What Defines A Successful Peacekeeping Mission- An ... Defines A Successful Peacekeeping Mission: An...
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WhatDefinesASuccessfulPeacekeepingMission:AnAnalysisoftheUnitedNationsProtectionForce(UNPROFOR)InBosnia
andHerzegovina
By:AllisonPinskiPoliticalScienceUndergraduateThesis
Advisor:ProfessorJingChenHartwickCollegeSpring2017
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Introduction
Peacekeepingwasdevelopedasatechniquetoresolveandcontrolarmed
conflictinthepost-WorldWarIIera,andismostnotablyutilizedbytheUnited
Nations(UN)(Goulding1993).AccordingtotheDepartmentforPeacekeeping
Operations(DPKO),peacekeepingisdefinedasanyformaloperationincorporating
anyone,orcombinationof,thefollowingfivepeaceandsecurityactivities:conflict
prevention,peacemakingthroughdiplomaticmeasures,peacekeepingthrough
militarymeasures,peaceenforcementthroughmilitaryactions,andpeacebuilding
(BellamyandWilliams2010,15).
Peacekeepingmissionshavefacedlargestructuralandorganizational
changessincetheUN’sfoundingin1945.Withaparticularemphasisonpeace
operationsinthepost-ColdWarera,boththeUNandglobalcommunityhave
witnessedanincreaseinthedeploymentofmissions.Thepoliticalglobal
atmospheretodayisincreasinglypronetoarmedconflictandintrastateviolence.As
aresult,theUNandotherinternationalorganizationsmustworkhardtodeploy
newoperationstoadequatelyaddresstheseconflictsastheyarise.
Studyingpeaceoperationsandtheirrespectivesuccessorfailureisvitalfor
understandingthesourceofarmedconflict,theelementsthatcompriseasuccessful
mission,andworkingtowardamorestableandsecureglobalsociety.Asnotedby
PaulSzasz,apoliticalscientistspecializinginpeacekeepingoperations,“AllUnited
Nations‘peacekeeping’missionsaredifferent.Thus,theactivitiescarriedoutbythe
UnitedNationsinBosniaandHerzegovinaareverydifferentfromanythatthe
Organizationhasundertakenelsewhere,eventheotheroperationsintheformer
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Yugoslavia”(Szasz1995,685).Asaresult,peacekeepingmissionsarecomplexand
difficulttocategorize.
ThisthesisseekstobetterunderstandtheeventsoftheUnitedNations
ProtectionForce’s(UNPROFOR)missiontoBosnia-Herzegovina.Inthisthesis,Iwill
analyzethemissiontodeterminewhetheritwasafailureorsuccessbasedonaset
ofcriteriacollectedfromtheLiteratureReview.Ifthemissionisdeemedafailureby
thesestandards,thisthesiswillseektodeterminewhatspecificelementsofthe
operationledtothatfailure.Itisimportanttodeterminewhetherthemissionwasa
successorfailuretohelpimprovefuturepeaceoperationsandidentifythespecific
eventsoftheBosnianWartobetterunderstandtheeffectivenessofUNintervention.
Background
ThissectionwillbrieflydiscussthehistoryoftheBosnianWarand
UNPROFORinBosnia-Herzegovinatoestablishabasisforunderstandingthe
conflict.TheSocialistFederalRepublicofYugoslavia(SFRYugoslavia)(Map1,Page
50),wasformedafterWorldWarIIandencompassedsixBalkanrepublics;Bosnia-
Herzegovina,Croatia,Slovenia,Montenegro,Serbia,andtheFormerYugoslav
RepublicofMacedonia.Inthecontextofthisthesis,theFederalYugoslavRepublicof
MacedoniawillbereferredtoasMacedonia.Eachrepubliccontaineditsownethnic
groupandpoliticalorganization,butwasunitedunderoneoverarching
government.Politicalrelationsbetweenthedifferentethnicitiesweretense,most
notablytheconflictbetweenSerbsandCroats.Ethnicrelationsweretheleast
strainedinBosnia-Herzegovinabetweenthecountry’sthreeethnicmajorities;
Bosniaks(alsoreferredtoasBosnianMuslims),BosnianSerbs,andBosnianCroats
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(“TheBosnianWarandSrebrenicaGenocide”;seealso“FormerYugoslavia–
UNPROFOR”1996).
Relationsbetweenethnicgroupsthroughoutthecountrybetteredunderthe
dictatorshipofPresidentJosipBrozTito.Despitetheirstaunchdifferences,Tito
unitedthesixrepublicsbyassertingstrongmilitarydominanceandutilizingtherise
ofYugoslavia’sCommunistParty.Yugoslavia’sCommunistPartywasmultinational,
andwasastrongadvocateforaunifiedrepublicandnationalequality.TheParty
gainedmomentumbyalienatingotherextremistpartiesandappealingto
nationalists.UnderCommunistrule,Titowasabletocontrolthecountryandsubdue
hostilitiesbyappealingtonewYugoslavidentitiesemergingafterWorldWarII
(Djilas1995).
TitoruledYugoslaviafrom1943untilhisdeathin1980.Yugoslaviagrew
politicallyunstableafterTito’sdeathasoldethnictensionsreappeared.AfterTito’s
death,eachrepublicsoughttocontrolitsownsovereigntyasanindependentstate,
withtheexceptionoftheFederalRepublicofYugoslavia(FRYugoslavia),composed
oftheSerbianandMontenegrinrepublics.Itisworthnotingthedifferencebetween
SFRYugoslavia,whichincludedallsixrepublics,andFRYugoslavia,whichonly
includedSerbiaandMontenegro.WithpersistencefromSerbia,FRYugoslavia
hopedtokeeptheYugoslavrepublicsfromgainingtheirindependence.DespiteFR
Yugoslavia’seffortstocontrolthefourroguerepublics,SFRYugoslaviacollapsedin
1991whenSloveniaandCroatiadeclaredtheirindependence(“TheBosnianWar
andSrebrenicaGenocide”).
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Afterthecollapse,Croatia,Bosnia-Herzegovina,Slovenia,andMacedonia
formedtheirownrespectiveindependentstates.Map2(Page51)illustratesthe
bordersandcitiesofpresent-dayBosnia-Herzegovina.In1991,theultra-nationalist
SerbianPresidentSlobodanMiloševićbeganmobilizingSerbminoritiesinthenewly
createdcountries.HespreadpropagandaandfakenewsstoriesofSerbsbeing
attackedbyotherethnicgroupstoexploitthealreadytenserelationshipbetween
SerbsandCroats.UndertheguiseofprotectingSerbminorities,Miloševićdeclared
waronCroatia,Bosnia-Herzegovina,Macedonia,andSlovenia.Withsomemilitary
backingfromFRYugoslavia,MiloševićandhisSerbianarmyattackedCroatiaand
SloveniainJune1991(“TheBosnianWarandSrebrenicaGenocide”).
In1992,MiloševićturnedhisattentiontoBosnia-Herzegovinabymobilizing
theBosnianSerbstoprotectthemselvesagainstthecountry’sCroatandMuslim
populations.Inresponse,CroatianPresidentFranjoTudjmanmobilizedtheBosnian
CroatstodefendthemselvesagainsttheBosnianSerbs.Inthiscontext,Bosnia-
HerzegovinawasusedasaproxywarforethniccleansingbetweenSerbiaand
Croatia(“TheBosnianWarandSrebrenicaGenocide”).
Amidfearsofescalatedviolence,theUNbeganitsinterventionintheBalkans
in1991throughUNSecurityCouncil(UNSC)Resolution721.Thisresolutionwas
createdinresponsetoaNovembermeetingbetweentheSecretary-General(UNSG)
PersonalEnvoy,Milošević,Tudjman,theSecretaryofStateforNationalDefenseof
FRYugoslavia,andLordCarringtonoftheUnitedKingdom.EachYugoslavparty
voicedtheirsupportforthedeploymentofapeacekeepingoperationintheregion
topreventfurtherviolence.Althoughaceasefirewasestablished,itwasalmost
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immediatelybrokenshortlyafterwhenBosnianSerbsbeganmasskillingsof
BosnianCroatsandMuslims.Itisworthnotingthekillingsoccurringduringthewar
werenotforthesakeofethniccleansing,butrathertocreateethnically
homogeneouscities.
AstheconflictbegantoescalateandMiloševićturnedhisattentionfrom
CroatiaandSloveniatoBosnia-Herzegovina,theUNSCcreatedResolution749
(1992),aresponsetotherequestfromBosnianPresidentAlijaIzetbegovićtodeploy
moreUNPROFORpeacekeepersintoBosnia-Herzegovina.From1992to1993,the
operationmandateofUNPROFORtroopsextendedtoCroatia,Bosnia-Herzegovina,
Serbia,Macedonia,andMontenegro,withapresenceinSlovenia.Themissionwould
concludeinMarch1995,tobereplacedbytheUnitedNationsConfidence
RestorationOperationinCroatia(UNCRO),theUnitedNationsPreventive
DeploymentForce(UNPREDEP),andtheUnitedNationsPeaceForces(UNPF)
stationedinZagreb,Croatia(“FormerYugoslavia–UNPROFOR”1996).
TheBosnianWarbeganin1992afterBosnia-Herzegovinadeclared
independencefromFRYugoslavia.Thenewstatewassooninvadedbythemajority-
SerbYugoslavPeople’sArmy,whobackedtheBosnianSerbs,andtheCroatian
Army,whobackedtheBosnianCroats.InApril,theUNbeganitspresenceinthe
countrybysending40militaryobserverstoMostar.TheUNSGandUNPROFOR
pressuredtheregiontonegotiateapermanentcease-firebetweenthewarring
parties.WithconstraintsfromCroatiaandSerbia,theUNwasforcedtowithdraw
someofitspeacekeepingforcesinBosnia-Herzegovina,andwasonlypermittedto
deliverhumanitarianaid(“FormerYugoslavia–UNPROFOR”1996).
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InAprilandMay1993,theUNcreatedsix“safezones”throughUNSecurity
Council(UNSC)Resolutions819and824.ThecitiesincludedSrebrenica,Sarajevo
(themostethnically-integratedcity),Žepa,Goražde,Tuzla,andBihać.Alsodeemed
“safe”cities,the“safezones”werecontrolledbyUNtroopstobetterprotectcivilians
andnoncombatantsfromthewar.However,theUNcouldnotprovidetheresources
ormandatestoeffectivelyprotectthesafezones,thuslyallowingsomeofthemost
detrimentalmassacrestooccurinEuropesinceWWII(“TheBosnianWarand
SrebrenicaGenocide”).
ThemassacreatSrebrenicaisconsideredtheworstmasskillingofthe
BosnianWarandthelargestinEuropeaftertheHolocaust.InJuly1995,theSerb
GeneralRatkoMladicbombedandinfiltratedthecitydespitethepresenceof
UNPROFOR.TheSerbstargetedSrebrenicabecauseitwaspredominantlyBosnian
CroatandMuslim,andwaslocatedinamajoritySerbianterritory.Thisterritoryis
laterdictatedtheRepublikaSrpskabytheDaytonAccords.Mladicandhisarmyof
BosnianSerbswereabletogainaccesstothecitybecauseUNtroopswere
prohibitedfromusingforceagainsttheapproachingarmy.TheUN’sinabilitytoact
allowedMladicandhisforcestocaptureandkillmorethan8,000Croatsand
MuslimsinthefieldsoutsideSrebrenica.Theirbodieswereburiedintwomass
graves.Asidefromthisestimate,therearefewreportsdetailingtheeventsofthe
massacre(“TheBosnianWarandSrebrenicaGenocide”).
AstheYugoslavWarsreachedanend,theDaytonAccordswerenegotiatedin
November1995betweenFRYugoslavia(specificallySerbia),Bosnia-Herzegovina,
andCroatia.TheAccordsestablishedalong-termceasefireintheregionbetween
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signatoriesMilošević,Tudjman,Izetbegović,andtheBosnianForeignMinister
MuhamedSaćirbeg.RepresentativesoftheUnitedStates,France,theUnited
Kingdom,Germany,Russia,andtheEuropeanUnion(EU)facilitatedthe
negotiations(“SummaryoftheDaytonPeaceAgreementonBosnia-Herzegovina”
1995).
TheAccordskeptBosnia-Herzegovinaunitedasonenation,butestablished
“twosemi-autonomousentities”topreventfutureconflict;theFederationofBosnia-
HerzegovinafortheBosnianMuslimsandCroats,andtheRepublikaSrpskaforthe
BosnianSerbs.Eachentitywaspermittedtoorganizetheirownseparatepolitical
structures,educationalsystems,andeconomies.However,theFederationand
RepublikaSrpskawererequiredtonationallyorganizeintoasingle,centralized
governmenttoensurethecountryoperatedsmoothly.Whilethiswastheintention
oftheAccords,realisticallythecountryhassincestruggledtofunctionefficiently
underatripartitepresidency(“TheBosnianWarandSrebrenicaGenocide”;seealso
“FormerYugoslavia–UNPROFOR”1996).
Anestimated100,000peoplewerekilled,mostofthemBosnianCroatsand
Muslims.Morethan200UNPROFORpeacekeepersanduniformedpersonnelwere
alsokilled.ItisdifficulttostudytheBosnianWarbecausetherearefewreportsand
statisticsdetailingtheeventsoftheconflict(“TheBosnianWarandSrebrenica
Genocide”).
LiteratureReview
Thefollowingliteraturereviewisdividedintofoursectionsrepresentingthe
fourmajorthemesemergingfrompreviousresearch;1)TheUNusedhumanitarian
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assistancewithoutmilitaryinterventioninBosnia-Herzegovina,2)Risingglobal
skepticisminUNpeacekeepingmissionsduringthe1990s,3)TheUN’sneglectof
risingnationalismandtheimpactofinfluentialregionalactors,and4)TheUN’s
delayedadoptionoftheResponsibilitytoProtect(R2P)doctrineandinternational
accountability.
I.TheUnitedNationsfavoredhumanitarianassistanceovermilitaryoperationsinBosnia-Herzegovina.
Thecontextofpeacekeepingoperationsisasimportantastheorganization
ofthemission.TheUNwaspermittedbythegovernmentsofBosnia-Herzegovina,
Croatia,andSerbiatodeployUNPROFORintoBosnia-Herzegovinatoaddressthe
country’sescalatingcivilwarasahumanitarianeffortandinternationalobserver.
PaulSzaszaddressedthischaracteristicinhis1995analysisonUNPROFORin
Bosnia-Herzegovina,publishedintheCornellInternationalLawJournal.According
toSzasz,UNPROFORwasdeployedinBosnia-Herzegovinatosupporthumanitarian
effortsby,“keepingopenairports(especiallySarajevo),escortingandotherwise
facilitatingthemovementofconvoys,andperformingotherrelatedtaskssuchasthe
repairofpower,water,andsewagesystems”(Szasz1995,687).Underthisspecific
guise,“strictlymilitaryfunctions”aresecondaryconcerns(Szasz1995,687).
UNPROFORtroopsweregreatlylimitedintheirperformance,astheyhada
lackofadequateequipmentandaninsufficientnumberofpersonneltoensureUN
mandates(Szasz1995,687).ThesemandatesincludedtheprotectionofUN-
mandated“safezones”andmonitoringtheno-flyzoneissuedinpartsofthecountry
bytheUNSC(Szasz1995,687).TheUNsuccessfullydeliveredhumanitarian
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assistancetoat-riskpopulations,butwasnotpermittedtofurtherprotectthese
populationsfromtheeffectsoftheon-goingwarwithmilitaryaction.
Szaszcontinuedtocriticizetheoperationbyadding,“Onlybyhelpingthe
partiesimplementtheseunfortunatelyshort-livedcease-firesdoesUNPROFOR
occasionally,briefly,andlocallyperformwhatmightbeconsideredclassic
peacekeepingoperations”(Szasz1995,687).Hisreferenceto“classicpeacekeeping
operations”referredtoUNPROFOR’slimitedabilitytomarklinesofconfrontation,
facilitatediscussionsbetweenopposinggroups,controljointmilitarycommissions,
controltheuseofheavyweaponryinhigh-conflictareas,andoccasionally
“interposebetweenarmedunits”(Szasz1995,687).AccordingtoSzasz’sanalysis,
theUNPROFORoperationinBosnia-Herzegovinawasafailurebecauseitcouldnot
utilizemilitarycomponents,throughthefaultoftheUNoralackofconsentfrom
otherpartiesinvolved.
AbookreleasedbyMichaelDoyleandNicholasSambanis,entitledMaking
WarandBuildingPeace:UnitedNationsPeaceOperations,reaffirmedSzasz’s
argument.AccordingtoDoyleandSambanis,“Stoppingcivilwarshasneverbeen
moreimportant…Internal(civilorintrastate)warhasreplacedinterstatewaras
theparamountconcernfororganizationschargedwithmaintaininginternational
peaceandsecurity”(DoyleandSambanis2006,3).Civilwarshavealargeimpacton
thesecurityandeconomicstandingofacountry,andholdthepotentialto
destabilizeanentireregion(DoyleandSambanis2006,3).Thisistrueofthe
BosnianWar,wheretheinternationalcommunityfearedthewarcouldfurther
destabilizetheregionandcreateapowervacuumintheBalkans.
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DoyleandSambanisstated,“Civilwarshaveregionalcontagionordiffusion
effects,antheyreduceratesofeconomicgrowthinboththedirectlyaffected
countriesandtheirneighbors”(DoyleandSambanis2006,3).TheUNwasunableto
easetheeffectsofcivilwarinBosnia-Herzegovinabecausetheycouldonlyprovide
humanitarianassistancetothecountry,asopposedtoprovidingbothaidand
militarydirectives.Thecombinedapproachofhumanitarianassistanceandmilitary
interventionwouldhaveprovidedtheUNwiththebestopportunitytode-escalate
theconflictandlimitciviliancasualties.
II.RisingglobalskepticismofUnitedNationspeacekeepingmissionsinthepost-ColdWareraandthewithdrawnsupportfromspecificstateactorsallowedtheBosnianconflicttoescalate. Inthepost-ColdWarera,referringtotheperiodbetweenthelate-1980sand
mid-1990s,thenatureofUNpeacekeepingmissionstransformedtobetteradaptto
newconflicts.Thisplacedaglobalfocusonintrastateconflict,likecivilwars,as
opposedtointerstateconflict.IntheirbookUnderstandingPeacekeeping,Alex
BellamyandPaulWilliamsnotedthistransformationusheredinsomehesitanceand
skepticismfromUNmemberstates.Skepticismespeciallygrewamongglobal
powers,liketheU.S.andWesternEurope,asthenumberofUNpeacekeeping
deploymentsdrasticallyincreasedtoaccommodatethechangingpolitical
atmosphere(BellamyandWilliams2010,109).
Thisskepticismdevelopedintowithdrawnsupportfromactivepeacekeeping
missions.Srebrenicaisanexampleofthis.WhiletheUNSCvotedinfavorofnaming
Srebrenicaa“safezone”toprotectcivilianlives,thezonewasseverelyunderstaffed,
underresourced,andlackedmeaningfuldirection(BellamyandWilliams2010,
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109).Atthebeginningoftheconflictin1992,DutchpeacekeepersinSrebrenica
werenotissuedclearmandatestoprotectthe“safezone”withforce.Inaddition,
theywerenotprovidedwithenoughtroops,equipment,orsuppliestoadequately
protectthemajorityBosnianCroatandMuslimciviliansinsidefromtheadvancing
YugoslavPeople’sArmy(BellamyandWilliams2010,109,117).Bellamyand
Williamsexplainedthat,“Thepoliticalwillofmemberstatestomandateand
contributetoUNpeaceoperationsisrelatedtotheoperationaleffectivenessofthe
organizationsitself”(BellamyandWilliams2010,109).Therefore,itisunsurprising
thatthe,“repeatedfailureofpeaceoperationsbetween1992and1995encouraged
memberstatestocurbtheirenthusiasmandlimittheircommitment,”toUNPROFOR
(BellamyandWilliams2010,109).
Consequently,somestateschosetowithdrawtheirsupportfortheUN
missiontoinsteadassistpeacekeepingeffortswiththeNorthAtlanticTreaty
Organization(NATO).BellamyandWilliamsexplainedthatthiswithdrawnsupport
forcedsingle-stateactorstoleadpeaceeffortsastheUNwasunabletomake
negotiationstoprovidetheresourcesandfundingnecessarytofulfillUNobligations
inBosnia-Herzegovina(BellamyandWilliams2010,109).Laterin1995,theU.S.led
theDaytonAccordsinOhiobetweenthepresidentsofBosnia-Herzegovina,Croatia,
andSerbiainanattempttoendtheregionalconflict(BellamyandWilliams2010,
109).
MarrackGouldingprovidedgreatercontextforBellamyandWilliam’s
conclusionswithhis1993publicationtotheRoyalInstituteofInternationalAffairs.
Gouldingbelievedtherewasastigmaassociatedwithpeacekeepingmissionsduring
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thepost-ColdWarera,ultimatelybecausetheywerespecificallyUnitedNations
missions(Goulding1993,453).Hewrotetheir“UnitedNationsness”wasderived
fromthreedifferentfactors:“Theywereestablishedbyoneofthelegislativeorgans
oftheUnitedNations…,theywereunderthecommandandcontroloftheSecretary-
General…,andtheircostsweremetcollectivelybythememberstatesas‘expenses
oftheOrganization’underArticle17oftheChapter”(Goulding1993,453-4).
Asaresultofthesefactors,manystateswerecriticalofwhereandfrom
whomauthorityinpeacekeepingmissionsderivedfrom.Intheyearsleadingupto
1993,theUNhadnevercommandedanenforcementoperation,andinstead
authorizedspecificmemberstatestouseforceasneededtoassurecompliancewith
itsdecisions(Goulding1993,463).AccordingtoGoulding,“Thisarrangementmay
raisequestionsabouttheextenttowhichtheoperationis–orisperceivedtobe–
reallyundertheUnitedNationsandnotcontrolledinrealitybythememberstates
contributingtothebulkofitstroops”(Goulding1993,463).Withinthisdiscussion,
GouldingperceivedtheUN’sweaknesstobeitslackofpersonalizedauthority,
whichmayhavecontributedtoitspoorperformanceinBosnia-Herzegovina.
AnotherauthorwhoanalyzedtheUNinBosnia-Herzegovina,JaneBoulden,
specificallydiscussedtheeffectstheinternationalcommunity’swithdrawnsupport
hadontheescalationofviolence.Initially,UNPROFORcommanderinBosnia-
Herzegovina,GeneralPhilippeMorillon,“plantedhimself[inSrebrenica]and
announcedthatheintendedtostayinSrebrenicauntiltheBosnianSerbsiegeofthe
cityended”(Boulden2001,92).Morillon’sdedicationtoprotectingtheUN-
sanctionedsafezoneinSrebrenicareceived,“mixedreviewswithintheUN
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hierarchy,”andwasshort-lived(Boulden2001,92).TheUNonlyprovidedenough
fundingandresourcesforMorillonandhistroopstoremaintheSrebrenicauntil
humanitarianaidwasdelivered(Boulden2001,92).Morillonwasforcedtoleave
shortlyafter,andtheBosnianSerbassaultontheCroatandMuslimpopulations
continued(Boulden2001,92).
InhisownpublicationfortheWorldBankEconomicReviewin2008,Nicholas
SambanisdrewfromhispreviousworkwithMichaelDoyletosuggesttheUN
providemoreattentiontomilitaryoperationsandlong-termnation-buildingand
development,asopposedtosolelyshort-termhumanitarianassistance(Sambanis
2008).HenotedthattheeffectsofUNpeacekeepingmissionsarenotlong-lasting,
becausetheUNisunabletodevotetheresourcesandfundingrequiredto
permanentlyinterveneinlong-termconflicts.Intheabstracttohisarticle,hewrote,
“Peacekeepingoperationscontributemoretothequalityofthepeace…thantoits
duration,becausetheeffectsofsuchoperationsdissipateovertime”(Sambanis
2008).SambanissuggestedtheUNadaptstrategiestoincorporateastronger
militarypresenceinsomecountriestohelp,“developinstitutionsandpoliciesthat
generateeconomicgrowth”(Sambanis2008).
Finally,manyinternationalactorshavequestionedhowtoidentify
peacekeepingoperationsassuccessesorfailures.Thisisdifficultaseachoperation
isdifferentfromtheonesbefore,andmanymayinvolvedifferentmeanstode-
escalateandpreventconflict.AfterreviewingandanalyzingapublicationfromPaul
Diehl,RobertJohansenidentifiedtwomajorcriteriaforassessingthesuccessofa
UNpeacekeepingmission;bylimitingarmedconflictandpromotingconflict
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resolution.WhileJohansenacknowledgestheimportanceofthesefactors,healso
notestheyhavethepotentialtoleadtomisunderstanding.Hediscussedthe
influenceoutsidefactorshaveonthesuccessofamission,likethereceptivenessof
thehostcountryandactiveparticipationofotherpartiesinvolved.TheUNcannot
beheldfullyresponsibleifamission“fails”(Johansen1994,307).
However,JohansendoesacknowledgeDiehl’sconclusionsthatpeace
operationsarethemostsuccessfulunderthefollowingconditions:activeconsentto
apeacekeepingmissionfromthehoststateandallpartiesinvolvedintheconflict,
peacekeepersare“lightlyarmedanddonotfireexceptinself-defense,”
peacekeepingforcesremainneutralintheconflict,themissionaddressesinterstate
conflictsoverintrastateconflicts,andthe“geographiccontextenablespeacekeepers
tobedeployedinrelativelyinvulnerablesettingsinwhichtheycaneasilydetect
violationsandcompletelyseparatethecombatants”(Johansen1994,307-8).Most
internationalorganizationsandpeacekeepingscholarshavedevelopedtheirown
criteriaforassessingthesuccessofapeacekeepingoperation,althoughJohansen
believedDiehloffersoneofthemostapplicableapproaches.
III.TheUnitedNationsdidnotaddresstheescalationandexploitationofethnicidentitiesandtheriseofnationalismfromregionalactors. Bosnia-Herzegovinaishistoricallycomprisedofthreeprominentethnic
groups;Muslims,Serbs,andCroats.In1995,afterthemajorityoftheconflictinthe
countryended,Muslimsconstituted45%ofthepopulation,Serbs35%,andCroats
16%(Szasz1995,690-1).InhisanalysisofUNPROFOR,PaulSzaszdiscussedthe
impactthecountry’sdemographicshadonitspoliticaldestabilization.While
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Bosnia-Herzegovinawasdividedintothreedistinctethnicgroups,thegroupswere
relativelyintermingledthroughoutthecountry.Hewrotethereweresomeareas
withahigherconcentrationofonegroupcomparedtotheothers,butthese
concentrationswere,“rarelymarkedandareevenmorerarelygeographically
extensiveorcoherent”(Szasz1995,691).Thisinterminglingmadeitdifficultto
characterizeanyofthenation’sregionsasbelongingtoonegroupovertheothers.
Szasznotedthatthedistinctionsbetweenthethreeethnicgroupshave
existedforcenturiesundertheOttomanandHabsburgEmpires,althoughtension
wasneverasprevalentasitwasafterthefallofSFRYugoslavia(Szasz1995,691).
EvenunderTito,thecountryexperiencedverylittleconflict(Szasz1995,691).
FurtherelaboratingonSzasz’sanalysis,BenLiebermanexplainedthe
exploitationofethnicidentitiesinhis2006articlefortheJournalofGenocide
Research.Liebermanwrote,“Shockingviolencebyneighborsemergesasamajor
themeinnumerousaccountsofwarandethniccleansinginBosniaand
Herzegovina,butatthesametimemanystudies…revealcordialandamicable
relationsbetweenBosnianMuslims,Serbs,andCroats”(Lieberman2006,298).
Liebermanusedinterviewsfromawell-cited1990survey,whererespondentsfrom
Bosnia-HerzegovinadescribedethnicrelationsinSFRYugoslaviaas,“goodor
satisfactory”(Lieberman2006,298).Beforethewarbegan,therewerevirtuallyno
significantpolitical,social,oreconomicdistinctionsbetweenethnicgroups.
Thefollowingquotesfromrespondentsduringtheirinterviewforthesurvey
supportthisidea;“AlthoughsomeofuswereMuslimandsomewereSerbs,weall
thoughtofourselvesasYugoslavs.IknowIdidn’tlookatfriend…anydifferently
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becausetheywereSerbs,”“Weweresoclosetoeachother,”and“Ididn’t[know]of
themwhowasMuslim,whowasSerb.Allmyfriendswerethesameforme”
(Lieberman2006,298).
Inhisanalysis,Liebermanexplainedthesuddenescalationofethnic-based
conflictresultedfromnewarisingnationalnarratives.Hewrote,
“Accounts of close relations between neighbors
typicallyrecallscenesofeverydaylife,ofindividualsas
friends, classmates, and colleagues. Stories of ethnic
rivalry,on theotherhand,presentnarratives inwhich
the same individuals function as members of enemy
nations.Thissameparadoxofa friendlyneighborwho
kills can be described with the concept of cognitive
frames or ‘a mental structure which situates and
connects events, people and groups into ameaningful
narrative’”(Lieberman2006,299).
AccordingtoLieberman,itwasimportanttounderstandthesignificanceofthis
context,especiallyinregardstoUNandNATOinterventionsinBosnia-Herzegovina.
TheUNdidnotprovideUNPROFORpeacekeepersinthecountrywiththe
informationorresourcestheyneededtoadequatelyaddressthenewandquickly
spreadingnationalnarratives(Lieberman2006,299).
Distinctionsbetweentheethnicgroupsweremoreideologicalthanphysical,
althoughsomekeycharacteristicseasilyallowedeachgrouptoidentifyoneanother.
InTonyBarber’sarticlefortheIndependent,writteninZagrebin1992,Barber
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emphasizestheunderlyingsocietal,linguistic,andreligioustensionsthroughout
SFRYugoslavia.Eachethnicgrouphaditsowndistincthistory,language,and
religion,andwhiledailyinteractionswerepleasant,asdescribedbyLieberman,the
overarchingsocietalinteractionsweremorehostile.SerbsandCroatsspokesimilar
languages,bututilizeddifferentalphabets.SerbsweremajorityOrthodoxChristian,
CroatswerepredominantlyCatholic,andBosniakswereMuslim.Thesekey
ideologicaldifferencesallowedSerbstomobilizeandjoinotherradicalizedSerbsin
protectingSerb-majorityBosniantownsandcities,andidentifywhowasCroatand
Muslim(Barber1992).
Thefirst-handaccountsofinvestigativejournalistDavidRohdehelpsupport
Lieberman’sconclusions.Inhisnovel,Endgame:TheBetrayalandofSrebrenica,
Europe’sWorstMassacreSinceWorldWarII,Rohdeusedhisskillsasajournalistto
studythecontextofthemassacresinSrebrenicaandinterviewseveral
peacekeepers,formerSerbianArmysoldiers,andsurvivors(Rohde2012).He
explainedthatthethreeethnicgroupswereraciallyidentical,andBosnia-
HerzegovinawasSFRYugoslavia’smostethnicallyintegratedrepublic(Rohde
2012).Theoverarchingquestioninhisintroductiontothegenocidewashowthe
coexistingethnicgroupswereradicalizedtoexterminateoneanother.
RohdebelievedoutsideinfluencefromSerbianPresidentSlobodanMilošević
andCroatianPresidentFranjoTudjmanplayedalargeroleinfuelingthewar.
Miloševićwasmaniacallybrilliantinhisuseofstate-controlledviolenceto,“whipup
nationalismandplayonpeople’sfearsthatpastSerbsufferingmightberepeated,”
andexpressanurgencythatSerbsneededtoprotectthemselvesbypersecuting
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MuslimsandCroats(Rohde2012).Underthiscontext,“pastSerbsuffering”refersto
propagandautilizedbyMiloševićtodiscussviolenceagainstSerbsbyCroatiaand
MuslimsundertheOttomanEmpireandduringWorldWarsIandII(Rohde2012;
seealsoBarber1992).Tudjmanusedsimilartacticsandpropagandatomobilize
Bosnia-Herzegovina’sCroatpopulation,providingfundingtotheBosnianCroatsto
combattheSerbian-backedBosnianSerbs.ThislefttheMuslimswithnooutside
backers,andnoresourcestoprotectthemselvesfromSerbianattacks(Rohde2012).
Inthissense,Bosnia-HerzegovinawasexploitedasaproxywarforMilošević
andTudjmantodividethecountryintoaGreaterSerbiaforFRYugoslaviaanda
GreaterCroatiaforCroatia(Rohde2012).RohdedescribedBosnia-Herzegovinaas
veryreactiveandexplosive,asitwasclearbothpresidentswerepromotingviolence
againsttheotherethnicgroup(Rohde2012).
RohdealsodiscussedhisdisappointmentintheUN’sinabilitytoseverthe
influenceMiloševićandTudjmanhadinthewar.Intheprefacetohisbook,he
wrote,“Allsidesinthebrutalwar–includingmanyWesternandUNofficials–have
resolutelyconvincedthemselvesthattheyareblamelessandtheothersideisguilty”
(Rohde2012).Rohde’sbiggestgrievancewasthelackofaccountabilitythe
internationalcommunitydisplayedtowardthewarinBosnia-Herzegovina,and
theirsubsequentinabilitytoassistthecountryasitnowattemptstomovebeyond
thewar(Rohde2012).Thisgrievancewillbefurtherdiscussedinthenexttheme
below.
IV.TheUnitedNationandinternationalcommunitydelayedtheirrecognitionofthevitalroletheyplayinpreventingmasskillingsandotheratrocities.
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Failedpeacekeepingmissionsduringthe1990sinBosnia-Herzegovina,
Somalia,andRwandapromptednecessarychangestotheUN’sstructureand
behavior.Toaddressthevaguenessandconfusionassociatedwiththe
responsibilitiesoftheinternationalcommunity,andtoensuregloballeaders
continuedtosupportUNeffortsinthefuture,RameshThakurdiscussedtheUN’s
developmentoftheResponsibilitytoProtect(R2P)doctrineinhis2006book.The
adoptionofR2PandsimilarglobalaccountabilitymeasuresallowedtheUNtotakea
firmstanceagainstmassatrocities,andenforcea,“collectiveglobalresponsibility
alongsidepreventingandrepellingarmedaggressionagainststates”(Thakur2006,
1).WhileThakurapplaudedthisvitalstepinpreventingfuturemasskillings,the
actionwastakentoolateforstateslikeBosnia-Herzegovina(Thakur2006,1).
LisaHultman,JacobKathman,andMeganShannonalsoaddressedtheUN’s
acknowledgementoftheroletheinternationalcommunitymustplayinpreventing
globalconflictsfromescalating.IntheirarticlefortheAmericanJournalofPolitical
Science,HultmanandhercolleaguesnotedtheUN’sunanimousadoptionofR2P
requiredtheinternationalcommunitytotakegreaterresponsibilitytoprotect
civiliansagainstviolence(Hultmanetal2013,875).Intheiranalysis,Hultmanand
herteamalsofound,“increasingthenumberofUNtroopsandpolicesignificantly
decreasesviolenceagainstciviliansbybothgovernmentsandrebels.Peacekeeping
successfullyreducesciviliansufferingiftheUNcommitslargernumbersof
appropriatelytaskedpersonneltoaconflict”(Hultmanetal2013,876).Whenthe
UNcombinesmilitaryactionwithhumanitarianassistanceandnation-building
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measures,itsmissionsshouldbemoresuccessfulinensuringthelong-termpolitical
stabilityofthehostcountry.
Howwillthisthesiscontributetotheexistingresearchdiscussedabove?
TheoveralltoneoftheresearcharguesUNPROFORfailedbecauseitwas
ineffectiveinpreventingthewarfromescalating.Thefindingsofthisthesiswill
seektoidentifyotherfactorsimpactingtheUN’scapabilitiesinBosnia-Herzegovina
andtheBalkanregion.Thisthesiswillspecificallyexaminetheinfluenceregional
actorsplayedinthewar,asmanyofthepublicationsabovedisregardtheimpact
SerbiaandCroatiahadonthewarandUNPROFORactions.
ThisthesisaimstocontributeagreatercontexttoUNpeacekeepingmissions,
specificallyUNPROFORinBosnia-Herzegovina.Understandingthesupposedfailure
ofthispeacekeepingmissionisimportantindeterminingwhatfactorshelpfacilitate
asuccessfulone.
Hypothesis
ThefollowinghypothesiswillanalyzeUNPROFORinBosnia-Herzegovinato
determineitssuccessatmeetingthecriteriaforpeacekeepingmissionsaccordingto
priorresearchcollectedintheliteraturereview.CompilingcriteriafromRobert
Johansen’sanalysisofPaulDiehl’sconclusions,andtheanalysesfromAlexBellamy
andPaulWilliams,Idevelopedfourcriteriaforassessingthesuccessofthe
UNPROFORmissiontoBosnia-Herzegovina:consentfromtheinvolvedparties,
peacekeepermilitaryinvolvementandtheuseofforce,peacekeeperimpartiality
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andconduct,andpromotingconflictresolutionattheconclusionofthemission.The
hypothesisbelowreferencesthesefourcriteria:
Hypothesis:TheUNPROFORpeacekeepingoperationinBosnia-Herzegovinadoesnotmeetthecriterianecessaryforasuccessfulmission,andisthereforeafailedoperation.
MeasurementandResearchDesign
Thisthesiswillutilizequalitativeandquantitativedatatodetermineif
UNPROFORmeetsallfourcriterialistedabove,andifnot,whatcriteriathemission
failedtoincorporate.Basedonthesefourcriteria,Icreatedaquestionnaire
(AppendixA,Page49)tocollect,organize,andassessdifferentaspectsof
UNPROFOR.
Thesheetwillconvertqualitativedataintoquantitativedata(asdetailed
below),andwillrelyondifferentsourcesforcollection.Measurement1refersto
hostconsentandthereceptivenessofeachinvolvedpartytoapeacekeeping
mission.Forthepurposeofthisthesis,consentisdefinedastheexplicit,active
permissionofeveryactorandpartyinvolvedintheconflicttoUNPROFOR.Iwill
collectdataforthismeasurementfroma1996casestudyfromChristineGrayfor
DukeUniversity,entitled“Host-StateConsentandUnitedNationsPeacekeepingin
Yugoslavia.”
Consentisthemostimportantcriteriatoobtainwhenplanningasuccessful
peacekeepingmissionbecauseitensurestheinvolvedpartiesunderstandthevital
roletheUNwillplayinfacilitatingtheconflict.Consentalsoensurestheinvolved
partiesarereceptivetoacceptingthird-partyassistanceinendingtheconflictand
workingtowardapost-conflictplantostabilizetheaffectedcountries.
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AfterreviewingGray’scasestudy,Iidentifiedthefollowingthreeactors
involvedintheconflict:thegovernmentsofBosnia-Herzegovina,FRYugoslavia,and
Croatia.Forthepurposesofthismeasurement,FRYugoslaviawillprimarilyreferto
theactionsofSerbiaunderMilošević.Usinganordinal-levelscaleof1-5,Iwill
measurethereceptivenessofeachgovernmentincomplyingwithUNmandates,
where1referstonoconsentandnosupportgiventotheUN,and5refersto
completeconsentandfullsupportgiventotheUN.Iwillcollectdataontheconsent
ofthesestatesfromthreedifferenttimeperiodstobetteraccommodatethecomplex
andchangingattitudesduringtheBosnianWar:beforethebeginningofthewar
(1991),duringthewar(1992-1994),andattheendofthewar(1995).
Ideally,eachgovernmentshouldscore4or5foreachtimeperiodtosignify
theirfullsupportofandconsenttoUNPROFOR.However,basedontheinformation
providedintheBackgroundsection,Iexpectthegovernments’consentand
compliancewiththemissiontoweakenduringthesecondandthirdtimeperiods.
Underthiscontext,UNPROFORwillhavefailedtomaintainconsentoftheoperation
fromthehostcountryandinvolvedparties.
Measurement2willdeterminetheextentmilitaryforcewasusedby
peacekeepers.Inthecontextofthisthesis,forceisdefinedastheuseofarmed
militaryinterventionbypeacekeepersduringthemission.Thisincludesfiringon
combatantsorcommittingviolenceagainstmembersoftheinvolvedparties,but
doesnotincludetheuseofforceforself-defense.Thismeasurementisconditional,
assomeconflictsmayrequirepeacekeeperstousesomelevelofforcetoprotect
themselvesorensureUNmandatesaremet.
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UsingtheanalysisofarmedpeacekeepersinBosnia-Herzegovinaduringthe
BosnianWarfromRobertBaumann,GeorgeGawrych,andWalterKretchik,this
measurementwilluseanordinal-levelscaletodeterminethefrequencyofarmed
interventionfromUNpeacekeeperstocontroltheconflict.Iwillcollectqualitative
datafromthestudyandratethepeacekeepingforceswithascoreof1-5in
accordancewiththeUNpeacekeepingprinciples,with1referringtonouseofforce
oranappropriateuseofforceand5referringtoaconsistentandinappropriateuse
offorce.
Ideally,UNPROFORshouldearnascoreof1or2becausetheUN
peacekeepingprinciplesprohibitpeacekeepersfromusingforceorarmed
interventionunlessspecificallypermitted.Thismethodwillbedifficulttomeasure
becausethereisnoprecedentformeasuringUNpeacekeepingforceandthedatais
subjective.ThereportfromBaumannandhiscolleaguesoffersthebestanalysisof
peacekeeperconductduringtheUNPROFORmission,andIbelieveitisthemost
unbiased.Iwillusetheiranalysis,inadditiontonewsarticles,toassigntherating
forthismeasurement.
Measurement3willdeterminetheimpartialityandconductofpeacekeepers
duringUNPROFORbecausetheUNemphasizestheimportanceofneutralityand
appropriatebehaviorduringongoingmissions.Inthisthesis,impartialityreferstoa
peacekeeper’sabilitytowithholdfromunwarrantedsocial,economic,military,or
diplomaticinterventionoutsideofUNmandates,andtoavoidmisconduct.Inthis
context,misconductreferstoanyobservedinstancesofcorruption,exploitation,
inappropriatebehavior,orabusesofpowerandauthority.
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SimilartoMeasurement2,Measurement3involvessubjectivequalitative
data.Thisquestionwillbedifficulttoresearchbecausethereisnodatabase
collectingallspecificinstancesofUNscandalsormisconductduringmissions.Asa
result,IamverylimitedinwhatdataIhaveaccessto.Iwillrelyonthesamereport
fromBaumannandhisteamusedinMeasurement2,reportsfromtheUN,andnews
coverageofUNPROFORinBosnia-Herzegovinatodeterminetheimpartialityand
conductofthepeacekeepers.
Iwilluseanordinal-levelscaleof1-5tomeasuretheseverityofthe
peacekeeper’simpartialityandconductduringthemission,with1referringtoan
entirelyunbiasedanduncorruptedforce,and5referringtoanentirelybiasedforce
withmanyinstancesofmisconduct.Ideally,thepeacekeepersdeployedinBosnia-
HerzegovinaduringtheBosnianWarshouldscorea1or2,signifyinganimpartial
peacekeepingforcecomplacenttotheUNcodeofconduct.
Lastly,Measurement4willdeterminehowUNPROFORconcludeditsmission
in1995.ThismeasurementisbasedononeofJohansenandDiehl’s
recommendationsforassessingthesuccessofaUNpeacekeepingmission.Iwilluse
UNreportstodeterminewhatstepstheytooktoconcludeUNPROFOR,howthey
removedtroopsfromBosnia-Herzegovina,andanyactionstheytooktohelp
facilitatepeaceinthecountry.
Inaddition,IwillalsoconsiderthereflectionsofthreeSecretary-Generalsto
determinetheirconclusionsofUNPROFOR:BoutrosBoutros-Ghali,theUNSGfrom
1992-1996;KofiAnnan,theUNSGfrom1997to2006;andBan-KiMoon,thecurrent
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UNSG.Ibelievethesereflectionswillallowmetobestassigntheconclusionand
successofUNPROFORinBosnia-Herzegovina.
Similartotheotherthreemeasures,IwillrateUNPROFOR’sfinalactionsand
theprogramstheUNemployedinBosnia-Herzegovinatoreplaceit(ifany)onan
ordinal-levelscaleof1-5.1willrefertoasuccessfulpost-conflictfacilitationand
removalofUNPROFORtroops,and5willrefertonopost-conflictfacilitationanda
poorremovalofUNPROFORtroops.
AnidealscoreforUNPROFORwillbea1or2,asthisindicatestheleast
intrusiveandmostconstructivemethodsforconcludingtheoperation.Ascoreof4
or5willindicateanunsuccessfulpost-conflictfacilitationwhereUNtroopswere
eitherunabletoleaveBosnia-Herzegovinawithoutseriouspoliticalrepercussions,
orweremetwithsignificantinternationalbacklash.
Results
Thissectionwillbrieflydiscussthefindingsofthequestionnaireandidentify
anytrendsinthedatacollected.TheDiscussionsectionbelowwillofferamore
extensiveanalysis,andexplanationsforthescoresofeachmeasurement.
Table1(Page52)illustratesmyfindingsforMeasurement1,which
determinestheconsentfortheUNPROFORoperationfromthegovernmentsof
Bosnia-Herzegovina,FRYugoslavia,andCroatia.Inthecontextofthistableand
discussion,thegovernmentofFRYugoslaviarepresentsMiloševićandtheSerbian
government.IutilizedChristineGray’spublicationfocusingonconsentduringthe
UNPROFORmission,andappropriateUNSCresolutions,todeterminethe
receptivenessoftheinvolvedgovernmentstothemission.
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ThefirstcolumnofTable1showsstrongconsentforUNPROFORinthestate
ofBosnia-Herzegovinabeforetheoperation’sformaldeploymentin1991.Both
governmentsfromBosnia-HerzegovinaandFRYugoslaviareceived5’sfortheir
receptivenesstotheproposedoperation.Croatiareceiveda4becauseTudjmandid
notprovidefullsupporttotheUNonbehalfofCroatiatothesameextentasthe
governmentsofBosnia-HerzegovinaandFRYugoslavia.
Thereisanobservedtrendamongeachgovernmentwhereconsentand
receptivenesstothemissiondecreasesastheBosnianWarprogresses.In1991,the
governmentsweremostlyinsupportofthemission,earning4’sand5’s.Between
1992and1994,consenttothemissionsignificantlydecreased,althoughno
governmententirelywithdrewitsconsenttotheoperation.Bosnia-Herzegovina
wasthemostcooperativegovernmentthroughoutthedurationofthewar,with
CroatiaandFRYugoslaviashowingincreasinglylessreceptivenesstoUNPROFOR.
By1995,CroatiaofficiallywithdrewitsconsenttothemissionandtheBosnian
governmentbecamemoreskeptical.TherewasnochangeinratingforFR
Yusoglavia.
Measurement2receivesascoreof3,signifyinglittleuseofforceby
UNPROFORpeacekeepers,eventhoughthereshouldhavebeensomeuseofforceto
fulfillsomeUNmandates.Table2(Page52)illustratesthreefactorsIcollected
informationonfromthereportbyBaumann,Gawrych,andKretchik,andfromTable
3(Page53).ThesefactorsarethesizeoftheUNPROFORpeacekeepingforce,the
necessityforuseofforceduringthemission,andUNmandateleniency.Despitethe
lackofaneffectiveprotocolorthepreventionofallviolenceduringthewar,theUN
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partiallyfulfilleditsprotocolbypermittingverylittleuseofforcethroughoutthe
operation,asshowninTable2.
Measurement2didnotreceiveanacceptablescoreasindicatedintheDesign
section.207peacekeeperswerekilledthroughoutthedurationoftheoperation.
Thisisthehighestnumberofdeathsinanypeacekeepingmissionbetween1990
and2015,accordingtoTable3.Inaddition,peacekeeperswereunabletoprevent
massacresin“safecities”likeSrebrenicabecausetheywereprohibitedfromusing
anyforceagainstanymilitarizedgroup.
Measurement3receivesascoreof3basedontheinformationrepresentedin
Table4(Page54).ThistableorganizesinformationcollectedfromanarticleforThe
GuardianbyOwenBowcott,areportonUNpeacekeepermisconductfromthe
JordanAmbassadortotheUN,andthesamereportonpeacekeepersinBosnia-
HerzegovinausedinscoringMeasurement2fromBaumann,Gawrych,andKretchik.
ThetableisorganizedintodifferentsectionsrelatingtotheUN’sofficialprotocolfor
identifyingandaddressinginstancesofmisconduct.Thisisfurtherexplainedinthe
Discussionsectionbelow.
IfoundthepeacekeepingforceactedrelativelyunbiasedinfulfillingUN
mandates,althoughthemostpressingissueforpeacekeeperimpartialitywasthe
contextofthewar.AsUNPROFORpeacekeepersweregiventheresponsibilityto
protecthigh-risk,majorityBosnianCroatandMuslim“safe”cities,BosnianSerb
combatantsmisconstruedtheseprotectionsasinterventiononbehalfoftheBosnian
CroatsandMuslims.ThisisexpressedinthefirstrowofTable4.
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Inregardstopeacekeepermisconduct,therewerelittletonorecorded
instancesofdisrespectfulbehavior,indicatedinthesecondrowofthefirstcolumn
ofTable4.However,peacekeepersinBosnia-Herzegovinawerechargedwith
engaginginsextraffickingandsolicitingsexatbrothels.Whiletherewerefew
instancesofsexualmisconduct,thepresenceofsuchactionsinfluencedmetoscore
theoverallimpartialityandconductoftheUNPROFORpeacekeeperswitha3.
Measurement4receivesascoreof2,representingthestrongandresponsive
roletheUNundertookaftertheconclusionoftheinitialUNPROFORmissionin
March1995.Table5(Page54)representsdataonthreefactorsIidentifiedfromUN
reportsandrelevantnewsarticles.Thefirstrowliststhereplacementsforthe
conclusionofUNPROFOR,mostimportantlytherestructuredUNPROFOR(lasting
from1995-1996),andthereplacementofIFORwithamultinationalStabilization
Force(SFOR).
Row2ofTable5specificallynotestwoUNmissionsinBosnia-Herzegovina
thathelpedfacilitatepeaceandcontinuedtopromotepoliticalstabilityafterthe
initialUNPROFORmissionwascompleted;therestructuredUNPROFOR(1995-
1996)andtheUnitedNationsMissioninBosnia-Herzegovina.Thesetwooperations
willbefurtherdiscussedintheDiscussionssection.
ThemostinterestingdatarepresentedinTable5isthereflectionsfrom
formerUNSecretary-GeneralsBoutrosBoutros-Ghali,KofiAnnan,andBan-KiMoon.
WhileeachUNSGbelievedUNPROFORwasunsuccessfulinBosnia-Herzegovina,
theyattributeitssupposedfailuretodifferentcharacteristics.Ifoundthisaspectof
thetablethemosthelpfulindeterminingthescoreforMeasurement4,asinsight
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fromSecretary-GeneralsisanintegralpartofassessingUNactions.
Discussion
Thissectionisorganizedintotwosubsectionstodiscussthesignificanceof
thequestionnaireandrelateitsfindingstotheHypothesis;TheUNPROFOR
peacekeepingoperationinBosnia-Herzegovinadoesnotmeetthecriterianecessary
forasuccessfulmission,andisthereforeafailedoperation.
Thefirstsubsectiondiscussesthecalculationofeachmeasurementfromthe
Resultssection.Thesecondsubsectiondiscussesthecollectivesignificanceofthe
questionnaire,anditsrelationtotheHypothesis.
I.AnExplanationoftheMeasurementScores
Measurement1:Consent
Table1illustratesmyfindingsforMeasurement1.Focusingonthefirst
columnratinggovernmentconsentin1991,Idecidedtoprovidethegovernmentsof
Bosnia-HerzegovinaandFRYugoslaviawith5’sbecausebothprovidedexplicit
supportforthedeploymentoftheUNPROFORmission.Inameetingbetweenthe
UNSGandtheUNSCinNovember1991,theUNSGreadaletterfromMiloševićtothe
CouncilonbehalfofSerbia.Theletterstated,“Ihavebeeninstructedbymy
governmenttorequesttheestablishmentofapeacekeepingoperationinYugoslavia
whichreflectsatthesametimetheexpresseddesireoftheprincipalpartiestothe
presentconflict”(Gray1996,246).
InresponsetoMilošević’sletter,theUNSCcreatedResolution721(1991),
whichstated;
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“ConsideringtherequestbytheGovernmentof[Serbia]
for the establishment of a peacekeeping operation in
[SFR]Yugoslavia,[and]Consideringfurtherthefactthat
each one of the Yugoslav participants in the meeting
withthePersonalEnvoyoftheSecretary-Generalstated
that they wanted to see the deployment of a UN
peacekeeping operation as soon as possible” (Gray
1996,246).
Thesetwodocumentsprovidedmewiththebasisformyratingofthegovernment
ofBosnia-HerzegovinaandFRYugoslaviafor1991.
WhileCroatiawasincludedinResolution721’sreferencetoSFRYugoslavia,
CroatiareceivedalowerratingthantheothertwogovernmentsbecauseTudjman
showedsomereluctanceinconsentingtotheUNPROFORoperation.Hewantedto
preserveCroatia’snewfoundindependence,andwashesitantinprovidingtheUN
withpoliticalandmilitaryaccesstotheregion.Despitethishesitation,Tudjman
ultimatelyprovidedconsenttothemissioninneighboringBosnia-Herzegovina,
earningCroatiaascoreof4(Gray1996,246).
ThesecondcolumninTable1representstheperiodbetween1992and1994,
andprovedmorecomplicatedformeasuringgovernmentconsent.Thegovernment
ofBosnia-HerzegovinaformallyrequestedthepresenceofUNpeacekeepersinthe
countryin1992afterSerbiainvadedCroatiaandSlovenia(Gray1996,247-8).While
Bosnia-HerzegovinawasthemostwillingpartytoacceptUNpeacekeepers,italso
“demanded”theUN,“surrendersomefacilitiesitalreadyoccupied[inBosnia-
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Herzegovina],payforothernewfacilities,andreopennegotiationsonthetermsof
employmentforlocalstaff”(Gray1996,253).
Despitethesedemands,Bosnia-Herzegovinawastheonlygovernmentto
completetheStatusofForcesAgreements(SOFA)mandatedbytheUN.The
completionofSOFAswasimportantforUNPROFORforseveralreasons.Itheld
“symbolic”importanceinassuringthecommitmentoftheinvolvedstatesin
cooperatingwiththeoperation(Gray1996,253).Italsoestablishedaprecedentfor
actionstheUNcouldtakewhennegotiatingwiththegovernments,andimproved
the“bargainingpositionoftheUNforcesindemandingcooperationfromthe…
state”(Gray1996,253).IdecidedtoassigntheBosniangovernmentascoreof4to
reflecttheirgrowingreluctancetocomplywithUNprotocol,butrelative
receptivenesstothemission.
In1992,thegovernmentofFRYugoslaviagrewdissatisfiedwithUN
interventioninBosnia-Herzegovina.FRYugoslaviadidnotagreetheUNneededto
protecttheBosnianCroatsandMuslimsfromthemobilized(andSerbian-backed)
BosnianSerbs.Inadditiontorefusingtohostpeacekeepingforcesoraccommodate
UNPROFOR,SerbiarefusedtosubmitanySOFAs.Later,theUNSCpassedResolution
947(1994)requiringbothCroatiaandFRYugoslaviatocompletetheirSOFAs.
Neithercountrymetthisrequirement(Gray1996,253).
IprovidedFRYugoslaviawithascoreof2foritslackofcooperationwiththe
peacekeepingoperation.FRYugoslaviadidnotearnascoreof1becauseitdidnot
formallywithdrawitsconsentfromthemission.
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InregardstoCroatia,TudjmanwasmostlyconcernedtheUNwouldinfringe
onCroatiansovereignty.InresponsetoaletterfromTudjman,theUNSCissued
Resolution740(1992),whichdictatedthefollowing;
“Takenote that the letterofPresidentFranjoTudjman
of 6 February 1992, in which he accepts fully the
Secretary-General’sconceptandplanwhichdefinesthe
conditions and areas where the UN force would be
deployed, removes a further obstacle in that respect…
[but] expresses its concern that the UN peacekeeping
plan has not yet [been] fully and unconditionally
acceptedbyall inYugoslaviaonwhosecooperation its
successdepends”(Gray1996,247).
ThisResolutionacknowledgedareluctantletterfromTudjmantotheUNSC,where
heacceptedtheUNSG’stermsforUNPROFOR,butexpressedsomehesitationsatthe
“technical”detailsoftheoperation.TheUNSGeventuallymanagedtogainapproval
fromCroatiatostationpeacekeepersatSarajevoInternationalAirport,butthey
weregrantedlimitedpowers(Gray1996,248).
InadditiontodefyingUNSCResolution947in1994,CroatiachargedtheUN
$8.6millioninfueltaxesand$2.5millioninairporttaxesbetweenJulyand
December.Thesechargesweredeemed“inconsistentnotonlywiththeUNModel
SOFA,butalsowiththe1946ConventionofthePrivilegesandImmunitiesofthe
UnitedNations”(Gray1996,254).Croatiabecamedifficulttoaccommodate,placing
furtherstrainsonUNPROFORinBosnia-Herzegovina.Asaresult,IprovidedCroatia
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withascoreof2foritscircumstantialconsenttoUNPROFORbetween1992and
1994.
ThelastcolumninTable1measuresgovernmentconsentthroughout1995
beforeUNPROFORwasconcluded.Bosnia-Herzegovinawastheonlystateto
expresscompleteconsenttothecreationofasecondaryUNpeacekeepingforce,the
RapidReactionForce(RRF).TheUNestablishedRRFsinJune1995tohelpdelegate
UNPROFORpower,butnotexpandoraddtoit.ThecreationofRRFswas
controversial,asit“ledtofurtherproblemsovertheconclusionofSOFAswiththe
hoststates”(Gray1996,263).SomeformerYugoslavgovernmentsargued,“theRRF
wasanewforceseparatefromUNPROFORanddemandedthenegotiationofanew
SOFA”(Gray1996,263).IdecidedtoprovidetheBosniangovernmentwithascore
of3,becauseitwasgrowingskepticalofUNPROFORafterthemassacrein
Srebrenica,butwasnotasuncooperativeasthegovernmentsofFRYugoslaviaor
Croatia.
ThegovernmentofFRYugoslaviamaintainedahostileattitudetoward
UNPROFOR,butdidnotwithdrawitsconsenttothemission.Asaresult,IscoredFR
Yugoslaviawitha2foritscontinueddefianceofUNresolutionsandmandates.
TheUNSGbecame“openlycriticalofCroatia’sfailuretoconcludeaSOFA
withregardtothe[UNConfidenceRestorationOperationinCroatia(UNCRO)],the
forcethathadreplacedUNPROFOR”(Gray1996,254).Croatiaformallywithdrewits
consenttotheUNPROFORmissioninJanuary1995(Gray1996,266).This
withdrawalwarrantedCroatiawithascoreof1,althoughitisworthnotingCroatia
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continuedtopushforanendtotheBosnianWarevenafterseveringtieswith
UNPROFOR.
Measurement2:UseofForce
WhendeterminingthescoreforUNPROFORpeacekeepers’useofforce
duringtheoperationinMeasurement2,IusedthefollowingfactorsshowninTable
2tobasemydecision;thesizeofthepeacekeepingforce,thenecessityfortheuseof
force,andUNmandateleniencyonpeacekeeperauthority.Ichosethesefactors
fromemergingthemesinBaumann’sreport.
BasedonTable3,theaveragetroopsizeforUNPROFORinSFRYugoslavia
consistedof27,632UNpeacekeepersanduniformedUNpersonnel.Bosnia-
Herzegovinaentertainedbetween7,000-38,000peacekeepersanduniformedUN
personnel,significantlymorethantheaveragenumberofpeacekeepersthroughout
thedurationofthelargermission(Baumann,Gawrych,andKretchik2004,27,37).
Inaddition,UNPROFORrequiredsignificantlymoretroopsinBosnia-Herzegovina
thananyotherpeacekeepingoperationbetween1990and2015.Forcontext,the
second-largestpeacekeepingmissioninTable3totheDemocraticPeople’sRepublic
oftheCongothroughMONUSCOonlyrequired19,881peacekeepers(asof2015).
Baumannandhisteamsuggestedapotentialcorrelationbetweentroopsizeandthe
escalationofviolenceinBosnia-Herzegovina,althoughthereisnotenoughdata
availablefromthewartotestthisbelief(Baumann,Gawrych,andKretchik2004,
27).
BasedonthereportfromBaumannandhisteam,Iconcludedtherewasa
necessityforsomeforceininstancesofviolenceagainstpeacekeepers,toenforce
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UNmandates,andtoprotectUN“safecities.”AccordingtoBaumann,“The
[UNPROFOR]forcewaslargelyineffectiveastheUNpeacekeeperspossessedvery
restrictiverulesof[engagement]despitethemushroomingethnicconflictaround
them”(Baumann,Gawrych,andKretchik2004,27).
Thisfactorwasmeasuredbyhowmanypeacekeeperswerekilledduring
UNPROFOR.AccordingtoTable3,UNPROFORentailedthehighestnumberofUN
peacekeeperanduniformedpersonneldeaths;207.Canada’sdirectorof
PeacekeepingPolicyfrom1996to1999,ColonelHatton,offeredsomeexplanation
forthisdeathtoll.AccordingtoHatton,“Theproblemlaynotonlywiththeflawed
mandatebutwiththefailureoftheinternationalcommunitytoprovideall
necessaryresources,especiallysoldiers,tosupportmissionrequirements”
(Baumann,Gawrych,andKretchik2004,44).HattonbelievedtheUNmandates
neededmoreclarificationfordefininginstanceswhereself-defensewas
appropriate.Hypothetically,thiscouldhavepreventedsomeofthedeaths.
AnUNPROFORpost-operationassessmentclaimedthattorestoreorderand
peaceinBosnia-Herzegovina,peacekeepersneededtheresourcesandauthorityto;
“1)crediblydemonstrateitsresolve;2)mountacredibleshowofforce;and3)have
themeanstoeffectivelyprotectthoseithasbeentaskedtoprotectagainstforces
equippedwithtanksandartillery”(Baumann,Gawrych,andKretchik2004,40-1).
TheUN’sinabilitytopermitsomeuseofforceininstancesofviolenceagainst
peacekeepersandinenforcingUNmandatesgreatlyaffectedtheabilityof
UNPROFORinBosnia-Herzegovina.
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UNresolutionsstrictlyprohibitedtheuseofforcethroughouttheUNPROFOR
mission.UNmandatesdeniedpeacekeeperswiththe“righttousemilitaryforceina
proactivemannerinsupportofinternationalobjectives”(Baumann,Gawrych,and
Kretchik2004,40).Asaresult,UNPROFOR“lackedtheleverage”toenforcepeace,
andwere“subjecttoinnumerableindignities–harassmentbysnipers,seizureas
hostages,andgeneralabuse”(Baumann,Gawrych,andKretchik2004,40).Baumann
identifiedUNmandatesasthemaintroubleforUNPROFORinBosnia-Herzegovina,
asidefromthehostileandcomplexethnicrelations.
In1993,theUNSCpassedResolution819,whichestablished“safezones”in
sixBosniancities.Thezonesofferedrefugetociviliansfromarmedattacksand
otherhostilities,andallowedUNtroopstodeliverhumanitarianassistancetothose
inneed(Baumann,Gawrych,andKretchik2004,45).Initially,thisresolution
prohibitedanyuseofforcebypeacekeepingtroops.
Afterpeacekeepersbecametherepeatedtargetsofattackfromcombatants,
UNSCResolution836(1993)waspassedtobetterdefineUNPROFORduties.The
resolutionclaimedUNPROFORneededto,“deterattacksagainsttheareas…monitor
thecease-fire…promotethewithdrawalofmilitaryorparamilitaryunitsotherthan
thoseoftheBosniangovernmentand…occupysomekeypointontheground”
(Baumann,Gawrych,andKretchik2004,45).ThroughResolution836,UNPROFOR
wasofferedlimitedpowerto,“takeallnecessarydefensivemeasures,includingthe
useofforceinresponsetobombardments,armedincursion,ordeliberate
obstructionoffreedom”(Baumann,Gawrych,andKretchik2004,45).WhiletheUN
permittedsomeuseofforce,mandateswerestillstrictinwhatconstitutedasan
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attackorobstructionoffreedom.UNPROFORtroopslackedtheresourcesand
claritytoappropriatelyutilizeResolution836toitsfullpotentialwhileprotecting
the“safe”cities.
Whenratingthismeasurement,Ialsoconsideredacomparisonofthe
militaryactionsofUNPROFORtotheactionsofanAmerican-ledmissionafterthe
warended,theDaytonImplementationForce(IFOR).IFORisconsideredamore
successfulmissionbecauseitorganizeditselfaroundmorelenientand
circumstantialmandates.Itwasalsoheadedbyasinglecountry,asopposedtothe
UN,andthuslyhadlessaccountabilitytointernationalprotocol.InregardstoIFOR,
Baumannwrote,
“To Americans…UNPROFOR’s principal relevancewas
that it demonstrated exactly how not to conduct a
military intervention in the midst of civil war and
humanitarian crisis. Although UNPROFOR strength in
Bosnia-Herzegovina reached 38,000 in 1994, it was
weaker than even its inadequate numbers implied. Its
largest combat elements were battalions, and each of
these answered to different a national chain of
command. Moreover, UNPROFOR lacked the authority
and all too often the firepower to use force in a
proactive manner” (Baumann, Gawrych, and Kretchik
2004,37).
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BasedonthiscomparisontoIFORandtheinformationprovidedinTables2and3,I
decidedtoscoreUNPROFORwitha3forlimiteduseofforceduringthe
peacekeepingmission,althoughsomeuseofforcewasneeded.
Measurement3:ImpartialityandConduct
Measurement3collectedinformationfromthe“ComprehensiveReviewof
theWholeQuestionofPeacekeepingOperationsinAllTheirAspects”bytheJordan
AmbassadortotheUNPrinceZeidRa’adZeidal-Hussein,anarticlefromThe
GuardiandiscussingUNpeacekeeperabuses,andthereportonpeacekeepingin
Bosnia-HerzegovinafromBaumann,Gawrych,andKretchik.Fromthesereports,I
sortedtheinformationintoTable4asinvolvingeitherpeacekeepingimpartialityor
peacekeepingmisconduct.
Baumannandhiscolleaguesoutlinedseveralinstancesofmisunderstanding
relatedtopeacekeepingimpartialityduringtheUNPROFORmission.While
peacekeeperswerepresentasneutralpartiesintheoperation,onlypermittedto
protectnoncombatantsin“safe”cities,someSerbiancombatantsinterpreted
UNPROFORactionasprovidingexcessiveprotectiontoBosnianCroatsandMuslims
becauseoftheirethnicidentities.
OneoftheseinstanceswasdiscussedinaDecember1994reportfromthe
UNSGtotheUNSC.Inthisreport,theUNSG,
“Not only acknowledged widespread difficulties
experienced by UNPROFOR in securing the safe areas,
but also offered a substantive analysis and tentative
conclusions…As demonstrated in the case of Gorazde,
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thepresenceofmanyMuslimfighters inthepresumed
sanctuaries jeopardized the perceived impartiality of
UNPROFOR peacekeepers. As noted in the Secretary-
General’s report, ‘After the first use of air power at
Gorazde, the Bosnian Serbs regarded UNPROFOR as
having intervened on behalf of their opponents.’ This
circumstance resulted in increased obstruction of
humanitarian relief convoys by the besieging Serb
forces, a formof retaliation that struck at the heart of
the UNPROFOR mandate. In addition, it was proof
positiveofUNPROFOR’slackofleveragewiththearmed
factions…During an uneasy cease-fire in a 3-kilometer
exclusion zone aroundGorazde, UNPROFORpersonnel
found theirmovement restricted by both sides (Serbs
andMuslims)andwerefrequentlythetargetsofsniper
fire”(Baumann,Gawrych,andKretchik2004,46).
ThisreportoutlinedtheperceptionsfromsomeBosnianSerbcombatantsthat
UNPROFORintervenedinthewarinfavoroftheBosnianCroatsandMuslims.This
wasevidentlyuntrue,aspeacekeeperswerechargedwithprotectedtheUN-
mandated“safe”cities,manyofwhichhappenedtohostmajorityBosnianCroatand
Muslimcivilianresidents.
Overall,UNPROFORmostlyexemplifiedtheUNcodeofconduct,which
requirespeacekeepersfollowthesethreestandards;1)Respectlocallaws,customs,
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andpractices,2)Treatthehostcountry’sinhabitantswithrespect,courtesy,and
consideration,and3)Actwithimpartiality,integrity,andtact(“UnitedNations
Peacekeeping:ConductandDiscipline”).Whilepeacekeepersmostlyupheldthese
standards,UNPROFORwasineffectiveinpreventingpeacekeepersfrompartakingin
thesexualexploitationoftraffickedwomenandchildren.
A2005reportfromPrinceZeidprovidedclarificationforhowtheUNshould
recognizeandcombatsexualexploitationandabusebypeacekeepers.PrinceZeid
definedsexualexploitationas“anyactualorattemptedabuseofapositionof
vulnerability,differentialpower,ortrust,forsexualpurposes,including,butnot
limitedto,profitingmonetarily,socially,orpoliticallyfromthesexualexploitationof
another”(“ComprehensiveReviewoftheWholeQuestionofPeacekeeping
OperationsinAllTheirAspects”2005,7).Healsodefinedsexualabuseas“actualor
threatenedphysicalintrusionofasexualnature,whetherbyforceorunderunequal
orcoerciveconditions”(“ComprehensiveReviewoftheWholeQuestionof
PeacekeepingOperationsinAllTheirAspects”2005,7-8).Thisreportdiscussedthe
alarmingprevalenceofsexualexploitationandabuseoccurringalongsideUN
peacekeepingmissions,includingtheUNPROFORoperationinBosnia-Herzegovina.
UNPROFORisoneofthefirstUNpeacekeepingmissionstoreceivebacklash
fromtheglobalcommunityforpeacekeepermisconduct.Duringthe1990s,
investigatorsfoundsomepeacekeepersvisitedbrothelsinBosnia-Herzegovinaand
Kosovotoengageinsexualactswithwomenforcedintoprostitution(Bowcott
2005).Onbehalfoftheinternationalcommunity,BowcottwroteforTheGuardian,
“TheembarrassmentcausedbythemisconductofUNforcesindevastated
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communitiesaroundtheworld–includingHaiti,SierraLeone,Bosnia,Cambodia,
EastTimor,andtheDemocraticRepublicoftheCongo–hasbecomeanincreasingly
highprofile,politicalproblem”(Bowcott2005).
WhileIfoundinformationtosuggestbothpeacekeeperbias(perceivedby
theBosnianSerbs)andmisconduct(sexualexploitationandabuse),Iwouldnot
deemUNPROFORinBosnia-Herzegovinaasexplicitlycorruptorimmoral.Ichoseto
scoreMeasurement3witha3becausepeacekeeperswereabletomaintaina
neutralposition,evenifsomecombatantsdidnotperceiveitassuch.Whilethe
existenceofanyactsofsexualexploitationfrompeacekeepersduringamissionis
unacceptable,theseactsdidnotdirectlyimpacttheoperation.
Measurement4:Post-WarTransition
AfterthewarendedinOctober2015,remainingUNPROFORofficials
monitoredthecease-firebetweenCroatia,FRYugoslavia,andBosnia-Herzegovina
inDayton,Ohio.InsigningtheDaytonAccords,alsoreferredtoasthePeace
Accords,thethreeBalkannationsagreedto,“conducttheirrelationsinaccordance
withtheUnitedNationsCharter,fullyrespectthe‘sovereignequalityofone
another,’settledisputesbypeacefulmeans,and‘refrainfromanyactionagainstthe
territorialintegrityofpoliticalindependenceofBosnia-Herzegovinaoranyother
state”(“UNMIBH:Background”).ThesigningoftheAccordswasconsideredalarge
success,asitendedtheconflictandforcedBosnia-HerzegovinaandFRYugoslaviato
recognizeoneanotherasindependentnationswithintheirowninternational
borders(“UNMIBH:Background”).
InreferencetothefirstrowofTable5,theUNSCrestructuredUNPROFORin
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Bosnia-HerzegovinainMarch1995,endingtheinitialUNPROFORoperationinSFR
Yugoslaviadeployedin1992.UNPROFORwasreplacedwiththreeseparatebut
“interlinked”peacekeepingmissionsoverseenbytheUnitedNationsPeaceForces
(UNPF).ThesemissionswereUNCRO(1995-1996)inCroatia,arestructured
UNPROFOR(1995-1996)presentthroughouttheBalkans,andtheUnitedNations
PreventiveDeploymentForce(UNPREDEP)inMacedonia(“SummaryofAG-061”).
TheAmerican-ledIFORwasreplacedwithSFOR,amultinationalforcecomprisedof
UNmemberstates(“UNMIBH:Background”).
ThemostimportantinitiativetheUNimplementedinBosnia-Herzegovina
aftertheconflictendedwastheestablishmentofUNMIBHfrom1996toDecember
2002.MentionedinthesecondrowofTable5,UNMIBHwasheadedbyboththe
SpecialRepresentativeoftheSecretary-General(SRSG)andtheCoordinatorof
UnitedNationsOperationsinBosnia-Herzegovina.Thesetwoofficialswerecharged
withcoordinatingallUNactivitiesinBosnia-Herzegovina,includingthenewly
createdUNInternationalPoliceTaskForce(IPTF),theresultofUNSCResolution
1035(1995).ThemaincomponentsofUNMIBHweretheCriminalJusticeAdvisory
Unit,theCivilAffairsUnit,theIPTF,theHumanRightsOffice,theOfficeofPublic
Affairs,andotheradministrativeofficesworkingwithinthecountryfortheUN.
UNMIBHwaseventuallyreplacedwiththeEuropeanUnionPoliceMission(EUPM)
inJanuary2003throughtheestablishmentofUNSCResolution1423(2002)
(“SummaryofAG-061”;seealso“UNMIBH:Background”).
Table5alsoaccountedforthereflectionsfromSecretary-Generals,whichare
importantindicatorsinthesuccessandconclusionofapeacekeepingmission.The
Pinski43
attitudesofthreeUNSGsareincludedinthethirdrowofTable5.BoutrosBoutros-
GhalioversawthedurationofUNPROFORinBosnia-Herzegovina,ashewasacting
UNSGfrom1992to1996.Boutros-GhalibelievedtheUNshouldhavedevotedmore
resourcesandpeacekeepingtroopstoBosnia-Herzegovina.Heinitiallywanted
35,000troopssenttothewarringnation,butwasdisappointedtoonlyreceive
permissionfor8,000bymemberstates(McFadden2016).
InhisfarewelladdresstotheUNin1996,Boutros-Ghali,“chidedmember
states[especiallytheU.S.]forfailingtodealwithdisastersinSomalia,Rwanda,and
Bosnia.”Hestated,“Theconceptofpeacekeepingwasturnedonitsheadand
worsenedbytheseriousgapbetweenmandatesandresources”(McFadden2016).
KofiAnnan,Boutros-Ghali’ssuccessor,alsodealtwiththerepercussionsof
UNPROFORinBosnia-Herzegovina.InOctober1999atamemorialceremonyin
Sarajevo,AnnancalledtheBosnianwar,“Oneofthemostdifficultandpainful
[missions]”inthehistoryoftheUN(“UNBosniaExperienceOneofMost‘Difficult
andPainful’initsHistory”1999).IncontrastwithBoutros-Ghali,Annanbelieved
theUNandtheinternationalcommunityhadaresponsibilitytointerveneinthe
conflict,abeliefreiteratedbymanyofthesourcesintheliteraturereview.
Heconcluded,“WewillneverforgetthatBosniawasasmuchamoralcause
asamilitaryconflict.ThetragedyofSrebrenicawillhauntourhistoryforever”(“UN
BosniaExperienceOneofMost‘DifficultandPainful’initsHistory”1999).
BanKi-MoonsharedsimilarremorseforUNPROFORasAnnan.Inarecent
interviewwithErolAvdovic,Ki-Moonreflectedonhisvisittoamemorialsitein
Srebrenicain2012.Hestated,
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“My most immediate reflection was connected to our
collectivefailure,asinternationalcommunity,toprotect
the innocent victims from what the International
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY)
laterqualifiedasgenocide.In1995wefailedtoprovide
protectiontomanypeoplewhoneededoursupport.We
mustnever forget the lessonsof Srebrenica, especially
in the context of today’s crises: from Syria to South
Sudan,peoplearestill facingunspeakableviolenceand
terror. The international community must do much
moretoprotectthosewhoturntousforhelp.Letusnot
turnourbackswhenpeople turn tous.Thisshouldbe
ourpromisetothevictimsofSrebrenica”(Avdovic).
Ki-Moonbelievestheinternationalcommunityhasaresponsibilitytoprotectother
countrieslikeSyriaandSouthSudanfromfacingsimilareventsasBosnia-
Herzegovina(Avdovic).
II.TheCollectiveSignificanceandFindingsoftheQuestionnaire BasedontheresearchandpublicationsdiscussedintheLiteratureReview
andResultssections,itisunderstoodasuccessfulpeacekeepingoperationmust
meetallfourcriteriaIidentifiedfromtheworksofJohansen,Diehl,Bellamy,and
Williams.Anoperation’sinabilitytofulfillanyofthesecriteriacompromisesthe
UN’sreputationandunderminesthesuccessofthepeacekeepingmission.According
Pinski45
totheseconclusions,UNPROFORinBosnia-Herzegovinaisafailedoperation
becauseitwasunabletofullyincorporatethreeofthefourcriteria.
First,theUNwasunabletomaintainconsentfromtheinvolvedparties
throughoutthedurationofthemission.Thisisthemostimportantcriteriafor
buildingasuccessfulmission,asitwilldeterminehowreceptivetheinvolved
partiesaretode-escalatingaconflict.Whiletherearemanydifferentfactors
impactingthewillingnessofthedifferentgovernmentstofulfillUNobjectives,the
mostimportantfactorwasthelackofcooperationbetweentheparties(Gray1996,
251).ThehistoricallyingrainedresentmentbetweentheCroatsofCroatiaandthe
SerbsofFRYugoslaviawastoostrongfortheUNtofacilitateagreements,asitwas
reinforcedthroughcenturiesofpoliticalandsocioeconomicevents.
IntheLiteratureReview,PaulSzaszattributedUNPROFORasafailure
becauseitwasnotauthorizedtousemilitaryactionbytheinvolvedparties.
ChristineGray’sreportfurtherreiteratedthisweakness,discussingthelimitations
placedonUNactioninBosnia-HerzegovinabyCroatiaandFRYugoslavia.Atrendof
thegrowingunwillingnessofCroatiaandFRYugoslaviatoparticipateinUNPROFOR
between1992and1995isobservedinTable1.Bothgovernmentsfailedtomeet
importantUNobjectives,liketheSOFAs,toensuredemilitarizationofrivalforcesin
Bosnia-Herzegovina.Asaresult,UNPROFORcouldnotmeetthiscriteria.
Second,UNPROFORfailedtoremainimpartialandactinaccordancewiththe
UNcodeofconduct.WhileUNmandatesandresolutionsdictatedthe
responsibilitiesofpeacekeepersandpreventedthemfromengagingindirect
militaryactions,someBosnianSerbcombatantgroupsperceivedtheUN-controlled
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“safezones”asharboringBosniakandBosnian-Croatmilitants.Althoughthese
townsandcitiesweremajorityBosnianMuslimandCroat,thismisconception
furthermobilizedBosnianSerbstotargetandshootatpeacekeepers.
Investigationsofthemissionalsofoundsomepeacekeepersengagingin
sexualmisconductandexploitation.Whetherintentionalornot,thisabuseofpower
placedastrainontherelationshipbetweentheUNandBosniancivilians.Inthe
“ComprehensiveReviewoftheWholeQuestionofPeacekeepingOperationsinAll
TheirAspects,PrinceZeidofJordandiscussedtheeffectsthisweakened
relationshiphadonUNaccountabilityandmemberstates’receptivenessto
participatinginfuturemissions.Instancesofpeacekeepermisconductovershadow
thesuccessesandcredibilityoftheUN.Forthesereasons,UNPROFORfailedtomeet
thiscriteria.
Third,UNPROFORonlypartiallyfulfilledthecriteriainvolvingpeacekeeper
useofforce.BasedonthescaledesignedtotestMeasurement2,UNPROFOR
receivedascoreindicatingitincorporatedthiscriteriatosomeextent.However,
duetothenatureoftheBosnianWarandtheUNmandates’emphasisonprotecting
civilian“safezones”fromviolence,UNPROFORdidnotadequatelymeetthiscriteria.
UNmandatesshouldhavepermittedsomeuseofforcetoprotectUN“safezones”
andpeacekeepersfromthewar.Thismayalsobeattributedtotheinabilityofthe
involvedpartiestofullyconsenttoUNPROFOR.
InhisanalysisofUNPROFORinBosnia-Herzegovina,Szasznotedone
weaknessofthemissionwerethelimitationsplacedonpeacekeepersfromstrictUN
mandates(Szasz1995,687).Forinstance,thepeacekeepingforceswerepermitted
Pinski47
toestablish“safezones”freeofviolencefornoncombatants,butwerenotgiventhe
appropriatemilitarydirectivestoprotectthesezones.Thisinflexibilityallowedfor
massacreslikethoseinSrebrenicatooccurinUN-protectedcities.Morethan200
peacekeepersandUNuniformedpersonnelsenttoBosnia-Herzegovinato
participateinUNPROFORwerekilledbycombatantsduringthemission.Forthese
reasons,UNPROFORdidnotadequatelyfulfillthiscriteria.
TheonlycriteriaUNPROFORfullyincorporatedwasMeasurement4,
indicatingasuccessfulconclusiontothemission.Anarticlediscussedinthe
LiteratureReviewwrittenbyLisaHultman,JacobKathman,andMeganShannon,
notedtheUN’sacknowledgementofthevitalroletheinternationalcommunityplays
inpreventingtheescalationofglobalorregionalconflicts(Hultmanetal2013).
WhiletheinitialUNPROFORmissionwasconcludedinmid-1995,theUNcreated
severalforcesandmissionstoreplaceandensurethesuccessfultransitionof
Bosnia-HerzegovinafromawarringnationtoapeacefuloneundertheDayton
Accords.UNPROFORinBosnia-Herzegovinawasreplacedbyasecondary
UNPROFORmission(1995-1996),UNPREDEP,andUNMIBHtoupholdalong-term
ceasefireandprotectthecountryfromengaginginanotherethnicwar.Whilethe
threeUNSGsdiscussedintheResultssectionaboveandoutlinedinTable5
perceivedUNPROFORasafailedoperation,itisworthnotingnonewerecriticalof
UNactionsaftertheconclusionofUNPROFOR.
AlthoughUNPROFORdidnotmeetallfourcriteria,itisnotsolelytoblame
forthefailureofthemission.TheunwillingnessofCroatiaandFRYugoslaviaplayed
alargeroleinthesubsequentfailureofthemission.Asneithergovernmentwasable
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orentirelywillingtodemilitarizetheirrespectiveethnicgroupsinBosnia-
Herzegovina,theUNwasgreatlylimitedinitsabilitytofacilitateanendtothe
conflict.
Conclusion
WhiletheUNPROFORpeacekeepingmissioninBosnia-Herzegovinais
regardedasafailedoperation,itsdeploymenthassincehelpedensurethe
importantroletheUNplaysinfacilitatingconflicts.Thelessonslearnedbythe
internationalcommunityfromUNPROFORillustratetheimportanceofsupporting
UNmissions,andensuringacountry’sreceptivenesstohostinganoperation.The
UNshouldnotberegardedasameanstoendallglobalarmedconflict,butratheras
atoolthatcanbeusedinreachingnegotiationstoprotectinternationalsecurity.
UNPROFOR’slegacywillhelpdeterminetheroletheUNandinternational
communitymustplayinfacilitatingaconflict.ThenatureofUNpeacekeepingisnot
toactivelypreventorstopaconflict,butratherhelptheinvolvedpartiesreach
negotiationsandassistintheenforcementoftheagreementswhenappropriate.
Thisroleisdifficulttounderstandandevenmoredifficulttopractice,butitis
strengthenedwiththeconclusionofeverypeacekeepingoperation.Itisimportant
tounderstandtheroletheUNplayedinBosnia-Herzegovinatobestunderstandthe
roleofitsauthorityinfuturemissions.UNPROFORmayhavefailedtomeetUN
objectives,butitsucceededinshowingtheglobalcommunitythenecessityof
peacekeepingoperations.
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Appendices
AppendixAQuestionnaire:HowsuccessfulwastheUNPROFORmissiontoBosnia-HerzegovinaaccordingtothecriteriafromJohansen,Diehl,Bellamy,andWilliams?
1. Consent:WhatweretheinvolvedpartiesanddidtheymaintainconsentfortheUNPROFORMissionatthebeforetheBosnianWar(1991),duringthewar(1992-1994),andattheendofthewar(1995)?(1-5rating)
2. MilitaryIntervention:DidUNPeacekeepersuseforce?(1-5rating)
3. Impartiality:Werepeacekeepersimpartial?Werethereinstancesof
misconductduringthemission?(1-5rating)
4. UNPROFORConclusion:HowdidtheUNconcludetheUNPROFORmissiontoBosnia-Herzegovina?WeretherereplacementsforUNPROFOR?WhatarethereflectionsoftheUNSecretary-GeneralsonUNPROFOR?(1-5rating)
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Maps
Map1:TheSocialistFederalRepublicofYugoslavia(1945–1991)
(Source:“MapShowingtheRegionsofYugoslaviafrom1945to1991”)
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Map2:Post-ConflictBosnia-Herzegovina,DividedBetweentheRepublikaSrpskaandtheFederationofBosnia-HerzegovinaAsOutlinedInthe1995DaytonAccords
(Source:“Bosnia-HerzegovinaPoliticalMap–BlackandWhite”)
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Tables
Table1:ConsentForUNPROFOR’sOperationinBosnia-HerzegovinaThroughouttheDurationoftheBosnianWar Beforethe
BosnianWar(1991)
DuringtheBosnianWar(1992-1994)
BeforetheDaytonAccords(1995)
TheGovernmentofBosnia-Herzegovina
5;Explicitconsentgiven
4;Consentgivenwithsomereservations
3;Someconsentgivenwithmanyreservations
TheGovernmentofFRYugoslavia
5;Explicitconsentgiven
2;Littleconsentgivenwithmanyreservations
2;Littleconsentgivenwithmanyreservations
TheGovernmentofCroatia
4;Consentgivenwithsomereservations
2;Littleconsentgivenwithmanyreservations
1;Consentwithdrawn
Table2:TheFactorsImpactingPeacekeeper’sUseofForceDuringtheUNPROFORMissionSizeoftheUNPROFORforceinBosnia-Herzegovina
7,000-38,000peacekeepers
Necessityforuseofforce1.Peacekeeperdeaths
207deaths
UNmandateleniency Strict;didnotallowforforceexceptforinstancesofself-defense
Score:3
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Table3:FatalitiesAmongUnitedNationsPeacekeepersandUniformedPersonnelinPeacekeepingOperations,1990-2015
(Source:VanDerLijnandSmit2015)
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Table4:InstancesofPeacekeeperImpartialityandMisconductDuringtheUNPROFORMissioninBosnia-HerzegovinaActwithimpartiality,integrity,andtact
UNpeacekeeperactionstoprotectnoncombatantswasskewedasethnicbiasbySerbiancombatants
Misconduct1.Sexualexploitation/abuse........2.Disrespecttolocallaws,customs,orpractices..............................3.Disrespectfultreatmentofhostcountrycivilianpopulation(abuseofauthority)...............................
SomeinvolvementinexploitingvictimsofsextraffickingandforcedprostitutionFewornonerecorded.Fewornonerecorded.
Score:3
Table5:TheConclusionofUNPROFORinBosnia-HerzegovinaandUNActioninthePost-ConflictCountry
ConclusionsofUNPROFOR RestructuredandreplacedwithUNCRO,UNPROFOR(1995-96),andUNPREDEP;SFORreplacesIFOR
UNinvolvementinpost-conflictBosnia-Herzegovina
Yes;-UNPROFOR(1995-1996)-UNMIBH(1996-2002)
UNSecretary-GeneralreflectionsonUNPROFOR:1.BoutrosBoutros-Ghali(1992-1996)....................................2.KofiAnnan(1997-2006)..........3.BanKi-Moon(2007-Present)......
Failed;moreresourcesshouldhavebeengiventoUNPROFOR.Failed;Bosnia-HerzegovinawillhauntUNhistoryforever.Failed;internationalcommunitymustcometogethertopreventfuturemassacreslikeBosnia-Herzegovina
Score:2
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