We Are All Negotiators Now

8/12/2019 We Are All Negotiators Now

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More than ever, effectiveproblem-solving de-mands that we knowwhen and how to createvaluable agreementswith other parties. But

negotiating isnt alwaysbest. Heres how to getto yes when its appro-priateand evencrucial.

STRATEGY TOOL #5

We Are All Negotiators Now:

An Introduction to Negotiation in

Community Problem-Solvingby Xavier de Souza Briggs

The Art and Science of Community Problem-Solving Project atHarvard University

July 2003

Sections to guide you:

Ideas in brief

Ideas at work

Taking stock: applying

the ideas in your

community

w w w . c o m m u n i t y - p r o b l e m - s o l v i n g . n e t

Download this and other strategy tools free at


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Weareallnegotiatorsnow,becauseagrowing

numberofpublicandprivateissuesarejointlyde

cided.Asmoreandmorestakeholdersasktopar

ticipateindecisionsthataffectthem,andasthe

workofpublicproblemsolvingissharedacross

thegovernment,business,andnongovernmental(nonprofit)sectors,thedemandfornegotiation

growsdramatically.Noonecanaffordtoignore

thiscorecivicskillbeingabletocreativelyad

vancesharedinterestsandresolvedifferencestoo.

Yettomanycivicmindedpeople,negotiationcon

juresupnegativeimagesofhorsetradinghard

ball,selfinterestedtransactinginwhichpower

games,threats,anddeceptiondominate.Plus,it

isntalwaysclearwhennegotiationismostappro

priateinalargerefforttotacklesocialproblemsor,

forexample,hownegotiationrelatestoothercivic

practices,suchasstakeholderorganizing,participa

toryplanning,orbuildingpartnerships.Finally,

communityproblemsolvingofteninvolvesspecialchallengesassociatedwithinformalbargaining,

powerfulsubtextsgroundedinacommunityshis

tory,ambiguousrulesaboutwhoshouldbeatthe

tableandwhocanrepresentwhom.

Thistoolprovidesanoverviewofnegotiationfunda

mentals,adiscussionofthespecialissuesoutlined

above,handyworksheetsforpreparingyourown

negotiations,andasetofpitfallstoavoid.

Ideas in BriefStrategy tool #5

Ideas at Work

KEY ISSUE OPPORTUNITIES CHALLENGES AND PITFALLS

Negotiation (or conflict management) is one

tool, not always the right tool, for problem-

solving with others. Itsimportantto

knowthepotentialandlimitsof

negotiationand torecognizethat

sometimeswehavenochoice:we

findourselvesnegotiatingwhere

weneedthecooperationofothers.

Strategiesandtacticsforcomingto

agreementareobviouslyimportant

forprogressonsocialproblems.

Withoutthem,jointproblem

solvingcanleadtoprocessparaly

sis(talkthatthwartsratherthan

supportsaction),impasse,orold

styleimposeddecisionsthatlack

constituencies.

Ifoneormorepartiesarenotcom

mittedtoit,negotiationcanbea

devicefordistractionormanipula

tion,particularlyifsomepartiesdo

nothavetheinfluenceneededto

protectandadvancetheirinterests.

Also,poorlyhandlednegotiation

candeepenconflictandmistrust.

Classic advice to negotiate interests, notpositions becomes challenging to practice in

the context of problems with many dimen-

sions, ideological divides, and complex stake-

holder interests.Subtexts,suchasa

tensionbetweenthecivicoldguard

andthenew,canunderminepro

gress.Still,recognizingthatele

mentsofcompetitioncancoexist

withcooperationcanshiftmindsets

fromstandoffandfingerpointing

toproblemsolving.

Togofrombargaininginthenar

rowsenseofnegotiatingfixedin

terestsandoptionstoproblem

solvingtogether,groupsmustbe

consciousaboutframingproblems

wellupfront,workinghardatgen

eratingoptions,andthenmoving

theideastowardnegotiatedagree

ment.Divergentthinkingcan

sharpenthe stakesandbeasource

ofbreakthroughinnovation.

Jointproblemsolvingtakeswill,

timeandotherresources,andprac

tice,practice,practice.Facilitators

andaccesstodiverseexpertisecan

help,butmuchhingesontheabil

ityofthepartiestoquestionas

sumptionswithoutresentment,

applyflexiblethinking,andcrea

tivelyexploittheirdifferences.

Muchjointgainisbuiltontrades

betweenpartiesthatwantdifferent

things.

A large part of community problem-solving isgetting effective agents (representatives) to

negotiate on behalf of coalitions of stake-

holders.Sometimes,comingtoagree

mentonoursideanddirectingour

agenteffectivelyareatleastas

trickyasnegotiatingwiththeother

side(s).

Agentsoftenplayacrucialrolein

brokeringagreementsacrossmulti

plelevelsofconflict,whereeach

sidehasseveralsubgroups.Com

ingtoagreementmeanslearning

howtonavigatetherulesofagame

withseverallevels.

Agentscanabusetheirrolestostall

agreementandadvancepersonal

agendas.Plus,theconventional

wisdomthatweshouldcometo

firminternalconsensus(circlethe

wagons)onoursideandthen

negotiatewiththemcanbackfire

badly,leadingtopositionalbar

gainingandfailure.

Copyright 2003 Xavier de Souza Briggs, The Community Problem-Solving Project @ MIT. No permission or fee is required for any and all educational use, pro-vided that this material is provided free or at cost of reproduction.


3/41

workstoreconciledonorsexpectations

aboutaccountabilitywiththeflexibility

required by fledgling grassroots or

ganizations and experienced commu

nitybasedserviceagencies.

A community development organiza

tion forgesadeal inwhicha forprofit

corporationagreestoemployneighbor

hoodresidentsandprocuregoodsand

services from small businesses in ex

change for communitybased support

for the corporations presence in the

area.

A neighborhood planning effort in

volves shared decisionmaking about

many thingsthe scope of planning,

the roles of key playersresidents,

merchants, funders, facilitators, and

othersintheprocess,andsubstantive

priorities once the plan is ready for

implementation.

A collaborative of funders looks for

ways to pool investments in a target

issue (or place), advancing shared ob

jectives while pursuing the funders

specialized missions and program

goalsaswell.

AsRogerFisherandWilliamUryput

it in GettingtoYes,the negotiationbest

seller:

Moreandmoreoccasionsrequire

negotiation;conflictisagrowth

industry.Everyonewantstopar

ticipateindecisionsthataffect

them;fewerandfewerpeoplewill

acceptdecisionsdictatedbysome

Negotiation happens in communities

all the time, sincejoint action andjoint

decisionmaking are crucial tomaking a

differenceintheworld.Rarely isthefor

malauthorityofanyonedecisionmaker

or stakeholder enough to accomplish

important ends, and all too often, im

posed decisions are mandates without

constituenciestoactonthem.

As for the specifics,negotiationhap

pens in many contexts, engages a huge

variety of stakeholder groups and per

sonal styles, and takes many forms. For

example:

A group of public, private, and non

profitcommunityleadersgathersinfor

mally to outline a local campaign to

strengthen families and promote child

wellbeing.Thegroupmustaccommo

date the varied interests around the

tableandchoosecommunicationstrate

gies that, likewise, will mobilize a

broadbaseinthecommunity.

Residentsinaruralvillagemeettode

velop a budget for allocating social

investment funds to avariety of com

munity infrastructure, income genera

tion,andotherneeds.Participantsmust

notonly chooseoptionsbutdecideon

criteria to apply to the options and

even decide how to decide:

through majority vote, consensus

process,someotherapproach?

A company works out new guide

linesonmitigatingpollution,dealing

with localandstategovernmentand

a coalition of environmental advo

cacygroupstobalanceeconomicand

socialobjectives.

A nonprofit service provider negoti

ates a performancebased contract

with a government funder. The two

parties look for ways to ensure re

sultswhileprotecting thenonprofits

autonomy todevelop its operational

capacityandmanage services incul

turally appropriate ways that serve

thecommunity.

Indevelopinganewcommunity ini

tiative, a local civic intermediary

We Are All Negotiators Now:An Introduction to Negotiating in Community Problem-Solvingby Xavier de Souza Briggs

XavierdeSouzaBriggs isAssociateProfessor ofPublicPolicy at theJohnF.Kennedy

School ofGovernment,HarvardUniversity,

79 JFK Street, Cambridge, MA 02138,

U.S.A.

Part

of

The

Art

and

Science

of

Com

munity ProblemSolving Project, this tool

waspreparedtoillustratestrategicchallenges

and choices facing people and institutions

around the globe rather than to highlight

effective or ineffective handling ofparticular

situations. Thisproject is madepossible by

generous supportfrom theAnnie E. Casey

Foundation, Harvards Hauser Center for

NonprofitOrganizations,andtheRockefeller

Foundation.

Negotiationisbackandforthcommunicationde

signedtoreachagreementwhenyouandtheother

sidehavesomeintereststhataresharedandothers

thatareopposed.FisherandUry,GettingtoYes

3


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governmental or

ganizations, grant

agreements be

tween philanthro

pies and nonprofit

service providers

and advocates, and

more. And interna

tional negotiations

a r e i mpo r t a n t

mechanisms for

resolving differ

ences within and

acrossnations.And

negotiation may

include complex

power games and,

sometimes, decep

tion. More gener

ally, negotiating

parties often use information strategi

cally, to advance their interests. Parties

emphasize certain ideas and not others,

and theymay omit informationwithout

actuallylyingtootherparties.

But thepopular imagesofwherene

gotiationhappens andhow itgetsdone

blindus toagreatdealofvalue thatne

gotiation adds to community problem

solvingandtothemanysettingsinwhich

it takesplace inourcivic livesveryof

ten more informally than in those stock

imagesofdiplomats andbusinesspeoplecuttingdeals,veryoftenbybuildingrela

tionships(notsouringthem)andcreating

newlearningsothatbetterideasarepos

sible,notjustconvenientdeals.

Thepopular imagesalsodistortwhat

itmeans tobe an effectivenegotiator. If

hardballandpowergamesweretherule,

onewouldexpectcunning,assertiveness,

impatience with those who do not con

cede, emotional toughness and a lackof

empathy, and similar traits to define an

effectivenegotiators style.Masternego

tiators would be those who have mas

oneelse.Peoplediffer,andtheyuse

negotiationtohandletheirdiffer

encesNegotiationisabasic

meansofgettingwhatyouwant

fromothers.Itisbackandforth

communicationdesignedtoreach

agreementwhenyouandtheother

sidehavesomeintereststhatare

sharedandothersthatareopposed.

A few big claims are embedded in

that simple definition, The first is that

negotiation is a means toward varied

ends,notanendoragoodthinginand

of itself. Negotiation can even be the

wrongmeans toward certainends, aswe

will see in amoment.More specifically,

the aimofnegotiation is tomake agree

ment possible (an interim goal, not an

endgoal).The results of that agreement

may or may not turn out as the partiesexpect. Negotiation does not provide a

crystalball.

The second implication is that nego

tiationisprimarilyaprocessofcommuni

cation,meaning that its subject tomany

of the breakdowns and breakthroughs

thataffecthuman communicationgener

ally. Wires get crossed, signals sent are

not necessarily those received. Clever

persuasion can oversimplify important

facts and mobilize people for all the

wrong reasons.People canuseverydif

ferentwordsandbody language, too

to convey their expectations. And theneededinformationmaynotbeavailable

ornottoeveryoneattherighttimes.

Third and finally, negotiation is de

fined by interests held by parties (or

stakeholders). Negotiation is clearly

not the only element in joint problem

solving.Its theone focusedoncomingto

decisionby (a)discovering commonalities

orcommonground inwhattwoormore

partieswant,alongwith

(b)waystoresolvetheir

differences.

By definition, then,

negotiationmakes sense

whereandwhenparties,

issues, and interests are

already (more or less)

defined and when the

partiesbelieve they can

dobetteratthenegotiat

ing table than away

from it. Negotiation

involves seeking agree

ment at key decision

points,but a great deal

of civic processin de

mocratic societies, both

young and old

involves

defining

the

parties,issues,andinterests,andsetting

upadecisionprocess.

Negotiation is therefore part of a

largerprocessofjointproblemsolving.

Itsnotasetoffacilitationtricksforuse

atthetablethatmakeupforbadcivics

awayfromthetable.

Myths and RealitiesIn spiteof the fact thatnegotiation

isuseful and increasingly common, to

manycivicmindedpeople,negotiation

hasabadname.Itconjuresupnegativeimages of horse tradinghardball,

selfinterested transacting in which

power games, threats, and deception

dominate.Bargaining instead ofbuild

ing consensus. Dealmaking instead of

building relationships and creating

newpossibilitiesforcivicaction.

Negotiation includes all of those

things, of course. It is important for

completing many economic transac

tionsnot just wage agreements but

businessdealsofmanykinds,contracts

be tween government and non

Introduction to Negotiation

Negotiation is therefore part of a larger process of

joint problem-solving. Its not a set of facilitation

tricks for use at the table that make up for bad civics

away from the table.

4

To many civic-minded

people, negotiation

has a bad name. It

conjures up images of

horse trading andhard-ball, power

games and deception

dominate. Bargaining

instead of building

consensus. Dealmak-

ing instead of build-

ing relationships.


5/41


tered psychological tricks for throwing

theothersideoffbalance.

Notso.Indecadesofadvancedtrain

ing in negotiation and conflict resolu

tionatHarvardandmanyotheruniver

sitiesweve learned that some of the

leasteffective negotiators are definedby

those

traits.

Negotiation

does

involve

persuasion and can require tremendous

assertiveness and toughness, but very

often,italsorequiresactivelisteningskill,

substantive creativity to invent options

formutualgain,andtheabilitytowinthe

trust of otherseven where that means

overcoming apainfulpast orbuilding a

relationshipfromscratch.

Whats more, when we ask veteran

negotiators from themilitaryorbusiness

world to negotiate with each other in

simulations or roleplays, these pros

oftendomuchworsethanbeginnerswith

a littlebitof trainingandstrategyunder

theirbelts.Notonlyarethetangibleout

comesworse,buttheveterannegotiators

leave the negotiations less emotionally

satisfied andwith fewer useful relation

ships with their counterparts across the

table.The reason is that theveteransof

ten have to unlearnbad habits. Because

ofthenormsintheirownworkplacesand

perhaps some factors ofpersonality and

upbringingaswell,theveteransalsotend

to

view

all

negotiations

as

essentially

competitive gamescontests wherein

one party has to dobadly for the other

party(ies)todowell.

Of course, this does not mean that

effectivenegotiationispurelyamatterof

cooperation. Often,wecannotassumethat

others willbe cooperative. Indeed, they

maybealltooeagertoexploitourgood

will and cooperativeness. They may

hoard information while we share it.

They may seek to improve their own

alternatives to negotiation andworsen

oursback us into a corner, so to

speak, where we have little room to

maneuver and (seemingly) little lever

ageovertheoutcomesthatmattertous.

Finding ways to create valuable coop

eration while guarding against these

risks is what negotiation skill is all

about.

Potential and Limits:Negotiation FundamentalsHow then should we define the

fundamentals of negotiation in ways

thatmakeusmoreeffective?Andhow

shouldweunderstandthe limitsofne

gotiation, too? The Taking Stock box

(next page) offers an outline. It ad

dresses the wide range of negotiation

situations inwhich problemsolvers in

th e public, private, and non

governmental sectors may find them

selves.The past few decades have seen

dramatic growth and progress in the

fieldsofnegotiation, mediation,alterna

tive dispute resolution, and consensus

building. The development of theory

and practice in these areas is tremen

dously positive, given the observation

thatshareddecisionmaking is increas

ingly the rule of the day in democ

ratic societies. But enthusiasm for thetechniquescanblindustoasimplefact:

Thebest tools are no goodand may

evenbebad (harmful)when applied

tothewrongtask.

When bringing people together to

effect change, the first question is not

how to go about negotiatingdecisions

effectively but rather : Is negotiation

appropriate in this situation at all?

Shouldwenegotiatewiththem?Why

now?Whatarethealternativestonego

tiation?

And

is

a

negotiation

in

fact

pos

siblewilltheyagreetonegotiate?

Fromthestandpointofathirdparty

wishingtohelppartiesinconflictcome

toagreement,similarquestionsare:Are

the parties that could craft a valuable

agreementreadytonegotiate?Willthey

recognize thevalue ofnegotiation and

trulycommittotheprocess?Whatwill

ittaketosupportthatprocessandseeit

through?

Sometimes, we have no choicebut

to negotiate. We depend on others to

help us accomplish things and influ

ence decisions. We find that we have

interests that are shared with other

stakeholders, as Fisher and Ury de

scribe it,but others that are opposed.

Without formallyannouncing itor set

tinganofficialtableatwhichtohold

talks, we are negotiating. We are en

gaged ingiveandtake toadvanceour

interests.

Butsometimeswedohaveachoice,

and negotiation may notbe appropri

ateornotyet.Forexample: Whenthenatureofaproblemand the

best solution are clear and widely

Negotiationdoes involvepersuasionandcan require

tremendousassertivenessandtoughness,butveryof

ten,italsorequiresactivelisteningskills,substantive

creativityto inventoptionsformutualgain,andthe

abilityto

win

the

trust

of

otherseven

where

that

meansovercomingapainfulpast.

When bringing people together to effect change, the

first question is not how to go about negotiating deci-

sions effectively but rather: Is negotiation appropriate

in this situation at all?

5


6/41

understood,negotiationmayberedun

dant, distracting, and even counter

productive. Negotiation and conflict

resolution have sometimes been criti

cizedaspoorpeoplesjustice in that

theycompensate forwhat the lawwill

not

enforce.

More

generally,

negotia

tion can lead to distraction and ma

nipulation. Insome instances, lawand

community norms point to a clear set

of actionse.g., complianceby a key,

powerfulparty.Negotiation canbean

awkwardwaytomakekeypartiesdo

therightthing.

Whenitisnotclearlyintheinterestsof

allparties tonegotiateorkeyparties

otherwise lack commitment to the

process.Thethresholdtesthere isthis:

Do the parties to a negotiation recog

nize, at minimum, the potential to do

better at the negotiating table than

away from it?This iskey to the com

mitment thatnegotiation requires.But

key parties may prefer lawsuit, inde

pendentaction(goingitalone),orsome

other alternative to negotiation. Dia

logue and key eventsa change of

statusorperceivedinterestsmaylead

key parties to reassess the attractive

nessoftheiralternatives(seebelow).

Whenpartiesneedassistancebutdont

yet have it. Sometimes, gaps in data

and information, the technical com

plexity of the issues, different world

views, a history of strained relation

ships,orotherbarriersmakeitimpossi

bleforpartiestocometoagreementon

theirown.Intheseinstances,mediators

orother thirdpartyfacilitatorsmaybe

helpful to support theprocess or sim

ply

to

help

parties

explore

the

possibil

ityofnegotiatingwith eachother (see

below).

As the tools in this series explore in

detail, community problemsolving is

defined by collective effort to identify

and frame problems for public discus

sion, tobuildmovementand create con

stituencies for change, to setmeaningful

directionschart a course or plan


6

TAKING STOCK (Part One): Negotiation Fundamentals

1. Should we negotiate? Negotiation is not always best. Sometimes, parties are notcommitted to it, negotiation may be a device for distraction or manipulation(where little of value will actually be decided), or one or more parties may nothave the influence and autonomy needed to protect and advance its interests atthe table. But sometimes, we have no choice: where there is interdependence and

people have different views of a problem or somewhat different interests, wefind ourselves, in effect, negotiating a way forward.

2. What value does negotiation add? Negotiation is a part of problem-solving to-gether. Negotiations are defined by parties, issues, interests, alternatives (choicesof terms that together would make up an agreement), and the size of the bar-gaining range (in which agreement is actually possible). But specific negotia-tionscrucial episodes in time when agreement may be forged, given parties,issues, interests, and alternativesare often embedded in larger processes oforganizing stakeholders and issues for attention, planning that is substantivelysmart as well as participatory, and building partnerships to implement jointlycreated plans. Moreover, community problem-solving frequently involves a host ofnegotiations, and varied sets of parties, over timenot one big deal in whichall things are decided once and for all.

3. Isnt it about competitive tricks and clever maneuvering? Negotiation ofteninvolves some element of competition, as when we each party wants part of alimited resource, but can also involve important and creative cooperation, aswhenparties invent new options to create more value for all sides. Sometimes, partiesvalue different things, not the same thing, and this provides a way to make valu-able win-win trades. Negotiation is not synonymous with either competition orcooperation alone.

4. OK, but in the end, is it only dealmaking? Negotiations can be focused oncrafting a deal (to seize an opportunity) or resolving a dispute (to overcome acostly stand-off or conflict) or both. The same fundamentals are useful either way,but deals and disputes may be quite different in tone, tempo, and specifics.

5. Dont some negotiations end in impasse anyway? Many impasses and ineffi-cient agreements result when parties refuse to negotiate their interests and in-stead focus on particular positions. Negotiation becomes a contest defined bydemands, a test of who will give in first.

6. Is negotiation always about formal agreements and marathon sessions atthe table? No, negotiation can be quite formal, as when a process of seekingagreement is announced and agreements made are recorded and given legalstatus, perhaps in a contract or pact. But negotiation can also be quite informal--part of the give-and-take of everyday civic life, in which participation is neededto make progress possible, in which constituencies for change, and not just techni-cally promising ideas, are required.

7. Who should participate? This depends on the issues and stakes. Negotiation cantake place between just two parties or among multiple parties. In the latter case,agreement may require the assent of all parties (unanimity) or some critical num-ber of the partiessay 5 out of 6 or 7 out of 10acting in a coalition. Plus,agents (representatives) must often negotiate on behalf of stakeholder groups.

8. Arent mediators or facilitators important? Negotiation may be assisted by thirdparties, whether neutral or interested facilitators. The most well-known type ofthird-party facilitator is the neutral mediator, whose job it is to help parties cometo useful, sustainable agreements. Neutrals have no substantive interest in theoutcome, only an interest in improving the process. But problem-solving over timemay call for intervention by mediators with clout who press stubborn partiesinto giving negotiation a chance. Indeed, intermediaries or go-betweens play avariety of challenging but important roles in community problem-solving. (See thelinked tool in this series, Working the Middle: Roles and Challenges of Intermedi-aries.)


7/41

decisions. Everyone agrees that de

mocracy

demands

dialogue

and

de

liberationtoallowacarefultreatment

of issues. But sustaining democracy

alsorequiresconcreteactiononprob

lemsintheworld,andactionrequires

making choices, setting priorities,

agreeing on roles, agreeing to dis

agreeonsomeissuesbutmoveahead

on others. Talk alone wont do the

trick,evenifthattalkisinspiredand

inclusive. Engage, define, deliberate,

decide, act, and then engage again.

Anywayyoudefine the civic action

loop,decisionandactionare critical,

and shared decision often requires

the giveandtake of negotiation,

whetheritsformalorinformal.

Whenthereisawillingnesstodecide

but basic communication break

downsorotherprocessbarriersget

in the way. Much of negotiation is

about thinking and communicating

more effectively to seize the potential

agreementsthatseemtoliejustoutside

ourgrasp.

Whenaunilateraldecisioncouldgetthe

jobdonebutajointdecisionwouldbe

morelegitimateandsupportableinthe

community.

ThesecondmajorlessonintheTaking

Stock box is that promoting the public

interestthroughjointactioncommunity

problemsolving, broadly definedmay

involvearangeofnegotiationsovertime,

not one big, formal negotiating table

where all thingsgetdecided,whereone

grand deal is struck. So we want to

think of the work of tackling a public

problem(s) or seizing a major opportu

nity to promote the common good as

demanding

a

host

of

negotiation

skillsandsettings,dependingonwhat ismost

appropriate when and whose interests

areatstake.

Furthermore, as Inotedabove,nego

tiationisameansofdeliveringthegoods,

but negotiation does not enable itself.

Negotiation matters most to a commu

nitysciviclifewhereitbuildsonaproc

essoforganizingissuesandstakeholders,

carrying out substantively smart aswell

as participatory planning, and building

partnershipstoimplementjointlycreated

plans.Somedefinenegotiationsobroadly

that it encompasses all of thesethe

agreementseekingprocessitselfandeve

rythingaround it.ButIfinditmoreuse

ful to define and explore those other

practices and processes as challenging,

importantintheirownright,andworthy

of careful strategies and tactics (see the

toolsinthisseriesonthosetopics).

Third,manyeffortstomakedecisions

together include, unavoidably, elements

ofcompetitionaswellascooperation. So


based on stakeholder values as well as

the substantive challenges posedby the

problems people care about, and other

processes.

The work isboth art and science in

that some patterns are regular and reli

able but improvisation and good judg

ment, as well as risktaking and acts of

intuition,areusuallyrequiredtoo.

The opportunities to apply negotia

tion skills within these processes, often

quite informally, aremany.Butnot eve

ryone wants to or can participate effec

tively innegotiation. (See thecaseexam

ples

on

organizing

and

negotiation

in

the

linked tool in this series, Organizing

Stakeholders, Building Movement, Set

tingtheAgenda.)

Beforewemove on, letsbe clearon

thekindsofsituations inwhichnegotia

tion may not only be appropriate but

actuallyessential:

When parties share an interest in an

outcomebuthavenot come toneeded

See linked tool in this series,Organizing Stakeholders, Building Movement, Setting

the Agenda

Beyond being appropriate, negotiation may actually be essential where: parties

share an interest in an outcome but have not come to needed decisions, there is a

willingness to decide but communication breakdowns and other barriers get in

the way, or a unilateral decision couldperhaps get the job donebut a joint one

would be much more legitimate and supportable in the community.

7


8/41

wewanttogetbetterat

identifying and work

ing through both as

effectivelyaspossible.

As we will see be

low, this is more than

an abstractprinciple of

recognition. Cooperat

ing and competing at

the same time is chal

lenging formost of us,

because

we

are

not

ro

bots. Efforts to get more of what we

wantclaim value, as negotiation ex

pertsJamesSebeniusandDavidLaxput

itmaycrowdouteffortstocreatevalue

forallof theparties involved.This ises

peciallytruewhereemotionsarerunning

high, the issuesarecomplex, theoptions

seem limited, and time and other re

sourcesareinshortsupply.

Point four in the textbox remindsus

that negotiations can be mainly about

creating an opportunity that hinges on

shareddecisionmakingadealtocreate

a new policy or program, pool funds,

exchange resources, etc.or mainly

aboutsettlingadisputethatiscostlyand

unacceptable to theparties involved.Or

both. Not only aredealmaking anddis

pute resolution somewhat different in

tempoandtone,buttheconsequencesof

not reachingagreementcanbequitedif

ferent as well. No agreement in the

contextofadealgenerallymeansthatthe

parties find alternative ways to pursue

the

opportunities

they

value.

But a failure to resolve adisputebe

tween two or more parties can impose

huge costs on other parties or the com

munityatlarge,sourrelationshipsamong

thedisputants(makingithardertoprob

lemsolve together later on), and even

generatenew,widerconflictsthedown

wardspiralwhereconflictescalates.

Fifth, as we will see in a moment,

many people instinctively negotiate

overpositionsspecific terms theypre

ferrather than explore multiple op

tions for advancing their interests (the

underlying, valued things that posi

tionsreflect).

Forexample, innegotiationswitha

companyandlocalgovernmentoveran

economicdevelopment project, a com

munitybased nonprofit group insists

on a specific number of newjobs for

neighborhood residents instead of ex

ploringmultiplewaysofsatisfying the

groupsunderlyinginterests,whichare

to (a)enhanceeconomicsecurity in the

neighborhood, inpartby (b)maximiz

ingthepositivespilloversoftheproject.

Finding these terms unacceptable, the

company backs off, governments gets

impatient with both parties, finger

pointingbegins,andtheresultiscostly

impasse.

Byengaging theparties in learning

and a process of considering different

ways

to

satisfy

the

underlying

interests,

interestedbasedbargainingenhances

the likelihood of a valuable agree

mentaswellasarelationshiptodraw

onanotherday.

Wewill explore the final points in

the textbox in the sections to come

lookingattwopartyversusmultiparty

negotiations, forexample, and the role

of mediators and other thirdparty fa

cilitators.Mediation isquite important

in community problemsolving, even

where it isunofficial and informal.And

welluse some caseexamples toexplore

what it means to prepare effectively for

negotiationandactuallyworkthingsout

atthetable,throughbackandforthcom

munication. (For more illustrations, see

thereadingandresourcelistattheendofthistool.)

Principled Negotiation:An OverviewFornow,letsassumethatnegotiation

actually is appropriateand perhaps

even essentialin some context that

matterstoyou.Therearedefinedpar

ties, key issues, interests that are at

least somewhat clear to shape and

motivate the negotiation. Here are

FisherandUrysbasicrulesforprincipled negotiation, which stand up again

and again in practicein an incredibly

widevarietyofspecificsituationsaround

theworld:

(People)SeparatethePeoplefromtheProb

lem.Fisher andUry advisenegotiators

nottomakebigassumptionsaboutthe

othersidesintentionsandnottoentan

gletherelationshipsinthesubstanceof

the problem. Instead, they urge us to

discussion perceptions, let each side

blow off steam, and listen actively towhatisbeingsaid.

(Interests) Focus on interests, not posi

tions. Acknowledge their interests as

part of problemsolving.Explore your

multiple interests: ask why ques

tions,get atbasic concernsbehind the

statedpreferences.

(Options)Generateavarietyofpossibilities

before deciding what to do. Invent op

tionsavoid the instinct to narrow

immediately to specific terms or positionsby making time to brainstorm

without judging. Use facilitators to

supporttheprocessofinventingbefore

deciding.

(Criteria)Insistthattheresultbebasedon

someobjectivestandard, such as market

value, precedents or moral standards,

bestavailable scientific judgments,

professionalstandards,theprincipleof


Failuretoresolveadisputebetweentwoormorepar

ties can impose huge costs on otherparties or the

community at large, sour relationships among the

disputants,andevengeneratenew,widerconflicts.

8


9/41

reciprocityorequity,measurable costs

andbenefits,etc.

Thedistinctionbetweenpositionsand

interests is extremely important and,we

have found,mucheasier said thanprac

ticed. Negotiation

educators often tell

the storyof two chil

dren fightingoveran

orange. A parent in

tervenesand,perhaps

not surprisingly,gets

the children to agree

to split theorange in

half.Fair and equita

ble, it might seem.

But it turns out that

one child wanted to

eat the orange (the

fruit),whiletheotherwanted only the orange rindto use in a

baking recipe.Eachchildcouldhavene

gotiated a much better dealall of the

fruit to one and all of the rind to the

other. But by responding to positions

rather than interests, the parent has un

wittingly created a very inefficient deal.

Intheshorthandofnegotiation, consider

ablevaluehasbeenleftonthetable.

AsFisherandUryhavelongstressed,

these and otherprinciples aredrivenby

practical,notmoralconsiderations.Thisis

not to say that feltobligations toothers,

or even allegiance to higher creeds and

notionsofjustice,havenoplaceinnego

tiation.Rather,theprinciplednegotiation

approach seeks to enable negotiators

who may have quite different moral

commitmentsandeven limited trust in

each other to problemsolve together.

The approach isdesigned to help two

or more parties do

better through ne

gotiation than they

could otherwise,

period. It does not

relyonhighermoral

principles about

what we owe to

others.

That said, it certainly helps when

negotiatorscometothetablewithsome

commitmenttofairplayandagenuine

interest in fair outcomes for all sides.

Such commitment and interest may

well be rooted in moral, religious, or

culturaltraditionsaboutwhichthepar

tiesfeelverystrongly.

Letsputthese ideas towork in the

firstcaseexample,inwhichwewillalso

use the firstworksheet in this strategy

tool.

Case #1: Negotiating a Public/Nonprofit Contract for Services

Imagine a meetingit could be in

almost any community in any corner of

the worldin which a government

agency and a nonprofit, non

governmental

organization

are

scheduledto develop a contract for services. The

nonprofitorganizationwillbetheservice

provider, government the funder and

regulator that invests public

resources and monitors per

formance toensurecompliance

withapplicable lawsaswellas

results. Lets say that the ser

vice is screening and vaccinat

ing children to prevent the

spread of a crippling disease.

(Theservicecouldjustaseasily

be job training or environ

mental cleanup or develop

mentofaffordablehousing.)

Letskeepitsimpletostartand

imaginethattheonlyissueupfordiscus

sionispricethefeethatgovernmentwill

pay thenonprofit for a specificquantity

and quality of service. There are, there

fore,just twopartiesandonenegotiable

issue.

The worksheet on the next page

(Getting Ready toNegotiate: Prep Tool #1)

allows

us

to

define

the

situation,

betterunderstandouralternatives,andprepare

an approach. Both partiesthe govern

ment and nonprofit representatives

could benefit from this preparation. To

keepthisdiscussionclearer,though, lets

supposethatIrepresentthenonprofit.

We know there are two issues, and

assume fornow that there ishistorybe

tweenme and the otherparty. Itwould

helpme toknowmoreabout theperson

negotiatingacrossthetablefromme,soI

decide to do some homework on their

work styleand reputation (ifany) in thecommunity as a negotiator.Also,where

influentialsareconcerned,assumethat

therearenootherkeypartiesexcept for

those ingovernment towhommynego

tiation counterpart reports. Presumably,

theirinterestswillbedirectlyrepresented

by my counterpart. (Note that it would

help if I knew somethingabout the per


The principled negotia-tion approach seeks to

enable negotiators who

may have quite different

moral commitments and

even limited trust in

each other to problem-

solve together.

9

TAKING STOCK (Part Two) PRINCIPLED NEGOTIATION

In Getting to Yes, Roger Fisher and William Ury provide four (4) core principles:

1. (People) Separate the people from the problem. Many impasses and poor agree-ments result from confounding the substance of the issues with the relationship orpersonal issues between the negotiators.

2. (Interests) Focus on interests, not positions. Intereststhe underlying things of

value that negotiators really wantcan often be advanced in many ways (seenext point). So specific terms (positions) should not crowd out the effort to under-stand and address interests.

3. (Options) Generate a variety of possibilities before deciding what to do. AsFisher and Ury add, Invent before deciding. Often, its psychological, not substan-tive barriers, that prevent parties from creating better options and more value forall sides.

4. (Criteria) Insist that the result be based on some objective standard, such as mar-ket value, community precedents or shared moral standards, best-available scien-tific judgments, professional standards, the principle of reciprocity or equity, meas-urable costs and benefits, etc.

(Continuedonpage11


10/41


11/41

sons bossi.e., about who this person

will report toon theoutcomeofourne

gotiation.Ifthatpersonsperceptionsare

important to my counterpart, then they

become,by extension, important to me,

too.)

Next,letstrytounderstandthenum

berandnatureoftheissuesbeingnegoti

ated and what thebargaining range on

thoseissuesmaylooklike.Theonetangi

bleissuehereisprice.Wecanexpectthat

thenonprofitwill favor a higher fee for

its services, while government will seek

to minimize the fee. The price issue is

therefore inherently

competitive; the two

parties interests

on this narrow is

sueare at odds,and the negotiation

looks much like a

private, negotiated

transaction, inwhich

youorImightbuya

homeorusedcaror

ornament in a ba

zaar.

Before we make this situation more

complexand also more realisticby

bringingother issues intoview,consider

how much room the two parties have,

evenonthenarrowissueofprice,tocraft

a mutually beneficial agreement and

leavethetablesatisfied.

First,thebargainingrange,sometimes

called the zone ofpossible agreement,

isdefinedby the limitsofwhat the two

partieswillaccept.Rationally, ifgovern

mentcanpurchasethesameservicefrom

another vendor for, say, $12 per unit of

service(perclientserved),whyshould it

pay this nonprofit vendor any more?

Twelvedollarsperunitofservice,whats

knownastheBestAlternativetoNegotiated Agreement or BATNA in the

shorthand,becomes the rational reserva

tionprice (reservationvalue)of thegov

ernmentparty.

Tokeep thecase simple fornow,we

are going to assume that government

doeshavearangeofserviceprovidersto

choosefrom(thoughthismaynotbethe

case) and that it can compare providers

and choose on thebasis ofprice alone

(though realistically, a host of other

factorsmightalsobeweighed).

The nonprofits alternatives and

reservationpricemaybemorecomplex,

however.Governmentmaybetheonly

funder in themarket forvaccination

services.Thenonprofitmaybe lowon

funds and eager toget thevaccination

service funded. Its only alternative to

governmentfundingmaybetoprovide

adifferentservice,generatesomereve

nuesthatwayandselffund(onamore

limited basis) the vaccination service.

Realistically, this nonprofitour non

profitsfinancial

options seem lim

ited.

Akey conclusion of

this

preliminary

analysis, then, turns

out tobe abig les

son about bargain

ing power: Some

times, the bestway to

gain leverage at the

table is to improve

your options away from the tablei.e.,

your alternatives to negotiated agree

ment.

Butstickingtothesimpleversionof

events, we, the nonprofit directors,

have decided that we will accept as

little as $6 per unit of service, which is

just a little more than our costs ($5) for

providing the service. Inprinciple, then,

thebargainingrangerunsfromthemini

mum $5 per unit thatwe will accept to

the maximum $12 that government will

pay($512).

Analyzing the Case: Persuasion,First Offers, and Walk-Aways

Whats striking, in the roleplayswe

haverunintheclassroomwithhundreds

of negotiators of all ages and back

grounds, ishowvariedtheoutcomesare

acrosspairsofnegotiatorsgiventhesame

instructions and same basic structure

(twoparties,one issue, fixed reservation

values). While quite a few negotiators

endupwithagreementsclustered in the

middle of the bargaining range, more

thanafewareattheextremes,andsome

donotreachagreementatall,evenwhere

thereseemstobemuchsoroomtoagree!

How is this possible? First, the two

partiesinvolvedrarelyknowexactlyhow

much the other party willbe willing to

accept. The frequently heard question,

Whats yourbottom line? aims to se

curethispreciousinformation.

So one reason that our hundreds of

pairs of negotiators end up in different

places is that people make different as

sumptionsabouttheothersidesreserva

tion value and how much or how little

willsatisfy them. Inmany instances,ne

gotiators underestimate the fullbargain

ing range: their own view of the issues

blinds them to the other sides perspec

tive and, in this case, financial room to

maneuver. Sometimes, though, each ne

gotiator overestimates how much the

other party can concede, and stubborn,

positionalbargaining ensues, leading to

impasse orbruising,dissatisfying agree

ments.

Note,before we move on, note that

the Worksheet is a device for recording

everythingthatyoualreadyknowandfor


11

(Continuedfrompage9)

Sometimes, the best way to gain leverage at the table

is to improve your options away from the tablei.e.,

your alternativesto negotiated agreement.


12/41

identifyingsomegapsinyourknowledge

that careful ba ckground work

(homework) might fill in. Typically,

youwontknow thebargainingrangeas

specificallyas Igave it toyouabove ($5

to$12),butthemoreyoucanfindout in

advance, the better. The more you can

learn at the table to add to your home

work,thebetteraswell.

Asecondreasonthatnegotiationout

comesdiffersodramaticallyfrompairto

pair is that negotiation is a backand

forthpersuasiveprocess, and somepeo

ple are more persuasiveor conversely

more easily persuadedthan others.

More

generally,

negotiators

strengths,

weaknesses, and stylesvarywidely (see

SkillsandStyleonthispage).

In multiple examples of the simple

price negotiation outlined here, we

have heard every conceivable argument

and requestat the table,during thene

gotiationbyeveryimaginablepersonal

ity!

Some in the seller role (the party

that seeks a higher price)will empha

sizehowhard it is tomakeendsmeet,

portraying itself as the resourcepoor

party, the disadvantaged in the situa

tion.Settingtheprice isframedasfun

damentallyafairness issue.Otherswill

make the most dramatic claims about

the service they are selling, comparing

theirservices(unaidedbyanythingthe

facultyhave suggested) tothebest in

theworldandstateoftheart.Other

negotiators will emphasize the impor

tance of a future working relation

ship,evenwheretheinstructionsindi

cate that no such future is likely, that

thisistobeaoneoffdeal.

Thekey is thathumanbeingsoften

respond at least as much to the

why (rationales) we offer as the

what. Mountains of psychological

research confirm this. We are much

more likely to respond to people and

ideas that strike us as reasonable and

evenimportant.

OnereasonIaskmystudentstothink

about their specific arguments, and not

just their interests, in advanceand to

outline their arguments on the Work

sheetis that a little attention to theseprinciples of persuasion can go a long

way(andseePrinciplesofPersuasionon

thenextpage).

Persuading, of course, is about influ

encinghowyouraudiencethinksandacts.So

know your audience is rule oneand

anotherreasontodoyourhomework.

More Lessons: The Psychology ofNegotiation

A third reason that outcomes range

widely is anchoring, a welldocumented

psychologicalphenomenon inwhichour

mindsgetstuckoranchoredbyassign

ingweight toapieceof information that

is irrelevantor,atbest,modestly impor

tant. As Max Bazerman and Margaret

Neale show in Negotiating Rationally,

manynegotiatorsusefirstoffersorother

early, stagesetting remarks to anchor

their counterparts in a favorable part of

thebargainingrange.

How does this work? The govern

mentnegotiatormightbeginourcontract

meetingwithastatement thatpasses forsmalltalk,Youknow,wevebeenburied

in these contract talks lately. The other

day, I spent fourhourswithanonprofit

groupeventhoughIwaswillingtocome

upto$7perunit!

Thegovernmentscontractnegotiator

is hoping I will do several things with

this casual remark. First, she hopes I

willviewmynegotiationwithher in the


Negotiation is a backandforthpersuasiveprocess, and somepeople are more

persuasiveorconversely,moreeasilypersuadedthanothers.

12

TAKING STOCK (Part Three) NEGOTIATION SKILLS & STYLE

Roger Fisher and Wayne Davis find that six interpersonal skills are consistently impor-tant for effective negotiation. They help define a negotiators personal repertoire:

1. Being able to express strong feelings appropriately.

2. Remaining rational in the face of strong feelings.

3. Being assertive within a negotiation without damaging the relationship.

4. Improving a relationship without damage to a particular negotiation.

5. Speaking clearly in ways that promote listening.

6. Inquiring and listening effectively (active listening).

Keith Allred, inventor of the Personal Conflict Profile, an assessment tool, recom-mends developing and, over time, measuring your success as a negotiator in multi-ple dimensions. You and those with whom you negotiate should rate you a success in

1. Being persuasive.

2. Maintaining strong relations with the other party.

3. Making your reasoning clear for the positions you advocate.

4. Understanding the other partys interests and communicating that you appreciatetheir perspective.

5. Recognizing the relative importance of various issues to the other party, as well aswhich interests you share with them and which conflict.

6. Generating options that effectively address the partys interests.

7. Apologizing for problems or harms for which you are responsible and avoidinginappropriate blaming of the other party for problems which arise.


13/41

context of comparable negotiations held

recently and perhaps accept a compara

bleoutcomeas fair.Butunless thereare

mandatedfeeschedulesandotherguide

lines for these contracts, my contract

shouldpresumablybedecidedonitsown

meritsandaccordingtothewillingnessof

the two parties at the table to craft the

mostvaluable agreement they can.Who

caresaboutthatothernegotiation?

Second,mynegotiationcounterpartis

hoping I will remem

ber the words even

though I was willing

to

come

up

to

$7a

signthatsheisacoop

erative ba rgai ne r

(willing) and that she really conceded

something to come, in effect, all the

wayupto$7.

Without using overt hardbargainer

tactics,my counterpart is seeking to an

chormeatthelowendofthebargaining

range so that I will think any outcome

greater than $7 incredibly generous (on

herpart)butperhapsevenunattainable.

Another, more direct approach to

anchoring ones counterpart is to make

thefirstoffer,andthiscanbedoneinfor

mally.My counterpartmight say,How

muchdoyou really needto provide this

service? About $5.50 per unit? Again,

the$5.50figureismeanttogetmethink

ing on the low end of the bargaining

range,andwhileitisnotanofficialoffer,

the implication is that my counterpart

mentions itbecause shewould certainly

bewilling toagreeonaprice thatmeets

myneeds.

AsFisherandUry remindus inGettingtoYes,ifnegotiationisaboutadvanc

ing interests, we can disarm the hard

bargainer without appearing unreason

able.Idontthinkitsstrictlyaquestion

of need, I say, So why dont we talk

aboutafairpricefordeliveringavaluable

servicetothecommunity?

The most important defense against

anchoringisrecognizingitandpracticing

a littlemindfulness at the table, lest our

ownmindsplaytricksonus.

But the second defense hinges on amorebasic question:Whenshould Imake

thefirstoffer?The ruleof thumb is that if

youhavedone your homework and are

fairly confidentyouknowyour counter

parts reservation value, then make the

first offer and work to anchor themin a

portionofthebargainingrangefavorable

toyou.Ifyouareunsureabouttheirreserva


Disarming the hard bargainer: I dont think its strictly a question of need, I say,

So why dont we talk about a fair price for delivering a valuable service to the

community?

Framing is important to persuasion because people perceive

their interests differently depending on how choices are posed.

13

TAKING STOCK (Part Four) PRINCIPLES OF PERSUASION

As Michael Watkins notes, framing is important to persuasion because people per-ceive their interests differently depending on how choices are posed. Taken too far,this is a recipe for manipulation, of course, but used appropriately, framing principlescan give our good ideas a needed boost. Here are some tried-and-true approachesto framing and otherwise conveying our ideas more persuasively:

1. Invoke the common good. Many persuasive arguments emphasize collective bene-fits and downplay individual costs.

2. Make connections to core values. Draw on the genius of marketing, which linksthings for sale (cars, clothes, etc.) to cherished values, such as independence, re-

spect, and innovation.3. Heighten concerns about loss or risk. Emphasize what makes desired courses of

action less risky than alternative courses of action.

4. Leverage the power of contrasts to make requests seem more reasonable. Prac-titionersoften manage expectations by living the adage, Under-promise, over-deliver. Likewise, negotiators may ask for a great deal initially and then retreatto a more reasonable request. Advocates compare what they want to what othershave asked for, showing how their requests arent so big in the scheme ofthings (i.e., in comparison).

5. Strategically narrow or broaden the focus. A choice that could be construed assetting an undesirable precedent might best be framed as a highly circumscribed,isolated situation independent of other decisions, says Watkins.

6. Neutralize toxic issues. Table them or make up-front commitments that allow you

to move on to other issues where you can generate momentum.

7. Refute counter-arguments in advance. This rule goes back at least as far as theancient Greeks, notes Watkins. Anticipate their major reservations and addressthem preventively.

8. Give your counterpart(s) a script for persuading others. Give those with whomyoure negotiating some arguments that address the concerns of key otherse.g.,their bosses, peers, allies, etc. Equip those you are persuading to persuade others.

Source: Michael Watkins, The Power to Persuade (Harvard Business School Publishing, 2000).See also Cialdini, Influence: The Psychology of Persuasion (1984) and Zimbardo and Leippe, ThePsychology of Attitude Change and Social Influence (1991).


14/41

tionvalue,either let them make the first

offer (andworkhard toavoidbeing an

choredbyit)ormakeaflexiblefirstoffer

that probes for information: What

would do it for you here, say about

$11? (Note that thiswording is lessag

gressive than Whats your bottom

line?)

Thereareother,moresubtle, reasons

thatpairsofnegotiators,given the same

basic exercise with the same instruc

tions,generatesuchawiderangeofout

comes.One reason isdifferences inper

ceptions of the situation. Some negotia

tors

instinctively

see

the

process

of

seek

ingagreementasaprimarilycompetitive

process.Theyhaveawilltowinanduse

the phrase winning to describe their

outcomes.Inthissimplepricecase,com

petitiveas it is,bothpartiescandobetter

thantheirreservationvalueswhich isa

form of winning open toboth parties

yetsomenegotiatorscannothelpbutsee

themselvesinaracewiththeotherparty.

Anotherpsychologicaldistinctionwe

often find is this: Some negotiators are

muchmorewillingthanotherstoriskno

agreement for the sake of winning con

cessions from the other party (i.e.,

claiming value for themselves). In

plainer terms, some parties are much

morewilling thanothers towalkaway

fromthetable.Andthecredibleindica

tion that theywill walk awayitmay

or may notbe seen as a threat per

secanbe apowerful source of influ

enceovertheoutcome(specifictermsof

the agreement). Not surprisingly, afavorite tactic in price negotiations, or

other competitive oneissue negotia

tions, ismakingtheotherpartybelieve

that you are indifferent to the agree

ment,couldtakeitorleaveit.

Taking the Case Further: Reputa-tions, Linked Bargains, and JointGain

Asapracticalmatter,mostnegotia

tionsimportantincommunityproblem

solvingarenot so limitedor sopurely

competitive.Letsaddafewfeaturesto

this public/nonprofit contract example.

That is, lets change thegame inways

that reflect more realworld features

andpossibilities.

Imagine,firstofall,thattheencoun

terbetweenagovernmentagencyanda

key nonprofit service provider is any

thingbutaonetimeoroneoffagree

ment, thatsome future is likely in that

the parties will be dealing with each

otheragainandperhaps inavarietyof

settings. Immediately, we should recog

nizeafewthingsabouthowdramatically

this may shift our preparation for the

negotiationandourbehavioratthetable:

Reputation matters. The stakes are no

longer limited to the tangible issues

formally up for negotiation (such as

priceforservices)butnowincludeour

reputationsin the community.We care

notonly about theneartermoutcome

but about perceptions of the outcome

andeffectsofthoseperceptionsonsub

sequent encountersprobably with a

range of parties, notjust our counter

partsacrossthetablenow.

Bargainscanbelinked.The termsof this

agreementmaybe linked to other ne

gotiations inwhich the same twopar

tiesexpect toengage.That is, thisbar

gainmaybelinkedtoanotheronethat

includes the two parties, so we will

probably think about the gains and

concessions we make with a series of

negotiations inmind, notjust the one

encounter.Wemayevenexplicitlylink

todays

agreement

to

another

one:

Dothisformenow,andIwillcompensate

youlater.

Thequalityandusefulnessof therelation

ship is at stake. For all of the just

mentioned reasons, strengthening or

weakening the relationship between

thepartiesisalwaysapossibility,even

if the parties do not discuss their


Somenegotiatorsaremuchmorewillingthanothers torisknoagreementwalk

awayfromthetableforthesakeofwinningconcessionsfromtheotherparty

The stakes are no longer limited to the tangible

issues formally up for negotiation but now include

our reputations in the community.

14


15/41

(intangible) interest in improving the

relationship explicitly (or pursue it

withequalgustoandeffectiveness).

These considerations are incredibly

commoninjointproblemsolvingandnotonly at the local or community level.

Many of our most valuable agreements

are forged with people with whom we

willdealagainandagain.Networksop

erate to communicate our reputations

forfairorunfairplay,forcertaintypesof

demandsandconcessions,foremploying

a particular style of negotiation. Parties

confronted with imposing limitations in

theneartermfindwaystousethefuture

to promise compensationwhat goes

aroundcomesaround,wesay,andwin

some, lose some, meaning that what

matters isdoing aswell asyou can over

thelonghaul,notjustwinningtoday.

Lets change the price game in an

otherimportantwaynow,expandingthe

number and types of issues. (Note that

one key question on the Worksheet is,

Whataretheissues?andanotheris,Is

there room to introduce additional is

sues?)

Evenwhereanegotiation ismainly

a transaction between two parties, in

public problemsolving, transactions

arerarelyaboutone issuealone.Along

withtangibleinterests

inprice(financial

resources),time,andsubstantiverolein

whateverfollowstheagreement,parties

often care about a host of intangibles,

such as image, higher principles

havingasay, forexample,orsettingan

importantprecedentorrespectingcom

munity traditions and the values be

hindthem.

There are two ways to look at the

effects of adding issues, which often

change the game. One way is to con

clude that thenewgame ismore com

plex,hardertoresolvebecausetheyare

nowmoreconcernsandmoretofigure

out and work out. And adding issues

may sometimes just make things

harder,itstrue.Butanother,morecrea

tive way to look at this is to see that

when theres more to negotiate, theres

oftenmore room tonegotiate too.AsSe

benius and Lax note in TheManager as

Negotiator, where parties value different

things (or the same things differently),

theycanmakevaluable,winwintrades.

Lets return to the case of our two

partycontractnegotiation, thistimewithafewmoreissuesandafuturethepros

pectofa relationshipand additional en

countersinthemix.

Imagine that thegovernment agency

valuesthreethingsbutnotallthreetothe

samedegree.Thepublicbudgetistighter

thisyear than last, and allmanagersare

under pressure to show cost savings

whereverpossible.Soprice (forservices)

isveryimportant,andultimatelythegov

ernment caresmost about totalprice,not

the

unit

price,

because

its

the

total

costthatwillbemostvisibletothepublicand

toelectedofficials.Second, theMayor is

eager to show progress on campaign

commitments to improve community

health,most of all childrenshealth and

safety.So timinghow soon the services

can begin and get to communitywide

scaleisalsovery important to thegov

ernment. A third issue, program design

(thespecificsofhowthevaccinationpro

gram will function) is only somewhat

important,aslongastheserviceprovider

guarantees quality outcomes, and gov


Where theres more to negotiate, theres often

more room to negotiate too.

15

TAKING STOCK (Part Five) EFFECTIVE WORKING RELATIONSHIPS

Effective relationships that allow people to work together over time share certaintraits. In general, such relationships tend to be

1. Forward-looking. Change is expected, even anticipated. The parties involvedmake room for their relationship to grow. They look ahead to anticipate shocks andopportunities in the environment that might affect the outcomes they care aboutand thus the relationship.

2. Committed and resilient. They withstand pressure, in part through willingness andcapacity to see things through before resorting to hardball. The parties avoidmaking major assumptions about each others intentions. Effective communication iskey, and this means more than sending signals clearly. It also includes active listen-inglistening to understand, summarizing what they say and checking with them tobe sure you have understood.

3. Fairi.e., perceived as fair by both sides. The relationship reflects a balancedallocation of benefits and rewards, meets the parties criteriawhatever definesvalueover time, even if short-term costs and benefits are uneven here and there.

4. Trust-based and forgivingbut provocable. Charles Sabel and other students ofcooperation recommend studied trust in which the parties make it easy for eachother to monitor compliance with commitments made. Beyond having a practicalvalue, supporting such mechanisms signals a willingness to do what you say. AndRobert Axelrod says parties can apply a tit-for-tat rule to infractions, beingprovocable but forgiving. Abuses will not be tolerated, but parties will extendeach other the benefit of the doubt and will be willing to forgive, at least withincertain limits.

5. Realistic. Agreed-upon expectations are reasonable and, where possible, adjust-able. In a rush to agree, parties will not insist on or agree to things that cannot bedelivered, based on best-available information and standards.


16/41

ernment has some preferences about

staffingandmaterialstobeused.

Thenonprofitseesthingsabitdiffer

ently. Itneeds toobtaina feeperunitof

service that will cover its costs,but the

organizationwouldbewillingtoforegoa

largercontractforthesakeofflexibilityto

experiment with the program design.

Onereasonisthattheorganizationwants

toestablish itselfasan innovator,andso

the specifics of program delivery are

quite important.A second reason is that

the nonprofitwants to retain the auton

omy to develop its own capacity in ap

propriatewaysnotgetstuckwithstaff

ingdictatedbygovernment,forexample,

onlytoseefundingevaporateandpriori

ties change.As for timing, thenonprofit

would like togetup and running soon,

butitdoesnotwanttorushintothefield

(and make costly errors) simply for the

sakeofvisibility.

Figure1outlinesthesedistinctprefer

ences.Intheshorthandofnegotiation, the

interestsindicatewhatpartieswouldpre

fer visvis specific issues, and weights

indicatehow important (overall)agiven

issueisrelativetotheotherissues.

Whereasbeforewehad abargaining

rangeinonedimension(price),nowthere

aremanypossibilities for oneparty to

trade (concede) something less impor

tant to it in exchange for something it

valuesmore.Forexample,inonepossi

bleoutcome:

Government grants significant flexi

bility on pro

gram design in

exchange for a

commitment by

thenonprofit for

early delivery,

beginning in

threeweeks.But

the nonprofit

convinces gov

ernment that

rapid startup

shouldbelimitedtoapilotphasethat

generates some lessons useful for a

scaledup version of the program to

start

3

4

months

from

now.

The

pilot

will show visible followup by the

Mayorbutlimitcostlymistakes.

Thenonprofitacceptsa smaller total

contract (addressing governments

needtolimittotalcosts)butsecuresa

fairly high unit price that will help

theorganizationbuildupaskilledstaff

and the equipment needed to deliver

quality community health programs.

Pointing to evidence that cheap pro

grams yield correspondingly limited

results, the service provider

argues

successfully

for

qual

ity and impact rather than

milewide, inchdeep cov

erageofthetotalpopulation.

Eachparty isable toclaim

victory on key intangible in

tereststhe nonprofit has

protected its autonomy to

design and deliver an inno

vative community health

program, the government

has ensured responsiveness

onanurgentpublicproblem,

aswellastheappearancethatitisman

aging resources carefully in a tight

budgetyear.

This agreement reflects what is

known in negotiation as a package or

bundle.Itaddressesspecificoptionson

severalissuesatonce.

Whyisthisbundlingsoimportant?

Goback toeach issuenamedabove,and

you will notice that the government

agency

and

nonprofit

service

providerseem to have conflicting interests. On

time, for example, government favors

start immediately and the nonprofit

wants time to do things right. On pro

gramdesign,governmenthassomepref

erences, but the nonprofit would like

total flexibility todo thingsas itsees fit.

Andfinally,onepartycontinuestowant

ahigher,andtheotheralower,price.


Whereas before we had a bargaining range in one di-

mension (price), now there are many possibilities for

one party to trade (concede) something less impor-

tant to it in exchange for something it values more.

16

PARTIES KEY INTERESTS (By Issue)

Government Agency Shave costs in a tight-budget year.

Show response on Mayors campaign promises(secure rapid implementation schedule)

Ensure quality

Nonprofit Service Provider Cover costs, ensure quality, develop capacity.

Ensure quality, learn through pilot phase

Protect autonomy, develop reputation for inno-vation

ISSUES (Relative Importance)

Price (very important) - focus is total price

Time (very important) - i.e., schedule for imple-menting the service

Program design (somewhat important)

Price (very important) - focus is unit price

Time (somewhat important)

Program design (very important)

Figure 1. Expanded Public/Nonprofit Negotiation over a Service Contract


17/41

Each individual issue in thisnegotia

tion, then, is purely competitive (or

zerosum). More for one party means

less for the other. Try to negotiate the

issuesonebyone,andwefaceaseriesof

competitive,winloseexchanges.Nowin

win(jointgain)willbepossible.

How can the parties dobetter than

this?The key is that the two partiesdo

nothaveidenticalinterestsorweighteach

issue the same way, as we outlined

above. Tradesarepossiblewhere theparties

can exploit these differences in what they

wantnot the most intuitive idea, since

negotiation is sometimesdescribed

asanefforttofindcommonground.

Yes, agreement will come only

where the twopartiesjointlyagree

on some package, but building a

valuable

package,

among

a

host

of

alternative proposals, will clearly

demand that thepartiesunderstandand

exploretheirdifferences.

AsGeorge Wu of theHarvard Busi

ness School notes in Sources of Joint

Gains in Negotiations, mostjoint gains

areaboutleveragingdifferences,inwhich

eachpartyreceivessomethingvaluableto

itinexchangeforgivingsomethingcheap

(or cheaper)to it.There aremultiple di

mensions along which differences can

leadtovaluablewinwintrades:

Differencesin

interests,aswesawinthis

simplecaseexample,often in theform

ofplacingdifferentweightsonspecific

interests.Swapscreatevaluebytrading

whateachpartyvalues less forwhat

eachvaluesmore;

Differences in belief about the future.

Parties that expect different things

can, in effect, place different bets

about the future.This iswhatmakes

stock markets run. In the exampleabove,governmentandthenonprofit

might have very different beliefs

aboutthepotentialofanuntriedpro

gram.Theparty confident of a high

payoff with the program might be

willing toback it for little up front

compensation, contingent on abig re

ward if the program indeed pays off.

Trades create valueby responding to

each partys (different) prediction

about the future,usuallyvia a contin

gentagreementorbet.

Differencesin

aversion

to

risk. Somepeo

pleare,aseconomistssay,riskseeking

whileothersareriskaverse.Riskseek

ers are willing to run bigger risks in

exchange for bigger rewards, while

othersprefertoplayit(comparatively)

safe. Trades offer a guarantee to the

more risk averse party while shifting

bigger rewards, in the caseof success,

to the riskseeking party. So a risk

averse community development or

ganization maybe happy to accept a

limitednumberofguaranteedjobslots

forneighborhood residents from a su

permarket moving into the neighbor

hood. What matters most is getting

some jobs for sure. The more risk

seekingparty (thesupermarket) tradesthat guarantee for flexibility to hire

anyone it likes should the marketbe

comevery successful (even if thepro

portionofthemarkets employeeswho

are neighborhood residents goes

down).Amoreconventionalapproach

wouldsimplysettleonanumberofjob

slots,regardlessofthesedifferentappe

titesforrisk.And

Differencesintimepreference.Aswe saw

above,

making

sure

that

somethinghappensrightawaymaybemuchmore

important tooneparty than toothers.

Thepartyagreeing to speed thingsup

canbe compensated via issues that it

caresaboutmorethantiming.

Wusuggeststhatnegotiatorsnotjust

identify interests they share with the

other side(s)butalsoconstructan inven

tory of differences. This can begin in ad


Wu suggests that negotiators not just identify interests they

share with the other side but also construct an inventory

of differences that can be a guide to possible trades.

17

TAKING STOCK (Part Six) BARRIERS TO JOINT GAIN

Win-winor creating value for all sidesis often possible in negotiation. Yet manyfactors can make it hard to find or deliver, for example:

1. Assuming a fixed pie (that parties interests are directly opposed on all issues,with no room for trades).

2. Assuming a conflict (parties actually want the same thing, but baggage, bias,and the escalation of conflict obscure it).

3. Thinking narrowly about differences (the parties consider differences in interestonly, ignoring time, risk aversion, and other preference differences).

4. Taking up zero-sum (competitive) issues one by one. Trades depend on workingacross issues to create value for both parties. Without bundling, the parties canonly carry out a series of competitive, win-lose negotiations that are less efficientand, typically, much less emotionally satisfying.

5. Devaluing the other sides offers (proposals by the other side tend to be deval-uedwhy arent they giving in more?!?).

6. Exaggerating claims and posturing.

7. Being overconfident (each side believes the other will be willing to concede more).


18/41

vanceof thenegotiationand continue at

thetable,asthepartieslearnmoreabout

eachother.

So far,weve added issues to a very

basiconeissue(price)negotiation.Below,

well see how adding more parties like

wise expands the possibilities for valu

able tradesand introducestheneed for

more tools to manage the process

through which parties interact. Before

readingon,takeamomenttoreviewthe

core concepts we have covered so far

(nextpage).

If you remember nothing else from

this first case anddiscussion, remember

this: Do your homework. Prepare, pre

pare,prepare.Most inexperiencednego

tiators, and many experienced ones too,

underprepare significantly. In effect,

they

foolishly

rely

on

assertiveness,

clev

erness,orcharmatthetable(orallofthe

above) to compensate for huge gaps in

the information they havegaps that

might havebeen remedied with a little

investmentoftimeandenergyupfront.

Beyond the Basics: More Parties,More Issues, More Creative Solu-tions

Weveseensofarthateffectivenego

tiationhingesonchoosingsituationsthat

are appropriateinsofar as one can

chooseadopting some basic principles

to enable joint problemsolving (rather

than standoff or avoidance), preparing

awayfromthetableforwhathappensat

thetable,managingourownperceptions

and thoseofothers, and looking forop

portunities to create joint gain

(sometimes in counterintuitive ways).

These factors, which apply even in the

case of two parties working out agree

ment, become all the more important

whenthenumberofpartiesincreasesand

the negotiation process becomes more

complex.

First, lets look at the general fea

tures that make multiparty negotia

tionsspecialandapplythese ideastoa

new case example, in which parties

cometogetherinacommunitytodefine

and implement solutions to a critical

socialproblem.Manyof the ideas that

applytonegotiations acrossorganizations

or groups, such as in the case example

below, also applywhenmultipleparties

within an organization are negotiating a

majordecision.

Followingtheexample,wellconsider

more advanced issues related to media

torsandothertypesof thirdparty facili


Most inexperienced negotiators, and many experienced ones too, under-prepare

significantly. In effect, they foolishly rely on assertiveness, cleverness, or charm at

the table (or all of those) to compensate for huge gaps in the information they

have.

18

TAKING STOCK (Part Seven) REVIEWING KEY CONCEPTS

1. Know your alternativesand improve them. Be clear on the value of your alter-natives to negotiated agreement, learn as much as you can about their (your coun-terparts) alternatives, and improve yours if you can. Alternatives to negotiatedagreement define the bargaining range, and the quality of these alternatives helpsdetermine the leverage that parties have. Sometimes, the most important thing youcan do to gain leverage at the table is to improve your alternatives away from the

tableor worsen the other sides perception of its alternatives. Options are asource of power.

2. Shape their perceptions through principled arguments. Since information aboutthe other party(ies) is often incomplete, much of the persuasion in negotiation cen-ters on shaping the other sides perceptions about the bargaining range and desir-ability of particular outcomes within it. This is different from convincing them simplyto share your interests or give in for the sake of fairness. So know your audience,and prepare your arguments and counter-arguments carefully.

3. Make the first offer if your information is good. First offer can help anchor theother party(ies) in a portion of the bargaining range favorable to you, but makethe first offer if your information on their reservation value is good, or make anopen-ended, probing offer to improve your information.

4. Be mindful of your own perceptions. What makes negotiation a human process,

and not a robotic exercise in information exchange, is the power of our perceptionsand biasesas well as, more positively, our capacity to self-correct and rescueourselves. Be careful about attributing (rather than confirming) the other partysintentions, listen well and communicate as clearly as possible (and confirm that theyunderstand), re-negotiate the process if their conduct does not seem respectful orconstructive.

5. Change the game to create a more valuable agreement. Even negotiations thatseem narrow and limited to competition can often be expanded to consider futurerelationship, intangible interests, and linked issues (such as quality linked to price).

6. Look for valuable trades. In multi-issue negotiations, win-win trades are possible,but its usually differences in what parties want that makes trades possible. Somekey types of trade-able differences relate to interests, beliefs about the future,aversion to risk, and time preferences.

7. Do your homeworkon the issues; options; other partys interests, alternatives,and negotiating style, and more. Once youve identified the stakeholders, learnall that you can about them, what they value, and how they view the world. Mostinexperienced negotiators, and many experienced ones too, under-prepare signifi-cantly. Use your personal networks, public information sources, industry databases,key informants or knowledgeable observers (including well-informed journalists),and other sources. Dont rush to the table ill-prepared.


19/41

tators, the challenges of negotiating on

behalf of constituents (being an

agent)a very common pattern in

communityproblemsolvingandmore.

Negotiations that include three or

more parties present dynamics that are

quite different from the twoparty case

we worked on above. First, unless full

consensus (unanimous support) is re

quired, agreementgenerallydependson

getting a coalitionofparties to supporta

package or proposal. That is, when the

numberofpartiesgoesfromtwotothree,

something new can happen: two parties

canally tooppose the third.Thespecific

number

of

parties

that

must

support

a

proposal may depend on law or prece

dent,or itmaybeuptothediscretionof

civicleaderswhosimplywanttoensurea

broadbaseofsupportforagivenpolicy,

program,orinitiative.

As Howard Raiffa shows in TheArt

andScienceofNegotiation, thismakes fora

more complex process of engagement

amongthepartiesbutalsoarichersetof

possibilitiesfor trades, for example

than oneonone negotiation offers. For

instance:

The process can be complex. Many

important negotiations can happen

among subgroups of the parties, in

sidemeetings.So theremay, for ex

ample, be twoparty and threeparty

negotiations embedded ina largersix

party negotiation process. When key

partiesorpublicobserversdislikesuch

meetings, they complain about

backroomdeals.Butmany informal,

smallgroup consultations can, with

proper safeguards, be invaluable asmechanisms for exploring options,

clarifying statements made in public

(e.g., in themedia), sharing controver

sial concerns, and removing obstacles

toagreement.Partiesoftenopenup in

smaller, informal settings inways that

larger gatherings, particularly if open

tothepublic,donotencourage.

Coalitionscanbebuiltinawidevariety

ways, for example by leveraging

shared interests (tangible or intangi

ble), sharedpositionsonaparticular

proposal(e.g.,asharedpreferencefor

nodealor even nonegotiation),

sharedhistory(commonexperiences,

an important relationship, sharedtraditions),sharedvulnerability (e.g.,

to being excluded from a valuable

agreement ) , valuable trades

(carrots)orpenalties(sticks)that

influencesupport,andcommonallies

orenemies.

Recruiting allies is often hardand

so iskeeping them.MichaelWatkins

and SusanRosegrant, in Sourcesof

Power in Coalition Building, notes

that framingandothereffectiveper

suasion techniques are crucial for

delivering on all of these. Recogniz

ingapotentialcoalitiononpaperis

onething.Buildingareal,committed

coalition by recruiting and retaining

alliesisanother.

Building a strong coalition sometimesdependsonwhenweapproachparticu

larparties,notjustwhowe approach.

Ratherthanapproachpotentialalliesin

just any order, coalitionbuilders look

tocreatebandwagoneffects(wherein

onepartysdecisiontooffersupport is

influenced by the appearance of a

group already in favor) and exploit

patterns of deference to particular in

fluential or respected parties (Since

partyXsupportsyou,Ishouldtoo).

Coalitions that are built can also be

brokenusingavarietyof those strate

gies. Those who oppose a given pro

posal may look for weak links in a

coalition inhopesofdissolvingorun

dermining it. Parties that can be re

cruited easily may also be recruited

awayeasilytoanadverseorblock

ing coalition. (Note that one partys

favorable coalition is typically an op

posingpartysadverseone.)

Beyond these key features, many

multiparty negotiations in community

problemsolving present with certain

common contextual features. These in

clude some of the issues we considered

above in the enriched version of the

twopartynegotiation.

For example, the parties around the

table can bring varied resourcesfrom

money and facilities to reputation and

political legitimacyto bear on commu

nity problems and opportunities. So

problemsolving together includes animportantelementof identifying,under

standing,andbundlingthoseresourcesin

creativeways.Thekeyquestionsarenot

just whatdoyouwant? (interests)but


The key questions inmultipartyproblemsolving are notjust what doyou

want?(interests)butwhatcanyoudo?(capacityandresources).

Recognizing a potential coalition on paper is one

thing. Building a real, committed coalition by recruit-

ing and retaining allies is another.

19


20/41

what can you do? (capacity and re

sources).

Next, theplayersgenerally expect to

bedealin

We Are All Negotiators Now

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