INHERITANCE

NACAR vs. NISTALG.R. No. L-33006 December 8, 1982 || Inheritance

VASQUEZ, J., concurring:xxx Isabelo Nacar died before the said complaint was filed. It does not appear that any proceeding has been filed to settle his estate. Under these

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.FACTS:On various dates since the year 1968, defendant Isabelo Nacar incurred indebtedness to plaintiff Ildefonso Japitana in the total sum of P2,791.00,and which the defendant had not been able to pay despite repeateddemands. Defendant died in 1970 leaving among other things personal property consisting seven (7) heads of carabaos now in the possession ofNicanor Nacar. Plaintiff filed a claim against the estate of the late IsabeloNacar to recover the aforementioned sum. Judge Nistal issued an order directing the attachment of seven (7) carabaos in the possession of Nicanor Nacar. However, only four (4) carabaos were attached because three (3) carabaos had earlier been slaughtered during the rites preceding the burial of the late Isabelo Nacar.ISSUE:Whether or not the indebtedness may be enforced against the estate of the late Isabelo NacarHELD:Indeed, although Japitana may have a legal right to recover an indebtedness due him, Nicanor Nacar has no correlative legal duty to paythe debt for the simple reason that there is nothing in the complaint to show that he incurred the debt or had anything to do with the creation ofthe liability.It is also patent from the complaint that respondent Japitana filed the case against petitioner Nacar to recover seven (7) heads of carabaos allegedly belonging to Isabelo Nacar which Japitana wanted to recover from the possession of the petitioner to answer for the outstanding debt of the late Isabelo Nacar. This matter, however, is only ancillary to the main action. The ancillary matter does not cure a fatal defect in the complaint for the main action is for the recovery of an outstanding debt of the late lsabelo Nacar due respondent Japitana, a cause of action about which petitioner Nacar has nothing to do.Separate Opinions

facts, the filing of an ordinary action to recover said claim is not allowed inany court. Even if settlement proceedings had been taken to settle the estate of Isabelo Nacar, the suit to recover the claim of the private respondents may not be filed against the administrator or executor of his estate. The claim of private respondents, being one arising from a contract, may be pursued only by filing the same in the administration proceedings to settle the estate of the deceased Isabelo Nacar. If such a proceeding is instituted and the subject claim is not filed therein within the period prescribed, the same shall be deemed "barred forever." xxx The carabaos, if really owned by Isabelo Nacar, pertained to his estate upon his death. The claim of the private respondents may only be satisfied by a voluntary act on the part of the heirs of Isabelo Nacar, or pursued in the appropriate settlement proceedings. A municipal court may not entertain such a proceeding, it not being vested, under the law then in force, with probate jurisdiction. XxxANDERSON v. PERKINSG.R. No. L-15388 January 31, 1961FACTS:Petitioner Dora Perkins Anderson filed a petition for the probate of the supposed last will and testament of the late Eugene Arthur Perkins who allegedly possessed of personal and real properties. Petitioner also filed an urgent petition for the appointment of Alfonso Ponce Enrile as special administrator of the estate. The court issued an order appointing Enrile as such special administrator upon his posting of a bond.Oppositor Idonah Slade Perkins, surviving spouse of the deceased, entered an opposition to the probate of the will presented by petitioner.The special administrator submitted to the court a petition seeking authority to sell, or give away to some charitable or educational institution or institutions, certain personal effects left by the deceased which were allegedly deteriorating both physically and in value in order to avoid their further deterioration and to save whatever value might be obtained in their disposition. The court required the administration to submit a specification of the properties sought to be sold. The special administrator

submitted to the court a copy of the inventory of the personal properties belonging to the estate with the items sought to be sold.Oppositor filed an opposition to the proposed sale on the grounds that (1) most of the properties sought to be sold were conjugal properties of herself and her deceased husband; and (2) unauthorized removals of fine pieces of furniture belonging to the estate had been made.The lower court approved the proposed sale. Oppositor moved to reconsider this order on the grounds that (1) said order in effect authorized the special administrator to sell the entire personal estate of the deceased, contrary to Rule 81, sec. 2, Rules of Court; (2) said order was issued without a showing that the goods and chattels sought to be sold were perishable, pursuant to Rule 81, section 2, Rules of Court; (3) the personality sought to be sold represented the lifetime savings and collections of oppositor; (4) there is evidence on record showing unauthorized withdrawals from the properties of the estate, and the sale of the inventoried lot would prevent identification and recovery of the articles removed; and (5) there is also evidence showing oppositor's separate rights to a substantial part of the personal estate.The lower court denied the above motion for reconsideration. Oppositor appealed.ISSUE:

Before the perishable and other property of the estate of the deceased are sold by the special administrator, it is clear that proceedings must first be taken to segregate the alleged exclusive property of the surviving spouse. The issue of the ownership of said properties should be decided first, and the conjugal properties liquidated, or at least the surviving spouse should agree as to which properties he or she does not mind to be sold. Any sale done without this requirement should be considered premature, and the court must therefore refuse to grant permission.After all, most of the items sought to be sold can easily be protected and preserved with proper care and storage measures in either or both of the two residential houses left by the deceased, so that no reasons of extreme urgency justify the proposed sale at this time over the strong opposition and objection of oppositor-appellant who may later be adjudged owner of a substantial portion of the personal estate in question.The lower court's order authorizing the special administrator to sell certain personal properties of the estate is set aside.NOTE: Properties not belonging to the estate must be excluded, for they are not part of the inheritance. Hence, it is important to determine the ownership of the properties involved.RIGHTS TO THE SUCCESSION ARE TRANSMITTED FROM THE MOMENT OF DEATHMARIA VDA. DE REYES V. CAG.R. No. 92436 July 26, 1991

Whether or not the oppositors contention that she is entitled to a large portion of the personal properties in question either because they were conjugal property of herself and the deceased, or because they are her own exclusive, personal property should be entertained.HELD:YES. The Court held that the records show that up to the time the proposed sale was asked for and judicially approved, no proceedings had as yet been taken, or even started, to segregate the alleged exclusive property of the oppositor-appellant from the mass of the estate supposedly left by the deceased, or to liquidate the conjugal partnership property of the oppositor-appellant and the deceased.

FACTS:The petitioners in the case are successors-of-interest of the deceased Rafael Reyes Jr. Rafael Reyes Jr. was the grandson of the late Gavino Reyes and has allegedly inherited a parcel of land from the latter.Gavino Reyes owned a 70 hectare parcel of land located at Sangayad, Ulong-Tubig, Carmona, Cavite. When Gavino Reyes died on March 7, 1921, his property was admittedly not yet covered by a torrens title. The application for Torrens title registration then was prosecuted by his son, Marcelo Reyes, who was the administrator of his property.Gavino's heirs (children) executed oral partition and created a SubdivisionPlan in 1936

In 1936, the above property was surveyed and subdivided by Gavino's heirs. They orally settled, subdivided and partitioned Gavino Reyes' landed estate without formal requirements of Rule 74 of the Rules of Court when a parcel of land is covered by a torrens title. Each lot was indicated for and assigned to a specific heir.It appears therein that two lots, one of which is Lot No. I A-14, were allotted to Rafael Reyes, Sr., one of Gavino's children. Per testimony of Juan Poblete, the children thereafter secured tax declarations for their respective shares.In 1941, or about twenty (20) years after the death of Gavino, the original certificate of title for the whole property OCT No. 255 was issued. It was, however, kept by Juan Poblete, son-in-law of Marcelo Reyes, who was by then already deceased.One of the heirs, Rafael Reyes. Sr., sold his share of land to private respondent.On 3 December 1943, Rafael Reyes, Sr. (son of deceased Gavino) sold a parcel of land with an area of 23,431 square meters, more or less, to private respondent Dalmacio Gardiola (husband of his niece, Rosario Martillano).According to the vendee, this parcel corresponds to Lot No. 1-A-14 of the subdivision plan. The deed of sale, however, did not specifically mention Lot No. 1-A-14. The vendee immediately took possession of the property and started paying the land taxes therein.The Grandchildren of the late Gavino Reyes executed Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate in 1967. TCTs were issued, one of which was given to Rafael Reyes Jr (son of Rafael Reyes Sr.)On 21 October 1967, the grandchildren of the late Gavino Reyes executed a Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate. Private respondent Rosario Martillano signed the deed in representation of her mother, Marta Reyes, one of the children of Gavino Reyes.The lots supposedly inherited by the grandchildren named in the deed of1967 were the same lots inherited and given to their respective fathers or mothers in 1936 while the land was not yet covered by the torrens system.Hence, in the case of Rafael Reyes, Sr., the land inherited by him was two (2) parcels of land known as Lots Nos. 1-A-3 and 1-A-14 described in the Subdivision plan of 1936, were the same parcels of land allegedly inherited

by Rafael Reyes, Jr. from Gavino Reyes in representation of his father, pursuant to the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate for which TCT No. 27257 was issued.13 and 1/2 years from time of sale of lot in question, Petitioners filed civil case for recovery of possession (restitution of property) OR in the alternative, relief for indemnification against private respondent spousesPetitioners herein, as successors-in-interest of Rafael Reyes, Jr., filed on 14March 1983 with the Regional Trial Court a civil case against private respondents for recovery of possession or, in the alternative, forindemnification, accounting and damages.In their answer, private respondents deny the material averments in the complaint and assert that they are the owners of the lot in question, having bought the same from Rafael Reyes, Sr., that the issuance of TCT No. 27257 is null and void, for such sale was known to Rafael Reyes, Jr.; that they have been in possession of the property and have been paying the land taxes thereon; and that petitioners are barred by prescription and/or laches.Trial Court concluded in favor of petitionersTrial court concluded that petitioners' "title over the subject property is valid and regular and thus they are entitled to its possession and enjoyment." And that the continued possession by private respondents, which it found to have started in 1943, did not ripen into ownership because at that time, the property was already registered, hence it cannot be acquired by prescription or adverse possession.CA set aside TC's ruling and declared private respondents as lawful owners of the lot.The Court of Appeals declared that the appealed Judgment is ordered REVERSED and SET ASIDE and a new one is rendered declaring appellants to be the lawful owners of the lot identified as Lot No. 1-A-14 in the TCT.Existence of Subdivision Plan made in 1936 infers that the heirs made an oral partition of the property. This oral partition is valid and binding under the law.The evidence on record bears out the existence of a subdivision plan which was not controverted nor denied by the appellees. With the existence of a subdivision plan, and from the uncontroverted testimony of appellants' witness, we can only infer that at least an oral partition, which under the

law is valid and binding, was entered into by the heirs of Gavino Reyes regarding his properties in 1936. As held in a long line of decisions, extrajudicial partition can be done orally, and the same would be valid if freely entered into (Belen v. Belen, 49 O.G. 997, March 1953). The reason for this is because a partition is not exactly a conveyance for the reason that it does not involve transfer of property from one to the other but rather a confirmation by them of their ownership of the property. On this score, the partition of the said property even without the formal requirements under the rule is valid as held in the case of Hernandez vs. Andal, 78 Phil. 176.ISSUE: Whether or not respondent Court of Appeals committed any reversible error in setting aside the decision of the trial court.HELD: No, the CA did not err in reversing the TC's decision. Petition denied.The Court of Appeals correctly held that the partition made by the children of Gavino Reyes in 1936, although oral, was valid and binding. There is no law that requires partition among heirs to be in writing to be valid.In Hernandez vs. Andal, supra, this Court, interpreting Section 1 of Rule 74 of the Rules of Court, held that the requirement that a partition be put in a public document and registered has for its purpose the protection of creditors and at the same time the protection of the heirs themselves against tardy claims. The object of registration is to serve as constructive notice to others.It follows then that the intrinsic validity of partition not executed with the prescribed formalities does not come into play when there are no creditors or the rights of creditors are not affected. Where no such rights are involved, it is competent for the heirs of an estate to enter into an agreement for distribution in a manner and upon a plan different from those provided by law. There is nothing in said section from which it can be inferred that a writing or other formality is an essential requisite to the validity of the partition. Accordingly, an oral partition is valid.Barcelona, et al. vs. Barcelona, et al., supra, provides the reason why oral partition is valid and why it is not covered by the Statute of Frauds:

partition among heirs or renunciation of an inheritance by some of them is not exactly a conveyance of real property for the reason that it does not involve transfer of property from one to the other, but rather a confirmation or ratification of title or right of property by the heir renouncing in favor of another heir accepting and receiving the inheritance.Article 493 of the Civil Code provides:Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part and the fruits and benefits pertaining thereto, and he may even substitute another person in its enjoyment, except when personal rights are involved. But the effect of the alienation or the mortgage, with respect to the co-owners, shall be limited to the portion which may be allotted to him in the division upon the termination of the co- ownership.In Ramirez vs. Bautista, this Court held that every co-heir has the absolute ownership of his share in the community property and may alienate, assign, or mortgage the same, except as to purely personal rights, but the effect of any such transfer is limited to the portion which may be awarded to him upon the partition of the property.In the case at bar, the lot sold by Rafael Reyes, Sr. to private respondent Dalmacio Gardiola is his share in the estate of his deceased father, Gavino Reyes. It is the same property which was eventually adjudicated to his son and heir, Rafael Reyes, Jr., represented in turn by his heirs-petitioners herein-in the extrajudicial settlement of 196The participation of private respondent Rosario Gardiola in the Extrajudicial Settlement did not place private respondents in estoppel to question the issuance of TCT No. T-27257. As correctly maintained by private respondents, she signed it in representation of her deceased mother, Marta Reyes, a daughter and an heir of Gavino Reyes. She did not sign for and in behalf of her husband, Dalmacio Gardiola, vendee of the share of Rafael Reyes, Sr.The same did not operate to divest the vendee of the share of Rafael Reyes, Sr. in the estate of Gavino. Petitioners, as mere successors-in-interest of Rafael Reyes, Jr., son of Rafael Reyes, Sr., can only acquire that which Rafael, Jr. could transmit to them upon his death. The latter never became the owner of Lot No. 1-A-14 because it was sold by his father in 1943.

The issuance of TCT No. T-27257 in the name of Rafael Reyes, Jr., in so far as Lot No. 1-14-A is concerned, was clearly erroneous because he never became its owner. An extrajudicial settlement does not create a light in favor of an heir. Thus, since he never had any title or right to Lot No. 1-14- A, the mere execution of the settlement did not improve his condition, and the subsequent registration of the deed did not create any right or vest any title over the property in favor of the petitioners as heirs of Rafael Reyes, Jr. The latter cannot give them what he never had before. Nemo dare potest quod non habet.Petitioners' immediate predecessor-in-interest, Rafael Reyes, Jr., never took any action against private respondents from the time his father sold the lot to the latter. Despite full knowledge that private respondents were in actual physical possession of the property, it was only about thirteen and one-half (13 1/2) years later that they decided to file an action for recovery of possession. As stated earlier, the original complaint was filed in the trial court on 14 March 1983SUAREZ VS CAGR No. 94918

On June 21, 1984 before the expiration of the redemption period, petitioners filed a reivindicatory action against private respondents and the Provincial Sheriff of Rizal, for the annulment of the auction sale and the recovery of the ownership of the levied pieces of property. They alleged, among others, that being strangers to the case decided against their mother, they cannot be held liable therefor and that the five (5) parcels of land, of which they are co-owners, can neither be levied nor sold on execution. The Sheriff issued to private respondents a final deed of sale.On October 10, 1984, RTC Branch 151 issued in Civil Case Nos. 21736-21739 an Order directing Teofista Suarez and all persons claiming right under her to vacate the lots subject of the judicial sale; to desist fromremoving or alienating improvements thereon; and to surrender to privaterespondents the owner's duplicate copy of the torrens title and other pertinent documents.Teofista Suarez then filed with the then Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari to annul the Orders of Branch 151. The CA granted but reversedits own ruling upon Motion for Reconsideration of herein respondents and ruled therefore that the petitioners vacate the said properties. Hence, thisappeal.

FACTS:Herein petitioners are brothers and sisters. Their father died in 1955 and since then his estate consisting of several valuable parcels of land in Pasig,Metro Manila has been liquidated or partitioned.In 1977, petitioners' widowed mother and Rizal Realty Corporation lost in the consolidated cases for rescission of contract and for damages, and were ordered by Branch 1 of the then Court of First Instance of to pay, jointly and severally, herein respondents the aggregate principal amount of about P70,000 as damages.The judgment against petitioners' mother and Rizal Realty Corporation having become final and executory, five (5) valuable parcel of land in Pasig, Metro Manila, were levied and sold on execution on June 24, 1983 in favor of the private respondents as the highest bidder for the amount of P94,170.000. Private respondents were then issued a certificate of sale which was subsequently registered or August 1, 1983.

ISSUE:W/N the courts were correct in allowing the sale of all the propertyHELD.NO.The law in point is article 777 of the NCC. Thus, from the foregoing, the legitime of the surviving spouse is equal to the legitime of each child.The proprietary interest of petitioners in the levied and auctioned property is different from and adverse to that of their mother. Petitioners became co-owners of the property not because of their mother but through their own right as children of their deceased father. Therefore, petitioners are not barred in any way from instituting the action to annul the auction sale to protect their own interest.WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals dated July 27, 1990 as well as its Resolution of August 28, 1990 are hereby REVERSED and set aside; and Civil Case No. 51203 is reinstated only to determine that

portion which belongs to petitioners and to annul the sale with regard to said portion.INTESTATENelia Constantino v. CAG.R. No. 116018. November 13, 1996 || IntestateFACTS:JOSEFA TORRES died intestate leaving a parcel of land located at Balagtas, Bulacan. Among her heirs are respondents Aurora S. Roque, Priscilla S. Luna and Josefina S. Austria. In 1984, the heirs of Josefa Torres (VENDORS), and petitioner Nelia A. Constantino (VENDEE), entered into a contract to sell a parcel of land (250sqm). The lot, owned in common by the Torres heirs, is being occupied by petitioners' mother and sister. An adjoining lot, also co-owned by the heirs, is being occupied by Sps. Severino and Consuelo Lim. Pursuant to their agreement, the heirs authorized petitioner to prepare the necessary Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate with Sale.After having the document drafted with several spaces left blank including the specification as to the metes and bounds of the land petitioner asked the heirs to affix their signatures on the document. The heirs signed the document with the understanding that respondent Roque, one of the heirs, would be present when the latter would seek permission from the Bureau of Lands and have the land surveyed.However, without the participation of any of the Torres heirs, the property was subsequently surveyed, subdivided and then covered by 2 TCTs. Petitioner did not furnish the heirs with copies of the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate with Sale nor of the subdivision plan and the certificates of title. Upon securing a copy of the deed from the Registry of Deeds, the respondents learned that the area of the property purportedly sold to petitioner was much bigger than that agreed upon by the parties. It already included the portion being occupied by the Sps. Lim.Private respondents sent a letter of demand to petitioner (for surrender of the deed of settlement & conveyance, the subdivision plan and the CTs); but to no avail, so they filed with the RTC of Bulacan an action for annulment of the deed and cancellation of the certificates of title.

PETITIONERS CONTENTION: Presented the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate with Sale wherein respondents agreed to divide and adjudicate among themselves the inherited property (w/ area of1,503sqm). In the same document, they caused the subdivision of the property into 2 lots according to a plan identified as Lot 4-A (1,096sqm) and Lot 4-B (407sqm), and acknowledged the sale to petitioner of said Lot4-B. As a consequence, on 18 March 1985, the Register of Deeds issuedTCTs in the name of the heirs of Torres and another in the name of petitioner.PRIVATE RESPONDENTS CONTENTION: that all the heirs signed the document before the land was surveyed and subdivided, hence, there was as yet no definite area to be sold that could be indicated in the deed at the time of the signing. They also claimed that they were not notified about the survey and the subdivision of the lot and therefore they could not have agreed on the area supposedly sold to petitioner. The respondent heirs insist that they could not have agreed to the extent of the area actually reflected in the deed because it included the portion being occupied by the Lim spouses, which was already the subject of a previous agreement to sell between them and their predecessor.RTCs Decision: RTC had doubts with respect to the preparation and due execution of the said Deed, taking into account that: petitioner was not able to enumerate all the signatories to the document; while petitioner claimed that the document was signed only after the survey of the land was completed, or on Oct 10, 1984, such fact was negated by her own witness who testified that the survey was conducted only on Oct 16,1984; and, while petitioner alleged that the document was signed and notarized in Manila no explanation was offered why the same could not have been signed and notarized in Bulacan where notaries public abound which could have been less inconvenient to the parties concerned.Additionally, RTC relied heavily on the assertions of respondents as reflected in their demand letter that they did not give their consent to the sale of Lot 4-B. Thus RTC ordered the annulment and cancellation of the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate with Sale, 2 TCTs and Subdivision Plan.CA: Sustained the decision of the RTC and denied Mot. To Reconsider

ISSUE:Whether or not the CA erred in concluding that Deed of ExtrajudicialSettlement of Estate with Sale did not reflect the true intent of the parties. [NO]HELD:NO MEETING OF THE MINDS BETWEEN PARTIES ON LAND AREA TO BE SOLD; Petitioner also insists that the real intent of the parties was to make the entire Lot 4-B the subject matter of the sale. She claims that during cross-examination respondent Roque admitted that she signed in behalf of her co-heirs a receipt for P30,000.00 as partial payment for the lot occupied by Ka Baring and Lina (relatives of petitioner) and Consuelo Lim. . . . The admission of respondent Roque cannot prevail in the face of the clear evidence that there was as yet no meeting of the minds on the land area to be sold since private respondents were still awaiting the survey to be conducted on the premises. . . . Likewise, we find the allegation of respondents that they signed the deed prior to the survey, or before determination of the area to be sold, worthy of credit as against the contention of petitioner that they signed after the survey or on 10 October 1984. As found by the RTC, such contention was contradicted by petitioner's own witness who positively asserted in court that the survey was conducted only on 16 October 1984 or 6 days after the signing. Quite obviously, when respondents affixed their signatures on the deed, it was still incomplete since petitioner who caused it to be prepared left several spaces blank, more particularly as regards the dimensions of the property to be sold. The heirs were persuaded to sign the document only upon the assurance of petitioner that respondent Roque, pursuant to their understanding, would be present when the property would be surveyed after obtaining permission from the Bureau of Lands. As it surfaced, the supposed understanding was merely a ruse of petitioner to induce respondents to sign the deed without which the latter would not have given their conformity thereto.We ruled in the Sales v. CA that the extrinsic validity of a document was not affected by the fact that it was notarized in a place other than where the subject matter thereof was located. What is more important under the Notarial Law is that the notary public has authority to acknowledge the document executed within his territorial jurisdiction. The ruling in Sales is not applicable to the present case. Our concern here is not whether the

notary public had the authority to acknowledge the document executed within his territorial jurisdiction but whether respondents indeed appeared before him and signed the deed. However, the quantum of evidence shows that they did not.RTC correctly appreciated the fact that the deed was notarized in Manila when it could have been notarized in Bulacan. This additional detail casts doubt on the procedural regularity in the preparation, execution and signing of the deed. It is not easy to believe that petitioner and the 10 Torres heirs traveled all the way to Manila to have their questioned document notarized considering that they, with the exception of respondent Roque, are residents of Balagtas, Bulacan, where notaries public are easy to find. Consequently, the claim of private respondents that they did not sign the document before a notary public is more plausible than petitioner's feeble claim to the contrary.Apparently, petitioner deceived respondents by filling the blank spaces in the deed, having the lots surveyed and subdivided, and then causing the issuance of transfer certificates of title without their knowledge, much less consent. Thus all the elements of fraud vitiating consent for purposes of annulling a contract concur: (a) It was employedby a contracting party upon the other; (b) It induced the other party to enter into the contract; (c) It was serious; and, (d) It resulted in damagesand injury to the party seeking annulment. Perhaps, another compellingreason for the annulment of the document of settlement and conveyance is that the 2nd page thereof clearly manifests that thenumber of the subdivision plan and the respective areas of Lots 4-Aand 4-B were merely HANDWRITTEN while all the rest of the statements therein were TYPEWRITTEN, which leads us to the conclusion that handwritten figures thereon were not available at the time the document was formalized.HEIRSHeirs of Guido and Isabel Yaptinchay vs. CAG.R. No. 124320 March 2, 1999FACTS:Petitioners claim that they are the legal heirs of spouses Yaptinchay, the owners-claimants of two lots situated in Bancal, Carmona, Cavite. On March 17, 1994 petitioners executed an Extra-Judicial Settlement of the estate o

f the deceased spouses. On August 26, 1994, petitioners discovered that a portion, if not all, of the aforesaid properties were titled in the name of res pondent Golden Bay Realty and Development Corporation ("Golden Bay").

FACTS:

Raymundo v. Vda. De SuarezGR No. 149017 || November 28, 2008

With the discovery, petitioners filed a complaint for annulment of TCTs ov er the properties.Upon learning that Golden Bay sold portions of the subject land, petition ers filed with the RTC an Amended Complaint to mention the TCTs to be a nnulled. The RTC granted the same. On August 12, 1995, the private respo ndents presented a Motion to Dismiss on the grounds that among others, t he plaintiffs did not have a cause of action being that they have not establis hed their status as heirs. The Motion to Dismiss was granted, holding that t he petitioners have not shown any proof that they have been declared lega l heirs of the deceased couple.Petitioners contend that the respondent court acted with grave abuse of discretion in ruling that the issue of heirship should first be determined be fore trial of the case could proceed. They further contend that the respond ent court should have proceeded with the trial and simultaneously resolve d the issue of heirship in the same case. The Court denied their motion to d ismiss. Hence, this petition.ISSUE:Whether or not the trial court can make a declaration of heirship in the civi l action?HELD:NO. The Court ruled that the trial court cannot make a declaration of hei rship in the civil action for the reason that such a declaration can only bemade in a special proceeding. The determination of who are legal heirs of the deceased couple must be made in the proper special proceedings in cou rt, and not in an ordinary suit for reconveyance of property. Under Section3, Rule 1 of the Rules of Court, a civil action is defined as one by which a pa rty sues another for the enforcement or protection of a right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong while a special proceeding is a remedy which a party seeks to establish a right, or particular fact. The Court held that the declaration of heirship can be made only in a special proceeding inasmuch a s the petitioners in the case at bar are seeking the establishment of a statusor right.

Marcelo and Teofista Isagon Suarez' marriage was blessed with both material wealth and progeny in herein respondents, namely, Danilo,Eufrocina, Marcelo Jr., Evelyn, and Reggineo, all surnamed Suarez. Duringtheir marriage, governed by the conjugal partnership of gains regime, they acquired numerous properties, which included the following:(1) a parcel of land situated in Barrio Caniogan, Pasig with an area of 348 square meters covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 30680;(2) property located in Pinagbuhatan, Pasig, with an area of 1,020 squaremeters under Tax Declaration No. A-016-01003; and(3) Lot Nos. 5, 6 & 7, Block 2 covered by Tax Declaration No. A-01700723 (subject properties).After the death of Marcelo Sr. in 1955, Teofista and herein respondents, aswell as Elpidio Suarez, executed an Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate, partitioning Marcelo Sr.'s estate. Despite the partition, title to the properties, explicitly identified in the Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate as forming part of Marcelo's and Isagon's property regime, remained in the couple's name. In 1975, Rizal Realty Corporation (Rizal Realty) and Teofista, the latter owning ninety percent (90%) of the former's shares of stock, were sued by petitioner Valente Raymundo, his wife Violeta, Virginia Banta and Maria Concepcion Vito (plaintiffs) in consolidated cases for Rescission of Contract and Damages. Thereafter, in 1975, the then Court of First Instance (CFI) rendered judgment: (1) rescinding the respective contracts of plaintiffs with Rizal Realty and Teofista, and (2) holding the two defendants solidarily liable to plaintiffs for damages in the aggregate principal amount of about P70,000.00.When the judgment of the CFI became final and executory, herein subject properties were levied and sold on execution to satisfy the judgment against Teofista and Rizal Realty. The decision for the RTC to have to determine an already settled issue i.e., herein respondents' status as heirs of Marcelo Sr. Moreover, petitioner Valente cannot assail, directly or indirectly, the status of herein respondents as legitimate children of Marcelo Sr. and Teofista, and likewise demand that herein respondents first prove their filiation to Marcelo Sr. The following records bear out Marcelo, Sr.'s and Teofista's paternity of herein respondents, and the latter's status as legitimate children:1. The CA decision where in Teofista, along with herein respondents, questioned the RTC, Branch 151's Orders. Although the CA ruled against

Teofista and herein respondents, it explicitly recognized the latter's status as legitimate children of Teofista and Marcelo Sr.; and2. The CA decision which incorrectly ruled that herein respondents were, as children of Teofista, merely successors-in- interest of the latter to theproperty and by virtue thereof, bound by the judgment in a civil case consistent with the doctrine of res judicata. The SC subsequently reversedthis ruling on the wrong application of res judicata in the conclusive case of Suarez. The SC retained and affirmed, however, the CA's factual findingof herein respondents' status as heirs of Marcelo Sr. We categorically held therein that "the proprietary interest of [herein respondents] in the leviedand auctioned [properties] is different from and adverse to that of[Teofista]. [Herein respondents] became co-owners of the property not because of [Teofista] but through their own right as children of their deceased father [, Marcelo Sr.]." Clearly, herein respondents' long possessed status of legitimate children of Marcelo Sr. and Teofista cannot be indirectly or directly attacked by petitioner Valente in an action to annul a judicial sale. Plaintiffs were the highest bidder, and bought the levied properties for the amount of P94,170.00. As a result, a certificate of sale was issued to them and registered in their favor. The Provincial Sheriff of Rizal issued a final deed of sale over the subject properties. Parenthetically, before expiration of the redemption period, herein respondents filed a revindicatory action against petitioner Valente, Violeta, Virginia and Maria Concepcion for the annulment of the auction sale and recovery of ownership of the levied properties. Essentially, respondents alleged in their complaint that they cannot be held liable for the judgment rendered against their mother, Teofista, not having been impleaded therein; and consequently, the subject properties, which they own pro indiviso with their mother, can neither be levied nor be sold on execution.RTC Ruling:RTC issued an Order against Teofista. Herein respondents, joined by their mother, Teofista, filed a Motion for Reconsideration arguing that the subject properties are co-owned by them and further informing the RTC of the filing and pendency of Civil Case No. 51203. Nonetheless, the trial court denied Teofista's and herein respondents' motion, reiterated its previous order, which included, among others, the order for Teofista and all persons claiming right under her, to vacate the lots subject of the judicial sale.CA Ruling:

Denied the petition for certiorari on the grounds that (1) it fails to show how the respondent judge had acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion and (2) as far as [petitioner] Teofista Suarez is concerned, she cannot complain about the levy because she was a party in the consolidated cases where judgment was rendered against her in her personal capacity and with respect to the children of Teofista Suarez, who are co-petitioners in this proceedings [herein respondents], suffice it to point out that not being parties in the consolidated cases, what they should have done was to immediately file a third party claim.ISSUE:Whether or not a separate special proceeding for a declaration of heirship of respondents is necessary in order that they can file an action to annul the judicial sale of what is, undisputedly, conjugal property of Teofista and Marcelo Sr.HELD:NO, it is not necessary. Herein respondents' status as legitimate children of Marcelo Sr. and Teofista and thus, Marcelo Sr.'s heirs has been firmly established, and confirmed by this Court in Suarez v. Court of Appeals. True, this Court is not a trier of facts, but as the final arbiter of disputes, we found and so ruled that herein respondents are children, and heirs of their deceased father, Marcelo Sr. This having been settled, it should no longer have been a litigated issue when we ordered a remand to the lower court. In short, petitioner Valente's, Violeta's, Virginia's, and Maria Concepcion's representation in the RTC that our ruling in Suarez required herein respondents to present evidence of their affiliation with the deceased, Marcelo Sr., is wrong.As was set forth in the dispositive portion of Suarez, "Civil Case No. 51203 is reinstated only to determine that portion which belongs to [herein respondents] and to annul the sale with regard to said portion." There is clearly no intimation in our decision for the RTC to have to determine an already settled issue i.e., herein respondents' status as heirs of Marcelo Sr. Moreover, petitioner Valente cannot assail, directly or indirectly, the status of herein respondents as legitimate children of Marcelo Sr. and Teofista, and likewise demand that herein respondents first prove their filiation to Marcelo Sr. The following records bear out Marcelo, Sr.'s and Teofista's paternity of herein respondents, and the latter's status as legitimate children:

1. The CA decision where in Teofista, along with herein respondents, questioned the RTC, Branch 151's Orders. Although the CA ruled against Teofista and herein respondents, it explicitly recognized the latter's status as legitimate children of Teofista and Marcelo Sr.; and2. The CA decision which incorrectly ruled that herein respondents were, as children of Teofista, merely successors-in- interest of the latter to the property and by virtue thereof, bound by the judgment in a civil case consistent with the doctrine of res judicata. The SC subsequently reversed this ruling on the wrong application of res judicata in the conclusive case of Suarez. The SC retained and affirmed, however, the CA's factual finding of herein respondents' status as heirs of Marcelo Sr. We categorically held therein that "the proprietary interest of [herein respondents] in the levied and auctioned [properties] is different from and adverse to that of [Teofista]. [Herein respondents] became co-owners of the property not because of [Teofista] but through their own right as children of their deceased father [, Marcelo Sr.]." Clearly, herein respondents' long possessed status of legitimate children of Marcelo Sr. and Teofista cannot be indirectly or directly attacked by petitioner Valente in an action to annul a judicial sale. Records of this case reveal a document, an Extrajudicial Settlement of Marcelo Sr.'s estate, which explicitly recognizes herein respondents as Marcelo Sr.'s legitimate children and heirs. The same document settles and partitions the estate of Marcelo Sr. specifying Teofista's paraphernal properties, and separates the properties she owns in common with her children, herein respondents. Plainly, there is no need to re-declare herein respondents as heirs of Marcelo Sr., and prolong this case interminably.DBP v. Gagarani, et.al.GR No. 172248Corona, J.:FACTS:1. Spouses Dionesio and Matea S. Asok owned several parcels of land.Upon the Spouses death, their eleven children inherited theproperties. One of the lands inherited was covered by Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. P-4272, a free patent, located at Pagawan, Manticao, Misamis Oriental.2. The children executed an Extrajudicial Settlement of the Estate with Quitclaim. Pursuant to this, Denison Asok (Asok) inheritedthe subject property. As a result, OCT No. P-4272 was cancelled.TCT No. T-9626 was issued in his name.3. Asok and his wife, respondent Ella Gagarani Asok, borrowed

P100,000 from petitioner DBP. They mortgaged the subject property as collateral to guarantee payment of the loan.4. On due date, Asok and Ella failed to pay the loan.5. The mortgage was extrajudicially foreclosed. DBP was the highest bidder. (November 28, 1991)6. A certificate of sale was issued in favor of DBP. This was registeredon December 24, 1992.7. DBPs ownership over the property was consolidated. TCT No. T-27172 was issued in its name.8. Meanwhile, Asok died on October 24, 1993. He was succeeded by his surviving spouse and children, the respondents.9. Respondents filed a Complaint for REPURCHASE against DBP in the RTC of Initao, Misamis Oriental. (May 15, 1998)10. Respondents filed an Amended Complaint upon learning that TCT No. T-9626 had been cancelled by TCT No. T-27172 issued in thename of DBP. They invoked their right to repurchase the property under Sec. 119 of CA 141, as amended:Sec. 119. Every conveyance of land acquired under the free patent or homestead provisions, when proper, shall be subject to repurchase by the applicant, his widow, or legal heirs, within a period of five years from date of the conveyance.11. DBP contends that respondents cannot claim the right under Sec.119 which covers homesteads and free patents. The free patentissued to Asoks parents had already been cancelled. A new TCT had in fact been issued to him. Thus, the property mortgaged was no longer covered by a free patent but by a TCT. DBP also argues that respondents are not the legal heirs of the patentees because respondents are merely their daughter-in-law and grandchildren. Lastly, that even if respondents could be considered as being entitled to the right under Sec. 119, this had already prescribed because the period should be counted from the date of conveyance which means the date of sale and not the date of registration of the certificate of sale.12. The RTC dismissed the Complaint. (January 7, 1999)13. Respondents filed a Motion for Reconsideration with the RTC.14. The RTC denied the Motion for Reconsideration. It ruled that theone-year period for redemption should be reckoned from the date of sale, i.e., November 28, 1991. Then the five-year period provided under Sec. 119 of CA 141 should be counted from the expiration of the redemption period, i.e., November 28, 1992.

Therefore, respondents had until November 28, 1997 to exercise their right to repurchase. However, the complaint was filed on May 15, 1998 which was beyond the prescribed period.15. Respondents appealed to the CA.16. The CA reversed and set aside the RTC decision. (December 14,2005)17. DBP filed a Motion for Reconsideration with the CA.18. The CA denied the Motion for Reconsideration. It held that theperiod of redemption started from the date of registration of the certificate of sale, i.e., December 24, 1992, and not from the date of sale. Thus, respondents had until December 24, 1998 to repurchase the property and the complaint was seasonably filed.19. DBP filed this Petition for Review on Certiorari before the SC.ISSUES: (1) Whether Sec. 119 of CA 141 is applicable in this case; (2) Whether respondents are the legal heirs of the patentees and (3) Whether the right to repurchase has already prescribed.HELD:(1) YES. Sec. 119 is applicable to this case.The plain intent of Sec. 119 is to give the homesteader or patentee every chance to preserve and keep in the family the land that the State has gratuitously given him as reward. Hence, the fact that the land was inherited by the patentees son (and a new title in his name issued) does not bring it outside the purview of Sec. 119. In fact, the policy behind the law is fulfilled because the land remains in the family of the patentee. In Ferrer v. Mangente:Logic thus call for continued adherence to the policy that not the individual applicant alone but those so closely related to him as are entitled to legal succession may take full advantage of the benefits the law confers.(2) YES. Respondents are the legal heirs of the patentees.In line with the rationale behind Sec. 119, we reject a restricted definition of legal heirs. It is used in a broad sense and the law makes no distinctions.

In Madarcos v. de la Merced:The term "legal heirs" is used in Section 119 in a generic sense. It is broad enough to cover any person who is called to the succession either by provision of a will or by operation of law. Thus, legal heirs include both testate and intestate heirs depending upon whether succession is by the will of the testator or by law. Legal heirs are not necessarily compulsory heirs but they may be so if the law reserves a legitime for them.Respondents inherited the property from Asok, their husband and father, who in turn inherited it from his parents. Respondent Ella Gagarani Asok, as daughter-in-law of the patentees, can be considered as among the legal heirs who can repurchase the land in accordance with Salenillas v. CA. In that case, we allowed the daughter and son-in-law of the patentees to repurchase the property because this would be "more in keeping with the spirit of the law. We have time and again said that between two statutory interpretations, that which better serves the purpose of the law should prevail." Furthermore, the law must be liberally construed in order to carry out its purpose.(3) NO. The right to repurchase has not prescribed.It was already resolved in Rural Bank of Davao City, Inc. v. CA:Thus, the rules on redemption in the case of an extrajudicial foreclosure of land acquired under free patent or homestead statutes may be summarized as follows: xxx If the land is mortgaged to parties other than rural banks, the mortgagor may redeem the property within one (1) year from the registration of the certificate of sale pursuant to Act No.3135. If he fails to do so, he or his heirs may repurchase the propertywithin five (5) years from the expiration of the redemption periodalso pursuant to Section 119 of the Public Land Act.Under Act 3135, the debtor or his or her successors-in-interest may redeem the property within one year. This redemption period should be reckoned from the date of registration of the certificate of sale. The five- year period fixed in Sec. 119 begins to run from the expiration of the one- year redemption period. Here, the certificate of sale was registered on

December 24, 1992 and the one-year redemption period expired on December 24, 1993. Reckoned from that day, respondents had a five- year period, or until December 24, 1998, to exercise their right to repurchase under Sec. 119 of CA 141.Consequently, the CA was correct in holding that the complaint filed onMay 15, 1998 was on time.Petition is DENIED. DBP is ordered to execute a deed of reconveyance in favor of respondents upon payment by the latter of the redemption price.REQUISITES OF A FORMAL WILLPaz Samaniego Celada vs Lucia D. AbenaG.R. No. 145545, June 30, 2008 || Requisites of a Formal Will

ISSUE:

1. Margarita's will failed to comply with the formalities required under Article 805 of the Civil Code because it is fatally defective for the reason that its attestation clause states that the will is composed of three (3) pages while in truth and in fact, the will consists of two (2) pages.2. that the will was procured through undue influence and pressure because at the time of execution of the will, Margarita was weak, sickly, jobless and entirely dependent upon respondent and her nephews for support, and these alleged handicaps affected her freedom and willpower to decide on her own;W/N the Court of Appeals erred in not declaring the will

FACTS:

Petitioner Paz Samaniego-Celada was the first cousin of decedent

invalid for failure to comply with the formalities required by law.

Margarita S. Mayores (Margarita) while respondent was the decedent's lifelong companion since 1929.On April 27, 1987, Margarita died single and without any ascending nor descending heirs as her parents, grandparents and siblingspredeceased her. She was survived by her first cousins CatalinaSamaniego-Bombay, Manuelita Samaniego Sajonia, Feliza Samaniego, and petitioner.Before her death, Margarita executed a Last Will and Testamentwhere she bequeathed one-half of her undivided share of a real property located at Manila and Makati, to respondent and three others.Margaritaalso left all her personal properties to respondent whom she likewisedesignated as sole executor of her will.On August 11, 1987, petitioner filed a petition for letters of administration of the estate of Margarita.On October 27, 1987, respondent filed a petition for probate of thewill of Margarita before the RTC of Makati.On March 2, 1993, the RTC rendered a decision declaring the last will and testament of Margarita probated and respondent as the executorof the willPetitioner appealed the RTC decision to the Court of Appeals. But the Court of Appeals affirmed in toto the RTC ruling.Hence this petition. Petitioners arguments:

HELD:

NO. The Supreme Court stated that:1. While it is true that the attestation clause is not a part of the will, the court, after examining the totality of the will, is of the considered opinion that error in the number of pages of the will as stated in the attestation clause is not material to invalidate the subject will. It must be noted that the subject instrument is consecutively lettered with pages A, B, and C which is a sufficient safeguard from the possibility of an omission of some of the pages. The error must have been brought about by the honest belief that the will is the whole instrument consisting of three (3) pages inclusive of the attestation clause and the acknowledgement. The position of the court is in consonance with the "doctrine of liberal interpretation" enunciated in Article 809 of the Civil Code which reads: "In the absence of bad faith, forgery or fraud, or undue [and] improper pressure and influence, defects and imperfections in the form of attestation or in the language used therein shall not render the will invalid if it is proved that the will was in fact

executed and attested in substantial compliance with all the requirements of Article 805."2. With regard to the contention of the petitioner that the testator was not mentally capable of making a will atthe time of the execution thereof, the same is without merit. The petitioner failed to establish, bypreponderance of evidence, said allegation and contradict the presumption that the testator was ofsound mind.In fact, witness for the oppositors, Dr. Ramon Lamberte, who, in some occasions, attended tothe testator months before her death, testified thatMargarita Mayores could engage in a normal conversation and he even stated that the illness of the testator does not warrant hospitalization. . . . Not one of the oppositor's witnesses has mentioned any instance that they observed act/s of the testator during her lifetime that could be construed as a manifestation of mental incapacity. The testator may be admitted to be physically weak but it does not necessarily follow that she was not of sound mind.WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision dated October 13, 2000 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 41756 is AFFIRMED.Costs against petitioner.Lee vs. TambagoAC No. 5281FACTS:In a letter-complaint dated April 10, 2000, complainant Manuel L. Lee charged respondent Atty. Regino B. Tambago with violation of the NotarialLaw and the ethics of the legal profession for notarizing a spurious last willand testament.In his complaint, complainant averred that his father, the decedent Vicente Lee, Sr., never executed the contested will. Furthermore, the spurious will contained the forged signatures of Cayetano Noynay and Loreto Grajo, the purported witnesses to its execution.

In the said will, the decedent supposedly bequeathed his entire estate to his wife Lim Hock Lee, save for a parcel of land which he devised to Vicente Lee, Jr. and Elena Lee, half-siblings of complainant.The will was purportedly executed and acknowledged before respondent on June 30, 1965. Complainant, however, pointed out that the residence certificate of the testator noted in the acknowledgment of the will was dated January 5, 1962. Furthermore, the signature of the testator was not the same as his signature as donor in a deed of donation (containing his purported genuine signature). Complainant averred that the signatures of his deceased father in the will and in the deed of donation were in any way (sic) entirely and diametrically opposed from (sic) one another in all angle[s]Complainant also questioned the absence of notation of the residence certificates of the purported witnesses Noynay and Grajo. He alleged that their signatures had likewise been forged and merely copied from their respective voters affidavits.In a resolution dated October 17, 2001, the Court referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation.In his report, the investigating commissioner found respondent guilty of violation of pertinent provisions of the old Notarial Law as found in the Revised Administrative Code. The violation constituted an infringement of legal ethics, particularly Canon 1 and Rule 1.01of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR). Thus, the investigating commissioner of the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline recommended the suspension of respondent for a period of three months.The IBP Board of Governors, in its Resolution No. XVII-2006-285 datedMay 26, 2006, resolved:[T]o ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, with modification, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner and finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, and considering Respondents failure to comply with the laws in the discharge of his function as a notary public, Atty. Regino B. Tambago is hereby suspended

from the practice of law for one year and Respondents notarial commission is Revoked and Disqualified from reappointment as Notary Public for two (2) years. [14]ISSUE:WON the will was in compliance of the requirements of a willHELD:A will is an act whereby a person is permitted, with the formalities prescribed by law, to control to a certain degree the disposition of his estate, to take effect after his death. [15] A will may either be notarial or holographic.The law provides for certain formalities that must be followed in the execution of wills. The object of solemnities surrounding the execution of wills is to close the door on bad faith and fraud, to avoid substitution of wills and testaments and to guarantee their truth and authenticity. [16]A notarial will, as the contested will in this case, is required by law to be subscribed at the end thereof by the testator himself. In addition, it should be attested and subscribed by three or more credible witnesses in the presence of the testator and of one another. [17]The will in question was attested by only two witnesses, Noynay and Grajo. On this circumstance alone, the will must be considered void. [18] This is in consonance with the rule that acts executed against the provisions of mandatory or prohibitory laws shall be void, except when the law itself authorizes their validity.The Civil Code likewise requires that a will must be acknowledged before a notary public by the testator and the witnesses. [19] The importance of this requirement is highlighted by the fact that it was segregated from the other requirements under Article 805 and embodied in a distinct and separate provision. [20]An acknowledgment is the act of one who has executed a deed in going before some competent officer or court and declaring it to be his act or deed. It involves an extra step undertaken whereby the signatory actually declares to the notary public that the same is his or her own free act and deed. The acknowledgment in a notarial will has a two-fold purpose: (1) to

safeguard the testators wishes long after his demise and (2) to assure that his estate is administered in the manner that he intends it to be done.A cursory examination of the acknowledgment of the will in question shows that this particular requirement was neither strictly nor substantially complied with. For one, there was the conspicuous absence of a notation of the residence certificates of the notarial witnesses Noynay and Grajo in the acknowledgment. Similarly, the notation of the testators old residence certificate in the same acknowledgment was a clear breach of the law. These omissions by respondent invalidated the will.As the acknowledging officer of the contested will, respondent was required to faithfully observe the formalities of a will and those of notarization. As we held in Santiago v. Rafanan:The Notarial Law is explicit on the obligations and duties of notaries public. They are required to certify that the party to every document acknowledged before him had presented the proper residence certificate (or exemption from the residence tax); and to enter its number, place of issue and date as part of such certification.These formalities are mandatory and cannot be disregarded, considering the degree of importance and evidentiary weight attached to notarized documents. A notary public, especially a lawyer, is bound to strictly observe these elementary requirements.The Notarial Law then in force required the exhibition of the residence certificate upon notarization of a document or instrument:Section 251. Requirement as to notation of payment of [cedula] residence tax. Every contract, deed, or other document acknowledged before a notary public shall have certified thereon that the parties thereto have presented their proper [cedula] residence certificate or are exempt from the [cedula] residence tax, and there shall be entered by the notary public as a part of such certificate the number, place of issue, and date of each [cedula] residence certificate as aforesaid. [25]Nevertheless, respondent should be faulted for having failed to make the necessary entries pertaining to the will in his notarial register. The old

Notarial Law required the entry of the following matters in the notarial register, in chronological order:nature of each instrument executed, sworn to, or acknowledged before him;person executing, swearing to, or acknowledging the instrument;witnesses, if any, to the signature;date of execution, oath, or acknowledgment of the instrument;fees collected by him for his services as notary;give each entry a consecutive number; andif the instrument is a contract, a brief description of the substance of the instrumentIn an effort to prove that he had complied with the abovementioned rule, respondent contended that he had crossed out a prior entry and entered instead the will of the decedent. As proof, he presented a photocopy of his notarial register. To reinforce his claim, he presented a photocopy of a certification [28] stating that the archives division had no copy of the affidavit of Bartolome Ramirez.A photocopy is a mere secondary evidence. It is not admissible unless it is shown that the original is unavailable. The proponent must first prove the existence and cause of the unavailability of the original, [29] otherwise, the evidence presented will not be admitted. Thus, the photocopy of respondents notarial register was not admissible as evidence of the entry of the execution of the will because it failed to comply with the requirements for the admissibility of secondary evidence.

of existing law and had complied with the elementary formalities in the performance of his duties xxx, we find that he acted very irresponsibly in notarizing the will in question. Such recklessness warrants the less severe punishment of suspension from the practice of law. It is, as well, a sufficient basis for the revocation of his commission [50] and his perpetual disqualification to be commissioned as a notary public. [51]WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Regino B. Tambago is hereby found guilty of professional misconduct. He violated (1) the Lawyers Oath; (2) Rule 138 of the Rules of Court; (3) Canon 1 and Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility; (4) Art. 806 of the Civil Code and (5) the provisions of the old Notarial Law.Atty. Regino B. Tambago is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one year and his notarial commission REVOKED. Because he has not lived up to the trustworthiness expected of him as a notary public and as an officer of the court, he is PERPETUALLY DISQUALIFIED from reappointment as a notary public.Let copies of this Resolution be furnished to all the courts of the land, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Office of the Bar Confidant, as well as made part of the personal records of respondent.SO ORDERED.ALUAD V. ALUADG.R. No. 176943. October 17, 2008

Defects in the observance of the solemnities prescribed by law render theentire will invalid. This carelessness cannot be taken lightly in view of the importance and delicate nature of a will, considering that the testator and the witnesses, as in this case, are no longer alive to identify the instrument and to confirm its contents. [34] Accordingly, respondent must be held accountable for his acts. The validity of the will was seriously compromised as a consequence of his breach of duty. [35]Respondent, as notary public, evidently failed in the performance of the elementary duties of his office. Contrary to his claims that he exercised his duties as Notary Public with due care and with due regard to the provision

FACTS: Maria Aluad (the mother of the Petitioners) as well as their Uncle(Respondent: Zenaido) were raised by the childless spouses Matilde andCrispin (crispin is a guy). Crispin was the owner of six sexy lots - located in Capiz. When he died Matilde (da wife) adjudicated the lots to herself. On November 14, 1981, Matilde executed a "Deed of Donation ofReal Property Inter Vivos" in favor of petitioners' mother Maria - covering all the six lots

On August 26, 1991, Matilde sold Lot No. 676 to respondent (Zenaido) by a Deed of Absolute Sale of Real Property and on her Last will and Testament she devised lot 674 to Zenaidoon 1992, Matilde executed a last will and testament,o devising Lot Nos. 675, 677, 682, and 680 to Maria,o and her "remaining properties" including Lot No. 674 to respondent(Zenaido). Matilde died on January 25, 1994, while Maria died on September 24 of the same year. On August 21, 1995, Maria's heirs-herein petitioners filed before the RTC - a Complaint for declaration and recovery of ownership and possession of Lot Nos. 674 and 676, and damages against respondent, As a Defense : Zenaido alleged thato That Lot 674 is owned by the defendant as this lot was adjudicated to him in the Last Will and Testament of Matilde Aluad o while Lot 676 was purchased by him from Matilde Aluad. These two lots are in his possession as true owners thereof. Petitioners later filed a Motion for Leave to Amend Complaint Already Filed to Conform to Evidence : to which it annexed an Amended Complaint which cited the donation of the six lots via Deed of Donation in favor of their mother Maria. Branch 15 of the RTC granted the motion and admitted the Amended Complaint.ISSUE: won the CA erred when it reversed the decision of the RTC holding that the deed of donation inter vivos in favor of petitioners' mother is infact a donation mortis causa.RULING: C.A. did not err motherfuckerr.1. It is Mortis Causa. As did the appellate court, the SC finds the donation to petitioners' mother one of mortis causa, it having the followingcharacteristics:(1) It conveys no title or ownership to the transferee before the death of the transferor; or what amounts to the same thing, that the transferor should retain the ownership (full or naked) and control of the property while alive;(2) That before the death of the transferor, the transfer should be revocable by the transferor at will, ad nutum; but revocability may be

provided for indirectly by means of a reserved power in the donor to dispose of the properties conveyed; and(3) That the transfer should be void if the transferor should survive the transferee./-----------------// The phrase in the earlier-quoted Deed of Donation "to become effective upon the death of the DONOR" admits of no otherinterpretation than to mean that Matilde did not intend to transfer theownership of the six lots to petitioners' mother during her (Matilde's)lifetime.o2. The donation being then mortis causa, the formalities of a will should have been observed (it was not)o it was witnessed by only two, not three or more witnesses followingArticle 805 of the Civil Code.o Further, the witnesses did not even sign the attestation clause: the execution of which clause is a requirement separate from the subscriptionof the will and the affixing of signatures on the left-hand margins of thepages of the will.o Furthermore, the witnesses did not acknowledge the will before the notary public, which is not in accordance with the requirement ofArticle 806 of the Civil Code that every will must be acknowledged beforea notary public by the testator and the witnesses.o More. The requirement that all the pages of the will must be numbered correlatively in letters placed on the upper part of each pagewas not also followed.The Deed of Donation which is, as already discussed, one of mortis causa, not having followed the formalities of a will, it is Void and transmitted no right to petitioners' mother.TESTAMENTARY CAPACITYESTATE OF THE DECEASED VICTORINA VILLARANDA. EUSEBIA LIMVS JULIANA CHINCOG.R. No. 33592. March 31, 1931TOPIC: WILLS; LACK OF TESTAMENTARY CAPACITY; COMA RESULTING FROM CEREBRAL HEMORRHAGE.FACTS:

On the morning of June 2, 1929, Victorina Villaranda y Diaz, was in a comatose condition due to apoplexy, incident to cerebral hemorrage. After examination, she was allowed to be taken to San Juan de Dios Hospital. Four days after June 5, 1929, she died.The contested document produced as her will, was prepared by Perfecto Gabriel. His wife appeared to be related to the named beneficiaries, who were collateral relatives of the deceased, named Eusebia, Crispina, and Maria Lim.At 9 or 10 o'clock on the forenoon of June 5, 1929, upon being informed of the condition of the testatrix, he took a sheet from his exercise book, wrote the instrument in question, and brought it into the sick room for execution. He suggested that the attending physician, Lopez del Castillo to sign as a witness. However, he refused on the ground of lack of testamentary capacity of the old lady. He also asked Marcos Ira, first cousin of the deceased, to sign as one of the witnesses, but he refused as well. In the end three persons served as witnesses, and two relatives of his wife. Victorina was not able to affix her signature to the document, and it was signed for her by the attorney.Eusebia, named as executrix, offered such as probate. However, the sister of the deceased, Chinco, opposed. The trial court favored the latter and disallowed the will on the ground that the testatrix did not have testamentary capacity at the time the instrument purports to have been executed by her.ISSUE:WON THE TESTRATIX HAD TESTAMENTARY CAPACITY AT THE TIME THE PAPER REFERRED TO WAS IGNEDHELD:NO. At the time the will was made, the proof showed that the testatrix was in a comatose condition and devoid of the power of articulate speech. Held, that testamentary capacity was lacking and that the purported will was not valid.As shown a marked preponderance, that the deceased, she was in a comatose condition and incapable of performing any conscious and valid

act. The testimony of these witnesses is convincing to the effect that the patient was in a continuous state of coma and did not have sufficient command of her faculties to enable her to do any valid act.Barrera v, TanjocoGr no l-5263 Feb. 17, 1954FACTS:A will was executed by Oliva Villapaa, leaving properties to her nephews and nieces and grandchildren. The oppositors alleges that the testatrix wasnot in a capacity to execute a will and that Oliva's signature was acquiredthrough fraud and trickery and the provisions of the will is invalid. The court of first instance of Tarlac ruled that the will was invalid because itwas not the personal last will of the deceased; that she did not furnish thenames of the persons instituted as heirs and; that the will was not read to her before she signed it.ISSUE:whether the will is valid?HELD: the court held that the will is valid. Omission of some relatives as beneficiaries does not affect due execution of the will. As the will was found to be free from fraud, trickery or undue influence, with the testatrix having testamentary capacity, the court was compelled to give expression thereto. It is also not necessary that the will be read upon its signing and in the presence of the witnesses.Heirs of Sanson vs CA and HernandezGR No. 76648FACTS :This case arose from a petition filed by private respondent Atty. EduardoF. Hernandez on April 22, 1981 with the Court of First Instance of Manila (now Regional Trial Court) seeking the probate of the holographic will of the late Herminia Montinola executed on January 28, 1980. The testatrix, who died single, parentless and childless on March 29,1981 at the age of70 years, devised in this will several of her real properties to specified persons.On April 29,1981, private respondent who was named executor in the will filed an urgent motion for appointment of special administrator. With theconformity of all the relatives and heirs of the testatrix except oppositor,

the court in its order of May 5, 1981 appointed private respondent asSpecial Administrator of the testate estate of deceased.On June 29,1981, Matilde Montinola Sanson (petitioner), the only surviving sister of the deceased but who was not named in the said win, filed her Opposition to Probate of Will, alleging inter alia: that the subject will was not entirely written, dated and signed by the testatrix herself and the same was falsely dated or antedated; that the testatrix was not in full possession of her mental faculties to make testamentary dispositions; that undue influence was exerted upon the person and mind of the testatrix by the beneficiaries named in the win; and that the will failed to institute a residual heir to the remainder of the estate.After a hearing on the merits, the probate court, finding the evidence presented in support of the petition to be conclusive and overwhelming, rendered its decision allowing the probate of the disputed will.Petitioner thus appealed the decision of the probate court to the Court ofAppeals which affirmed in toto the decision.On September 24,1986, petitioner filed with the respondent court a motion for new trial. Attached to her motion was the Affidavit of Merit ofGregorio Montinola Sanson, petitioner's son, alleging that witnesses havebeen located whose testimonies could shed light as to the ill health of the testatrix as well as undue influence exerted on the latter.The appellate court in its resolution of October 13, 1986, denied the motion for new trial of petitioner on the following grounds: (1) theAffidavit of merit attached to the motion alleged that efforts were exerted to locate unnamed witnesses only after the court's decision was handed down, and (2) the unnamed witnesses would allegedly shed light on thefact of grave illness of the testatrix as well as the undue influence exerted on her which are merely corroborative or cumulative since these factswere brought to light during the trial.The motion for reconsideration of petitioner dated October 27, 1986 was likewise denied by the appellate court in its resolution of November 20,1986 on the ground that the affidavit of one Patricia Delgado submittedwith the motion constitutes cumulative evidence and the motion being in reality a second motion for reconsideration which is prescribed by law.ISSUE :Whether or not the testatrix failed to dispose of all of her estate is an indication of the unsoundness of her mind.HELD :

No. We cannot subscribe to this contention. Art. 841 of the Civil Code provides A will shall be valid even though it should not contain an institution of an heir, or such institution should not comprise the entire estate, and eventhough the person so instituted should not accept the inheritance or should be incapacitated to succeed.In such cases, the testamentary dispositions made in accordance with law shall be complied with and the remainder of the estate shall pass to thelegal heirs.Thus, the fact that in her holographic will, testatrix disposed of only eleven(11) of her real properties does not invalidate the will, or is it an indication that the testatrix was of unsound mind. The portion of the estateundisposed of shall pass on to the heirs of the deceased in intestatesuccession.Neither is undue influence present just because blood relatives, other than compulsory heirs have been omitted, for while blood ties are strong in thePhilippines, it is the testator's right to disregard non-compulsory heirs.Thefact that some heirs are more favored than others is proof of neither fraud or undue influence. Diversity of apportionment is the usual reason for making a testament, otherwise, the decedent might as well die intestate. The contention of the petitioner that the will was obtained by undue influence or improper pressure exerted by the beneficiaries of the will cannot be sustained on mere conjecture or suspicion; as it is not enough that there was opportunity to exercise undue influence or a possibility that it may have been exercised. The exercise of improper pressure and undue influence must be supported by substantial evidence that it was actually exercised.Finally, We quote with approval the observation of the respondent courtThere is likewise no question as to the due execution of the subject Will. To Our minds, the most authentic proof that decreased had testamentarycapacity at the time of the execution of the Will, is the Will itself whichaccording to a report of one of the two expert witnesses reveals the existence of significant handwriting characteristics such as:1. Spontaneity, freedom, and speed of writing xxx xxx xxx3. good line quality.4. presence of natural variationThe characteristics of spontaneity, freedom and good line quality could not be achieved by the testatrix if it was true that she was indeed of unsound

mind and/or under undue influence or improper pressure when she theWill.HOLOGRAPHIC WILLSPOUSES ROBERTO AND THELMA AJERO, petitioners, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS AND CLEMENTE SAND, respondents.G.R. No. 106720 September 15, 1994

Whether or not the non-compliance of the subject holographic will toArticles 813 and 84 of the New Civil Code makes the will testament void.HELD/RULINGPetition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED and SET ASIDE, except with respect to the invalidity of the disposition of the entire house and lot in Cabadbaran, Agusan del Norte.

FACTSIn the will, decedent named as devisees, the following: petitioners Roberto and Thelma Ajero, private respondent Clemente Sand, Meriam S. Arong, Leah Sand, Lilia Sand, Edgar Sand, Fe Sand, Lisa S. Sand, and Dr. Jose Ajero, Sr., and their children.On January 20, 1983, petitioners instituted Sp. Proc. No. Q-37171, for allowance of decedent's holographic will. They alleged that at the time of its execution, she was of sound and disposing mind, not acting under duress, fraud or undue influence, and was in every respect capacitated to dispose of her estate by will.Private respondent opposed the petition on the grounds that: neither the testament's body nor the signature therein was in decedent's handwriting; it contained alterations and corrections which were not duly signed by decedent; and, the will was procured by petitioners through improper pressure and undue influence. The petition was likewise opposed by Dr. Jose Ajero. He contested the disposition in the will of a house and lot located in Cabadbaran, Agusan Del Norte. He claimed that said property could not be conveyed by decedent in its entirety, as she was not its sole owner.Notwithstanding the oppositions, the trial court admitted the decedent's holographic will to probate. The probate court finds no reason at all for the disallowance of the will for its failure to comply with the formalities prescribed by law nor for lack of testamentary capacity of the testatrix. However, respondent court held that the holographic will of Anne Sand was not executed in accordance with the formalities prescribed by law. It held that Articles 813 and 814 of the New Civil Code, ante, were not complied with, hence, it disallowed the probate of said will.ISSUE

No evidence was presented to show sufficient reason for the disallowance of herein holographic will. The object of the solemnities surrounding the execution of wills is to close the door against bad faith and fraud, to avoid substitution of wills and testaments and to guaranty their truth and authenticity. Therefore, the laws on this subject should be interpreted in such a way as to attain these primordial ends. But, on the other hand, also one must not lose sight of the fact that it is not the object of the law to restrain and curtail the exercise of the right to make a will. So when an interpretation already given assures such ends, any other interpretation whatsoever, that adds nothing but demands more requisites entirely unnecessary, useless and frustrative of the testator's last will, must be disregarded.In the case of holographic wills, what assures authenticity is the requirement that they be totally autographic or handwritten by the testator himself, as provided under Article 810 of the New Civil Code. Failure to strictly observe other formalities will not result in the disallowance of a holographic will that is unquestionably handwritten by the testator.A reading of Article 813 of the New Civil Code shows that its requirement affects the validity of the dispositions contained in the holographic will, but not its probate. If the testator fails to sign and date some of the dispositions, the result is that these dispositions cannot be effectuated. Such failure, however, does not render the whole testament void.Likewise, a holographic will can still be admitted to probate, notwithstanding non-compliance with the provisions of Article 814.Thus, unless the unauthenticated alterations, cancellations or insertions were made on the date of the holographic will or on testator's signature,

their presence does not invalidate the will itself. The lack of authentication will only result in disallowance of such changes.The Court of Appeals further held that decedent Annie Sand could not validly dispose of the house and lot located in Cabadbaran, Agusan del Norte, in its entirety. This is correct and must be affirmed. She cannot validly dispose of the whole property, which she shares with her father's other heirs.INTRINSIC & EXTRINSIC VALIDITYAznar v. Garcia (Christensen Case)GR No. L-16729FACTS:In the proceedings for admission of the will to probate, the facts of record show that the deceased Edward E. Christensen was born on November 29,1875, in New York City, N. Y., U.S.A. His first arrival in the Philippines, asan appointed school teacher, was on July 1, 1901 and he stayed in thePhilippines until 1904.In December 1904, Mr. Christensen returned to the United States and resided in Sacramento, California for 9 years until 1913.He came back to the Philippines in July 1913 and since then, he returned toCalifornia only for year-long visits in 1928 and 1938. He was interned by the Japanese Military Forces in the Philippines during World War II. Uponliberation, in April 1945, he left for the United States but returned to thePhilippines in December, 1945. He never acquired a home or properties in the State of California.On March 5, 1951, Edward E. Christensen executed his last willand testament at his lawyers' office in Manila. He died at the St. Luke's Hospital in the City of Manila on April 30, 1953.In accordance with the provisions of the will, the executor in his final account and project partition ratified the payment of only P3,600 to MariaHelen Christensen Garcia, the oppositor-appelant in this case, residing inDavao, Philippines, and proposed that the residue of the estate be transferred to his daughter, Maria Lucy Christensen Daney, residing inCalifornia, U.S.A.Opposition to the approval of the project of partition was filed by Helen Christensen Garcia, insofar as it deprives her (Helen) of her legitime as an acknowledged natural child, she having been subsequently declared an acknowledged natural child of the deceased Edward E. Christensen in

1958 [G.R. Nos. L-11483-84. February 14, 1958].The legal grounds of opposition are (a) that the distribution should be governed by the laws of the Philippines, and (b) that said order ofdistribution is contrary thereto insofar as it denies to Maria HelenChristensen, one of two acknowledged natural children, one-half of the estate in full ownership.It was alleged that Section 946 of the California Civil Code, which requires that the disposition of the property shall be governed by the law of thedomicile of the decedent, i.e. Philippine law, should be applicable. It was also alleged that Maria Helen Christensen having been declared anacknowledged natural child of the decedent, she is deemed for allpurposes legitimate from the time of her birth.The Court of First Instance of Davao ruled that as Edward E. Christensen was a citizen of the United States and of the State of California at the timeof his death, the successional rights and intrinsic validity of the provisionsin his will are to be governed by the law of California, in accordance with which a testator has the right to dispose of his property in the way he desires, because the right of absolute dominion over his property is sacred and inviolable.Oppositor Maria Helen Christensen, filed various motions for reconsideration, but these were denied. Hence this appeal.ISSUE:Whether or notTHE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO RECOGNIZE THAT UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW,PARTICULARLY UNDER THE RENVOI DOCTRINE, THE INTRINSIC VALIDITY OF THETESTAMENTARY DISPOSITION OR THE DISTRIBUTION OF THE ESTATE OF THEDECEASED EDWARD E. CHRISTENSEN SHOULD BE GOVERNED BY THE LAWS OF THE PHILIPPINES.Or, alternatively,What law should govern the intrinsic validity of the will in light of the renvoi doctrine, CA law orPhilippine law?HELD:PHILIPPINE LAW is to be applied, NOT the law of California.Appellees argue that the internal law of California shall apply as pointed out in Article 16 of the Civil Code of the

Philippines. However, in this case, the State of California prescribes two sets of laws for its citizens, an internal law for residents therein and another for those domiciled in other jurisdictions. Hence, reason demands that the California conflict of law rule, i.e., Article 946 of the Civil Code of California, which authorizes the reference or return of the question to the law of the testator's domicile, should be applied (for those domiciled abroad).Article 946, Civil Code, precisely refers back the case, when a decedent is not domiciled in California, to the law of his domicile, the Philippines in the case at bar. The court of the domicile can not and should not refer the case back to California; such action would leave the issue incapable of determination because the case will then be like a football, tossed back and forth between the two states, between the country of which the decedent was a citizen and the country of his domicile. The Philippine court must apply its own law as directed in the conflict of law rule of the state of the decedent, if the question has to be decided, especially as the application of the internal law of California provides no legitime for children while the Philippine law, Arts. 887 (4) and 894, Civil Code of the Philippines, makes natural children legally acknowledged forced heirs of the parent recognizing them.Following the renvoi doctrine, the question of the validity of the testamentary provision in question should be referred back tothe law of the decedent's domicile, which is the Philippines.As the domicile of the deceased, who was a citizen of California, was the Philippines at the time of his death, the intrinsic validity of the provisions of his will depriving his acknowledged natural child of her legitime, should be governed by the Philippine law, pursuant to Article 946 of the Civil Code of California.

Kennedy who survived him, he had three legitimate children; and finally, he had three illegitimate children: Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis.On August 5, 1952, Amos G. Bellis executed a will in the Philippines, in which he directed that after all taxes, obligations, and expens