseemtolicenseashiftfrom“IknowJohnisintheoffice”to“Idon’tknowthatJohnisintheoffice”.Theinterchangeabilitybetween“Idon’tknowthatIknowthatP”and“Idon’tknowthatP”,explicableifthelatterconveys“Pisnotsettledforme”,explainsthiswithoutresorttocontextualism.SeeDeRose2009,109-112.40DeRosearguesagainstsuchWAMmersinchapter3ofDeRose2009.

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thesamewaywhethershesaysthatsheandLenadon’tknoworindicatesthatshecan’tsaythatsheandLenadoknow.41

Thelma,meanwhile,neednotbesocautious.ShecangoaheadandassumethatJohndidn’tleavehishat,reasonablytakeherselftoknowthatsheandLenabothknowthathewasthere,andsoproperlyassertthatsheandLenadoknow.

DoThelma,Louise,andLenaknowthatJohnwasintheoffice?ThatdependsonwhetherJohnlefthishat.Ifhedidn’t,thentheydo.Andifhedid,thentheydon’t.42

SothisWAMdoesnotinvolveexcusingLouise(orThelma)forassertingwhatwe,andshe,recognizetobeafalsehood.Itonlyrequiresthatweexcuseherfromindicatingthat“Lenaknows”isnotsettledforherbyassertingthat“Lenadoesn’tknow”.Thelatter—thatLenadoesn’tknow—mightbetrue.Andwecaneasilyunderstandwhyshesaysthis:it’seasiertoexpress,thepolicefindoutwhattheyneedtofindout—thattheycan’trelyoneitherLouiseorLenatoverifyJohn’spresence—andtheconsequencesarethesame.

16.Infelicity

Itis,infact,primafacieinfelicitoustosay“Idon’tknowwhetherIknowthatP”.Itseemstantamount,moreover,toconcedingthatonedoesn’tknowthatP.Unlessthe“KK”ruleiscorrect—accordingtowhichonecannotknowthatPunlessonealsoknowsthatoneknowsthatP—itiscoherentingeneralforStoknowthatPwithoutknowingthatSknowsthatP.43Andyetitisatleastoddtosay“Idon’tknowthatIknowthatP”,especiallyifoneisunwillingtosaymoresimplythatonedoesn’tknowthatP.

Whyisthis?PerhapswhenweconsiderwhetherweknowthatPwearereallytypicallyconcernedonlywiththequestionwhetherwecantreatPassettled,sothatweusetheexpression“Idon’tknowthatP”tojustconveythefactthatwedonottakePtobesettled.Ifso,thentoclaimthatIdon’tknowwhetherIknowthatPreallydoesjustamounttoassertingthatIdon’tknowthatPinthisbroadersense.

41DeRosetellsusthat“thepolicesubsequentlyverifythat[Johnwasintheoffice]withFrankandwithacoupleofotherworkers….”,whichtheypresumablywoulddowhicheverresponseLouiseprovided,solongasitwasn’t“LenaandIknowhewasintheoffice”(DeRose2009,5).42Perhapsitalsodependsonthesatisfactionofother,perhapsmodal,conditions.But,ifso,thatwon’tunderminetheargumenthere.Quitethecontrary;seenote37above.43TheKKruleisunpopularnowadays.DeRosehimselfthinksthatitisfalse;seeDeRose2009,104-106.

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FortakingmyselfnottoknowwhetherIknowthatPalsoamountstonotbeingsettledwithrespecttoP.

Thisisonlyasketchofanexplanation,andleavesanumberofissuesopen.Isthisaclaimaboutthesemanticsoftheexpression“Idon’tknowthatP”,atleastonmanyoccasionsofuse,sothatitliterallymeans“Pisnotsettled”onthoseoccasions?Ordoestheexplanationrequiremobilizationofthedistinctionbetweenwhatonesaysandwhatoneimplies,sothatoftenwhenonesays“Idon’tknow”oneisassertingsomethingthatoneisnotreallyinapositiontoassert,buttheassertionofwhichimpliesacloselyrelatedtruth?

Iofferthisexplanationonlytentatively,andwon’tattempttoanswerthesequestionshere.ForpresentpurposesIrelyonlyonthebareintuitionthatitisinfelicitoustoassert“Idon’tknowwhetherIknowthatP”.Assuming,therefore,thatLouisewillavoiddoingso,shereallyisconfrontedwithonlytwooptions:assertthatsheknowsorthatshedoesn’t.Forreasonsalreadygiven,sheshouldn’tselecttheformer,andsomustselectthelatter.SheisalsoconstrainedtomakethesamechoicewithrespecttowhatLenaknows.Soourintuitionthatherassertionthat“Lenadoesn’tknow”isappropriateisexplicablewithoutrecoursetocontextualism.

“[T]hecaseforcontextualism,”DeRosesays,“wouldbeatleastconsiderablyweakeriftheevidentfactsaboutHIGHwereonlythatwearereluctanttopositivelyascribe‘knowledge’thereand/orthatifamisguidedspeakerweretopositivelyascribe‘knowledge’insuchacase,theascriptionswouldseemfalseand/orinappropriate.Thattheactualsituationissuchthat,beyondtheabove,speakersgosofarastodeny‘knowledge’inHIGHcases,anddosotruthfullyandappropriately,toallappearancescertainlyseemstoconsiderablystrengthenthecaseforcontextualism”(DeRose2009,53).

However,thefactthatspeakers“gosofar”isexplicablebyappealonlytotheintuitionthat“Idon’tknowwhetherIknowthatP”isinfelicitous.Wecan,moreover,discerntheoutlineofanexplanationofthisinfelicitybyappealtothesuggestionthat,insaying“Idon’tknowP”,weareveryoftenconcernedtoconveyonlythatPisnotsettledforus.

Evenifthisexplanationisoffthemark,itdoesatleastseemobviousthatthecorrectexplanation,whateveritis,won’tbeavailableonlytothecontextualist.“Ican’tsaythatJohnisintheoffice”and“Johnisn’tintheoffice”areobviouslydifferentclaims.Andyet,“Ican’tsaythatIknowthatJohnisintheoffice”and“Idon’tknowthatJohnisintheoffice”seematleastofteninterchangeable.NothingincontextualismthatIcanseeexplainsthatdifference.Perhaps,then,DeRoseismakingmountainsoutofmolehills.

17.Conclusion

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Invariantistshaveconcededtoomuchtocontextualists.Whiletheformerdisagreewiththelatterwithrespecttowhether“Lenaknows”istrue(orfalse)inThelma’s(orLouise’s)mouth,theyhaveagreed,atleastimplicitly,thatthedescriptionoftheoriginalcasesufficestosettlethematteronewayortheotherand,moreover,thatThelmaandLouisethemselvesknowwhichitis(andyetoneofthemproceedstoassertthenegationofwhatsheknows).

Onthepresentinterpretation,however,theinformationprovidedintheoriginalcasedoesnotdeterminewhetherLenaknows,nordoesitindicatethatThelmaandLouiseknowwhichitis.Asaresult,toexplicitlyintroducetherequisiteinformation—eitherasbackstoryoraspartofwhatLouiseknowswhendecidingwhattoassert—istoalterthestory.Thealterationdoesn’tinvolvereplacementofafictionaltruthintheoriginalversionwithafalsehood.Butitdoesinvolveintroducingasfictionaltruthapropositionthatwas,originally,neitherfictionallytruenorfalse.

Ourintuitions—bothwithrespecttowhetherLouise’sassertionthat“Lenadoesn’tknow”istrueandwhetheritisappropriate—correspondinglyshift.Theydoso,moreover,inamannerthatisinconsistentwiththecontextualisthypothesisthatthoseintuitionsconcernthetruth-conditionsof“Lenaknows”.Thatshiftis,however,consistentwiththehypothesisthatthoseintuitionsconcernthereasonabilityofThelma’sandLouise’stakingthemselvestoknowthatLenaknows,solongasthereasonabilityoftheirdoingsoisafunction,inpart,ofthepracticalsignificanceoftheirbeingright.

DeRoseandothercontextualistsrightlyemphasizetheimportanceoftakingthethird-personstandpointinviewwhentheorizingaboutknowledgeattributions.Thedistinctionbetweenwhatoneknowsandwhatonecanreasonablytakeoneselftoknowisadistinctionthatisitselfonlyeasilydiscernablefromthethird-personstandpoint:ifyouaskmewhatIknowvs.whatIcanreasonablytakemyselftoknow,youwillgetthesameanswer;butthoseanswersmightwellbedifferentifI’maskedaboutwhatsomeoneelseknows.Andyetitisonlybyconflatingthisdistinctionwithrespecttotheoriginalofficeandsimilarcasesthattheintuitionstheygenerateseemtosupportcontextualism.44

44Theinvariantistreadingofthevariationsaboveemphasizestheeffectofstakesonthesecondaryproprietyofassertion.Butcontextualistsveryoftensuggestthatthesalienceofanerror-possibility,aswellasstakes,canshiftcontext.DeRoseintentionallyconstructedtheofficecasesoastoincludevariationinboth.However,Louiseonlycontemplatestheerrorpossibility—thatJohnlefthishat—asaresultofhavingrecognizedthestakesinvolved.Thesameistrueinthebankandairportcases.Itwouldbeodd,then,tosuggestthatvariationinsalienceisdrivingthevariationinwillingnesstoattributeknowledge,atleastwithrespecttothesecases.Atanyrate,anaccountoftheeffectofsalienceonknowledgeattributionscongenialtotheinvariantistinterpretationofferedherewillhavetoawaitanotheroccasion.

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