ISSN 1391-9407ISBN 92-9090-551-4

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Water Management in the Yellow River Basin:Background, Current Critical Issues and Future Research Needs

Mark Giordano, Zhongping Zhu, Ximing Cai, Shangqi Hong, Xuecheng Zhang and Yunpeng Xue

Research Report 3

I n t e r n a t i o n a lWater ManagementI n s t i t u t e

The Comprehensive Assessment of Water Management in Agriculture takes stockof the costs, benefits and impacts of the past 50 years of water development foragriculture, the water management challenges communities are facing today, andsolutions people have developed. The results of the Assessment will enable farmingcommunities, governments and donors to make better-quality investment andmanagement decisions to meet food and environmental security objectives in the nearfuture and over the next 25 years.

The Research Report Series captures results of collaborative research conductedunder the Assessment. It also includes reports contributed by individual scientists andorganizations that significantly advance knowledge on key Assessment questions. Eachreport undergoes a rigorous peer-review process. The research presented in the seriesfeeds into the Assessment’s primary output—a “State of the World” report and set ofoptions backed by hundreds of leading water and development professionals and waterusers.

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Comprehensive Assessment Research Report 3

Water Management in the Yellow RiverBasin: Background, Current Critical Issuesand Future Research Needs

Mark GiordanoZhongping ZhuXiming CaiShangqi HongXuecheng Zhang andYunpeng Xue

Comprehensive Assessment of Water Management in Agriculture

With support from the Yellow River Conservancy Commission

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The authors: Mark Giordano is a Senior Researcher at IWMI; Zhongping Zhu is aPrincipal Researcher at IWMI; Ximing Cai is Assistant Professor, Ven Te ChowHydrosystems Laboratory, Department of Civil and Environmental Engineering,University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign; Shangqi Hong is Professor, Yellow RiverConservancy Commission; and Xuecheng Zhang and Yunpeng Xue are SeniorEngineers, Yellow River Conservancy Commission.

Giordano, M.; Zhu, Z.; Cai, X.; Hong, S.; Zhang, X.; Xue, Y. 2004. Water managementin the Yellow River Basin: Background, current critical issues and future researchneeds. Comprehensive Assessment Research Report 3. Colombo, Sri Lanka:Comprehensive Assessment Secretariat.

/ water management / research priorities / river basin development / institutionaldevelopment / water resources development / water stress / soil conservation / watersupply / policy / water scarcity / water quality / environment / irrigation water / runoff/ Yellow River Basin /

ISSN 1391-9407ISBN 92-9090-551-4

Copyright © 2004, by Comprehensive Assessment Secretariat. All rights reserved.

Please send inquiries and comments to: comp.assessment@cgiar.org

The Comprehensive Assessment is organized through the CGIAR’s System-Wide Initiative on WaterManagement (SWIM), which is convened by the International Water Management Institute. TheAssessment is carried out with inputs from over 90 national and international development andresearch organizations—including CGIAR Centers and FAO. Financial support for the Assessmentcomes from a range of donors, including the Governments of the Netherlands, Switzerland, Japan,

Taiwan and Austria; the OPEC Fund; FAO; and the Rockefeller Foundation.

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Contents

Summary ............................................................................................................. v

Introduction ......................................................................................................... 1

General Basin Characteristics ............................................................................ 2

Role of the Yellow River Basin in Chinese Culture and History .......................... 9

Basin Development and Management ...............................................................11

Current Critical Issues ...................................................................................... 17

Key Issues for Future Research ....................................................................... 33

Concluding Remarks ......................................................................................... 36

Literature Cited ................................................................................................. 37

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the Yellow River basin which will serve not only asa store of knowledge but also as a basis forinforming and prioritizing future Yellow River basinwater resources research. The report is dividedinto three parts. In the first, an overview of theYellow River basin including its physical geography,its role in Chinese history, and the historicdevelopment of its water resources is presented,often utilizing information sources not typicallyaccessed by water resources researchers. Thereport then discusses the key critical issues nowbeing faced by basin residents and managers,breaking with conventional wisdom and placingwater scarcity rather than flood control as thenumber one priority. The paper concludes with adiscussion of promising areas for future researchand analysis, including intersectoral waterallocation, water savings, pollution abatement, dataissues and institutional development.

Summary

Management of China’s Yellow River basin is at across-roads. Decreasing water supplies, increasingdemand and a rapidly growing economy haveadded new challenges to a management agendaand institutional infrastructure traditionally focusedon flood control and irrigation development. As aresult, basin managers must now contend withsuch issues as water scarcity, water allocation, andenvironmental degradation while still guardingagainst floods and contributing to China’s foodsecurity goals. Because of the role of the YellowRiver basin in China’s overall economy, thesuccess of its water managers in addressing thesenew issues will have implications for the entirecountry. At the same time, China’s experience canprovide lessons for other parts of the world facingsimilar challenges and change. The goal of thisreport is to provide an English language synthesisof information on water and water management in

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Water Management in the Yellow River Basin:Background, Current Critical Issues and FutureResearch Needs

Mark Giordano, Zhongping Zhu, Ximing Cai, Shangqi Hong, Xuecheng Zhang and YunpengXue

Introduction

management agenda. In essence, a transition inriver management is now taking place in whichfocus is shifting from prevention of the riverdoing harm to people to preventing people fromdoing harm to the river.

Significant institutional, policy and legalreforms are required to successfully bringabout such a fundamental transition in a rivermanagement system that has evolved overtwo millennia. This report has been producedas a background to assist researchers andpolicy makers in informing the debatesurrounding that reform. The report is dividedinto three primary sections. The first discussesthe background to the Yellow River basin andits management including the basic geographyof the basin, the role of the basin in Chinesehistory, and the historic development of basinwater resources management and waterresources. The second discusses the key criticalissues now being faced by basin residents andmanagers, including water scarcity, flood control,and land and other environmentaldegradation. The report concludes with somereflections on promising areas for future researchand analysis, including intersectoral allocation,water saving, pollution abatement, data issuesand institutional gaps.

The Yellow River basin has been part of Chinavirtually since the inception of the Chinesenation. Designated as “the cradle ofChinese Civilization,” the basin has played a keyrole not only in the country’s economicdevelopment but also in the historic and culturalidentity of the Chinese people. Perhaps,ironically, the Yellow River is also known as“China’s Sorrow,” because the soils whichhave fostered human development are alsoassociated with frequent, sometimescatastrophic, floods. The devastation brought bythese floods, often at scales unimaginable in theWest, makes it easy to understand whysuccessive Chinese administrations from thelegendary Xia Dynasty (ca. 2000 B.C.) throughthe 20th century made flood control the numberone priority of Yellow River management. Whilethe possibility of flooding is ever present andremains a key issue in basin management, majorachievements have been made in flood controlsince the founding of the People’s Republic ofChina in 1949. As a result of this success andthe rapid economic and social changes whichhave taken place over the past few decades,new issues such as water scarcity, overuse ofresources and environmental degradation arenow rising to the top position of the water

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General Basin Characteristics

necessary if one wishes to understand the issueswhich both the Chinese government and basinresidents face in their daily efforts to use,manage and protect the river. To accomplish thisformidable task, the river is often divided into itsthree main reaches for analysis.1

The Upper Reach

The upper reach of the Yellow River drains justover half of the total basin area and extendsfrom the river’s origin in the Bayenkalamountains to the Hekouzhen gauging stationdownstream from the city of Baotou. While theupper reach provides approximately 54 percentof the river’s total runoff, this contribution comesfrom two distinct geographic backdropscharacterized by off-setting physical processes.

Physical Geography

Most descriptions of the Yellow River’sgeography commence with a recitation of facts.For example, the Yellow River begins in theQinghai-Tibetan plateau of Qinghai province fromwhence it flows across 8 other provinces andautonomous regions before emptying into theYellow Sea north of the Shandong peninsula(figure 1). With a length of over 5,400 km, theYellow River is the second longest in China andthe 10th longest in the world and drains an arealarger than France. The basin containsapproximately 9 percent of China’s populationand 17 percent of its agricultural area. Whilesuch static figures may be of passing interest, itis a deeper understanding of variation in theYellow River basin’s physical geography that is

FIGURE 1.The Yellow River Basin.

1By Chinese convention, the Yellow River is divided into the three reaches described here. However, other methods, such as that used byGreer (1979) may more closely reflect fundamental physical differences across basin space. This may be especially true in the Upper Reach.

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On the Qinghai-Tibetan Plateau where the YellowRiver begins, steep rock slopes, low evaporationand high moisture retention produce runoffcoefficients estimated to range from 30 percent(World Bank 1993) to 50 percent (Greer 1979).This, combined with relatively high precipitationlevels, results in this western most region of theupper reach contributing 56 percent of the entireriver’s total runoff by the point of the Lanzhougauging station (YRCC 2002a). As the rivermoves northward from there into the Ningxia/Inner Mongolian plains and the Gobi Desert,evaporation rises to levels several times that ofprecipitation (World Bank 1993). As a result, thissection of the river is a net consumer of runoff,and total flow is greatly reduced from the levelwhich would otherwise exist if the river kept aneastward course. The spatial variation in flowcontribution within the upper reach is furtherexacerbated by human usage patterns. In themost western regions of the upper reach,relatively low population densities, agriculturaldevelopment and industrialization limit in situusage. As the river moves northward fromLanzhou, the agricultural population, with its longhistory of irrigation, and a growing industrialbase, substantially increase water withdrawals.

The Middle Reach

The middle reach, covering 46 percent of basinarea and providing an additional 43 percent ofthe total runoff, begins at the Hekouzhen gaugingstation (YRCC 2002a). From there the riverbegins its “great bend” to the south into andthrough the Loess Plateau. The middle reach ofthe Yellow River plays a significant role in basinwater balances and availability for human use fortwo reasons. First, the reach includes some ofthe Yellow River’s major tributaries such as the

Fen and the Wei, which contribute substantiallyto the total flow. Second, as the river turnssouthward, it cuts through the Loess Plateau andits potentially fertile but highly erodible loesssoils. These soils enter the mainstem and itstributaries as massive quantities of silt, resultingin average sediment concentrationsunprecedented amongst major waterways(Milliman and Meade 1983) and giving both theriver and the sea into which it flows, theircommon “Yellow” names.

While sediment levels in the Yellow River arecaused in part by such natural factors as theerodibility of the loess soils already mentioned,low average precipitation which retards thegrowth of soil stabilizing vegetation, and anincrease in the gradient and power of the YellowRiver as it passes through the most erodiblezone, these levels are clearly exacerbated byanthropogenic factors, many of which have beenin place for centuries or millennia (Ronan 1995).While there is debate on the degree to which theLoess Plateau was “naturally” forested, it seemsclear that as early as the Qin and Han dynasties,large areas of land had been deforested for fuelwood and agricultural expansion, a factor whichis believed to have contributed to increasederosion and, perhaps, regional desiccation(Menzies 1995).2 Whatever the cause, the longstanding nature of the sedimentationphenomenon can be seen in the Chinese use ofthe phrase “when the [Yellow] river runs clear” tomean “never.” As will be described later, controlof the potentially devastating Yellow River floods,which are greatly exacerbated by the highsediment loads generated in the middle reach,has formed a central theme in Chinese watermanagement and politics for at least 3,000 years.In addition, control of sedimentation to reducethe severity and frequency of flooding,

2There is also evidence that the Loess Plateau, with the exception of riverine bottoms, higher mountains and some other areas has essentiallybeen treeless at least since the Pleistocene ( Ho 1998). Lowdermilk (1925, 1930) provides interesting observations and comments. The generaldebate is covered by Menzies (1995).

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accomplished through flushing, is now estimatedto require about 25 percent of the total YellowRiver flow and so is a major factor in currentutilization of basin water.

The Lower Reach

The lower reach of the Yellow River commencesat Huayuankou near the city of Zhengzhou andforms one of the most unique river segments inthe world. Here the sediment transported fromthe middle reach begins to settle as the riverspills onto the flat North China Plain, producing aconsistently aggrading bed and a naturallymeandering and unstable channel (Ren andWalker 1998). This instability has in fact been sosevere that the Yellow River has had 6 majorchannel changes over the past 3,500 years inwhich the outlet to the sea shifted the 400 kmfrom one side of the Shandong Peninsula to theother (Greer 1979). These massive shifts in theriver channel, as well as more frequent smallermovements, clearly cause problems for themillions of people who have attempted to farmthe lower reach’s fertile alluvial soils. Inresponse, successive river managers down themillennia have constructed levees along thebanks of the Yellow River in an attempt to

stabilize the main channel. While such structuresmay hold the channel in the short term, theirsuccess depends on consistently raising leveewalls as sediment elevates the level of thechannel constrained within.

Over the time, the process of levee raising hascontributed to a “suspended” river in which thechannel bottom is above ground level, sometimesby more than 10 meters (Leung 1996) (figure 2).This raising of the channel above the level of theneighboring countryside has clear implications forthe severity of flooding when the levees inevitabilitybreak but also alters the meaning of the YellowRiver “basin.” With the channel above ground level,the surrounding landscape cannot drain into theriver nor can tributaries enter. This essentiallymeans that the river “basin” becomes a narrowcorridor no wider than the few kilometer breadth ofthe diked channel. With almost no inflow, thecontribution of the lower reach is limited to only 3percent of the total runoff. While much of thesediment is deposited in the lower reach,approximately half has historically reached theriver’s outlet to the sea. These large depositshave, at least until recently, caused the river’sdelta to expand outward, creating substantial newfarm land (see Ren and Walker 1998, for adiscussion of the delta’s dynamics).

FIGURE 2Representative cross-section of the "suspended" Yellow River.

Source: After Ronan 1995.

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Extra-basin Issues

While the above discussion focuses on thecurrent geographic boundaries of the YellowRiver basin, it is important to note that theseboundaries, particularly in the lower reach, havechanged, and may again change, over the time.As mentioned, the high sediment load of theYellow River makes the channel highly unstablein the lower reach where the topography isextremely flat. When the Yellow River’s channelshifts, typically after a flood event or throughhuman intervention it connects hydrologically witheither the Hai River system to the north or theHuai River system to the south, resulting in anexpansion of basin boundaries across variousportions of the North China Plain. The last timesuch a change occurred was in 1938 when theYellow River’s south dike was purposefullybreached at Huayuankou to block an advance ofthe Japanese army. The river was returned to itspresent course by engineering means in 1947(Todd 1949). The imposition of the Grand Canal,which runs perpendicular generally to the east towest flowing rivers of eastern China andessentially links all of the basins from Hangzhounorth to Tianjin, further complicates strictdefinition of basin boundaries in the lower reach.The blur of basin boundaries and the challengeof the term “basin” across the North China Plainbecome more evident by an examination of thegenerally criss-crossing, highly engineered riversystems of the region.

A second problem confusing theunderstanding of the Yellow River basinboundaries is the lack of congruence betweenthe geographic extent of the basin as commonlydelineated and the relevant hydrologic units. Forexample, in the lower reach of the basin,seepage from the suspended main stem of theriver recharges groundwater aquifers in both theHai and Huai basins where it is extracted forcrop production. Additional water is alsotransferred out of the basin for industrial and

domestic use, especially to the cities of Jinan,Qingdao and Tianjin. Of potentially greatersignificance for the future is the plannedconstruction of the “South waters North”engineering schemes which may eventuallytransfer large amounts of water from theChangjiang basin into the Yellow River, furthermarring the relevance of the geographic definitionof the Yellow River basin (Biswas et al. 1983; Liu1998).

Human and Non-water ResourceGeography

According to year 2000 statistics, the YellowRiver basin is home to some 110 million peopleor around 9 percent of China’s total population. Ifthe flood zone in the surrounding lower reachwere included, the figures would rise to around190 million people or 15 percent of the totalpopulation. In general, population densities arehighest in the lower reach and are lowest in theupper reach. While urbanization is increasingrapidly, about ¾ of the basin residents are stillclassified as rural and most of them depend onagriculture for their livelihood. Income levels inthe basin are, on average, somewhat lower thannational averages and the basin accounts forsome 7 percent of national output (YRCC 2001).While its per capita share of total output is lowerthan average, the basin’s agricultural output ishigher with grain production within basinboundaries and on adjacent flood zonessurpassing 75 million tons or 16 percent ofChina’s national total in 2000 (table 1). Theabove average agricultural output is in partexplained by the fact that the per capita arableland area in the basin, at 0.12 ha, is 1.5 timesChina’s national average (Hong et al. 2002).

In addition to hydropower, the basin hasimportant reserves of other energy resources andis known in China as the “energy resourcesbasin.” In total, the basin is estimated to contain

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TABLE 1.

Agricultural production in the Yellow River basin.

Agriculture (106 tons Gross output value

Grains Cotton Oil (109 US$)

1) Within basin 36.2 0.1 2.4 77.1

As a percent of national 7.8% 3.1% 8.2% 6.8%

2) Downstream flood area 44.6 1.3 4.0 61.3

3) Sum 76.2 1.4 5.9 131.3

As a percentage of national 16.2% 24.8% 19.8% 11.8%

Source: YRCC 2001.

almost half of the nation’s coal and over 25percent of its oil. The basin is also home to the“Victory Oilfield” (Shengli Youtian), located inShandong province near the mouth of the YellowRiver, which has significant symbolic value inaddition to the value of its energy reserves. Theverification of the high potential of this field byChinese engineers in the early 1960s (and at theDaqing Oil field in Heilongjiang Province), afterdeclarations by foreign petroleum engineers thatChina contained no oil, marked the modern erafor Chinese achievement and self-reliance. Inaddition to energy supplies, the Yellow Riverbasin is also a major source of minerals andcontains nearly half of the nation’s bauxite, aswell as 4 of the 8 major Chinese aluminumplants, and significant quantities of zinc, lead,nickel, copper and gold.

The Yellow River basin is also at the nexusof important north-south and east-west tradeaxes. Historically Xian, Lanzhou and other citiesin the basin served as important points on thefamous silk road and the crossing of the YellowRiver by the Grand Canal marked an importanttransport hub. In more recent times, an importantnorth-south and east-west rail junction was sitedat the city of Zhengzhou. The newly plannedEurasia Bridge, approximately 50 percent of

which lies parallel to the Yellow River, will onlyfurther enhance the basin’s role as a transportand trading center if it is completed according toplan.

Water Supply and Use3

On average, the Yellow River basin receivesapproximately 450 mm of rainfall per year, aquantity marginally sufficient for agriculturalproduction (table 2). However, the averagerainfall figures belie a great variation, bothspatially and temporally, which has been a causeof the basin’s two major natural hazards- droughtand flood. Spatially, precipitation levels tend to belowest in the north and west and highest in thesouth and east, with average levels of 120 mm inareas of Ningxia and Inner Mongolia and 800mm in the hills of Shandong. Precipitation levelsacross much of the Loess Plateau, where soils

are most erodible, average less than 500 mm.Temporally, there is also a great variation in

rainfall levels both within and across years. Intra-annually, most rainfall occurs between June andSeptember with almost no precipitation betweenNovember and March. In addition, summerrainfall, especially in the Loess areas of the

3This section is based largely on Zhu et al. 2004.

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TABLE 2.

Yellow River basin rainfall (millimeters).

Time Period

1956-70 1971-80 1981-90 1991-00 AVG

Upper 380 374 373 360 372

Middle 570 515 529 456 523

Lower 733 689 616 614 671

Basin 482 451 455 413 454

Source: YRCC 2002c.

middle reach, often comes in quick cloudburstswhich overcome the infiltration capacity of thesoil and carry massive quantities of sedimentsinto the Yellow River and its tributaries. It hasbeen estimated that as much as 35 percent ofprecipitation comes in the form of these suddencloud bursts (Greer 1979). Inter-year precipitationvariability is also substantial and by somedefinitions drought is said to occur every 2-3years.

This variation makes consistent agricultureproduction particularly difficult and hasperiodically led to massive drought and famine.For example, during the draught of the 1920s asmuch as half of the population in the basin hasbeen estimated to have fled their homes insearch of food. In addition to contributing todrought, the spatial and temporal concentrationof rainfall has also been a major factor inflooding as discussed further below.

While the Yellow River basin has playedand continues to play a critical role in China’ssocial and economic development, it, in fact,has relatively limited water resources. Forexample, while the river is the second longestin China, it ranks fourth in terms of annualrunoff and in total provides only 2 percent ofChina’s water resources (YRCC 2002a). Basinresidents have, on average, only about onequarter of the nation’s 2, 200 m3 annualaverage supply.

The water resources of the Yellow Riverbasin for 2000 and the framework used for theiraccounting by the Yellow River ConservancyCommission (YRCC) are shown in table 3. TheYRCC framework divides water into its twoprimary components; surface and ground.Surface water is calculated as measured flowadjusted by estimates of human depletion(discussed further below) and change in storage.Groundwater resources are then separatelycalculated for mountain and plain areas and thesum adjusted to compensate for a doublecounting error which occurs in the estimationprocess. The total surface and groundwaterestimates are then further adjusted to account fora second, large, double counting error, to arrivefinally at a total water resource calculation.

Water use in the Yellow River basin iscurrently considered to come from two sources,ground and surface, and serve three sectors:agriculture, industry and domestic. Data on use bysource and sector for recent years is shown intable 4. As seen in the table, the average annualwithdrawal from the Yellow River basin has beenapproximately 50 billion cubic meters (bcm), ofwhich approximately 74 percent was from surfacewater and 26 percent was from groundwater.Agriculture is by far the largest user of water,accounting for 80 percent of the total withdrawal,with industrial, urban and rural domestic sectorssharing the remaining 20 percent.

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TABLE 4.Yellow River basin water withdrawal, 1998-2000 (bcm).

By source By sector

Surface Ground Total Domestic

Year water water Ag. Ind. Urban Rural Total

1998 37 12.7 49.7 40.5 6.1 1.6 1.5 49.7

1999 38.4 13.3 51.7 42.6 5.7 1.8 1.5 51.7

2000 34.6 13.5 48.1 38.1 6.3 2.1 1.6 48.1

Average 36.7 13.2 49.8 40.4 6 1.8 1.5 49.8

Share 74% 26% 100% 81% 12% 4% 3% 100%

Note: Groundwater withdrawal includes 2.7 bcm pumping in regions lower than Huayuankou.

Source: 1998, 1999, and 2000 YRCC water bulletins.

TABLE 3.Yellow River basin water resources (bcm), 2000.

Gauging station

LZ TDG LM SMX HYK

(1) Surface runoff (a) Measured river flow 26.0 14.0 15.7 16.3 16.5

(b) Depletion 2.7 13.0 13.6 17.0 18.4

(c) Change in storage -3.3 -3.3 -3.3 -3.2 0.1

Surface runoff = (a)+(b)+(c) 25.4 23.7 26.0 30.1 35.0

(2) Groundwater (e) Hilly area 12.6 13.1 15.3 19.7 22.6

(f) Plain area 1.6 7.6 9.5 14.6 15.4

(g Double counting in (e) & (f) 0.7 1.3 1.8 3.8 4.1

Groundwater = (e)+(f)-(g) 13.5 19.5 23.0 30.4 33.9

(3) Double counting in (1) and (2) 12.8 17.2 18.6 22.4 24.7

(4) Total water resources = (1)+(2)-(3) 26.0 26.0 30.4 38.1 44.1

Note: LZ = Lanshou; TDG = Toudaoguai; LM = Longmen; SMX = Sanmenxia; HYK = Huayuankou.

Source: YRCC 2002b.

In total, human depletion accounted for 36.6bcm or 76 percent of total utilizable waterresources in the basin in 2000 as shown in table5. An additional 4.9 bcm entered the Bo Sea,leaving 6.6 bcm of the total 48.4 bcm of surfaceand groundwater supply to be accounted for asnon-process depletion from evaporation,

interaction between groundwater and deepaquifers, or other unrecorded “losses.” Depletionat present levels means that theYellow Riversupplies are essentially fully allocated. Since theearly 1970s, this has been reflected in thecomplete, or near complete desiccation of thelower reach at certain times each year.

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TABLE 5.Yellow River water accounts, 2000.

(bcm) Percentage

Utilizable 48.4 100%

1) River water 35.0

2) Groundwater 10.7

3) Groundwater outside basin* 2.7

Outflow 4.9 10%

Reported Depletion 36.6 76%

1) From agricultural use 30.6

2) From industrial use 3.2

3) From domestic use 2.8

Unaccounted Depletion 6.9 14%

*Groundwater from outside the basin’s topographic boundaries in the lower reach is calculated as actual abstraction.

Source: YRCC 2002b.

The Yellow River basin has been part of theChinese nation essentially since its inception andhas played a key role not only in country’seconomic development but also in the historicand cultural identity of the Chinese people. Whilethe Yellow River Basin may have been inhabitedfor tens of thousands of years, its main culturalsignificance began to emerge less than 7,000years ago with the development of agriculture(Ho 1998; Bray 1984). The availability ofnutrient— rich and friable soils in the LoessPlateau region, along with a favorablecoincidence of precipitation and solar energy insummer months, are believed to be major factorsexplaining the Yellow River’s role in the earlydevelopment of Chinese, and therefore world,agriculture (Lattimore 1988; Ho 1998). Fromthese early agricultural origins developed one ofthe first known sites of human habitation inChina (Banpo ca. 5000 BC) and complex socialorganizations, as exemplified by the Yangshao,

Majiayao and Dawenkou cultures, whicheventually provided at least one of the basesfor Chinese culture (Hessler 2003).

Ironically, the Yellow River, the apparent“cradle of Chinese civilization,” is also known as“China’s Sorrow,” because the loess depositswhich have fostered human development arealso associated with the frequent, oftencatastrophic, floods in downstream regions.While these floods and the climate extremesbehind them have been linked with dynasticchange (Bodde 1981), the devastation theybring, often at scales unimaginable in the west,makes it easy to understand why successiveChinese administrations have made floodcontrol the number one priority of the YellowRiver management. In fact, the control of YellowRiver floods has been seen as a primarymeasure of good governance and is nowingrained in Chinese culture at a fundamentallevel.

Role of the Yellow River Basin in Chinese Culture and History

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This deep connection between Chineseculture, the Yellow River and flood control can beseen in the Legend of Yu. The Great Yu (c.2,000 BC) was one of the three early, probablymythical, leaders of China and was known fortaming the Yellow River floods using a strategyof channel clearing rather than dyke construction.While it is unlikely that Yu, or anyone else,successfully controlled Yellow River flooding byany strategy, the story continues to be told, inpart because it carries with it the moral analogythat adverse human nature can be bettercorrected by guidance (clearing a path) thanpunishment (constructing a barrier).

More fundamentally, the channel-clearingversus dyke-construction can also be seen as areflection of a general philosophical debate inriver management which has continued in Chinafor more than 2,000 years between Taoists, withtheir emphasis on letting nature, human orotherwise, follow its own path and Confucianists,with their desire to channel behavior throughvirtuous moral codes (Needham 1956).4 Thedichotomy of approach can still be seen in themodern debates on Yellow River management. Infact, both the historic and modern debates formpart of a broader, and in many ways uniquelyChinese approach to river management predatingConfucianism and Taoism of “using the river totame itself.”

Differences between ideals and practice notwithstanding (Rhoades 1967; Tuan 1968; McNeill1998), the value of recognizing the role ofphilosophy in Chinese water management, andthe role of water management in Chinesephilosophy and culture, is not simply foracademic exercise. Rather it highlights a morehistorically robust and broadly defined concept of“integrated water management” than exists in theWest in which concern is placed not only onbasic science, engineering and appropriatemanagement units, but also on a philosophicalunderstanding of man and nature. For example,

current Yellow River managers approach theproblem of environmental requirements with aChinese perspective of the interrelationshipbetween man and the environment, and so,define environmental water uses differently thanmay typically be the case elsewhere. Ingeneral, the concept, if not the practice, ofenvironmental water use in China can beconsidered to contain not only the maintenanceof biodiversity and “natural” ecosystem function,as emphasized in the West, but also themaintenance of the landscape as a place forhuman habitation and livelihood.

Whatever the philosophical underpinning,Chinese water management practice has alsobeen intricately connected both with thedevelopment of Chinese government as well asthe modern perceptions of China by the outsideworld. For at least 2,000 years, major waterengineering projects in China in general and theYellow River basin in particular have used themass mobilization of labor. For example,reports indicate that tens of thousands ofworkers were being mobilized for engineeringprojects by the 2nd century B.C. and that asmany as 5 million laborers were used in canalconstruction by the 7th century A.D. (Greer1979). While the number of people involved isamazing, even more impressive is theorganizational skill which was needed tomobilize such numbers. Some have interpretedthe development of mechanisms to successfullymanage such large numbers of workers as aprecursor to what would become a lastingcentralized, autocratic government in China(Wittfogel 1957). While this contention, as wellas the cause and effect relationship betweenwater engineering and governmentdevelopment, has since been brought intoquestion (Ho 1998), the idea of “orientaldespotism” seems still to taint the view of manyoutsiders towards the Chinese political systemin particular and Asian society in general.

4The actual debate on Yellow River management was more fundamentally over whether the river should be confined within narrow banks ordykes which would scour the channel or should be allowed to range widely in a flood plain constrained only by widely placed levees.

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From Earliest Times to the Founding ofthe People’s Republic of China

Management of the Yellow River is recorded bythe famous Han Dynasty (206 BC -220 AD)historian Sima Qian to have begun by the 20th

century BC with the Great Yu and his floodcontrol, and perhaps, irrigation work. While theseearliest claims cannot be confirmed, an 8th

century B.C. mention of an irrigation pond nearmodern Xian clearly suggests the early existenceof water engineering programs in the YellowRiver Basin (Chinese Hydraulic EngineeringSociety et al. 1991).5 Y’ang K’uan (Greer 1979)also lists a number of flood control levees thathad been built in the middle and lower reachesof the Yellow River and some of its tributaries bythe 6th Century B.C. Further evidence is providedby a treaty signed in 651 B.C. banning thedestructive use of flood control levees in warfare(Greer 1979).

The earliest significant irrigation project isreported to have been constructed between 424and 296 B.C., in modern Henan Province (Ho1998). The most famous early project, theZhengguo Canal, was finished in 246 B.C. by thestate of Qin and irrigated some 80,000 ha northof modern Xian (Greer 1979; Will 1998 for ahistory of the canal in the context of humanecology). The increased agricultural productionfrom this project is believed to have contributedto the Qin state’s ability to overpower the otherwarring kingdoms of the time, resulting eventuallyin the initial unification of China, againhighlighting the central role of the Yellow Riverand its management in Chinese history (Greer1979). Other early irrigation projects weredeveloped in the great bend area of the river,perhaps also initially during the Qin dynasty butmore likely during the Han Dynasty which

followed (Chinese Hydraulic Engineering Societyet al. 1991). Perkins (1968) provides estimates ofthe number of water control projects undertakenfrom the Han Dynasty forward to the 20th centuryand shows a cyclical construction pattern whichhe states is caused by a number of forcesincluding settlement of new areas, populationgrowth, severe weather and political stability.

The earliest known mention of Chinese wateradministration is said to come from the Zhou Li,or Rituals of the Zhou Dynasty (Caponera1960), though its actual date is unclear. The Li-Ji(Record of Rites), believed to be written around300 B.C., also includes passages on wateradministration including the collection ofreasonable levels of water related revenues. Theconcepts from these early texts (wateradministration is the responsibility of the state;there is no private water ownership; duties but norights related to water use) formed a basis formuch of later codifications of the Chinese waterlaw (Caponera 1960; Caponera 1992). In fact,the Han dynasty codifications, derived in part onthe Zhou principles, established watermanagement practices which have continued withmodification into the 20th century and in somesenses continue to date.

While regional, if not basin level, waterplanning may have begun as early as the lateSpring and Autumn period (722-481 B.C.)(Chinese Hydraulic Engineering Society et al.1991), pre-Han water management bureaucracieswere relatively small in scale and scope in partbecause the kingdoms which controlled themwere also small (Greer 1979). As a result, earlyconstruction and management programs wereundertaken largely to serve local, narrowlydefined purposes. During the Han Dyansty, anew office known as the Director of WaterConservancy (Tu-shui) was created under the

Basin Development and Management

5Ho (1998) places the first mention of a possible irrigation ditch in the 6th century B.C.

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Ministry of Public Works. Under such centralizedoffices, famous Chinese water managersemerged such as Chia Jang (fl. 6-2 B.C.), WangChing (fl. 58-76 A.D.), Chia Lu (1271-1386 A.D.)and Pan Jixun (1521-1595), all of whom devisedrelatively comprehensive strategies for floodcontrol which, even if not at full basin scale, canbe seen to have anticipated more modern RiverBasin Management concepts. In fact, as arguedby Caponera (1960), integrated riverdevelopment was already a “preoccupation” bythe Tang times (618-907 A.D).

While the plans of the mangers justmentioned took a broad approach to watermanagement, compressive basin planning wasnot undertaken, nor were the various functionsof river management put under a single centralauthority, even nominally, until the 20th century.For example, the role of the Director of WaterConservancy was primarily one of planningwhile labor mobilization and construction wasthe responsibility of provincial and localagencies. Thus successful management of theYellow River required coordination between thecentral and local levels (Dodgen 2002), asituation not dissimilar to that which existstoday in the Yellow River basin and elsewherein the world.

Modern efforts to comprehensively managethe Yellow River basin can be traced back to theChihli River Commission, and later the Hua BeiRiver Commission, which began the firstsystematic monitoring of the Yellow River flow in1922 (Todd and Eliassen 1940).6 The monitoringwork of the Chihli River Commission was takenover by the Yellow River Water ConservancyCommission (YRWCC) after its founding in 1933.The first commissioner of the YRWCC, Li Yi-chih,was perhaps the first person to advocate a basinlevel agency under central government control tomanage the Yellow River that could avoid China’s

historically problematic inter-provincial tensions.Li Yi-chih, while a modern scholar, clearly placedhis work within the context of ancient watermanagement principals and Chinese philosophyand is considered one of the great managers inthe long history of Yellow River Management. Hisinfluence and philosophy is still felt in theYRWCC’s predecessor agency, the Yellow RiverConservancy Commission (YRCC), which wasfounded in 1946 in the Communist controlledareas of Hebei, Henan and Shandong provinces.In June 1949, the responsibility for managing thewhole basin was placed under YRCC and inNovember of the same year, the Commissionwas put under the leadership of the Ministry ofWater Resources. In early 1950, the Yellow RiverConservancy Commission was officially made a“basin management institution” under OrderNumber 1 of the State Council. Despite thesechanges and the ideas of Li Yi-chih, the YRCCwas not given the autonomy to act evennominally as a true basin organization until the1950s, though even then it served more as amediating body, often without clear mandate, andfrequently had conflicts with other ministries.(Greer 1979).

From the Founding of the People’sRepublic of China to the Present

The founding of the People’s Republic of Chinain 1949 ushered in fundamental changes forChina socially, politically and in terms of thewater management and development. Despitethe long history of water management projectsjust discussed, the entire country in factcontained only 6 large and 17 medium reservoirsin 1949 (Chinese Hydraulic Engineering Societyet al.1991), and the total irrigated area was lessthan 18 million hectares (Perkins 1969).7

6The Chihli River Commission was primarily interested in the Hai River. However, the Yellow River sediment had a direct impact on the portof Tianjin over which it was concerned.7Note that for a variety of reasons Chinese irrigation statistics (Nickum 1995; Nickum 2003), and statistics in general (Holz 2003), must beviewed with caution.

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Furthermore, the Yellow River itself was stillviewed primarily as a threat and even as late as1940 two American engineers closely associatedwith the river stated that “There is probably noother river in the world which is of so little useto mankind as the Yellow River…The river is anenemy instead of a helpful agent” (Todd andEliassen 1940). On coming to power, thegovernment of New China set out almostimmediately in a National Water ConservancyConference and the first Five Year Plan (Chi1965) to change this view of the Yellow Riverthrough projects to control flooding and utilizethe river’s waters to increase agricultural andenergy production as well as expandtransportation opportunities.

The Ambitious 1950s

After the People’s Republic was founded andthe focus of the nation shifted from war toreconstitution and progress, water resourcesdevelopment in general and the Yellow Riverbasin in particular were given high priority. Earlyefforts were undertaken with support from theSoviet Union, and in 1952 alone 156 Sino-Sovietprojects for harnessing the Yellow River wereoutlined. In 1953, a large-scale Yellow Riverbasin survey was jointly conducted by Chineseand Soviet officers and professionals, and inOctober 1954 a Technical and Economic Planfor Yellow River Comprehensive Utilization wassubmitted to the State Council. This wasprobably the first ever comprehensivedevelopment plan for the basin and focused onpower generation in the upper reach, floodcontrol in the middle reach, and irrigationdownstream. The ambitious plan, approved byFirst People’s Assembly in July 1955,envisioned, amongst other items, theconstruction of an astounding 46 large dams onthe Yellow River’s main stem (Greer 1979). It isinteresting to note that, probably because of theSoviet influence and aid, the water engineeringefforts in the early 1950s were relatively capital

rather than labor intensive as had traditionallybeen the case in Chinese water development(Chi 1965).

Behind the early People’s Republic ofChina plans for the development of the YellowRiver basin was a strong belief in the ability ofhuman ingenuity to overcome nature. Thisbelief emanated from the tremendous prideand euphoria following the defeat of Japan,victory in the Chinese Civil War and theestablishment of “New China,” and thesuccess in stopping the advance of U.S. andU.N. forces in the Korean Peninsula. If theChinese people could defeat feudalism andimperialism, why would not it also be possibleto conquer the Yellow River? Why would it notbe possible to use the will of the People tomake the river “run clear” for the first time inhistory? The then Commissioner of the YellowRiver Conservancy Commission, the successoragency to YRWCC, Wang Huayun presentedsuch visions during a field trip to the YellowRiver by Chairman Mao through a promise:The Yellow River would be made peaceful forat least three hundred years through theconstruction of the planned large dams. WhileMao is attributed to have made a somewhatmore realistic assessment of the potential tocontrol the river in his suggestion that theYellow River problems could be “well handled”though not necessarily fully resolved in thisrespect, the actions of the government were tofollow the ambitious plans (Ma 1999).

An example of the resolve to develop theriver is seen in the name of the first majorirrigation project under the new developmentplans, the People’s Victory Canal, located inHenan province. This project, which still providesthe name to a brand of cigarettes, was designedto divert Yellow River waters by gravity to irrigatealmost 100,000 hectares of farmland (Zhang andDeng 1987). Signaling the symbolic and realsignificance of such undertakings, Chairmen Maovisited the project in October 1952 when heofficially opened its diversion gates.

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Irrigation and dam construction continuedthrough the late 1950s under the slogan “bigdiversion, big irrigation.” However, the primarymeans to complete projects shifted from capitalto labor, probably in large part due to thewithdrawal of Soviet aid. In fact, the decision,made in 1957, to “depend on the masses” andrely more on local capital in water constructionprojects can be seen in some ways as thebeginning of the nationally disastrous great LeapForward which began in 1958 (Chi 1965).

The Cooling-down 1960s

While the water engineering projects of the1950s were built with great hope and optimism,they were not well designed or constructed.Project focus tended to be on basic infrastructureand ignored less visible, but critical, engineeringand management aspects. As succinctly put byPerkins (1968), “Water-control developments innorth China in the 1950s, both traditional andmodern, were not so clearly beneficial.” As anexample, irrigation projects like the People’sVictory Canal ignored drainage, and as a result,water logging and salinization occurred to suchan extent that crop yields dropped below pre-project levels. The situation was so severe thatfarmers actually destroyed diversion canals andthe irrigation scheme was essentially abandonedby 1961 (YRCC 2001). Comparable events tookplace in many other newly built schemes.

Similar failures in water engineering occurredin dam and reservoir projects, most notably inSanmenxia. The Sanmenxia Reservoir wascreated behind the first significant dam in historyto be built on the main stem of the Yellow Riverand, like the People’s Victory Canal, was asymbol of the 1950s ambition to conquer theriver. However, because of the failure of theSoviet Engineers to appreciate the nature of thesediment load in the river and the Chineseenthusiasm of the period to carry the projectforward, the dam was woefully unsuited and the

reservoir was silted within only a few years ofconstruction. This in turn caused the waters ofthe Yellow River to back up into the Weihebasin where they inundated land and threatenedthe ancient city of Xian with flooding.

The huge engineering failure of Sanmenxia(Greer 1979, chapter 4), the similar failure ofearly irrigation projects, and the famine whichoccurred in the aftermath of the Great LeapForward (Becker 1998) were shocks to theleadership of the People’s Republic in Beijing aswell as the Yellow River ConservancyCommission. Together, these events caused anew sense of realism in policy and dampenedthe enthusiasm for pure engineering solutions todevelopment problems and programs. Bettereffort was made to understand the role of thesediment in reservoir operations, damconstruction plans were modified and thenumber of new reservoirs to be constructedwas reduced. Drainage development andirrigation system rehabilitation were also begun,and farmers were slowly re-convinced of thepotential value of irrigation construction.Unfortunately the opportunity for a full review ofthe errors in the 1950s basin developmentblueprint was lost when the political chaos ofthe Cultural Revolution began in 1966 (Spence1990; Meisner 1999).

The 1970s and 1980s

The Cultural Revolution, which lasted from 1966to 1975, brought political chaos to China,including the Yellow River basin. Somewhatsurprisingly, the moderately reviseddevelopment plans of the 1950s and heavygovernment investment in the basin continued(Stone 1988, provides figures for irrigated areafor China as a whole) despite the chaos,without substantial debate. Giant powergenerating reservoirs were constructed in theupper basin, a soil conservation campaigncreated new terraced fields on the Loess

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Plateau of the middle reach, and irrigationdiversions were substantially expanded in thelower reach, especially in Shangdong and Henanprovinces. Meanwhile, village-based watermanagement systems, including canalmaintenance and water allocation betweenneighboring villages, were shaped in the basinalthough structured based on the politicalovertones of the time.

With the death of Mao Zedong in 1975, DengXiaoping came to power and helped to introducea wide ranging set of reforms that swept throughChina in the 1980s (Meisner 1999; Naughton2003). The commune system that had beenestablished in villages was abolished and a ruralhousehold responsibility system movedproduction decisions and power towardsindividual farmers (Ash 1988). Governmentplanning and control became more decentralized,and, as also occurred in the agricultural sector,government investment in the water sectordeclined. At the same time, environmentalawareness started to grow and a more politicallyliberal atmosphere allowed people to review pastbasin strategies and lessons. In 1984, the StateCouncil approved the Second Yellow River BasinPlan, which listed soil erosion control in themiddle reach as the most important policyobjective as opposed to power-generation andflood control as had been emphasized in the1954 Plan.

The New Water Decade of the 1990s and intothe New Millennium

The 1990s witnessed a new water era in Chinabased on the reforms and their economicimpacts, ushered in by Deng Xiaoping in the later1970s and 1980s. The reforms have had twomajor impacts related to water management anduse in the Yellow River. First, the rule of law wasgiven added relevance. Second, economicgrowth placed increasing demand on waterresources, both in quantitative and qualitative

terms. Together, these and other factors causedfundamental changes in both perceptions ofappropriate water policy and management, andincreasingly, in water management practice.

While the impact of legal reform manifesteditself most deeply in the 1990s, the new legal erain water management actually began with theintroduction of a new Chinese constitution in1982. In terms of water management, theconstitution is significant because it caused ashift towards legal methods for guiding actionand decision making and also because itreiterated the state ownership of waterresources. After the promulgation of the newconstitution, hundreds of laws were passed,institutions related to virtually all sectors of theeconomy, including the environment, changed,(Jahiel 1998; Palmer 1998), and continuedefforts, especially in the1990s, to improve theoperation and professionalism of the legal systemwere made. With regard to water, the major legallandmark was the 1988 water law which providedthe basic framework and principles for watermanagement in the 1990s. This was followed byrelated legislation including the Water PollutionPrevention and Control Law, the Soil and WaterConservation Law, and the Flood Control Law. Alarge body of additional administrative rules andministerial regulations related to water was alsopassed along with a number of other laws atleast indirectly related to water including TheEnvironmental Protection Law, The LandAdministration Law, the Fishery Law, the ForestryLaw and the Mineral Resources Law.

This move towards legalism took place at atime of dynamic economic growth and structuralchange which began in the early 1980s.Increasing liberalization of markets and foreigninvestment helped to sustain rapid economicgrowth. Industrial output increased dramatically.Increasing agricultural labor productivity and defacto and de juere changes in residency rulesfreed people from the farms and allowed rapidurbanization. While population growth slowed,

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expansion continued, and, importantly, risingaffluence caused dietary changes which favoredmeats and contributed to massive growth in feedgrain use. Together, all these factors placedgrowing demands on water supplies for theindustrial, domestic and agricultural sectors. Atthe same time, increased industrializationcoupled with inadequate or poorly enforcedpollution control regulations exacerbated waterquality problems as did increased use ofagricultural inputs. In the face of this massivedemand growth and effective supply decreasecaused by declining water quality, and a period oflow rainfall, many places in China, in particularthe north and the Yellow River basin, began toreach their water limits. Water policy andmanagement needed to shift away from asingular emphasis on flood control and resourcedevelopment, towards comprehensive basinmanagement strategies.

Such a new direction in thinking was in factreflected in Article 1 of the 1988 Water Lawwhich stated that the law was “formulated for therational development, utilization, economizationand protection of water resources, for theprevention and control of water disasters and forthe realization of sustainable utilization of waterresources in order to meet the needs in nationaleconomic and social development.” In otherwords, water management in China in the 1990s,harkening back to Tang Dynasty edicts, wasofficially going to take a more comprehensiveapproach which would include concepts ofeconomic value and trade-offs, resourceprotection and sustainable development amongother items. To carry out such changes inmanagement, however, would require amovement in institutional structures towardsintegrated basin management.

While the Yellow River ConservancyCommission was already ostensibly serving asthe river basin authority, in practice, its powersfor basin management and planning were limitedand unclear. However, the changes in thinking

brought about in part by the 1988 water lawslowly began to be reflected in themanagement mandate of the Yellow RiverConservancy Commission. For example, in1997, the State Council approved the Outlineof Yellow River Harnessing and Developmentwhich, though still calling for the constructionof 36 additional large dams, began addressingthe issues of comprehensive utilization of thebasin water resources. In 1998, the StateCouncil, the Ministry of Water Resources andthe National Planning Committee issued the“Yellow River Available Water Annual Allocationand Main Course Regulating Scheme” and the“Management Details of Yellow River WaterRegulating,” leading the way to the first basin-wide main course flow regulation which beganthe following year.

Part of the impetus for change to basin-wide flow regulation was derived from anincreasing awareness of the ecological value ofwater. The flow cuts in the lower reach of theYellow River, which began in the 1970s butwhich became acute in the early to mid-1990s,played a major role in shifting focus toecological value. Recognition of the value ofwater in maintaining ecosystem functions inwetlands along the main stem and, inparticular, in the Yellow River delta has alsogained a prominent place in watermanagement discussions as has the value offlows in diluting pollution levels and contributingto erosion prevention in the Loess Plateauregion.

At the national level, other changes tookplace in the 1990s which began to impactYellow River water management. In 1998, theMinistry of Water Resources brought forwardideas for the conceptual transformation ofwater resource development and managementin China from engineering-dominatedapproaches to approaches based on demandmanagement and the value of water resources(Boxer 2001). Following these ideas, concepts

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such as water prices, water rights and watermarkets were further discussed and tested andare now beginning to have profound impacts onwater management across China including theYellow River basin.

While the changes of the 1990s havepushed thinking on water management in theYellow River basin towards an integratedconcept, the actual situation there, as in most ofthe rest of the world, continues to be one ofoverlapping levels of authority, unclearresponsibilities, and competing interests. A newwater law passed in 2002 may give the YellowRiver Conservancy Commission increased

authority to act as a basin managementorganization, but the new goals of overallmanagement will still need to be met through thecombined efforts of national, basin, provincial andlocal governments with various interests inagricultural, mining, industrial development andother endeavors as well as domestic use. Thechallenge for the 21st century will be for Chinesesociety to devise acceptable water managementsystems in the midst of rapid change not only inwater resources demand and supply but also insocial structure, institutions and thinking oneconomics, politics, and openness to the outsideworld.

Current Critical Issues

apparently less severe dry-spell occurred in thedecade from 1922-1932, it is suspected by someChinese hydrologists in particular that the YellowRiver is now at the tail end of a 70 year cycleand that rainfall levels and river flows willtherefore begin climbing in the near future.

Clearly, rainfall in the 1990s has been low.However, as figure 3 graphically shows, the run-off decline is not only a phenomenon of the1990s. Further, the fall in rainfall does not fullyexplain the decline in the rainfall/run-off ratio. Infact, the finding, as depicted in figure 3, that therelative decline in runoff seems to increase asone moves from upstream to downstreamregions seems to support the idea that additionalwater detention and use in upstream regions areat least part of the explanation (see Ongley, 2000citing Zhang et al. 1997). As such, it seems likelythat some of the change in measured runoff andrunoff yield may be related to accountingsystems which have not been able to capturechanges brought on by new water resourcedevelopment patterns.

Water Stress—Now the Number OneIssue in the Basin

While flood control has historically been theprimary issue in Yellow River management,water stress has now emerged as the numberone issue for most basin authorities andresidents. The rise of water stress as a criticalissue has been caused by three factors: arecent decline in water supplies due to droughtand other factors, an increase in demand, and agrowing awareness of environmental waterneeds.

On the supply side, table 6 shows data onrainfall and runoff over the past 40 years. Fromthe figures, it is immediately clear that recordedrainfall, runoff and rainfall/runoff ratios were allsubstantially lower in the 1990s than in previousdecades. One question is whether the declinesin the 1990s are part of a short-term climaticcycle or are caused by secular declines in long-term precipitation levels brought about, perhaps,by global climate change. As a similar but

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FIGURE 3.Yellow River Runoff, 1956–2000.

Note: LZ = Lanshou; TDG = Toudaoguai; LM = Longmen; SMX = Sanmenxia; HYK = Huayuankou;

LJ = Lijin.

Source: YRCC 2002c.

TABLE 6. Rainfall and runoff in Yellow River basin, 1956-2000.

Area Time period 1990s Change

(000 km2) 1956-70 1971-80 1981-90 1991-00 Average from average

Upper 368 Rain (mm) 380 374 373 360 372 -3%

Runoff (bcm) 35 34 37 28 34 -16%

Runoff yield (%) 25% 25% 27% 21% 24% -13%

Middle 362 Rain (mm) 570 515 529 456 523 -13%

Runoff (bcm) 29 21 23 15 23 -34%

Runoff yield (%) 14% 11% 12% 9% 12% -25%

Lower 22 Rain (mm) 733 689 616 614 671 -8%

Runoff (bcm) 1.5 1.1 0.6 0.0 0.8 -100%

Runoff yield (%)

Basin 752 Rain (mm) 482 451 455 413 454 -9%

Runoff (bcm) 65 56 61 43 57 -24%

Source: YRCC 2002c.

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On the demand side, total depletion hasincreased by a significant 21 percent over just aten year period as shown in table 7.Geographically, this change can be decomposedinto a reduction in lower reach depletion morethan offset by increases in the upper and,especially, middle reaches. Sectorally, the changeconsists of a moderate increase in agriculturaldepletion and dramatic growth from the industrialand domestic sectors, again most notably in themiddle reach.

Partially in response to declining supplies andincreasing demand, groundwater pumping hasalso increased dramatically over the past 20years. From 1980 to 2002, groundwaterabstraction increased by 5.1 km3 or 61 percent.In some regions of the basin, groundwaterdepletion is now a major problem. For example,in the Guanzhong plain located in the middle-reach of the basin in the vicinity of Xian, the areawith a groundwater depth less than 4 meters hasshrunk from 23 percent of the total land in 1981to 8.5 percent in 2000 while the area with

groundwater depth greater than 8 metersincreased by 24 percent, from 10,700 km2 in1981 to 13,200 km2 in 2000 (MWR 2002).Groundwater overdraft is now causing anextension of “funnels” and significant sinks. Forexample, in the city of Xian, average annualsubsidence is now as high as 35 millimeters insome areas and the maximum accumulateddecline has reached 1340 millimeters.

The outcome of declining supplies andincreasing demand has already been theseasonal desiccation of portions of the YellowRiver’s lower reach since the early 1970s. From1995-1998 there was no flow in the lower reachfor some 120 days each year and in some casesflow ended over 700 kilometers of the sea, failingeven to reach Shandong province. This cut off inflow has important repercussions to basinfunction for three reasons. First, it limits theavailability of surface water for human use.Second, it negates the competence of the riverto carry its heavy sediment load to the sea,potentially resulting in a more rapidly aggrading

TABLE 7.Yellow River depletion (bcm), 1988-92 and 1998-2000.

Years Reach Total Agricultural Industrial Urban domestic Rural domestic

1988-1992a Upper 13.11 12.38 0.51 0.15 0.07

Middle 5.44 4.77 0.38 0.17 0.11

Lower 12.18 11.24 0.55 0.18 0.20

Basin 30.72 28.39 1.45 0.51 0.38

1998-2000 b Upper 15.18 13.64 0.96 0.22 0.37

Middle 10.59 7.69 1.47 0.54 0.89

Lower 11.47 10.38 0.60 0.24 0.25

Basin 37.24 31.72 3.02 1.00 1.51

Difference Upper 16% 10% 88% 46% 430%

Middle 95% 61% 286% 217% 711%

Lower -6% -8% 9% 36% 23%

Basin 21% 12% 109% 96% 297%

a) Data from Chen, 2002.

b) YRCC Water Resources Bulletins of 1998, 1999, and 2000.

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and flood prone channel than would otherwiseexist (though low flows also tend to beassociated with lower sediment loads). Third, ithas clear consequences for the ecology of thedownstream areas and, in particular, the YellowRiver delta and coastal fisheries. After the 1998strengthening of the 1987 Water AllocationScheme, the Yellow River ConservancyCommission has managed to nominally endabsolute flow cut-off since 1999, though flowlevels were still far below that considerednecessary just for environmental needs.

With decreasing supplies and increasingdemand, the Yellow River’s waters are nowessentially fully allocated, suggesting thatreductions in allocations to some sectors must befound if additional new demand is to beaccommodated. Further complicating matters, itis now clearly established that environmentalwater demands have not been adequatelyincluded in existing allocation schemes. Theprimary environmental water use in the YellowRiver according to basin managers is forsediment flushing to control potentiallydevastating floods. At present, 1 trillion tons ofsediment is believed to enter the Yellow Rivereach year. Of these, 400 million tons arecalculated to be captured by two large reservoirsand various irrigation diversions, 100 million tonsare believed to settle within the lower reach, andan additional 100 million tons are flushed to thesea through dry-season minimum flow. To flush theremaining 400 million tons, an environmental waterrequirement of 14 bcm (3.5 bcm of water per 100million tons of sand), which is more than onequarter of the recent flow, is currently estimatednecessary. As was the case with runoff, however,actual sediment loads in the 1990s weresubstantially below the levels from which the 1trillion ton figure was based, and the level in 2000was only 5 percent of the 1956-95 average.Whether or not the change is permanent and howit will eventually be reflected in Yellow Rivermanagement plans remains to be seen.

Nonetheless, it is still assumed that anecological water requirement of 14 bcm isneeded for sediment flushing but that the figurewill decline as erosion control measures aresuccessfully implemented. These controlmeasures are to be based in part on theestablishment of new vegetative cover which willalso require water, and water for this purpose isalso considered to be an environmental use. Atpresent, the Yellow River ConservancyCommission estimates that this new use willapproximately offset the savings from reducedsediment flushing, though with the clearadvantage of increased agricultural output and animproved upland environment.

In the more “traditional” sense of ecologicaluse, Chinese scientists also recognize the value ofmaintaining dry-season flows for biodiversityprotection and sustenance of grass, wetlands andfisheries at the mouth of the river. To meet theseneeds, a 5 bcm minimum environmental flowrequirement for the river mouth is also assumedalong with a minimum continuous flow of 50 m3/sat the Lijin gauging station. The minimum flowrequirement is also expected to partly meetrequirements for sand flushing. Similarly, both theoverall sediment flushing and minimum flowrequirements are currently seen as sufficient forthe river to continue its function of diluting anddegrading human introduced pollutants and so, noadditional environmental requirement for thispurpose is officially envisioned.

Together, then, the ecological waterrequirements for the Yellow River basin arecurrently estimated by the Yellow RiverConservancy Commission at 20 bcm per year, afigure predicted to remain relatively constant asreductions in sediment flushing requirements areoffset by increases in erosion controlrequirements. Nonetheless, the estimates maychange over the time as managers improve theirscientific understanding, and economic growthalters perceptions, and perhaps definitions, ofecological value. More fundamentally, the

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question remains as to how these ecological“requirements” will be met. Twenty billion cubicmeters represents approximately one third of theaverage annual flow over the past four decadesand nearly one half of the flow during the drydecade of the 1990s. With the river almost fullyutilized at present and with industrial growth,urbanization and agricultural demand furtherclaiming water resources, the challenge in theYellow River basin will be how to balance humandemand with ecological needs.

Policy Discussion

Water resources management in the Yellow Riverbasin is now no longer just an issue of floodcontrol or the creation of new irrigation systems.It is a matter of making hard choices concerningthe allocation of water between sectors andlocations, and it is clear that these hard choicesare going to become more critical in the comingdecades. Even if rainfall and runoff patternsreturn to pre-1990 conditions, growing domesticand industrial water demand would likely fullyexhaust expected additional supplies within adecade or so. Use of water for environmentalpurposes at levels recognized adequate by theYellow River Conservancy Commission wouldmean that the river would be over-allocated evenwith increased flow and without any growth indemand. Hard choices must be made, and failureto act will likely only exacerbate the water-relateddifficulties already facing current users.Furthermore, a failure to create well-designedallocation plans and mechanisms almost ensuresthat valuable and scarce water supplies will notbe put to their most productive, broadly defineduses. Addressing the problem of water scarcity isclearly the number one priority in Yellow Riverbasin management now and will have impacts faroutside basin boundaries (Compare Brown, 1995and Brown and Halweil 1998 with Nickum 1998for differing views on the role of Chinese water

scarcity in global grain demand. See also Huangand Rozelle 1995).

In tackling the water scarcity problem in theYellow River basin, it is imperative thatmanagement plans and policies be made basedon sufficiently accurate figures and assumptionsconcerning supply. Various Chinese documentsand papers continue to cite 58 bcm as averageannual runoff for the basin. However, theaverage flow from 1956-2000 is alreadymarginally below this level and the figure fromthe 1990s, averaging only 43 bcm annually, is25 percent lower. As a result, it now seemsapparent that traditional assumptions of YellowRiver water availability need to be reassessed.Plans also need to consider strategies to dealwith annual variation in whichever average isused so as to take into account the possibilitiesof low and high flow years as well as changesin availability by reach.

As importantly, the YRCC needs toreassess the system it uses to allocate waterirregardless of flow conditions. The currentsystem of basing allocations on a percentage ofriver flow, though similar to the strategy oftenstill advocated in international river agreements,does not take into account differences in waterproductivity or its marginal value acrosseconomic sectors and locations. In addition, thecurrent system does not fully take into accountthe critical value of the river’s environmentalservices and so has not provided water tomaintain river flow, resulting in painful flow cutsin the lower reach. Change from the currentsystem may wish to focus on developing waterallocation mechanisms to shift supplies to thosesectors, including the environmental sector, andregions which use it most productively. In sodoing, thinking would need to shift away fromconsidering water as an absolute quantity to beallocated to water as an input whose valuedepends on differences in the manner andlocation in which it is used.

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Given the growing supply/demand imbalancein the Yellow River basin, it will be increasinglydifficult if not impossible to meet new waterdemands from one sector without decreasingsupplies to another. Since agriculture is now byfar the largest consumer of the Yellow River’swater resources and appears to have relativelylow water productivity levels, meeting growingindustrial and domestic demands andenvironmental requirements is likely going tomean a reduction in supplies to the agriculturalsector. Given the importance of agriculture to theChinese economy, its role in rural livelihoods, andthe long standing policy of maintaining near self-sufficiency in grain production, the talk ofreducing agricultural water supplies may seemboth highly disruptive and, even, radical.However, some choice must be made, and evenif initially painful, it is clear that properlyconceived policies executed correctly can bringtremendous long-term benefits. One need onlyreflect on the historic economic changes broughtabout by Deng Xiaoping’s agricultural sectorreforms in the late 1970s and early 1980s to bereminded of what is indeed possible. Fewforesaw that the implementation of theHousehold Responsibility System would usher ina new era in Chinese agriculture and later theChinese economy. The key questions to beaddressed regarding water will be how toimplement the new allocation policies whichcause the least disruption to the livelihoods offarmers, in particular poor farmers, andagricultural output. China’s recent ascension tothe World Trade Organization may provide anopportunity to begin discussing options. As theChinese saying goes, though it may be difficult, itis necessary to proceed (zhi nan er jin).

The Continued Threat of Floods

Yellow River floods over the millennia have likelycaused the deaths of literally millions of people,

sometimes portending dynastic change, and so itis not surprising that until recently, flooding wasconsidered to be the primary management issuein the Yellow River basin. Since 600 B.C.,records indicate over 1,600 dike breaches and 26significant course changes of the Yellow Riverincluding 8 major shifts (5 “natural”, and 3 humaninduced). On average, that is two breaches everythree years and one course change every 100years. These course changes have often beensubstantial with the mouth of the river shiftingback and forth at various times from Tianjin inthe north to the Huai and Yangtze Rivers in thesouth. The most recent “natural” shift occurred in1855 when the channel mouth moved from thesouthern to the northern side of the Shandongpeninsula, a change of some 500 kilometers. Thechannel also shifted in 1938 when the dikes nearHuayaunkou were purposefully breached to stopadvancing Japanese troops (Todd 1949). Thisbreach, which is estimated to have cost the livesof some 800,000 Chinese, was plugged and theriver returned to its current channel in 1947.

Despite major engineering efforts, the historicrecords indicate that consistent flood control wasrarely achieved for significant periods until the20th century under the government of thePeoples’ Republic of China. Since 1949, floodprotection work has greatly reduced theincidence of flooding, and in fact there has beenno major dike breach for over 50 years and onlyminor breaches during spring ice floods, a majoraccomplishment. However, while the threat offlooding has been reduced, it has notdisappeared. Large scale dam and reservoirconstruction in the middle and upper reaches hasreduced the probability of the large flows whichhave historically caused floods, but the channelin the lower reach is now more constricted bysediment, decreasing the flow levels required tocause flooding, and one major tributary, the Qing,is still un-harnessed and poses a substantialthreat. Furthermore, the channel belowHuayuankou continues to rise above the

23

surrounding countryside as sediments aredeposited and is now some 20 meters higherthan the floodplain at Xinxiang City, 13 metershigher at Kaifeng City and 5 meters higher atJinan City, aggravating the impact of a flood if itdid occur (YRCC 2002c).

The potential costs of flooding have alsoincreased as the basin has developed over thepast 50 years. The areas subject to floodingcover approximately 250,000 km2 from Tianjin inthe north to Jianghuai in the south and includeparts of the five provinces of Hebei, Shangdong,Henan, Anhui and Jiangsu. The flood prone areais the most densely populated in the basin andcontains nearly 90 million people, a numberwhich would rank the flood area number 12 inthe world if an independent country. The region isalso relatively well-developed economically, withnumerous cities, national transportation facilitiessuch as railways and highways providing keyNorth-South and East-West linkages, and majortelecommunication lines. In addition, the area isone of the breadbaskets of china and containsover 7 million ha of crop land. According to someestimates, if the river breaches at the north bankabove Yuanyang or at south bank near Kaifeng,the direct economic loss would be hundreds ofbillion of yuan while the cost in loss of life andoverall disruption of the national economy wouldbe immeasurable, dealing a severe blow at thenational economy and social stability. Thusensuring safety from Yellow River floods andprotecting what is considered the heartland ofChina continues to be a priority area for thenational government and basin managers.

The flooding season of the Yellow River isnormally from late June to late September, theperiod of the heaviest rainfall. About 40 percentof all precipitation falls in July and August and 70percent falls between July and September. Whilemore than a half of the runoff generated byrainfall comes from the upper reach, this flow isrelatively consistent. In contrast, the watershedsbetween Hekouzhen and Huayuankou in the

middle reach produce both substantial and highlyvariable runoff brought about by concentratedrainfall events, and it is the runoff from theseevents which is the primary factor in lower reachflooding. The storms are typically concentratedwithin a range of 10,000 km2 and occur over aperiod of 6-20 hours during which time rainfallvolumes can reach 2 – 6 km.3 Massive floods,which are thought of as “1000 year floods” incontrast to the “100 year flood” standard usedelsewhere, can also occur when these middlereach storms coincide with extreme rainfallevents in the upper reach.

In addition to the “traditional” floods justdiscussed, a second form of flood, known as icefloods, occurs in the winter and early spring butfor much different reasons than those justdescribed. Ice floods occur when the river flowssouth to north as happens in the Ningxia-InnerMongolia area and in the lower reach startingnear Kaifeng. In the winter, higher latitude, butfurther downstream reaches are the first tofreeze, blocking the passage of flow from lowerlatitude, more upstream regions and causingfloods. Similarly, higher latitude downstreamreaches stay frozen longer into the spring thanupstream reaches, again blocking the flow andcausing flooding. It has been estimated that icefloods have been responsible for about 1/3 of allfloods in the basin. Ice floods are notoriouslydifficult to control, so much so that there was asaying in the Qing Dynasty that a river officialcould not be found guilty of causing such a flood.It is interesting to note that the ice floodphenomenon in the lower reach is a function ofthe particular course of the river. When theriver’s mouth was below the ShandongPeninsula, as it was periodically before 1855 theprobability of such floods was much lower.

The basic problem of flooding in the YellowRiver is not simply one of large flood peaks butrather a combination of flow coupled withsediment transport and deposition. The middlereach of the river runs through the highly erodible

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Loess Plateau which in some places produces20,000 tons of sediment per square kilometer peryear (YRCC 2002c). About 90 percent of thesediment comes from the reaches betweenHekouzhen and Tongguan in the Loess area, andmore than 80 percent comes in the floodingseason as a result of only a few large storms.Over the last half century, the annual averagesediment load reaching Huayuankou is generallyestimated to have been 1.6 billion tons and theaverage sediment concentration 35 kg/m,3 easilymaking the Yellow River waters the mostsediment— dense of any major system in theworld. The maximum sediment concentrationmeasured at Sanmenxia was 920 kg/m,3

essentially meaning that the river was a flow ofmud rather than water. About one half of allsediment in the river is estimated to be depositedin the lower main channel and delta region.Deposition is in large measure a function of thevolume of large particles within the sediment loadas those are most prone to settle out beforereaching the sea. Coarse sediment with particlesizes greater than 0.05 mm are believed bysome to make up nearly 50 percent of the totaldeposition of the lower river channel. The primarysource of large particles is the upper half of themiddle reach, a fact which has implications forthe focus of any erosion control policies.

The famous Qing dynasty emperor Kangxi,following the work of the Yellow River’s greathistoric managers, once wrote that there arebasically two strategies related to floodmanagement, using flow to scour the channel ordividing the flow to dissipate its ability to dodamage. However, the engineering skills broughtto bear on the Yellow River in the 20th century,especially after 1949 under the People’s Republicof China, have expanded the range ofpossibilities for managing the river. The basicYellow River flood control policy since 1950 hasbeen to “retain water in the upper and middlereaches, drain water at the lower reach, anddivert and detain water on both sides of the

river,” following the notion of “keeping wideriver sections and strengtheningembankments”. To accomplish its strategy, thePeople’s Republic has spent vast sums ofmoney and devoted massive amounts ofhuman resources to Yellow River flood control.In total an estimated 1.4 bcm of earth and rockworks have been constructed for flood control,a volume equivalent to that required in buildingthirteen 5,000 km Great Walls (Ma 1999).

The Chinese government has graduallyadopted comprehensive approaches for floodcontrol in the basin. Along with the primaryembankment projects, detention basin projects,and reservoir storage built in the main river andits tributaries, soil conservation works in theupper and middle reaches have beenundertaken. A system of flood controlengineering works “retaining water at the upperstream and middle stream, discharging waterat the downstream and retarding at detentionbasins on the both banks” has been formed.The current comprehensive flood managementplan comprises a range of interrelated anddelicately balanced strategies for themanagement of the natural resources base,following an assessment of the ADB (2001),including (i) extensive soil and waterconservation programs in the upper and middleriver reaches (particularly in the LoessPlateau); (ii) the construction of multipurposereservoirs; (iii) the continuous adjustment andstrengthening of flood control embankments inthe lower river reach; (iv) the development andimprovement of flood retention basins in thefloodplain to store flood water whenembankments are at risk of overtopping; (v)the implementation of development andbuilding controls in flood-prone areas; and (vi)planning measures, such as the relocation offamilies presently living in areas of high floodrisk such as the inner floodplain. Thesemeasures are complemented by floodprediction and warning systems.

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Policy Discussions

Because of efforts by the Chinese government,the nature of flooding in the Yellow River basinhas been changed over the last 50 years for,perhaps, the first time in human history. Inparticular, the construction of large dams on boththe main stem and major tributaries has greatlyreduced the probability of the major flows whichhave plagued the basin. At present, there is onlyone stretch of river which is still subject tohistoric flooding problems, the so-called“SanHuajian” area (the area between Sanmenxiaand Huayuankou) which is affected by the stillunregulated Qing River. However, despite thesuccess in overall flow control, the nature of theriver has also changed and the constrictedchannel capacity in the lower reach now meansa flood can be generated with significantly lessflow than before. In the post 1949 period, effortsto address the new nature of Yellow Riverflooding have focused mostly on reservoirconstruction and dike raising. However, neither ofthese approaches can be sustained in the longterm. Reservoirs lose their storage capacitybecause of siltation, sometimes at rates muchhigher than originally anticipated. Even if they dofunction as planned, reservoir life-spans arerelatively short. Similarly, continued sedimentdeposit in the lower reach requires continualheightening of the dikes. Each time the dikes areraised, the potential consequences of a breakincreases. As former minister Qian Chen hassuggested (Qian 2001), dike raising is not asustainable option, the question is how long thedike system can be maintained. Clearly, areduction in sediment flows would increase the lifespan of reservoirs and post-pone the limit of dikeraising and has potential benefits for agriculturalproduction. However, given the nature of thephysical landscape and climatic conditions, it isunlikely that such an outcome will be possible innear future, if ever. The dream of “letting the riverrun clear” is probably just that, a dream.

Thus the job of the Yellow RiverConservancy Commission and other bodies is todevelop measures to continue protecting thelower reach of the Yellow River from flooding inthe short-term while developing long-termstrategies for flood management. In the shortterm, the reservoir operation and dikemaintenance and improvement are clearlynecessary. In addition, focus must be placed onminimizing the risk of loss of life from theunregulated “SanHuajian”section, through river-harnessing efforts and/or improvement in floodprediction and evacuation.

In the long-term, it is important to think backon earlier river management philosophies, notnecessarily in terms of specific concepts such asdividing the flow or letting it scour, but rather onthe more general concept of “using the river tomanage itself.” Such ideas can be used withinthe context of integrated water management toimprove both flood management and to addressother issues such as water scarcity. For example,increased use of flood detention areas, such asDongping Lake, can provide both a means todissipate flood waters as well as rechargegroundwater, freeing the highly developedagricultural area from sole reliance on rainfall forgroundwater recharge. Such strategies make itpossible not just to stop the destructive power offlooding, but to actually produce benefits fromflooding. A key constraint in this strategy atpresent is the substantial human population,estimated at nearly ½ million in the case ofDongping Lake, which have moved into potentialflood detention zones and flood plains. It will beup to the government to balance the costs andbenefits of population and economic movementthat such strategies would require and ensurethat the gains from such a policy are shared withthose whose lives would be disrupted. Examplesof attempts to create such win-win strategiesmight be sought from the U.S. Army Corps ofEngineers in its efforts to control the floods ofthe Mississippi. Instead, of continuing to build

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embankments on the river, a process it couldphysically accomplish, the Corps’ current policy isto encourage the movement of people out of theflood plain in order to allow it to serve its naturalfunction.

Soil Conservation

The Yellow River flows through the LoessPlateau, an area of about 640,000 km2 coveredwith a thick loess layer dozens to hundreds ofmeters deep. Seventy percent of the area isclassified as an “active” erosion area and theregion as a whole is considered to be the largesterodable area on earth (YRCC 2002c). The soilof the Loess Plateau is ripped down and into theYellow River and its tributaries in massivequantities, in particular during the severe,concentrated rainstorms of the summer months.As a result, the Yellow River is estimated to havecarried an average 1.6 billion tons of sedimenteach year in recent decades. If made into asquare belt with sides of one meter, the quantityof sediment moved annually by the river wouldbe sufficient to loop around the earth at itsequator 27 times (YRCC 2001). Of the totalsediment, only about 25 percent is carriedthrough to the sea, and the remainder isdeposited in the river bed and flood plains. As aresult, the bed of the river has risen at anaverage rate of 5-10 centimeters per year, andflood control embankments have beenperiodically raised in response. It is this sedimentand its impact on channel dynamics that hasmade governance of the river in its lowerreaches so difficult.

The ultimate causes of soil erosion in theLoess Plateau are debated but generallyassociated with both human action and climatechange. Much of the plateau region containsdeep soils and temperature regimes favorable for

crop growth, given sufficient water. Partly forthese reasons, agriculture began very early inthe region, probably 7-8,000 year ago (Ho 1998),and eventually allowed the early Chinese statesto flourish. Agricultural expansion and associatedactivities, especially from the Qin Dynastyonwards, appears to have contributed to the lossof vegetative cover which exposed fragile soils toerosion. The problem seems to have expandedwith population growth which eventually led toextensive land clearance and cultivation of highlysloping, and hence highly erodible, lands. It isbelieved that these trends in human related landdegradation have been exacerbated by a longterm secular decline in precipitation in the region.The result of the drying pattern is that thesustenance of erosion controlling vegetation,even on non-agricultural areas, is hindered.However, while human and recent climaticchange may have greatly increased erosion onthe plateau, the geologic record of the NorthChina Plain makes clear that erosion processesin the Loess region are not limited to the historicera.

Soil conservation as a policy for the LoessPlateau began in the mid 1950s though primarilyas a means to increase grain output rather thancontrol sedimentation. The nature of the earlypolicies is made clear in the slogan of the timewhich stated, “let bald hills become productivefields.” After the problems from sedimentation ofthe Sanmenxia reservoir project in the 1960s, thecritical role of sediment control in Yellow Rivermanagement was also better recognized. Fromthat time, erosion control was justified both onthe grounds of increasing agricultural productivityas well as for flood control and rivermanagement. In essence, the Chinesegovernment has followed a “two birds with onestone” approach by using soil conservation as ameans both to reduce poverty and downstreamsedimentation.

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Policy Discussion

The main thrust of the soil conservation policy onthe Loess Plateau since 1949 has been physicaltreatment of erodible areas. Over the last 40years, about 3,000 km2 have been treated peryear, a figure which has expanded to around6,000km2 per year in the 1990s with the help ofthe World Bank. At the present time, 166,000km,2 or 36.6 percent of the farmland in theerodible area, is considered to have beenbrought basically under control through the useof terracing, strip farming, sediment retentiondams, and planting of trees and grasses amongother measures. According to one analysis, theannual average reduction of sediment depositionfrom such measures has been about 300 milliontons since the1970’s resulting in accrued benefitsof 200 billion Yuan and an annual increase ingrain production of 4 million tons.

The effective rate of erosion control, at leastin terms of downstream deposition, might befurther improved if focus is placed primarily onthe coarse sand areas in the upper portions ofthe middle reach which contribute most to thesedimentation downstream. Even if such controlis done, the coming challenge using conventionalcontrol strategies will still obviously be huge. Infact, at current rates, it will still take more than100 years to fully bring Loess Plateau erosionunder control even assuming that treatments arein fact as successful as claimed. Adding to theproblem, erosion control efforts are being offsetby other human activities, especially as relatedsmall scale coal and non-ferrous metal mining inthe “black triangle” area of Shaanxi, Shanxi andInner Mongolia, which are encouraged at theprovincial level.

Within the context of current efforts andstrategies, improvements can clearly be made intechniques applied to erosion control thoughthese efforts can only hope to have marginalimpacts on rates of control. Another alternative isa change in erosion control paradigms. Control of

soil erosion should probably be viewed from abroad perspective in which conservation effortsare placed within the overall economic planningand policy reform frameworks. For example, soilconservation strategies could consider activitiessuch as the mining previously mentioned. Inaddition to direct impacts, mining indirectlyaggravates soil erosion, for example byencouraging the cutting of trees which hascontributed to continued loss of forest area andhence the erosion-controlling vegetative cover.Focussing soil conservation strategies ontechnical solutions in the agricultural sector maycause one to overlook basic opportunities.

More fundamentally, the choice betweenalternative soil conservation strategies shouldclearly be better placed within a morecomprehensive analysis of short-term costs, long-term benefits, and the distribution of those costsand benefits. For example, while the energyresources of the Loess Plateau are beingdeveloped, the main economic and employmentbenefits of that energy are enjoyed by otherregions of China in the form of energy and rawmaterials for industry and manufacturing. Thusthe Loess Plateau receives much of theenvironmental damage from coal mining, but littleof the employment benefits of the down-streamindustries that could provide alternatives tofarming marginal, highly sloping and highlyerodible lands.

From a water use perspective, the basicstrategy behind current soil conservation effortsalso needs to be more closely examined. QianZhengying, in her long career as China’s waterminister, argued that while soil conservation mayhelp block erosion, it also depletes water— treeplantations make the land green but alsoconsume water. A key policy question for thefuture will be whether or not the reduction insediment flows and potentially increasedagricultural activity upstream are sufficient tojustify the reduction in runoff downstream. Thisquestion will become increasingly important as

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economic development in the lower reach and itsdemands for additional water continues toexpand. The issue also leads to basic questionson water productivity and equity in use. It is likelythat downstream areas have higher productivityin water use, especially in the industrial sectors.However, it is also downstream, eastern regionsof China that are already economically mostadvanced. While the balance can be set bydefault, clear consideration of the issues basedon empirical analysis can contribute to thepossibility of generating positive sum solutions tothis difficult problem.

Water Quality and the Environment

While growing supply/demand imbalances andthe threat of flooding— exacerbated by erosion—are still considered to be the primary issuesfacing Yellow River water managers, rapiddegradation of water quality is increasinglybecoming a key factor in basin watermanagement. The expanded interest in waterquality is not surprising, given the sharp increasein pollution levels over the past few decades andthe fact that degraded water quality isaggravating water supply problems. In ShanxiProvince, for example, return flow of water usedin the mining industry is often so polluted that ithas no value for other uses and severelydegrades the quality and value of the “fresh”water with which it is mixed. Growing pollutionlevels along with changes in flow regimes arealso having severe consequences for the ecologyof the Yellow River delta and the coastal andmarine environments of the Bo Sea as well astheir commercial fisheries. For the Yellow Riverwith its limited waters and growing demand,problems of water quality, water quantity, andsediment are interdependent, making basinmanagement complex and calling for basin-wide,or even broader, approaches for their solution.

The declining state of Yellow River waterquality is exemplified in figure 4. Data in thefigure are classified using the system establishedin the Surface Water Quality Standards issuedby the State Environmental Protection Agency(SEPA, GB3838-88 and revised as GHZB-1999and GB3838-2002). Under the standards,Classes I & II represent acceptable drinkingwater quality, Class III represents potentiallypotable water if appropriate withdrawal andtreatment measures are taken, and Classes IVand V represent quality levels appropriate onlyfor industrial and agricultural use. At present,water in less than 40 percent of the reacheswithin the basin is suitable for direct human use,and in most of those places the water is in factof only Class III quality. While the current figuresare disturbing, more disconcerting is the fact thatquality has been and continues to be declining ata rapid rate. As the figure shows, the percentageof the river length classified as Class II hasdeclined from 50.1 percent to 1.5 percent from1985 to 2001 while the percentage classified as“V— worse” has increased from 3.7 percent to25.4 percent. This negative trend has continuedto the present, with the percentage of river lengthclassified as Class V or “V— worse” increasingfrom 33.8 percent to 41.9 percent in just 4 yearsfrom 1998-2001. The Yellow River is now thesecond most polluted major river in China afterthe Huai.

The worsening trend in Yellow River waterquality, and the high absolute level of pollutants,are also illustrated in table 8 which shows theincreases in two of the main measuredpollutants. While the table only includes figuresfor the main stem, pollution levels tend to in factbe even worse in the Yellow River’s maintributaries. For example in 2001, 66 percent ofthe total length of all measured tributaries wasclassified as Class V or “V— worse” whereas thefigure for the main stem was “only” 15.8 percent.Over all, the most polluted section of the Yellow

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River is near the inlet of the Weihe. Though notdiscussed further here, the problem of YellowRiver basin water pollution extends togroundwater as well. As an example, 293 out of500 domestic-use wells in Taiyuan city werefound to have pollutant levels above allowedlimits, and the area with damaged groundwaterquality in Xian city has an extent of 200-300 km2

(MWR 2002).

The pollution levels in the Yellow River arecausing increasingly serious problems for watersupply and the environment. These problemscame to a head with the occurrence of the “blackwave.” In the beginning of 1999, a massivedischarge of pollutants entered the main channelbelow Tongguan, causing the water to turnblackish-gray and produce bubbles and foam ashigh as several meters. Measured COD

FIGURE 4.Yellow River water quality, 1985,1993 and 2001.

TABLE 8.

KMnO4 (potassium pemanganate) and NH4-N (ammonia) concentrations in the Yellow River main stem, 1981 and 2002.

River KMnO4 (mg/l) NH4-N (mg/l)

stations 1981 2002 % 1981 2002 %

Increase Increase

Lanzhou 2.2 2.4 9% 0.37 0.56 51%

Toudaoguai 2.1 5.2 148% 0.06 1.2 1900%

Longmen 1.6 3.7 131% 0.07 1 1329%

Tongguan 1.7 5.6 229% 0.07 2.5 3471%

Smamenxia 1.8 5.4 200% 0.07 1.8 2471%

Huayuankou 1.4 5.3 279% 0.18 1.2 567%

Lijin 1.7 4.8 182% 0.08 0.8 900%

Average 168% 1527%

Source: Hong et al. 2002.

Source: YRCC 2002c.

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has been especially rapid in recent years (table11). Over the last 8 years, total sewagedischarge increased by 1.8 billion tons or morethan 50 percent. While growth in industrialsewage outpaced that of domestic, the growthrates in both sectors were substantial. Alreadythe average annual sewage discharge from 1998-2001 was about 12 percent of the averageannual Yellow River runoff, with intra-annualratios obviously much higher during the non-flooding season. Without timely and effectivemeasures, the water quality of all the reaches inmain stem and all significant tributaries willprobably soon exceed Class V, an outcomewhich will seriously reduce the security of watersupply in the basin and exacerbate environmentaldeterioration.

While the discharge numbers are shocking,they in fact account for only part of the problemof water quality degradation in the Yellow River.Two other important factors are the unmeasuredwastewater discharge from industry in ruralTownship and Village Enterprises (TVEs) andnon-point pollution sources from agriculture.Beginning in the 1980s, TVEs have developedrapidly throughout China and have often beenallowed to remain out of compliance fromwastewater laws and regulations because of theirlimited technology and financial levels, difficulty inmonitoring their wastewater discharge, and the

TABLE 9.Provincial wastewater discharge, 1998.

Province Industrial Domestic Sum

(MCM) (MCM) (MCM)

1 Qinghai 248 45 293

2 Gangsu 658 114 772

3 Ningxia 496 74 570

4 Neimeng 162 80 242

5 Shanxi 416 161 577

6 Shaanxi 776 548 1324

7 Henan 423 228 651

8 Shandong 248 52 300

Sum 3427 1302 4729

Source: Hong et al. 2002.

(Chemical Oxygen Demand) levels were as highas 64.7 mg/l in the main course and 125 mg/l atthe entrance of tributary Weihe which are wellabove 25 mg/l required to be classed as Class“V— worse.” The black wave, which continuedfor 20 days and resulted in the shut-off of manyriver intakes in areas further downstream, servedas a wake-up call for the seriousness of theYellow River’s water quality problems.

The water quality problem in the Yellow Riveris caused by a combination of factors. Mostfundamentally, large quantities of waste aredischarged into the main stem and its tributariesas shown in table 9. While there is substantialdischarge from all provinces, Shaanxi contributesover one quarter of the total and the Weihetributary contributed the largest share, almost 30percent of the basin total.

The overall load of COD and NH4-N in theYellow River’s main stem and tributaries areshown in table 10 which indicates shockinglyhigh levels. Total wastewater discharge in 1998was estimated at about 5.1 bcm, of which about80 percent is from industry and 20 percent isfrom domestic sources. The growth in discharge

TABLE 10.

Wastewater discharge in Yellow River basin, 1998.

Pollution load

Flow COD NH4-N

(mcm) (mil ton) (mil ton)

Main stem 923 277 25

Tributaries 4134 1240 46

Basin sum 5057 1517 71

Note: Tributaries’ wastewater flow estimated by proportioning theCOD values in tributaries and main course.

Source: Hong et al. 2002.

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general trend in decentralization of economiccontrol and management.

Non-point source pollution, also unmeasured,from agricultural lands is another important factorin water quality decline and plays a large role inthe substantial increase of heavy metals in basinas well as BOD discharge. From the early1980’s to the mid 1990s, farmers substantiallyincreased their use of fertilizer and pesticideswith the result that a considerable fraction ofresidues now enter the river with return flow fromirrigation. In the upper reach, large quantities ofagricultural return flow drains directly to the mainchannel while in the middle stream, most of thereturn flow enters major tributaries such as theWeihe, Fenhe and Qinhe. In the floodingseason, pollutants are taken up from the largeflood plain and they enter the river, providing asecond non-point pollution source.

The previous discussion has focused on theimpact of pollution on river water quality.However, another source of environmentaldisruption is the change in Yellow River flowdynamics which has taken place over the past50 years. The natural wetlands in the lowerreach of the Yellow River and, in particular, theYellow River delta, hold a rich array of aquaticspecies, provide habitats for migrating birds, and

serve as the basis for economically valuableindustries such as fisheries. Historically, floodsplayed an important function in controlling theecology of the delta as well as the wetlandsalong the river’s banks. However, the success inflood control has meant an end to this naturalfunction for the last five decades. The last threedecades have also seen greatly reduced, andsometimes even stopped, flow. This, and theresultant lack of sediment output, has caused aretreat of the shore-line, saltwater intrusion, andincreased salinity in the Bohai estuary amongstother changes. Together these factors havecaused such changes as a lowering of seawatertemperature during the fish breeding season fromApril to June and reduced nutrient levels whichhave contracted fish production and changedspecies composition. The cutting of the flows hasalso limited the ability of fish to return to thedelta waters after breeding. Further complicatingmatters, the Shengli Petrolium field, the secondlargest oil source in China, is located in theYellow River delta and requires increasingamounts of water for production as well asartificial changes in the river course.

Policy Discussion

It is abundantly clear that water quality in manyparts of the Yellow River is already approachingor is at crisis levels and that the current trend isfor a worsening, rather than an improvement, ofthe situation. It also appears that there is littlehope for the construction of new wastewaterfacilities to keep pace with continuing rapideconomic growth and urbanization, let alone todeal with the problems already in existence.Discharge of untreated sewage and otherpollutants into the river will continue into thefuture. Thus efforts to improve water quality musttake a realistic approach in determining waterquality protection and pollution abatement plans.

TABLE 11.Wastewater discharge (billion tons), 1993 and 1998-2001.

Industrial Domestic Totalsewage sewage sewage

1993 2.66 0.87 3.53

1998 3.25 0.95 4.20

1999 4.20 1.08 5.28

2000 3.07 1.15 4.22

2001 4.14 1.18 5.32

Source: Hong et al. 2002.

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At present, many officials and researcherssuggest relying more heavily on using riverflow to flush pollutants. Such a plan may havelimited scope for success when the flow isabundant but is infeasible under the shortageconditions which are likely to continue, andprobably worsen, in the future. Furthermore,the dilution approach does not address manyfundamental environment problems which canbe caused by high levels of pollutiondischarge. Many industrialized nations usedsimilar dilution strategies, especially in the 1960s,but changed plans as environmental awarenessin their countries increased and additionalknowledge of the costs of pollution becameknown. By studying these experiences, theYellow River Conservancy Commission has anopportunity to learn from the errors of others andmay be able to skip over an environmentaldevelopment stage in its efforts to satisfactorilysolve the pollution problem.

A realistic immediate step in controlling thedamage from pollution discharge may be tobegin considering legal and institutional reform(Jahiel 1998). At present, the situation is oneof “local agencies standing on the bank, YRCCstanding in the river.” In other words, YRCChas control over the water but not thepollutants which are discharged into it. Withthe promulgation of the 2002 Water Law, thismay be a good time to try to further integratemanagement and responsibility for pollutioncontrol and work towards having “all partieswith one foot on the bank and one in theriver.” How this will work out in practice shouldbe a matter for discussion by parties frommultiple sectors and points of view. For

example, the state of California in the U.S.uses a committee composed of one politicalappointee, two lawyers, two biologists and twoengineers to guide environmental water policy.

Also, building on the opportunity of the newwater law and the possibility for institutionalreform, it may also be useful for the Yellow RiverConservancy Commission to investigate the useof semi-market measures to control pollution. Forexample, the Commission could set annualpollution discharge levels and issue permits topolluters up to that level. Over time, the limitscould be reduced. Dischargers who can morecheaply reduce effluents could then sell theirpermits to those for whom reduction was morecostly. In this way, pollution loads could bereduced with the least harm to the overalleconomy.

As a second realistic step in controlling thedamage from pollution discharge, the YRCC maywish to build from China’s State EnvironmentalProtection Administration’s recently issued policyon regulating the river by function. Within thisframework, a central point is to identify keydischarge and withdrawal points through studyand monitoring in order to use the information toreduce the impact of discharge on withdrawal. Inother words, some sections of the river can bedesignated as discharge reaches, some sectionsas withdrawal reaches and some as recoveryreaches. By regulating the river in this way, thecosts of pollution can be reduced. However, suchan effort may involve large investments forrelocating withdrawal points, but in the end itmay still be more economic than the treatment ofmore polluted water withdrawals which wouldotherwise be required.

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This report has reviewed the geographic settingof the Yellow River basin, the role of the basin inChinese history and culture, the trajectory ofbasin development and the issues considered tobe most critical by current basin managers.These issues included water scarcity, thecontinued threat of flooding, erosion control andenvironmental water use. Based on the analysiswe now outline particular issues for whichadditional research and policy review would likelycontribute significantly to the future of YellowRiver basin water management.

Inter-sectoral Allocation

With Yellow River basin supplies apparentlydeclining in absolute and quality-adjusted termsand basin resources already over-allocated, oneof the key questions facing basin managers andresidents will be how to meet growing demand inthe industrial and domestic sectors. One clearpossibility is through changes in inter-sectoralallocations. In practice this would mean thetransfer of water out of the agricultural sector.However, agriculture in China, as in many othercountries, holds a special place and national foodsecurity is considered a matter of high politics.Furthermore, it is the rural sector which is mostimpoverished and has probably benefited leastfrom recent economic growth. Shifting wateraway from those already relatively disadvantagedthus has clear implications for equity and,perhaps, social stability. At the same time, it isindustrial growth, dependent on increasing watersupplies, which is seen as the driving force inpowering China’s transformation to a modern,world class economy. It is also industrial growth,broadly defined, which has provided the reliefvalve for an overcrowded agricultural sector. Abetter understanding of the role of Yellow Riverbasin water in economic growth, the trade-offs

between equity and efficiency in sectoral waterallocation, and the range of possibilities forinstitutionalizing water allocation decisions wouldserve to better inform coming critical decisionson inter-sectoral transfer.

Water Savings in Irrigation

The agricultural sector is now by far the largestconsumer of the Yellow River’s waters and, asmentioned above, pressure is growing todecrease agricultural water use. Already theYellow River Conservancy Commission plans tocut agricultural consumption some 10 percent by2010. One way to minimize the impact of anyreductions is to improve the use of irrigationwater in agriculture. There are a number ofpossible methods through which this could occur.Improvement in irrigation efficiency is one suchmethod. However, while there are some areaswhere this may be possible such as the Ningxia/Inner Mongolia region, there is also evidence thatoverall irrigation efficiency from the river basinperspective is already quite high. A secondoption is the use of more water efficient plantvarieties or cropping systems, methods which arealready showing promise in some areas. Finally,there is the possibility of shifting thinking awayfrom irrigation efficiency per se and focusinginstead on improving irrigation water productivity.That is, increasing the value of output producedby irrigation, for example by shifting water tothose crops or regions which can produce thehighest value of agricultural output per unit ofwater input or by rationalizing agricultural inputand output prices to provide economic incentivesfor more efficient water use. Drawing from this,key areas worthy of additional analysis includeexamination of the true scope of potentialirrigation water savings, the costs and benefits ofalternative water saving farming systems, the

Key Issues for Future Research

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potential role of agricultural and other policychange in changing irrigation water usedecisions, and the institutional frameworks whichare best suited to realizing the decided options.

Pollution Control and Treatment

In addition to its direct environmental and healthcosts, pollution in the Yellow River basinexacerbates water scarcity problems by reducingeffective supplies. By any measure, includingofficial Chinese government standards, waterpollution levels in the Yellow River, and especiallysome of its major tributaries, are exceptionallyhigh. The key question is what measures can betaken to improve the pollution situation in theshort term while addressing the true nature ofthe problem in the long term while not inflictingundue harm to economic growth. To implementsuch measures it will be important to understandthe evolving nature of pollution sources and todifferentiate between pollution from “traditional”industries and urban zones, and that emanatingfrom more decentralized Township and VillageEnterprises (TVEs) and agriculture. The problemwith pollution control is not, fundamentally,technical know-how. Rather, it is devising ways tofinance and enforce existing anti-pollutionregulations and effectively integrate the interestsand authority of various organizations andagencies responsible for both pollution creationand control. Analysis of these issues will becritical in changing the trend in the Yellow River’swater quality.

Environmental Use

There is now a growing recognition in China, asin other parts of the world, that water should beused to serve ecological and environmentalfunctions in addition to direct human needs.Currently, ecological water requirements are not

an explicit category in water budgeting orallocation in the Yellow River. In addition, even ifincluded, the Chinese definition of environmentalwater use would include not only maintenance ofbiodiversity and “natural” ecosystem function, asis emphasized in the West, but alsomaintenance of the landscape as a place forhuman habitation and livelihood. As such, YellowRiver environmental use would include sedimentflushing to control potentially devastating floodsas well as more “traditional” concepts such asconservation and biodiversity. There are threeprimary issues related to environmental wateruse in the Yellow River basin which would benefitfrom additional work. The first is ensuring thatthe definitions of environmental use by policymakers and researchers, both within and outsideof China, are consistent or at least understood.The second is developing better methodologiesfor determining the value of variousenvironmental flow levels on annual or shortertime scales so that the costs of particularenvironmental flow choices can be evaluated anddebated. The final issue is the development ofmechanisms for ensuring that any establishedenvironmental flow requirements are actuallymet. Since at present Yellow River basinmanagers estimate that requirements arebetween one third and one half of total annualflow, this final issue is clearly going to be themost challenging for basin managers to address.

Data Issues

One of the main problems facing researchers,especially those outside China but also thosewithin, in attempting to understand key issues inthe Yellow River basin is data access andattribution. In some cases, certain questionsrelated to understanding the Yellow River’s watermanagement problems require the collection ofadditional data. In other cases, however, the datahave already been collected but are functionally

35

unavailable either because of lack of publicity orexplicit control. While unwillingness to makeexisting data available can occur for legitimatereasons, it is probably more typically a result oflack of understanding of its potential value,unclear dissemination rules, and desire forcontrol by decentralized collection agencies.Further complicating matters, the data madeavailable do not carry with them the collectionmethodologies and key parameters necessary forunderstanding their context. For example,Chinese sources and outside papers often stilldiscuss average Yellow River runoff figures of 58bcm, average sediment loads of 1.6 billion tons,and an expanding river delta without stating thetimeframe over which the information is based.Over the last 10 years runoff has averaged lessthan 50 billion cubic meters, sediment loads havebeen closer to 1 billion tons, and the YellowRiver delta is retreating rather than expanding.Failure to understand data contexts canobviously lead to incorrect basic assumptionsabout the nature of the Yellow Riverphenomena. While the data problems justdescribed are not unique to the Yellow River,they can perhaps still be resolved to some extentwithin the Yellow River basin context if all partiesbecome more precise in their data use andattribution and more open in discussions on dataavailability and potential applications.

Institutional Gaps

Water management is an inherently complexissue in part because the “natural” unit foradministration is usually considered to be theriver basin while the actual units of governancehave other boundaries. In the case of the YellowRiver basin, efforts have been made to overcomethis problem by creating the Yellow RiverConservancy Commission (YRCC) as the river

basin authority. However, from its founding to thepresent, the YRCC has not had power to act asa true basin authority, and, furthermore, thescope of its mandate has remained unclear.Instead, a wide range of environmental,agricultural, construction, and other agenciesalong with YRCC have had overlapping functionsand authority while at the same time national,provincial and local agencies have been able toplace varying claims and priorities on the river’sresources and development. While the 2002water law may have partially clarified roles, theauthoritative scope of the many involved actorsand the way they should interact over the keyissues such as pollution control, groundwatermanagement, resolution of upstream/downstreamprovincial conflicts and the myriad other issues isstill ambiguous. With respect to YRCC itself, it,like most government organizations in China,now must operate in a much different economicand social environment than the one whichexisted at its creation. The YRCC wasestablished primarily to defeat the threat offlooding and develop irrigation. While it has hadmuch success in this regard, the problems todayare much broader with less easily definablesolutions or even preferred outcomes. This shiftin the nature of the problems has already beenreflected in official Chinese water managementfocus from Shuili to Ziranshuli (in essence a shiftin emphasis from the “engineering benefits” ofwater to broader “resource” benefits). However, thequestion remains as to what institutionalarrangements can best turn the change in thinkingto a change in practice and which institutionalframeworks can be used to handle the shift awayfrom pure engineering problems to problems with alarger social dimension. In the end, clarifyinginstitutional roles and establishing appropriateinstitutional arrangements may be the mostsignificant challenge in ensuring the best long-termmanagement of Yellow River basin resources.

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Clearly, implementing the institutional andmanagement reforms needed to meet the newchallenges will not be a simple task. However,the process can be made less painful by thecareful study of the physical and socialenvironment of the Yellow River basin itself,the pressures now facing basin managers, andthe range of technical solutions that basinmanagers might apply in addressing currentissues. Specifically, we have identified 6 areasin which researchers might focus their efforts,namely understanding the implications ofintersectoral water transfer, assessing thepotential for water savings in irrigation,studying options for pollution control andtreatment, making clear the role ofenvironmental flows and ensuring theirprovision, clarifying data issues, and assessingoptions and needs for institutional changes. Avariety of methods can be used to addressthese issues. However, a promising avenue isto combine the broad water managementknowledge base which already exists withinthe Yellow River Basin and elsewhere inChina, with experience from elsewhere in theworld. Such a combined effort not only offersnew possibilities for developing meaningfulsolutions to water problems in the Yellow Riverbasin, it also increases the potential of theYellow River experience to contribute to theglobal knowledge.

The Yellow River basin has played, andcontinues to play, a role in Chinese societydisproportionate to either its land area oravailable water resources. The basin isconsidered the home to Chinese culture,provided the stepping stones to the creation ofthe Chinese nation and has been a source areafor world agriculture and a breadbasket for theChinese people. For thousands of years, thechallenge in the Yellow River has been to controlflooding and expand irrigated areas. Flooding isnow largely under control, and irrigation growthcoupled with rapid increases in industrial andhousehold water use now leave the river a drybed in some years. Because of thesefundamental changes, the challenge in modernYellow River management is no longer one ofengineering, how to control the river, but one ofmanagement—how to allocate water betweencompeting users while still maintaining ecosystemservices. The government of the People’s Republicof China and the Yellow River ConservancyCommission recognize this challenge and the needto reform management institutions andmechanisms in order to meet it. However, it mustbe remembered that the fundamental changeswhich have taken place in basin issues occurredonly in the past half century, and especially in thelast 25 years, while the existing basin managementinstitutions and philosophies have developed overthe last few thousand years.

Concluding Remarks

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Information for this report was taken both from traditional English language sources, from Chineselanguage data and publications, and from interviews and meetings with members of the Yellow RiverConservancy Commission and others. As such, it brought together two differing approaches to watermanagement research which are not always easily reconciled: a “Western” approach focusing on theattribution of information to individual scholars and a “Chinese” approach in which the accumulatedbody of knowledge can be exemplified in the policy speech of a single individual or organization. Forthe use of non-Chinese scholars, the target audience of the report, an effort was made to provideEnglish language citations for major ideas so as to facilitate additional research and understanding.Special effort was also made to cite literature from the “China Studies” field so as to provide guidanceto information sources perhaps less generally obvious to water specialists working in China.

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Research Reports

1. Integrated Land and Water Management for Food and Environmental Security. F.W.T.Penning de Vries, H. Acquay, D. Molden, S.J. Scherr, C. Valentin andO. Cofie. 2003.

2. Taking into Account Environmental Water Requirements in Global-scale WaterResources Assessments. Vladimir Smakhtin, Carmen Revenga and Petra Döll.2004.

3. Water Management in the Yellow River Basin: Background, Current Critical Issuesand Future Research Needs. Mark Giordano, Zhongping Zhu, Ximing Cai, ShangqiHong, Xuecheng Zhang and Yunpeng Xue. 2004.

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Water Management in the Yellow River Basin:Background, Current Critical Issues and Future Research Needs

Mark Giordano, Zhongping Zhu, Ximing Cai, Shangqi Hong, Xuecheng Zhang and Yunpeng Xue

Research Report 3

I n t e r n a t i o n a lWater ManagementI n s t i t u t e