“WE DO NOT WAIT FOR THE GOVERNMENT”: AN EVALUATION OF A

DISASTER REBUILDING PROGRAM IN KATHMANDU VALLEY

Shannon Cronin

Thesis Prepared for the Degree of

MASTER OF SCIENCE

UNIVERSITY OF NORTH TEXAS

August 2020

APPROVED: Andrew Nelson, Committee Chair Jamie Johnson, Committee Member Jennifer Trived, Committee Member Lisa Henry, Chair of the Department of

Anthropology Tamara L. Brown, Executive Dean of the

College of Liberal Arts and Social Sciences

Victor Prybutok, Dean of the Toulouse Graduate School

Cronin, Shannon. “We do not wait for the government”: An Evaluation of a Disaster

Rebuilding Program in Kathmandu Valley. Master of Science (Applied Anthropology), August

2020, 109 pp., 2 tables, 15 figures, references, 74 titles.

Five years ago, a massive earthquake and its subsequent aftershocks rocked the core of

Nepal. Recovery from these quakes has been a long and difficult process. This thesis will explore

findings from a qualitative evaluation of Lumanti Support Group for Shelter, an NGO in

Kathmandu, Nepal that implemented a residential reconstruction program in four peri-urban

communities in Kathmandu Valley. These findings are a culmination of 26 semi-structured

interviews and document analysis. This research highlights the processes of reconstruction and

the forms of resistance that occurred through disaster governance.

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Copyright 2020

By

Shannon B. Cronin

iii

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

To my mother, who consistently provided support and insight throughout the entire

process of this thesis. Thank you for taking care of my cat while I gallivanted off to Nepal to

conduct research for two months, and for helping me throughout the writing process. Thank you

so much for everything you have done.

A special mention to Sobina Lama and the staff of Lumanti Support Group for Shelter for

allowing a graduate student from the U.S. to come conduct research on your wonderful program.

Thank you to Ananta Bajracharya and Lumanti Joshi for your guidance. I am especially grateful

to Newton Maharjan for helping me reach out to the communities as well as your amazing

photography skills.

Thank you to the wonderful women of the women’s cooperatives in Siddhipur,

Macchegaon, and Thecho. It was an amazing experience to learn about your organizations and to

see your communities. Thank you to all the beneficiaries who participated in the research. It

would not have been possible to conduct this research without you.

A special shout out to the 2018 graduate cohort for all your support. You are an amazing

sounding board and it is wonderful to have peers that understand firsthand the struggles in

research.

Thank you to my committee, Dr. Andrew Nelson, Dr. Jamie Johnson, and Dr. Jennifer

Trivedi for your advice, feedback, and your patience. Thank you, Andy, and Melissa Nelson, for

taking the time to help me prepare for life in Nepal.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ........................................................................................................... iii

LIST OF TABLES ........................................................................................................................ vii

LIST OF FIGURES ..................................................................................................................... viii

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS ........................................................................................................ ix

CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................... 1

1.1 Research Question .................................................................................................. 2

1.2 Deliverables ............................................................................................................ 4

1.3 The Earthquake ....................................................................................................... 5

1.4 Kathmandu Valley .................................................................................................. 6

1.5 History of Nepalese Leadership .............................................................................. 7

1.6 Caste ........................................................................................................................ 8

1.7 Newar ...................................................................................................................... 8

1.8 Lumanti Support Group for Shelter ...................................................................... 11

1.9 Project Site Overview ........................................................................................... 13

1.9.1 Siddhipur ................................................................................................... 15

1.9.2 Macchegaon .............................................................................................. 17

1.9.3 Thecho....................................................................................................... 21

1.9.4 Chitlang ..................................................................................................... 22

CHAPTER 2. LUMANTI PHASES OF RECONSTRUCTION .................................................. 24

2.1 Phase 1 – Disaster Response ................................................................................. 24

2.2 Phase 2 – Temporary Shelter Provision and Construction ................................... 25

2.3 Phase 3 – Rebuilding – Rehabilitating Communities ........................................... 27

2.3.1 Housing Reconstruction and Repair Program ........................................... 27

2.3.2 Housing Reconstruction Program ............................................................. 28

2.3.3 Housing Repair Program........................................................................... 29

2.3.4 Identification, Reconstruction and Repair Process ................................... 31

CHAPTER 3. LITERATURE REVIEW ...................................................................................... 38

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3.1 Disaster Anthropology .......................................................................................... 38

3.2 Disaster Governance ............................................................................................. 41

3.3 Gender ................................................................................................................... 50

3.4 Women’s Credit and Savings Cooperatives ......................................................... 53

3.5 Community Perceptions ........................................................................................ 57

3.6 Non-Governmental Organizations ........................................................................ 58

3.7 Rejection of Traditional Architecture ................................................................... 63 CHAPTER 4. PROJECT DESIGN ............................................................................................... 66

4.1 Introduction ........................................................................................................... 66

4.2 Design ................................................................................................................... 67

4.3 Timeline ................................................................................................................ 68

4.4 Methods................................................................................................................. 69

4.4.1 Interviewee Recruitment ........................................................................... 69

4.4.2 Analysis..................................................................................................... 71 CHAPTER 5. RESULTS .............................................................................................................. 72

5.1 Challenges of Reconstruction ............................................................................... 72

5.2 Government Issues ................................................................................................ 75

5.2.1 Revision of Grant Amount ........................................................................ 77

5.2.2 Land .......................................................................................................... 77

5.3 Family Disputes .................................................................................................... 79

5.4 Challenges in the Private Market .......................................................................... 80

5.5 Women’s Economic and Savings Cooperatives ................................................... 82

5.6 Bylaws................................................................................................................... 84

5.7 Rejection of Traditional Architecture ................................................................... 86

5.8 Essential Networking: The Challenges of Expanding beyond the Valley ............ 88

5.9 Lumanti Affiliates ................................................................................................. 91 CHAPTER 6. DISCUSSION ........................................................................................................ 93

6.1 Challenges ............................................................................................................. 93

6.1.1 Challenge 1 Land Rights ........................................................................... 93

6.1.2 Challenge 2: Construction Style ............................................................... 94

6.1.3 Challenge 3 Organizational Affiliation and Timeline .............................. 94

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6.1.4 Challenge 4 Subverting Governance ........................................................ 96

6.2 Recommendations ................................................................................................. 98

6.3 Limitations .......................................................................................................... 100

6.4 Personal Reflection ............................................................................................. 102 REFERENCES ........................................................................................................................... 104

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LIST OF TABLES

Page

Table 1: Completed Reconstruction and Repairs in Each Project Area (Lumanti 2019) ............. 30

Table 2: Project Timeline .............................................................................................................. 68

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LIST OF FIGURES

Page

Figure 1: Map showing the epicenters of both major earthquakes (MSF 2015). ........................... 6

Figure 2: Tectonic plates – South Asia. (Source: Uttar Pradesh News Portal.).............................. 7

Figure 3: Newari settlement in Siddhipur. .................................................................................... 10

Figure 4: Housing in Siddhipur..................................................................................................... 10

Figure 5. Lumanti Support Group for Shelter logo and sign. ....................................................... 11

Figure 6: Community locations: Siddhipur, Macchegoan, Thecho. (Source: City Population.) .. 14

Figure 7: Community locations: Macchegaon and Chitlang. (Source: City Population.) ............ 14

Figure 8: Taukhel row houses before the earthquakes. ................................................................. 19

Figure 9: Taukhel plot map (Lumanti 2018, 36)........................................................................... 20

Figure 10: Taukhel reconstruction planning draft (Lumanti 2018, 36). ....................................... 20

Figure 11: Rendering of plans for temporary shelters (Lumanti 2015, 11). ................................. 26

Figure 12: Result of community mapping exercise (Lumanti 2015, 14). ..................................... 32

Figure 13: Example of building plan drafted by Lumanti architect (Lumanti 2015, 14). ............ 35

Figure 14: Categorization of affected districts (GoN NPC 2015 PDNA Report). ........................ 45

Figure 15: Model of owner-driven reconstruction process (adapted from DESaster). ................. 46

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ACHR-CAN Asian Coalition for Housing Rights-Community Architect Network

BSET Balaju School of Engineering & Technology

CAN Community Architect Network

CGI Corrugated galvanized iron

CIC Community information centres

CORDAID Catholic Organization for Relief & Development Aid

DDRC District Disaster Relief Committee

DRR Disaster risk reduction

DUDBC Department of Urban Development and Building Construction

GDP Gross domestic product

GoN Government of Nepal

MoHA Ministry of Housing Affairs

NGO Non-governmental organizations

NR Nepalese rupee

NRA National Reconstruction Authority

PDRF Post-disaster recovery framework

PTAG Pro-Poor Technical Assistance Group

SACCOS Savings and credit cooperative organizations

UN United Nations

UNESCO United Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural Organisation

VDC Village Development Committee

WASH Water, sanitation & hygiene

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Five years ago, a massive earthquake and its subsequent aftershocks rocked the core of

Nepal. The impact of these earthquakes was immense and culminated in significant human loss,

economic cost, and infrastructural damage. Also, millions of people were displaced and more

than half a million buildings were destroyed. For the most part, recovery from this disaster has

been fraught with strife, uncertainty, and fear for those affected by the quakes, much of which is

owed to the Nepalese economy. The poverty level is a significant consideration, as 25% of the

population live in abject poverty and earn less than 1.25 USD per day (Atteraya, Gnawali and

Palley 2016, 321).

As of 2020, five years after the earthquake, a number of survivors have still not been able

to rebuild their homes. Governmental policy is a major contributing factor to Nepalis’ inability to

rebuild. The Government of Nepal implemented reconstruction through a centralized, top-down

approach that did not meet the needs of all residents, particularly those on the urban periphery of

Kathmandu, the nation’s capital and largest city in Nepal. Due to standardized policies that did

not take into account the specific needs of differing communities, there were significant gaps in

overall reconstruction throughout the country. In response to this, Nepalis offered up forms of

resistance in all phases of reconstruction, especially toward the government and other

institutions, such as non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and economic cooperatives.

This research project investigates the challenges of reconstruction in general, the roles of

NGOs in reconstruction, and the ways in which policies, expectations, and norms are resisted

throughout the process.

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1.1 Research Question

One of the NGOs tackling residential reconstruction in Kathmandu Valley is Lumanti

Support Group for Shelter. Established in 1993, the organization is solely organized and operated

by Nepalese individuals. Lumanti’s mission is to eradicate urban poverty in Nepal through an

integrated approach to improving shelter conditions. For the most part, Lumanti has historically

engaged in programs of urban development in squatter settlements and low-income areas in

Kathmandu Valley as well as in 14 other municipalities in Nepal. Their familiarity and

experience with urban policies, especially as they relate to housing and urban development, as

well as their existing community networks, well positioned the organization to delve into

reconstruction work in the affected areas of the Valley. In the broader scope of this/my research,

an important question to consider is: What is the role of NGOs, such as Lumanti, in addressing

post-disaster reconstruction in the context of neoliberally weakened states, such as Nepal?

Moreover, how do these organizations enact change against a framework of centralization and

ineffective state governance?

I address these questions through the local example of Lumanti’s reconstruction program,

entitled ‘Community Managed Post Earthquake Reconstruction in Urban Poor Communities.”

The ‘urban poor’ in the program title alludes to individuals residing in Kathmandu Valley who

are below the poverty level and are unable to rebuild their home without financial assistance.

Lumanti was interested in learning what aspects of the program were done well and could be

duplicated in future reconstruction efforts. Other inquiries include, what was the structure of the

program, how did it contribute to reconstruction, and what were the major processes of

reconstruction efforts within the affected communities? Furthermore, what are the areas for

improvement and what elements can be added or removed from the program to make it more

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effective in post-earthquake reconstruction in the affected areas?

As an affiliated investigator, I began the program research by delving into the operational

and staffing structure of Lumanti and how they communicated with their field offices, with other

organizations like the government, and with Lumanti’s community partners in the settlements of

Macchegaon, Siddhipur and Thecho. I also investigated Lumanti’s operations within those

settlements and evaluated each step of the process within those communities. These included the

establishment of relationships both within and outside of those communities, the permitting and

reconstruction process, and the completion of projects and Lumanti’s subsequent withdrawal

from reconstruction activities in those communities. The evaluation of these elements, along with

central themes that appeared in the data, is pertinent to addressing the primary research question.

Through this research, I envisage highlighting the complexities of negotiation and the

interrelationships between the different levels of disaster reconstruction – the individuals

(particularly beneficiaries and community members), the communities, the various organizations,

and the different levels of government. This research helped highlight the challenges associated

with peri-urban reconstruction and provided insight into methods that could potentially be

adopted for use in other urban areas, particularly for NGOs working in the global south.

This work is essential because, as I discovered through my field research and review of

the available literature on earthquake recovery in Nepal, much of the focus has been on

reconstruction in rural areas such as Gorkha, Lamjung and Dhading. Admittedly, these regions

have closer proximity to the epicenter of the quake (Gorkha is the district where the epicenter

was located). However, the losses - human, economic, and cultural – were also significant

within Kathmandu Valley. There are many reasons for the lack of practical and scholarly focus

on earthquake reconstruction in the valley, such as governmental barriers for both foreign and

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local NGOs, delay in releasing damage assessments in the valley versus other areas, as well as

challenges in addressing disasters that affect both rural and urban areas. Through this research, I

hope to add to both practical and academic knowledge of post-earthquake reconstruction,

particularly as it pertains to reconstruction in urban settings.

1.2 Deliverables

The deliverables for the project were comprised of two parts. First, I prepared a report for

Lumanti on the history of the reconstruction program and its metrics. The purpose of this report

was to provide an internal account and to also provide a foundation upon which the organization

could create a publication on their program, the ‘Community Managed Post Earthquake

Reconstruction in Urban Poor Communities in Nepal’ reconstruction project. Secondly, I

prepared recommendations for possible improvement and additions to the Lumanti’s

reconstruction program if the need to implement such a program were to again arise.

To prepare these deliverables, I spent two weeks reviewing documentation created by the

Lumanti Support Group for Shelter and the Didi Bahini Women’s Credit and Savings

Cooperative. The documentation entailed manuals, presentations, training materials, as well as

monthly, quarterly, and yearly reports. Along with this information, I further gathered general

data from the interviews to 1) develop a timeline of the reconstruction program, 2) identify

themes that could lead to potential areas of improvement, and 3) to illuminate areas in which the

beneficiaries, staff, and partner organizations were satisfied. I created a draft of the report for

review by the client, who then gave feedback. I then revised the report and submitted a final draft

on July 29, 2019. Attached as an addendum to the report are the recommendations based on the

data collection process consisting of documentation review, semi-structured interviews, and

participant observation.

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This introduction contextualizes the earthquake and aftermath by describing the

geography of the area of research and the non-governmental organization with/for whom the

research was conducted. Chapter 2 provides further context in terms of how Lumanti, a non-

governmental organization, operated in reconstruction. Chapter 3 illustrates a larger scope of the

literature as it relates to disaster anthropology, disaster governance, non-governmental

organizations, gender and women’s cooperatives. It s also elucidates the rejection of traditional1

architecture in reconstruction. Chapter 4 highlights the methods used prior to, during, and after

field research in the Kathmandu Valley. Chapter 5 provides the key findings of this research that

I hope shed light on the interplay of beneficiaries, organizations, and the government. Finally,

Chapter 6 connects the previous chapters and illustrate how the findings and the literature

connect.

1.3 The Earthquake

Starting on April 25, 2015, the Gorkha earthquake (7.8 magnitude) with an epicenter to

the east of the district of Lamjung (Figure 1), shook Nepal. On May 12, a second earthquake

(7.3 magnitude) occurred, with an epicenter located northeast of Kathmandu. These quakes,

along with the subsequent aftershocks collectively resulted in approximately 9,000 casualties and

23,000 injuries. Furthermore, it destroyed more than half a million buildings, including

UNESCO World Heritage sites, and left 2.8 million people without homes (Adhikari, Mishra and

Raut 2016; Sharma, Subedi and Pokharel 2018). Economically, the earthquakes culminated in a

1 Traditional architecture – more closely refers to vernacular architecture, which consists of the use of local materials and knowledge for construction of structures. Often done without the use of professional architects. The term “traditional” in this thesis refers to the common usage by interlocutors of the term, in which they are discussing Newari housing that are associated with construction methods utilizing bricks and mud plaster, wood framing, ornate wooden details, and/or thatch and tin roofs.

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loss of approximately one-quarter of Nepal’s 5 billion-dollar GDP (Yamamoto 2015, 111).

Objectively, the losses were massive in terms of lives and livelihoods.

The earthquakes also resulted in significant damage to institutions and infrastructure,

including systems such as schools, hospitals, road networks, irrigation canals, and hydropower

facilities (Keshap, Subedi, and Pokharel 2018, 760). Beyond the economic and infrastructural

consequences of the earthquakes lie the social and political costs.

Figure 1: Map showing the epicenters of both major earthquakes (MSF 2015).

Mass displacement, mass uncertainty and stress have pervaded the population in the five

years following the earthquakes. As is often anticipated from such an immense disaster event,

recovery from the earthquakes, and reconstruction in particular, have been exceedingly difficult

and complex processes.

1.4 Kathmandu Valley

Kathmandu is located in the foothills of the Himalayan mountain range and constitutes the

boundary between the Indian and the Eurasian tectonic plates (Karkee et al. 2005, 411).

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Figure 2: Tectonic plates – South Asia. (Source: Uttar Pradesh News Portal.)

Due to its position in a seismic zone, Nepal has historically experienced large

earthquakes nearly every century (Lekakis, Shaky, and Kostakis 2018, 90). The last historically

well-known destructive earthquake in this region was the 1934 Kathmandu Valley earthquake,

measuring at 8.4 magnitude on the Richter scale. This quake resulted in 8,500 casualties and

caused the partial to complete collapse of 38,000 buildings. Other earthquakes resulting in severe

damage and human loss occurred in the years 1980, 1988 and 2011 (Tiwari 2016, 374).

In 2015, Nepal was already in the process of a major political transition. Until 2006, the

Nepalese people were beleaguered by a civil war that spanned a decade. Partially due to the

transition in governance, the country was still politically unstable with an uncertain economy

when the earthquakes struck (Lekakis, Shakya, and Kostakis 2018, 92).

1.5 History of Nepalese Leadership

Administrative upheaval began long before Nepal’s latest political struggle and long

before the quakes. Kathmandu Valley became the capital of Nepal in 1768 following several

internal battles, with the Gorkha people as the victors (Whelpton 2005). These conquerors

unified the valley under one rule. The Gorkha rulers, belonging to the Shah family, as well as the

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Rana prime ministers, hailed from the mid-central hills and belonged to the Khas people, who

were Nepali speakers. Throughout the Shah Dynasty, the state maintained an economy based on

a feudal system that was organized around caste. This system largely benefitted Bahun Chhetri

Nepali speakers. A caste system, or muluki ain, was developed in which ethnic difference was

based on three categories: 1) Bahun-Chhetri, or priestly and ruler caste 2) Janjati (alcohol-

consuming) middle castes of indigenous Newars, Tamangs, Gurungs, Magar, Rai, Limbu, and 3)

lower caste Nepali speakers (Whelpton 2005). This caste system prevailed into the mid-20th

century.

1.6 Caste

In the mid-1950s, the Government of Nepal officially rejected the caste system,

outlawing it through the 1955 Civil Liberties Act. Based on this act, discrimination on the basis

of race, caste, tribe or ethnic group were prohibited. However, while the caste system was legally

prohibited, castes still exist today in Nepal as a form of social identity (Rankin 2004, 130).

According to Rankin, there are three principles that result in distinctions amongst the different

castes. These principles are: “separations in matters of marriage and contact, occupational

interdependence by which each caste fulfills professional and ritual roles, and hierarchical

ranking” (Rankin 2004, 131). In recent decades, class has seen an emergence as the dominant

model of social organization over caste, especially in urban areas. With this shift in social

organization, hierarchy is being restructured based on material consumption instead of spiritual

concepts such as karma and ritual purity (Leichty 2003; Rankin 2004, 175).

1.7 Newar

In the context of Kathmandu Valley, caste is particularly complex because the Newar, an

ethnic community indigenous to Kathmandu Valley, have their own caste system that is separate

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from the more dominant form related to Nepali-speakers and the Shah royalty. At this point, I am

going to briefly discuss who the Newar are, as they represent the demographic of many of the

interviewees in this research, as well as the majority of residents of the communities in which

Lumanti worked. I also consider Newari settlement patterns as they relate to the current research

problem.

The Newar were at one time the majority of the population in the area. In Nepal, the term

‘Newar’ originally referred to the dominant Hindu high castes. The use of the term ‘Newar’ to

signify the indigenous people of Kathmandu Valley is more recent, starting around the 17th

century. Definitively, it was used by British missionaries and the rulers of the time (Gorkhali), to

refer to the people of Kathmandu Valley, specifically the ‘indegenes’ (Rankin 2004). During the

reign of the Shah rulers, Newars were organized within a single caste but they had and still have

their own internal caste hierarchy. Historically, Newars have worked as artisans, potters, traders,

weavers, and farmers (Daly et al. 2017, 407), and have settled accordingly. The majority of the

earthquake survivors interviewed in the thesis research are Newar, of the Maharjan caste. The

Maharjan are the agricultural caste of the Newars and make up the largest group in the Newar

community.

Newar settlements in peri-urban Kathmandu Valley are representative of several

centuries of construction. For the most part, the communities are compact, with compound-style

buildings that frame courtyards and are interconnected by narrow alleyways. Traditional houses

in Newar settlements are associated with construction methods utilizing bricks and mud plaster,

wood framing and ornate wooden details, and thatch and tin roofs. Houses are multi-storied,

often consisting of second-floor residential space and ground floor commercial space for shops

or restaurants, bringing the public and the private together within one structure.

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Figure 3: Newari settlement in Siddhipur.

Figure 4: Housing in Siddhipur.

Newar communities maintain strong informal associations (Bhandari 2014, 325) marked

by unique social and cultural practices. Like many South Asian families, Newar people typically

reside in extended “joint family” households comprised of a couple, their sons, daughters-in-law,

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grandchildren and unmarried daughters. The senior male is the head of household while the

senior woman designates work among the other women in the household. Newar households are

often multi-occupational with the younger males of the family specializing in different types of

work to contribute money to the family (Rankin 2004, 115). The women typically participate in

domestic activities as well as contribute to the family’s commercial enterprises.

1.8 Lumanti Support Group for Shelter

In the previous sections, I discussed general information about Nepal, including its

history and caste distinctions. In this section, I narrow the focus to Lumanti, an NGO that

conducted reconstruction work in Kathmandu Valley. The physical Lumanti head office is

located in Kathmandu, in the Thapathali area on Jeetjung Marg. Lumanti’s office is in close

proximity to governmental offices, a hospital, and multiple NGO offices. The three-story

building serves as the base of operations for staff working within Kathmandu Valley. This

structure is devoted entirely as work and meeting space for Lumanti staff and organizational

partners.

Figure 5. Lumanti Support Group for Shelter logo and sign.

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Lumanti, in the Newar language, means memory. Lumanti was founded in honor of Dr.

Ramesh Manandhar, a respected community member and activist. The founder of Lumanti and

current executive director of the organization is Lajana Manandhar, the wife of Dr. Ramesh

Manandhar. Throughout the duration of the research, Lajana was working remotely and on a

limited basis due to a chronic illness. The acting executive director, Mahendra Shakya, was

responsible for the daily operations of the organization.

The staffing structure of Lumanti mirrors the structure of businesses and NGOs in the

United States. The organization is overseen by a board of directors, an executive director, and

other upper level staff. Managers are designated as heads of their respective departments and

programs. Lumanti also hires freelancers such as designers, engineers, and consultants as the

need arises. Importantly, Lumanti employs a team of Nepalese architects, an essential

component in an organization that focuses on the built environment and the provision of shelter.

Lumanti Support Group for Shelter hosts a variety of programs throughout Kathmandu

Valley and in some areas beyond the valley. As mentioned in the introduction, Lumanti operates

in low-income areas in Kathmandu Valley and 14 other municipalities in Nepal. The programs

facilitated by Lumanti in these areas include WASH (Water, Sanitation, and Hygiene) programs,

disaster resilience, and advocacy for squatters’ rights.

Lumanti receives funding through a multitude of sources. As seen in Chapter 3, NGOs

typically need to obtain funding through multiple sources in order to continue projects.

Reconstruction is a significant endeavor and Lumanti needed to utilize as much funding as

possible to implement programs for reconstruction. Specifically, pertaining to the ‘Community

Managed Post Earthquake Reconstruction in Urban Poor Communities in Nepal Program,’

Lumanti received the bulk of their funding from MISEREOR Ihr Hilfswerk, also known as the

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German Catholic Bishops’ Organization for Development Cooperation. The organization had a

previously established relationship with Lumanti prior to the earthquake in 2015. To this end, the

organization provided funding for two-year reconstruction projects in four areas of Kathmandu

Valley. In turn, Lumanti was responsible for the implementation of the program and provided

regular reports to MISEREOR on their progress. The project incorporated the settlements of

Macchegaon in Kathmandu, Siddhipur and Thecho in Lalitpur and Chitlang in Makwanpur

District. Reconstruction work began in March 2016 in Thecho, Macchegaon, and Siddhipur; in

Chitlang, reconstruction began in September 2016.

The project in each location was designed to support and encourage community-based

participation in the recovery of the earthquake-affected homes in each of the communities. The

program aimed to assist families and communities affected by the earthquake by helping them

plan the reconstruction process, rebuild homes, and implement basic infrastructure. Also, the

projects were geared towards helping the communities to not only rebuild, but also to improve by

making infrastructure safer and more resilient. Lumanti’s role was to provide technical and

financial assistance to the families and communities. Among the 26 interviewees consulted, the

highest cost to rebuild a home came to roughly 40 lakhs, or NRs. 4,000,000 (~35,000 USD).

Apart from home reconstruction, the project also addressed infrastructure planning and

implementation based on the needs of the individual communities.

1.9 Project Site Overview

The four settlements encompassed in the research are Siddhipur, Macchegaon, Thecho,

and Chitlang. These communities were devastated by the earthquake and suffered significant

losses; not only in terms of lost family members and homes, but also a vast disruption to their

way of life.

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Figure 6: Community locations: Siddhipur, Macchegoan, Thecho. (Source: City Population.)

Figure 7: Community locations: Macchegaon and Chitlang. (Source: City Population.)

15

Siddhipur, Macchegaon, Thecho, and Chitlang are towns whose primary economy is

agrarian. These towns range in size from roughly 5,500 people (Macchegaun and Chitlang) to

10,000 people (Siddhipur). The populations consist mostly of the Newar, specifically those of

the Maharjan caste.

These residents more often speak Newari instead of Nepali, work the land and/or own

small shops and reside in communities that are on the periphery of the urban hustle and bustle of

Kathmandu. Because the communities are peri-urban, residents do not have as much access to

resources as those who live within the city. For instance, they often lack financial capital, and

were often overlooked by the government’s reconstruction initiatives.

Siddhipur, also known as Sanogaon, is among the Newar towns dotting around three

cities of the valley. Thecho is situated approximately 9km (~5.5 miles) south from Patan, a major

historical bazaar area of the Lalitpur district. Part of the Chandragiri Municipality, Macchegaon

is located approximately 15 kms (9.3 miles) southwest of central Kathmandu and is most well-

known for its historic temple (Machhe Narayan Temple) located in the center of the settlement.

1.9.1 Siddhipur

Siddhipur, locally known as Sanogaon, is among the few historic towns placed around

the periphery of the three cities of the valley. Notably, it is most known for the production of

sukul, straw mats, and is still popular for supplying these mats to other areas in the valley.

Siddhipur was among the most affected areas in Lalitpur. The active community organization in

this area is the Didi Bahini Women’s Cooperative, with whom Lumanti partnered to support the

affected families in residential reconstruction.

Lumanti, with the aid of the women’s cooperative, collected data from 420 households,

and found that most of the houses in Siddhipur were partially demolished (45%) with many

16

people still dwelling in the damaged home. Furthermore, approximately 30% of the houses

remain untouched after the damage by the earthquake. Only 14% had cleared the site for

reconstruction at the time of data collection (almost one year after the earthquakes). Lack of

finances and lack of available labor were significant factors in this delay. Unfortunately, there is

no available demographic data on the social or financial status of the 14% who were able to clear

the debris, to determine why those individuals were able to clear their land more quickly than the

rest of the community. In terms of land ownership, 60% of households possessed a land title and

8% were in the process of obtaining a land title (Lumanti 2019, 17). However, none of the homes

had the “standard sized” land parcels of 2.5 aana, or 855.625 sq. ft. This policy was put into

place by the Ministry of Urban Development and required that any new residential construction

would only be approved if the land on which the home would be build was at least 2.5 aana. Due

to this restriction, most of the homes were not eligible for municipal approval for construction.

This conundrum prevented them from receiving permission to rebuild as well as financial

support from the state, as funding was only granted in stages as the rebuilding process occurred.

Figure 8: Didi Bahini Women's Credit and Savings Cooperative.

17

When asked about funding sources for reconstruction, more than 50% of the citizens

cited loan dependency; only 5% had their own savings. 14% relied on the sale of their

agricultural land; 8% said they had no financial resources to rebuild (Lumanti 2015, 15). Based

upon these figures, Lumanti felt there was an urgent need for both financial and technical support

in Siddhipur.

1.9.2 Macchegaon

Macchegaon, also spelled as Macchegaun and Machchhegaun, is located in the

Chandragiri Municipality of the Kathmandu District. Macchegaon is approximately 15 kms (9.3

miles) southwest of central Kathmandu and is most well-known for its historic temple (Machhe

Narayan Temple) located in the center of the settlement. Machhegoan can be broadly divided

into three separate areas: Old Town, Dhaksi, and Taukhel. Old Town is a relatively small area

around the Machhe Narayan Temple, located on the hillside of Old Town. Taukhel is located at

the northern side of Old Town. The majority of the inhabitants in the area are Newars, mostly of

the Maharjan caste, in Old Town and Taukhel, whereas in the Dhaksi community, most of the

families are Tamang, another large ethnic group that originated in Kathmandu Valley.

Fortunately, the Machhe Narayan Temple was not damaged during the earthquake.

However, many homes surrounding the temple and within the settlement were completely

destroyed. According to the data collected through the rapid disaster assessment conducted by

the community and local disaster management. About 70% of the total households were

completely damaged by the 2015 earthquake. Moreover, of the total 800 households in

Macchegoan, 473 houses collapsed, and 118 houses were categorized as partially damaged

(Lumanti 2015, 6).

Lumanti and the local government found that none of the houses in Macchegaon had

18

standard land parcels (2.5 aana) and a significant number of residents did not possess land titles.

Consequently, as with Thecho, more than 90% of the houses were considered ineligible for

municipal approval for construction based on the requirements set forth by the National

Reconstruction Authority (NRA), and these residents were unable to obtain the reconstruction

grant through the government. With these issues in mind, Lumanti advocated in the municipality

for a building bylaw that would support reconstruction in central areas, as many of the wards and

municipalities did not have existing policies in place to facilitate reconstruction permitting

approvals. This lack of policies geared towards reconstruction reflects a lack of preparedness at

the local and national political levels for a disaster that would require reconstruction. After

working with various socio-political groups and the mayor, policies were approved for

adjustment to help residents to gain municipal approval.

• Taukhel Project

In April 2015, the Bishnudevi Women and Credit Savings Cooperative held a heritage

workshop in Taukhel on the historic conservation of heritage sites. A few weeks after the

workshop, on 25 April, the 7.8 magnitude earthquake (Gorkha Earthquake) struck. This

prompted the cooperative to consider not only heritage conservation, but also reconstruction. Of

the three areas in Macchegaon, Taukhel was the most devastated. Four people died during the

earthquake, one of whom was only two years of age. Of the 86 houses at the time of the

earthquake, only 26 were still standing – this meant that more than 70% of households were

permanently damaged (Lumanti 2018, 4). As is the case with many of the older communities,

most of the collapsed houses were old, worn down due to lack of regular maintenance, and

constructed with poor-quality brick work in mud mortar. However, three days following the

earthquake, Lumanti Support Group for Shelter, along with other organizations such as Mercy

19

Relief and UN-Habitat, arrived to distribute food items and temporary shelters, of which 115

were distributed in the area. During this time discussions began between Lumanti and the

cooperative on how to begin reconstruction in Taukhel.

Figure 8: Taukhel row houses before the earthquakes.

One of the major projects in Taukhel are the row houses that house approximately 20

families. These row houses were located on either side of a narrow road cutting through Taukhel.

In order to accommodate reconstruction, a wider road needed to be installed to aid access and

movement of construction materials and to meet municipal regulations. These regulations were

also put into place by the Ministry of Urban development, requiring that roads be widened to six

meters, an increase of two meters from the original pre-earthquake regulations. In response to

this issue, Lumanti, the local women’s cooperative, the ward office, and a reconstruction

committee formed by community members all collaborated to utilize land from an adjacent field

to widen the road and reconstruct the row houses.

To accommodate the widening of the road, land was pooled through a cooperative and

collaborative system in which residents contributed a percentage of their property to help

redistribute the land. The land parcels were distributed on a grid system to allow for the wider

20

main road and smaller roads between housing units.

Figure 9: Taukhel plot map (Lumanti 2018, 36).

Figure 10: Taukhel reconstruction planning draft (Lumanti 2018, 36).

21

1.9.3 Thecho

Thecho is located in the Godawari Municiplaity of the Lalitpur District and is 9km from

Patan. Thecho is noted for the production of organic mustard oil and is predominately an

agriculture-based community. In addition, most of the houses in the town were constructed using

Newari techniques consisting of mud, brick, and mortar. Following the earthquake, many of

these houses needed immediate repair and rehabilitation.

At the time of the earthquake, Thecho had approximately 2,352 households (Lumanti

2015, 6). The April 25th earthquake and subsequent aftershocks left as many as 544 houses

completely destroyed and 410 partially damaged rendering many families homeless (Lumanti

2015, 6). Three deaths were reported. For the most part, debris could not be cleared for many

days as the street networks within the community were very narrow. As with the other

communities, the residential areas of Thecho are compact, with a mixture of narrow streets and

alleyways connecting compound-style buildings that frame public courtyards.

Thecho Women’s Savings and Credit Cooperative mobilized their own funds to provide

relief to the affected residents. Likewise, in a partnership with the technical team from Lumanti,

the cooperative conducted a rapid damage assessment of the most damaged homes. The group

leaders of the assessment teams were mobilized to “select the poorest and the most vulnerable2

households” (Lumanti 2019, 20). With support from Lumanti and organizations such as UN

Habitat, Mercy Relief, and Sign of Hope, temporary shelters were provided to more than 137

families in the community.

The need for repair and reconstruction of damaged homes became apparent in the

community meetings as living in temporary shelters became increasingly difficult during the

2 Lumanti uses “vulnerable” to indicate individuals that are below the poverty level, have physical (disabilities) and/or social disadvantages (lack of familial and community support), with little means to support themselves.

22

winter season in Kathmandu. However, none of the affected houses in Thecho had standard sized

land parcels and the majority of residents did not have land titles, due to either shared or

undocumented ownership of land parcels. The community of Thecho had more than 90% of

houses that were not eligible for municipal approval for construction, and therefore deemed

ineligible for the reconstruction grant. The number of families seeking technical as well as

financial support for repair/reconstruction of their houses in the community drastically increased

after the publication of the newest list of eligible families. The list, published by the National

Reconstruction Authority, included the names of people that were eligible to receive

governmental financial aid for reconstruction based on their citizenship status, possession of a

land title, and the level of damage to their homes. Families sought technical and financial support

from either the government or Lumanti, or both. In total, Lumanti worked to support the repair

and reconstruction of homes belonging to 115 families in Thecho.

1.9.4 Chitlang

Chitlang is located in the Thaha Municipality of the Makwanpur District. Geographically,

Chitlang lies north-west of Kathmandu city and is approximately 1.5 hours from the city by car,

during normal weather conditions. The main ethnic populations of Chitlang are the Newar,

Tamang, Khas, Magar, Chhetri, Brahman, and Gurung. Agriculture is the primary source of

income for most of the families there. Large numbers of families in Chitlang export vegetables

to Kathmandu and Hetauda. In addition, some families operate local shops.

At the time of the earthquake, the total population of Chitlang was 7524 people with 1252

households. More than 86% of the households reported damage to their homes. As explained by

the data presented by the Chitlang VDC (Village Development Committee), 627 houses were

fully damaged, 293 partially damaged and 152 reported minor damage (Lumanti 2018, 6).

23

Moreover, most of the houses constructed with bricks in mud mortar were damaged, reporting

significant cracks that made the homes uninhabitable.

Lumanti had not previously worked in Chitlang, but chose Chitlang due to its relative

proximity to Kathmandu and as a test for possible expansion of the reconstruction program.

Lumanti’s technical team and volunteer architects from the Community Architects Network

assisted in a detailed assessment of the community in Chitlang immediately following the

earthquake. Initial interactions with the communities in some of the meetings conducted during

the visits produced details of the extent of damage in the community. The work in Chitlang

commenced in September 2016.

In addition to the rapid assessment survey conducted by Lumanti, its partners, and other

organizations, an official survey of the damaged homes in affected areas including the

aforementioned towns was conducted by the National Reconstruction Authority (NRA). The

NRA then published a list of earthquake victims in late November 2016, which the government

used to determine who would receive government funding for private reconstruction.

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CHAPTER 2

LUMANTI PHASES OF RECONSTRUCTION

2.1 Phase 1 – Disaster Response

In the immediate days after the earthquake, Lumanti mobilized the women’s savings and

credit cooperatives in affected areas of the valley for rapid needs assessments. Due to their

ongoing engagement in their respective communities, these cooperatives had access to invaluable

information on small-scale infrastructure and housing improvement activities in their

communities.

Of the four communities in the ‘Community Managed Post Earthquake Reconstruction in

Urban Poor Communities in Nepal’ project sponsored by MISEREOR, Lumanti had an existing

partnership with women’s savings and credit cooperatives from three of those communities;

Siddhipur, Macchegoan, and Thecho. There was no existing partnership in Chitlang. Lumanti

contacted its networks and mobilized these groups for rapid assessments of the communities.

These assessments deduced that there was a demand for supplies to address immediate needs,

including tarpaulins and small cash grants for medicine and food. To address these immediate

needs, funds were disbursed by Lumanti and the cooperatives to purchase and distribute supplies.

Lumanti sent in staff support to assist in supply distribution. In coordination with local ward and

municipal governments and other ‘on the ground’ organizations, tarpaulins and temporary

shelters were constructed, and community kitchens established for newly homeless families.

With regard to finance, all cooperatives agreed to ease on loan repayment requirements and

subsidized on loan interest for two months.

One of the larger needs assessments took place from 1 June 2015 – 9 June 2015. For the

most part, the assessment was supported by the Asian Coalition for Housing Rights - Community

25

Architect Network (ACHR-CAN) along with the Hunnarshala Foundation. Hunnarshala is an

Indian-based NGO that formed after the 2001 earthquake in Kutch (a district of Gujarat state in

Western India) and specializes in disaster reconstruction and infrastructure development. This

assessment consisted of community visits and was used to identify possible areas of focus in

which to address relief needs. In addition, these assessments formed a starting point from which

Lumanti contemplated the possibility of developing a community-led reconstruction program in

the impacted areas.

With the support of MISEREOR, Lumanti worked with local disaster management

committees to begin the process of cleaning up debris resulting from the earthquake. Notably,

debris clean-up was identified as an immediate need in the response phase because it would

enable access to affected communities and damaged homes. The funding needed to support this

effort was significant considering the cost of dismantling the buildings, renting the equipment,

salvaging reusable material, and the price of labor. As such, in addition to the support provided

by MISEREOR, families in areas such as Macchegaon each raised as much as NRs. 5000 (~44

USD) to help fund this effort. This is the first occurrence of Lumanti’s efforts in community

mobilization in the disaster response phase.

2.2 Phase 2 – Temporary Shelter Provision and Construction

Lumanti supported the construction of temporary shelters through networks such as

community-based organizations and disaster management committees. During the process, 5,963

families were reached and provided with assistance for temporary shelters. These families

resided in 24 communities of Kathmandu Valley and in selected VDCs of Dhading and Rasuwa

(Lumanti 2019).

For the construction of the temporary shelters, Lumanti recruited volunteers from Pro-

26

poor Technical Assistance Group (PTAG). Definitively, PTAG is an informal group sponsored

by Lumanti that consists of technical professionals (architects) committed to urban community

development. PTAG members visited affected communities in the valley and provided technical

support (construction advice) for the construction of temporary shelters. The youth from the

affected communities, women and local masons also contributed to the construction of the

temporary shelters. Shelters were constructed from locally available bamboo or plywood with

GI (galvanized iron) roofing material depending on need and availability.

Figure 11: Rendering of plans for temporary shelters (Lumanti 2015, 11).

Also, to effectively implement temporary shelter support, Lumanti met with local

stakeholders for an initial consultation. The preliminary needs assessment conducted by local

stakeholders and by CAN (Community Architects Network) showed that temporary shelter was a

crucial immediate need of the earthquake-affected residents in the community. However, before

identifying the specific sites at which to implement the project, cooperative leaders from the

severely impacted areas were invited to discuss the development of methods and processes for

identifying individuals in the most need of assistance. Consequently, each cooperative, through

consultation with their board members, developed their own strategies for implementing the

project. Lumanti then signed an agreement with partner organizations and local government

27

entities at the ward and municipal levels to move forward with the construction of temporary

shelters. The affected families were selected to receive these temporary shelters. Following the

selection of beneficiaries, Lumanti’s technical team, consisting of engineers and architects,

designed a simple 10’x12’ one-room temporary shelter utilizing CGI (corrugated galvanized

iron) sheets, bamboo, and plywood as a starting point for the construction of the temporary

shelters.

Furthermore, Lumanti provided funds to the women’s cooperatives, who then procured

construction materials and distributed those materials to the families. Lumanti provided a brief

orientation about the technical and non-technical aspects of building these shelters to groups of

cooperative leaders and families, and the technical teams were provided as a resource to advise

and assist families upon request.

Technical assistance for construction of the shelters included site visits by Lumanti

architects and engineers in cooperation with leaders of the women’s savings and credit

cooperatives to offer more practical assistance and advice on the structure. Also, they took into

account any changes the family wanted to make in the design and materials to use.

In the nine months following the earthquake, with support from different funding partners

such as UN Habitat, OXFAM, Christian Aid, Mercy Relief, Sign of Hope, CORDAID (Catholic

Organization for Relief and Development Aid), ACHR (Asian Coalition of Housing Rights) and

MISEREOR, temporary shelters and relief materials were provided to a total of 6,889 families in

five areas: Kathmandu, Lalitpur, Bhaktapur, Rasuwa, and Dhading (Lumanti 2019, 21).

2.3 Phase 3 – Rebuilding – Rehabilitating Communities

2.3.1 Housing Reconstruction and Repair Program

Within Lumanti’s reconstruction program, there were two sub-programs; the Housing

28

Reconstruction Program and the Housing Repair Program. Through these sub-programs,

Lumanti sought to support those who are the “most exposed, most affected, and most vulnerable

families” (Lumanti 2019, 20).

Lumanti Support Group for Shelter’s Housing Reconstruction and Repair Programs

prioritized those of low-income and from marginalized groups, women-led households, the

elderly, and single women. As mentioned previously, there are several groups that are

prioritized when determining potential beneficiaries. The following is a list of those

requirements:

• Belong to extremely poor and vulnerable families

• Are poor who have completely lost their homes and belongings with no alternatives

• Families who have very small pieces of land available for reconstruction

• Women-led families and families who have lost their family members in the earthquake

• A large family with many children, pregnant women or with babies

• Families with old people and people with illness

2.3.2 Housing Reconstruction Program

In order to become eligible for the reconstruction program, beneficiaries were required to

own the home that was damaged by the earthquake and the home must have been listed by the

government as earthquake-affected.

For the most part, the application process to become a beneficiary of Lumanti essentially

mirrors the application process for becoming a beneficiary of the government. This process

incorporates the submission of several documents:

• The red card which identifies the individual as an earthquake victim.

• Proof of land ownership including the land title.

29

• Personal photograph.

• Citizenship card.

• Signed agreement between Lumanti and the beneficiary.

As part of the program, beneficiaries of Lumanti’s reconstruction services received:

• 300,000 rupees (2,600 USD) in grant support, given in three installments.

• Free technical drawings, which are equivalent to NRs. 30,000.

• Technical support at any time.

• Orientation program for beneficiaries.

• Assistance with the application process and documentation.

• Assistance navigating land issues.

• Technical advice and assistance to build an “earthquake resilient home”.

• Additional grant support for individuals and families that are considered particularly vulnerable.

2.3.3 Housing Repair Program

To become eligible for the repair program, beneficiaries were required to own the home

that was partially damaged by the earthquake but not have their home listed by the government

as earthquake affected. The government rated the damage of homes based on visual assessment

and determined the scale of damage and if the damage can be attributed to the earthquake. If the

scale of damage was not rated as significant enough or if the government believed the damage

was not caused by the earthquake, the home would not be listed on the earthquake victim list.

Therefore, the homeowners would not qualify for reconstruction aid from the government.

However, there were several partially damaged households in each area that were revealed

through community mapping as well as government survey data. Lumanti wanted to still help

those households, despite their not being listed on the earthquake victim’s list. As such, Lumanti

30

planned to repair as many households as possible. According to Lumanti, repairing a home

versus reconstructing a home had two primary benefits:

• Repairing a house holds significantly less financial burden than rebuilding a house.

• Beneficiaries can retain much of the original character and aesthetic of the house.

Beneficiaries that joined the housing repair program agreed to contribute 30% to the total

repair cost. In exchange, the beneficiaries received:

• Up to 250,000 (~2,100 USD) rupees in grant support.

• Free technical drawings, as needed.

• Technical support at any time.

• Assistance with the application process and documentation.

• Assistance with any other issues.

• Technical advice and assistance to repair home and make the home “earthquake-resilient home”.

Table 1: Completed Reconstruction and Repairs in Each Project Area (Lumanti 2019)

Project Area

Reconstruction Data

Total Households

# of Homes Destroyed

# of Homes Partially Damaged

Completed Reconstruction

Completed Repairs

Siddhipur 1,100 767 278 108 11

Macchegaon 800 473 118 107 1

Thecho 2,352 544 410 123 9

Chitlang 1,252 627 445 123 1

Looking at Table 1, one notices the low numbers of completed repairs compared to

completed reconstructions in each community. These low numbers can be attributed to a few

things. The first is the repair program was not well advertised to the communities in which

Lumanti was working. Second, Lumanti staff had less experience with “retrofitting,” where they

would install metal rods in existing homes to strengthen the walls, thus making the home more

31

“earthquake resilient.” Finally, the repair program depended on the expertise of architects and

engineers from Hunnarshala to help oversee the process. Also, the organization did not stay in

Kathmandu the full length of the reconstruction program, so the repairs ceased.

2.3.4 Identification, Reconstruction and Repair Process

Phase 3 entails the active rebuilding of homes and public structures. Also, this phase

consists of two programs, the first is the repair program. This program is for beneficiaries whose

homes were not completely damaged by the earthquake. The second program is the

reconstruction program, in which homes were completely destroyed by the earthquake and

needed to be entirely rebuilt. Objectively, both programs shared much of the same history.

However, before any rebuilding or repair could occur, Lumanti needed to prepare for the

projects. With support from MISEREOR, urban reconstruction projects were initiated in

Siddhipur, Thecho, Machhegaon and Chitlang. It should be noted that initial field assessments in

these areas were conducted in coordination with the women’s cooperatives, PTAG, and ACHR-

CAN.

In 2016, the national government published an initial list of individuals whose homes had

been damaged by the earthquake. This list was a significant source of contention and clearly

illustrated some of the issues inherent in top-down governance. The requirements to be on this

list, particularly in terms of ownership and citizenship, were too stringent for many residents.

However, in collaboration with the local government and women’s cooperatives, Lumanti

initially utilized this list, in addition to the recommendations of collaborators, in the process of

community mapping to create their own list of potential beneficiaries for both the reconstruction

and repair programs.

Community mapping exercises were used by Lumanti to prioritize projects in most need

32

of completion. Likewise, the data collected through mapping aided Lumanti not only in the

selection of beneficiaries but also in discerning the underlying issues in the community that

could hinder the process of reconstruction. Through the mapping process, the communities laid

out a visual representation of data relating to landownership, homeownership, land areas,

damage grade, construction technologies, building bylaws and policies. The communities were

then able to utilize these maps to identify priorities in revitalizing their community both through

reconstruction and infrastructure projects.

Figure 12: Result of community mapping exercise (Lumanti 2015, 14).

Potential beneficiaries were selected based on their level of vulnerability. Lumanti

consulted with the individuals on this new list to determine ways in which to help them and

decide which program would best suit these individuals and families. After consulting with the

33

ward office, the finalized list was passed up the bureaucratic chain to the municipality and the

National Reconstruction Authority for review and approval.

The approved beneficiaries were guided by both Lumanti’s head office and the technical

team through the application process to receive benefits from the program such as grant and

technical support. Moreover, the application process included assistance with the collection and

submission of necessary documentation. Following the application process, beneficiaries

received the first of 3 tranches (grant installments). Objectively, the tranches mirrored the

tranche disbursement system implemented by the National Reconstruction Authority. This first

tranche amounted to NRs. 50,000 (~413 USD). In addition, orientations for beneficiaries were

held to help educate them on the reconstruction process and earthquake-resilient technologies.

Lumanti established Community Information Centres (CIC) in Siddhipur, Macchegaon,

Thecho, and Chitlang. The CICs were established to provide community consultations regarding

reconstruction agendas. In coordination with the local women’s cooperatives, the CIC

disseminated knowledge pertaining to structural safety in construction, reconstruction policies,

and government procedures. Communities frequently had questions regarding land titles, land

sizes, and bylaws. Other questions related to government grant procedures, bank loans,

construction systems, and household designs. The Lumanti teams worked extensively with both

the local women’s cooperatives and community user committees to connect community

members and provide suggestions and remedies.

Lumanti also established field offices in each of the four communities. These field offices

housed the technical teams whose purpose was to facilitate the reconstruction program in their

respective areas. For the most part, these teams were comprised of architects, engineers, and

social mobilizers. Also, they were headed by a project coordinator, who provided technical

34

support to the people in affected communities. ‘Social mobilizer’ may be an unfamiliar term, but

they are roughly the equivalent of the combination of a disaster case manager and a community

engagement coordinator. Case managers and community engagement coordinators, respectively,

guide disaster survivors through the process of recovery and engage with the community to

mobilize resources to aid in reconstruction. The social mobilizers took on both of these roles.

Social mobilizers were often individuals with a foothold in the community. They were most

often female, and many were active members of the local women’s cooperative or were

prominent members of the community. In addition, the technical teams themselves were mostly

female. The technical team in Thecho consisted entirely of women.

The technical teams were the ‘on the ground’ force that aided community in the

reconstruction process by preparing drawings for house construction and providing technical

supervision of the reconstruction process. The technical teams at the field offices consulted with

beneficiaries to begin making plans for rebuilding their homes. These plans incorporated

significant input from the beneficiaries in addition to “earthquake-resilient” designs. The plans

were then presented to the beneficiaries for approval, and if changes needed to be made, the

technical team’s architects and engineers adjusted the drawings as needed. Initially, Lumanti

would make as many changes as requested by the beneficiary, but eventually, they placed a cap

on the number of times they would redraft plans due to the significant investment of time and

consultation for each revision. The finalized plans were submitted to the municipalities for

approval. Once the building plans were approved, the engineers from the technical team worked

with the contractors and masons for a particular house to guide them in the techniques and

technologies that were needed to make the homes “earthquake-resilient”, according to guidelines

released by the National Reconstruction Authority, in addition to the engineers from

35

Hunnarshala and Lumanti’s own architects. Below, (Figure 8) is an example of the drafted

reconstruction plans for a residence.

Figure 13: Example of building plan drafted by Lumanti architect (Lumanti 2015, 14).

Lumanti also provided orientations for masons in earthquake-resilient technologies to

help further the reconstruction process. Then Lumanti organized technical trainings for masons

and other contractors. In order to facilitate the mason trainings, Lumanti gained approval from

the Department of Urban Development and Building Construction (DUDBC). With this,

Lumanti was able to conduct 6-day mason trainings in three areas of Kathmandu Valley:

Kathmandu, Lalitpur, and Bhaktapur. To conduct the trainings, Lumanti partnered with the

Balaju School of Engineering and Technology (BSET), a government-managed training institute.

Also, with support from MISEREOR and other agencies, mason trainings for artisans in

36

Siddhipur, Machhegoan, and Thecho were provided in collaboration with BSET. For the most

part, the trainings were focused on practical and “hands-on” approaches.

Throughout reconstruction, capacity building and strengthening, awareness and education

of the community were pertinent to the program. As part of the program, Lumanti provided

technical trainings focusing on earthquake-resistance technology for the local masons and, in

turn, these trained masons were mobilized for the reconstruction of houses in the community. In

addition, the communities were trained on different issues like disaster risk reduction,

earthquake, and disaster management. Consequently, the community was more aware of disaster

risk and management strategies. Relatedly, the masons would go out into the community and

begin construction work in those communities, focusing on both repairs and reconstruction.

Upon completion of the foundation of specific homes, Lumanti’s engineers would inspect

the construction and certify the completion of that section of the home. Moreover, Lumanti

would also help to arrange for the government (NRA) engineer to inspect the foundation and

certify for government records. Upon approval of the section of the home, the second tranche of

Lumanti’s grant support, NRs. 150,000 (~1,240 USD) was released to the beneficiary. The final

tranche of NRs. 100,000 (~830 USD) was released to the beneficiaries upon completion of the

roof of the home and subsequent inspections and approvals. For the repair program, the homes

would also be inspected and the installments would be disbursed up to the amount of NRs.

250,000 (~2,100 USD).

In addition to reconstruction and repairs, Lumanti organized several community trainings

for women of the community and for masons. The idea was rooted in the need to have refresher

orientations on earthquake-safe construction techniques with support from the women’s

cooperatives. The community trainings included health and hygiene training, such as sanitary

37

pad-making trainings, loan management training, and as mentioned, mason orientations. They

also addressed social mobilization and finances. The trainings were arranged to help build the

community knowledge base and allow members of the community to have more investment in

the processes of reconstruction and revitalization.

38

CHAPTER 3

LITERATURE REVIEW

In preparation for my analysis, I conceptualize the earthquake, its impacts, and how

different groups and levels of government interacted throughout the process of reconstruction.

To begin, I discuss disaster anthropology and its role in researching disasters, providing a broad

overview of how disaster researchers contribute to these studies. The next section, Disaster

Governance, offers more insight into the difficulties inherent in disaster recovery

(reconstruction), power disparities, and how citizens are affected by governance. From there, I

discuss gender, microfinance, and women’s cooperatives and discuss how they navigate the

market. Then, I discuss NGOs and their roles in disaster reconstruction. Finally, I discuss

traditional architecture and the rejection thereof by beneficiaries in the rebuilding of their homes.

3.1 Disaster Anthropology

Since 2009, an estimated one person per second are displaced by disasters worldwide.

Combined with ongoing urbanization and the increasing consequences associated with climate

change, the impact of disasters on the global built environment have drastically risen (Celentano

et al 2019, 34). Indeed, disasters affect nearly a quarter of the world’s population each year with

a global annual average of disaster-related deaths numbering roughly 100,000. Likewise, the

reported economic damages average more than US $160 billion per year (Guha-Sapir et al.

2015).

To better understand these events, disaster anthropology has been an increasingly

growing field of study over the past few decades. Oliver-Smith defines a disaster as a

“process/event involving the combination of a potentially destructive agent(s) from the natural

and/or technological environment and a population in a socially and technologically produced

39

condition of vulnerability (1996, 305).” While disasters have been defined in different ways

throughout the social sciences, it is widely accepted that, rather than being extreme or

unpredictable events, disasters are a culmination of the clash between hazards and chronic,

structural conditions that increase susceptibility to these hazards (Hewitt 1983; Wisner et

al.2004).

Oliver-Smith attributes the increase in both number and severity in disasters to the lack of

resilience and sustainability of current human-environmental adaptations. Essentially, this means

that if a society cannot weather a “typical” hazard without severe infrastructural damage and

disruption at the societal level, then that society has not developed sustainably, referring to the

concept of resilience (Oliver-Smith 1996, 304). There are ongoing debates in the discipline of

disaster anthropology, as well as other disciplines in social and physical sciences, over the use of

terminology such as resilience and vulnerability. For instance, Barrios has discussed that

resilience, or “the ability [of individuals and communities] to survive and cope with a disaster

with minimum impact and damage,” (2017, 121) has become widely used in not only the social

sciences, but in other disciplines as well. However, the difficulty with this terminology, as

discussed by A.J. Faas, is that the resilience framework places significant responsibility on

disaster-affected communities for the outcomes of the event (2016, 9). Admittedly, the

placement of responsibility, or even blame, deflects attention away from the root structural

causes. The same can be said for the concept of vulnerability, in which identifying particular

groups as vulnerable can constitute an act of marginalization, thus reifying existing social and

economic systems that do not benefit those groups (Marino and Faas 2020, 9). Therefore, in this

thesis, I do not use the term ‘resilience’ due to these same concerns with semantics. For

‘vulnerable,’ I only employ the term as directly used by Lumanti in their requirements for

40

beneficiaries, which is defined in Chapter 1. I instead be specifically highlighting some of the

structural and governance issues that have taken place throughout the recovery and

reconstruction process from the Gorkha earthquake and positioning recipients of aid within my

recollection accordingly

Oliver-Smith points out that there have been two significant themes that have arisen from

anthropological research on the political interrelations with disasters: disaster as opportunity and

cause for the political mobilization, and disaster-caused changes in relations with the state

(Oliver-Smith 1996, 309). Also, there is an increasing focus on the social and historical

processes that contribute to the exposure of particular groups to the higher chance of risk and

harm (Faas 2015, Hoffman and Oliver-Smith 2002). Research on disaster phases, such as

response and recovery, attempt to illustrate the extent to which relief and reconstruction efforts

impact the structural conditions that contributed to the extent of harm experienced from the

disaster. Essentially, most anthropological research on disasters has focused on patterns of

vulnerability, the lived experiences of survivors, perceptions of risk and disaster, and patterns of

aid (Zhang 2016, 86).

There has been a long-held understanding amongst researchers that disaster events are

capable of triggering immense social change (Davis 1999; Hoffman and Oliver-Smith 1999:9;

Scheper-Hughes 2006). The extent to which this change occurs depends on the size or magnitude

of the event, whether change is examined through the short or long terms, and whether culture is

analyzed at the deep or surface levels (Faas 2016, 10). In “Toward an Applied Anthropology of

Disaster,” Howard Stein compares disasters to a story or language, with their own plots,

characters, sequences, and endings (2002, 157). He explains that these “stories” are often

complicated, drawn out narratives that highlight the complexities inherent in disasters and their

41

social and political impacts. Disaster events also present opportunities to examine these stories

by looking at the structure of existing power relations, tracking how events alter social and

political dynamics , and understanding the positionality of each entity within these dynamics.

With regard to recovery, disaster reconstruction is a complex process rife with

uncertainty and disparity. For the most part, those affected by the disaster event seek to rebuild

their homes and their lives and to find a way to return to some form of stability. However, these

events often highlight the power dynamics amongst different groups, some of whom benefit

more than others. Reconstruction becomes a process wherein some groups will seek to maintain

the pre-existing social structures, whereas others will seek change. Reconstruction further

highlights areas where change is needed and also involves extended disputes in means and goals

involving change (Oliver-Smith 1996, 313).

For the survivors seeking change, Maldonado argues that disaster survivors have agency

through the disaster recovery process and are empowered. Thus, they should be treated as ‘equal

partners’ by those participating in disaster governance, such as NGOs and governmental entities,

to help inform and direct the process in a way that works in a localized context (Maldonado

2016, 54). Unfortunately, differing groups will have different goals and agendas that do not take

into account the needs of the disaster survivors. For example, Roberto Barrios’ research on

Limón de la Cerca, a post-disaster resettlement site in Honduras, highlighted the competing

interests of disaster survivors and the NGOs and government officials managing resettlement.

The survivors did not have agency in how the site and the homes were built, and the NGOs and

government officials prioritized budgets and meeting project deadlines (Barrios 2017, 49-66).

3.2 Disaster Governance

When it comes to addressing this particular disaster, there were significant challenges

42

throughout the response phase and there have been and still are current significant challenges

surrounding reconstruction in Nepal on the whole. These challenges are present from the

individual through to the governmental level. One of the major challenges in reconstruction has

been financial constraints experienced by the earthquake survivors. In addition, the top-down

approach to reconstruction, versus the localized context aforementioned, has left many groups

without the necessary resources to rebuild. When taking into account these issues, one must

consider the role disaster governance has played in exacerbating challenges to recovery.

In 1995, the Commission on Global Governance defined governance as “the sum of the

many ways individuals and institutions, public and private, manage their common affairs. It is a

continuing process through which conflicting or diverse interests may be accommodated and

cooperative action may be taken. It includes formal . . . as well as informal arrangements that

people and institutions have agreed to or perceive to be in their interest” (Commission on Global

Governance 1995: 2; Karns, Mingst, and Stiles 2015, 2). Governance does not necessarily

indicate government in which there is a central hierarchy, but power and authority do play a role

in varying ways. The concept of governance relates to “decisions taken by, and interactions

between, members of private or public institutions who influence a population because, for

example, these members are empowered to enforce policies or conduct actions that have

consequences for the population” (Daly et al. 2018, 355). In sum, those in positions of power

have the ability to influence and make decisions on behalf of individuals and communities. In

the social sciences, governance relates to three sectors: public, private, and the non-governmental

sector (Lekakis, Shakya, Kostakis 2018, 2)., In this section, I focus on first the public, and then

on the non-governmental sectors.

Lebel et al. state that ‘good governance’ is an overarching term encompassing any

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policies resulting from public-sector reforms or civil societal actions that are designed to create

sustainable, positive changes through the utilization of principles such as “accountability,

deliberation, empowerment, participation, representation, and social justice, as well as

organizational features” (Jones, Aryal, and Collins 2013, 443; Lebel et al., 2006).

Tying governance specifically into disaster governance, Tierney argues that “disaster

governance entails the interrelated sets of norms, organizational and institutional actors, and

practices that are designed to reduce the impacts and losses associated with disasters” (Tierney,

344). Disaster governance comprises a multitude of components including cooperation, in-depth

stakeholder involvement, transparency, and clear and direct channels through which information

is transferred (Lam Ming and Kuipers 2018, 322).

In Nepal, the implementation of the Natural Disaster Relief Act in 1982 resulted in the

establishment of central (national), regional, district, and local level natural disaster relief

committees, in addition to a system for the allocation of disaster relief funding (Jones et al 2014,

82). Prior to the 2015 Gorkha earthquake, the Ministry of Housing Affairs (MoHA) was

responsible for the implementation and enaction of national policies including preparedness and

mitigation activities, in addition to the distribution of disaster relief funds (Jones et al 2014, 82).

This system changed with the establishment of the National Reconstruction Authority, a

reflection of disaster governance in many other areas of the world. The National Reconstruction

Authority represents the standard practice of establishing an independent agency to manage

recovery and reconstructions amongst multiple sectors (Sharma et al. 2018, 770).

In May 2016, the Government of Nepal (GoN) issued a master plan for rebuilding that

advocated for vulnerability reduction, fair and equitable distribution of aid, and owner-driven

housing reconstruction (Daly et al. 2017, 419). This plan focused on the centralization of the

44

government’s approach to recovery and reconstruction, with the National Reconstruction

Authority as the primary institution to oversee the process. The formation of the National

Reconstruction Authority (NRA) took place roughly nine months following the 2015 Gorkha

Earthquake in late April (Cousins 2017, 1; Dhakal 2018, 306). For the most part, the goal of the

NRA was to provide a centralized institution from which to channel reconstruction coordination

efforts. Also, the ideal of centralization promotes active centralized planning to represent the

interests of large institutions and actors while bypassing those institutions and actors with less

capacity, including local residents (He 2019, 53; Lyons 2009). The Post-Disaster Recovery

Framework (PDRF) was Nepal’s centralized governmental response to the Gorkha earthquakes,

and emphasizes the reduction of vulnerability, the improvement of resilience to disasters, and the

approach of owner-driven housing reconstruction (Lam Ming and Kuipers 2018, 324; PDRF).

The new constitution, placed into legislation only 6 weeks after the April 25 earthquake

effectively restructured the nation, mandating a federal state consisting of zones in which each

had their own parliaments and executive branches (Jones, Oven, and Wisner 2016, 40). Also, the

existent districts, villages and municipalities were placed under the additional level of the new

state governments. Furthermore, the NRA established sub-regional offices to act as a go-between

for federal and local authorities. Relatedly, they established district committees to oversee local

recovery and resource centers to help mobilize and provide direct support for communities (Lam

Ming and Kuipers 2018, 324). The establishment of the NRA itself was tumultuous and, as of

2017, the NRA had already changed leadership four times in the two years following its

establishment (Harrowell and Özerdem 2019, 5).

The government of Nepal categorized the earthquake-affected districts in 5 subcategories:

(1) severely hit, (2) crisis hit, (3) hit with heavy losses, (4) hit, and (5) slightly affected (Kotani,

45

Honda, and Sugitani 2019, 3; Shrestha and Pathranarakul 2018, 2).

Figure 14: Categorization of affected districts (GoN NPC 2015 PDNA Report).

As seen in Figure 14, the research sites, located in the districst of Kathmandu, Lalitpur,

and Makwanpur, all fall into the Crisis Hit category. Funding by the National Government of

Nepal (GoN) in response to the earthquake consisted of cash reimbursements to affected

households. Initially, the NRA provided 15,000 rupees (~ 120 USD) to families to address

immediate needs, such as food and clothing. Further funding consisted of disbursements of NRs

140,000 (1,190 USD) for those who lost a family member due to the earthquake (He 2019, 55).

One year following the earthquake, the NRA established a tranche system for distributing

funding to beneficiaries as part of the reconstruction program. The funding consisted of a total of

NRs 300,000, roughly equivalent to $2,600. The first tranche, or installment, was NRs 50,000

(~413 USD) and was granted to the beneficiary upon agreement with the government to rebuild

their home. With this NRs 50,000, the beneficiary was expected to build the foundation for their

home, or more accurately build to the plinth level.

46

Figure 15: Model of owner-driven reconstruction process (adapted from DESaster).

47

Upon completion of the plinth, the beneficiary would apply for the second installment consisting

of NRs 150,000 (~1240 USD). Also, the NRA would send an inspector to verify the completion

of the plinth, and then signal approval for the second installment. This installment was intended

for the main structure, essentially the framing and the walls. Again, an NRA inspector would

come to verify the completion of the main structure and signal approval for the third and final

installment, NRs 100,000 (~830 USD) for installation of the roof and overall completion of the

house (He 2019, 55). Illustratively, the reconstruction approval and reconstruction process can be

seen in Figure 15.

In addition to the structural benchmarks in reconstruction to receive funding, several

deadlines were implemented by the NRA in order to receive funding. For example, if a

beneficiary did not have their plinth completed by a certain date, they would not receive the next

installment. These deadlines were aimed at increasing the number of rebuilt homes in a short

span of time. However, this progress came at the cost of beneficiaries experiencing significant

stress, accruing debts to meet those deadlines, and increased tensions between families and

communities who were forced to compete for resources (Lam Ming and Kuipers 2018, 326).

In addition to the NRs. 300,000 (2,600 USD) granted by the government, earthquake

victims had the option to take out private loans for reconstruction. According to the literature,

there were three options through which an individual could sign for a loan (Bownas and

Bishokarma 2019; De Juan et al. 2020; Lam Ming and Kuipers 2018). The first option was a

banking institution. Typically, banking institutions had a set interest rate of 14% APR. This was

an option for those individuals with steady income or who had land they could use as collateral.

The second option for loan acquisition was through local lending cooperatives and microfinance

initiatives, including women’s cooperatives. The interest rate for these organizations ranged from

48

16-22% APR. The last loan option was through private moneylenders, with interest rates ranging

from 24-36% APR (Bownas and Bishokarma 2019, 187). However, as one can see, this is not an

ideal situation for any individual, with or without a consistent income or resources.

It has been noted that the policy toward reconstruction by the NRA leaned strongly

towards equity in compensation. This is the reason for the same amount of cash to all affected

families and individuals (De Juan et al. 2020, 5; Lam and Kuipers 2019). However, due to the

bureacratization of the applications process, formal requirements such as having a bank account,

land titles, and citizenship cards placed significant barriers between individuals and access to

compensation. In addition, while the reconstruction policies put in place by the NRA were

ostensibly geared towards community empowerment, the reconstruction initiative was heavily

centralized, and therefore discouraged community-level initiatives and action ((De Juan et al

2020, 10; Lam and Kuipers 2019). Moreover, there is little evidence that the NRA effectively

collaborated with other institutions, including other areas of the government, such as the

Ministry of Housing Affairs, and stakeholders, such as public groups and NGOs at the local level

(Daly et al. 2017, 414). Issues with centralization were exacerbated by the state’s incapacitation,

represented by understaffing and unclear responsibilities which culminated in irregularitites and

delays in the compensation process (De Juan et al 2020, 15). Apart from centralization, several

key issues surrounding the NRA formation impaired reconstruction, including timing. The GoN

did not establish the NRA until months after the disaster event. As a completely new structure of

authority, it had no existing networks or relationships with key stakeholders, including

government officals at ward and municipal levels. (Daly et al. 2017, 416).

When considering post disaster reconstruction, logistics and the navigation of politics are

significant challenges. Not to mention, reconstruction in general is exceedingly expensive.

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There have been critiques amongst the literature indicating that the top-down centralized form of

governance, as seen with the NRA, is not adaptive or flexible enough to fully facilitate

reconstruction (Daly et al. 2017, 405). David Lewis uses the example that “experts” tend to

conceive problems in a way that is overly technical and implemented using a top-down

approach, rather than through the engagement of local perspectives (2011, 176). Typically,

reconstruction requires coordination across multiple sectors and levels of governance.

Unfortunately, rigid frameworks, organizational hierarchies, and politicized budget and

accountability mechanisms” (Daly et al. 2017, 405) do not allow for the necessary flexibility and

coordination to successfully navigate the complexities of recovery. De Juan et al. call for a

“decentralized and multilayered implementation structure involving NGOs, community-based

associations, and international actors to compensate for the weak capacity of state institutions”

(2020, 15). Decentralization is essentially “a process of diluting the arbitrariness of policy-

makers from government and increasing local participation in planning and implementing

development strategies (Beinen, Kapur, Parks, and Riedinger, 1990; He 2019, 53).” In practice,

decentralization necessitates local participation and can be stimulated by “creating incentives,

improving education levels and building dialogues for households, and including lower-caste

members in decision-making committees” (He 2019, 53). For example, while the central

government did play a role in managing reconstruction from the 1934 Lalitpur City earthquake

previously discussed in the introduction, communities were still the first to respond to the

disaster utilizing their own resources. Governmental support arrived later and was somewhat

inequitable amongst the classes (Lekakis, Shakya, Kostakis 2018, 325). The response of the

communities to these disparities was to depend on their own networks to navigate the recovery

process.

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The decentralization of disaster governance is particularly crucial in urban peripheries

such as the communities of Siddhipur, Macchegoan, and Thecho. Multiple factors impinge upon

residential recovery. Increasing peripheral urbanization, positioning in the liminal space between

rural and urban, classification as “urban poor” (Bayat 2015), and marginalization of community

residents all contribute towards the lack of access to resources and oversight through disaster

governance. This impacts the residents and the communities’ recovery, particularly those on the

periphery of the valley. Also, decentralizing allows one to account for the complex social,

political and economic dynamics common in cities. Furthermore, it fosters accounting for the

multitude of overlapping stakeholders involved, and the potential lack of alignment between

disaster-affected areas and political/administrative boundaries (Daly et al. 2017, 563). Daly et al.

argue that if disaster management is not decentralized, it can lead to disjointed oversight, in

which there is a lack of transparency. It may also culminate in the prevalence of overlapping

policies, and weak communication between the central government and other stakeholders

(2017, 46). Ultimately, the issues result in the inability to decisively implement policies at all

levels of the government.

3.3 Gender

Groups that most often suffer from governmental oversight are typically those considered

vulnerable by the government and Lumanti, such as women, individuals with disabilities, and

those of lower castes who have more difficulty accessing information from officials at the local

and central levels. These groups are often excluded from the rest of the community, particularly

as relates to decision making (Lam and Kuipers 2019, 326). Of the aforementioned groups,

women have faced significant difficulties in obtaining relief and support for reconstructing their

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homes, particularly those who are unmarried, widowed, or have husbands working abroad

(Sthapit 2015, 685).

Women’s status relative to men in Nepal is low in comparison to other areas of the

world. The most prominent factor affecting a woman’s status is her position within the hierarchy

of the household. In a typical patriarchal society, gender equity can be difficult to achieve.

In Nepal, the female population is slightly over 50 percent (Shrestha et al. 2019, 86). Per

the 2011 national population and housing census in, there were 796,422 more females than males

in Nepal. However, representation of women in public domains, such as civil service, are still at

significantly low levels. Admittedly, representation of women in politics is improving, with

female representatives consisting of 29.41% of the national parliament. However, there is still a

long way to go in order to reach gender equality in the workforce. Moreover, the rate of

education is also low amongst women in Nepal, with only 24.1% of women having attained at

least some secondary education. Notably, between the ages of 15 and 49, over 40% of women

and 14% of men have never attended school. Roughly, 73% of women are engaged in

agricultural practices (Thapa and Pathranarakul 2019, 209). These women contribute the bulk of

productive labor, in addition to contributing much of their income to household care (Rankin

2001, 28). However, only 19.71% of households in Nepal indicate female ownership of land and

property (Thapa and Pathranarakul 2019, 209). The level of women’s empowerment within

Nepal has previously been quantified by examining the extent to which women participate in

self-help groups. Also considered was the status of their employment, property owned, level of

education, and the level of decision-making in the household (Atteraya, Gnawali, and Palley

2016, 323).

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As previously mentioned, traditional family structures in Nepal are patrilocal joint family

systems (Brunson 2016, 2). Three-quarters of women in Nepal have reported living in joint (with

spouse) or co-residing households (with spouse and other family members) (Diamond-Smith et

al. 2017, 2). Extended family households are not uncommon and can consist of multiple families

residing in one household. Status in the household is typically based on the birth order of the

sons, with the eldest son and his wife attaining the highest status in said household. When a

woman from outside the home marries into the family and moves into the household, the mother-

in-law and elder sisters-in-law have higher status and influence over the new bride (Diamond-

Smith et al. 2017, 2). However, while there is still a strong preference for sons, many households

now state they would like to have daughters. Despite the gender preferences, having children in

general is a way to improve status within the home (Brunson 2016, 2).

Women have faced significant challenges in obtaining both relief and reconstruction

support after the earthquake. However, those who face even more difficulties are unmarried

women or those with husbands working in other countries. For the most part, the lack of spousal

support hampers the attainment of resources. In addition, inequity in land and property

ownership among women enhances the likelihood that women will be excluded from centralized

programs such as the owner-driven reconstruction program established by the NRA (Sthapit

2015, 685).

Though gender plays a significant role in one’s positionality within hierarchy in Nepal,

one cannot discredit the intersections between ethnicity, social location, and class. While formal

hierarchies were abolished in 1963, along with the promotion of equality amongst different

groups as a result of the Constitution of 1990, discrimination based on ethnicity, gender, and

caste remain (Aasland and Haug 2011, 185).

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These factors constrain a women’s mobility separate from their household, limiting their

ability to “expand markets, invest in technology, or innovate in response to new opportunities”

(Rankin 2001, 31). These contributing factors also influence women's property rights and

manifestations of empowerment, such as decision-making and participation in social and

collective organizations (Pradhan, Meinzen-Dick, and Thesi 2019, 28). Resistance to these

gender norms open up spaces for the creation of collective organizations that center on the

empowerment of women, through social and economic initiatives.

3.4 Women’s Credit and Savings Cooperatives

Throughout the Global South, savings and credit cooperatives play a significant role in

the microfinance industry. For instance, microfinance is considered to be a governmental

strategy whose focus is to influence transformation amongst people in an upward-trending

positive direction as prioritized by the governmental entity (Rankin 2001, 30). This positive

direction results in achieving “socially progressive goals” (Rankin 2004, 189). Essentially, the

goals can include the promotion of economic development in marginalized communities, and

empowerment of not only the poor, but also women.

Women’s Savings and Credit Cooperatives, also known as SACCOs (Savings and Credit

Cooperative Organizations), are present globally and are capable of bringing in large numbers of

members (Ramnarain 2015, 678). These organizations are based on cooperation amongst

members, making possible the undertaking of group savings and loan schemes (Lewis and Kanji

2009, 63). Though these cooperatives did not become commonplace in Nepal until 1992,

women’s credit and savings cooperatives in Nepal now number in the tens of thousands

(Simkhada 2013, 146). Nepal has incorporated microfinance and has developed a legal

framework that allows the creation of institutions, such as NGOs and finance cooperatives, to

54

enact their programs separately from the state. This is partially due to the connection between

poverty alleviation and the promotion of small-scale private enterprise, resulting in a market

friendly model that could be adapted in the global south (Shakya and Rankin 2008, 1216).

Also, the cooperative is a term that is derived from either a social enterprise of

community-based organizations that has prioritized service to its members in order to meet their

economic, social, and cultural needs. Within this framework, the Guthi, a core feature of Newar

society, held the practice of contributing labor for the benefit of the wider community.

Definitively, the practice translates well into the collaborative model displayed by the women’s

cooperatives (Lekakis, Shakya, Kostakis 2018, 326).

The women’s cooperatives function as jointly owned and democratically-controlled

enterprises (Basnet and Regmi 2019, 456). Structurally, cooperatives are set up so that members

are essentially the owners of said cooperatives. They are community-based and member-

managed organizations. Typically, this framework operates outside the formal banking sector,

and utilizes social versus economic forms of collateral. This results in a system that relies on the

capacity of self-organizing (Rankin 2004, 132). As stipulated by the International Cooperative

Alliance, there are seven principles under which cooperatives in Nepal operate. The principles

highlight characteristics that are inherent in all forms of cooperatives. The principles are:

voluntary and open membership, democratic and member-controlled, economic participation of

members, autonomy and independence, education, training, and information, cooperation among

cooperatives and concern for the community (Simkhada 2013, 150).

Cooperative members choose, from amongst themselves, their board of directors, who in

turn, hire managers to oversee the daily operation of the cooperative (Schmidt 2016, 347). Also,

consistently increasing membership is encouraged. As members contribute money to the

55

cooperative, it results in more funds for the cooperative as a whole (Morrison et al. 2017, 471).

Objectively, this works by the cooperative selling off its shares to members and collecting

savings from the members. In some instances, cooperatives can also receive funds in the form of

grants from banks and other financial institutions (Simkhada 2013, 145). These funds, in addition

to the members’ contributions, are pooled and used to give loans to members, coordinate

livelihood and health trainings, and grant money for members in need, such as members who

have been hospitalized or have had a death in the family (Simkhada 2013, 149-151).

Women’s groups form organically among community members with varying

compositions, but are often comprised of only women. In the case discussed by Mansios et al., of

Ugandan female sex workers in community savings groups, the composition varied and could

include both men and women. However, when female sex workers joined the groups that

consisted of mixed community members, they felt unwelcome and left to join all female groups

(Mansios et al. 2018, 6-7).

In 1956, the Nepali government began instituting 5-year development plans. In the eighth

iteration of this plan in 1992, the approach towards poverty reduction was addressed through the

process of neoliberalism (Atteraya, Gnawali and Palley 2016, 322). Likewise, the tenth iteration

of this plan in 2002 emphasized the development of programs designed to address the social

inclusion of women. Particularly, those who are low-income and are from marginalized castes or

ethnic groups. The programs included trainings and livelihood programs designed to increase

socio-economic opportunities (Atteraya, Gnawali and Palley 2016, 322).

Members of economic credit and savings cooperatives join for a variety of reasons. One,

participation in women’s groups can be a useful approach to address poverty and gender-based

inequality within their respective communities. For the most part, women in Nepal often have

56

less education than men, and they have more limited economic opportunities, including

employment (Atteraya, Gnawali and Palley 2016, 321). Many see these groups as a path to

financially support themselves and their families. Furthermore, they view them as a means to

supplement existing income, and to save money for future investments and purchases (Mansios

et al. 2018, 7).

A case study of countries in Asia, Africa, and Latin America discerned that women who

have access to and are members of credit cooperatives experience an increase in economic

empowerment (Atteraya, Gnawali and Palley 2016, 323). Relatedly, another study examined the

role of women’s groups in South India and found that membership and participation in these

groups not only helped them economically, but also increased their participation in activities that

relate to community development (Atteraya, Gnawali and Palley 2016, 323). Notably, this is an

example that indicates that the benefits associated with these groups do not only relate to

economics.

In addition to economic empowerment, which pertains to economic mobility, increase in

economic security and the ability to make purchases. There is evidence of an increase of

independence in their own homes and involvement in making important household decisions

(Gram et al. 2018, 193) as well as an increase in political and legal awareness amongst members

of the cooperatives (Atteraya, Gnawali and Palley 2016, 323-324). Other reasons for joining

include a sense of solidarity and community. Not to mention, the structure of the groups provides

a network of people to turn to in times of need, allowing members to feel a sense of emotional

support (Mansios et al 2018, 8). Another vital benefit of cooperatives is the creation of

institutions to provide sustainable community services. Other benefits include “employment

generation, increasing incomes, improving health, education and sanitation, women’s

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empowerment, better physical infrastructure” (Simkhada 2013, 150).

Critiques of microfinance models such as women’s cooperatives include questions of its

capacity to reach financial sustainability, challenge gender relations, and improve socioeconomic

conditions of the poor (Shakya and Rankin 2008, 132). Typically, the question lies in if the

model of microfinance actually allows borrowers to become empowered both socially and

economically. Also, it is critiqued if the model is entrenched in the processes of neoliberalism,

defined by Harvey as an ideological model and belief in the free market as a leading framework

for growth and distribution of the market economy (2010). The focus on women versus men can

be, according to Rankin, attributed to the increased likelihood that they will pay back their loans

versus men (2004, 189).

3.5 Community Perceptions

In terms of how a community perceives groups like women’s credit and savings

cooperatives, the roles of these groups in community development and the fact that the members

are from within the community, helps the group maintain a foothold in the community. As such,

it can be postulated that reconstruction at the community level, facilitated by community groups

such as the SACCOs, would only help ease the reconstruction process. According to a study of

information channels in Nepal’s disaster reconstruction process, community members that

receive technical, financial, and procedural information through “bonding” networks through

social capital, such as community groups, family members, and neighbors were more likely to

begin home repairs and reconstruction earlier than those who received their information through

other channels (Kotani and Honda 2019, 8). Also, these networks provide a resource to link the

community members to the market, allowing them to become intrinsic in the reconstruction

process.

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Maharatta recommends a community-based approach to disaster management that would

incorporate organizations such as savings and credit cooperatives, because of their capacity to

bring in external support such as donations and government funding (2012, 169). Notably, the

article was written prior to the earthquake and only shows cooperatives have the potential to

work in disaster management and does not present a case that they do.

In Shrestha et al’s article, “Enhancing Earthquake Resilience of Communities,” the

discussion of women’s cooperatives revolves around disaster risk reduction (DRR) in particular.

This article argues that involving women and women’s groups in community mobilization is an

effective way to reduce disaster risk and enhance disaster preparedness (2019, 86). Shrestha et al.

also note that women play an important role in construction, and are directly engaged in

physically performing home repairs, the purchasing of homes, and furnishing the homes.

Finally, the majority of the literature focuses on reconstruction in rural areas of Nepal.

There are fewer sources that examine reconstruction, particularly relating to those in urban or

urban peripheral settings, within the significantly more populated boundaries of Kathmandu

Valley.

3.6 Non-Governmental Organizations

NGOs are “an extremely diverse group of independent organizations that are neither run

by government nor driven by profit” (Jones et al 2014, 79). In this study, the NGOs in question

are specifically non-profit organizations (Lumanti) and community-based organizations

(women’s cooperatives).

Nepal has historically ranked very low in development outcomes, ranking 145 out of 187

countries on the Human Development Index. This ranking is categorized by “low incomes;

widening gaps between rich and poor and rural and urban areas; discrimination and

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marginalization of women, political instability, corruption and growing dependence on foreign

aid” (Kernot 2006). Following the 2015 earthquake, Nepal received a significant amount of

foreign aid, up to 4 billion USD from several countries and organizations for the utilization of

recovery and reconstruction efforts (Jones, Oven, and Wisner 2016, 40).

This ‘funneling’ of aid is a result of a decree by the Nepal government in the 1990s that

prevented international donors from directly implementing development projects (Nightingale et

al. 2018, 862). Instead, international donors were required to work through local providers, most

often NGOS, to implement the actual programming. As such NGOs often act as an intermediary

on behalf of these international donors in exchange for funding.

These proportional changes reflect how the relative position of NGOs has also increased

in relation to the state allowing for greater flexibility in how they function (Jones et al 2014, 79).

According to Schuller, NGOs represent alternatives to states that are fragmented by

neoliberalism and have the ability to undermine governance capacity of states in the global south

(2009, 97). These organizations and their incorporation into political processes has enabled them

to make a choice whether to challenge existing governmental policies by taking on the roles of

advocates and/or activists, or to work within the confines of existing regulations and processes

(Nightingale et al. 2018, 854). Schuller also argues that NGOs provide higher paying jobs to an

educated middle class, thus “reproducing inequalities inherent to and required by the

contemporary neoliberal world system (2009, 97).” Finally, Schuller discusses NGOs as a buffer

between the elites and the impoverished masses and can present institutional barriers against

local participations and priority setting (2009, 85). As buffers, NGOs have the opportunity to

present themselves to the government as representatives of these communities, thus increasing

their roles in community governance (Nightingale et al. 2018, 855).

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In addition to international and national governmental contributions, non-governmental

organizations play a significant role in the processes of development in Nepal, with nearly

40,000 recognized NGOs in the country (Hillig and Connell 2018, 311). In Sindhupalchok

district, approximately 500 NGOs came to the area following the earthquakes. Of these 500

NGOs, only 102 were registered with the District Disaster Relief Committee (DDRC). Of the

NGOs that were registered, only 52 submitted reports of their activities, many of which contain

very little detail about the metrics and administrative costs of their projects (Bownas and

Bishokarma 2019, 188). In Kathmandu Valley, approximately 113 organizations were operating

in Kathmandu when the earthquake hit the region (Hillig and Connell 2018, 311).

Anthropologists have pointed out that NGOs represent the “filling of a gap” that the

government is either unable or unwilling to fulfill (Jones et al. 2014, 85). The argument here is

that if the government had the capacity or prioritized addressing the needs in each sector, there

would not necessarily be a need for NGOs. This ties NGOs into the larger framework of

governance as discussed in the previous section, wherein these organizations play a role in

contributing to policies and actions to influence or affect the population. It also speaks to the

formation of civil society, in which representation more closely reflects the needs of affected

populations (Edwards 2014).

Hillig and Connell argue that NGOs are most effective when they work with other

agencies, relying on pre-existing networks and partnerships to “access information, human and

physical resources” (2018, 320). As with the women’s cooperatives, social networks “enhance

trust and cooperation, benefitting their links with access to assistance and resources. They create

a shared identity, establish solidarity and allow faster, cheaper flows of information and

materials” (Carrero et al. 2019, 564). These networks allow NGOs to expand their reach beyond

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the boundaries of one organization, thus allowing the NGO to reach more of the population.

This method is common, particularly in the development sector.

In addition, within the structure of Nepal’s Post Disaster Recovery Framework and the

Mobilization of NGOs for Reconstruction and Rehabilitation Procedure Guideline published in

April of 2016. Residents that qualified for reconstruction funding had to choose between

receiving funding from the government or from another source, such as an NGO. The

government stipulated that there be no duplication of efforts. The same guidelines also required

approximately 80% of an organization’s total project expenditures be allocated to project

activities and not for overhead expenses, such as salaries and travel (Lam, Khanna, and Kuipers

2017, 79-80).

NGOs have had difficulty adapting to frequent changes in the national reconstruction

policy. The NRA required NGOs to submit proposals for the reconstruction projects and required

approval prior to the implementation for said projects and sign a Memorandum of Understanding

(Lam, Khanna, and Kuipers 2017, 79). This may seem like a simple process. However, as

previously mentioned, there were significant delays put in place as well as bureaucratic hoops

through which to jump that deterred many NGOs from further pursuing reconstruction efforts.

As a result, it is estimated that less than 2% of the rebuilding of private houses have been

supported by non-governmental organizations (Lam, Khanna, and Kuipers 2017, 79-80).

The funding structure of non-governmental or non-profit organizations are contract-

based. In this instance, funders engage these organizations to implement projects, leading to a

process in which project documentation and grant compliance is provided in exchange for the

receipt of funding (Freeman and Schuller 2020, 6). These organizations that are the recipients of

said funding are dependent on securing projects to continue operations. The duration and extent

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of the funding is stipulated by the funder but can be negotiated on a case by case basis. In

exchange, the organizations produce documentation, typically in the forms of reports, to verify

their compliance with the funders’ requirements for the projects, thus legitimizing the use of the

funding (Freeman and Schuller 2020, 7).

According to Schuller, a project is a “discrete administrative form that is submitted for

funding and denotes a limited, measurable set of deliverables. Projects are specified

interventions, limited in space and time” (Freeman and Schuller 2020, 2). In essence, a project is

an intervention with an end result, through which a process occurs where an action(s) is

performed while benchmarks are met and measured. The commoditization of project reports in

return for aid funding inflates the exchange value of the reports and other forms of

documentation. When comparing the inflation to the actualized value of the project to the

targeted groups the projects are intended for, it can be argued that many projects do not meet the

same value that is placed on the documentation itself. Though this may not be the case with all

NGOs, this trend of placing higher value on documentation has led many NGOs to not place as

much care in addressing the needs of the beneficiaries for whom they are implementing their

respective programs.

NGOs are dependent on funding from external sources. These funding sources often

require the organizations to meet deadlines, meet benchmarks, and provide reports detailing the

projects and their impacts. In exchange, the NGO receives financial support on a contracted

basis. As a result, projects and their ensuing reports become commodities with an exchange

value that ensure the continued survival of the non-governmental organization (Freeman and

Schuller 2020). Unfortunately, these “commodities” are not sustainable, and have a set

expiration date, at which point the NGO needs to extend or identify new projects for the same

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funder to contribute to, or they will need to bring in other sources of funding. Often, the NGO

will need to utilize multiple sources of funding to support the same project.

3.7 Rejection of Traditional Architecture

When considering the built environment, a significant issue in Nepal is that the

infrastructure is not equipped to withstand earthquakes of the size the country has historically

experienced. With expanding urban density, resulting in newer construction and a lack of

enforced building codes, many structures are not constructed to endure significant seismic

tremors. The last known destructive earthquake to affect Kathmandu’s urban infrastructure was

in January 1934, wherein one quarter of Kathmandu Valley’s infrastructure was damaged or

destroyed (Karkee, Cuadra, and Sunuwar 2005, 411). The 2015 earthquake again damaged and

destroyed much of the built environment in the Valley. In this section, I discuss some of the

literature on how residents rebuilt their homes following the 2015 Gorkha earthquake,

particularly in regard to the preference for building modern structures.

In her article on approaches to rebuilding in Nepal, Catherine Forbes states that, due to

their abundance in the areas affected by the 2015 Gorkha earthquake, traditional housing, and

their subsequent damage by the quakes, were extensively reported in the media (2017, 221).

Modern-style concrete buildings, structures that are now commonly being built in place of

traditional homes, were featured far less often (Adhikari 2016, 3).

Furthermore, Forbes notes that the general populace associates the failure of traditional

structures with the materials that are used (mud, brick, and unburned bricks) as opposed to poor

construction and maintenance, and the changing built environment. The costs associated with

maintaining traditional housing in addition to the lack of skilled labor resulted in the

deterioration of homes prior to the earthquake. This deterioration served to make the structures

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more susceptible to increased rates of damage from the earthquake. As argued by Forbes, the

conception that the homes themselves were not safe led to residents rejecting traditional housing

typologies in favor of imported modern technologies (2017, 228). A study conducted by

Ohsumi, Mukai, and Fujitani resulted in findings that indicate traditional construction methods

for the construction of earthquake-resistant buildings can be done to stabilize buildings using

mud mortar and timber beams (2016, 1244). Unfortunately, the construction has to be done

properly. At the time, bylaws instituted by the NRA did not necessarily support the rebuilding of

traditional housing as the building height, minimum square footage requirements, and spacing

between buildings did not align with the traditional styles (Daly et al. 2017, 415).

Nelson postulates some further reasons for the shift in preferences from traditional to

modern housing may stem from phenomena such as foreign modernity, India’s exportation of

concrete architectural styles, and the demand for new styles by urban elites (2019, 5). Nelson

points out that houses are symbols of prestige, and a modern house can be easily distinguished

from the traditional styles so common in settlements on the urban periphery (Nelson 2017, 58).

The influence of phenomena such as modernity led to residents embracing the

incorporation of new techniques and styles when offered the opportunity. He also points out the

distinction between the perception of ‘permanent materials’ such as concrete columns and brick-

cement masonry in opposition to ‘temporary materials’ such as mud and lumber (2017, 59). A

perception of permanence when considering what to use to build your home would be an ideal

for individuals who do not want to invest in continual maintenance of the home over the years.

This could also contribute to the perception that a home using ‘permanent materials’ is safer in

case of an earthquake, which is not necessarily the case. .

Nelson also argues that the expansion of privatization in Nepal, allowing for the

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increased production of cement in-country versus depending on imports, greatly influenced the

built environment. This shift resulted in a vast increase in the number of cement houses in the

Valley over a span of 40 years (Nelson 2017, 60). The market, combined with the perception of

permanence, the media coverage of traditional homes impacted by the earthquake, and the push

for modernity are all factors that contribute to a growing trend in which individuals elect to build

more modern-style concrete homes rather than in the traditional style, even in the urban

periphery.

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CHAPTER 4

PROJECT DESIGN

4.1 Introduction

In this chapter, I discuss the overall design and implementation of the research. I begin by

reviewing how the project was created and discuss the timeline and methods used in the research.

Then, I discuss the interviewee recruitment process and end with the approache to analysis.

In a professional capacity, I have conducted disaster response and recovery work in

communities in Missouri, Louisiana, and Texas. My academic interests encompass

environmental anthropology and, specifically, disaster anthropology. As such, I was interested in

practicing applied anthropology in a disaster context for my master’s thesis research. Beginning

Fall 2019, I began to reach out to various disaster organizations, from the non-profit to the

governmental levels to inquire as to their research needs. Though there was some general

interest, the organizations or potential projects did not quite mesh. Retrospectively, I began to

speak with faculty in the applied anthropology department to utilize existing networks. Dr.

Andrew Nelson recommended contacting a colleague, Dr. Sabin Ninglekhu, a geographer based

in Kathmandu, to inquire if there were any projects in Nepal, the site of Dr. Nelson’s dissertation

research on the transformation of Kathmandu Valley’s urban periphery and how it relates to the

social relations of post-insurgency Nepal. I had previously heard of the earthquakes in Nepal in

2015, so was happy to reach out to Dr. Ninglekhu. After some helpful recommendations and

guidance, we identified three potential NGOs to connect with. I reached out to all three and was

fortunate to receive a positive response from Sobina Lama, the manager of the Disaster Risk

Reduction program at Lumanti Support Group for Shelter. We initially connected via email, then

via Skype and phone calls. During these meetings, we identified a need for an evaluation of the

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Lumanti’s earthquake reconstruction program. Sobina provided background on the program and

emailed additional information as needed.

During this phase of the project, I began to collect information on the earthquake and its

impacts in Kathmandu Valley, the primary location in which Lumanti implemented their

reconstruction program. Along with the information Sobina provided, as well as the background

research, I was able to put together my research proposal and send it to Lumanti for review.

4.2 Design

For this project, I selected three separate methods for data collection. These methods

were document analysis, semi-structured interviews, and participant observation. From my own

experience working within a non-profit organization, I found that one can learn a significant

amount about how an organization operates by reading the documents they produce. I chose

semi-structured interviews as they provide a sizeable scope for topic repetition throughout the

interviews, which is pertinent to more quantitative analysis. Semi-structured questions are also

open enough that interviewees will respond in more depth, allowing for qualitative analysis.

Finally, I elected to use participant observation as a third method, because in addition to

document analysis and interviews, it provides the opportunity to see firsthand and take part in the

actual processes of the reconstruction program. Ultimately, these three methods complement

each other and are capable of providing a holistic perspective of the reconstruction efforts.

The interview questions were constructed by focusing on several topics that Lumanti and

myself wished to delve more into. For beneficiaries, the first questions addressed the experiences

of the interviewee throughout the earthquake event and their experiences in the years following.

These questions related to how they funded reconstruction, what resources they used, and the

status of the rebuilding of their home. Other questions related to their relationship with Lumanti,

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including how they connected with the organization, the services they were provided, and any

recommendations they have for improving the program. For staff members of Lumanti and

members of the women’s cooperatives, the questions focused on the structure and processes of

the reconstruction program, their own experiences in facilitating those processes, and how they

collaborated with other stakeholders.

4.3 Timeline

The project timeline from the time of proposal submission through thesis submission can

be seen in the table below. IRB approval was received in May and data collection took place

from June 3 through August 3 of 2019. This work incorporated semi-structured interviews,

document analysis, and participant observation.

Table 2: Project Timeline

Project Timeline March April May June July August September

October 2019-

March 2020

Project Proposal

IRB Write-up and Review

Literature Review

Interviews

Document analysis

Participant Observation

Data Analysis Deliverable Completion

Thesis Write-up and Submission

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4.4 Methods

Prior to departing for field research, I put together a general literature review of disasters

and reconstruction, including disaster rebuilding programs. The literature review also included

South Asian/Nepal responses to disasters to ground the data locally.

For the field research in the summer of 2019, there were three major components of the

project: document analysis, interviews and participant observation. Document analysis consisted

of the review of Lumanti documents pertaining to the reconstruction program from the

implementation of the program through 2019. These documents consisted of manuals,

presentations, training materials, and monthly, quarterly, and yearly reports. The limitation with

this aspect was that some of the documentation was written in Nepali and is essentially not

helpful to the research without a translator.

4.4.1 Interviewee Recruitment

The interview component consisted of 26 semi-structured interviews with beneficiaries of

the reconstruction program (11) and staff members of Lumanti that worked in the reconstruction

program (8). Also encompassed were members of women’s cooperatives and users’

groups/committees (6), and one local politician that Lumanti worked with throughout

reconstruction.

The process for recruitment of interviewees among the beneficiaries of Lumanti’s

reconstruction program mirrored Lumanti’s own process of beneficiary recruitment. Following

the earthquake, Lumanti reached out to the women’s economic and savings cooperatives with

whom they already had an established relationship. The women in these cooperatives had an in-

depth knowledge of their own communities and were more easily able to identify and connect

Lumanti with potential beneficiaries that would meet Lumanti’s prioritization requirements. My

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own methods mirrored this pathway of communication. In the initial recruitment phase, I spoke

with Lumanti staff, who then connected me with the women’s cooperatives. Through these

cooperatives, I was able to identify and connect with potential interviewees.

Amongst the interviewees, I interviewed 11 beneficiaries of whom half were Newar of

the Maharjan caste. As discussed in the introduction and in the caste section of the literature

review, Maharjans are typically the traditional agricultural caste of the Newars and make up the

largest group in the Newar community. Furthermore, there was a fairly equitable representation

of male and female beneficiaries. Of the beneficiaries, many had families. Two beneficiary

interviewees were widows whose husbands died after the earthquake. These women are

considered single women and received monthly funding from the national government. Half of

the interviewed beneficiaries experienced the loss of at least one family member as a result of the

earthquake. As per Lumanti's prioritized groups for potential beneficiaries, none of the

interviewer beneficiaries would have been able to reconstruct their home without financial

assistance.

Each interview was tailored towards each respective category of interviewee. For

example, while all interviewees were asked about their level of satisfaction with Lumanti’s

reconstruction program, the question was rephrased to reflect their differing levels of

involvement with the program. All interviews were conducted in person and audio recorded.

Informed consent was obtained from each participant prior to the start of the interview. Interview

times varied. The shortest interview lasted 19 minutes because the interviewee had a cold but

still wanted to take part in the interview. Relatedly, the longest interview was more than three

hours. For the most part, the interviews took place at Lumanti’s head office in Thapathali, as

well as in the towns of Macchegaon, Siddhipur and Thecho.

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The names of participants are not identified in the interview transcripts. Any names

mentioned within an interview were replaced with a randomized ID. Randomized IDs consist of

the numerical annotation of the month and the day (July 15 is 715). Also they entail the

abbreviation for the interviewee's category (RR- reconstruction recipient, RT - reconstruction

team member, and KS - key staff member). Also, the number associated with that interview's

position in the number of interviews that day (second interview that day - 2). For example a

reconstruction recipient whose interview took place on July 15th and was the second interview of

the day was identified as 715RR2. For the write-up, I randomly selected pseudonyms using

Nepali names and assigned them based on gender. In Chapter 5, each interviewee is referred to

by a specific name.

Participant observation consisted of working daily at Lumanti and interacting with and

observing Lumanti staff, particularly the staffing structure and how they communicate. For

participant observation, my initial plan was to work alongside the reconstruction team, observing

trainings, construction methods, supply chain management, community interaction,

communication, coordination and planning. However, the reconstruction program had already

been completed and I was unable to conduct this aspect of the research.

4.4.2 Analysis

All interviews were transcribed and analyzed for emergent themes. Interview data was

uploaded into MAXQDA, a qualitative data analysis software. From there, data was coded and

analyzed for themes. Typically, the researcher cross-referenced interview data from the three

categories of interview participants. Drawing on the data obtained from document analysis,

interviews, and participant observation, I then connected the information gathered to develop a

more cohesive picture of the reconstruction program’s processes.

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CHAPTER 5

RESULTS

In this chapter, I discuss the data obtained through document analysis, interviews, and

participant observation. These findings, beginning with the challenges of reconstruction,

illustrate the impacts of the reconstruction process .

5.1 Challenges of Reconstruction

Based upon interview data, issues included ineffectiveness in supporting reconstruction

in the peri-urban communities under study. Lack of governmental capacity and confusion about

policies, building codes, and bylaws motivated communities to plan their own reconstruction.

Individual households within communities would rebuild early, prior to the release of the

earthquake victim’s list by the national government. In certain wards, early builders effectively

bypassed permitting processes, which were not put into place by the NRA until the spring of

2016. The communities themselves would work with or establish community groups that focused

on reconstruction and plan how they, as a community, would address reconstruction.

As discussed in Chapter 3, the Nepalese government created the NRA with the intention

of delivering effective reconstruction throughout Nepal. However, the “top-down” approach of

centralized governance, and the inability and inflexibility to collaborate with stakeholders at

more localized, community-based levels, created a significant disconnect between the NRA and

the households and communities in the urban periphery. There were several barriers to

establishing firm reconstruction programs in both urban and rural settings in Nepal, discouraging

many NGOs from gaining a foothold in the recovery and rebuilding processes. One major

restriction the NRA implemented for NGOs is a prohibition of direct involvement in housing

reconstruction, particularly as pertains to the provision of financial assistance or building

73

materials to residents. The NRA’s reasoning was NGOs could not comply with building codes.

NGOs were informed that their efforts should be confined to one area, such a village or district,

and were instructed that no reconstruction projects should target a specific group of people as it

could undermine the government’s sovereignty. As a result, there were few NGOs working in

reconstruction and even fewer acting as intermediaries to create a bridge between the

government and those communities, resulting in vast disparities in who received information and

reconstruction aid.

Regarding the lists released by the NRA identifying those considered earthquake victims,

many members of already peripheral communities faced further marginalization in

reconstruction. These individuals are citizens, but do not have the same rights as those who are

included in the government’s assessment. In addition to their physical location on the urbanized

periphery, they were also further cut off from access to resources due to government oversight

which resulted from centralized versus decentralized disaster governance. Consequently,

community members were required to draw on support from their own communities. Many of

these individuals still reside in temporary shelter, either next to their damaged home, on their

land, or in a public area. Many individuals must try to subsist by growing crops within the small

plot of land upon which their shelter stands in addition to participating in other informal or

formal labor practices to earn income (Field notes 2019).

For those who are identified by the Nepalese government as earthquake victims, there

still remain significant challenges. As the NRA only provides up to 300,000 rupees (2,600 USD)

for grant support for most beneficiaries (those who lost a family member in the earthquake or are

considered “vulnerable” receive slightly more) many beneficiaries still need to find a way to

finance the reconstruction of their home. Some either drew on their existing informal labor

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efforts or created new methods to garner income. These economic activities include shops and

restaurants within the home, renting out space for commercial use, sewing, handicrafts, and

agricultural work. For example, Binsa, a single woman who recently lost her husband, supports

herself through income gained from renting out part of the ground floor of her home for a shop.

Fuli, a mother of two in Macchegaon, supplements her family’s income through the operation of

a “common shop” (selling common goods such as noodles, biscuits, and beer) in her home, as

well as the sale of Newari food. Hasri, another woman from Macchegaon and member of the

local women’s cooperative, supplements her income through sewing and cleaning in addition to

agricultural work. Here, she describes her efforts for survival:

So, during the festival, I will sew some clothes, but rest of season, for festivals, there are most important festivals here…and during other time I got a cleaning income and agriculture, from the agriculture, but that is only enough for the getting food.

As this excerpt clearly evidences, even with participation in informal and/or formal labor, in

addition to the grant received from the NRA, many still struggle to fund reconstruction.

Other options available are to take out loans and/or to sell their land. One interviewee

received grant funding from Lumanti, took out a loan for 900,000 rupees from their local

women’s cooperative, took out a 400,000 rupee (~3,320 USD) loan from the bank, and sold 3

aanas (roughly .02 acres or 10sqft) of land to fund the reconstruction of their home. This

multilayered strategy for funding reconstruction was common amongst the interviewed

beneficiaries. Those who take out loans are required to pay high interest rates to the lender (up

to 24-36% for private lenders), even through community lending organizations, such as women’s

cooperatives, reaching up to 22 percent. These complicated strategies require the individual to

continually find ways to garner income to pay back the loan, in addition to the investment of

time and energy in rebuilding.

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Those who sell their land often find that form of funding does give them enough to

rebuild, and in the manner and style which they prefer, which varied between vernacular

architecture and modern-style concrete structures. This is due to the increasing property values in

those communities over the past decades, making the land a valuable commodity. However, the

loss of the land may have deleterious impacts in the future, as many of these individuals must

work the land to generate their income. So, while they have money in the short-term, they may

face financial issues after that money runs out. This sentiment was pointed out by three staff

members of Lumanti. The following quote encapsulates the consequences of selling land to fund

reconstruction as narrated by Palisha, an architect employed at Lumanti:

I think we, one of the biggest regrets we see is, many of the families whom we supported were farmers. They were based in agriculture and built their house. They sold their agricultural land. I think now you cannot see the impact. But later on, like after years, that will have an impact in their lives. I think because they are now required to purchase like vegetables or like grains [instead of grow them]. So now after selling the land, it's adding up to the expenses. It's having a long-term effect on them. Land is an increasingly valuable commodity, and the sale of land enabled many

beneficiaries to fund reconstruction. However, as Palisha out, this was at the cost of viable land

on which they grew crops on which to subsist and sell for income. Conversely, Nelson discusses

diversification of investments resulting from the use or sale of owned land, for entrepreneurial

opportunities such as schools, stores, and other businesses (Nelson 2015, 271). With this, the sale

of land to fund reconstruction could also present an opportunity to garner income in ways that do

not involve working the land.

5.2 Government Issues

There were several barriers to establishing firm reconstruction programs in both urban

and rural settings in Nepal, discouraging many NGOs from gaining a foothold in the recovery

and rebuilding processes. One major restriction the NRA implemented for NGOs is a

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prohibition of direct involvement in housing reconstruction, particularly as pertains to the

provision of financial assistance or building materials to residents. The NRA’s reasoning was

NGOs could not comply with building codes. NGOs were informed that their efforts should be

confined to one area, such a village or district, and were instructed that no reconstruction projects

should target a specific group of people as it could undermine the government’s sovereignty.

In additional to the immense financial challenges associated with financing

reconstruction, lack of transparency from the NRA and other governmental entities

disadvantaged many potential beneficiaries. For example, there was an initial lack of

understanding in regard to the actual procedures for the application process for reconstruction.

Residents did not know where to go to even begin applying for reconstruction support. They

also had difficulty navigating the process itself and actively sought help. This can be attributed

in most cases to the complexity of the process, and literacy issues in some cases.

Lumanti’s own approach consisted of working the wards and municipalities, meetings

with stakeholders, and connecting with different community groups. Lumanti made a significant

effort in understanding these processes in order to best aid those undergoing the reconstruction

process. In the following quote, the coordinator for one of the project communities discusses

collaboration inherent in Lumanti’s process:

So twice a week I would go to the cooperative office and I would meet the social mobilizers, the staffs of the cooperative office and I would go to the field to understand the situation, right? I would talk to the ward office. Then it would be sort of just observation around the area and trying to understand.

This quote reflects Lumanti’s “on-the-ground” approach to implementing the program,

wherein they would attempt to act as a bridge, or mediator between the government and

the community.

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5.2.1 Revision of Grant Amount

During the early stages of Lumanti’s reconstruction program, Lumanti’s community-

based approach was complicated by the government’s announcement that grant support from the

government would increase from NRs. 200,000 (~1650 USD) to NRs. 300,000 (~2,600 USD).

Prior to this announcement, Lumanti had begun the selection of beneficiaries and set numbers of

houses in each community that would benefit from the program. With the grant increase,

Lumanti realized they would also need to increase their grant amount, which had also been NRs.

200,000, to match the government’s new reconstruction grant.

After consultation with MISEREOR, Lumanti decided they could increase the amount

but would also have to lower the overall number of beneficiaries. This resulted in a decrease

from providing support to 600 families to only 470 families total in the four communities

(Lumanti 2019). This decrease in beneficiaries is essentially two sides of the same coin. The

change did allow for families to receive more money towards reconstruction. However, those

removed from the program, in addition to not receiving funding, also did not receive technical

support that would have been beneficial in navigating the reconstruction process.

5.2.2 Land

In addition to financial constraints, one of the most significant challenges faced in the

course of the reconstruction project related to land, specifically land titles and distribution of

property within families. In order to receive the reconstruction grant support from the

government, one had to possess a land title. However, that is very often not the case in many of

the communities, as expressed in the following quote by Arun, a member of the technical team in

Thecho:

The main challenge was for the, there was the land issue. People were wanting to build the houses, but they didn't have the proper documents. And, the process of making the

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documents was really difficult for them because, like in government offices, they have to go for several times to make the documents and then understand the process. So it was difficult for them. Documentation was an immense issue, particularly for individuals not familiar with

government requirements and policies for the documents that are needed and the processes for

submitting the paperwork. In addition, many individuals did not possess the necessary

documents, particularly land titles. In response to this issue, Lumanti took part in advocacy work

at the local and municipal levels to help consult on bylaws in favor of those who do not possess

land titles but do have valid ownership of the land, and therefore the houses that sit upon the

land. The issue of possessing ownership without land titles was explained to me by Griva, a

beneficiary from Siddhipur:

The house, it does not have land title. With the permission of the ward and verifying by the ward, that okay this house is being living from the years from the generations by the owner. That is why the get the permission from the ward office. And we start for the building. That is called sarjamin, so without land title, next one is ward provide some kind of the letter. That means the surrounding people, the adjoining neighbors. They provide permission, they give the written agreement that this area, this is the area that you own, and we do not demand in future. You do not have land title, but the land title belongs to you. That is sarjamin and it is verified by the ward in permission with the neighbors.

As can be noted from the above quote, individuals depend on other members of their community,

specifically their neighbors, to verify ownership in the absence of a land title. These agreements

require close communal ties and cooperation, and greatly indicates an intimacy within the

community.

Schematics versus actualized land measurements can also be tied into land issues. Often

the existing plans on file at the ward office or the land belonging to beneficiaries did not match

up to the actual measurements of the land on which the beneficiaries live. This created a

problem, in that if the plans do not match the actual land measurements filed with the ward or

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municipal office, the government could not grant approval for reconstruction. This issue led to

significant delays in reconstruction, as beneficiaries would need to find the financial and

technical resources to have the plans redeveloped or find a way to negotiate a compromise with

the local ward and municipality. As pertains to the financial aspect, the cost of hiring an

individual to develop the architectural plans for a home averaged to approximately 30,000 rupees

(~244 USD), a cost most beneficiaries could not afford on their own. This was a significant

barrier as one would have to spend their own money in order to even be allowed to receive any

funding for reconstruction. Two beneficiaries reported experiencing this barrier in their own

reconstruction process. They also reported that Lumanti’s field office worked with the local

government and the beneficiaries to develop and finalize plans that matched the actual land

measurements. These collaborations were conducted at the ward and, occasionally, the municipal

level.

5.3 Family Disputes

Family disputes were cited by five of the eight interviewed Lumanti staff members as one

of the most common challenges to their reconstruction program in Kathmandu Valley. In the

case of one of the beneficiaries, a man living with his wife in a five-story home in Siddhipur, the

beneficiary had owned only a 0.91 meter (three foot) strip of the home prior to the earthquake.

This was a result of equal inheritance with his brothers. Due to partial ownership of property,

some individuals cannot claim full ownership and are therefore unable to possess a land title for

the property. This makes the individual ineligible to apply for reconstruction funding through the

government. In order to gain full ownership of the property, the individual must have the written

agreement of all of their brothers, granting permission to place the land title in the name of the

individual. As can be expected, not all family members will agree and may vie for the property

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for themselves. Five of the eleven interviewed beneficiaries discussed experiencing this issue

themselves or having a neighbor that experienced this issue. These disputes halt the ability to

move forward in the reconstruction process. Lumanti reported sending their social mobilizers,

and occasionally, the coordinators in the respective areas, to work with the families to attempt to

find a resolution. However, this endeavor was often unsuccessful as the families could not

always find a compromise.

Through the interviews, I did not find evidence that the social mobilizers had any formal

training in social work or conflict resolution. As discussed previously, many of the social

mobilizers were members of the women’s cooperatives and/or locals of the community.

Navigating the complexities of disaster case management at the household level can be a

significant challenge for individuals that do not have a firm background in this type of work, as

evidenced by the difficulties in resolving family disputes.

5.4 Challenges in the Private Market

The issues in the private market brought about another common barrier to reconstruction,

which was the lack of available material and labor to rebuild damaged or destroyed homes.

Following disasters, there is a high demand for supplies and contractors; Kathmandu Valley was

no different. The flurry of rebuilding activity across communities at the beginning of the

reconstruction process made it difficult for many people to find the resources they need. Demand

for construction materials and contractors at this time was so great there were not enough

resources to go around.

In two of Lumanti’s publications, authors explained their support for obtaining

construction materials :

Procurement of housing construction materials such as bricks, sand, cement, rod and wood was overseen by the committees formed within the communities to manage the

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construction. Throughout the procurement process, Lumanti procurement guidelines were followed. As needed, government procurement guidelines were also followed (Beneath the Rubbles publication).

The committees mentioned in this segment are women’s cooperatives and reconstruction-focused

user committees/groups. Within the interviews, no details were provided on how these

committees procured the materials, only that beneficiaries had difficulties in obtaining

construction supplies and hiring labor. Lumanti itself provided consultation on type and quality

of materials to use in the construction process and advised some beneficiaries to pause

reconstruction until materials became available.

One interviewee, Palisha, stated they advised beneficiaries and communities to take a

staggered approach to reconstruction, wherein one set of households rebuild and share resources,

then another set will rebuild, then another, and so on and so forth. This method would result in

decreasing the likelihood of the depletion of resources and labor due to too high of a demand. In

her interview, Palisha discussed the lack of materials and the challenges individuals faced when

rebuilding:

When we were working, there was lack of construction materials, because everybody's working at the same time. Lots of houses were being constructed and the price hike was there, so people, it was very difficult for to complete the house in time and also the scarcity of space to store the construction material. If one building is being constructed, he would store his construction materials in the court and other people will have to wait. When he is finished, then it is my turn to reconstruction. So the reconstruction process was so slow. Thus far in this chapter, I have presented findings that relate to the general challenges of

reconstruction following the earthquakes. From this point, I discuss findings that relate

specifically to Lumanti and how they navigated the reconstruction process, as intermediaries and

as collaborators with other groups, such as the women’s cooperatives.

Lumanti took pride in their emphasis on collaboration. Of the eight staff members

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interviewed, seven cited the collaborative approach as a key element in the reconstruction

program. Lumanti staff agreed that if people are actively involved in making decisions that affect

their communities and are active throughout the entire process, they have agency in

reconstruction. Lumanti staff also (five of the eight staff members) repeatedly stated they did not

wish to do things for the communities, but instead wanted the communities to be engaged in

making change, as illustrated by Chaha, Lumanti Housing Manager, in the following quote

where she emphasizes the need for community members and beneficiaries to have an active role

in the disaster recovery process:

Acceptance of the people and the local stakeholders and the level of participation in the process. Like they have their say and then they are like very active members through the entire process. It's not like we are doing it, but it's, we are facilitating the process to make it like, they're accountable. It's a very transparent process. The point of Lumanti’s approach was to act as facilitators for these communities.

As facilitators, they would have to collaborate with multiple groups and stakeholders to

facilitate these processes. One example of this is their deeply entrenched relationship

with the women’s cooperatives in three of the four communities. This reflects

Maldonado’s argument that disaster survivors should have agency and be treated as equal

partners in the process, actively participating in disaster governance.

5.5 Women’s Economic and Savings Cooperatives

Through the research I discovered Lumanti had actually been directly involved in the

creation of these economic and savings cooperatives as part of a development initiative in

microfinance. This formation of the savings groups was discussed by Sabin Ninglekhu, where he

describes Lumanti’s first foray into some communities as outsiders to promote savings initiatives

in communities around Kathmandu Valley (2016, 85). Lumanti was seeking to apply an

approach towards poverty alleviation, targeting poor women living on the urban periphery. With

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Lumanti’s direct support, some of these organizations grew in size from 5-10 women to over

2,000 women. As a result, they began to build their networks and create a foothold in their

respective communities. In essence, Lumanti created groups that would have the capacity to

work with them in the future. For example, the women’s cooperatives provided resources to

Lumanti throughout the entirety of the reconstruction process. The women were able to direct

Lumanti to potential beneficiaries for the reconstruction program. They did not just give names

to the organization, they also walked with Lumanti staff through the communities to speak with

potential beneficiaries. Several women from the cooperatives also acted as social mobilizers for

Lumanti. In addition, they collaborated with Lumanti to implement community mapping,

livelihood trainings, and provided loans to members (many of whom were Lumanti

beneficiaries) for reconstruction support.

Cooperative loans were provided to members for the purpose of rebuilding damaged or

destroyed homes. As previously mentioned, the interest rates for these loans ranged from 16-22

percent and lenders had an agreed upon period of two years to pay back the loan. The interest

rates are higher than the interest rates provided by the banks, which averaged around 14 percent.

However, many individuals still took out loans through the cooperatives. There are myriad

reasons for this. The first is that many people did not qualify for loans through the bank because

they lacked the necessary paperwork, be it citizenship cards or land titles. The application

process through the cooperatives was less stringent, in that they did not often require those

specific documents. Secondly, many individuals also did not possess collateral the bank could

possess in the event the lendee was unable to pay back the loan. Finally, some individuals would

take out loans through both the banks and the cooperatives because one source of funding was

not sufficient to finance the full reconstruction of their homes.

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Ease of loan approval was not the only reason community members sought financial aid

from the women’s cooperatives. A significant pattern that arose from the interviews was the

element of trust. Women’s cooperatives are organizations at the community level and consist of

community members. As such, these organizations are more familiar to potential lendees and

were more likely be trusted than banks or private lenders from outside their own community. The

benefits of this trust did not only apply to community members but also applied to Lumanti, who

was directly connected with the cooperatives. If a community trusts a community organization, it

is likely they will trust other organizations that are connected to it. Lumanti was able to use this

trust to scale up their efforts in the three communities with established cooperatives.

In another form of collaboration, Lumanti acted as a bridge, or intermediary, between the

government and community residents. One example of how Lumanti worked with and around

the government is through bylaws.

5.6 Bylaws

Navigating the application process itself was a difficult prospect, but navigating policies,

or the lack thereof, at the local and national levels was a significant challenge for beneficiaries

seeking to reconstruct their homes. At the ward and municipal levels of government, there were

initially no bylaws (policies) in place to specifically address the disaster reconstruction process at

the residential level. The districts were also changed after the earthquake, which also led to

changes in wards. In addition, the delay in forming the NRA led to a lack of clarity on the

expectations at the national level. This led to further delays in reconstruction. Many of the

Lumanti staff discussed this issue and highlighted their attempt to work around this problem.

Below are quotes from key staff members of Lumanti, one of whom is an architect (1st quote)

and the other is Chaha, the housing manager (2nd quote).

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And in Thecho was, at that time, started working on the bylaws because we realized that there was no particular bylaws to conserve this heritage area. So we started working on the bylaws. There were no bylaws. And we tried to work with the local engineers. We worked with the local politicians. We even talked with the municipalities… And so many municipal approvals despite the fact that there was no bylaws and the municipality could not approve even a single house in that area before we came. So actually, what Lumanti's strategy was, we don't wait for the government. So that is what I was trying to do. We don't wait for the government rules to come; we don't wait for the government decisions to come. We will not even comply to some of the government rules because if we do that, we will not be supporting the people. That was our strategy. We took very bold decisions. As can be noted from these quotes, Lumanti had an approach of collaboration with local

political entities at the ward and municipal levels to work through the process of gaining

approvals for reconstruction. On the flip side, they did not always wait for these bylaws to come

through. Lumanti, as an organization, prioritized the beneficiaries. They felt that the beneficiaries

and the communities needed help. As such, they made the conscious choice to work around the

government to enact change. Chaha, the housing manager, had more to say about how Lumanti

worked around existing regulations:

Chaha: We broke a lot of regulations with central government. I: What would have happened if the national government saw you breaking regulations? Chaha: They know. They know. But they have other issues than to get up and go after one NGO. They saw that we are doing the job but like they are not, we are not following the regulation. They called us for several meetings and then said you're not doing correctly, na na na na. And then later on they said they take action against them but they have their own other issues so they don't have the time to take any actions. But since we were working closely with the local governments, they, they also consulted with the local governments and they were very positive on what we were doing, so they not do much. The strategy of collaboration with the local governments allowed Lumanti, as an

organization, some flexibility in how they implemented their program, to the extent where they

did not necessarily need as much oversight by the national government. Their role as

intermediaries became weighted more to the community level as transparency was clearer in the

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localized context than in the national framework.

5.7 Rejection of Traditional Architecture

Although there was a high level of participation in the reconstruction process, between

Lumanti and beneficiaries in particular, there were still some sticking points. One such point

was the desire of beneficiaries, opposite Lumanti’s own wishes, to rebuild their homes in a way

that veered from traditional styles. Traditional houses in Newar settlements are associated with

construction methods utilizing bricks and mud plaster, wood framing and ornate wooden details,

and thatch and tin roofs. In opposition, modern houses consist of concrete reinforced by metal

rods, brick-cement masonry, and concrete roofs and cement plaster. Unfortunately, oversight by

the government toward reconstruction of traditional features was lacking, particularly in areas on

the periphery. Again, for these communities, the intention of centralized urban planning by the

government did not quite come to fruition. In fact, many individuals within the communities had

other ideas in mind.

While members of public user groups, women’s cooperatives, and many of Lumanti’s

staff members agreed that traditional structures should be conserved, many individuals rejected

the reconstruction of residential traditional-style structures and showed a preference for modern

concrete structures, particularly structures that can be built higher to add more space in the home.

This preference for building higher to accommodate for space was well discussed by Anjan, a

Lumanti staff member:

In order to have a heritage compliant building, your house should be 35 feet high. So people want five-story because you've seen the small plot area. And they are at least five people living in that house. It's the size of this room. A house is the size of this room (referring to meeting room where interview took place). Basically, every size is this room. So all they can do is have a room, a toilet, and a staircase. That's the average size of the house. So there's one room, a toilet, and a staircase. That's all they have. So they're five people living in that house. They at least need five-story. With two people living in each floor they need kitchen and maybe one living room. You will at least need five-

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story. That's the basic. If there's 35 feet and you can't go to the five-story, you could have seven feet here, each floor. And people are okay with that. People are willing to compromise the height of the floor. Seven feet is okay. But even that is not normal. You have to have eight feet. What is that? And people are making five-story, which is 45 feet, because eight feet is what? Minimum. And now the government is saying, "We can't give you approval because you have five-story." And people are rebuilding without municipal approval. They're putting the facade, all the traditional elements, and the brick and all that. They're doing it. But they want five-story and they're building five-story. Everybody's building five-story. 90% of the houses are going with five-story, but the government does not want to recognize the five-story. Government saying, "You have to bring it down to three and a half."

The eight feet Anjan refers to in this quote is the regulation passed by the government stating

that ceilings within residential homes are required to be at 2.4 meters (nearly eight feet

high)(National Building Code 2015, 13). However, that footage requires a compromise of space

in terms of how many floors a home can be built to.

The trend towards modernization and the concern over the safety of traditional-style

housing came through in the research. In several interviews, Lumanti staff expressed frustration

on the part of organizational partners that many residents prefer not to rebuild their homes in the

traditional style, even refusing to incorporate traditional elements in a modern style home (field

interviews 2019). This is highlighted in the following quote by Sanjiya, a young architect that

worked in Siddhipur during the reconstruction program:

The reconstruction program … it was obviously beneficial for the people, but, to the built environment, we think we tried to like convince them to build it in like a traditional technology using, but like they were like slightly, they didn't agree with that. So everyone was building with concrete. So, uh, we're quite a little disappointed with that. But for people it was good for, because I went there before earthquake and Siddhipur looked really beautiful back then and after the reconstruction happened, like everyone, they change technology to concrete and basically the environment there was not as good as before. I: Why didn't people want to rebuild using traditional technological methods? Sanjiya: They didn't feel it was safe. And they felt they had high maintenance costs in terms of technology so maybe that was the main point. And like concrete, once you build

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it you don't have to maintain it. Or maybe that, that was the main point in like a concrete, once you have it, you don't have to maintain it. The concern over safety was a prevailing theme in the research, wherein beneficiaries did

not want to rebuild their homes in the traditional styles using mud and brick. After seeing their

homes damaged so intensively by the earthquake, and in many cases, seeing family members

injured or killed inside those homes, many residents felt unsafe and did not wish to risk

rebuilding in the same style for fear of the same results. This also ties into the perceptions

perpetuated by media after the earthquake, especially those which reinforced concrete structures

are more earthquake-safe (Nelson 2015). In reality, those perceptions may be based more upon

disparities in enforcement of building codes and the quality of the materials and contractor work

than upon rebuilding using previous models (Nelson 2015).

Lumanti staff and some interviewees from partner organizations expressed deep regret

that many beneficiaries did not wish to rebuild their homes in the traditional style. Lumanti

technical teams consistently tried to convince beneficiaries to do so, and even considered

incentivizing the beneficiaries. However, most beneficiaries were determined to utilize the

funding to rebuild in ways they felt were safer, fit more into the architectural trends of

modernity, did not require constant maintenance, and allowed them to erect structures at higher

heights, granting the beneficiaries the ability to use the bottom floors as commercial space and

still have substantial living space for the family above.

5.8 Essential Networking: The Challenges of Expanding beyond the Valley

Centering on the broader reconstruction efforts by Lumanti, I would like to focus on one

particular community in which Lumanti worked. In terms of reconstruction, Chitlang was an

entirely different project from the other three communities because Lumanti did not have an

established network or preexisting connection with any of the community’s organizations or their

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members. As such, the technical team in Chitlang had to prioritize community relations to gain

rapport. Dinesh, the project coordinator of the reconstruction program in Chitlang, was the sole

interviewee concerning that community. In the quote below, Dinesh shares some insight into the

challenges Lumanti faced in establishing itself in the community:

So, uh, our challenge was to establish the Lumanti there. Lumanti did not work in that entire district throughout so many years. It's a totally new organization in the district, in the district headquarter, among the government offices, in the community. Wherever you go, Lumanti is new there. So our challenge was to make Lumanti known to them; what Lumanti does, what is its history. Then we had to establish why we are there. Then we had to also make people understand that what will be different if you get associated with Lumanti rather than you wait for government reconstruction program. That was the most difficult part. And we had to, we have to attract people to Lumanti rather than uh, wait for government. So we had to, we had to show them the competitive advantage part. There was significant backlash against Lumanti from the local government and many

community members and organizations. The collaborative approach Lumanti prided itself on was

not possible there, as can be seen from the following quote from Dinesh:

Even the ward chairperson who was elected later on after this local election: he was asking the same question even till the last day. Why is Lumanti interfering in government’s project? Lumanti's part of that project was 150 households, whereas the total beneficiaries there were around seven hundred. So we were taking just a chunk, the around 25%. So you are taking only 25% and you are telling us to do what to do and what not. Why should we wait? Why should you, we follow your orders? We follow government orders. Either you do in that 600, 700 households, then we will understand what you say. You're doing a small part and then you are bringing in so many things. So that was very difficult.

According to Dinesh, Lumanti reacted against the local government’s “claim” on reconstruction

in the community, and despite the backlash, sought to work in the community. “Why should we

wait?” Here again, one can see that Lumanti did not believe in waiting for the government, and

often acted independently of them.

However, it is important to ask why Lumanti was so insistent on working within a

community that provided so much resistance. As “outsiders,” there is no established trust and no

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existing networks to utilize to help ease into the community. Unfortunately, Dinesh was the only

individual associated with Chitlang that I was able to interview, resulting in a single perspective

of Lumanti’s reception in the community. However, one can interpret from the above quotes

that the organization was facing resistance from two different groups, the community members

and the government officials. Lumanti had to persuade individuals to become beneficiaries of

the program, though the methods of this persuasion is unclear. This implies that the community

members themselves were resistant to, or at the very least uncertain, about the presence of the

organization. The resistance of the government officials was more outright. This brings one to

ask why Lumanti was so insistent. One possible reason is budgetary concerns. Lumanti was

allocated funding for the reconstruction program, in a specific area, and needed to expend the

allocated funding in order to continue the program and continue to receive funding.

In addition, Lumanti attempted, as they did with other communities, to recruit a social

mobilizer from within Chitlang to help establish those needed relationships and gain trust. While

social mobilizers in the other communities were successful members of their respective teams,

Dinesh notes that was not the case in Chitlang:

For that, we had one dedicated person for that social mobilizer. He's a local person. But uh, I didn't know what the problem with him was. He didn't cooperate very well for a long time. We had to do it ourselves. He was there but he was on and off. He used to come to office sometimes, sometimes he didn't. It was very difficult. He always telling that I am in field looking for people going around convincing them, like that. So we had, we had a big problem, we team, and we complained to the head office also. Actually we wanted him to be fired and bring in another person. But the head office didn't do that, and we had to deal with him and all our burden, all his burden, we, we had to get it. That was the most difficult. He being a local, he supported very less to us.

The social mobilizer described in the quote hindered rather than helped the project in Chitlang.

While it would have been beneficial to find someone else, there was a lack of motivation within

the head office to do so. From the interview analysis, my impression is that there was a

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significant disconnect, possibly due to the distance and subsequent lack of oversight, between

Chitlang’s field office and the head office. With the community not being as close to

headquarters as the other three, there could have been a lack of knowledge or understanding on

the part of headquarters as to the difficulties the field staff were facing.

While the Chitlang operation did eventually meet its reconstruction goals, the

reconstruction program there was extended by nine months due to the continued difficulties

establishing the organization in the community. This further highlights the importance of having

an existing relationship with the community, as Lumanti consistently encountered challenges

establishing themselves in Chitlang and gaining the trust of the community.

5.9 Lumanti Affiliates

I was interested in ascertaining why individuals chose Lumanti to aid them in

reconstruction over government resources. Why did some beneficiaries, particularly those who

had not previously heard about Lumanti, choose to work with the organization? From my

interviews, the most common answers, evidenced by the following quotes, were that residents

did not have a land title and were therefore unable to receive funding from the government.

Other reasons included that Lumanti is accessible - that beneficiaries were familiar with the

organization. Through these networks, still others heard from people who had worked with

Lumanti, either as a beneficiary or with a women’s cooperative or community group. Chantin, a

young member of the women’s cooperative in Macchegoan, had this to say about Lumanti’s

process:

Lumanti is working with two different types of beneficiaries: with title and without land title. So those with the land title, they will be processed through the government process that municipal approval, with the permit of the municipality. Those beneficiaries who do not have the land title, they will follow the rules of Lumanti.

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This quote indicates that Lumanti can accept beneficiaries that do not possess land titles and

even has the ability to provide the funding without oversight by the government. In this next

quote, Sajit, a beneficiary of Lumanti, also points out the lack of government oversight:

The government haven’t supervise. I don’t have land title and Lumanti provide small photos, passport-sized photos. So all these. And red card, that is provided by the government. To have red card [earthquake victim card], we have to have the land title. So if I do not have land title, I do not have that card. What Sajit is pointing out is that, without a land title, residents, regardless if they are a

citizen of Nepal, do not have access to necessary resources through the government. As a result,

they needed an organization that was both accessible and willing to work with them to rebuild

and/or repair, despite the lack of a land title. In the following quote, Tri Ratna, a beneficiary

from Macchegaon well explains why he preferred to work with Lumanti:

There's no other organization working reconstruction here. And, Lumanti [is] quite easy. And you know, quite accessible also. And I preferred Lumanti. And that is why I want to work with Lumanti, as I had already saw the work of Lumanti and trusted them also. So working with the Lumanti, I have knowledge about different aspects about land, land issues, and, uh, you know, the blueprint of the land. I helped set rules on the okay, so this is my land, this is our land, I have the knowledge of the issues. Maybe all the different things that have been working with at Lumanti. Since maybe. So that is why I prefers to work with Lumanti rather than government.

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CHAPTER 6

DISCUSSION

6.1 Challenges

Lumanti’s efforts have herein related to providing housing and lobbying for housing

rights for the urban poor. The earthquake provided an opportunity for Lumanti to not only

expand the type of work they do within the valley, but also to expand beyond Kathmandu Valley

into other areas of Nepal. Lumanti was interested in an evaluation of their reconstruction

program to determine the feasibility of conducting a reconstruction program in other regions and

possible areas of improvement for future reconstruction efforts. I served in this capacity, and

learned there were several key topics that came through in the research, the most significant of

which was challenge.

In different contexts, the concept of challenge arose as both barriers in reconstruction and

as forms of resistance against other entities. As discussed at length throughout this thesis, there

were significant challenges in reconstruction stemming from low incomes, deep inequalities

between rich and poor and urban and rural, and a growing dependence on foreign aid (Kernot

2006). Adding into this mix, the political instability prior to and following the earthquake further

compounded the disaster, as well as a centralized approach to disaster governance in a country

that has far more variability than can possibly be met by the current framework.

6.1.1 Challenge 1 Land Rights

Land issues were also a prevalent challenge, particularly the absence of land titles as well

as family disputes over ownership. These issues created significant barriers in Lumanti’s

reconstruction efforts, even disabling Lumanti from being able to help certain families who could

not resolve their disputes. The question, “Who owns the land?” was also pervasive. Is ownership

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strictly based on documentation such as land titles, or is it generational through inheritance and

some form of historical attachment? Still other scenarios include individuals who inherit land

and work that land. However, they do not possess the actual deed for that specific plot and

therefore do not claim legal ownership (Nelson 2015, 260), but can utilize the land through

usufructuary rights. This experience is common in the urban periphery, where families can live

in a home and work the land for generations and still not legally own the house or the land,

resulting in significant difficulty finding help in times of crisis, such as when one needs to

rebuild after an earthquake.

6.1.2 Challenge 2: Construction Style

Separately from the land issues was the focus on the structures themselves, wherein a

commonly cited point of contention amongst Lumanti’s staff was the rejection by beneficiaries

of reconstructing their homes in a ‘traditional’ style, with a preference for more modern concrete

load-bearing structures. Lumanti wanted beneficiaries to rebuild in a style that more reflected the

heritage of the community, but residents more often selected modern structures. Of the five

interviewed beneficiaries that rebuilt in a modern style, four stated this was because the

traditional structures felt unsafe and are costly to build and maintain. As discussed in Chapter 2,

there is an expanding push for modernity as well as a desire to distinguish themselves separately

from those traditional roots.

6.1.3 Challenge 3 Organizational Affiliation and Timeline

As was the case with Lumanti, the reconstruction project had a set expiration date, for

which each field office had two years to complete their project. During this time period, Lumanti

submitted a formal report to MISEREOR, the development organization that was funding the

project, every six months. These reports consisted of detailed descriptions of the progress of the

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project in each community, numbers of people they helped, the services provided to those

beneficiaries, challenges they encountered, and lessons they learned from the project. These

reports helped to meet accountability requirements to ensure continued funding for the project in

each community.

NGOs are often familiar with the requirements and process of reporting. However,

challenges often arise when projects have a time limit. In this case, Lumanti had a limit of two

years for their reconstruction projects in each of the four communities. This time limit became a

challenge for several reasons. Many beneficiaries needed time to get funding, there were material

and labor shortages, and many homes took a longer amount of time to be fully reconstructed due

to delays in tranche releases, permit approvals, and the aforementioned issues surrounding labor

and materials. Many interviewees shared sentiments in the following quote by Gaurav, a

Lumanti architect, regarding the need for more time:

But if we include, if we make the quite flexible, at the beginning of the time, then more earthquake families we may support at the time. We can increase more time on that period, so we can include more earthquake victims.

As can be noted from this quote, the lack of time as well as the lack of flexibility created an

additional barrier to providing aid to more individuals.

As with the deadlines imposed by the NRA for beneficiaries to receive each of the three

funding installments, as discussed in Chapter 2, the two-year timeline for Lumanti’s

reconstruction program served as a source of stress for both beneficiaries and staff. The

beneficiaries were concerned about the loss of support in rebuilding their homes whilst the staff

members were concerned about completing and meeting their project goals “on time.”

Completing the program at the established deadlines allowed the organization to meet their

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obligation to their donors, thus helping to ensure the project would be deemed by the

organization and its funders, as successful.

In addition to the institutional time constraints, the emotional and physical toll of

implementing reconstruction work was draining for Lumanti staff. This new program required

significant investment in time and continuous exposure to individuals who have suffered from

traumatic experiences, which was emotionally draining.

6.1.4 Challenge 4 Subverting Governance

The other context of challenge was displayed through forms of resistance against other

entities such as the NRA and governmental officials and committees in place at the ward,

municipal, and district levels.. Lumanti challenged governmental policies and developed

strategies to work around and through the different levels of government to get beneficiaries

approved for reconstruction. The challenge of government was reflected in Lumanti’s methods

for working with and around governmental policies and regulations at various levels. The

organization would often work directly with government officials at the local level to gain

approvals for reconstruction that contradicted policies set in place by the National

Reconstruction Authority.

The women’s cooperatives, essential partners of Lumanti, played a key role in this

resistance by challenging the traditional male order and by contributing significantly to

reconstruction - both how reconstruction was and is enacted in the community, and who

was recommended as beneficiaries. Though it could not be quantified in the research, it

can be supposed that members of the cooperative, who can only be women, would be

prioritized when making recommendations for potential beneficiaries. Additionally, the

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number of women in Lumanti’s technical teams, and the fact that one of the teams

consisted entirely of women, further challenges traditional gender norms.

Of each of the four communities in which Lumanti Support Group for Shelter conducted

their ‘Community Managed Post Earthquake Reconstruction in Urban Poor Communities’

project, Lumanti felt that all were successful. However, the project in Chitlang, as discussed in

Chapter 4, arguably faced the most challenges of all four projects. These challenges can be

attributed to the lack of established relationships with the community. From the beginning,

Lumanti faced resistance from the local government, local organizations, and the residents

themselves. As had been previously noted, trust is a key element in the acceptance of any

organization by the community. Without the approval of local entities and residents of Chitlang,

forward momentum in Lumanti’s reconstruction program was exceedingly difficult. There is

also still the question of why Lumanti was so insistent on establishing the program in Chitlang

despite the continued difficulties, therefore positioning themselves as part of disaster governance

that does not take into account the agency of the communities.

Furthermore, Chitlang’s location further from headquarters than that of the other three

communities, led to some dissonance between the experiences of the field team and the

perception of staff at the main office. This caused continued issues in providing the field office

with the resources they needed, particularly in regard to staffing, to help establish the

relationships the operation needed to successfully implement the program.

Finally, the beneficiaries of both Lumanti and the government challenged Lumanti and

the government by reconstructing their homes in a manner that went against the prescribed

architectural recommendations, particularly traditional architecture.

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It has now been five years since the initial earthquake on April 25, 2015. There are still

damaged and destroyed homes, displaced individuals and families, and an ongoing recovery

effort that does not have an end in sight. The problems associated with the reconstruction process

in Kathmandu Valley are vaster than can be discussed in a single thesis. However, it is my hope

this thesis sheds some light on some of the impacts associated with disasters, provides an

example of how disaster governance is structured in Nepal, and highlights some of the actors and

their roles in the ongoing process of reconstruction.

6.2 Recommendations

• At the time of reconstruction, the beneficiaries are particularly economically

vulnerable. Therefore, it would be beneficial to have an optional program devoted to livelihood

(income generation) at the same time as the implementation of the reconstruction program in that

particular area. These livelihood programs would be tailored to the community’s needs, trades

and specializations. Repeat these trainings/programs on a regular basis throughout the project

period (i.e. quarterly, once a year, etc.).

• In reports, be very specific about what kind of support is being provided – listing the

service of technical support is good but what does that actually mean?

• Encourage your funders to post/publicize information about the programs at Lumanti

they sponsor. MISEREOR vaguely mentioned Lumanti on their site and it would be more

beneficial overall if that information was made more public. This could help Lumanti gain more

exposure and help attract more funders.

• I know there are loan management trainings offered through the cooperatives. Are

there financial counseling programs to help beneficiaries understand the pros and cons of the

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financial choices that are available to them? For example, selling their land. Do they understand

the long term costs of this?

• If possible, consider extending project timelines beyond two years. Often, recovery is

a slow process and it can be difficult to find the resources needed to complete the houses in the

time offered. Technical support should still be offered for all signed and approved beneficiaries

of Lumanti, even when the project timeline has ended.

• Through the interviews, some of the employees indicated they had experienced

symptoms that can be associated with burnout or ‘compassion fatigue.’ I do not know if Lumanti

has self-care trainings for employees during disaster response and recovery projects, but

consistent trainings/events would be highly beneficial. However, due to limited deadline to

complete the projects. Lumanti should have a self-care trainings for employees during disaster

response and recovery projects which would be highly beneficial to counter fatigues.

• For the future, identify communities that are particularly vulnerable to hazards and

work on creating a strong partnership with those community leaders, committees, and

cooperatives. Having an established network is greatly beneficial to allow for introducing the

program into the community. This was definitely the case for Thecho, Macchegaon and

Siddhipur. Unfortunately, without an established network in Chitlang, the program experienced

some challenges in establishing itself within the community. These partnerships can also be

utilized to form an agreement prior to disasters wherein banks, cooperatives, etc. agree to loan

interest subsidies in the case of future disasters where reconstruction/repair are required.

• Provide an incentive to families to reconstruct in the traditional style in order to help

preserve architectural and cultural heritage. If possible, discuss with funders a heritage

conservation fund that can be used in addition to the reconstruction grant support.

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• There was an issue raised in an interview that indicated communication/decision

making in an area further from the city proved to be a challenge. In this regard, sometimes those

in the field have more clarity on the issues, particularly when it comes to members of the team,

and the effects those members have on the project. I would encourage the head office to trust in

the recommendations made by the team regarding staffing issues and perform due diligence in

making decisions regarding those issues.

• In the initial phase of the reconstruction project, it would be beneficial to consolidate

the geographic range of the project to one particular area. This allows the technical teams to

easily access and plan out those given areas. As the program establishes itself in this particular

area and the ‘kinks’ are worked out, then the geographic range can expand and staffing can be

increased as needed. In essence, start small then expand outward.

• Consider having a team whose sole purpose is to help navigate land issues and

disputes. While the social mobilizer worked to resolve these issues, it sounds like these

challenges are of great significance and complexity requiring more specialized support and

greater time commitment.

• Consider if Lumanti even wants to provide grant support in the future. The program

may benefit from narrowing the focus of the program and providing more resources towards that

focus.

6.3 Limitations

When communicating from different countries, it can occasionally be difficult to transmit

and receive all the necessary information. Through some form of miscommunication, I

discovered when I arrived in Nepal (in June 2019) that Lumanti Support Group for Shelter’s

reconstruction program had been completed in January 2019. In my proposal for the thesis

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research, I had stated that I would conduct participant observation of ongoing reconstruction

efforts through the program. However, because the program had already ended, I was unable to

incorporate participant observation in that form as part of my thesis research. As a result, I was

limited to conducting participant observation at the office, observing staffing structure and how

the staff communicated with each other.

June through September is monsoon season in Nepal. This means rain and flooding is

common in the area. In addition, landslides are also more prevalent during this time period,

making travel to other areas difficult. As such, interviews and field visits were often postponed.

In addition, rice planting season coincides with the rainy season. Rainy days are an optimum

time for harvesting rice. As many of Lumanti’s beneficiaries depend on agriculture for

subsistence and their livelihood, some interviews and field visits were often postponed for this

reason as well. Conducting this research required great flexibility and adaptability in response to

challenges that were beyond the researcher’s control.

Also due to the weather, I was unable to personally visit Chitlang, the fourth community

in Lumanti’s ‘Community Managed Post Earthquake Reconstruction in Urban Poor

Communities’ program. As the rains began to increase in frequency and intensity, the roads to

Chitlang became more and more impassible. As such, I had to depend on report analysis and

interviews to gather information about the reconstruction project in Chitlang. As the project was

no longer in operation, and because many of the field staff had moved on to other work, I was

only able to interview one person from the Chitlang project. While the interview lasted over 3

hours, and the interviewee was the project’s coordinator, it is not this researcher’s place to

determine the whole of the project based on one interview. As such, while I feel confident the

conclusions I have drawn from this interview and through analysis of the documents are

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accurate, I cannot say with certainty that I have been able to gain a holistic perspective of the

project community itself.

Finally, I recognize that my interviewees are either beneficiaries of the reconstruction

project, members of Lumanti staff, or members of partner organizations. As such, it is to be

expected that many of these individuals would not necessarily be critical of the program or have

an “outsider’s” perspective of project. While time was a limitation, if I were to do this project

again, I would also interview members of the government to gain a more cohesive picture of

Lumanti’s operations, particularly from more critical perspectives.

6.4 Personal Reflection

This research was a completely new venture for me and was completely unexpected.

When I entered the Applied Anthropology program at UNT, I had the vague notion of looking at

disaster recovery more locally, and at the furthest geographically, considered examining Puerto

Rico’s ongoing recovery from Hurricane Maria. I had prior experience working in disaster

recovery and felt that type of project would be a good transition from professional to academic

research. In my search for a client, I found myself looking further and further afield, finally

finding a group in Nepal that was very interested in having research conducted on their

reconstruction program. I was excited for the opportunity to work with Lumanti Support Group

for Shelter, but was also hesitant as I had never even been to South Asia prior to this experience.

I dove into the research, learning as much as I could about South Asia in general and

Nepal specifically. I also learned a lot about the earthquake and its effects, the government’s

response, and the recovery efforts. I questioned how, as an American scholar, my presence and

role might be perceived and affect the individuals I am researching.

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I learned and honed through practicing the skills we had been developing in our

coursework the year prior. My initial interviews were somewhat clumsy but improved with time

as I learned what vernacular was more easily understood and the phrasing and approaches that

made the most sense to the interviewees. I absorbed as much information as I could, and wrote

out ideas, questions, thoughts, and observations as they entered my mind.

I met many people from all backgrounds and saw firsthand the struggles that residents are

facing in recovery. From those who are still living in temporary shelter, to those who are

struggling to pay back the loans they took out to reconstruct their homes, the insights and

revelations gained from this research were enlightening and allowed me to conceptualize a

clearer perspective of the disaster and its impacts.

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