Vol. 635 24 May 2018 Mei - Open Gazettes South Africa

Vol. 635 24 May 2018 Mei

No. 41652

2 No. 41652 GOVERNMENT GAZETTE, 24 MAY 2018

STAATSKOERANT, 24 MEl 2018 No.41652 3

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Contents

Gazette Page

No. No. No.

PROCLAMATIONS • PROKLAMASIES

17 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996: Commission of Inquiry into tax administration and governance by the South African Revenue Service (SARS) ....................................................................................................... 41652 4

17 Grondwet van die Republiek van Suid-Afrika, 1996: Kommissie van Ondersoek na belasting administrasie en bestuur deur die Suid-Afrikaanse Inkomstediens (SAID)......................................................................................... 41652 12


PROCLAMATIONS • PROKLAMASIES

PROCLAMATION NO.17 OF 2018

by the

President of the Republic of South Africa

COMMISSION OF INQUIRY INTO TAX ADMINISTRATION AND GOVERNANCE

BY THE SOUTH AFRICAN REVENUE SERVICE

In terms of section 84(2)(f) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa of

1996, I hereby appoint a Commission of Inquiry into tax administration and

governance by the South African Revenue Service (SARS) with the terms of

reference attached hereto and appoint the former judge of the Supreme Court of

Appeal who has been discharged from active service, Honourable Mr Justice Robert

Nugent as Commissioner, assisted by Mr Michael Katz, Advocate Mabongi Masilo

and Mr Vuyo Dominic Kahla.

Given under my Hand and the Seal of the Republic of South Africa at

day of ,t1 A-~ Two Thousand and

By Order of the President-In-Cabinet:

~--r--Minister of the Cabinet


SCHEDULE

TERMS OF REFERENCE OF THE COMMISSION OF INQUIRY INTO TAX

ADMINISTRATION AND GOVERNANCE BY SOUTH AFRICAN REVENUE SERVICE

WHEREAS taxation forms a crucial basis for a democratic govemment. imposed for the

purpose of funding the constitutional obligations of Govemment including the provision of

public services to all;

AND WHEREAS the significant revenue shortfalls in two consecutive years in 2016/17 and

(projected for) 2017/18 are identified as key fiscal risks and a factor in South Africa's credit

rating;

AND WHEREAS delays in VAT and other refunds form part of a systematic policy to reach

revenue targets, taking account of the findings of the Office of the Tax Ombud;

AND WHEREAS the public must have confidence that SARS is managed to the highest

standard of ethics, integrity and efficiency;

AND WHEREAS certain practices in the tax system have undermined taxpayer morality and

confidence;

AND WHEREAS administrative provisions relating to revenue collection must be

transparent, applied fairly and applied without fear or favour;

AND WHEREAS reports in the public domain that potentially undermine taxpayer morality

need to be assessed for the veracity thereof and possible corrective measures need to be

implemented to maintain taxpayer morality and confidence;

AND WHEREAS deterioration in revenue collection, transparency of, and fairness in tax

administration present a threat to fiscal sustainability, service delivery to the public and the

continued deepening of our democratic gains,

THEREFORE a Commission of Inquiry (the Commission) is hereby appointed in terms of

section 84(2)(f) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996.


1. The Commission must enquire into, make findings, report on and make

recommendations on the following:

1.1. The adequacy and legality of steps that SARS took, or failed to take -

1,1.1. in light of the revenue shortfalls, relative to the budgets announced on 24

February 2016 and 22 February 2017, to improve revenue collection,

including steps to change the timing oftax refunds;

1.1.2. in the management of tax and customs settlements, to ensure that the

settlement process was not compromised or selective having regard to

favouring (or discriminating against)-

1.1.2.1. a domestic prominent Influential person (as defined in section

1 of the FInancial Intelligence Centre Act, 2001);

1.1.2.2. an immediate family member (as contemplated In section

21 H(2) of the Financial Intelligence Centre Act, 2001) of a domestic

prominent influential person; and

1.1.2.3. known close associates of a domestic prominent influential

person;

(herein called "relevant personsa);

1.1.3. in the management of the audit case selection process. to ensure that the

case selection process was not compromised or selective having regard to

favouring (or discriminating against) relevant persons;

1.1.4. in the management of or participation in, investigations into any

malpractices or allegations of malpractices. whether SARS infonnation was

deliberately compromised by the omission or withholding of information that

the SARS leadership was aware was critical or necessary to ensure a fair

and transparent investigation:

1.1.5. in ensuring that criminal transgressions were not concealed or ignored

under the auspices of taxpayer confidentiality;

1.1.6. in ensuring that the Prevention and Combating of Corrupt Activities Act,

2004 (PRECA), Financial Intelligence Centre Act, 2001 (FICA), South

African Revenue Service Act, 1997 (SARS Act). Customs and Excise Act,

1964, the Tax Administration Act, 2011 and other applicable legislation


were fully adhered to in respect of information that was provided by the

Financial Intelligence Centre or was made available to the public;

1.1.7. in ensuring that all material matters affecting the credibility of SARS were

reported to the Minister of Finance and/or Parliament; and

1.1.8. in ensuring that performance bonuses to SARS employees in the senior

management structure of SARS, as contemplated in section 18(3) of the

South African Revenue Service Act. 1997. were duly authorised particularly

in the context of growing revenue shortfalls and the need for fiscal

prudence.

1.2. The influence of institutional factors on SARS' performance of its duties with

particular reference to the quality of decision making in audit selection, technical

capacity in auditing, technical capacity in tax and customs enforcement, technical

capacity in transfer pricing and illicit capital flows. oversight of mining rehabilitation

trusts or companies, payment of refunds, technical capacity in risk assessment and

inspections Including-

1.2.1. due consideration of the factors that must be taken into account in any

decision, approval or discretion exercised in terms of the Tax Administration

Act, 2011 and the Acts mentioned in Schedule 1 of the South African

Revenue Service Act, 1997;

1.2.2. whether material deviations occurred in the practice and protocols that

relate to these areas;

1.2.3. whether any abuse of such deciSion making powers took place and, if so

whether such abuse resulted in undue benefits to SARS' senior managers,

or any connected persons in relation to the aforementioned persons (in

these Terms of References, the term ~connected personsft means a

"connected person" as defined in section 1 of the Income Tax Act, 1962).

1.3. Whether the tax administrative processes to determine or detect compliance or

nonMcompliance of taxpayers with regards to the obligation to submit tax returns,

declare taxable income and settle tax liabilities or the tax administrative processes

to issue tax assessments, determine taxable income, enter into settlements,

reopen assessments and collect revenue resulted in any non-standard treatment of

any persons referred to in:


1.3.1. section 8(1 )(e)(i) of the Income Tax Act,1962;

1.3.2. section 18(3) of the South African Revenue Service Act,1997; or

1.3.3. any connected persons to the aforementioned persons.

1.4. Whether the process and practices to determine and enforce compliance by all

taxpayers in respect of goods indicated in Part 2A of Schedule 1 of the Customs

and Excise Act, 1964 resulted in intentional non-enforcement of laws in respect of

any taxpayers that resulted in loss of revenue to the State, Including the veracity of

reports In the public domain of collusion between SARS officials and Industry

leaders in illicit tobacco trade.

1.5. Whether SARS neglected to comply with applicable legislation and internal policies

regarding any appointment, employee grievance. disciplinary process, performance

bonus, termination of services and any changes made to the functions performed

in respect of senior SARS employees,

1.6. With regard to the reports of the number of senior or experienced SARS

employees that have left the employ of SARS since 2014, to inquire into the

reasons why they left, whether any employees were coerced in any manner into

reSigning; whether any severance benefits were paid to those employees; whether

there was any obligation to inform the Minister of Finance of these resignations and

severance benefits; and if such an obligation existed whether that obligation was

discharged.

1.7. Whether SARS followed due and proper process In the appointment of key

members of SARS staff. including members of EXCO.

1.8. Whether SARS acted responsibly in regard to its obligations to account to the

Executive, Minister of Finance and the Standing Committee on Finance within the

relevant areas;

1.9. Whether SARS, in the discharge of Its obligations to collect revenue utilised the

services of debt collection. legal, audit or forensic firms rationally. reasonably and

prudently and in accordance with its mandate and objectives.


1.10. Whether any SARS official. In utilising the services of any debt collection, legal,

audit or forensic firm influenced or attempted to influence the outcome of the

services rendered or the outcome of any report following the services so rendered.

1.11. Whether the post-2014 Large Business Centre function review lead to inefficiencies

and Ineffectiveness with specific reference to enforcement of compliance with

legislation giving effect to the international efforts of curbing base erosion and profit

shifting.

1.12. Whether the change in the operating model of SARS post 2014 contributed to

inefficiencies and ineffectiveness with particular reference to the revenue shortfall

in 2016/17 and 2017118.

1.13. Whether, having regard to any finn of consultants advising on the new operating

model. an obligation existed on the consultant(s) to demonstrate improvements in

efficiencies or cost saving or revenue collection or any other similar cast/benefit

obligation as may be set out in the terms of reference and I or contractual

obligations and, if so, whether this was proven.

1.14. Whether the current govemance and operating models of SARS is the most

effective and efficient model and, if not, make recommendations as to the most

suitable govemance and operational models fur SARS for the future:

1.15. Whether sections 49 to 57 of the Public Finance Management Act, 1999, were

complied with, In particular;

1.15.1. actions envisaged in section 51(1)(e) and (2). In relation to acts by senior

SARS employees that may have undermined internal control systems of the

SARS;

1.15.2. implementing the relevant recommendations and findings of the Auditor

General; and

1.15.3. implementing and enforcing procedures for the disclosure of financial

interests described in internal policies of SARS as they relate to SARS

employees that report to the Commissioner.


1.16. Whether any processes to award tenders, or awarded tenders resulted in any

undue benefrt being received by any SARS employee or any connected person to

the aforementioned employee or any person or entity that is not part of the tender

award.

1.17. Whether any legal proceedings or complaints instituted by SARS against other

state institutions(for example the Auditor-General). the media or any other person

for reasons that do not relate to their tax affairs were instituted for reasons that are

rational and in the best interest of SARS:

1.18. Whether any media statement issued by SARS, or any similar statement or

comment issued by any SARS official, whether in his or her official capacity or not,

during the period September 2014 until March 2018, brought SARS into disrepute

and I or contradicted the official position of the South African Government

2. The Commission must in its enquiry for the purpose of its recommendations consider the

period 1 April 2014 to 31 March 2018.

3. The Commission must submit interim reports in accordance with the following table:

I nterim report 30 September 2018

Final report 30 November 2018

4. The Commission may investigate any other SARS revenue administration, process or

governance matter the CommisSion considers necessary but those other investigations

may not cause any delay In the submission of the reports on the applicable dates

referred to in paragraph 3.

5. The Commission may request the advice or input of:

5.1. The South African Revenue Service

5.2. the Davis Tax Committee;

5.3. the Office of the Tax Dmbud;

5.4. the Financial Intelligence Centre;

5.5. the South African Reserve Bank;


5.6. the National Treasury;

5.7. any other person or organisation that is able to assist the Commission, including

taxpayers or professional bodies involved with tax affairs of clients.

6. The Commission must take into account in its recommendations the protection of the

State's current and future revenue; the characteristics of a good tax system, namely

equity. effiCiency, neutrality. certainty, transparency and buoyancy of the tax system;

trends in taxpayer compliance and the cost of compUance; and any recommendation by

the DaviS Tax Committee and tax policy framework determined by the National Treasury.

7 Regulations must be made in terms of the Commissions Act, 1947 and must apply to the

Commission in order to enable the Commission to conduct its work meaningfully and

effectively and to facilitate the gathering of evidence by conferring on the Commission

powers as are necessary, including the power to enter and search premises, secure the

attendance of witnesses and compel the production of documents and any other

required information.


PROKLAMASIE NO. 17 VAN 2018

deur die

President van die RepubJiek van Suid-Afrika

KOMMISSIE VAN ONDERSOEK NA BELASTING ADMINISTRASIE EN BESTUUR DEUR DIE SUID-AFRIKAANSE INKOMSTEDIENS

Ingevolge artikeJ 84(2)(f) van die Grondwet van die Republiek van Suid-Afrika, 1996,

stel ek hierby 'n Kommissie van Ondersoek na belasting administrasie en bestuur

deur die Suid-Afrikaans Inkomstediens (SAID) aan, met die opdrag 5005 hierby

aangeheg en stel ek hierby voormalige regter van die Hoogste Hof van Appel wat

van aktrewe diens ontslaan is, Sy Edele Regter Robert Nugent as Kommissaris aan,

en wie bygestaan word deur Meneer Michael Katz, Advokaat Mabongi Masilo en

Meneer Vuyo Dominic Kahla.

Gegee onder my Hand en die Seel van die Republiek van Suid-Afrika te ............... .

op hierdie .... dag van Tweeduisend-en-Agtien.

President

Op las van die President-in-Kabinet

Minister van die Kabinet


BYLAE

OPDRAG VAN DIE KOMMISSIE VAN ONDERSOEK NA BELASTING ADMINISTRASIE

EN BESTUUR DEUR DIE SUID-AFRIKAANSE INKOMSTEDIENS

NADEMAAL belasting 'n deurslaggewendebasis vorm vir 'n demokratiese regering. opgele

met die doel om die kostitusionele konstitusionele verpligtinge van die Regering te befonds,

met inbegrip van die voorsiening van openbare dienste vir alma I;

EN NADEMAAL die aansienlike inkomste tekort in twee opeenvolgende jare in 2016/17 en (

beraamvir) 2017/18 uitgewysis as deurslaggewende fiskale risikos en 'n faktor in Suid-Afrika

se kredietwaardigheid;

EN NADEMAAL opondhoudin BTW en ander terugbetalings deel vorm van In stelselmatige

beleid ten einde inkomste teikens te haal, met inagneming van die bevindings van die

Kantoor van die 8elasting Ombud;

EN NADEMAALdie publiek vertroue moet he dat die Suid-Afrikaanse Inkomstediens (SAID)

bestuur word met die hoogste standaard van etiek, integriteit en doeltreffendheid;

EN NADEMAALsekere gebruike in die belastingstelsel belastingpligtesse moraal en

vertroue ondergrawe het;

EN NADEMAAL administratiewe bepalings met betrekking totbelastinginvordering

deursigtig moet wees, en billik , sonder vrees of vooroordel toegepas word;

EN NADEMAAL berigte in die openbare domein, wat moontlikdie moraal van

belastingpJigtiges kan ondergrawe, beoordeelmoet word ten einde die geloofwaardigheid

daarvan te bepaal en moontlike regstellende maatreels ingestel moet word ten einde die

moraal en vertroue van belastingpligtiges te handhaaf;

EN NADEMAAL agteruitgang in belastinginvordering, deursigtigheid van, en billikheid in

belastingadministrasie 'n bedreiging inhou vir fiskale handhaafbaarheid, dienslewering aan

die publiek en die voortgesette versterking van ons demokratiese vordering,


DERHALWE word 'n Kommissie van Ondersoek (die Kommissie) hierby ingevolge artikel

84(2)(f) van die Grondwet van die Republiek van Suid-Afrika, 1996, aangestel.

1. Die Kommissie moet ondersoek instel na, bevindings maak, verslag doen en

aanbevelings maak, oor die volgende:

1.1 Die toereikendheid en regsgeldigheid van stappe wat SAID geneem het of versuim

het om te neem -

1.1.1 in die fig van inkomste tekorte, met betrekking tot die begrotings wat op 24

Februarie 2016 en 22 Februarie 2017 aangekondig was, om insameling van

inkomste te verbeter, met inbegrip van stappe om die tydstip van

belastingterugbetalings te verander;

1.1.2 in die bestuur van belasting- en doeane skikkingsreelings, om te verseker dat

die skikkingsproses nie onder verdenking was of selektief toegepas was nie,

met inagneming van die begunstiging van (of diskriminasie teen)-

1.1.2.1 'n binnelandse-vooraanstaande-invloedryke-persoon (soos omskryf in

artikel1 van die Wet op Finansiele Intelligensiesentrum, 2001);

1.1.2.2 'n onmiddellike familielid (soos beoog in artikeJ 21 H(2) van die Wet op

Finansiele lntelligensiesentrum, 2001) van 'n binnelandse-

vooraanstaande-invloedryke-persoon; en

1.1.2.3 bekende vertroude deelgenote van 'n binnelandse-vooraanstaande

invloed ryke-persoon,

(hierna "relevante persone" genoem);

1.1.3 in die bestuur van die ouditsaak keuringsproses, ten einde te verseker dat die

keuringsproses nie onder verdenking is of nie selektief toegepas is nie, met

inagneming van die begunstiging van (of diskriminasie teen) relevante

persone;

1.1.4 in die bestuur van of deelname in, ondersoeke na enige wanpraktyke of

bewerings van wanpraktyke, hetsy SAID se inligting doelbewus onder

verdenking geplaas wasdeur die weglating of weerhouding van inligting dat

die SAID se bestuur bewus was dat dit krities of noodsaaklik was om 'n billike

en deursigtige ondersoek, te verseker;

1.1.5 om te verseker dat strafregtelikeoortredings nie verdoesel of ge'ignoreer is

onder die vaandel van belastingbetalervertroulikheid nie;

1.1.6 om te verseker dat die Wet op die Voorkoming en Bestryding van Korrupte

Bedrywighede, 2004, die Wet op Finansiele Intelligensiesentrum, 2001


(FICA), die Wet op die Suid-Afrikaanse Inkomstediens, 1997, die Doeane- en

Aksynswet, 1964, die Wet op Belastingadministrasie, 2011 en ander

toepaslike wetgewing ten volie nagekom was met betrekking tot inligting wat

deur die Finansiele I ntelligensiesentrum verskaf was of aan die publiek

beskikbaar gestel was;

1.1.7 am te verseker dat aile wesenlike aangeleenthede wat die geloofwaardigheid

van SAID raak aan die Minister van Finansies en/of aan die Parlement

gerapporteer is; en

1.1.8 am te verseker dat diensbonusse aan SAID werknemers in die senior

bestuurskader van SAID, soos beoog in artikel 18(3) van die Wet op die Suid

Afrikaanse I nkomstediens, 1997, behoorlik gemagtig was, veral in die

same hang van groeiende inkomstetekorte en die behoefte aan fiskale

omsigtigheid.

1.2 Die invloed van institusionele faktore op die uitoefening van SAID se pligte, met

spesifieke verwysing na die gehalte van besluitnemings in ouditkeuring, tegniese

kapasiteit in ouditering, tegniese vermoeby die toepassing van belasting en doeane,

tegniese kapasiteit in oordragprys vasstelling en ongeoorloofdekapitaalstroming,

oorsig oar mynrehabilitasie trusts of maatskappye, terugbetalings, tegniese

kapasiteit in risiko skatting en inspeksies, met inbegrip van -

1.2.1 behoorlike oorweging van die faktore wat in in ag geneem moet word

in enige besluit, goedkeuring of diskresie wat ingevolge die Wet op

Belastingadministrasie, 2011 en die Wette wat in Bylae 1 van die Wet

op die Suid-Afrikaanse Inkomstediens, 1997 genoem word, uitgeoefen

word;

1.2.2 of wesenlikeafwykings plaasgevind het in die praktyk en protokols wat

verband hou met hierdie areas;

1.2.3 of enige misbruik van sodanige besluitnemingsbevoegdhede plaasgevind het

en, indien wei, of sodanige misbruik gelei het tot onbehoorlike voordele aan

senior bestuurders van SAID of aan enige verbonde persone ten opsigte van

die voormelde persone, (in hierdie Opdrag, beteken "verbonde persone" 'n

"verbonde persoon" soos omskryf in artikel 1 van die Inkomstebelastingwet,

1962).


1.3 Of die belasting administratiewe prosesse wat nakoming of nie-nakoming

deur belastingbetalers bepaal of vasstel met betrekking tot die verpligting om

belastingopgawes in te dien, om belasbare inkomste te verklaar en om

belastingverpligtinge te vereffen of die belasting administratiewe prosesse om

belastingaanslae uit te reik, om belasbare inkomste te bepaal, om skikkings

aan te gaan, om aanslae te heropen en om inkomste in te vorder, gelei het tot

enige nie-standaard behandeling van persone soos verwys in -

1.3.1 artikel 8(1 )(e)(i) van die Inkomstebelastingwet, 1962;

1.3.2 artikel 18(3) van die Wet op die Suid-Afrikaanse lnkomstediens, 1997;

of

1.3.3 enige verbonde persone aan die voormelde persone.

1.4 Of die proses en praktyke om nakoming deur aile belastingbetalers ten

opsigte van goedere aangedui in Deel 2A van Bylae 1 van die Doeane en

Aksynswet, 1964, vas te stel en toe te pas, gelei het tot die opsetlike nie

toepassing van wette ten opsigte van enige belastingpligtiges, wat verlies

aan inkomste vir die Staat tot gevolg gehad het, met inbegrip van die

geloofwaardigheid van berigte in die openbare domein betreffende

samespanning tussen SAID beamptes en industrieleiers in die onwettige

tabakhandel.

1.5 Of die SAID versuim het om te voldoen aan toepasJike wetgewing en

interne beleid rakende enige aanstelling, werknemer grief, dissiplinere

proses, diensbonus, beeindiging van dienste en enige veranderinge aan

die funksies verrig ten opsigte van senior SAID werknemers.

1.6 Met betrekking tot die berigte oar die aantal senior of ervare SAID

werknemers wat die diens van die SAID sedert 2014 verlaat het, om

ondersoek in te stel oar die redes waarom hulle gegaan het, of enige

werknemers op enige manier forseeris am te bedank; of enige

skeidingsvoordele aan daardie werknemers betaal is; of daar enige

verpligting was om die Minister van Finansies oor hierdie bedankings en

skeidingsvoordele in te lig; en indien sodanige verpligting bestaan het, of

daardie verpligting nagekom is.


1.7 Of die SAID 'n gepaste en behoorlike proses in die aanstelling van

sleutelpersoneellede in die SAID, met inbegrip van lede van die

Uitvoerende Komitee, gevolg het.

1.8 Of die SAID verantwoordelik opgetree het ten opsigte van die verpligting

daarvan om binne die toepaslike areas aan die Uitvoerende Gesag, die

Minister van Finansies en die Staande Komitee oar Finansies, verslag te

doen;

1.9 Of die SAID in die nakoming van die verpligting daarvan am inkomste in te

vorder, die dienste van skuldinvordering-, regs-, oudit- of forensiese firmas

rasioneel, redelik en omsigtig en ooreenkomstig sy mandaat en oogmerke,

gebruik het.

1.10 Of enige SAID beampte, in die gebruik van die dienste van enige

skuldinvordering-, regs-, oudit- of forensiese firma, die uitkoms van die

dienste gel ewer, of die uitkoms van enige verslag voortspruitend uit die

dienste sodanig gelewer, be"invloed het of gepoog het om dit te be"invloed.

1.11 Of die hersiening van die na-2014 Groot Sake Sentrum se funksies gelei

het tot ondoeltreffendhede en oneffektiwiteit met spesifieke verwysing na

die afdwinging van die nakoming van wetgewing wat uitvoering gee aan

internasionale pogings am basis erosie en winsverskuiwing aan bande te

Ie.

1.12 Of die verandering aan die bedryfsmodel van die SAID na 2014 bygedra

het tot ondoeltreffendhede en oneffektiwiteit met besondere verwysing na

die inkomste tekort in 2016/2017 en 2017/2018.

1.13 Of, ten aansien van enige konsultantefirma wat advies rakende die nuwe

bedryfsmodel gegee het, daar 'n plig op die konsultante gerus het om

bewys te lewer van verbeterings in doeltreffendheid of kostebesparing of

die invordering van inkomste of enige ander soortgelyke plig ten opsigte


van koste/voordeel soos in die opdrag en/of kontraktuele verpligtinge

uiteengesit mag wees en, indien wei, of bewys daarvan gelewer is.

1.14 Of die huidige bestuurs- en bedryfsmodelle van die SAID die mees

effektiewe en doelmatige modelle is, en indien nie, aanbevelings te maak

rakende die mees gepaste bestuurs- en bedryfsmodelle vir die SAID vir

die toekoms.

1 15 Of artikels 49 tot 57 van die Wet op Openbare Finansiele Bestuur, 1999,

nagekom is, in die besonder:

1.15.1 optrede soos beoog in artikel 51(1)(e) en (2), met betrekking tot

handelinge deur senior SAID werknemers wat interne

beheerstelsels van die SAID kon ondergrawe;

1.15.2 uitvoering van die tersaaklike aanbevelings en bevindinge van

die Ouditeur-Generaa[; en

1.15.3 uitvoering en toepassing van prosedures vir die

openbaarmaking van finansiele belange soos omskryf in interne

beleid van die SAID ten aansien van SAID werknemers wat

verslag doen aan die Kommissaris.

1.16 Of enige prosesse om tenders toe te ken, of toegekende tenders gelei

het tot die ontvangs van enige onbehoorlike voordeel deur enige SAID

werknemer of enige verbonde persoon aan die voormelde werknemer

of enige persoon of entiteit wat nie deel is van die tendertoekenning

nie.

1.17 Of enige geregtelike stappe of klagtes deur die SAID ingestel of gele

teen ander staatsinstellings (byvoorbeeld die Ouditeur-Generaal), die

persof enige ander persoon, vir redes wat nie verband hou met hulle

belastingaangeleenthede nie, ingestel of gele is vir redes wat rasioneel

en in die beste belang van die SAID is.

1 18 Of enige persverklaring deur die SAID uitgereik, of enige ander

soortgelyke verklaring of kommentaar deur enige SAID beam pte


uitgereik, hetsy in syof haar amptelike hoedanigheid of nie, gedurende

die tydperk September 2014 tot Maart 2018, die SAID in oneer gebring

het en I of 'n weerspreking was van die Suid-Afrikaanse Regering se

amptelike posisie.

2. Die Kommissie moet in sy ondersoek die tydperk 1 April 2014 tot 31 Maart

2018, vir doeleindes van sy aanbevelings, oorweeg.

3. Die Kommissie moet tussentydse verslae in ooreenstemming met die

volgende tabel voorle:

Tussentydse verslag 30 September 2018

Finale verslag 30 November 2018

4. Die Kommissie kan enige ander inkomste administrasie, proses of

bestuursaangeleentheid van die SAID wat die Kommissie nodig ag,

ondersoek, maar daardie ander ondersoeke mag nie enige vertraging

veroorsaak in die voorlegging van die verslae op die toepaslike datums in

paragraaf 3 genoem nie.

5. Die Kommissie kan die advies of bydrae van:

5.1 Die Suid-Afrikaanse Inkomstediens;

5.2 die Davis Belastingkomitee;

5.3 die Kantoor van die Belasting Ombud;

5.4 die Finansiele Inteliigensiesentrum;

5.S die Suid-Afrikaanse Reserwebank;

5.6 die Nasionale Tesourie; en

5.7 enige ander persoon of organisasie wat in staat is om die Kommissie

by te staan, insluitende belastingbetalers of professionele liggame wat

met belastingaangeleenthede van k[jente gemoeid is,

versoek.

6. Die Kommissie moet in sy aanbevelings, die beskerming van die Staat se

huidige en toekomstige inkomste; die eienskappe van 'n goeie


belastingstelsel, naamlik reverdrgheid, doeltreffendheid, neutraliteit,

sekerheid, deursigtigheid en veerkragtigheid van die belastingstelsel; neigings

in belastingbetalers se nakoming en dre koste van nakoming; en enige

aanbeveling deur die Davis Belastingkomitee en die

belastingbeleidsraamwerk bepaal deur die Nasionale Tesourie, in ag neem.

7 Regulasies moet ingevolge die Kommissiewet, 1947, gemaak word wat op die

Kommissie van toepassing moet wees ten einde die Kommissie in staat te

stel om sy werk betekenisvol en effektief te doen en die insameling van

bewyse te vergemaklik, deur aan die Kommissie die nodige bevoegdhede te

verleen, insluitend die bevoegdheid om persele binne te gaan en te deursoek,

die aanwesigheid van getuies te verseker en die voorlegging van dokumente

en enige ander vereiste inligting at te dwing.

Vol. 635 24 May 2018 Mei - Open Gazettes South Africa

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Transcript of Vol. 635 24 May 2018 Mei - Open Gazettes South Africa