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Water for the Poor: Who Cares?

Are Water Kiosks a Sustainable and Adapted Solution for Peri-Urban Areas and Informal Settlements?A Critical Analysis of an Article Prepared for KfW1

Table of Contents

Water for the Poor: Who Cares?..................................................................................4

1 Introduction...........................................................................................................4

2 Objectives of Water Supply Schemes for the Urban Poor....................................5

2.1 Accessibility...................................................................................................5

2.2 Assumptions Regarding the (Continued) Use of Alternative Sources...........6

2.3 Kiosk Water Consumption and the Planning Process...................................8

2.4 Being Rational or Unaware?..........................................................................9

3 Advantages and Disadvantages of Kiosk Systems...............................................9

3.1 Introduction....................................................................................................9

3.2 Kiosks and “Social Connections”: The Kampala Case................................10

3.2.1 Introduction...........................................................................................10

3.2.2 Kiosk Operation and Vendor Incomes..................................................11

3.2.3 A New Approach..................................................................................11

3.2.4 Kiosk, Yard taps, Price and Distance...................................................11

3.2.5 Keeping Treated Water Affordable.......................................................12

3.2.6 Advantages of the NWSC “Social Connection” Approach....................14

3.2.7 Disadvantages of the NWSC “Social Connection” Approach...............14

3.2.8 The Price of Water and the Rights of the Customer.............................15

3.3 Main Advantages of the Kiosk System........................................................16

3.4 Kiosks in Un-Metered Environments...........................................................17

3.5 Areas Less Suited for Kiosks.......................................................................18

3.5.1 Urban Areas with Low Population Densities.........................................18

3.5.2 Urban Areas Served Through Hand Pumps and Springs.....................18

4 Changing Settlement Patterns and the Introduction of Kiosks............................18

1 See Bibliography.

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GKW Consult Water for The Poor: Who Cares? May 2005

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4.1 Dedicated Kiosk Distribution Networks or Mixed Systems?........................18

4.2 Impact of the Introduction of Water Kiosks..................................................19

4.3 Investments and New Types of Housing.....................................................20

4.4 Kiosks: A Supply Driven Water Supply Technology?..................................21

4.5 Responding to an Emerging Market for House Connections.......................21

5 The Low-Cost Residential Areas: A Public Health Time Bomb..........................22

5.1 Making Necessary Distinctions....................................................................22

5.2 The Low-Cost Issue: Downgrading or Doing Nothing?................................23

5.3 Adapting to Dilapidation...............................................................................24

5.4 Experiences with the Introduction of Kiosks in Low-Cost Areas..................24

5.5 Arguments in Favour and Against “Downgrading”.......................................27

5.6 Lessons Learned.........................................................................................28

6 Kiosks and the Need for Proper Planning...........................................................29

6.1 The Use of Norms During the Planning Process.........................................29

6.2 Measuring Water Consumption in Peri-urban Areas...................................30

6.3 Planning of a Kiosk System: Using Norms or Facts?..................................31

6.4 An Example: Poor Planning of Kiosks Schemes on the Copperbelt............31

6.5 The Millennium Development Goals and Per Capita Investment Costs......32

7 Planning and Management of Kiosk Systems: Community Participation............33

7.1 Should Community Participation Determine Access to Water?...................33

7.2 Zambia: The Peri-Urban Water Supply and Sanitation Strategy.................34

7.3 A Critical Evaluation of the Strategy: Limits to Community Participation.....34

7.3.1 Differences between Rural and Peri-Urban Areas...............................34

7.3.2 Water Supply in Poorly Organised Peri-urban Areas...........................36

8 Poor Image, Loss of Confidence and the Creation of By-Passes.......................38

8.1 Poor Image of the LWSC.............................................................................38

8.2 Creating By-Passes and Development from Below.....................................38

8.3 Local Presence is Key.................................................................................40

8.4 Need for a Holistic Approach (2).................................................................42

9 Management of Kiosk Systems by Service Providers........................................43

9.1 Main Problem Service Providers Face Managing Kiosks............................43

9.2 Vendor Livelihood Strategies and an Absent Service Provider...................43

9.3 Being Sucked by the Swirl...........................................................................45

9.4 More Observations Concerning Corporate Culture.....................................46

9.4.1 Office and Field....................................................................................46

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9.4.2 The Corporate Culture of the Old SWSC.............................................46

9.5 Management of Water Supply Schemes by RDCs......................................47

9.6 Lessons Learned from RDC-Managed Water Supply Schemes.................49

9.7 Reasons for Service Providers to Supply Peri-Urban Areas.......................49

10 Tariffs, Per Capita Consumption and Water Vendor Incomes........................50

10.1 Introduction..................................................................................................50

10.2 Willingness and Ability to Pay and Quantities Consumed...........................50

10.3 How Tariff Structures are Designed............................................................51

10.4 Decision-Making at the Household Level....................................................53

10.5 Improving Vendor Incomes, Tariffs and Elasticity of Demand.....................54

10.6 Rendering the Kiosk System More Flexible.................................................55

10.7 Vendor Incomes and Cross Subsidies.........................................................56

11 Should the Poor Pay More?............................................................................56

11.1 LWSC and Peri-Urban Water Supply..........................................................56

11.2 The Regulator and the Solidarity Principle: Making Peri-Urban Water Supply Unattractive............................................................................................................56

11.3 Potential Revenue from the Peri-Urban Areas............................................58

11.4 Victims of a Short-Sighted Political Debate.................................................59

11.5 The Pro-Poor Discourse and the Willingness and Ability to Pay.................60

12 Concluding Remarks: Who should be Responsible for Peri-Urban Water Supply?......................................................................................................................60

12.1 Lazy Entrepreneurs and Assumptions about Peri-Urban Water Supply......60

12.2 The Role of NGOs: Lessons Learned.........................................................61

13 Coverage and the MDGs: MLGH Wake Up!...................................................62

13.1 What Are We Aiming For?...........................................................................62

13.2 Urban or Rural: Who knows?......................................................................63

Glossary, List of Abbreviations, Exchange Rates and Bibliography..........................65

Glossary.................................................................................................................65

List of Abbreviations...............................................................................................66

Exchange Rates.....................................................................................................67

Bibliography...........................................................................................................67

Endnotes....................................................................................................................71

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Water for the Poor: Who Cares? Are Water Kiosks a Sustainable and Adapted Solution for Peri-Urban Areas and Informal Settlements?

1 IntroductionThe objective of this discussion paper is to offer a detailed critical analysis of an article prepared for KfW (see: List of Abbreviations) entitled Wasserversorgung über Zapfstellen: Relevante Aspekte für die Versorgung armer Bevölkerungsgruppen (KfW 2004, see Bibliography). We would like to address and refute some of main generalisations and conclusions of this article as well as the assumptions or data upon which assertions are based. Our commentary also contains a set of recommendations. One of the major weaknesses of the KfW article is that it does not offer any alternative pro-poor water supply solutions.

Our critique is based upon experience with the introduction and management of kiosk systems acquired in Zambia. We will also draw upon experiences and data from Rwanda, Burkina Faso, Nigeria, Uganda and Tanzania.

Through the preparation of this paper, we hope to contribute to a better understanding of the complex challenges faced by service providers, ministries, regulators, NGOs and donor agencies that are involved in the development and implementation of water supply schemes in informal settlements and other underprivileged urban settings. We also intend to show that kiosk systems can and do achieve their objectives in a variety of African urban settings and do make a significant contribution to the improvement of the public health situation as well as to the performance of service providers.

This paper is organised as follows:

Chapter 2 discusses the main objectives of water supply to the peri-urban and informal settlements.

Chapter 3 focuses upon the advantages and disadvantages of various peri-urban water supply approaches. This is done by comparing the kiosk system with another approach to peri-urban water supply.

Chapter 4 looks at the advantages of kiosk-dedicated distribution networks and mixed systems (networks supplying kiosks and domestic connections). This chapter also tries to answer the question whether water kiosks should be seen as a demand-driven or supply-driven technology.

Chapter 5 examines the pitfalls and potentials of the introduction of kiosks in planned residential areas which previously received water through house connections.

Chapters 6 and 7 discuss the planning of kiosk systems. It is argued that the planning of kiosk system should be done on the basis of data instead of upon norms and assumptions.

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Chapters 8 centres on the role, responsibilities and actions of the various stakeholders – communities, service providers and NGOs – concerning water supply to peri-urban areas and informal settlements. Chapter 8 shows that community organisations have developed several ways to by-pass councils and ministries in their attempt to develop their area and to improve water supply.

Chapter 9 deals with the management of kiosk systems. Attention is paid to the important relation between the service provider and the water vendor. One of the conclusions presented in this chapter is that, low vendor incomes often explain why collection efficiencies are low. Low collection efficiencies are a direct threat to the long-term sustainability of the kiosk system.

Chapter 10 analyses vendor incomes in relations to tariffs and water demand.

Chapter 11 discusses the discrepancy which exists between the willingness and ability of peri-urban residents to pay for water and the commercial/financial requirements of the service providers on the one hand and the amounts mentioned by other stakeholders such as the regulator on the other.

Chapter 12 presents a number of concluding remarks and shows that service providers should not shun the peri-urban areas but consider them as an interesting challenge, also from a commercial point of view.

Chapter 13 looks at the coverage and adequate water supply definitions used by the Zambian Central Statistical Office (CSO) and argues that clear definitions are needed in order to assess the required interventions in order to achieve the Millennium Development Goals.

2 Objectives of Water Supply Schemes for the Urban Poor

2.1 AccessibilityThe main objectives of kiosk-based water supply schemes which aim at supplying the poorest urban socio-economic strata can be summed as follows:

Social objectives.

Public health objectives.

Commercial and Financial objectives.

Technical objectives.

Environmental objectives.

All objectives directly or indirectly relate to the sustainability of the water supply schemes. For example, a kiosk system is only viable in the long run if it is able to meet the financial and commercial targets of the service provider. The social objective can be translated into “accessibility”, a concept which can be dissected into the following elements:

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Distance between the dwellings and the nearest kiosk. Maximum waiting time at the kiosk during peak demand hours. The price (affordability) of water. The design of the kiosk (user-friendliness and ergonomic design). Business hours of the kiosks. The quality of the service provided by the Water vendor.

Considering sustainability and the financial/commercial objectives in particular also implies that the long and short term interests of the following 3 main stakeholders are taken into account:

The population of the urban areas concerned.

The Service provider.

The Water vendor who operates the kiosk.

It is often assumed that the various objectives of a kiosk system and the interests of the various stakeholders are incompatible. The social objective of a kiosk system is often assumed to be incompatible with the financial and commercial objectives of service providers. If treated water is affordable for the urban poor residing in informal settlements, then collections cannot cover the operation, maintenance and replacement costs of these supply schemes. If water is affordable, and if the service provider is able to cover its costs, then the commission (a percentage of the tariff) given to the vendors will not allow them to earn a decent living. In the following chapters, we argue that kiosk systems can achieve all their objectives and satisfy the needs and interests of all stakeholders, provided they are well planned and provided certain conditions are met. Conditions such as a minimal population density and the willingness and ability to pay a certain tariff. We also show that proper planning involves the active participation of the community and its representatives.

2.2 Assumptions Regarding the (Continued) Use of Alternative SourcesThe KfW article concludes that the introduction of kiosks or standpipes (“Zapfstellen”) usually results in households abandoning their usual sources of unsafe water sources (springs, wells, surface water, etc., see KfW 2004: 4/8), which represent significant health risks. Several studies (detailed household water supply measurements among large numbers of households) carried out in informal settlements in Zambia, Uganda and Rwanda2 by GKW Consult show, however, that after the introduction of piped water, households continue to use cheaper sources of water for usages such as construction work, laundry, watering domestic animals and even bathing. The newly introduced water outlets that supply safe but relatively expensive water are mainly used for drinking and preparing meals. The inhabitants of Ngenda (Rural District) in the Bugesera-Sud region of Rwanda, did not abandon their springs after the introduction of water kiosks in 1998, and continued harvesting rain water. In Chipata and Monze, 2 mid-size towns in Zambia, residents did not abandon the wells in their yards, nor their wells in the nearby dambo (see glossary).

The introduction of kiosks usually leads to adaptations in water fetching practices, domestic treatment methods and consumption patterns. For example, in many

2 These studies were carried out by GKW Consult in Chipata in 1998 and Monze in 2002 (both in Zambia), in Bugesera-Sud in August 1998 (Rwanda) and in Kampala in 2003 (Uganda).

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Zambian peri-urban areas, households that depend on unsafe sources of water (yard wells, scoop holes and shallow dambo wells) treat their water by adding chlorine (brand name Clorin). The use of chlorine has been promoted by an American NGO (the Society for Family Health). The introduction of kiosks often puts an end to domestic water treatment practices.3

The fact that households prefer to use a combination of safe and unsafe sources also explains why per capita consumption levels are low. In Chipata, where kiosks were introduced in 1994, daily per capita kiosk consumption never exceeded 7.5 litres.4 In Lusaka per capita consumption levels in some peri-urban areas with poor access to alternative sources, range between 15 and 27 litres. Even in Burkina Faso, where people often lack alternative water sources and where per capita consumption levels at kiosks are relatively high (between 19 and 25 litres), residents will use alternative sources if they have access to them. A study carried out in Bobo Dioulasso, shows that total kiosk consumption during the hot season (when temperatures often exceed 40ºC) is between 40 and 45 litres/person/day (see endnote). i During the rainy season when residents use rainwater and water from wells, at the kiosks was measured at 21 - 25 litres/cap/day. (ONEA/IGIP/Hydroplan/GKW Consult 1997: 13).5

In Rwanda (Bugesera-Sud region), daily per capita kiosk consumption ranged between 1 and 2.5 litres (approximately 88% of all households used the kiosks 6 months after their inauguration). These low consumption levels are not an indication of unaffordable tariffs. In fact, in the Bugesera-Sud Region, some residents paid 10 times more for a 20-litre container (FRW 150 which in 1998 was approximately $ 0.50) of unsafe water (from a stream or the lake) before the inauguration of the kiosks and a study carried out by GKW Consult showed that the proposed tariff of FRW 14 was affordable and acceptable to a large majority of the population.

The consumption patterns of kiosk customers and that combined use of unsafe and safe sources6 explains why residents of informal settlements, who belong to the less affluent socio-economic strata of society, are prepared to pay relatively high tariffs. Their appraisal of existing and proposed tariffs already incorporates an estimation with regard to the quantities of payable water they consume or will consume.

In the informal settlements of Kampala (Uganda) and the peri-urban areas of Lusaka (Zambia), kiosk customers pay 2 to 9 times as much for a cubic metre of water as compared to the residents of formal residential areas who have access to house connections. Residents of low-income areas who depend upon informal tariffs because they make use of the house connections of neighbours or the services of water resellers often pay even more. In Dar es Salaam and Ouagadougou water resellers who deliver water at their customers’ doorstep, charge a tariff which is 5 to 15 times higher than the domestic tariff.

3 In some cases, the introduction of kiosks can even have a negative impact upon public health because people store water for too long.4 It should be noted that a survey carried out in 1998 showed that ± 90% of all households in the peri-urban areas of Chipata (in 1998 the total population of the peri-urban areas of Chipata was estimated at 43,000 persons) served through water kiosks, made use of the kiosks. Only 65% of all households occasionally visited the kiosk in order to fetch water for bathing and washing.5 Total daily kiosk consumption is also influenced by such variables as; water pressure, the tariff, water quality, distance, etc.6 Some mountain springs in the Bugesera-Sud region could be categorised as being sources of safe water.

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The strategic use of a combination of water sources is to some explained by the limited financial resources households have access to but they also reflect household priorities. In order to limit and control water expenditures, many residents of peri-urban or informal settlements will restrict the consumption of “expensive” treated water to health related usages such as drinking, preparing meals and washing babies.

Household members do not always share the same priorities. In Ikom and Ogoja in Cross River State (Nigeria), female-headed households tend to spend more money on water in comparison with households where the man (husband) is the main breadwinner (GKW 1993). Fetching water is considered to be a female responsibility and although male household heads are expected to pay for water, their household budget priorities tend to be different from the priorities of female household heads.

The continued use of sources of unsafe water in combination with kiosk water is sometimes based upon non-budgetary considerations. Residents in Itimpi, a peri-urban area of Kitwe (an important mining town in Zambia’s Copperbelt) pointed out that they continue using the wells in their yard because the distance is short and whilst they value having their own source of water.

2.3 Kiosk Water Consumption and the Planning ProcessThe use of a combination of water sources has important implications for the planning and evaluation of kiosk projects. Initial comments by the responsible Ministry (MINITRAP) and KfW, which were made a few months after the inauguration of the Ngenda kiosks, reflected a deep sense of disappointment because the beneficiaries were only consuming 1 - 2.5 litres/day instead of the expected 10 litres/capita/day.7 All technical and financial/commercial calculations and estimations had been made on the basis of the assumption that the beneficiaries - the total population of Ngenda (approximately 120,000 persons in 1998) - would consume according to the norm of the Ministry: initially, 10 litres/capita/day and eventually 20 litres/capita/day. Data collected by the Consultant on alternative sources of water and pre-project consumption patterns, on the basis of which a daily per capita kiosk consumption of 3.75 litres was predicted, were disregarded. The discrepancy between the norm and reality was explained by a lack of awareness among the population, which was largely attributed to the sensitisation programme which apparently had not managed to lure residents away from their traditional sources of water.

A household survey and numerous formal and informal in-depth interviews with residents 6 months after the inauguration of the kiosks, showed, however, that the majority of the population of Ngenda considered the kiosk project, which involved the construction of a large treatment plant, a success. Treated water had become accessible and affordable and most households fetched the water they needed for drinking and preparing meals, at the kiosk. For other usages, they continued fetching water from alternative and cheaper sources such as streams, springs, the lake and rooftops (rainwater harvesting).

7 These consumption figures are comparable with consumption figures recorded in Nyakabuye in the South-West of Rwanda where in 1998, residents were still able to fetch water free of charge.

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2.4 Being Rational or Unaware?The Ngenda example shows, that residents do not act according to norms, but when it comes to their water supply problems consider such factors as health risks, distance, usage, price and opportunity costs. The result of these assessments may result in low household and low per capita consumption levels, but this does not imply that families make irresponsible decisions.

In Ngenda, the team of the consultant responsible for the sensitisation programme had not convincing scientific public health arguments which could be used during a sensitisation/education campaign to convince the population not to use spring water for bathing and washing, or not to use the water from streams for watering domestic animals or construction work. In other words, the Ngenda example shows that a kiosk project can achieve its social and public health objectives even if per capita consumption levels are low.

Convincing the Ministry and KfW, however, was not easy. Initially the project was considered to be a semi-failure. The fact that residents consumed less than the norm8 meant that the public health objectives had not been achieved. During the year following the inauguration of the kiosks, the emphasis on the norm prevented fruitful discussions regarding the use of the overcapacity of the treatment works and main storage tank through the extension of the distribution network into neighbouring regions.

3 Advantages and Disadvantages of Kiosk Systems

3.1 IntroductionIn this chapter, we try to analyse the advantages and disadvantages of 2 different water supply approaches which are currently being implemented in the informal settlements of a number of African cities and towns: the yard tap approach and the kiosk system. As we show the choice between these 2 options is not made on the basis of purely technical and managerial arguments, but it also reflects a recently initiated political debate which focuses upon the long-term sustainability of pro-poor water supply schemes and upon the question to what extent service providers are responsible for providing water to the urban poor.

8 Low recorded kiosk consumption levels do not mean that households necessarily will start using less water as soon as they have to start paying according to consumption. It is possible that as a result of the introduction of kiosks the total household water consumption increases because the access to “safe” water has become easier.

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3.2 Kiosks and “Social Connections”: The Kampala Case

3.2.1 Introduction

Approximately 45% of the total population of Kampala (Uganda) resides in one of the so-called informal settlements. Although the Kampala City Council (KCC) discourages people to settle in informal areas, most informal settlements will continue to exist and, when considering the near future, are likely to undergo a process of densification and extension.

The National Water and Sewerage Corporation (NWSC) has the obligation to supply the whole urban population of Kampala with safe treated water.9

The average PSP consumption is 65 m3/month. Field measurement data collected in two informal settlements, Kisenyi and Ndeeba, show that the average number of households and persons using a PSP are 27.6 and 105 respectively.10 This means that the average per capita consumption of PSP water is approximately 80 litres per household and 20 litres per person. These findings indicate that per capita consumption levels are relatively high (higher, for instance than figures collected in Kigali, Rwanda (8 litres/person/day)) and suggest that households also fetch water for other usages, such as washing and bathing, at the PSP.

If we adopt the above-mentioned figures, we are able to conclude that the total PSP clientele is approximately 86,000 persons (Assuming a total of 820 functioning PSPs) which amounts to approximately 8% of the total population of Kampala and approximately 18% of the total population of the informal settlements (Assuming the population of the informal settlements is 480.000).

3.2.2 Kiosk Operation and Vendor Incomes

NWSC supplies the informal settlements of Kampala through 1,321 (June 2003) kiosks (often referred to as public stand posts or PSPs). However, monthly sales

9 Policy and standards: NWSC has defined a “basic service level” which is based upon the World Health Organization standard of 25 litres of safe water per person per day at no more than 200 metres walking distance. This means that a family consisting of 4 persons (The current average household size in Kampala) in order to be able to lead a healthy living, has to have access to 3,000 litres. The NWSC “basic service level” is 20l/cd at no more than 200 metres from dwellings and delivering 10l litres/minute to cover peak demand.

“NWSC has a constitutional duty to provide access to water to all urban consumers in their water service areas. NWSC must therefore take responsibility for providing the service and for setting tariffs (Including a pro-poor tariff where appropriate). However, NWSC must also maintain its financial viability and must therefore do a proper assessment of what they can achieve with available financial and organizational resources.” (Identification of Management Options for Improved Water and Sanitation Services of Informal Settlements in Kampala, Draft Final Report, Volume Two: Implementation Framework and Guidelines (2002) NWSC/AquaConsult: 18)

The main objective of the “Affordable Basic Water Policy” of NWSC is to ensure that no one is denied access to water supply simply because they are resident in informal settlements. Underlying this is the recognition that supply of water at a ‘basic’ level assists in alleviating poverty, improves community health and frees women from drudgery. This implies that the main target group of the policy are the urban poor. 10 The average household size in the informal settlements of Kampala is 4 persons.

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from a single public kiosk provide vendors with an average monthly income of only about USh 60,000 (approximately US $ 35, May 2005). This income is not adequate to support the household needs of an average low-income family. It is thought that the low average earnings compel some water vendors (called Operators), particularly those without supplementary income sources, to capture collections from water sales and to abandon the water retail businesses. On average, only 700 kiosks on the database are in active operation.

3.2.3 A New Approach

In order to overcome the problems faced with the management of the kiosks/PSPs, the NWSC has tried to develop and implement a water supply strategy concept for the informal settlements, which is sustainable from a commercial and financial perspective, but which at the same time is adapted to the living conditions, the financial capacities and the demands and requirements of the urban poor.

In some urban areas, the NWSC has tested an approach which aims at promoting “social connections” which are offered to prospective customers at an affordable cost. The new owners of these “social connections” or yard taps motivated to sell water to their non-connected neighbours.11 This new approach was tested in the town of Jinja during the implementation of the “Jinja Area Programme”. With this programme, the NWSC intended to establish whether the affordable individual yard tap could become the water supply strategy and concept for the informal settlements of Kampala and other towns. The objective of the NWSC is to create in the informal settlements high “social connection” densities. Owners of these “social connections”(in most cases a tap in the yard) are encouraged, among others, through the absence of a block tariff, to sell water to their neighbours.12 The high density of yard taps promotes competition among owners and hence the tariff remains low and affordable.

In the following sections, we show some of the advantages and disadvantages of the sale of water by yard tap owners to neighbours and other residents.

3.2.4 Kiosk, Yard taps, Price and Distance

In the informal settlements of Kampala, the yard tap connection rate is relatively high (between 10 and 40% of all households). Even before the introduction of the “social connection” approach, many households already fetched water at the yard tap of one of their neighbours and the NWSC encouraged the sale of water by connected households to their non-connected neighbours.

Constructing a large number of kiosks in the informal settlements, in order to supply the non-connected households, would not make much sense as these kiosks would only serve a few residents. Interviews carried out by GKW Consult in a number of informal settlements (in 2003) show clearly that many households would continue to fetch water at the neighbours’ tap in spite of higher tariffs. Women in particular, emphasised that the shorter distance works in favour of the yard tap. Others focussed upon social status and prestige. One woman, residing in Kisenyi II, one of

11 This implies an adapted tariff structure. 12 It should be noted that in Tanzania and Uganda, the informal settlements are characterised by the absence of fenced-off yards.

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the major informal settlements of Kampala, explained that she would not like to be seen walking a long distance in order to fetch water at the kiosk just because kiosk water is cheaper:

“Distance is a problem for a lot of people. They prefer to have water nearby. That’s the advantage of a yard tap. Many people prefer to pay more as long as they do not have to walk. Distance is seen as a problem. In Kasato zone, they have a kiosk where water is cheap, only 100 Shillings for 4 containers, but if you visit that kiosk you will see it is quiet; only a few customers. The kiosk is run by a Somali woman but often she does not open her kiosk because of lack of clients. Embarrassment is also important. People feel embarrassed when their neighbours ask: “Why are you fetching at such a far away place when there is a tap next to your door.” People do not want to admit they are after cheap water. They want to show others that convenience is important to them. Walking means showing poverty, but people who are really poor do not have a choice. Poor people should have access to clean water. ”13

Another woman who took part in the same group discussion disagreed and responded as follows:

“Yes, in the business area (of the informal settlement, GKW Consult) people give priority to small distances, but in the residential areas, a lot of people will consider the price of water and not so much the distance. Price is important, especially to people who are poor. That’s why people continue to fetch the water they drink from springs; they know the taste of spring water is not good and they know spring water is not safe, but they do not have the money to buy tap water. Some people use a spring because they are used to community infrastructures.”14 15

3.2.5 Keeping Treated Water Affordable

Indeed, a considerable number of residents cannot afford the informal tariffs charged by the yard tap owners. Many households in the informal settlements of Kampala are unable to fetch the quantities of treated water they require. To some extent, this is explained by the inaccessibility of piped water due to the insufficient number of house connections, yard taps and public stand posts. Another important factor is the high informal retail price charged by yard tap owners. Many households in the informal settlements cannot afford to purchase the quantities they need to satisfy their daily water requirements. In some areas, residents pay USh 33 for a 20-litre jerrycan containing approximately 23.5 litres and in other informal settlements, residents have to pay as much as USh 50 or even USh 100 (= ZMK 275 or US $ 0.06) for the same quantity. During water shortages, the price of water can even reach USh 200/20-litre container. This means that households in informal settlements pay more, much more for a cubic metre of water than residents with a house connection. The current

13 The fact that there are a number of water resellers (vendors) active in the area can be an indication of the fact that a proportion of the population attributes a high value to convenience for which one is willing to pay a high retail price.14 Children are, in most cases, responsible for fetching water at springs and at yard taps and often children in charge of the operation of these taps. 15 This and other remarks show the importance of localising public water infrastructures, such as kiosks, together with the community taking factors into account such as economic differentiation and economic activities.

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domestic tariff is 654 USh/m3, residents of informal settlements, however, pay between 2.1 (1,406 USh/m3 if the price is 33 USh/20-litre container and if a container contains 23.5 litres) and 14 (8,520 USh/m3) times as much as a household paying for the consumption of their metered house connection.

The NWSC argues that the promotion of yard taps, results in a lowering of the informal tariff. Although evidence from a number of informal settlements shows that this is indeed the case, one also has to conclude that even the lowest informal tariff exceed the price people pay at the kiosk (USh 20/20-litre container) or the tariff connected residents pay (figures for 2003).16

According to a report prepared by NWSC and the consultancy firm AquaConsult:

.… The prices paid by PSP customers are 5 times the domestic tariff and vendor-supplied services are 10 times tariffs paid by the consumers with private connections. These prices are way above the affordability limits of the majority (at least 60%) of the residents of informal settlements.” (Identification of Management Options for Improved Water and Sanitation Services of Informal Settlements in Kampala, Final Situation Assessment Report (2002) NWSC/AquaConsult : 51-2)

Table 3.1 shows the range of prices paid by majority of consumers in informal settlements.

Table 3.1: Informal tariffs paid by consumers in informal settlements of Kampala

Category Charges in USh (1)

Per m3 Per 20 Litres

PSP (2) wholesale (NWSC tariff) 424 8

PSP retail recommended 1650 33

PSP actual 2500 50

Vended Water 5000 100Source: Situation Assessment Report: 51 (see Bibliography)1): USh = Ugandan Shilling2): PSP = Public stand post (see Glossary)

Households try to cope with this situation by fetching water from cheaper sources. In most informal settlements of Kampala, the spring still plays an important role in the supply of water to households. According to the household survey carried out in 200217, 67% of all households still fetch water from a spring and many residents continue to use spring water for drinking purposes. During the rainy season, many households harvest rainwater. These conclusions were affirmed during the group discussions organised by GKW Consult in Kisenyi II (April-May 2003). According to the members of the Parish Development Committee (PDC), the retail price charged

16 The Consultant observed that although there exists a correlation between the number of yard taps per 1,000 residents and the informal tariff paid by customers, the tariff does not seem to drop below USh 33 or USh 50. According to residents and PDC members, this is due to a tacit consent among yard tap owners and yard tap customers that USh 33 or USh 50 is an acceptable tariff. 17 The survey was carried out by the team responsible for the Identification of Management Options for Improved Water and Sanitation Services of Informal Settlements in Kampala (see bibliography)

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for NWSC water is far too high, forcing residents, and especially the poorer strata within society, to make use of cheap sources which “produce” water of poor quality.

Other factors that have a negative impact upon the accessibility of treated water can be summed up as follows:

Many yard taps and public stand posts, have been disconnected by NWSC due to non-payment of water charges.

Many residents do not know how to acquire a yard tap. Procedures are considered to be complicated, not transparent and time consuming and fees are believed to be excessive.

3.2.6 Advantages of the NWSC “Social Connection” Approach

The approach developed and implemented by the NWSC has a number of clear advantages in comparison with the water kiosk:

The service provider does not have to make a distinction between kiosk and domestic connections.

The service provider does not have to recruit, train, manage and replace water vendors.

The service provider does not have to control the hygienic conditions of the water outlets.

Social connection densities are usually much higher than kiosk densities. In other words, the service provider is able to bring water closer to the customer.

3.2.7 Disadvantages of the NWSC “Social Connection” Approach

The main disadvantages of the affordable yard tap concept which was introduced by the NWSC can be summed up as follows:

Public health is not considered. The service provider cannot guarantee that the water outlets are kept clean.

Customers of yard taps are not protected by the tariff policy of the service provider but depend upon the forces of the market.

High yard tap disconnection rates render water supply unreliable and erratic.

Low income of informal water vendors. This explains why many yard taps are operated by children.

A successful; yard tap programme results in a high density tertiary network. This tends to create technical (maintenance and repair) problems. Moreover, in comparison with a kiosk dedicated distribution network, a yard tap-based network offers more opportunities for the construction of illegal connections.

A yard tap approach can result in residents becoming dependent upon an absentee house owning class.

Yard tap owners are not obliged to keep their tap and it surroundings clean. Service standards are low as many taps are operated by children. Maintenance and repair costs on the distribution network are considerably

higher due to the high network density.

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Due to the unplanned layout of the informal settlements, the high density of the distribution network and the relatively long distance between the water meter and the secondary network, the proliferation of illegal connections becomes a risk factor.

The tariff structure which is designed to motivate the owners of “social connections” to sell water does not discourage water wastage.

Many yard taps resemble a PSP or a kiosk in the sense that they are operated by someone who is selling water to customers who have to pay for each container they fetch. As the number of clients is limited, the yard tap water vendors are often young children or housewives without any other income generating activities. Hygienic conditions of the yard taps and their surroundings are often unsatisfactory.

3.2.8 The Price of Water and the Rights of the Customer

Members of Parish Development Committees (PDCs) interviewed by GKW Consult, emphasised that it is an injustice and unacceptable that connected customers are protected by the tariff policy of the NWSC, whereas non-connected residents in the poorest settlements of the city are exposed to the forces of the market and end up paying much higher water charges.

GKW Consult was asked to assist NWSC and KfW in developing a pro-poor water supply approach. Although subscribing to the emphasis, NWSC puts on achieving its commercial and technical objectives, the Consultant agreed with the PDCs that residents of informal settlements, who are dependent upon a kiosk or a PSP, have the right to be protected, just as any customer with a domestic connection, by the tariff policies of NWSC. A protection against high prices, against a whimsical market. In its report, the Consultant concludes:

“This means, for example, that although kiosks are run as businesses, water is sold at a price which has been fixed by NWSC. A fixed retail tariff should be seen as an essential part of a socially acceptable pro-poor water supply approach. The challenge is therefore to design an approach which is pro-poor but which preserves the entrepreneurial spirit. ….Customers pay for the water they fetch at a kiosk or PSP. This means they have the right to fetch water at a kiosk or PSP which is clean and controlled by NWSC. During an emergency such as an outbreak of cholera, the customer must have the guarantee that NWSC is able to assure that water supply takes place according to the instruction of NWSC and/or the Ministry of Health. In other words, the responsibilities of NWSC go beyond just supplying areas with treated water, as they include offering paying customers access to treated water a good and reliable service and protection.” (see NWSC 2003: 81-2)

The Consultant, therefore, proposed to reinforce the yard tap approach through the supply of water with a small number of kiosks:

“It is important to emphasise that with the planning, construction and management of kiosks, NWSC merely intends to provide a minimum “lifeline” supply of treated water to residents who cannot afford to pay for more expensive yard tap water. With the kiosk system NWSC aims at reaching the urban poor; residents who cannot afford to pay the informal retail price of water and who have to rely upon contaminated spring water. The majority of the population will continue to use house or yard taps.

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The kiosk component should allow NWSC to achieve its social and public health objectives. This means that a market study will have to show if they are needed, where they are needed and how many are needed, taking into account that NWSC has to cover its costs and that the operator/kiosk water vendor has to earn enough to make a living. In this context, it is important to repeat that a large majority of the non functioning kiosks (Almost 50% of the total number of kiosks in Kampala) were disconnected because operators had accumulated large debts and not because customers are not paying. This implies that existing norms and guidelines (a maximum of 200 persons/kiosk, see also footnote 9) cannot be applied. In principle, the kiosk component should be considered as offering a temporary solution during a phase of transition. Kiosks and even yard taps are transitional technologies as with economic development residents will demand higher service levels, mainly house connections. If the informal settlement, as a result of economic growth or patterns of migration, no longer requires their existence, if they no longer serve a minimum number of customers, they can be closed or, preferably, transformed into yard taps.” (NWSC, 2003: 92-3)

3.3 Main Advantages of the Kiosk SystemKiosk systems have a number of clear advantages in comparison with supply approaches based upon the promotion of social connections:

Low per capita investment costs. In Kitwe and Monze (Zambia), per capita investment costs, including the dedicated distribution network ranged between $ 4.00 and $ 7.00 per resident.

Relatively low maintenance and repair costs.

The service provider, through the contract which it signs with the water vendor, can insist upon the strict observance of cleanliness and hygiene regulations as well as rules regarding business hours, service delivery to customers.

The service provider can determine the retail price of water. Residents no longer are dependent upon other households, where they have to buy water for a price which is set by the owner of the legal or illegal connection.

The service provider can adapt the design of public water supply outlets to the wishes of customers and take ergonomic considerations into account. Kiosks can also be made vandalism proof.

For many service providers that have gained experience with the sale of water in low-income areas through water kiosks, the advantage of the kiosk system is that it allows them to meet their obligation – supplying all residents living within the boundaries of their supply area – through a system which is relatively easy to manage. Although, due to low per capita consumption levels, kiosk systems are not “cash cows”, they do allow service providers to increase their customer base. It is important to realise that many low-income, informal and formal, settlements received water from the service provider, even before the introduction of kiosks. Pre-kiosk water supply is often through illegal connections, legal house connections charged a flat monthly rate, public standpipes where water is fetched free of charge and what residents in Nakatindi compound in Livingstone called “initiative leaks” (deliberately created leaks in the main distribution pipes or the secondary distribution network).

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Kiosk systems, therefore, tend to put an end to water wastage and theft. The construction of kiosks and:

the technical rehabilitation or replacement of the distribution network,

the disconnection (or regularisation) of illegal connections and public standpipes,

and the metering of all legal connections,

often has a dramatic impact upon unaccounted for water. In Monze (Zambia), the introduction of kiosks in 2 peri-urban areas, Zambia and Freedom Compound and the implementation of the above-mentioned additional measures resulted in a dramatic improvement in the overall water supply situation. Residents of some formal residential areas, supplied through house connections, who were receiving little or no water prior to the introduction of the kiosks, suddenly started paying their bills. The introduction of kiosks and the metering of un-metered connections18 open the road to the improved management of entire water supply zones.

In Monze and other Zambian towns (Chipata, Kitwe), management of the water companies consider the reduction of water wastage and theft to be one of the main advantages of the kiosk system.

3.4 Kiosks in Un-Metered EnvironmentsExperience from African countries shows that kiosks do not tend to be sustainable (i.e. they fail to meet their commercial objectives) if they are found in an area with un-metered house or yard connections and/or illegal connections. Residents with an individual connection, who pay a flat monthly water charge, usually do not object to their neighbours fetching water at their tap. In Lusaka (Zambia), Dar es Salaam and Mbeya (Tanzania) and Butare (Rwanda), many households with an illegal or un-metered legal connection sell water for a tariff lower than the one paid at the nearest kiosk. The successful implementation and operation of a kiosk system, therefore requires the metering of the area supplied through kiosks as well as of the surrounding areas.

3.5 Areas Less Suited for Kiosks

3.5.1 Urban Areas with Low Population Densities

It would be wrong to suggest that kiosks are the best solution for all urban and peri-urban settings. In Burkina Faso, some urban areas of the smaller provincial towns have such low population densities that it has proved to be impossible to make the social objective (making treated water accessible) compatible with the commercial objectives of the water vendor and the service provider. Giving priority to accessibility has resulted in very low customer/kiosk ratios and unacceptably low vendor incomes. Most vendors have responded by keeping their kiosk open for just a few hours a day. Others have given the day-to-day operation of their kiosk to young children.

18 It is important to emphasise that kiosks, where water is purchased at a fixed price per container, cannot “survive” in an un-metered environment. In most cases, the owners of yard taps will offer water for a price which is lower than the kiosk retail tariff.

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3.5.2 Urban Areas Served Through Hand Pumps and Springs

The introduction of kiosks in areas where the population has access to hand pumps or springs, where water can be fetched free of charge or for a relatively low monthly maintenance and repair charge, is often unsuccessful from a commercial perspective. The situation may change, however, when population densities increase. In Serenje and Kalomo, 2 small provincial towns in Zambia, residents of peri-urban areas described how the water quality of their hand pumps had gradually deteriorated. Residents attributed changes in taste and colour to the densification of the area which had resulted in the contamination of the aquifer by pit latrines and local commercial enterprises (garages, tanneries, etc.).

It would be wrong to suggest that all existing hand pumps and springs found in urban settlements, with high population densities, supply water of poor quality. After all, water quality is determined by such factors as location19, soil conditions and sanitation technologies used. However, considering the (future) public health risks, hand pumps and springs have ceased to be acceptable and suitable water supply technologies and sources for urban settlements.

4 Changing Settlement Patterns and the Introduction of Kiosks

4.1 Dedicated Kiosk Distribution Networks or Mixed Systems?Some service providers prefer to supply low-income areas through kiosk dedicated networks. Other providers consider the introduction of kiosks as a first step which is followed by offering individual connections to residents who can afford them.

Many low-income areas are characterised by marked patterns of social and economic differentiation and their usually exists a significant market for house connections. In Lusaka, recent local economic developments and the legalisation of previously illegal settlements has resulted in significant investments in housing and a rise in the demand for house connections. In some peri-urban areas of Lusaka, landlords are asking for house connections as they wish to increase house rents by offering their tenants higher service levels.

Studies carried out by GKW Consult in Zambia (for example, in Itimpi Compound in Kitwe) and Rwanda (Bugesera-Sud region) show that local entrepreneurs (restaurant owners, brewers of local beer, etc.) wish to have direct access to water. In some urban Muslim communities in Northern Nigeria, households in informal settlements prefer to have piped water supply within their yard so women do not have to leave home. In urban areas with high levels of vandalism and a lack of cheap sources of safe water (springs, hand pumps), residents are often prepared to make significant investments in individual connections.

In this chapter, we argue that offering a mixed water supply system consisting of water kiosks, house connections and even institutional (local clinics, etc.) and commercial connections is preferable as it does not put a freeze upon the social and economic developments taking place in the low-income areas. Moreover, as

19 In Rwanda and Uganda residents of some informal settlements use well maintained springs. The water quality of these springs is often good because they are situated on higher grounds (up the hill).

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households with house connections tend to consume more water, a mixed system can make a significant contribution to the revenue base of a service provider.

4.2 Impact of the Introduction of Water KiosksExperience from Zambia shows that the extension of the distribution network into peri-urban areas and the introduction of water kiosks, can have a positive impact upon the social and economic development of these areas.

One of the main reasons why peri-urban water supply, but also the supply of other basic services to peri-urban areas such as sanitation, drainage, waste collection, roads, health centres has been neglected, is explained by the fact that until recently the peri-urban areas were considered to be illegal settlements. They were seen as temporary options, awaiting more permanent solutions in the form of Low-Cost, Medium-Cost or Site and Service residential areas. As a result they almost never appear on any (Development Plan) map. Sometimes they did not even seem to appear on the “mental map” of the local Council staff.20

In recent years however, the attitude towards the peri-urban areas has started changing. The central government and the Councils have come to realise that due to the deteriorating economic situation, the financial means to implement Development Plans and to offer reasonable alternatives to peri-urban residents are lacking and will continue to be lacking in the foreseeable future. The fact that Councils do not have the capacity and the financial means to phase-out existing informal settlements and use the vacated land for the development of new low-cost, medium-cost, site and service or high-cost residential areas21 means that these squatter areas are there to stay. This recognition has given rise to a new policy aimed at legalising squatter areas by incorporating them in the municipalities and developing peri-urban areas by providing them with basic services and infrastructure such as roads, electricity and water. In other words, this process of legalisation of squatter or shanty areas, now often called peri-urban areas, was born out of necessity. Currently many peri-urban areas in Zambia have been legalised or are in the process of being legalised.

Interviews with peri-urban residents revealed that the construction of kiosks is seen by them as a clear sign of being recognised by the Local Authority, by the outside world. Notwithstanding the importance of legalisation and the establishment of Residents Development Committees (which represent the community and are

20 In 1994, when discussing the introduction of kiosks in a number of peri-urban areas in Chipata, the Consultant was shown a map, which was part of the Development Plan of Chipata. The map showed the planned developments (high and medium cost residential areas, a shopping center and sport accommodations) covering a large area which at the time was inhabited by the residents of Navutika (which means: “We are in problems”), Chipata’s largest peri-urban area (+- 12,000 residents in 1998). The Consultant was told that supplying water to Navutika was not a priority as the settlement was illegal and its residents had to be aware that “any time from now” they would have to resettle and shift to a new area to make place for the development of the town. Only during subsequent discussions Council staff admitted that the Council lacked the resources to implement the Development Plan and considering the shortage of land it was unable to offer Navutika residents an alternative. Moreover, the council expected social unrest if any attempt was made to “clear” or “bulldozer” the area. Navutika still exists and has expanded considerably since 1994. 21 Although low-cost houses are in high demand, most families cannot afford the current price of a house.

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responsible for the coordination of all development activities), the upgrading of the compound is seen as being the real proof of official recognition.

Upgrading of peri-urban areas through the construction and/or improvement of roads and drains, the construction of a Community Police Post, a Community School involves the introduction of planning principles and processes taking place in a previously unplanned environment. For residents such developments, which represent a dramatic break with a past, offer security of tenure.

The result of these developments, processes and improvements is that residents tend to invest in better housing structures and better sanitation facilities.22

4.3 Investments and New Types of Housing The last decade has seen a significant change in the settlement patterns in the peri-urban and low-cost areas of Zambia. In the peri-urban areas of Lusaka, for example, many plot owners have constructed large houses, often referred to as “flats” that are rented out. Most flats have 4 to 6 rooms or apartments but the larger flats may accommodate up to 12 families.

Landlords target different income categories. Single rooms without indoor plumbing and a shared pit latrine in the yard usually can be rented for ZMK 35,000/month – ZMK 50,000/month. The more luxurious apartments that are equipped with electricity, individual bathrooms and flush toilets (linked to septic tanks), may be rented out for as much as ZMK 300,000/ month.

Often, the landlord lives on the same plot, either in one of the flats or in a separate house. The concept of absentee landlord is, however, becoming a more widespread phenomenon.

To some extent, these investments in the peri-urban areas can be seen as a result of the peri-urban legalisation process and the availability of water supply and electricity. The construction of flats should also be seen as a response by local entrepreneurs to the growing scarcity of land and the fact that many (young) families lack the financial resources to construct their own house.

4.4 Kiosks: A Supply Driven Water Supply Technology?Some experts have argued that kiosks are a government or donor imposed technology, as most peri-urban residents prefer a domestic connection. Even a household survey carried out in Lusaka (Consumer Assessment for Water and Sanitation in Lusaka, Part I) shows that many respondents prefer a connection within their yard or within their house. However, if, during group discussions, the costs of a house connection are explained, preferences tend to change in favour of kiosks. High satisfaction levels among the users of kiosks in Kanyama also indicate those water kiosks are suitable solutions for peri-urban areas. Suitable because they are adapted to income and consumption levels of a majority of the peri-urban population. Kiosks are a good water supply solution for high density peri-urban urban areas and informal

22 The construction of kiosks, provided a community participation concept is used, can also contribute to a sense of shared ownership and higher levels of social cohesion and social control.

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settlements that lack alternative sources of water. In such areas, kiosks can be sustainable (a large enough number of customers per kiosk and relatively high per capita consumption levels) and distance between dwellings and the nearest kiosk can be short (200 metres or less).

The introduction of kiosk in such areas does not mean that the kiosk should be regarded as a developmental end-station.

4.5 Responding to an Emerging Market for House ConnectionsThe often heard assumption that the population of the peri-urban areas can be classified as “urban poor” is wrong. Although most people who can be classified as poor or extremely poor, do live in the low-cost and peri-urban areas, most of these areas are marked by a marked pattern of social and economic differentiation.

Due to a lack of land in the formal residential areas, an increasing number of urban residents are constructing large homes in the peri-urban areas. In Kapiri Mposhi, for example, the Consultant was asked by the RDC of Kawama Compound to visit the “high-cost section” of their peri-urban area. The RDC members explained that in recent years the demand for large high-cost plots within their area had increased. The Consultant was told that this development had been accompanied by the demand by these new residents for improved water supply. The RDC members stated that they had been able to improve service levels in the compound through the construction of a police post, a community hall, a clinic and a school, but that piped water supply was still lacking. We were told that many “high-cost” houses had electricity and some even DSTV, but that water was still fetched from a well (although some residents had plans to sink their own borehole).

Similar trends are observable in some of the peri-urban areas of Lusaka. These developments indicate that there exists a significant and increasing market for individual house connections. This market is mainly found among the new more affluent residents, local landlords23 and the local business community (restaurant owners, bars, hair salons, etc.).

In order to able to respond to growing demand, the Consultant believes it is not advisable to plan for kiosk dedicated networks, but rather for a distribution network that allows for a mixed system (kiosk and other types of connections). One could argue that such a mixed system reflects a real demand driven approach as it allows for the gradual upgrading of an area on the basis of emerging demand.

5 The Low-Cost Residential Areas: A Public Health Time Bomb

5.1 Making Necessary Distinctions The “traditional” distinction which is made between rural and urban water supply and sanitation has had an important impact upon the WSS sector, as it has helped to shape ministries, projects and programmes. The distinction is a useful one, but has also contributed to masking the differentiation that exist within rural and especially

23 After having explained the working and function of the water meter, many landlords stated that they expect to have problems paying their water bill once they are charged according to consumption.

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within urban areas when it comes to habitation patterns and population densities. In large villages with high population densities, WSS projects are confronted with typical urban problems in the sense that the aquifer may be polluted by pit latrines. In parts of Central Province (Serenje District, Zambia), where the farm is the most common settlement pattern, the localisation of a hand pump may be difficult as a result of very low population densities. In other words, even in the rural areas, population densities have to be taken into account when planning for water supply and sanitation and when choosing between technologies.

The Consultant believes, however, that the focus upon the urban – rural distinction has had more serious consequences for the perception of urban WSS problems.. Donors usually make a choice between either rural or urban WS and subsequently fail; to look beyond the simple distinction which prevents them from grasping the differences that exist between, for example, low-cost and peri-urban areas. 24 Making a distinction between planned (low-cost) and initially unplanned (peri-) urban areas is, as far as WSS is concerned, almost as important as the distinction between rural and urban.

Making a distinction between areas like Matero (low-cost) and Kanyama (peri-urban) is important if one wishes to understand what, from a residents’ perspective, is an acceptable water supply and sanitation solution and what is not. For example, peri-urban residents may consider the kiosk to be a good solution to their water supply problems, whereas for the resident of low-cost areas such as Matero, the introduction of kiosks would be interpreted as being part of an effort to “downgrade” their area. The distinction between low-cost and peri-urban is important because investment costs differ. The introduction of kiosks in an area may cost between ZMK 25,000 and ZMK 75,000 (US $ 5.30) per capita and the same sum (or even less) would be sufficient for a demand driven onsite sanitation concept (based on a revolving fund). The rehabilitation of the existing WS infrastructure in a low-cost area may range between ZMK 350,000 and ZMK 900,000/capita.25

This chapter focuses upon the serious WSS problems many low-cost residential areas in Zambia such as Matero in Lusaka, are faced with. It is important to note that the total low-cost population of Zambia is estimated at 1,000,000 persons (minimum).

5.2 The Low-Cost Issue: Downgrading or Doing Nothing? Group discussions that were conducted by the Consultant in Matero, a large low-cost area in Lusaka (Zambia) show, that the water supply and sanitation situation in many parts of this large low-cost residential area (with an estimated population of 45,000 persons) can be described as very poor. Some parts of Matero no longer receive water. Water supply in other parts is rationed and residents only receive water once every three days. Almost all houses of Matero are connected to the water distribution

24 Within the African context, Zambia is rather unique, even if compared to most other former British colonies, in the sense that the urban areas can be categorised according to 4 residential area categories: Planned areas: High-cost, medium-cost, low-cost and Unplanned areas: Peri-urban.

25 ZMK 350,000 per capita according to a cost estimate prepared by the Lusaka Water Supply and Sewerage Company for Matero (March 2005) and ZMK 900,000 per capita according to cost estimates, prepared by GKW Consult, for low-cost areas in Livingstone (Southern Province, Zambia).

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network and to the sewer. The current situation, therefore, cannot be attributed to poor or no WSS planning, but to insufficient and poorly implemented maintenance, repair and rehabilitation works, initially by the LCC and later by the LWSC.26

Matero is not the only low-cost residential area characterised by dilapidated ablution blocks, leaking and blocked sewer lines, leaking and vandalised water pipes and irregular supply of water. In Northern Province, the WSS systems of many low-cost areas are in a state of total disrepair. In Kabwe, with a population of more than 180,000 Zambia’s fourth largest city, the open well is the most important source of drinking water for 72% of the total low-cost population (estimated at 36,000 persons, MLGH/GKW Consult)!!

The reason why the WSS infrastructure is in such a deplorable condition in most towns is due to the fact that:

Most large low-cost areas in Zambia were constructed during the same period, the decades before and after independence (October 1964).

Most systems were designed for much smaller populations. There has been structural lack of maintenance and repair works. The construction of house extensions and cabins by house owners.

The sale of Council houses to sitting tenants during the mid 1990’s has indeed resulted in the large-scale construction of house extensions and cabins by house owners. House owners who wish to have more space or increase their income by accommodating tenants. These construction activities not only resulted in higher populations and population densities, but also in service lanes being used for gardening and construction purposes. Many, peri-urban areas are in fact undergoing a gradual process of what one might call “peri-urbanisation”.

The Consultant believes that many large low-cost areas in Zambia are heading for a public health disaster.

It is unfortunate, therefore that until now, the Government and the Ministry of Local Government and Housing, but also the CUs have not responded to this emerging crisis by putting the low-cost problematic on the agenda, by preparing a technical WSS assessment inventory and by formulating a clear WSS policy for the low-cost areas. Government seems to recognize that something has to be done in order to improve the situation in specific low-cost areas such as Libuyu in Livingstone and Matero in Lusaka, but does not seem to go beyond a kind of “case-by-case approach”.

What are the feasible WSS options for the low-cost areas? As we indicated earlier, the complete rehabilitation of the existing WSS infrastructure would be very costly affair. An alternative, much cheaper, solution would be to supply low-cost areas through water kiosk and adapted onsite sanitation solutions.

5.3 Adapting to Dilapidation Experience from Zambia shows that introducing kiosks in low-cost residential areas is considered to be unacceptable by many residents. Almost all low-cost areas were served through individual house or yard connections and through sewer lines and

26 The Matero township water supply infrastructure was constructed in the 1950’s and 1960’s.

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communal septic tanks. In many towns, the water supply and sanitation infrastructure, due to a lack of maintenance and repair works but also as a result of unauthorised building activities has deteriorated. In an increasing number of low-cost areas, all over the country, the entire water supply and sanitation infrastructure is in a state of disrepair. In these areas, residents depend on a variety of alternative sources of water such as yard wells, wells in the dambo, house connections in neighbouring areas and even public standpipes. In low-cost areas with a non-functional water supply infrastructure, the sewer lines are usually blocked, forcing residents to construct pit latrines within their yards or to resort to “kavela” and “bush facilities (see Glossary). In some low-cost areas with a non-functional water supply system, for example Chibolya in Mufulira (one of the towns on the Zambian Copperbelt), residents, continue using their toilets, flushing them (once or twice a day) with water they fetch from “cheap” sources such as springs or wells.

5.4 Experiences with the Introduction of Kiosks in Low-Cost AreasExperience acquired with a kiosk project in Maiteneke, a low-cost residential area in Chingola (equally a town on the Copperbelt), shows that the introduction of kiosks in planned areas can meet with strong criticism and even active resistance from the residents.

To our knowledge Maiteneke is the first and only low-cost residential area in Zambia where kiosk were introduced. In 2002, water supply through the existing distribution network had become very unreliable and water pressure extremely low. The water distribution network was placed parallel to the sewer line in the service lane behind the plots. The WSS was characterised by serious water shortages, the contamination of water by sewage, sewer line blockages, a zero collection efficiency and regular night time flooding caused by numerous leaks, many of them so-called “initiative leaks” created by residents who could no longer use their taps due to the low water pressure.

The Mulonga Water and Sewerage Company (MWSC) did not have the financial resources to rehabilitate the existing infrastructure but saw the need to intervene in Maiteneke in order to prevent the outbreak of water and sanitation related diseases. This provided the main reason for MWSC management to prepare a project proposal and apply for financial support from the GTZ “Own Measures” (Eigenmassnahmen) programme. Knowing that the financial resources that could be secured through the GTZ programme were limited, the MWSC decided to design a kiosk dedicated network that was to replace the existing distribution network. MWSC and the Consultant estimated that 5 kiosks would be sufficient to supply the population of the area (estimated at 11,000, see table 5.1)27 and to increase revenue.

Table 5.1: Population distribution in Maiteneke compound

Category Number of households Population

Low-cost 829 Semi-detached 5,637

Low-cost 13 Own yard 88

Cabins smaller structures 739 5,025

27 The Kiosks were constructed under the GTZ Eigenmassnahme program.

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Teachers houses 13 88

Total: 1,581 10,839Source: GKW Consult 2003

Initially the project was supported by the RDC and large sections of the population. Many residents argued that although the kiosk represented a step backwards on the development path, it was clear that the current situation was not sustainable and that kiosks were therefore an urgently needed improvement. The community and the RDC were involved in the localisation of the kiosk, the recruitment and training of vendor and in numerous sensitisation and education activities that were organised in Maiteneke.

Weeks after the inauguration of the kiosks (see also picture 5.1), a number of residents (in most cases residents from parts of Maiteneke where water supplied had been relatively reliable) staged a protest against the kiosks and demanded from the MWSC to reopen the old distribution network, which implied that the kiosks had to be disconnected.

The protesters, who were not supported by the RDC, argued that the closure of the old distribution network had resulted in sewer line blockages also because water leakages had contributed to a water flow reduction in the sewer.

Picture 5.1: MWSC Water kiosk in Maiteneke, Chingola

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During a number of heated meetings and debates, the pressure group managed to persuade the service provider to close the kiosks and to reconnect the old network. ii

One of the arguments used by the pressure group, an opinion which was shared by other households in the area, was that as households refused to use expensive kiosk water to flush their toilets, the old sewer lines were getting blocked. At first the company was asked to rehabilitate the existing network and ablution blocks. The company responded by explaining that it simply lacked the financial resources and technical capacity to carry out such large-scale technical works, also because the sale of Council houses to sitting tenants during the mid 1990s had resulted in service lanes being occupied by structures, trees and gardens.

The closure of the new kiosks resulted in counter protests by kiosk customers. A meeting with kiosk opponents resulted in a compromise. The old distribution network was to be disconnected and the kiosk to be reopened, but residents would be given the opportunity to apply for a metered house connection (at commercial rates) linked to the new kiosk network which was extended to non-connected streets in order to reduce dwelling – network distances. In other words, residents proposed a mixed system consisting of house connections and kiosks all connected to the new distribution network.

Currently (May 2005) all kiosks are operational and a limited number of houses have received their own connection. A majority of the population of Maiteneke, however, uses the kiosks.

i Water Consumption Levels in Rwanda, Burkina Faso and Zambia When comparing Burkina Faso, Rwanda (Ngenda and Butare) and Chipata, Zambia one has to conclude that kiosk consumption levels in Butare (Rwanda) and Chipata (Zambia) are significantly lower. Variations are to a large extent explained by differing climatic conditions access by households to alternative sources of water. Table i.1 shows that even in Burkina Faso, where average annual temperatures are high, average rainfall levels relatively low and where many households, especially in the larger towns, do not have access to alternative sources, per capita consumption figures are well below the average per capita consumption figures of persons who have access to a house connection.

Table i.1: Kiosk water supply in Burkina Faso, Rwanda and Zambia

Conditions:Ouagadougou, Burkina FasoButare, RwandaChipata, Zambia (4)Lusaka, Zambia (4)Length of rainy season3 to 4 months9 months6 months6 monthsAverage annual rainfall levels250-1,000 mm (3)1,140 – 1,600 mm 800 mm 800 mmVariation in rainfall HighLowRelatively highRelatively highDo households have access to alternative sources Only a minorityMost householdsMany householdsFew households Average daily per capita kiosk consumption19-25 litres1-7 litres5.5-7.5 litres19 – 25 litresKiosk price of water (per 20 litres)FCFA 5.-= ZMK 26.-FRW 14.- = ZMK160.- (1)

FRW 10.- = ZMK139.- (2)ZMK18.-ZMK 20ZMK 33ZMK 501): Ngenda: figure for 1996. It should be noted that in the years just after the 1994 genocide, price levels and income levels in Rwanda were considerably higher compared to Zambia2): Butare: figure for 20023): 1,000 millimetres in the south and less than 250 millimetres in the north. The central part (Ouagadougou) receives less than 700 millimetres. 4): According to water consumption measurements carried out by GKW Consult.

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5.5 Arguments in Favour and Against “Downgrading”The Maiteneke case shows that although a kiosk system, from a financial and technical perspective, may represent the best solution, it may be unfeasible if social arguments are considered. Some residents of Maiteneke described the introduction of kiosks as a being “downgrading exercise” and as “a step backward on the road to development”.

The main arguments against the introduction of kiosks in low-cost residential areas can be summed up as follows:

Social arguments

Many stakeholders have stated that downgrading is likely to result in social and political unrest, as downgrading not only means a lower level of service, but also a loss of status and sometimes of personal prestige. The existence of such services as electricity28 and individual water supply and sanitation, are important reasons for town residents to settle in low-cost areas and to invest in the improvement of their homes.

Commercial arguments

According the staff of the Chipata Water and Sewerage Company (CWSC) the construction of kiosks in low-cost areas will not be successful from a commercial point of view if a large proportion of the population still has access to un-metered house connections. Disconnected households will continue to fetching water from their neighbour. The water bill is shared.

Population densities in low-cost areas are sometimes lower compared to peri-urban areas. To make kiosks commercially viable would imply having a large number of households supplied by one single kiosk. This means that the average distance between households and kiosks is likely to be considerably longer than in peri-urban areas.

Public health arguments

Plots in low-cost areas are relatively small (between 360 and 450m2) and population density is often quite high (albeit lower than in most peri-urban areas). Processes of densification (as a result of the extension of houses and the construction of cabins) may even lead to even higher population densities. This implies that the construction of on-site sanitation facilities becomes a problem. In some high-density areas, one can observe that residents use their pit latrines as a bathroom. This results in unhygienic situations, especially during the rainy season when the water table is high.

There are also arguments in favour of downgrading the existing low-cost areas, which in this contexts means abandoning the existing house connections, individual waterborne sewerage network (septic tanks etc.) and providing water kiosks and promoting the construction of on-site sanitation (pit latrines and VIPs).

28 Unlike the peri-urban areas, most low-cost residential areas in Zambia have access to electricity. For example, 92% of all low-cost houses in Kabwe have access to electricity

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Financial/commercial arguments:

The Councils and most service providers lack the financial resources to repair, rehabilitate or to replace the existing water distribution network or the (water-borne) sanitation and sewerage systems.

As a result of current economic conditions and high unemployment levels, some residents are unable to pay their water and sanitation charges.

Some households are unable to finance necessary repair works on the water supply and sanitation facilities within their yard.

Technical arguments Many residents of low-cost areas have constructed house extensions or new

structures within their yards. Quite often these new constructions have been built on top of existing water and sanitation pipes. This renders the rehabilitation, repair and maintenance of the WSS infrastructure more difficult and more expensive.

Often residents, who have been unable or unwilling to pay their water and sanitation charges, continue to use their waterborne toilet facilities after having been disconnected. This often results in the blockage of their sanitation facility and the sanitation network as a whole.

Public health arguments Those in favour of downgrading will probably argue that if residents are

unable to pay for private water and sanitation services, this will have public health repercussions. When a household is disconnected, the flushing toilet becomes a kind of pit latrine and sooner or later the sewer network gets blocked. Eventually residents are forced to construct pit latrines next to their flushing toilet.

5.6 Lessons LearnedFindings from Chipata (CWSC, 2002) show that in Kapata, a large low-cost residential area, a minority (32%) of all households is not paying (is not able or not willing to pay) its water and sanitation bill (sewerage charges for households with a domestic sewer connection are 50% of the water charge). These findings indicate that in some areas, downgrading has to be seen as a last option, if no other alternatives exist.

The Maiteneke case shows that offering a lower service level, even if such a decision is justifiable from a public health, technical and commercial point of view, can trigger the resistance from a number of residents, a resistance which may even result in social and political unrest. The Maiteneke project also shows that a mixed system, kiosks and the opportunity to acquire an individual connection may be the way forward for a number of low-cost areas, especially areas where the old water and sewer networks have partly or completely collapsed.

A mixed system may also address the social aspects of downgrading. Introducing a mixed system does not offer a lasting sanitation solution. Although in some low-cost areas, for example Chibolya in Mufulira, cheap sources of water such as springs and wells are used to flush toilets, the use of sources or outlets (kiosks) outside the yard do not offer a lasting solution for toilets linked to a sewer which require a minimum sewage/water mix to function properly. This means that the introduction of mixed systems probably involves the development and introduction of adapted and

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affordable sanitation solutions (for example, poor flush toilets linked to a communal septic tank, etc.).

There can be a debate on the feasibility of the various technical options, but what we would like to stress is that improving the WSS conditions in the low-cost residential areas of Zambia and the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals, will require a strong guidance, a clear policy and creative solutions from the Ministry of Local Government and Housing.

6 Kiosks and the Need for Proper Planning

6.1 The Use of Norms During the Planning Process A publication of the German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation (BMZ) states that:

“What is to be regarded as a sufficient and adequate basic demand, depends on the water use habits as well as on climatic and cultural conditions. A sufficient basic supply can be achieved with 20 to 40 litres per inhabitant per day (WHO: 30 l/c/d). The following consumption rates are adequate and eligible from a development perspective.

40 l/c/d for public standpipes. 60 l/c/d for yard connections. 120 l/c/d for house connections.”(BMZ, 1984: Sector Paper).

The South African Department of Water Affairs and Forestry (DWAF) uses the following norms concerning water supply in informal housing areas:

Quantity: 25 litres/person/day. Cartage: The maximum distance that a person should have to cart water to

their dwelling is 200 metres. Availability: the flow of water from the outlet should be at least 10 litres/minute

and water should be available on a regular, daily basis. Assurance of supply: The supply should provide water security for the

community; i.e. in terms of raw water availability, and effective operation and maintenance.

Quality: compliance to currently accepted minimum standards. “Upgradability”: the desire of many communities to upgrade a basic service to

provide for household connections should be provided for during the planning phase.

The Zambia Bureau of Standards (ZBS) has adopted the following guidelines (Table 6.1) for residential water demand for formal and informal housing areas:

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Table 6.1: Residential water demand

Requirements Informal or rural housing (i)

Low-cost housing

Medium-cost housing

High-cost housing

Litres/person/day Litres/person/day Litres/person/day Litres/person/day

Drinking 5 5 5 5Bathing 15 25 50 90W.C. - 30 30 40Cooking and cleaning 10 15 20 40Laundry 5 10 20 40Gardening - 10 15 45Other uses 5 5 10 20Total: 40 100 150 280Notes: 1. Demand is expressed in litres per capita per day

2. High/medium-cost housing based on main house occupants, excluding servants’ quarters

3. For servants quarters allow for 6 persons at 100l/c/d

4. Water demand in rural areas is not explicitly covered, however the demand figures for “informal housing” are recommended

Source: Zambia Bureau of Standards, Zambian Standards for Water Supply Systems-Consumption Figures for Design-Guidelines: Table 1

i): Water supply: Communal or shared standpipe or one tap in the plot; Sanitation: pit latrines

Several remarks can be made with regard to the ZBS guidelines. Firstly, they do not reflect the current situation found in most peri-urban and low-cost areas in Zambia, where total per capita consumption levels are considerably lower (Consumer Assessment for Water and Sanitation in Lusaka, Part I). Secondly, it would have been better to separate the category “cooking & cleaning” and create two requirement categories. As we point out in Chapter 2, households, when it comes to fetching water, water usages, water treatment, water sources and paying for water, make a distinction between the water they fetch for drinking and cooking and the water they require for other usages. If possible households tend to fetch the water they need for drinking and cooking from what they consider to be a secure or protected source (a public tap, a hand pump, a spring or a protected well).

6.2 Measuring Water Consumption in Peri-urban Areas The findings obtained with several water consumption measurement exercises carried out in a large number of peri-urban areas in Zambia (Lusaka, Kitwe, Kabwe, Mkushi, Monze, Chipata, Nampundwe, see also Part I) show that even where treated water can be fetched free of charge (such as in Nampundwe, 2002) or at a flat rate (Monze before the introduction of kiosks), urban treated water consumption levels are low, much lower than the ZBS residential demand figures for the peri-urban areas (informal housing areas; 40 litres/capita/day) and in many cases, lower than the minimum consumption figures proposed by the World Health Organisation (20 litres/capita/day for peri-urban areas). Only in some peri-urban areas of Lusaka,

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where peri-urban residents do not have access to open wells in their yards, kiosk consumption levels exceed 20 litres per person per day.

6.3 Planning of a Kiosk System: Using Norms or Facts?Ideally, a kiosk system should achieve a number of objectives: a social objective (making water accessible to the population), a public health, a technical, a management, a financial/commercial and a corporate image objective (the service provider takes its responsibilities serious as it aims to supply all residents in its service area, including the urban poor).

Unfortunately all these objectives are often not taken into account during the planning of kiosk schemes. The planning phase is often dominated by the social and public health objective, whereas some of the other objectives are not even considered.

The neglect of the commercial/financial and management aspect during the planning phase, often becomes apparent when the kiosks (due to their small clientele) are unable to generate enough revenues to keep water vendors motivated. Indeed vendor incomes are often forgotten when designing a kiosk system. Instead of calculating the number of kiosks required on the basis of population data and expected demand for treated water, the social objective is translated in a number of norms and assumptions, Norms regarding distances between kiosks and dwellings (for example a maximum distance of 200 metres) and assumptions and norms concerning per capita consumption levels (for example, peri-urban residents consume or are expected to consume 30 litres per person per day).

The outcome of this emphasis and neglect is that the number of kiosks which is constructed in an area is too high. This results in low-vendor incomes and subsequently in low collection efficiencies.

Why is the long-term sustainability of kiosk system often neglected? The answer is simple: A study of the potential market for treated water is not carried out because it is often assumed that residents will consume the quantities specified in existing norms and recommendations.

6.4 An Example: Poor Planning of Kiosks Schemes on the CopperbeltThe Assessment Team that evaluated the World Bank-funded kiosk schemes on the Copperbelt concluded (Kleemeier and Malama, 2002) that the schemes were based upon incorrect assumptions concerning the population size, consumption levels, consumption practices, the willingness and ability of residents to participate financially in the scheme, their willingness and ability to pay for water and the managerial capacities of local organisations such as the RDC.

The data collected by the Consultants during the early stages of the projects were to a large extent ignored (with the exception of the population data) and the initial assumptions continued to be at the basis of the project because the decision to implement the schemes had already been taken. The Consultant responsible for the design and implementation of the schemes did not collect data on the willingness and ability of residents to pay for water. If they would have, none of the six communities, according to Kleemeier and Malama, would have passed. The fact that the gathering of and use of collected data was not considered to be of great importance can, in its

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turn, be explained by the emphasis upon the social and public health objective and the relative insignificance of the commercial/financial objective. In other words, insufficient attention was given to the long-term sustainability of the project. An important conclusion is that, predictions with regard to expected consumption were based upon norms (residents will consume 35 litres per capita per day) instead of an assessment of the future market for treated water which takes the use and continued use of cheap and nearby sources such as yard wells into account. When consumption in project areas such as Racecourse and Kapisha (in Kitwe) turned out to be much lower (between 1.5 and 2 litres per capita per day) the sustainability of the schemes was immediately undermined. However:

“Evidence that effective demand would be weak was close to the surface. First, the situation described in the staff appraisal report did not correspond to conditions on the ground. The report stated that people in peri-urban areas had “to haul water from distant supply points or purchase water from vendors” (World Bank 1995, p. 28). At worst, residents in some schemes had sometimes to haul water from farther supply points, but no one was purchasing water from vendors. In fact, the supply of water in the peri-urban areas was fairly good. Zambia is fortunate to sit on a geological formation that brings the water table quite close to the surface. In all six peri-urban areas, people have shallow wells close to their homes, in their or a neighbour’s compound. In addition to shallow wells, two areas (Racecourse and Kanyala-Bunga) had communal stand posts supplying free water from the municipal system. Some of these wells dry up at certain times of the year, forcing people to converge on the perennial wells in the area. These wells were further but hardly “distant.”

These are not the conditions under which one would expect to find strong effective demand, that is, a strong willingness to pay for water. This is especially true in a country such as Zambia, with its long tradition of the government providing water for free. From what the Assessment Team learned in its interviews, residents had a demand for free water, but limited effective demand. To the extent the latter existed, it was for household connections. In fact, even the demand for water, let alone effective demand, had its limits. In one of the areas (Chibote), residents listed water as only their fifth priority during a participatory needs assessment, even before anyone suggested that residents would have to pay for water.” (Kleemeier E. and Malama A., 2002: 34)

This example shows that during the planning of the Copperbelt schemes, the commercial/financial objectives were completely neglected and that even data on current consumption patterns and accessibility of water sources were not collected.

Currently the collection efficiencies of the World Bank schemes are low. An analysis of the Kapisha scheme in Chingola, for example, shows that customers pay the water vendors the required tariff. The main reason that explains why collection efficiency is low, is the fact that vendors do not deposit all the cash they collect to the RDC which is responsible for the financial management of the scheme. The RDC in its turn refuses to pay Mulonga Water and Sewerage Company for the water the company has supplied.iii

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6.5 The Millennium Development Goals and Per Capita Investment CostsWithin the Zambian context, improving peri-urban water supply is a relatively recent phenomenon which, in most cases, has been donor and NGO driven. The fact that investments in the peri-urban areas were donor-funded has obscured the commercial and financial imperatives of peri-urban water supply and has equally obscured the necessary emphasis on investment costs and per-capita investment costs. The debate on poverty reduction and the contribution of investments to this objective has made donors and the Zambian Government more aware of the need to look at and to compare per capita investment costs and the impact of measures upon the lives of the beneficiaries.

According to a DTF/NWASCO publication (“Reaching the Millennium Development Goals for Water Supply and Sanitation: The Urban Perspective”, January 2005: 22), approximately € 20 million are needed to halve the proportion of the population without having access to safe water by the year 2015. Financial resources are usually scarce. This means that available resources have to be spent wisely and efficiently. Unfortunately this can not only be achieved by organising fewer workshops and by abolishing sitting allowances and unnecessary trips. It also means that per capita investment costs have to be considered. There are indeed considerable differences between the various kiosk schemes. Kleemeier and Malama (Kleemeier and Malama, 2002) show that per capita investment costs of the World Bank schemes on the Copperbelt ranged between US $ 22 and US $ 40. The hardware component of the Kyawama scheme (including boreholes and tanks) in Lusaka required a per capita investment of approximately US $ 17, whereas the software (sensitisation community participation, recruitment and training of vendors, etc.) of the Monze kiosk scheme (no boreholes and tanks) are estimated at US $ 6.

On the basis of these data, one may assume that independent community managed schemes are much more expensive as compared with schemes that are organisationally and physically linked to the existing WS organisation and infrastructure.

High per capita investment costs are sometimes explained by poor planning. Instead of calculating the number of kiosks required on the basis of facts and expected demand, the social objective is translated in a number of norms and assumptions. Poor planning thus often results in high investment costs and at a later stage in serious management problems.

Peri-urban water supply and sanitation proposals and projects, therefore, have to be analysed and compared by using a set of evaluation criteria which not only include the current (pre-project) water situation and the “demand driveness” of the project, but also the per capita investment costs and the proposed kiosk management concept.

7 Planning and Management of Kiosk Systems: Community Participation

7.1 Should Community Participation Determine Access to Water?In their evaluation of a number of peri-urban water supply schemes on the Zambian Copperbelt which were funded by the World Bank, Kleemeier and Malama show that:

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“The development credit agreement signed between the IDA and the GRZ stipulated the following criteria for selecting communities to receive a scheme under the Peri-Urban Component. The community must:

not have a reliable connection to a formal water supply system and must live in a peri-urban area;

either have formed a community organization with the capacity to develop a Settlement Technical Plan or be willing to work with project design and training Consultants for that purpose;

be able and willing to finance the investment cost of the scheme above the amount to be financed (i.e., US$ 25.- per capita) and to undertake the post investment operation and maintenance of the scheme;

play a key role in the design of the demonstration project, and be willing and able to play a key role in the implementation, monitoring, and management of the scheme; and

have the technical, financial and managerial capacity necessary to operate and maintain the scheme.” (Kleemeier E. and Malama A., 2002: 30).

The question remains if and how peri-urban areas, that cannot meet these criteria, should be supplied with treated water.

7.2 Zambia: The Peri-Urban Water Supply and Sanitation StrategyAccording to the Peri-Urban Water Supply and Sanitation Strategy:

“Community management has the purpose and benefit of locating ownership of WSS services within the community, enabling user accountability, promoting the dignity of the beneficiaries, and contributing to national domestic resource mobilization for WSS. Community participation is seen as a basic right of people, a fundamental principle of democracy, a prerequisite for service sustainability, and a catalyst for community self reliance.The Strategy is to provide peri-urban Water Supply and Sanitation services through partnership with community level organizations and the community itself.Local Authorities and CUs are to hand over the day-to-day management of peri-urban WSS services at community level to community institutions. These community organizations are to be prepared for their role in accordance with the DRA approach. They are to take responsibility for community inputs into the construction, costs of operation and maintenance, enforcement of user charges, and remittance of tariffs to the service provider.The community organizations are to be elected representatives of the service users, accountable to the service users, and enjoying clearly demonstrable support from the community.” (Peri-Urban Water Supply and Sanitation Strategy, 1999: 15-6)

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7.3 A Critical Evaluation of the Strategy: Limits to Community Participation

7.3.1 Differences between Rural and Peri-Urban Areas

The Peri-Urban Water Supply and Sanitation Strategy mentions that over the last ten years, the participation of communities in the provision and management of water supply and sanitation has been integrated into rural water supply projects in Zambia with varying degrees of success. However, this strategy has only been recently applied to urban water supply and sanitation, mainly through efforts of NGOs who have been implementing projects in the peri-urban areas.

It remains to be seen however, whether a strategy, which has not always proved to be successful in rural areas, can be applied in a peri-urban context. From a social and cultural point of view many peri-urban areas in Zambia are different from villages and other settlement types found in the rural areas. Most peri-urban compounds in Zambia can be characterised as follows:

They are not ethnically and culturally homogenous. A marked pattern of economic differentiation is combined with a high poverty

level. High mobility level (high levels of in and out migration). High levels of unemployment, especially among the youth. Low levels of social control and social cohesion. Residents do not feel they

belong to a community, which shares the same interests, priorities and objectives. High levels of vandalism. Lack of a social structure based upon traditional leadership and traditional

institutions. Lack of strong community based organisations. Due to their illegal status most peri-urban areas (with the exception of the

legalised peri-urban areas that have a RDC) lack a visible and strong governing body.

The recent past has shown that many peri-urban communities can be divided over political issues. Such divisions can seriously hamper a fruitful cooperation between residents.

The above-mentioned factors, alone or in combination, may render it difficult to unite the whole population of a peri-urban area behind a community participation concept or a project. Some RDCs, are weak others are practically non-functional as a result of internal conflicts, political intrigues, mismanagement of funds (corruption and theft), etc.

Bolt, Schouten and Moriarty argue that community participation and management have often failed to achieve its full potential on two major counts:

“Firstly, there is the problem of long-term sustainability. Following ‘hand-over’ communities are frequently left entirely on their own; the assumption being that the capacity building work undertaken during the project period has left them with the necessary skills and institutions to manage their systems indefinitely. However, there is increasing recognition that community management institutions and rules are often as vulnerable as the water supply technology itself. Community management institutions are susceptible to conflicts, abuse

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of resources, or external interference. In addition, external factors such as population growth, illegal settlements or diminishing water resources may also put heavy pressure on the community management rules and institutions. … The second failure of community management is in terms of support by (local) government institutions. Because of their limited time frame projects (often funded and carried out by NGOs) are incapable of guaranteeing long-term support and thus sustainability of community management institutions and systems. Governments lack the resources the capacities or the political will to create a support structure for communities left on their own after ‘hand over’. (Bolt, Schouten and Moriarty, 2001: 61)

Another reason why community participation in water supply and sanitation in peri-urban areas differs from community participation in rural areas concerns the technical complexity of the water supply infrastructures. Rural water supply projects use relatively simple technologies such as hand pumps and windlass wells. Although the supply of spare parts can be problematic, rural water supply projects, such as the KfW-funded Rural Water supply Project in Eastern Province, show that is it possible to have the infrastructure maintained by the users themselves (see Phiri, D.S. and Ball, A.M., 2001). Decisions concerning the water supply technology are of course based upon economic, logistical and demographic factors. Usually rural communities are given simpler technologies because they are cheaper and because villages are scattered over the territory. This dispersion makes it difficult and/or expensive to have water supply installations maintained and repaired by say a private company or a Department of Water Affairs.

Pollution of the aquifer, due to the high density of pit latrines and because of chemical pollution (from garages, small scale industries, etc.) often results in the decision not use such technologies as hand pumps and windlass wells in peri-urban areas with high population densities. Economies of scale make it possible to supply peri-urban compounds with piped water. Peri-urban water supply infrastructure is, therefore, usually more complicated and requires the input of technicians with enough expertise and a detailed knowledge of the supply network, valve chambers, etc. Especially since urban water supply projects are prone to vandalism and theft. When considering community participation in relation to water supply one may, therefore, conclude that in general, peri-urban water systems based on piped water supply require less community involvement than simpler technologies (hand pumps, windlass wells, springs, etc.)

The problems projects and programmes face when trying to realise community participation in peri-urban contexts are, however, not related to the complexity of the water supply system but to social and cultural factors.

7.3.2 Water Supply in Poorly Organised Peri-urban Areas

Adopting a demand drive approach, when developing water and sanitation solutions for peri-urban areas seems to be a sensible if not a necessary decision. According to Bajracharya and Deverill:

“It is increasingly being acknowledged that the supply driven methods, which have dominated service delivery since the early 1980’s, often make incorrect assumptions about what people need or can afford. A series of evaluations has revealed that a significant proportion of the facilities being provided are not used

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or not sustained (see for example White, 1997). ..Reflecting this fact, a new generation of demand responsive approaches is being developed which emphasise the need to respond to user demand. In this context, demand could be defined as “an expression of desire for a good or a service, measured by the contribution people are willing and able to make to receive and sustain this service” (Deverill et al, 2001). … External assumption is replaced by user perception” (Bajracharya, D. and Deverill, P., 2001: 33)

The question is however, whether a demand driven approach is inextricably bound up with community participation and whether the conceptual link, which is made in the Peri-Urban Water Supply and Sanitation Strategy, between community participation and a demand driven approach is justified. In other words, the question arises whether the entire population of a peri-urban area has to suffer from the fact that its leaders or representatives are divided or involved in conflicts? Should peri-urban residents be denied access to a basic necessity just because the community is unable to organise itself and express a demand, its needs, through a RDC or another type of local organisation? In the formal housing areas, there exists a direct relationship, by means of a contract, between a service provider and the client. Is it fair to supply peri-urban areas on the condition that the residents first establish an organisation, which will act as an interface between the service provider and themselves? Why should peri-urban areas and RDCs that receive the continuous support from the Council and NGOs be favoured when it comes to water supply? Why should water supply infrastructure be owned and managed by the community? Are community participation, management and ownership, the best possible solution for tackling the peri-urban water supply problem?

Another important question is whether a particular RDC really represents the community. Does the presence of the RDC imply that residents feel they are represented, that their priorities and interests are made known to the outside world? Is the RDC really part of the cementing social tissue that is able to transform a population consisting of individuals, families and households into a community? There are examples of RDCs that only seem to be interested in furthering the financial or other interests of the committee itself, totally neglecting the hopes and needs of the people they have to represent. Most peri-urban areas are in fact fractured and differentiated communities. Differentiated from an ethnic, religious, political, economic and cultural point of view and some peri-urban areas are characterised by the continuous power struggle that is taking place between individuals, groups, and political parties. This power struggle may result in the coming into power of some and the marginalisation of others. Some groups or categories may not even be given the opportunities to express their views, problems and needs. In this context, it is difficult to establish an organisation that is able to remain non-political and to represent the large majority of the population. Experience shows that an RDC easily becomes the focus or tool of peri-urban power struggles. Other cases show, however, that RDCs, especially if they receive the active support of the Council, manage to become efficient non-political organisations that truly represent their community.

It is important to realise that the capacity of a community to organise itself is not an indication of the priorities or needs that exist among the population. It is not an expression of an existing demand. A demand may exist but residents, or a particular category of residents, may be unable, or lack the opportunity to express their views because the community is preoccupied with political or other conflicts. Should the _________________________________________________________________________________


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women in a community, who do not express their views in male dominated public arenas (meetings, etc.), continue to fetch water from unreliable sources just because the male residents are unable to organise themselves, or to manage community funds properly?

The Consultant believes that the needs of peri-urban residents and the low levels of social cohesion and community organisation require that a peri-urban water supply system in principle should be able to function and be sustainable without community participation.

8 Poor Image, Loss of Confidence and the Creation of By-Passes

8.1 Poor Image of the LWSCDiscussions with residents of high-cost, low-cost and peri-urban areas indicate that the Lusaka Water and Sewerage Company (LWSC), the licensed service provider in Lusaka, is perceived by many as a being an inflexible bureaucratic organisation consisting of well dressed managers who rarely leave their offices, who spend much of their time attending workshops and who are only interested in buying fancy cars and computers for themselves.

In the low-cost and peri-urban areas, residents described the LWSC as an organisation which has lost interest in the urban poor and which instead of responding to complaints, requests and new market opportunities, only responds to political pressure and to the demands of influential residents of the high-cost residential areas such as Kabulonga, Rhodes Park and Leopard’s Hill.

It is remarkable that the LWSC was often compared to ZESCO and ZAMBEEF and some of the banking corporations. ZESCO is seen as a more dynamic organisation, which responds to customer complaints and to new potential markets. ZESCO engineers are seen working in overalls in the field. Enterprises such as ZAMBEEF and some of the banks have discovered that the peri-urban and low-cost areas represent an important market for their products and services. These organisations have established a local service and product delivery presence which the LWSC lacks. LWSC is perceived as not being very interested in the water supply problems of these areas.

8.2 Creating By-Passes and Development from BelowFocus group discussions in the peri-urban areas showed that residents are deeply disappointed in the Lusaka City Council (LCC), in the LWSC and in the Central Government as these organisations have failed to extend services into the peri-urban areas and to maintain what exists or existed. Participants in the low-cost blamed the LCC and the LWSC for having been unable to maintain and extend the WSS infrastructure put in place by the Colonial Authorities. During the group discussions, it also became clear that residents have lost hope that the Lusaka City Council, the LWSC and other organisations such as the Ministry of Education are capable and even willing to improve the living conditions in their area.

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It would be wrong to think, however, that peri-urban and low-cost communities have not responded to the gradual degradation of the existing WSS and other infrastructure in their area. Increasingly, residents of peri-urban areas see the need to organise themselves, if the living conditions in their area are to be improved. The improvement of the layout of peri-urban areas and the construction of roads, drainages and bridges through the PUSH programmes (Programme Urban Self-Help) the building of community schools, the establishment of local police posts and health centres, as well as numerous local water supply projects, should be seen as the response of residents, of communities to the inability of the Government and other providers to deliver these services. Community initiatives and contributions, for example the construction of a police post, are considered strategies that can improve the accessibility of services, including services delivered by the Government such as police services, educational services and medical services. It is acknowledged by residents and RDCs that the Government, by legalising many peri-urban areas, by establishing and supporting the RDCs and other CBOs and by supporting community-based initiatives, has facilitated community-initiated and -managed development. 29

Legalisation and the creation of RDCs have resulted in peri-urban residents becoming more dependent upon their capacity to organise themselves and to communicate with the outside world. Instead of relying on the implementation of national of local Government policies, peri-urban communities are assumed to develop themselves on a project-by-project basis. This explains the proliferation of community schools, community clinics, waste collection programmes, and water supply initiatives.

This relatively new tacit self-help ideology, has resulted in a situation characterised by successful attempts of communities to by-pass government institutions and parastatals, including a service provider such as the LWSC, in order to secure access to services such as water supply. Hence the emergence of partnerships between communities and a number of NGOs and the introduction of community-managed water supply schemes. The result, as far as water supply in Lusaka is concerned, is the existence of a number of community run Water Trusts which have been established by CARE International within the framework of a project funded by DFID. These Water Trusts supply water to a large proportion of the peri-urban population of Lusaka. None of the Trusts have been licensed by the water and sanitation regulator, NWASCO (see Endnote iv), as they all operate within the service area of the LWSC.

One has to admire the community participation, community capacity building and community management concepts developed and introduced by the late Rose Chimansa and the other members of the CARE Prospect team. The Water Trusts are professionally run organisations, that are controlled by the community and which consist of trained staff recruited from within the area. In areas like Kanyama and Chipata, where water is supplied by Water Trusts, residents have a very strong sense of psychological ownership.30 Residents tend to talk enthusiastically about the

29 Although the author is responsible for the analysis presented in this report, the ideas presented in this section are to a large extent the result of discussions with the Consultant Mr. Ian Banda. 30 In Kanyama, the Kanyama Trust Management Board operates the Kanyama Water Scheme. The Board comprises of 9 members. Five members are elected by the community. The Lusaka City Council has 2 of its staff members on the Board, the LWSC one member. CARE International is

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water schemes comparing the current situation with the problems they faced before the construction of the kiosks, blaming the LCC and the LWSC for not answering their pleas. Some residents stated that “only over our dead bodies” they would allow the LWSC to take over operations. This sense of ownership has resulted in low levels of vandalism. This is important as levels of vandalism are high in many peri-urban areas. The Consultant noticed that residents of areas supplied by the Trusts are indeed worried that the Water Trusts may be “taken over” by the LWSC. The question is; should the LWSC take over operations? After all the Trusts are not licensed and operate within the boundaries of the service area of the LWSC. Moreover, one may ask whether it is a desirable that the population of a city like Lusaka is supplied by a large number of small water companies.

The Consultant believes that, notwithstanding the above-mentioned shortcomings, the Water Trusts should remain relatively independent. This does not mean that they can (continue) to operate in a legislative vacuum. The fact that the LWSC is represented on the Board of the Trusts is a good development, but more needs to be done. The Trusts need to conform themselves to the important regulations stipulated in the license contract service providers have to sign with NWASCO. This means, among others, that:

Water quality has to be controlled on a regular basis by an independent organisation approved by NWASCO.

The retail tariff has to be justified to and approved by NWASCO.

External financial audits have to be carried out on a regular (yearly) basis.

The Trust has to meet service and product delivery performance standards.

Through these and other measures, the Water Trusts should be protected against internal corruption and falling prey to local political struggles.

8.3 Local Presence is Key What can a service provider like the LWSC learn from the exercises gained with the establishment and operation of the Water Trusts?

One of the main strengths of the Water Trusts is that they have a strong local presence and make use of local human resources and capacities. This means that the communication lines are short. If damage is reported, response is rapid. The lack of a presence in the informal settlements is seen as a major weakness of City Water, the water and sanitation service provider in Dar es Salaam.31 If customers have complaints they do not know where to go and whom to approach. Illegal connections

represented by one of its staff members, but the CARE representative does not vote during the Board meetings. The Kanyama Water Scheme operates as an independent utility. The scheme has a Manager, an Accountant, a Secretary and casual workers. CARE International has implemented similar projects in 11 other peri-urban areas of Lusaka.

The compound is divided into 4 zones and supplied by 2 boreholes. Water from these boreholes is pumped into 4 elevated water tanks. There are 102 water points (kiosks) and each water point has 4 taps. Each water point has a clientele of 600 - 1,000 persons. Although customers can opt for a monthly water cards, most of them prefer to buy water at the kiosk where water is sold at ZMK 33 per 20-litre container. Vendors deposit their money on a daily basis with the cashiers at the scheme’s offices. The Board (KTMB) controls the finances. The commission of the vendor is 1/3 of the total collection.

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go unreported and are therefore a common phenomenon. Leakages are not reported and levels of vandalism are high. In fact vandalised pipes are the main source of water in many informal settlements (see picture 8.1).

Picture 8.1: Fetching water from a vandalised City Water pipe in Manzese, Dar es Salaam

There even exist a number of illegal water sale points where young boys sell water from vandalised pipes. The lack of a strong local presence in the informal settlements also explains low collection efficiencies; residents refuse to pay because they do not receive enough water (low pressure, irregular supply) and because they know there is nobody to disconnect them. Interviews carried out by the Consultant with City Water staff showed that the centralised damage reporting and response procedures and system had resulted in a situation characterised by a total neglect of the informal settlements.

There is no reason why a service provider like LWSC would not be able to establish a strong local presence in the peri-urban areas. In Monze (Southern Province, Zambia), for example, the Southern Water and Sewerage Company (SWSC) has a Kiosk Supervisor whose responsibility it is to supervise and assist the kiosk water vendors, to communicate with residents (inform, sensitise) and the RDC and to report

31 Meanwhile (end of may 2005) the Government of Tanzania has decided to terminate the private sector participation contract with Bi Water and Gauff Ingenieure which resulted in the creation of City Water.

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customer complaints and damage.32 The residents of Zambia and Freedom compound, two large peri-urban areas in Monze, feel the water kiosks belong to the community and that the company is approachable and responding to their needs. The RDC, which has been involved from the start in the project (localisation of kiosk, recruitment and training of vendors, sensitisation of residents, etc.), represents the community during kiosk related meetings organised by the SWSC.

8.4 Need for a Holistic Approach (2)The household survey and focus group discussions carried out in Lusaka, show that solid waste, drainage and sanitation are seen as major problems and increasingly so. The group interviews and field observations made by the Consultant, raise the question whether with the further increase in population densities in both the low-cost and peri-urban areas, these problems can be dealt with in isolation. Water supply, sanitation, solid waste and drainage are linked in the sense that in combination they represent a serious health risk. Solid waste is blocking drains, poor drainage maintenance results in the exposure and breaking of sewer lines and water pipes, poor sanitation and a lack of sanitation facilities result in the pollution of drains and even water outlets, etc. etc.

In Kampala (Uganda), there exists an increasing awareness among all stakeholders (including the Kampala City Council) that in the informal settlements with high population densities, addressing the above-mentioned problems requires an integrated approach. In order words, improving water supply only has a limited impact upon public health if sanitation, drainage and solid waste management are left out.

Adopting a more holistic approach in a city like Lusaka, also means that an intervention would go beyond the responsibility and capacity of the LWSC, which is only responsible for water supply and sanitation. This implies that the LWSC would have to work together with other organisations and with the local communities involved.

Adopting a holistic and integrated approach to solving the above-mentioned problems, can only be successful if the residents and their organisations (RDC, Neighbourhood Health Committees) are involved from the outset. Some peri-urban areas have strong RDCs and the population shares a sense of belonging and sharing the same development objectives. In other areas, and the low-cost areas in particular, residents do not feel they belong to “a community”. In these areas, communal initiatives and works are uncommon. Matero, for example was described by residents as being “poorly organised”.33

32 Small repair works are carried out by the Kiosk Supervisor.33 Within the framework of the Baseline Study it took one of the Field Teams one week to find out that Matero has in fact an RDC. Many residents are apparently unaware of this.

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9 Management of Kiosk Systems by Service Providers

9.1 Main Problem Service Providers Face Managing KiosksA kiosk system can be analysed by considering the relationships, interfaces and exchanges between the main stakeholders: Customers, kiosk water vendors and the service provider.

The relationship between the customers and the other 2 stakeholders does not often create (structural) problems. Customers may be dissatisfied with the services offered by some vendors, they may complain about water pressure, the number of kiosks (not enough), the distance (too far) or the quality of the water supplied by the provider (etc.), but in most cases they continue using the kiosks and continue paying the official tariff.

The weakness of many kiosk systems appears to be the problematic interactions and transactions between the provider and the kiosk water vendor. Many kiosk systems are characterised by low collection efficiencies. Low vendor incomes and the absence of the service provider in the peri-urban areas (sanctions do not exist or are not implemented) are the main cause of the poor financial and commercial performance of many kiosk systems.

Why are vendor incomes often unacceptably low?

In most cases, kiosk water vendors are paid a commission (i.e. a percentage of the value of the quantity that has passed the water meter). The percentage given to water vendors is usually acceptable (ranging between 20 and 35%). The number of clients per kiosk is usually also acceptable, at least from a customer perspective. In Zambia a single kiosk can serve between 200 (Burton and ZECCO in Livingstone) and 2,200 customers (Zambia-Freedom, Monze). The time customers have to wait, during peak demand hours, does not often exceed 10 minutes.34 Although some kiosk schemes are characterised by high kiosk/customer ratios, most kiosks constructed in recent years, serve a large enough number (between 1,000 and 2,200) of customers. Low vendor incomes are in most cases caused by a combination of low per capita consumption levels and a low tariff (vendor incomes per capita consumption and tariffs are discussed more in detail in Chapter 10).

9.2 Vendor Livelihood Strategies and an Absent Service Provider Water vendors are often dissatisfied with the revenue they generate with the sale of water but many lack alternative sources of income. In order to make ends meet, many vendors try to increase their monthly revenue by borrowing or spending cash they owe the provider.

During the months following the commissioning of new kiosks, collection efficiencies are usually high, between 90 and 105%. A drop in collection efficiency usually occurs 6 to 12 months after the introduction, when water sales have stabilised and vendors come to realise that their revenue will not show any significant increase. After the inauguration of the kiosks vendors usually have high expectations regarding their business prospects: water sales will increase, especially during the dry season,

34 If the pressure is good and if the number of taps at the kiosk sufficient. Peak demand hours during week days are usually between 06.00hrs and 08.00hrs and between 16.00hrs and 18.00hrs.

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residents will consume more kiosk water because they will abandon their wells, kiosk revenue will allow vendors to invest in consumer goods, which will allow them to transform their kiosk into a small neighbourhood grocery shop (etc.). When vendors start realising that the water sales will remain relatively low and that the running of a small-scale business requires careful planning and management skills, many of them become disillusioned. Some will accuse the provider of not having thoroughly considered the potential market for kiosk water, of having introduced low vendor tariffs, of not being interested in the vendors and the populations that depend on the kiosks. In addition to low revenue, vendors often have to cope with significant social pressures. Relatives and friends, according to many vendors that were interviewed in Monze and Chipata (Zambia) simply cannot understand that a beautiful and clean kiosk where hundreds of people come and fetch water every day is not a “cash cow”. In fact, when being asked why they had been unable to settle their water bill many vendors explained that they had been unable to recover the money they had lent to relatives.

The first problems occur, however, when vendors start depositing less than they are supposed to do, simply because they feel the provider does not appreciate their efforts and because they come to the conclusion that the money they earn is not sufficient to meet their daily needs.

If the provider does not properly manage the vendors, they tend to get away with not paying their bills. The result is a gradual or even rapid drop in collection efficiencies. In Livingstone, for example, the Southern water and Sewerage Company (SWSC) still accepts a collection efficiency which ranges between 8 and 20%.

It is interesting to note that the blue collar staff of the provider often sympathises with the vendors. They feel that vendors and field staff (plumbers, meter readers, etc.) share a common burden in the sense that their incomes are low and that their work is not appreciated by management.

Some vendors and blue collar staff, attribute the poor performance of kiosk system to a lack of interest among management in peri-urban water supply. Some junior staff members of the SWSC told the Consultant in 200335 that senior managers and the Board of Directors were mainly preoccupied with their own salaries and bonuses and were wasting company money on numerous meetings and irrelevant workshops, instead of showing commitment and interest in the water supply problems of the urban poor and the requirements of their own staff. Senior management, we were told, only visited the peri-urban areas in the presence of donors.

We have noticed that field staff of service providers tend to express, when being in the field, their solidarity with the vendors36 and consider it to be justified that, in order to make ends meet, they and the vendors create their own “room for manoeuvre”. Vendors do not deposit all the cash they collect and plumbers earn an additional income by creating by-passes at disconnected premises or by accepting money from the owners of connections they are supposed to disconnect. Field staff members of providers, therefore, are often reluctant and even unwilling to implement management decisions that may harm the vendor.

35 Meanwhile the management of the SWSC has been replaced by a completely new team. 36 In Chipata and Monze (Zambia) vendors and blue collar company staff often reside in the same peri-urban areas and can be said to belong to the same socio-economic category.

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Many providers have failed to formulate and implement a transparent policy and clear (payment and debt recovery) procedures and sanctions which enable them to deal in an efficient and just manner with defaulting vendors. Collection efficiencies are often determined by such factors as the determination and persistence of the staff responsible for the water kiosks, vendor incomes, the relationship between vendors and kiosk supervisors, the number of vendors that were replaced by the provider, logistical problems faced by the provider, and the priority attributed by the provider to water supply through kiosks. The collection efficiency of many kiosk systems in Zambia is, therefore, not the result of the implementation of clear guidelines, rules and sanctions, but the outcome of ongoing negotiations between service provider staff and vendors. Negotiations during which each party attempts to manipulate its room for manoeuvre.

If service providers are stricter when it comes to paying the water bill, water vendors with low incomes tend to develop alternative coping strategies. In Chipata, for example, where kiosks were introduced in 1994 vendors, when being interviewed in January 2005, explained that they are not respecting the agreed upon business hours because their incomes are too low. Some vendors explained they felt they needed the extra time to rest or to earn money elsewhere.

9.3 Being Sucked by the Swirl The drop in collection efficiency usually marks the beginning of the gradual demise of a kiosk system. The drop in collection efficiency often results in the provider becoming (even) less interested in the kiosks and in peri-urban water supply. This attitude translates itself in a growing unwillingness to carry out necessary maintenance and repair work. Resources and means of transport are no longer made available to staff members responsible for the kiosks and the frequency of kiosk supervision shows a downward trend. Kiosk supervisors, meter readers and plumbers also become less motivated to visit the kiosk areas as they feel squeezed between the complaints of vendors and residents on the one hand and the indifference of their employer on the other. As a result of this lack of supervision and maintenance, collection efficiencies tend to drop even further. If, due to poor maintenance, water quality drops or varies or if water supply becomes less reliable, company staff tend to become even more reluctant to visit the area and to collect revenue and listen to disgruntled customers.

At this point in time, a kiosk system has entered a downward spiral movement which may lead to the total dilapidation of the infrastructure and the collapse of water supply. Sometimes, however, providers, in order to avoid problems with the local populations, the Council and local health authorities, make sure that, through minimal interventions, the kiosks continue to be supplied with water. At this stage, the local water supply landscape may already have undergone drastic changes. Kiosks may have been abandoned and replaced by illegal connections or vandalised pipes where residents fetch because water pressure has become low. Sometimes kiosks have been transformed in public taps, where water can be fetched free of charge.

During the early stages of kiosk system decay, customers continue paying the official tariff and vendors usually manage to implement tariff adaptations introduced by the provider. The neglect of the infrastructure by the provider often results in low water pressure, poor water quality (as a result of leaks which are not being repaired) and,

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therefore, in low customer satisfaction levels. Residents become less willing to pay for kiosk water, may even resort to alternative sources of water or decide to vandalise the distribution network. If their customers are no longer willing to pay for a poor service and water of poor quality, vendors leave their kiosks and are no longer replaced. Subsequently the provider may even conclude that kiosks are not the way forward as vendors are difficult to manage and because the system is not adapted to the peri-urban realities.

9.4 More Observations Concerning Corporate Culture

9.4.1 Office and Field

To some extent, the neglect of peri-urban water supply is explained by the fact that the new corporate and management culture and discourse that developed within and among providers, after the council-company transition had been completed, emphasised the commercial objectives of the company and therefore the need to give priority to servicing the high-cost and medium-cost areas and the local commercial enterprises. Within such a culture where well dressed staff members (ties and suits) attended seminars and workshops and dealt with local industries and businessmen, there was apparently no room for such (old-fashioned 1970’s) concepts as, illegal squatter compounds, Residents Development Committees (RDCs), community participation, gender aspects of water supply, public meetings, sensitisation and kiosks.

Peri-urban water supply and managing a kiosk system imply leaving the comfortable office, leaving a modern business environment and entering an arena characterised by dirt roads, dusty markets, local beer, heaps of uncollected solid waste, small huts and poor sanitation. An arena where one has to walk and talk to people who lead a completely different life and who are faced with a different set of livelihood problems. A manager may feel out of place here when he or she comes to the conclusion that having a cell phone or memory stick hanging from your neck does not really impress anyone.

9.4.2 The Corporate Culture of the Old SWSC

Informal interviews with plumbers and meter readers of the Southern Water and Sewerage Company (2001 and 2004) showed that the dominant corporate culture can be said to have contributed to deteriorating water supply conditions in kiosk areas and to low collection efficiencies. According to these respondents, company management and middle management preferred to work in their offices, receiving clients instead of working in “the field”. Being a real manager, we were told, meant staying in the office and receiving visitors, not leaving the office. When management did leave the office, they went by car to another clean environment: an important customer, a workshop at the Sun Hotel, the Head Office in Choma.

Field staff members were given assignments, but their work was hardly ever checked as this would involve “the office people” having to leave their habitat. If management was seen in the peri-urban areas, visiting a kiosk, it meant that high visitors had arrived, maybe even representatives of the donor. Such visits were special occasions during which drums were beaten and songs or plays were performed by local residents or vendors. For the occasion, the vendors were given new company t-shirts

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to give them a clean and organised appearance and to prevent them from disturbing the moment by expressing criticism regarding the company or the kiosk system. In case of a donor visit, company management would adopt a, what can be described as a pro-poor, pro-peri-urban discourse in order to please the visitors and assure continued investments.

Vendors would be bribed into silence but the same can be said about the relationship between company management and lower staff. Some of our respondents even went as far as suggesting that exorbitant management salaries and bonuses and corruption among company management forced the latter, in order to prevent unrest and revelations, to allow lower staff to have their own sphere of autonomy. This explains why no efforts were undertaken by the SWSC to identify illegal connections or reconnections or to suspend company plumbers responsible for these activities. According to respondents, there existed a kind of tacit agreement between management and lower-level staff, which resulted in a culture of secrecy in which each employee had an opportunity to increase his or her income. Honest employees - and we should assume that most employees were honest and just trying to do their job - were even seen as a threat as they refused to be part of the silent conspiracy.

The remarks and explanations offered in this section may seem irrelevant and even uncomforting. After all they lead us from transparent business principles, procedures and practices into a culture characterised by informal relations, untraceable and illegal transactions, a world of corruption and theft. Some may argue that introducing issues such as corporate culture, corruption and nepotism tend to distract attention from the real challenges providers, customers and vendors are faced with. This may even explain why, when confronted with corruption and theft we tend to mask it by using words such as “diversion” or “inappropriate use” of funds and other resources.

We should not shy away from including more evasive concepts into our analysis of the problems and challenges peri-urban water supply is faced with. Corruption undermines organisations and a company culture which neglects the urban poor may have a serious impact upon the water supply and the health of a large majority of the urban population. In Zambia more than 65% of the total urban population resides in an unplanned peri-urban area.

9.5 Management of Water Supply Schemes by RDCs The assumption that water supply, aimed at reaching the populations of informal settlements, cannot not achieve its commercial and technical objectives as well as its social and public health objectives is wrong. The borehole-based water schemes introduced by CARE International in Lusaka, where residents pay between ZMK 33 and ZMK 100 per (full)37 20-litre container (ZMK 4.167/m3)38 show that peri-urban residents are willing and able to pay a tariff which is considerably higher than the domestic tariff (ZMK 600/m3, 0-6 m3) paid by customers of the Lusaka Water and Sewerage Company.

37 Most customers prefer and are allowed to fill their plastic container to the rim. A full jerrycan contains between 22 and 24 litres. 38 ZMK 100 = US$ 0.02; ZMK 400 = US $ 0.08; ZMK 4,170 = US$ 0.88.

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There are not convincing reasons why LWSC could not introduce similar systems in other peri-urban areas. The description of the old Ng’ombe kiosk system39 shows that the reluctance of providers to really involve themselves in peri-urban water supply, is sometimes cleverly masked by adopting a community participation approach and discourse. Instead of supervising vendors and kiosks, the management of peri-urban water supply is left in the hands of local organisations such as the RDC. Before February 2005, the RDC of Ng’ombe was responsible for cash collections among vendors and the latter had to pay the LWSC a flat monthly rate, which did not reflect the actual quantities of water sold and wasted. Kiosks, in some cases, were not much more that a metal pipe and a tap. Kiosks were not metered and vendors, who received a fixed monthly sum for their services, had to deposit the amounts they collected from their customers to the RDC. All stakeholders admitted that the system was open for abuse and tended to favour the vendor and the RDC at the expense of the LWSC and especially at the expense of the customers who pays more than 10 times the domestic (0-6 m3) tariff.

Community participation and community management therefore do not necessarily benefit the population and the poorer socio-economic strata in particular. Many peri-urban residents do emphasise that the community and the RDC should be involved in the planning of kiosk systems and that they can contribute to its sustainability by preventing and addressing vandalism. When being asked if RDCs should be responsible for the financial management of the local kiosk system, many residents seem to agree that the technical and financial management of the kiosk system should be the responsibility of a professional and specialised organisation which is not subject to local rivalries, interests and political intrigues. If one considers the fact that many residents of Ng’ombe and of other peri-urban areas in Lusaka are willing and able to pay ZMK 100/20-litres container, it should be possible to introduce a kiosk system which allows the LWSC to achieve all its objectives and the objectives of the other stakeholders: customers and vendors.

The problem with community managed schemes is that once the RDC is in control it becomes difficult to transform the kiosk system as the financial and prestige interests of individual RDC members and vendors are at stake. The World Bank funded Kapisha scheme in Chingola, and the CARE International scheme in Livingstone, show that RDCs are willing and even eager to transfer the technical maintenance of kiosks and the distribution network and even the supervision of vendors to the provider, but will do everything possible to prevent providers from becoming responsible for cash collection. It is rather disappointing having to conclude that RDC members are often driven by personal instead of community interests.

Schemes such as the Kapisha and Ng’ombe have fostered the idea among providers and other stakeholders, including the World Bank, that water supply in informal settlements is a complicated and loss making venture. The lessons which should be drawn from the experiences in Chingola, Livingstone and Lusaka is that crucial mistakes tend to be made during the planning phase and that poor kiosk system performance can be attributed to the unwillingness of providers to really commit themselves to peri-urban water supply. A lack of commitment which is often based upon poorly founded assumptions.

39 In February 2005, the kiosk management system described in this section was replaced by a management system similar to the one of the George Complex water scheme. In Ng’ombe, the LWSC did not use the word kiosk but communal tap to describe its water outlets.

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9.6 Lessons Learned from RDC-Managed Water Supply SchemesThe Kanyama scheme designed and implemented by CARE International in Lusaka shows that the NGO has drawn important lessons from earlier projects. The Kanyama scheme has a strong community management component and community participation emphasis. The difference between Kanyama and Ng’ombe is that in Kanyama CARE has created a strong professional organisation which was recruited from within the community. One could argue that a local water provider (water trust) was created which is controlled by the community through a trust.

9.7 Reasons for Service Providers to Supply Peri-Urban AreasInstead of shying away from their responsibilities, service providers should be more creative and develop and implement kiosk systems which take all objectives and interests of all stakeholders into account.

Providers should be aware that, although they have to adopt commercial principles in order to achieve full cost recovery (being their commercial/financial objective), they also have the responsibility to provide the entire population of the towns they work in with treated water which is affordable, accessible and of good quality. Running a kiosk system requires a committed management team and qualified staff who are creative and enthusiastic and willing to work under difficult conditions.

Service providers may have additional reasons for becoming more pro-poor and for making peri-urban or informal settlement water supply one of their priorities:

1. The Zambian Government and relevant ministries such as the Ministry of Local Government and Housing (MLGH) increasingly emphasise the need to address problems faced by the rural and urban poor. Many studies carried out among peri-urban populations show that water supply is seen as an important, and often the most important, development priority. The Government emphasises the importance of achieving the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). Providers cannot ignore these priorities and are expected to play an important role in the achievement of the water and sanitation-related MDGs.

2. In the near future, most providers will continue to depend upon foreign investments, credits and expertise when it comes to financing and realising large-scale extensions and rehabilitation works. It is, therefore important to understand the policies and objectives of these investors and donors as well as the policy of the Ministry of Local Government and Housing. During a discussion at the CWSC office in Chipata in 1994, a member of a KfW mission pointed out that the Ministry of Local Government and Housing and KfW agreed that more attention had to be given to peri-urban water supply, adding that institutions like KfW and German Ministries involved in development cooperation were controlled by the German parliament and, therefore, by the German population. These institutions have to give shape to Germany’s development cooperation objectives. Poverty alleviation being an important objective, nor the members of parliament nor the population would ever accept a development project or water supply programme, which only aims at supplying high-income areas whilst neglecting the peri-urban areas where, a majority of the urban poor reside.40

40 Although we acknowledge that the development of commercial and industrial enterprises is a condition for economic growth and development of the town.

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4. Also the regulator, NWASCO (see Endnote iv), is giving priority to the improvement of services for the urban poor.

3. With the establishment of the Devolution Trust Fund (DTF) providers that give priority to water supply and sanitation for the urban poor, that have developed a sound water supply and peri-urban concept and have prepared detailed proposals for the improvement and sustainability of peri-urban water supply, can receive DTF support.

5. Peri-urban areas represent interesting and challenging markets for treated water (see Chapter 11).

10 Tariffs, Per Capita Consumption and Water Vendor Incomes

10.1 IntroductionIn the previous chapter, we have claimed that the vendor-service provider interface usually constitutes the weakest link of a kiosk system. We have argued that the poor performance of kiosk systems can often be attributed to low vendor incomes. Why are vendor incomes low? Sometimes the answer is rather simple and embarrassing; vendors are simply forgotten, are left out of the equation during tariff studies and the design of the tariff structure. In some cases, low vendor incomes are the result of a more complicated process which has important political dimensions and is based upon a set of unfounded assumptions.

Some service providers assume that residents of informal settlements are unable and unwilling to pay a tariff which allows the providers to cover its costs. This explains why some providers prefer not to get involved in supplying these areas. The fact that residents of informal settlements in Kampala, Dar es Salaam and Lusaka pay 3 to 20 times more for treated water already shows that residents of such settlements are able to pay a high water tariff.

10.2 Willingness and Ability to Pay and Quantities ConsumedThe question remains whether they are willing to pay such tariffs. Studies carried out in the above-mentioned cities and other African towns show that water is seen as a priority. When being asked questions about the existing water situation, residents tend to complain about exorbitant informal tariffs41, long distances, poor pressure and poor water quality. Willingness and ability to pay studies carried out among residents of informal settlements usually also show, however, that the willingness to pay for water and improved water supply is high.

41 Complaints expressed by the residents of informal settlements concerning the price of water are often expressed by referring to the household income or the price of other household needs and not by making comparisons with the tariffs paid by residents of formal residential areas. In other words, the tariff is not seen as an injustice. To some extent this can be explained by different consumption patterns. We also found that many peri-urban residents are not aware of the tariffs paid by connected households. Others do not make comparisons because they use buckets and jerrycans and do not calculate their consumption and expenditures on the basis of cubic metres.

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Studies, which focus on the willingness and ability to pay and on the current and expected consumption, show that residents of informal settlements are able and willing to pay a relatively high tariff, but only for a relatively small quantity of water. In other words, statements on the ability to pay a certain tariff already incorporate an assessment concerning expected consumption and daily or monthly expenditures.

Water consumption measurements carried out in Burkina Faso show that kiosk customers in Ouagadougou consume 19-25 litres per capita per day. Considering the climate and the lack of alternative sources of water consumption levels can be considered rather modest. In Chipata (Zambia), where many residents have access to cheap alternative sources, (wells a stream, etc.) kiosk consumption ranges between 5.5 and 7.5 litres. In Butare, Rwanda, where rain water harvesting is a common phenomenon kiosk consumption ranges between 1 and 7 litres, depending on the season.

10.3 How Tariff Structures are DesignedMany kiosk systems in Zambia face serious difficulties in becoming sustainable undertakings because vendor incomes are low and because service providers are unable to cover the costs of peri-urban water supply.42 These constraints are often caused by low kiosk retail tariffs. Are many kiosk tariffs in Zambia indeed too low? Table 10.1 compares the kiosk tariffs in Uganda, Tanzania and Zambia.

Table 10.1: Kiosk tariffs in a number of African countries

City and Country Year Kiosk tariff Domestic tariff

Amount/20-litres (in US $/m3) Amount/m3 (in US $/m3)

Kampala/Uganda 2003 USh 20 0.58 USh 654 0.40Dar es Salaam/ Tanzania 2004 TSh 20 1.05 - -

Lusaka (Kanyama)/Zambia 2005 ZMK 33 0.35 - -

Lusaka, LWSC (Ng’ombe) 2005 ZMK 12 0.13 ZMK 600 (0-6m3) 0.13

SP/NWP (*)/Zambia 2005 ZMK 20 0.21 ZMK 750 (0-6m3) 0.16

Ouagadougou/Burkina Faso 2000 FCFA 5 0.47 - -

Bugesera-Sud/ Rwanda 2000 FRW 14 1.68 - -*): SP = Southern Province, NWP = North-Western Province

Table 10.1 shows clearly that kiosk customers in Zambia pay much less for treated water in comparison with kiosk users in Tanzania, Uganda and Rwanda. Customers in Tanzanian cities such as Dar es Salaam and Mwanza pay 3 to 5 times more for their water than kiosk customers in Solwezi and Lusaka.

Assuming a consumption of 20 litres/person/day, and an average household size of 6 persons (see CSO, November, 2004) and an average monthly household income in the peri-urban areas of ZMK 100.000 (which amounts to a daily household income of US $ 0.7/day), households in Lusaka and Solwezi that pay ZMK 20/20 litres, will

42 In 2005 only 65% of the operational costs of the 10 commercial licensed service providers were covered by collections (see the “Urban and peri-Urban Water Supply and Sanitation Sector report 2003/2004, NWASCO 2005: 31).

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spend 3.6% (ZMK 3,600) of their income on water. This is well below the maximum of 5% recommended by the WHO and the World Bank.

In other words, the current tariff charged by the service providers in Lusaka, Southern Province and North-Western Province are relatively low. Low tariffs mean low vendor commissions especially in areas where the per capita consumption levels are low. Table 10.2 shows average vendor incomes in Lusaka (Kanyama Water Trust), Monze (Southern Water and Sewerage Company), Kitwe (Nkana Water and Sewerage Company) and Solwezi (North-Western Water Supply and Sewerage Company).

Table 10.2: Average vendor Incomes

Lusaka Monze Kitwe Solwezi (*)

Vendor commission % 33 35 37 35

Per capita consumption l/c/d 21 3 3 2

Number of customer/kiosk No. 950 2,200 1,500 1,600

Tariff ZMK/20-litres 33 18 20 20

Average vendor monthly income ZMK/month 326,000 63,000 50,000 33,600*): Figures for Solwezi are based upon preliminary estimates made soon after the commission of a number of

kiosks in Kyawama Compound.

According to the data presented in table 10.2, tariffs and per capita consumption levels have an important impact upon vendor incomes and upon the revenue of the service provider. In Lusaka, vendor incomes are more or less acceptable, whereas in towns (Kitwe, Monze, Solwezi), where tariffs are low and where peri-urban residents have access to alternative sources of untreated but cheap water43, vendor incomes are well below an acceptable minimum. The reason that in towns like Monze, vendors do not leave their kiosk is that in most cases they do not have alternative sources of income and because the kiosk were designed in such a way that they can be used to store and sell other goods (groceries). 44

Why are kiosk tariffs in Zambia low, if the ability of customers to pay is high and if a service provider needs a higher tariff to achieve full cost recovery?:

The regulator, NWASCO (see Endnote iv) instead of evaluating tariff proposals made by the service providers on the basis of financial and commercial indicators and upon the willingness and ability of the various types and categories of customers to pay, is guided by potential political implications, and vague assumptions regarding customer opinions, preferences and capacities.

Providers and the regulator tend to adopt an unfounded pro-poor approach in the sense that it is argued that the peri-urban residents or the residents of the informal settlements (simply referred to as “the urban poor”) should not pay more than more affluent residents with house connections.

43 Mainly yard wells.44 In Monze the Southern Water and Sewerage Company, assisted by the RDC, recruited vendors among the large number of HIV/AIDS widows. Most female-headed households have very low incomes.

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Service providers fail to sensitise customers on the need to change their consumption patterns. Residents of high-cost areas in Livingstone (Zambia), when being interviewed by the ZNBC News, complained about tariff increases and metering because it would prevent them from irrigating their vegetable gardens and the (public lawns in front to their gardens). Instead of disconnecting customers who are unable to pay their bills, providers, succumb to local political pressure and reintroduce flat rates and/or low tariffs.

10.4 Decision-Making at the Household LevelWhen faced with poor vendor performances and decreasing collection efficiencies, some service providers opt for the sensitisation of kiosk customers. As per capita kiosk water consumption levels are lower, much lower than the recommended quantities of the WHO, the customers must be unaware of the risks of consuming untreated water. Sensitisation, it is believed will allow the provider to achieve its health objectives and to increase revenue and vendor incomes. The fact that residents use kiosk water for drinking and preparing meals and the water from their wells for other usages as well as the fact that many households treat (by adding chlorine) the water they fetch from their wells is usually disregarded.

Kiosk consumption levels which are considerably lower than WHO or Government water consumption norms or recommendations, do not imply that households behave in an irresponsible manner or are ignorant and have to be sensitised. In-depth studies focussing upon household budget priorities and water consumption patterns show that most households, considering their financial constraints, do make well founded water supply-related decisions (MINERENA 1998, MLGH 2002). In most informal settlements water is considered to be an important problem, and in many cases it is an important item on the household budget. In order to satisfy their daily water needs households in peri-urban areas have developed a wide range of practices and strategies that involve the use of financial resources and the use of water from different sources for a variety of water usages.45 Residents are right, if they use safe water for such usages as drinking, preparing meal and bathing babies and unsafe water for usages such as bathing, washing and construction work, they are acting responsibly and are reducing health risks. In most cases there exists no scientific public health argument that can be used during a sensitisation campaign to discourage residents to use well water for washing.

Interviews with residents of peri-urban areas in Zambia and Rwanda show that people are aware of health risks and that health-related risk assessments are made by household members. These assessments are adapted on the basis of experiences and recent occurrences. For example, peri-urban residents in Kabwe

45 Households and household members pay workers to have an open well constructed within their yards, they fetch drinking water from a leak in a rising main, they pay a water reseller to have water delivered at their door step, they pay a Council plumber for having an illegal connection, they walk 4 kilometres to fetch water from a shallow well in the dambo, they collect rain water for bathing and for washing their clothes, they vandalise their kiosk, they put chlorine (brand name Clorin) in their stored water to keep their family healthy, they contribute money so their RDC can purchase pipes and taps, etc. etc.

These practices and strategies reflect the ability of households to adapt themselves to rapidly changing circumstances.

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explained during interviews which took place in 2001 and 2002 that the widespread practice of domestic chlorination can be explained by the recent large outbreak of cholera and the sensitisation provided by the Central Board of Health (CBH) and the Society for Family Health (an American NGO). At times, risks assessment are made on the basis of personal experiences. As one male respondent explained: “We use our body as a water quality indicator. If we do not get sick, the water is OK.”

Indeed, some residents who have access to treated water are aware of the risks continue to consume water from unsafe sources because they lack the financial means to purchase safe water, or because they are used to drinking unsafe water (“My grandfather already fetched water from this well and he got very old.”). Some peri-urban residents are aware of the risks, but they simply do not seem to care, or they believe their health condition is predestined and there is not much they can do to influence it. Often, however, the decision to drink water from a yard well is the result of balancing the financial consequences, accessibility (time spent fetching water) and health risks.

10.5 Improving Vendor Incomes, Tariffs and Elasticity of DemandIncreasing the tariff would of course be a way to boost vendor incomes. Especially since some studies indicate that the elasticity of demand is low. In other words, a tariff increase, even a considerable one, does not seem to have a major impact upon

iii Also in Kapisha (a large peri-urban area in Chingola) per capita consumption levels are very low, approximately 2 litres per person per day. As there is one kiosk for approximately 630 residents, kiosk consumption levels are low and at some of the kiosks even remarkably low. Some vendors do not sell more than ZMK400.-/day worth of water and some kiosks only have 15 to 20 clients (households). Busy kiosks have more than 70 clients. The Consultant was told that some kiosks at times remain closed for a number of weeks as vendors are not motivated to work. The kiosks are open between 7.00 hrs and 17.00 hrs. The price of water residents pay is ZMK20.- for a container of 20 litres. The vendors are recruited and managed by the RDC. The cash collected by the vendor is handed over to the RDC treasurer. Whenever a vendor deposits money he or she has to be issued with a receipt by the RDC. According to the Peri-Urban Unit of the MWSC it could well be that the RDC does not always issue receipts.

The RDC receives 30% of the collections, the vendor 40%, MWSC 20% and 10% has to be used for investments in the scheme. All the collected cash has to be paid into a special bank account, including the 20% share of the MWSC and the 10% required for investments. The MWSC is supposed to receive its share from the RDC. The RDC, however, often uses part of the money they collect through the scheme to finance other community programmes and activities.

Previously the RDC was responsible for carrying out the monthly meter readings. If the amount deposited by the vendor was less than the water bill the vendor did not receive his or her commission. When the Consultant visited the scheme the vendors had not received their commission for 4 consecutive months.

In April 2003, the vendors of the Kapisha scheme had accumulated (between November 2002 and March 2003) a total debt of approximately ZMK 8.4 million. During this period vendors only remitted ZMK 2.6 million.

As in the case of the Racecourse scheme in Kitwe, the main weaknesses of the current kiosk system (the one in Racecourse) can be divided into planning and operational (technical and financial/commercial management) shortcomings.:

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consumption levels. Interviews with residents of Kalikiliki (see Consumer Assessment for Water and Sanitation in Lusaka, Part II) revealed that even the poorest households emphasise the accessibility of treated water and not so much its price. Peri-urban residents tend to fetch relatively small quantities, the quantities they really need, and this quantity is mainly determined by the access to cheap accessible sources, not so much by its price.

A number of studies carried out in Zambia (Lusaka, Southern Province, North-Western Province) show that current tariffs do no reflect the ability and willingness of peri-urban residents to pay for water. The amounts residents are able and willing to pay by far exceed the current tariff. Considering the financial and commercial performance of most Zambian Commercial Utilities (CUs), one can only conclude that

Planning Aspects

Some kiosks have been poorly localised (in areas where there are many open wells or in low population density areas) and as a result have few customers.

The population of the compound has not received sufficient sensitisation concerning the advantages of treated water and many households continue to use untreated water from open wells.

The RDC responsible for the management of the scheme has received insufficient training and lacks the basic financial and commercial management skills.

There are no clear and transparent management and financial accounting rules and procedures.

Vendors do not receive any training and in most cases do not understand the role of the meter and the meter reading process.

The set of criteria used to recruit vendors (they have to pay a deposit of ZMK50.000.-, be a resident of Kapisha. and at least 18 years of age) is not sufficient as it does not include criteria concerning educational levels.

vendors have to follow certain rules and regulations but without having signed a contract. In other words all rules, regulations and guidelines are verbal.

Management Aspects

The RDC has proved unable to manage the vendors and to replace vendors who fail to follow the rules and regulations. This is to some extent due to the fact that RDC members have managed to appoint their relatives as vendors.

Some residents consider kiosk water to be too expensive (ZMK20.-/20 litres). Many vendors do not follow the rules and regulations. For example. Many vendors

do not respect the agreed-upon opening hours (06.00hrs – 18.00hrs). This is mainly due to the fact that most kiosks have few customers and vendors have to develop other income generating activities in order to make ends meet.

Many vendors are often replaced by their children or other relatives. Many vendors are dishonest and only remit part of the cash they have collected. The Company is not informed about the replacement of vendors by the RDC. The Company has no control over the vendors and simply has to accept the fact that

many vendors do not deposit all the cash they collect. The RDC controls the interface between the Company and the vendor as well as

between the Company and the community. The Company and the Council do not have any grip on the management of the system.

There is no accountability; vendors deposit whatever sums the feel like and the same can be said about the RDC. Although the MWSC carries out the monthly meter readings, the meter readings are not used to oblige vendors to deposit the cash they collect.

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the current tariffs to not allow most service providers to achieve their financial and commercial objectives. According to the Urban and Peri-Urban Water supply and Sanitation Sector Report 2003/2004 (NWASCO 2005: 31-2), all the CUs are operating at a loss and none of them has proved to be able to cover operational costs through collection.

10.6 Rendering the Kiosk System More Flexible There are ways to improve vendor incomes or to render a kiosk system more flexible. In Kitwe, Monze, Chipata and North-Western Province kiosks are in fact small shops equipped with shelves and a sales window (see picture 10.1). Vendors are

The RDC is unable to prevent the increase in the number of illegal connections.

Technical Aspects

Water pressure is too low in the higher parts of the compound. This results in unreliable meter readings due to frequent airflows.

Although the RDC has to reserve funds for necessary maintenance and repair (M&R) works, it hardly ever organises any M&R works. Although M&R is the responsibility of the RDC in most cases the MWSC is asked to solve all major and minor technical problems.

Due to the deteriorating technical state of the scheme unaccounted for water is increasing. Part of the distribution network has been damaged as a result of the construction of roads and drains (within the framework of the PUSH programme).

Gate valves were made of low quality materials and many are defective. If repair work has to be carried out the whole scheme has to be shut down.

The plumbers of the MWSC lack a toolbox and the required spares.

Explanations Offered by the Peri-Urban Unit of the MWSC

The members of the Peri-Urban Unit explained the occurrence and persistence of the weaknesses of the Kapisha Scheme as follows:

“There was no Peri-Urban Unit within our Company, people had different responsibilities and as a result peri-urban water supply was not a priority.”

“We have inherited the scheme. Too much responsibility was given to the RDC, they could not handle it and now it is too late to make significant changes. The RDC has been given too many responsibilities without having received the necessary training. There are no transparent financial accounting/management measures and procedures and the RDC is not being monitored and controlled by an outsider such as the Council or the MWSC. ”

“The problem is that we as a Company have allowed a bad situation to continue without interfering. The situation with regard to Kapisha has deteriorated also because there has been no follow up from our side.”

“There has been a lack of sensitisation within the Company. Few people know about the Kapisha scheme and about peri-urban water supply. This contributes to the fact that peri-urban water supply is not considered to be very important.”

“Stakeholders – the community, the RDC, the Council and the Company – have never worked as partners. For example, the Council does not give enough guidance to the RDC.”

“There are too many internal conflicts within the RDC. All conflicts seem to be money related. NGOs have entered the area and the RDC is involved in different programmes. This brings them in contact with money and that’s when the problems begin. That’s when you get tensions and changes. In Kapisha there is a Water Committee, but that committee is not very active because the RDC is in control of everything.”

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encouraged to sell other goods (groceries) in addition to water. The contract which vendors sign with the service provider, specifies the products which, for public health reasons, cannot be sold at the kiosk (insecticides, meat, prepared foodstuffs, etc.).

Another way of rendering a kiosk system more flexible is by adapting business hours to clientele. If a kiosk has relatively few customers, it only has to stay open long enough to serve these customers. Reducing opening hours has a positive impact upon vendor motivation as it allows them to spend the extra free time on other activities, including income generating activities.

Picture 10.1: Selling water and groceries at the Monze kiosks

10.7 Vendor Incomes and Cross Subsidies The Chipata Water and Sewerage Company and a number of service providers outside Zambia have adopted a different approach. Water vendors, in addition to their commission, receive a fixed monthly amount, a kind of basic security payment.46

46 Also in Chipata vendors are allowed to sell groceries at their kiosk.

A MWSC cashier was assigned to collect cash from the RDC on a regular basis. According to a MWSC staff member: “The system worked quite well but there were logistical problems. Then it stopped and since then no money has been collected from the RDC.”

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If we assume that the kiosk tariff allows the service provider to cover its operational costs, the fixed amount given to vendor should be covered through a system of cross subsidies through block tariffs. In other words, households with domestic connections that consume large quantities of water pay the fixed amounts given to the vendors. Such an approach is not always feasible. Chipata has a good clientele mix but in North-Western Province, the proportion of commercial connections and the proportion of customers with high incomes residing in high-cost areas with indoor plumbing are probably too low to allow for the introduction of such a payment system.

11 Should the Poor Pay More?

11.1 LWSC and Peri-Urban Water SupplyIn many peri-urban areas of Lusaka, where water is supplied by other providers (not the LWSC), peri-urban residents currently pay ZMK 33, ZMK 50 or even ZMK 100 for a single full 20-litre container. In other words, a tariff of ZMK 1,375/m3, ZMK 2,083/m3

or ZMK 4,167/m3!! This means that many urban poor pay 2.3, 3.5 or even 7 times more than the new social tariff the LWSC intends to introduce in June 2005 (0 – 6 m 3: ZMK 600/m3, the current tariff is ZMK 400/m3).

In the peri-urban areas where the LWSC is responsible for water supply residents pay ZMK 3,500 per month47, which allows them to fetch 6m3 (ZMK 583/m3). This amounts to ZMK 14 for a full container of 20 litres. It is doubtful, whether with such a low tariff the LWSC is able to cover the operation costs of peri-urban water supply.

This tariff is considerably lower than the amount peri-urban residents are willing and able to pay for treated water. The study on the willingness and ability to pay (see Consumer Assessment for Water and Sanitation in Lusaka, Part I) shows that that a tariff of ZMK 33/20-litre container is acceptable, because the per capita consumption levels are relatively low.

11.2 The Regulator and the Solidarity Principle: Making Peri-Urban Water Supply Unattractive

In many African cities and towns, the residents of informal settlements pay more, much more than residents with a house connection, although they receive water from the same service provider.

The question is, however, whether form a social perspective it is acceptable to ask the poorest residents of Lusaka to pay more for a basic need than the more affluent residents of Lusaka? Can the higher tariff at the kiosk be justified, as some experts do, by referring to low per capita consumption leveIs? Is it necessary that the peri-urban poor pay more? Is the social objective of peri-urban water supply compatible with the financial and commercial objectives of the service provider?

The Consultant believes it is good that LWSC has introduced a solidarity principle in the sense that its peri-urban customers do not pay more than the social tariff. The

47 ZMK 3,500 after the first of June 2005.

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only disadvantage of the current situation is that with the current tariffs and given the current operational problems, the LWSC is only able to cover approximately 76% of its operational costs (operation and maintenance, see Sector Report 2003/2004: page 31). In other words, LWSC is making a loss.

Moreover, low tariffs in combination with a solidarity principle (the poor should not pay more) have a negative impact upon the image of peri-urban water supply. This, to some extent, explains why the private sector is reluctant to become responsible for peri-urban water supply which is regarded as an unsustainable (loss making) venture. The peri-urban areas are seen as a commercial minefield for the entrepreneur and the domain of NGOs which tend to emphasise social WS objectives and do not have to base their operations on commercial principles. This assumption is incorrect. Incorrect because the tariffs asked by the Water Trusts in Lusaka allow these organisations to meet their financial objectives.48 Incorrect, also because the current low tariff does not reflect the ability and willingness of peri-urban residents to pay for water.

It is rather remarkable that one has to conclude that the schemes established by CARE International in a large number of peri-urban areas, which are run by small professional community based organisations, have been able to introduce commercial tariffs, whereas there is a tendency among the private sector and the World Bank to turn away from peri-urban water supply. There is no reason, however, why commercial utilities (CUs) should not be able to run peri-urban water schemes in a sustainable way. Several examples from within (Chipata) and outside (Burkina Faso) Zambia show that it is possible to establish successful kiosk schemes that are able to cover their costs.

It is understood that the LWSC and the other CUs will need at least 5 years before they will be able (and allowed by the Regulator?) to introduce tariffs which allow for full cost recovery. Meanwhile it is important to take notice that in the peri-urban areas residents are willing and able to pay - and are paying - high tariffs. Tariffs which should be able to motivate any service provider, including the private sector, to invest in and operate peri-urban water schemes.

One explanation that could serve to defend the position of the private sector is that Water Trusts, unlike the CUs, are not restricted by the solidarity principle a licensed service provider has to observe. The regulator, NWASCO, would probably object to a kiosk tariff which exceeds the social tariff. iv

Indeed some of the Zambian CUs (NWWSSC for example) complain that the discourse concerning water tariffs is dominated by political considerations - resulting in the adoption of the solidarity principle - and upon unfounded assumptions regarding the peri-urban populations. Data on the willingness and ability of peri-urban residents to pay for water, the priorities of peri-urban residents (security of access) and the commercial objectives of the CU are not taken into account.

To answer the question presented in the title of this paragraph: No, the poor should not necessarily pay more, but they should be allowed to pay what they are able and willing to pay. The urban poor should not become the victim of a solidarity principle, which sounds good in a (pro-poor) political or policy discourse, but which tends to

48 It is a serious shortcoming of the NWASCO Sector Report that it does not include the performances of these Water Trusts. Although they are not licensed, it would be good for the sector to have a detailed understanding of their performance.

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turn peri-urban water supply into an unattractive loss-making enterprise. The problem is often not the sustainability of the kiosk system itself - caused by the inability or unwillingness of residents to pay a cost recovering tariff - but a solidarity principle which links the kiosk tariff to the tariffs paid by the other customer categories. The domestic tariff is often influenced by the willingness of domestic consumers to pay for water. The resulting low kiosk tariff in most cases results in extremely low vendor incomes. Low vendor incomes are the main cause of low kiosk system collection efficiencies.

Adopting a pro-poor solidarity principle can result in unsustainable systems and sustainability is a major concern of many peri-urban residents. When in 2003 the Southern Water and Sewerage Company (SWSC) and GKW Consult introduced the

iv The National Water and Sanitation Council, NWASCO was established on October 8, 2000. NWASCO is the regulatory body set up by Parliament to oversee operations of the commercialised water and sanitation sector in Zambia. The launching of this regulatory institution is one of the final actions, which paves way for the operations of the Commercial Water utilities.

NWASCO is responsible for advising the government on water and sanitation issues as well as issuing operating licences to all water providers in the country. Other responsibilities will include the provision of technical and financial guidelines for water providers as well as setting guidelines for tariffs.

The main mission of NWASCO is to regulate the services of the providers and the assets development in the water and the sanitation sector in urban areas focusing specifically on the:

Protection of the consumers; Enforcement of standards (efficiency, effectiveness, level of service, investments); Promotion of market competition.

The functions of NWASCO are to:

Advise government and local authorities on all issues affecting water and sanitation; License providers (local government, Cu's, Management contract holders and asset

holding companies) including new actors on institutional changes as well as other activities relating to the provision of water;

Issue guidelines, requirement and standards.

NWASCO can direct any provider to:

Enable the Government to comply with international agreements comply with Act; Provide information for purpose of monitoring its performance.

NWASCO can enforce measures through:

License process (issuing, refusal, transfer, amendment, suspension) Tariff negotiations/ setting; Enforcement notices; Penalties.

(Source: NWASCO Website: http://www.zambia-water.org.zm/nwasco.htm, and http://www.zambia-water.org.zm/nwasco_is_here.htm).

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http://www.zambia-water.org.zm/nwasco_is_here.htm

http://www.zambia-water.org.zm/nwasco.htm

kiosk water tariff in the peri-urban areas of Monze (ZMK 18/20-litre container = ZMK 900/m3, which was higher than the lowest domestic tariff of ZMK 700/m3), peri-urban residents expressed their doubts during a number of public meetings, emphasising that with such a tariff the kiosk system would not be sustainable. Some residents argued that “things” given free of charge or services offered for a low price often ended up being white elephants. We believe this conclusion is correct. In Solwezi North-Western Province the Consultant was told by residents that ZMK 20 for 20 litres of water was “nothing” (one man explained: “If a child finds a 20 Kwacha note he does not even pick it up”) and that with such a low tariff the kiosks would not last.

11.3 Potential Revenue from the Peri-Urban Areas Table 11.1 shows the potential revenue that could be realised in the peri-urban areas of Lusaka for a number of daily per capita consumptions and retail tariffs. It is assumed that the total number of kiosk customers and potential kiosk customers in peri-urban Lusaka is 650,000.

Table 11.1 shows clearly that the peri-urban areas of Lusaka do represent an important market for treated water. If we take a tariff of ZMK 33 for a full 20-litre container and a per capita consumption of 20 litres per capita per day, the peri-urban areas would account for 16% of total billing.49 A per capita consumption of 24 litres and a tariff of ZMK 33/full 20-litre container would account for 19% of total billing. If vendor commissions are put at 33% of the retail price, the picture changes somewhat. Than a tariff of ZMK 33 for a full 20-litre container and a per capita consumption of 20 litres per capita per day the peri-urban areas would account for 12% of total billing.

Table 11.1: Potential revenue

Per capita consumption Potential gross revenue (ZMK per month)(1)

Kiosk tariff: ZMK 20 Kiosk Tariff: ZMK 33 Kiosk tariff: ZMK 505 l/c/d 81,250,000 134,062,500 203,125,000

7 l/c/d 113,750.000 187,687,500 284,375,000

10 l/c/d 162,500,000 268,125,000 406,250,000

15 l/c/d 243,750,000 402,187,500 609,375,000

20 l/c/d 325,000,000 536,250,000 812,500,000

25 l/c/d 406,250,000 670,312,500 1,015,625,000

1): Assuming a total number of kiosk consumers in Lusaka of 650,000.

49 The “total billing” of the LWSC was ZMK 32,739,000,000. This amounts to an average of ZMK 2,728,250,000/month (see the: “Urban and Peri-Urban Water Supply and Sanitation Sector Report 2003/2004, NWASCO: page 24, table 4).

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11.4 Victims of a Short-Sighted Political Debate One more we would like to raise the question: Why are kiosk tariffs too low? In paragraph 11.2 we emphasise that the debate concerning the tariff is not taking place on the basis of commercial viability indicators nor on the basis of existing willingness and ability to pay data. No, the tariff debate is in fact a political discourse which mainly takes place in the workshop arena, a discourse which is dominated by short-terms political gains and not by a concern for the long-term sustainability of peri-urban water supply. The political discourse is dominated by individuals and stakeholders who often know little or nothing about the peri-urban areas and who base their opinions and statements upon a set of unsubstantiated assumptions and misconceptions. Common assumptions are that peri-urban residents are all poor and not able and willing to pay for water, also because they consider water to be a gift from God. Another assumption is that peri-urban residents consume 10 or 20 litres of treated water a day and if they don’t, this irrational behaviour is due to the fact that they are not aware of the health risks. It is also assumed that residents will abandon their yard wells as soon as they have access to piped water.

The political debate, therefore, is not taking place on the basis of a thorough knowledge on the peri-urban areas and their populations, nor on the basis of more scientific arguments (studies, measurements) but on assumptions which, because they are continuously repeated in the workshop arena, tend to be seen as true facts.

The outcome of this discourse is often that influential politicians or residents of high-cost areas manage to keep the water tariff low (one way of putting pressure on the service provider is by threatening to drill a borehole in case of a tariff increase). Subsequently a pro-poor solidarity principle is adopted, mainly under pressure of the Regulator NWASCO: peri-urban residents should pay the social (lifeline) tariff and should not pay more than residents of the high-cost areas. The resulting kiosk tariff leads to low vendor incomes and low service provider revenues. As a result peri-urban water supply is regarded as an unsustainable activity which better left to NGOs. The same NGOs, however, as they are not restricted by a license, have shown that they are able to operate their schemes on a commercial basis, charging tariffs which are more adapted to the willingness and ability of residents to pay for treated water.

On has to conclude, therefore, that water vendors and residents of non-supplied or poorly supplied areas that lie within the service area of a licensed service provider, who are wiling and able to pay, can become the victims of a rather short-sighted political debate, notwithstanding the fact that they are able and willing to work and able and willing to pay.

11.5 The Pro-Poor Discourse and the Willingness and Ability to Pay The assumption that commercial objectives of the kiosk system on the one hand and the social objectives (making water accessible as far as distance price and quality is concerned) are incompatible is wrong if one considers the willingness and ability of peri-urban residents to pay for water, or the informal tariffs which many residents already pay. The source of the apparent incompatibility is the pro-poor discourse and policies of the service providers, the Regulator and the donors.

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The idea that peri-urban water supply, that kiosks are unsustainable should, therefore, be seen as the outcome of 2 factors, the inability of the providers to introduce commercial tariffs and the adoption of a pro-poor approach, which links kiosk tariffs to the tariffs paid by other customers categories. The un-sustainability of peri-urban water supply and low-vendor incomes, therefore, can sometimes be attributed to political pressure which was exerted to defend the interest of the more affluent residents.

Implementing a pro-poor tariff policy means that the poor can consume clean drinking water. Access means that clean drinking water is available and affordable, in the short-term and in the longer-term. In other words, tariffs should allow for cost recovery (see also: Sharing the Experience on Regulation in the Water Sector, GTZ, April 2004: 10-3).

12 Concluding Remarks: Who should be Responsible for Peri-Urban Water Supply?

12.1 Lazy Entrepreneurs and Assumptions about Peri-Urban Water SupplyIt is often assumed that the various objectives of water supply for the peri-urban and informal parts of town are not compatible. Some experts believe that commercial service providers should only deal with customers which allow them to achieve their commercial objectives, whereas the informal settlements should be covered by organisations whose culture and principles are more adapted to an approach which puts priority on the social objectives. Peri-urban water supply, therefore should not be the responsibility of a commercial provider or a private operator but be regarded as the target areas for national and international NGOs.

Workshops focussing on pro-poor water supply and PSP hardly ever consider the fact that low-collection efficiencies and the poor commercial performance of kiosk systems can be caused by poor planning guided by social objectives and not on commercial considerations, lack of entrepreneurial skills and innovativeness and a corporate culture which orients itself towards the large domestic and commercial consumers. These customers are considered to be manageable because they are willing and able to pay their bills. Discussions with the management of several Zambian providers also revealed that shared educational and cultural backgrounds to some extent explain why providers focus their efforts upon the wealthier customers and why the lower urban socio-economic strata are being neglected.

This neglect does not only affect the informal and illegal settlements but also the poorer planned areas. Zambian providers such as the Lusaka Water and Sewerage Company (Zambia) have proved to be unable to manage their customers residing in the low-cost areas. In Lusaka, many low-cost residents do not pay for the water they receive and others only pay a flat rate. Lusaka has an estimated population of 1.2 – 1.5 million50, but the LWSC has less than 39,000 customers, although the company supplies a large percentage of the total population. The LWSC has a Peri-Urban Unit, but its interventions do not reflect a commitment of LWSC management to really

50 Source: Central Statistical Office (CSO), 2002

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improve service levels and collection efficiencies in the peri-urban areas through the introduction of creative and sustainable water supply solutions.

12.2 The Role of NGOs: Lessons LearnedThe question remains whether peri-urban water supply should be left to NGOs, simply because peri-urban water supply is not attractive from a financial and commercial perspective? In the case of Zambia, such a decision would mean that the responsibility to supply water to peri-urban areas, is transferred from a licensed commercial utility, which is forced by the Regulator, to charge low tariffs, to an unlicensed provider, an NGO or a community managed water trust, which is allowed to charge a commercial tariff.

Instead of creating a situation which may result in the proliferation of small community-managed schemes or water trusts within an urban centre, residents, including peri-urban residents, should be able to benefit from the technical expertise and the economies of scale, a single commercial provider can offer.

What we can learn from the CARE International schemes in Lusaka is that it is essential to introduce retail water tariffs that allow for the sustainability of the scheme and for acceptable vendor incomes. The other lesson we must learn from the Lusaka trusts is that it is crucial to establish a continuous presence in the peri-urban areas, which is more than having a peri-urban unit at the head office, and that it is important to involve the community in the planning of peri-urban water supply and to build local capacities.

The lesson we have to learn from the community-managed schemes in Burton and ZECCO, Livingstone (established by CARE International) and in Kapisha, Chingola is that allowing RDCs to manage community water schemes can be disastrous when RDC members can decide to use revenue to satisfy their personal needs instead of assuring the continuity of the scheme. Both water schemes, which are characterised by a high kiosk/population ratio, also show that planning of kiosk-based schemes should be based upon a thorough knowledge of local potential water demand instead of upon unfounded norms and recommendations.

Customers who reside within the service area of a licensed provider should not have to depend upon the support provided by NGOs nor upon the capacity to manage water schemes.51 In the formal residential areas residents rely upon the product and services of a professional and specialised organisation and there is no reason why residents of legalised peri-urban areas should be denied this right.

The Regulator should, by imposing low tariffs which do not reflect the willingness and ability of customers to pay, nor the financial requirements of the provider, turn peri-urban water supply into an unattractive and unsustainable activity.

Commercial utilities and the private sector should not shun the peri-urban areas simply because they assume there is no market, no significant demand for treated water. They should not avoid the peri-urban areas because they wrongly assume that these areas are too complex too informal and only inhabited by urban poor who cannot afford to pay for water. Instead of focussing upon their traditional customers, relatively easy targets, they should show some entrepreneurial spirit and develop

51 Water schemes supplied through their own boreholes or that depend upon the bulk purchase of water produced by a service provider.

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workable peri-urban water supply concepts. If NGOs can turn peri-urban water supply into a sustainable venture why cant’s the private sector, with all its expertise, do the same.

Donors and institutions such as the World Bank should, when considering private sector participation (PSP) options, provide more (not necessarily financial) support to CUs that have concrete plans to extend their services into the peri-urban areas.

13 Coverage and the MDGs: MLGH Wake Up!

13.1 What Are We Aiming For? Treated water coverage levels as presented in CSO publications or publications that make use of CSO data, are relatively high (85% or more) if compared to other countries in Africa. It is important to know, however, how coverage is defined by CSO. The (household level) questionnaire used to collect data for the Census (including the 2000 Census) contains a question on water and water supply. Households are asked about their main source (piped water inside the housing unit, protected well, communal tap52, etc.) of water supply (see CSO 2000 Census of Population and Housing, Form A – General Characteristics: question H9). Coverage data are based upon this question. This means that coverage levels are based upon the source people use, irrespective of the accessibility of this source: distance, waiting time, price, etc. In other words, many households in the peri-urban and low-cost areas will appear in the category “covered” although their access to treated water is poor and per capita consumption levels insufficient to meet daily household requirements.

The question is whether the definition of “coverage” should reflect the status quo (what is the main source of water) or if should it describe what the Government considers to be adequate water supply. If “coverage” refers to what is considered to be adequate, its definition will incorporate a set of specific norms which reflect the objectives the Government. Norms relating to maximum distance, waiting time, price, etc.

One of the main contributions of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) is that they have given the developing nations a clear set of time bound development targets. Goal 7 of the MDGs concerns the achievement of environmental sustainability. Target 10 of Goal 7 states the main objective for the WSS sector:

“Halve, by 2015, the proportion of people without sustainable access to safe drinking water and basic sanitation”. (MDG Goal No. 7, see also NWASCO/DTF, January 2005: 1).

What is sustainable access to safe drinking water? It is obvious that the CSO coverage percentages do not offer us any indication on sustainability and they are not based upon a clear definition of accessibility. In order to achieve the MDG target, guide and plan WSS interventions and evaluate the existing situation (establish

52 It is remarkable that sources such as “someone else’s connection, kiosk and institutional connection do not appear in the list of sources. The question does not make a distinction between main source of drinking water and main source of water for other usages.

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existing coverage levels), there is need to define concepts like sustainability and access. These definitions can be used to define adequate water supply and coverage.

So far the Ministry of Local Government and Housing has not developed a coverage definition which is adapted to the Zambian WS context and which can and should be used by all stakeholders in the water and sanitation sector. The Consultant believes that the preparation of a coverage definition should follow a sector-wide approach.

Discussions among stakeholders should also focus upon adequate technologies. For example:

Should the hand pump placed on a borehole or well be considered an adequate technology for high density peri-urban area where people depend on pit latrines?

What is the maximum number of customers per kiosk or per kiosk tap?

Sustainability also means that the financial interests of the service provider and the water vendor are taken into account. Sustainability implies, therefore, that the social (distance, price, waiting time, etc.), public health, financial/commercial and technical objectives of a kiosk system are made compatible.

13.2 Urban or Rural: Who knows? Another factor which has an impact upon the CSO coverage data concerns the way in which Census data are being collected. All areas outside the Council Jurisdictional Boundary are considered to be rural areas. In parts of Northern Province, for example, former villages - of which the land tenure is under Customary Law which means that the security of tenure is assumed by the Chief - have developed into peri-urban areas that are “attached” to, or even part of, a nearby town. The new peri-urban areas, however, are classified as “rural”. Classified as rural in spite of the fact that these areas may have all the urban characteristics (e.g. high population densities).

In other words, if one compares CSO data on the urban wards with the data collected within the framework of the Baseline Study on Peri-urban and Low-cost Water Supply and Sanitation (NWASCO 2005), the CSO urban population figures are considerably lower. This is explained by the fact that the Baseline Study considers – and collects data on – all low-cost and peri-urban settlements, irrespective of their legal status and location with regard to the Council Jurisdictional Boundary. This is necessary since the adequacy of water supply and sanitation technologies is determined by population density.

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Glossary, List of Abbreviations, Exchange Rates and Bibliography

GlossaryBush Facility: Some respondents mentioned that they use a bush facility if they

do not have a toilet or access to a toilet and therefore use a nearby bushy area.

Communal tap: Water outlet which is managed by a user group which is responsible for operation, cleaning and the payment of the water bill. Access is restricted to the user group.

Dambo: A treeless, grassy and often swampy plain bordering seasonal or perennial water courses.

Kavela: The use of plastic bags for defecation purposes. These bags are later thrown away in a drain, along the road or on someone’s roof.

Kiosk: Etymology: Turkish word of Persian origin.

Encyclopaedia Britannica: 1 : an open summerhouse or pavilion

2 : a small structure with one or more open sides that is used to vend merchandise (as newspapers) or services (as film developing)

Water kiosk: water outlet (open or roofed) where water is sold on behalf of a service provider. The kiosk is operated by a water vendor. Access is not restricted. Sometimes vendors are allowed to sell other goods from their kiosk.

Low-cost area: A planned residential area. Most low-cost areas were built just before or after Independence (October 1964). They were planned as housing areas for junior Council staff (messengers, etc.), government workers and miners. Houses or yards are usually connected to the water distribution network and to the sewer line. In most cases the water supply and sanitation infrastructure is in a poor state of repair and often not functioning.

Peri-urban area: An initially unplanned informal or formal settlement within the area of jurisdiction of a local authority. Most peri-urban areas in Zambia are found on the outskirts of municipalities and cities. These areas are now referred to as peri-urban areas in preference to the earlier terms of “squatter” or “shanty” compounds. Many peri-urban areas are characterised by a high incidence of poverty, high population densities, their unplanned appearance and inadequate or non-existent basic services (such as water supply, sewerage, roads, storm water drainage and solid waste disposal). According to the Peri-Urban Water Supply and Sanitation Strategy (1999, see bibliography) the lack of

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adequate or no basic services provided by the municipality tends to make “the living environment essentially unhealthy.” (Peri-Urban Water Supply and Sanitation Strategy, 2000: v)

Public stand post: Water outlet where water can be fetched free of charge.

List of AbbreviationsCBO: Community-based organisationCBH: Central Board of HealthCBO: Community-based organisationCSO: Central Statistical Office (Zambia)CU: Commercial (water and sewerage) Utility DFID: Department for International Development (United Kingdom)GKW Consult: Gesellschaft für Kläranlagen und WasserversorgungGRZ: Government of the Republic of ZambiaIDA: International Development AssociationJCTR: Jesuit Centre for Theological ReflectionKfW: Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau (German Bank of Reconstruction)KTMB: Kanyama Trust Management Board LA: Local AuthorityLWSC: Lusaka Water and Sewerage CompanyMDGs : Millennium Development Goals MINERENA: Ministère de ‘Energie et des Ressources Naturelles (Rwanda)MINITRAP: Ministère des Travaux Publics (Rwanda)MLGH: Ministry of Local Government and Housing (Zambia)MWSC: Mulonga Water and Sewerage CompanyNGO: Non-governmental organisationNHC: Neighbourhood Health CommitteeNWASCO: National Water Supply and Sanitation CouncilNWSC: National Water and Sewerage Corporation (Uganda) NWSC: Nkana Water and Sewerage Company (Zambia) NWWSC: North-Western Water and Sewerage CompanyONEA: Office National de l’Eau et de l’AssainissementPDC: Parish Development Committee (Uganda)PSP: Private sector participationPSP: Public stand postPUSH: Programme Urban Self Help RDC: Residents Development CommitteeSWSC: Southern Water and Sewerage Company

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TSh: Tanzanian ShillingUSh: Ugandan Shilling VIP: Ventilated improved pit latrinesWHO: World Health Organisation WS: Water supplyWSRP: Water Sector Reform ProjectWSS: Water supply and sanitation ZMK: Zambian KwachaZBS: Zambia Bureau of StandardsZNBC: Zambia National Broadcasting Corporation

Exchange RatesUS $ 1 = ZMK 4,800.

US $ 1 = USh 1,725

US $ 1 = TSh

US $ 1 = € 0.78

Bibliography Key article:

KfW (2004) Strategieentwicklung und Weiterentwicklung des FZ-Instrumentariums im Bereich der Siedlungswasserwirtschaft zur verstärkten Ausrichtung auf die Millennium Development Goals, Wasserversorgung über Zapfstellen: Relevante Aspekte für die Versorgung armer Bevölkerungsgruppen” (27-10-2004), KfW Entwicklungsbank, Frankfurt, Germany. ___________Aymar, R. (September 2004) Ability and Willingness to Pay Study, NWWSSC (Draft), prepared for NWWSSC, GTZ/RODECO), Solwezi, Zambia

Bajracharya, D. and Deverill, P. (2001) NEWAH: Developing a poverty focused, demand responsive approach. Proceedings of the 27th WEDC Conference, Lusaka, Zambia, 2001, WEDC, pp 33-36.

Banda, T.I. (1996) Integrating commercialisation and community participation in peri-urban areas: The Lusaka Challenge, Lusaka Water and Sewerage Company.

BMZ (1984) Sector Paper Water Supply, Bonn, Federal Republic of Germany (no author)

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Bolt, E., Schouten, T. and Moriarty, P. (2001) From Systems to Service: scaling Up Community Management, In: Proceedings of the 27th WEDC Conference, Lusaka, Zambia, 2001, WEDC, pp 61-63.

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Chanda, O.M. (2001), Regulating the water and sanitation sector: serving the poor (pages 80-81). In: People and Systems for Water, Sanitation and Health, Pre-prints of the 27th WEDC Conference, Lusaka, Zambia, 2001, WEDC, pp 80-81.

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Deverill, P., Bibby, S., Wedgwood, A., and Smout, I. (2001) Designing Water Supply and Sanitation Projects to Meet Demand – Interim Report, WEDC, March 2001.

Deverill, P. and Smout, I (2000) Designing to Meet Demand: Putting users first. In Pickford, J. (ed.) Water, Sanitation and Hygiene: Proceedings of the 26 th WEDC Conference, Dhaka, Bangladesh, 2000 WEDC, pp 326-328.

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Kelly, K. and Muludyang, L. (2001) The challenges of community managed development, In: People and Systems for Water, Sanitation and Health, Pre-prints of the 27th WEDC Conference, Lusaka, Zambia, 2001, WEDC, pp 152-4.

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Long, N. (ed.) (1989) Encounters at the Interface: A Perspective on Social Discontinui-ties in Rural Development, Wageningen: The Agricultural University.

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Endnotes

ii

? The old water distribution network and sewer lines are found in the service lanes behind the houses and ablution blocks, whereas the new kiosk dedicated network was laid along the streets in front of the houses.

The old water distribution and the sewerage systems, which were built during the colonial era, have numerous leaks and as the sewer line (at a depth of 1.50 metres) runs parallel to the water distribution network at a depth of 90 centimetres) the water risks being polluted by sewer. The last few years Maiteneke has known long periods during which it did not receive any water. According to the service provider (Mulonga Water and Sewerage Company = MWSC), water supply problems started in 1990. According to a female resident of Maiteneke:

“Water stopped coming to our compound in the year 2000. That’s when a lot of people here started digging wells. People use the water from their wells even for drinking because water from the pipe is not safe. We just add Clorin to the water from our well.”

Private wells were and still are used by a large number of other households. Well water was also used to unblock the toilets and to keep the sewer flowing.

Only in January 2003, after the Company increased the pressure, water supply, became more reliable. Especially the lower parts of the area benefited from this measure. Many households, however, continued to fetch water from open wells and many respondents told the Taskforce they did not drink the water supplied by MWSC, as it was contaminated by sewer. Many residents considered the water supply situation to be a serious health hazard.

At the time of the data collection exercise almost all taps and toilets found within the water and sanitation blocks were not functioning. Water supply within the compound was secured through a large number of hosepipes and “informal” connections, which have been mounted (illegally) on the distribution network. Pools surround many of these “connections” and in fact water wastage was seen as a serious problem by residents. Paradoxically many residents interviewed by the Taskforce complained about water shortages and the poor water quality.

The sewer system, surprisingly enough, was still functioning. Households used water from their wells or fetched from one of the taps or hosepipes to flush their toilets. Although the system was often blocked and although most residents only flushed their toilets one or two times a day, residents did not complain much about the state of the sewer system, water seemed to be their priority, also because water was needed to keep the sewer functioning.

Maiteneke had and still has 839 occupied plots but this no longer offers an indication concerning the size of the population of the area as in recent years many house owners have constructed small houses and cabins within their plots to accommodate relatives or lodgers. In other words, although Maiteneke is in fact a low-cost residential area it is gradually acquiring some peri-urban characteristics.

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The MWSC had suspended all billing with the exception with the first two lines of houses. According to the MWSC, the old water distribution network had to be replaced by a new one in order to supply safe water to the planned kiosks. The old system would have to be disconnected.

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