Volume One: Contributed Papers || Temporality, Secondary Qualities, and the Location of Sensations

Temporality, Secondary Qualities, and the Location of SensationsAuthor(s): Paul FitzgeraldSource: PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association,Vol. 1982, Volume One: Contributed Papers (1982), pp. 293-303Published by: The University of Chicago Press on behalf of the Philosophy of Science AssociationStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/192674 .

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Temporality, Secondary Qualities, and the Location of Sensations

Paul Fitzgerald

Baruch College/ City University of New York

Several phi losophers in recent years, e.g., Baker (1974-5, 1979), Grunbaum (1971), Rescher (1973) and Salmon (1974) have argued that something they call "temporal becoming" is mind-dependent. They see the issue as analogous to the traditional one about the mind-dependence of secondary qualities. Do directly seen colors, felt coldness, and salty taste exist in the mind-independent world? Or only within experience? We know how the dialectic dances around that question....

"Roses are red, violets are blue, in the same way that some of our afterimages and sense-data are.'"

"No, roses and violets don't really have colors. Roses only have the property of selectively reflecting light in the 7200 X region. That makes them Zook red to us. But they aren't really red. Science shows that . ''

"You're both wrong. Of course roses are red. But to be red just is to be the sort of thing which would Zook red to normal observers under standard conditions. Similarly, to be soluble is simply to have the dispositional property of dissolving-if-placed-in-a-solvent."

How about phenomenal spatiality and phenomenal temporality? Dis- cussion of the mind-dependence of temporality has tended to assume that the classical secondary qualities are mind-dependent, and then argue that we should likewise accept the mind-dependence of temporal becoming. It has also tended to assume that the close temporal analogue of directly experienced phenomenal qualities of color, taste, and so on is nowness (cf. Baker 1979, Salmon 1974, and Grunbaum 1971). Nowness is supposed to be a property or "A-determination" (Gale 1968) expressible by such irreducibly indexical predicates as 'is occurring now' or 'exists at present'.

This second assumption is mistaken, as is argued by Fitzgerald (1980).

PSA 1982 Volume 1, pp. 293-303 Copyright Q 1982 by the Philosophy of Science Association



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The really close analogue of phenomenal sensory qualities is the phenomenal temporality or eZapsiveness of which we are directly aware in our experience. This has no closer connection with an indexical nowness property than the phenomenal spatial features of our afterimages have with any alleged property of hereness. This claim will not be argued here. See Fitzgerald (1980).

Here I want to argue that defenders of the mind-dependenceof temporal becoming are right at least to this extent. The classical problem of secondary qualities does arise for temporality (and spatiality as well). The visual appearances which the physical world presents to us are not located outside of our bodies. Our somatic sensations are not located in the parts of our bodies where we ostensibly feel them. Your toothache isn't in your tooth. If these sensations are anywhere in physical space they are in the brain. But even if they have physical location in the brain (whether literally, or in some extended sense), they also have phenomenaZ spatial and temporal features. "Features" refers here not to repeatable universals but to non-repeatable abstract or Stoutian par- ticuZars, to use the term coined by D.M. Armstrong (1978). Those features might well be numerically distinct from the physical spatio-temporal features of physical brain states. They might be quaZitativeZy different as well. This is the analogueof the oldquestionaboutwhether the colors of our visual sense-data resemble anything in the physical world.

Apply this to time. I have a sense-datum which lasts for awhile. Is its durational or elapsive character numerically distinct from the physical duration of any physical event or chunk of spacetime? Is it qual- itatively similar to any such physical duration or proper time? These questions are genuine ones, I hope to show. Defenders of the claim that "temporal becoming" is mind-dependent may be right in thinking that phenomenal temporality is mind-dependent. They are wrong only in thinking that it has some peculiarly close connection with indexicality, or that reflecting on "nowness" and the ways of indexicals could take us far toward solving the real analogue for timeof the secondary qual ities problem.

Many would deny that there is a genuine "secondary qualities problem" for spatiality and temporality. Some deny there's a problem because, as direct realists, they deny the split between sensory appearance and physical reality which raises the problem. Some deny it on the grounds that sensations are brain states and have no non-physical phenomenal features. I want to argue, against both these groups, that there is a genuine problem of the relation(s) between phenomenal spatiality and temporality, and physical spatio-temporality. Direct realism is wrong. Both the visual appearances of material objects and our own somatic sensations have no location in physical space, except possibly in the brainof theperceiver. And if sensations aren't in physical space, how can they literally be in physical time, given the way relativity theory welds space and time to- gether? Even if sense-data are somehow located in the brain, they have phenomenaZ spatial and temporal features which may be distinct and different in kind from any physicaZ spatio-temporal features. Ugly old dualism threatens, at least dualism of aspects. There is in fact a non-phy-



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sical phenomenal realm whose connections with physical space and time are problematic. This strains the commonsense belief that sensations are located in physical time in the same straightforward way that physical events are. I don't like this dualism at all. But I find all the attempts to avoid it specious and unacceptable.

PEirt of the case for this dualism consists in showina that somatic sensations are not located in the parts of our bodies where we ostensibly feeZ them. Your toothache isn't in your tooth. The case of somatic sensations is important because of all phenomenal entities they seem com- monsensically to have the strongest claim to be located in physical space, and outside the brain. Here it will be argued that neither they nor physical sense-data are outside the brain. And even if they are in some sense in the brain, they stifl have phenomenal spatial and temporal features whose connection with physical spacetime is problematic.

Some say that it is a matter of "logical grammar", not to be gainsaid by philosophical argument, that somatic sensations arewhere we ostensibly feel them. Of course a toothache is in a tooth. A few would even say that when I sincerely believe that my toothache is in myright bicuspid, or the searing is in my left arm, it must be so. But how could my toothache be in my right bicuspid if the dentist has extracted it and it's been ground to powder by a garbage disposal unit? The searing pain can't be in my left arm if the arm's been amputated and is now miles away. For that reason defenders of the "conceptual truth" claim might be tempted to add that when we say our aches are in our teeth or limbs we are not claiming Ziteral spatial location for them at all.

I would welcome this non-literalist interpretation, if it could be es- tablished. It would place me in the happy position ofnot being in conflict with what ordinary people think and say. I could argue my case that somatic sensations are not ZiteraZZy located in physical space. Then I would add that when you say, in an everyday way, that there's a pain in your tooth, you are not saying anything that disagrees with my claim. For you are not attributing literal location in physical space to the toothache. And that literal locatedness is all I meant to deny.

Alas, I see no way to establish this non-literalist interpretation. How can we show that people are not attributing literal spatial location to their sensations when they locate them in parts of their bodies? To be sure, you don't expect the dentist to see or feeZ your toothache when he probes your tooth. And the oculist won't see the spots-in-front-of-your- eyes when he gazes at the space before your eyes. But these facts don't show that you are not attributing literal location in physical space to the aches and spots. Maybe you just haven't thought through the implica- tions of what you're saying. Or maybe you don't expect literally located sensations to be publicly observable, because they are not publicly observable kinds of things even though they do have literal physical locations. Or maybe you are implicitly attributing to them a kind of literal spatial location but a relationaZ location, as when we say that the glare is on the blackboard from over here. To see the glare you have to occupy the place from which it exists on the blackboard. Other people are not



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located in the place (presumably that occupied by your brain) from which they are there before your eyes. That is why they can't see the spots. Because of all this, I find it hard to establish that people are not attributing to thei r sensations l iteral locations in physical space. Even i f they are not, we can go on to ask whether sensations do have such locations.

Many philosophers would reject our question about whether aches, afterimages, and the like are located in physical space by saying that it pre- supposes an illegitimate act-object analysis of sensations. This analysis involves an alleged distinction between the act(state) of sensing or feel- ing, and the X which is immediately sensed or felt, and which is also called a sensation or feeZing. (Indeed, that distinction is presupposed here). It is then argued against me that this act-object analysis is a mistake. We should adopt instead an adverbiaZ anaZysis. "'I have a toothache in my right bicuspid." should not be analyzed as predicating a four- place relation of a person, a time, a tooth, and an ache. On the adverbial analysis the statement is viewed as analogous to "She broke the vase by accident.". This does not predicate a four-place relation binding a person, a past time, a vase, and something cal led "accident" by which she broke the vase. Rather, it is equivalent to "She broke the vase accident- ally.". Similarly, the statement about the toothache is equivalent to "I feel (toothache-in-right-bieuspid)-Zy.'', where the italicized phrase is an adverbial modifier of the verb "feel". And instead of wondering whether visual sense-data exist in physical space, have backsides, consist of unextended geometrical points, and are three-dimensional, we are en- couraged to say simply that we are appeared to redZy, or roundZy, thus avoiding reification of appearances and phony philosophical puzzles. The classical secondary qualities problem does not arise. Neither do its ana- logues for temporal becoming or spatial extension. Adverbial theories were championed by G.Dawes Hicks (1917), C.J. Ducasse (1951), R. Chisholm (1957,1977), W. Sellars (1968,1975), J.Cornman (1975) and others. They have been attacked by F. Jackson (1977), R. Grossmann (1976), R. Clark (1975) and P. Butchvarov (1980). Ducasse applied an adverbial theory to the spatio-temporal features of experience explicitly, in saying that we "may or must speak of being aware not only bluely but also briefZy (or perhaps lengthily), extensionaZZy (or perhaps punctually), here-Zy (or perhaps there-ly)... ." (Ducasse 1951, quoted by Butchvarov 1980, p. 269).

It seems to me that the adverbial theory will not work. Phenomenolog- ical inspection reveals that the act-object analysis is appropriate for visual, somatic, and other sensations. The problems which the adverbial theory seeks to avoid should not be brushed under the rug by artifices like adverbial paraphrase. They should be faced squarely and solved.

Consider. It is perfectly natural to say things like "I just had two afterimages, the smaller one a pale green, and located to the right of the larger, deeper green one .". This on the face of it seems to be saying that there were two Xs, each colored green, spatially located (in some sense), and having spatial properties and relations. We could infer from the quoted statement that something pale green stood in a spatial relation to something else, which was both darker and larger than the first thing. These inferences make sense if an act-object analysis of visual experience is



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correct, and we are here talking about the objects of that experience. To capture the inferences we would want to use the whole apparatus of pronominal cross-reference which is captured formally by quantification over individual variables: "(3x)(3y)(x j' y & Rxy....)".

On the adverbial analysis, we would presumably have something likethis. "I was just appeared to (two afterimages, the smaZZer one a paZe green, and Zocated to the right of the Zarger, deeper green one)-ly.' The best that the adverbial theorist can plausibly hope for is that the references to afterimages will be sealed up within some kind of brackets, the whole to be regarded as an adverb (formally, a predicate-forming operator on predicates). Inside the adverb we have quantifications, in story-talk about a world of non-real Xs such as afterimages and toothaches. This story-talk cannot be sullied by quantifiers from without. It must be her- metically sealed off from talk about the real.

But should it be thus sealed off? Don't we want to be able to say things like 'There are three letters on the eye chart, but without my glasses I see only two blurs when looking at it. So there is one more letter than there are blurs.'? This requires quantifiers to trespass into the sealed precincts of the adverbial construction. (Of course, we also want to make such numerical comparisons between fictionaZ entities and real ones. I am not here arguing that sense-data are reaZ, as opposed to fictional or merely possible, because we need to quantify over them. My argument is just that adverbiaZ "eliminations" of them won't work, because we need to quantify over them.)

Besides, what is gained by the adverbialization maneuver, once even purely internal quantification is admitted within the adverbial operator? The same old questions about sense-data arise, only now they appearin the form of questions about which intra-bracket inferences are permissible. From the fact that I was just appeared to redly and roundly, we can infer that I was just appeared to coloredly and shapedly. Can we infer that I was just appeared to three-dimensionally? Was I appeared to something- with-a-backside-edly? Answering that last question is tantamount to answering the old conundrum about whether or not sense-data have backsides. Many old problems about sense-data will simply trot out again, dressed now as questions about the logical relations among appearing predicates or operators. Nothing is gained by the adverbial appearing theory. We have to quantify over appearances or sense-data in any complete story about the world, and the appearing theory won't really help us avoid the problems this raises.

Similarly, some have tried to conjure away visual impressions, afterimages, hallucination images, and other kinds of sense-data by means of behaviorist or else topic-neutraZ anaZyses. I take it that Jackson (1977) and others, such as Bradley (1963), Noren (1970), Campbell (1971) and Schaffer (1968) have shown the inadequacies of such attempts.

Suppose then we adopt an act-object analysis of sensation. Still , why can't somatic sense-data be in those regions of physical space where we spontaneously locate them! Isn't your toothache in your tooth? Or, if



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the tooth is gone, isn't the toothache in the place by your gum where the tooth was when you had one? I would like to argue against this suggestion by calling attention to some general similarities between visual sense- data and other kinds, such as somatic. An important similarity is that both kinds are proximately caused by states of the perceiver's brain. So it is plausible to hold that if somatic sense-data were located in the regions of the body where they seem to be, then the visual sensory appearances of things would be located outside the body, where they seem to be. But visual sense-data are not located outside of the perceiver's body. (We'll see why not in a minute.) Therefore somatic sense-data are notin the places where they seem to be, either.

Imagine you were one of the Chinese astronomers who in 1054 A.D. saw the supernova in the Crab nebula. The supernova explosion had taken place 6000 years earlier. It reveals itself to you by a bright, glittery spot in your visual field. If you hold a rose-tinted, transparent glass in front of your eyes the spot changes hue, taking on a rosy cast. That rose- tinted appearance of the long-gone explosion is a visual sense-datum. Is it located outside your body, in physical space?

I think not. The proximate cause of the sense-datum consistsof neural events in your brain (perhaps in the visual centers of the occipital lobes, perhaps not). Do these neural events cause the sensa-datal appearanceof the supernova to pop into existence outside you in physical space? Ifso, where in space, exactly? I will argue that it is impossible to assign a location in any reasonable way, and that that is a good reason for saying the sense-datum is not located outside you. But let's check all this.

Is the sense-datal appearance of the supernova located where the supernova occurred and emitted the light that is just reaching you? Sounds good. But what does it mean? What we count as the same place lasting through time depends on what reference frame we freely decide to pick. There is no such thing as the place, lasting through time, at which the explosion occurred. Even within pre-Einsteinian physics there would be an infinity of non-overlapping place-times simultaneous with your here- and-now brain events, each of which can be regarded as a later stage in the history of the place at which the supernova occurred, 6000 years ago. Are we to suppose that the brain picks out a particularoneofthese place- times and causes the sense-datum to leap into life at that particular one? What is the brain mechanism whereby this selective feat of causality ata distance is brought about? Why does the brain "choose" the particular place-time which it does? And how does it "rule out" inel igible candid- ates, ones which could not possibly be later stages of any place where the supernova occurred? We have no reason to believe there is any such mechanism, and no way of discovering the location of the sense-datum out in space. To say that it is at a specific place out in space is to posit a state of affairs which is empirically undetectable in principle. That is the sort of thing which led Einstein to deny that there is real rest and motion with respect to the ether. There is not. And there is no such thing as the place in space outside the perceiver where his sense-datum exists as he is sensing it. See Diagram 1.



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DIAGRAM I )Time

P4 p5 6 P7

p P2 3

\\ perceiving of the supernova

ON WHICH LINE IS THE SENSE- DATUM?

the supernova spatial axis x

Any of the vertically oriented "P" lines could be regarded as tracing the later history of "the place" where the supernova occurred. At which of these places is the perceiver's sense-datum of it located?

There is another point. According to relativity, there is no such thing as the time when anything happens, either. Simultaneity is frame- relative. So we have an additional problem for the claim that the perceiver's brain events cause a sense-datum to come into existence out in space simultaneously with them. Simultaneously, relative to what reference frame? And why that particular one? How does the brain "know" or "decide" which frame-time to choose as the time at which the supernova sense-datum is to be brought into existence, way far away? Once again, we have a question which is empirically undecidable in principle.

Any of the "T" lines picks out a frame-time at which the perceiver senses the sense-datal appearance of the supernova.

future-facing light-cone of the percept ion event

3 perceptiton of the supernova T4

ON WHICH LINE IS THE SENSE-DA UM?

past-facing light-cone of the- perception event T

the supernova



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Relativity to reference frames is what causes the problem here. There is a way to avoid that. We might try the idea that when you look at the supernova, your supernoval sense-datum is caused by your brain to come in- to existence back at the place-time where the supernova occurred 6000 years before. Of course, that place-time is in the absolute past of the brain events which "generate" your sense-datum. So we get a cause which is later than its effect. Bizarre. But less trouble than it might seem. For we can hold, plausibly, that the sense-datum existing back there at the place-time of the supernova can have no physical effects back there and then. So we have no worry about temporally closed causal chains.

The trouble lies elsewhere. How does the perceiver's brain "know" the place-time at which the supernova presently seen actually occurred? The light waves hitting the observer's retinas carry no signs betraying the identity of the place-time from which they were dispatched. And the brain has no fine-tuned mechanism for causing the sense-datum to come in- to existence at the exact place-time 6000 years or so ago where the light waves started out from the explosion. If the sense-datum is not located at that (somewhat fuzzily demarcated) place-time, so far away and long ago, then when and where is it located? Whatever (doubtless arbitrary) answer is given, the same answer should be given in the case of a simulated Crab supernova, staged by cleverly arranged lighting on the roof of a planetar- ium, fifty feet above the perceiver. For the physical stimuli impinging on the observer in that case may be exactly similar to those which hit the Chinese observers who saw the real thing. Is each sense-datum fifty feet from the brain which causes it? Six thousand light-years away?

Clearly, neither of these. There is no plausible way to defend the claim that any visual sense-data are located in spacetime outside the body of the person who senses them. In short, the spots-in-front-of-your-eyes are not in front of your eyes. Nor, by the way, are they in your eyes. Think of having two eyes and a single afterimage. Which is the lucky eye in which the image lurks?

I suggest that what holds for visual sense-data can be expected to hold for tactual and somatic ones as well. Take phantom pain, throbbing "in" a non-existent limb. Does it throb out there in empty space, where the sufferer's leg would be, if he still had a leg? Do others fail to feel it there simply because it exists there not simpliciter but perspectivaZZy, that is, in that empty place but only from the sufferer's brain, whereits proximate cause is found? I suggest that if the pain exists anywhere in space outside the sufferer's brain, it should exist out there where his leg would be, if he still had one. It is implausible to hold thatif the sufferer still has his leg then his brain would cause the pain to exist out there in the leg, but that if his leg is no longer there,an identical brain state will cause the pain to exist somewhere else instead, such as in the stump. Further, differences between tactual-somatic and visual sense-data depend not on the difference between the natures of the nerve messages transmitted from different sense organs, but only on the fact that they terminate in different places in the brain. A bit of re-wi ring would translate the visual stimuli from the Crab supernova into somatic sense- data. A stubbed toe would show up as stars before the eyes. This makes



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me believe that if visual sense-data are not outside the brain, then somatic ones aren't either.

Why not in the brain, then? An identity or a double-aspect theory (which accepted an act-object analysis of sensation) might well locate our sense-data in our brains, where their proximate physical causes or correlates are. This could always be done in a rough way, assuming that the required physical brain correlates do exist. A sense-datum would be located where its physical correlate is. But unless further conditions were satisfied, this would be a brute verbal convention, defining a physical location for sense-data only in a sense anaZogous to that in which physical things and events themselves have location in spacetime. To see this, suppose for example that the physical correlate of a single, cir- cular afterimage were a spatially scattered brain state. We could adopt the convention of saying that the single (arcwise connected) afterimage had as location the mereological sum of scattered places in the brain where its physical correlate occurred. But this would not permit us to locate the various subparts of the image within corresponding subpartsof the scattered physical location. And it would not permit us to identify the particular roundness of the afterimage withany physical shape-feature of its physical correlate. (The roundness of which I speak is not the universal but the abstract particular; what D.M. Armstrong (1978) callsa "Stoutian particular".) If the geometry of the phenomenal visual space differed from that of physical apace, for example, in not having uncount- ably many points between any pair of locations, then our convention of locating sense-data in the brain would be somewhat arbitrary. They would have location there only in a weak or analogous sense.

On the other hand, if there were a strong isomorphism between the phenomenal spatial features of oursense-data and the physical spatial features of their brain correlates, then the sense-data would be strongZy located in the brain. I have in mind a situation in which, e.g., phenomenal parts of sense-data could plausibly be paired off with physical parts of their brain correlates. In that event, we might argue that the phenomenal spatial features of the sense-data (say, the roundness of the afterimage) are numerically identical to the physical spatial features of the brain correlates (e.g., the roundness of the place in the cortex in which the physical correlate occurs). Partly analogous remarks hold for the phenomenal durational features of our sense-data and the physical temporal features of their correlates, if any.

Since it is not known at present even that there are physical brain correlates of our sense-data, much less what their features are, we don't know at present whether sense-data are strongly, or only weakly located in the brain. Since there is no location in physical time without location in physical spacetime, the way in which sense-data are spatially located in the brain bears on the ontological status of their temporal features. We can at present only set up the questions and alternative answers as clearly as possible. Further empirical input is needed to give us the answers. Perhaps acts of sensing are literally brain states, stronqly located in physical spacetime, but havinq a non-physical simultaneity relation with their sense-datal objects, which thereby get weak location there. Just a speculation. Let us have some more.



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