THE CATHOLIC UNIVERSITY OF EASTERN AFRICA

FACULTY OF ARTS AND SOCIAL SCIENCES

DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SCIENCES

EFFECTS OF POLITICS ON SECURITY IN KENYA

(A Case Study of Bungoma)

A Research Project submitted to the Catholic University of Eastern Africa in

partial fulfillment for the requirements of an award of the degree of Bachelor of

Arts in Social Sciences

BY

LUKHOBA, EDWARD WENYA

REG.NO.1020661

FEBRUARY, 2015

i

DECLARATION

This project report is my original work and has not been submitted for any award in any other

institution.

Name: Edward Wenya Lukhoba

Signature: ________________________

Date: ____________________________

This project report has been submitted with my approval as the university supervisor

Name: Mr. Solomon Onyango

Signature: ________________________

Date: ____________________________

This project has been submitted to the department of Social Sciences with my approval as the

Head of Department

Name: Mr. Samuel Wakanyua

Signature: ________________________

Date: ____________________________

ii

DEDICATION

I wish to dedicate this work to my parents Mr. and Mrs. Lukhoba and my siblings- Anne, Ezekiel

and Antony for their encouragement and love.

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

I wish to thank the Catholic University of Eastern Africa for enabling me conduct this research.

My particular thanks go to my supervisor Mr. Onyango, Solomon for his guidance and

encouragement, my friends and colleagues in the programme. I would like to acknowledge the

support of my parents and most of all to the Almighty God for giving me the strength and health

to endure.

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ABSTRACT

The study set out to investigate the effects of politics on security in Kenya focusing particularly

on Bungoma District between the period 1992 and 2007. As its hypothesis, it relied on the

question of whether the cases of insecurity in Bungoma were as a result of political factors. In

answering this hypothetical question, the study aimed to determine the numbers of people who

victimized during the clashes. The particular regions of Bungoma that were most affected were

also identified. The narratives and testimonies of the people that affected by the insecurity in

Bungoma were also recorded. The study also sought to respond to questions such as the causes

of insecurity in Bungoma, its intensity in terms of the profile and number of people most

affected, the period of its occurrence and the areas most affected.

The study reviewed literature by analyzing reports by human right, humanitarian agencies and

other Non-Government Organizations as well as the media. It also undertook analyses of

historical and contemporary accounts, information, reports and other forms of data connected

with insecurity in Bungoma and Mount Elgon areas in the period between 1992 and 2007.

Testimonies, case studies and narratives of victims of violence in the region were assessed and

some of them included for evidential purposes.

The study concluded that insecurity in Bungoma District and its surrounding areas was as a

result of factors such as ethnicity, the question of historical injustices, the nature of electoral

politics and criminal elements; all which worked in combination to aggravate the problem.

In offering solutions and making recommendations, the study suggested several ways in which to

tackle the question of violence perpetrated by criminal elements during electioneering periods

including effective law enforcement by the respective responsible agencies. The study suggested

constitutional solutions in resolving the question of land, made a case for building a Kenyan

society that was cohesive and suggested support programs for victims of violence by government

entities and civil society.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Contents PageDECLARATION ............................................................................................................................................. ii

DEDICATION................................................................................................................................................ iii

ABSTRACT....................................................................................................................................................v

TABLE OF CONTENTS...................................................................................................................................vi

Contents Page....................................................................................................................................vi

LIST OF FIGURES........................................................................................................................................viii

CHAPTER ONE .............................................................................................................................................1

1.0. BACKGROUND TO THE STUDY..........................................................................................................1

1.1. INTRODUCTION.................................................................................................................................1

1.2. PROBLEM STATEMENT......................................................................................................................6

1.3. MAIN OBJECTIVE...............................................................................................................................7

1.4. SPECIFIC OBJECTIVES........................................................................................................................7

1.5. RESEARCH QUESTIONS......................................................................................................................7

1.6. THE SCOPE OF THE STUDY................................................................................................................8

1.7. JUSTIFICATION OF THE STUDY..........................................................................................................8

CHAPTER 2.................................................................................................................................................11

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND LITERATURE REVIEW............................................................................11

2.0. INTRODUCTION...............................................................................................................................11

2.1. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK...........................................................................................................11

2.2. LITERATURE REVIEW.......................................................................................................................14

CHAPTER 3.................................................................................................................................................23

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY.......................................................................................................................23

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3.0. INTRODUCTION...............................................................................................................................23

3.1. RESEARCH DESIGN..........................................................................................................................23

3.2. LOCATION OF THE STUDY..............................................................................................................24

3.3. TARGET POPULATION ....................................................................................................................25

3.4. SAMPLING TECHNIQUES.................................................................................................................25

3.5. DATA COLLECTION..........................................................................................................................26

3.6. DATA ANALYSIS...............................................................................................................................26

CHAPTER 4.................................................................................................................................................27

DATA PRESENTATION AND INTERPRETATION............................................................................................27

4.0. INTRODUCTION...............................................................................................................................27

4.1. THE NUMBER OF PEOPLE KILLED AND DISPLACED IN BUNGOMA AS FROM 1992 UNTIL 2007 ......27

4.2. THE PEOPLE MOSTLY AFFECTED BY THE INSECURITY IN BUNGOMA FROM 1992 TO 2007............29

4.3. THE CAUSES OF INSECURITY IN BUNGOMA FROM 1992 TO 2007..................................................33

CHAPTER 5.................................................................................................................................................42

SUMMARY DISCUSSIONS OF FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMEDNATIONS.................................42

REFERENCES..............................................................................................................................................48

vii

LIST OF FIGURES

Content Page

viii

CHAPTER ONE

1.0. BACKGROUND TO THE STUDY

Security, according to Steans (2006), is a state of being safe, free from danger, injury and harm

of any sort. He further acknowledges that security has been understood in terms of the protection

of the national communities from violence- actual or potential. Huysman (2006) interpreted

insecurity threats or dangers to someone and therefore views it is a socially and politically

constructed phenomenon.

Sharma and Sharma (2000) define politics as the concern with the description and analysis of the

manner in which power is obtained, exercised and controlled, the purpose for which it is used,

the manner in which decisions are made, the factors which influence the making of those

decisions and the context in which those decisions take place.

The purpose of this research is to investigate how politics influences security using the case of

Bungoma County in Kenya. The research is confined to the period between 1992 and 2007.

1.1. INTRODUCTION

Insecurity in Africa can be traced from the colonial era where the anti-colonialists and freedom

fighters mobilized communities to liberate their countries from colonialism. This was followed

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by a great number of coups, many characterized by the individualistic nature of civil-military

relations in Africa (Liebenow, 1989). One such case is the 1971 coup in Uganda which occurred

when General Idi Amin grabbed power in a military coup against President Milton Obote

because Amin was afraid Obote might dismiss him. On the other hand, President Obote had

given orders for the arrest Amin because he posed a threat to his government (Mwakikagile,

2012).These state of affairs resulted into prolonged insecurity and a general state of instability in

Uganda spanning more than fifteen years from 1971 to 1986. Another case of insecurity in

Africa was witnessed in Libya in 1969 when Muammar Gaddafi spearheaded a military coup de

tat that led to the overthrowing of the government of King Idris 1 causing chaos in Libya.

African countries also experienced enormous incidents of insecurity during the periods of their

liberation struggle for independence from colonial rule. One example is the Algerian War of

Independence that t was led by National Liberation Front against the French between 1954 and

1962 which saw an end to the French rule that had begun in 1830 (Evans and Phillips, 2007).

The experience of insecurity in Kenya can similarly be traced back to the pre-independence

period. For instance, the Mau Mau guerrilla war of 1952-1955 was an unstructured violent revolt

amongst Africans mostly Kikuyu, against land alienation, political and economic inequality. The

war was fought mainly in the northern Kikuyu districts of Nyeri and Fort Hall and the

mountains, particularly the dense bush of the Aberdares Forest. The war led to the death of at

least 14,000 Africans most of whom were Mau Mau supporters, 29 Asians and 95 Europeans

bringing insecurity in that region of Kenya (Hornsby, 2012).

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Although Kenya remained fairly secure during a significant part of its post-independent history,

its first and by far the most significant experience of insecurity was witnessed during the reign of

President Jomo Kenyatta with the assassination of Tom Mboya in 1969 sparking ethnic unrest

that culminated into the banning of Kenya People’s Union (KPU) party and the arrest of

Jaramogi Oginga Odinga. This left Kenya African Union (KANU) as the only political party to

contest elections.

During the reign of President Daniel Arap Moi, Kenya also witnessed political tensions which

spilled over into violence starting with the bombing of Norfolk Hotel in Nairobi’s Central

Business District on New Year’s Eve on the 31st December 1980. The hotel was partially

destroyed, fifteen people killed and more than eighty others wounded. The regime of President

Moi reigned in and suppressed political opposition by first officially declaring Kenya a one-party

state in June 1982. These would lead into an attempted coup two months later on Sunday 1st

August 1982. In early morning, of that day at around 2 am., non-commissioned officers mainly

of the Luo ethnicity from the Kenya Air Force rebelled and took over Embakasi, Eastleigh and

Nanyuki Airbases before seizing Jomo Kenyatta Airport, the Post Office and the Voice of

Kenya, the only broadcasting station at the time. The coup aborted because the coup leaders

failed to get the support of the bomb loaders and other pilots (Hornsby, 2012). The events

immediately after, created extensive insecurity, mostly in Nairobi but also in other parts of

Kenya.

In more recent history, insecurity also manifested itself in Kenya during the 1992 ethnic violence

which pitted the Kalenjin and Maasai who were supporters of the Moi government on one hand,

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against the Luo, Luhyia and the Kikuyu communities who were mostly associated with

opposition politics. This particular episode of insecurity that was politically triggered led to the

loss of more than 1,500 and the displacement of more than 300,000 people (Ahluwalia et al.,

2007) causing much tension in the country.

More recently, insecurity was witnessed in Kenya after the 2007 general elections when the

country experienced large scale violence whose consequences were devastating. Violence

erupted because of the wide spread anger expressed by supporters of Raila Odinga of the Orange

Democratic Movement when President Kibaki was declared the winner of the presidential

elections held on 27th December 2007. Supporters of Kibaki’s opponent alleged electoral

manipulation. The violence led to the death of 1,300 people and the displacement of more than

600,000 (Njogu, 2009).

Some incidents of political violence have been confined to particular areas. In the 2000s,

Marsabit district, in the North Eastern part of Kenya witnessed insecurity as a result of political

differences and inter-clan rivalry between the Gabra, then led by the late Bonaya Godana, a

Member of Parliament for North Horr, and the Borana led by the late Guracha Galgalo, an

Member of Parliament for Moyale. Causes of rivalries between these two communities were

based on several ranging from policy to border demarcations between the two constituencies and

the use of common range resources. The Borana claimed that the Gabra had become arrogant and

provocative to their neighbors as a result of the immense political influence that the Gabra had

acquired within government circles. This led the Borana attacking Turbi village, killing close to

100 people and driving away with hundreds of animals in what became known as the Turbi

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Massacre of August 2005 (Baregu, 2011).

Most recently, insecurity in Kenya was observed in Tana River in August 2012 during fighting

between the agriculturalist Pokomo and the pastoralist Orma communities in which at least 180

people died and more than 34,000 were displaced. Issues of these conflicts were linked to

struggles for political power and in particular competition to gain control of the devolved system

of government (Commonwealth Observer Group, 2013).

In the case of Bungoma, which is the subject of this research, insecurity was experienced from

January to April 1992 when ethnic clashes escalated in the district and its neighboring Trans

Nzoia district. This resulted into deaths, burning of houses and stealing of livestock as the clash

victims fled for their lives. This conflict between the Bukusu and Sabaot tribes had strong

political undertones which among other things culminated in the carving out of Mt. Elgon

District from the old Bungoma District. However one effect of the conflict was that many people

were displaced from Bungoma into the neighbouring Trans Nzoia District (Oucho, 2002),

escalating tensions in the region.

The waves of politically instigated violence and insecurity in Bungoma are visible not only

during the 1992 period but also in the years 1997, 2006 and 2007. Although some of the factors

of insecurity in Bungoma are probably as a result of ethnic clashes, unemployment and poverty

especially among the youth, political party contests, incitement, coffee smuggling among others;

there is no scientific data to support those assertions. This study therefore seek to carry out an

empirical investigation to determine whether political factors are the potential triggers or causes

of insecurity in Bungoma.

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1.2. PROBLEM STATEMENT

Insecurity in Kenya has a historical context. It began when the colonialists forcefully evicted

Kenyans from their fertile highlands to settle on the land to grow cash crops such as coffee and

tea for export to the European markets (Kumssa, et al., 2011). This led to conflicts in protest

against land alienation and the abuse of social and civil liberties of the indigenous. One such

example is the Mau Mau rebellion of 1952-1955 that led to the death of over 14,000 people

(Hornsby, 2012). These colonial conflicts created political and economic instability that

continued to influence subsequent conflict and insecurities experienced in Kenya from 1992 to

2007. In the most recent case of insecurity in Kenya-that following the 2007 general election, the

pockets of violent conflicts were witnessed in various hotspots such Nairobi, Kisumu, Eldoret,

Naivasha, Nakuru and Bungoma. The violence, sparked by rival political and ethnic differences

pitted the groups lead by opposition leader who had just lost the general elections against those

groups considered to support the winner. It led to 1,500 people killed and over 300,000 displaced

(Kumssa, et al., 2011).

The waves of politically instigated violence and insecurity in Bungoma, which played out in the

years 1992, 1997, 2006 and 2007, can also be traced to the early colonial setups in the area.

Although some of the factors such as unemployment and poverty, especially among the youth,

political party contests, incitement, coffee smuggling contribute toward these conflicts, there is

no scientific data to support one those assertions. This study therefore seeks to determine

whether political factors are the potential triggers of insecurity in Bungoma.

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1.3. MAIN OBJECTIVE

The main objective of the study is to investigate the effects of politics on security in Kenya and

particularly in Bungoma.

1.4. SPECIFIC OBJECTIVES

1. To assess whether the cases of conflict and insecurity in Bungoma are as a result of

political factors.

2. To determine the numbers of people who were killed and displaced during the clashes

occurring in Bungoma between 1992 and 2007.

3. To determine the particular regions of Bungoma most affected

4. To explore the narratives and experiences of the people that affected by the insecurity in

Bungoma.

1.5. RESEARCH QUESTIONS

The study responded to the following research questions:

1. What are the causes of insecurity in Bungoma?

2. How many people were killed and displaced in the Bungoma insecurity?

3. When did the insecurity in Bungoma occur?

4. Which areas of Bungoma were most affected by the state of insecurity?

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5. Who were the most affected by the insecurity that took place?

1.6. THE SCOPE OF THE STUDY

This study focused on the region of Bungoma, an area covering 852 square miles (2,069 sq. km)

with a population of 1,37 million which was most affected by the chaos. The study focused its

interest in the period from 1992 to some months just before the 2007general elections commonly

referred to as the post-election violence. Of equal interest were the numbers of people affected

by the insecurity out of the entire population of the area. The study assessed the effect of

insecurity in Bungoma paying specific attention to the economy, the social well-being of the

people and the environment among other effects.

1.7. JUSTIFICATION OF THE STUDY

Bungoma has suffered from insecurity from April 1992 to date whereby the members of the

Sabaot, a Kalenjin sub-group who lived on the slopes of Mt. Elgon clashed with the local Bukusu

residents. Well-armed with AK-47 rifles which they had acquired from remnants of Obote's

Ugandan army, gangs operating from Mt. Elgon attacked Bukusu residents in the vicinity of

Sirisia, 35 miles from Bungoma town which led to 2,000 Bukusu fleeing, 120 houses destroyed

and the fleeing population's livestock seized by mid-April (Throup and Hornsby, 1998).

In the period between 1992 and 2007, the Bungoma region experienced dramatic changes in the

8

political party loyalties starting from Forum for Restoration of Democracy (FORD) led by

Jaramogi Oginga Odinga and Masinde Muliro. The leadership of the original FORD party was

handed over to Michael Wamalwa Kijana, who despite his representation of a constituency in

Trans Nzoia remained loyal to his original Bukusu roots in Bungoma. FORD then split into

several smaller entities before the creation of the Coalition for Restoration of Democracy

(CORD). Bungoma is uniquely the predominant part of Kenya where the remnants of the

original FORD party still exist. Therefore it is a unique region for a study in political allegiance

and loyalty.

During the period following the multiparty elections of 2007, violence was again witnessed

where property owned by people perceived to be foreigners was destroyed and the people evicted

from Bungoma town and onwards to Internally Displaced Persons (IDP) camps in Eastern

Uganda (Leonard, 2008). There is insufficient information and data on the relationship between

politics and insecurity in Bungoma. This calls for a research such as the one proposed in order to

gather and present empirical evidence on this relationship. It is therefore important to determine

whether the historical roots of ethnicity have any relationship with politics and insecurity in

Bungoma in order to avert future conflicts and violence in the area.

1.8. LIMITATIONS AND DELIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY

This study was limited to a few areas given that the resources available could not allow for

coverage of all the regions in Bungoma. In this respect, the study focused on areas that were

mostly affected by the insecurity therefore limiting its scope.

9

This study was limited by the method used in collecting data. In this regard, the use of secondary

sources of data like books, magazines and journals was the predominant mode of data collection.

The study relied on secondary data like newspapers, government security reports for its primary

data.

This study is mitigated in the sense that it will be of use in future by social scientists and other

people who would want to know the history of insecurity in Bungoma district from 1992 up to

2007.

1.9. THE ORGANIZATION OF THE STUDY

Chapter One of the study introduces the background, state the problem of study, describe the

specific problem addressed in the study, state the objectives of the study, its scope, justification

and its limitations. Chapter two presents a review of literature and the relevant sources of

research associated with the problem addressed in this study. Chapter three of the study presents

the methodology and procedures used for data collection and analysis. Chapter four contains an

analysis of the data and presentation of the results. Finally, Chapter five offers a summary and

discussion of the researcher’s findings, implication for practice and recommendations for future

research.

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CHAPTER 2.

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND LITERATURE REVIEW

2.0. INTRODUCTION

This chapter deals with the conceptualization of the theoretical framework and a detailed review

of literature on effects of politics on security in Kenya and particularly in Bungoma district. The

research tries to find out how some authors view politics and security in Kenya. The chapter then

presents some views on the issue of politics and security in Kenya and finally it links the

theoretical perspectives of the situation under study.

2.1. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

This study has identified various theories that could be applied in explaining the effects of

politics on security. Among these theories is the critical theory concerning the proliferation of

ethnic conflict, the liberal theory, realism theory and other theories that helped in explaining

insecurity in Bungoma.

The critical theory states that the realist preoccupation of the state focuses on the insecurity of

individuals, groups and communities (Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy, 2007). The insecurity in 11

Bungoma occurred as a result of the ethnic clashes among the Sabaot, the Kalenjin sub-group

and the Bukusu residents in April 1992 (Throup and Hornsby, 1998).

The liberal theory notes that security does not compromise only military and material capacities

but also institutional, economic and political factors (Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy, 2007). The

insecurity n Bungoma occurred as a result of the political factors for example the organizing,

planning and financing of the ethnic clashes by the KANU elites who used violence to displace

and disenfranchise opponents and mobilize an ethnic support base (Lynch and Anderson 2014).

Realism asserts that the state is considered to be the only unitary rational actors whose

aspirations are constant states always prefer maximum security. The state of Kenya failed to

prevent the insecurity in Bungoma that occurred in April 1992 because the five Bungoma MPs

were accused of remaining silent despite the attacks on their constituents. The local FORD

officials also criticized the District Commissioner, the local police chief and announced that they

would organize a demonstration against the security forces if the clashes did not end within a

week (Throup and Hornsby, 1998). The implication of these allegations was that the state of

Kenya was unable to prevent insecurity as it was supposed to have maximum security on the

region of Bungoma.

The contemporary competition theory states that the competition between two or more ethnic

groups for the same economic and political resources produces ethnic conflict (Yang, 2000). The

ethnic conflict between the Sabaot and the Luhyia in Bungoma was a result of the land shortage

12

(Oucho, 2002) which was a competition for the same economic resource leading to the insecurity

in Bungoma in 1992.

According to the human needs theory, the root cause of conflict is a lack of satisfying needs that

are universal (Scheffran et al., 2012). The insecurity in Bungoma was a result of the land

shortage which was a satisfying need for the Bukusu and the Sabaot.

The realistic group conflict theory emphasizes that inter-group conflict originates in the

perceptions of group members with regard to real competition for scarce resources, thus

suggesting that hostility between group results from real or perceived conflicting goals because

they generate inter-group competition (Cordell and Wolff, 2010). The conflict between the

Sabaot and Bukusu was a result of the land shortage which was a scarce resource leading to the

ethnic clashes in 1992 in Bungoma.

The internal colonialism perspective argues that the internal colonization of the minority groups

by the dominant groups is the major source of ethnic conflicts (Yang, 2000). Bungoma witnessed

insecurity when the Sabaot claimed that their subgroups which were the minority groups were

excluded and harassed by their Luhyia neighbours who were the dominant groups (Lynch and

Anderson2014).

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2.2. LITERATURE REVIEW

2.2.0. OVERVIEW

Literature review looked at the views of the authors concerning the insecurity in Bungoma. The

review explored issues such as such as the role of ethnicity on security in Kenya particularly

Bungoma, the role of the elections, effects of land issue among others in determining the

insecurity in Bungoma.

2.2.1. ROLE OF ETHNICITY ON SECURITY IN KENYA PARTICULARLY IN

BUNGOMA

In a systematic review conducted by Throup and Hornsby (1998), the members of the Sabaot, a

Kalenjin sub-group who lived on the slopes of Mount Elgon clashed with local Bukusu residents

which culminated in over 2,000 Bukusu fleeing from their homes, 120 houses destroyed and the

fleeing population's livestock seized. This conflict has similarities to the ethnic driven conflicts

along the Mau escarpment in Molo constituency where Kikuyu communities at places like

Olenguruone were interspersed with Kalenjin and Maasai. As the Bungoma conflict along the

ethnic frontier became increasingly serious during March-May 1992, discontent with the regime

14

grew deeper among the Abaluhya inside Western province. The Abaluhya-Kalenjin violence

represented a serious threat to Moi’s Abaluhya’s allies, undermining support for KANU in this

vital swing province.

These “ethnic clashes” were also organized, planned and financed by KANU elites who sought

to use violence to displace and disenfranchise opponents and mobilize an ethnic support base.

Lynch and Anderson (2014) noted that the local disputes had largely pitted Sabaot against their

Bukusu neighbours. In the study by Oucho (2002), the Bukusu-Sabaot conflict had strong

political undertones which among other things culminated in the carving out of Mount Elgon

district from Bungoma district and which displaced population from the Bukusu community into

the neighbouring Trans-Nzoia district, also settled by the Luhyia, Kalenjin and smaller numbers

of other ethnic groups.

Ochieng (2002) demonstrated that the continuation of ethnic identity and the negative

connotations it may have was clearly illustrated by the 1991-92 conflict or ethnic clashes. The

violence that was associated with these clashes brought considerable death and the destruction of

the region. Not only were violent attacks directed against those alleged outsiders in Western

Kenya, such as the Luhyia of Bungoma, the Luo of Nyanza District, and the Gusii of Kisii and

Nyamira districts. The clashes left a legacy of ethnic bitterness and suspicion that continued to

exist a decade later to say nothing of the extensive economic losses associated with those

affected in the region.

15

2.2.2. EFFECTS OF LAND CONFLICT

Lynch and Anderson, 2014) found that, the land allocation process was mired by controversy; it

moved ahead extremely slowly, dogged by allegations of favouritism and corruption. The most

common complaint was that local politicians and their associates, along with these working in

the Provincial Administration, had used their positions to gain plots either for themselves or for

their friends and relatives. This left many potential beneficiaries those from Chepkitale and

landless Sabaot from lower down the mountain without land and therefore means of livelihood

and identity.

The Chepyuk Settlement scheme had more recently become the focus of conflict on Mount

Elgon. Violence and displacements began in the 1990s, worsening after 2000 and then escalating

into a sustained campaign of assassinations and targeted attacks during 2006. By March 2008,

the Chepyuk area had been placed under military rule as the Kenyan army moved in to flush out

alleged perpetrators. However, the military intervention quickly became the subject of great

controversy, first over accusations of political manipulation of the intervention and then over

reports of the army's gross and systematic abuse of human rights.

It is apparent that the Mount Elgon community remained deeply divided around the politics of

land allocations on the Chepyuk scheme and that this was the key political issue of the election.

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2.2.3. ROLE OF ELECTIONS

Lynch and Anderson (2014).noted that the parliamentary and presidential elections of 27 th

December 2007 took place in Mount Elgon region amidst a heavy presence of state security

forces. Due to the displacements of residents because of violence, the turnout for the ballot was

expected to be lower than in other constituencies, but with over 39,000 votes cast at 68 per cent

of the registered electorate only two other constituencies in Western province saw a larger

proportionate turnout. By then, much of Kenya's Western highlands had exploded into violence

in response to the allegations made by the ODM national leadership that the result was

fraudulent.

According to Gona and Wa-Mungai (2014), the violence in Western province began prior to the

elections with some switches of the province’s territory being taken over by the SLDF whose

activities had accounted for the death of more than 700 people and the displacement of thousands

in Mt. Elgon district.

In Western province, modes of violence began through narratives that identified what people

called ‘agents of PNU’ who were accused of hoarding election materials. For instance, violence

began on 27th December 2007 in Mumias when youths surrounded the house of Joseph Mbacio

Thiru on allegations of ballot hoarding.

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2.2.4. EFFECTS OF CRIMINAL ORGANIZATIONS OR MILITIA

Lynch and Anderson (2014) demonstrated that the Sabaot Land Defence Forces (SLDF)

continued its campaign of assaults, assassinations and intimidation after the December polls,

killing 22 people at Kimama village on 31st December. Within the district, the SLDF continued

to carry out murders, estimated to be two a week by the Kenya Red Cross. It was also reported

that the militia was still intimidating families into “allowing” their sons to join the SLDF and

extorting protection money and food from villagers.

The SLDF was set up to defend the claims to Chepyuk Settlement Scheme that local politics was

transformed into a matter of life and death for local Sabaot. Hornsby (2013) argued that the

February 18th Revolution Army (FERA) was the rationale for another bout of repression by the

security forces and the death or imprisonment of 300 Bukusu and a few Luo in Bungoma and

Trans-Nzoia in 1994-5.’

Gona and Wa-Mungai (2014) explained that over a period of two years, SLDF’s activities had

spread into Bungoma and Trans Nzoia districts. SLDF’s agitations and intentions of reversing

historical agrarian injustices had resonance among many groups in the Rift Valley. Its very

existence pointed not only to the absence of political will by the state to deal with agrarian

18

issues, but also to the apparent ineptitude and institutional crises within security organs in the

province.

Rawlence (2008) asserted that the SLDF promoted its favoured candidates in the 2007 general

election in a vicious campaign that, according to local residents, amounted to a campaign of

terror. The candidates favoured by the SLDF were all contesting on an ODM ticket. A chief from

the area told Human Rights Watch that the incumbent councilor for Emia ward, Nickson Manyu,

was warned at gunpoint not to contest against the ODM candidate. He also reported widespread

intimidation and election violence. The view of many was that the electoral commission was not

fully in control of the elections in Mt. Elgon. Nearly all witnesses described the SLDF

controlling polling stations, inking the fingers of voters while casting their ballots for them. Forty

six polling stations up the mountain were transferred to the district headquarters in Kapsokwony

because of insecurity.

Some reports alleged that the Sabaot Land Defence Force, a shadowy militia group active in and

around the Mt. Elgon region of western Kenya, had joined with their Kalenjin cousins. It had

been engaged in its own campaigns against the so called non-indigenous tribes.

2.2.5. ROLE OF POLITICS

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According to Lynch and Anderson (2014) it is the sense of ethnic indifference and communal

injustice that fed into electoral politics. In 1963, the leading Sabaot politician Daniel Moss stood

on a West Kalenjin Congress (WKC) ticket against a Luhyia Kenya African Democratic Union

(KADU) candidate. Prior to the election that year, tensions rose, and a number of houses owned

by suspected KADU supporters were burnt down and their livestock stolen

A more recent account suggests that the conflict erupted around disagreement over the

nomination of parliamentary candidates on the basis of their ethnicity. Violence was used as a

pre-election strategy to disrupt local campaigns and then to affect voting, and later to evict

Bukusu from good agricultural land on the mountain's slopes.

On Mount Elgon, the mobilization for violence included the Local Member of Parliament (MP)

Wilberforce Kisiero, local councilors, and other prominent Sabaot who “were instrumental in

bringing ill feeling towards the non-Sabaot and were indeed advocating their removal from

Mount Elgon.” The local MP came under particularly heavy fire, as witnesses accused him of

being at the “forefront of calling for the expulsion of non-Sabaot from the area as long as they

refused to support KANU” and even continuing to incite violence after the clashes were over by

declaring that Sabaot would not allow strangers to buy land in the district.

20

The ethnic clashes of the early 1990s were promoted across the Rift valley and parts of Western

province by advocates of President Moi's “KANU zone” politics in response to calls for, and

then return to multi-party politics.

A local political culture characterized by debates about ethnic citizenship or indigenousness and

marked by violence dated back to the late colonial period. Up until 1993, these local disputes had

largely pitted Sabaot against their Bukusu neighbours. The Sabaot hoped that the creation of a

separate administrative area would improve their situation, while a popular narrative of forced

removal from the rightful ownership to grazing pastures in Trans Nzoia, to which the Luhya also

claim, reinforced the perceived importance of Sabaot political unity.

In a systematic review conducted by Oucho (2002) the Sabaot Land Defence Forces (SLDF) was

organized and funded by local politicians although the actual politicians in control have changed

over time. The SLDF drove out the non-Kalenjin groups in Mt Elgon who were unlikely to vote

for the KANU party which took place in the elections of 1992 and 1997 (Rawlence, 2008). The

Bukusu-Sabaot conflict had a strong political undertone which among other things culminated in

the carving out of Mt. Elgon district from Bungoma district and which displaced population from

the latter in the neighbouring Trans-Nzoia district also settled by Luhyia, Kalenjin and smaller

numbers of other ethnic groups.

21

2.3. CONCLUSION

To a smaller extent the role of politics has contributed to the insecurity in Bungoma as compared

to other factors such as ethnicity, criminal organizations or militia groups. The biggest

contributor to the insecurity in Bungoma is the ethnic conflict between the Bukusu and the

Sabaot communities witnessed in 1992 which shook the regions of Mount Elgon, Bungoma,

Trans-Nzoia among other regions.

22

CHAPTER 3.

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

3.0. INTRODUCTION

This chapter outlines the research methodology of the study and it covers research design,

location of the study, target population, sampling techniques, data collection and data analysis.

3.1. RESEARCH DESIGN

Research design is a logical and systematic plan prepared for conducting a research study

(Verma, 1989).

The type of research design used in this study is the secondary data analysis whereby the data of

the investigation of the problem of insecurity in Bungoma from 1992 until 2007 especially in

Sirisia, Mt. Elgon and Kimilili constituencies collected and tabulated is analyzed using other

sources like government agencies for example Kenya Bureau of Statistics, newspaper reports,

pronouncements by government officials, analysis of insecurity status conducted about Bungoma

by non-government organizations and internet research.

23

3.2. LOCATION OF THE STUDY

The area of the study was Bungoma district which is a border district in Western Kenya. It

borders the Republic of Uganda to the west and lies between latitude 0 25.3' and 0 53.2' north

and latitude 34 21.4' and 35 04 East. To the north, it borders Trans-Nzoia district. To the east, it

borders Kakamega district and to the south Mumias Butere district. Its southwest neigbouring

districts are Busia and Teso. It covers a land area of 2,068.5 sq. km or a quarter of Western

province. The district had ten administrative divisions, comprising 44 locations. The population

of the district was estimated at 1.2 million in 2006. The population is evenly distributed with an

average density of 482 persons/ sq. km. The constituencies of Bungoma are Sirisia, Kimilili,

Webuye, Kanduyi, Bumula and Mt. Elgon.

The land in Bungoma generally slopes from the foot of Mt. Elgon from the north where the

altitude is over 2000 meters above sea level falling to the lower lying south and south west of

altitude 1200 meters. Four main rivers drain the land, river Nzoia forms the boundary to the West

with Lugari and Butere Mumias, river Lwakhakha forms another boundary with Uganda to the

West while Kuywa and Chwele and Khalaba River drain the middle areas.

On infrastructure, Bungoma district has a road network of 1,313.4 km with 990.1 km of

classified roads and 323.2 km of unclassified roads. Of the classified roads, 165.6 km are

tarmacked. Most of the classified roads in the district are either murrum or earth roads. This

makes them impassable during the rainy seasons, making transportation of agricultural produce

24

and other goods difficult. The district also has two airstrips at Bungoma and Webuye towns

which are under-utilized and mostly vandalized.

3.3. TARGET POPULATION

The target populations for this study were members residing in Bungoma district especially in

Sirisia. Data sources like newspapers, government and non-government security reports were

used to assess the number of people displaced, killed during the insecurity in Bungoma from

1992 until 2007

3.4. SAMPLING TECHNIQUES

Kothari (2004) defines non-probability sampling as that sampling procedure which does not

afford any basis for estimating the probability that each item in the population has of being

included in the sample The type of sampling used in this study was non-probability sampling

especially the use of purposive sampling whereby the researcher selected the sample based on

what would be appropriate for the study. The sample the researcher used were four government

security reports from 1992, some websites explaining the number of people killed and displaced

during the clashes that took place from 1992 until 2007 in Sirisia constituency Bungoma district.

25

3.5. DATA COLLECTION

Secondary data is the data which has been collected by someone else and which has already been

passed through the statistical process (Kothari, 2004). Data was collected using secondary means

especially the use of literature based survey like newspapers, analysis of insecurity status

conducted about Bungoma, pronouncements by government officials indicating the numbers of

people who were killed and displaced

To sum it all, the researcher used secondary means to infer opinion from the opinion leaders,

government security apparatus for their take on the effects of politics on the security of Bungoma

from 1992 until 2007. Using secondary sources, the researcher reviewed the statistical records of

the number of people killed, displaced or otherwise affected by the state of insecurity.

3.6. DATA ANALYSIS

Data analysis is the process of computing various summaries and derived values from the given

collection of data (Mirkin, 2011).The study used qualitative and quantitative data analysis which

showed the effects of politics on security in Bungoma and the number of people displaced and

killed as from 1992 until 2007.Data was entered into a excel spreadsheet, and presented using

bar diagram.

26

CHAPTER 4.

DATA PRESENTATION AND INTERPRETATION

4.0. INTRODUCTION

This chapter presents and discusses the findings of the study with the aim of establishing the

effects of politics on security in Kenya particularly in Bungoma. This chapter further examines

the number of people killed and displaced in Bungoma. This study assesses insecurity as a result

of political factors taking place. The presentation and discussion of findings are in accordance

with the objectives of the study and are discussed in details as here below:

4.1. THE NUMBER OF PEOPLE KILLED AND DISPLACED IN BUNGOMA AS FROM

1992 UNTIL 2007

27

Insecurity in Bungoma is not new in the history of Bungoma. Since the early 1990s to 2007,

Bungoma has suffered from insecurity as there are various people killed and displaced. Figure 1

shows the number of people killed in Bungoma as from 1992 until 2007.

Figure 1. Total number of persons killed between the years 1992 and 2007. (Data collated

from government security reports).

28

Figure 2. Total number of persons displaced between 1992 and 2007. (Data collated from

government security reports).

From Figure 1, it is observed that the year 2006 witnessed the highest number of killings (253

pax), which is more that half of all deaths during the period under study. Noticeably is that this is

the year preceding the 2007 elections. Figure 2 depicts the number of displacements within the

same period and shows that 1997 recorded the highest number of displacements that is 15,000. It

is clear that the highest levels of insecurity in Bungoma took place in the years related to or

coming shortly before the elections.

4.2. THE PEOPLE MOSTLY AFFECTED BY THE INSECURITY IN BUNGOMA

FROM 1992 TO 2007

29

This part of the Chapter presents the accounts and testimonies of the people who were most

affected by the insecurity in Bungoma from 1992 to 2007 for example women, youth and the

elderly. These are women and men who suffered as a result of sexual violence, recruitment into

the militia, maimed or mutilated, beaten by the members of the SLDF searching for the

husbands, killed when trying to return to their land among other form of oppression. It used the

stories of the people mostly affected as from 1992 to 2007.

Story 1: The man who was abducted by the SLDF

I was woken up by a knocking door. I opened it and there were guns and torches staring at me.

They rounded up my cows, beat me and stabbed me as we walked. When we reached the bush

they tied me by my feet to a tree, my head hanging down. They were others hanging also. They

beat me very badly and said: ‘choose: either surrender all your possessions including your land

or you die now.’ I told them to take it. They cut off my ear as a mark, then they made me eat it. I

crawled home; I could not walk (Human Rights Watch, 2011).

Story 2: The woman whose neighbor was raped by security forces in March 2008

“At night (the officers) steal food, destroy homes and rape women. I heard a commotion next

door. I woke up and came outside. I hid in the bushes. I saw my neighbor there on the ground

outside the house. Three soldiers all took their turns” (Human Rights Watch, 2011)

30

Story 3: The Man who was harassed by the Kalenjins

One Luhya man told Africa Watch that he had been harassed by Kalenjins when he has tried to

return to his land in April 1992 (Africa Watch, 1993).

Story 4:The old man who fled his land when trying to return in Sirisia, Bungoma district

An elderly Luhya man had fled his land in April 1992 along with other Luhyas from the area

after being attacked by approximately one hundred Kalenjins, dressed in skins and shorts with

clay on their faces, who burned and looted the Luhyas’ homes. When he had tried, he heard

gunshots and fled (Africa Watch, 1993).

Story 5: Teacher found dead on March 30 1993

A teacher, Francis Juma na Mayengo, who had moved into the old man’s house to take care of it

on his behalf was found hacked to death on March 30 1993 .(Africa Watch, 1993).

Story 6: Helen raped by the SLDF soldiers

Helen recounts the day of horror; at around 5pm, Helen was home when the men came to her

compound. They asked her for her husband, but he was not home. They demanded to know how

many of the SLDF she knew; since they alleged that she went round talking about them. She

31

declined and that is when they kidnapped her and brought her to an unknown place. There, they

blindfolded her, raped her in turns and even beat her for almost 24 hours. The following day she

was unconscious, but they did not let her go. She was told to open her mouth where one of them

urinated and yet another forced her to eat human feces. After all this they left her, but she was

unable to walk home because of the pain she had suffered. She forced herself up because she

believed that if she continued to stay there, others might come and continue the torture. She tried,

and thankfully, a person helped her home. When she made it home, her husband took her to

hospital where she was treated and tested for HIV/AIDS. Later on that husband rejected her,

alleging that she was infected with HIV/AIDS and other venereal diseases. In that domestic

dispute, she lost her child as a result of family negligence and the stigmatization she underwent

(MSF, 2008).

Story 7: The 75 year old woman whose ear was cut off by the SLDF in 2007

I was coming from the market. The SLDF stopped me and asked, “Do you want us to cut off

your head or your ear?” Then they talked amongst themselves. I was silent while they cut off my

ear (Human Rights Watch, 2011).

Story 8: 234 Pupils who were clash victims

32

The headmistress of Kapkateny Primary School told Africa Watch that they had 234 pupils who

had been clash victims. “Sometimes the children have to leave school to go look for food

because they are always hungry,” she observed. “They also often get malaria and are sick”

(Africa Watch, 1993).

4.3. THE CAUSES OF INSECURITY IN BUNGOMA FROM 1992 TO 2007

This part of the chapter discusses the causes of insecurity in Bungoma which are political factors,

criminal organizations or militia, ethnicity, land issue, elections among others as explained

below.

4.3.1. The Political Factors

According to Lafargue (2009), political rivalry and inter-ethnic tensions between the Sabaots and

the neighbouring Bukusu, a sub tribe of the numerically larger Luhya ethnic community led to

the creation of an electoral constituency for the Sabaot (Elgon) from 1963 and later on, in 1993,

a district (Mount Elgon) which are co-extensive. This did not seem to diminish the inter-tribal

fighting. This situation characterized the political atmosphere in the coming years.

33

Outbreaks of violence between the Sabaot and Bukusu sub tribes pitted the two key politicians in

the region namely Elijah Mwangale and Wilberforce Kisiero in the 1970s. Both Kimilili and

Mount Elgon Constituencies had been hit by the wave of violence. Mwangale had condemned

Sabaot raids into Bukusu territory, while Kisiero claimed that the Minister’s anti-Sabaot remarks

had exacerbated the troubles. Mwangale’s speeches, Kisiero protested, spread confusion and

hatred between the two communities. As a result, Kisiero switched sides in the power struggle,

leaving Mwangale isolated, supported only by Wa Mang’oli, the MP for Webuye, Alfred

Sambu’s opponent (Throup and Hornsby, 1998).

The parameters of recent conflict on the mountain began to take place in 1993, when Mount

Elgon District was hived off from the larger Bungoma district yet a local political culture

characterized by debates about ethnic citizenship or autochthony and marked by violence dates

back to the late colonial period. Up until 1993, these local disputes had largely pitted Sabaot

against their Bukusu neighbours. The Sabaot hoped that the creation of a separate administrative

area would improve their situation, while a popular narrative of forced removal from the rightful

ownership to grazing pastures in Trans Nzoia to which the Luhya also claim, reinforced the

perceived importance of Sabaot political unity (Lynch and Anderson (2014).

The sense of ethnic difference and communal injustice soon fed into electoral politics. In 1963,

the leading Sabaot politician Daniel Moss stood on West Kalenjin Congress (WKC) ticket

against a Luhya Kenya African Democratic Union (KADU) candidate. Prior to the elections,

tensions rose and a number of houses owned by suspected KADU supporters were burnt down

34

and livestock stolen. Violent clashes erupted following the election and within two weeks 142

houses had been burnt down, over 200 heads of cattle had been stolen or slaughtered and

property and crops destroyed. The Sabaot claimed “that they had been provoked by the Bukusu

who intended to suppress them and rob them of their land.” In contrast, intelligence reports

suggested that Sabaot supporters of the Kenya African National Union (KANU) aligned WKC

had sought “to expel KADU supporting Bukusu tribesmen from parts of the district as a result of

the proposal that a portion of the adjoining Trans Nzoia District including Kitale Township

should be transferred from the Rift Valley Region to the Western Region.” The critical juncture

in this dispute was thus exploited by the WCK to mobilize support and demonize the KADU

candidate.

These tensions continued to colour local politics into the postcolonial period as evidenced by

repeated calls by Sabaot for a separate district, “ethnic clashes” of the early 1990s were

promoted across the Rift Valley and parts of Western province by advocates of President Moi’s

“KANU zone” politics in response to calls for, and then return to, multi-party politics.

On Mount Elgon, this mobilization for violence included the local Member of Parliament

Wilberforce Kisiero, local councilors and other prominent Sabaot who “were instrumental in

bringing ill feeling towards the non-Sabaot and were indeed advocating their removal from

Mount Elgon.”The local MP came under particularly heavy fire, as witnesses accused him of

being at the “forefront of calling for the expulsion of non-Sabaot from the area as long as they

refused to support KANU,” and even continuing to incite violence after the clashes were over by

declaring that strangers would not be allowed to buy land in the district.

35

The ethnic clashes were also organized, planned and financed by KANU elites who sought to use

violence to disenfranchise opponents and mobilize an ethnic support base. Violence has been

used in Mount Elgon to assert rights to the ownership and political control of territory, with

political actors and their followers manipulating ethnic signifiers and historical narratives to

justify their actions. Over time, local disputes here shifted from a conflict between Sabaot and

Bukusu to one between Sabaot-speakers depending on the political alignments of the various

candidates.

It is apparent that the Mount Elgon community remained deeply divided around the politics of

land allocations on the Chepyuk scheme and that this was the key political issue of the election.

Although the election came and went, the crisis provoked by the land allocations at Chepyuk

rumbled on.

4.3.2 Land Issues

Traditionally, the Sabaot and the Luhya had uneasy co-existence in the area, largely due to land

shortage but it never reached the scale of the 1991-93 ethnic clashes. (Oucho, 2002). The

Chepyuk Settlement Scheme has more recently become the focus of conflict on Mount Elgon.

Violence and displacements began in the 1990s worsening after 2000 and then escalating into a

sustained campaign of assassinations and targeted attacks during 2006 (Lynch and Anderson

2014).

36

The land allocation process was mired by controversy; it moved ahead extremely slowly, dogged

by allegations of favouritism and corruption. The most common complaint was that local

politicians and their associates, along with those working in the provincial administration had

used their positions to gain plots either for themselves or for their friends and relatives. This left

many potential beneficiaries-those from Chepkitale and landless Sabaot from lower down the

mountain without land.

The second allocation process, directed by the Provincial Commissioner Francis Lekoolol and

Mount Elgon Commissioner Changole, was dogged by even more serious allegations of

systematic nepotism, corruption and favouritism than the first. Consequently, a third reallocation

process was began in 1990, but abandoned in 1992 amid the “ethnic clashes” that had broken out

with the return to multi -party politics and which led to “an influx of people into the settlement

scheme, most of whom were not original inhabitants of the area.” By 1992 Phase 1 of the scheme

was in chaos with no proper allocation of plots resolved.

Phase 2 began in 1994 but was characterized by complaints of mismanagement and nepotism. By

1996, local Ndorobo were insistent that illegal land allocations to “outsiders” in Chepyuk be

nullified and Kisiero was accused of manipulating the allocation process to boost the chance of

re-election.

37

In early 1999 the government degazetted another part of Mount Elgon forest “to settle more than

1,000 landless Dorobo families,” when the local District Commissioner insisted that “land would

be allocated to genuine Dorobo squatters.” In the run-up to the 2002 election, the scheme became

the focus of local politicking. The fact that the allocation of land and issuance of title deeds had

not been completed enabled parliamentary candidates to promise that they would finally bring

the scheme to completion in favour of one community or another.

Phase 3 began in 2003, with a total of 2,157 five acre plots given to registered beneficiaries. It

was also decided that settlement in the first two phases was to be determined “in the proportions

of 60:40 as between the Ndorobo and Soy,” that is between those from Chepkitale and those

from the lowlands. However it was Phase 3 in Chepkurkur that posed the greatest problems.

Lowland Sabaot who were dissatisfied with 40 per cent allocation given to them on the first two

phases argued for a larger proportion of the land in this final area. An agreement was finally

reached to divide the Phase 2 allocations on a proportion of 50:50 between those from

Chepkitale and those from the lowlands.

As these debates rolled on, Chepyuk was hit by organized, though at first only sporadic violence.

By early 2004 it was clear that the violence was taking on a more systematic and organized

pattern. Activists who supported the claim of those from Chepkitale to the land increasingly

argued that there was a malevolent political purpose in the attacks, and simultaneously came to

argue that Ndorobo, Ogiek or Mosop were not simply Sabaot speakers who had lived above the

forest belt but were actually members of a distinct ethnic group as indigenous residents.

38

4.3.3. Criminal Organizations or Militia

Wycliffe Komon Matakwei formed the Sabaot Land Defence Forces to fight for land at the

Chepyuk Settlement Scheme after his family was evicted from Phase 3 of the scheme.

The Sabaot Land Defence Forces set out to defend the interests of the lowland Sabaot against the

Mosop and their political supporters, and resist government attempts to evict squatters in the

Chepyuk areas. During 2006 and 2007 the violence escalated: the SLDF killed around 600

people, terrorizing “the local population through physical assaults and threats” and committing

“murder, torture, rape and the theft and destruction of property.” Within an 18 month period

these activities displaced over 66,000 people.

The violence in Western Kenya began prior to the elections with some swatches of the

province’s territory being taken over by the SLDF whose activities had accounted for the death

of more than 700 people and the displacement of thousands in Mount Elgon district. Over a

period of two years SLDF’s activities had spread into Bungoma and Trans Nzoia districts.

Another peak in the violence began in late October 2007, ahead of the electoral polls at the end

of December. The first attack saw the murder of another chief, while a few days later three

people were beheaded in the Kamneru area of Kapsokwony Division. The following day there

were a major gun battle between police and militiamen (Lynch and Anderson2014).

39

Lafargue (2009) asserts that at a time when fortunes were progressively diminishing for the

Ndorobo militia in November 2007, the SLDF effectively took control of Chepyuk and stamped

its authority locally. The SLDF continued its campaign of assaults, assassinations and

intimidation after the December polls, killing 22 people at Kimama village on 31 December. By

7 January the post election death toll in the district stood at 50.

4.3.4. Ethnicity

Lynch and Anderson (2014) argue that the clashes of the early 1990s framed the development of

more recent conflicts in a number of ways. First, they brought about a concentration of ethnic

communities in the area, as many Bukusu and Teso residents moved down and away from the

mountain while many Sabaot moved back to their homeland in the newly formed district.

Oucho (2002) stated that in Western province itself, there were ethnic clashes between the

Sabaot Kalenjin and the Bukusu Luhya in Bungoma district. The clashes reminisced the pre-

colonial traditional animosity between the two groups, though in 1991-92 seemed to be state-

sponsored.

The Sabaot, who live on the border of Kenya and Uganda, around the slopes of Mt.Elgon,

clashed with the Bukusu not over land or political differences but apparently because they

wanted to assert their distinctiveness in order to eventually have their own district. Historically

40

the White settlers evicted the Sabaot from their original home in Trans Nzoia district around

Kitale. They were pushed into the forests around Mount Elgon where, like many other Africans

like the Nandi and the Kikuyu for instance became squatters in a “foreign” land of the Bukusu

who forced the Sabaot to work for them. In the race towards multi-party politics, the Sabaot

sparked an already volatile situation, in the end convincing the KANU government to carve a

Sabaot district out of the former Bungoma district.

Conclusion,

The political factors to a larger extent contributed to the insecurity in Bungoma as opposed to

land issue, criminal militia or organizations as they have led to the instability from 1992 until

2007.

41

CHAPTER 5.

SUMMARY DISCUSSIONS OF FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND

RECOMMEDNATIONS

This Chapter five offers a summary and discussion of the researcher’s findings, implication for

practice and recommendations for future research.

Evidence presented in Chapter Four of this study indicates a clear link between politically

instigated insecurity and the electioneering seasons in the wider Bungoma region. It would seem

that politicians have, repeatedly, used violence as a selfish tool of intimidation to their opponents

during electioneering periods. In the case of Bungoma, such practices have also fed off long and

deep held historical grievances over land.

The convoluted phases of land allocation in the wider Mount Elgon area especially in such

places as the Chepyuk Settlement Scheme have amply demonstrated vested ethnic interests as

well as the corrupt tendencies of the provincial administration. Land that was meant to resettle

the landless never achieved those purposes and ended up creating full blown out ethnic and inter-

ethnic violence among the Sabaot Kalenjin, the Bukusu Luhya, the Ndorobo and other

communities.

In a context of fluid and highly charged political party campaigning periods, it is very easy for

42

criminal elements to hijack these situations to commit atrocious crimes such as murder, rape and

other gender-directed forms of violence. As shown by the various narratives and testimonies

cited by human rights groups, individual victims are often helpless and continue to be

traumatized by these crimes, more so where there is no investigation and punishment of the

perpetrators. These kinds of situations fester and breed more crimes and a general state of

impunity.

The military intervention in operation with the police called “Operation Okoa Maisha” that was

deployed in Mount Elgon in March, 2008 which crushed the Saboat Land Defence Force militia,

though laudable, appears to have been a short term remedy. In order to bring about sustained and

long term solutions to the problems of land related ethnic violence in the Mount Elgon area, the

root causes which include justice and transparency in land adjudication and issuance must be

addressed.

The study made the following recommendations:

1. Dealing with the Politics of Violence

Successive KANU governments in Kenya perfected the art of using violence to intimidate

political opponents and zone off some regions in order to acquire power. In successive election

years, violence became the tool of preference in driving away voters that were deemed to be

opponents of what was seen as the ethnic political position of a given region. Article 88 (4) (j) of

43

the Constitution provides for the Independent Elections and Boundaries Commission (IEBC) to

develop a code of conduct for candidates and parties contesting elections and to monitor and

sanction non-compliance to that code of conduct. IEBC should fully apply the provisions of the

law in hedging in and punishing the perpetrators of political violence and thereby send a strong

signal that it is intolerant to criminal acts aimed at disenfranchising voters in Kenya.

2. Land Issues

The Constitution of Kenya that was promulgated in August 2010 took cognizance of the question

of land and how historical maladministration and other improper policies and practices in the

land sector have continued to disenfranchise many Kenyans causing ethnic anger. The Ministry

of Lands, Environment and Natural Resources together the National Land Commission have

been tasked with addressing the question of historical injustices in the sector. In particular,

Article 67 (2) (e) of the Constitution provides the National Land Commission with the powers to

initiate investigations, on its own or on a complaint, into present or historical land injustices, and

recommend appropriate redress. This is a function the National Land Commission and other

government entrusted agencies must fulfill expediently in the case of Bungoma so as to remedy a

situation that has been a powder keg in Kenya’s fractured ethnic history.

3. Criminal Organization or Militia

44

Poverty, landless, unemployment, negative ethnicity, political sponsorship, impunity and lack of

punishments for those who commit criminal acts has bread an environment in Kenya where

criminal organizations or militia has been allowed to grow. In the case of Bungoma, the Sabota

Land Defence Force and other groups were allowed space and time to grow into a network that

was brutalizing ordinary citizens with impunity. The law enforcement agencies including the

provincial administration, the Criminal Investigations Department, the National Intelligence

Services and others proved inept in pre-emptying these types of organizations. This is not the

case of Bungoma alone. Criminal enterprise has arisen in many parts of Kenya as a result of this

kind of lethargy and it is time for citizens and civil society to demand accountability from the

agencies charged with the protection of human lives and property. This is a standard provided for

constitutionally. Citizen lobbies should file in courts of law suits to demand that heads of such

agencies serve and play their roles or they be removed from office for abdication of

constitutional duty.

4. Ethnicity

Negative ethnicity has been associated with elections periods and used as a basis to discriminate

and intimidate political opponents. Fortunately, the government has organs responsible for

advocacy of national cohesion and unity which must be pressurized to do their part on

confronting negative ethnicity. The Ministry of Education, Science and Technology together

with the Kenya Institute of Curriculum Development should also put into place a curriculum that

promotes national cohesion and integration. For example, the composition of the student

45

population in schools should be as inclusive as possible to reflect national diversity and thereby

contribute to national cohesion.

In conclusion, the study makes a case for the establishment of advocacy programs that promote

reconciliation including the full implementation of the report on Truth and Justice which has

remained pending for many years. In addition, counseling programs by the Government and

NGOs should be extended to the victims of violence and their families so as to enable them de-

traumatize and bring about closure to heinous crimes that were committed in Bungoma, Mount

Elgon and the adjacent communities.

As already indicated in Chapter One of the study, the research had certain limitations arising out

of its design as a desk study. It is therefore proposed that a longitudinal study be considered by

other researchers in future. Such a study would employ household survey methodologies to

determine the progress made in pacifying the Bungoma and Mount Elgon areas since 2008 after

the military intervention in the area. Such a study would also assess the cohesion of the

ethnicities in that region and draw lessons for other parts of Kenya in national reconciliation and

integration.

46

47

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