WALLNER LegitimacyandPublicPolicy SeeingBeyondEffectivenessEfficiencyandPerformance

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Legitimacy and Public Policy: Seeing Beyond

Effectiveness, Efficiency, and Performance

Jennifer Wallner

Studies of failure typically assess public policies through the lenses of effectiveness, efficiency, and

performance. Here I wish to propose a further dimension to the evaluation and assessment of policy

failurelegitimacy. The substantive elements of public policies and the procedural steps taken byauthoritative decision makers during the policy cycle affect the perception of policy legitimacy held by

both stakeholders and the public. In substantive terms, policy content should align with the dominant

attitudes of the affected policy community and, ideally, the broader public. Procedurally, factors such

as policy incubation, the emotive appeals deployed to gain support for an initiative, and the processes

of stakeholder engagement shape the legitimacy of public policies and the governments who promote

them.

This argument is based on a comparison of education reform in two Canadian provinces during the

1990s. Governments in Alberta and Ontario pursued common agendas of education reform, but while

Alberta achieved success, the Ontario government experienced a series of setbacks and lost the support

of education stakeholders and the public. The root of Ontarios failures lies in the realm of legitimacy.

These findings highlight the fact that the strategies used for enacting policy change may fail to bring

about the necessary consensus among societal actors to sustain a new policy direction and calls

attention to our need to better understand how governments can achieve meaningful public participa-

tion while still achieving legislative success in an efficient fashion.

KEY WORDS: policy failure,legitimacy, policy incubation,emotive appeals, stakeholder engagement

Public policy scholars have long contemplated the meaning and sources of

policy failure. Studies of failure often investigate cases where policies do not achieve

their stated objectives or are unable to realize effectiveness. From that vantage point,

a failed policy is one that inadequately ameliorates a defined problem or, as coinedby Bovens and t Hart (1996), a policy fiascoa case where a significantly negative

event is caused at least in part by avoidable and blameworthy failures of public

policymakers (p. 15). Recent examples of fiascos include the Walkerton water crisis

in Ontario in 2000, the French governments response to the 2003 heat wave, and the

post-Katrina New Orleans recovery effort in 2005. Alternatively, failed policies are

identified in light of inefficiencypolicies that realize suboptimal outcomes or have

negative, unintended spillover effects that cause performance shortfalls in other

policy arenas or jurisdictions (Shepsle & Bonchek, 1997). Such initiatives as Canadas

The Policy Studies Journal, Vol. 36, No. 3, 2008

421

0190-292X 2008 Policy Studies Organization

Published by Wiley Periodicals, Inc., 350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148, USA, and 9600 Garsington Road, Oxford, OX4 2DQ.


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federal gun control registry or the American health care regime are illustrative

of this second category of failure. In both conceptualizations, policy failure is

recognized after implementation through an assessment of the outcomes, with

researchers implicating such factors as inappropriate problem definition, poor

selection of policy instruments, the limited rationality of actors, and insufficientresourcesparticularly money and time (Forester, 1984; Rochefort & Cobb, 1994;

Simon, 1991; Stone, 1989).

More recently, scholars have shifted away from a central focus on outcomes

and toward exploring cases where a policy was not even implemented. Arguably

inspired by U.S. President Bill Clintons failed attempt at health care reform,

researchers now see failure as instances where by all accounts, a policy should have

achieved success and yet was abandoned before implementation. Using the example

of Clintons health care reform, in Kingdons (1995) lexicon, the policy window was

open, the streams were flowing in a similar direction, and a seemingly strong policy

entrepreneur was poised to connect all the elements together. Clintons efforts alone

generated a good deal of research aimed at explaining the collapse of health care

reform (Hacker, 1997; Skocpol, 1997; Steinmo & Watts, 1995). From this springboard,

the attention of policy scholars turned away from recognizing and explaining failure

solely through the lenses of efficiency and effectiveness and toward the performance

of institutions and agents in the policy process.

Here I wish to propose a further dimension to policy failure. Even if a policy is

implemented and achieves its objectives in an efficient and effective fashion, the

policy can fail in terms of legitimacy. Failure in policy legitimacy may subsequently

compromise the long-term goals and interests of authoritative decision makers byeroding societys acceptance of their legitimate claims to govern. The substantive

elements of public policies and the procedural steps taken by authoritative decision

makers during the policy cycle affect the perception of policy legitimacy held by

both stakeholders and the public. In substantive terms, policy content should align

with the dominant attitudes of the affected stakeholders and, ideally, the broader

public. Procedurally, factors such as the incubation period, the emotive appeals

deployed to gain support for an initiative, and the processes of stakeholder engage-

ment in policy development shape the legitimacy of public policies and the govern-

ments who promote them.

My interest in legitimacy stems from a seemingly small puzzle. During the1990s, governments in Alberta and Ontario pursued common agendas of education

reform, but while the Alberta government achieved complete legislative success

and generally maintained societal support, the Ontario government experienced a

number of setbacks and lost significant support from both education stakeholders

and the public. The source of Albertas successes and the root of Ontarios failures lie

in the realm of legitimacy. While adhering to the requirements of substantive legiti-

macy, the Ontario government under the Progressive Conservative (PC) Party fre-

quently undermined elements of procedural legitimacy and eroded the publics

acceptance of the appropriateness of the party. As a result, the PC Party sacrificed the

support of stakeholders and the broader public and compromised its future capaci-

ties to govern.

422 Policy Studies Journal, 36:3


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To present this argument, I begin by explaining why legitimacy is significant to

public policy and outlining the methodology used in this study. The second section

supplies the background on the two cases and provides the reader with the context

and immediate outcomes of the efforts of both governments. Sections three and four

present the analytical core of the argument, examining the factors that influencedpolicy legitimacy in the two cases. The final section discusses the implications and

the potential lessons drawn from this research.

Conceptualizing Legitimacy

One way the state can ensure enforcement of its authoritative decisions is

through coercive power, where penalties and sanctions are applied to those who do

not comply (Weber, 1946/1958). An alternative recourse toward facilitating public

compliance, however, is through legitimacy. Legitimacy entails a general confidence

among the public that a governments power to make binding decisions for the

polity are justified and appropriate (Dahl, 1998). When authority rests upon legiti-

macy, citizens will feel an obligation or duty to uphold laws and accept the decrees

of government as legal and authoritative (Peters, 1986, p. 63). Public policies are

inextricably linked to societys confidence in the fairness and suitability of their

government. And, while illegitimate policies rarely lead to the complete breakdown

of the states authority, such policies can damage the specific party in power during

their implementation, thus eroding its status before societal actors. The legitimacy of

public policies can, therefore, affect whether a government achieves its stated goals

and objectives, as well as its capacity to maintain public stability and support aidingits future endeavors.1

At its core, legitimacy is a normative concept that rests upon the principles of

justness and appropriateness. Legitimacy, moreover, is a subjective interpretation

found in the beliefs and perceptions of individuals and groups toward the actions

and behaviors of others. As Peters argues, legitimacy is largely psychological. It

depends on the majoritys acceptance of the rightness of government (p. 63).

Because policies have many implications and affect groups in different ways, the

majority is not a monolith, and it is necessary to consider the achievement legiti-

macy among different groups and interests (Baumgartner & Jones, 1993; Schn &

Rein, 1994). Here, we first examine legitimacy between stakeholders and the gov-ernment and second between the public and the government.

In every policy arena, governments rely on stakeholders to support their initia-

tives (Atkinson & Coleman, 1989; Neustadt, 1976; Richardson, 2003), but as rational

actors, stakeholders are rarely willing to support policies that do not fit with their

substantive objectives. Moreover, if excluded from the process of policy develop-

ment, affected stakeholders may protest against an initiative, arguing that it insuffi-

ciently responds to their goals and interests (Carmine, Darnall, & Mil Homens, 2003;

King, Feltey, & Susel, 1998; Russell, 1992). When designing policies, as Schn and

Rein (1994) argue, political actors must take care to create and maintain a level of

mutual trust sufficient to sustain cooperative inquiry (p. 170). Put differently, stake-

holders should be included and engaged through the process of policy development.

Wallner: Legitimacy and Public Policy 423


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Consequently, stakeholders should perceive the substance of a policy as reasonable

and the process of policy development as appropriate if they are going to accept it

and support the initiatives of the government, contributing to the subsequent legiti-

macy of the policy and the political actors that promote it.

The public, in turn, should view policies as legitimate. The substantive goals,

instruments, and outcomes of policies should align with the general sentiments

present in the community, if not the common values of society.2 Added to which, the

democratic principle of popular control raises the expectation of public participation

and influence in the processes of government (Cooper, 1991; Kettering Foundation,

1991; Strivers, 1990; Thomas, 1995). Governments must, therefore, work to ensure

that the development of their policies affords some degree of participation to the

public (either through broad consultation forums or by proxy through stakeholders)

and that the subsequent policy prescriptions are reasonably congruent with popularattitudes. If compromised, the government may reduce its authority and erode its

legitimate status over time (Peters, 1986).

From this conceptualization, it is possible to distill factors that influence the

perception of policy legitimacy held by stakeholders and the public, summarized

above in Table 1. Intuitively critical to the justness and appropriateness of a policy

is the content of the policy itself. Public policies are the tangible manifestations of

conscious decisions by governments on the behalf of their citizens. As such, gov-

ernments should work to ensure that its instruments, ideas, and implementation

strategies effectively align with the dominant attitudes of their populations (Bakvis

& Skogstad, 2002; Bemelmans-Videc, Rist, & Vedung, 1998; March & Olsen, 1989;Neustadt, 1976). Or, as Schn and Rein (1994) observe, policies should at least be

framed in a way to suit the problem formulations and preferred solutions of the

affected groups. Skocpols (1997) analysis of health care reform in the United States

confirms the importance of fit between public values and public policy as Clintons

proposals had to be compromised . . . they couldnt be regarded as a government

take-over scheme for socialized medicine (p. 39). Therefore, governments should

ensure that the substantive contents of public policies align with the dominant

attitudes of stakeholders and society to promote the legitimacy of its specific

agenda.

In procedural terms, if there is one factor upon which there is almost universal

consensus among observers of public policy, it is the importance of time. Nelson

Table 1. Core Elements of Legitimacy in Public Policy

Legitimacy Type Core Elements Evidence from Cases

Alberta Ontario

Substantive Policy content aligned with:Stakeholders Yes YesThe public Yes Yes

Procedural Incubation period Extended ExtendedEmotive appeals Positive NegativeStakeholder engagement Comprehensive Minimal



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Polsby (1984) argues that time facilitates policy incubation, where political actors

take the idea up, reshape it, adapt it to their political needs, publicize it, and put it

into the ongoing culture of decision-makers (p. 153). According to Hacker (1997),

incubation serves a twofold purpose. First, incubation ensures that the ideas of

reform are secure in the minds of public officials and policy professionals who areresponsible for the agenda itself. Second, incubation allows the time to educate

members of the policy community and the public of the value of the proposed

strategies. If political actors try to rush strategies through, they may be unable to

garner support from the community to enable successful implementation or create a

meaningful consensus to guarantee the sustainability of the initiatives (Neustadt,

1976, p. 252; Weir, 1992).

Political actors nevertheless rarely have any influence over the time horizons of

policy development; it is, therefore, important to consider two other elements over

which agents exert greater control. First, establishing, developing, and implementing

policy agendas require not only choices about the empirical content of the policy but

also building supportive emotive appeals to galvanize stakeholder and public

support for a political agenda (Baumgartner & Jones, 1993, p. 26). Emotive appeals

consist of evaluative elements including the symbols and discourse used to frame a

policy problem and its solution, and scholars of public policy recognize that lan-

guage plays an important symbolic role shaping the policy agenda. Rein and Schn

(1991, p. 263) define discourse as the interactions of individuals, interest groups,

social movements, and institutions through which problematic situations are con-

verted to policy problems, agendas are set, decisions are made, and actions are

taken. The ways in which political actors express their ideas, and the objectives thatthey emphasize, influence the choices and actions of individuals and groups toward

the policy agenda. Political actors, therefore, try to manipulate symbols and craft the

discourse to stimulate support for their policy agenda and strengthen its legitimacy

in the eyes of stakeholders and the public. If they select discourse and symbols that

positively resonate with societal actors, political actors will increase their legitimacy;

if, however, they select discourse and symbols that negatively resonates with societal

actors, political actors risk compromising the legitimacy of their agenda and eroding

their authority writ large.

Second, we can also look within the specific processes of stakeholder and public

engagement in policy development and implementation to reveal determinants oflegitimacy. How a government chooses to craft and execute a political agenda shapes

its acceptance by stakeholders and the public. For example, a government can pull

away from societal actors and isolate itself throughout the policy process to achieve

fast and efficient decision making that precisely adheres to the governments stated

agenda. Alternatively, a government can choose to engage stakeholders and the

public in meaningful participation. No doubt, engagement may slow the policy

process down and perhaps reshape a governments policy agenda. However, the

democratic principle of popular control includes the expectation that non-state

actors, both citizens and stakeholders, should be able to participate throughout the

various stages of the policy cycle (Thomas, 1995). We can, therefore, predict that a

government who engages societal actors in a meaningful fashion will increase not



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only the legitimacy of the specific policy but also its overall legitimacy before stake-

holders and the public.

This investigation reconstructs the events surrounding education reform in the

Canadian provinces of Alberta and Ontario between 1993 and 2002. Emphasis is

placed on the substance of the reforms, the strategies deployed to engender stake-holder and public support for the education agenda, and the processes of decision

making. Government documents, including annual reports, pieces of legislation, and

publications, provide the content of the education reforms. Between April 2006 and

April 2007, I conducted over 40 elite interviews, drawing respondents from the

ministries of education, the premiers offices, and the Privy Councils, as well as

representatives from the major stakeholders in both provinces to uncover the

strategies and decision making processes used by the two governments.3 Press

statements, policy briefs, and memos from the governments and the various orga-

nizations including teachers federations, trustee groups, and school officials asso-

ciations enhance the analysis and serves to fill in the narrative presented here.

Education Reform in Alberta and Ontario

What makes educational reform in Alberta and Ontario during the 1990s inter-

esting? Both provinces offer excellent cases to examine the strategies used by gov-

ernments when attempting to implement comprehensive policy reform in a specific

sector. Comprehensive reform is marked as a period of atypical policy change

involving substantial modifications or transformations to the policy arena (Bennett &Howlett, 1992); put differently, long periods of sustained stability can be punctuated

with periods of volatile change (Baumgartner & Jones, 1993, p. 4). In these periods,

the acceptability, appropriateness, and justifiability of new policy directions for the

affected stakeholders and public are therefore in question. Cases of comprehensive

policy reform, thus, offer a perfect opportunity to assess some of the determinants of

policy legitimacy. The Alberta and Ontario governments were committed to reshap-

ing the existing policy monopolies and transforming their respective K12 education

sectors, consequently satisfying the criteria of comprehensive reform.

The two provinces also share certain important similarities. Both provinces were

governed by the PC Party and faced significant budgetary shortfalls due to a reces-sion in the early 1990s. While Alberta is known as a one-party dominant system

(Carty & Stewart, 1996, p. 368), Ralph Kleins selection as leader of the Alberta PC

Party in 1993 marked an ideological break from the previous regime toward a more

market-oriented neoliberal approach to government. Similarly, the election of Mike

Harris PCs in 1995 represented a comparable shift toward neo-liberalism in Ontario

with a new approach to governing (Jacek, 1997; Williams, 1997). The public also

elected both governments on platforms that clearly emphasized public sector reform

based on the principles of new public management that included explicit proposals

on education (Clark, 2002). The subsequent education reform agendas of these new

governments were, therefore, not a surprise to stakeholders and the public in either

province.



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Alberta and Ontario pursued similar education policy objectives and proposals(Anderson & Ben Jaafer, 2006; Gidney, 1999; Taylor, 2001; Wagner, 1998). The prod-

ucts of their respective agendas are presented in Table 2.

Their reform agendas included plans to: limit school boards through consolida-

tion and increased accountability mechanisms, implement full provincial funding

and terminate the fiscal autonomy of the local boards, adopt new out-comes based

curricula, implement province-wide universal student assessments, and make

changes to teacher certification. It is therefore fair to say that both governments

sought comprehensive reform in the education arena. But the results of their com-

parable efforts varied in meaningful ways, presented in Table 3.

The Klein government successfully implemented the majority of its reformagenda while retaining substantial support among the policy community and the

public at large. In Ontario, the Harris government managed to implement most of its

proposals but not without certain costs. The provincial PC Party lost the support of

education stakeholders and saw a marked decline in its public approval, particularly

in the education portfolio. What is more, during their second term in office, they

were unable to implement a cornerstone of their education reform platform, despite

favorable public support for the specific initiative. Finally, the specter of the Harris

governments behavior continues to hinder the electoral chances of the PCs in the

province. In the most recent Ontario election, Dalton McGuinty became the second

Liberal Premier in the provinces history to win back to back majorities since 1937.While not solely the result of the Harris governments actions, there is a lingering

Table 2. Education Reforms of Alberta and Ontario, 19932002

Policy Dimension Alberta Ontario

Governance Reduced school boards from 141 to 60 Reduced school boards from 129 to 72Capped administrative expenditures

to 4%

Capped trustee salaries at $5,000 per

yearMandated local school councils Mandated local school councilsIntroduced Charter schools

Finance Eliminated independent taxing powersof school boards

Eliminated independent taxing powersof school boards

Centralized educational finance Centralized educational financeCurriculum Implemented results-based curriculum Introduced outcomes-based curriculum

Increased common standards inelementary and secondary schoola

Common curriculum with specificlearning outcomes and prescribedstandards by grade

Testing Annual testing of reading, writing, andmath for all Grade 3

Annual testing of reading, writing, andmathematics of all Grades 3 and 6

Annual testing of English, math, socialstudies, and science for Grades 6and 9

Annual testing in math Grade 9Compulsory Grade 10 literacy test as a

requirement of high schoolgraduation

Teacherprofessionalism

Teacher recertification and professionaladvancement program

Teacher testing program of newlytrained teachers

aDuring the 1980s, the Government of Alberta engaged in a comprehensive review of its curriculum andimplemented a common back to basics program in 1985.



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In Ontario, the outcomes and consequences of the governments actions were

notably different. First, strained relations between the Ontario government and the

teachers federations took a dramatic turn in 1997. Minister of Education John

Snobelen had introduced a series of bills that included lengthening of the school day

and year, reducing the number of professional development days, permitting uncer-tified instructors into the public system, terminating mandatory teachers federation

membership, and ending the right to strike (Gidney, 1999, p. 256). In response, the

teachers launched a vitriolic campaign insisting that Harris and Snobelen wanted to

destroy the public system and bankrupt education. The five teachers federations in

the province claimed that the bills were not about improving education but only

about reducing spending and presented a series of demands to the government

asking for certain changes to the bills. The intensity of the teachers campaign forced

the premier to shuffle his cabinet, moving Snobelen into Natural Resources and

replacing him with Dave Johnson. The new minister offered an olive branch of

sorts (Gidney, 1999, p. 259), promising some small amendments to the bills. Imme-

diately after the ministers counteroffers, however, a copy of a deputy ministers

performance contract was leaked, which directed the deputy to cut an additional

$667 million from the schools budget throughout 199899. The leaked contract

undermined the governments position that the legislation was about improving

schools and not, as the teachers were arguing, about cutting spending.

This information on the deputy ministers contract, combined with the limited

compromises offered by the government, pushed the teachers into taking a radical

step: on Monday, October 27, 1997, Ontario teachers closed the schools. Lasting 10

school days, it was the largest demonstration of teacher solidarity in Ontario historyand garnered worldwide attention. Called a political protest by the teachers

federations and an illegal strike by everyone else, at its heart, the action challenged

the legitimacy of the governments education agenda (Blinch, 1997).5 The teachers

actions in Ontario went outside the usual parameters of labor relations. Unlike the

strike in Alberta, Ontario teachers were not in a bargaining year and had no legal

basis for the work stoppage. Relations between the government and stakeholders

had completely collapsed and all communications between them ceased. Eventually,

the teachers returned to work and the government put in the minimal compromises

to the legislation, but relations with the government were never repaired: Before the

work stoppage we thought things were badbut after it was just outright hostilityfrom the government and trust was never restored (personal interview, April 2007).

Opposition to the government among Ontario education professionals further

manifested itself during the 1999 election campaign. Federations and unions repre-

senting teachers, nurses, and government workers launched a sustained campaign

against the conservative government that targeted 26 swing ridings in the province

(McKinley, 1999).6 One of the 26 targeted ridings was that of the incumbent minister

of education, Dave Johnson, who had ushered through the contentious legislation

of 1997 (Lewington, 1999). On election night, the Liberal candidate David Caplan

defeated Johnson, a rare achievement in Canadian politics.7 Following the election,

Johnsons campaign manager declared: It was unprecedented for any one candidate

to be targeted to the extent Dave has been (quoted in Lewington, 1999). In 1999, the



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PCs had campaigned on a commitment to continue education reform. The defeat of

the incumbent minister of education, thus, had greater significance and weakened

the governments mandate in the field.8

The Ontario governments weakness in the education sector following the 1999

election was evident in its failed proposal for mandatory recertification of teachers.Inspired by legislation successfully implemented by the Klein government in

Alberta,9 the PC Party had made teacher recertification a cornerstone of its platform

during the 1999 campaign (Progressive Conservative Party of Ontario, 1999). Accord-

ing to the results from a public survey, Ontarians overwhelmingly supported the

idea of teacher recertification as a component of the public education sector (Living-

stone, Hart, & Davie, 1999). The bill presented in the next legislative session,

however, contained only a watered-down version of the original proposal. Rather

than centralized professional development and periodic mandatory recertification of

all teachers, the government settled for a single test administered at the end of the

pre-service teacher education program (Anderson & Ben Jaafer, 2006, p. 30). There-

fore, despite holding a legislative majority during their second term and campaign-

ing on the specific policy proposal, the Ontario government failed to implement this

key element of its education reform agenda.

The response among the publics throughout the reform process diverged

between the two provinces. To start, according to the EnvironicsFocus Ontario 1997

poll, 62 percent of Ontarians disapproved with the governments handling of edu-

cation, second only to the health portfolio (Environics Research Group, 1997). Two

years later, and well into the education agendas in both cases, an Angus Reid poll

recorded the highest level of public satisfaction with public schools in Canadaamong the Prairie Provinces: 62 percent of respondents in Alberta, Saskatchewan,

and Manitoba were either somewhat or very satisfied with schooling in their

provinces (Angus Reid, 1999). Only 48 percent of Ontarians, in contrast, were some-

what or very satisfied. According to a Leger Marketing (2002) poll, the gap had

widened between the regions with respondents in the Prairie Provinces being the

most satisfied (72 percent) and Ontarians the least satisfied (32 percent) with educa-

tion in their provinces.

The comprehensive biannual survey on public attitudes toward education con-

ducted by the Ontario Institute for Studies in Education provides further information

on the opinions of Ontarians (Livingstone et al., 1999). In 1996, immediately follow-ing Harris victory, the survey found growing satisfaction among Ontarians for

public schools. However, two years later, results indicated that opinions had taken a

downward turn where over a third of those surveyed believed that public schooling

in the province had declined. More significantly, despite the illegality of the teachers

strike, a majority of respondents directly implicated the Harris government as the

reason for the downturn in education. Indeed, when asked in 1998, How satisfied

are you with the current situation in Ontario elementary and high schools with

regard to the job teachers are doing? 62 percent of respondents indicated that they

were satisfied (Livingstone et al., 1999, p. 16). In contrast, when asked Do you think

the changes the provinces government has made in the school system in the past few

years have generally improved, worsened or made no difference to the quality of



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education in Ontario? 44 percent of those surveyed indicated that the provinces

changes had worsened conditions (Livingstone et al., 1999, p. 18). By 2000, the

general satisfaction among Ontarians for education in their province was at an

all-time low. Consequently, during the tenure of the Harris government, public

opinion of the governments performance on the education file significantly declinedwhile the Klein government in Alberta managed to retain notable public support.

Substantive Legitimacy

In no other arena is the prominence of the policy community more important

than in education. Under the auspices of modern schooling, governments delegate

the task of implementing education policy to school boards, schools, administrators,

and teachers. Without the acquiescence of education professionals, the government

has no guarantee that its projects and reforms will actually be implemented. Educa-

tion is therefore an arena where a states capacity to act autonomously is highly

circumscribed by the influence of stakeholders. Because teachers retained a fair

degree of autonomy once the classroom door was closed, as Tyack and Cuban (1995)

argue, they could, if they chose, comply only symbolically or fitfully or not at all

with the mandates for change pressed on them by platoons of outside reformers

(p. 9).

Education is also a unique policy arena in terms of public perceptions. Canadi-

ans, like citizens in most other states, consistently place education near the top of

their policy priorities, repeatedly signaling to politicians that public schooling is a

key concern (Roth, 2003). Since the advent of universal schooling, the vast majorityof the population is better educated and has strong feelings about what school

should look like. As one former education minister in Alberta put it, Everyone has

an opinion on schooling because everyone has gone to school (personal interview,

April 2006). One Ontario trustee echoed this sentiment: Schools, in the eyes of the

public, are sacrosanct. Since everyone went to school, everyone has an opinion of

how it should be run (personal interview, January 2007).

Given the importance of stakeholders and the public in the education arena, we

could predict that the reasons for Ontarios failures lay in the content of the policies.

The substance of education reform, however, provides little traction to explain the

observed differences in the achievement of policy legitimacy between the two gov-ernments; both provinces pursued comparable education agendas centered on

improving efficiency, effectiveness, and accountability of public education. While

education professionals in both provinces expressed concerns over various elements

of the reform agenda, and in some instances raised vehement opposition as demon-

strated by the strike in Ontario, stakeholders were in general agreement of the need

for improvements to the existing systems. Albertans were agreed that reforms were

necessary. We in the boards, for example, knew that the fiscal inequalities among us

needed to be fixed (personal interview, April 2006). Respondents from Ontario

expressed similar sentiments. We knew the system needed to be changed, a former

Ontario trustee reported, and the Harris government largely followed the accepted

wisdom of the day (personal interview, January 2007). And as a former Ontario



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principal put it, We [education professionals] recognized the need for change and

improvements to accountability, but Harris blamed the education system (personal

interview, April 2007).

In terms of policy substance, the Alberta government even went beyond the

efforts of Ontario, introducing charter schools into the mix of educational provisionin the province. The first in Canada, few would deny the contentious nature of

charter schools particularly for those employed in the public system. Strong oppo-

sition from Alberta education stakeholders was launched against the initiative

(Buski, 1995; MacKay, 1994). But the Alberta government made an interesting stra-

tegic decision when establishing the content of the charter school policy. Parents

seeking a school charter must first approach their local school board to see if the

existing system would be willing to accommodate their needs (Alberta Education,

1994). Giving school boards the chance to respond to new demands from the public

and potentially include would-be charter schools under the official umbrella of the

public system offset some of the concerns raised by stakeholders. The Alberta gov-

ernments legislation acknowledged the importance and value of public schooling

while increasing the flexibility of the system, thus framing the policy according to

the dominant attitudes and values of stakeholders and the public.10

The content of the reforms substantively fit with public expectations in both

provinces. There is evidence of a synergy between the agendas and the public in a

variety of places. In Ontario, all three political parties agreed on many of the ideas

and policy prescriptions on the agenda (Gidney, 1999). Moreover, opinion polls from

both provinces confirmed that their publics favored the general direction of the

education reforms (Alberta Learning, 2000; Livingstone et al., 1999). Finally, as men-tioned earlier, both governments had campaigned on clear platforms that outlined

their education agendas and were elected on the basis of those platforms. It therefore

seems fair to conclude that the policy content was appropriately aligned with public

attitudes, thus satisfying this component of policy legitimacy.

Procedural Legitimacy

Incubation Period

Interestingly, given the accepted significance of time, in our cases, time horizons

cannot account for the differences in the perceived legitimacy among stakeholders

and the public for the education reforms. The two premiers pursued educational

reforms rapidly and imposed comparable duress on education professionals in both

provinces. In terms of incubation periods, both governments benefited from the

work of previous administrations where the general direction of educational reforms

had already been considered and debated by relevant actors in the policy field

(Gidney, 1999; Wagner, 1998). In fact, Klein and Harris borrowed much of their

education reform packages from previous governments, who had already primedbureaucrats, politicians, educators, and the public to the value of the ideas. These



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bureaucracies (Gidney, 1999, p. 236). He therefore selected an individual who was

similarly committed to the CSR agenda and education outsider, John Snobelen. In

addition to his ideological credentials, the premiers choice also shared the distinc-

tion of being a high school dropout. The point here is not to imply that Snobelen was

incapable of heading a department simply because he had not completed high school(in fact, he was a highly accomplished executive and consultant, thus bringing strong

credentials to the cabinet table). Symbolically, however, the selection of a high school

dropout as minister of education did not send a positive endorsement of teachers

and the existing system.

The negative language issued to school boards coupled with the selection of John

Snobelen as minister generated a sense among stakeholders and the Ontario public

that the PCs were making the teachers scapegoats (Palmer, 1998). They [the

Harris government] needed to change public opinion in Ontario against education,

observed one former trustee, and so through a blitzkrieg approach they set us up to

take the fall (personal interview, January 2007). Education professionals were able

to package this rebuttal to the Ontario public, and the government could do little to

stop it. Teachers federations used the message sent against trustees to their advan-

tage and the public believed the idea that the conservatives were anti-education. We

had no credibility on this issue, stated one former Harris insider, Teachers were

always well respected within individual communities, and parents dont like to hear

their teachers criticized (personal interview, April 2007).

From this we see that the discourse and symbolic choices made by the two

governments generated strikingly different emotive appeals for their education

agenda. On the one hand, the Alberta government did not aggressively implicateparticular groups within the education community but instead set out to demon-

strate its own personal commitment to reducing spending to gain the necessary

support for its education agenda. The Ontario government, on the other hand,

intentionally used negative language and combative strategies to legitimate the need

for reform before the public. This marked the PC Partys first step toward the erosion

of legitimacy in Ontario.

Stakeholder Engagement

Respondents from the major stakeholders in Alberta expressed feelings of part-nership and inclusion throughout the policy process. To start, on March 30, 1994,

Minister of Education Halvar Jonson announced the establishment of five

government-led teams to assist in the development of regulations and policies under

Bill 19. The five teams will work with multi stakeholder consultation groups and

Alberta Education officials to help develop more detailed implementation plans

(Legislative Assembly, 1994, p. 1135). Representatives from Alberta stakeholders

confirmed the process as indicated by the minister. Any time the School Act is

opened, the government seeks our input, stated a representative from the trustees

association. Discussion papers are circulated by the ministers office, and we have

the opportunity to provide our comments (personal interview, April 2006). To be

sure, there was rarely universal support among stakeholders for all components of



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Kleins agenda; however, respondents frequently reiterated that they were consis-

tently included in the process of policy development and that the government

sought their input throughout the duration of the education agenda.11

Respondents from Ontario education organizations painted an appreciably dif-

ferent picture of governmentstakeholder relations in the province. Overwhelm-ingly, sources indicated widespread dissatisfaction with the practices of the Harris

government frequently citing feelings of alienation and exclusion under the PC

regime: The previous NDP government used to consult with us, asserted one

former leader of secondary teachers federation, but Harris declared war on the

teachers (phone interview, April 2007). Rather than being invited to the table

throughout the policy process, education reforms were fleshed out without the

engagement of representatives from the education organization. Indeed, as one

respondent from the Elementary Teachers Federation of Ontario put it: With the

Tories we were simply not involved. The ministers door was closed to us (personal

interview, April 2007).

The Harris government underestimated the importance of reaching out to

stakeholders through the policy agenda. It did not place emphasis on gaining

stakeholder approval for the changes being proposed and instead chose to see

professional educators as part of the problem that needing fixing through a hier-

archical approach to policy development. Stakeholder consultations were not a

priority for us, one senior advisor recalled (personal interview, April 2007). We

realized too late that communications with teachers needed to be improved,

reported a member of the Premiers inner circle (personal interview, April 2007).

The Harris government had gone in believing that as a majority government theyhad the mandate and capacity to implement their agenda, with or without the

buy-in of stakeholders, and proceeded through the policy process isolating itself

from societal actors.

In part, this strategy was driven by the Premiers own perception of the educa-

tion establishment (Harris, 2002). Mike Harris demonstrates his views in a speech

made in February 2002: In no other area was there more organised resistance and

more money spent by those who strive to preserve the status quo [than in education].

This may explain why previous governments failed miserably in their attempts to

reform the system. Its hard to make real change happen, especially with endless

consultation and a go-slow attitude. Tactics with an objective of really no change atall. To deliver our goals, we had to wrest control of key decisions away from the

unions away from the bargaining table and give that decision-making power back to

administrators and parents.

Moreover, there was a perception among those closest to the Premier that con-

sultations with stakeholders would not make any real difference. Discussions, it was

believed, would lead only to conflict and acrimony between professional educators

and the ministry with the sense that stakeholders would never agree with the

Premiers central agenda.12 In fact, according to one government insider, on the rare

occasions of public consultations, the government made sure to fill the chairs with

party faithfulsrather than taking representatives selected by the organizations

themselves (personal interview, April 2007). The Ontario government had no inten-



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tion of veering from its stated objectives and the reforms were going to be imple-

mented, with or without the consent of stakeholders.

There is one significant difference between the Alberta and Ontario education

policy communities that needs to be acknowledged. Education organizations in

Alberta make up a tightly integrated network, which have enjoyed a long history ofcomprehensive and meaningful collaborations with government (Chalmers, 1967,

p. 384).13 A loose form of corporatist practices have developed in the province

where the minister circulates working documents for comment by the five principle

organizations, followed by a series of meetings between the ministry and the stake-

holders (personal interview, April 2006).14 To be sure, there were occasions when

consultations were largely window dressing, since the minister had already made a

decision, supported by the Premier (personal interview, April 2006). Even in these

instances, however, the Alberta government consistently presented the image of

listening to stakeholders and engaging them as partners in education reform.

In contrast with the integrated network of Alberta, Ontarios education policy

community is highly fragmented with numerous organizations jockeying for posi-

tion before the government.15 Among teachers, there are five different organizations

loosely coupled under the umbrella of the OTF, but most of the real power is left

in the hands of the five affiliates (Gidney, 1999, p. 22).16 Added to which there are

different organizations for trustees (divided along religious and linguistic lines),

private schools, and parents. The multiplicity of the formal organizations serves to

complicate any proposed consultation processes as the fractured representation

makes it difficult for education professionals to reach a consensus among them-

selves. Therefore, from the perspective of the government, one can see why politi-cians and bureaucrats had an incentive to avoid consultationif the groups cannot

provide clear and consistent positions, why bother bringing them to the table in the

first place?

Difficult, nevertheless, does not mean impossible. Following the defeat of the

conservatives in 2003, the newly elected Liberal government took the immediate step

of reintroducing stakeholder engagement into the process of education policy devel-

opment. Similar to Alberta, the Liberal government instituted informal corporatist

practices encapsulated in the Education Partnership Table. Described as a practical

new forum designed to get broad and diverse insights from the education sector

on provincial education policy early in the governments policy process (Ontario,Ministry of Education, 2007), the Partnership Table has been lauded by political

officials and educational professionals as an unmitigated success. Now in its fourth

year, it remains to be seen if this new component of the policy process will withstand

the test of time or a change in government. For the moment, however, all those

involved reported their strong support for the Partnership Table.17

Finally, the way a government implements a policy can influence its legitimacy.

In 1993, the Alberta government announced that school board amalgamations were

a priority and set a target for the province to reach. Rather than telling which school

boards needed to merge, the ministry declared that the boards could choose for

themselves. The ministry, therefore, set a mandatory target and established a clear

timeline, but did not impose its own boundaries. The ASBA sponsored a number of



17/23

meetings facilitating amalgamation in the province (personal interview, April 2006).

The Ontario government, through the arms length Education Improvement Com-

mission, assigned John Sweeney to the task of amalgamations (Gidney, 1999). Fol-

lowing minimal consultations, Sweeney released the new boundaries to the boards

unilaterally. Anecdotal accounts report that the new boundaries frequently did notmesh with geographic realities, and boards that had previously been collaborating

on initiatives were now divided and paired up with alternative units (personal

interview, April 2007). On amalgamation day, we [the trustees] were put into hotel

rooms with closed circuit TVs broadcasting the announcements. In Muskoka, wed

figured they put us with Nippising and the Northbut instead we were put with

Victoria County with no direct roads connecting us (personal interview, January

2007).

A cynical reading of Albertas strategy would suggest that the government was

simply off-loading difficult decisions to mitigate public animosity stemming from

amalgamation. The Alberta government diffused potential local resentment by

giving school boards the responsibility of determining the final arrangements. By

giving the boards a formal role in the process, however, the Alberta government also

acknowledged their importance in the provision of education in the province. The

Ministry of Education thus recognized the professional competence of the policy

community engaging them as partners in the education reforms.

The Ontario government was similarly interested in diffusing public opposition;

however, they decided to delegate responsibility to an external commission, which

emphasized a hierarchical approach to amalgamation. School boards were not

trusted to make their own decisions and reduce their numbers to comply with thegovernments agenda. Sweeney reinforced this message when he unilaterally redrew

district boundaries with little regard for existing collaborations or the preferences of

school boards themselves.

Therefore, throughout the policy process, the Ontario government actively iso-

lated itself from stakeholders, refusing to listen or compromise to alternative inter-

ests. This hard-nosed approach to the policy process antagonized stakeholders and

undermined the democratic principle of popular control. Alberta, through its con-

sistent engagement with societal actors, maintained positive relations and secured

the legitimacy of its education agenda and its authority as a government.

Conclusion

The central message here is to encourage policy scholars to look beyond perfor-

mance, effectiveness, and efficiency to examine the role that legitimacy plays in the

successes or failures of public policies and the governments who create them. I

started by conceptualizing legitimacy and hypothesizing the factors that can affect

the assessment of legitimacy in the eyes of societal interests. The substantive align-

ment of policy content with the dominant attitudes of society and the procedural

elements found in the processes of policy development and implementation influ-

ence the perception of legitimacy.



18/23

What explains the different outcomes in Alberta and Ontario? I argue that the

strategies used by the Harris PCs throughout the policy cycle served to alienate the

education stakeholders and generate a negative sentiment among the public toward

the government. To accomplish comprehensive education reform rapidly, the Harris

government compromised the achievement of legitimacy and undermined itsauthority before both education stakeholders and the general public.

There are a number of broader lessons from this research. First, these findings

challenge certain conventional wisdom on parliamentary institutions. A hallmark of

parliamentary governance is the considerable autonomy of the state from societal

actors. Pal and Weaver (2003) argue that the parliamentary system confounds the

abilities of interest groups to exert pressure: [C]entralization of power in the execu-

tive combines with party discipline to insulate decision makers from pressures that

might come through political parties (p. 7). As a result, a government can pursue its

agenda with remarkable impunity. Bradford (2003) further notes that the combina-

tion of Westminster-style cabinet government with the single-member plurality

electoral system offers governing parties considerable autonomy in setting policy

agendas and legislative priorities (p. 1009).

However, as I demonstrate, simply because one has the power to railroad

through legislation, does not mean that such aggressive practices are the most

effective or appropriate strategy. Through its strategy of disengagement and demor-

alization, the Harris government managed to pass the majority of its education

agenda, but its uncompromising tactics ended up radicalizing the teachers federa-

tions and alienated the public. What is more, as a result of the governments

combative methods, the teachers federations ended up overcoming many of theinstitutional barriers between them where today they are more unified and influen-

tial than ever (personal interview, April 2007).

Second, this research confirms Weirs (1992) position that the tricks useful in

passing a policy can actually undermine the emergence of long-term political

coalitions and enduring institutions needed to sustain policy direction (p. 193).

Though both governments succeeded enacting their agendas, the Harris govern-

ment was unable to fashion an agreement with education stakeholders. This inabil-

ity to achieve a consensus can be attributed to the strategic choices made by the

premier and those close to him. Sources both in and outside of government

reported that education professionals had only minimal access to the center ofgovernment. Instead, stakeholders turned their efforts to other members of the

government and the opposition parties to build a coalition that would be ready to

reclaim the education agenda when the opportunity presented itself. That oppor-

tunity arrived in 2003 when the Liberals won the Ontario election. Under the new

minister of education a number of conservative initiatives, including teacher

testing, were rolled back thus demonstrating a lack of policy stickiness in compo-

nents of the reform agenda. And, as the 2007 Ontario election demonstrated,

Ontario teachers remain strident opponents of the PC Party and are willing to

campaign vociferously against them.

Finally, this case study speaks to research on authentic public participation in the

policy process and the relations between the governing and the governed. It draws



19/23

attention to the need for further research comparing the administrative structures of

different governments to reveal which frameworks enable meaningful and effective

participation. We therefore need to understand the different instruments and tools

deployed within the process of policy development to better recognize how public

administration affects the realization of policy and political legitimacy.

Jennifer Wallner is currently completing a Ph.D. at the University of Toronto inPolitical Science. Her research interests include federalism and social policy, andpolicy cohesion in decentralized arenas.

Notes

This paper was originally presented at the Policy Failure Workshop at Canadian Political Science Asso-ciation meetings at Saskatoon, Saskatchewan in 2007. I acknowledge the helpful comments of Grace

Skogstad, Andrea Rounce, Phil Triadafilopouolos, and the journals anonymous reviewers.1. This idea of legitimacy is inspired by Richard Neustadts (1976) reflection on the nature of presidential

power in the United States Neustadt argued that presidential power is the capacity to influence theconduct of others conditioned by their sense of obligation to follow him. Specifically, the source ofpresidential power lies in perceptions of legitimacy and sentiments of loyalty (p. 2) and a Presidentwho senses what his influence is made of and who means to guard his future will approach his presentactions with an eye to the reactions of constituents in Washington and out (1976, p. 252).

2. This is not to claim that all policies reflect the attitudes of a society; indeed, dissonant policies can oftenbe a stimulus for societal change. There are, nevertheless, limits to the acceptability of inharmoniouspublic policies among the community meaning that policy content should fit within certain ideational

boundaries. The extension of same-sex marriage rights in Canada and other countries around theworld is an example of a dissonant public policy. While encouraged by a minority of the population

and supported by specific stakeholders, the policy is nevertheless unsettling to the majority ofCanadians (Smith, 1999).

3. Respondents were drawn on the basis of their presence in Alberta and Ontarios education policysector throughout the period under investigation and were provided with a list of questions cued tospecific pieces of legislation prior to the interview. Respondents were given the chance to consider theissues in advance because of the fact that the period under investigation predated our conversations

by at least 10 years. All interviews were conducted on the condition of anonymity.

4. That year, the government increased the salaries of employees in the public service by 12 to 15 percentbut only increased teachers by 6 percent. Throughout February 2002, Alberta teachers across theprovince went on strike. On February 22, teachers returned to their classrooms complying withprovincial back to work legislation. Eventually, the government agreed to increase teachers salaries bya greater amount and initiated a major review of education in the province. The review was seen as a

way to reconcile relations between the government and the teachers, to rebuild the trust that was lostduring the strike.

5. One story from the Winnipeg Free Press observed that, In a country where massive changes toprovincial education systems are almost fashionable, only Ontario Premier Mike Harris has managedto provoke insurrection of the kind demonstrated this week by 126,000 striking teachers. In Alberta,Premier Ralph Klein rolled back teachers wages five per cent to help fight the deficit and yet heardhardly a peep from the guardians of his provinces classrooms (McCann, 1997).

6. The targeted ridings approach was taken because it was clear that the PCs were poised for victory. TheNDPs anti-union actions and general failures as government in 199095 were still fresh in the mindsof the electorate. The new Liberal Party leader Dalton McGuinty was viewed as weak and lackedcredibility. Finally, Ontarios economy had achieved significant growth under the PCs tenure. Giventhese conditions, it seemed apparent that toppling the PC government was unachievable and so the

organizations opted for a strategy of selective targeting.7. While turnover in Canadian elections is quite commonplace (Franks, 1987), the unseating of an

incumbent cabinet minister is a rarity (Docherty, 1997, p. 54).



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8. In fact, of the 26 targeted riding, the conservatives lost 22. The Conservatives, as a representativefrom the Ontario Secondary Schools Teachers Federation (OSSTF) said, were unaware of localsupport for teachersthe closer you get to the schools the more support you get and parents andstudents will go to great lengths to protect the system (phone interview, April 2007).

9. The Alberta government successfully changed the previous teacher certification regime, centralizing

control over professional development and introduced a policy requiring the recertification of teach-ers every three years (Alberta Education, 2003).

10. On charter schools, one former president of the ASBA said: I fully endorse the policy. It has enabledcreativity and innovation in the province where people can bring forward ideas that have never beenseen. However, it still gives the opportunity for the public system to incorporate these new ideasunder their own umbrellawhich has largely been the case, particularly in Edmonton (personalinterview, April 2006).

11. Annual reports from the Alberta Teachers Association (ATA) in the period under investigationconfirm these various representative bodies and consultative meetings. For example in 1996, seniorassociation staff held their annual meeting with Department of Education officials to discuss itemsunder the Annual Representative Assembly policy and throughout the year, the ATA responded inwriting to six proposals issued by the Government of Alberta (Alberta Teachers Association, 1996,

p. 21).

12. This perception was echoed in the Globe and Mail immediately before the 1999 election: Ontario is lateamong the provinces in making these [education] reforms, and many deeply entrenched interestgroups have opposed them . . . education . . . is managerially tough and politically explosivewhichis why most politicians avoid it. Mr. Harris did not avoid it (Globe and Mail, May 31, 1999).

13. The ATA represents all teachers in the province, the ASBA all the school boards, the Alberta CatholicTrustees Association Catholic trustees when issues directly affect the Catholic system but are other-wise under the umbrella of the ASBA. In addition to these groups, other important organizationsinclude the College of Alberta School Superintendents, the Association of School Business OfficialsAlberta, and the Alberta Home and Schools Councils Association.

14. Stakeholder participation ended up substantially changing a key government project designed tostimulate innovation in teaching practices. The initial proposal, entitled the School PerformanceIncentive Program, introduced performance-based bonus funding to teachers and schools in 1999.Education professionals, however, argued that the program simply rewarded schools that werealready economically advantaged and reinforced inequalities in the system. The government placedSPIP on hold and commenced a major round of consultations with the five organizations. The resultof which was the Alberta Initiative for School Improvement (AISI) to encourage the creation ofinnovative programs to improve student learning. AISI has now garnered international attention andall respondents indicated their strong support for the program.

15. One Ontario respondent described the education community as Byzantine alluding to the com-plexity and disordered nature of the various representative organizations (personal interview, April2007).

16. The five federations are: OSSTF, Ontario English Catholic Teachers Association, Ontario Public SchoolMen Teachers Federation and the Federation of Women Teachers Associations of Ontario (which

joined together in 1998 forming the Elementary Teachers Federation), and LAssociation des Enseig-nantes et des Enseignants Franco-Ontariens.

17. One should neither assume that education reforms have ceased under the new Liberal governmentnor that education stakeholders have agreed with all the changes. However, the reopening of com-munication lines and the willingness of both parties to compromise on certain issues has reengagedthe education community within the policy process. In turn, this has leant credibility and support tothe governments legitimacy in the sector.

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