Warning decision making – Austria 2003 A successful integrated convective warning system: Workshop...

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Warning decision making – Austria 2003 A successful integrated convective warning system: Workshop in Österreich – The integrated warning system 20-23 Workshop in Österreich – The integrated warning system 20-23 May 2003 May 2003 Presented by Jim LaDue Warning Decision Training Branch Norman, Oklahoma
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Transcript of Warning decision making – Austria 2003 A successful integrated convective warning system: Workshop...

Warning decision making – Austria 2003

A successful integrated convective warning system:

A successful integrated convective warning system:

Workshop in Österreich – The integrated warning system Workshop in Österreich – The integrated warning system 20-23 May 2003 20-23 May 2003

Presented by

Jim LaDue

Warning Decision Training Branch

Norman, Oklahoma

Warning decision making – Austria 2003

ObjectiveObjective

To share our experiences with what makes an effective warning system

Warning decision making – Austria 2003

An integrated warning systemAn integrated warning system1. A research program for science, technology, human factors

2. Rapidly updating stream of information about storms and their environment from radar, satellite, point observations, model information, and spotters

3. An office with an effective warning operations plan to help forecasters maintain situational awareness

4. Knowledgeable forecasters in the science, technology and human factors recognize the threats and issue timely watches, warnings and updates

5. Multiple and redundant methods of communicating warnings to the media, emergency preparedness community and the general public

6. A public knowledgeable in using the watches and warnings to protect life and property

7. Post-mortem on events to review mistakes

Warning decision making – Austria 2003

OverviewOverview1. Intro to the warning program

I. Pre-event products

II. Warnings and statements

2. The information flow

I. Radar, spotters, environment

3. Situational awareness

4. Warning Operations – maximizing SA

I. Office strategies

II. Individual storm assessment strategies

5. Maintaining proficiency

I. training

II. Learning from past mistakes

Warning decision making – Austria 2003

Pre-event awarenessPre-event awareness

The Storm Prediction Center (SPC) issues

outlooks from 1 to 3 days before the event

The Norman Weather Forecast Office translates the SPC products to enhance public awareness of the risks

Warning decision making – Austria 2003

An example SPC outlookAn example SPC outlook

50 kt

50 kt

70 kt

LShort wavetrough

MDT risk

These outlooks are intended for

forecasters

-9 hr -6 hr -3 hr -0 hr +3hr

Warning decision making – Austria 2003

An example WFO hazardous weather outlook

An example WFO hazardous weather outlook

THUNDERSTORM OUTLOOK

NATIONAL WEATHER SERVICE NORMAN OK

1230 PM CDT MON MAY 3 1999

THERE IS A MODERATE RISK OF SEVERE THUNDERSTORMS OVER THE WESTERN HALF OF OKLAHOMA AND WESTERN NORTH TEXAS LATER THIS AFTERNOON THROUGH TONIGHT. THE RISK AREA IS EAST OF A HOLLIS TO BUFFALO LINE AND WEST OF U.S.HIGHWAY 177. AREAS OF CENTRAL AND SOUTHEAST OKLAHOMA EAST OF HIGHWAY 177 ARE IN A SLIGHT RISK.

DISCUSSION... (stuff deleted)

WIND SHEAR IN THE ATMOSPHERE IS EXPECTED TO BE FAVORABLE FOR STORM ORGANIZATION AND SOME SUPERCELL THUNDERSTORMS ARE LIKELY. ALTHOUGH HAIL AND DAMAGING WINDS ARE THE MAIN SEVERE WEATHER THREATS...THE COMBINATION OF MODERATE INSTABILITY AND MODERATELY STRONG WIND FIELDS SUGGEST THAT ISOLATED TORNADOES ARE ALSO POSSIBLE INTO THE MID-EVENING. AS THE THUNDERSTORMS ORGANIZE INTO A SQUALL LINE LATER THIS EVENING...THE MAIN SEVERE THREATS WILL BE HAIL AND STRONG WINDS.

EMERGENCY MANAGERS AND SPOTTER GROUPS ACROSS CENTRAL AND WESTERN OKLAHOMA AND WESTERN NORTH TEXAS SHOULD BE PREPARED FOR POSSIBLE ACTIVATION LATER THIS AFTERNOON AND THROUGH THE EVENING.

Location of the moderate risk in

Norman’s area

Weather discussion

Call to action

Warning decision making – Austria 2003

Local offices disseminate which counties are included in the watch

Spotters are activated

SPC watch – Threat imminentSPC watch – Threat imminent

Issued before storms mature

Valid for 6 hrs

-9 hr -6 hr -3 hr -0 hr +3hr

Warning decision making – Austria 2003

Warning OperationsWarning Operations

-9 hr -6 hr -3 hr -0 hr +3hr

•Severe Tstm•>2cm hail•>25 m/s•Valid 1 hr

•Tornado•Radar/spotter indications•Valid <1hr

•Flash flood•Life threatening flood•Spotter reports•Valid >2 hr

Warning decision making – Austria 2003

Warning OperationsWarning Operations

-9 hr -6 hr -3 hr -0 hr +3hr

Warning decision making – Austria 2003

Warning geometryWarning geometry

• The warning is drafted with latitude/longitude vertices

Warning decision making – Austria 2003

Warning geometryWarning geometryBULLETIN - IMMEDIATE BROADCAST REQUESTED

SEVERE THUNDERSTORM WARNING

NATIONAL WEATHER SERVICE NORMAN OK

415 PM CDT MON MAY 3 1999

THE NATIONAL WEATHER SERVICE IN NORMAN HAS ISSUED A

* SEVERE THUNDERSTORM WARNING FOR...

COMANCHE COUNTY IN SOUTHWEST OKLAHOMA

* UNTIL 500 PM CDT

* AT 415 PM CDT...DOPPLER RADAR INDICATED A SEVERE THUNDERSTORM 3 MILES SOUTHWEST OF LAWTON...MOVING NORTHEAST AT 30 MPH.

* LOCATIONS IN THE WARNING INCLUDE CACHE...ELGIN...FLETCHER…FORT ILL...GERONIMO...LAWTON...MEDICINE PARK...MEERS AND STERLING

HAIL UP TO THE SIZE OF QUARTERS AND WIND GUSTS TO AT LEAST 60 MPH ARE LIKELY.

LAT...LON 3454 9868 3447 9842 3454 9817 3485 9810 3483 9862

Warning decision making – Austria 2003

Warning geometryWarning geometry

• Most users refer to the political boundaries for which the warning has been issued

• The body of the warning specify which towns are in the path

• And expected wind and hail size

• All warnings are tone alerted on weather radio

Warning decision making – Austria 2003

Warning geometryWarning geometry• The warning is followed

by severe weather statements describing the progress of the warning

SEVERE WEATHER STATEMENT

NATIONAL WEATHER SERVICE NORMAN OK

421 PM CDT MON MAY 3 1999

AT 420 PM QUARTER SIZE HAIL WAS REPORTED IN LAWTON. A SEVERE THUNDERSTORM WARNING REMAINS IN EFFECT FOR

COMANCHE COUNTY UNTIL 5 PM.LAT...LON 3454 9868 3447 9842 3454 9817 3485 9810 3483 9862

Warning decision making – Austria 2003

Experimental warning productsExperimental warning products

Significant weather advisory or pre-warning

Warning decision making – Austria 2003

Experimental Warning ProductsExperimental Warning ProductsWARNING DECISION UPDATE

NATIONAL WEATHER SERVICE NORMAN OK

345 PM CDT THU MAY 8 2003

THIS WARNING DECISION UPDATE CONCERNS SOUTHWEST AND CENTRAL OKLAHOMA.

NORTHEAST COMANCHE COUNTY STORM IS STRENGTHENING AND POLARIMENTRIC RADAR DATA (ZDR) FROM NSSL SUGGESTS LIQUID WATER ABOVE FREEZING

LEVEL INDICATIVE OF STRENGTHENING UPDRAFT. NOW LOOKING CAREFULLY FOR COLUMN OF HIGH Z (>50 DBZ) BETWEEN 15-30 KFT. THIS MAY BE AN INCIPIENT SUPERCELL.

NOTE: THIS IS AN EXPERIMENTAL PRODUCT MEANT TO INCREASE INFORMATION EXCHANGE ON THE STORM SCALE.

Warning decision making – Austria 2003

Local Storm ReportsLocal Storm Reports

• Required to relay all incoming storm reports immediately

LOCAL STORM REPORT

NATIONAL WEATHER SERVICE NORMAN OK

1025 AM CDT WED MAY 07 2003

TIME (CDT) .....CITY LOCATION.....STATE ...EVENT/REMARKS...

....COUNTY LOCATION....

1040 PM 5 E STRINGTOWN OK .88 INCH HAIL

05/06/03 ATOKA PUBLIC REPORTED HAIL

COVERED THE GROUND.

Warning decision making – Austria 2003

Other Warning operations tasksOther Warning operations tasks• Relay all warnings on the National Warning System (NAWAS)

• All products are related out to spotters via amateur radio networks

• Some offices also relay warnings out via pager services

• Emergency managers in populated areas receive personal phone calls from NWS personel when warnings are issued

• Some offices use instant messaging to describe their thought processes to selected customers

Warning decision making – Austria 2003

Data inputData input

RadarData

(others)

SpotterReports

RadarData

(yours)

ProbingCalls

RadarData

(others)

Model

Guidance

Yea Nay

Radar

(others)

Satellite

UpdatedMesoscaleAnalysis

???

Data

Point soundingsSurface data

Lightning

Warning decision making – Austria 2003

Radar dataRadar data

The most important input tool for short term warnings.

Warning decision making – Austria 2003

Influence of spotter reports on warnings

Influence of spotter reports on warnings

• Warning frequency is strongly correlated to the number of reports

• Therefore, spotters are the second most important input in warning decision making

• Consider this example from St. Louis

• Carroll et al. 2002 - Research Experiences for Undergraduates program at OU

Warning decision making – Austria 2003

St. Louis CWA Population DensitySt. Louis CWA Population Density

People per km2

Warning decision making – Austria 2003

Events per 1,000 km2Events per 1,000 km2

Events per 1,000 km2

Warning decision making – Austria 2003

Warnings per 1,000 km2Warnings per 1,000 km2

Warnings per 1,000 km2

Carroll et al., 2002

Warning decision making – Austria 2003

The Norman WFO amateur radio liaison network

A ham radio operator at the NWS OUN office relays the latest warnings and storm updates out to one of three networks

Dennis McCarthy – KC5EVH

WX5OUN

Warning decision making – Austria 2003

The Norman WFO amateur radio liaison network

Managers of repeater networks coordinate radio traffic between the NWS and local spotter networks, the media and emergency managers.

Example: The Southwest Independent Repeater Association (SWIRA) ismanaged by Terry Mahorney KB5LLI

SWIRA WX5OUN

Warning decision making – Austria 2003

The Norman WFO amateur radio liaison network

Managers of repeater networks coordinate radio traffic between the NWS and local spotter networks, the media and emergency managers.

Example: The Southwest Independent Repeater Association (SWIRA) ismanaged by Terry Mahorney KB5LLI

SWIRA WX5OUN

Warning decision making – Austria 2003

The Norman WFO amateur radio liaison network

146.79 Altus

Chasers receive the NWS update, and may respond back with reports directly to the repeater or to a local spotter group

The local spotter net controller relays spotter reports through the liaison network

SWIRA WX5OUN

Warning decision making – Austria 2003

The Norman WFO amateur radio liaison network

The Norman WFO amateur radio liaison network

146.79 Altus

Media stormchasers and helicopter pilots relay their observations back to their stations.

These reports are fed back to the NWS via TV broadcasts, and by amateur radio.

Other chasers/spotters listen in on these reports too.

WX5OUN

Warning decision making – Austria 2003

The Norman WFO amateur radio liaison network

The Norman WFO amateur radio liaison network

Rick Smith, WCM – NWS OUN

Terry Mahorney KB5LLI SWIRA

Andy Wallace, Lawton KC5GHH Ch 7 Lawton

Charlie Byers SPS EM

Robert Moose 'Moose' Ch4 OKC NBC

Jay Kruckenberg, Woodward

Mike Honigsburg, Garfield CO EM

Putnam Ryder KC5GVD OK state EM office OKC

Gayland Kitch, KC5MMU Moore EM

Brent Myers, WA5NWS, Chillocothe, TX Police

Herb Gunther, Seminole CO EM

Dave Ewoldt

Acknowledged contributors

EM

EM

EM

EM

EM

EM

EM

Warning decision making – Austria 2003

Where media assists the NWSWhere media assists the NWS

Get to the video!

Realtime chaser data from

multiple stations

Warning decision making – Austria 2003

Environmental data inputEnvironmental data input

• Radar cannot adequately observe hail size, downbursts or tornadoes

• Environmental data becomes important in the process

Warning decision making – Austria 2003

04 May 2001 04 June 2001

Pick the storm most likely to be tornadic

Warning decision making – Austria 2003

04 May 200104 May 2001

Warning decision making – Austria 2003

04 June 200104 June 2001

Warning decision making – Austria 2003

Storm Types/Hazards TableStorm Types/Hazards TableDmg winds Hail Tornado FF

Ordinary cell

(0-6km shear <15 m/s)

Steep LL lapse rates

High LCL, dry midlevels, high DCAPE

Intense elevated core

Descending core bottom

Elevated radial convergence

Cold temps aloft

Large buoyancy ~

-20 C

Intense elevated core ~ -20 C and colder

High VIL density, TBSS

No CIN, steep LL lapse rates

Sharp boundary with LL vertical vorticity

Rapidly growing and new CBs

high RH in deep layer; deep warm cloud; small mean wind

Slow storm motion

Large storm core

Super-cell

(0-6km shear > 15 – 20 m/s)

Similar environ as above except for shear and high CAPE & DCAPE, strong 0-1 km shear can assist

In addition to above, LL mesocyclogenesis; developing hook, deep convergence zone

Large buoyancy @-20 C level, strong 0-6 km shear, stg mid- upper SR flow;

WER BWER, intense elevated core,

mesocyclone,

TBSS, high VIL density

Strong 0-1km shear in addition to 0-6 km shear; low LCL; low CIN

LL TVS, meso, inflow notch; sign of a hook, strong LL convergence below mesocyclone;BWER

High RH in deep layer; deep warm cloud; small SR anvil flow

Low supercell motion

Not an LP storm

Multicell

(organized group of

ordinary/supercells)

>40kt 0-6km shear

Strong >30kt 700-500 wind;

Stg leading Gradient;

Bookend vortex pair;

MARC, deep convergence zone, rear inflow notch

Separated cores; cells exposed to favorable environment

Similar to supercells?

Mostly left of rear inflow notches along leading edge of core, front inflow notch with WER and vert vorticity

Slow MBE motion; triple pt anchoring; upwind instability, LL jet, high PW, high mean RH

Intrastorm seeding

Echo training, slow motion

Source: IC 5.7 Student Guide http://wdtb.noaa.gov/DLCourses/dlocFY03/ic57/ic57-0210-2-screen.pdf

Warning decision making – Austria 2003

Lightning data Lightning data

• Cloud to ground lightning sometimes is useful in severe thunderstorm detection

• However, the most severe storms often elevate charging layers resulting in less LTGCG http://www.cira.colostate.edu/ramm/visit/ltgmet2.html

Warning decision making – Austria 2003

Satellite dataSatellite data• Supercells often exhibit a

warm wake downstream of the updraft.

• However, these wakes only occur with isothermal or inversion layers above the equilibrium level

http://www.cira.colostate.edu/ramm/visit/ev.htmlhttp://www.nssl.noaa.gov/istpds/icu624/

Warning decision making – Austria 2003

Overwhelming data input rateOverwhelming data input rate

RadarData

(others)

SpotterReports

RadarData

(yours)

ProbingCalls

RadarData

(others)

Model

Guidance

Yea Nay

Radar

(others)

Satellite

UpdatedMesoscaleAnalysis

???

Data

Point soundingsSurface data

Lightning

Warning decision making – Austria 2003

And excessive workloadAnd excessive workload

• Can lead to lower performance

Stress/Performance

Curve

StressPer

form

ance

Team Building Associates (1997)

Warning decision making – Austria 2003

A more robust look at events could yield valuable associations

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99

Skill – based Errors are:

•Poor technique

•Improper use of equipment

•Omitting required procedures

•Failure to observe critical data

Percentage of Human Error Mishaps Associated with skill-based Errors (FY 91-99)

From analysis of Naval Safety Center accident database

Shappell and Weigman, 2001

Warning decision making – Austria 2003

Aviation industry findingsMechanical errors decreased, human error did not

Cla

ss A

, B,&

C M

isha

ps/1

00,0

00 F

ligh

t Hou

rsC

lass

A, B

,& C

Mis

haps

/100

,000

Fli

ght H

ours

00

22

44

66

88

1010

1212

1414

1616

1977

1977

1979

1979

1981

1981

1983

1983

1985

1985

1987

1987

1989

1989

1991

1991

YearYear

Mechanical

Human

Shappell, S. and Wiegmann, D. (1996). U.S. Naval aviation mishaps 1977-1992 All NAVY/MARINE Class A, B, & C Mishaps

Reason: Much emphasis on relatively easy to see mechanical problems… very little on human factors contribution.

Warning decision making – Austria 2003

OrganizationalFactors

Technology

Science

Latent Conditions Training

Infrastructure, policyCharacteristics•Radar( RF, Dealiasing ,sampling)

Models

Stability of equipment

What we don’t know NSE

Conceptual models

Failed orAbsent Defenses

HumanFactors

Unwarned eventDeath and injury

Active Conditions Teamwork

Coordination

SA

Experience

It’s never just one thing

*Human Factors Analysis and Classification System (Shappell/Wiegman)

Warning decision making – Austria 2003

Situation Awareness -review The ability to maintain the big picture

Only one of these guys has good SA.

Warning decision making – Austria 2003

Situation AwarenessOfficial definition

Situation AwarenessOfficial definition

• Perception of the elements in the environment within a volume of space and time (level I)

• Comprehension of their meaning (level II)

• Projection of their status in the near future (level III)

Endsley 1988

Warning decision making – Austria 2003

Situation AwarenessSituation Awareness

• Perception of the elements in the environment within a volume of space and time (level I)

Or did you see this as well?

Is this what your decision is based on?

Same time…different radar

Warning decision making – Austria 2003

Situation AwarenessSituation Awareness• Comprehension of their meaning (level II)

Now that you’ve seen this, do you understand what this is?

Did you see this?

Perceive

Hook echo with 65dBZ in the hook: debris

Warning decision making – Austria 2003

Situation AwarenessSituation Awareness

• Projection of their status in the near future (level III)

Now do you realize what is likely to happen? And what you should do?

Do you understand what this is?

(Hook echo with 65dBZ in the hook: debris)

Did you see this?

Perceive

Comprehend Project

…Tornado Emergency for the OKC Metro……...

Warning decision making – Austria 2003

Factors affecting your ability to get or maintain SA

Factors affecting your ability to get or maintain SA

• Attention

Limited; affected by task priority

• Working memory

Information stored but easily accessed

• Use of conceptual models

Perception of meaningful patterns

Relationships between different pieces of information

Workload

As workload increases, SA decreases

Warning decision making – Austria 2003

SA and workloadSA and workload• Low SA, low workload

Don’t know anything, don’t want to know

• Low SA, high workload

Don’t know anything, but am trying way too hard to find out

• High SA, high workload

Do know plenty, but at great effort (can’t keep this up for long!)

• High SA, low workload

Do know, and it comes easily

• If you are not operating here….find out why and fix it!

Warning decision making – Austria 2003

SA and WorkloadSA and Workload

• Warnings take all three levels of SA

Perceive, comprehend, project

• Decision to warn based on

Knowledge of Conceptual Model

Recognition of Conceptual Model in radar and other supporting data (spotter input, knowledge of environment)

• Requires proactive interrogation of base data

– Which is a workload problem if ratio of forecaster to number of storms is insufficient

» Key: Sectorize (re-distribute workload)

» Assure staffing is appropriate

Warning decision making – Austria 2003

I. What do effective warning events have in common?

Factors for success in NWS warning events

I. What do effective warning events have in common?

Factors for success in NWS warning events

• Science

• Technology

• Human Factors

Warning decision making – Austria 2003

The ScienceThe more we learn, the more we understand about some

things…the less we understand about others

• Atmosphere/phenomena understood

• Representative conceptual models are in place

“Already, some new explanations of aspects of tornadic behavior have been proposed. They await testing with theoretical understanding and more VORTEX cases."

Harold BrooksVORTEX-95

Warning decision making – Austria 2003

The TechnologyTechnology is best when:The Technology

Technology is best when:

• It has the ability to convey science

• Strengths/limitations are understood

• It is reliable

• Software/hardware designs are effective

• It has a positive impact on situation awareness of user

I know about the strengths and limitations of the 88D

I will need to learn a new set of strengths and limitations with any new technology

Warning decision making – Austria 2003

Human FactorsWarnings aren’t issued in a vacuum

Human FactorsWarnings aren’t issued in a vacuum

Does everyone understand their role today?

Does everyone understand what

they’re looking at?

What are each of these people doing?

Did the right person hear that report?

Does someone see what’s happening outside??!!

•Correct application / understanding of conceptual model

•Good situation awareness (individual/team)

•Effective strategies, methodologies

•Effective use of technology

•Organizational and individual contributions are positive

•There is effective communication, coordination, teamwork

WFO OUN Ops area on May 3rd, 1999

Warning decision making – Austria 2003

A good office warning operation depends on good team SA

A good office warning operation depends on good team SA

What I know

What you know

What she knows

What he knows

What we all know

What we share with others

Warning decision making – Austria 2003

Example – A typical NWS Office Layout

Example – A typical NWS Office Layout

MKX operations for “outbreak” event

WS1

CRS

WS2

WS3

CRS

WS5

WS4

Public/Flash Flood(1-2 Mets)

River Flood(1-2 HMT/Intern)

Svr Wx Coordinator(1 Met)

Marine/Aviation(1-2 Mets)

Warning (2 Mets)

Statements(2 Mets)

HAM (2-3 Persons)

Storm Reports(1 HMT/Intern)

QC(1 HMT/Intern)

Asst. Svr Wx Coordinator(1 Met)

Warning decision making – Austria 2003

Roles and dutiesRoles and duties• Warning meteorologists

• Mesoanalysts

• Radio operators

• Event loggers

• Technicians

• Severe weather coordinator

Oversees warning operations

Makes sure workload for each warning forecaster

Ensures uninhibited communication amongst all

Warning decision making – Austria 2003

How to split up workload here?How to split up workload here?

Warning decision making – Austria 2003

Splitting up the workloadSplitting up the workload

• Geographical sectorizing

• Sectorizing by severe weather type

• Sectorizing by product type

• All of the above with adequate staffing

• Coordinator is needed to help split up workload and ensure no storms are missed

Warning decision making – Austria 2003

 

Accident Investigations

Root Cause Analysis

Proximal Cause

Post-Mortems

Post-mortems: learning from the past

Post-mortems: learning from the past

WB-Graph (Why-Because)

Warning decision making – Austria 2003

Warning decision making – Austria 2003

Some past significant events which weren’t as effective – one example

Some past significant events which weren’t as effective – one example

• Science Severe box(moderate risk)

• Technology Map inaccuracies

• Human Factors Applying conceptual model (tornadic supercell)

• Understanding of conceptual model Situation Awareness

• Lack of real-time reports (visibility, lines of comms)• Procedures, strategies (storm interrogation techniques)

Communication, coordination (internal, external) Roles, responsibilities Wording Relationship with customer

Warning decision making – Austria 2003

Some past significant events which weren’t as effective 12 Tornadic Events*

Number of times each category has played a role in the 12 events we looked at

Some past significant events which weren’t as effective 12 Tornadic Events*

Number of times each category has played a role in the 12 events we looked at

5

7

12

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

Science Technology Human Factors

*All but 1 event had little or no lead time. Ten events F3 or greater.

Warning decision making – Austria 2003

ScienceThe science of the event, and our

understanding of it, help to shape our expectations.

ScienceThe science of the event, and our

understanding of it, help to shape our expectations.

•Watches•Severe - 4•None - 1

5

7

12

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

Number of Events = 12

Science Technology Human Factors

Warning decision making – Austria 2003

TechnologySometimes technological issues

play a role

TechnologySometimes technological issues

play a role

• Range Folding - 2

• Radar sampling – 3

• No algorithm guidance – 2Only mentioned on one report

• Equipment malfunction - 1

• Warning Dissemination - 3Comms, NWR, Maps

5

7

12

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

Science Technology Human Factors

Warning decision making – Austria 2003

Human FactorsUltimately the human must put it all together

Human FactorsUltimately the human must put it all together

• Apply Conceptual Model – 8 Cyclic tornadic supercell Comma head tornadoes

• Situation Awareness - 12 Strategies - 8

• Sectorizing, inadequate procedures or RPS List, failure to use other radars, failure to make PRF changes, equipment distractions (attention)

Workload - 4 Spotter reports delayed or not received – 6

• Organizational - 9 Roles/responsibilities (3), Partnerships (3), Coord/Comms

(3), climate (2), face threat, staffing, shift change, inexperience

• Other wording, time of day

5

7

12

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

Science Technology Human Factors

Warning decision making – Austria 2003

How we improveincluding a review of relevant WDM concepts

(at least for these cases)

How we improveincluding a review of relevant WDM concepts

(at least for these cases)

• Science – (Where severe threat was not realized before

event occurred)

Additional research plus local studies

• Requires better data sets

• Technology

Additional development plus incorporation of local applications

Evaluation of user needs and impacts

Warning decision making – Austria 2003

How we improveincluding a review of relevant WDM concepts

How we improveincluding a review of relevant WDM concepts

• Human Factors

Correct understanding and application of conceptual models

Warning environment which supports good SA

Effective office strategies

Warning environment which supports good communication and coordination

Warning decision making – Austria 2003

• Simulations are the most effective method of training

• Every forecaster in the NWS is required to complete two/year

Warning decision making – Austria 2003

• What are staffing practices during severe weather?

Do you sectorize? Use a coordinator? How is workload?

• What is your organizational environment like?

How does the flow of the office support good SA?

• Access to all data sets (spotters, etc)

How good is teamwork and communication?

How long have you and others worked there and with each other?

Are roles and responsibilities clear during severe weather operations?

What is working relationship with partners (other WFOs, spotters, EMs, etc)

Meeting the ChallengesHow do you and your office stack up in these

areas?

Meeting the ChallengesHow do you and your office stack up in these

areas?

Warning decision making – Austria 2003

ContactsContacts

Storm interpretation and warning methodologies

James LaDue [email protected]

Mesoscale analysis and warning methodologies

Brad Grant [email protected]

Situational Awareness and cognitive task analysis

Liz Quoetone [email protected]

Warning decision making – Austria 2003

ReferencesReferencesAviation Safety Network, http://aviation-safety.net/index.shtmlEndsley, M.R., 1988. Design and Evaluation for Situation Awareness Enhancement. M.R.

Endsley, Proceedings of the Human Factors Society, 32nd annual meeting, Santa Monica, CA

Lemon, L.R., and C. A. Doswell III, 1979b: Severe thunderstorm evolution and mesocyclone structure as related to tornadogenesis. Mon. Wea. Rev., 107,1184-1197.

Orasanu, J., U. Fischer, L. McDonnel, J. Davison, K. Haars, E. Villeda, C. VanAken 1998: How do Flight Crews Detect and Prevent Errors? Findings from a Flight

Simulation Study. Proceedings of the Human Factors and Ergonomics Society 42nd Annual Meeting, Chicago 191-195.

Shappell, S., D. Wiegmann. A Human Factors Approach to Accident Analysis and Prevention, Workshop, 45th Conference on Human Factors and Ergonomics Society, Minneapolis, 2001

Xiao, Y., C. Mackenzie, R. Patey, and LOTAS Group 1998: Team Coordination and Breakdowns in a Real-life Stressful Environment. Proceedings of the Human Factors and Ergonomics Society 42nd Annual Meeting, Chicago 186- 190.

NWS – Various Disaster Survey Reports and communications with survey team members.

Warning decision making – Austria 2003

ReferencesSome WDTB presentations online

ReferencesSome WDTB presentations online

WDMISituation Awareness and Decision Making Warning Methodology Office Strategies Warning Operations in the AWIPS EraVortex Findings Techniques for Improving Warnings

WDM IINWS Warnings and Customer Response Team Decision MakingPublic Reaction to Warnings Effective Warning Environments AWIPS Configurations for Warnings Radar Limitations and TVS Detections Environmental Assessment

DLOC WorkshopUsing Near-Storm Environ. Data in WDM Process Convective Initiation/Tornado Warning GuidanceRadar Detection of Severe Tstm Features

WDM IIIMaximizing AWIPS ProceduresFailure ModesThe Role of Effective Communication in the Warning ProcessStrategies for Optimizing Severe Weather PerformanceMesoscale Input into WDMAlgorithms and War GamesImpacts of Automation on Expertise Social Science of WarningsSevere Weather Probability Outlooks WDM IVWhen Bad Things Happen to Good ForecastersSevere Weather Threat AssessmentThe Value of Post-MortemsRadar Precursors to Damaging Winds

www.wdtb.noaa.gov

Warning decision making – Austria 2003

ReferencesReferencesSevere Convection Forecasting and Warning Professional Development Series, http://www.wdtb.noaa.gov/resources/PDS/newconvectpds.htm

Severe storms interpretation guide, see IC57 of the WSR-88D DLOC course, http://www.wdtb.noaa.gov/DLCourses/dloc/dlocmain.html#studentguides

Capabilities of severe weather and thermodynamic parameters in severe storms forecasting, http://www.wdtb.noaa.gov/resources/IC/svrparams/intro/index.htm