Waldo Canyon Fire Review - US Forest Service · Web viewWaldo Canyon Fire Review Pike and San...

Waldo Canyon Fire Review Pike and San Isabel National Forests USDA Forest Service June 2013

PurposeOn November 26, 2012, James Hubbard, Deputy Chief for State and Private Forestry (SPF) issued a letter requiring several large fires of Fiscal Year 2012 be reviewed by the National Incident Management Organization (NIMO). The letter emphasized the responsibility of the Forest Service to evaluate management actions and assure they were appropriate, risk based and effective. The fires were selected based on complexity and national significance ensuring the selected fires provide a cross section of our risk management performance in fires of various final costs, sizes and oversight complexity.

On January 28, 2013, Tom Harbour, Director of Fire and Aviation Management, issued a letter to Bob Houseman defining expectations for the review of the Waldo Canyon Fire located on the Pike-San Isabel National Forests in Colorado. The purpose of the review is to learn from those involved, share observations and considerations with the greater fire community and improve risk-based decision making.

Background

The review team gathered incident data from several sources including the Waldo Canyon Fire documentation package located at the Forest Supervisor’s Office for the Pike and San Isabel National Forests, FTP site (209s), Wildland Fire Decision Support System (WFDSS) and the City of Colorado Springs After Action Reports (initial and final). Interviews were conducted with personnel closely involved with making key decisions on development of incident objectives, strategy, and missions. They included the Agency Administrator (AA) and AA representatives, Initial Attack (IA) Incident Commander (IC), Type 1 IC and Deputy IC, Type 1 Operations Section Chiefs (OSC), and the Forest and District Fire Management Officers (FMO). The focus of the review was internal, concentrating on organizational effectiveness and the four review objectives.

1

Review Objectives:

Identify Best Business Practices Used on Fires This Past Season

Identify How Social and Political Issues Factored Into Our Decision Making

Identify Which Current Procedures Can Be Enhanced or Expanded

Identify Improvements That Can Be Made In Sharing and Clarifying Expectations

Review Team Members from the US Forest Service National Incident Management Organization (NIMO), and Rocky Mountain Region Staff:

Bob Houseman Incident Commander, NIMO

Mark Stiles, Forest Supervisor, San Juan National Forest

Scott Sugg, Fire Operations Specialist, Rocky Mt. Region

Curtis Heaton, Operations Section Chief, NIMO

Bruce Palmer, Public Information Officer, NIMO

Nick Giannettino, Planning Section Chief, NIMO

Waldo Canyon Fire Review Pike and San Isabel National ForestsUSDA Forest Service

The Southwest United States and the State of Colorado were experiencing severe drought conditions with winter snow pack below the 25th percentile. Heavy and fine fuels were extremely dry; the result of extended periods of above average temperatures and below average moisture. Significant fire activity had already occurred along the Colorado Front Range and across the Rocky Mountain and Southwest Geographic Area. Resource availability was stretched thin due to complex fires along the Colorado Front Range and competition with other geographic areas. On June 23, 2012, the National Planning Level was 3.

Continuous stands of Ponderosa pine and Douglas-fir constituted the fuels on the upper portion of the fire. Lower elevations were dominated by Ponderosa pine and Gambel oak. The area is a true Wildland/Urban Interface (WUI) – where forested lands and urban environments have no clear boundary. Drought stressed vegetation and cured fine fuels intermix with homes, fences, outbuildings, firewood stacks and other receptive fuels to form a continuous fuel bed directly into the suburbs.

Actual reported conditions from fire line observations and local National Fire Danger Rating System (NFDRS) data: 1000 hour fuels – 4%

10 hour-min. recorded values – 3% ERC-100th percentile, setting new records Live fuels 83-115% (Ponderosa pine, Gambel oak)

The fire area is dominated by a major ridge, Rampart Ridge that runs southeast to northwest along with numerous parallel smaller ridges and canyons. These canyons tend to run from the western portion of the fire and drain down into the city of Colorado Springs to the east. These topographic features contributed to the extreme fire behavior that occurred on June 26, 2012. Elevations within the fire range from 6,400 to 9,500 feet. Weather was characterized for several days by red flag warnings for instability, high temperatures and low relative humidity during the last week of June and first part of July. These conditions were present on the large fire growth days of the fire and on June 26, 2012, when the fire exhibited extreme fire behavior when thunderstorm outflow caused the fire to move down the east drainages into the subdivisions of Colorado Springs.

2

Review Objectives:

Identify Best Business Practices Used on Fires This Past Season

Identify How Social and Political Issues Factored Into Our Decision Making

Identify Which Current Procedures Can Be Enhanced or Expanded

Identify Improvements That Can Be Made In Sharing and Clarifying Expectations

Review Team Members from the US Forest Service National Incident Management Organization (NIMO), and Rocky Mountain Region Staff:

Bob Houseman Incident Commander, NIMO

Mark Stiles, Forest Supervisor, San Juan National Forest

Scott Sugg, Fire Operations Specialist, Rocky Mt. Region

Curtis Heaton, Operations Section Chief, NIMO

Bruce Palmer, Public Information Officer, NIMO

Nick Giannettino, Planning Section Chief, NIMO


Fire Chronology

Day(s) Date CommandSize From

209s Actions

1 6/23

I/A and T3(RMA Team A sent key

qualified individuals from Springer Fire to

assist the T3 Organization) 2000

0% cont.Aggressive I/A response

Life and PropertyEvacuation(s)Ordered IMT1

2 6/24Type 3

3,600

0% cont.Over 13,000 residence/commercial

threatened and evacuatedDisaster declaration (County)

3 6/25Type 3 to Type 1

(transition) 4,500

5% cont.Over 15,500 residence/commercial

threatenedEvacuations in effect

Transition from IMT3 to IMT1 (Harvey)

4 6/26 Type 1 6,200

5% cont.Red Flag/Haines of 6Record temperatures

Large fire run (10,000 + acres)Evacuation(s) in Colorado Springs

up to 30,000+Structures lost (no conf. on #s)Area Command in place for the

Waldo Canyon and High Park Fires (Front Range Colorado)

Meeting(s) with Department of Defense

5 6/27 Type 1 18,500

5% cont.20,200 structures threatened

Approx. 32,000 people have been affected by evacuations.

Area Command received Delegation of Authority (Waldo/High Park)

6 6/28 Type 1 16,750

15% cont.23000+ structures threatened

347 structures destroyed (June 26th)Presidential disaster declared

7 6/29 Type 1 17,073 23000+ structures threatened President visits Waldo Canyon Fire,

with other high ranking officials

3


Day(s) Date CommandSize From

209s Actions(Senators, USFS Tidwell, etc…)

8 6/30 Type 1 17,659

15,000+ structures threatenedResidences damaged 24

Destroyed structures 347

9 7/1 Type 1 17,827

55% cont.Highway 24 reopened to residents

and then to the public in the afternoon

10 7/2 Type 1 17,920

70%Incident Commander site visit to the

Air Force Academy.

11 7/3 Type 1 18,247

80%Site visit Secretary of Agriculture

and Homeland Security12 7/4 Type 1 18,247 90%13 7/5 Type 1 95%14 7/6 Type 1 98%

15 7/7 Type 3 (transition)98%

Transition from ICT1 to ICT3

16-257/8-17 Type 3 and Type 4 18,247

7/10 100%7/17 Final 209

Critical Values at Risk

The values at risk in the fire area as identified by the Forest Service and City of Colorado Springs included life (over 100 hikers in vicinity of the fire on the day of discovery), numerous surrounding communities, Colorado Springs watershed and Colorado Springs residential areas. Specific communities at risk included the town of Manitou Springs, Crystal Park, Green Mountain Falls, Cascade, Chipita Park and Woodland Park. Residential subdivisions of city of Colorado Springs included Mt. Shadows and Cedar Heights. In addition, the US Air Force Academy was at risk. The fire resulted in 32,000+ residences evacuated, 347 primary residences destroyed, 25 residences damaged and two civilian fatalities.

Observation by Objective:

The following are key observations and corresponding lessons learned organized by the four objectives of the review.

1. Identify Best Business Practices Used on Fires This Past Season

4


First responders immediately realized IA would be unsuccessful given the extreme fire conditions and quickly shifted their emphasis to the primary value at risk – human life. As the unit FMO noted the definition of success changed from catching the fire to conducting good risk management and ensuring everyone was safe.

Pre-season engagements, cross training and local leadership at the Forest level built the foundation for a unity of effort across jurisdictional boundaries fueled by a common goal to protect life, property and critical infrastructure. Lessons learned from the 2002 Hayman Fire had been applied on the Waldo Canyon Fire as part of a focused effort to rebuild damaged relationships between the FS and its partners. These relationships were tested as the fire quickly entered the WUI and became a “worst-case” scenario.

During the interviews, FS personnel realized more could have been done to prepare for the “worst-case” scenario but there was no doubt a foundation was in place that allowed federal, state and local resources to manage the fire until a National Incident Management Team (IMT) could arrive. The individuals involved in the Type 3 incident management organization demonstrated the core values of leadership – Duty, Respect and Integrity. A lack of agreements (specifically with United States Air Force Academy) and at times, a lack of understanding of the interagency wildland fire response system, created friction between agencies. A primary concern was the interoperability between the federal communication system and the county/city 800 MHz system. Not having the ability to directly communicate between agencies via radio created some issues and hampered the ability to track the resources in this complex environment. The professionalism and dedication to the common goal of protecting human life, allowed the multi-agency partners to work through these friction points.

The complexity of the incident was so apparent that a National Type 1 IMT was ordered within an hour of the fire’s detection. The Type 3 IC managed the fire in excess of 36 hours before transitioning to the Type 1 IMT. This is not a reflection on any of the personnel involved rather a reflection on the system that allows a Type 3 IC to manage a fire of the highest complexity for 36 hours. Fortunately, a common “work around” allowed the Type 3 IC to “borrow” members of a Type 2 IMT that was demobilizing a nearby incident. These individuals provided support and expertise to an organization stretched to the breaking point under an extremely complex scenario.

The incident strategy was rather simple and carried from the Type 3 IC to the Type 1 IMT – get the people out of harm’s way, contain the fire before it reaches the values at risk or minimize the impacts if it does reach them. The operational environment was described as “360 degrees” (the fire was threatening something of value in all directions, all the time). All of the IC’s and OSC referenced limited decision space and pointed out that from the start of the fire until its conclusion they had their “backs against the WUI.” In addition to the threat to human life, the fire threatened critical infrastructure, private property (primarily residential homes) and the watershed responsible for approximately 80% of the greater Colorado Springs area’s water supply. The monetary value of infrastructure within the watershed was estimated at nearly one billion dollars.

5


The incident complexity was complicated by responders from multiple fire departments; the variety of tactics required the development of a workable Incident Management “Organization” (IMO) and the multiple jurisdictions the fire was affecting. When feasible, direct and indirect fire line was used along the perimeter where topography and existing road systems increased the probability of success. As expected, there was a heavy emphasis on tactical air support from fixed and rotor-wing aircraft, particularly in the WUI but also to support perimeter control operations. The tactics employed were “bump and run” within the interface; a proven but specialized technique in the WUI where mobile task forces and strike teams take action as the fire moves through a WUI environment. This was a very dynamic “firefight” based on windows of opportunity as opposed to a traditional “anchor and flank” approach to perimeter control.

All interviewees felt critical information was delivered by all the AAs. It was noted that partner agencies that had never hosted an IMT struggled with the mechanics and needs of the IMT. A recommendation was to consider how we prepare a local entity for an IMT managed incident. A simulation or short training session to prepare local governments was suggested. This is a common theme heard from IMTs – local government has not had the same amount of exposure to IMTs as many of the state and federal agencies.

The IMT had a unique situation; not all of the affected partners were willing to delegate authority. This required both a unified command and a unity of effort approach to the fire. The Incident Command System is noted for its flexibility, scalability and adaptability. The Type 1 IMT used it well to adjust to the unique command structure. The Type 1 IMT created a branch dedicated to supporting structure protection within the Colorado Springs jurisdiction. Through a unity of effort, the combination of IMT skills, the incorporation of local fire department talent and senior leaders into the IMT or better yet IMO proved to be a force multiplier and ensured “ownership” and enhanced communications across agency boundaries. This model has been successfully used before by this IMT (Four Mile Fire in Boulder, 2010) and should be incorporated into IMT case studies and presented at Advanced Incident Management Training courses (such as S-420/S-520). It is an art form to bring so many entities together – the Forest and IMT should be recognized for their efforts.

The United States Air Force Academy and the local Forest did not have existing agreements in place prior to this fire, resulting in a series of complicated “workarounds” by IMT and Air Force personnel; specifically, coordinating suppression and protection efforts without cross-billing. A consideration would be to implement a memorandum of agreement to address this barrier in the future.

None of the IC’s indicated a desire, based on the extreme fire conditions, to commit to an aggressive perimeter control strategy that would have required additional hand crews and had a very low probability of success. Human life as the principal value at risk drove the strategy which focused on getting people out as opposed to firefighters in. The clear and present danger was the fire moving into the WUI – and the need for engines capable of operating within the WUI supported by skilled Type 1 hand crews where roads and direct

6


line could be effectively held. The ideal resources for this scenario were a combination of structural engines and FS/DOI agency Type 3 engines. The FS strike teams assigned to Colorado from California proved exceptionally effective and were recognized at the highest level for their expertise and successful operations. However, there was resistance to looking outside the Geographic Area Coordinating Center (GACC) for resources given the national fire situation. Although local Fire Department Engines and contract resources were available, there was hesitancy to deploy them in all situations.

The incident strategy focused on the abundant road systems which lead to a relatively easily supported logistical train. Dutch Creek Protocols were easily met due to the fire’s urban environment. Hoist and night capable National Guard aircraft were available to the IMT and only minutes away. It is interesting to note that both the IC’s and OSC’s reflected on how the Dutch Creek Protocol has had a positive effect on the team and their decision making: “…It [Dutch Creek Protocol] makes us think about where we put people.”

2. Identify How Social and Political Issues Factored Into Our Decision Making

A major WUI wildfire on the Front Range of Colorado always attracts considerable media attention and the Waldo Canyon Fire was no different. Local and national news media provided constant coverage of the fire. Media coverage, thousands of evacuees and the multiple jurisdictions involved demanded a continuous, coordinated flow of information about the fire. Early on, the Regional Forester tasked the Forest Supervisor with coordinating community outreach. The Forest Supervisor was instrumental in bringing together city and county officials to keep the community informed. This work continues to reap benefits from a grateful community. One interviewee summed it up by saying, “For once the Forest Service was the good guy.”

Previously-built relationships are essential during a complex, rapidly-expanding incident like the Waldo Canyon Fire. The District FMO (also the IA IC) has put considerable effort into mending relationships damaged during the Hayman Fire. Joint training exercises, informal meetings and other pre-season work contributed to a shared knowledge of everyone’s values at risk. This became evident during the fire. All jurisdictions immediately agreed on the values at risk – public safety, structures and infrastructure. The Type 1 IMT continued the relationship building with cooperator meetings. At daily meetings, strategies were shared with cooperators, additional values identified and evacuation plans discussed.

One concern mentioned was keeping up with the information flow. An emergency in a major city like Colorado Springs is going to generate a considerable amount of social media traffic. Social media (Facebook, Twitter, blogs, etc.) is one way to communicate with the public but keeping up with the constant demand for information and the agency restrictions on its use are issues with using these tools. Incorporating local cooperators into the Information function and using their expertise in social media may be one way to bridge the gap between what agencies are allowed to do and the demand for information.

The Waldo Canyon Fire attracted a large number of elected officials and other dignitaries during the relatively short time it burned. Visitors to the fire included the President of the

7


United States, Governor of Colorado, Colorado’s Congressional delegation, secretaries of Agriculture and Homeland Security, Chief of the Forest Service, Under Secretary for Natural Resources & Environment, military officers and various other elected officials and their staffs. Daily briefings were also conducted for the Washington Office, Department of Agriculture and Congressional staffs; all of this in addition to the already heavy demand from the news media. While their interest in the fire gave us an opportunity to tell our story, we need to understand the impact of VIP visits on the incident management team and agency administrators. One or two visits are easy, but many may become taxing. When multiple VIP visits are anticipated (i.e., during election years and high profile fires), they should be recognized as an incident within an incident and appropriate resources ordered to assist the IMT and AA. A short team of Command and General Staff could be assigned to manage the daily logistics of VIP visits and briefings.

3. Identify Which Current Procedures Can Be Enhanced or Expanded

There was consistent support from the AAs in oversight of the incident, up and down the chain of command from the Chief to district level. It was done in a manner that added value appropriately. Teams felt that the AAs did a good job in supporting the IMTs and were appropriately engaged and helpful. Although individuals changed, the message didn’t change – put the fire out safely and maintain relationships. The Regional Forester went to the incident early and made the decision to have the Forest Supervisor focus on community relations and the Deputy Forest Supervisor work as AA. The Regional Forester’s representative was also used to assist oversight from the region. The split of duties between the Forest Supervisor (external, media) and Deputy Forest Supervisor (AA, Agency Representative {AREP}) worked very well here.

The Wildland Fire Decision Support System (WFDSS) process helped to frame the size and extent of the values at risk, and is best understood by agency folks because cooperators are not that familiar with WFDSS. It became clear early on that the local unit needed assistance with WFDSS, especially in developing a cadre that excludes the IA staff who are actively engaged in suppression and are needed in the field to direct suppression efforts and to manage emerging risk. This was recognized by the Regional Office who ordered a WFDSS support team to help. An understanding of what would meet the “acceptable” level for the first 24 hours for WFDSS was mentioned, with the understanding that follow up could occur to build a more complete product after the initial 24 hour entry. It was felt that WFDSS is time consuming but we get a lot out of it – it helps the line officer in making a good decision. Because WFSDS was lacking current information it was suggested that results would be improved by having routine (annual) updates such as current GIS structure layers from partners and engaging partners in pre-season simulations with WFDSS.

Procedures related to the role of the Sheriff were noted, particularly the unique role of the Sheriff in the state of Colorado, and their jurisdiction when ownership changes to National Forest Lands, and coordination with suppression resources during evacuations. The evacuation process worked rather well in this instance considering the rate of spread of this fire and the number of residences needing to be evacuated. This issue is addressed in detail in the section on improvements that can be made in clarifying expectations.

8


Items that can be enhanced included the role of the military, utilization of military assets, and the utilization of MAFFs on the incident. There was confusion by the public over the use and role of the military in assisting the incident. This can be enhanced by developing agreements between the agencies to define expectations and in sharing the terms of these agreements with the public. In this incident, as in all WUI incidents, there is always the question of structure protection – who pays, how it will work, etc. The structure protection/perimeter control issue is often not clearly defined or understood by all. This too would benefit from pre-season work with partners.

The practice of using multiple Liaison Officers (LOFRs) in managing this incident was instrumental in assisting with community relationships, supporting management decisions and conveying these decisions to the community.

4. Identify Improvements That Can Be Made In Sharing and Clarifying Expectations

Although some felt that the 2012 Leader’s Intent letter came out late in the season (May 25, 2012), fire managers liked the direction and felt that it assisted in strategic decision making and felt there was no problem in implementing what was expected – risk management and firefighter safety.

The roles and responsibilities for community involvement between the AA and the IMT were clearly identified in the Delegation of Authority. The daily practice of the AA/AREP attending with the IC at briefings and public meetings helped ensure that expectations and leader’s intent were clear and shared throughout the incident.

Utilization of military assets was mentioned earlier. The Colonel assigned as LOFR was very helpful in obtaining and utilizing military assets along with providing a central military figure to work through. Dual status command is the key when dealing with National Guard and regular military which should be pursued in all incidents with military assets deployed. A medevac helicopter for 24/7 extraction was obtained within ten minutes of requesting one, and had a ten minute travel time for deployment.

Evacuation processes and procedures, including decisions to evacuate (when/where/how) and decisions affecting re-entry could be improved. Overall there was very good communication on these issues/roles, especially considering the scope of the evacuations on this incident. We need to remain mindful that when people are evacuated from their residences, questions exist which can lead to confusion. This experience can be very emotional for the citizens affected. We need to clearly define pre-evacuation, mandatory evacuation and time frames for evacuation. There is an opportunity to provide clarity and consistency to these terms. The time frames need to be clearly understood by all affected. The Waldo Canyon Fire covered three miles in 45 minutes. The fire behavior we see today may be the new normal. Everyone needs to be clear on timeframes and re-entry so all fully understand. Evacuations are within the jurisdiction of our cooperators, but we need to be clear in our use of terminology regarding evacuations.

9


The Delegation of Authority was not signed by the City of Colorado Springs. As a result having two different command structures could have caused confusion, but in the case of the Waldo Canyon Fire it did not, primarily because of the close coordination, integration of resources, and communication between the City of Colorado Springs Fire Department (CSFD) resources and the IMTs.

Lessons Learned / Observations and Recommendations

National Priority

1. The absence of a Cooperative Agreement or Memorandum of Understanding with the military resulted in delays and confusion attempting to incorporate military assets. At the national level we need clarification of roles and mission when dealing with the military and for working together to manage incidents, share resources, etc. Who can call them in? Who pays for them? How? The community doesn’t understand why we can’t use the military resources; we need better understanding of how the military can be involved.

2. Local fire leadership expressed concern over the delays in getting additional agency resources. The delay in getting resources was not due to availability but more of a failure of the dispatch system to recognize the seriousness of an emerging fire within the WUI. The IC Type 3 felt he had to explain why a Type 1 team was needed when the location and the values at risk alone warranted the rapid escalation in incident complexity. There was also concern over delays in resource orders being processed. This is partly due to multiple fires occurring within the dispatch center’s sphere of influence, reduced staffing and vacancies in critical positions, but it is also indicative of a geographical area already taxed with multiple large fires and re-organizing to meet a new and emerging priority.

3. Careful attention must be given to the development of accurate, cautious joint fire information, talking points in light of the seriousness of the event and the constant potential for delayed discovery of tragic outcomes. This should include more effective use of social media to ensure the accuracy of near-real-time information being disseminated by parties outside of the IMO. Also, measured approaches to reducing the effort required for fire information activities as the event progresses will ensure the overall focus remains on emergency response.

4. The forum of information sharing provided political entities with the appropriate level of contact needed to address their concerns. Bringing in other folks within the agency that can help manage this was a help and key to success on the Waldo Canyon Fire. This was a great learning opportunity and outcome for the Department representatives on scene, i.e. how the military resources assigned to the incident are compensated and the extent to which they engage their resources. Assigning someone to ride with them and “stay at their hip” allowed them to find answers to questions they may not have known how to ask.

5. High profile fires like the Waldo Canyon Fire are likely to attract interest from elected officials and other dignitaries. In addition to local and national media attention,

10


multiple VIP visits and briefings may become taxing on the IMT and AAs. This extra work load, especially from high ranking officials, should be recognized as an incident within an incident, and appropriate resources ordered to assist with the assignment. Consider ordering a Command and general staff or soliciting national office assistance in coordinating, consolidating and supporting briefings and visits of high-ranking officials.

6. A primary concern was the interoperability between the federal communication system and the county/city 800 MHz system. Not having the ability to directly communicate between agencies via radio created some issues and the ability to track the resources in this complex environment.

7. The incident also had a FEMA Incident Management Assistance Team and Area Command team assigned, however since these teams have such limited deployments it is suggested to include partners and cooperators in the rationale and decision to utilize these teams in the future so all affected parties and the public better understand the roles these specialized teams fill in management of larger fires.

8. A recommendation was to consider how we prepare a local entity for an IMT managed incident. A simulation or short training session to prepare local governments was suggested. This is a common theme heard from IMTs – local government has not had the same amount of exposure to IMTs as many of the state and federal agencies.

9. Through a unity of effort, the combination of IMT skills, the incorporation of local fire department talent and senior leaders into the IMT or better yet IMO proved to be a force multiplier. This model has been successfully used before by this IMT (Four Mile Fire in Boulder, 2010) and should be incorporated into IMT case studies and presented at Advanced Incident Management Training courses (such as S-420/S-520) for all IMTs to follow.

Regional & Local Priority

1. No fuels treatment projects on national forest lands had any direct influence on the fire due primarily to how this fire burned. There were fuels treatment projects on the west flank of the fire but the fire was contained prior to reaching these national forest fuels treatments. As was pointed out by one of the ICs, the fuels reduction in the Colorado Spring area was designed for a normal or possibly a “bad” fire. Waldo Canyon Fire was an extreme fire, under a perfect storm of fuels, weather and topography. It moved unabated through most of the treatment areas. However, one fuel treatment project, the treatment around Cedar Heights (which served as an anchor point) was noted for its success in significantly slowing the fire.

2. The IMT established the Colorado Springs Branch assigning CSFD personnel as the OPBD and DIVS within the branch. This provided the local chief “home rule” and showed that local resources were assigned and were integrated into the management organization and decision processes. This worked very well. There was a cooperative identification of strategies to be employed and resources to be assigned at the appropriate time and place needed. It is recommended that on the future incidents that we consider assigning fire department resources to the IMT as opposed to

11


leaving them under control of the fire department. Additionally, integration of the local fire departments, particularly CSFD in the room next to Operations office at ICP was critical to have in place.

3. In thinking of how to make the in-briefs more effective, most of the Agency Administrators are following an established format and most units are good at this. Partners may not know their roles at an in-briefing since they haven’t been trained in this area. The host agencies should inform partners of their appropriate roles at the in-briefing. This would provide our partners an opportunity to share their concerns, to bring maps and other supporting information and allow them to engage more effectively.

4. “It’s all about relationships.” Even though relationships were good between the Forest Service and local officials, interviewees admitted that relationships and communication can always be improved. Pre-season work (exercises, joint training, meetings) are essential for developing a common understanding of responsibilities, values at risk and likely strategies. These meetings are also a time to ensure WFDSS is up to date and there is agreement on public information strategies such as social media and joint information centers.

5. The appointment of a Forest Service senior leadership position dedicated to community outreach created much support for the agency and the firefighting efforts. That work is still garnering community goodwill a year after the fire. This model may not work on all incidents but was a real benefit in building community relations on the Waldo Canyon Fire.

6. There was frustration from the Forest trying to work through WFDSS. It became clear early on that the local unit needed assistance with WFDSS, especially in developing a cadre that excludes the IA staff who are actively engaged in suppression and are needed in the field to direct suppression efforts and manage emerging risk. Ultimately, a WFDSS support team was ordered by the Region that provided support on several incidents over a period of a few weeks. Assistance and training can help to identify the most important elements to include, especially at the start of a rapidly progressing incident. Concern was expressed regarding the internal and external understanding, application, and updating of WFDSS. It would be useful to sponsor annual simulations and training with agency staff, partners and cooperators on WFDSS applications and procedures and to use this session to update WFDSS data. Have all stakeholders involved in the WFDSS process collaborate on incident objectives (even if they are not signing the document). Annual simulations can include not only WFDSS updates, but also evacuation procedures and media integration as well.

7. Confusion over evacuation authority and procedures demonstrated the need for a common understanding between agencies and the public on future evacuations. Example; during transition with the Type 1 IMT, an area that had been evacuated on June 24, 2012, (Mt. Shadows) was reopened to the public on June 25, 2012, and re-evacuated on June 26, 2012. We need to clearly define pre-evacuation, mandatory evacuation and time frames for evacuation. There is an opportunity to provide clarity and consistency to these terms.

12


8. The use of daily cooperator meetings with local stakeholders by the Type 1 IMT was valuable for identifying values at risk, sharing strategies and enhancing relations with the local community. All IMTs should consider regular cooperator meetings as a way of building community relationships.

9. Consider incorporating local cooperators into the Information function and using their expertise in social media as one way to bridge the gap between what agencies are allowed to do and the demand for information.

Attachments Page

1. Waldo Canyon Fire History – Key Fire Events 14 2. Waldo Canyon Fire Progression Map 17 3. Preliminary Damage Assessment Map 18

13


Waldo Canyon Fire History – Key Fire Events

Saturday, June 23, 2012Waldo Canyon Fire reported at approximately 1200. Forest Service (FS) Incident Commander (ICT3) responded and assumed command. Technically it was not a unified command; the County Fire Management Officer with the Sheriff’s Department became a Deputy IC to keep the overall command under the FS IC and to not add to an already complex and confusing situation. A Type I Incident Command Team (IMT) was ordered.

Sunday, June 24, 2012Mandatory evacuations were placed for the residents of Manitou Springs and Crystal Park, bringing the number of evacuees to 7,000. Later in the morning around 7 a.m., residents in the towns of Green Mountain Falls, Cascade and Chipita Park were ordered to start a mandatory evacuation. Most of western Colorado Springs is also evacuated in the early morning, raising the evacuation total to 11,000. The fire was approximately 3,500 acres. The city and county issued disaster declarations.

Monday, June 25, 20120600 Transfer of Command from ICT3 Zanotto to ICT1 Harvey. IMT1 establishes daily cooperator meetings for the duration of the incident. IC Harvey discussed with Agency Administrator Peterson the USFS Chief's 2012 “10 Questions regarding Risk Assessment.” IC Harvey discussed incident objectives/priorities, strategy, tactics and situational awareness with personnel from the City of Colorado Springs, El Paso County and Pike San Isabel National Forest. These meetings become daily events led by the IMT.

Tuesday, June 26, 2012 Fuels, topography and weather (Red Flag Warning/wind conditions), combined with extreme fire behavior (spotting up to 1/2 mile) led to a large-scale fire run mid-afternoon to early morning hours (6/27) on the southeast flank of the fire, with the fire reaching into several subdivisions of Colorado Springs. The result of this fire spread resulted in 32,000+ residences evacuated, 346 primary residences destroyed, 25 residences damaged and two civilian fatalities.

A Geographic Area Command Team, with Bob Anderson as Area Commander, was put in place to help prioritize incident needs for fires along the Front Range.

IC Harvey established relationship with military personnel from NORCOM, including General Jacoby and Major General Lucky, Fort Carson; Major General Anderson, Air Force Academy;

14


General Gould; and Dual Status Command, Colonel Berg, for efficient coordination of the deployment of Department of Defense assets to assist the incident. The hottest temperature in Colorado Springs history, 101 degrees F, was recorded.

Wednesday June 27, 2012 With the establishment of Area Command, IC Harvey received Delegation of Authority from Area Commander Bob Anderson, effective 0800 hrs. this date.

IC Harvey met with representatives from Burlington Northern Santa Fe Railroad (BNSF), who had over 27 trains backed up and a “fire train” available on a siding near the Air Force Academy. Close coordination/communication with Mike Ensminger, Sheriff of Teller County, on evacuations in the county and community of Woodland Park. FEMA IMAT Matt Burns established contact with IC Harvey and coordination with IMT.

Thursday June 28, 2012 Presidential Disaster Declaration made late afternoon this date for El Paso and Larimer Counties (Waldo Canyon and High Park fires, respectively).

IC Harvey discussed with Forest Supervisor Jerri Marr and Tom Tidwell, Chief of the USFS the USFS Chief's 2012 “10 Questions regarding Risk Assessment.”

IC Harvey discussed incident objectives/priorities, strategy, tactics and situational awareness with personnel from the City of Colorado Springs, El Paso County and Pike-San Isabel National Forest.

Friday, June 29, 2012 Effective 1000 hrs. Colorado National Guard has primary military support response to the Waldo Canyon Fire, per Dual Status Command agreement reached earlier between regular military forces and Colorado National Guard. This results in one “go to” source (LNO Lt. Col. Mitch Utterback; Col. Byrne).

President of the United States Barak Obama visits Waldo Canyon Fire. IC Harvey briefs POTUS and members of his party including Senator Udall, Senator Bennett, Mayor Bach and Chief of the USFS Tom Tidwell and participates in discussions, tours and media briefings.

Sunday, July 1, 2012 With the dissolution of Area Command, IC Harvey received updated Delegation of Authority from US Forest Service Rocky Mountain Regional Forester and Colorado Department of

15


Public Safety (with additional signature by Colorado State Forest Service Line Officer), effective 0600 hrs. this date.

Hwy 24 opened to returning evacuee residents 0900 - 1300. At 1300 hrs. Hwy 24 opened to all public traffic.

Monday, July 2, 2012 IMT and host agencies initiated discussions about transition to a smaller incident management organization. Ultimate decision was made to transfer command to a Type 3 organization, building most components internally from resources existing within the Type 1 IMT. Tentative plans made to transfer command 0600 Saturday, 7/7.

IC Harvey visited the Air Force Academy and presented General Gould and staff a briefing and situational update.

Tuesday, July 3, 2012 DPIC Broyles meet with BAER Team Leader Marc Stamer to discuss support needs from the IMT to BAER Team.

Secretary of Homeland Security Janet Napolitano and Secretary of Agriculture Tom Vilsack visited Waldo Canyon Fire. IC Harvey briefs secretaries and members of their party, including Ernest Mitchell, U.S. Fire Administrator, and participates in discussions, tours and media briefings.

Wednesday, July 4, 2012 Colorado National Guard LNO Lt. Col. Mitch Utterback conducted brief flag ceremony and Pledge of Allegiance at 0600 briefing.

Thursday, July 5, 2012 Waldo Canyon fire is at 95% containment.

Saturday, July 7, 2012 0600 Transfer of Command from IC Harvey to ICT3 Nelson.

Tuesday, July 10, 2012 Waldo Canyon fire is declared 100% contained.

16


17

Waldo Canyon Fire Review - US Forest Service · Web viewWaldo Canyon Fire Review Pike and San...

Documents

Transcript of Waldo Canyon Fire Review - US Forest Service · Web viewWaldo Canyon Fire Review Pike and San...