Running  head:  TEA  FOR  THREE        1    

Tea for Three:

Revisiting the Protest Paradigm and Media Coverage of the Tea Party Movement by Cable

Outlet

David A. Weaver

University of California, Santa Barbara

Boise State University

Joshua M. Scacco

The University of Texas at Austin

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Abstract

Political movements, regardless of ideology, represent a threat to entrenched interests and values. The emergence of the national “Tea Party” movement since Barack Obama’s election as president has stimulated a wealth of news media coverage and commentary regarding the movement’s origins, goals, participants, even temperament. Unlike many of the political movements in the mid-to-late 20th century, however, the Tea Party stands starkly to the right. This research examines media coverage of this movement and how it is portrayed as a threat to progressive policies.

Previous research on media framing of protest movements and events has often incorporated the “protest paradigm”—the tendency for media to frame a movement and/or focus on tangential topics in ways that draw attention away from the issues such movements are attempting to address. This research utilizes these frames with a focus on the unfolding, unsettled media environment and political movements that stand to the right of center.

Moreover, the extant analyses of the protest paradigm is characterized by two key features that shaped its early development and implementation in the literature. First, the historically progressive nature of most political protests naturally placed such movements at odds with dominant political and social forces in the United States, which in turn engendered critical coverage. Second, such research was developed during the era of the “big three” television networks, an era of consensus journalism that is historically associated with the “mainstream media.” Today’s media environment, however, is marked by the emergence of various ideologically tinged media channels appealing to either the political left or right. This study asks whether application of the “protest paradigm” today is also influenced by the development of these channels. That is, do these channels utilize frames in ways consistent with their respective ideological hues? We draw on a representative sample of stories regarding the national movement from the three major cable news networks, FOX News, MSNBC and CNN. The Associated Press serves as a reference point. To examine these divergences, we apply a number of marginalization frames present in the protest paradigm literature, including protester characteristics, evocation of public opinion, and use of official sources. We also include some new frames: First, the depiction of protesters’ emotional state, namely labeling protesters as “angry,” which may imply they are not thinking rationally in carrying out their activities. We hypothesize that application of the emotion frame will correspond to the ideological leaning of the channel (e.g., FOX News will apply the emotion frame less so than MSNBC). The second frame we incorporate is characterization of protesters’ motives, which includes the “why” behind movement actions. We hypothesize that application of the motives frame will be based on whether the corresponding network approaches the movement as legitimate (FOX News) or an “Astroturf” front (MSNBC).

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Political movements, regardless of ideology, represent a threat to entrenched interests and

values. Scholars have long sought to understand the nature of how the media choose to cover

protest events—or whether they are covered at all (Dardis, 2006; McLeod & Hertog, 1992;

Boyle, McCluskey, Devanathan, Stein, & McLeod, 2004; Boyle, McCluskey, McLeod, & Stein,

2005; McLeod & Detenber, 1999; Gitlin, 1981). This corpus demonstrates that protests that

threaten the status quo tend to be marginalized in the press. This “protest paradigm” shows how

news media often frame a movement and/or focus on tangential topics to draw attention away

from the issues movements attempt to address. Despite the richness of this literature, it has been

mainly applied to coverage of left-leaning protest movements in the traditional news media

environment. This article applies these foundational frames to news coverage of the right-leaning

Tea Party movement in a fragmented cable news environment.

The emergence of the national ‘Tea Party’ movement since Barack Obama’s election has

stimulated news media coverage and commentary regarding the movement’s origins, goals,

participants, even temperament. Unlike many of the political movements in the mid-to-late 20th

century, the Tea Party stands starkly to the right. This research examines media coverage of this

movement and how it is portrayed as a threat to progressive policies. In doing so, we attempt to

capture how the Tea Party quickly moved from a street-based to election-oriented movement.

This article proceeds as follows. First, we briefly review current scholarship regarding the

Tea Party movement, including its broader placement in the political system and with respect to

the Republican Party. Second, we review the primary literature on the protest paradigm and

make the case that the application of the protest paradigm should vary along ideological lines

that have emerged in the modern cable news environment. Third, we present the design,

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implementation, and results of our analysis. Finally, we discuss the findings and ask whether we

can expect to see similar manifestations of the protest paradigm in the future.

The Tea Party Movement(s)

As noted by Williamson, Skocpol & Coggin (2011), there is little social scientific

knowledge regarding the nature of the Tea Party movement. While the focus of this paper is not

to definitively describe this nature, it is important to enumerate what is known in order to better

place the media coverage of the movement in its proper context.

The emergence of a Tea Party identity in the first months of the Obama administration

led to an increased media focus on the conservative opposition to the Democratic agenda.

Passage of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA), the implementation of the

Troubled Asset Relief Program, and direct federal intervention with the domestic auto and

banking industries sparked conservative recriminations of government “takeovers” and a trend

toward “socialism.” CNBC financial commentator Rick Santelli’s well-publicized call for a

nationwide Tea Party from the floor of the Chicago Mercantile Exchange in February 2009

provided publicity for the formation of a movement (Williamson et al., 2011).

From its main inception with protests on April 15, 2009, the movement adopted dual

purposes, both of which ran in tandem through the 2010 midterm elections: (1) directly confront,

protest, and publicize the policies of unified Democratic government and; (2) support candidates

in 2010 who would repeal Democratic policies, advocate for smaller government and lower

taxes, and halt the Obama agenda. These purposes are manifest from the “cultural dispositions”

of Tea Party supporters and members: authoritarianism, ontological insecurity, libertarianism,

and nativism (Perrin, Tepper, Caren, & Morris, 2011, p. 74).

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The movement was initially framed by supporters and some media elites as a bipartisan

cross-section of citizens. Demographically, the Tea Party is supported overwhelmingly by

conservative Republicans who are older, white, male, middle to upper class, and politically

experienced (Williamson et al., 2011). According to exit polls from the Pew Center for the

People and the Press, 40 percent of voters in the 2010 midterm elections supported the Tea Party

and of these voters, 87 percent voted Republican (A Clear Rejection, 2010). Furthermore, the

well-publicized and often successful involvement of Tea Party candidates in Republican

primaries affirmed the movement in the center-right political sphere (Karpowitz, Monson,

Patterson, & Pope, 2011).

Survey evidence has also confirmed that the issue profile of Tea Party supporters aligns

more with Republican voters than the general public (Perrin et al., 2011; Clement & Green,

2011). In addition to holding beliefs similar to those of Republicans on the size and role of

government, Tea Party supporters are more likely to favor abortion restrictions and oppose same-

sex marriage compared to the public at large (Clement & Green, 2011). The Pew Forum on

Religion and Public Life has also found that the Tea Party movement is strongly supported by

white evangelicals (see also Campbell & Putnam, 2011). Ideological and issue similarities

between Republicans and Tea Party supporters affirms the notion that the movement sought to

rework conservative “identity” following the Bush administration (Williamson et al., 2011).

Although the Tea Party’s demographics are relatively homogeneous, the movement itself

is not. It is an amalgam of local grassroots entities that use traditional and digital venues for

mobilization; a small set of competing national organizations, such as the Tea Party Patriots and

Tea Party Express, who emphasize different policies associated with conservative orthodoxy;

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and conservative media boosters (Williamson et al., 2011). This decentralized organizational

structure is characteristic of some of the elements of post-bureaucratic politics (Bimber, 2003).

There has been some controversy as to whether the movement is truly grassroots in

nature or “Astroturf” activism stirred up by conservative forces using disaffection for its own

gain. We cannot answer the question normatively, but Republican Party operatives—working

with FreedomWorks and former House Majority Leader Richard Armey—were instrumental in

organizing the Tea Party Express and other related groups (Courser, 2010; Williamson et al.,

2011). Past media commentary has also linked Tea Party elements to NewsCorp Chairman and

CEO Rupert Murdoch and billionaires David and Charles Koch (Rich, 2010).

We argue that the Tea Party constitutes a legitimate sociological and political movement

insofar that a large portion of the activists did have previous political experience and were

therefore not neophytes scurrilously manipulated by powerful elites (Campbell & Putnam, 2011).

The 2010 midterm election results at the primary and general election stages illustrated the

mobilization and financial success of merging grassroots, political and media elites (Karpowitz,

et al., 2011) Furthermore, the movement’s influence has been consistently exerted within

government since the midterm elections, including the recent debate over raising the debt ceiling.

The Protest Paradigm Revisited

Those citizens participating directly in the movement make up a very distinct minority of

the population. Because of this, citizen knowledge of the movement is garnered largely from

media elites, who enjoy a significant role in shaping public perceptions of the Tea Party. Indeed,

social movements are dependent on media to communicate with potential supporters, broaden

the scope of conflict and obtain a sense of legitimacy (Gamson & Wolfsfeld, 1993). While non-

active supporters of the movement may have been interacting with the movement vicariously or

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identifying with its objectives (Kohut, Doherty, Dimock, & Keeter, 2010), the opportunity to

frame the movement for the general population is significant (Entman, 1993; Iyengar, 1994).

The extant analyses of the protest paradigm are characterized by two features that shaped

its early development and implementation in the literature. First, the historically progressive

nature of most political protests naturally placed such movements at odds with dominant political

and social forces in the United States, which in turn engendered critical coverage. Second, such

research was developed during the era of the “big three” television networks, an era of consensus

journalism that is historically associated with the “mainstream media.”

The first of these two research elements—the historically progressive nature of protests—

has often focused on left-leaning causes. In these instances, the press turns from being a “‘watch

dog” to a “‘guard dog,’ maintaining order and protecting the [political] system against potential

internal and external threats” (McLeod & Detenber, 1999, p. 5; see also Donohue, Tichenor, &

Olien, 1995). Left-wing protest has not only been the traditional variant of street-level activism,

but such movements are often focused on overturning deeply entrenched social, economic and

political arrangements. Such movements—especially those from the civil rights and the Vietnam

war era(s)—have engendered hostile press responses (Boyle et al., 2005; Di Cicco, 2010; Gitlin,

1981; McLeod & Hertog, 1992). This negative coverage has also been documented with respect

to anti-Iraq War protests as well as the 1999 World Trade Organization demonstrations in Seattle

(Dardis, 2006; Jha, 2007). Coverage of protest events often fail to accurately describe the

motives for which a movement is active (Smith, McCarthy, McPhail, & Augustyn, 2001).

There are a number of mechanisms by which the press reduces the value of social protest.

These “marginalization” devices have become ways of structuring and framing the narrative so

as to decrease emphases on the causes of the protests by focusing on the protesters themselves,

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especially if there was any violence that occurred. When violence is more prevalent, media often

consider the protests higher in deviance in terms of the protest’s tactics, a factor that

considerably darkens the tone of relevant coverage (McLeod & Detenber, 1999).

In addition to this “violence and crime” device, Dardis (2006, pp. 120-2) identifies other

common marginalization tools including those focusing on appearance or mental abilities of the

protesters; framing the protest event as a carnival; evocation of public opinion; heavy reliance on

statistics, generalizations and witness accounts to counter the demonstrators’ cause; noting

counter-demonstrators; and making historical comparisons to other protest events. Journalists

have also been known to rely heavily on official sources that are privileged over the protester on

the street (McLeod & Detenber, 1999). Studies of protest framing have focused on newspaper

coverage of protest at the state (Boyle et al., 2004) and national levels (Boyle & Armstrong,

2009; Dardis, 2006). Experimental studies have also focused on television news, seeking to

capture effects of protest coverage (Detenber, Gotlieb, McLeod, & Malinkina, 2007; McLeod &

Detenber, 1999;).

What makes the Tea Party unique is that its ideological core is solidly right-wing,

providing for few historical analogies with which to make a comparison. However, scholars do

appear to find that there is variation in the application of the protest paradigm across the

ideological spectrum. One possibility is to distinguish between protest events that are focused on

supporting the status quo, promoting “modest reform” or seeking more “radical” changes (Boyle

et al., 2004). Protests focused more on sustaining the status quo have tended to receive more

favorable media coverage compared to reformist groups. From a strictly political standpoint, one

could argue, as do Williamson et al. (2011), that the Tea Party arose at a time when the political

winds appeared to be unfavorable to a grassroots conservative revolt: The American public had

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very recently elected a popular new Democrat to the presidency. In this sense, the Tea Party

could be conceived as being “radical” relative to the dominant Democratic administration. Yet,

the movement’s advocacy of entrenched American tropes, values, and issues with which a major

political party and many citizens identify with suggests it is more appropriate to consider the

movement “conservative” and status-quo oriented.

The Modern Media Environment

Applying the protest paradigm in the modern news environment is a challenge because it

has changed markedly even in the past decade. In contrast to past eras (particularly the Vietnam

era), today’s news environment is considerably different from both media and journalistic

perspectives. The media environment has been altered first and foremost by the emergence and

commercial success of ideologically tinged media outlets, such as the FOX News Channel and

sources that make up the conservative “echo chamber” (Jamieson & Cappella, 2008). But with

the strong performance of liberal alternatives such as MSNBC, ideological preferences are

increasingly part of one’s decision regarding which news source to consult, at least with regard

to cable network news (Iyengar & Hahn, 2009; Stroud, 2008, 2010, 2011).1 Concurrent changes

in journalism have also exacerbated trends in partisan filtering by cable news outlets compared to

print and newswire services (Baum & Groeling, 2008) while placing a premium on the

commentator’s news perspective.2

This study asks whether application of the “protest paradigm” is also influenced by the

changing format for television news. Specifically:

                                                                                                               1 It is true that, once the effect of political interest is controlled for, the relationship between viewing MSNBC and FOX is positive and significant (Holbert, Hmielowski, & Weeks, 2011) and therefore some viewers do not merely receive one-sided message flows regarding the Tea Party (Zaller, 1992). 2 This journalistic trend has been documented by Schudson (1995), Patterson (1994, 2003), Fallows (1997), Davis and Owen (1998), and Bennett (2009).  

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RQ1: Do cable channels utilize marginalization and legitimation frames of the Tea Party movement in ways consistent with their respective ideological hues?

Furthermore, incorporating the Associated Press print newswire as an ideologically control

referent to compare news coverage by ideology and news medium, this research asks:

RQ2: Do medium differences exist in how the Tea Party is marginalized and legitimized between cable news and a print newswire?

Building on protest paradigm literature regarding the frames for marginalization, legitimation,

and their news use against ideologically dissimilar protest movements, this research posits:

H1: Conservatively-aligned cable networks (FOX News) will utilize issue attribution to legitimize the Tea Party significantly more than liberally-aligned cable networks (MSNBC). H2: Liberally-aligned cable networks (MSNBC) will utilize marginalization devices against the Tea Party significantly more than conservatively-aligned cable networks (FOX News).

Methodology

To assess how cable news outlets engaged in marginalization and legitimation of the Tea

Party movement, this research employed a content analysis of the top two primetime broadcast

programs on CNN, FOX News, and MSNBC. In addition, a comparative sample was derived

from Associated Press coverage to serve as a referent for the cable programming.3

Population of Interest

Using Nielsen data as a guide, the top two most-watched programs on each cable outlet

were selected for inclusion in this analysis. During the time period from Barack Obama’s

inauguration (January 20, 2009) through one week following the 2010 midterm elections

(November 15, 2010), these programs included: Larry King Live and Anderson Cooper 360

                                                                                                               3 Building on previous research (Baum & Groeling, 2008), the Associated Press sample in this analysis serves as the ideologically neutral control to be compared against the three cable outlets. Newswires have been found to base their content on journalistic norms of newsworthiness whereas the cable outlets are more likely to engage in partisan filtering.

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(CNN), The O’Reilly Factor and Hannity (FOX News), and Countdown with Keith Olbermann

and Rachel Maddow (MSNBC). All news stories that mentioned and/or discussed the Tea Party

served as the population of interest. Additionally, all Associated Press Tea Party news stories

from this same period were also included. Using Lexis-Nexis as the sampling frame, 773 total

cable stories and 136 Associated Press stories constituted the population.4

Sampling Unit and Reliability

Each article constituted the unit of analysis. To achieve a sample of 200 stories for

analysis (approximately 20 percent of the total population), the population was divided by news

outlet and each individual story assigned a number. Fifty stories were then randomly selected

from each outlet by random number generator. The sample was then subsequently reviewed to

exclude irrelevant stories, leaving 181 stories for analysis.5

The ideological nature of this research required that news transcripts be blinded before

analysis. Transcripts were blinded so as to remove network, program, host, and any other

information identified with a particular program. This provided a level of anonymity when

coding the transcripts.6

                                                                                                               4 The entire population of stories was derived in Lexis-Nexis by a search for key words “Tea Party protest,” “Tea Party movement,” “Tea Party Express,” or “Tea Party Patriots” during the time period January 20, 2009 – November 15, 2010 for the chosen cable programs. Additionally, the Associated Press stipulated two additional criteria that excluded “state and local” stories so as to derive national-level Tea Party stories and explicitly included “Tea Party” in the headline. This excluded stories wherein the Tea Party was not the primary focus. Of the 773 total cable stories, 353 came from FOX News, 223 from MSNBC, and 197 from CNN. The Associated Press population contained 136 stories. 5 A second sampling process for the AP was conducted following concerns that the sampled stories did not adequately capture protest events that occurred over the study’s time period. The secondary process limited Lexis-Nexis searches to seven days (inclusive) following major protest events outlined by Williamson et al. (2011). Specifically, the search focused on the 2009 and 2010 tax day protests, the 2009 and 2010 September 12th rallies, and healthcare protests on March 20, 2010. It excluded the 2009 town hall meeting protests because the relationship between the Tea Party and these events is not as direct as other instances. After filtering out irrelevant stories and accounting for stories already sampled, an additional three stories were included. 6 While providing for an increased level of anonymity, the researchers were able to identify some broadcast transcripts based on common slogans used by the anchors and recurring guests. The Associated Press transcripts were not blinded, as the news article format is qualitatively different than a cable transcript.

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Cable transcripts were coded separately from Associated Press articles during the

reliability phase to allow for consistency among the blinded transcripts. Two coders analyzed

approximately 10 percent of the cable and 15 percent of the print samples during each reliability

iteration. Disagreements were resolved through further clarification of the codes and reviewing

pertinent examples from the articles. This process was used especially for the appearance, mental

ability and public opinion-themed codes. Unless otherwise noted, content analytic codes

achieved a reliability of 0.80 or higher as is standard for an analysis of this type (Frey, Botan &

Kreps, 2000; Stroud & Higgins, 2008; Krippendorff, 2004).7

Content Analysis and Codes

Each news item was analyzed at the article level using quantitative content analysis

procedures (Frey, Botan & Kreps, 2000; Stroud & Higgins, 2008) that focused on codes arising

from scholarship on social protest and the media (Boyle & Armstrong, 2009; Dardis, 2006;

McLeod & Detenber, 1999). A separate set of codes were created to examine whether news

personnel assigned motives or emotions to the protesters and/or Tea Party political candidates.

The analysis focused on a set of thematic codes for motives, appearance and mental ability,

public opinion, counter-demonstrations, and emotions (see Appendix A for the detailed codes).

In all cases, each story was coded “1” for the presence of a given code and “0” if it was not.

Motives. Scholars have observed that one method the news media use to evaluate the

authenticity of political candidates is to discuss potential motives (Parry-Giles, 2001). In judging

the authenticity of the Tea Party, the news media could have ascribed negative motives to the

                                                                                                               7 The initial round of reliability coding contained four coders. Krippendorff’s alpha was utilized and the reliabilities are subsequently reported here. Following the first round, two coders conducted the remaining reliability iterations, using Cohen’s Kappa as the alpha measurement.

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movement (racism, opposition to President Obama) or legitimizing motives in the form of issue

advocacy (lower taxes, government spending, etc.).8

Appearance and Mental Ability. As a marginalization tool, news media personnel may

comment on the appearance and dress of protesters, whether protesters engaged in child-like

behavior (henceforth idiots), and characterize protest events as a “spectacle,” “circus,” or

“parade” (Dardis, 2006; McLeod & Hertog, 1992; Gitlin, 1981). These codes were extended to

Tea Party campaign events and candidates as well. To account for political extremism as media

judgment of unintelligence and immaturity, mentions of Tea Party extremism were included with

the child-like behavior codes.9

Public Opinion. The framing of public opinion against protests was one of the original

foci of the protest paradigm (McLeod & Hertog, 1992; Dardis, 2006). This frame was

operationalized by including codes for the citation of public opinion data about the Tea Party

movement or its positions; its potentially “waning” political influence; whether the movement

was “fractured;” assertions of fake public opinion or “astroturf activism;” eyewitness accounts;

and the inclusion of elite sources over those from the movement.10

Counter-demonstrations. This theme sought to capture whether media elites divided their

attention between Tea Party protests and/or campaign events and counter-demonstrations.

Emotions. The emotions of protesters and candidates were coded for whether Tea Party

supporters were described as either “angry” or “frustrated” in each story.

                                                                                                               8 Cable story reliabilities are as follows: Opposition to government (.73), healthcare (.71), and government spending (.71); Cable reliability for opposition to President Obama was included for future analysis and revision.  9 For the AP, protest as “spectacle” was included for future analysis and revision. 10 For AP reliability, protest public opinion and eyewitness accounts were included for future analysis and revision; for cable reliability, waning influence, fracture, eyewitness accounts, and official sources were included for future analysis and revision though they did not meet the conventional level of 0.70.

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Macro-level Issues and Marginalization. To account for the presence of issue mentions

and marginalization devices used in each story, two additive variables were created after the

coding process. For each story, the issue variable added mentions of Tea Party opposition to

bailouts, the stimulus (ARRA), healthcare, taxes, government spending, and debt/deficits. The

marginalization variable added together devices used in each story that included mentions of

dress, child-like qualities, event as spectacle, waning influence, fracture, astroturf, eyewitness

accounts, office sources, and the attribution of anger to the Tea Party.

Results

Motives & Issue Attribution

As a potential means for Tea Party legitimation, the results suggest that issue coverage is

patterned along ideological lines and illustrate the nuanced patterns of the protest paradigm in

today’s media environment. Four of the nine key issues displayed significant differences among

the four sources at the .01 level or better: opposition to government, bailouts, government

spending, and debts/deficits. Table 1 shows the number of stories for each source in which an

issue was mentioned at least once, along with the total number of stories mentioning the issue,

and the associated chi-square test of significance. Figure 1 illustrates these figures graphically.

Table 1 Presence of Issues by Source.

Issue MSNBC (n = 48)

CNN (n = 37)

AP (n = 50)

FOX (n = 46) Total χ2

Opposition to government 17 24 32 15 88 16.71***

Bailouts 3 8 11 1 23 12.95**

Government

spending 9 18 25 9 61 18.60***

Debt/deficit 3 13 9 10 35 13.50** Note. **p < .01, *** p < .001; all χ2 values reflect 3 degrees of freedom.

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Figure 1 Issue presence by source.

Two of these issues (government and associated spending) reached the .001 level or

better, and in both cases the Associated Press dominated coverage, followed by CNN.11 No

source particularly dominated with respect to issues of the bailouts or debt. The relatively little

coverage of these two issues by MSNBC and/or FOX suggests these ideological outlets were the

force behind the statistically significant chi-squares tests.

The issue attribution results present a trend: more neutrally-branded news outlets (CNN,

AP) mention issues as a motive for the Tea Party more than their ideological counterparts (FOX

News, MSNBC). This seems suggestive of Baum and Groeling’s (2008) notion that partisan

filtering by ideological media screen out issues as a byproduct. These findings also fail to

support H1 that FOX News would use issue attribution significantly more than MSNBC. Only in

                                                                                                               11 Opposition to taxation (χ2 [3] = 6.83, p = .078) approached traditional levels of significance and indicates the potential for further divergence among news sources. Opposition to Obama, the stimulus bill (ARRA), and the health care bill all failed to achieve any reasonable significance, with p-values ranging from .16 to .55.  

17  

3  

9  

2  

24  

8  

18  

13  

32  

11  

25  

9  

15  

1  

9   10  

0  

5  

10  

15  

20  

25  

30  

35  

Government   Bailouts   Gov't  spending   Debt/deJicit  

#  of  stories  

Issue  

MSNBC  CNN  AP  FOX  

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the case of debt/deficit mentions did an analysis restricted to MSNBC and FOX stories confirm

the latter’s significantly greater emphasis (χ2 [1, N = 94] = 13.49, p = .011).

Examining a negative motive ascribed to the Tea Party, attributions of racism (χ2 [3] =

7.36, p = .061) approached the traditional level of significance and indicates the strategies for

marginalization and inoculation among the four media outlets. Restricting analysis of the racism

frame to the more ideological outlets, FOX News invoked the racism frame (37% of stories)

more often than MSNBC (21% of stories). This occurrence was marginally significant (p = .10).

The final issue attribution analysis examined the average number of issues mentioned in

a story by any given source (Table 2). A one-way ANOVA shows significant differences among

the four sources as a whole (F [3, 177] = 7.57, p < .001). CNN was the most likely to discuss

issues, with an average of a little over two per story. Post-hoc Scheffe tests indicate that CNN

differed significantly from both MSNBC and FOX (p < .01), but that neither the AP covered

issues significantly more (than any other source), nor did MSNBC and FOX outstrip each other.

Table 2 Average Number of Issues Mentioned by Source.

Source Mean (S.D.)

MSNBC .92a (1.07)

CNN 2.05a, b (1.63)

AP 1.64 (1.61)

FOX .89b (1.0)

Note. Sources sharing subscripts significantly different at p < .01

Marginalization.

The issue results may be as much about the type of medium (print versus cable

television) as the ideological lean of each outlet. Isolating the codes that specifically dealt with

marginalization devices, this article finds a much different focus by the news outlets.

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Of the marginalization devices, idiots and fracture were present in a substantial number

of the total stories (Ns = 117 and 86, respectively). In each case, the data pattern is quite similar,

with MSNBC dominating use of the frame, followed by the AP; CNN and FOX used these

devices less often (Table 3 and Figure 2). Of key interest here is whether the differences between

MSNBC and FOX are statistically significant. Chi-square tests restricted to these two sources

confirm this for idiots (χ2 [1] = 12.66, p < .001) and fracture (χ2 [1] = 11.00, p = .001).

Table 3 Presence of Marginalization Devices by Source.

Issue MSNBC CNN AP FOX Total χ2 Dress 6 0 9 1 16 12.13**

Idiots 38 24 35 20 117 14.07**

Fracture 30 18 25 13 86 11.30**

Astroturf 22 3 6 2 33 34.32*** Note. **p < .01, ***p < .001; all χ2 values reflect 3 degrees of freedom.

 

Figure 2. Marginalization device presence by source.

Far less attention was devoted to the physical appearance and dress of activists, with 16

stories total, though there was an overall significant difference among the four sources at the .01

6  

38  

30  

22  

0  

24  

18  

3  

9  

35  

25  

6  

1  

20  

13  

2  

0  

5  

10  

15  

20  

25  

30  

35  

40  

Dress   Idiots   Fracture   Astroturf  

#  of  stories  

Marginalization  device  

MSNBC  

CNN  

AP  

FOX  

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level. MSNBC’s slightly stronger tendency to focus on dress over that of FOX just barely missed

the conventional level of significance (p = .058). The picture is much different with respect to the

astroturf frame. Thirty-three stories questioned the grassroots nature of the Tea Party, and

MSNBC was the source for two-thirds of these. The difference between MSNBC and FOX was

also highly significant  (χ2 [1] = 21.26, p < .001).

Two marginalization frames narrowly missed traditional significance, specifically waning

influence (p = .068) and attributions of Tea Party anger (p = .074). Moreover, neither the devices

of spectacle (p = .26) nor official sources (p = .15) evinced any significant differences.12

However, when the analysis was restricted to ideological channels, the waning influence device

met conventional significance, with MSNBC utilizing the device nine times, while FOX did so

only twice (χ2 [1] = 4.72, p < .05).

Creating a separate marginalization variable akin to that of the issues variable (see

Content Analysis Codes in Methodology), table 4 shows that the average number of

marginalization devices used by each source was significant overall (F [3, 177] = 14.70, p <

.001). The pattern of the data is different than was the case with issues: MSNBC utilized an

average of 2.5 devices followed by the AP and CNN. Post-hoc Scheffe tests indicated that

FOX’s low average marginalization use sets it apart from all other sources, while MSNBC and

CNN were also significantly different from each other. These results support H2 that liberally-

aligned cable channels (MSNBC) were significantly more likely to use marginalization devices

against the Tea Party than conservatively-aligned cable channels (FOX News).

                                                                                                               12 The eyewitness accounts frame was not analyzed because not a single story utilized it.

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Table 4. Average Number of Marginalization Devices Used by Source.

Source Mean (S.D.)

MSNBC 2.50a, b (1.26)

CNN 1.65a, c (1.09)

AP 1.84d (1.39)

FOX .91b, c, d (.81)

Note. Sources sharing subscripts significantly different, a, c p < .05, d p < .01, b p < .001.

Discussion

The results present a compelling update of the “protest paradigm” and its application to

the new normal of ideological cable news sources. This article set out to answer two particular

research questions: (1) Do cable channels utilize marginalization and legitimation frames of the

Tea Party movement in ways consistent with their respective ideological hues? (2) Do medium

differences exist in how the Tea Party is marginalized and legitimized between cable news and

print newswire? The findings present answers to both of these questions.

Ideological Marginalization and Legitimation

This research’s findings confirm that cable channel strategies for employing devices of

marginalization and legitimation run in tandem with the ideological contours of the cable

network. Compared to all four sources analyzed, MSNBC was more likely to portray the Tea

Party protests and/or candidates as idiots, argue that within-movement opinion was fractured,

and was a representation of fake public opinion (AstroTurf). When directly comparing

MSNBC’s coverage to FOX News, the differences are highly significant in the direction of

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MSNBC engaging in more forms of marginalization. Marginalization tactics once used against

left-leaning protests have now been adopted by a left-leaning cable news outlet. 13

How did this coverage manifest itself? Countdown with Keith Olbermann, for instance,

began a standard segment about the Tea Party on July 6, 2010 by opining:

First, no, it`s not your water coming to a boil. It`s our nightly checkup on the something for nothing crowd. It`s Tea Time. If I asked you which Tea Partier was likeliest to compare themselves to Abraham Lincoln, could you guess? Yes, it`s Sharon obtuse Angle from Nevada, in the middle of a fawning interview with a supporter who confessed to once predicting she would not win the nomination.

These types of references were strategic forms of marginalization by framing Tea Party

candidates as stupid and child-like as well as hypocrites for wanting “something for nothing.”

This moniker began a number of Olbermann’s shows following the rise of the Tea Party. Similar

references continued throughout 2009 and 2010, particularly when discussing how the Tea Party

movement was fractured or as Olbermann framed on January 28, 2010 “eating their own.” A

guest on this show invoked both division and fake opinion devices: “One is you have, in the Tea

Party movement, a fight between authentic grass roots activists…and people that are trying to

exploit them, profit off them, AstroTurf groups that are coming in, Republican consultants…” In

other broadcasts, Keith Olbermann and Rachel Maddow attribute Tea Party AstroTurf to Richard

Armey and his organization FreedomWorks.

One type of marginalization device that approached significance (p < .10) between

MSNBC and FOX News was the racial motive to Tea Party events. From a qualitative

perspective, MSNBC used it more traditionally, ascribing to the movement sinister and secretive

motives involving racial hatred. Surprisingly, FOX News used the marginalization device more

in an attempt to inoculate the movement against attacks. During Bill O’Reilly’s Talking Points

Memo on March 29, 2010, he states “It's clear that some on the American left fear the Tea Party                                                                                                                13 Although not all marginalization devices were significant, it is compelling that MSNBC utilized all marginalization devices more than FOX did.

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movement and that, there is a media strategy to brand Tea Party people as racist.” In another

broadcast of the O’Reilly Factor on July 19, 2010, O’Reilly mentions Vice President Biden’s

belief that the Tea Party is not racist and concludes “One footnote: the Tea Party has now

expelled activist Mark Williams from its ranks after Williams posted a racial satire letter on his

Web site.”

While the effects of this type of inoculation strategy are beyond the scope of this analysis,

it is worth noting that repetition of an opponent’s frame increases the salience of the frame.

Cognitive linguists have noted that the articulation of an opponent’s frame only perpetuates it

(Lakoff, 2008). Thus, it is possible that the repeated mentioning of the frame may have hurt

perceptions of the Tea Party more than inoculated it from future attacks.

Issue attribution as a form of ascribing motive to the Tea Party movement showcased the

trend toward partisan filtering among the cable news outlets (Baum & Groeling, 2008). Directly

comparing the three cable outlets, CNN mentioned on average more issues associated with the

Tea Party than either FOX News or MSNBC. This increased issue emphasis by CNN was highly

significant (p < .01) compared to its ideologically-leaning competitors. For instance, on a

September 14, 2009 broadcast of Anderson Cooper 360, correspondent Candy Crowley listed a

litany of issues that turned Tea Party protests into a “seething September protest:” “And after the

Wall Street bailout, the mortgage bailout, the stimulus program, and the auto industry

restructuring, too much government, period.”

While potentially representing a form of legitimation of the movement, CNN was also

significantly more likely than FOX News to use marginalization devices against the Tea Party

(1.65 marginalization devices average versus 0.91). In the same September 14th broadcast,

Crowley went on to remark after the issue attribution, “Delegitimatizing the messenger is a tried-

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and-true way to dismiss the message. But there's no denying fringe and racist element. Concern

about that may be part of why Republicans are reluctant to join in these rallies against what they

too see as government overreach.” The broadcast marginalized the protesters as extreme, racist,

and fractured. This segment illustrates CNN’s tact between legitimation and marginalization.

What this indicates is a greater reliance on a balance of approaches to the movement,

highlighting motives associated with authenticity and marginalization devices simultaneously.

Print Newswire versus Cable

The findings reveal a potentially growing gap between more traditional print news and

ideological cable news. While scholars have documented the adoption of a more interpretive

style of journalism to differentiate print coverage from television (Bennett, 2009; Davis & Owen,

1998; Fallows, 1997; Patterson, 1994, 2003), the ideologically-leaning cable networks showcase

programming in the evenings that is largely interpretive. From this perspective, the Associated

Press demonstrates a more traditional journalistic focus on issues and strategy in an interpretive

style. In turn, the ideological cable outlets have spurned mentioning issues in relation to the Tea

Party movement.

Changes in journalistic standards of sourcing and reporting are evinced foremost by two

types of marginalization codes: eyewitness accounts that use person-on-the-street interviews to

frame protesters negatively and use of official sources. This analysis did not find a single story

using eyewitness accounts to reveal the perspective of the journalist through the lens of a lay

person. Similarly, use of official sources to discuss the movement was almost non-existent and

non-significant.14 In light of the largely interpretive format and commentary of primetime cable

news broadcasts, there is little need for an eyewitness or official source accounting when the host

                                                                                                               14 There was no use of official sources by the cable outlets and only two Associated Press stories contained official sources.

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is at liberty to state his or her views. These results are somewhat more surprising among print

newswires, but confirm the print journalism trend toward an interpretive style that places the

journalist and their voice at the center of stories (Patterson, 1994).

It is with issue attribution where the chasm between the types of news media becomes

more prominent. Compared to the ideological cable outlets, the Associated Press was more likely

to cover issues most closely associated with the Tea Party movement: opposition to government,

bailouts, and government spending. While each CNN story on average had more issue mentions

for the Tea Party than the Associated Press, the latter also had a greater number of issue

mentions on average than the ideological cable outlets. This reveals that CNN and the Associated

Press’s reputation for perceived neutrality amid the ideological wars is showcased in coverage of

issues and marginalization frames in a relatively balanced fashion. It similarly illustrates that in

the drive for more ideological audience members who attend to their respective news sources,

MSNBC and FOX News are screening out issue coverage. To an outlet like MSNBC that

engaged in significant forms of marginalization, use of legitimation devices may seem contrary

to their dominant stream of coverage. However, for an outlet such as FOX News, which

attempted to inoculate and publicly trumpet the Tea Party Movement (Stroud, 2011), the lack of

issue attribution potentially suggests coverage lacked a key legitimizing motive in building the

movement’s authenticity.

Conclusion

This study has demonstrated that coverage of protest movements can no longer be

discussed in terms of “the” media: Changes in the media environment along ideological lines—

with the continued presence of strong, traditional journalism from sources such as the Associated

Press—will invite diverse coverage for the foreseeable future. Indeed, this implies that it may not

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even be appropriate to discuss “the” protest paradigm if utilization of legitimation and

marginalization frames continues to fall along the lines of ideology and medium.

There are three potential limitations to this research. First, it is clear that some of the

more marginal results are a product of insufficient statistical power, particularly given the

somewhat lower N for CNN. Similarly, chi-square is not the most powerful statistical test in the

researcher’s toolbox, a limitation that grows out of the nominal nature of the legitimation and

marginalization frames employed here. Resolving the latter would involve scoring each story

using a host of scalar measures for which obtaining sufficient reliability would be challenging.

However, other studies have successfully utilized chi-square analyses (e.g., Boyle et al., 2004)

and future expansions of the present analyses will supplement with additional stories in the

interest of additional statistical power.

Second, it is important not to over-emphasize the prevalence of some frames in the

sample, particularly the marginalization devices. Indeed, out of 181 stories analyzed, the range of

story counts for the frames varies considerably, from a low of two for official sources to a high

of 117 for idiots. No doubt some of this is due to the fact that the tone of protests over the years

may have shifted from one of dangerous radicalism in earlier eras to one of “nuisance” in more

recent times (Di Cicco, 2010). It is also quite possible that the conservative and status-quo-

oriented nature of the Tea Party may, to some degree, inoculate the movement from traditional

marginalization devices (Boyle et al., 2004; Di Cicco, 2010). Nevertheless, it is clear that some

sources still utilize marginalization devices in potent forms.

Third and lastly, the nature of the Tea Party movement made it necessary to broaden the

scope beyond the traditional confines of protest paradigm studies. Few protest movements have

successfully transitioned to the electoral sphere as successfully as the Tea Party. Discrete protest

TEA  FOR  THREE     25    

events made up a portion of the sampling frame, temporally speaking. Moreover, much of the

attention on the Tea Party emphasized the political ramifications of the movement (e.g., midterm

elections). The subsequent codes were adapted for more thematic, narrative interpretations of the

movement in addition to the marginalization tools that are more reliant on events associated with

discrete protest events, at least with respect to the cable networks.

The future of right-wing protest is uncertain; not since the 1964 campaign of Barry

Goldwater has there been such a visible movement on the street and at the ballot box, “Astroturf”

or not. In this case, however, it is clear that even a right-leaning movement that benefits from

pursuing goals that benefit the status quo may nonetheless be subject to marginalization from at

least some quarters of the media.

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Appendix A: Codebook

Motives 1. Does the article mention why the TP is protesting and/or mounting challenges in the 2010

elections? (NOTE: If the article or actors in the article mention anything regarding motivations, the drive of the TP, or something similar to “what gets them up in the morning?”, this is a motives argument. Motives may be either blatant or latent). 1 = Yes 0 = No If No, skip to item 3.

2a. Does the article mention any of the following motives for the tea party? Mark “1” if present and “0” if not present. (NOTE: Motives can be combined together – “racial fears” can be coded as both racism and fear. However, “opposition to the president’s [Obama’s] policies” should only be coded only as opposition to policies.)

2aiii. __ Racism 2aiv __ Opposition to “government” broadly stated (federal and/or state level) 2av. __ Opposition to government policies (includes stimulus, healthcare, bailouts, taxes) 2avi. __ Opposition to President Obama

2b. If the article mentions that the TP as a whole or a TP actor is motivated by opposition to government policies, which policies are opposed? Mark “1” if opposition to the specific policy is present and “0” if opposition is not present.

2bi. __ Bailouts (Auto, bank, TARP, any other industry) 2bii. __ The stimulus (American Recovery and Reinvestment Act, or other derivation) 2biii. __ Healthcare legislation (Obamacare, h-care overhaul, gov’t takeover, or other

derivation) 2biv. __ Taxes 2bviii. __ Government spending policies 2bix. __ Debt or deficit

Appearance/Mental Ability of Protesters (Code “1” for present, “0” if not present)

3. Does the story mention peculiar characteristics of protesters in dress (costumes, hats with tea bags), body, mannerisms, or other physical ways? 1 = Yes 0 = No

4. Does the story describe child-like qualities on the part of TP protesters and/or candidates?

This can include the idea of an “idiots-at-large” motif which describes obtuse/simple/stupid/close-minded protesters/candidates that are contrasted with the complexity of issues. Child-like qualities can include the inclusion of statements (direct quotes or paraphrase), media interpretation of inconsistent opinions/beliefs, misspellings on signs, political extremism, outside the political mainstream. 1 = Yes

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0 = No 5. Does the story convey TP protests and/or campaign events as a spectacle, a sort of

production, a theatre production, featuring celebs, etc.? Include in this code language that compares protests/events to a parade/sideshow/carnival or synonyms for these terms. 1 = Yes

0 = No Evocation of Public Opinion 6. Does the story cite public opinion numbers or cite statistics about the

protesters’/movement’s positions and/or the movement itself? [NOTE: Do not code Tea Party here as part of a political campaign/candidate.] 1 = Yes

0 = No If No, skip to item 7. 6a. If public opinion numbers/statistics are cited (Yes to Question #6), which of the following apply? 1 = Story only cites number(s) indicating protesters views in minority

2 = Story cites number(s) indicating protesters views are in majority somehow and minority in another way (there is a mix of majority-minority sentiment/cross-cutting evocation)

3 =  Story only cites number(s) indicating protesters views in majority 7. Does the story make a statement (sweeping/unsubstantiated/substantiated for either the present or future status) about protests drawing smaller numbers/waning in influence? 1 = Yes 0 = No 8. Does the story mention whether or not the movement is fractured? This can include between national and local groups, competing TP groups/leaders, establishment Republicans and grassroots, conservatives and moderates (RINOS), etc. [Note: Do not code cross-cutting viewpoints here. Can be a broad code for either protesters or campaigns.] 1 = Yes 0 = No 9. Does the story frame the Tea Party protests as “Astroturf” or “fake” public opinion? This can include any insinuation that Republicans/conservatives/GOP are behind the Tea Party and orchestrating protests secretly, wealthy organizers behind TPM, conservative organizations such as FreedomWorks behind protests, etc. 1 = Yes 0 = No

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10. Does the story cite eyewitness accounts that paint the protesters or Tea Party candidates in a negative light? [NOTE: Include here the typical person-on-the-street/casual observer who is interviewed after observing the protest and frames the protesters negatively.] 1 = Yes 0 = No 11. Does the story rely almost exclusively on official sources, including government agents, police/fire/EMS, business leaders, lobbyists/public relations managers, bureaucrats, former government officials (Members of Congress), political party officials, think tank officials, or academics instead of interviewing protesters themselves? [The ratio here should be clearly unbalanced – if the ratio is 2:1 or more (2 official sources for every 1 protester), then code “yes.”] 1 = Yes 0 = No Counter-Demonstrations 12. Does the story mention counter-demonstrations? [NOTE: This may be purely descriptive and/or may actually quote one or more persons directly/indirectly that took part in a counter-demonstration.] 1 = Yes 0 = No 12a. If counter-demonstration mentioned, is size mentioned?

0 = Does not indicate size of counter-demonstration 1 = Indicates counter-demonstration is smaller than TP 2 = Indicates counter-demonstration is larger than TP

Protester Emotions 13. Does the article mention any of the following emotions that are attributed to the protesters/movement/candidates/supporters of the TP? Code “1” for yes and “0” for no. [Note: Do not code for overall story tone here. We are looking specifically for emotions related to the protesters/candidates.] 13a. __ Anger/Angry [If you code for anger/angry, be sure to complete item 14.] 13e. __ Frustration/Frustrated 14. If the protesters/candidates are said to be angry, does the story portray the anger as blind, irrational, or otherwise detrimental/negative/uncivil? [Note: Look for the presence of this through key words like “spasm” or “outburst.” This is not an exhaustive list, but focus on key adjectives.] 1 = Yes 0 = No