Volume XVI, Issue No. 63 July-September 2014

VOLUME XVI ISSUE NO. 63 1

It was a hectic quarter for PHILJA with the usual delivery of

our various programs—the Orientation Seminar-Workshop

for Executive Judges (selected Executive Judges and Vice

Executive Judges of the Visayas) held in Cebu; the Career

Enhancement Program for RTC Clerks of Court in Region VI

(Roxas City) and Region XI (Davao City); the 70th Orientation

Seminar-Workshop for Newly Appointed Judges; the 28th

Orientation Seminar-Workshop for Newly Appointed Clerks

of Court and the 4th Orientation Seminar-Workshop for

Newly Appointed Sheriffs and Process Servers (Batch 1),

both held at the PHILJA Training Center (PTC) in Tagaytay

City. Other activities also held at the PTC were the Judicial

Career Enhancement Program for selected RTC Judges of

the National Capital Judicial Region and the Career

Development Program for Court Legal Researchers of

Region VIII.

The Focus Group Discussion on the Rules of Procedure

for Environmental Cases and the Personal Security Training

for Judges, as well as the Refresher/Advanced Course for

Court-Annexed Mediators for the Batangas, Laguna, and

Quezon Mediation Programs, also took place at the PTC.

“Glenda,” one of the most powerful typhoons to hit the

Philippines this year, dealt the Metro area and Tagaytay

City a blow dreadful enough to damage some areas of the

PTC and to cause both a power outage and water shortage.

Our commendable PTC staff and PHILJA training teams

proceeded with the scheduled activities notwithstanding

the discomfort in the typhoon’s aftermath.

In August, we headed to Dumaguete, the lovely city by

the sea, for this year’s Academic Excellence Lecture Series

in the Judiciary (AELSJ), in partnership with the Metrobank

Foundation and in cooperation with the Silliman University

College of Law and its General Education Integrative

Learning Lectures Program. Human Rights lawyer and

University of the Philippines Professor Herminio Harry L.

Roque, Jr., featured speaker, addressed an audience of

judges, lawyers, and law students in a lecture on Legal

Nuances to the Philippine Ratification of the Rome Statute

in the International Criminal Court held at the University’s

world-class Claire Isabel McGill Luce Auditorium.

In addition, quite a number of special focus seminar-

workshops were carried out by PHILJA training teams all

From the Chancellor’s Desk

VOLUME XVI ISSUE NO. 63JULY-SEPTEMBER 2014 ISSN 2244-5862

(Continued on page 6)

over the country: Competency Enhancement Training for

Judges and Court Personnel Handling Cases Involving

Children (Dumaguete City); seminar-workshops on Various

Laws and Rules Relating to Money-Laundering and other

Financial Crimes held for Judges of Regions XI and XII (Davao

City) and Regions VIII and IX (Cebu City); seminars on the

Rules of Procedure on Financial Rehabilitation for Special

Commercial Court Judges and Pairing Court Judges in the

NCJR and Regions IV and V (Pasay City), Regions I to III, and

for other stakeholders (Baguio City); seminar-workshop on

Strengthening Judicial Integrity and Rule of Law for

Executive and Vice Executive Judges of Regions IX to XII

(Davao City).

After a long time since the last one, and pursuant to

the Chief Justice’s directive, a Curriculum Review for the

Philippine Judicial Academy was held at the PTC which was

immediately followed by a well-attended 4th Plenary

Assembly of the PHILJA Corps of Professors at the Court of

Appeals Auditorium in Manila.

It was at this last forum that I shared the information

that I had been elected Member of the International

Commission of Jurists for a five-year term. I will continue as

Chancellor of PHILJA but will attend and give lectures on

human rights and the rule of law in the Asian region to fulfill

two weeks a year of service.

Notwithstanding its full calendar, PHILJA continued to

assist in the Enhanced Justice on Wheels Program (EJOW)

through the delivery of the component Information

Dissemination through a Dialogue among Barangay Officials

and Court Officials in the cities of Iloilo and Bacolod in

Western Visayas, in Digos, Davao del Sur, and in Kidapawan

City in the province of Cotabato.

We also extended a hand to the 16th Convention and

Seminar of the 20,000 strong Philippine Association of Court

Employees (PACE) in Davao City, which was attended by

some 3,000 of its members, and likewise helped in the 16th

Convention and Seminar of the Metropolitan and City Judges

Association of the Philippines held in Quezon City.

The Academy, thru the Philippine Mediation Center

Office (PMCO), conducted a number of activities supporting

JULY - SEPTEMBER 20142

From the Chancellor’s Desk . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Judicial Views . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Trainings, Programs and Activities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Judicial Moves . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Doctrinal Reminders . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Circulars

OCA Cir. No. 87-2014 — Guidelines on the Releaseof Pensions for Judges/Pensioners and SurvivorshipPensioners . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

OCA Cir. No. 89-2014 — Small Claims CaseMonitoring System (SC2MS) Survey . . . . . . . . . . . . .

OCA Cir. No. 90-2014 — A.M. No. 12-4-6-SC (Re:BIR Letter of Authority to Examine SC Books ofAccount and other Accounting Records). . . . . . . . .

OCA Cir. No. 99-2014 — Reduction of Initial/Opening Deposit and Maintaining Balance ofRegular Savings Account from P10,000 to P1,000for the Fiduciary and Sheriff’s Trust Fund Accounts;Waiver of Certification Fee on Bank Balances; andWaiver of Fee on Requests for Snapshots and Re-Printing of Bank Statements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

OCA Cir. No. 104-2014 — Court of Appeals Decisiondated June 25, 2014 in C.A. G.R. SP No. 131969 . . .

OCA Cir. No. 110-2014 — Bar Matter No. 2604(Re: Clarification Relative to Sections 2 and 13,RULE III of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice). . . .

Cir. No. 112-2014 — Court Recognition of BJMP’sParalegal Program . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

OCA Cir. No. 113-2014 — Inventory of ConfiscatedProperty Bonds . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

OCA Cir. No. 115-2014 — Uniform Period andProcedure in the Payment of Fines inAdministrative Matters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

OCA Cir. No. 119-2014 — Conduct of PhysicalInventory and Renewal of AcknowledgmentReceipt for Equipment (ARE) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

OCA Cir. No. 120-2014 — Piloting of a New Systemfor Speedy Court Trial . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

OCA Cir. No. 121-2014 — Clarification on theCollection of Postponement Fee in ConsolidatedCases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

OCA Cir. No. 122-2014 — A.M. No. 14-08-94-MeTC(Re: Proper Fees to be Collected in Election ContestsInvolving Elective Municipal and BarangayOfficials) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

OCA Cir. No. 125-2014 — A.M. No. 11-10-03-0 (Re:Letter Dated April 18, 2011 of Chief Public AttorneyPersida Rueda-Acosta . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Orders

Office Order No. 10-2014 — Establishing theStandard Thickness of Case Rollos and Records . . .

Memorandum Order No. 19-2014 – Reorganizingthe Committee on Computerization and Library . .

Memorandum Order No. 20-2014 — Creating theCommittee on Family Courts and Juvenile Concerns . . . .

Fourth Quarter Trainings, Programs and Activities . . .

Chancellor Azcuna Elected as ICJ Commissioner

The Philippine Judicial

Academy (PHILJA) takes

pride in its Chancellor,

Justice Adolfo S. Azcuna,

for his election as a

Commissioner to the International Commission of Jurists

(ICJ) [http://www.icj.org] based in Geneva, Switzerland.

Justice Azcuna’s election to the ICJ is a recognition of

PHILJA’s work in judicial education particularly in promoting

and strengthening the cause of human rights and the rule

of law in the Philippines and worldwide.

The International Commission of Jurists, composed of

eminent judges and lawyers from around the world,

promotes and protects human rights through the rule of

law to develop and strengthen national and international

justice systems. It aims to ensure the progressive

development and effective implementation of international

human rights and international humanitarian law; to secure

the realization of civil, cultural, economic, political, and

social rights; to safeguard the separation of powers; and to

guarantee the independence of the judiciary and the legal

profession. As a Commissioner, Justice Azcuna is expected

to work actively towards the fulfilment of the objectives of

the Commission and to assist in the implementation of its

programmes, especially those related to his expertise —

human rights.

Justice Azcuna, the first Filipino ICJ Commissioner, will

serve for a five-year term until 2019.

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Contents


A Thought Piece on the Philippine Judicial Academy Curriculum Review

Maria Lourdes P. A. Sereno

Chief Justice of the Philippines

In 1996, the Philippine Judicial Academy (PHILJA) was established by the Supreme Court and “charged with the formulation

and implementation of a continuing program of judicial education for justices, judges, court personnel and lawyers” (Sec.

1, A.O. No. 35-96, March 12, 1996). Two years later,1 PHILJA was given its legislative charter through the passage of

Republic Act No. 8557 (“An Act Establishing the Philippine Judicial Academy, Defining Its Powers and Functions,

Appropriating Funds Therefor, and for Other Purposes”).

OFFICE OF THE CHIEF JUSTICE

SUPREME COURT

MANILA

12 August 2014

Hon. ADOLF S. AZCUNA

Chancellor

Philippine Judicial Academy

Dear Chancellor Azcuna:

Allow me to express my gratitude to the Philippine

Judicial Academy (PHILJA) for its initiative to conduct a

curriculum review, with the goal of establishing a

strategic training plan and adapting new methods of

judicial education to address the distinct educational

needs and skill-sets of our judges and court personnel.

One of my reform visions includes a reinvigorated

PHILJA that is able to utilize modern trends in judicial

education and impart international best practices to

our judges and court personnel. I have concretized this

vision through the attached Thought-Piece, which I am

sharing with you and the participants of the curriculum

review, such that we may continue to realize our

common vision of PHILJA as the gold standard in judicial

learning and training.

Again, congratulations and mabuhay!

Sincerely,

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Chief Justice

Pursuant to the State policy to ensure the existence of

an efficient and credible Judiciary, PHILJA’s mandate is to

“provide members of the Judiciary and prospective

applicants with continuing good education and training”

(Sec. 1, RA No. 8557) by serving as a “training school for

Justices, Judges, court personnel, lawyers and aspirants to

judicial posts” (Sec. 3, RA No. 8557).

Under the last mentioned provision of RA No, 8557,

PHILJA “shall provide and implement a curriculum for

judicial education, and shall conduct seminars, workshops

and other training programs designed to upgrade (the)

legal knowledge, moral fitness, probity, efficiency, and

capability” of those it is mandated to train and educate.2

Eighteen years after the passage of PHILJA’s charter, a

curriculum review has become imperative. Modern trends

in judicial education should be recognized, and

international best practices be considered for local

application, to keep the Philippine judiciary up-to-date with

current developments. Some of my observations and

recommendations are as follows:

1. Judicial Education by Career Stages

Our programs should follow a cycle set by stages, for the

different participants. In the United States they call this

“Career Stage Education Programming” based on the

philosophy that “judicial education programming occurs

1. Approved by President Fidel V. Ramos on February 26, 1998.

2. SEC. 3. The PHILJA shall serve as a training school for justices,

judges, court personnel, lawyers and aspirants to judicial posts.

For this purpose, it shall provide and implement a curriculum for

judicial education, and shall conduct seminars, workshops and

other training programs designed to upgrade their legal

knowledge, moral fitness, probity, efficiency, and capability. It

shall perform such other functions and duties as may be

necessary in carrying out its mandate.

(Next page)


along a continuum” (Issues and Trends in Judicial Branch

Education, Judicial Education Reference, Information and

Technical Transfer Project JERITT, Michigan State

University). The following stages are currently in use

internationally and may be studied:

(a) Pre-bench Programming

(b) New Judge/Employee Orientation: within the

first year

(c) Updates/Hot Topics: all career stages

(d) Mentoring

(e) Early Career Programming: 1–3 years

(f) Mid-Career Programming: 3.5–6 years

(g) Advanced Career Programming: 6+ years

(h) Retreats

Locally, new judges undergo an orientation seminar,

then after a year (which is too brief a period) participate in

a career enhancement seminar in compliance with

continuing legal education. A comparison of the programs

for these two seminars shows similarity, if not identity, in

content. While jurisprudence may have evolved in a span

of a year or more, there is so much more that PHILJA can

offer. It has been observed that, more often than not, the

same lecturer at the orientation for new judges will likewise

deliver the same lecture at the enhancement seminar, with

(hopefully) updated materials. The value-added factor is

thus diminished.

Following the career track per type of participant, I

suggest that programs be developed to advance their

respective expertises within a set time frame. For example,

PHILJA must study what programs should be conducted for

judges who have been on the bench for one to five years,

for those those who have served from five to 10 years, and

for those who have been judges for longer than that. This

would coincide with the career track of a judge who may

apply for promotion from a first level court to a second

level court after five years, and so on. The Judicial and Bar

Council, pursuant to Republic Act No. 8557 and A.O. No.

35-96, would thus have additional basis for vetting

applicants for judicial posts, in terms of knowledge and

skills training received.

Consistent with career tracking, PHILJA may also

consider developing its curriculum to allow for

specialization by Judges, after a specified period of time. It

may be considered that, part of developing one’s judicial

career is to not be a “generalist,” knowledgeable in all fields

of law but mastering none, but that one may pursue

passionately a chosen field, even as a Judge. Thus, PHILJA

could consider preparing its curriculum to allow for Judges

to become better at chosen fields, even as it continues to

strengthen Judges who choose to remain “generalists.”

2. Degree and Certificate Programs

PHILJA could further maximize its potential as a judicial

academy by offering degree programs. At present, it only

offers certificate programs which have largely not been of

use to participants who wish to obtain higher academic

credentials. Thus far, only San Beda School of Law’s Master

of Legal Studies program, which accepts PHILJA credits

from seminars attended as equivalent to class credits, has

progressed ahead of other schools in this respect. It is

suggested that by using PHILJA credits, participants may

be awarded with “diplomas” if they satisfy certain

requirements. The National Judicial College in the United

States confers a “Diploma of Judicial Skills” and a “Diploma

of Humanities and Judging.”

More significant, however, would be the grant of

degrees (e.g., Master of Judicial Studies and Ph.D. in Judicial

Studies). Majority of our judges have had no opportunity

for further studies due to “financial and time constraints.”

PHILJA should be able to partially address this need. PHILJA

could also commission a study by educators and curriculum

specialists on “equivalencies” so that the value of experience

can also lead to attainment of a higher degree.

3. Methodology for Program Delivery: “Blended

Learning”

“Interactive” learning methods produce better results,

especially in continuing education. At present, the majority

of PHILJA programs follow the traditional face-to-face

delivery format, without the interactive learning

component. A variety of delivery formats should be explored

and utilized based on the needs of the participants and the

goals of the program, thus:

1. Traditional Conference Format

2. Seminar-type Format

3. Retreats (with Strategic Mentoring)

4. Internet-based/Computer-assisted/Self-study

Format

5. Video Teleconferencing

6. Live Broadcasts

7. Clinical education, when legally possible

The last three options maximize distance learning

education. E-learning has become the trend in judicial

education. Through “webinars,” distance learners may

listen to and view presentations, then type in their

questions for the lecturer’s immediate response. Short


courses on a particular subject, which will be a prerequisite

to a “live” program, may also be offered online, thereby

obviating the need to discuss basic principles and freeing

up time for interactive learning. Post-program assignments

will likewise be done online. This is an example of a mixed

delivery format, which John Meeks and Diane Cowdrey of

the US National Center for State Courts call “Blended

Learning,“ referring to a mix of the traditional law school

classroom type of education and distance education. The

objective is “to match the best methods to the educational

goals and the audience.”

The pedagogical value of a Retreat with Strategic

Mentoring cannot be gainsaid. Close quarters supervision

over a period of time, where the Judge is not distracted

with the burden of his office and can focus on “sharpening

the saw,” by experienced mentors can do a lot to transform

the ways people think and act. The value of experience

that a mentor brings into the retreat would be in the

practical things and the many “best practices” that can be

shared and taken on by the Judge. PHILJA must consider

venues such as strategic retreats as not only an opportunity

for wellness but also for education.

Presently, the bulk of PHILJA lectures are on substantive

law. Unless there are new developments which require

face-to-face training, it is suggested that all learning in

substantive law be done through distance education, i.e.,

the target audience will have access to recorded lectures,

whether through CDs or via the internet. The text of the

presentation should likewise be made accessible. A

mechanism for receiving and answering questions on the

presentation should also be put in place. It is every judicial

officer’s professional duty to keep abreast of legal

developments, and each judicial officer is presumed to have

more than just a rudimentary understanding of the law.

PHILJA will provide them with the materials; it is their duty

to study them.

As for remedial law, it is suggested that lectures on

the Rules of Court and related jurisprudence be dispensed

with. Instead, all remedial law lectures should incorporate

the presentation of procedural flowcharts that justices,

judges and court personnel can easily follow, coupled with

checklists of jurisdictional requirements, formal

requirements, and the like. Each remedial law lecture

should also provide participants with sample ready-made

templates and forms of frequently used papers (court-

issued and court-bound) relevant to the subject of the

lecture. As with the suggestion on substantive law, any

changes in the rules or updates on jurisprudence should

also be done by distance education.

These suggestions are considerably more cost-effective

than traditional programs, particularly with respect to the

executive time of judges, court officials and employees.

I recommend that skills training be the emphasis of

our programs. Thus, judges should be taught how to write

by actually making them write, and not through lectures

on how to write. This can be done live with follow-up writing

activities via distance education computer-based writing

exercises. Judges should also be taught how to handle and

rule on objections in the examination of witnesses. They

should be trained on how to conduct an exhaustive pre-

trial – not by lecturing them about Rule 18, but through a

live action approximation of a pre-trial proceeding. While

moot court is currently part of the new judges’ orientation,

they do not get to practice being judges but instead act

out the roles of lawyers, litigants, and witnesses. Judges

should likewise be taught how to deal with the different

types of witnesses, and how to compute penalties. They

should also be taught how to conduct plea bargaining and

how to conduct sentencing in open court. Judges should be

taught how to manage their caseload based on their court’s

peculiar needs, and not based on a general formula that

fails to take into account the environment each court

operates in. I likewise propose a mentoring program to be

established in conjunction with the OCA. Judges should be

taught how to manage their personnel and meager

supplies. Judges should be taught how to manage their

trials and keep active control of proceedings. Above all,

judges should be taught how to conduct themselves

ethically in day-to-day scenarios they commonly encounter.

The case study method of the leading schools can be a

good model to equip judges on handling many everyday

“dilemma” situations.

4. Fixed and Synchronized Program Calendar

Although PHILJA prepares an annual calendar of its

programs, it currently does not make this calendar available

to the targeted participants to enable them to synchronize

their own schedules with the projected activities. More

often than not, participants receive notices only a few

weeks before the date of the program, and virtually all

participants need to make travel arrangements. This results

in numerous resetting of court schedules, which is contrary

to the judiciary’s mandate and therefore should be avoided.

As far as feasible, PHILJA should schedule its regular

programs in January and July when trial courts conduct

their semestral inventories and hold no hearings. PHILJA

should also utilize the dates when the DOJ prosecutors,

the public attorneys, the court stenographers, and the court

interpreters are set to hold their annual conventions (and

therefore no court hearings are scheduled). “Seasonal”

programs such as the orientation of new judges and the

seminar component of conventions may be scheduled

based on need.

Judges should be able to maximize oral arguments by

way of summation instead of requiring that everything be


reduced to writing. This saves time and shortens the period

for resolution of cases.

It is therefore proposed that PHILJA come out with its

annual calendar of programs by November of the current

year, such that it may be circulated to all targeted

participants by December 1 of the same year.

5. Learning Needs Assessment and Program Evaluation

It is important that an effective needs-assessment

mechanism be put in place. The evaluation form currently

used for programs administered by PHILJA generates

predictable results. In these evaluations, PHILJA solicits

comments on the program, as well as suggestions on future

programs that participants want PHILJA to offer. These

evaluation forms are filled out by participants when the

program is about to end, and participants are frequently in

a rush to leave. To be effective, needs assessment requires

great thought and consideration; a hastily filled-out form

may not provide the information necessary to formulate a

responsive curriculum. Instead of the written survey form,

PHILJA might consider ending the program with an

interactive, on-the-spot assessment of the program and a

survey of further learning needs of the participants.

Program evaluation should also go beyond the usual

end-of-program evaluation. There should be a follow-up

evaluation on profitability or the “value-added” to assess

whether changes, positive or negative, have been observed

and could be attributed to attendance in the program.

There should also be a cost-benefit analysis after each

program.

6. Training for Court Personnel

Only clerks of court and legal researchers receive regular

formal training from PHILJA. The other court personnel

receive training as a part of their conventions, but since

participation is voluntary because it entails personal

expenses, not all court personnel benefit from these

programs. Besides, these programs usually just comprise

two to four lectures.

PHILJA should expand its programs to train court

personnel in the efficient operations of our courts. The

most urgent candidates for training are sheriffs and process

servers. Next to the clerks of court, the sheriffs have the

weightiest responsibilities in a court.

To aid in the training of the different types of personnel,

manuals should be developed for each group, such as the

Manual for Clerks of Courts. Training should then be

conducted based on the developed manuals, which should

be simpler, checklist-oriented, and employ a practical,

experience-based approach.

Alternative Dispute Resolution. In Negros Oriental,

we delivered an Orientation Conference with

Stakeholders on Court-Annexed Mediation, an

Orientation and Screening of Prospective Mediators

and PMC Unit Staff, and a Basic Mediation Course

and a Pre-Internship Orientation and Meeting with

judges, clerks of court, branch clerks of court,

mediation-trainees and PMC Unit staff in Court-

Annexed Mediation under their Mediation Program.

In Iloilo City, we held a Judicial Settlement

Conference for Judges on Judicial Dispute Resolution

(JDR) and the JDR Orientations of Public Prosecutors

and Practitioners, Clerks of Court, and Branch Clerks

of Court. A Refresher/Advanced Course for Court-

Annexed Mediators was also held in La Union for

the benefit of the La Union, Benguet, and

Pangasinan Mediation Programs.

Two roundtable discussions (RTDs), held for the

benefit of Court of Appeals Justices, rounded off our

activities for this quarter—one on Substantive Laws

and Jurisprudence on Intellectual Property (Batch

3) held in Zambales and the other on the Rules of

Procedure on Financial Rehabilitation in Manila.

We took note of the new rulings, doctrinal

reminders, and recent resolutions, circulars, and

orders of the Supreme Court as well as of the Office

of the Court Administrator.

To our officials and staff, keep up the good work

and congratulations on our highlights thus far.

To our development partners, thank you for your

valuable support as we pursue our common goal.

To the Supreme Court, we are very grateful for

the unwavering support for PHILJA in all our

trainings, programs, and activities.

To the Almighty be the glory.

ADOLFO S. AZCUNA

Chancellor

From the Chancellor’s Desk (Continued from page 1)


TRAININGS, PROGRAMS AND ACTIVITIES

PHILJA Curriculum Review

On August 14, 2014, PHILJA convened the most brilliant

minds in judicial education for a PHILJA Curriculum Review,

in response to the directive of the PHILJA Board of Trustees,

to re-visit the training curricula and ensure that the

substance of PHILJA programs meet the needs of the

judiciary and current trends in judicial education. The activity

was designed: to develop a strategic training plan based on

needs assessment, including skills training, professional

development and personal growth; to learn, develop, and

adopt new methods in judicial education in relation to

emerging trends and technological advances; and to

formulate programs which address distinct educational

needs and enhance specific skills of judges and court

personnel who work in highly specialized areas of law.

PHILJA Chief of Office for Academic Affairs Justice

Delilah Vidallon-Magtolis presented the PHILJA Highlights

from 2012–2013 which provided: the current state of PHILJA

activities; statistics on the core programs completed and

their profitability ratings; trends in PHILJA courses; and issues

and concerns in the delivery of curricula. By way of

introduction to the curriculum review proper, Justice Hilarion

L. Aquino, Department of Ethics and Judicial Conduct Chair,

and Fr. Ranhilio C. Aquino, Department of Jurisprudence

and Legal Philosophy Chair, presented The Problem of

Integrity and Teaching of Judicial Ethics and Current Trends

and Developments in Judicial Education, respectively.

The PHILJA Curriculum Review was carried out in two

discussion sessions: the first was a presentation addressing

what judicial training should be, considering the comments

and suggestions previously gathered from the Chief Justice

and Supreme Court justices; the second was a re-

examination of PHILJA programs with department

chairpersons/member-representatives presenting their

respective comments and suggestions.

Prior to the forum, Chief Justice Maria Lourdes P. A.

Sereno provided PHILJA her observations and

recommendations for the activity through her paper A



Following through the recently conducted Review of PHILJA

Curriculum and acting upon the proposal of the members of

the Corps of Professors, PHILJA held a Plenary Assembly of

the PHILJA Corps of Professors on August 29, 2014, to

apprise the participants on the outcome and output of the

PHILJA Curriculum Review and gather their professorial

commitment to PHILJA. One hundred eight members of

the Corps of Professors, comprising Supreme Court and

PHILJA officials, incumbent and retired justices and judges,

professors of law, the academe, including the SC and PHILJA

staff, attended the activity.

The program’s morning session began with the

conferment of the Posthumous Award to Dr. Purificacion V.

Quisumbing, Chair of the PHILJA Department of

International and Human Rights Law, for her significant

contributions to the Academy and to the Supreme Court.

The award was presented to Justice Leonardo Quisumbing

(ret.) and the rest of the family. Justice Quisumbing

responded with a message of appreciation.

The plenary assembly proper immediately followed the

conferment ceremony. PHILJA Chancellor Adolfo S. Azcuna

4th Plenary Assembly of the

PHILJA Corps of Professors and Conferment

Ceremony of the Posthumous Award to

Dr. Purificacion V. Quisumbing

Within the past four years since the Rules of Procedure on

Environmental Cases took effect on April 14, 2010, the

Philippine Judicial Academy (PHILJA), in partnership with

valuable development partners conducted 18 multi-sectoral

capacity building trainings on the Rules for judges and other

stakeholders of designated Green courts and courts of

environmental hot spot areas. Court of Appeals justices

who are also duty bearers of the Rules were capacitated in

its application in three trainings conducted by the Academy.

To determine the Rules’ effectiveness, PHILJA, in

partnership with the United States Agency for International

Development (USAID) and the United States Department

of the Interior (USDOI), conducted a Focus Group Discussion

(FGD) on the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases

on July 3–4, 2014 at the PHILJA Training Center, Tagaytay

City having as participants selected Court of Appeals justices

and judges who have participated in the previous trainings.

The FGD aimed to assess the application of the Rules;

identify the provisions of the Rules that need enhancement;

identify additional provisions to further improve the

application of the Rules; identify innovations and best

practices in the effective enforcement of remedies and

redress for violation of environmental laws; and assess the

impact of the series of trainings in the conduct by justices

and judges of their hearings and decision-making.

The Chancellor, Justice Adolfo S. Azcuna, formally

opened the activity with a total of 52 participants in

attendance. The participants were clustered into workshop

groups to discuss problem areas in the application of the

Rules and share best practices in the resolution of identified

problems. The workshop outputs were then presented in

plenary before distinguished panelists, Supreme Court

Justices Diosdado M. Peralta and Lucas P. Bersamin, who

are members of the Subcommittee on the Rules of

Procedure for Environmental Cases, Justice Oswaldo D.

Agcaoili and Director Asis G. Perez of the Bureau of Fisheries

Focus Group Discussion on theRules of Procedure for Environmental Cases

presented the Review’s outputs and summary of

recommendations. The afternoon session was devoted to

workshop-focus group sessions by academic departments

where key guide questions were provided to facilitate their

discussions. In the same session, participants who were not

yet members of any department were given the opportunity

to sign up for membership in the department of their choice.

Led by Justice Delilah V idallon-Magtolis,the present

members of the Corps of Professors then took their Oath of

Professorial Commitment to solidify their dedication to the

task of judicial development and education. Justice Hilarion

L. Aquino delivered the closing remarks.



The Supreme Court of Bangladesh delegation, led by

Mr. Chief Justice Md. Muzammel Hossain, accompanied

by H.E. John Gomez, Ambassador of Bangladesh in the

Philippines, visited to the Philippine Judicial Academy on

August 25, 2014, at the PHILJA Training Center, Tagaytay

City. They were welcomed by Chancellor Adolfo S.

Azcuna, Executive Secretary Marina L. Buzon, Chief of

Office for Academic Affairs Delilah Vidallon-Magtolis,

Head of the Research, Publications and Linkages

Office Sedfrey M. Candelaria and PHILJA Professor Thelma

A. Ponferrada. The delegation of eight was composed of

Mr. Chief Justice Md. Muzammel Hossain; Honorable

Judges of the Appellate Divisions Najmum Ara Sultana

and Syed Mahmud Hossain; Honorable Judges of the High

Court Division A.H.M. Shamsuddin Choudhury, Moyeenul

Islam Chowdhury, and Naima Haider; Senior District Judge

S. M. Kuddus Zaman; and Mr. Jakhongir Khayderov, Chief

Technical Adviser of Judicial Strengthening Project.

During the visit, the PHILJA officials gave them a tour of

the PTC facilities and a brief overview on PHILJA, with

focus on its composition, programs, publications, and

mediation activities.

Visit of Bangladesh SC Delegation

70th Orientation Seminar-Workshop for Newly Appointed

Judges

Date: July 15–24, 2014

Venue: PHILJA Training Center, Tagaytay City

Participants: 41 newly appointed and 7 promoted judges,

namely:

A. NEW APPOINTMENTS

REGIONAL TRIAL COURTS

REGION III

Hon. Gorgonio B. Elarmo, Jr.

RTC, Branch 77, Malolos City, Bulacan

Hon. Francisco P. Felizmenio


Hon. Gener M. Gito

RTC, Branch 92, Balanga City, Bataan

Hon. Philger Noel B. Inovejas


Hon. Jose Marie A. Quimboy

RTC, Branch 94, Mariveles, Bataan

Hon. Maria Zenaida Bernadette T. Tamayo-Mendiola


METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURTS

Hon. Kirk M. Aniñon

MeTC, Branch 44, Pasay City

Hon. Ma. Lourdes V. Barrios-Sapalo

MeTC, Branch 64, Makati City

Hon. Dorothy Grace R. Daguna-Inciong

MeTC, Branch 52, Caloocan City

Hon. Honorio C. Ebora, Jr.

MeTC, Branch 71, Pasig City

Hon. Ihmie Michiko C. Gacad-Presto

MeTC, Branch 5, Manila

Hon. Fricia C. Gomez-Guillen


Hon. Jerome U. Jimenez


Hon. Ma. Ludmila P. Lim

MeTC, Branch 34, Quezon City

Hon. Analie B. Oga-Brual

MeTC, Branch 41, Quezon City

Hon. Eriza P. Pagaling-Zapanta


Hon. Karen M. Sy


Hon. Manuel Gerard C. Tomacruz


Orientation-Seminars


Hon. Sheryll D. Tulabing*

MeTC, Branch 56, Malabon City

MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURTS IN CITIES

REGION V

Hon. Jocelyn P. Gamboa-Delos Santos

MTCC, Branch 4, City of San Fernando, Pampanga

Hon. Zharone Fritz M. Japzon-Ferreras

MTCC, City of Cabuyao, Laguna

Hon. Roberto Ricardo O. Kanapi

MTCC, Branch 2, San Jose City

Hon. Ryan Scott F. Robiños

MTCC, Branch 1, Tarlac City, Tarlac

MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURTS

REGION III

Hon. Michael Benedick V. Aleta

MTC, Pantabangan, Nueva Ecija

Hon. Kristine A. Aquino-Ferrer

MTC, Lupao, Nueva Ecija

Hon. Maria Cristina C. Botigan-Santos**

MTC, San Ildefonso, Bulacan

Hon. Jamila D.R. Cruz-Sarga

MTC, Rizal, Nueva Ecija

Hon. Rachelle G. Ernie

MTC, Zaragosa, Nueva Ecija

Hon. Julieta M. Isidro-Reyes

MTC, Dingalan, Aurora

Hon. Vincent E. Lamug

MTC, Iba, Zambales

Hon. Ian P. Ramoso

MTC, Talugtog, Nueva Ecija

Hon. Juan G. Rañola, Jr.

MTC, Hagonoy, Bulacan

Hon. Mario Pocholo M. Telan

MTC, Baliuag, Bulacan

REGION IV

Hon. Cyrus B. Goco

MTC, Socorro, Mindoro Oriental

Hon. Dennis U. Magsombol

MTC, Balayan, Batangas

Hon. Maricel M. Magpantay-Ng

MTC, Mataas-na-Kahoy, Batangas

Hon. Amiel Raymond O. Pargas

MTC, San Pascual, Batangas

Hon. Emmanuel S. Paynor

MTC, San Antonio, Nueva Ecija

Hon. Juanita A. Unira-Orejas

MTC, Lian, Batangas

MUNICIPAL CIRCUIT TRIAL COURTS

REGION III

Hon. Julius A. Java

1st MCTC: Quezon-Licab, Nueva Ecija

Hon. Stanley Marvin J. Pengson

3rd MCTC: Laur-Gabaldon, Nueva Ecija

B. PROMOTION


REGION I

Hon. Rusty M. Naya

RTC, Branch 51, Tayug, Pangasinan

REGION III

Hon. Isidra A. Argañosa-Maniego


Hon. Amelita C. Corpuz

RTC, Branch 96, Dinalupihan, Bataan

Hon. Eda P. Dizon-Era

RTC, Branch 60, Angeles City, Pampanga

Hon. Maria Maruja P. Narvaiza-Mendoza


Hon. Marion Jacqueline P. Poblete


Hon. Frazierwin V. Viterbo

RTC, Branch 33, Guimba, Nueva Ecija


Clerks of Court

Date: September 16–19, 2014


Participants: 69 newly appointed clerks of court, namely:


NATIONAL CAPITAL JUDICIAL REGION

Atty. Joselino N. Sucion

RTC, Branch 61, Makati City

REGION II

Atty. Maylene M. Nicolas

RTC, Branch 23, Roxas, Isabela

REGION III

Atty. Theodorick K. Ayungo

RTC, Branch 86, Cabanatuan City, Nueva Ecija

Atty. Anihairah B. Hadji Omar

RTC, Branch 73, Olongapo

REGION IV

Atty. Alpha L. Andrada

RTC, Branch 22, Imus, Cavite

Atty. Harvy Brian H. Valencia

RTC, Branch 48, Masbate* Missed the morning session on the fifth day (July 21)

** Missed the first day (July 15)


REGION V

Atty. Albert S. Olavere

RTC, Branch 33, Pili, Camarines Sur

REGION VI

Atty. Therese C. Del Campo-Peñaranda

RTC, Branch 28, Iloilo City

Atty. Jean-Paul A. Diputado

RTC, OCC, Dumaguete City, Negros Oriental

Atty. Maria Cecilia M. Garrido

RTC, Branch 40, Silay City

Atty. Kathryn Rose A. Hitalia-Baliatan

RTC, Branch 24, Iloilo City, Iloilo

Atty. Ma. Jezzel C. Rasimo

RTC, Branch 69, Silay City

REGION VII

Atty. Perpetua Socorro O. Enriquez-Belarmino

RTC Branch 8, Cebu City, Cebu

Atty. Rosadey E. Faelnar-Binongo

RTC Branch 11, Cebu City

REGION VIII

Atty. Hyacinth D. Renomeron

RTC, Branch 15, Burauen, Leyte

Atty. Ruby Christie C. Jordan-Merilo

RTC, Branch 9, Tacloban City, Leyte

Atty. Phoebeth S. Peras

RTC, Branch 25, Maasin, Southern Leyte

Atty. Djhoana Gene A. Antoni-Clemencio

RTC, Branch 44, Tacloban City

REGION IX

Atty. Maricel S. Bangayan-Lahi

RTC, OCC, Zamboanga City, Zamboanga del Sur

Atty. Leah Meih S. Macapas-Gagaracruz

RTC, Branch 12, Zamboanga City

Atty. Richelle A. Noblefranca

RTC, Branch 8, Dipolog City, Zamboanga del Norte

Atty. Edwin M. Tomon

RTC, Branch 21, Pagadian, Zamboanga del Sur

Atty. Aileen A. Zorrilla-Febiar

RTC Branch 10, Dipolog City, Zamboanga del Norte

REGION X

Atty. Joseph Emmanuel C. Cotares

RTC OCC, Tandag, Surigao del Sur

Atty. Ed Anthony F. Guerra

RTC, Branch 29, Surigao City, Surigao del Norte

Atty. Jeanny Mae H. Rafols

RTC, Branch 38, Cagayan de Oro City

Misamis Oriental

Atty. Katrina Farrah P. Suarez

RTC, Branch 7, Bayugan City, Agusan del Sur

REGION XI

Atty. Marian Abbie B. Casipe

RTC, Branch 24, Koronadal, South Cotabato

Atty. Rubylin D. Pecson

RTC, Branch 2, Tagum City, Davao del Norte

REGION XII

Atty. Vicente C. Dumbrigue, Jr.

RTC, Branch 17, Kidapawan City, North Cotabato

Atty. Ma. Luningning P. Lagcao-Dy

RTC, Branch 4, lligan City, Lanao del Norte

Atty. Ruby M. Luy-Dela Banda

RTC, OCC, Kidapawan City, North Cotabato

Atty. Nurhani C. Pacasem-Nur

RTC, Branch 14, Cotabato City

Atty. Desiree P. Pacilan

RTC, OCC, IIigan City, Lanao del Norte

METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT

Ms. Ofelia R. Viray-Sarte

MeTC, OCC, Marikina


REGION IV

Ms. Anita L. Crisostomo

MTCC, Branch 3, Antipolo City

REGION VI

Ms. Sharon Antoniette M. Verde

MTCC, Branch 4, Bacolod City

REGION VII

Ms. Clemente S. De Jesus

MTCC, Branch 2, Talisay, Cebu

Ms. Beverly A. Presas

MTCC, OCC, Talisay City

REGION X

Ms. Laarne D. Badoles

MTCC, Branch 2, Cagayan de Oro City

Ms. Ma. Rizalie Blossom E. Bagas

MTCC, OCC , Cagayan de Oro

REGION IX

Ms. Eleanor S. Angeles

MTCC, Branch 2, Dipolog City

REGION XI

Ms. Maria Luisa F. Elorde-Ellima

MTCC OCC, Island Garden City of Samal, Davao del Norte

Ms. Cynthia Mae F. Pingoy

MTCC, Branch 1, General Santos City


REGION XII

Ms. Mia E. Dela Peña

MTCC, Branch 2, Iligan City

Mr. Ramon Moshe U. Pernitez II

MTCC, Branch 5, Iligan City

MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURTS

REGION II

Ms. Leonida L. Sandoval

MTC, Bambang, Nueva Vizcaya

REGION IV

Ms. Merly A. Beso

MTC, Calauag, Quezon

Mr. Jose Roy C. Piñon

MTC, Branch 2, Binangonan, Rizal

REGION V

Ms. Maryruth M. Verdadero

MTC, Pasacao, Camarines Sur

REGION VI

Ms. Jessica G. Castro

MTC, Cauayan, Negros Occidental

Ms. Arlyn M. Medina

MTC, San Jose, Antique

REGION VII

Ms. Hannah B. Ortiz

MTC, Sibonga, Cebu

REGION VIII

Mr. Ranulfo R. Balano

MTC, Tanauan, Leyte

REGION XII

Ms. Wenifreda I. Epe

MTC, Sultan Naga Dimaporo, Lanao del Norte

MUNICIPAL CIRCUIT TRIAL COURTS

REGION I

Ms. Resanelyn Margarita B. Nicolas

4th MCTC: Piddig-Carasi-Solsona, IIocos Norte

REGION III

Mr. Jerrycham A. Lora

3rd MCTC: Botolan-Cabangan, Zambales

REGION V

Mr. Diogenes L. Virtucio, Jr.

7th MCTC: Mobo-Milagros, Masbate

REGION VII

Mr. Aladino B. Lumayno

6th MCTC: Ubay-President Carlos P. Garcia, Bohol

Ms. Necifora G. Sayon

16th MCTC: Carmen-Batuan, Bohol

REGION VIII

Ms. Mirasol O. Catamco

5th MCTC: Maydolong-Balangkayan, Eastern Samar

Ms. Nora S. Dato

6th MCTC: San Jose-Biri-Rosario, Northern Samar

Mr. Leon C. Duran

10th MCTC: Balangiga-Lawaan, Eastern Samar

Mr. Alexander Serapio C. Abala

11th MCTC: Villaba-Tabango, Leyte

REGION IX

Mr. Johnil D. Magtuba

5th MCTC: Katipunan-Sergio Osmeña, Sr.

Zamboanga del Norte

Mr. Sherlando R. Pepito

10th MCTC: R. Magsaysay-Midsalip-Sominot

Zamboanga del Sur

Mr. Peter Laurence D. Real

2nd MCTC: Naga-Titay, Zamboanga Sibugay

REGION XI

Ms. L’Leonor G. Huqueriza

1st MCTC: Norala-T’Boli-Sto. Nino, South Cotabato

REGION XII

Ms. Euvelyn P. Casangoan

1st MCTC: Parang-Buldon-Matanog-Barira, Maguindanao


Sheriffs and Process Servers (Batch 1)



Participants: 35 newly appointed sheriffs and 27 newly

appointed process servers, namely:

A. SHERIFFS



Mr. Marwin Paul S. Bacho

RTC, Br. 128, Caloocan City

Mr. Vladimir T. Cos

RTC, OCC, Parañaque City

Mr. Melito E. Cuadra

RTC, Br. 100, Quezon City

Mr. Constancio M. Gallamos, Jr.

RTC, Br. 192, Marikina City

Mr. Delfin Dakila Y. Guerrero II

RTC, Br. 111, Pasay City

Ms. Marietta B. Limon

RTC, Br. 113, Pasay City

Mr. Felix V. Moreto III

RTC, OCC, Parañaque City


REGION IV

Mr. Francis Gerald C. Cruz

RTC, Br. 77, San Mateo Rizal

Mr. Joel S. Dalida

RTC, Br. 57, Lucena City, Quezon

Ms. Lea G. De Los Santos

RTC, Br. 96, Antipolo City, Rizal

Mr. Mario S. Devanadera

RTC, Br. 30, San Pablo City, Laguna

Ms. Imelda M. Magpantay

RTC, OCC, San Pedro, Laguna

Mr. Vincent Patrick R. Mataban

RTC, Br. 34, Calamba, Laguna

Mr. Bryan E. Noroña

RTC, Br. 27, Sta. Cruz, Laguna


Mr. Dino B. Alejandro

MeTC, Br. 99, Mandaluyong City

Mr. Norgen A. Altarejos

MeTC, Br. 81, Valenzuela City

Mr. Frederick F. Amparo

MeTC, Br. 73, Pateros

Mr. Dann August S. Arnuelo

MeTC, Br. 91, Parañaque City

Ms. Elena C. Banias

MeTC, OCC, Parañaque City

Mr. Jaime G. Banias, Jr.


Ms. Menchie A. Barcelona


Mr. Rogelio V. Clemente, Jr.

MeTC, Br. 39, Quezon City

Mr. Marc Christofer G. Dela Cruz

MeTC, Br. 93, Marikina City

Mr. Rommel P. Divina


Mr. Igmedio D. Garonia

MeTC, Br. 12, Manila

Mr. Zarex G. Marqueses

MeTC, Br. 6, Manila

Mr. Enrico H. Matias

MeTC, Br. 2, Manila

Ms. Editha S. Pacamparra

MeTC, Marikina City

Mr. Araw C. Perez

MeTC, OCC, Makati City

Ms. Emily J. Reyes

MeTC, Marikina City

Mr. Ronelio V. Salamanca

MeTC, Br. 55, Malabon City

Mr. Daniel Q. Saligumba

MeTC, OCC, Manila

Mr. Wilbur S. Young

MeTC, Br. 80, Muntinlupa City


REGION IV

Mr. Conrado O. Quiamzon, Jr.

MTCC, OCC, Cavite City

Mr. Frederick Matthew A. Galvez

MTCC, Br. 2, Batangas City

B. PROCESS SERVERS



Ms. Carol D. Aguilar

RTC, Br. 255, Las Piñas City

Mr. Alejandro U. Aribuabo

RTC, Br. 44, Manila

Mr. Eduardo C. Castillo, Jr.

RTC, Br. 158, Pasig City

Mr. Mark King V. Corrales


Mr. Andrew Nikko M. Dimo

RTC, Br. 84, Quezon City

Mr. Lorenzo D. Martinez


Mr. Ramesis L. Minay

RTC, OCC, Quezon City

REGION IV

Mr. Joemar C. Aseremo

RTC, Br. 5, Lemery, Batangas

Mr. Jeremy M. Atienza

RTC, OCC, San Pablo, Laguna

Ms. Racquel A. Javate

RTC, Br. 35, Calamba City, Laguna


Mr. Ric L. Gorospe


Mr. IIvin M. Jacob

MeTC, Br. 85, Caloocan City

Mr. Mario P. Liprado


Ms. Ricky B. Maniago


Mr. Reymie Jay Z. Montes


Ms. Sheila S. Pendon


Ms. Joy M. Punzalan


Mr. Ryan R. Quinto

MeTC, Br. 49, Caloocan City

Mr. Elias Francisco E. Ranches


Mr. Rhonald Allan G. Santos

MeTC, Br. 22, Manila


Mr. Rizalino D.L. Santos


Mr. Frederick E. Silloga

MeTC, Br. 55, Malabon City


REGION IV

Mr. Mark Lyndon C. Alzate

MTCC, OCC, Cavite City

Mr. Edgardo B. Bisente

MTCC, Dasmariñas City, Cavite

Ms. Marilyn O. Gabica

MTCC, OCC, Antipolo City, Rizal

MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT

REGION IV

Mr. Jose Emmanuel Z. Sumbilla

MTC, OCC, San Pedro, Laguna

MUNICIPAL CIRCUIT TRIAL COURT

REGION IV

Mr. Glenn C. Austria

6th MCTC: Roxas-Cagayancillo, Palawan

Seminar for Executive Judges (Selected Executive Judges

and Vice Executive Judges of the Visayas)

Date: July 24–25, 2014

Venue: Marco Polo Plaza Hotel, Cebu City

Participants: 24 RTC and MTC judges

JCEP for Selected RTC Judges of the National Capital Judicial

Region

Date: July 16–18, 2014


Participants: 15 RTC judges

CEP for RTC Clerks of Court

Region VI

Date: July 1–3, 2014

Venue: San Antonio Hotel, Baybay, Roxas City

Participants: 66 RTC clerks of court

CDP for Court Legal Researchers of Region VIII

Date: July 16–17, 2014


Participants: 16 RTC and MTCC legal researchers

Competency Enhancement Training for Judges and Court

Personnel Handling Cases Involving Children

Date: July 8–10, 2014

Venue: Bethel Guest House, Dumaguete City

Participants: 56 RTC judges, clerks of court/officers in

charge, court interpreters, court social workers,

prosecutors, PAO lawyers, and representatives from

Consuelo Foundation

Seminar-Workshop on Various Laws and Rules Relating to

Money Laundering and Other Financial Crimes for Judges

Regions XI and XII

Date: July 23–24, 2014

Venue: Marco Polo Hotel, Davao City


Regions VIII and IX


Venue: Radisson Blu Hotel, Cebu City


Seminar on the Rules of Procedure on Financial

Rehabilitation for Special Commercial Court Judges and

Pairing Court Judges

NCJR and Regions IV and V

Date: August 8, 2014

Venue: Traders Hotel, Pasay City


Regions I to III and Other Stakeholders


Venue: The Manor, Camp John Hay, Baguio City

Participants: 40 RTC judges and IBP Baguio-Benguet

Chapter lawyers

Judicial Career EnhancementPrograms (JCEP)

Career Development Programfor Court Personnel (CDP)

Special Focus Programs

Career EnhancementPrograms (CEP)

Region XI


Venue: Park Inn by Radisson Davao, Davao City

Participants: 42 RTC clerks of court


16th Convention and Seminar of the Metropolitan and City

Judges Association of the Philippines (MetCJAP)

Theme: Judicial Innovations: Trends, Issues and Practices


Venue: Crowne Plaza Manila Galleria, Quezon City

Participants: 164 MeTC and MTCC judges

16th National Convention and Seminar of the Philippine

Association of Court Employees (PACE)

Date: July 9–11, 2014

Venue: SMX Convention Center, Lanang, Davao

Participants: 2082 RTC, MeTC, MTCC, MTC and MCTC court

employees

Roundtable Discussion on Substantive Laws and

Jurisprudence on Intellectual Property for Court of Appeals

Justices (Batch 3)


Venue: Kamana Sanctuary, Subic, Zambales

Participants: 23 CA justices

Roundtable Discussion on the Rules of Procedure on

Financial Rehabilitation for Court of Appeals Justices

Date: September 4, 2014

Venue: Court of Appeals Auditorium, Manila

Participants: 40 CA justices

Focus Group Discussion on the Rules of Procedure for

Environmental Cases



Participants: 52 CA justices, SC Officials and staff, and RTC,

MTCC, MTC, and MCTC judges

Roundtable Discussions

Focus Group Discussion

Convention-Seminars

Curriculum Review of the Philippine Judicial Academy



Participants: 26 PHILJA officials and members of PHILJA

Academic Departments

Academic Excellence Lecture Series in the Judiciary

Topic: Legal Nuances to the Philippine Ratification of the

Rome Statue of the International Criminal Court


Venue: Claire Isabel McGill Luce Auditorium

Silliman University, Dumaguete City, Negros Oriental

Participants: 248 PHILJA official, secretariat/documentors,

RTC and MTCC judges/branch clerks of court/clerks of

court/legal researchers, Silliman University students and

other guests

Information Dissemination through a Dialogue between

Barangay Officials and Court Officials

Iloilo City


Venue: Sen. Potenciano T. Treñas Hall

Lone District Office, Iloilo City

Participants: 167 barangay officials and RTC court personnel

Bacolod City


Venue: Atrium Hall of Justice, Bacolod City

Participants: 152 barangay officials

Kidapawan City


Venue: Kidapawan Provincial Gymnasium

Amas, Kidapawan City


Digos City


Venue: Digos Cultural Center and Sports Complex

Digos City


Seminar-Workshop on Strengthening Judicial Integrity and

Rule of Law for Executive and Vice Executive Judges of

Regions IX to XII


Venue: Marco Polo Hotel, Davao City

Participants: 28 RTC, MTCC, MTC and MCTC judges

Personal Security Training for Judges

Date: September 30–October 2, 2014

Venue: PHILJA Training Center

Participants: 67 RTC, MeTC, MTCC, MTC and MCTC judges


Newly elected officers of the Philippine Association of Court Employees (PACE)

2014–2016

National Officers

Region I: Dr. Macario Salva

MCTC, Sarrat-Vintar

Ilocos Norte

Region III: Roy M. Mendonez

RTC OCC, Iba, Zambales

Region IV-A: Rosalina G. Aguado

RTC, Branch 8, Batangas City

Region V: Zenaida Magayanes

RTC, Branch 7, Legaspi City

Region VI: Dr. Erly M. Martir

RTC, Branch 65

Buena V ista-Guimaras

Region VII: Meriam C. Quizo

MTCC, Bais City

Region VIII: Leila L. Cinco

RTC, Branch 28, Catbalogan,

Samar

Region IX: Virgilio S. Sila

MTCC, Branch 2, Pagadian City

Region X: Nolan P. Lacang

RTC, Branch 35, Ozamis City

Region XI: Virgilia Elnah G. Gementiza

RTC, Branch 30, Tagum City

National President: Atty. Ma. Fe O. Maloloy-on

MTCC OCC, Davao City

Exec. Vice President: Atty. Virginia R. Coloma-Rafael


Vice President for Luzon: Eddie H. Saracanlao

MTCC, Bacoor City

Vice President for Visayas: Lyvia M. Malate

RTC, Branch 34, Tacloban City

Vice President for Atty. Andres B. Mission, Jr.

Mindanao: RTC, Branch 35,

General Santos City

Vice President for NCJR: Edmund S. De Javing

RTC Branch 148, Makati City

Treasurer: Ellen DLS Serrano

RTC, Branch 231, Pasay City

Assistant Treasurer: Arlyn M. Falcon

RTC,Branch 119, Pasay City

Auditor: Agnes T. Sapinoso

MTCC, Imus City

Assistant Auditor: Belinda G. Go

Branch 10, Cebu City, Cebu

Presidential and Atty. Perlita V. Ele

Legal Adviser: RTC, OCC, Quezon City

Secretary General: Marie Ann B. Dolorito


Davao Del Norte

Board of Directors

Region XII: Atty. Kristinne M. Camandero

RTC, Branch 24, Midsayap

North Cotabato

Region XIII/CARAGA: Ferninand P. Mesagrande

RTC, Branch 28, Lianga

Surigao del Sur

Caloocan City: Azucena A. Berania

RTC OCC, Caloocan City

Makati City: Ma. Teresa L. Umali

METC OCC, Makati City

Malabon City: Percival S. Ponciano

RTC, Branch 72, Malabon City

Mandaluyong City: Rayson M. Mayor

RTC, Branch 210

Mandaluyong City

Parañaque City: Rumel M. Macalisang

RTC, Branch 258, Parañaque City

Quezon City: Bambito Sabiniano

RTC, Branch 219, Quezon City

Taguig City: Joselito C. Baldamor

RTC, Branch 267, Pasig City

Valenzuela City: Atty. Rio Nila L. Abiang

RTC OCC, Valenzuela City


4th Plenary Assembly of the PHILJA Corps of Professor (with

Conferment Ceremony of the Posthumous Award to the

Family of Dr. Purificacion V. Quisumbing)


Venue: Auditorium, Court of Appeals, Manila

Participants: 64 PHILJA officials and professorial lecturers,

Justice Leonardo A. Quisumbing and family, and other

guests

Refresher/Advanced Course for Court-Annexed Mediators

La Union, Benguet and Pangasinan Mediation Programs


Venue: Oasis Country Resort, San Fernando City, La Union

Participants: 50 mediators

Batangas, Laguna, and Quezon Mediation Programs

Date: August 14–15, 2014



Orientation Conference with Stakeholders on Court-

Annexed Mediation (Negros Oriental Mediation Program)

Date: July 10, 2014

Venue: Hotel Essencia, Dumaguete City, Negros Oriental

Participants: 97 RTC, MTCC, MTC and MCTC judges, clerks

of court, representatives from NPS, PAO, IBP, LGU, civil

society, business, academe, and media

Judicial Settlement Conference for Judges on Judicial

Dispute Resolution (Skills-based Course)

Date: August 26–29, 2014

Venue: Hotel del Rio, Iloilo City

Participants: 47 RTC, MTCC, MTC and MCTC judges

Orientation and Screening of Prospective Mediators and

PMC Unit Staff (Negros Oriental Mediation Program)


Venue: Hall of Justice, Dumaguete City, Negros Oriental

Participants: 63 mediators, and staff applicants


Venue: Hall of Justice, Bais City, Negros Oriental

Participants: 31 mediators, and staff applicants

Orientation of Public Prosecutors, Public Attorneys and

Law Practitioners on Judicial Dispute Resolution


Venue: Hotel del Rio, M.H. del Pilar Street, Molo, Iloilo City

Participants: 40 prosecutors, PAO and IBP lawyers

Orientation of Clerks of Court and Branch Clerks of Court

on Judicial Dispute Resolution


Venue: Hotel del Rio, M.H. del Pilar Street

Molo, Iloilo City

Participants: 50 clerks of court and branch clerks of court

Basic Mediation Course (Negros Oriental Mediation

Program)



Negros Oriental


Pre-Internship Orientation and Meeting with Judges,

Clerks of Court, Branch Clerks of Court, Mediation

Trainees and PMC Unit Staff in Court-Annexed Mediation

(Negros Oriental Mediation Program)



Negros Oriental

Participants: 108 RTC, MTCC, MTC and MCTC judges,

clerks of court, branch clerks of court, mediation trainees,

and PMCU staff

Alternative Dispute Resolution(ADR) Programs

On PHILJA


Judge Jaime B. Santiago, Presiding Judge of RTC Br. 4, Manila, gives some pointers on firearms proficiency to the participants

of the Personal Security Training held on September 30–October 2, 2014 at the PHILJA Training Center, Tagaytay City.

PHILJA Chancellor Adolfo S. Azcuna (seated center), and DCA Raul B. Villanueva (seated fifth from left) with the participants of the

70th Orientation Seminar-Workshop for Newly Appointed Judges held on July 15–24, 2014 at the PHILJA Training Center, Tagaytay City.

Dr. Cheselden George V. Carmona, Member of PHILJA’s Department of Commercial Law lectures on “Overview on Asset

Forfeiture” during the 4th Orientation Seminar-Workshop for Newly Appointed Sheriffs and Process Servers held on September 2–4,

2014, at the PHILJA Training Center, Tagaytay City.


Supreme Court Associate Justice Estela M. Perlas-Bernabe gives an “Overview of the 2013 Financial Rehabilitation Rules”

during the Seminar for Court of Appeals Justices on the Rules of Procedure on Financial Rehabilitation held on September 4, 2014, at

the Traders Hotel, Pasay City.

Lecturers and Resource Persons Justice Magdangal M. De Leon (seated fourth from left), Justice Delilah V idallon-Magtolis

(seated fifth from left) IPO-Phil Director General Ricardo R. Blancaflor (seated center), and Justice Teresita Dy-Liacco Flores with

the participants of the Roundtable Discussion on Substantive Laws and Jurisprudence on Intellectual Property for Court of Appeals

Justices (Batch 3), held on July 3–4, 2014 at the Kamana Sanctuary, Subic, Zambales.

Justice Marina L. Buzon, PHILJA Executive Secretary and Acting Chief of the Philippine Mediation Center Office (seated center)

with the participants of the Judicial Settlement Conference for Judges on Judicial Dispute Resolution, held on August 26–29, 2014 at

the Hotel del Rio, Iloilo City.


Justice Francis H. Jardeleza served as Solicitor General of

the Republic of the Philippines from February 2012 until his

appointment as the 173rd Associate Justice of the Supreme

Court on August 19, 2014. He also served as Deputy

Ombudsman for Luzon.

As Solicitor General, Justice Jardeleza argued many

cases before the Supreme Court, notably the constitutional

challenges to the Cybercrime Law and the Reproductive

Health Law. He also served as Agent for the Republic of the

Philippines and Head of the Philippine legal team handling

the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea Annex

VII arbitration with China, in relation to the West Philippine

Sea maritime disputes. As Agent of the Republic, he lectured

extensively on the Philippines’ claim here and abroad,

including at the Department of Foreign Affairs; the

Philippine Navy Headquarters; the Council on Foreign

Relations in New York, USA; the Center for a New American

Security in Washington, D.C., USA; Harvard University in

Cambridge, Massachusetts, USA; New York University in

New York, USA; and at the New York State Bar Association

Seasonal Meeting in Hanoi, Vietnam.

At the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), Justice

Jardeleza worked to improve the quality of representation

by the OSG through capacity building programs for OSG

lawyers and the recruitment of new lawyers from the top

graduates of law schools, including bar topnotchers.

Prior to his career in government, Justice Jardeleza had

an extensive private law practice. He joined Angara Abello

Concepcion Regala and Cruz (ACCRALAW) in 1975 and

became partner in 1981. He was the only junior partner

allowed to be a member of both the Litigation and Corporate

(Special Projects) Departments. In 1986, he became

Chairman of the ACCRALAW Litigation Department.

In 1987, Justice Jardeleza left ACCRALAW and founded

Jardeleza Sobrevinas Diaz Hayudini and Bodegon. In 1990,

he established the Jardeleza Law Offices as a solo practice.

Later, he joined Roco Bunag Kapunan Migallos and

Jardeleza, as partner, where he headed the Litigation and

Labor Law Departments.

Hon. FRANCIS H. JARDELEZA

Associate Justice

Supreme Court

appointed on August 19, 2014

In 1996, Justice Jardeleza became Senior Vice President

and General Counsel of San Miguel Corporation, a position

he held until June 30, 2010.

Justice Jardeleza also taught Constitutional and

Administrative Law, and Civil Procedure at the University of

the Philippines (UP) College of Law, where he was a

professorial lecturer since 1993. He also served as examiner

for Political Law in the 2012 bar examinations.

Born in Jaro, Iloilo, on September 26, 1949, Justice

Jardeleza graduated class valedictorian in elementary and

high school at the Jaro Elementary School and the UP Iloilo

College High School, respectively. He took his Bachelor of

Arts, Major in Political Science, from UP Iloilo College, where

he was recognized as the Most Outstanding Graduate in

1970. In 1974, he obtained his Bachelor of Laws from the

UP College of Law, Diliman, graduating salutatorian and

cum laude. In the same year, he placed third in the Bar

Examinations with a general average of 88.35 percent. In

1977, he obtained his Master of Laws at the Harvard Law

School, Cambridge, Massachusetts, USA. He then trained

as a foreign associate in the New York law firm of Sullivan

and Cromwell, specializing in securities, litigation, and public

offerings.

� Seminar-Workshop on Various Laws and Rules

Relating to Money Laundering and Other

Financial Crimes

November 26–27, Puerto Princesa City, Palawan

� Career Enhancement Program for RTC Clerks of

Court (Region VII)

December 2–4, Cebu City

� Personal Security Training for Judges

December 2–4, PTC, Tagaytay City

� Career Development Program for Court Legal

Researchers

December 9–10, Tagaytay City

� Seminar-Workshop on Money Laundering and

Other Financial Crimes (Region VI)

December 9–10, Bacolod City

Fourth Quarter Trainings, Programs and Activities(Continued from page 44)


Nepotism defined.

Nepotism is defined as an appointment issued in favor of a

relative within the third civil degree of consanguinity or

affinity of any of the following: (1) appointing authority;

(2) recommending authority ; (3) chief of the bureau or

office; and (4) person exercising immediate supervision over

the appointee. Here, it is undisputed that respondent Cortes

is a relative of Commissioner Mallari in the first degree of

consanguinity, as in fact Cortes is the daughter of

Commissioner Mallari.

By way of exception, the following shall not be

covered by the prohibition: (1) persons employed in a

confidential capacity; (2) teachers; (3) physicians; and (4)

members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines. In the

present case, however, the appointment of respondent

Cortes as IO V in the CHR does not fall to any of the

exemptions provided by law. In her defense, respondent

Cortes merely raises the argument that the appointing

authority referred to in Section 59 of the Administrative

Code is the Commission En Banc and not the individual

Commissioners who compose it.

The purpose of Section 59 on the rule against nepotism

is to take out the discretion of the appointing and

recommending authority on the matter of appointing or

recommending for appointment a relative. The rule insures

the objectivity of the appointing or recommending official

by preventing that objectivity from being in fact tested.

Clearly, the prohibition against nepotism is intended to

apply to natural persons. It is one pernicious evil impeding

the civil service and the efficiency of its personnel.

Moreover, basic rule in statutory construction is the

legal maxim that “we must interpret not by the letter that

killeth, but by the spirit that giveth life.” To rule that the

prohibition applies only to the Commission, and not to the

individual members who compose it, will render the

prohibition meaningless. Apparently, the Commission En

Banc, which is a body created by fiction of law, can never

have relatives to speak of.

Indeed, it is absurd to declare that the prohibitive veil

on nepotism does not include appointments made by a

group of individuals acting as a body. What cannot be done

directly cannot be done indirectly. This principle is

elementary and does not need explanation. Certainly, if

acts that cannot be legally done directly can be done

indirectly, then all laws would be illusory.

In the present case, respondent Cortes’ appointment

as IO V in the CHR by the Commission En Banc, where his

father is a member, is covered by the prohibition.

Commissioner Mallari’s abstention from voting did not cure

the nepotistic character of the appointment because the

evil sought to be avoided by the prohibition still exists. His

mere presence during the deliberation for the appointment

of IO V created an impression of influence and cast doubt

on the impartiality and neutrality of the Commission En

Banc.

(Abad, J., Civil Service Commission v. Maricelle M. Cortes, G.R. No.

200103, April 23, 2014.)

Administrative Law

Requisites of a valid dismissal based on loss of trust

and confidence.

In M+W Zander Philippines, Inc. v. Enriquez the requisites

of a valid dismissal based on loss of trust and confidence,

follows:

Article 282(c) of the Labor Code allows an employer

to terminate the services of an employee for loss

of trust and confidence. Certain guidelines must

be observed for the employer to terminate an

employee for loss of trust and confidence. It was

held in General Bank and Trust Company v. Court of

Appeals, viz.:

[L]oss of confidence should not be simulated. It

should not be used as a subterfuge for causes which

are improper, il legal, or unjustified. Loss of

confidence may not be arbitrarily asserted in the face

of overwhelming evidence to the contrary. It must be

genuine, not a mere afterthought to justify earlier

action taken in bad faith.

The first requisite for dismissal on the ground

of loss of trust and confidence is that the employee

concerned must be one holding a position of trust

and confidence.

There are two classes of positions of trust:

managerial employees and fiduciary rank-and-file

employees.

Managerial employees are defined as those

vested with the powers or prerogatives to lay down

management policies and to hire, transfer, suspend,

lay-off, recall, discharge, assign or discipline

employees or effectively recommend such

managerial actions. They refer to those whose

primary duty consists of the management of the

establishment in which they are employed or of a

department or a subdivision thereof, and to other

officers or members of the managerial staff. Officers

and members of the managerial staff perform work

directly related to management policies of their

employer and customarily and regularly exercise

discretion and independent judgment.

Labor Law


Doctrinal RemindersLabor Law (continued)

The second class or fiduciary rank-and-file

employees consist of cashiers, auditors, property

custodians, etc., or those who, in the normal

exercise of their functions, regularly handle

significant amounts of money or property. These

employees, though rank-and-file, are routinely

charged with the care and custody of the employer’s

money or property, and are thus classified as

occupying positions of trust and confidence.

x x x x

The second requisite of terminating an

employee for loss of trust and confidence is that

there must be an act that would justify the loss of

trust and confidence. To be a valid cause for

dismissal, the loss of confidence must be based

on a willful breach of trust and founded on clearly

established facts.

To summarize, the first requisite is that the employee

concerned must be one holding a position of trust and

confidence, thus, one who is either: (1) a managerial

employee; or (2) a fiduciary rank-and-file employee, who, in

the normal exercise of his or her functions, regularly handles

significant amounts of money or property of the employer.

The second requisite is that the loss of confidence must be

based on a willful breach of trust and founded on clearly

established facts.

In Lima Land, Inc. v. Cuevas, we discussed the difference

between the criteria for determining the validity of invoking

loss of trust and confidence as a ground for terminating a

managerial employee on the one hand and a rank-and-file

employee on the other. In the said case, we held that with

respect to rank-and-file personnel, loss of trust and

confidence, as ground for valid dismissal, requires proof of

involvement in the alleged events in question, and that mere

uncorroborated assertions and accusations by the employer

would not suffice. With respect to a managerial employee,

the mere existence of a basis for believing that such

employee has breached the trust of his employer would

suffice for his dismissal.

(Velasco, Jr., J., Wesleyan University-Philippines v. Nowella Reyes, G.R.

No. 208321, July 30, 2014.)

Registration of a property in the name of one spouse

does not destroy its conjugal nature.

Registration of a property alone in the name of one spouse

does not destroy its conjugal nature. What is material is

the time when the property was acquired. The registration

of the property is not conclusive evidence of the exclusive

Civil Law

ownership of the husband or the wife. Although the property

appears to be registered in the name of the husband, it has

the inherent character of conjugal property if it was

acquired for valuable consideration during marriage. It

retains its conjugal nature.

In order to rebut the presumptive conjugal nature of

the property, the petitioner must present strong, clear and

convincing evidence of exclusive ownership of one of the

spouses. The burden of proving that the property belongs

exclusively to the wife or to the husband rests upon the

party asserting it.

In the present case, aside from its allegation that the

subject property is no longer conjugal and its assertion that

it is a mortgagee in good faith, the petitioner bank offered

no evidence, convincing to the Court, that the subject

property exclusively belonged to Jose, Sr. As stated earlier,

the petitioner bank failed to overcome the legal

presumption that the disputed property was conjugal. Thus,

the conclusion of both lower courts that the subject property

was conjugal property holds. Factual findings of the CA

affirming those of the trial court are binding on the Court

unless there is a clear showing that such findings are tainted

with arbitrariness, capriciousness or palpable error.

(Brion, J., Philippine National Bank v. Jose Garcia and Children Nora

Garcia, Jose Garcia, Jr., Bobby Garcia and Jimmy Garcia and Heirs of

Rogelio Garcia Namely: Celedonio Garcia, Danilo Garcia, Elsa Garcia,

Fermin Garcia, Heherson Garcia, Gregorio Garcia, Imelda Garcia and

Jane Garcia., G.R. No. 182839, June 2, 2014.)

Novation; its concept.

Novation was extensively discussed by the Court in Garcia v.

Llamas:

Novation is a mode of extinguishing an obligation by

changing its objects or principal obligations, by

substituting a new debtor in place of the old one, or by

subrogating a third person to the rights of the creditor.

Article 1293 of the Civil Code defines novation as

follows:

ART. 1293. Novation which consists in substituting a

new debtor in the place of the original one, may be

made even without the knowledge or against the will

of the latter, but not without the consent of the

creditor. Payment by the new debtor gives him rights

mentioned in articles 1236 and 1237.

In general, there are two modes of substituting

the person of the debtor: (1) expromision and (2)

delegacion. In expromision, the initiative for the

change does not come rom — and may even be

made without the knowledge of — the debtor, since

it consists of a third person’s assumption of the

obligation. As such, it logically requires the consent

of the third person and the creditor. In delegacion,

the debtor offers, and the creditor accepts, a third

person who consents to the substitution and

assumes the obligation; thus, the consent of these


three persons are necessary. Both modes of

substitution by the debtor require the consent of the

creditor.

Novation may also be extinctive or modificatory.

It is extinctive when an old obligation is terminated

by the creation of a new one that takes the place of

the former. It is merely modificatory when the old

obligation subsists to the extent that it remains

compatible with the amendatory agreement.

Whether extinctive or modificatory, novation is made

either by changing the object or the principal

conditions, referred to as objective or real novation;

or by substituting the person of the debtor or

subrogating a third person to the rights of the

creditor, an act known as subjective or personal

novation. For novation to take place, the following

requisites must concur:

1) There must be a previous valid obligation.

2) The parties concerned must agree to a new

contract.

3) The old contract must be extinguished.

4) There must be a valid new contract.

Novation may also be express or implied. It is

express when the new obligation declares in

unequivocal terms that the old obligation is

extinguished. It is implied when the new obligation

is incompatible with the old one on every point.

The test of incompatibility is whether the two obligations

can stand together, each one with its own independent

existence. (Emphasis supplied)

(Leonen, J., Arco Pulp and Paper Co., Inc. and Candida A. Santos v. Dan

T. Lim, doing business under the name and style of Quality Papers &

Plastic Products Enterprises, G.R. No. 206806, June 25, 2014.)

Naturalization process may be judicial or

administrative; qualifications of applicant and his

witnesses.

No less than the 1987 Constitution enumerates who are

Filipino citizens. Among those listed are citizens by

naturalization, which refers to the legal act of adopting an

alien and clothing him with the privilege of a native-born

citizen. Under the present laws, the process of

naturalization can be judicial or administrative. Judicially,

CA No. 473 provides that after hearing the petition for

citizenship and receipt of evidence showing that the

petitioner has all the qualifications and none of the

disqualifications required by law, the competent court may

order the issuance of the proper naturalization certificate

and the registration thereof in the proper civil registry. On

the other hand, Republic Act (RA) No. 9139 provides that

aliens born and residing in the Philippines may be granted

Philippine citizenship by administrative proceeding by filing

a petition for citizenship with the Special Committee, which,

in view of the facts before it, may approve the petition and

issue a certificate of naturalization. In both cases, the

petitioner shall take an oath of allegiance to the Philippines

as a sovereign nation.

It is a well-entrenched rule that Philippine citizenship

should not easily be given away. All those seeking to acquire

it must prove, to the satisfaction of the Court, that they

have complied with all the requirements of the law. The

reason for this requirement is simple. Citizenship involves

political status; hence, every person must be proud of his

citizenship and should cherish it. Verily, a naturalization

case is not an ordinary judicial contest, to be decided in

favor of the party whose claim is supported by the

preponderance of the evidence. Naturalization is not a right,

but one of privilege of the most discriminating, as well as

delicate and exacting nature, affecting, as it does, public

interest of the highest order, and which may be enjoyed

only under the precise conditions prescribed by law therefor.

Jurisprudence dictates that in judicial naturalization,

the application must show substantial and formal

compliance with CA No. 473. In other words, an applicant

must comply with the jurisdictional requirements, establish

his or her possession of the qualifications and none of the

disqualifications enumerated under the law, and present at

least two character witnesses to support his allegations. In

Ong v. Republic of the Philippines, the Court listed the

requirements for character witnesses, namely:

1. That they are citizens of the Philippines;

2. That they are “credible persons”;

3. That they personally know the petitioner;

4. That they personally know him to be a resident

of the Philippines for the period of time

required by law;

5. That they personally know him to be a person

of good repute;

6. That they personally know him to be morally

irreproachable;

7. That he has, in their opinion, all the

qualifications necessary to become a citizen

of the Philippines; and

8. That he “is not in any way disqualified under

the provisions” of the Naturalization Law.

In vouching for the good moral character of the

applicant for citizenship, a witness, for purposes of

naturalization, must be a “credible” person as he becomes

an insurer of the character of the candidate. The Court, in

Ong, explained:

a “credible” person is, to our mind, not only an

individual who has not been previously convicted

of a crime; who is not a police character and has no

police record; who has not perjured in the past; or

whose “affidavit” or testimony is not incredible.

What must be “credible” is not the declaration


Doctrinal RemindersCivil Law (continued)

made, but the person making it. This implies that

such person must have a good standing in the

community; that he is known to be honest and

upright; that he is reputed to be trustworthy and

reliable; and that his word may be taken on its face

value, as a good warranty of the worthiness of the

petitioner.

In consonance with the above dictum, in Lim Ching Tian

v. Republic, the Court explained that the “law requires that

a vouching witness should have actually known an applicant

for whom he testified for the requisite period prescribed

therein to give him the necessary competence to act as

such. The reason behind this requirement is that a vouching

witness is in a way an insurer of the character of petitioner

because on his testimony the court is of necessity compelled

to rely in deciding the merits of his petition. It is, therefore,

imperative that he be competent and reliable. And he is

only competent to testify on his conduct, character and

moral fitness if he has had the opportunity to observe him

personally, if not intimately, during the period he has

allegedly known him.” The law, in effect, requires that the

character witnesses be not mere ordinary acquaintances

of the applicant, but possessed of such intimate knowledge

of the latter as to be competent to testify of their personal

knowledge; and that they have each one of the requisite

qualifications and none of the statutory disqualifications.

In this case, the OSG mainly harps on the petitioner’s

failure to prove that his witnesses are credible.

The Court agrees.

The records of the case show that the joint affidavits

executed by petitioner’s witnesses did not establish their

own qualification to stand as such in a naturalization

proceeding. In turn, petitioner did not present evidence

proving that the persons he presented were credible. In

the words of the CA, “he did not prove that his witnesses

had good standing in the community, known to be honest

and upright, reputed to be trustworthy and reliable, and

that their word may be taken at face value, as a good

warranty of the worthiness of petitioner.”

While there is no showing that petitioner’s witnesses

were of doubtful moral inclinations, there was likewise no

indication that they were persons whose qualifications were

at par with the requirements of the law on naturalization.

Simply put, no evidence was ever proffered to prove the

witnesses’ good standing in the community, honesty, moral

uprightness, and most importantly, reliability. As a

consequence, their statements about the petitioner do not

possess the measure of “credibility” demanded of in

naturalization cases. This lack of “credibility” on the part of

the witnesses, unfortunately, weakens or renders futile

petitioner’s claim of worthiness. An applicant for Philippine

citizenship would carefully testify as to his qualifications,

placing emphasis on his good traits and character. This is

expected of a person who longs to gain benefits and

advantages that Philippine citizenship bestows. Therefore,

a serious assessment of an applicant’s witnesses, both as to

the credibility of their person and their very testimony, is an

essential facet of naturalization proceedings that may not

be brushed aside.

(Mendoza, J., Dennis L. Go. v. Republic of the Philippines, G.R. No. 202809,

July 2, 2014.)

Marriage ceremony defined.

While Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, does not

specifically define a “marriage ceremony” and what

constitutes its “illegal” performance, Articles 3(3) and 6 of

the Family Code are clear on these matters. These provisions

were taken from Article 55 of the New Civil Code which, in

turn, was copied from Section 3 of the Marriage Law with

no substantial amendments.

Article 6 of the Family Code provides that “[n]o

prescribed form or religious rite for the solemnization of

the marriage is required. It shall be necessary, however, for

the contracting parties to appear personally before the

solemnizing officer and declare in the presence of not

less than two witnesses of legal age that they take each

other as husband and wife.”

Pertinently, Article 3(3) mirrors Article 6 of the Family

Code and particularly defines a marriage ceremony as that

which takes place with the appearance of the contracting

parties before the solemnizing officer and their personal

declaration that they take each other as husband and wife

in the presence of not less than two witnesses of legal age.

Even prior to the date of the enactment of Article 352

of the RPC, as amended, the rule was clear that no

prescribed form of religious rite for the solemnization of

the marriage is required. However, as correctly found by

the CA, the law sets the minimum requirements constituting

a marriage ceremony: first, there should be the personal

appearance of the contracting parties before a solemnizing

officer; and second, their declaration in the presence of

not less than two witnesses of legal age, that they take

each other as husband and wife.

(Brion, J., Rene Ronulo v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 182438, July

2, 2014.)

Consequences of an acquittal on the civil liability of

the accused.

The consequences of an acquittal on the civil liability of the

accused are as follows:

Criminal Law


Consideration of other grounds not raised or assigned

as errors.

The Supreme Court has allowed the consideration of other

grounds not raised or assigned as errors in several instances.

In the case of Manila International Airport Authority v.

Rivera V illage Lessee Homeowners Association,

Incorporated, the Court enumerated such instances. Thus:

The Court has allowed the consideration of other

grounds not raised or assigned as errors specifically

in the following instances: (1) grounds not assigned

as errors but affecting jurisdiction over the subject

matter; (2) matters not assigned as errors on appeal

but are evidently plain or clerical errors within the

contemplation of the law; (3) matters not assigned

as errors on appeal but consideration of which is

necessary in arriving at a just decision and complete

resolution of the case or to serve the interest of

justice or to avoid dispensing piecemeal justice;

(4) matters not specifically assigned as errors on

appeal but raised in the trial court and are matters

of record having some bearing on the issue

submitted which the parties failed to raise or which

the lower court ignored; (5) matters not assigned

as errors on appeal but closely related to an error

assigned; and (6) matters not assigned as errors

on appeal but upon which the determination of a

question properly assigned is dependent.

(Mendoza, J., Heirs of Paciano Yabao, Represented by Remedios Chan v.

Paz Lentejas Van Der Kolk, G.R. No. 207266, June 25, 2014.)

Litis pendentia; its requisites.

Litis pendentia refers to the situation where another action

is pending between the same parties for the same cause of

action so that one of these actions is unnecessary and

vexatious. The dismissal of a civil action on the ground of

litis pendentias based on the policy that a party is not

allowed to vex another more than once regarding the same

subject matter and for the same cause of action in order

that possible conflicting judgments may be avoided for the

sake of the stability of the rights and statuses of persons.

To constitute litis pendentia, the following requisites

must be present: (1) identity of the parties in the two

actions; (2) substantial identity in the causes of action and

in the reliefs sought by the parties; (3) and the identity

between the two actions should be such that any judgment

that may be rendered in one case, regardless of which

party is successful, would amount to res judicata in the

other.

Indisputably, the requisite identity of parties is met in

the present case. The disputed point is whether there is

substantial identity in the causes of action and in the reliefs

sought in the cases for annulment of lease contract filed by

Stop and Save and for unlawful detainer filed by Dominga.

“The test to determine whether the causes of action

are identical is to ascertain whether the same evidence

will sustain both actions, or whether there is an identity in

the facts essential to the maintenance of the two actions.

If the same facts or evidence would sustain both, the two

actions are considered the same, and a judgment in the

first case is a bar to the subsequent action.”

In the present case, while there is an identity in the

facts between the two actions, involving as they do the

same lease contract, the issues and the relief prayed for

are different so that the causes of action remain entirely

distinct from each other.

In the unlawful detainer suit, the issue is who between

the parties has a better right to physical possession over

the property or possession de facto and the principal relief

prayed for is for Stop and Save to vacate the property for

failure to pay the rent. In contrast, in the annulment of

lease contract, the issue is the validity of the lease contract,

where Stop and Save puts in issue Dominga’s ownership.

In other words, the issue of physical possession in the

action for unlawful detainer cannot be identical with the

issues of ownership and validity of contract in the action

for annulment. From these essential differences, the lack

of required identity in the causes of action for litis pendentia

to exist cannot be denied.

Brion, J., Dominga B. Quito v. Stop & Save Corporation, as represented

by Gregory David Dickenson, as its Chairman, and Julieta Buan-

Dickenson, as its President, Roberto Buan, Henry Co, Angelina Lumotan,

Rodel Pineda and Rose Calma, G.R. No. 186657, June 11, 2014.

Remedial Law

Our law recognizes two kinds of acquittal, with

different effects on the civil liability of the accused.

First is an acquittal on the ground that the accused

is not the author of the act or omission complained

of. This instance closes the door to civil liability,

for a person who has been found to be not the

perpetrator of any act or omission cannot and can

never be held liable for such act or omission. There

being no delict, civil liability ex delicto is out of the

question, and the civil action, if any, which may be

instituted must be based on grounds other than

the delict complained of. This is the situation

contemplated in Rule III of the Rules of Court. The

second instance is an acquittal based on

reasonable doubt on the guilt of the accused. In

this case, even if the guilt of the accused has not

been satisfactorily established, he is not exempt

from civil liability which may be proved by

preponderance of evidence only. This is the

situation contemplated in Article 29 of the Civil

Code, where the civil action for damages is “for the

same act or omission.” x x x.

(Peralta, J., Cristina B. Castillo v. Phillip R. Salvador, G.R. No. 191240,

July 30, 2014.)


Service of summons upon judicial entity.

Section 11, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court provides the rule

on service of summons upon a juridical entity. It provides

that summons may be served upon a juridical entity only

through its officers. Thus:

SEC. 11. Service upon domestic private juridical entity. –

When the defendant is a corporation, partnership

or association organized under the laws of the

Philippines with a juridical personality, service may

be made on the president, managing partner,

general manager, corporate secretary, treasurer, or

in-house counsel.

We have already established that the enumeration in

Section 11 of Rule 14 is exclusive. Service of summons upon

persons other than those officers enumerated in Section 11

is invalid. Even substantial compliance is not sufficient service

of summons.

This provision of the rule does not limit service to the

officers’ places of residence or offices. If summons may not

be served upon these persons personally at their residences

or offices, summons may be served upon any of the officers

wherever they may be found.

(Leonen, J., Cathay Metal Corporation v. Laguna West Multi-Purpose

Cooperative, Inc., G.R. No. 172204, July 2, 2014.)

Summary judgment and judgment on the pleadings

distinguished.

A summary judgment is usually distinguished from a

judgment on the pleadings. Under Rule 34 of the 1997

Rules of Civil Procedure, trial may be dispensed with and a

case decided through judgment on the pleadings if the

answer filed fails to tender an issue or otherwise admits the

material allegations of the claimant’s pleading.

Judgment on the pleadings is proper when the answer

filed fails to tender any issue, or otherwise admits the

material allegations in the complaint. On the other hand,

in a summary judgment, the answer filed tenders issues as

specific denials and affirmative defenses are pleaded, but

the issues raised are sham, fictitious, or otherwise not

genuine.

(Leonen, J., Olivarez Corporation and Dr. Pablo R. Olivarez v. Benjamin

Castillo, G.R. No. 196251, July 9, 2014.)

Jurisdiction over dispute between an employer and

his employees.

The Court ruled in the recent case of Portillo v. Rudolf Lietz,

Inc. that not all disputes between an employer and his

employees fall within the jurisdiction of the labor tribunals

such that when the claim for damages is grounded on the

“wanton failure and refusal” without just cause of an

employee to report for duty despite repeated notices served

upon him of the disapproval of his application for leave of

absence, the same falls within the purview of Civil Law, to

wit:

As early as Singapore Airlines Limited v. Paño, we

established that not all disputes between an employer

and his employee(s) fall within the jurisdiction of the

labor tribunals. We differentiated between

abandonment per se and the manner and

consequent effects of such abandonment and ruled

that the first, is a labor case, while the second, is a

civil law case.

Upon the facts and issues involved, jurisdiction over

the present controversy must be held to belong to the

civil Courts. While seemingly petitioner’s claim for

damages arises from employer-employee relations,

and the latest amendment to Article 217 of the Labor

Code under PD No. 1691 and BP Blg. 130 provides

that all other claims arising from employer-

employee relationship are cognizable by Labor

Arbiters [citation omitted], in essence, petitioner’s

claim for damages is grounded on the “wanton failure

and refusal” without just cause of private respondent

Cruz to report for duty despite repeated notices served

upon him of the disapproval of his application for leave

of absence without pay. This, coupled with the further

averment that Cruz “maliciously and with bad faith”

violated the terms and conditions of the conversion

training course agreement to the damage of petitioner

removes the present controversy from the coverage of

the Labor Code and brings it within the purview of Civil

Law.

Clearly, the complaint was anchored not on the

abandonment per se by private respondent Cruz of

his job—as the latter was not required in the

Complaint to report back to work—but on the manner

and consequent effects of such abandonment of work

translated in terms of the damages which petitioner had

to suffer. x x x.

Indeed, jurisprudence has evolved the rule that claims

for damages under Article 217(a)(4) of the Labor Code, to

be cognizable by the LA, must have a reasonable causal

connection with any of the claims provided for in that article.

Only if there is such a connection with the other claims can

a claim for damages be considered as arising from employer-

employee relations.

(Peralta, J., Indophil Textile Mills, Inc. v. Engr. Salvador Adviento, G.R.

No. 171212, August 4, 2014.)

Doctrinal RemindersRemedial Law (continued)


TO: ALL JUDGES/PENSIONERS AND SURVIVORSHIP

PENSIONERS

SUBJECT: GUIDELINES ON THE RELEASE OF PENSIONS FOR

JUDGES/PENSIONERS AND SURVIVORSHIP PENSIONERS

Pursuant to OCA Circulars Nos. 18-2013 (February 8, 2013),

103-2013 (August 7, 2013) and 55-2014 (April 10, 2014),

the Automated Payroll System (APS) was fully implemented

for the payment of salaries and allowances to all judges and

personnel of the lower courts. Payroll crediting dates for

salaries and allowances were specified for uniform

implementation. Notably, pensions of retired judges/

pensioners are likewise released through the automated

payroll system at their options. However, all survivorship

pensioners receive the pensions only by checks to strictly

monitor compliance with the requirements for their receipt

of the survivorship pensions.

In order to rationalize the release of pensions, whether

by check or by APS, together with the releases of salaries

and allowances of incumbent judges and personnel of the

lower courts through APS, specific dates for the release of

pensions was recommended by the Office of the Court

Administrator and was APPROVED by Chief Justice MARIA

LOURDES P. A. SERENO on May 23, 2014.

Thus, beginning July 2014, the following guidelines shall

be observed in the release of pensions for judges/pensioners

and survivorship pensioners:

1. Pensions of retired judges/pensioners who

receive their pensions through APS shall be

credited not earlier than the 7th working day of

every month;

2. Pensions of retired judges/pensioners who

receive their pensions through Modified

Disbursement Scheme (MDS) checks shall

likewise be released not earlier than the 7th

working day of every month, by mail or by

personal pick-up; and

3. Pensions of survivorship pensioners shall be

released not earlier than the 10th working day

of the month, by mail or by personal pick-up.

For strict compliance.

June 23, 2014.

(Sgd.) JOSE MIDAS P. MARQUEZ

Court Administrator

OCA CIRCULAR NO. 87-2014

TO: ALL SELECTED FIRST LEVEL COURT JUDGES AND BRANCH

CLERKS OF COURT/OFFICERS IN CHARGE

SUBJECT: SMALL CLAIMS CASE MONITORING SYSTEM (SC2MS)

SURVEY

On March 26, 2014, the Office of the Court Administrator,

in cooperation with the American Bar Association Rule of

Law Initiative, disseminated survey/questionnaires on the

Small Claims Case Monitoring System (SC2MS) to a select

group of courts to gather insights and perspectives on how

to improve the Amended Rule of Procedure for Small Claims

Cases and the SC2MS.1

To further assess the needed amendments to the

Amended Rule of Procedure for Small Claims Cases as well

as improve the SC2MS, it is necessary to acquire additional

data from the Iitigants. Thus, the branch clerks of court/

officers in charge of the selected courts2 are hereby directed

to: (1) encode on to the SC2MS all the required data for the

cases you have listed as samples under OCA Circular No. 43-

2014, and (2) disseminate the attached questionnaires* for

plaintiffs, and thereafter mail them back to the Office of

the Court Administrator using the paid envelopes provided

herein.

Your utmost cooperation in completing the survey is

hereby enjoined.

July 4, 2014.


Court Administrator


1. OCA Circular No. 43-2014

2. Manila MeTC Br. 6; Manila MeTC Br. 11; Quezon City MeTC Br. 35;

Makati City MeTC Br. 65; Marikina MeTC Br. 92; Dagupan City; MTCC

Br. 2; Bacnotan MTC; Rosales MTC; Urdaneta City MTCC; Alfonso

Lista-Aguinaldo MCTC; Aparri-Calayan MCTC Br. 2; Ilaga MTC;

Limay MTC; Malolos City MTCC Br. 1; Marilao MTC; Meycauayan

City MTCC Br. 1; Olongapo City MTCC Br. 3; Rizal MTC; Silang-

Amadeo MCTC; Brooke’s Point-Espanola MCTC; Calamba City

MTCC; Bauan MTC; Looc-Alcantara-Sta. Fe-San Jose MCTC; Rosario

MTC; Libmanan-Cabusao MCTC; Iriga City MTCC Br. 1; Tabaco City

MTCC; Cadiz City MTCC; Iloilo City MTCC Br. 8; Miag-Ao MTC;

Pontevedra-Panay MCTC; Pototan-Mina MCTC; Silay City MTCC;

Toledo City MTCC; Carmen-Batuan MCTC; Cebu City MTCC Br. 1;

Mandaue City MeTC Br. 3; Carigara MTC; Catarman- Lope De Vega

MCTC; Barauen MTC: Leyte MTC; Maasin City MTCC; Liloy-

Tampilisan MCTC; Catbalogan City MTCC; Pagadian City MTCC Br.

1: Zamboanga City MTCC Br. 2; Zamboanga City MTCC Br. 4; Dapitan

City MTCC; Aurora MTC; Cagayan De Oro City MTCC Br. 1; Gingoog

City MTCC: Maramag-Kalilangan-Pangantucan MCTC; Oroquieta

City MTCC Br. 2; Ozamis City MTCC Br. 3; Laguindingan-Gitagum

MCTC; Bansalan-Magsaysay MCTC; Norala-T’boli-Sto. Nino MCTC;

Tupi MTC; Kidapawan City MTCC; Davao City MTCC Br. 1; Island

Garden City of Samal MTCC Br. 1; lIigan City MTCC Br. 3; Kapatagan

MTC; Tacurong City MTCC; Pigkawayan-Alamada-Banisilan MCTC;

Pres. Roxas-Antipas-Arakan MCTC.

* Questionnaires available in the PHILJA website

(http://philja.judiciary.gov.ph).


TO: ALL OFFICIALS AND PERSONNEL OF THE FIRST AND

SECOND LEVEL COURTS

SUBJECT: A.M. NO. 12-4-6-SC (RE: BIR LETTER OF AUTHORITY

TO EXAMINE SUPREME COURT BOOKS OF ACCOUNT AND

OTHER ACCOUNTING RECORDS)

In the June 25, 2014 Resolution of the Honorable Court En

Banc in A.M. No. 12-4-6-SC (Re: BIR Letter of Authority to

Examine Supreme Court Books of Account and Other

Accounting Records), the Court resolved, upon the

recommendation of the Commission on Audit under Audit

Observation Memorandum No. 2014-001 (SAJ), as

submitted by the Fiscal Management and Budget Office, to

APPROVE the withholding and remittance of the correct

amount of tax required to be deducted and withheld from

the Special Allowance for the Judiciary (SAJ) of officials and

employees, as well as the withholding of the corresponding

taxes from the following:

(1) The monthly SAJ of incumbent justices, judges

and judiciary officials with the equivalent rank

of a Court of Appeals Justice or Regional Trial

Court judge;

(2) The monthly special allowance in an amount

equivalent to the SAJ being received by judiciary

officials not included in item no. 1; and

(3) The additional allowance from the surplus of

the SAJ Fund that may be authorized to be given

to judiciary officials and employees who are

not direct beneficiaries under Republic Act No.

9227.

For your information, guidance and strict compliance.

July 7, 2014.


Court Administrator


TO: EXECUTIVE/PRESIDING JUDGES, CLERKS OF COURT/

OFFICERS IN CHARGE/ACCOUNTABLE OFFICERS OF THE FIRST

AND SECOND LEVEL COURTS

SUBJECT: REDUCTION OF INITIAL/OPENING DEPOSIT AND

MAINTAINING BALANCE OF REGULAR SAVINGS ACCOUNT

FROM P10,000 TO P1,000 FOR THE FIDUCIARY AND SHERIFF’S

TRUST FUND ACCOUNTS; WAIVER OF CERTIFICATION FEE ON

BANK BALANCES; AND WAIVER OF FEE ON REQUESTS FOR

SNAPSHOTS AND RE-PRINTING OF BANK STATEMENTS

Quoted hereunder, for the information and guidance of all

concerned, are certain matters on bank policies of the Land

Bank of the Philippines (LBP) which were requested by this


Office in its letter dated May 26, 2014, and were approved

by the LBP through Ms. Delma O. Bandiola, Assistant Vice

President/Relationship Officer, North NCR Cluster B, to wit:

(1) Reduction of initial/opening deposit and

maintaining balance of Regular Savings

Account from P10,000 to P1,000 for the

Fiduciary Fund and Sheriff’s Trust Fund;

(2) Waiver of certification fee on bank balances;

and

(3) Waiver of fee on requests for snapshots and

re-printing of bank statements.

The foregoing shall also serve as an authority to open a

Fiduciary Fund and Sheriff’s Trust Fund account.

July 31, 2014.


Court Administrator

TO: ALL JUDGES OF THE FIRST AND SECOND LEVEL COURTS

SUBJECT: COURT OF APPEALS DECISION DATED JUNE 25, 2014

IN CA-G.R. SP NO. 131969, ENTITLED RICARDO MENDEZ Y

DUALAN V. HON. LIZA MARIE R. PICARDAL-TECSON, ET AL.

In his letter dated July 30, 2014, Prosecutor General Claro

A. Arellano reported that some of the courts in the National

Capital Judicial Region “have dismissed a significant amount

of criminal cases for lack of jurisdiction, using as basis the

decision of the Fourteenth Division of the Court of Appeals

in the case, “Ricardo Mendez y Dualan v. Hon. Liza Marie

R. Picardal-Tecson, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court of

Makati City, Branch 144 and People of the Philippines,”

docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 131969, promulgated on June

25, 2014.” With respect thereto, Prosecutor General

Arellano disclosed that they “filed a Motion for

Reconsideration to the aforementioned decision.”

By reason thereof, Prosecutor General Arellano sought

the assistance of the Office of the Court Administrator “to

provide our Honorable Courts the necessary guidance

pertaining to the subject CA decision.” He added that “the

Honorable Courts (should) restrain the dismissal of criminal

informations filed by (their) prosecution offices on the basis

of the said CA decision while (their) Motion for

Reconsideration is still pending before the Court of Appeals.”

It is clear that the decision in the subject cases has yet

to attain finality. Thus, the same should not be cited as basis

in the meantime to quash criminal informations being filed

by prosecution offices which are found to be suffering from

the supposedly fatal defect of lack of the required approval

by the concerned city prosecutors. Accordingly, and until

further notice, the proper course of action to take is to



maintain the status quo and newly-filed criminal cases should

not be dismissed citing as authority the decision in the

Mendez case (CA-G.R. SP No. 131969) since the said ruling

is not yet final.


August 8, 2014.


Court Administrator

TO: THE COURT OF APPEALS, SANDIGANBAYAN COURT OF

TAX APPEALS, REGIONAL TRIAL COURTS, SHARI’A DISTRICT

COURTS, METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURTS, MUNICIPAL TRIAL

COURTS IN CITIES, MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURTS, MUNICIPAL

CIRCUIT TRIAL COURTS, SHARI’A CIRCUIT COURTS, THE OFFICE

OF THE STATE PROSECUTOR, PUBLIC ATTORNEY’S OFFICE AND

THE INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES

SUBJECT: BAR MATTER NO. 2604 (RE: CLARIFICATION RELATIVE

TO SECTIONS 2 AND 13, RULE III OF THE 2004 RULES ON

NOTARIAL PRACTICE)

In the Resolution of the Court En Banc dated December 11,

2012 in the above-cited administrative matter, the Court

resolved the clarification sought by Atty. Noreen Grace

Salise-Gonzaga relative to the requirements for renewal of

notarial commission, the full context of which is reproduced

below, to wit:

In a Letter dated September 4, 2012, Atty. Noreen

Grace Salise-Gonzaga seeks a clarification on the

requirements for renewal of notarial commission,

specifically Section 13 of Rule III of the 2004 Rules

on Notarial Practice. She avers that the Clerk of Court

in her judicial region “requires us to comply with

the provisions of Rule III, Section 2 all over again,

plus the requirement of Section 13.”

WHEREFORE, for renewal of notarial commission,

specifically under Section 13, Rule III of the 2004

Rules on Notarial Practice, aside from payment of the

application fee, a notary public needs only to file a written

application with the Executive Judge within forty-five

(45) days before the expiration of the notarial

commission, attaching thereto clearances from the

following:

(1) Executive Judge of the Regional Trial

Court who will issue the notarial

commission;

(2) Office of the Bar Confidant;

(3) Local Chapter of the Integrated Bar of

the Philippines where the applicant is

seeking notarial commission; and

(4) National Bureau of Investigation.

(Emphasis supplied)


Any prior circular from the Office of the Court Administrator

on this matter which is contrary to the foregoing is hereby

superseded.


August 22, 2014.


Court Administrator

TO: ALL CONCERNED JUDGES, CLERKS OF COURT, AND OTHER

COURT PERSONNEL

SUBJECT: COURT RECOGNITION OF BJMP’S PARALEGAL

PROGRAM

Acting on the letter of the Bureau of Jail Management and

Penology (BJMP) dated March 28, 2014 that “it has been

the perennial report of (their) Paralegal Officers that they

find utmost difficulty in asking for court records and following

up cases with many court personnel,” and pursuant to the

Resolution of the Court in A.M. No. 12-11-2-SC (Guidelines

for Decongesting Holding Jails by Enforcing the Rights of

Accused Persons to Bail and to Speedy Trial), dated March

18, 2014, and took effect on May 1, 2014, which recognized

the need “to effectively implement existing policies laid

down by the Constitution, the laws, and the rules respecting

the accused’s rights to bail and to speedy trial in the context

of decongesting our detention jails and humanizing the

conditions of detained persons pending the hearing of their

cases,” all judges, clerks of court, and other concerned court

personnel of all first and second level courts are ENJOINED

to RECOGNIZE the BJMP Paralegal Program and its

Paralegal Officers, “who are tasked to assist inmates, avail

of legal modes of release, and conduct coordination

(mechanisms) to help expedite the resolution of their

pending cases,” for a speedier disposition of cases and

decongestion of jails.


August 26, 2014.


Court Administrator


TO: ALL TRIAL COURT JUDGES AND CLERKS OF COURT/

BRANCH CLERKS OF COURT

SUBJECT: INVENTORY OF CONFISCATED PROPERTY BONDS

It has come to our attention that majority of the branches

of the lower courts have not been submitting to the Office



of the Court Administrator (OCA) their reports on

confiscated property bonds in both civil and criminal cases

where such bonds were posted. OCA Circular No. 4-2002

was issued on May 8, 2002 to the effect that all branches of

the lower courts are directed to submit an inventory of all

confiscated property bonds. It is in this light that the OCA is

reiterating its previous directive, requiring all branches of

the trial courts to submit an inventory of confiscated

property bond.

The inventory shall be reported using the following format:

The aforesaid inventory report shall be submitted to

the Docket and Clearance Division, Legal Office, Office of

the Court Administrator, not later than 30 days from receipt

hereof. Henceforth, all branches of the lower courts are

enjoined to submit a report on the inventory of confiscated

property bond, as the need arises.


August 26, 2014.


Court Administrator

TO: JUSTICES, JUDGES, COURT OFFICIALS AND PERSONNEL

OF THE THIRD, SECOND AND FIRST LEVEL COURTS

SUBJECT: UNIFORM PERIOD AND PROCEDURE IN THE

PAYMENT OF FINES IN ADMINISTRATIVE MATTERS

In accordance with the Court’s August 27, 2013 Resolution

in A.M. No. P-03-1703 (Edna Fe F. Aquino v. Jose R. Martin,

Sheriff IV, Regional Trial Court, Cauayan City, Isabela)

approving the circular proposed by the Office of the Court

Administrator (OCA) relative to the payment of fines in

administrative matters, all concerned justices, judges, court

officials and personnel are hereby informed of the following

procedure:

In order to have a uniform procedure in the payment of

fines imposed by the Court in administrative matters, all

fines shall be paid within 30 days from the finality of the

decision or final resolution imposing the fine. Decisions and

resolutions in administrative cases which are immediately

executory shall be considered final, for purposes of the

payment of fines, upon receipt of the subject decision or

resolution and the fine shall be paid within the

aforementioned period regardless of the filing of a Motion

for Reconsideration.

Payment shall be made with the Office of the Clerk of

Court of the station where the respondent is assigned which,

within five 5 days, shall furnish the Docket and Clearance

Division (DCD), Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) with

a certified copy of the receipt indicating therein the case

number where the fine was imposed. Payment may also be

made with the Cash Division of the Financial Management

Office, OCA, which shall immediately furnish the DCD, OCA,

with a certified copy of the receipt indicating therein the

case number where the fine was imposed.

The DCD shall inform the Court of all payments of fines

in administrative matters. It shall likewise report to the

Court any failure of respondent(s) to pay fines imposed by

the Court.

This Circular supersedes prior circulars/memoranda

inconsistent herewith and shall remain in force until further

orders from the Court.

Strict compliance is hereby enjoined.

August 27, 2014.


Court Administrator

OCA CIRCULAR NO. 115-2014 TO: ALL CLERKS OF COURT, OFFICERS IN CHARGE, LIBRARIANS

AND ACCOUNTABLE OFFICERS OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL

COURTS, METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURTS, MUNICIPAL TRIAL

COURTS IN CITIES, MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURTS, MUNICIPAL

CIRCUIT TRIAL COURTS, SHARI’A DISTRICT COURTS, SHARI’A

CIRCUIT COURTS AND MAINTENANCE OFFICES OF THE HALLS

OF JUSTICE

SUBJECT: CONDUCT OF PHYSICAL INVENTORY AND RENEWAL

OF ACKNOWLEDGMENT RECEIPT FOR EQUIPMENT (ARE)

For purposes of updating the records of property

accountabilities and to determine the condition of all office


CircularsOCA Circular No. 113-2014 (continued)


equipment, furniture, books and all other properties of the

lower courts, all Clerks of Court, Officers in Charge, Librarians

and accountable officers of the lower courts and

maintenance offices of the Halls of Justice are hereby

directed to conduct a physical inventory of all court-issued

properties in their respective, offices, branches and libraries

and to renew their Acknowledgment Receipt for Equipment

(ARE).

The conduct of the inventory must be witnessed by a

representative from the nearest Commission on Audit (COA)

office.

The result of the inventory must be reflected in the

attached Inventory Report form, accomplished in triplicate,

and must be duly attested by the representative of the

COA.

In the preparation of the inventory reports, all court-

issued properties, including equipment and other properties

which are issued by the offices of the Supreme Court (SC) or

offices of the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) without

ARE and donated properties whose ownership has been

transferred to the SC, must be included in the report. The

condition (ex. serviceable, unserviceable) of each piece of

property should be duly indicated in the “Remarks” column

of the prescribed form. Information such as the property

number, serial number, the date the property was acquired

and to whom it was issued must also be indicated.

Not to be included in the Inventory Report are the

properties issued by local government or non-government

agencies where ownership is not transferred to the court,

properties issued by the Department of Justice to the courts

or offices housed in Halls of Justice for reason of lack of

formal transfer, and office supplies and other consumables.

All Executive and Presiding Judges shall supervise the

proper implementation of this directive within their

respective jurisdictions to insure the proper accomplishment

and prompt submission of such reports to the Property

Division, Office of Administrative Offices, OCA.

All Clerks of Courts, Officers in Charge, Librarians and

accountable officers of the lower courts and maintenance

offices of the Halls of Justice are required to submit their

respective Inventory Reports and ARE within 30 days from

receipt of this Circular, and thereafter, to submit the

Inventory Report on or before the first week of January of

every succeeding year, and the ARE every three years on

the first week of January.


September 11, 2014.


Court Administrator

TO: ALL JUDGES AND CLERKS OF COURT OF SELECTED

FIRST AND SECOND LEVEL COURTS IN QUEZON CITY,

MAKATI CITY, ANGELES CITY, ILOILO CITY, DAVAO CITY,

AND CEBU CITY

SUBJECT: PILOTING OF A NEW SYSTEM FOR SPEEDY

COURT TRIAL

The Supreme Court En Banc, in a Resolution dated

March 18, 2014 in A.M. No. 14-03-02-SC (Re: Program for

Piloting and Assessing the Proposed Revised Rules of Civil

Procedure), approved the Piloting of a New System for

Speedy Court Trial, the full text of which is appended herein

as “Annex A.”

The rules of the new system shall apply to all civil actions

which have not yet undergone pre-trial in the selected first

and second level courts mentioned in said rules, and shall

take effect on February 23, 2015.

For your information, guidance, and strict compliance.

September 12, 2014.


Court Administrator

“ANNEX A”

ANNOUNCING THE PILOTING OF

A NEW SYSTEM FOR SPEEDY COURT TRIAL

The Supreme Court has approved by Resolution A.M. 14-

03-02-SC dated March 8, 2014 the piloting of Rules 22 and

24 of the draft Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, reproduced

below. These Rules shall, beginning February 23, 2015,

apply to all civil actions in the following first and second

level courts that have not yet undergone pre-trial:

Quezon City

a. Regional Trial Courts: Branches 77, 78, 81, 84, 89,

90, 92, 93, 97, 100, 218 and 225

b. Metropolitan Trial Courts: Branches 31, 36, 38 and

42

Makati City

a. Regional Trial Courts: Branches 57, 58, 60, 62,

133, 134, 136, 137, 142 and 149

b. Metropolitan Trial Courts: Branches 61 and 67

Angeles City

a. Regional Trial Courts: Branches 56 and 57

b. Metropolitan Trial Courts: Branch 2

Iloilo City

a. Regional Trial Courts: Branches 27, 28, 29, 37 and

39

b. Metropolitan Trial Courts: Branches 6, 8 and 10




Davao City

a. Regional Trial Courts: Branches 10, 12 and 16


Cebu City

a. Regional Trial Courts: Branches 9, 10, 11, 12, 18,

19, 22 and 24


RULE 22

PRELIMINARY CONFERENCE

SECTION 22.1. Policy of the Rule. — It is the policy of this

Rule in relation to the Rule on Trial of issues to:

(a) Require the parties to make a full disclosure of the

known facts of the case early in the proceedings and

submit to the court the affidavits and documents that

prove their claims, for the purpose of enabling the

court to accurately identify the issues between the

parties and facilitate the process of settling their

disputes amicably or, if this is not possible, to

considerably limit the scope of trial;

(b) Treat litigations not as a contest pitting the resources

and skills of the parties in building up their cases and

destroying those of the others, but as a collective effort

of all to search for the truth and to render justice to

all;

(c) Empower the judge to take a direct role in examining

the witnesses during the trial and elicit from them the

answers needed for rendering a just judgment;

(d) Make maximum use of the court’s time and shorten

trial without sacrificing the quality of hearing and

adjudication:

(e) Require the parties and their counsels to assist the

court in doing work they can properly perform to enable

the judge to do his judicial duties with greater dispatch

and efficiency; and

(f) Raise the level of professionalism of judges and counsels

in terms of promptness in starting court proceedings

and meeting deadlines.

SEC. 22.2. Mandatory disclosure of evidence. — If the

parties do not settle their disputes during the JDR [Judicial

Dispute Resolution stage], the case shall be raffled to a

different branch for further proceedings. The parties may,

however, instead file a joint written motion or manifestation

requesting the court that concluded the JDR to continue

with the case. In either case, the parties shall then submit

to the court and disclose to each other the evidence in the

case that are known and available to them in the following

manner:

(a) The court shall, motu proprio or on motion, give notice

to the parties to simultaneously submit to the court

within 30 days from notice and serve upon each other,

the following:

1. The judicial affidavits of their witnesses in support

of their allegations, which shall take the place of

such witnesses’ direct testimonies; and

2. The parties’ documentary or object evidence, if

any, which shall be attached to the judicial

affidavits, identified and marked as Exhibits P, P-1,

P-2, and so on in the case of-the plaintiff or

petitioner, Exhibits C, C-1, C-2, and so on in the

case of the complainant, Exhibits D, D-1, D-2, and

so on in the case of the defendant, Exhibits R, R-1,

R-2, and so on in the case of the respondent, and

duly identified and authenticated by the proper

witness or witnesses.

(b) A party may, if he or she so desires, submit reply judicial

affidavits respecting matters not touched by his or her

initial affidavits within 15 days from receipt of the

adverse party’s judicial affidavits. No further judicial

affidavit may be submitted without prior leave of court

which shall be granted only on justifiable grounds.

(c) Should a party or a witness desire to retain possession

of the original document or object evidence, he or she

may, after it has been identified, marked as exhibit,

and authenticated, warrant in his or her judicial

affidavit that the copy, reproduction, or picture

attached to such affidavit is a faithful copy,

reproduction, or picture of the original. In addition,

the party or witness shall bring to court the original

document or object evidence to enable the adverse

party to compare the original document with its copy

or reproduction or the object evidence with its picture.

The comparison shall be done by the adverse party

before the branch clerk of court prior to the date of

the preliminary conference. The comparison shall then

be duly noted by the branch clerk of court on the

attached copy, reproduction, or picture before the date

of the preliminary conference. Unless the comparison

is done or deemed waived by the non-appearance of

the adverse party, the copy attached to the judicial

affidavit shall not be admitted.

(d) If the requested witness, who is neither the witness of

the adverse party nor a hostile witness, unjustifiably

declines to execute a judicial affidavit or refuses

without just cause to make the relevant books,

documents, or other things under his or her control

available for copying, authentication, and eventual

production in court, the requesting party may avail

himself or herself of a subpoena ad testificandum or

duces tecum under the Rules of Court. The party

requesting the issuance of a subpoena shall be


responsible for ensuring its personal service upon the

witness, and shall bear the cost of such personal service

and the expenses of the witness in appearing before

the lawyer who will prepare or supervise the

preparation of his or her judicial affidavit.

(e) A party who fails to submit the required judicial

affidavits and exhibits when they are due shall be

deemed to have waived such submission and the right

to present evidence in support of his or her case. Still,

the court may, for good cause shown and not later

than 15 days from receipt of the adverse party’s judicial

affidavits and exhibits, allow but once the late

submission of the requirements. It may also, if no good

cause is shown, still allow such late submission but once,

provided that the defaulting party or his or her counsels,

whoever may appear at fault, pays a fine set by the

court which shall not be less than P1,000 or more than

P5,000.

(f) If a vital witness is (1) outside the Philippines, or (2) is

shown to be under an exceptional or compelling

predicament at the time his or her judicial affidavit is

needed for submission, the counsel may, with leave of

court, prepare such affidavit through video

conferencing and submit it to the court with the

counsel’s attestation regarding its authenticity,

conditioned on the witness appearing at the hearing

to sign it, affirm its truth, and submit to an examination

by the court and the parties.

(g) The court may, on motion, allow a witness who,

because of exceptional and compelling reasons, has

been unable to execute a judicial affidavit to testify in

court by way of a narration of what he or she needs to

relate in relation to the case which shall be restricted

to relevant facts, provided that the motion is filed

within the period for submission of judicial affidavits

and the movant states in the motion the substance of

the testimony of such witness. This shall include

government employees or officials who are unable to

execute judicial affidavits by reason of the demands of

their official work.

(h) In case a party submits judicial affidavits that do not

conform to the content requirements, the court shall

issue an order excluding such affidavits from the record.

The court may, however, allow but once and for good

cause shown the subsequent submission of the

compliant replacement affidavits within 10 days from

receipt of the exclusion order. If no good cause is

shown, the court may still allow such subsequent

submission provided that the erring party or his or her

counsels, whoever may appear responsible for their

preparation and submission, pays a fine set by the court

which shall not be less than P1,000 or more than

P5,000.

(i) The direct testimony of a witness shall be deemed

offered and admitted upon submission in court of his

or her judicial affidavit, subject to motions for exclusion

of inadmissible testimonies at the appropriate time

and to the examination of such witness. The documents

and object evidence that the parties previously marked

as their exhibits shall also be deemed offered and

admitted upon their submission in court as part of the

testimony of the witness who testifies on their

existence, execution, or functions for the purposes that

such testimony indicates, whether expressly or

impliedly, subject to motions for exclusion at the

appropriate time and to the examination of the

witness.

SEC. 22.3. Use of certain discovery procedures. — A party

who desires to avail himself or herself of the modes of

discovery shall do so in accordance with Rules 27 to 31.

Such party shall take steps to complete the process and

submit the material portions of the record of the

proceedings, previously undisclosed documents or facts, and

the necessary judicial affidavits pertaining to the fruits of

the discovery within 60 days from the start of the discovery

process.

Sec. 22.4. Preparation of the Terms of Reference. — The

Court shall, taking into account the submissions of the parties

and counsels, prepare the Terms of Reference of the case

that will control the scope of trial.

(a) After the parties shall have submitted their respective

judicial affidavits, documentary and object exhibits,

and the results of the discovery procedures they have

undertaken, the court shall issue an order requiring

each party through their respective counsels as officers

of the court, to simultaneously submit to it and serve

on the other party within 15 days from notice a brief,

concise, and fair draft of the Terms of Reference of the

case, containing:

1. A summary of the admitted facts;

2. A statement that the documents attached to

judicial affidavits or object evidence referred to

are faithful copies, reproductions, or pictures of

their originals if such be the case;

3. A summary of the totality of the facts that the

plaintiff’s evidence appears to have established;

4. A summary of the totality of the facts that the

defendant’s evidence appears to have established;

5. Based on the two summaries above, a statement

of the factual issue or issues that the conflicting

evidence of the parties present:

6. A list of the witnesses from either side who, based

on their judicial affidavits and exhibits, are



competent to testify on each of the factual issues

or related factual issues in the case; and

7. A statement of the legal issues that the case

presents once the factual issues and related factual

issues have been resolved.

(b) An issue is factual when the contending parties cannot

agree that a thing exists or has actually happened. An

issue is legal when the contending parties assume a

thing exists or has actually happened but disagree on

its legal significance or effect on their rights or

obligations.

(c) Only relevant and significant issues need be tried. An

issue is relevant and significant when its resolution will

help decide the case on its merits. Otherwise, it is

irrelevant and need not be tried.

(d) Every factual issue should be adequately stated. The

statement of an issue is adequate when it contains

words describing the ultimate facts that the party

bearing the burden of proving the affirmative of such

issue must establish by his or her evidence.

(e) The facts alleged by the parties in their complaint,

answer, and judicial affidavits, when not put in issue in

the Terms of Reference, shall be deemed admitted or

otherwise regarded as irrelevant to the resolution of

the dispute.

(f) If a party’s counsel fails to submit his or her draft of the

Terms of Reference, he or she shall be deemed to have

waived the submission of such draft, without prejudice

to appropriate sanctions for failure to comply with the

order of the court.

(g) Within 15 days of its receipt of the drafts of the Terms

of Reference, or after the lapse of the period to submit

such drafts, the court shall prepare its final version,

taking such drafts into account. (n)

SEC. 22.5. Notice of Preliminary Conference. — The branch

clerk of court shall, through phone calls and electronic

messages, consult the parties, through their counsels, on

their availability before setting the case for preliminary

conference. In addition, the branch clerk shall serve a

written notice of such conference on the parties, through

their counsels, requiring the parties and their counsels to

appear before the court for a preliminary conference on

the date and time that it has set. It shall be the duty of the

counsels to promptly inform their clients regarding the

setting and the need for them to be present as well. (n)

SEC. 22.6. Appearance of parties. — It shall be the duty of

the parties and their counsels to appear at the preliminary

conference. A party’s non-appearance may be excused only

for valid cause shown or if he or she is represented by another

person who is fully authorized to act on his behalf respecting

all the matters subject of the conference. (n)

SEC. 22.7. Decision as in default against absentee. — In

the event a party or his counsels fails to appear at the

preliminary conference, the court shall, within thirty days

from the date of the scheduled preliminary conference,

render a decision, adjudicating the other party’s claims, if

warranted, after the court’s ex parte examination of such

party’s witness or witnesses based on their judicial affidavits.

(n)

SEC. 22.8. Decision as in default, when set aside. — The

court may, however, set aside a judgment rendered under

Section 22.7 if, within 15 days from notice of the decision,

the party concerned files a motion with the court with prior

notice to the adverse party that his or her failure to comply

with what was required of him or her has been due to

extrinsic fraud or unavoidable accident. Only when the

ground is clearly meritorious will the court grant the motion.

The court may at its discretion, however, where the ground

is not clearly meritorious, still grant the motion, set aside

the decision of default, and reschedule another preliminary

conference for the last time, upon admission of error or

neglect by the party or his or her counsel and after payment

of a fine set by the court which shall not be less than P1,000

or more than P5,000. (n)

SEC. 22.9. Matters to be taken up at the preliminary

conference. — The court shall take the following actions

during the preliminary conference in the order listed below:

(a) The, court shall determine, in consultation with the

parties and their counsels, if there is a need to make

changes in the contents or wordings of the Terms of

Reference that it earlier prepared. If there is such a

need, the court shall enter the changes on the

document.

(b) If a party asks the court to try an excluded issue, the

court shall include it for trial provided that such party

makes a deposit for court costs amounting to not less

than P10,000 but not more than P50,000 at the

discretion of the court. Should the trial court or, on

appeal, a higher court find the additional issue a sham,

it shall order the deposit forfeited to the court;

otherwise it shall have the same refunded to the party

concerned.

(c) The court may adjourn the preliminary conference

once if there is a chance of settlement and the parties

need time to consider the matter; otherwise, the court

shall proceed with the conference.

(d) The court shall, in consultation with the parties:

1. Fix the order in which the issues are to be tried;

2. Identify the witnesses who need to be present to

testify on each of the issues;


3. Set the specific dates for reception of evidence on

each issue or related issues;

4. Determine whether the circumstances warrant

an alternate or face-to-face trial of issues and in

the latter case, whether it shall be a simple or

regular trial of issues as provided below, and

determine who among the witnesses are exempt

from face-to-face examination;

5. Determine the need to refer certain issues to trial

by commissioners; and

6. Summarize the foregoing arrangements towards

the end of the preliminary conference and issue

an Order of Trial, copy furnished the parties, which

shall reflect such arrangements.

(e) The court may, as a result of the preliminary

conference or in the course of it when the

circumstances warrant, render judgment or dismiss

the action. If evidence is required for adjudicating a

ground for dismissal, the court shall set the case for

reception of such evidence and then dismiss the action

if warranted.

x x x x

RULE 24

TRIAL OF ISSUES

SECTION 24.1. Alternate trial. — An alternate trial is one

where parties take turns in presenting their witnesses

respecting the first factual issue or related issues stated in

the order of trial. The party who bears the burden of proving

the affirmative of the issue under consideration shall be the

first to present a witness.

SEC. 24.2. Face-to-face trial. — A face-to-face trial is one

wherein witnesses from the contending sides appear

together before the court, sit face-to-face around a table

in a non-adversarial environment, and answer questions

from the court as well as the parties’ counsels respecting

the factual issue under consideration.

SEC. 24.3. Options for trying the issues. — The court shall

have the option to try the issues embodied in the Terms of

Reference either by alternate or face-to-face trial. In the

latter case, the court may conduct either simple or regular

face-to-face trial, whichever it considers more suitable. The

parties may by unanimous agreement, however, choose to

have an alternate trial in lieu of a face-to-face trial.

SEC. 24.4. Common rules. — The following common rules

shall govern both alternate and face-to-face trials:

(a) Each factual issue shall be tried strictly in the sequence

provided in the Order of Trial although two or more

closely related issues may be simultaneously tried.

(b) A party may move on proper ground to disqualify a

witness before he or she is examined and strike out his

judicial affidavit or exclude any of the answers found in

it on ground of inadmissibility. This motion shall be

resolved in accordance with Sections 24.8 and 24.9

below.

(c) A party may also move to exclude any of the exhibits

attached to the judicial affidavit of a witness on ground

of inadmissibility. This motion shall be resolved also in

accordance with Sections 24.8 and 24.9 below. The

objecting party shall make his motion in writing before

the trial if the exhibits are voluminous to facilitate its

resolution. The rulings of the court respecting the

exclusion of testimonies and exhibits based on public

policy grounds shall be without prejudice to a tender

of excluded evidence under the appropriate rule.

(d) The court and the counsels of the parties shall examine

the witnesses and determine the truthfulness of the

judicial affidavits that constitute their direct

testimonies in the case.

(e) A witness may testify on one or more issues.

SEC. 24.5. Rules governing alternate trial. — In an alternate

trial:

(a) The parties shall take turns in presenting their

witnesses respecting the first factual issue or related

issues stated in the Order of Trial.

(b) The party who bears the burden of proving the

affirmative of the issue under consideration shall be

the first to present a witness. If the party has more

than one witness, the witnesses will be presented

successively respecting such issue. The opposing party

shall afterwards present the witness or witnesses for

that issue.

(c) The court shall be the first to examine each of the

witnesses thus presented. The parties shall then take

their turns to conduct the cross, re-direct, and re-cross

of the particular witness. This is without prejudice to

the right of the court to ask additional questions of the

same witness.

(d) The examination by the court and by the parties shall

entirely focus on the issue or issues at hand and not

dwell on matters outside of and totally unrelated to

such issue or issues.

(e) After all the witnesses from both sides have been

examined respecting the issue or related issues under

consideration, the trial shall move on to the next issue

or related issue in the Order of Trial until all the issues

shall have been tried.



SEC. 24.6. Ground rules governing a face-to-face trial. — In

a face-to-face trial:

(a) The witnesses from the contending sides shall appear

together before the court and simultaneously swear

to the truth of their respective testimonies.

(b) The witnesses shall sit face-to-face around the table in

a non-adversarial environment and answer questions

from the court and the parties’ counsels respecting

the factual issue under consideration;

(c) Only one person at a time shall speak during the face-

to-face trial and always with prior permission from the

court which shall take steps to ensure that the person

who speaks is identified for the record;

(d) The witnesses shall address their answers to the

examining judge or counsels; and

(e) The witnesses shall not pose questions to the other

witnesses relating to their testimonies but shall be

given equal opportunity to respond to the questions.

SEC. 24.7. Two-phase examination of witnesses in a face-

to-face trial. — The examination of the witnesses from the

contending sides in the face-to-face trial shall consist of two

phases: the first phase shall be by the court and the second

phase by the parties’ respective counsels.

(a) In the first phase, the court shall examine the witnesses

regarding the issue or related issues at hand in no

particular sequence and may also direct its questions

to one or more of the Witnesses from the contending

sides.

(b) When the questions from the court are directed to a

specific witness, the other witnesses from the same

side may seek permission to supplement, clarify, or

qualify the answers that the first witness has given.

(c) In turn, the court shall give the witnesses from the

other side equal time and opportunity to reply.

(d) The court may allow the witnesses from the

contending sides to continue their divergent exchanges

provided new facts or new arguments are introduced

and the testimonies have not become repetitive.

(e) The court may also stop the exchanges if the answers

from the contending sides have sufficiently clarified

their positions and the points of their disagreement.

(f) The court may, before moving the examination of the

witnesses from first phase to second phase, summarize

its own understanding of the positions of the parties

and the testimonies of their witnesses on the issue or

related issues at hand.

(g) In the second phase, the court shall allow counsels

from the contending sides to cross-examine, re-direct,

and re-cross the witnesses based on their judicial

affidavits, the attached exhibits, the answers the

witnesses gave during the court ’s first-phase

examination, or their testimonies. This second-phase

examination shall be without prejudice to the court’s

further examination of the witness already examined

by the counsels.

(h) Where there are multiple parties involved (the plaintiff,

the defendant, the third, fourth, or fifth-party plaintiffs

or defendants, or the intervenors) the court shall fix

the order of cross, re-direct, and re-cross examination

by the various counsels involved, making sure that a

party is able to examine the witness whose testimony

is adverse. A party may adopt a favorable testimony.

(i) After the counsels have concluded their examinations

of the witnesses, the court shall terminate the second

phase respecting the particular issue or related issues

and move to the examination of the witnesses

respecting the next issue or related issues if such

examination is likewise in the agenda of the court for

that day’s setting. The reception of evidence for the

next issue or related issues may be scheduled on

another setting in accordance with the Order of Trial.

SEC. 24.8. Exceptions to the court’s examination of the

witnesses. — The counsel for any party may in the course

of the court’s examination of the witnesses, take exceptions

to objectionable questions that it poses to one or some of

them. The exceptions shall simply state the legal grounds

for objection with no further explanation. The court shall

act on the exceptions in the following manner:

(a) In case of exceptions as to form, such as when the

questions from the court are perceived to be

argumentative, leading, multiple, repetitive, vague,

improper characterization, confusing, or unfair, the

counsels shall state the ground for exception after the

question has been answered. The court shall take note

of the exception or where warranted, strike out the

answer and rephrase the question;

(b) Exceptions as to substance such as when the questions

from the court are perceived to elicit answers that are

inadmissible on public policy grounds including those

relating to the rights against self-incrimination,

privileged communication, disqualification, and to the

Statute of Frauds, rape shield law, bank secrecy laws,

Anti-Money Laundering Act, and other laws or rules

that prohibit disclosure of information or data, may be

made before the witness answers the questions. The

counsels may also move to strike out any answer

already given on the same grounds. In either case, the

court shall promptly rule on such exceptions or motions.


(c) In case of exceptions to admissibility under the rules

governing best evidence, parol evidence, conclusion

or opinion evidence, hearsay evidence, irrelevant

evidence, or character evidence, the counsels shall

state the ground for exception after the question has

been answered. The court shall take note of the

exception and consider the same when deciding the

case.

SEC. 24.9. Objections to the questions of counsels.

(a) It is the counsels’ duty to fairly elicit only admissible

evidence from a witness, either by way of preparing the

judicial affidavit constituting the direct examination

or by way of cross, re-direct, or recross examination.

(b) The counsels for one side may move to exclude the

whole or part of the testimony embodied in the judicial

affidavit of a witness presented by the other side on

ground of inadmissibility.

(c) Objections as to form in Section 24.8(a) and admissibility

in Section 24.8(c) shall be made after the questions

have been answered. Objections as to substance in

Section 24.8(b) may be raised before the questions

are answered; if the answers have already been given,

motions to strike out may be made.

(d) The court shall act on the motion or objection in the

same manner it would act on exceptions from questions

of the court as provided under Section 24.8 above.

SEC. 24.10. When face-to-face examination of witnesses

shall not apply. — The face-to-face examination of

witnesses shall not apply when one of the witnesses to the

factual issue under consideration is either (a) a child covered

by the Rule on Examination of a Child Witness, or (b) a person

who is mentally, psychologically, or physically challenged,

or has a similar condition that puts such witness at a

disadvantage in a face-to-face confrontation. In such a case,

the witnesses on that issue shall be examined separately.

The face-to-face examination shall, however, proceed with

respect to the other issues that do not involve the child or

disadvantaged witness.

The face-to-face trial shall also not be required in: (a)

special civil actions; (b) special proceedings; and (c) where

the court perceives the danger of uncontrollable passion

arising from deep animosity between the parties.

SEC. 24.11. Examination of Expert Witnesses in a face-to-

face trial of issues. — The examination of expert witnesses

in a face-to-face trial of issues shall follow the same

procedure provided in Section 24.7. With leave of court,

however, an expert witness may ask questions directed to

the other party’s expert witness on any matter covered by

the testimony of the latter on the issue or related issues at

hand.

SEC. 24.12. Regular or summary face-to-face trial schedules.

The schedules for holding face-to-face trial of issues shall

either be simple or regular based on the circumstances of

each case.

(a) Where the issues are complex or numerous and the

evidence from both sides consist of the testimonies of

several witnesses or involve numerous pieces of

evidence, the court shall hold a regular face-to-face

trial, with the hearings spread over a period of time.

(b) Where the issues are simple and few, the court shall

hold a simple one-time face-to-face trial, with an oral

judgment rendered at the end of such trial. But if in

the course of such trial, the court discovers that the

issues are after all complex or numerous, it shall suspend

the proceedings and direct the conduct of a regular

trial in the succeeding settings.

SEC. 24.13. Memorandum, oral argument, and judgment.

The court may hear the parties argue their respective

positions before rendering judgment in the case, as follows:

(a) In an alternate or regular face-to-face trial of issues:

1. The court shall, after all the issues in the case have

been heard, direct the parties to simultaneously

submit their respective memorandum or draft

decision within 30 days from the date the trial

ended, accompanied by a softcopy of the

document in a format acceptable to the court.

2. Furthermore, the court shall , within 10 days from

receipt of such memorandum or draft decision,

set the case for oral argument on a date and time

the court and the parties may agree on.

3. The court shall render a written decision within

90 days after hearing the parties on their oral

argument. It may wholly or partially adopt or use

the memorandum or draft decision of the winning

party for its decision or prepare its own.

(b) In a simple face-to-face trial of issues:

1. The court may, immediately after all the witnesses

have been examined, hear the parties briefly on

oral argument and afterwards orally state its rulings

on the issue or issues involved and announce the

dispositive part of its judgment.

2. Such oral judgment shall be recorded in the minutes

of the proceedings which, together with the

resolution of each issue, shall be signed by the

parties or their counsels as evidence of notification.

If a party or his counsels refuses to sign, the refusal

shall be reflected in the same minutes.

3. The court shall then direct the winning party to

submit within 30 days from the oral judgment a



memorandum or draft, of the decision based on the

oral judgment then rendered, accompanied by

softcopy of the document in a format acceptable to

the court.

4. In place of oral judgment, the court shall have the

option of requiring each party to submit a

memorandum or draft decision within 30 days from

the date the face-to-face trial ended, accompanied

by a softcopy of the document in a format

acceptable to the court.

5. Whether or not the court adopts a party’s

memorandum draft decision, it shall promulgate

its written decision in the case within 60 days from

the oral judgment, if any, or from the date the face-

to-face trial ended.

6. The period to appeal from the judgment of the court

in this case shall be reckoned from the date of

receipt of written decision by the appealing party.

SEC. 24.14. Trials shall be intransferable.

(a) Because of the numerous persons involved in, and the

complex preparations required for, the conduct of trial,

especially the face-to-face trial, the dates set for trials

shall be intransferable except on grounds of fortuitous

event or serious illness of a counsel or witness. The

party seeking postponement or resetting of the hearing

has the burden of proving with satisfactory evidence

the ground invoked. Otherwise, such party shall be

deemed to have waived the appearance of counsel and

witnesses at the scheduled face-to-face trial.

(b) No motion for postponement or resetting shall be

granted on ground of serious illness of a counsel or

witness, unless the party concerned presents a medical

certificate issued by a physician stating that the illness

is of such gravity as to prevent the counsel or witness

from attending the scheduled hearing. The judge may

require the physician to appear before the court or

order another physician either government-employed

or retained by the adverse party, to verify the truth of

the certification. If such certification turns out to be

false, the certifying physician shall be held in contempt

of court and punished accordingly.

(c) If the ground for postponement or resetting turns out

to be false, the party or counsel who sought it shall

also be subject to contempt of court.

SEC. 24.15. Consequences of failure to appear at the trial.

(a) The failure of counsel to appear at the pre-agreed face-

to-face trial without obtaining a prior postponement


OFFICERS IN CHARGE/ACCOUNTABLE OFFICERS OF THE FIRST

AND SECOND LEVEL COURTS

SUBJECT: CLARIFICATION ON THE COLLECTION OF

POSTPONEMENT FEE IN CONSOLIDATED CASES

Queries have been brought to the attention of this Office as

to the proper interpretation and application of Rule 141 of

the Revised Rules of Court, specifically on the postponement

fee to be collected in consolidated cases.


shall be considered a waiver of appearance and trial

shall proceed without such counsel. The absent

counsel’s witnesses, if present, shall be regarded as

witnesses procured by the court concerning the case

and shall be examined in the usual course.

(b) In the event of the failure of a witness to appear, the

court shall order such witness’ judicial affidavit

expunged, without prejudice to the adverse party using

it as a judicial admission if the witness is also a party.

SEC. 24. 16. Newly discovered evidence; new issues evolving

during trial. — A party may, in the course of trial, file a

motion to admit newly-discovered evidence subject to the

rule governing its admission. A party may, without amending

the pleadings, also file a motion to amend the Order of Trial

to include a new issue or issues that may have since arisen.

SEC. 24.17. Language used during trial. — The court shall

require the witnesses in the trial of issues to testify either in

English or Filipino, whichever language would enable such

witnesses, the court, and the counsels to have fair

exchanges. If any of the witnesses cannot take part in such

exchanges because of language difficulty, the examination

of the witness shall be conducted in the language or dialect

known to such witness. In this case, the judge or examining

counsels shall make use of an interpreter of their choosing

who shall assist them in propounding questions to, and

appreciating the answers of, the witness. Nevertheless, the

recording of the actual answers given by the witness, not

their English or Filipino translation, will constitute the official

and binding testimony of the witness. When quoting in a

pleading, motion, memorandum, petition, or other court

submission, the text of quest ions and answers of a witness

given in a local dialect, the counsels shall indicate the

translations into English or Filipino in appropriate brackets.



OFFICERS IN CHARGE/ACCOUNTABLE OFFICERS OF THE

FIRST AND SECOND LEVEL COURTS

SUBJECT : A.M. NO. 11-10-03-0 (RE: LETTER DATED APRIL

18, 2011 OF CHIEF PUBLIC ATTORNEY PERSIDA RUEDA-

ACOSTA REQUESTING EXEMPTION FROM THE PAYMENT

OF SHERIFF’S EXPENSES)

In the July 30, 2013 Resolution in A.M. No. 11-10-03-0 (Re:

Letter dated April 18, 2011 of Chief Public Attorney Persida

Rueda-Acosta Requesting Exemption from the Payment of

Sheriff’s Expenses), the Supreme Court En Banc DENIED

the request of Atty. Persida V. Rueda-Acosta for the


The Court in, Chua v. The Executive Judge, G.R. No.

202920, October 2, 2013, explained the rationale on

collecting fees, albeit on the subject of docket fees, on each

individual case and not on its entirety. It declared, in part,

the following justifications:

In the instant case, there are a total of 40 counts of

violation of BP Blg. 22 that was filed before the MeTC. And

each of the 40 was, in fact, assessed its filing fees, individually,

based on the amount of check one covers. Under the rule of

criminal procedure, the filing of the 40 counts is equivalent

to the filing of 40 different informations, as each count

represents an independent violation of BP Blg. 22. Filing

fees are, therefore, due for each count and may be paid for

each count separately.

Second. In an effort to justify her refusal of petitioner’s

request, the Executive Judge further argues that since all

40 counts of violation of BP Blg. 22 were brought about by

a single complaint filed before the OCP and are now

consolidated before the court, the payment of their filing

fees should be made for all or none at all.

That all 40 counts of violation of BP Blg. 22 all

emanated from a single complaint filed in the OCP is

irrelevant. The fact remains that there are still 40 counts

of violation of BP Blg. 22 that were filed before the MeTC

and, as a consequence, 40 individual filing fees to be

paid.

Neither would the consolidation of all 40 counts make

any difference. Consolidation unifies criminal cases

involving related offenses only for purposes of trial.

Consolidation does not transform the filing fees due for

each consolidated into one indivisible fee (Emphasis

supplied).

Henceforth, considering the foregoing

pronouncements, the collection of a postponement fee,

whenever there are consolidated cases filed in the trial

court, should be made separately on each case included

therein, and not on the entire or collective fee for the

consolidated cases, since the mode of consolidation is

merely underscored for purposes of trial, and does not

in any way affect the collection of an individual

postponement fee for each case involved in the

consolidation. Further, the rule shall not only be exclusively

applied to consolidated BP Blg. 22 cases, but shall also

equally apply to all types of cases subject of consolidation.

For your information, guidance, and strict compliance.

September 16, 2014.


Court Administrator

In its September 2, 2014 Resolution in A.M. No. 14-08-94-

MeTC (Re: Proper Fees to be Collected in Election Contests

Involving Elective Municipal and Barangay Officials) the

Honorable Court, upon the recommendation of the Office

of the Court Administrator, resolved, among others, to:

(b) ADVISE the Clerks of Court in the first and

second level courts that: (i) Section 1, Rule 7 of

the Rules of Procedure in Election Contests

Before the Courts Involving Elective Municipal

and Barangay Officials (A.M. No. 07-4-15-SC),

dated May 15, 2007, is controlling insofar as

the proper collection of filing fees is concerned;

(ii) other assessments for Legal Research Fund,

Sheriffs Trust Fund, V ictim’s Compensation

Fund and Mediation Fund shall be collected

in election contests; (iii) the P3,000 filing fee

for election contest shall be allocated to the

amount of the Special Allowance for the

Judiciary; and (iv) postal money orders are not

acceptable as a mode of payment of filing fees.

Strict compliance is hereby enjoined.

September 16, 2014


Court Administrator

TO: CLERKS OF COURT/OFFICERS IN CHARGE/ACCOUNTABLE

OFFICERS OF THE FIRST AND SECOND LEVEL COURTS

SUBJECT: A.M. NO. 14-08-94-MeTC (RE: PROPER FEES TO BE

COLLECTED IN ELECTION CONTESTS INVOLVING ELECTIVE

MUNICIPAL AND BARANGAY OFFICIALS)



Sheriff ’s expenses are not exacted for any

service rendered by the court; they are the amount

deposited to the Clerk of Court upon filing of the

complaint to defray the actual travel expenses of

the sheriff, process server or other court-authorized

persons in the service of summons, subpoena and

other court processes that would be issued relative

to the trial of the case. It is not the same as sheriffs’

fees under Section 10, Rule 141 of the Rules of Court,

which refers to those imposed by the court for services

rendered to a party incident to the proceedings before it.

Thus, in In Re: Exemption of Cooperatives from

Payment of Court and Sheriff’s Fees Payable to the

Government in Actions Brought Under RA No. 6938, the

Court clarified that sheriff ’s expenses are not

considered as legal fees, ratiocinating that:

The difference in the treatment between the

sheriff’s fees and the sheriff’s expenses in relation

with the exemption enjoyed by cooperatives is

further demonstrated by the wording of Section 10,

Rule 141, which uses “fees’” in delineating the

enumeration in the first paragraph, and “expenses”

in qualifying the subsequent paragraphs of this

provision. The intention to make a distinction

between the two charges is clear; otherwise, the

Rules would not have used different designations.

Likewise, the difference between the two terms is

highlighted by a consideration of the phraseology in

the first sentence of the second paragraph of Section

10, Rule 141, which uses the clause “in addition to

the fees hereinabove fixed,“ thereby, unequivocally

indicating that sheriff ’s expenses are separate

charges on top of the sheriff’s fees. (Italics supplied)

The Court, however, is not unmindful of the

predicament of PAO’s clients. In exempting PAO’s

clients from paying docket and other legal fees, RA

No. 9406 intended to ensure that the indigents and

the less privileged, who do not have the means to

pay the said fees, would not be denied access to

courts by reason of poverty. Indeed, requiring PAO’s

clients to pay sheriff’s expenses, despite their exemption

from the payment of docket and other legal fees, would

effectly fetter their free access to the courts thereby

negating the laudable means of Congress in enacting RA

No. 9406.

x x x x

Having the foregoing principles in mind, the

Court, heeding the constitutional mandate of

ensuring free access to the courts and adequate

legal assistance to the marginalized and less

privileged, hereby authorizes the officials and

employees of PAO to serve summons, subpoena,

and other court processes pursuant to Section 3,

Rule 14 of the Rules of Court. The authority given

herein by the Court to the officials and employees

of PAO shall be limited only to cases involving their

client.

exemption of the clients of the Public Attorney’s Office (PAO)

from the payment of sheriff’s expenses.

Relevant portions of the Resolution explicitly provide:

That Section 6 of RA No. 9406 exempts PAO’s clients

from the payment of “docket and other fees

incidental to instituting an action in court and other

quasi-judicial bodies” is beyond cavil. However,

contrary to Atty. Acosta’s claim, a plain reading of the

said provision clearly shows that the exemption granted

to PAO’s clients cannot be extended to the payment of

sheriff’s expenses; the exemption is specifically limited

to the payment of fees, i.e., docket and other fees

incidental to instituting an action.

The term “fees” is defined as a charge fixed by

law or by an institution for certain privileges or

services. V iewed from this context, the phrase

“docket and other fees incidental to instituting an

action” refers to the totality of the legal fees

imposed under Rule 141 of the Rules of Court. In

particular, it includes filing or docket fees, appeal

fees, fees for issuance of provisional remedies,

mediation fees, sheriff ’s fees, stenographer’s fees

and commissioner’s fees. These are the fees that

are exacted for the services rendered by the court

in connection with the action instituted before it.

Sheriffs’ expenses, however, cannot be considered

as a “fee” within the purview of the exemption granted

to PAO’s clients under Section 6 of RA No. 9406. Sheriffs’

expenses are provided for under Section 10, Rule

141 of the Rules of Court, viz:

SEC. 10. Sheriffs, PROCESS SERVERS and other persons

serving processes.

x x x x

In addition to the fees hereinabove fixed, the amount

of ONE THOUSAND (P1,000) shall be deposited with

the Clerk of Court upon filing of the complaint to defray

the actual travel expenses of the sheriff, process server

or other court-authorized persons in the service of

summons, subpoena and other court processes that

would be issued relative to the trial of the case. In case

the initial deposit of ONE THOUSAND (P1,000) PESOS

is not sufficient, then the plaintiff or petitioner shall

be required to make an additional deposit. The

sheriff, process server or other court authorized

person shall submit to the court for its approval a

statement of the estimated travel expenses for

service of summons and court processes. Once

approved, the Clerk of Court shall release the money

to said sheriff or process server. After service, a

statement of liquidation shall be submitted to the

court for approval. After rendition of judgment by the

court, any excess from the deposit shall be returned

to the party who made the deposit.

x x x x



ESTABLISHING THE STANDARD THICKNESS OF CASE

ROLLOS AND RECORDS

WHEREAS, the undersigned has directed the conduct of

process mapping and cluster meetings as mechanisms for

threshing out issues and addressing problem areas with

respect to the functions of a particular office or cluster;

WHEREAS, in these process mapping sessions and

cluster meetings, the offices concerned have raised the

problem of voluminous rollos and case records, e.g., the

difficulty and inconvenience of handling them, and their

disintegration due to constant handling;

WHEREFORE, all offices concerned are hereby

informed that, henceforth, the thickness of case rollos and

records shall not exceed 2½ inches. Annexes may be

contained in a subsequent volume or volumes in cases where

the pleading itself exceeds 2½ inches; Provided, that a

particular document, whether pleading or annex, may not

be split or divided into separate volumes. For this purpose,

the rollos or records shall be labeled as Volume I, II, III, and

so on.

FURTHER, Members of the Court may request that

rollos or records of old cases be separated in parts in

accordance with the herein established standard; Provided

that the rollos shall be coursed through the Rollo Room

which shall in turn transmit the rollos to the docketing office

concerned for stitching.

This Office Order shall take effect upon its issuance this

7th day of August 2014.

(Sgd.) MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Chief Justice

OFFICE ORDER NO. 10-2014

REORGANIZING THE COMMITTEE ON COMPUTERIZATION

AND LIBRARY

WHEREAS, there is recognition of the need to harmonize

and integrate all computerization efforts at all levels of the

judiciary to truly implement the Enterprise Information

Systems Plan of the Judiciary and related reforms;

MEMORANDUM ORDER NO. 19-2014

Authorizing the officials and employees of PAO

to serve the summons, subpoenas and other court

processes in behalf of their clients would relieve

the latter from the burden of paying for the sheriffs

expenses despite their non-exemption from the

payment thereof under Section 6 of RA No. 9406.

The amount to be defrayed in the service of

summons, subpoena and other court processes in

behalf of its clients would consequently have to be

taken from the operating expenses of PAO. In turn,

the amount advanced by PAO as actual travel

expenses may be taken from the amount recovered

from the adversaries of PAO’s clients as costs of

suit, attorney’s fees or contingent fees prior to the

deposit thereof in the National Treasury.

WHEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing

disquisitions, the Second Motion for Reconsideration filed

by Atty. Persida V. Rueda-Acosta is DENIED. The Court’s

Resolution dated November 22, 2011, and April 24, 2012

are hereby AFFIRMED. The request of Atty. Persida V.

Rueda-Acosta for the exemption of the clients of the Public

Attorney’s Office from the payment of sheriff’s expenses is

DENIED.

Nevertheless, the officials and employees of the Public

Attorney’s Office are hereby AUTHORIZED to serve

summons, subpoenas and other court processes in behalf of

their clients pursuant to Section 3, Rule 14 of the Rules of

Court, in coordination with the concerned court. The

amount to be defrayed in serving the summons, subpoenas

and other court processes could be taken from the

operating expenses of the Public Attorney’s Office which, in

turn, may be taken from the amount recovered by it from

the adversaries of PAO’s clients as costs of suit, attorney’s

fees or contingent fees prior to the deposit thereof in the

National Treasury, or damages that said clients may be

decreed as entitled to in case of the success of PAO’s indigent

clients.

SO ORDERED. (Emphasis added)


September 24, 2014.


Court Administrator


OrdersMemorandum Order 19-2014 (continued)

CREATING THE COMMITTEE ON FAMILY COURTS AND

JUVENILE CONCERNS

WHEREAS, Republic Act No. 8369 was enacted in 1997

providing for the establishment of family court;

WHEREAS, from its enactment the law has not been

fully implemented;

WHEREAS, there is a need to revisit the Iaw and map

out plans for its implementation taking into consideration

current issues and requirements;

NOW THEREFORE, the Committee on Family Courts

(formerly the Subcommittee on Family Courts under the

Committee on the Revision of the Rules of Court and the

Committee on Gender Responsiveness) is hereby created

and constituted as follows:

Chairperson

Justice Teresita J. Leonardo-De Castro

Vice Chairperson

Justice Victoria Isabel A. Paredes, Court of Appeals

Members

Judge Angelene Mary Quimpo Sale, RTC, Br. 106, Quezon City

Judge Lorifel Lacap Pahimna, RTC Br. 69, Pasig City

Judge Ma. Theresa M. Arcega, RTC Br. 17, Malolos Bulacan

Judge Cesar Pabel D. Sulit, RTC, Pasig City

Court Administrator or his representative

Chief, Office of the Chief Attorney

Chief, Fiscal Management and Budget Office

Chief, Management Information Sytems Office

Chief, Public Information Office

Atty. Myrna Feliciano, Philippine Judicial Academy

Representative, Office of the Chief Justice

Secretary

Atty. Catherina N. Manzano

MEMORANDUM ORDER NO. 20-2014

WHEREAS, there is a need to modernize and enhance

court library collections, facilities and e-library systems to

assist judges and court personnel in their adjudication

functions;

NOW, THEREFORE, in the interest of service, the

Committee on Computerization and Library is hereby

reorganized as follows:

Chairperson

Chief Justice Maria Lourdes P. A. Sereno

Vice Chairpersons

Hon. Associate Justice Estela M. Perlas-Bernabe

Hon. Associate Justice Marvic Mario Victor F. Leonen

Members

Court of Appeals Associate Justice Apolinario D. Bruselas

Court of Appeals Associate Justice Maria Filomena D. Singh

Representative of the Court of Tax Appeals

Representative of the Sandiganbayan

Representative of the Office of the Court Administrator

Chief, Management Information Systems Office

Secretary

Atty. Michael B. Ocampo

Assistant Secretary

Atty. John Robert G. Real

Members of the Secretariat

Ms. Editha D. Pontaoe

Mr. Gary Louie Comia, and

Mr. Ferdinand Duero (alternate)

There shall be a Subcommittee on Libraries and

Research, which shall be composed of the following:

Chairperson:

Hon. Associate Justice Marvic Mario Victor F. Leonen

Members:

Mrs. Milagros Santos-Ong

Chief Librarian of the Supreme Court

Chief Librarian of the Court of Appeals

Chief Librarian of the Court of Tax Appeals

Chief Librarian of the Sandiganbayan

Representative of the librarians from the lower courts

[To be designated by the Chief Justice]

The Chairperson, Members, Consultants, and Members

of the Secretariat of the Committee and the Sub-

Committee, including those who have rendered service as

part of the same prior to the issuance of this Memorandum

Order shall receive the usual expense allowances.

This Memorandum Order shall take effect upon its

issuance this 4th day of July 2014.


Chief Justice

Chairperson, First Division

(Sgd.) ANTONIO T. CARPIO

Senior Associate Justice

Chairperson, Second Division

(Sgd.) PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice

Chairperson, Third Division


and Aquatic Resources. The outcomes of the

workshop and panel discussion were consolidated

and formally presented for consideration to the

Subcommittee, through Justices Peralta and

Bersamin who gave their respective responses to

the consolidated outputs. Justice Bersamin officially

led the distribution of the certificates of participation

to the participants and declared the closing of the

activity.

Focus Group Discussion on the Rules of Procedure for

Environmental Cases (Continued from page 8 )

PHILJA Curriculum Review (Continued from page 7)

Thought Piece on the Philippine Judicial Academy

Curriculum Review. Supreme Court Associate Justices

Martin S. V illarama, Estela M. Perlas-Bernabe,

Mario Victor F. Leonen, and Lucas P. Bersamin were

also interviewed for their thoughts and comments

on enhancing judicial education. The Justices

responded to the discussion points given them

earlier; Justice Bienvenido L. Reyes addressed the

points in a letter. The Justices’ common comments

and suggestions placed emphasis on the following:

how to conduct pre-trial; skills-based modules, e.g.,

management, decision writing, strong oral and

written skills, court governance to include challenges

and developments in judicial processes; apprising

judges on latest developments in law, recent

legislative acts and SC decisions, rules and

procedures; maximizing the benefits of PJP and

accreditation from other law schools; ethics; and use

of mock trial and interactive case-based simulations

to apply critical thinking skills in decision making. The

Chief Justice’s thought piece as well as the inputs

from the associate justices interviewed proved

substantial in the discussions on what judicial training

should be and served as the road map during the

PHILJA Curriculum Review.

Professor Sedfrey M. Candelaria, Head of the

Research, Publications and Linkages Office,

summarized the comments and recommendations

towards the end of the program, which included a

proposal to convene another forum to study and

approve the new curriculum.

All PHILJA executive officials; 22 department

chairpersons, vice chairpersons, and members of the

14 academic departments attended the activity,

with 13 PHILJA lawyers and staff assisting.

Assistant. Secretary

Ms. Ma. Theresa Baylon

Secretariat

To be designated by the Chairperson

The Committee shall have the following duties:

1. Formulate the implementing Rules and

Regulations and other rules for Republic Act No.

8369 (Family Courts Act of 1997)

2. Draft plan for the organization of family courts to

include the following:

a. Creation/Development of staffing pattern for

family courts

b. Determination of number of courts that must

be created under national legislation

c. Report on training needs assessment of all

actors in family and juvenile justice sector

d. Recommendations for infrastructure

requirements for family courts

e. Piloting of family courts that will have ideal

guidelines, resources, environment, facilities

and staff for addressing family and juvenile

justice concerns

3. Monitor the implementation of the plan for the

creation and organization of family courts

including identification of procedural rules and

court guidelines, as well as judicial and legal forms,

that must be adopted to increase the effectiveness

and efficiency of family courts;

4. Create such working groups as necessary to carry

out its duties.

The Chairperson, Vice Chairperson, Members, and

Members of the Secretariat of the Committee, including

those who have rendered service as part of the said

Committee prior to the issuance of this Memorandum Order,

shall receive the usual expense allowances.

This Memorandum Order shall take effect upon its

Issuance this 13th day of August 2014.


Chief Justice

Chairperson, First Division

(Sgd.) ANTONIO T. CARPIO

Senior Associate Justice

Chairperson, Second Division

(Sgd.) PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice

Chairperson, Third Division

JULY - SEPTEMBER 201444PRIVATE OR UNAUTHORIZED USE TO AVOID

PAYMENT OF POSTAGE IS PENALIZED BY FINE

OR IMPRISONMENT OR BOTH

3rd Floor, Supreme Court Centennial Building

Padre Faura Street corner Taft Avenue, Manila 1000

Philippines

Justice Adolfo S. AzcunaChancellor

Professor Sedfrey M. CandelariaEditor in Chief

Editorial and Research Staff

Atty. Orlando B. CariñoArsenia M. Mendoza

Armida M. SalazarJocelyn D. Bondoc

Joseph Arvin S. CruzChristine A. Ferrer

Charmaine S. NicolasSarah Jane S. Salazar

Jeniffer P. Sison

Circulation and Support Staff

Romeo A. ArculloMichael Angelo P. Laude

Lope R. PalermoDaniel S. Talusig

Printing Services

Leticia G. Javier and Printing Staff

The PHILJA BulletinPHILJA BulletinPHILJA BulletinPHILJA BulletinPHILJA Bulletin is published

quarterly by the Research,

Publications and Linkages Office

of the Philippine Judicial

Academy, with office at the 3rd

Floor of the Supreme Court

Centennial Building, Padre Faura

Street corner Taft Avenue, Manila.

Tel: 552-9524; Fax: 552-9621; E-mail:

[email protected];

[email protected]; Website:

http://philja.judiciary.gov.ph (Continued on page 20)

Fourth Quarter Trainings, Programs and Activities

� 11th Metrobank Foundation

Professorial Chair Lecture

October 8

Court of Appeals Manila

� Seminar-Workshop on

Intellectual Property for Clerks of

Court of Special Commercial

Courts

October 8–9, Cebu City

� Philippine Judges Association

Midterm Convention

October 14–16

Legazpi City, Albay

� 4th Orientation Seminar-

Workshop for Newly Appointed

Sheriffs and Process Servers

(Batch 2)

October 14–16, Tagaytay City

� Refresher/Advanced Course for

Court-Annexed Mediators

October 16–17, Tagaytay City

� 21st National Convention Seminar

of the Philippine Trial Judges

League, Inc.

October 23–25, Malay, Aklan

� Information Dissemination

through a Dialogue between

Barangay Officials and Court

Officials

October 23

Cagayan de Oro City

October 24, Malaybalay City

� Roundtable Discussion on Issues

and Concerns Relating to

Intellectual Property Rights

Enforcement

October 23–14, Makati City

� 5th Orientation Seminar-

Workshop for Newly Appointed

Sheriffs and Process Servers

November 4–6, Mactan, Cebu

� CET for Judges and Court

Personnel Handling Cases

Involving Children

November 11–13, Tagaytay City

� Refresher/Advanced Course for

Court-Annexed Mediators

November 13–14

Court of Appeals, Manila

� CEP for RTC Clerks of Court

November 18–20

Cagayan de Oro City

� Seminar-Workshop for Special

Commercial Court Judges and

Pairing Court Judges

November 19–20, Pasay City

� Seminar-Workshop on

Intellectual Property for

Selected Special Commercial

Court Judges and Pairing Court

Judges

November 21, Pasay City

Volume XVI, Issue No. 63 July-September 2014

Documents

Transcript of Volume XVI, Issue No. 63 July-September 2014