JOACHIM VOGEL

WELFARE STATE

The idea of the welfare state builds on a conception of social rightsguaranteed to all citizens (Marshall, 1950). Social rights are anextension of democratic rights, defining welfare rights monitoredon the political arena by collective decision-making. Social rightsare usually expressed with explicit reference to equality and socialinclusion. The issue has repeatedly entered public debate and socialplanning, promising a great leap forward as in Roosevelt’s NewDeal, Johnson’s Great Society or the Swedish social democraticvision of the ‘Folk Home’. The right to employment (supported bylabour market policy), to safe working conditions (labour protec-tion regulation), the right to education (tax-based mass schooling),poverty relief (transfers) and general public health care are allwidely accepted in Europe in all political camps. However, there isless consensus on just how far social citizenship and the responsibil-ities of the welfare state should be reaching. This is the field of majorpolitical dispute between liberal, conservative and socialist ideo-logy. Believers of the free market tend to see the welfare state, socialrights and taxation as an obstacle to market efficiency. Competit-iveness is often equated with fairness in the distribution of livingconditions, and social rights as disincentives to work. Hence, there isa dual conception of social rights: most people take them for grantedand inevitable, but just how comprehensive, residual or targeted theyshould be, and for what areas in life, is a matter of dispute.

The dominant power relation between these ideological positionsis reflected in the way we choose to allocate the responsibilitiesof the welfare state. However, the actual role of the welfare stateis also influenced by available options. Efficient labour marketsproducing high employment levels and low unemployment willfacilitate generous welfare state intervention; and resourceful tradi-tional families will reduce the need for welfare state intervention, orliberate resources for generosity in other areas. In the same vein,

Social Indicators Research 64: 373–391, 2003.© 2003 Kluwer Academic Publishers. Printed in the Netherlands.

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malfunctioning labour markets and families will exhaust publicresources and will limit the scope of social rights and equality.

The welfare state operates with two strategies, by regulationand by redistribution. By regulations it controls the distributionof resources at the labour market, as well as within and betweenfamilies. Regulations include a large range of legislation as wellas less formal ruling serving to produce welfare and equality ‘atsource’, i.e., at the labour market or within the family, in order tominimize the inequality created on the labour market and by familynetworks. At the labour market labour rights are either regulatedby law or negotiated between labour market parties with back upsupport from the political arena, or sometimes regulated by mixedapproaches. At the family level we have extensive ruling of rightsand duties of family members and the power balance between them.The other strategy is ‘repairment’ by redistribution, in other wordsby intervention through taxes, transfers and subsidised services.This strategy includes marginal income taxes and income substi-tutions (unemployment benefits, sickness benefits, old age pensionsetc.) versus labour market risks; and family allowances, public care,and other services versus the family.

WELFARE STATE REGIMES

Several models of welfare state regimes have been proposed, iden-tified by a range of different factors, such as the level of socialexpenditure, institutional arrangements of distribution (e.g., enti-tlements, compensation levels, the public/private mix of provi-sions), features of taxation, the initial need structure and the finaldistributive outcome, the historical tradition and actors, and present-day partisanships.

Esping-Anderson (1990) identified three distinctive welfare stateregimes, representing different ways of ‘decommodification’ oflabour in a capitalist economy, empirically measured by the replace-ment rates and contribution periods of benefits, and the financialarrangements. The Liberal Welfare State Regime is market-orientedin the distribution of resources and social protection benefits. Publicprovisions are typically modest, flat rate, and needs/means tested,producing a stigmatised and residual group of beneficiaries. The

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state encourages market solution by private welfare schemes. Thedecommodification effect is limited, and the distribution of livingconditions is closer related to the stratification created by marketforces. USA is the archetype in this category, as well as Canada andAustralia. In Europe UK is moving in this direction.

The Conservative Welfare State Regime, rooted in corporatismand Catholic social policy, is identified by status-preserving inter-vention, supporting the market logic of distribution. Family andmotherhood are supported, women encouraged to stay at home, andthe one-breadwinner family is supported by benefits and taxation.Germany, France, Italy, Belgium and Austria belong to this category.

The third type is the Social-democratic Welfare State Regime,where social policy is encompassing, with high standards of materialliving conditions guaranteed, high levels of transfers as well assubsidised public service; hence also high levels of tax rates. Theindividual is the favoured unit instead of the family as in theconservative regime. Sweden is the archetype in this category, alsoincluding Finland, Denmark and Norway.

Several other welfare state regime typologies have been offered,some of them expanding the number categories, or renamingcategories focusing on other core elements. A fourth missing type tobe added to the threefold typology above would be the RudimentaryWelfare State Regime, found in countries where there is no historyof full employment; but a recent history of authoritarian politics,where welfare politics is minimal and left to the household subsist-ence economy and a large informal sector. The southern countries(Greece, Spain, Portugal and southern Italy) fall into this category.Castles and Mitchell (1992) defined a similar fourfold typology,adding a fourth radical regime.

Korpi and Palme (1997) developed a typology of five types ofinstitutional arrangements, focusing on features of the major socialinsurance programs, using the eligibility for benefits and the benefitlevels as the major characteristics. In the order of their historicalappearance these are labelled the targeted, voluntary state subsid-ised, corporatist, basic security and encompassing model. Themajor characteristics of this model are illustrated in Table 3.1.

The general idea of welfare state regimes is to understand vari-ations in the distribution of material living conditions, or effects of

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TABLE 3.1

Institutional types of social insurance programs

Type Eligibility Principle Benefit principle

Targeted proved need minimumVoluntary membership contributions flat rate or income relatedCorporatist employment and occupation income relatedBasic security citizenship flat rateEncompassing citizenship and employment flat rate and income related

‘decommofication’, in terms of income inequality, poverty, socialexclusion and living standards in a wider sense. The different clas-sifications of welfare state regimes relate to the social cleavagesaddressed earlier in unique ways. The liberal type (or basic securitytype) falls short of managing the class cleavage; hence, class conflictwill continue to occupy political attention. The conservative (orcorporatist) type creates a cleavage between insiders and outsidersnot covered by social protection, including the new surplus popula-tion of unemployed. In the social democratic (or encompassing)model the gender conflict surfaces, corresponding to large femaleemployment in the public sector, and the family’s dependency on thepublic sector. Public services and equality by redistribution becomesa foremost female interest, moving the gender cleavage into thepolitical arena.

Since the initial writings of Titmuss and Esping-Andersenregimes research has undergone profound expansion, moving fromthe welfare state focus as a market corrective (‘decommodifica-tion’) towards its impact in a wider sense, including the labourmarket as well as the family in their role as welfare producers. Theincreased interest in the interrelationship between the three insti-tutions adds defamilialisation to the functions of the welfare state(Esping-Andersen, 1999), decreasing individual dependencies frommarket as well as family. In particular, the issue of gender roles,the two-breadwinner model and caring duties has been added andtheorised in the context of welfare production (e.g., Lewis, Ostner).

Accordingly, in the search for a European typology of welfareproduction, our indicators have to address these new issues. Distinct

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empirical evidence of the complex web of welfare state arrange-ments along the lines of the theorised welfare state regimes donot come easily. Most countries display a mixed pattern withexamples of all discussed principles of redistribution. Here we arenot primarily concerned with these principles as such, but withtheir overall outcome in terms of equality. Hence, we need globalindicators of the overall expenditure for redistribution, which arecomparable between nations, plus indicators of special policiesfocused at the family, i.e., related to caring activities, and at thelabour market policies. The following indicators have been selected:

• Total social protection expenditure (GDP-share and PPP/capita)

• Redistribution of market earnings (reduction in Gini-coefficients)

• Family policies (child care facilities, paid parental leave)• Employment promotion expenditure

Global Indicators of Welfare State Provisions

Figure 3.1 displays the member states by the volume of socialbenefits as a percentage of GDP for 1994. As inn the previouschapter for employment, we find again that the Nordic countries(except Norway) are in the lead, ahead of central Europe, whilethe Southern cluster stays at considerably lower levels. It shouldbe noted that the level of benefits again produces a clear distinctionbetween the three clusters. The same applies to social protectionexpressed in purchasing power parities (PPP) per capita (Figure 3.2).Here we also see the effect of the general economic level, whichplaces Luxembourg with the highest GDP level at the top. Finlandand Sweden who experienced a heavy decline in their GDP in themid 1990s step down in the country ranking, while Norway withbooming economy advanced. But still, as a group the Nordic welfarestates perform much better than the central cluster, and much betterthan the Southern cluster.

Finland as well as Sweden suffered rapid decrease in employ-ment rates as well as GDP levels over the early 1990s, which wasfollowed heavy reductions in their social protection expenditure, inabsolute as well as in relative terms. Furthermore, in this period ofunusual labour market crisis the need for social protection payments

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(unemployment compensation, social welfare payments) increased.Figure 3.3 shows the trends over the 1990s for the EU memberstates. Finland and Sweden display a step downwards decline afterthe early 1990 crisis. However the same applies to Denmark andNorway, and to some extent also to parts of the central cluster.Meanwhile most of the Southern cluster (except Spain) advanced,but slowly even aver mid 1990s. In summary, there was still someexpansion of the welfare state in the early 1990s, but around 1993this period came to an end. Then comes consolidation in the Centreand South, and decline in the North. The overall pattern seems topoint at convergence.

Figure 3.1 Total social protection expendi- Figure 3.2 Total social protection expendi-ture 1994, as share of GDP. Source: Esspros. ture 1994. PPS per capita. Source: Esspros.

This picture of stagnation or even reduction of the welfare stateprovisions seems disappointing. However, these trends are calcu-lated in relative terms, as a percentage of the increasing GDP. Ifwe look at social protection in absolute terms (Figure 3.4) thenthe picture is less distressing. There is considerable progress inall member states. However, there is no convergence between theSouth and the North and Centre. Furthermore, the distance betweenthe central and Nordic cluster practically disappears. Around 1997Sweden appears less extreme than is used to do in the 1980s. Again,the big spender is Luxembourg with extremely high GDP.

It has to be remembered that the expenditure data is notcontrolled for the national need structure, in terms of indicators

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such as poverty, unemployment or public health. In fact, there ismuch that indicates that the social expenditure is the lowest (inrelative as well as absolute terms) where the needs are the greatestand the available resources (GDP) are the lowest.

Figure 3.3 Total social protection expenditure 1990–1997. Percent of GDP.

Figure 3.5 demonstrates the link between the input and outputside of the financing of the welfare state. Extensive social transfersand services will certainly demand high taxes and/or social contri-butions, as in the Nordic countries. On the other hand, this paysoff in terms of lower levels of inequality in material living stand-

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ards, concerning income inequality, lower poverty rates and lowerlevels of class inequality (see part 2). The southern cluster, withlower resources in terms of GDP, uses a lower share of its GDP forcollective use in general as well as for redistribution in particular, bychoosing lower tax levels. Lower levels of social protection as wellas lower employment imply a larger burden on the family.

Figure 3.4 Total social protection expenditure 1990–1997. PPP per capita.

The long-term time series for the Swedish case, concerning socialprotection expenditure reaching back to 1960, will be commentedlater in conjunction with other institutional features in chapter 9.

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Figure 3.5 Social protection expenditure versus tax rates and social contributions.Source: Esspros 1995.

Income Redistribution

The second global indicator of the welfare state impact is based onthe reduction of inequality of market income (earnings) by redis-tribution through taxes and transfers. Income inequality is usuallymeasured by the Gini-coefficient. By comparing the change in Gini-coefficients from earnings to post tax/transfer disposable income thewelfare state effect can be calculated as a percent reduction, whichcan be compared over time and between nations.

A recent study based on the Luxembourg Income Study (LIS)published by OECD (Burniaux et al., 1998) gives the followingpicture for an incomplete set of OECD-countries participatingin the Luxembourg Income Study (Figure 3.6). This study againindicates that the Nordic countries (and Belgium) have the mostre-distributive tax/transfer systems. Other representatives of thecentral cluster (Germany and the Netherlands), as well as Italy, theonly Southern country included in this study, fall at a much lowerlevel. USA and Japan are rated well behind all EU-member statesin this study (UK was not included). Further analysis based on LISindicates that nations with centralised bargaining (e.g., Germany,Sweden) display lower levels of inequality in earnings.

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Figure 3.6 Percent reduction in income Figure 3.7 Redistribution by welfareinequality (Gini-coefficient) by taxes/ transfers and taxes in Sweden 1975–98.transfers. Mid 1990s. Source: Luxem- Percent reduction of the Gini-coefficientbourg Income Survey (Bumieau 1998). for factor income.

Comparative trend data on redistribution are very incomplete (forcountries as well as years of observation) and suffer from inadequatecomparability. Very few countries have robust annual time series. Inthe Swedish case we can identify a clear increase in redistribution upto the early 1980s (Figure 3.7). From then on we record a decline inredistribution. In the 1990s followed a period of strong fluctuation inthe aftermath of the 1991 tax reform, a decline employment of some10 percent points, and further temporary changes in the tax systemand reductions in the transfer system1. However, the general pictureis clear: Sweden reached its peak in redistribution in the early 1980s,and thereafter followed a decline. The details of the redistributivefeatures are discussed further in chapter 8.

Family-Related Public Expenditure

Family policies can be classified into two different categories; first,policies to support the family as a welfare institution, and second, tosubstitute the family as a welfare institution, by taking over respons-ibilities from the family. A second way of structuring family policiesconcerns regulations versus redistribution, as already applied to thewelfare state-labour market relation in the previous chapter.

The traditional family can act as a powerful welfare institutionwithin certain demarcations. This concerns above all the family’semotional support, which cannot be substituted by the welfare state.

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Strengthening the family in this respect, by contributing to thesupport of social networks is a major objective in social planningin a wider sense. However, the family is also a welfare producerwhen it comes to material living conditions and requirements forcare services. As a second function, can larger families share assetsand utilise the economy of scale in pooling their income as well ascoordinating their consumption. Larger household size then implieslower living costs. Thirdly, families can offer free care services toits member, including children, elderly and the handicapped. Thesethree functions of the family form the basis of conservative priorityof the family as the major responsible welfare institution. From therefollows support of the male breadwinner model, tax rebates andchild allowances for children, and meagre social supply of caringservices usually assigned to the family. With the male breadwinnermodel follows non-activity on the labour market for women as wellas lean pension rights. With poor care services and welfare statesupport of the family women tend to be entrapped in their families.

Recent demographic change point at a powerful trend away fromthe familiaristic welfare strategy, towards transferring the family’swelfare duties to the welfare state. With the Nordic countries asa vanguard there is a drift towards increased female and maternalemployment, underpinned by mass education and ambitions for afull career for men as well as for women. This trend leads to newdemands on the welfare state to provide care services as well as paidleave. This seems to be a common ambition in all member states,but in reality welfare provisions have not yet adjusted to this modeleverywhere. Accordingly, we have two strategies with very differentconsequences, and we have several surprising findings with respectto family formation (see details in chapter 4):

• The Nordic cluster displays a success story: with generouspublic provision of care for children and the elderly, paidmaternity and parental leave and other transfers relatedto dependents, female employment has expanded, familyformation is supported (earlier partnering, increased fertility,increased gender equality in general terms);

• In the Southern countries we see a pattern of protest. Femalecareers are blocked by poor job opportunities as well as lack ofpublic care and subsidised leave required to support employ-

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ment. Accordingly, there is delayed partnering and fertility, aswell as increased poverty.

Now turning to statistics on family-related expenditure, there isonly limited access to harmonised overview data, due to the vastvariation and complexity in types of arrangements and coverage.The best global indicator is the total expenditure for family/childrenbenefits provided by Esspros. Family expenditure is requiredto promote employment for women, and in particular mothers.Again the EU-member states fall well separated into three clusters(Figure 3.8). It should be noted that family-related expenditure isthe highest in the ‘collectivistic’ Nordic cluster, and the lowest inthe familiaristic and catholic Southern cluster, including Ireland.It should be understood that the higher public support for theNordic families serves to relieve the family, and in particularwomen, from caring duties, support female employment, and delib-erate women from dependency on the patriarchy. In other words,family expenditure serves as a ‘defamiliaristic’ strategy. Lowerfamily provisions, as in the Southern cluster tend to reinforce largerfamilies, by leaving caring duties within the family.

Figure 3.8 Social protection benefits forfamily/children 1994. Percent of GDP.Source: Esspros.

Figure 3.10 Weeks of maternity/parentalleave with 100% pay of previous earnings(converted to equivalent weeks; appliesto the first child and private sector).Source: European Commission/DG5 1998.

Figure 3.9 displays the available trend data for the 1990s, usingthe recent harmonised social expenditure statistics for the Europeanunion (Esspros). There is considerable change over the 1990s; in

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the first half we record an increase in the Nordic as well as thecentral cluster, towards a pattern of divergence. Then followed aclear decline in all of the Nordic countries. There is little change inthe Southern cluster throughout the decade.

Figure 3.9 Social protection benefits for family/children 1990–1997. Percent ofGDP.

Next, we proceed to welfare state characteristics relating directlyto family formation and child-bearing by focusing on measureswhich support the reconciliation between work and family, and inparticular the situation of women in this respect. A recent generaloverview in this direction by the European commission (DG5, 1998)gives a general picture of the public support in member statesconcerning the family’s responsibilities in caring for children andelderly respectively, addressing:

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• subsidised care services• measures to enable workers to redistribute some of their time

from the workplace to the home while retaining an employmentcontract (“time off”)

• monetary benefits, including payments during leave, socialsecurity, social assistance, tax rebates.

The length of paid maternity plus parental leave (converted toequivalent weeks with 100% substitution) is best supported in theNordic countries (Norway, Finland, Sweden, also Austria), whileGreece, Spain, Portugal, Ireland and UK have the lowest provisions(Figure 3.10). This again places the Nordic cluster in the lead, butdoes not discriminate between the central and southern cluster.

Figure 3.11 Percentage of children 0–3 Figure 3.12 Percentage of children 6–20years attending/places available in publicly years attending/places available in publiclyfunded services for children. Source: funded services for children. Source:Deven, Inglis, Moss, Petri 1997. Deven, Inglis, Moss, Petri 1997.

The same applies to publicly funded care services for children;however, here the general pattern of three clusters is not equallyconsistent. Again the Nordic countries and the former EastGermany are the best providers for children in the age of 0–3 years,followed by France and Belgium, while the Southern countries aswell as some of the central countries (Germany-W, UK, Austriaand the Netherlands) perform as poorly as the Southern countries(Figure 3.11). For children of higher age the variation is lesspronounced (Figure 3.12). Notably, the Nordic countries are alsogood providers for school-age children 6–10 years. Again Franceis close to the Nordic countries, while most other central European

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countries unite with the Southern cluster. In summary, it is in thisarea the public sector should have a major impact in the Nordiccountries to support child-bearing and parenthood.

Figure 3.13 Public child care supported: Paidmaternity/paternity leave (equivalent weekspaid 100%) and publicly funded child careprovisions for the first child (percentage ofchildren attending/available places).Source: European commission 1998.

Figure 3.14 Percentage of older peoplereceiving home care services.Source: Deven, Inglis, Moss, Petri 1997.

In order to support the reconciliation between parenthood (orrather maternity) and gainful employment for women, both elementsare required in public support of maternity. There is a need forchild care facilities as well as provisions for time off, including theright to leave, and in particular the right to paid leave. A recentstudy has recalculated the full payment period (weeks with 100%pay, see Figure 3.10) from existing replacement rates and lengthof periods for the first child (European Commission/DGV, 1998).This indicator is in Figure 3.13 related to the available public careprovisions for children aged 0–3 (based on Figure 3.11). Both condi-tions are of course necessary to support maternal engagement in thelabour market, along with job opportunities. Here we again recorda clear Scandinavian cluster (including East Germany) deliveringboth, and a Southern cluster rating low on both conditions. UK,Ireland and the Netherlands also belong to this group, with UKdisplaying the worst conditions in the European union. Germany-W and Austria have equally high financial provision as the Nordiccountries, but fall short on childcare facilities. This will certainlyreduce the employment levels of mother (which will be demon-

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strated in the second part of this report). France comes out lowerthan the Nordic countries on paid leave, which is calculated forthe first child only. From the second child on these provisions aremuch better in France, which should affect female employment andearnings.

Concerning the care of elderly several countries support timeoff for care of ill adult relatives, with Sweden granting the longestduration. Notably the Nordic countries also have the largest propor-tion of elderly people receiving home care services (13–24 percent),while the Southern cluster falls at 1–2 percent, close to Germany(3 percent). Figure 3.14 again reproduces the already familiar threecluster of Northern, Southern and central European welfare produc-tion. The variation in institutional care of the older population israther limited, but even here the Nordic countries are in the lead.

Labour Market Policy

While family policies serve to promote increased employment andequal opportunity, labour market policy is intended to do the sameby influencing the demand of labour as well as the supply side. Inthis excursion we are primarily interested in what is usually calledactive labour market policies. We leave passive measures asidesince these are difficult to identify in comparative measurement,because of the overlapping and variation of the various nationalprograms. Active measures include training and job creation, youthmeasures inc. apprenticeships, subsidised employment, support tostarting enterprises, and rehabilitation and work for the disabled.These measures are intended to mobilise the individual’s resourcesto contribute to his/her personal welfare by gainful employment,by opening job opportunities, improve employability, stimulate jobseeking, prevent depreciation of skill, and on a general level, preventsocial exclusion. Labour market measures also have a central func-tion on a societal level. They serve to minimise public expenditure,and relieve other urgent public expenditure. Hence, active labourmarket policies are an essential tool on the repertoire of the welfarestate, since high employment levels are a prerequisite for a generouswelfare state. Accordingly, the ‘work line’ and related concepts suchas workfare and work incentives, are catchwords in most developedwelfare states.

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Figure 3.15 show that there is again a clear north-south clus-tering within the European union, with the Nordic countries in thelead, while the southern member states fall at much lower levels.However, expenditure for active measures should be corrected forthe need for such intervention. Figure 3.16 shows a rough indicatorlinking the volume of expenditure to the (remaining) unemploy-ment rate. Certainly should the preferred indicator be the initialunemployment rate, which however is not properly measurable. Theproxy indicator in Figure 3.16 again confirms that the Nordic clusteris unique, and that Sweden, in particular, falls at very high levels.Since Finland as well as Sweden had dramatic rise in unemploymentin the early 1990s (see chapter 2), the estimates for these countriesfrom around 1990 are also displayed in Figure 3.16. At that timeSweden as well as Finland had much higher active labour marketexpenditure, in relation to its unemployment level.

The important message from these findings is that Sweden aswell as Finland institutionalised active labour market measures, andhad comparatively low unemployment levels (2–3 percent) whilemost other EU member states parked at much higher levels. Evenafter the Swedish/Finnish crisis Sweden kept its uniqueness.

Figure 3.15 Expenditure on active labour Figure 3.16 Expenditure on active labourmarket policies. Percent of GDP. 1993–95. market policies. Percent of GDPSource: Hvinden 1999 and OECD. spent per percent of unemployment.

Source: OECD 1997 and Hvinden 1999.

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DISCUSSION

The findings in this chapter on the variation of welfare state provi-sions in the European union again demonstrate a clear grouping ofEU member states into three rather distinct clusters, with three levelsof general generosity. We have explored the general level of socialprotection expenditure, as well as welfare policies relating to theother two welfare institutions, i.e., labour market policies and familypolicies. In summary, the Nordic welfare states (Sweden, Denmark,Finland and Norway) are most interventionist in their general socialexpenditure and redistribution strategies through taxes and trans-fers, as well as in regulating the other welfare institutions, i.e., thefamily and the labour market, as compared to the southern andcentral cluster. The southern member states (Italy, Portugal, Greeceand Spain) have the least interventionist and generous policies. Thecentral member states (Germany, France, Belgium, Netherlands,Luxembourg, UK, Ireland) again form an intermediate cluster.

However, as compared with the findings on labour market andfamily characteristics (chapters 2 and 4) the clustering is lessdistinct, with several exceptions. It should also be mentioned thatthe choice of indicators is restricted by the variation in institu-tional forms and by the access to comparable data for the entireset of EU member states. As for labour market characteristics in theprevious chapter, we utilise indicators of global and summary char-acter, which might not always capture the specificity of all nationalwelfare state strategies.

The clustering of EU member states by welfare state provisionsis highly correlated with labour market characteristics: Inclusivelabour markets, signified by high employment rates, low unem-ployment levels and lower inequality in earnings, have in generallarger social protection expenditure, as well as extensive labourmarket policies and family policies supporting high employment.The Nordic countries come out as forerunners towards activa-tion policies, by much larger expenditure in active labour marketexpenditure. The logic between this positive correlation is furtherdiscussed in final chapter.

Further, in the next chapter we will demonstrate that we have anequally clear negative correlation between welfare state provisionsand family characteristics in EU member states: regions with poor

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labour markets and lean welfare state arrangements have to adapt byinclusive family networks.

The large variation in public provisions and labour market perfor-mance in Europe explains the very different family structure in theSouthern countries as compared to the Nordic and central clusters.A whole range of indicators on the ‘traditional family’ tells us thatthe age of exit from the parent’s home and partnering comes muchlater, and fertility is lower in the South and higher in the Nordiccountries. Recent trends also indicate that these differences havebeen increasing. The explanation is ‘coping behaviour’; the tradi-tional family has to take on much of the responsibilities, which inthe North are guaranteed by the welfare state as social rights, andthis behaviour has increased lately (see next chapter). Our findingsconcerning welfare state provision have demonstrated that the totalvolume of the welfare state expenditure as well as the directed provi-sions (family policies supporting public support of care of childrenand elderly and paid parental leave; active labour market policies)tend to support female employment, fertility and parenthood bestin the Nordic countries, with France closer the Nordic cluster, andGermany close to the Southern cluster. However, there are signof retreat from the generous provisions in the North, while someadvancement is seen in other member states.

NOTE

1 The income concept was changed in the 1991 tax reform (broken line = adjustedline). Peaks are effects of the tax reform (1991) and a temporary 50 percentreduction of capital taxation.

SCB Statistics SwedenWelfare Analysis ProgramandUniversity of UmeåPO Box 2430010451 StockholmSweden

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