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Human Securityin the Arab Region

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Hum

an Security in the Arab Region

Human securityin the Arab region

The authors are responsible for the choice and the presentation of the factscontained in this publication and for the opinions expressed therein, which arenot necessarily those of UNESCO, the League of Arab States (LAS) or theHuman Security Unit (HSU/OCHA) and do not commit these Organizations.

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Contents

List of acronyms

Introduction

1. Human security in the Arab regionANTOINE SFEIR

Introduction The state of play in the Arab region: the UNDP reports The essence of human security and its various aspects An overview of the threats to human security Challenges to human security in the Arab region Recommendations Select bibliography

2. Poverty eradication in the Arab region from a human security perspectiveATIF KUBURSI

Introduction Arab achievements and failures in poverty eradication Poverty-eradication policies in the Arab region Effective poverty-eradication policies Frameworks of the new policy: increasing growth

and pro-poor policies Conclusion and recommendations

3. The environment in the Arab region from a human security perspectiveBADRIA AL-AWADHI

Introduction

The position of Arab constitutions on the protection of the environment and human security

The human security perspective in Arab environmental legislation The Kuwaiti experience (1990–91)

The role of the environment in promoting human security (general recommendations)

4. Managing conflict and post-conflict situations in the Arab region from a human security perspectiveMOHAMED ABDEL SALAM

Introduction Current trends of armed conflicts in the Arab region Principal impacts of armed conflicts and post-conflict situations

on human security in the Arab region Conclusion: handling the consequences of armed conflict

and post-conflict situations on human security Annexes

5. Establishing democracy and human rights in the Arab region from a human security perspectiveABDALLAH SAAF

Introduction The significance of human security within the Arab context Human security and reformulating the security concept Human security and terrorism: combating terrorism

as a top priority The links between democracy, human rights and human security Towards a new relationship between human security, democracy

and human rights

Select bibliography

Biographical notes on the authors

AppendixFinal report of the Conference on Human Security in the Arab Region, Cairo, 15–16 December 2008

Acronyms

ABHS Advisory Board on Human Security, UNESCOAEF Arab Environment FacilityAFESD Arab Fund for Economic and Social DevelopmentAQIM Al-Qaeda in the Islamic MaghrebARCEL Arab Regional Centre for Environmental Law, KuwaitAWO Arab Women OrganizationCAMRE Council of Arab Ministers Responsible for the EnvironmentCBD Convention on Biological DiversityCERI Centre d’Études et de Recherches Internationales, Sciences Po, ParisCHS Commission on Human SecurityCITES Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species

of Wild Fauna and FloraCOSIMO Conflict Simulation Model (a database established by HIIK)CPA Comprehensive Peace Agreement (Sudan);

Coalition Provisional Authority (Iraq)DAL Droit au Logement, FranceEFA Education for AllESCWA Economic and Social Commission for Western AsiaEU European UnionFLASCO Latin American Faculty of Social Sciences, San José, Costa RicaGCC Gulf Cooperation CouncilGDP gross domestic productHIIK Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research, GermanyHSU/OCHA Human Security Unit of the Office for the Coordination of

Humanitarian AffairsICRC International Committee of the Red CrossICT information and computing technologyIDP internally displaced personIISS International Institute for Strategic Studies, LondonLAS League of Arab StatesLDCs Least Developed CountriesMAMAN Sudanese Human Security Initiative Organization

MARPOL 73/78 International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from ShipsMDG Millennium Development GoalNGO non-governmental organizationOECD Organisation for Economic Cooperation and DevelopmentOWFI Organization of Women’s Freedom in IraqPERSGA Regional Organization for the Conservation of the Environment

of the Red Sea and Gulf of AdenPLO Palestine Liberation OrganizationPSC protracted social conflictPVPV Propagation of Virtue and Prevention of Vice, IraqRBAS Regional Bureau for Arab StatesRHSC Regional Human Security CenterROPME Regional Organization for Protection of the Marine EnvironmentROWA Regional Office for West AsiaSMEs small and medium enterprisesSPLA Sudan People’s Liberation ArmySPLM Sudan People’s Liberation MovementTFG Transitional Federal Government, SomaliaUAE United Arab EmiratesUDHR Universal Declaration of Human RightsUNDG United Nations Development GroupUNDP United Nations Development ProgrammeUNEP United Nations Environment ProgrammeUNESCO United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural OrganizationUNTFHS United Nations Trust Fund for Human SecurityUSA United States of AmericaUSSR Union of Soviet Socialist RepublicsWHO World Health Organization

Introduction

The Human Security in the Arab Region1 project, jointly implemented by theLeague of Arab States (LAS), the Human Security Unit of the Office for theCoordination of Humanitarian Affairs (HSU/OCHA) and the United NationsEducational, Cultural and Scientific Organization (UNESCO), was launched as aconsequence of Arab interest in addressing emerging global challenges. In thiscontext, the League of Arab States has been highly involved in advancing an in-depth debate in the Arab region about such new challenges.

The issue of human security is considered one of these new global challengesfaced by the Arab region. On the one hand, there were doubts about using theconcept to advance certain agendas that do not necessarily serve Arab collectiveinterests. On the other hand, the concept is related to many interconnectedproblems that the Arab region is currently experiencing.

There has been ongoing discussion on the issue of human security in the Arabregion since 2001. Regional human security forums were held in Tunisia in 2001,at the League of Arab States Headquarters in Cairo in 2002, and in Jordan in 2003.In 2004 the League of Arab States hosted the launch of the Arabic version of thefinal report of the Commission on Human Security, Human Security Now. In thesame context, the years 2004 and 2005 witnessed intensive and comprehensivedebates within the League of Arab States about the need for reform in the Arabregion: these debates tackled a range of reform-related issues, among themdevelopment and human rights issues. In 2005 in Jordan, the League of Arab Statesparticipated in the International Conference on Human Security in the Arab States,which was jointly organized by UNESCO and the Regional Human Security Center(RHSC) at the Jordan Institute of Diplomacy. Government representatives from anumber of Arab and non-Arab states participated alongside NGO representativesand independent experts. The conference adopted a series of recommendations,

1 For the purposes of this project, the papers could follow the broad definition of human security asoutlined in the report of the Commission on Human Security, Freedom from Fear, Freedom fromWant and Freedom to Live in Dignity.

including one regarding the need to launch an in-depth dialogue on humansecurity in the Arab states through a high-level conference to be jointly organizedby the League of Arab States, HSU/OCHA and UNESCO.

Thus, the Human Security in the Arab Region project was conceived within thecontext of the Arab states’ determination to deal with emerging global challengesand to address the question of reform in the Arab region.

The project was funded by the United Nations Trust Fund for Human Security(UNTFHS),2 as part of the follow-up activities to the launch of the Arabic versionof the Human Security Now report and the 2005 UNESCO–RHSC Ammanconference.

The overall project goals were to:

• deepen the understanding and acceptance of the human security concept atthe policy and at the academic level in the region, as well as among civilsociety actors;

• improve human security in the Arab region through appropriate policy,analysis and strategic cooperation; and

• disseminate the human security concept in the Arab region.

Those goals were to be met through the different phases of the project. In thetheoretical preparation phase, five academic papers were prepared by prominentArab experts who discussed the threats, challenges and opportunities for humansecurity in the Arab region. They took into account the region’s specific political,economic, social and cultural context, as well as the outcomes of previous humansecurity initiatives in the region (the Declaration of the Arab Summit in Tunisiaon Development and Modernization; the launch of the Human Security Nowreport; UNESCO’s Promoting Human Security: Ethical, Normative and EducationalFrameworks in the Arab States3 by Bechir Chourou; and all the contributions madeby the participants in the 2005 UNESCO–RHSC Inter national Conference onHuman Security in the Arab States.4)

The above-mentioned papers include one background paper entitled ‘HumanSecurity in the Arab Region’ and four thematic studies respectively on poverty

2 See: http://ochaonline.un.org/TrustFund/TheUnitedNationsTrustFundforHumanSecurity/tabid/2108/Default.aspx3 http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0014/001405/140513E.pdf4 http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0015/001540/154030E.pdf

eradication; the environment; managing conflict and post-conflict situations; andestablishing democracy and human rights, which are all included in the presentpublication.

The core phase of the project was the organization of the joint LAS–HSU–UNESCOhigh-level Conference on Human Security in the Arab Region, which took placeat the League of Arab States Headquarters in Cairo on 15 and 16 December 2008.Participants included representatives from LAS Member States, several internationalexperts, and regional experts and representatives from national and regional civilsociety organizations, representatives of the League of Arab States specializedorganizations and some UN specialized agencies.

In line with the 2005 World Summit Outcome Document,5 in which ‘humansecurity’ and the ‘responsibility to protect’ agendas are clearly distinguished andseparated from each other, the conference concentrated solely and exclusively onthe human security issues in the region. It subsequently investigated the role ofgovernments in addressing emerging global challenges in their national prioritiesand plans from a human security perspective. The conference’s final report isincluded in the appendix to the present publication.

The authors of the four thematic papers were then asked to prepare policypapers that were more action-oriented and included concrete recommendationsto serve as tools for policy-makers and civil society actors. The policy papers arecollected in a second publication which complements the present book.

Both publications, printed in English, Arabic and French, will be widelydistributed to the relevant ministries of the Member States of the League of ArabStates, NGOs in the Arab region, specialized Arab organizations, and researchinstitutions and academies, as well as to Permanent Delegations to UNESCO,National Commissions for UNESCO, and so on.

As a follow-up to the Human Security in the Arab Region project, possiblefuture projects on human security in the region might be considered under thedirect guidance of the League of Arab States and its Human Security Unit –established within the framework of this project to supervise and implement allactivities carried out in this field – with possible support from the United NationsTrust Fund for Human Security (UNTFHS) and other relevant partners.

5 2005 World Summit Outcome Document (A/RES/60/1).

1. Human security in the Arab region

ANTOINE SFEIR

•Volume1E Bàt:Mise en page 1 03/09/10 11:08 Page13

Introduction

The Commission on Human Security (CHS) defines human security as theprotection of ‘the vital core of all human lives in ways that enhance human freedomsand human fulfilment’. Human security thus means protecting fundamentalfreedoms, without any field limitation. Human security is far more than the mereabsence of violent conflict. Unlike this negative definition, it encompasses humanrights, good governance and access to economic opportunities, education and healthcare. It includes not only protecting people from ‘critical and pervasive situations’,but also from any potential threat, as human security addresses both ‘freedom fromfear’ and ‘freedom from want’. Thus it promotes the political, social, environmental,economic, military and cultural systems that, when combined, give people the basisfor survival, a livelihood and dignity.

This rather new concept came into being in 1994 on the initiative of some UnitedNations agencies, including the United Nations Educational, Scientific and CulturalOrganization (UNESCO), in addition to several non-governmental organizations(NGOs), which all wished to extend the approach to security beyond the bordersof nation states; rather than the traditional ‘top-down’ procedure, they advocateda ‘bottom-up’ process that would put people, not states, at the core. They alsoconsidered that there had to be a more comprehensive and global approach topeople’s problems than the already existing agenda, such as human rights and accessto food or education, which, until then, had been dealt with as separate issues.

Some sixteen years on, the idea of human security has now come to beunderstood as a concept that focuses on populations rather than states, even ifstates are still essential, having a driving role in many respects. This new humansecurity approach is no doubt explained by the fact that peoples all over the worldfeel increasingly at odds with their own governments. This situation, to which theunipolar world contributes greatly, has unfortunately become widespread since


the collapse of the Soviet Union and at the same time the break-up of some nationstates on the basis of the sacrosanct principle of the self-determination of peoples.

In human security, the stress is on the link between respect for human rightsand international insecurity. It also involves protection from the impact ofeconomic crises. Military force alone cannot solve the problems of security; it istherefore necessary to develop the appropriate economic and social policies. Inthis sense, human security already includes and embraces human rights.

This is why, although it cannot only be explained by intra-state conflicts or ethnicwars, human security should be approached from the angle of insecurity, that is tosay the risks and threats to society (natural disasters, poverty, disease, etc.) whichendanger people’s lives on a daily basis. It can also be viewed in terms of solutions.Or else it may be approached from both angles, with a new vision, one that isdifferent from the traditional military/state-centric bias. These are the twoperspectives that will be considered in our two-pronged approach.

What is already clear is that the components of human security are above allinterdependent. Insecurity starts with feelings of fear produced by the uncertaintiesof daily life. All citizens require protection against illness, hunger and unemployment;the right to accommodation; access to education; the prevention of delinquency,criminality and social unrest, and also protection from the repression of their owngovernments. The strange thing is that these demands concern – admittedly, tovarying degrees – both rich and poor countries: illness and unemployment,delinquency and natural disasters are certainly not the preserve of poor countries.In every part of the world, these growing threats are facts of life. This is what giveshuman security a universal dimension.

Secondly, it must be recognized that the interdependence of the componentsof human security is both sectoral and geographic. A country with a hungrypopulation is admittedly more vulnerable to disease, but the neighbouringcountries then become vulnerable to that disease, whatever it is. And this pointdoes not relate only to disease: pollution is also contagious, and the same may, ofcourse, be said of drug trafficking and the breakdown of the state or the fabric ofsociety. Ethnic conflicts may no longer be confined within a country’s borders; theentire region may be contaminated. This interdependence was clearly highlightedin regard to the Arab world in the United Nations Development Programme(UNDP)’s Arab Human Development Reports for 2002, 2003, 2004 and 2005.1

Human security in the Arab region

1 For full details, see the bibliography.


The state of play in the Arab region: the UNDP reports

The conclusion of these reports drawn up by Arab experts from UNDP paints anextremely negative picture: stalled gross domestic product (GDP), shortcomingsin education, lack of prospects for an increasingly young population tempted byemigration, ignorance, the alienation of women and the lack of freedom – all ofthis makes the Arab world today a region from which some half of its young peopledream of escaping.

These UNDP reports, which tie in with our all-in approach to human security,looked at the 22 Member States of the League of Arab States (LAS), which todayrepresent more than 300 million inhabitants. The population is young (38 per centare under the age of 14) and poorly educated (65 million Arabs, i.e. nearly 1 in 4, areilliterate, and of these, 2 out of 3 are women). This increasingly urban populationwill grow steadily, exceeding 400 million people by the 2020s. It is mainly poor (1 Arabout of 5 still lives on less than US$2 a day) and often underemployed (12 millionunemployed according to a 1999 estimate, i.e. 15 per cent of the economically activepopulation, rising to 25 million in 2010 if current trends are maintained). Lastly, andimportantly, half of this population – women – is excluded from social, economicand political life.

This situation is leading to a regression that could have been avoided, since theregion has a rich history, culture, religion and traditions and a language shared byall its inhabitants – factors which should have enabled it to play a pivotal role inthe development of its economy and of its trade with the rest of the world, andincreased its political influence in a globalized world. The region is also rich in oiland raw materials. Nevertheless, it remains cut off from progress.

‘The Arab region might … be said to be richer than it is developed …’.2

Undoubtedly, this situation heralds another regression in the future, arising from theconjunction of demography, ignorance and poverty, when we consider that hardlyanything is being done today for the generation of tomorrow, which, poorly educatedand without any hope of employment, will populate the already overflowing cities.‘If you want to understand the milieu that produced bin Ladenism,’ wrote the NewYork Times leader writer Thomas Friedman, ‘read this report.’3

1. Human securityin the Arab region

2 UNDP, RBAS, 2002, Arab Human Development Report 2002.3 Thomas Friedman, 3 July 2002, Arabs at the crossroads, New York Times.


Unfortunately, neither the political classes in the Arab countries themselves northe leaders of Western countries seem to have read these reports: in the last twentyyears, per capita income growth in the countries of the League of Arab States hasbeen the lowest in the world (0.5 per cent), with the exception of sub-SaharanAfrica. Whereas the inhabitants of some developing regions have doubled theirincomes in a decade, the Arabs would need 140 years to achieve the same feat atthe present rate, according to UNDP. While productivity in other areas of the worldincreased rapidly between 1960 and 1990, it declined in the Arab world. In the1960s the Arab region’s per capita product was higher than that of Asia. Today,its twenty-two countries taken together represent no more than half the percapita GDP of the Republic of Korea. The aggregate GDP of the Arab region in1998 – $531.2 billion – was lower than that of Spain.

A decline of such proportions is not without consequences, one of which ispoverty: economic poverty, naturally, but also, and most particularly, ‘inequality ofcapabilities and inequality of opportunities’, as stressed by the authors of the reports.This poor performance is further aggravated by the mismatch between educationand the needs of the economy on the one hand and the rigidities of the labour marketon the other. Young people are the principal victims of these dysfunctions. Theauthors highlight an alarming trend: 51 per cent of the young people interviewed inthe survey expressed a desire to emigrate – ‘clearly indicating their dissatisfactionwith current conditions and future prospects in their home countries’.4

Reading these reports also raises the question of what has become of a regionthat was for centuries at the forefront of civilization, dominating the arts, poetry,astronomy, architecture and mathematics, while Europe remained for so long inthe Middle Ages. The Arab world has long sought to put the blame on others, fromthe Mongols to the French and British colonial powers, as well as the Turks andthe Jews. Today, however, a growing number of Arabs are looking at themselves, attheir governments and at the role of Islam in their societies for the cause of theirdecline. Yet it is first and foremost the ‘lack of freedom’ which lies at the root of allthe problems. Freedom has been characterized by Bernard Lewis as: ‘freedom ofthe mind from constraint and indoctrination, to question and inquire and speak;freedom of the economy from corrupt and pervasive mismanagement; freedomof women from male oppression; freedom of citizens from tyranny …’5


4 http://www.nakbaonline.org/download/UNDP/EnglishVersion/Ar-Human-Dev-2002.pdf, p. 30.5 Bernard Lewis, Jan. 2002, What went wrong?, Atlantic Monthly.


This lack of freedom was underlined when the publication of the third UNDPArab Human Development Report was almost cancelled. Its publication, initiallyplanned for October 2004, was delayed for nearly six months as its conclusionswere not to the liking of several governments in the region, and also particularlyto that of the United States of America, which had no qualms about remindingUNDP (which had commissioned the study) that it financed a quarter of itsbudget. Washington was especially annoyed by a part of the report (only one-tenthof the whole document) which unreservedly denounced the invasion andoccupation of Iraq and also the Bush administration’s support for Israeli policy.Some Arab countries, on the other hand, could not tolerate the criticism levelledat the shortcomings and excesses of their own regimes.

However, the authors (themselves of Arab origin) produced what was essentiallyan exhaustive and damning survey of the situation of freedoms and systems ofgovernance in the Arab world. They describe in particular how the concentrationof power in the hands of the region’s executives, whether monarchical, military,dictatorial or the result of presidential elections, has transformed the state into asort of ‘“black hole” which converts its surrounding social environment into asetting in which nothing moves and from which nothing escapes’. They alsodenounce the institutionalization of corruption and the reinforcement of the clansystem as factors of ‘passivity and obedience to authority, along with intoleranceof dissent’. A servile judiciary, a muzzled press, a lack of respect for freedom ofassociation and a fake multiparty system – there is no shortage of examples todescribe a situation whose main corollary is the lack of legitimacy of Arabgovernments, for whom the sole means of staying in power is repression, religioussectarianism or a clan-based system of patronage.

An explosive situation

Deploring the fact that Arab governments are in no hurry to reform, the authors ofthe report warn against the consequences that this attitude may well produce inmany countries of the region. They emphasize that maintaining the status quo – inother words, the shortcomings in development, internal repression and the laissez-faire attitude of foreign powers – could result in a worsening of the social conflictsin the Arab states.6 The Arab UNDP researchers do not shrink from highlighting,


6 http://www.geographie.ens.fr/sanmarco/cours5/PnudsommaireRDHA2004.pdf, p. 19.


in very clear terms, the risks of ‘chaotic upheavals’ and ‘armed violence’ whichwould inevitably accompany an uncontrolled transfer of power. This point is madeall the more forcefully as they consider that: ‘Nor would a transfer of power throughviolence guarantee that successor governance regimes would be any more desirable.’The crucial question of how such power can be transferred now arises. There canbe only one solution: a policy of quality education, ensuring the emergence of amiddle class nurtured by pluralism, if not democracy.

The Arab researchers at UNDP nevertheless note that the growing aspirationsof Arab populations for greater freedom and political change have not beenwithout consequences. The pressures exerted by Arab civil society, combined withthose from outside the region, have indeed enabled certain advances to be made:women took part in parliamentary elections in Oman for the first time in 2006;free, multiparty elections were held in Algeria in 1991; and in 2004 Moroccoadopted a Family Code that gives statutory protection to women’s rights. Recentchanges in the Arab world should also be taken into account, such as the electionsin the Occupied Palestinian Territories and in Iraq in 2005, the popular uprisingin Lebanon in the same year, and also the semblance of an opening-up announcedthe following year in Egypt.

The essence of human security and its various aspects

Human security may appear to be a subjective concept, since it is based on freedomfrom fear, freedom from want and freedom to live in dignity, three componentsthat rely upon individual perceptions. So what is involved is a deep, human anddynamic feeling, the product of a particular set of circumstances defined by bothsubjective and objective factors. Thus, the following considerations contribute tothe definition of human security.

The security of basic rights means the right to have a job, to have a source ofincome, to be free from poverty and want, to be able to meet one’s material needs,to have an education, etc. In the attempts to eradicate social injustice, criminality,and so on, state policy – particularly education policy – should be taken intoconsideration. Human security may be linked with the security of the state sincean economically strong state can more readily provide for its citizens’ basic needs.This is relative, however, as the emphasis today is on the growth of social injustice



and the uneven distribution of the fruits of development, particularly indeveloping countries.

Two points stand out clearly at this stage of the discussion. First, human securityis inseparable from the concept of justice. While justice may seem to be one of thesolutions to the problem of criminality, it is not in itself sufficient; criminal justiceentails social justice. However, globalization has heightened social disparitiesthroughout the world, and in the Arab region in particular. Poverty is gainingground even in countries that have many natural resources and are therefore rich.In May 2008 Portugal proposed that poverty be placed on the agenda of theEuropean Union (EU) as a crime against humanity.

Second, poverty is increasing as a consequence of the breaking down of socialties between members of society, which is why we should consider individual andcommunity security as one: people who are adversely affected become withdrawn,feeling rejected – sometimes legitimately so – by the natural environment, evenwithin an ‘asabīya (clan system), that indefinable bond that is stronger than blood,family and even tribal ties. They are then caught up in a spiral that can lead theminto extreme situations. The present author has personally seen schoolgirls fromthe mountain regions of Lebanon falling into the trap of prostitution in order tohelp their families.

Typical components of human security

As shown above, human security is above all inclusive: it starts and ends withpeople. What is new in this approach is the way that it is bound up with civilsociety, which, strangely enough, becomes the mainspring of human security. Thisprobably explains why the Arab region today is still relatively unfamiliar with thisconcept, since civil society does not exist in most Arab countries.

Basic human rights

Since it is widely accepted that eating and drinking are the two most basic humanrights, we are entitled to ask questions about the level of poverty that exists inthe Arab region. Arab society, which is tribal, based on clan and family, impliescast-iron solidarity, especially in the Maghreb and the tradition of the Maliki schoolof law; but how can it withstand the scourge of population growth, which oftengets the better of this intrinsic solidarity? Such solidarity also applies to shelter, but



this is still a matter of individual rather than institutional initiative: no Arabcountry has an association similar to Droit au Logement (DAL; Right to Housing),which defends the homeless in France. The easy way out is to argue that this ‘doesnot fit with the Arab mindset’! Yet it should be considered as one of the basichuman rights.

Among other typical components of human security are the following:

• Health security is governed by subjective factors, such as people’svulnerability to disease. Yet the existence of appropriate hospitals capable oftreating diseases and emergencies could reduce this feeling of insecurity.What is important here is a health policy that encompasses developmentrequirements, access to drinking water, decent sanitary conditions, and soon. Mention may be made here of the terminology of the World HealthOrganization (WHO), which refers to ‘Health for All’. Physical security isalso governed by objective factors, such as increased violence in society,which is itself linked to the growth of social injustice that can harm peopleboth physically and psychologically.

• Political security means that the individual feels safe from foreign attack,colonialism and physical or psychological political violence. In this regard,human security is closely linked to state security; indeed, examples aboundof people who, bereft of citizenship, fear rather than feel protected by the stateand simply withdraw from the political arena. It is natural in thosecircumstances for them to feel that they are no longer citizens.

• Intellectual and behavioural security means freedom of thought and choice,and above all the feeling that one is shown due consideration in that regardand that one’s integrity is not threatened because of a religious, ethnic orother difference. That means not being subjected to threats relating to thepractice of one’s religion, providing that it is not harmful to society.



An overview of the threats to human security

States against states, people against states

This situation is all too prevalent in the Arab region, when the struggle istransformed from one between states to one between peoples and their owngovernments. States often seem to forget that they are no more than an expressionof the nation.

People should not feel that there is a threat to their life, their physical integrity,their property, their honour, their dignity or their activities, for whatever reason,be it racial, religious, national or social status, cultural or ideological allegiance,and so on. Thus, human security means not being afraid for oneself or one’sproperty. This feeling of self-assurance is the product of internal well-being.A country’s citizens must be able to live in an environment that does not represent,in the short or medium term, a threat to life, long-term survival, the family andproperty.

The wars in Algeria, Lebanon and Iraq, the centrifugal Berber forces in Moroccoand Algeria, and the Shiite demands in the Arabian peninsula are all strikingillustrations not only of the fragmentation of an Arab space, but also of thesplintering within communities that has shattered the ‘asabīya and solidarityamong and within communities.

How is it possible, under such conditions, to safeguard and promote humansecurity and make it a means of reinforcing the fabric of society? This is anothernew aspect of the concept: ensuring, in peace and hope, genuine solidarity betweenindividuals. ‘By all the standards that matter in the modern world – economicdevelopment and job creation, literacy, educational and scientific achievement,political freedom and respect for human rights – what was once a mightycivilization has indeed fallen low,’ according to Bernard Lewis.7

All of these components converge on a single point, which we may term the‘renewable’ source of security. For the unit of analysis of human security is theindividual before the group. It is true that the security of an individual is closelylinked to that of groups of individuals and vice versa. Nor can we speak of one


7 Lewis, op. cit.


type of security. There are several different kinds: political, economic, social,physical, and so on. They are complementary, thus pointing towards the unitaryidea of overall security. The absence of any one component will undoubtedly giverise, whether directly or indirectly, to the instability of the system. In a word,security resembles an atom whose nucleus is human (physical) security, and theother forms of security then become electrons which spin around this nucleus.The loss of one of the electrons risks endangering the stability of the entire system.

Human security offers human beings an opportunity to live in a communitywithout threats to their physical or moral well-being. In a perfect world, securitywould be an assemblage whose various components, of differing dimensions,would all play a part in the design of the final picture, which, in this case, is humansecurity. We might also suggest that, since human security is a dynamic conceptevolving over time, it becomes more complex each time that a new threat appears.It is always the idea of respect for oneself and others, respect for life and profoundintegrity, that lies at the heart of human security.

What factor could be more conducive to ensuring human security thaneducation? Human security is itself an idea that covers political, cultural and socialfreedoms, the rule of law, democracy, dialogue, peaceful domestic and foreignpolicies, conciliation, sustainable development and cooperation, interdependenceand non-dependence, and above all, education. It is therefore essential to conducta real policy of acculturation and intellectualization with the active support andparticipation of the media. Governments must concentrate their efforts on peacefulsecurity to enable their populations – at home and abroad – to find the time andthe resources for proper instruction and education. Education and instruction arethe only long-term answers, together with a powerful ecological outreach.

Women’s struggle

The security of women in the Arab region provides a good illustration of whyhuman security, understood as behavioural security and protection from physicalviolence, is crucial. For women and children are the primary victims here. Althoughit was usual to hear of ‘crimes of honour’ in some parts of Jordan, the authoritieshave reacted quite strongly to prevent such abuses. It is now the turn of Iraq, wherethe war waged by the USA has unleashed all the negative forces that SaddamHussein’s authoritarian regime had kept under restraint.



As Zeina Zataari writes, Iraqi women’s organizations are drawing attention tothe escalating war against women in Iraq, aided by the widespread chaos andlawlessness caused by the US occupation.8 In addition to violence by US troopsboth inside and outside prisons, women in Iraq face daily violence from militantsunder the guise of religion and ‘liberation’.

In Iraq’s second largest city, Basra, a stronghold of conservative Shiite groups,as many as 133 women were killed in 2007 for violating ‘Islamic teachings’ and inso-called ‘honour killings’, according to the United Nations Office for theCoordination of Humanitarian Affairs. The brutal methods adopted are evidenceof a backlash by previously subdued tribal forces that have been unleashed by theoccupation: women are being strangled and beheaded, their hands, arms and legschopped off. As the US army in Iraq now funds both Shiite and Sunni tribal chiefsin an attempt to stabilize the country, women’s living conditions have becomemore life-threatening by the day. The Islamists have imposed new restrictions onwomen, including prohibitions on work, bans on travel without a muhram (maleguardian) and compulsory veiling. According to the Organization of Women’sFreedom in Iraq (OWFI), established in Baghdad in 2003, women are harassed onthe streets of most Iraqi cities, in educational institutions and in the workplace.Now there are even ‘no woman zones’ in some southern cities controlled by theIslamists and tribal chiefs.

‘Honour killings’ of Iraqi women are justified by allegations of promiscuity oradultery. In fact, the practice targets women who have pursued a higher education,holders of PhDs, professionals, political activists and office workers. According toAmnesty International’s 2007 report, ‘Politically active women, those who did notfollow a strict dress code, and women human rights defenders were increasinglyat risk of abuses, including by armed groups and religious extremists.’ 9 A seniorpolice official in Basra has reported that as many as fifteen women are killed everymonth in the city. Ambulance drivers in Basra, paid to ‘clean the streets’ beforepeople go to work, pick up a growing number of dead women every morning.

Ironically, the forces leading this assault on women had practically no powerunder Saddam Hussein, but after the US-led invasion in 2003, southern Iraq wasopened to forces known as the Propagation of Virtue and Prevention of Vice (PVPV),


8 C:\Documents and Settings\c_maresia\Local Settings\Temporary Internet Files\OLK73\the-war-against-iraqi-women (3).htm9 Amnesty International Report 2007, 2007, London, Amnesty International.


militant gangs and individuals committed to archaic Islamic laws and thesuppression of women’s rights. Some members of these groups now serve ingovernment, others in militias or as self-appointed vigilantes or hired killers. Thegoal of the PVPV is to confine women to the domestic sphere and to end all femaleparticipation in society and in public and political life. This topic is taboo: the newIraqi leaders have been unwilling to tackle, or even discuss, the problem of escalatingviolence against women. What role is being played by the USA, which, under theGeneva Convention, is responsible for protecting the civilian population in anoccupied country?

Two measures are urgently needed. First, the Iraqi Government mustimmediately establish ‘protection of women’ security patrols in Iraq’s southerncities. These patrols must receive gender-sensitive training and give women’ssecurity precedence over tribal values or religious fundamentalism. Second,pursuant to its obligations under the Geneva Convention, the USA mustimmediately take steps to protect the lives and freedoms of Iraqi civilians.Otherwise, it must withdraw from Iraq because the occupation is merely sustaininga seedbed of violence against women.

It must not be forgotten that Arab women have repeatedly safeguarded theircountry’s social fabric. In Lebanon, ever since the 1975 civil war, women have beenmobilized and have joined associations in the front-line battle to prevent drugsfrom spreading to combatants and young people. As the web of associations hasgrown, Lebanese women have stepped into the breach to replace the men who havegone abroad to work, and have thus sustained districts, cities, villages and entireregions through new ties of solidarity. In Algeria, too, women have formed a solidfront against the Islamists. In Tunisia, women in business constitute 10 per cent ofthe country’s top executives. Yet women remain, if not a target, second-class citizensin most Arab countries.

Quality education

Access to education, particularly quality education, raises certain questions: firstand foremost, the relationship to ‘unrepresentative’ governments. For this epithetcould be applied to all the countries in the Arab-Islamic region with the notableexceptions of Lebanon, Morocco and Tunisia. Authoritarian governments rarelysee any point in providing compulsory quality education for all their citizens,fearing that it might become a breeding ground for the opposition. The example




of Tunisia is instructive in this regard: the core of the opposition is recruited fromthe middle class, itself a product of the system.

The provision of education is of fundamental importance. In this connection,mention should be made of the Education for All (EFA) movement, a genuine globalcommitment to providing quality basic education for all children, young people andadults. This movement was launched at the World Conference on Education for All(Jomtien, Thailand, 1990). Ten years on, at which time many countries were far fromachieving the goal that had been set, the international community met again inDakar, Senegal, and reaffirmed its commitment to achieve EFA by the year 2015. Sixmajor goals were identified in the field of education to meet the learning needs of allchildren, young people and adults by 2015. As the lead agency for the movement,UNESCO is mobilizing and coordinating the international efforts to achieve the EFAgoals. Governments, development agencies, civil society, NGOs and the media areonly some of the partners working towards the achievement of these goals.

Unfortunately, their task is far from easy: one need only glance at the textbooks incertain Arab countries to see the extent to which children are still exposed to sheerbrainwashing. Without pointing to any particular system or regime in the Arab world,an overview of curricula and textbooks suffices to reveal the mediocrity of educationalprovision and the disparity, if not divergences, among the countries of the region. Themost dangerous factor in this regard is still the pride of place given to religion. Theintention here is not to deny the beneficial role of faith and religion in the individual’smoral and ethical education. On the contrary, religious guidance helps people to resistthe commercial temptations of the world in which we live; the point is not to confusereligion with faith, but to enable religion to adapt to modernity.

In this sense, Islamism has become a drag and a danger: a drag on modernityand a danger for human security, for every time in the history of humanity thatpeople have taken possession of God and claimed to speak in God’s name, theresult has been a catastrophe.

Exclusion, discontent and the rise of Islamism

How can we explain the fact that Islamists are chalking up undisputed successesall over the Arab region, in more or less free elections? In Palestine, Hamas wonan absolute majority in the 2006 legislative elections; in Egypt, the MuslimBrotherhood made an unprecedented breakthrough in elections to the People’sAssembly in 2005. Even in Saudi Arabia, they carried off the municipal elections


in May 2005, the first in the history of the kingdom. In Bahrain, Qatar andKuwait, things are no different. Does this mean that the populations of all thesecountries subscribe unreservedly to the views of those who wish to establishsharī‘a (Islamic law) and Islamize the social, economic and political domains?For this is the real purpose of Islamism today.

The use of such terms as fundamentalism and Islamism gives rise to controversyand confusion, particularly in the case of the fundamentalist movements in Islam. Inthe dictionary,10 the word ‘Islamism’ means ‘Muslim religion’, on a par with Judaismand Christianity, whereas in political terminology it has become synonymous withfundamentalism or even terrorism. Islamism (or Muslim fundamentalism) can bedefined as a politico-religious ideology which seeks to establish an Islamic stategoverned by sharī‘a and to reunite the umma (the Islamic community) withoutborders. However, this relatively simple definition covers a complex situation, underconditions which vary from country to country and from one ideological current toanother (the Sunni Muslim Brotherhood, the Tabligh, and so on). Moreover, Islamisttendencies oscillate between a literal adhesion to tradition and an aspiration to renewalthrough reforms or revolutionary situations.

Here we must ask why Islamism apparently only appeared in the twentiethcentury or whether, in fact, it existed before. Islamism in its present sense was bornwith Islam; it naturally became the spiritual heir to the Hanbali school of law inthe ninth century, whose doctrine could be summed up in the phrase: ‘After theProphet, nothing new.’ The Hanbali tradition was handed down over the centuriesby outstanding theologians such as the Syrian Ibn Taimiyya in the fourteenthcentury. However, the twentieth century produced the first break in continuity:when the Ottoman empire was dismantled in 1922, France and Britain weredetermined to establish nation states in the region – although it had always beena part of vast empires – and to establish borders where none had existed sincepharaonic times. Muslim groups protested against the division of the umma andrejected these new borders. They also rose up against the tutelary or mandatorypowers. In response, the Western powers simply pressed ahead with the emergentdivisions and, as explained below, exploited Islamist movements against thisnationalism, which endangered their position.

To understand this development fully, however, it is necessary to look moreclosely at the words used. What is the link between Islam and Islamism? The feat


10 Dictionnaire Robert, 1985, Paris, p. 1035.


achieved by the fundamentalists has been to sow confusion in people’s minds byconflating the two terms.

Existing in the guise of many nationalities and drawing inspiration from variousdoctrines, radical Islam also assumes several forms in its struggle. In simple terms,there are two different methods. On the one hand, some Islamists seek to assertthemselves within the Muslim community, promoting a popular challenge to theestablished authorities: this is Islamization from the grass roots. Others set theirsights more directly on taking power at the highest state level: this is Islamizationfrom above.

Grass-roots Islamism (anti-establishment activity)

At this level, too, the challenge to the establishment may take different forms. It maybe located within the state itself, although those gravitating to al-Qaeda have shownthat this territory can lose much of its significance. Inside the state, the conditionsconducive to the emergence of Islamism are exclusion and poverty. In the face ofsuch afflictions, religion has the advantage of giving a meaning to life, helping peopleto recover the dignity denied them as they cope with social problems and racistcontempt. Thus it is easier for Islamists, in such a context, to attract those outsidethe social mainstream to an assertive form of radicalism. In the words ofAbdelwahab Meddeb, this movement is the Islam of ‘resentment’.11

In the West, it is the population of immigrants and those of immigrant originwho are the first to hear the siren call of Islamic rhetoric. It is easy for theirdefenders to introduce themselves as ‘big brothers’ although most of them haveno experience of poverty and come mainly not from the Maghreb but from theArabian peninsula. Their aim is to generate hatred by using to advantage theconcept of the ‘clash of cultures’. By exploiting the difference between ‘us’ and‘them’ in this way, they create the conditions for extending their influence in thecommunity thus formed.

The development of immigrants’ demands in France is significant. In the 1980s,the demands were mainly concerned with the ‘right to work’. Starting in the 1990s,however, with the arrival of foreign Islamists – a small but very skilful minority – thedemands have come to focus on a new issue: the ‘right to be different’. Behind thisinnocuous expression lie all the ideas for challenging the society in which Muslims


11 A. Meddeb, 2003, The Malady of Islam, New York, Basic Books.


live. They are no longer legitimate demands for integration, but rather for therejection of the Other, questioning republican and secular principles in the guiseof a simple request for recognition.

The example of the veil is typical: it represents both the religion and membershipof the community, two issues that are clearly controversial in Western societies. Inevery instance, radical Islam presents itself in terms of a reaction. In L’Islam desjeunes,12 Farad Khosrokhavar shows what this radicalism offers the young peopleof the suburbs: an outlook which enables them to interpret positively a state ofaffairs that is hostile to them. Similarly, in Germany, Turkish nationals have formeda minority ethnic group in reaction to the concept of German nationality.

There is a similar dynamic in the Muslim world. Islam is being politicized and,in this process of exploitation, often radicalized and hence deformed. LaetitiaBucaille has focused on the case of Palestine. In her book Growing Up Palestinian:Israeli Occupation and the Intifada Generation,13 she explains the importance of thecontext: Islam is used to rally people to the cause of resistance to the Israelioccupation. This form of exploitation is a response to two failures: the failure ofthe nationalist cause as such and the failure of the state. The figure of the martyris given great importance in this daily struggle in which the population feelscompletely abandoned. The young are indoctrinated, and this is easily done, as thefuture appears to hold no decent prospects. The second (or al-Aqsa) intifada(intifada means ‘uprising’) in 2000 was unquestionably more radical than the firstin 1987. It was also clearly Islamized.

The case of al-Qaeda presents another form of this challenge. Its strength liesin ‘deterritorialization’, for al-Qaeda – which is often described as a nebulousgrouping – is an organization that ignores geographical and cultural borders. AsOlivier Roy explains, ‘What is new in the transfer of Islam to the West is itsdissociation as a religion from any particular culture.’14 Each individual approachesit in his or her own way to the point that even jihād (holy war), a collective duty,has become an individual injunction. In other words, each person invents his orher own religiosity on a ‘do-it-yourself’ basis.


12 F. Khosrokhavar, 1997, L’Islam des jeunes, Paris, Flammarion.13 L. Bucaille, 2006, Growing Up Palestinian: Israeli Occupation and the Intifada Generation, Princeton,N.J., Princeton University Press.14 O. Roy, 2006, Globalized Islam: The Search for a New Ummah, New York, Columbia UniversityPress.


Religion for everyone must be made as simple as possible. Western technology,the Internet in particular, ensures that it is broadcast to the entire world or‘globalized’. Roy stresses the links between neo-fundamentalism and globalization,although the Islamist movement criticizes the latter. Hence, the aim is no longer toconquer the state or any particular territory, but rather to go beyond the bordersmarked out by Western colonial history in order to convince each individual. By a‘trick of history’,15 deterritorialization, together with individualization, has producedthe ‘globalization’ of Islam, a ‘globalized Islam’. A sign of its transnational characterand detachment from any particular culture is that this form of Islam has found itsplace in the West. This can be seen from the profiles of those who perpetrated theattacks of 11 September. In this connection, Roy outlines the extent to which liberalsocieties offer opportunities for the development of this neo-fundamentalism, farfrom the considerable constraints present in Muslim states. Dwelling at some lengthon al-Qaeda, Roy demonstrates how different this movement is from Islamism andthe extent to which it lacks a political strategy. For the attacks of 11 September arenothing more than a demonstration of force, a challenge based on the model ofrevolutionary movements such as the Baader-Meinhof Group, for example, devoidof specific political demands.

Islamization from above (the taking of power)

Islamization from above involves the overthrow of the established government,whether by revolutionary means or through elections. Movements which seek totake power directly differ from those considered above in that they do not seek tointervene in the affairs of the population. If they all seek some form of power,they differ by virtue of the means employed to achieve it: asserting themselveswithin society or reaching the highest level of the state. It is this latter case thatconcerns us here.

The sociological base of the Islamist movements that seek to take power is suchthat they find in the middle and poorer classes a most attentive audience.Frequently disappointed by modernizing revolutionary governments which haveleft no place for them, in spite of their promises, the populations of these countriesare looking for change. Moreover, faced with the radical message of an Islampresented as pure and representing a return to basics and to morality, many


15 Ibid.


individuals feel guilty about abandoning their faith and their roots, and allowingthe persecution of staunch, faithful Muslims. In the end, such people represent aconsiderable mobilizing force.

Gilles Kepel shows how the seizure of power is based on the mobilization ofthree distinct social classes.16 Poor urban youth, the pious middle class and thereligious intelligentsia are, for Kepel, the categories of the population which, oncerallied to the same cause, are capable of overthrowing the established authorities.

Political Islam revives the idea of a return to a unitary Muslim state as the basisfor regional reconstruction in many Muslim countries. The foremost thinkers herewere Jamal ad-Din al-Afghani (d. 1897) and Rashid Rida (d. 1935), who defendedthe restoration of the caliphate. The Muslim Brotherhood draws inspiration fromtheir theories. The social reform for which it calls is constructed, like the philosophyof these leading thinkers, in reaction to the West. For example, the zakāt (percentageof their income that all Muslims are required to contribute for the good of thecommunity), which is a religious duty and one of the five pillars of Islam, shouldbe a means of resisting the unjust capitalist system.

In contexts where the population is dissatisfied with the established governmentand has no means of expressing itself, political Islam presents itself as an alternative.It usually occupies the space left vacant by the established authorities. In this typeof situation, Islamists have little difficulty in presenting themselves as a betteralternative than the corrupt and incompetent leaders. Indeed, in most cases,Islamism provides a way of actively opposing the authorities, and not just takingtheir place where they are found lacking. Its language then takes on a flavour thatis political rather than religious, and enables it to mobilize the populationsoppressed by governments that are disinclined to respect human rights, in theforefront of which is freedom of expression. The mosque becomes the locus of freespeech and of a challenge to the current leadership. As the principal victims of stateoppression, Islamists are in the vanguard, defending the very rights trampled onby Arab governments. For similar reasons, Islamists appear as democrats: this isvery much in their interest. Yet this certainly does not mean that, once in power,Islamists uphold fundamental freedoms more consistently than others; they merelycampaign for those rights under regimes that do not tolerate them.


16 G. Kepel, 2002, Jihad. The Trail of Political Islam, Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press.


A standard profile?

Although there is no ‘standard profile’ of Islamists today, an analysis of thesituation enables us to conclude that certain population groups are prime targetsfor radical rhetoric. We have seen that the authoritarianism of most regimes inMuslim countries, together with corruption and incompetence, in a context ofpauperization, are factors of frustration that are likely to encourage individuals inthe direction of violent activism. The poor and the young are a precious labourforce for the struggle, and the middle classes represent a valuable source of supportfor accession to power, while the most privileged groups help to provide thenecessary finance. Yet even if the Islamist message is found appealing, the violentmethods employed are only rarely accepted by the population. This point needsto be emphasized, and it should be borne in mind that Muslims are the first victimsof attacks carried out by Islamists. Hence, although we have identified theconditions necessary for the expansion of Islamist movements, we mustnevertheless point out that such expansion remains limited, and that there is stilla great deal of resistance among the populations in the Arab region, even whenthey exhibit the characteristics previously described.

In other words, and to put the matter more clearly, there are many individualsin the Muslim world who hearken to the radical sirens, but there are very few whooffer them unconditional support. In the face of a closed-off regime, Islamismmakes it possible to challenge authority, and this is often its sole attraction forsociety. The example of Palestine is striking in this regard. Under Israeli occupationand with no prospects other than a worsening of the deadlock, Palestinians votedfor Hamas in the 2006 legislative elections. Yet, at the same time, surveys clearlyindicate opposition to all terrorist acts against civilians. Seen in this light, theelection of Hamas does not indicate an acceptance of terrorism, but, rather, thepopulation’s use of a violent group to challenge the established authorities, aspeople had been unable to make themselves heard in any other way.

Hamas as a typical example

The Muslim Brotherhood has long been present in Palestine. The brother of Hasanal-Banna was the leader of this ‘offshoot’, which was particularly influential in theGaza Strip bordering Egypt. It became official in 1939, and remained so when theother Palestinian political movements were forced underground by the Israeliconquest of the territory. In spite of this, the Palestinian branch of the Muslim



Brotherhood was not immune from internal conflicts from the beginning of the1950s, and violence was used to persuade some members to dissociate themselvesfrom a strategy favouring compromise with the authorities.

At the start of the 1980s, the model of the Islamic revolution in the IslamicRepublic of Iran, together with the expulsion of the Palestine LiberationOrganization (PLO) from Beirut, created the conditions for a genuine Palestinianform of Islamism to assert itself. Until then, nationalism had flirted with thesemore religious tendencies before deciding to oppose them. At present, Islamism isalmost fashionable. It exists in and of itself, and no longer in relation to the stateor the nation. Thus, Islamic Jihad was established in 1980. Seven years later, whenthe first intifada broke out, Sheikh Yasin created Hamas (which means ‘enthusiasm’and is also an acronym for the Islamic Resistance Movement). At the outset, theorganization enjoyed Israeli support: Israel closed its eyes to the financial aidprovided to the movement by Saudi Arabia. Hamas was seen as a counterweightto the PLO, which was by then a political force to be reckoned with. Indeed, Israelattributed all terrorist acts to the PLO and thus accused it of undermining thepeace efforts. Yet it was Hamas that torpedoed the Oslo peace process by carryingout numerous suicide operations in Israel.

Israeli support did not last long, however, and repressive measures were soonintroduced: the leaders of Hamas became targets for Israeli governments driven bya shocked public opinion. This war only increased the attraction of Hamas for asection of the Palestinian population, and particularly for the youngest, for whomHamas activists were heroes resisting the Israeli occupation. Persecution madeHamas thoroughly legitimate. Moreover, the failure of the Oslo peace process hasworked to the movement’s advantage and weakened the signatories, who aredeemed guilty of accepting too many futile compromises and, ultimately, increasingthe Palestinians’ humiliation.

With the second intifada in 2000, Hamas became more radical. Whereas it wasnot very active during the intifada, the movement was definitely active in carryingout spectacular suicide attacks, which left their mark on international opinion. Inso doing, it lost some of its original support. Violence against civilians is onlysupported if it succeeds in wringing concessions from the enemy. But this is hardlythe case: Israeli repression of the Palestinians has constantly increased, with Israeliselecting the most radical politicians in a bid to stop the violence. And while thevicious circle of violence and repression continues, the two camps are merelyweakening each other.



Hamas’ only chance is the political deadlock in which the PLO finds itself. Aswith a pair of communicating vessels, Hamas absorbs those who are disillusionedwith the PLO. And there are many such people. First, because the policy ofcompromise has not led to any progress, Israel remains inflexible, and the onlychanges of strategy that appear to benefit the Palestinians are actually the productof clever calculations of advantage. Thus, Israel’s withdrawal from South Lebanonand, more recently, from the Gaza Strip were decisions made with a view toorganizing colonization more effectively in other areas, in the West Bank. Gaza,since the much-hyped evacuation, has been the target of almost constant armedIsraeli attacks. The second reason is that the PLO has also been sapped by internalstruggles and corruption.

These were the circumstances under which Hamas won the legislative electionsin 2006. It thus reaped the rewards for its work at the grass-roots level. In Gaza,particularly, the movement is buoyed up by its social work among a populationhit by unemployment. Hamas thus has an image of integrity, far removed fromthe clientelism and secret accounting of Fatah. However, as a result of the violencefor which Hamas continues to be responsible, it has been ostracized by theinternational community and subjected to financial suffocation such that it hasbeen obliged to revert to a political compromise, alongside Fatah. In short, thisexperience of power represents a turning point for the movement, and whatappeared to be a success has ultimately proved to be an ordeal.

Challenges to human security in the Arab region

This section will highlight the development of civil society in some parts of theArab-Muslim world. The 1975 civil war in Lebanon enabled civil society to exist,to develop a structure and to act. Legal provisions governing associations have thusdeveloped in a context where representation has broken down, as indicated above.In 90 per cent of instances, these associations have been established (as statedabove) by women, in spite of the distinctly unfavourable political conditions.Mention could also be made of the women of Algiers, who stood up againstterrorism and Islamism during Algeria’s darkest years. Women have played aparticularly prominent role in the Arab region, both as political activists and asmothers.



�•Another fundamental point to be taken into account here, clearly linked tothe above, concerns the rights of the child. The Arab region has no legislationon children’s rights. Children’s rights means family planning and relationswith the family, and so on. However, Islamic fundamentalists do not acceptfamily planning.

• Consideration must be given to free and pluralist information, and to the roleof the media in forming critical, free and informed opinion. Without it, therecan be no human security. Freedom and responsibility are the two keywordshere.

• Another area that deserves study is the relationship of the Arab-Muslim worldto other forms of fundamentalism: Christian, Jewish (Lubavitch), Americanevangelicals and the impact of their statements in the Arab-Muslim world(Algeria, Palestine, etc.).

• ‘Model’ and Western borrowing: tolerance, which is often presented as theinvariable solution to all problems is, at best, no more than a stopgap. Itamounts to accepting the Other, for lack of anything better. In what sense isthis desirable? Can it really be considered as a step forward, as progress? Thisis no more than a Western term with strong neo-colonialist connotations.How then can a language be invented for the Arab-Muslim world thatexpresses its identity, its expectations, its structures and its policies withoutnecessarily offending other parts of the world, working within it to promotehuman security in all its forms?

• The phenomenon of globalization, which is today essentially industrial andeconomic, hampers human security and takes no account of the ‘human’dimension of security. More consideration is given to the stabilization of bankbalances than to the well-being of individuals.

• Poverty: what is the relation of Africa to the Arab-Muslim region in thisregard? The case of Tunisia is paradoxical: a country with no natural resourceshas, at the same time, the highest per capita GDP in North Africa.

• Inter-integration/the issue of immigration: in Kuwait, the bidūn, or ‘peoplewithout [identity papers]’, represent 30 per cent of the population. Thenthere is the case of the Ghanaian immigrants in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya,and Egypt. Also noteworthy are the persistent attempts to emigrate by NorthAfricans suffering from high unemployment and seeking a way out on theother shore of the Mediterranean. The population of North Africa will soonreach 100 million, a not inconsiderable figure and one that needs to be taken



into account when education, social, cultural and economic policies aredrawn up.

• Successful integration in Western countries: some 800,000 professionals ofNorth African origin live and work in France. Immigration also has itssuccesses. As an example of an absence of migratory flows, there are very fewSyrians in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya and vice versa. The same situationapplies between Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia. The reason is politics. Theonly migratory flow is that of Palestinians: here, the phenomenon of ‘sealeddestinies’ results in the cutting-off of societies.

• Corruption and clientelism: how to combat these plagues which perpetuatethe breakdown in representativeness? Moral, ethical and physical integrity –which is indispensable for human security – is thus directly affected.

• Violence: its various forms, perpetrators and consequences.• The environment: states and nations must take clearly into account the

preservation of their countries’ natural heritage and the rational andreasonable use of available resources. This requires the implementation of anincisive awareness-raising policy and related development and planningstrategies.

• Perception of the Other: what kind of education is offered in Arab andMuslim countries? What kind of young people are wanted? What view isprovided of other states, and of non-Arab-Muslim denominations (here theissue of school textbooks is of particular relevance)?

It is not a question of criticizing any particular country; while incidents in Algeriamay be totally unacceptable, they must be placed in their sociological context, orseen within the perspective of the power struggle in the country. The basicprinciples of freedom of thought and speech inherent in human security mustnonetheless be redefined.



Recommendations

• Access to education: all citizens should be assured of a basic minimumeducation that introduces them to their history and culture, and to theirenvironment, in addition to that of other cultures, other parts of the worldand other religions. The purpose of this indispensable knowledge andinstruction is to meet their basic requirements, and to contribute to their well-being and that of the community.

• Access to health services: clearly, all human beings desire good health andconsider disease as an attack against and a threat to their safety and survival.

• Access to remunerative and income-generating activities: in order to meettheir basic needs (food, housing, etc.), people need an income, and in order toobtain it, they must engage in a productive activity. Appropriate conditionsmust therefore be established, in terms of infrastructure, rules and training, toprovide everyone – men and women alike – with an opportunity to performan income-generating activity.

• Citizens who are unable to meet their basic needs by their own efforts shouldreceive public assistance. In particular, vulnerable groups such as children, theelderly, the disabled, the chronically ill, and people living in isolated or remoteareas are entitled to particular attention. If states are unable to provide themwith assistance, the international community should intervene to support suchpersons.

• The concept of human security and the values underpinning it, such assolidarity, openness, dialogue, transparency, responsibility, justice and equity,should be incorporated at all levels of education. The media, in particularradio and television, should be mobilized to organize awareness-raisingcampaigns and to encourage people to explore ways and means of improvingtheir own security and that of other members of their community.

• The media have another function in relation to the achievement of humansecurity: the presentation of forums where ideas, policies and programmes arefreely debated. It is very unlikely that citizens will be willing to accept or



implement decisions imposed on them from above. They should therefore begiven opportunities to hear, to propose and to debate alternative approachesto achieving the common good. The involvement of citizens in public life canonly be effective and productive if it is based on freedom of speech andexpression. If not, public opinion can only be a sterile echo chamber forpolitical decision-makers. The media must again play the educational role thatmost of them have sacrificed somewhat in the name of communication.

• Civil society should be mobilized to help promote human security. Aparticular effort should be made to involve women’s associations, academics,professional organizations and the private sector in order to take advantageof their resources, their abilities and their nearness to the community to ensurethat the concept of human security is taken on board by local officials, andthat the culture of human security is widely disseminated. Only civil societycan carry out this task, provided full recognition is given to freedom ofassociation.

• Freedom of speech and of association must be considered as part and parcelof human rights, and all possible restrictions aimed at limiting their room formanoeuvre, all potential violations of such rights, should be subject toauthorization by the appropriate independent judicial bodies.

• Members of civil society should be encouraged to put in place national andregional networks for the purpose of sharing experiences and drawing theappropriate conclusions.

• Many aspects of human security are deeply rooted in Arab culture and in Islam.There should thus be no great difficulty in adopting or implementing therecommendations set out above. In this connection, any argument to the effectthat human security or one of its components should be rejected as an imposed‘foreign’ construct should not be entertained, especially if this type of argumentis used as an excuse not to introduce human security into the Arab-Muslimregion. It is essential to place a premium on free and innovative thinking, and tostop importing ideologies and models to be followed. If authentic internalchange is to come about, it can only do so in and through dialogue,communication within civil society, and between governments and civil society.



• States should not put themselves in a position where they are seen as opposinghuman security or as obstacles to achieving it. If public opinion sees the stateas more concerned for its own security than that of its citizens, this can onlycreate instability and constitute a direct and immediate threat to humansecurity. Political systems should also be able to evolve and change certainpractices and procedures, such as the voting system, the financing of electoralcampaigns, responsibility or accountability, the involvement of differentsections of society in a country’s domestic and foreign policy, and so on.

• The most appropriate level at which human security could be effectivelyapplied is the local or community level. However, adequate resources are notalways available at that level. In that case, the state should play its part bymobilizing resources and allocating them to those in need. To that end, Arabstates should be encouraged to offer and to receive moral, human and materialassistance from other Arab states and from the international community.

• Young people should be able to participate in making decisions about whatconcerns them and affects their daily life. Learning and the improvement ofeducation systems is of prime importance in this regard. The teaching ofinternational languages to children could also provide a key to a constantlychanging world. Young people should have easy access to the new informationand communication technologies. If knowledge is power, then young peopleshould have full, free and continuous access on a preferential basis.

• Any reforms that Arabs judge necessary must spring from the conviction thatthe quest for human security is an ethical endeavour, and not merely atemporary political expedient. If the reforms carried out in the Arab-Muslimworld are adopted as a result of external pressure, if they are defined byforeigners or if their follow-up is entrusted to a third party, then it is highlyunlikely that any such reforms will be lasting. On the other hand, the fact thatappeals for reforms come from outside the region should not be used as anexcuse to reject those reforms.

• There is no question of being taken in by sermonizers who, affecting goodwill,merely wish to pull the well-worn strings of neo-colonialism. To avoid thosepitfalls, however, the Arabs should begin by putting their own house in order.



As the saying goes, one hand cannot clap alone. Why has action not yet beentaken to establish genuine cooperation among Arab countries on mattersthat, despite political differences between them, are common to all humanbeings and to every free and responsible individual?

• In order to alleviate the democratic deficit in the Arab world, four immediatemeasures must be taken. The first is to ensure complete respect for thefreedoms of opinion, expression and association; the second, to end ethnic orreligious discrimination against minorities; the third, to guaranteeindependence for the judiciary; and the fourth, to abolish martial law, whichhas become permanent in some Arab countries.

It is generally agreed that such changes cannot be achieved overnight. There mustbe a gradual and negotiated transition of power towards more representative formsof government. Accordingly, all those who genuinely constitute civil society,stakeholders in human security, including, above all, intellectuals who have hithertobeen all too excluded, should take part in this process.



Select bibliography

Bibliography on Human Security. Aug. 2001. Prepared by the Harvard Program onHumanitarian Policy and Conflict Research.

Boemeke, M. F. 1999. The changing face of peace: new security challenges and the UnitedNations. Work in Progress, A Review of Research Activities of the United NationsUniversity. 15.3 (summer). http://www.unu.edu/hq/ginfo/wip/wip-sum99.html

Bucaille, L. 2006. Growing Up Palestinian: Israeli Occupation and the Intifada Generation.Princeton, N.J., Princeton University Press.

Buzan, B., Wæver, O. and de Wilde, J. 1998. Security: A New Framework for Analysis. Boulder,Colo., Lynne Rienner.

Chourou, B. 2005. Promoting Human Security: Ethical, Normative and EducationalFrameworks in the Arab States. Paris, UNESCO.English: http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0014/001405/140513E.pdfArabic: http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0014/001405/140513a.pdf

Graham, D. T. and Poku, N. K. (eds). 2000. Migration, Globalisation and Human Security.London, Routledge Research in Population and Migration.

Kepel, G. 2002. Jihad. The Trail of Political Islam.Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press.Khosrokhavar, F. 1997. L’Islam des jeunes. Paris, Flammarion.King, G. and Murray, C. 2002. Rethinking human security. Political Science Quarterly

(winter). http://gking.harvard.edu/files/hs.pdfLammers, E. 1999. Refugees, Gender and Human Security: A Theoretical Introduction andAnnotated Bibliography. Utrecht, International Books.

Lewis, B. 2002. What Went Wrong? The Clash Between Islam and Modernity in the MiddleEast. New York, New York University Press.

McRae, R. and Hubert, D. (eds). 2001. Human Security and the New Diplomacy: ProtectingPeople, Promoting Peace.Montreal, McGill-Queen’s University Press.

Meddeb, A. 2003. The Malady of Islam. New York, Basic Books. (Trans. from French byP. Joris and A. Reid.)

Roy, O. 2006. Globalized Islam: The Search for a New Ummah. New York, ColumbiaUniversity Press.

Thomas, C. 2000. Global Governance, Development and Human Security: The Challenge ofPoverty and Inequality. London, Pluto Press.

UNDP. 2002. Human Development Report 2002. Deepening Democracy in a FragmentedWorld. New York, Oxford University Press.http://hdr.undp.org/en/media/hdr_2002_en_complete.pdf

—. 2003. Human Development Report 2003. Millennium Development Goals: A CompactAmong Nations to End Human Poverty. New York, Oxford University Press.http://hdr.undp.org/en/media/hdr03_complete.pdf

—. 2004. Human Development Report 2004. Cultural Liberty in Today’s Diverse World. NewYork, United Nations Development Programme.http://hdr.undp.org/en/media/hdr04_complete.pdf



—. 2005. Human Development Report 2005. International Cooperation at a Crossroads: Aid,Trade and Security in an Unequal World. New York, United Nations DevelopmentProgramme. http://hdr.undp.org/en/media/hdr05_complete.pdf

UNDP, RBAS. 2002. Arab Human Development Report 2002. Creating Opportunities forFuture Generations. New York, United Nations Development Programme, RegionalBureau for Arab States.http://www.nakbaonline.org/download/UNDP/EnglishVersion/Ar-Human-Dev-2002.pdf

—. 2003. Arab Human Development Report 2003. Building a Knowledge Society. New York,United Nations Development Programme, Regional Bureau for Arab States.

—. 2005. Arab Human Development Report 2004. Towards Freedom in the Arab World. NewYork, United Nations Development Programme, Regional Bureau for Arab States.http://www.unngls.org/Arab_Human_Development_Report_2004_eng.pdf

—. 2006. Arab Human Development Report 2005. Towards the Rise of Women in the Arab World.New York, United Nations Development Programme, Regional Bureau for Arab States.

UNESCO. 2007. Selected Papers – International Conference on Human Security in the ArabStates, 14–15 March 2005. Amman/Paris, RCHS/UNESCO.English: http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0015/001540/154030E.pdfArabic: http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0015/001540/154030A.pdf



2.Poverty eradication in the Arab region

from a human security perspective

ATIF KUBURSI


Introduction

Although the attainment of human security primarily requires freeing citizensfrom fear, guaranteeing their complete freedom and ensuring their broaderparticipation in development, both as actors and as recipients, freedom fromwant, poverty and deprivation remain the basic and essential conditions forconsolidating and ensuring their overall security. Human security, humandevelopment and poverty eradication are intersecting factors that work withinone context, based on the fact that the human person is the target of development,and that human security and personal freedom are two sides of the same coin– human development.1

The broad meaning of poverty and want goes beyond failing to secure aparticular level of income, or even the satisfaction of the basic needs of food, waterand shelter, to include absence of peace, lack of stability and constrained freedoms.This extended concept of poverty that goes beyond income or consumption povertybecomes synonymous with the concept of human security.2

For marginalized Arab citizens who cannot determine their own fate, who areunder occupation, who are torn between conflicting doctrines and sects, whosenatural resources are stolen or squandered, who are vulnerable to random deathat any moment and who are imprisoned without reason, their security is notattained by simply being supplied with a morsel of bread and a place of abode. Thesecurity of such citizens can only be ensured by providing an integratedcombination of rights, entitlements and guarantees that enable them to fulfil

1 B. Chourou, 2005, Promoting Human Security: Ethical, Normative, and Educational Frameworksin the Arab States, Paris, UNESCO.2 M. Max-Neef, 1991, Human Scale Development: Conception, Application and Further Reflections,London, Zed Books, pp. 13–39.


themselves, determine their own fate, satisfy their needs and participate widely inwork, political accountability and full citizenship.

It goes without saying that marginalized Arab citizens share many characteristicsand attributes with all citizens of developing countries. However, there are certainpeculiarities that distinguish the Arabs from the citizens of other states and regions.Political instability in the Arab region; the foreign occupation of several states; lowlevels of political participation; the lack of democracy; the knowledge deficit;limited available opportunities; the rapid population increase (at an annual rateof 2.9 per cent); a large percentage of youth between the ages of 15 and 24(20 per cent: see Fig. 1); excessive dependence on non-renewable natural resourcessuch as oil and water; and the dominant role of Islam in articulating the valuesand rules of behaviour in the daily life of citizens – all these factors combine tosharply distinguish the Arabs from other peoples and to keep their security


10 8 6 4 2 0 2 4 6 8 10

FEMALEMALE

0–45–9

10–1415–1920–2425–2930–3435–3940–4445–4950–5455–5960–6465–6970–7475–7980–8485–8990–9495–99+ 100

PER CENT

(15–24) = 10.5% (15–24) = 10.1%

Source: United Nations, World Population Prospects: 2006 Revision, Online Population Database,available at: http://esa.un.org/unpp/

Figure 1. Population pyramid in the Arab region, 2005


contingent on several factors that, though basic and intuitive, are beyond theirreach and control.

It is difficult to provide one definition for human security or even for poverty.It is similarly difficult to design an indicator that can be accurately measured andused as the basic index for any of the two phenomena: human security and poverty.It is, however, quite easy to consider human security as a framework that enablescitizens to be free from want and fear and to participate fully in economic, socialand political systems that have fundamental impacts on their daily life.

This concept of human security goes beyond the traditional state-focusedconcept of security and considers human security as part and parcel of the state’ssecurity. Failing or weak states usually fall short of ensuring the security of theircitizens. Countries that marginalize their citizens lose their legitimacy andstability. Therefore, states’ security and human security are interdependent:neither is achievable in the absence of the other.

Mutual support between the state and the citizens involves an array ofprinciples, values and rules that preserve the rights and duties of both sides, explainthe nature and basics of their relationship, and are regulated by clear laws that areimplemented on the basis of the equality of all people before the law, particularlyminorities, females and other vulnerable groups.

Human security is fundamentally anchored in the eradication of poverty.There is no solid security for hungry human beings who are unable to satisfy theirbasic needs. Freedom from hunger is an essential part of freedom from fear. Onthe other hand, marginalized human beings who cannot determine their own fateand who are under occupation remain vulnerable to fear and instability, no matterhow much food or shelter is provided. Arab citizens, particularly those in Palestineor Iraq, who are under foreign occupation and who are deprived of the freedomof self-determination remain insecure because of their inability to achieve self-fulfilment on their own land, regardless of the means of living that might beoffered.

By concentrating on poverty eradication in this chapter, we are not disregardingthe importance of freedom, stability and national security. We are simply focusingon an essential aspect of empowering human beings, increasing their options andmeeting their demands for a free and decent life.

2. Poverty eradication


Arab achievements and failures in poverty eradication

Arab periods of growth have been linked to a substantial decrease in absolutepoverty. This decrease in the rates of abject poverty, however, has not seen a paralleltrend towards the equal distribution of wealth and income. The fruits of Arabgrowth have remained within the grasp of the elite (the minority), keeping themajority excluded from enjoying fully the proceeds of this growth.

Poverty and inequality

It is worth noting that measuring poverty by US$1, or even $2, a day does notaccurately reflect the poverty picture in the Arab region. Average incomes in themember states of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)3 are as high as those inthe world’s wealthiest countries. Most countries in the Arab region, with a fewexceptions, are considered middle-income developing countries (see Fig. 2).

However, if we estimate poverty using the national poverty lines explained indetail in the United Nations Millennium Development Goals (MDG) countryreports,4 we find that they provide a better explanation of the living standardsand consumption patterns of each individual country. The Arab HumanDevelopment Report 2005 shows that in 2004 the poverty indicator in Arabcountries estimated the number of disadvantaged persons at around 23.5 per centof the population, which is lower than the figure of 27 per cent in 2002.5 Thepercentage was as low as 15 per cent in the GCC countries, 18 per cent in theMashreq (eastern Arab countries), 25 per cent in the Maghreb (western Arabcountries) and 34 per cent in the Arab Least Developed Countries (LDCs).6

But if we examine the dominant trends in the percentages of populations livingunder the income poverty line, we notice that the Arab countries have not witnessedany remarkable progress in regards to decreasing income poverty. Statistical dataregarding poverty indicators in sixteen Arab countries show that poverty has


3 The GCC countries include Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Kuwait, Bahrain, Oman and the United Arab Emirates.4 For the MDG country reports, see www.undg.org and www.undp.org.5 UNDP, RBAS, 2006, Arab Human Development Report 2005. Towards the Rise of Women in the ArabWorld, New York, United Nations Development Programme, Regional Bureau for Arab States.6 The Mashreq countries include Iraq, Palestine, the Syrian Arab Republic, Lebanon and Jordan,whereas the Maghreb countries include most of the Arab countries in North Africa (the LibyanArab Jamahiriya, Algeria, Tunisia and Morocco). The Arab LDCs include Sudan, Yemen and Mauritania.


increased significantly in both Palestine and Iraq. Likewise, the slow decrease in thelevel of malnutrition in the Arab region indicates that Arab development isstumbling and is failing to achieve tangible results (see Fig. 3). The percentage ofunderweight children below 5 years of age was relatively high in 2000 and still istoday; there has not been any improvement since 1990. There are substantialdifferences, however, in the progress achieved by individual Arab countries (seeFig. 4). In Yemen, for example, the percentage of underweight children reached45.1 per cent in 2003, as opposed to 3.3 per cent in Lebanon in 2002.7


-2%

-1%

0%

1%

2%

3%

4%

5%

6%

7%

8%

-2%

-1%

0%

1%

2%

3%

4%

5%

6%

7%

8%

2000–2005

1990–2000

YemenSudan

Maurita

nia

Comoros

United A

rab Emira

tes

Saudi A

rabia

Oman

Bahrai

n

Syrian

Arab

Republic

Lebanon

Jordan

Egypt

Tunisia

Morocco

Algeria

Source:World Bank, World Development Indicators 2006; United Nations, World Population Prospects:2006 Revision, Online Population Database. http://esa.un.org/unpp/

Figure 2. Average annual growth of the individual’s share of GDP in the Arabregion, 1990–2005 (estimated using Purchasing Power Parity [PPP]; percentage)

7 ESCWA and LAS, 2007, Millennium Development Goals in the Arab Region 2007: A YouthLens, Beirut, Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia and the League of ArabStates, pp. 8–10.


Unemployment

Arab labour markets are characterized by the spread of both open and disguisedunemployment, and by the low percentage of recruitment when compared topopulation. In 2005 the overall percentage of unemployment in the Arab regionwas estimated at 18 per cent, reaching 25 per cent among young men. This percentageis very high, probably among the highest in the world. In addition, the level ofunemployment among young women in the Arab world reached 34 per cent in 2005,indicating that high female unemployment is a characteristic of this region.8 Thesepercentages rise to very high levels in the Arab countries that suffer from conflicts,


0

10

20

30

40

502000–20051995–1999

ARABREGION

ARABLDCs

MAGHREBCOUNTRIES

MASHREQCOUNTRIES

17.9

11.2

46.3

23.0

19.0

9.0

44.8

22.6

Note: data for GCC countries are not available.Source: UNDP–SURF.

Figure 3. Spread of poverty (percentage), 1995–2005

8 ESCWA and LAS, 2007, Millennium Development Goals in the Arab Region 2007: A YouthLens, Beirut, Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia and the League of ArabStates, p. 10.



1. Data for developing regions refer to the time periods 1990–1992 and 2001–2003.Source: UNDP–SURF; UNSD, Millennium Development Goals Indicators Database, available at:http://mdgs.un.org/unsd/mdg/Data.aspx

0 5 10 15 20 25 30

200219961991

DEVELOPINGREGIONS 1

ARABREGION

ARABLDCs

GCCCOUNTRIES

MAGHREBCOUNTRIES

MASHREQCOUNTRIRS

3.2

3.0

3.2

4.7

5.2

4.7

5.5

3.4

3.4

8.8

7.8

8.6

20.0

17.0

26.5

23.4

26.3

Figure 4. Percentage of population below the minimum limit of dietary energy consumption by subregion, 1991–2002


reaching 27 per cent in Iraq in 2004, around 30.5 per cent in the West Bank, andmore than 50 per cent in Gaza in the same year.

There are strong pressures on the Arab labour market, given the registeredincreases in the population growth rates. Six million Arabs enter the labour marketevery year, requiring real annual growth rates in gross domestic product (GDP) ofmore than 6 per cent to create a sufficient demand that can maintain the currentunemployment rates.

Dependency on non-renewable resources

The fact that Arab economic growth is associated with transforming oil from amaterial asset into a financial asset basically means that the Arab economy dependson non-renewable resources that are borrowed from nature and can never be returned.The objective of Arab development, in this case, is quite clear. It should strive tomaintain Arab wealth and counterbalance the depletion of oil by human and financialresources that are capable of ensuring renewable output. Investing in humans,knowledge and capabilities is the only way of ensuring the sustainability of Arabinvestment. This means that the Arab region must expand its economic base andreduce its high dependence on oil. This does not imply that the Arabs should notexploit oil and its by-products, but the oil surplus should be converted into usefulnon-oil investments that go together with, rather than act as a substitute for, oil.

Building a dynamic, flexible, renewable and competitive society that dependson creating high value added and confidently entering the new economy is a basicrequirement for sustainable Arab human development.

Culture structure

The Arab Human Development Report 2003 considered the acquisition, productionand use of knowledge as the sufficient and most effective means of achieving Arabhuman development in all its relevant areas.9 Knowledge defines the line betweencapability and powerlessness, invulnerability and weakness, health and disease,and wealth and poverty.


9 UNDP, AFESD, 2003, Arab Human Development Report 2003. Building a Knowledge Society,New York, UNDP, RBAS.


The report also saw Arab culture as a suitable cradle and a strong pillar forbuilding up knowledge. Building on a long tradition of appreciating the value ofknowledge and of acquiring knowledge and the incessant need to pursue wisdom,Arab culture provides a conducive and enabling environment for buildingknowledge structures and pillars for the knowledge-based society.

Irregularities, shortcomings, distortions and defects in these cultural structureshave, however, corrupted and constrained the Arabs’ ability to champion theinterests of knowledge and development. These shortcomings are now an impedimentto the production and employment of knowledge in necessary and more effectiveand productive realms.

Having accurately diagnosed the factors related to embedding knowledge, thereport suggested conjuring up a strategic vision for establishing a knowledgesociety and economy, supported by five pillars. These pillars include: ‘guaranteeingthe key freedoms of opinion, speech and assembly; disseminating high-qualityeducation; embedding and ingraining science; shifting rapidly towards knowledge-based production in Arab socioeconomic structures; and developing an authentic,broad-minded and enlightened Arab knowledge model’. This model shouldactivate interpretative jurisprudence as an approach for finding solutions, advancethe Arabic language, and enrich and promote cultural diversity within Arabcountries. It should also open up to other cultures and interact with them clearlyand confidently. This new economy is the best guarantee for ensuring the humansecurity of the Arab citizen.

The oil factor

Oil has created a huge financial surplus that has been used to build an outstandinginfrastructure of roads, bridges, lofty buildings, airports, ports, schools andhospitals. This wealth has also been used to establish solid economic bases in a fewsectors, such as petrochemicals, vessel maintenance and aluminium manufacturing.But this investment has not matched the level and dimensions of oil extraction anddepletion. It has depended almost exclusively on building physical structures andfailed to sufficiently nurture human beings who can make a valuable contributionin the areas of knowledge and creativity. It has depended, particularly during itsinitial stages – and still continues to depend – on hiring cheap foreign labour,whether Arab or non-Arab. This has created an obvious bias towards cheap labourand labour-intensive production. This excessive dependence on cheap labour has



led to increased unemployment among citizens and a reduced dependence on Arablabour. Favouring Asian workers over Arab workers has lessened the positive effectsof oil on employment both in the Gulf and in the entire Arab region. On the positiveside, however, it has helped a number of Asian economies (Pakistan, Bangladesh,India and the Philippines) that supply the large pools of cheap labour.

The impact of the oil boom was not limited to labour; it also impinged negativelyon consumption patterns that were dramatically diverted into provocative,conspicuous and wasteful consumerism. This does not apply only to the Arab Gulfcountries, but also to other Arab areas whose citizens flocked to work in the Gulf.Rentier behaviours also became widespread. The most pronounced effects includethe separation between income and production and between consumption andproduction, a reliance on rents, and the reluctance to perform productive work. Theultimate outcome of the oil boom was a rapid increase in wealth that was nottranslated, in practical terms, into the required (or expected) increase indevelopment. The Arab region is now richer than being a developed region.

Our concentration here on oil and its effects on human development in the Arabregion springs from a fundamental assumption: oil is the foundation of all the Arabeconomies, whether they are oil-producing or not. The latter group relies largelyon exporting its goods and labour to the oil-producing areas, and receives tourists,investment and assistance from the oil-producing countries. All Arab countries,without exception, now depend on oil, albeit at different levels of dependence.

Reducing and eradicating poverty in the Arab region is therefore essentiallydependent on the positive contributions as well as the negative effects of oil.Consequently, the strategies and policies directed at dealing with poverty areultimately oil-dependent in terms of content. The wealth generated from oil iscapable of eradicating poverty if distributed and directed towards this end. Ifdirected otherwise, it will delay and obstruct the accomplishment of the MDG oferadicating poverty. However, it is naive to believe that the problem only concernsthe equal distribution of wealth. Poverty in the Arab world also exists because ofthe high levels of illiteracy; the feeble, non-diversified economies; the traditional,fragile and non-productive economies; the great failure to create employmentopportunities; the obvious failure to recruit Arab workers and to favour them overother workers; the very high, indiscriminate population growth; the failure toprovide the youth with the skills required by the dynamic domestic and regionallabour markets; the faltering, overloaded and substandard education systems; thenon-productive investments that are paralleled by lavish consumption; the



marginalized citizens who enjoy limited freedoms; the repressive regimes thathamper participation and accountability and reverse the relation between the rulerand the ruled; and the region’s profound and endemic instability. The Arab worldis unique for suffering occupation and foreign interference and domination, aswell as for its over-dependence on non-renewable natural resources.

The equal distribution of wealth can remedy abject poverty, but cannot achievethe sustainable growth that would ensure deep-rooted immunity for the economyand the society. Growth is associated with creating useful, high-income workopportunities that guarantee for the individual a decent life, one that is protectedby unambiguous freedom, open participation and precise accountability.

Poverty-eradication policies in the Arab region

In order to achieve sustainable development, the Arab economies must be weanedoff their excessive dependence on oil. This is not a call to abandon oil; rather, it isa clarification of the necessity to establish other activities and for properdiversification structures. Other activities should be put in place to complementor substitute oil-dependent activities in order to invigorate the impact of oil onthe economy. It also requires the active and widespread participation of a largesector of citizens in a dynamic process in which the state partners the private sector.This will improve the conditions of the poor by creating suitable employmentopportunities for them and improving their educational, health and nutritionalconditions. In this way, the poor will be enabled to acquire property, gain usefulinformation and establish their legal status within the society, thus becoming apart of the political, economic and social fabric of the state.

This fits well with the definition of human security as enunciated by theCommission on Human Security in its final report, Human Security Now, especiallywhere it notes that human security ‘means using processes that build on people’sstrengths and aspirations. It means creating political, social, environmental, economic,military and cultural systems that together give people the building blocks of survival,livelihood and dignity.’10


10 CHS, 2003, Human Security Now, New York, Commission on Human Security, p. 4.


In other words, an integrated strategy should be formulated to empower the pooras part of ensuring human security that aims to decrease want, deprivation andfamine, and to narrow the gap of unequal distribution of income, wealth and benefits.It is also essential that this strategy aims to encourage self-reliance by guaranteeingwork opportunities for everyone, stabilizing prices and supporting incomes to a levelthat guarantees that individuals will live with dignity. This is a tall order for any state,let alone a developing one. It calls for a dynamic and vibrant partnership with theprivate sector, the latter being a major generator of wealth and jobs everywhere.

Effective poverty-eradication policies

One of the absolute realities today is that paying attention to GDP does notnecessarily mean caring for the poor. High GDP growth rates do not necessarilyentail an increase in the incomes of the poor or a rise in the opportunities availableto them. The ‘trickle-down’ theory is invalid, because wealth remains in the handsof the wealthy and never finds its way into those of the poor. Wealth is like glue; itsticks to the hands that obtain it first.

Functional socioeconomic policies have failed to diagnose and treat poverty.Equal categorization of the poor and the rich in the consumption function is notuseful, but rather cripples the ability of macro-policies to deal with poverty.Focusing on traditional economic policies has stripped the economy of its socialand humane content. The inherent contradiction between efficiency and equalityin functional policies has led to perceiving more egalitarian distributions of incomeand wealth as detrimental to productivity and efficiency. In fact, they either existtogether or not at all.

Keynes regarded economic problems as temporary and instantaneous issues. Hisfamous quip, ‘In the long run, we are all dead,’ led to the adoption of transitory,short-term and short-sighted policies. Policies consequently turned away fromembracing long-term objectives that pertain to restructuring and redeveloping theeconomy on a more cohesive and sustainable basis.

It cannot be denied that the Arab region’s governments have been unable toachieve balanced, fair and sustainable growth using their traditional unsuccessfulpolicies. Adhering to traditional policies will fill the current growth period withconditions similar to those of the previous oil booms in the 1970s and the 1980s,thus wasting the existing opportunities yet one more time.



The poor are typically undocumented, with no proof of their existence. This putsthem at greater risk of exploitation, restricts their access to health care and educationand prevents them from fully participating as political, economic and social actors intheir countries. The property of the poor, if it exists, is not protected. Constantly atrisk of being evicted without compensation, the poor are left with little or no incentiveto invest in their land or develop their business. The majority of the poor work in theinformal economy; they typically receive no employment benefits from the state ortheir employer, suffer poor working conditions and hold jobs that are never secureand often cut off from any credit or assistance.11

Legal empowerment of the poor is now seen as a profound tool for tacklingpoverty. At the core of the legal empowerment agenda is unlocking humanpotential. If the poor are afforded legal protection such as property rights andsecurity of tenure, labour rights and business rights, they may have a chance toobtain their fair share and entitlements that could enable them to lift themselvesout of the poverty trap.

Frameworks of the new policy: increasing growth and pro-poor policies

The new policy has to work through certain frameworks to reduce the povertyphenomenon. These frameworks can be summarized as follows:

Improving the investment climate

Bringing about a fundamental change in the economic environment isindispensable if the Arab region is to move from its current high-consumptiongrowth pattern to a more stable, high-investment pattern. In the early 2000s, thecountries of the region invested 25 per cent of their GDP, while Asian countries(the ‘Asian tigers’) invested 25–30 per cent of their GDP. China made massiveinvestments that were valued at 40 per cent of its GDP.12


11 L. Axeworthy, 17 June 2008, Level the playing field for the world’s poor, Globe and Mail, A19.12 J. Stiglitz, 11 August 1996, Some lessons from the East Asian miracle, World Bank Observer,pp. 151–74.


Soaring consumption and sluggish production have extremely negativeimpacts. Slow growth is translated into increasing poverty because of risingunemployment rates and falling incomes.

Human security of the poor

Providing human security and stability for the poor can only be attained byovercoming the four weaknesses, or ‘deficits’, identified in the Arab HumanDevelopment Report 2002.13 These can be summarized in the following points:

Overcoming the ‘freedom deficit’

An intrinsic characteristic of the Arab region is that citizens do not enjoy thefreedom to openly enjoy their political, social, and cultural activities.14 Thishighlights the importance of an all-encompassing political reform needed toovercome this deficit. This reform focuses on three main goals:

• adopting a charter of rights that would enshrine the civil liberties of allcitizens;

• ensuring the existence of institutional procedures through which citizenswould be able to choose the leaders of their governments and demonstratetheir preference for alternative policies; and

• creating institutions that have extensive competence in auditing, budgeting,and observing and questioning the government’s executive apparatus.15

Overcoming the ‘knowledge deficit’

It is essential that a deliberate decision is taken to enter the new economy andnarrow the ever-widening digital gap. The oil-dependent economies in theArab region have turned them into non-diversified, one-sided economies that


13 UNDP, RBAS, 2002, Arab Human Development Report 2002, Creating Opportunities for FutureGenerations, New York, United Nations Development Programme, Regional Bureau for Arab States.14 Z. Abdel Samad, 2004, The linkages between international, national and human security, SocialWatch Annual Report, Montevideo, pp. 39–41.15 B. Buzan, 1991, People, States and Fear: An Agenda in International Security Studies in the Post-ColdWar Era, 2nd edn, Hemel Hempstead, Harvester, Wheatsheaf.


are ill-equipped to face the challenges of the twenty-first century. The GCCcountries have made significant strides in the use of information andcomputing technology (ICT), but this must be accompanied by visibleachievements in the knowledge-based industries.

Promoting the role of women

It is necessary to counter the phenomenon of feminizing poverty, unemploymentand illiteracy. The role of women should be enhanced politically, socially, culturallyand economically.

Overcoming the deficit of ‘creation employment opportunities’

A clear link should be established between growth and the creation of employmentopportunities. A pro-poor growth is basically a pro-employment growth.

Support and promotion of regional integration

The Arab countries have been slow to opt for Arab regional economic integrationthat paves the way for integration of their region within the global economy whencompared to other regions of the world. Regional integration of the countries inthe area is the principal booster of the domestic economies: it increases thestrength of regional industrial exchange as it offers a more comprehensive andrational distribution of work and encourages the diversification of productionand coordination of investment. The outcome of these measures will consequentlystrengthen the commercial exchange of these countries when they interact withother regions.

This strategy is expected to effectively immunize the economies of the countriesin the region from the negative impacts of globalization and overcome theirindividualized, limited economies, as well as their restricted diversity and heavydependence on a handful of products. In other words, the role of regionaleconomic integration can be instrumental in helping the countries of the regionto achieve a very pro-poor advancement and growth. This integration will actthrough an overt commitment to certain central tasks, with a view to endorsingeffective economic policies that expedite and activate the necessary steps towardssustainable growth. These tasks can be summarized as follows:



• The monetary policies that exist in most Arab countries are ineffective andshould be reformed. This is mainly due to combining a fixed currencyexchange regime with a tax system that depends mainly on indirect taxes thatare mostly imposed on imports and consumption. These taxes are known tobe regressive in their effects because they tend to be borne mainly andexcessively by the poor. Added to this is the constant increase in external debtsand the free movement of capital. Both of these factors have combined tolimit the efficiency and effectiveness of the policy system. Fiscal policies aretypically effective under fixed exchange rate regimes whereas monetarypolicies work best under a flexible exchange rate regime. At present, Arabeconomies are using monetary policies under fixed exchange rate regimeswhere they do not work. Their capacity to create and sustain growth and jobsfor the poor is therefore limited.

• Pro-poor fiscal reforms should aim to promote the legitimacy of the state bypaying more attention to equitable tax and expenditure policies. Here emergesthe considerable importance of reforming the tax system by depending moreon progressive income taxation (borne more by the rich than the poor),restructuring property and capital taxes to reflect the ability to pay, enlargingthe scope of taxes to prevent evasion, and reallocating public expendituretowards building social, intellectual and scientific infrastructures. Thesereforms should target providing assistance to the poor, improving their healthand educational conditions, and incorporating them into the state’s politicalstructure.

• The state should assume full social responsibility for establishing a socialsecurity network and devise comprehensive social policies to defeatopportunism and the rise of inefficient employees who exploit the socialvacuum created by shaky and weak governments.

• Tax-collection systems should be developed in order to meet the financialdemands of growth and social justice. Administrative capabilities should bedeveloped and new mechanisms should be created for this purpose. It alsorequires the drafting of strict laws and disciplinary procedures against taxevaders and corruption.

• Regional expansion in joint investment projects requires maximizing regionalcommercial exchange and ensuring an adequate level of inter-Arab financialcoordination. Effective laws should be drafted in order to prevent the negative



consequences if certain countries opted out and acceded to other commercialblocs outside the greater Arab trade zone.

• The monetary policy of most Arab countries can be summarized in twoapproaches: it is either directed towards the sole objective of maintaining alow inflation rate, or it is ineffective in a fixed exchange currency regime. Whatis truly worrying is the application of an austere financial policy in a regionthat suffers from high unemployment.

• Pro-poor monetary policy should aim to maintain high rates of saving.Meanwhile, this policy should support capital expenses – particularly instrategic sectors – to encourage exports and investment, create workopportunities and eradicate poverty. In this regard, macro-policies shouldbe connected to the policies of encouraging savings and investment, ratherthan just maintaining a fixed currency exchange rate.

• Pro-poor financial improvement should promote the establishment ofextensive networks of financial institutions that encourage people to save andpave the way for an extensive and equal flow of funds to remote areas and tothe small projects that suffer from limited resources and weak businesses.

• Pro-poor financial improvement requires the establishment of banks thatare competent to grant assistance to certain industrial sectors, which shouldbe selected on the basis of feasibility and satisfactory performance. Thisshould include labour-intensive small and medium enterprises (SMEs).

• Microcredit programmes that directly target the poor and support thedevelopment of social institutions and productive activities should beformulated and created. These institutions can be modelled along the Islamicprinciples of sharing, empowerment and participation in risk and profits.

• The currency exchange regime applicable in most Arab countries is deficientand inefficient because it serves two contradictory roles. On the one hand, itpegs the exchange rate of the local currency to that of the US dollar, in otherwords, it works like a fixed exchange regime. On the other hand, the constantfluctuations of the US dollar entail cumulative costs as countries try to copewith the fluctuations in the exchange rate. In this case, the exchange rateregime is considered to be floating.

• The present circumstances of free movement of capital make it difficult forany Arab country to aspire to a free exchange rate system and to defend itscurrency. This has strengthened global speculative activities and exacerbated



the absence of global monetary institutions that can maintain a stable worldfinancial system.

• There are serious repercussions to pegging the exchange rate of localcurrencies to the US dollar. This procedure has caused the purchasing powerof Arab countries’ economies to sustain severe losses, estimated at $800billion if we take into account the money spent on their huge imports fromcountries that do not transact in US dollars. Therefore, the exchange ratesof foreign currencies should be pegged in the region to a trade-weightedcurrency basket.

• Serious thought and coordination are required to draw up a unified systemthat guarantees pegging the region’s different currencies to a general unionto confront other global blocs. This system will produce two results: first, itwill stabilize regional trade because of the ability to fix the exchange rates ofregional currencies; and, second, such a system will be able to defend nationaleconomies from external influences and allow the monetary policy to solveand curb the unemployment problem.

• Despite the fact that the GCC member states have made great strides towardsunifying their currency and monetary policies, these states should not ignorecoordination with other countries in the region in order to create a unifiedregional bloc.

• Such regional monetary coordination may achieve gradual progress towardsthe ultimate objective of issuing a unified regional currency that will enlargethe volume of inter-Arab transactions and foster the ability of theseeconomies to create extensive work opportunities for many people, includingthe poor.

• The Arab region has some of the world’s richest countries (Qatar, the UnitedArab Emirates and Kuwait) and some of the poorest (Yemen, Djibouti andSudan). It is inconceivable that the rich would turn their backs on the poor.There are extensive programmes in which rich Arab states have providedgenerous support for their poorer brothers and sisters. Much of this aid isdirected towards government support or project support as well as investmentin the poorer countries, welcoming labour and receiving exports from them.More could and should be done. Equally relevant here are the institutionalstructures that should be developed to oversee and sustain these flows withaccountability and transparency.




Universal health care and education for all

Poor health conditions exact a heavy toll on the economy in terms of lostproductivity. An unhealthy citizen is a social and economic liability to society.Human security that broadens people’s opportunities and capabilities addressesfirst things first. A healthy citizen is a more productive and more valuable citizen.Human security means supporting the right to enjoy good health through theprovision of universal health care: for the rich, who can afford it without theassistance of the public sector; and for the poor, whom the government is obligedto assist in order for them to receive the same services without any discrimination.16

This universal principle seems to work well as it removes these social programmesfrom the class divide. Exorbitant health costs are known to have crippled even well-to-do families. Universal coverage guarantees equal access and coalesces around acommonality of interest and benefits.

Educated people are enabled citizens. In the present global economy, educationis a crucial pillar of comparative advantage and competitive strengths. Inter -national competition is stiff and success is contingent on innovation andcreativity. Illiteracy in the new economy is very costly; it imposes economiccosts and high social costs. Skill formation is a highly prized economic andenabling process. Empowerment of the poor is strengthened by the provisionof quality education for them. This is the foundation and the true and effectivemeaning of broadening people’s choices. Uneducated people have limitedchoices and restricted options. Human security that rests on an empowermentagenda calls for the right to education for all citizens as a basic human right,regardless of their financial abilities, and providing them with adequate skillsthat are necessary for self-reliance and for advancing towards the newknowledge economy.

16 T. Owen, 2004, Human security – conflict, critique and consensus: colloquium remarks and aproposal in a threshold – Basel Definition, Security Dialogue, Vol. 35, No. 3, pp. 378–87.


Conclusion and recommendations

Poverty eradication requires a number of essential arrangements and policieswithin the broader context of human security and human development. They canbe summarized as follows:

• First: linking economic growth to the creation of employment opportunitiesthat offer sufficient salaries to meet basic needs and overcome poverty.

• Second: expanding the ability of the Arab economy to grow rapidly,effectively and sustainably by expanding its sustainable income andproduction resources.

• Third: raising investment allocations to levels that are sufficient to supportthe necessary growth to secure work opportunities for a wide segment ofcitizens who enter the labour market every year.

• Fourth: supporting the redistribution of regional investment and work. Thisrequires activating the Arab Common Market and increasing the ability ofArab economies to be competitive and highly productive as a guarantee forsustainably meeting the needs of their citizens, particularly the poor. It alsocalls for institutionalizing support for poorer economies and dealing directlywith their poverty and sluggish development.

• Fifth: supporting the right to education for all citizens, regardless of theirfinancial resources, and providing them with the necessary skills for self-reliance and for advancing towards the new economy.

• Sixth: supporting the right to health care and offering these services toeveryone: to the rich, who can afford them without the assistance of the publicsector; and to the poor, whom the government is obliged to assist in orderfor them to receive the same services without discrimination.



• Seventh: redefining the state’s role in the economy and increasing its abilityto draw up tax, financial, monetary and commercial policies that increase itsincome and enable it to provide subsidies to the poor and shoulder theprovision of basic services.

• Eighth: improving the legal structures and regulations to recognize the poorand protect their rights and property.

• Ninth: ensuring that dealing with poverty is not divorced from, and nottraded against, the political and social rights and freedoms of the poor.



3.The environment in the Arab region


BADRIA AL-AWADHI


Introduction*

The environmental situation and the challenges facing the Arab regionThe Arab countries are currently facing many challenges, including lacunae inenvironmental security that have serious consequences for human security in theregion as a result of the geographical, climatic and economic conditions; politicalinstability; and the scarcity of natural resources, particularly freshwater. This leads toincreased desertification; the scarcity or absence of rain; dependence on rivers thatrise in other countries; overgrazing; and pollution of the marine environment. Marinepollution is triggered by oil spills, untreated sewage water, and other hazardous wastesgenerated by dangerous industrial, chemical or radioactive processes that includecertain materials or concentrations of certain materials. These wastes cause chemicalreactions and have other characteristics that pose a threat to human health and to thenatural environment, whether independently or in contact with other wastes.1

In addition, there is an absence of long-term development policies and plans forthe protection of the environment and natural resources. Legal and administrativeframeworks for the preservation of the environment and natural resources areineffective, in addition to the deficient framework of environmental legislation inmost Arab countries.

The 2003 report on the environment in the Arab world highlights manychallenges that hinder sustainable development in the Arab region.2 The most

* The views expressed in this chapter are those of the author and do not represent the views orpositions of LAS, UNESCO or HSU/OCHA.1 See ‘The Environmental Situation in the Arab World, 2003’, prepared by the Joint Secretariat forthe Arab region, composed of the Technical Secretariat of the Council of Arab Ministers Responsiblefor the Environment (CAMRE), and the United Nations Environment Programme’s Regional Officefor Western Asia (UNEP/ROWA), the Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia (ESCWA).2 Ibid.


important factors are political instability, armed conflicts and unemployment. Theoverall unemployment rate in the region stands at 22 per cent, while more thantwo-thirds of the Arab population live in low-income countries, with 70 millionpeople below the poverty line. In addition, there is an ongoing political conflictover natural resources, especially freshwater, which most Arab countries lack andwhich is one of the major challenges facing the United Nations Economic andSocial Commission for Western Asia (ESCWA)3 region. Freshwater is a scarceresource, although it is one of the basics of a true human development that is freefrom disease.4

Regional and civil wars

The peoples of the Arab region have suffered from the absence of human securitydue to regional and civil wars for over half a century. The most important of theseis the Israeli-Arab (Palestinian) war that dates back to 1948, a war that threatensArab national security and deprives the Arab peoples in general and the Palestinianpeople in particular from human security. The region has also experienced theIraq–Iran regional war, also known as the Imposed War, which lasted for eightyears (from September 1980 to August 1988), and the civil wars in several Arabcountries. Examples are the civil war in Sudan which lasted for more than twentyyears, the civil war in Lebanon which continued for fifteen years, the ongoing civilwar in Somalia, and those in other Arab countries.

The dire situation in the region has meant that, for more than half a century,the Arabs have been among the peoples that suffered more than any other fromthe lack of human security in its broader sense due to the unstable national,political, social and human security situation. This is clear from a brief survey ofthe regional and civil conflicts that were (and still are) the principal cause of thedestruction of the environment and natural resources. Such destruction is inaddition to the absence of human security, as is evident from some of the regionaland national conflicts outlined below.


3 ESCWA is a United Nations regional commission based in Beirut and consisting of thirteen memberstates: the six member states of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) – Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, Qatar,Kuwait, Oman and the United Arab Emirates – and Jordan, the Syrian Arab Republic, Iraq, Lebanon,Egypt, Yemen and Palestine.4 ‘Environmental Situation in the Arab World, 2003’, op. cit.


The Israeli-Arab (Palestinian) conflict

The Arab-Israeli conflict, which began in 1948, continues to be one of the region’sgreatest threats to national and human security. Since that date and until now, theoccupying state (Israel) has adopted the policy of building settlements on unlawfullyconfiscated land by force. Beginning in 2002, Israel destroyed large areas of thenatural environment under the pretext of building the ‘separation wall’5 in areasinhabited by the Palestinians, which constitute 16 per cent of the territories occupiedin 1967. In addition, olive trees and fruit trees are regularly destroyed by the Israelimilitary, despite the fact that they are the source of income for the majority of thecivilian population in the areas adjacent to the ‘separation wall’ as well as for futuregenerations. This policy has left the owners of the land no other option but to fleein large numbers to other areas of Palestine, in an attempt to find the social,economic and moral conditions that would afford them human security.6

In 2004 the International Court of Justice in The Hague issued an advisoryopinion upon a request made by the United Nations General Assembly in 2003.The Court ruled that the wall was ‘contrary to international law’ and affirmed thatit encouraged settlement projects, thus violating Article 49 of the 1949 FourthGeneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War.The Court noted that the restrictions imposed on the people trapped between the‘separation wall’ and the Green Line could lead to them being driven out of theirhomes, which is also contrary to the above-mentioned Article. In addition, theadvisory opinion shows that the Israeli seizure of private lands on which toconstruct the ‘separation wall’ violates personal property, which constitutes aviolation of Articles 46 and 52 of the Hague Regulations of 1907, and Article 53 ofthe 1949 Fourth Geneva Convention (ratified by Israel on 6 July 1951).7

3. The environment

5 The ‘separation wall’ is called the ‘racial wall’ by the Palestinians and the ‘security wall’ by Israel.6 See the Millennium Development Goals in the ESCWA Region, Goal 7: Ensure EnvironmentalSustainability. The report sets out the challenges facing the Arab region, including the impact ofwars and conflicts on environmental degradation; the lack of financial and human resources allocatedfor environmental action; weak or absent environmental scientific research; limited civil societyactivity; and weak capacity of the institutions charged with implementing environmental laws andregulations. ESCWA, 2005, Progress Report, p. 76. http://www.un.org/arabic/depts/escwa7 Concerning the legality of constructing the ‘separation wall’, the International Court of Justiceaffirms that Israel must halt construction of the wall and dismantle the parts of it that have beenbuilt in the West Bank, cancel all construction orders that have been given, and compensate Palestiniansharmed by it. The Court also called upon the international community to refrain from supportingthe continuation of the illegal situation that has arisen from the establishment of the ‘separationwall’, and to take legal actions to stop the Israeli violations and ensure the application of the FourthGeneva Convention of 1949. The Israeli Supreme Court rejected this view on the basis that the wall →


This deprives the Palestinians of the right to enjoy the basic human needsthat constitute the concept of human security, such as respecting the right to life,freedom of movement, the right to choose one’s residence, the right to work, theright to health and the right to education as provided for in Article 12(1) of the1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which binds Israel asone of the states parties to the Covenant since 1991, and in accordance with theprevious Article: ‘Everyone lawfully within the territory of a State shall, withinthat territory, have the right to liberty of movement and freedom to choose hisresidence.’ In addition, individuals have the right to enjoy proper conditions ofphysical and psychological health. Article 6 of the above-mentioned Covenantemphasizes that the right to life is an inherent right of every human being andthat the law should protect this right and no one shall be arbitrarily deprivedfrom such a right.8

The Iraq–Iran war (1980–88)

The Iraq–Iran war was the bloodiest regional war and the most devastating in itsconsequences for both the land and the marine environment. Spanning eight years(1980–88), the war claimed the lives of more than 1 million people on both sides,and inflicted extensive damage on the marine environment in the Arabian Gulf asa result of the destruction of oilfields and offshore oil platforms by the twocountries. This was followed by the war to liberate Kuwait from Iraqi occupationin 1991 by the Allied forces, which destroyed the natural environment due to themilitary operations over twenty-two days.

The environment and the Iraqi people have also been suffering from theabsence of human security since 2003 because of the military operations launchedby the international coalition (led by the United States of America and the United


→ protects Israel’s national security and its right to defend itself under the rules of international law.See: Israeli Information Center for Human Rights, the Occupied Territories.http://www.bezelem.org/Arabic/Separation_Barrier/InternationalCourt8 Article 2 of the International Covenant obliges the State of Israel, being a state party to the Covenant,to: ‘1) Respect the rights recognized in the Covenant, and ensure such rights for all individualswithin its territory and under its jurisdiction. No discrimination should be practised because ofrace, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property,birth or other status; 2) Where not already provided for in its existing legislative or other measures,each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to take the necessary steps, in accordance withits constitutional processes and with the provisions of the present Covenant, to adopt such laws orother measures as may be necessary to give effect to the rights recognized in the present Covenant.’


Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland) against the regime of PresidentSaddam Hussein. Military operations are still in progress to end the terrorist actscommitted by al-Qaeda and the other armed militias of the conflicting religiouscurrents that continue to fight for authority in Iraq. This tragic situation has hadnegative impacts on the natural environment and the lives of the people in Iraq,as emphasized in the report issued by the United Nations EnvironmentProgramme (UNEP) on the environmental situation in Iraq in 2003. In the report,experts list the environmental priorities that Iraq needed in order to achieveenvironmental and human security in the period 2005–08. These includeestablishing an environmental infrastructure, enacting environmental laws andregulations to support reconstruction efforts and reduce environmental risks tohuman health in the short term, and avoiding the wasteful exploitation of naturalresources. One of the long-term goals for environmental management is topromote sustainable development.9

The civil war in Lebanon

The civil war in Lebanon started in 1975 and lasted for some fifteen years,inflicting severe damage on human beings and the infrastructure in Lebanon andpolluting the marine environment and the rivers with hazardous and nuclearwastes. All sections of Lebanese society are still paying the price for this sectarianand political war.

Then, in 2006, war broke out between Lebanon and Israel; it lasted for over amonth and had a major impact on Lebanon’s infrastructure, with the bombing ofbridges, industrial facilities and residential areas. As usual in wars against civilians,the conflict had devastating consequences: some 30,000 housing units weredestroyed or heavily damaged and nearly 1 million people were displaced. Theimpact of the conflict was not limited to the civilian population, but also causedextensive damage to the natural environment. The bombing of the Jiyyeh powerplant south of Beirut resulted in the leakage of some 10,000–15,000 tons of oil into

3. The environment

9 The UNEP report on the post-conflict environmental situation in Iraq sets out several prioritiesfor environmental and human rehabilitation, including conducting a temporary environmentalassessment, spreading environmental awareness as an essential part of ensuring a sustainableimprovement of environmental quality, and preventing the population from exposure to the risksof air, soil and water pollution. See: UNEP, 2003, Environment in Iraq: UNEP Progress Report,Switzerland, United Nations Environment Programme, pp. 33 and 34; and UNEP, 2003, Desk Studyon the Environment in Iraq, Switzerland, United Nations Environment Programme. http//www.unep.org


the Mediterranean Sea. There are fears of a possible contamination of land, air,water and organisms as a result of the toxic chemicals leaking from industrial sitesand the types of weapons used in this war.

These figures show the close relationship between military operations and theabsence of human security in Lebanon, a country that is rich in the naturalresources necessary for human survival and the religious pluralism which has beencrucial to its unity and development. However, the civil war and the regional warinflicted massive damage on both the people and the environment.10

The civil war in Sudan

Sudan also suffered for more than two decades (twenty-two years) from the civilwar with separatist groups in the South. The war between the KhartoumGovernment and Southern rebels led to the deaths of at least 1.5 million peopleand the displacement of approximately 5 million people internally and in theneighbouring countries. Sudan now has the largest number of displaced personsin the world. The war brought destruction to the Southern territory until it endedin 2005 with the conclusion of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA)between the Khartoum Government and the Sudan People’s Liberation Army(SPLA). The civil war is still continuing in the territory of Darfur despite thesigning of a peace agreement with rebel tribes in May 2006.

UNEP’s Sudan post-conflict Environmental Assessment shows the closerelationship between conflict and environmental degradation and the absence ofpeace and human security in Sudan.11 This is reflected in the displaced population;the poor administrative structure; the ways in which the disputed resources areexploited; the inadequate investment in sustainable development; the competitionfor oil and gas reserves, Nile water and timber; and agricultural land-use issues.These and other factors are the main reasons behind the eruption and continuation


10 The key recommendations of experts included: the need to strengthen waste management systems,this being one of the fundamental environmental problems associated with armed conflicts; andnational measures to prevent the mixing of hazardous medical wastes with regular wastes, whichposes a severe health risk to workers at those sites and to the public. For the recommendations ofenvironmental experts as to environmental and human rehabilitation, see: UNEP, 2007, Lebanon:Post-Conflict Environmental Assessment, Nairobi, Kenya, United Nations Environment Programme.http//www.unep.org11 http://www.unep.org.bh/Publications/UNEP%20PostConflict%20Work%20in%20the%20Arab%20Region-Arabic.doc


of the conflict. In all situations, environmental factors overlap with a range of othersocial, political and economic issues.12

The civil war in Somalia

The civil war between the factions fighting for power in Somalia is another exampleof the close relationship between armed conflict and the loss of human security.Since the fall of President Siad Barre’s regime in 1991, Somalia has suffered fromover two decades of civil war that has caused massive destruction and led to thedisplacement of thousands of civilians in search of safety, security and a decentliving. The Transitional Federal Government (TFG) has started to identifycommon needs, and the World Bank and the United Nations Development Group(UNDG) participated in this process from November 2005 to July 2006. UNEP, ascoordinator, prepared a draft report on the state of the environment in order toidentify the common needs and provide assistance to Somalia for sustainabledevelopment and reconstruction, and to stimulate the peace process during theperiod 2006–10.

UNEP’s Post-Conflict Unit and the Regional Office in Africa are working closelywith the World Bank and UNDG to prepare the Subcommittee’s report on theenvironmental situation in Somalia. However, the unstable security conditionsmake the task of international organizations highly dangerous and have led tofurther destruction of the environment and the future of the Somali people,particularly the civilian population, in this part of the Arab region.13

* * *As is clear from the above, the worsening economic, social and political situation,in addition to the long-lasting international, regional and civil armed conflicts,constitute the main tool in the destruction of the natural environment and

3. The environment

12 The close relationship between armed conflict and environmental challenges was explained inUNEP’s Sudan field report, December 2005–March 2007. UNEP Executive Director Dr Achim Steinerreferred to this relationship in his introduction to the report: ‘Indeed, UNEP’s investigation hasshown clearly that peace and people’s livelihoods in Darfur as well as the rest of Sudan are inextricablylinked to the environmental challenge. Just as environmental degradation can contribute to thetriggering and perpetuation of conflict, the sustainable management of natural resources can providethe basis for long-term stability, sustainable livelihoods and development.’ See: UNEP, 2007, Sudan:Post-Conflict Environmental Assessment, Nairobi, Kenya, United Nations Environment Programme.http//www.unep.org13 For issues related to the environmental situation and the challenges facing the Arab region, see:‘Environmental Situation in the Arab World, 2003’, op. cit.


components and elements of the environment in the Arab region and the loss ofthe basic components of human security. This was confirmed in the 2003 UNEPreport, ‘Environmental Situation in the Arab World’, which states that:

Peace and security, especially at the national and regional levels, have amajor influence on the form and rate of economic and social development.This is also true in the Arab region, where the situation is even more criticalthan it was during the last decade.

The report adds that war and insecurity in Iraq since the beginning of militaryoperations in 2003 have led many countries in the region to prioritize nationalsecurity at the expense of environmental issues that are no longer seen as a priorityin this region.

Given this situation, decision-makers in the Arab region should be well awarethat their efforts to impose law and order to protect the environment and humansecurity should not be primarily targeted at protecting the state’s political andmilitary security, but rather at protecting the lives of individuals and componentsof the natural environment from other dangerous threats related to theachievement of human security. At the top of the list should come: developmentof the education system; respect for public rights and freedoms; the establishmentof a democratic system; the enactment of regulations and laws on environmentalprotection; and the establishment of an early warning system to face crises, disastersand conflicts that threaten the environment and human security so that individualscan feel secure and achieve stability and sustainable development.

The fear that is reflected in prioritizing military spending over other basic formsof expenditure on humanitarian and sustainable development needs, such aseducation, health care, creating job opportunities and combating illiteracy, washighlighted in the UNDP Human Development Report 2007/2008 on the publicexpenditure priorities in the Arab region.14

* * *The present chapter studies and analyses the legal system in force in the Arabcountries regarding the integration of environmental protection and naturalresources, considering them to be requirements for achieving human security.National and regional commitments to protect the natural environment and its


14 See Table 1 on the next spread.


elements should be one of the highest priorities in order to enhance humansecurity. The study is divided into an introduction and four main sections. Thefirst section deals with the position of Arab constitutions on the protection of theenvironment and human security. The second section deals with the issue ofhuman security in Arab environmental legislation. The following section is devotedto a study of the experience of Kuwait in 1990–91, as a contemporary example ofthe close relationship between destroying the environment and the naturalresources on the one hand, and the loss of human security during armed conflictson the other. The final section includes general recommendations on protectingthe environment as part of the promotion of human security in the Arab region.

A definition of human security

Some legal and social experts maintain that human security consists of severalcomponents, including the maintenance of human dignity and the satisfaction ofindividuals’ moral and physical needs. They stress that human security can beachieved through the adoption of rational development policies, and that themilitary threat is not the only danger – the danger could come in the form ofeconomic deprivation and lack of sufficient guarantees of basic human rights.Achieving human security requires sustainable economic development, theprotection of human rights and freedoms, good governance, social equality andthe rule of law.15

The real contribution that stimulated the concept of human security was theUNDP Human Development Report 1994, whose second chapter dealt with the ‘NewDimensions of Human Security’. The report predicted that the idea of humansecurity, despite its simplicity, could lead to a revolution in society management inthe twenty-first century. The report explained that human security consists of twocomponents: freedom from want and freedom from fear.16

3. The environment

15 K. Arafah, 2003, ‘Changes in the concept of security Human First’, Asian Studies Research Center,Faculty of Economics and Political Science, University of Cairo.16 The team responsible for preparing the Human Development Report 2008 chose the topic of humansecurity as the theme of the report. A questionnaire was prepared to survey the largest numberpossible among the Arab public and researchers on issues threatening human security in Arabsocieties. The questionnaire discovered several threats, most importantly: conflicts with neighbouringcountries; conflicts related to racial, ethnic or religious identity; external aggressions and threats orforeign occupation; global warming; air, water and soil pollution; terrorist operations inside thecountry; restrictions on democratic practices and freedom of expression; and weak legal protectionof individual rights.



Country

Public expenditure on health(% of GDP)

2004

Kuwait 2.2

Qatar 1.8

United Arab Emirates 2.0

Bahrain 2.7

Libyan Arab Jamahiriya 2.8

Oman 2.4

Saudi Arabia 2.5

Jordan 4.7

Lebanon 3.2

Tunisia 2.8

Algeria 2.6

Occupied Palestinian Territories 7.8

Syrian Arab Republic 2.2

Egypt 2.2

Morocco 1.7

Comoros 1.6

Mauritania 2.0

Sudan 1.5

Djibouti 4.4

Yemen 1.9

Iraq –

Somalia –

Source: UNDP, 2007, Human Development Report 2007/2008. Fighting Climate Change: Human Solidarity in a Divided World, New York, United Nations Development Programme, Table 19, pp. 296–97.http://hdr.undp.org/en/reports/global/hdr2007-2008/

Table 1. Priorities in public spending in the Arab states


3. The environment

Public expenditure on education(% of GDP)

Military expenditures(% of GDP)

Total debt service

(% of GDP)

1991 2002–2005 1990 2005 1990 2005

4.8 5.1 48.5 4.8 – –

3.5 1.6 – – – –

2.0 1.3 6.2 2.0 – –

3.9 – 5.1 3.6 – –

– 2.7 – 2.0 – –

3.0 3.6 16.5 11.9 – 4.1

5.8 6.8 14.0 8.2 – –

8.0 4.9 6.9 5.3 15.6 4.8

– 2.6 7.6 4.5 3.5 16.1

6.0 7.3 2.0 1.6 11.6 7.2

5.1 – 1.5 2.9 14.2 5.8

– – – – – –

3.9 – 6.0 5.1 9.7 0.8

3.9 – 4.7 2.8 7.1 2.8

5.0 6.7 5.0 4.5 6.9 5.3

– 3.9 – – 0.4 1.0

4.6 2.3 3.8 3.6 14.3 3.6

6.0 – 3.5 2.3 0.4 1.4

3.5 7.9 5.9 4.2 3.3 2.6

– 9.6 7.9 7.0 3.5 1.4

– – – – – –

– – – – – –

.


On the other hand, the 2001 ‘Third Millennium Report’ of the United Nationsprovided a broad definition of the concept of human security, which was notlimited to:

the absence of armed violence or the absence of wars, but imperativelyincluded human rights, good governance, access to education and healthcare, and emphasis on and providing of opportunities to everyone accordingto their own preference to make their own choices.

Any step in this area is a step closer towards reducing poverty, accessing economicgrowth and preventing conflicts. Freedom from want and freedom from fear, andthe right of future generations to inherit intact natural resources – these componentsrepresent the integrated human pillar which equals national security.

Meanwhile, the United Nations Commission on Human Security (CHS) defineshuman security as follows:

Human security means protecting vital freedoms. It means protectingpeople from critical and pervasive threats and situations, building on theirstrengths and aspirations. It also means creating systems that give peoplethe building blocks of survival, dignity and livelihood.

The position of Arab constitutions on the protection of the environment

and human securityTheoretically speaking, all Arab constitutions contain the constituents of theconcept of human security, which also includes environmental protectionaccording to the definition provided in the UN’s 2001 ‘Third Millennium Report’and the definition of the CHS. All Arab constitutions provide for the state’sobligation to protect and enhance human rights, to offer education and healthcare, the right to work and to choose one’s profession, and the obligation to provideopportunities for citizens without discrimination. However, these constitutionsvary in their position on the nature of the relationship between environmentalprotection and the achievement of human security as one of the constituents ofhuman security in its broader sense as defined by the CHS. This is the tendency



adopted indirectly in most Arab national constitutions, with the exception of somemodern constitutions that are keen to include one or more articles dealing withthe environment and consider it as a constitutional right of citizens that the stateis obliged to achieve, similar to the other basic rights and freedoms necessary toachieve human security.

Selected Arab constitutions

Here we shall outline the position of some Arab constitutions which directly orindirectly provide for the protection of the environment and the conservation ofnatural resources as a human right. The state is under an obligation to take suitablemeasures to enable people to practise these rights, since it is one of the constituentsnecessary to achieve human security in their societies. The Sudanese TransitionalConstitution of 2005, for example, lays down the legal system governing the rightof human beings to a healthy environment, with the state’s commitment tomaintain and promote this right and to refrain from any action that wouldadversely affect natural resources. Article 11 provides that:

(1) the people of Sudan shall have the right to a clean and diversified naturalenvironment. The State and the citizens shall preserve, care for, and developthe biodiversity in the country. (2) The State shall not adopt policies or takeor allow any action that would negatively impact on the existence of anyanimal species or plant variety or on their natural or chosen environment.(3) The State shall enact laws that guarantee the appropriate use of naturalresources and the best ways to manage these resources.17

In addition, the state is under an obligation to refrain from pursuing policies thatcould adversely affect the environment or natural resources, and to work towardsmaking the best use of natural resources through the most successful means of soundenvironmental management to ensure sustainable development. Article 23(1&2h)of the Sudanese Transitional Constitution sets out the basic duties that citizens areobliged to fulfil, including:

3. The environment

17 The Sudanese Constitution of 1998 considers the environment as a guiding principle for the state,as spelled out in Article 13: ‘The State shall promote the health of the society and protect the environmentand its natural balance in order to achieve safety and sustainable development for all generations.’


preserving the natural environment, which requires the active participationof citizens with the relevant State authorities in the preparation andimplementation of plans and programmes, and the cooperation with civilsociety organizations through the preservation of the natural environmentin order to achieve human security in Sudanese society.

Chapter 9 of the Sudanese Penal Code of 1991 outlines the offences relating topublic safety and health. Articles 70 and 71 of the code set out the penaltiesapplicable to any person contaminating the environment and endangering people’slives or safety. Article 71(1) provides that:

Any contamination or pollution of the air or the public environment thatis likely to cause harm to the health of persons, animals or plants shall bepunishable by imprisonment for not more than three months or a fine orboth. If such an act was likely to endanger the lives of people, it shall bepunishable by imprisonment for not more than three years and may alsobe punishable by a fine.

Article 59 of the Egyptian Constitution of 1973 states that: ‘Protection of theenvironment is a national duty and the Law shall provide for the necessary measures topreserve the environment.’ With this article, the task of protecting the environment isassigned to the law drafters; however, protection of the environment is not seen as abasic component of society, as is the case with the right to work, the right to health careand the right to education. Therefore, the protection and preservation of theenvironment is a human right that the state must ensure for its citizens. This policy doesnot consider environmental protection as a constituent of human security, as can befound in the international practice to specify the constituents of human security. TheEgyptian Environmental Law No. 4 of 1994 does not specify the relationship betweenthe environment and human security because the constitution does not consider theprotection of the environment and natural resources as a human right.

Article 35 of the Yemeni Constitution of 1991 as amended in 2001 is similar toArticle 59 of the Egyptian Constitution as it considers environmental protection as anational duty, not as a human right. However, the Yemeni Constitution considersprotecting the environment to be a religious duty and provides that environmentalprotection is the responsibility of the state and society. Article 35 of the YemeniConstitution states that: ‘Protecting the environment is the responsibility of the State



and the society, and is a religious and national duty of every citizen.’ This wordingconfers greater protection on the environment than can be found in some other Arabconstitutions, and holds the community and the citizens responsible for protectingthe environment in the event of damage to the natural environment, natural resources,humans and other living organisms – this is a binding constitutional duty.18

Article 3(4) of the Yemeni Environment Protection Law of 1995 stresses thatthe general principles and objectives of the law should include: ‘Protecting thesociety, human health and the health of other living organisms from all activitiesand acts that are environmentally harmful or that impede the lawful use of thenatural environment.’ Article 4(2) adds that the right of the citizen to a safeenvironment shall be legally protected:

Citizens shall have the fundamental right to live in a healthy and balancedenvironment that is consistent with human dignity and allows people toenjoy healthy physical, mental and intellectual growth. Every natural orlegal person shall be obliged to preserve the environment and naturalresources and to prevent environmental damage and combat pollution.

Paragraph 3 of the previous article provides for the principle of collectiveresponsibility for the protection of the environment and natural resources: ‘OfficialState agencies, public institutions and individuals shall be responsible forpreserving the environment and natural resources, preventing pollution andprotecting wild and marine life.’19

From the above, it is clear that the Yemeni legislature managed to use thisconstitutional right to provide legal protection in the amended EnvironmentProtection Law, and to help to support the human security of individuals in Yemenisociety by holding the state responsible for the protection and conservation of theenvironment and natural resources. This can be achieved by adopting and properlyfollowing good governance and maintaining the productive capacity for the benefit

3. The environment

18 Article 2(8) of the Yemeni Environment Protection Law provides a generic definition of environmentalprotection: ‘Protecting its components, characteristics and natural balance; preventing, reducing orcombating pollution; conservation of natural resources and rationalizing its consumption; andprotecting living organisms, particularly endangered species.’19 Article 80 of the Yemeni Environment Protection Law is a key provision for protecting theenvironment: ‘As an exception to the general rules, penalties punishing acts harmful to the environmentshall not prescribe in the period set by the Law.’


of present and future generations in order to emphasize the close relationship betweenprotecting the environment and natural resources and achieving human security.20

A good example of the modern Arab constitutions that consider the protectionand preservation of the environment as a human right is Article 33 of the IraqiConstitution of 2005, which states that: ‘Every individual has the right to live in asafe environment. The State undertakes to protect and preserve the environmentand biological diversity.’ This constitutional obligation allows Iraqi citizens to obligethe state to develop plans, programmes and laws for environmental protection andthe conservation of natural resources. By virtue of this constitutional provision, thestate is responsible for protecting the environment, which contributes to theachievement of human security in Iraq, a country that has suffered from the absenceof human and environmental security for many decades because of the regionalwars launched by and against Iraq and the terrorist attacks that have taken placeunder the US occupation since 2003.

It should be noted that there are seven Arab provisions that do not directly referto the protection of the environment as a constitutional right of their citizens, whoshould be entitled to live in a clean and pollution-free environment.21 Theseconstitutions do not hold the state constitutionally responsible for protecting theenvironment and developing natural resources, which are considered a constituentof human security. Nonetheless, these constitutions address in some detail theconstituents of human security as they provide that the state should guaranteeeconomic social, political and human rights, undertake to respect and operationalizeinalienable rights and freedoms, and impose constitutional restrictions to limit thedamage to the natural resources of the state and preserve and protect these resourcesfor future generations. The constitutions also provide for recognizing the right tolife; respecting personal freedom and security, safe from persecution, torture orrestrictions on freedom of movement within the homeland and abroad; andrespecting the principle of equality between men and women in terms of rights and


20 Article 4(5) of the Yemeni Environment Protection Law states: ‘When practising any activities oractions of any kind, official government authorities and public and private institutions, whethernational or foreign, as well as individuals, are obliged to prioritize the principle of protecting theenvironment and preventing pollution, not only removing or compensating for damages after suchdamages take place.’21 These seven constitutions are: the Constitution of Algeria as amended in 2002; the Constitutionof Jordan of 1952 as amended in 1985 and 1984; the Constitution of Mauritania of 1991 as amendedin 2006; the Constitution of Morocco of 1996; the Federal Charter of Somalia of 2004; the Constitutionof the Syrian Arab Republic of 1973; and the Constitution of Tunisia of 1976 as amended in 2002.


duties and before the law without any discrimination on the grounds of gender,religion, social origin or for any other reason.

Constitutions of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countriesIn the early 1990s, most Arab Gulf countries started to include environmentalprotection and preservation in their modern national constitutions, thus making ita constitutional obligation that the state, the community and the citizens are obligedto honour. This obligation became equal in its enforceability to the legal rights andfundamental freedoms that constitute the elements of human security. Theseinclude, for example, the right to compulsory education; combating illiteracy; publichealth and access to health care; the right to work and the freedom to choose one’sprofession; and other public rights and freedoms. For example, Article 32 of theBasic Law of Saudi Arabia of 1992 provides that: ‘The State shall work on thepreservation, protection and improvement of the environment, and for the preventionof pollution.’ Pursuant to this constitutional obligation, the state must take thenecessary legislative, administrative, economic or humanitarian procedures topreserve, protect and upgrade the environment in order to achieve the environmentalsecurity of citizens in Saudi Arabia.

In implementation of Article 70 of the Basic Law, Saudi Arabia enacted theGeneral Environmental Law of 2001, which represents the legal framework forenvironmental protection in the Kingdom. Article 2 of this law outlines the overallobjectives, the most important of which are to protect and develop theenvironment, protect public health from the risks of activities and acts that areharmful to the environment, and conserve, develop and rationalize the use ofnatural resources.22 It is worth mentioning that Saudi Arabia is one of the mostadvanced countries in the Arab region in the area of environmental legislation,particularly the protection of wildlife and natural resources, and the establishmentof mechanisms to monitor and implement these laws.23

3. The environment

22 The General Environmental Law of Saudi Arabia consists of twenty-four articles. In implementationof Article 22 thereof, the Implementing Regulations were issued in 2001, and the law came into forcein 2001.23 Royal Decree No. M/34, 1400 AH (AD 1980) on the Conservation of Water Sources, and the 1995Royal Decree on the system of the Protected Areas of Wildlife. In its eighteenth session in Kuwait in1997, the GCC’s Supreme Council approved the 1985 Unified System for Wildlife Protection andDevelopment in GCC States.


On the other hand, the Basic Law of Oman of 1996 considers environmentalpreservation and protection to be among its guiding policy principles, equal toother political, economic and social principles. Article 12 of the Basic Law providesthat: ‘The State shall preserve and protect the environment and prevent pollutionthereof.’ In accordance with this article, the state is committed to ensure, on behalfof all Omani citizens, the protection of the environment from all types of pollution.This falls within the framework of other social principles, the most important ofwhich are: public health; providing health care for all citizens; recognizing the rightto work and to choose one’s profession; and ensuring justice, equality and equalopportunities for all Omanis, considering these principles as the pillars of thesociety. This said, the state’s commitment to preserve and protect the environmentand prevent pollution helps to advance the other fundamental rights, which areconsidered to be basic requirements for achieving human security in Omani societythrough implementing and putting into practice the political, economic, social,cultural and security principles.24

Article 9(C) of the Constitution of Bahrain of 2002 is similar to Article 12 ofthe Omani Basic Law, but it does not consider environmental protection andpreservation to be a fundamental right of citizens, as is the case with the right tohealth care or the right to work or to choose one’s profession. The constitutionconsiders environmental protection as a constitutional obligation that is bindingon the state. This can be clearly seen in the wording of Article 12(C) on theenvironment: ‘The State shall take the necessary measures to preserve theenvironment and maintain wildlife.’ Likewise, Article 33 of the Constitution ofQatar of 2003 considers environmental protection as a basic pillar of society: ‘TheState shall protect the environment and maintain its natural balance in order toachieve comprehensive and sustainable development for all generations.’

Article 23 of the Constitution of the United Arab Emirates (UAE) of 1971 asamended in 2004 obliges the society ‘to preserve and best utilize natural resourcesfor the benefit of the national economy, considering such resources as a basic socialand economic backbone of the Union.’ With this article, the UAE legislature


24 Oman is considered one of the first GCC states to have drawn up an environmental law, as itissued the Law on Protecting the Marine Environment in 1974, in addition to several laws protectingwildlife and establishing nature reserves. A general law regulating environmental protection andpollution control was amended in 1985 and 1989. In 2001, Sultanic Decree 114/2001 was issued,promulgating the Law on Environment Protection and Pollution Control, abolishing Sultanic Decree82/10 and all decrees contradicting the new law, which came into force on 14 November.


curtails the state’s constitutional commitment towards the protection andpreservation of the environment, if compared to Article 70 of the Saudi Basic Law,which considers environmental preservation, protection and development as oneof the state’s binding duties. The same can be found in the constitutions of Bahrainand Qatar and the Basic Law of Oman. Despite the generic language in Article 23of the UAE Constitution, the state remains responsible for cooperating with thesociety to take legal action and other measures to protect the environment andpreserve natural resources, considering such resources as a basic social andeconomic backbone of the Union.25

On the other hand, the Constitution of Kuwait of 1962 – which has not beenamended subsequently – does not include clear provisions that would giveconstitutional leverage to environmental preservation and protection or oblige thestate to protect or preserve the environment, as was stated in the constitutions ofGulf countries that were issued or amended in the early 1990s. However, theKuwaiti Constitution includes many articles that concern the basic rights andfreedoms that represent the constituents of human security. Article 21, for example,obliges the state to protect, preserve and make best use of natural resources, takinginto account the security and national economy of the state. Article 31 prohibitsthe torture of all human persons and restrictions on their freedom of residenceand movement except where the law so provides. However, Articles 35 and 36provide for the right of all persons to express their opinion verbally, in writing orotherwise; absolute freedom of belief; and that the state shall ensure freedom ofopinion and scientific research.

Another key requirement in achieving human security and contributing toenvironmental protection and preservation is the promotion of public educationand environmental awareness. The Kuwaiti Constitution is similar to all the otherGCC constitutions in considering the right to education as a constitutional rightof all citizens. According to Article 40 of the constitution, the state guarantees theright of Kuwaiti citizens to education, which is free of charge in the earlycompulsory stages. This will help to combat illiteracy, which is still widespreadamong the Arab Gulf countries, especially among women, and is only expected tobe eradicated by 2015. (Qatar and the UAE are the exceptions here.)26

3. The environment

25 The UAE issued Federal Law 24/1999 concerning the Protection and Development of the Environmentas a comprehensive framework law, as we shall see in the next section of the present chapter.26 For estimates and projections of adult illiteracy for the population aged 15 years and above, bycountry and by gender, in the Arab Gulf countries, see Table 2.



Country Illiteracy rate (%) Year

Male Female Total

Bahrain

9.1 17.4 12.5 2000

7.4 13.6 10.0 2005

6.0 11.0 8.1 2010

5.0 8.4 6.5 2015

Iraq

45.1 76.7 60.7 2000

43.4 74.8 58.9 2005

41.9 72.9 57.2 2010

40.3 70.9 55.4 2015

Kuwait

16.1 20.4 18.1 2000

14.3 17.2 15.6 2005

12.9 14.8 13.8 2010

11.6 12.8 12.2 2015

Oman

19.9 38.4 28.3 2000

15.1 29.5 21.7 2005

11.3 22.7 16.6 2010

8.4 17.9 12.9 2015

Qatar

19.6 16.9 18.8 2000

18.0 13.5 16.5 2005

16.3 11.4 14.6 2010

14.7 9.0 12.7 2015

Saudi Arabia

17.0 33.1 23.8 2000

14.2 26.7 19.6 2005

11.7 21.4 16.0 2010

9.5 17.0 12.9 2015

United Arab Emirates

25.2 20.9 23.8 2000

23.2 17.3 21.2 2005

21.5 14.4 19.0 2010

19.9 12.1 17.0 2015

Source: UNESCO, Institute for Statistics: Literacy and Non Formal Education Sector, Estimates andProjections of Adult Illiteracy for Population Aged 15 Years and Above, by Country and by Gender1970–2015 (July 2002 Assessment)http://www.uis.unesco.org/en/stats/statistics/UIS_Literacy_Country2002.xls

Table 2. Estimates and projections of adult illiteracy for the population aged 15 years, by country and by gender, in the Arab Gulf countries, 2000–2015


The human security perspective in Arab environmental legislation

The Arab region is facing several environmental challenges that affect the sea, theair and the soil. Ineffective environmental legislation and continuing regional andnational conflicts are also part of these challenges. Arab seas are contaminated withoil and dangerous wastes, not to mention the negligence and reluctance to takeserious measures to dispose of wastewater and eliminate air pollution. Otherproblems include physical changes in the natural habitat, industrial discharges,solid wastes, waste dumping, and the lack of projects and legal frameworks toprotect biodiversity in Arab marine environments.27

Other problems are land degradation and the spread of desertification, whichreduce the productivity of the land and thereby threaten human life in this region.Therefore, proper management of land resources, and also water resources, isimperative in order to achieve sustainable development and human security in theregion and to combat land degradation and preserve the soil and protectvegetation. Since land degradation and desertification have local, regional andglobal dimensions, Arab states have exerted great efforts to curb them on thenational level with the assistance of international, regional and subregionalorganizations.28

Meanwhile, the majority of Arab countries are signatories to many internationalagreements and conventions, including biodiversity conventions, such as the UnitedNations Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD), the Convention on InternationalTrade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES) and the Conventionon Wetlands of International Importance especially as Waterfowl Habitat (RamsarConvention). But there are many impediments hindering biodiversity protectionand conservation in the Arab region, including water scarcity, land degradation,poverty, poor application of the relevant national laws and international conventions,and the lack of financial resources in most of these countries.29

3. The environment

27 The biodiversity protocols for areas protected by the Regional Organization for the Conservationof the Environment of the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden (PERSGA), in cooperation with UNEP/ROWA,the Regional Organization for Protection of the Marine Environment (ROPME) and the SaudiNational Commission for Wildlife Conservation and Development.28 The majority of Arab countries ratified the International Convention to Combat Desertificationin 1994.29 For the position of the Arab states on international environmental conventions, see Table 3.



CountryCartagenaProtocol

on Biosafety

FrameworkConvention on ClimateChange

Kyoto Protocol to the FrameworkConvention on Climate Change

2000 1992 1997

Kuwait – 1994 2005

Qatar 2007 1996 2005

United Arab Emirates – 1995 2005

Bahrain – 1994 2006

Libyan Arab Jamahiriya 2005 1999 2006

Oman 2003 1995 2005

Saudi Arabia 2007 1994 2005

Jordan 2003 1993 2003

Lebanon – 1994 2006

Tunisia 2003 1993 2003

Algeria 2004 1993 2005

Occupied Palestinian Territories – – –

Syrian Arab Republic 2004 1996 2006

Egypt 2003 1994 2005

Morocco 2000 1995 2002

Comoros – 1994 –

Mauritania 2005 1994 2005

Sudan 2005 1993 2004

Djibouti 2002 1995 2002

Yemen 2005 1996 2004

Iraq – – –

Somalia – – –

Table 3. Major international environmental treaties ratified by Arab states

Note: Dates are as of 1 July 2007. Dates refer to year of ratification, accession approval or succession unless otherwisespecified. All these stages have the same legal effects. Bold signifies signature not yet followed by ratification.Source: Human Development Report 2007/2008. Fighting Climate Change: Human Solidarity in a Divided World,Table 25, pp. 314–17. http://hdr.undp.org/en/reports/global/hdr2007-2008/


3. The environment

Conventionon BiologicalDiversity

Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer

Montreal Protocol on Substances that deplete

the Ozone Layer

StockholmConvention on

Persistent OrganicPollutants

Convention of the Law of the Sea

Convention to Combat

Desertification

1992 1988 1989 2001 1982 1994

2002 1992 1992 2006 1986 1997

1996 1996 1996 2004 2002 1999

2000 1989 1989 2002 1982 1998

1996 1990 1990 2006 1985 1997

2001 1990 1990 2005 1984 1996

1995 1999 1999 2005 1989 1996

2001 1993 1993 2002 1996 1997

1993 1989 1989 2004 1995 1996

1994 1993 1993 2003 1995 1996

1993 1989 1989 2004 1985 1995

1995 1992 1992 2006 1996 1996

– – – – – –

1996 1989 1989 2005 – 1997

1994 1988 1988 2003 1983 1995

1995 1995 1995 2004 2007 1996

1994 1994 1994 2007 1994 1998

1996 1994 1994 2005 1996 1996

1995 1993 1993 2006 1985 1995

1994 1999 1999 2004 1991 1997

1996 1996 1996 2004 1987 1997

– – – – 1985 –

– 2001 2001 – 1989 2002


It is worth stressing that environmental laws are a key requirement in achievingsustainable development and protecting the environment. Eco-conservation is abasic constituent of human security in the Arab region; it requires legal protectionand the promotion of institutional and legal frameworks to protect the environmentand the seriously deteriorating natural resources that threaten the Arab peoples’potential to live in a proper environment, considering it as a human right.30

In addition to the three modern environmental framework laws (the UAE FederalLaw 24/1999 concerning the Protection and Development of the Environment; theLebanese Law on Environmental Protection of 2002; and the Qatari Decree Law30/2002 promulgating the Environment Protection Law), the Egyptian Law onEnvironmental Protection was passed in 1994 and is considered to be one of the mostcomprehensive environmental laws in the Arab region. Yemen enacted theFramework Law 26/1995 concerning Environmental Protection (and these areamong the modern Arab laws that established the legal and institutional frameworksfor protecting the environment and the natural resources), and in 1996 Bahrainissued the Environmental Law.31

In the light of the environmental developments and challenges facing the Arabregion, the law has a major role to play. Many Arab environmental laws wereenacted in the early 1990s, particularly the modern Arab framework environmentallaws that make an active contribution to the protection of the natural environmentand the conservation of natural resources in order to achieve human security forthe Arab people.

Three new environmental laws have been selected for study and analysis in thischapter: the UAE Federal Law concerning the Protection and Development of theEnvironment of 1999; the Lebanese Law on Environmental Protection of 2002;and the Qatari Environment Protection Law of 2002. The aim is to discover howfar the measures and procedures set out in these laws address the environmentalchallenges at the national and international levels and achieve environmentalsecurity and human security in the Arab region.


30 For obstacles preventing the integration of international environmental conventions into nationalenvironmental laws in the GCC, see B. A. Al-Awadhi, 2000, ‘Obstacles Preventing Implementationof International Environmental Conventions in GCC Countries’, Conference on EnvironmentalLaws in the Arab Region, Faculty of Law, University of Kuwait.31 Yemeni Law 11/1993 on Protecting the Marine Environment from Pollution. Jordan issued theProvisional Environmental Protection Law 1/2003, consisting of twenty-five articles.


The UAE Federal Law concerning the Protection and Development of the Environment (1999)

In Article 1 of the Federal Law,32 the UAE legislature adopted environmentalprotection in the broad sense: it defined the term ‘environmental degradation’ asaffecting the environment in ways that would reduce its value, distort its nature,deplete its resources or harm living organisms or monuments. Article 2 of this lawoutlines the objectives and general principles that the law seeks to achieve. Thesereflect the state’s policies and commitments towards the environment and the people:

• protecting the environment and maintaining its quality and balance; and• combating the various forms of pollution and avoiding any damage or

negative/long-term impacts resulting from economic, agricultural, industrial,urban or other development plans and programmes, or any other developmentprogrammes that aim to improve the quality of life.33

A new characteristic in the Federal Law that is not common in Arab environmentallaws is Article 2(6), which provides for ‘implementing the commitmentsenumerated in the international or regional conventions ratified or accessed bythe UAE that address environmental protection, pollution prevention and naturalresources conservation’. This paragraph is consistent with the norms ofinternational law, which stress states’ commitment to respect and implement theprovisions stipulated in the conventions they ratify or to which they accede, unlessthe state has reservations on certain provisions of the convention.34

In line with the international policies and the recommendations of the UnitedNations Conference on Environment and Development, also known as the Earth

3. The environment

32 Law 24/1999 concerning the Protection and Development of the Environment, UAE Official Gazette,Issue 340/28, October 1999. According to Article 101, this law came into force as of 17 December 1999.33 Paragraph 3 of Article 2: ‘The Federal Law seeks to achieve coordination between the Agency[Federal Environmental Agency], the competent authorities [the competent local authority in eachEmirate of the UAE] and concerned agencies [all agencies concerned with environmental affairsand development within the UAE], to protect the environment, maintain its quality and naturalbalance, spread environmental awareness and establish pollution control principles.’34 This orientation is also adopted by the Qatari Constitution of 2003 regarding all internationalenvironmental and other conventions. In Article 6, Qatar undertakes: ‘… to respect internationalcovenants and conventions, and to implement all international agreements, treaties and covenantsto which Qatar is a party.’


Summit (Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, 1992), which stress maintaining sustainable developmentand promoting human security, Article 9 of the UAE Federal Law states that:

All government authorities concerned with environmental and developmentalaffairs … particularly the agencies responsible for economic and urbanplanning and development, shall pay attention to the considerations ofenvironmental protection, pollution prevention, and rational exploitation ofnatural resources when adopting economic and social development plans, andwhen establishing and implementing projects.

The Federal Law addresses protection of the marine environment in detail in orderto provide effective protection for this environment and for living and non-livingnatural resources, which are considered a basic pillar for the national andhumanitarian stability of any country. Article 21 prohibits the discharge or disposalof oil or oil mixtures into the marine environment by all means of marinetransportation, including ships, hydrofoils, hovercrafts, floating units, stationaryor floating marine platforms, and seaplanes – regardless of the nationality thereofand whether or not they were registered in their country.35

Emphasizing the seriousness of hazardous materials for the marine environmentand for living and non-living natural resources, Article 27 of the Federal Lawprohibits ‘all means of marine transportation carrying hazardous materials fromreleasing or discharging any harmful substances or wastes into the marineenvironment directly or indirectly’. It also prohibits ‘means of marine transportationcarrying harmful substances in packages, shipping containers, portable tanks ortanker cars, whether they are trucks or rail cars, from disposing of such substancesby discharging them into the marine environment of the State’.36

Although disposal of, discharging or dumping of dangerous substances andwastes into the marine environment is more dangerous than the dumping of oilor oil mixtures, Article 73(1) of the UAE Federal Law punishes the captain or theperson in charge of the vessel when such person violates the provisions of


35 Articles 22, 23, 24, 25 and 26 of this law spell out the obligations of the captain or the person incharge of the vessel in cases of marine environment pollution, and the data to be entered into theOil Record as stated in the Implementing Regulations, as well as the availability of the equipmentnecessary for the operations of fighting marine pollution caused by vessels as specified in theImplementing Regulations.36 Articles 27–31 of the UAE Federal Law.


Articles 21, 27 or 31 by discharging or releasing oil or oil mixtures into the marineenvironment with the same penalty: imprisonment and a fine of not less than150,000 dirhams and not more than 1 million dirhams.37

We agree with the UAE lawmakers, who imposed stronger penalties onviolating the prohibition explained in Article 62(1), i.e. cases of importing orbringing in substances, wastes or nuclear wastes; or burying, sea-dumping, storingor disposing in any way of such substances and wastes within the country’senvironment. The maximum penalty is either death or life imprisonment and afine of not less than 1 million and not more than 10 million dirhams. In addition,any person who violates the provisions of paragraphs 1 and 2 of Article 62 mustre-export the hazardous and nuclear wastes that are the subject of the crime attheir own expense.38

The same can be seen in Article 62, which imposes a total ban on importing orbringing in hazardous substances, or burying, sea-dumping, storing or disposing inany way of such substances within the country’s environment by any public or privateinstitution, natural person or legal entity. The ban also applies to importing or bringingin nuclear substances or wastes or burying, sea-dumping, storing or disposing in anyway of such substances within the country’s environment: this is an important steptowards protecting the environment from the pollution caused by hazardous andnuclear wastes and protecting the national and human security of citizens.

To achieve the overall objectives of the Federal Law in protecting the environment,human health and natural resources in the UAE and neighbouring countries, it isimperative that the third paragraph of Article 62 is amended. It reads as follows:‘Unless a written permit is granted by the Authority allowing the passage of marine,air or land means of transportation that are carrying hazardous or nuclear wastes inthe marine or land environments, such passage shall be prohibited.’ What isdangerous about this paragraph is that it is not a total ban, thus opening the doorfor exceptions that may threaten environmental and human security in the state. Inmany cases, the UAE prioritizes urban and economic development over theprotection of natural resources and the natural environment. This concern is justifiedwhen we consider the heavy punishments provided for in Article 73(2), which

3. The environment

37 The UAE ratified the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships (MARPOL73/78) by virtue of Federal Decree 74/2006, which came into effect as of 15 April 2007 pursuant tothe recommendation of the GCC’s Council of Ministers. This recommendation urged states toexpedite their accession to MARPOL 73/78.38 Article 62(3) of the UAE Federal Law.


stipulates capital punishment or life imprisonment and a fine of not less than 1million dirhams and not more than 10 million dirhams for any person who violatesthe provisions of Article 62(2), in addition to obliging the importer to re-export thehazardous or nuclear wastes that are the subject of the crime at his own expense.

On the other hand, the UAE Federal Law addresses in ten articles the subject ofprotecting the air from pollution to reduce the damage to human health, which isan essential constituent for achieving human security. According to Article 48, allinstitutions shall be committed, when exercising their business, not to allowemissions or leakage of air pollutants beyond the allowed limits determined in theImplementing Regulations. The Federal Law establishes the procedures andmeasures to be taken, as well as the actions that are prohibited, in order to preventair pollution in the state.39

It is clear from this brief explanation of the main articles of the UAE Federal Lawthat the degradation of the natural environment and its elements in the Arab regionis due to the fact that environmental laws have failed to keep pace with scientificdevelopments in the field of environmental protection on the one hand, and the lackof mechanisms involved in monitoring and implementing environmental laws at thenational level on the other. In addition, extensive powers are granted to theauthorities that supervise the application of the law within the country.

As the UAE seeks to prevent these obstacles from hindering the implementationof this framework law at the federal level, Article 71 sets out detailed andcomprehensive rules governing the liability and the compensation related toenvironmental damages. According to this article, any person whose actions ornegligence causes damage to the environment as a result of violating the provisionsof this law, or any regulations or decrees issued in implementation thereof, shallbe responsible for bearing all the costs for the treatment or removal of all damages,in addition to any ensuing compensation. Article 72 of the Federal Law outlinesthe elements of environmental damage compensation, which include damagesdirectly affecting the environment, preventing or reducing the legitimate usethereof whether temporarily or permanently, harming the economic or aestheticvalue of the environment, as well as the rehabilitation of the environment.40


39 Articles 48–57 of the UAE Federal Law.40 Article 69 of the UAE Federal Law allows inspectors of facilities, and other sites, to verifyimplementation of the provisions of the law and the decrees issued to enforce it. Article 70 specifiesthe functions of judicial inspectors regarding violations committed by the captain of the vessel,according to the provisions of the Law on Marine Environment Pollution.


3. The environment

The Lebanese Law on Environmental Protection (2002)

Article 1 of the Lebanese Law on Environmental Protection sets out the legalframework for implementing the national environmental protection policy whiletaking account of recent environmental laws and policies by stressing the closerelationship between environmental protection and sustainable development. Thisaims to prevent all forms of degradation and pollution, promote the sustainableuse of natural resources, and provide an environmentally proper and stable life toachieve human security in Lebanese society.41

Article 3 of this law reflects how keen the Lebanese legislature is to keep abreastof recent developments by considering environmental protection and theconservation of natural resources as a human right by emphasizing that:

Every human being shall have the right to a proper and stable environment,and every citizen shall be under the duty to maintain environmentalprotection and ensure the needs of present generations, without prejudiceto the rights of future generations.

Article 4 outlines the responsibility of natural persons, legal entities, and public andprivate institutions for protecting the environment and natural resources througha commitment to the eleven environmental principles set out in this law. Seriousand effective protection of the environment could be ensured in Lebanon if this lawwas effectively implemented. Lebanon has suffered greatly from environmentalviolations due to the civil and regional wars throughout the last quarter of a century,and the absence of a comprehensive framework law that would prevent damage tothe environment and natural resources. We provide a brief overview below of themost important environmental principles that constitute the legal basis of this lawand distinguish it from the Arab environmental laws that were enacted in the late1990s and the early years of the twenty-first century.

41 The Lebanese Law on Environmental Protection No. 444 consists of sixty-eight articles and cameinto effect according to this article as of the date of its publication in the Official Gazette.


The principle of equal participation in the National Environment Council

Article 6 of the Lebanese Law on Environmental Protection is unique in that itestablishes for the first time in the Arab region a modern legal framework for jointenvironmental action between the state and civil society organizations. The articleexplains that the National Environment Council is to be formed of fourteen members,half of whom are to be from the ministries concerned with the environment, andthe other half from the private sector (environmental associations, environmentalexperts and members of trade unions).

The way the National Environment Council is formed gives a distinctive characterto this law when compared to environmental laws in the rest of the Arab region,which do not provide for the principle of equal participation in the management ofnational environmental councils or bodies. With the implementation of this rule,environmental action becomes a shared responsibility between public and civilsectors, which will participate equally in making and implementing environmentalpolicies. This pioneering step by the Lebanese legislature should encourage equitableparticipation in environmental decision-making in Lebanon, thus contributing tothe public’s acceptance of and commitment to the law as they become a central partyin its enactment and implementation.

This emphasizes the National Environment Council’s supervisory role over theMinister of Environment when the minister drafts and revises the government’scentral plan for environmental protection. Article 5(1) of the law provides that:‘In implementation of this Law, the Minister of Environment shall set up a centralenvironmental protection plan upon the suggestion of the National EnvironmentCouncil …’. Paragraph 2 of the same article provides that:

The central environmental protection plan shall be subject to periodicbiennial review by the Minister of Environment upon the suggestion ofthe National Environment Council. Amendments to such plan shall beadopted by virtue of a Cabinet decree upon the proposal of the Ministerof Environment.42


42 Article VII of the law reads as follows: ‘In addition to the tasks assigned to the National EnvironmentCouncil, according to the Law Establishing the Ministry of Environment, the Council undertakesthe following advisory tasks:


Establishing an Environment Fund

Article 8 of the law provides for the establishment of an Environment Fund thatshould be granted the status of an independent legal entity under the control ofthe Audit Court and the trusteeship of the Minister of Environment. Article 9defines the functions and competences of the fund, the most important of which isto contribute to financing control procedures and to supervise the application ofthis law and its Implementing Regulations. We believe that entrusting theEnvironment Fund with this task is very important in the Arab region, which suffersfrom the absence of environmental law enforcement due to the lack of necessaryfinancial resources to enable governments to carry out this task. Hence, the fact thatthe Lebanese Law on Environmental Protection grants the Environment Fund theright to provide financial support to finance control measures and superviseenactment of the law and its Implementing Regulations is a serious step taken bythe Lebanese legislature towards putting this law into effect.

Other tasks assigned to the Environment Fund that have a positive influence onenvironmental protection and promote environmental and humanitarian securityin Lebanese society include: supporting and encouraging sustainable developmentactivities and projects that aim to protect the environment, fight desertification,deforestation and soil erosion and protect biodiversity; supporting the initiativesand activities undertaken by non-governmental associations and organizations;contributing to the preventive activities that have an impact on the environment ingeneral; and granting loans under certain conditions to be determined in a Cabinetdecree upon the proposal of the ministers of environment and finance to any personpractising an activity that would improve the quality of the environment.

Article 10 of the Lebanese Environmental Law sets out the conditions andrestrictions governing the sources of income of the National Environment Fund. Themost important of those are an annual financial contribution from the state’s generalbalance sheet, the fines and damages awarded or agreed upon in compensation for

3. The environment

‘A) Recommending the specification of environmental priorities and objectives, and proposingamendments to environmental policies.

‘B) Evaluating the environmental impacts associated with any activity related to natural resourcesand making necessary recommendations.

‘C)Coordinating the orientations of institutions, departments and ministries concerned withenvironmental protection.

‘D)Recommending the amendment of laws, systems, specifications and national quality standardsrelated to the protection of the environment and its resources.’


any damage caused to the environment pursuant to the provisions of the law andany reconciliation related thereto.43

Recognizing the citizen’s right to access environmental information

Article 14(1) of the Lebanese Environmental Law lays down the managementsystem governing environmental information and environmental protectionmethods. This system is applied under the supervision of the Ministry ofEnvironment. Paragraph 2 of this article states that:

Any natural person or legal entity concerned with environmentalmanagement and sustainable development may access the environmentalinformation management system according to the provisions of this Lawand its Implementing Regulations. Any person may obtain objectiveinformation on the situation of the environment, except for informationrelating to national security or professional confidentiality. Such informationshall be made available within one month. Any refusal to provide therequired information shall be justified.

Further to the Ministry of Environment’s control and supervision of the qualityof environmental education programmes in Lebanon, Article 16 of the LebaneseEnvironmental Law states that:

All educational institutions, whether elementary, preparatory, secondary oruniversity, public or private, and any other academic institution, shallincorporate into the curriculum thereof environmental programmes. Suchprogrammes shall be subject to the approval of the Ministry of Environment.Article 17 of this law provides that public and private institutions workingin the fields of education, training, research, information and culture shallcooperate with the Ministry of Environment and the concerned ministriesto develop media information campaigns and awareness-raising campaigns


43 For other revenue sources of the National Environment Fund, see subparagraphs b–e of Article 10(1)of the law. Article 65 provides that: ‘… The total amount of fines and compensations collectedpursuant to the provisions of this Law and its Implementing Regulations shall be received by theNational Environment Fund.’


on the protection of the environment and natural resources and theapplication of protection techniques.

The Lebanese legislature’s concern for environmental awareness will have a positiveimpact on raising a generation that is eager to protect the natural environmentand conserve natural resources. In return, this will enhance human security inLebanon.

Participation in environment management

Article 18 of the Lebanese Environmental Law provides for the citizen’s right toparticipate in the management and protection of the environment by taking partin many activities related to the achievement of human security, in particular:

• launching awareness campaigns and disseminating information on environ -mental issues among citizens;

• developing recycling technologies and centres for waste collection, separationand disposal, particularly at the local level;

• preparing instructions for the use of special technologies and alternativeenergy and materials and the preservation of natural resources. Alsodeveloping monitoring indicators that encourage the prevention, reductionand control of pollution; and

• the duty of everyone to report any potential environmental harm to theMinistry of Environment.

Reliance on economic incentives

Article 20 outlines the incentives included in the law to encourage individuals andcompanies to follow modern techniques in order to reduce environmentalpollution and treat, recycle and use wastes. These incentives include tariffreductions of up to 50 per cent or tax reductions of not more than 50 per cent forthese businesses, according to the conditions and rules to be determined in aCabinet decree upon the proposal of the ministers of environment and finance.44

3. The environment

44 Article 20 is similar to Articles 17 and 18 of the Egyptian Law on Environmental Protection andArticle 96 of the UAE Federal Law concerning the Protection and Development of the Environment.


Protecting the marine environment from pollution

Article 29 of the law sets out the objectives to be achieved from protecting themarine environment – particularly the country’s shores, natural resources andmarine resources – from pollution. The law addresses the protection of the marineenvironment from all forms of pollution within Lebanese territorial waters. It isstrictly prohibited to discharge, submerge or burn in Lebanese territorial watersany substance that would directly or indirectly affect human health or naturalresources, or that would harm marine activities and marine organisms. Thisincludes navigation, fishing, the removal of plants and algae, sabotaging the qualityof marine waters, and reducing the recreational value or tourism potential of thesea and the shores of Lebanon.45

Protecting the aquatic environment from pollution

Four articles of the law address the measures that should be taken to: (a) protect thewater environment – including surface water and groundwater – from all risks andforms of pollution and to restore the quality of water; (b) protect environmentalbalances; (c) develop, protect and value natural resources as economic resources; and(d) ensure the distribution of water among the different uses. The articles also explainthe measures and conditions for protecting the terrestrial and undergroundenvironment in order to: (a) limit soil degradation and erosion; (b) fight desertificationand the pollution of land, underground and natural resources; and (c) promote rationalland and underground uses and the utilization of their natural resources.46

Protecting the environment from hazardous materials

Article 44 of the Lebanese Environmental Law deals with protecting the environmentfrom hazardous and harmful substances and explains the conditions to be met for


45 Articles 29, 30 and 34 of the law. Article 31 authorizes the Minister of Public Works and Transportationto depend on environmental impact assessment studies carried out in accordance with the provisionsof the law and its Implementing Regulations to permit the discharge, dumping or burning interritorial waters and the sea bottom of territorial waters.46 Articles 35, 36 and 37 of the law and Articles 38, 39, 40 and 41 of Chapter IV of Part V of the law.Article 38 provides for protecting the terrestrial and underground environment. Such protection isto be determined by virtue of a decree by the Council of Ministers, upon the proposal of the Ministerof Environment and other concerned ministers.


importing, producing, extracting, transforming, marketing, possessing, using,damaging or transporting such materials through Lebanese territory. The article alsoexplains how to manage natural resources and protect biodiversity in the face of allsources of degradation, pollution and risks of exhaustion.47

Article 50 defines the preventive measures that must be taken to address any seriousenvironmental pollution resulting from natural disasters, war or other circumstances.It also defines the competences of the concerned departments and authorities in theimplementation of these measures through developing a national plan for managingdisasters and natural hazards in each region of Lebanon. Such a plan is to be preparedby the Ministry of Environment in collaboration with the concerned ministries. Webelieve that the Lebanese legislature was right to include these precautionary measuresin the Environmental Law because they are of vital importance in ensuring humansecurity during environmental disasters, whether in peace or war.

Responsibilities and penalties

Chapter 6 of the Lebanese Environmental Protection Law specifies the responsibilitiesand penalties applicable to any person who causes damage to other persons or tothe environment. Article 51 entitles the state, represented by the Ministry ofEnvironment, to seek compensation for any harm caused to the environment.48

Article 62 lists the penalties applicable to any person who violates theenvironmental protection provisions of this law and its Implementing Regulations.These penalties are specified as imprisonment for up to one year and/or a fine ofnot less than 1 million and not more than 10 million Lebanese pounds. In case ofrepetition of the offence, the punishment is doubled. In recognition of theseriousness of environmental pollution caused by harmful wastes and hazardoussubstances, the fine specified in Article 61 has been increased from 10 million to100 million Lebanese pounds.49

3. The environment

47 Articles 47–49 of the law.48 Article 52(1),(2) provides for the responsibility of persons causing harm to the environment,especially in relation to primary environmental inspection or environmental impact assessment.They are obliged to take all measures necessary to remove the damage at their own expense. Theresponsibility of the persons causing the environmental damage includes the expenditures incurredby the concerned authorities to prevent any damage affecting the environment.49 The maximum fine provided for in Law No. 44/88 of 1988 on the Preservation of the Environmentagainst Pollution from Hazardous Wastes and Materials (10 million Lebanese pounds) was amendedin the current law.


Seeking to implement the basic principles enumerated in this law, the Lebaneselegislature has imposed a severe penalty on anyone who violates its provisions. Thisapplies to projects that are established unrestricted by the applicable environmentalspecifications and standards: for example, environmental examination studies orenvironmental impact assessments. Article 58 punishes violators with imprisonmentfor not less than one month and not more than one year, and/or a fine of not lessthan 15 million and not more than 200 million Lebanese pounds. The same penaltyapplies to those who oppose or obstruct supervision, inspection and analysisprocedures provided for in the law or its Implementing Regulations.

There is no doubt that Article 58 of the Lebanese Environmental Law representsan important and daring step towards combating environmentally harmful projects.Article 66, however, reduces the effectiveness of the penalties included in this law,as it allows the Minister of Environment ‘to reconcile the fines and the damagesimposed in implementation of this law and its Implementing Regulations againstany harm caused to the environment …’, even if this right is to reach a settlementregarding not more than half the amount of the fine or compensation.

The Qatari Environment Protection Law (2002)

The Qatari Environment Protection Law aims to provide comprehensiveprotection for the environment and natural resources, and is considered amongthe most modern environmental laws in the Arab region. Under Article 3 of thelaw, all facilities that already existed when the law was issued have been granted aperiod of two years from the enforcement date of its Implementing Regulationsto adjust their status. This period can be extended for further periods by virtue ofa decision by the Amir upon the proposal of the Head of the Supreme Council forEnvironment and Protected Area.50

The five paragraphs of Article 2 specify the goals that the law seeks to achieve,with an emphasis on the link between environmental protection and sustainabledevelopment. These goals most notably include:


50 Decree Law 30/2002 issuing the Environment Protection Law on 29 September 2002 came intoforce six months following the date of its publication in the Official Gazette; it consists of seventy-fivearticles divided into five sections.


• protecting the environment and maintaining its quality and natural balance;• developing natural resources and maintaining biodiversity conservation and

best utilizing it for the benefit of present and future generations;51 and• protecting the society and the health of humans and other living organisms

from all activities that harm the environment or impede the lawful use ofenvironmental surroundings.

Article 2(5) of this law is in line with Principle 12 of the Declaration of the UNConference on the Human Environment (Stockholm, 1972) and Principle 14 ofthe 1992 Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, which has beenincluded in numerous international environmental conventions, particularlyArticle 195 of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea of 1982, which obligesstates to take all necessary ‘measures to prevent, reduce and control pollution ofthe marine environment. States shall act so as not to transfer, directly or indirectly,damage or hazards from one area to another or transform one type of pollutioninto another.’

Article 6 of the Qatari Environment Protection Law binds all administrativeand private bodies to stipulate environmental protection and fighting pollutionin all national and international agreements and contracts whose execution mightadversely impinge on the environment, and on human health, and consequentlyon human security in Qatari society. These contracts must include penalty clausesand should oblige transgressors to bear the costs of removing the environmentaldamages and pay the ensuing compensations. Despite the importance of thisarticle, given the rapid and indiscriminate economic development in GCCcountries, the penalties established for violations of the provisions of this law donot include penalizing the administrative bodies if they violate their legalobligation to protect the environment or if they breach the legal provision thatplaces local and international contracts under the supervision of the SupremeCouncil for Environment and Protected Area.

In line with recent trends to develop a contingency plan to face environmentaldisasters, Articles 21 and 22 of the Qatari Environment Protection Law oblige the

3. The environment

51 Articles 3–6 of the law explain the obligations of the state’s administrative bodies in: protectingthe environment; heeding environmental considerations and prioritizing such considerations duringplanning stages; considering environmental planning as an integral part of comprehensive developmentplanning in all industrial, agricultural, urban and other areas; and rationalizing the use of naturalresources, whether living and non-living, for the benefit of present and future generations.



Supreme Council for Environment and Protected Area, the Standing EmergencyCommittee and all administrative bodies to develop a general emergency plan toface environmental disasters. This plan must be approved by the Cabinet.Depending on relevant international experiences, the law explains the content ofthe emergency plan and illustrates how it works.

On the other hand, Article 24 explains how to deal with wastes and hazardousmaterials. As a general rule, the law bans imports of hazardous wastes and doesnot allow the entry, passage, disposal, burying, injecting or storing of such wasteswithin the country. Article 24 also prohibits the passage of vessels carrying suchwastes through the territorial sea or through Qatar’s exclusive economic area.However, this ban can be lifted if permission is granted by the concernedadministrative authority, thereby limiting the legal significance of this generalprohibition, unless such permits are controlled by clear environmental restrictionsand standards to be enumerated in the Implementing Regulations. Suchenvironmental standards should be binding on any ministry, government agencyor public institution competent to grant such permits. These environmentalrestrictions and standards should also apply to the prohibition provided for inArticle 25 of the law in relation to the establishment of projects for treatinghazardous wastes, unless such projects are licensed by the competent administrativeauthority following the approval of the Supreme Council for Environment andProtected Area.52

Qatar is one of the leading Gulf states in the production and exporting of oiland natural gas. Article 43 of the Qatari Environment Protection Law providesthat:

all ships and tankers shall be prohibited from discharging or dumping oilor oil mixture into the territorial sea or the exclusive economic area of thestate. All ships and tankers frequenting the ports of the country shallimplement all the requirements and obligations set forth in this Law andthe Implementing Regulations thereof.

This general prohibition entitles the government to take all necessary measuresand actions to protect its marine environment from all types of pollution fromships.

52 See Articles 25, 26 and 27 of this law.


According to Article 44, this prohibition applies to the entities authorized toexplore, extract or exploit the rights related to marine oil or marine naturalresources, as they are prevented from discharging any contaminated materialresulting from operations of drilling, exploring, well testing or production withinthe territorial sea or the exclusive economic area of the state, unless safe meansthat do not result in damage to the aquatic environment are used.

The previous article obliges the competent authorities to treat any dischargedwastes or contaminating substances using the latest technical systems available,and in accordance with the requirements set forth in international and regionalconventions ratified by Qatar. We believe that referring to internationalrequirements and restrictions in the national law will give momentum to theinternational and regional conventions which strengthen the legal protection ofthe marine environment against all sources of marine pollution.

Protection of the marine environment is known to require specific proceduresto be taken by the coastal country since it is the most affected by the pollution toits marine area. Therefore, Article 47 of the Qatari Environment Law obliges the‘competent administrative bodies to provide at the ports it specifies the necessaryfacilities and equipment to receive wastes, oil deposits and oil mixture from vesselsanchored in these ports’.

Meanwhile, Article 49 of the Qatari Environment Protection Law discussesliability and compensation for the victims of pollution and other environmentaldamage, thus providing protection for this coastal country to obtain fullcompensation for all damages caused by pollution incidents. This article obliges oiltankers working within the Qatari territorial sea or its exclusive economic area, andwhose capacity reaches 2,000 tons or more, to submit to the competentadministrative authority (in accordance with the restrictions listed in a decree by thecompetent minister and in coordination with the Supreme Council for Environmentand Protected Area) a financial guarantee certificate in the form of security, acompensation bond or any other guarantee upon the entry of such tankers into theterritorial sea. This certificate must be valid and must cover the tanker’s responsibilityfor compensating for any damages caused by potential pollution accidents accordingto the estimation of the competent administrative authority.53

3. The environment

53 Article 50 of the law obliges ships that regularly transport oil to or from any Qatari port, or fromany means of oil transportation within the territorial sea or the exclusive economic area of Qatar,to hold an international certificate of oil pollution prevention as determined by the ImplementingRegulations.


The Environment Protection Law also addresses the protection of the marineenvironment from land sources, which are important sources of pollution for themarine environment. These land sources are detrimental to the marineenvironment adjacent to the country’s coastline, which is the marine area that ismost exposed to the operations and activities taking place on the land. Thisprotection is in line with Qatar’s commitment to the provisions of the 1990Protocol on Protecting the Marine Environment from Pollution from Land-BasedSources of Pollution, as Qatar was among the signatory states to this regionalprotocol in the Arab Gulf area.54

Article 71 of the Environment Protection Law imposes the maximumpunishment, which is imprisonment for not less than three years and not more thanten years, and/or a fine of not less than 200,000 and not more than 500,000 riyals.This punishment applies to violations of the provisions of this law in relation toprohibited acts that are detrimental to the environment. Examples includeimporting hazardous wastes, or allowing entry, passage, disposal, burying, injecting,placing or storing of such wastes within the country, as well as establishing projectsfor treating hazardous wastes.55

Article 73 entitles the court, when making a conviction, to order the closure ofa project or facility, the deportation of an alien, or the confiscation of tools orequipment used in the violation, as the case may be. The violator is obliged toremove the violation and restore the original status to what it was before theviolation took place. The court is entitled not to restrict the punishment torehabilitating the environment, as is the case in the UAE Federal Law concerningthe Protection and Development of the Environment.56

From the above, it is clear that the Qatari Environment Protection Law stressesthe close relationship between environmental protection and natural resourcesdevelopment on the one hand and the achievement of human security in Qatar


54 The 1990 Protocol on Protecting the Marine Environment from Pollution from Land-Based Sourcesof Pollution consists of sixteen articles and three annexes aimed at protecting the marine environmentfrom all land-based sources of pollution. The Protocol was concluded in implementation of Article 6of the 1978 Kuwait Regional Convention for Cooperation in the Protection of Marine Environment,and came into force in 1993 after it was ratified by five member states of ROPME.55 Articles 24 and 25 of the Qatari Environment Protection Law.56 Article 75 applies the joint responsibility rule to the ship owner, the captain and the person incharge of the ship’s equipment, as well as the owners of shops, businesses and facilities for all damagesarising from violating the provisions of this law, and for the payment of fines and damages imposedin implementation thereof, as well as the costs of removing the effects of such violation.


3. The environment

on the other. This can be seen from the severe restrictions and strict standards thatmust be followed by the bodies that explore and exploit natural resources in orderto ensure the proper and sustainable utilization of these resources for futuregenerations, while taking care not to damage the natural environment or naturalresources. Paragraph 3 of Article 2 sets out the general objectives that the law seeksto achieve, including: ‘Protecting the society and the health of humans and otherliving organisms from all activities and acts that are harmful to the environmentor that impede legitimate use of the environment.’

The overall objective of the Qatari Environment Protection Law is to promotehuman security in Qatar as well as in the Arab region, through the optimal use ofnatural resources for the benefit of present and future generations. In this way,environmental protection and natural resources development are integrated intothe essential constituents that lead to the achievement of human security in itsbroader sense in Qatar. This integration is consistent with the constitutionalobligation stipulated in Article 33 of the Qatari Constitution of 2003: ‘The Stateshall protect the environment and the natural balance thereof in order to achievecomprehensive and sustainable development for all generations.’

The Kuwaiti experience (1990–91)

The destruction of Kuwait’s environment during the warFrom the outset, we should like to clarify that the aim of reviewing the Kuwaitiexperience during the period 2 August 1990–26 February 1991 is to highlightthe close relationship between human security and environmental security inany country, and to shed light on the natural disasters that take place during atime of war. Our review also highlights the devastating environmental impacton Kuwait’s environment, natural resources, civilian population and futuregenerations as a result of the Iraqi aggression and occupation of Kuwait on2 August 1990. We recognize the right of human persons to live in a healthyenvironment, which is considered an essential constituent of human security inany country, whether during peace or war. The absence or lack of effective legalprotection on the national and regional levels leads to a serious situation, where


it becomes imperative to enforce public international law in order to restorehuman security.57

The Iraqi military invasion and occupation of Kuwait highlights the closerelationship between armed conflicts and the loss of human security of thepopulation due to the destruction of the environment and natural resources. Theinvasion has had a direct adverse effect on the environmental security of futuregenerations. The oil flowing from hundreds of burning oil wells led to anunprecedented environmental disaster that has left behind many contaminatedareas and destroyed underground wells in Kuwait. At the same time, militaryoperations during the period of occupation, and during the liberation of Kuwaitfrom Iraqi occupation in 1991, contributed to the collapse of the ecosystem withinwhich living organisms, whether animals or plants, used to live.

Marine and land pollution

One of the grave consequences of the Iraqi aggression against Kuwait was the oilpollution disaster, one of the most catastrophic accidents in recent history. Theamount of oil that leaked into the waters of the Gulf at that time was estimated atbetween 4 million and 6 million barrels, leading to the pollution of the marine andcoastal environment of the eight countries on the shores of the Arabian Gulf. Thebarrier reef and the marine plants represent the foundation of the economy for thepeoples of the Gulf states because they depend on the increase in fish stocks as abasic source of protein.58

The impact of the environmental destruction caused to the marineenvironment by the Iraqi aggression was no less severe than the impact on the landenvironment. The occupying forces transported to Kuwait hundreds of thousandsof soldiers and large quantities of materiel, including tanks, armoured carriers and


57 The UN General Assembly affirmed that Arab Gulf states are not the only countries that sufferedfrom the environmental damages, and therefore called upon the international community in 1992to provide assistance for the affected countries in order to assess the environmental impacts andrehabilitate the environment in this region. See the UN General Assembly’s Resolution on InternationalCooperation to Mitigate the Environmental Consequences on Kuwait and other Countries in theRegion resulting from the Situation between Iraq and Kuwait: A/RES/46/216. Available at:http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3b00efdf67.html58 For a detailed study of the devastating effects of the Iraqi aggression on Kuwait’s marine environment,see: ‘Environmental Impact Assessment of the Iraqi Aggression against the State of Kuwait: Seven YearsFrom the Gulf War’, 1998, Research Department, Kuwait Foundation for the Advancement of Science.


self-propelled heavy artillery. This was in itself a heavy burden on the fragile desertsoil and its feeble vegetation, which were extremely vulnerable to the enormouspressure resulting from the military operations. Landmines – estimated by somemilitary experts at about 5 million mines distributed in the desert and in Kuwaititerritorial waters – pose a threat to wildlife as well as to people. All traces of lifedisappeared from the burning oilfields because of the intense heat and thewidespread oil ponds. The plant life in these areas has undergone significantmodifications.59

The air pollution disaster

The impact of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait was not limited to the Kuwaiti land andmarine environment, but also triggered the biggest air pollution disaster in thetwentieth century as a result of the fires that broke out in hundreds of Kuwait’s oilwells. The burning and destruction of about 798 out of a total of 914 oil wells ledto an environmental disaster. The skies over Kuwait and parts of southern Iraq,western regions of the Islamic Republic of Iran, and eastern Saudi Arabia andBahrain were covered with a pall of smoke that affected even the neighbouringcountries. Environmental experts put the amount of burnt oil at approximately4–5 million barrels a day.

Most Arab environmental laws do not include provisions and rules governingthe protection of the natural environment during armed conflicts, with theexception of some environmental laws issued in the late 1990s. In these exceptions,the authorities concerned with environmental protection called indirectly forcoordination with other concerned government authorities when planning foremergencies, natural environmental disasters and human-induced disasters, whichmight include environmental disasters resulting during a time of war.60

3. The environment

59 Ibid., pp. 29–44.60 Paragraph 2 of the Preamble of Resolution 686/1991 confirmed that the UN Security Councilreceived the two letters from the Foreign Minister of Iraq, which stressed Iraq’s agreement to complyfully with all the above-mentioned resolutions (UN Security Council Resolutions 660–678/1990).The second paragraph of this resolution demanded that Iraq implement its acceptance of all twelveresolutions noted above, and in particular that Iraq accepts, among other things, the principle ofinternatonal liability for any loss, damage or injury arising in regard to Kuwait and third states, and theirnationals and corporations, as a result of the invasion and illegal occupation of Kuwait by Iraq.


International conventions and the protection of environmental security during a time of war

Public international law

The rules of public international law stress the responsibility of conflicting countriesto protect civilian properties and ensure the health and safety of the civilian populationaccording to the 1949 Fourth Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of CivilianPersons in Time of War. It goes without saying that the primary objective of theseinternational conventions is to achieve human security based on the principle of theright of human persons to life and to enjoy all inherent rights and freedoms, includingthe right to environmental security. According to the international rules applicableduring international armed conflicts, the environment shall not be destroyed underthe justification of military necessity, because this contradicts the general principles ofinternational humanitarian law and the right of the human person to live in a healthyenvironment free from human-induced pollution or natural disasters. The conflictingparties are consequently obligated under international conventions, charters anddeclarations to preserve – and not to harm – the natural environment in time of war.

World Charter for Nature (1982)

Principle 5 of the general principles enshrined in the 1982 World Charter forNature emphasizes the respect for nature and reiterates that basic environmentalprocesses may not be disrupted, even during wars: ‘Nature shall be secured againstdegradation caused by warfare or other hostile activities.’ In addition, Principle 20provides that: ‘Military activities damaging to nature shall be avoided.’

This global principle was also confirmed by the 1992 Rio Declaration onEnvironment and Development. Principle 24 of the declaration states that:‘Warfare is inherently destructive of sustainable development. States shall thereforerespect international law providing protection for the environment in times ofarmed conflict and cooperate in its further development, as necessary.’61


61 The UN General Assembly’s Millennium Declaration, adopted in 2000, included a set of valuesand principles as a basis for international relations. These values must be respected by the wholeinternational community since they represent fundamental values that are essential for internationalrelations in the twenty-first century. These values include respect for nature. We must therefore takegreat care in relation to the management of all living organisms and natural resources, in accordancewith the principles of sustainable development.


1949 Geneva Conventions

Even if it does not use the term ‘environment’, international humanitarian law asenshrined in the 1949 Geneva Conventions lists numerous restrictions on the rightof combatants during armed conflicts in order to limit the suffering and harminflicted on civilians and the destruction of civilian areas, the natural environment,and vital and natural resources. This general restriction is confirmed in Article 53of the 1949 Fourth Geneva Convention, which provides that:

Any destruction by the Occupying Power of real or personal propertybelonging individually or collectively to private persons, or to the State, orto other public authorities, or to social or cooperative organizations, isprohibited, except where such destruction is absolutely necessary bymilitary operations.

In accordance with this basic rule, conflicting parties must direct their waroperations to military targets. We believe that the obligation to distinguishbetween civilian and military targets also applies to military operations whichmight destroy the environment and natural resources since they are consideredcivilian targets that are vital for the survival of the civilian population.According to Article 147 of the Fourth Geneva Convention and Article 85(3) ofAdditional Protocol I, any violation of this basic rule shall be considered a graveviolation of international conventions and of Protocol I, i.e. it shall beconsidered as in breach of the rules of international humanitarian law and asconstituting a war crime.62

In this regard, we agree with most scholars of international law as to theillegality of the military operations carried out by the Iraqi occupation forcesagainst the environment, natural resources and people of Kuwait. These militaryoperations violated the general rules of international law, and constituted

3. The environment

62 Article 48 of Additional Protocol I corresponds in spirit to Article 53 of the 1949 Fourth GenevaConvention: ‘In order to ensure respect for and protection of the civilian population and civilianobjects, the Parties to the conflict shall at all times distinguish between the civilian population andcombatants and between civilian objects and military objectives and accordingly shall direct theiroperations only against military objectives.’


inhumane behaviour against the safety of others and a crime against theenvironment of Kuwait and the neighbouring countries. Iraq therefore bearsinternational responsibility for all the environmental losses and damages resultingfrom such illegal actions. This is confirmed by the Resolution of the United NationsGeneral Assembly in 1992, whose Paragraph 5 reads: ‘Stressing that destruction ofthe environment, not justified by military necessity and carried out wantonly, isclearly contrary to the existing international law.’63

Additional Protocol I of 1977

To avoid the insufficient and inadequate legal guarantees provided for in the fourGeneva Conventions of 1949 concerning the protection of the natural environmentagainst military operations during armed conflicts, Article 35(3) of the 1977Additional Protocol I bans the use of ‘methods or means of warfare which areintended, or may be expected, to cause widespread, long-term and severe damageto the natural environment’. This is supported by the general international rulementioned in Article 35(1) of Additional Protocol I, which reads as follows: ‘Inany armed conflict, the right of the Parties to the conflict to choose methods ormeans of warfare is not unlimited.’64

On the other hand, the Iraqi attacks on the environment and natural resourcesdestroyed oil facilities and vital buildings, causing heavy loss of life and damage tothe economy that threatens the human security of the people of Kuwait. These attacksclearly violate the provisions of Article 56 of Additional Protocol I, which prohibitsthe destruction of nuclear power plants, even where these objects are military targets.These attacks led to the wasting and depletion of enormous amounts of oil resources,which are the only source of revenues for the Kuwaiti national economy. Reservoirsand oil-gathering centres were also destroyed. Out of Kuwait’s twenty-six oil-gathering centres, four were completely demolished and seven were seriouslydamaged, while damage to the rest of the centres was less serious. The industrialisland that was used to export oil was completely destroyed.65


63 As of 26 September 2008, there were 194 member states of the 1949 Geneva Conventions, includingall the Arab countries. As for the 1977 Protocols I and II, the number of member states was 164,including 18 Arab countries that ratified the two protocols until 26 September 2008.64 Part III: Methods and Means of Warfare, Protocol I of the 1949 Geneva Conventions.65 For more information, see: State of Kuwait, 1991, ‘Environmental Situation in Kuwait’ (a report oncrimes committed by Iraqi troops against the environment), Kuwait, Environmental Protection Council.


In addition, burning the Kuwaiti oil wells was a flagrant violation of theprovisions relating to protecting works or installations containing ‘dangerousforces’, according to Article 56(1) of the 1977 Additional Protocol I, whichprohibits knowingly attacking works or installations containing dangerous forcesin a way that might cause severe fatalities or injuries among the civilian populationand might cause death or severe harm to their health or physical well-being.66

Security Council Resolutions

According to the rules of international law, Paragraph 16 of UN Security CouncilResolution 687 (1991) confirms Iraq’s responsibility for environmental damagesand for depleting Kuwait’s natural resources: ‘Iraq … is liable under internationallaw for any direct loss, damage, including environmental damage and the depletionof natural resources, or injury to foreign Governments, nationals and corporations,as a result of Iraq’s unlawful invasion and occupation of Kuwait.’67

Article 53 of the 1949 Fourth Geneva Convention emphasizes that theoccupying power shall be held liable for the destruction of properties in theoccupied country. The same is found in Article 2 of the Hague Convention IV onthe laws of war, and finally Article 91 of the 1977 Additional Protocol I, whichopenly confirms the responsibility of conflicting parties who violate provisions ofthe conventions or the protocol to pay compensation if necessary, and for all actscommitted by persons who are part of their armed forces.

It is noteworthy that the late Amir of Kuwait, Sheikh Jaber Al-Ahmad Al-Sabah,called upon the international community during the 1992 Earth Summit toupgrade environmental laws to criminalize the deliberate destruction of theenvironment:

The State of Kuwait has been the scene of the worst environmental disasterknown in modern history, so I call upon the international community,

3. The environment

66 Article 56(4) of the 1977 Protocol I reads: ‘It is prohibited to make any of the works, installationsor military objectives mentioned in paragraph 1 the object of reprisals.’ Subparagraphs a, b and cof Article 56(2) of the 1977 Protocol I specify the conditions under which ‘the special protectionagainst attack provided by paragraph 1 shall cease’.67 This paragraph constitutes the international and legal basis for demanding compensations for theenvironmental damages to the land, air and marine environment and the damages to oil resourcesin Kuwait. UN Security Council Resolution 687/1991 consists of 32 paragraphs.


through this forum, to take action for the issuance of the necessarylegislation that confirms that the deliberate destruction of the environmentis a crime against humanity whose perpetrators must receive the severestpenalties.

From all of the above, we understand that promoting a close interrelationshipbetween the environment and human security in its broader sense remainsunattainable in the Arab region. This is because of the dominant traditionalunderstanding of the concept of human security and the continuing internationalconflicts and regional as well as civil wars between some Arab regimes, separatistmovements or religious and nationalist minorities who call for their politicalrights and receive foreign assistance for economic, military or other purposes.This atmosphere may also explain the position of some Arab governments whodelay the introduction of environmental policies, plans and strategies necessaryto achieve human security, on the pretext that they are incompatible with theconcept of preserving regional and national military security. On the contrary,the concept of human security considers the reduction of conflicts as one of thefive priorities in order to achieve human security. The international community’scapability to prevent or resolve disputes should also be enhanced, and sectors ofthe indigenous populations should be trained to manage local disputes withoutresorting to force.



The role of the environment in promoting human security (general recommendations)

• Several countries in the Arab region are potentially threatened byenvironmental disasters due to poorly thought-out political decision-makingwhich destabilizes human security in the region and leads to a deteriorationof the environment and natural resources. To avoid this situation, decision-makers in the Arab region should take the appropriate measures in order tochange their environmental, security and humanitarian policies, andrecognize the reciprocal relationship between environmental protection andthe promotion of human security. The Arabs must develop an awareness ofthe negative impact of unstable human security on the environment andnatural resources in the Arab world, a region that has been afflicted withinternational, regional and civil wars. To achieve this end, the followingrecommendations should be implemented:

• Recommendation I: Arab decision-makers should review the generalenvironmental policies and national and regional strategies that are designedto develop and implement national environmental laws. They should alsocurtail the extensive powers legally assigned to the concerned authorities inthe implementation of development projects that directly affect theenvironment and natural resources. These unlimited powers threatenenvironmental security, the lives of Arab peoples and human security in theArab region.

• Recommendation II: Arab governments should be encouraged to establisha committee of environmental experts, ministers of environment and militaryexperts to develop a regional Arab strategy for human security and to devisea plan to address the environmental issues that threaten Arab regional humansecurity. This should be done in close cooperation with the League of ArabStates Arab Defense Ministers Committee. Assistance should also be soughtfrom regional and international organizations that specialize in environmentalsecurity in order to develop national and regional strategies for environmentalsecurity.

3. The environment


• Recommendation III: Arab countries should mobilize their national andregional resources to promote environmental security in the light ofincreasing nuclear threats against the region. Arab countries should also ratifythe International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of NuclearTerrorism, which came into force in 2007. This convention establishesinternational legal measures to reduce the risks posed by nuclear, biologicaland chemical weapons and promotes the nuclear security of the states partiesto the convention.

• Recommendation IV: Arab countries should operationalize the role ofenvironmental and humanitarian civil society organizations in promotingand developing human security by actively participating in legal awarenessdissemination related to international humanitarian law. During armedconflicts, humanitarian services should be provided to the civilian populationand to displaced persons, particularly women, children and other victims ofthese conflicts in the Arab region.

• Recommendation V: Arab governments should be encouraged to integratethe international conventions that govern environmental protection duringarmed conflicts into their national environmental legislation and militarylaws. The aim is, first, to apply and promote human security and, second, todisseminate environmental legal awareness about natural environmentalprotection during international and non-international armed conflicts andto establish national mechanisms to ensure respect and implementation ofinternational environmental law in these situations.

• Recommendation VI:Decision-makers in the Arab region should encourageArab women to take an active role in the preparation and enforcement ofenvironmental and humanitarian policies in implementation of Principle 20of the 1992 Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, whichaffirms that: ‘Women have a vital role in environmental management anddevelopment. Their full participation is therefore essential to achievesustainable development.’



• Recommendation VII: Scientific institutes and universities in the Arab regionshould encourage academics and environmentalists to undertake scientific,economic, social and environmental research in order to highlight the closerelationship between the environment and human security and the role ofgood governance of natural resources in reducing conflicts with neighbouringcountries over natural resources and strengthening human security in theregion.

• Recommendation VIII: Since environmental degradation and scarcity ofresources are the main reasons for armed conflicts, especially during civilwars, the Arab countries should invest in environmental management toavoid conflicts over natural resources. Some Arab countries have sufferedfrom those wars for many decades. The sustainable management of eachcountry’s natural resources should be encouraged as a requirement to solvethis problem and achieve social stability, provide citizens with a livelihoodand stimulate sustainable development in order to achieve human securityin the Arab region.

3. The environment


4.Managing conflict and post-conflict

situations in the Arab region


MOHAMED ABDEL SALAM


Introduction

Armed conflicts still constitute a major threat to human security in the variousregions of the world, and will continue to do so for a long time to come. The ConflictBarometer of the Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research (HIIK),one of the most renowned monitors of global security, counted 328 existing andpotential conflicts in the world in 2007. These included 6 wars and 25 armedconfrontations, in other words, there were 31 conflict ‘hot spots’ witnessing highlevels of armed violence in addition to 99 cases witnessing varying levels of violence.More importantly, 198 cases of non-violent conflicts were counted, including latentconflicts (80 cases) and manifest conflicts (118 cases) that may one way or anotherturn into open conflicts in the future.1 The world is witnessing a ‘state of war’ thataffects people’s lives almost everywhere, though to varying degrees in the differentregions.Given this situation, the 2003 report of the Commission on Human Security

(CHS), Human Security Now, shows that more than 800,000 people a year lose

1 The term ‘conflict case’ is a central term in the present chapter. It is basically associated with thenature of each conflict in terms of its parties and issues. There are simple conflicts that break outand then end, thus representing a single conflict case. Other conflict cases are protracted, such asthe Arab-Israeli conflict, which consists of many ‘rounds’ (1948, 1956, 1967, 1973 and 1982). Eachround is considered to be a separate conflict case. There are also complex, multi-layered conflicts,such as the post-2003 conflicts in Iraq (al-Qaeda versus US forces, Shiite militias versus governmentforces and Sunni resistance versus US and government forces), each of which – according to themethodology adopted here – is a separate conflict case involving different parties and issues andemploying different dynamics. The conflict tables in this chapter were prepared on the basis ofinformation provided in the international conflict databases of the Heidelberg Institute forInternational Conflict Research (HIIK), Germany. For figures relating to international conflictsin a particular year, see the first paragraph: Conflict Barometer 2007, Crises – Wars – Coups d’état,Negotiations – Mediations – Peace Settlements, 16th Annual Conflict Analysis, Heidelberg Institutefor International Conflict Research, Department of Political Science, University of Heidelberg,Germany: www.konfliktbarometer.de


their lives to violence, and indicates that war does not only kill people, but alsodestroys trust among them, increases poverty rates and slows down the economy.2

It is pointless to list the impacts of war on human security, because they havealready been dealt with in countless international reports, academic studies,documentaries, films and novels, nearly all of which emphasize – as indicated inthe Human Rights Watch 2004 Report – that: ‘Almost without exception, the world’sworst human rights and humanitarian crises take place in combat zones.’3

This situation reflects the grim reality in the Middle East, in whose centre lies theArab region.4 Although the human security situation in this vast area is confrontedwith all the problems of empowerment against non-armed conflicts – whether theyare related to good governance, human rights, poverty rates, education, health care,environmental pollution, organized crime, and so on – there still exists the problemof ongoing and potentially ever more catastrophic armed conflicts. These affect atleast 75 million people in Iraq, Sudan, Lebanon, Somalia and the OccupiedPalestinian Territories, in addition to those in countries such as Algeria, Yemen andMorocco.5 Additional numbers of people who live in areas surrounded by worst-casemilitary scenarios may be added to this list.The Arab region’s leading trends now understand that human security goes well

beyond the absence of armed conflicts, and is connected to broader humanitarian issuesthat must be dealt with. The recent political stand-offs, social tensions and economiccrises have added a more or less permanent ‘humanitarian dimension’ to the prevalentsecurity concepts under various terms (i.e. humanitarian intervention). However, theregion’s experience of major wars over some six decades, and the outbreak of violenceall over the region in the post-2003 period, has led to a parallel conviction that armed


2 This report (published in New York in 2003) is considered a significant landmark in developingways of determining the concept of human security. See the outline at: Outline of the Report of theCommission on Human Security, Human security – now.http://www.humansecurity-chs.org/finalreport/Outlines/outline.pdf, p. 1.3 See the introduction to the Human Rights Watch World Report, 2004: Human Rights and ArmedConflict: http://www.hrw.org/legacy/wr2k4/download.htm4 The case study in the current chapter is the Arab region – not the Middle East, which is traditionallycomposed of Arab countries and the major regional powers around or within its area, such as theIslamic Republic of Iran, Israel, Turkey, Ethiopia and, more recently, Eritrea, Uganda, Chad andSenegal. The chapter focuses on the conflicts related to the Arab region, but the extensive interconnectionsbetween the Middle East and the Arab region as regards the phenomenon of conflicts will lead usto refer to the Middle East whenever necessary.5 This figure was calculated on the basis of the populations in the countries mentioned, whetherthose vulnerable to direct violence resulting from conflicts or those who might be exposed to living,health or humanitarian problems resulting from violence.


conflicts are capable of totally destroying human security. Protection against theimpacts of conflicts is still a dominant component of the perception of security in theArab region, and is the first to come to mind in this context.The main argument in this chapter is that armed conflicts still pose one of the

greatest threats to human security in the Arab region because they cause a total orpartial collapse of the systems that ensure the minimum level of human security,which includes basic rights and humanitarian needs. Even if the ability to prevent theoutbreak of conflicts in the region, stop ongoing conflicts after they erupt or resolveconflicts in order to prevent their re-emergence is not part of the human securityconcept, at least as far as the situation in the Arab region is concerned,6 it is importantto give serious consideration to two points: how to reduce the impacts of militaryoperations on human security and how to contain the repercussions of armedconflicts after the end of hostilities. This will not only help to protect those who sufferfrom the impacts of conflicts, but also pave the way to empower them in the future.In this context, the methodology adopted in this chapter when analysing the

impacts of conflicts, particularly armed conflicts, on human security in the Arabregion – and discussing how to reduce their impacts – is based on:

• an analysis of the current trends of conflict in the Arab region in light ofdevelopments during the period 2003–07,7 using these trends to monitor thenature of the threats posed to human security by their different patterns; alsodetermining which conflict fields probably need more attention than others.As Shahrbanou Tadjbakhsh points out in her important paper, ‘HumanSecurity: the Seven Challenges of Operationalizing the Concept’, conflictsneed to be better understood in order to develop approaches before, duringand after their outbreak, and ultimately to try to prevent them;8

4. Managing conflict and post-conflict situations

6 Preventing, stopping and resolving conflicts are more relevant to the concepts of security studies,such as those on conflict resolution, settlement and management. These processes need other typesof parties, tools and dynamics; sometimes they require pressure and the use of ‘carrot and stick’methods to force the conflict parties to change their behaviour.7 Following the year 2003, in the post-Iraq invasion phase, there has been a fundamental change inconflict patterns and intensity in the Arab region.8 Tadjbakhsh stresses that there is a ‘need to understand conflicts better and to develop conflict preventivetools’. She adds that a deeper understanding of the sources of conflict, for example, and a willingnessto go beyond theoretical models to understand the surrounding local context, is needed in order todesign human security approaches before, during and after conflicts. In fact, her paper discussesthreats that are important for the situation in the Arab region. Most of the issues it discusses are stillthe focus of discussion in the few cases where the concept of human security is raised during→


• an analysis of the outstanding features of a number of major conflicts thatcurrently exist in the Arab region, and the post-conflict conditions of other casesin the region during the period 2003–07. These examples should reveal the mostimportant problems of human security that emerged during these conflicts inorder to formulate some recommendations on how to deal with them.

The importance of a case study on the situation in the Arab region lies in the fact thatthis region sometimes seems to be a ‘special case’. The area is too strategicallyimportant to be disregarded by the world’s leading countries and organizations. Thereis a famous adage that goes: ‘If you do not care about the Middle East, the MiddleEast will care about you.’ Bechir Chourou discusses very complicated factors thataffect human security within the Arab region,9 in addition to the nature of the conflictsin the area. There are historical conflict-based allegations, mutual suspicions, armedconflicts, denials of basic rights, extensive population overlapping across borders andhuge arsenals of sophisticated weapons. Although the ‘special case’ assumption mightnot be totally accurate, important lessons about handling the impact of conflicts onhuman security in general can be learned from the situation in this region.However, there is a controversial issue that should be dealt with at the outset. The

main problem with security studies’ analyses of conflict impacts on security in generalis that they tend to be relatively conservative, in other words, they depend on thearguments of the political realism school or Realpolitik. This is especially true if theissue is related to violent armed conflicts that entail destructive impacts affectingcountry structures and societal coherence, and forming public opinion trends. Thesame applies if the case study is of a region whose most dominant security conceptsare ‘traditional’. Consequently, the distance separating state security from humansecurity is quite limited. Likewise, the value of stability (or restoring stability, regardlessof cost) is given high priority; and, following the war in Iraq, many countries in theArab region are hesitant to accept the concept of external intervention.Accordingly, the present chapter is divided into two main sections, each of

which includes a number of focal points. The first section concentrates on the


→ some regional forums. See: Shahrbanou Tadjbakhsh, ‘Human Security: The Seven Challenges ofOperationalizing the Concept: 60 Minutes to Convince’, organized by UNESCO, Section of SHS/FPH/PHS,13 September 2005-09-14, Paris. http://www.peacecenter.sciences-po.fr/pdf/unesco_13-09-05.pdf.9 See: Bechir Chourou, 2005, International and Regional Factors Affecting Human Security in the ArabWorld. Promoting Human Security: Ethical, Normative and Educational Frameworks in the Arab States,Paris, United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO).


current trends of armed conflicts in the Arab region, including the particularpatterns, parties, issues, ranges and intensity of conflict ‘hot spots’, depending onquantitative indicators.10 The second section focuses on the effects of armedconflict on human security in the region, including the problems of existingconflicts or post-conflict situations, depending on the specific case. Finally, theconclusion attempts to examine the core of the problem, while putting forwardsome practical, implementable proposals on how to limit the impact of conflictson human security.

Current trends of armed conflicts in the Arab region

The dominant perception of the Middle East, this region that consists of the Arabarea and its surrounding major regional powers, is that it is one of the world’s mosttense regions. This unstable region has witnessed acute long-term political andmilitary conflicts. On its lands, wars and armed disturbances with deep historicalroots have flared up. The most dangerous of these are the Arab-Israeli conflict andthe successive wars in the Arabian Gulf. The area has also witnessed extensivecompetition among the major regional powers, in addition to the confrontationsbetween the two superpowers during the Cold War. According to the COSIMO(Conflict Simulation Model) database established by HIIK, during the period1945–99 the Middle East witnessed some 164 conflict cases among and withinthe region’s countries, and between them and external parties.11 This pattern


10 The data shown in the tables and annexes (relating to conflicts in the Arab region) are based onthe annual reports of the HIIK Conflict Barometer for the years 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006 and 2007.However, some changes have been made: for example, conflicts in the Arab region are categorizedas ‘regional conflicts’, although HIIK categorizes them as ‘Sub-Saharan Africa’ conflicts. This regionis usually included under the Middle East and Maghreb region. The conflicts of Turkey and theIslamic Republic of Iran with non-Arab parties have been excluded, except for their conflicts withparties in Arab countries, such as the People’s Mujahedeen of Iran and the Kurdistan Workers’ Party.Slight amendments have also been made that do not alter the database of certain cases that areambiguous to HIIK database users, such as amending the status of Hezbollah’s conflict with Israelto include it among regional conflicts (between Israel and Lebanon), instead of considering it as anIsraeli intra-state conflict as the HIIK data suggest. The same has been done in the case of thePalestinian-Israeli conflicts, which the Conflict Barometer treats as Israeli intra-state conflicts. ThePalestinian cause has been changed from ‘secession’ to ‘independence’.11 These data are based on the HIIK database for conflicts during the period 1945–99. See: COSIMODatabase 1945–1999, at: http://hiik.de/en/kosimo/index.html



of interaction was generally dominant throughout the second half of thetwentieth century, although it has begun to witness important changes with thestart of the twenty-first century.The current conflict situation in the Middle East indicates that, during the period

following the 2003 Iraq war, the Arab region has witnessed about sixty-eight conflictcases, as shown in the annexes at the end of the present chapter. According to thesequantitative indicators – and contrary to the prevalent perception – it is not amongthe world’s most tense regions. In 2007 the previously mentioned Conflict Barometerranked the area (with its geographical parameter within the Middle East) fourth interms of conflict cases after the Asian area, sub-Saharan Africa, and even thecontinent of Europe itself. The only areas that ranked below the Arab region werethe Americas. However, dominant assessments of the region have describedconditions there as the worst in terms of instability, to the extent that a prevailingtrend has started to describe the area as drifting towards chaos.It appears – apart from the quantitative indicators – that the situation in the

Arab region has steadily worsened since the post-9/11 period. The region has gonebeyond the instability with which it has traditionally been associated to what lookslike a ‘state of war’. This is due to the escalating instances (or possibilities) of theuse of armed force by the active players in the region since the invasion of Iraq in2003. It is also due to the internal situations of several countries that have begunto head towards worst-case scenarios. This is in addition to the emergence ofserious sectarian and ethnic tensions among and within these countries, acontinuing increase in transborder terrorism and the impact of non-traditionalsecurity problems on the Arab region.12

To some extent, this has always been quite understandable. The difficulty withthe region’s conflicts has never been the magnitude of any particular conflict, butrather the complications associated with it – whether in terms of conflict patterns,the number of parties directly involved, the nature of the issues leading to aconflict, ordinary conflict duration, the ways and methods used in managing theconflict, the intervention of external actors, the level of intensity characterizing theconflict, the effects that trickle from one conflict field to another, or the scale of

12 The importance of the impacts of non-traditional security problems has recently been increasingin the Arab region, as extensive attention has begun to be paid to these problems on both theacademic and the practical level. These problems are the non-military security problems, such asnatural crises, epidemic diseases, illegal immigration, organized crime, etc.


ensuing casualties or financial losses. Finally comes the difficult dilemma of howto solve these conflicts.This framework can be used to discuss the most important aspects of the

conflict situations in the Arab region, as well as their significance for the humansecurity problems of the Arab peoples, as outlined below.

Conflict patterns in the Arab region

The Arab region is currently witnessing all forms of conflict (see Table 1): thereare international conflicts between parties from inside and outside the area;regional conflicts among countries from the area; and several intra-state Arabconflicts.13 However, there seems to be an unprecedented rise in intra-state conflictsas opposed to other forms of conflict. In the period 1945–99, the region witnessed


13 Conflicts are traditionally categorized into interstate conflicts, or intra-state conflicts. However, giventhe complex levels of conflict in the Arab region, and for the analytical purposes of this chapter, weconsider the conflicts that take place between a party from the region and an international party as aninternational conflict, and the conflicts among parties from the region as regional conflicts, while leavingintra-state conflicts unchanged. There is a trend among intellectuals in the Arab region that focuses onthe existence of international interventions in regional conflicts and regional/international interventionsin domestic conflicts, which is already a characteristic of the region’s conflicts. The present chapter,however, depends on the analysis of the nature or level of the conflict and on the criteria of the directparties to it, to avoid analytical errors that might make the study ideologically biased.

Table 1. Conflict patterns in the Arab region

Regional conflictsLatent conflict 9 Manifest conflict 7 = 16Crisis 3 Intense crisis 1 War 1 = 5

Total 21

International conflictsLatent conflict 2 Manifest conflict 4 = 6Crisis 1 Intense crisis 1 War 1 = 3

Total 9

Intra-state conflictsLatent conflict 9 Manifest conflict 9 = 18Crisis 8 Intense crisis 11 War 1 = 20

Total 38

•Volume1E Bàt_Mise en page 1 03/02/11 10:46 Page131

thirty-four regional-international conflicts, sixty-nine regional-interstate conflictsand forty-two intra-state conflicts. In the past, intra-state conflicts represented32 per cent of all conflicts in the region; they now constitute 84 per cent, which isa global trend.14

Conversely, the percentage of regional conflicts fell to 28 per cent, whereas itused to represent the area’s most acute problem because it was associated with themajor armed conflicts between Israel and the Arabs, as well as the protracted warsand tensions between the Islamic Republic of Iran and Turkey and between Eritreaand the neighbouring Arab countries. In addition, there was the phenomenon ofArab-Arab conflicts, in the shape of a ‘cold war’ in the 1960s and a leadershipconflict in the 1970s. One of these conflicts (the Kuwait war in 1990) almostfragmented the Arab system. Although most Arab-Arab border disputes calmeddown or were resolved in the 1990s, this period witnessed several manifest orviolent conflicts that were linked to the interference of the Islamic Republic of Iranin Iraq, or Israel’s military operations against the Palestinians. There was also anextensive regional war between Israel and Lebanon (Hezbollah) in 2006.Although, quantitatively, international conflicts seem not to have constituted a

major problem during that period as they did not exceed 12 per cent of the conflictsin the region – especially since most of them (66 per cent) were non-violent – theArab region has witnessed one of the most complex wars in modern history: theinvasion of Iraq in 2003. In addition, there is a manifest conflict between theIslamic Republic of Iran and the United States of America that also impinges onthe Arab region. Regional interactions based on conflict, or even on politics, arebeing internationalized to an unprecedented degree.


14 The definitions of conflict patterns included in this table and mentioned throughout the chapterare based on those in the COSIMO database, as follows:• Latent conflict: a positional difference over definable values of national meaning is consideredto be a latent conflict if demands are articulated by one of the parties and perceived by the otheras such.• Manifest conflict: a manifest conflict includes the use of measures that are located in the stagepreliminary to violent force. This includes for example verbal pressure, threatening explicitlywith violence, or the imposition of economic sanctions.• Crisis: a crisis is a tense situation in which at least one of the parties uses violent force in sporadicincidents.• Intense (severe) crisis: a conflict is considered to be a severe crisis if violent force is used repeatedlyin an organized way.• War: a war is a violent conflict in which violent force is used with a certain continuity in anorganized and systematic way. The conflict parties exercise extensive measures, depending onthe situation. The extent of destruction is massive and of long duration.


The main orientation indicates that intra-state wars impinge the most onhuman security. Studies show that approximately 90 per cent of war victims arecivilian rather than military, and that most of those are women and children.15

These conflicts take place inside countries and within heavily populated areas. Theydo not differentiate between civilians and fighters and the parties involved are notsubject to the general laws governing a state of war. This leads to an increasingdependence on violence and severe violations of human rights. This large numberof internal conflicts indicates that there is a real crisis threatening human securityin the Arab region. At the same time, the region’s experience of conflicts duringthis period shows that international and regional conflicts, though few in number,have similarly led to tragic consequences from a human security perspective, as inIraq and Lebanon.

Parties to conflicts in the Arab region

There have been significant developments regarding conflict parties in the Arab regionand their impact on human security. The first of these developments is theunprecedented rise of what are termed ‘non-state actors’. Traditionally, major conflictswere associated with states, and the legitimate use of arms was associated withgovernment troops. However, the situation has changed in many instances in the Arabregion. There is an increasing number of political groupings that have military wings,such as Hezbollah and Hamas; mixed paramilitary forces such as the KurdishPeshmerga and the Revolutionary Guards in the Islamic Republic of Iran; and armedorganizations that have cross-border extensions such as al-Qaeda. Even privatesecurity companies have become active players in certain cases, such as Iraq.These entities have become main parties to the ongoing conflicts in the Arab

region, as well as effective players in post-conflict situations. Most of them areengaged in real conflicts with government forces. This has led to the concept of‘asymmetrical wars’ that are very complex in terms of how their management affectshuman security. The majority of these entities are engaged in clashes against other


15 Arab writings are in more or less complete agreement on this point, although Arab mainstreamopinion is more engaged with conflicts that erupt with external parties or between regional partiesthan with dangerous internal conflicts. For an example of the writings that tackle these issues, seethe report entitled: ‘Diversions in Security Perception: Human First’ on the Islam Online website:http://www.islamonline.net/servlet/Satellite?c=ArticleA_C&cid=1184649218862&pagename=Zone-Arabic-ArtCulture%2FACALayout, 3/9/2003



parties inside civilian areas in what are called ‘civil wars’. Some of them have becomestates within a state, thus creating major complications in dealing with post-conflictsituations. The incessant splits and changing alliances among these parties complicateany strategy that aims to contain the impacts of conflict on human security.This situation has led to an exceptional rise in the number of conflicting parties

in the Arab region. Multilateralism continues to characterize international conflictswaged by ‘alliances’, such as the case in Iraq, or regional conflicts such as the Arab-Israeli conflict. But the current situation, especially in relation to intra-state conflicts,reveals a new phenomenon: for example, there are seven parties forming two campsin the Lebanese conflict, and other unexpected actors (such as Jund al-Sham) appearoccasionally. There are opposed parties within the Palestinian camp, the mostimportant of which are Fatah and Hamas. In Iraq, there are at least fifteen majorinfluential forces; and Darfur alone includes eight main factions, some of whichhave split internally into fighting sub-factions. It is difficult to count the activeplayers on the Somali scene.16 This creates a large number of problems in relationto managing conflicts, containing their effects and attempting to resolve them.

Conflict issues in the Arab region

This is a traditional issue that has recently seen complex developments. Parties tosome conflicts used to hold the ideological conviction that they were not fightinga ‘conflict over borders’, but a ‘struggle for existence’ that only ended with thedefeat of one of the parties, as was the case with the Arab-Israeli conflict until theend of the 1960s. The Arab region has witnessed a particular type of conflict thatis associated with what is called ‘comprehensive territorial claims’, as was the casewith the Western Sahara in Morocco, Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990 and thewar between North and South Yemen in 1994. According to a study of Arab-Arabarmed conflicts prepared by the Al-Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studiesin Cairo, 85 per cent of the conflicts in the Arab region are associated with interestsrelated to political or border disputes that can perhaps be resolved; they are notrelated to values over which there can be no compromise or demands that threatenthe very existence of others.17

16 See the ‘Direct parties’ column in the annexes at the end of the present chapter.17 Mohammed Abdel Salam, 1994, Arab–Arab Armed Conflicts, Cairo, Al-Ahram Center for Politicaland Strategic Studies, Year 4 (Strategic Monographs Series, 23).


The Arab region still has territorial disputes, disputes over resources, internal powerconflicts and conflicts over the orientation of a particular political regime. However,the annexes at the end of the chapter reveal the following two main points:

• Ideological conflicts are escalating to an unprecedented extent. Twenty-sevenconflicts in the region are related to ideological issues, whether or not theyare accompanied by other issues. These represent approximately 36 per centof the total conflict cases, which is noteworthy as the effects of the religiousfactor are increasingly apparent in the region.

• Conflicts associated with complete or partial regional demands are alsoescalating. There are some sixteen conflict cases related to the issue ofsecession, autonomy or regional predominance within the same state. Theserepresent approximately 11 per cent of the total number of conflict cases, allof which are mostly based on internal conflicts. The quest for a nation-stateapparently has noticeable effects.

However, the type of conflict that revolves around ‘fundamental values’, and thatalways anticipates a tribal war, is now found in a different strategic environment.Except for the obstinate beliefs associated with terrorist groupings such as al-Qaeda, the objectives of US Neoconservatives have shifted from ‘regime change’to that of changing states’ behaviour. The statements of President Ahmadinejadof the Islamic Republic of Iran on ‘the existence of Israel’ in the region are nevertaken seriously. Internal powers have found different formulations for statefederalism or for the internal share of power and wealth that alleviate the intenseimpact of these issues on conflicts. However, these conflicts still pose dangerousthreats to human security.

Intensity of conflicts in the Arab region

Conflict interactions in the Arab region are characterized by violence, but exceptfor the two cases of post-2003 Iraq and Darfur, it is difficult to make comparisonsbetween the current situation and what these areas witnessed in the past, or theongoing situation in other regions such as sub-Saharan Africa.18 During the period


18 The cases of Iraq and Darfur seem to differ from the current situation in the Arab region. Theyare intra-state conflicts that have witnessed large-scale acts of violence and a huge number ofcasualties, like most of the conflicts in sub-Saharan Africa.


1945–99, the region witnessed eight main regular wars, about five devastatingintra-state civil wars and at least thirty-six violent crises each of which can becounted as a limited war between countries in this same region. In addition, therewas a high level of internal violence that ranged between power struggles and civildisturbances; these were paralleled by waves of violent terrorist acts from the 1970sto the 1990s, until their recent escalation to an exceptional and chronic level.In the past, the main regional conflicts led to heavy casualties and financial

losses. According to some sources, the number of casualties from the armed Arab-Israeli conflict during the period 1948–90 amounted to 200,000. The total costsustained by the conflict parties during the same period was US$300 billion. In theArabian Gulf, the casualties from the two major wars in this area (the Iraq–Iranwar in 1980–88 and the Gulf war in 1990–91) amounted to 720,000 (600,000during the former and 120,000 during the latter), with financial costs as high as$950 billion ($300 billion and $650 billion respectively).19

However, the following facts emerge for the period 1948–90:

• A very small percentage (about 9 per cent) of the conflicts that took placebetween Arab countries evolved into armed conflicts. The rest, except for theKuwait war in 1990, did not go beyond a limited war. These wars were subjectedto strict rules of engagement 20 that were particularly sensitive over inflictingany human or financial losses that were not justified by ‘military necessity’.


19 The calculations of casualties and financial losses did not rely on the COSIMO database, becauseit is unlikely to be accurate in this regard. Classifications that associate conflict intensity with numberof casualties were also avoided because they are not realistic in relation to the Arab region. Thefigures in the present chapter are based on a table entitled ‘Losses and Casualties of Armed Conflictsin the Middle East and North Africa Region 1948–1991’ prepared by the Ibn Khaldun Centre forDevelopment Studies and based on the statistical files held in the Centre’s Minority Affairs Department.This table has been annexed to several publications by the Ibn Khaldun Centre, such as: Discussionson the Book: Struggle for Power in Syria, n.d., Cairo. (The Centre published these discussions in theperiod 1992–95.) The estimate given in the present chapter reflects the relevant common estimatesin the Arab region. In fact, there is no Arab database of conflicts in the region. The Darfur caseshows that the differences between the assessments of human casualty numbers are so great thatthey pose many questions about the indicators adopted in these assessments.20 Military intervention was resorted to as the fourth option (in 9 per cent of cases) in conflictsbetween Arab countries when compared to the number of times that other conflict tools were used.Even when Arab countries resorted to military force, it was used within the framework of limitedmilitary operations (in approx. 86 per cent of cases) as against approx. 14 per cent of large-scaleborder clashes. This was prior to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990, which appeared to be a ‘specialcase’ from the perspective of Arab criteria, when military intervention was Iraq’s option numberone vis-à-vis other means. For more details, see: Ahmed Youssif Ahmed, 1988, Arab–Arab Conflicts(1945–1981), a Pilot Study, Beirut, Center for Arab Unity Studies.


• Arab intra-state wars went beyond all imaginable limits of military necessity.Most of them were open wars where all means could be employed, includingsurface-to-surface missiles, chemical weapons, ‘civilian massacres’ or the‘scorched-earth’ policy adopted in cases like Iraq, Somalia, Algeria, Yemenand Lebanon, among others.

As Table 2 demonstrates, the region has witnessed twenty-eight violent conflicts,representing approximately 40 per cent of all conflicts. This percentage is highwhen compared to the levels of violence in other regions. However, Table 1 suggeststhat this high percentage is basically due to intra-state conflicts, not regional orinternational conflicts. Three out of nine international conflicts were characterizedby violence, including only one war and one violent crisis. Meanwhile, five out oftwenty-one regional conflicts were characterized by violence, including only onewar and one violent crisis. Twenty out of the thirty-eight intra-state conflictsreached the level of violent conflicts, and included only one war (relatively limited).But the region had witnessed eleven extensive armed conflicts, with devastatingconsequences for the civilian populations.

Duration of conflicts in the Arab region

Conflict interactions have existed in the Arab region throughout its modernhistory. As Table 3 suggests, this is not solely due to what are called ‘protractedsocial conflicts’ (PSCs), which continue for decades. In the Arab region, thereare seventeen PSCs that have existed for thirty years, and their expected span isfifty years (see the annexes to the present chapter). Table 3 shows that there aretwenty-six short-term conflicts (conflicts lasting between one and four years),


Non-violent conflicts

Latent conflict 20 Manifest conflict 20

Total 40

Violent conflicts

Crisis 13 Violent crisis 12 War 3

Total 28

Table 2. Intensity of conflicts in the Arab region


representing approximately 40 per cent. The percentages of conflict breakout aremuch higher than those of conflict termination.

Most short-term conflicts are associated with the breakout of new forms of intra-state conflicts. Remarkably, four out of the nine international conflicts mentionedin Annex 1 have been terminated within the period, the highest rate of conflicttermination among all three types. The other international conflicts are eitherchronic, like the USA’s problems with the Islamic Republic of Iran and the SyrianArab Republic – and the remnants of its problem with the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya– or latent such as Morocco’s dispute with Spain. The only other seriousoutstanding question concerns the clashes between US troops and armed orterrorist elements in Iraq, which are always under debate given the growingexhaustion of the troops and the pressures of public opinion.As for regional conflicts, most of them are long-term (except for the Israeli-

Palestinian conflict) and are either latent or manifest. Nonetheless, three criseshave broken out in recent years between Chad and Sudan, and Ethiopia andSomalia, in addition to the tensions surrounding the Syrian Arabic Republic’srelationship with Lebanon and Iraq, and the 2006 war between Israel and Lebanon.Most of these conflicts have ended or been frozen. Thus the real problem, yet again,concerns intra-state conflicts – which means that the regional ‘volcano’ is still activeand the conflict parties are not yet exhausted. The demands made in the area ofhuman security may be impossible to satisfy.

Acute conflict ‘hot spots’ in the Arab region

Although the security situation in the Arab region is widely evaluated as unstable,and despite the fact that all Arab countries – without exception – are experiencingvarious kinds of latent or manifest conflicts, the large number of conflicts


Table 3. Duration of conflict interactions in the Arab region

Duration ThirtyYears+

TwentyYears+

TenYears+

FiveYears+

One Year+

Conflicts 17 8 11 6 26


mentioned above (sixty-eight cases) does not signify that this number is dividedequally among Arab countries, or that the entire region is witnessing a state of war.Some eleven Arab countries are not experiencing unusual conflicts beyond thelevel of latent problems or sporadic terrorist acts – they have become used todealing with these on the political and security levels and they no longer impingemarkedly on their economies. However, the situation in the Middle East remainsunpredictable.According to the methodology adopted in the present chapter, there is a

difference between the number of conflicts and their distribution throughout theregion. Conflict situations may include many ‘conflict rounds’ or forms that arelinked to one particular party in the region. The nine international conflict roundsmentioned in Annex 1 are related to five conflicts only, while the twenty-oneregional conflict rounds mentioned in Annex 2 are related to approximately sixteenconflicts only. The distribution of these conflicts in the Arab region shows six ‘hotspots’ of intense conflict interactions (see Table 4).

The six ‘hot spots’ mentioned above are witnessing some forty-one conflictrounds in total, representing 88 per cent of all conflicts in the Arab region. At thetop of the list comes Iraq, which, alone, is witnessing fourteen conflict cases,including three that are categorized as international conflicts. Meanwhile theseinternational conflicts do not exist in other conflict circles. Then comes Sudan,where five conflict situations are raging, and Somalia, which has collapsed undersix cases, or more, of internal conflicts. In Lebanon, ‘regional conflicts’ have put


Table 4. Circles of intense conflict interactions in the Arab region

International Regional Intra-state Total

Iraq 3 4 7 14

Sudan – 3 5 8

Somalia – 1 6 7

Lebanon – 5 2 7

Palestine – 1 2 3

Algeria – – 2 2


great pressure on the security situation, as this small country has as many as fiveconflict situations. The Occupied Palestinian Territories are witnessing the mostcomplex conflict in the Middle East – the Arab-Israeli conflict. Inter-Palestinianconflict have recently started to emerge. Quantitatively, Algeria is not considereda conflict ‘hot spot’, though it is witnessing two internal conflicts, one protractedand the other violent.Clearly, these circles do not represent isolated conflict systems, as there are

connecting links between conflicts, and a series of marginal conflicts thatcomplicate the situation still further. Conflicts within circles are not totally isolatedfrom the many other surrounding conflicts. In addition, there are no simpledividing lines to define conflict limits within each circle. These circles, however,are useful models when studying the major impacts on the human security ofpersons present on the scene, following the breakout of conflicts and post-conflictsituations.21 Developments in any other case will probably not be so very differentfrom what is occurring within these circles, barring some limited exceptions.From the foregoing, it is clear that the magnitude of the conflict phenomenon

in the Arab region is unprecedented – the area seems to be on the verge of a ‘stateof war’. This means that the institutions concerned with human security in theregion should prioritize the resolution of armed conflicts; it also places aformidable burden on them. More importantly, the trends of conflict interactionsin the area are witnessing fundamental changes (to differing degrees) in the nature,parties, issues, intensity and durations of conflicts. This means that particularattention must be paid to the nature of the existing or potential effects of thesechanges on the human security situation in the Arab region, whether duringconflicts or after their cessation.


21 See the sections headed ‘Problems of human security during armed conflicts’ and Human securityproblems after armed conflicts’ below.


Principal impacts of armed conflicts and post-conflict situations

on human security in the Arab region

The concept of human security intrinsically means protecting the security ofpersons from dangerous threats and risks, and establishing systems that ensure thebasic human necessities of living, survival and dignity. According to the 2003 reportof the Commission on Human Security, Human Security Now, conflicts lead to acritical and extensive lack of human security in two main areas:

• Protecting people in violent conflicts:Civilians are the main victims in conflicts,and this requires adopting a comprehensive strategy to protect them, doingwhatever it takes to save their lives, and not allowing the violators of theirrights to go unpunished, particularly in relation to women, children, theelderly and vulnerable groups. The security of individuals during armedconflicts is the highest priority.

• Protecting and empowering people in post-conflict situations: Ceasefireagreements and political settlements may end conflicts, but they do notnecessarily achieve peace. The first mission should therefore be continued bylaunching reconstruction, establishing civilian police, meeting the needs ofdisplaced persons, encouraging reconciliation and coexistence, and developinggood governance in order to provide human security.22

The main problem in analysing the basic impacts of armed conflicts on humansecurity, based on the conflicts in the Arab region, is that the distinction betweenconflict situations and post-conflict situations may be unclear. Protracted conflictsthat continue for round after round are an essential characteristic of the region’sconflicts. Conflicts remain open for long periods: they are never resolved or settled,but are simply contained and addressed. This is due to the impossibility of a militarysolution and the difficulty of a peaceful settlement.23 This has led to a ‘no-war,no-peace situation’ in the Arab region.


22 For more details of the Commission on Human Security’s report on these two areas, see: Outlineof the Report of the Commission on Human Security, Human security – now:http://www.humansecurity-chs.org/finalreport/Outlines/outline.pdf, p. 2.23 One of the main trends in international conflict studies used to treat the Arab-Israeli conflict, as wellas some other conflicts in the region, according to the theory of ‘protracted social conflicts’ (PSCs): →


What is more complicated is that the post-2003 period is characterized by whatthe Iraqi writer Saad al-Bazzaz describes as ‘wars begetting wars’.24 Whenever aconflict ends, its implications or consequences lead to the outbreak of otherconflicts, as demonstrated by the magnitude of the conflicts that have erupted overthe last four years. The problem is not only that conflict termination does not meanthe achievement of peace, but also that conflicts continue even after the end ofwars. This puts a heavy burden on the mission of human security, which isconstantly having to deal with grey areas.For the purposes of analysing the effects of conflicts on human security, and

based on practical conflict indicators, conflict situations can be separated frompost-conflict situations, as shown in Table 5.

There are some fifteen conflict situations whose violent interactions have alreadyended because no succeeding or parallel conflicts were present within the sameconflict circle. Important lessons can be drawn from the effects on human securityassociated with these fifteen conflicts. On the level of international conflicts, the warwaged by US and UK troops against Iraq in 2003 has provided the most importantlessons about post-conflict situations in the region’s modern history. Two crises –also linked to Iraq – ended with (or immediately after) this war, with after-effects


→ these continue for a long time, pervade all areas, evolve through different stages until they fadeaway and are generally difficult to resolve. In these cases, war represents a crisis, as does peace, withsimilar intensity. So these conflicts tend to revert to the usual pattern of interaction.24 This phrase is taken from the title of a famous book by the Iraqi author Saad al-Bazzaz in whichhe analyses Iraq’s successive conflicts. See: Saad al-Bazzaz, 1993, Wars Beget New Wars: The SecretHistory of the Gulf War, Amman, al-Ahlia for Publication and Distribution.

Table 5. Conflict and post-conflict situations in the Arab region

Post-conflict situationsLatent conflict 2 Manifest conflict 3Crisis 4 Violent crisis 3 War 3

Total 15

Conflict situationsLatent conflict 18 Manifest conflict 17Crisis 8 Violent crisis 10 War –

Total 53


that continue to the present day. The manifest conflict between the USA, the UnitedKingdom and the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya also ended in 2004 without any lastingconsequences that might bring manifest tensions back to the surface.As for the other cases, three are related to regional conflicts whose main actions

have ended: the Lebanon war in 2006, Ethiopia’s intervention in Somalia in 2005and the dormant border problem between Egypt and Sudan concerning theHalayeb Triangle. As to intra-state conflicts, the Fatah–Hamas state of war in 2007is considered terminated. The same applies to the armed confrontations betweenthe Lebanese army and the Fatah al-Islam and Jund al-Sham groups in thePalestinian camps, and also to two conflict situations in Mauritania (one of themrelated to a military coup d’état, which was unusual in the context of the region’sconflict history). The other cases are the chronic conflicts in Iraq between thegovernment and the Shiites and the Kurds, which ended with the downfall ofSaddam Hussein’s regime, in addition to two instances of violent confrontationsand widespread military chaos in Iraq.We note here that there were fifteen conflict cessation cases, representing only

20 per cent of the total conflict situations. However, this percentage includes thethree main wars that the area has witnessed during the post-2003 period, as wellas seven other violent conflicts. This is understandable because it relates more tothe nature of the military operations associated with these conflicts than to theconflict situation itself. Wars end, but conflicts may drag on.In this context, the main consequences of the Arab region’s conflicts on human

security (within conflict hot spots) can be analysed in a manner that underlinesthe essential problems of human security, as shown below.

Problems of human security during armed conflicts

There is no need to stress once again that no situation is more dangerous forhuman security than armed conflict because it usually creates a state of insecuritythat may jeopardize the very right to survival. The Arab region is witnessing somefifty-three actual or potential conflicts, though not all of them pose maximumthreats to human security. Only eighteen conflicts pose this maximum level ofthreat, including ten conflicts associated with and directly caused by violent crises:one is the Darfur conflict in Sudan, which is an intra-state conflict with ethno-political dimensions; there are two intra-state conflicts in Somalia; and there is onechronic armed conflict in Algeria between the government and armed religious



groups. These come within the framework of broader conflicts within the samecircle (see Table 6).

In armed conflicts there is widespread targeting of civilians through violent actionsthat sometimes reach the level of mass murder. Assassinations, executions, forcedmigrations, hostage-taking, torture, rape, arbitrary detention and intimidationalso spread uncontrollably, especially during intra-state conflicts. The destructionof basic systems and infrastructures leads to the inability to pursue a normal lifefor long periods.According to a common definition, human security means: ‘freedom from fear,

freedom from want and living in dignity’. In light of this definition, the componentsof security that are usually jeopardized by armed conflicts are the following:

• the physical integrity of citizens during armed conflicts;• the basic needs of citizens during armed conflicts; and• the human dignity of citizens during armed conflicts.25


Table 6. Cases of armed conflict in the Arab region

AlgeriaLatent conflict 1 Manifest conflict –Crisis – Violent crisis 1 War –

Total 2

SomaliaLatent conflict 1 Manifest conflict 4Crisis 1 Violent crisis 1 War –

Total 7

SudanLatent conflict 4 Manifest conflict 1Crisis 2 Violent crisis 1 War –

Total 8

25 The first two components come from Bechir Chourou’s study, and the third component has beenadded by the present author. This last component is referred to in various studies. See: Chourou,op. cit., pp. 43–51.


Within this context, it is possible to analyse the potential consequences of theconflicts in the Arab region on all the components of human security in light ofthe situations described below.

The intra-state conflict in Darfur

Claims of ‘ethnic cleansing’ have been almost non-existent in any conflict situationin the Arab region apart from Darfur. The region has previously witnessed acts ofgenocide like the Sabra and Shatila massacre in 1988, and the poison gas attackson the northern Iraqi Kurdish area of Halabja in 1988. Forced transfers ofPalestinians have also occurred during the Arab-Israeli conflict. The Iraqi invasionof Kuwait in 1990 led to the exodus of large numbers of Kuwaiti citizens. Not oneconflict in the Arab region has witnessed acts of ethnic mass murder similar to thegenocide of Rwanda in 1994 or the ethnic cleansing in Bosnia in 1992–95. Even inDarfur, which has witnessed extensive killings, the situation has been variouslyevaluated as ‘ethnic cleansing’ or ‘a crime against humanity’.Under the serious ‘lack of security’, which has finally been interrupted by a

fragile stability, the armed conflict in Darfur has threatened almost all thecomponents of human security. Between 300,000 and 400,000 people have beenkilled in Darfur since 2003, either as a direct result of the conflict or because ofmalnutrition and the catastrophic humanitarian situation. Violence has led to thedisplacement of some 2.3 million people, both inside and outside the area, anddestroyed its health structures and water services. Citizens are no longer able toengage in their traditional activities of grazing and trading in livestock. Around3.5 million people are now dependent on humanitarian relief. The rape of womenhas spread on an unprecedented scale when compared with any other conflict inthe Arab region,26 and has been committed as an organized strategy to humiliatethe other party to the conflict.This coincides with the grave inability of all parties – whether the United

Nations Security Council, the African Union, the League of Arab States or the


26 For more details on the humanitarian situation in Darfur, see: Nadia Mustafa (ed.), 2004, Dimensionsof the Conflict in Darfur: Crisis and Future Horizons, Center for Political Research & Study, Universityof Cairo; Muataz al-Fegeiry and Radwa Zyada, 8 Jan. 2007, ‘Manifestations of Arab Denial of theDarfur Tragedy … Our Double Standards’, al-Hayat (London); Jan Egeland, UN Under-SecretaryGeneral for Humanitarian Affairs, Oct. 2006, ‘Darfur: Again, on the Verge of Doom’, al-Siyassa al-Dawliya, al-Ahram, Issue 166, p. 149; and ‘the Republic of Sudan’, Amnesty International Report 2007:http://www.amnesty.org.


European Union (EU) – to contain the conflict. The peacekeeping forces have faceda succession of problems over a long period, and the dire security situation has ledmany humanitarian relief organizations to withdraw from Darfur. When the ideaof humanitarian intervention was proposed, this alarmed the Government inKhartoum and the regimes in neighbouring Arab countries, because – givenprevious experience – this idea is not popular in the Arab region.Darfur displays all the aspects of a dangerous conflict. It is a complex intra-

state conflict with numerous parties to it, both governmental and ‘non-state’, suchas the Janjaweed militias, the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) and the SudanPeople’s Liberation Movement (SPLM). All these parties are engaged in intenseconflict practices. However, the conflict in Darfur is not a protracted conflict; justa few years ago, it was a latent conflict and it was not inevitable that it would turninto a ‘state of war’. This has serious implications for other latent conflicts in Sudanand in other states of the Arab region.

The civil war in Somalia

The situation in Somalia represents another model of intense armed conflict – civilwar – that has outrageous consequences for human security. The problem withthis model is that although the concept of civil war is common in the Arab region,and analyses (including the present study) use this term to refer to at least fiveconflicts, the region has, on the whole, not witnessed extensive civil wars that ledto the collapse of central governments or the spread of nationwide internalconfrontations, or that lasted for more than fifteen years under a de facto divisionof the state’s territories. There are only two exceptions: Lebanon (1975–90) andSomalia. The other cases cannot really be classified as civil wars.Somalia has recently witnessed the continuation or the outbreak of at least seven

chronic conflicts, six of which are internal. Remarkably, none of these has reachedthe level of war. Only one case was a limited armed confrontation, and anotherconflict reached the level of armed crisis. The other four cases are categorized asmanifest conflicts, and the last of them as a latent conflict.27 The situation in Somaliais governed by ‘balances of weakness’, changing alliances and foreign interventions,and is therefore expected to last for a long time as a low-intensity, protracted conflictthat can neither be terminated nor settled. It will leave chronic effects on human


27 See the annexes at the end of the present chapter.


security due to the lack of a state that can provide more than a minimum level ofprotection (which is more or less ensured locally by warlords and separate pettystates), or any form of ‘empowerment’. A prerequisite of the second dimension ofhuman security – empowerment – is the existence of a non-failing state.The word ‘collapse’ best describes the situation of human insecurity in Somalia.

Somali citizens live on an average of less than US$1 a day. Some 1 million Somalisare threatened with starvation. There are only 200 doctors in the country, serving5 million people. Life expectancy at birth is 47 years, and arms are endemic.Organized crime is growing in the form of extensive sea piracy (which has risen todangerous levels during the last two years), human trafficking and the dumpingof toxic and radioactive waste.28

More importantly, the length of the conflict and the apparent impossibility ofachieving a settlement has created what appears to be international inertia regardingthe situation in Somalia – except for the dangers associated with it, such as the increasein extremism and terrorism. According to the Amnesty International Report 2007,although most of the country is barren, the absence of security and the threats to reliefworkers are hampering the supply of humanitarian assistance. International aid torebuild the country has been ‘put on hold’ for lack of a unified and effective governmentas the state collapsed in 1991. Some 400,000 internally displaced persons (IDPs)continue to suffer from appalling conditions; discrimination and violence againstminorities are widespread; and neither the government nor judicial institutions areable to offer even a minimum level of protection.29 Thus it is clear that chronic civilwars not only affect human security, but also lead to its total breakdown.

Armed violence in Algeria

The situation of ‘armed violence’ in Algeria represents a very complex model ofthe region’s conflicts and their impacts on the human security within conflictcircles. The problem originally arose from a violent political development, one thatcould perhaps be repeated in other parts of the Arab region where there are manylatent conflicts between the government and political Islamist groups. But Algeria’sparticular geography makes it difficult to conceive of the repetition of a similarly


28 For more details on the humanitarian situation in Somalia see: Sultan Soliman, 29 June, ‘Two HundredPhysicians for Five Million Somalis’, al-Hayat (London); and Atif Saqr, 27 Nov. 2005, ‘Al-Ahram inSomalia: Sea Pirates, Human Trafficking, Nuclear and Chemical Wastes are the Worst Crimes’, al-Ahram.29 ‘Somalia’, Amnesty International Report 2007: http://www.amnesty.org.


intense conflict in other places. The situation in Algeria is characterized by thefollowing features:

• There have been heavy casualties and financial losses. According to mostinternational reports on the situation, the violence in Algeria during the period1992–2002 led to between 120,000 and 150,000 deaths, an indeterminatenumber of people injured, the disappearance of some 4,800 people and therape of around 5,000 women. The financial losses are estimated at between$20 billion and $25 billion (which equals Algeria’s income from oil over threeyears), in addition to the destruction of 12,000 infrastructure projects and themigration of at least 600,000 Algerians.30

• Mutual violations of human rights are being committed. The conflict ismanaged by violent, even heinous, practices: massacres, the terrorization ofcivilians – especially those living in remote villages – bomb attacks in civilianareas, the targeting of private families, torture and arrests. A large part of thepopulation suffers from the violent practices involved in the conflict.

• Extremely pragmatic methods have emerged in managing the conflict. Thegovernment, which wishes to contain the violence, has enacted amnesty lawsthat some international organizations have seen as allowing the perpetrators ofserious human rights violations to go unpunished.31 Although the governmenthas imposed restrictions on this amnesty, in all conflict situations against armedgroups, the authorities often seem willing to deal with terrorists as ‘prisoners ofwar’ or ‘freedom fighters’ for practical reasons.

What is startling in the case of Algeria is that, although it can in no way beconsidered a civil war, the resultant loss of life has exceeded the casualties in all theregular wars fought as part of the Arab-Israeli conflict between 1948 and 1982.Here we can see the danger of the religious factor in intra-state conflicts and thesecurity services’ ‘heavy hand’ in managing conflicts. The problem is that each side


30 For more details on the humanitarian situation in Algeria, see: Khalid Al-Sirgany, ‘Why ArmedConflict Continues in Algeria’, April 2002, al-Ahram Strategic File, Issue 88, Cairo, Al-Ahram Centerfor Political and Strategic Studies, p. 43; and ‘People’s Democratic Republic of Algeria’, AmnestyInternational Report 2007: http://www.amnesty.org.31 Amnesty International’s report indicates that in Algeria the amnesty decisions issued by virtue ofpresidential decrees in February (which the government stated were in implementation of the‘Charter on Peace and National Reconciliation’) support ‘escaping punishment’. See: ‘People’sDemocratic Republic of Algeria’, Amnesty International Report 2007: http://www.amnesty.org.


acts as if it were compelled to behave in a certain way, as if no other choices wereavailable. Even more dangerous, when it comes to the crisis in Algeria, is that‘humanitarian missions’ are given the least consideration.Therefore, the existing intense conflict cases in the Arab region either impinge

dangerously on the human security situation within their areas (as in Algeria), raiseunprecedented possibilities of war crimes (Darfur) or turn the conflict scene into ahumanitarian disaster zone (Somalia). In every case, all the parties commit grossviolations of the rules of war, and there is an increasing discrepancy between theirhumanitarian undertakings and their real behaviour. Humanitarian organizationsface many obstacles in carrying out their work so long as a conflict is ongoing,whether the state is still intact or has already collapsed. These events appear to befar removed from the international legal criteria that govern armed conflicts.

Human security problems after armed conflicts

All recent international reports on the relationship between armed conflicts andhuman security have paid particular attention to post-conflict conditions,particularly because of events in Iraq in 2003. Compared to the long history ofconflicts in the region, post-conflict situations have been given clear attention fromdifferent perspectives. This attention was obvious in many trends that reached thelevel of ‘slogans’, such as ‘removing the impacts of aggression’ and ‘rebuilding whatthe war has destroyed’. But the situation in Iraq was so disastrous that academicsand decision-makers were forced to focus their attention on what takes place aftera conflict has ended. Their pessimistic assessments led Guy Debonnet ofUNESCO’s World Heritage Centre to comment that post-conflict situations canbe worse than the conflicts themselves.32

The discussion of post-conflict situations has made great progress inexamining their characteristics, the challenges they pose, the efforts they require,the problems that hinder the implementation of these efforts, and the nature ofpossible human security approaches for dealing with these problems. Manydifferent models of post-conflict stages have been analysed and important lessonsdrawn from them, particularly regarding reconstruction and building the security


32 This comment came in an interview on the impact of post-conflict situations on wild life, and theproblem of militants who are left without control at the end of conflicts. See: interview by Agnès Bardonof UNESCO’s Bureau of Public Information, UNESCO Courier, Dec. 2006: www.unesco.org/courier/


forces.33 The background paper prepared by the Commission on Human Security,the Advisory Board on Human Security (CHS/ABHS) for the Round Table onHuman Security (Brussels, 2006) on ‘Resolution of Conflicts and Peace Building:A Human Security Approach’ is a clear example in this respect.The paper shows that the cessation of hostilities does not necessarily mark the end

of a conflict, but merely moves it into a new stage – a transitory stage between conflictand peace. Even if the violence stopped completely, the reconstruction process wouldstill be difficult because of the large numbers of people who have been harmed by thewar and the need for huge financial resources. This is particularly true as the post-conflict stage witnesses vulnerability and urgent needs, requiring a process in whichsecurity interacts simultaneously with the economy to restore stability so that stepscan be taken towards the restoration of normal life and, consequently, a completepeace. After a ceasefire has been agreed, there is a generally agreed list of tasks that isalways referred to as a ‘work plan’ for this stage. It consists of:

• public safety and security, including security sector reform;• humanitarian relief;• rehabilitation, reconstruction and development;• reconciliation and coexistence; and• governance and empowerment, including the rule of law, human rights,democratization and participation.34

According to Table 5 above, there are fifteen situations in the Arab region that areassociated, to some degree, with the end of conflict acts in a manner that allows ananalysis of post-conflict situations. The most important of these situations areshown in Table 7: they are linked to a particular end of a particular type of conflict,and are followed by a discussion of all post-conflict issues within frameworks thatvary from one case to another.


33 See, for example, an important model of a critical discussion by six experts on the problems ofbuilding security forces after conflicts: Post-Conflict Security-Building,Nov. 2006, London, ChathamHouse (ISP/NSC Briefing Paper 06/02); and D. M. Law, The Post-Conflict Security Sector, June 2006,Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF) (Policy Paper No. 14).34 For more details about the information provided in this chapter, and for details of humanitarianmissions and the challenges they face, see: ‘Resolution of Conflicts and Peace Building, A HumanSecurity Approach’, Background Paper prepared by CHS/ABHS for the Round Table on HumanSecurity, Brussels, 15 Nov. 2006: http://ochaonline.un.org/humansecurity/OutreachandABHS/Outreach/2006Activities/RoundTableonConflictandPostConflict/tabid/2452/language/en-US/Default.asp


Each case is linked to a different pattern of wars that the Arab region witnessedduring the period under discussion. The first case is an example of what wasearlier defined as an international conflict, the second is a regional conflict andthe third is an intra-state conflict. In all three cases, the operations scene extendedstate-wide or ‘sector’-wide. Each party employed power on a massive scale, theobjective being to defeat the enemy. Violent tactics were used in managing theseconflicts, which is why their ensuing conditions represent clearly differentiatedmodels of post-conflict situations.Within this framework, human security problems in post-conflict situations

can be analysed according to our regional experience, and depending on thesecases, as shown below.

Post-Iraq invasion (2003)

Several years have passed since the invasion of Iraq in 2003, but attempts are stillbeing made to explain how events took such a disastrously wrong turn after thedownfall of the Saddam Hussein regime. These events resulted in a post-warsituation that was worse than the war itself. Various analyses have attributed thiswrong direction to the decision to go to war, the arrogance of power, themiscalculations, the operations plan, ‘Bremer’s mistake’ (see below), alliancemanagement, the nature of Iraq or the interventions by neighbouring countries.


Table 7. Post-conflict situations in the Arab region

Post-Gaza clashes 2007Latent conflict – Manifest conflict –Crisis – Violent crisis 2 War 1

Total 3

Post-Lebanon war 2006Latent conflict 1 Manifest conflict 2Crisis 2 Violent crisis 1 War 1

Total 7

Post-Iraq invasion 2003Latent conflict 2 Manifest conflict 3Crisis 4 Violent crisis 4 War 1

Total 14


A wide consensus now seems to have been reached that – in the words of JohnKerry, the former US Democratic presidential nominee, in 2004 – this was ‘thewrong war in the wrong place at the wrong time’.Developments after the collapse of the Iraqi regime took a direction that

deviated from any expectation of how events might unfold, based on previoushistorical experiences such as the German or the Japanese model. Over time, theseboth proved not to be applicable to other circumstances,35 especially when ittranspired that insufficient preparations had been made for the post-war stage,and the Allied forces were unable to provide the minimum level of basic security.In particular, Paul Bremer’s36 decision to dissolve the army, the police and theruling Baath Party led to a ‘security vacuum’ that resulted in a situation of armedanarchy that still poses the principal challenge in the post-war period.In consequence, the conditions in post-conflict Iraq are characterized by three

main features that are directly related to human security:

• The war against Iraq ultimately created another more intense, multi-level,complex war 37 that included three conflicts, each of which represented a‘small war’ waged by al-Qaeda, armed militias (Mahdi Army) and Sunniresistance against Allied and US troops on the one hand, and opposing sectson the other. Armed groups and security companies were also involved, andIraq appeared to be in a state of war of ‘all against all’.The Iraqi case has made the Arabs suspicious of any external armed

interventions designed to change regimes, or even to change their behaviour– even if these interventions are based on humanitarian or ‘idealistic’principles. It has become obvious that the collapse of the state leads to thecollapse of society, and that national security is closely related to humansecurity. In the absence of the state, only risks can be encountered.


35 For a critical discussion on this point, see Alain Caillé (Introduction by Boutros Ghali), Peace andDemocracy: Benchmarking, 2004, Paris, UNESCO, International Centre for Human Sciences (Jbeil),International Panel on Democracy and Development, p. 85.36 Head of the Coalition Provisional Authority in Iraq.37 Statements on the concept of a ‘complex war’ were discussed extensively by one of the mainworkgroups of the Fifth Global Strategic Review of the London-based International Institute forStrategic Studies (IISS), held in Geneva from 7 to 9 September 2007, on the theme, ‘Managing GlobalSecurity and Risk’. For more details, see:http://www.iiss.org/conferences/global-strategic-review/global-strategic-review-2007/


• The human security situation in Iraq deteriorated dramatically after the firstwar. Some 150,000 civilians have been killed, there are about 2 million IDPsand approximately 2.5 million Iraqis have fled the country. There is a shortageof food and drinking water, very poor health conditions, a lack of sewagedrainage networks and educational institutions, very high unemploymentrates and many violations committed against women and children, whichwound ‘the pride of the people’. The report issued by the InternationalCommittee of the Red Cross five years after the war described thehumanitarian situation in Iraq as ‘still among the most critical in the worldin most of the country’. According to Amnesty International’s report, Iraq:Five Years of Carnage and Despair, Iraq remains ‘one of the most dangerouscountries in the world for human rights’.38

According to a view held by much of Arab mainstream opinion and themass media, and repeated in credible international reports, general conditionsin Iraq under the dictatorial regime of Saddam Hussein were better than theyare now or, at least, current conditions have not greatly improved. Iraqisthemselves are strongly divided as to the truth of this opinion.

• All the items on the ‘work plan’ for managing the post-conflict situation havefaced serious problems, whether relating to: rebuilding the security forces;humanitarian relief operations; rehabilitation, resettlement and politicalreconciliation; coexistence; or good governance. The challenges on the groundare more complex than any theoretical discussion of the situation. Democracyand the rule of law seem to be unattainable in the short term. Throughout theseyears, the aspiration of most Iraqis was for their country not to descend into a‘worst-case scenario’: a dismantling of its territory or a full-scale civil war.


38 The general trend of the two reports was largely identical. The headings, images and data give avery clear picture of the magnitude of the Iraqi tragedy. For more details, see: International Committeeof the Red Cross (ICRC), 2008, ‘Iraq, No Let-up in the Humanitarian Crisis’: www.icrc.org; andAmnesty International, 2008, ‘Iraq: Five Years of Carnage and Despair,’ AI Index: 2008/001/AI Index:MDE, http://www.amnesty.org.For more details on the humanitarian situation in Iraq, see: Nafissa al-Sabbagh, 20 March 2008,

‘Iraqi Children … 1.5 Million Displaced, 11 per cent Work, 33 per cent Leave Work’, al-Masryal-Youm (Cairo); Khalid Omar Abdel-Halim, 20 March 2008, ‘Iraqi Economy … Infrastructure:Total Destruction and Reap of Embargo and War Years’, al-Masry al-Youm (Cairo); Mahmoudal-Mubarak, 11 Feb. 2008, ‘Iraqi Refugees … A Forgotten Disaster’, al-Hayat (London); MagdaTantawy, 8 Jan. 2008, ‘Iraq Refugees’ Situation Worsens’, al-Akhbar; idem, 2 Jan. 2008, ‘PovertyObliges Iraqi Women Refugees to Engage in Sex Trade in Syria’, al-Hayat (London); and ‘Iraq’,Amnesty International Report 2007: http://www.amnesty.org.


Post-Lebanon war (2006)

This case is also linked to a complex form of conflict that began to spread after11 September: the asymmetrical war. This was a war between a paramilitary force(elements of the Lebanese Hezbollah) and a regular military force (the Israeliarmy). Events during the conflict, which lasted over thirty-four days in mid-2006,showed that this type of war might be more devastating to the components ofhuman security for both parties – with a huge difference in the scale of devastation –than other regular regional wars.The difference in the armament systems employed, and the fighting tactics

adopted, led to interpretations that widely overstepped the principles ofconventional warfare such as the principle of proportionality, military objectivesand military advantage. The concept of ‘military necessity’ lost all meaning.39 Thisled to an open war in which civilian areas were the main targets and were subjectedto indiscriminate bombing. It was one of the few wars where war crimes or the useof internationally prohibited weapons became a serious issue. The course of militaryoperations went as follows:

• Israel engaged in extensive shelling of Lebanese civilian targets, killing about1,200 and injuring approximately 4,400 people, mostly civilians, one third ofwhom were children. One million people, representing a quarter of the Lebanesepopulation, were displaced, tens of thousands of houses were razed to the groundand most of the country’s civilian infrastructure was destroyed.

• Hezbollah fired around 4,000 Katyusha unguided missiles at residential areas innorthern Israel, killing 43 civilians, damaging hundreds of buildings and forcingthousands of civilians to leave their houses or spend long periods in shelters.40

Lebanon faced a disastrous situation at the end of the war. It had to rebuild thecountry, resettle displaced persons, remove cluster bombs and clean the shoresfrom oil pollution. These tasks were well beyond the capability of the LebaneseState. Israeli air raids had damaged or completely destroyed tens of thousands of


39 For more details on the concept of ‘military necessity’, see, for example: Francoise J. Hampson,Military Necessity, in: Lawrence Fishler et al., ‘War Crimes: What the Public Should Know’, translatedby Ghazi Massoud, Azmina Press, Amman, 2003, pp. 325–26. Source: HIIK, Conflict Barometers2003–2007,Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research, Department of Political Science,University of Heidelberg, Germany.40 For more details of the military operations during the war and the resultant losses, see: ‘Republicof Lebanon’, Amnesty International Report 2007: http://www.amnesty.org.


houses, as well as Beirut airport, ports, main roads, bridges, commercial stores, fuelstations, factories and about 350 schools, leaving 1 million metres of rubble. Hugenumbers of cluster bombs were dropped during the war, containing an estimated1 million smaller bombs, creating ‘killing fields’ in many areas.41

According to Lebanese Prime Minister Fouad Siniora, the war set back Lebanon’srecovery by fifteen years. Everything that had been built after the end of the civilwar in 1990 was destroyed or severely damaged. Unlike Israel, which could recovereasily from the non-military impacts of the war, Lebanon needed up to $9.5 billiondollars for reconstruction,42 putting a severe strain on the economy. However, thestate of regional cold war between the ‘moderates’ and the extremists helpedLebanon to advance towards reconstruction without facing any obstructions.Nevertheless, only some 200,000 displaced persons had been resettled by the endof 2006, and the remnants of cluster bombs still pose a grave problem.One of the characteristics of regional wars is that, unlike intra-state conflicts,

their post-conflict conditions do not entail serious complications such asreconciliation, empowerment and the restoration of security. The fact that theLebanon war was waged by an ‘internal actor’, away from the decisions of the state,has generated additional internal security problems during the post-war period.It has also led to a debate about disarming Hezbollah and its external links with theIslamic Republic of Iran. All the repercussions of intra-state conflicts came to theforefront, drawing Lebanon towards a dark tunnel from which it only managed toemerge around the middle of 2008.

Post-Gaza clashes (2007)

The Gaza Strip represents a humanitarian tragedy that has frequently beendescribed as a ‘time bomb’. The area covers a mere 365 km2 and is inhabited by1.5 million people, a high percentage of whom suffer from unemployment, health


41 Fatehi Mahmoud, 23 Aug. 2006, ‘Seventy-five Thousand Displaced, Million Meters of RubbleImpede Removal of Destruction Impacts’, al-Ahram (Cairo); and John Sfakianakis, 12 Aug. 2006,‘The Lebanese Economy on the Verge of Collapse’, al-Sharq al-Awsat (London).42 Estimates of the losses caused by the Lebanon war were alarming. Some official bodies estimatedthe economic losses alone at more than $3 billion. An economic report prepared by the LebaneseEconomic Support Center (based on statistics from the Council of Development and Reconstruction)put Lebanese losses during the war at $9.5 billion, including $785 million losses in infrastructureand $1,464 million losses in houses and commercial stores. See: ‘Lebanon Loses $9.5 Billion becauseof the Israeli Aggression’, 23 Aug. 2006, al-Ahram.


problems and poor housing. In addition, life is characterized by depression andsevere stagnation, and is isolated on all sides from the outside world by a militaryembargo, economic restraints and complicated border-crossing arrangements thathave turned Gaza into what is frequently described as a large prison. As a result,suicide operations seem as much the inevitable consequence of the appalling livingconditions as a form of resistance against occupation.The description of Gaza as a prison is not merely a metaphorical statement. The

withdrawal of Israeli forces from the Strip in September 2005 was an alarm as morethan 350,000 Gazans trespassed the border fences with Egypt and flocked to the cityof El Arish in Sinai to stock up on basic needs and breathe some free air. Theconstruction of tunnels under the Egyptian border has increased to unprecedentedlevels for various humanitarian purposes that are much more important thansmuggling weapons. The tunnels are used to smuggle goods, fuel and humans,leading to constant disputes between Egypt, Israel and the Palestinians. Given theproblems of the external embargo, instability, mismanagement, security chaos andinternal corruption, Israel’s withdrawal has not led to any economic or humanitarianimprovements in Gaza.During this period, Gaza saw a manifest power conflict between Fatah and

Hamas. The results of the 2006 elections exacerbated the crisis, and in June 2007the conflict between the two sides erupted in an armed confrontation that ultimatelyled to the expulsion of the Palestinian Authority to the West Bank, with Hamasimposing its control over the Gaza Strip.Hamas’s control over the Gaza Strip led to strategic concerns on all sides over the

likelihood of Gaza becoming separated from the West Bank and then implementinga policy of violent resistance against Israel, establishing a small Islamic emirate inthe Strip or becoming a ‘failed Strip’ whose problems would leak in all directions.The accuracy of these scenarios is open to discussion. The reality on the ground isthat most parties are following policies that have strangled the Gaza Strip andactivated the ‘time bomb’ that has ultimately blown up against the neighbouringcountry that has always had ‘soft’ borders with Gaza – in other words, Egypt.The Israeli Government had already begun to adopt a tough policy towards Gaza,

but the situation escalated after Hamas took over the Strip. Under this untenablesituation, and with the constant games played by the leaders of the conflict, theescalating violence on both sides tripled the number of Palestinians killed by Israelitroops in 2007. However, the devastating ‘humanitarian’ impacts on Gaza werecaused by the long-standing policies of closures of crossing-points and restrictions



on the Palestinians’ movements. The successive rounds of armed clashes betweenthe two sides also destroyed Gaza’s fragile infrastructure, including bridges, roadsand water and sanitation networks. The worst example of Israeli aggression was whenIsraeli troops destroyed the only power plant in Gaza in 2006.Living conditions in Gaza during that period were dire, as described by the

Media Spokesperson of the World Food Programme, Simon Pluess. UN reportsindicate that 80 per cent of Gazans depend on food aid, while more than 50 per centare unemployed. Seventy per cent of children below 16 years of age suffer fromanaemia43 and the education system has almost completely disintegrated. This isnot all: early in January 2008, the interruption of fuel supplies to the Strip led to acomplete blackout and life came to a standstill. This led around 750,000 Gazans tobreach the borders and enter Egyptian territory, an unprecedented event in the Arabregion in terms of its scale.The dilemma here springs from the fact that it poses once again the challenge

of post-conflict conditions in the Arab region, when all the components of humansecurity are exposed to comprehensive, parallel threats that ultimately turn humansecurity into complete ‘insecurity’. This highlights the concept of a ‘disaster’ orhuman tragedy whose aspects go well beyond the concept of human security itself.

* * *

Thus it is clear that the conditions following severe conflict situations (or ‘rounds’)that break out inside or between Arab countries have additional connotations,some of which are traditional. Post-war conditions might have more negativeconsequences for human security than war itself because of the resultant instability.The conflicting parties may not refrain from using their own interpretation ofmilitary necessity to embark on violent retaliatory acts that cause humanitariandestruction. The economic restrictions on people’s lives may cause far-reachinghumanitarian tragedies.The priorities of containing the consequences of war on the humanitarian

situation vary according to the nature of each case. In most instances, however,the basic humanitarian needs of restoring security and supplying food are thehighest priorities. Dealing with post-regional-war conditions usually starts with


43 For more details on the humanitarian situation in the Gaza Strip, see Magued Kialy, April 2008,‘Fatah and Hamas: What Comes after the Gaza Crisis?’, al-Siyassa al-Dawliya, Issue 172; and ‘Israeland the Occupied Territories’, Amnesty International Report 2007: http://www.amnesty.org.



reconstruction – as long as the conflict does not erupt again or a new conflictappear on the same scene. In every case, moving from protection to empowermentseems difficult in post-conflict situations in the Arab region (and this is probablythe case in other regions too). Nevertheless, these situations theoretically allow thestate and the society to be re-established on a new basis.

Conclusion: handling the consequences of armed conflict and post-conflict situations

on human security

The main conclusion that can be drawn from this chapter may appear verytraditional, but it could gain importance given the current ‘state of war’ in the Arabregion. The most important approach when attempting to protect human securityin areas of armed conflicts, or post-conflict conditions, is to try to control thecourse of the conflict itself. This will reduce – as much as possible – the effects ofthe conflict during its existence or after it has ended. Consequently, what we arediscussing here is the need to pay as much attention to the military dimensions ofhuman security as to the human dimensions of the outbreak or cessation of armedconflict. This inevitably falls within the scope of the human security concept, whichdepends on soft power as an effective tool.The early literature on human security, particularly the 1994 Human Development

Report, referred to what was called the ‘third characteristic’ of human security,indicating that it was easier to ensure human security through ‘early prevention’than through ‘later intervention’.44 This characteristic should be examined not onlyin light of the logic on which it is based, but also in light of the magnitude andaspects of the conflict phenomenon that the Arab region is currently witnessing,and the experience of ‘later intervention’ as an attempt to handle this phenomenonon a humanitarian level. This will allow us to move from the situations describedin this chapter to affirm the need to focus in greater depth (as part of an integratedpreliminary approach to dealing with the problem of human security) on handlingthe ‘military framework’ surrounding this phenomenon. This framework might

44 See Ch. 2, pp. 21–22, of the UNDP Development Report 1994, which focuses on the ‘new’ dimensions:http://hdr.undp.org/en/media/hdr_1994_en.pdf.


aggravate, or even totally destroy, this phenomenon, making it impossible tocontain – or it could turn out to be true after an analysis of the possibledevelopments in any conflict.There is a military slogan commonly adopted by armies all over the world.

While it might not fit the subject of our chapter, it explains the concept we putforward earlier. In the words of the slogan: ‘Sweat (i.e. training) before battle savesblood during the battle.’ Accordingly, any effort exerted to intervene in howconflicts are managed by their parties will save much of the effort required to dealwith their simultaneous or subsequent impacts. The Lebanon war in 2006 showed(according to the previously mentioned statement by Fouad Siniora) that what hasbeen built up over fifteen years can be destroyed in a mere thirty-four days. Mostof the ‘intense conflict’ models that we have studied indicate the following points:

• Conflicts in the Arab region have created intense conflict hot spots that haveresulted in total human insecurity, as in Iraq and Darfur. While viciousmilitary operations rage, it is the conflict that controls the parties’ conduct,not the reverse, leaving no opportunity for relief organizations to performtheir humanitarian mission without running major risks.

• Dealing with these hot spots is beyond the power of any effort that may beexerted – apart from the minimum requirements for ensuring people’ssurvival, such as providing security, food and water – as demonstrated by thecases of Somalia and Gaza. Even within these limits, there will be resourceproblems, even if the conditions relate to a conflict that has ceased to exist.

In this context, it is difficult to recommend the approaches usually adopted bypeace studies, which tend to work on resolving conflicts or terminating wars. Theseapproaches do not represent a likely solution as far as human security, or thesituation in the Arab region (or the Middle East in general), is concerned. Aspointed out above,45 the conflicts in the region have reached an unprecedentedlevel of complexity in terms of nature, parties, issues, intensity and duration. Noleading world power or international organization, or even the security forces ofArab countries, has managed to stop these conflicts. There seems to be no otherapproach than to contain the impacts of conflict on human security.


45 See the section headed ‘Current trends of armed conflicts in the Arab region’.


The tendency to ‘contain’ the impacts of armed conflicts at their outbreak, orafter they end, seems to dominate the thought pattern surrounding efforts toprotect human security, at least in the Arab region. ‘Containment’ is ofconsiderable importance in protecting as many lives, relieving as much sufferingand rehabilitating as many people as possible. These efforts have made great stridesin the region: one example is a programme set up in Beirut (after the 2006 Lebanonwar) and designed to lessen the psychological impacts of war on children.46 Basedon an analysis of conflict situations in the region, we can highlight two preventivestrategies that are partially in place:47

• Moving a step forward from thinking about what to do during a conflictsituation to acting during the pre-conflict stages: this can be done by opposingany tendency to use armed force to address existing problems, even in relationto humanitarian issues (except in rare cases that must be handled under certaindeterminants). Specific early warnings may be given when examining theconditions surrounding the potential conflict in terms of the human securityconditions that might ensue if the conflict erupts. This will also help to lessencurrent Arab suspicions that ‘human security’ issues are being exploited as anexcuse to interfere in the internal affairs of Arab countries.

• Moving a step forward from thinking about what to do after the conflict endsto acting during the conflict by controlling the military conduct of the conflictparties. This can be done by measuring this conduct against the perception of‘military necessities’. The problem is that each conflicting party believes (likea novice chess player) that what it does is necessary and is the only choice,although this is not true in most cases. Therefore, the study stresses thefollowing points:• A code of conduct could be drawn up for military practices that might affectcivilians’ lives through the use of force that leads to excessive or indiscriminatedamage and that is militarily unjustified. This code of conduct could be based on


46 For more details on the work carried out by the International Movement of Apostolate of Childrenin Beirut, see: Ghassan Hajjar, ‘Lebanon: The Scars of War’, UNESCO Courier, Dec. 2006:www.unesco.org/courier/47 Detailed discussions have been conducted on these ideas at different events in the Arab region.The most important of these events was the International Conference on Human Security in theArab World. See, for example: Gada Ali Moussa, ‘Rethinking Strategies for Human Security in theArab Region’, in UNESCO, 2007, International Conference on Human Security in the Arab World,14–15 March 2005, Amman/Paris, UNESCO, pp. 9–26.


a study of the most common patterns of military behaviour in the current formsof armed conflicts that impinge most on human security in the Arab region, andmay use specific phrases like ‘do not do’.• A framework could be established for the creation of special task forces thatwould start their work immediately after the outbreak of any armed conflictin the region. These task forces could observe the conduct of the conflictingparties, relying on specialist neutral experiences to warn against any existingpractices that might exacerbate human security conditions; they could useclear phrases to identify acts, entities and names without these warnings beingconsidered as legal accusations. Certain phrases such as ‘stop’ might be used.48

When dealing with conflict impacts in the Arab region, we can draw on the fundof initiatives, programmes, ideas and experiences that have been developed orapplied in other regions. For example, ‘codes of conduct’ that apply to the situationin the Arab region and depend on international humanitarian law as regards armedconflict can be given to Arab ministries of defence; the possibility of their beingexamined by military academies could also be discussed. These codes of conductcould also be sent to the leaders of ‘non-state players’ or the leaders of armedfactions in conflict areas without this procedure being given any politicalsignificance. Regardless of the response, the humanitarian purpose of these actionswill create more receptiveness, or at least awareness, that someone is caring andwatching, and is able and willing to do more.As for the usual approaches to dealing with human security problems after the

end of a conflict or one of its rounds, different methods are used to estimate thequantity and quality of impacts and the resources required to handle them. Thepoliticization of some of these methods in certain post-conflict situations mayrequire the setting-up of evaluation missions (or chief officials of the concernedinternational organizations might be sent to the region). They would go to aconflict area in the post-war stage – whether a ceasefire, a truce or even a temporarylull in hostilities – to discuss the humanitarian situation in the stricken area and


48 A permanent conflict monitor could be established that works actively in time of conflicts toobserve the conduct of conflicting parties and issue warnings against certain practices that aredetrimental to human security and are militarily unnecessary. This monitor might eventually callfor special investigations if major violations have been committed. Even if no investigation tookplace or no outcome was achieved, the idea of conducting an informal investigation sometimesprevents the same violation being repeated.


the containment or reconstruction priorities, even if such visits yield nothing morethan humanitarian appeals.In conclusion, the concept of human security has now started to impact on the

Arab scene. At this stage, the approaches through which this concept isimplemented have become as important as the concept itself.49 The region iscurrently undergoing a period of exceptional instability, with many countriesexposed to overwhelming internal and external challenges. There are escalatingarguments within each country about what determines and what threatens itsnational security. There is a traditional suspicion of any non-traditional securityconcept. The main challenge that will determine the acceptance (or otherwise) ofthis concept in the Arab region is the need to arrive at approaches that can supportthe human security of the region’s peoples without affecting the national securityof Arab states. All parties in the Arab region have taken note of the experience ofthe invasion of Iraq, when the collapse of the regime led to an overall collapse ofthe Iraqi state and society. There can be no human security without nationalsecurity.


49 The final decisions of the regular 16th Arab Summit (Tunis, 2004), for example, show how muchhas been achieved by the Arab states in focusing on human security issues in the Arab region. Mostof these decisions have been highlighted in the present chapter, whether condemning inhumanpractices in Iraq; the focus on development projects in Southern Sudan, which is an importantapproach to prevent the re-emergence of conflicts; or the decisions related to the situation in Somalia,particularly in relation to reconstruction and emergency assistance. Special attention was paid tothe conditions in the Comoros, in addition to offering support to the Palestinian economy.Attention was also paid to issues that are directly related to human security in the Arab region,

such as updating the Arab Charter on Human Rights, all of whose fifty-three Articles were enumeratedin the final decisions of the Summit after having been approved by the leaders of all Arab states. Therights of the Arab child were also stressed, as well as the draft Arab Agreement on People with SpecialNeeds. The decisions of the Tunis Summit show that mainstream opinion in the Arab region, onthe level of political leaders, has become more aware and attentive to all the concepts of humansecurity, some of which have been incorporated in the agreements approved at Summit level. Seethe decisions of the Tunis Summit on the website of the League of Arab States.


Annexes

Notes (referring to all three annexes):1. The order in which the parties to a conflict are mentioned does not indicate that the partymentioned first in the ‘Conflict’ column or the ‘Direct parties’ column is the party that initiated theconflict. It is simply a listing of the conflict parties and does not imply any analytical bias or politicalsignificance.2. Conflicts in the ‘Duration’ column that are shown as starting and ending in the same year areshort-term conflicts that broke out and ended within the same year.



Annex 1. International conflicts in the Arab region

Conflict Direct parties

Islamic Republic of Iran–USA Islamic Republic of Iran vs USA

Iraq–USA, UK Iraq vs USA and UK

USA, UK–Iraq USA and UK vs Iraq

Iraq (resistance groups) Resistance groups vs Allied forces and transitional government

Libyan Arab Jamahiriya–USA, UK Libyan Arab Jamahiriya vs USA and UK

Libyan Arab Jamahiriya–USA Libyan Arab Jamahiriya vs USA

Morocco–Spain (Ceuta and Melilla) Morocco vs Spain

Morocco–Spain (Parsley Island) Morocco vs Spain

USA–Syrian Arab Republic USA vs Syrian Arab Republic



DurationIntensity Conflict items

Start End Duration(years)

1979 – 28 Manifest conflict System, ideology, international power

1990 2003 13 Crisis International power, resources, system

2003 2003 1 War International power, resources, system

2003 2004 2 Intense crisis National power, ideology, resources

1986 2004 18 Manifest conflict International power

1969 – 38 Latent conflict System, ideology, international power

1956 – 51 Latent conflict Territories

2002 – 7 Manifest conflict Territories





Egypt–Sudan Egypt vs Sudan

Islamic Republic of Iran–Israel Islamic Republic of Iran vs Israel

Islamic Republic of Iran–UAE Islamic Republic of Iran vs UAE

Iraq–Islamic Republic of Iran (successive conflicts) Iraq vs Islamic Republic of Iran

Iraq–Kuwait (borders) Iraq vs Kuwait

Iraq–Syrian Arab Republic (protracted tensions) Iraq vs Syrian Arab Republic

Israel–Lebanon (Hezbollah) Hezbollah vs Israel

Israel–Lebanon (Hezbollah) Hezbollah vs Israel

Israel–Palestinians (Palestinians) Palestinian Authority, Fatah, Hamas, Islamic Jihad vs Israel

Israel–Jordan (West Bank) Jordan vs Israel

Israel–Jordan (water) Jordan vs Israel

Lebanon–Israel (water) Lebanon vs Israel

Israel–Lebanon (borders) Israel vs Lebanon

Syrian Arab Republic–Israel (Golan) Israel vs Syrian Arab Republic

Syrian Arab Republic–Lebanon(protracted tensions) Syrian Arab Republic vs Lebanon

Turkey–Iraq (protracted tensions) Turkey vs Iraq

Turkey–Syrian Arab Republic (latent problems) Turkey vs Syrian Arab Republic

Chad–Sudan (armed tensions) Chad vs Sudan

Mauritania–Senegal Mauritania vs Senegal

Ethiopia–Somalia Ethiopia vs Somalia

Sudan–Uganda Sudan vs Uganda

Annex 2. Regional conflicts in the Arab region





1958 2007 48 Latent conflict Territories, resources, system, ideology


1970 – 37 Manifest conflict Territories

1969 – 38 Manifest conflict International power

1961 – 46 Latent conflict Territories, resources

2003 – 4 Latent conflict System, ideology, international power

1982 – 25 Manifest conflict System, ideology

2006 2006 1 War System, ideology

1948 – 60 Intense crisis Independence, system, ideology, resources

1967 – 40 Latent conflict Territories

1967 – 40 Latent conflict Resources


1978 – 29 Crisis Territories, international power

1967 – 40 Crisis Territories, other



1983 – 24 Latent conflict International power, resources

2003 – 4 Crisis International power


2004 2005 2 Manifest conflict International power

1994 – 13 Latent conflict International power




Algeria (Berber/Kabylia) Four ethnic and tribal groups vs government

Algeria (Islamic groups) al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) vs government

Bahrain (Shiite opposition) Shiite opposition groups vs government

Egypt (Islamic groups) Muslim Brotherhood and Islamic groups vs government

Islamic Republic of Iran(People’s Mujahideen) People’s Mujahideen (in Iraq) vs government

Iraq (northern region) Ansar al-Sunna and Islamic Union vs Kurdish troops

Iraq (Kurds) National Party and Democratic Union vs government

Iraq (Shiites) Shiite Iraqis in the south vs government

Iraq (resistance groups) Resistance vs Allied forces and transitional government

Iraq (al-Sadr group) al-Sadr group vs government, Allied forces and Sunnis

Iraq (al-Zarqawy group) al-Zarqawy group vs government, Allied forces and Shiites

Iraq (Sunni armed insurgents) Insurgents vs government and Allied forces (and Shiites)

Palestinian territories (Fatah–Hamas) Hamas vs Fatah

Palestinian territories (Fatah–Hamas) Hamas vs Fatah

Jordan (armed groups) Armed groups vs government

Lebanon (Hezbollah and sects) Hezbollah and sectarian groups vs government

Lebanon (Fateh al-Islam and Jund al-Sham) Fateh al-Islam and Jund al-Sham vs government

Morocco (Western Sahara) Polisario Front vs government

Annex 3. Internal conflicts in the Arab Region





1963 – 44 Latent conflict Autonomy, system, ideology

1989 – 18 Intense crisis System, ideology, national power

1975 – 22 Manifest conflict National power

1992 – 15 Manifest conflict System, ideology, national power

1965 – 42 Latent conflict System, ideology, national power

2001 2003 2 Crisis Regional predominance, system

1945 2003 58 Crisis Autonomy, resources

1991 2003 12 Manifest Autonomy

2003 2004 2 Intense crisis National power, ideology, resources



2004 – 3 Crisis System, ideology, national power

1994 – 13 Intense crisis System, ideology, predominance

2007 2007 1 War System, ideology, predominance

2006 – 1 Manifest conflict System, ideology


2007 2007 1 Intense crisis System, ideology, international power

1975 – 32 Manifest conflict Secession




Saudi Arabia (Islamists) Islamists vs government

Saudi Arabia (reformers) Reformers vs government

Turkey (Kurdistan Workers’ Party,Kurdish region)

Kurdistan Workers’ Party, Kurdish movements vs government

Yemen (Believing Youth Movement) Believing Youth Movement vs government

Yemen (Islamic Jihad) Islamic Jihad vs government

Chad (ethnic groups) Arab groups vs African groups

Ethiopia (Ogaden) Oromo vs Somali

Mauritania (coup plotters) Taya and Taya loyalists vs government

Mauritania (armed disobedience) Military Council for Justice and Democracy vs government

Somalia (Puntland–Somaliland) Puntland vs Somaliland

Somalia (Puntland) Puntland vs Transitional Federal Government

Somalia (Somaliland) Somaliland vs Transitional Federal Government

Somalia (Union of Islamic Courts) Union of Islamic Courts vs warlords

Somalia (Union of Islamic Courts) Federal government and Ethiopia vs Union of Islamic Courts

Somalia (various rebel groups) Warlords vs government

Sudan (Darfur) Darfur armed factions vs government, Janjaweed

Sudan (Eastern Front) Eastern Front vs government

Sudan (Hottiya, Baggara–Newbia,Aballa) Hottiya, Baggara vs Newbia, Aballa

Sudan (Nuer, White Army, Southerners) Nuer, White Army vs Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA)

Sudan People’s Liberation Movement(SPLM/A South Sudan) SPLM/A vs government

Annex 3. Internal conflicts in the Arab Region (cont.)






2001 – 6 Latent conflict System, ideology

1920 – 87 Intense crisis Autonomy

2004 – 3 Intense crisis System, ideology

1994 – 13 Latent conflict National power

2003 – 4 Intense crisis Regional predominance

2005 – 2 Latent conflict Autonomy, regional predominance,resources

2003 2007 4 Latent conflict National power

2005 2007 2 Crisis National power

1998 – 9 Manifest conflict Territories, regional predominance

1998 – 9 Latent conflict Autonomy

1991 – 16 Manifest conflict Secession

2006 – 1 Crisis System, ideology, international power



2003 – 4 Intense crisis Regional predominance, resources



2006 – 1 Latent conflict Regional predominance

1955 – 52 Crisis Secession


5. Establishing democracy and human rights in the Arab region


ABDALLAH SAAF


Introduction

Human security, as defined by the Commission on Human Security (CHS),means freedom from fear, freedom from want and the freedom to live in dignity.1

Despite its having been introduced fairly recently, this concept is already on theagenda of the League of Arab States and is not new to Arab societies.2 The‘human security’ paradigm is an attempt to shift from the state-centred securityapproach to an individual-centred security approach. Under the former, individualsmight be threatened by their own states – which could turn against them at anymoment – or by transnational groups. The current context of threats and risks hasdriven the security debate out of all national, territorial, local and regionalframeworks. Indeed, it tends towards universalism at the same time asendeavouring to focus on the individual. The individual has become fragile in faceof all the traditional connotations and manifestations of international powers,transnational criminal networks and other organizations whose actions have madethe creation of a new security model inevitable.Human security furthers the cause of human dignity and promotes recognition

of the individual’s value and inalienable rights and freedoms. This requires theappropriate legislation and stable political, economic and social conditions.Security on the levels of society, culture and mentality is influenced by psychologyand by economic, social and cultural needs. Security itself is multidimensional,with physical, economic and even cultural implications; it is also related to valuessuch as freedom, dignity and peace that have an impact on other areas of life:education, health and the economy.

1 See CHS, 2003, Human Security Now, New York, Commission on Human Security.2 See UNDP, RBAS. 2009. Arab Human Development Report 2009. Challenges to Human Security inthe Arab Countries. New York, United Nations Development Programme, Regional Bureau forArab States.


The human security concept is based on enabling individuals to live in anenvironment that is free from threats and dangers by ensuring that they have decentand free lives. Since human security frees human persons from ‘critical andpervasive threats’ that put their lives and freedoms in jeopardy, we need todifferentiate between the various kinds of threats: direct threats (which violate livesand freedoms and are a product of worsening situations or sectarian clashes),identity conflicts or repressive state structures. On the other hand, indirect threatsresult in the loss of jobs, the lack of a rewarding and suitable income, famines, thedeterioration of health services and rising levels of crime. Among the direct andindirect threats to life and freedom, the Arab countries are characterized bysectarian unrest and identity crises.Under the human security framework, the rule of law, human rights and the

promotion of democracy cannot be dealt with in isolation from other sources ofthreats and risks. This subjective interaction shows how ‘establishing democracyand human rights from a human security perspective’ cannot work in isolationfrom the interaction between various sources of economic, social and culturalthreats and risks, as explained above, because they depend on matters likeenvironmental management, foreign occupation, sectarian unrest, lack of foodsecurity, health degradation and personal insecurity. The magnitude of the issuesdrives the state to forfeit its legitimacy by violating its citizens’ right to life anddignity, with complete disregard for international human rights agreements, whichhave been ratified by most Arab countries. From among this wide array of issues,we will focus on the various threats currently posed in the Arab region.Linking security and justice is normal in the Arab cultural context. Justice is

the best way to guarantee that human persons will be free from critical threatsto their life and freedom. The level of threats is linked to basic characteristicssuch as: maintaining life, guarantees of minimum freedoms, and not being liableto detention.A focus on human security in the Arab region is long overdue when compared

with other regions of the world, and discussion of the new challenges facing theregion still appears to be slow in terms of materialization and implementation.The concept of security is becoming increasingly important on the level of itsrelationship to human rights and the promotion of democracy, however, formany reasons:



• The emergence of the concept of human security has aroused suspicionsabout agendas that many national and regional actors see as not necessarilyserving the current collective and basic interests of the Arab region. Inaddition, the concept of human security is connected to several issuescurrently faced by the region.3 The actors in the region find this connectiondubious. Not long ago, similar initiatives such as ‘human rights’, ‘democracy’and ‘peace’ projects were viewed with the same distrust. The recent historyof the Arab region abounds in conflicts; this hinders the spread of a humansecurity culture in general.

• Conversely, however, the discussions that followed major ‘setbacks’ such asthe Arab-Israeli wars (particularly the 1967 war and those that followed it),and the humanitarian disasters in Iraq during the Gulf wars of 1980, 1991and 2003, paved the way for the concept of human security to dominate theregion. The basic argument used by a wide array of political actors andinfluential intellectuals in the region stressed the debacle of Arab regimes, notonly on the military level, but also on the political, economic, social andcultural levels, given the absence of democracy and the lack of respect forhuman rights.4

• An argument is being steadily advanced in Arab political and intellectualcircles suggesting that the Arab region’s understanding of human securityhas been given new momentum by the efforts exerted by states and civilactors, using various techniques and leading to different impacts. Theseinclude enacting new laws, acceding to international conventions, setting upinstitutions and adopting institutional practices under pressure frominternational organizations and as a result of the struggles of actors withincivil society.

• It is clear that the difficulty in spreading this concept across the Arab regionis basically due to theoretical impairment and lack of historical roots. Somedecades ago, the influence of active human rights groups in the region wasobvious. A restructuring process was initiated by social mainstreams thatwere deeply rooted in Arab structures and were the subject of sociological

5. Establishing democracy and human rights

3 Concerning the evolution of democracy projects in the world’s major powers, see: ‘La fin du momentdémocratique’, Aug.–Sept. 2008, special issue of the review Esprit (Paris).4 After Israel’s defeat of several Arab countries in 1967, a great number of intellectuals criticizedArab dictatorships and called on them to adopt democracy.


research. Examples of these mainstreams include ‘individualism’, increasingindividual independence and abandoning the logic of belonging to primarygroups.

• The current Arab context, however, means that controversial issues such ashuman security, democratization and human rights must also be taken intoaccount when drawing up national security policies and discussing majorissues – such as terrorism – before searching for more radical articulations.

• In the current international context, the concept of human security must bebroadened on the political level, with particular attention paid to cultural andacademic areas, as well as to actors within civil society. Arab states andsocieties must live up to the new macro-challenges. Human security in theArab region must be bolstered by the formulation of suitable policies and thecreation of conditions that encourage wide discussion of this conceptthroughout the region. It is of vital importance to set these goals andincorporate them into the various phases of ongoing economic, cultural andsocial projects. Another task is to link these goals to the outcome of earlier‘human security’ initiatives.

• By linking human rights to human security we are highlighting the basicrights and freedoms to which all individuals are entitled, regardless of gender,race, sect or private life. Human rights are mostly violated in contexts ofdisputes, immigration, refugee/immigrant movements or wide-scale humansuffering. Human security thus stresses the close connection between criticalviolations of human rights on the one hand and the various levels ofinsecurity on the other, starting from the local or national level and movingup to the regional or international level.

Human security does not distinguish between civil, political, economic, culturaland social rights. It puts all security violations and threats within a multi -dimensional/conceptual context that provides a practical framework within whichthe particular rights and duties that operate under certain relevant contexts canbe specified.We therefore need to evaluate the position and significance of human security

in the Arab region and its complicated relationship with democracy and humanrights before we examine the topics of human rights, modern institutions anddemocracy, and how they relate to security, particularly with the unprecedentedrise in terrorism. Even if it is not possible to separate democracy and human rights



from the other levels of the political and rights-related context in the region, itshould be possible to identify the major threats and challenges in this three-wayequation, in order to highlight promising avenues for reform.

The significance of human security within the Arab context

In the search for correlations between human rights and the promotion ofdemocracy in the Arab region from the human security perspective, we need tospecify where exactly these human security components belong. However, weshould first attempt to explore and capture the available chances to measure humansecurity, the extent of its manifestations and its main developments.

Measurements and perceptions of security from a human rights perspective and the ‘promotion of democracy’ in the Arab region

In addition to the criteria that enable security levels to be monitored every year,there are several methods of evaluating human security based on temporal andquantitative profiles. These methods raise basic issues as to the usefulness of thiskind of research: do they allow us to highlight the phenomenon under discussion,for example, and are they able to inspire the relevant actors?5

Since the invasion of Iraq in 2003, led by the United States of America, humansecurity seems to have declined markedly in the Arab region. Previously, it wasranked ‘moderate’ in international ratings as it was among the regions of the worldleast liable to experience conflict and among the least vulnerable to unipolarviolence. The Arab region’s ranking was better than that of other African and Asiancountries in terms of casualty figures in 2002. But in 2003 the figures changedmarkedly and, for the period 1960–2003, the ‘Middle East’ ranked second in termsof political oppression and use of violence, approaching the highest rank among


5 K. Bajpaï, Aug. 2000, Human Security: Concept and Measurement, Indiana, Kroc Institute forInternational Peace Studies Occasional Paper.


Southern Hemisphere countries during the 1990s.6 In the Failed States Indexpublished by Foreign Policy magazine, countries like Sudan, Iraq and Somaliaappeared at the top of the list, while other countries like the United Arab Emirates(UAE), Qatar, Bahrain and Tunisia appeared among the least failed states.7 TheIndex considered four Arab countries to be among the most likely to becomebankrupt: Egypt, Lebanon, the Syrian Arab Republic and Mauritania. The otherArab countries occupied an intermediate rank.The number of research projects focusing on the identification and analysis of

human security has doubled in the last decade,8 and the deadlock between citizens,states and institutions has intensified. The distrust of parliamentary and localinstitutions highlights widespread contradictions and discrepancies: people whohave confidence in the state are in a minority, while the vast majority express onlylimited confidence.It is noticeable that Morocco and Lebanon rank among the democratically

developed countries, despite criticism of the performance of their representativeinstitutions.9 However, high levels of confidence in civil society organizations areexpressed in these two countries – though one might well ask how well-foundedthis confidence in freedom of faith, expression and association is since there is awide divergence of opinions in this regard.

Human rights and democracy development

In general, linking human security to democracy in the Arab context is stillcontingent upon defending democratic institutions and values. It has become anintegral part of initiatives to avoid conflict, while in certain cases, particularlyduring conflicts, it is associated with the quest for a sustainable peace.The move towards democracy, in the current state of affairs in the Arab region,

creates a series of challenges and options, and potentially heightens politicaltensions and aggravates the threats to human security. Several conflicts are


6 The Failed States Index 2007, July/Aug. 2007, the Fund for Peace/Foreign Policy magazine.http:/www.foreignpolicy.com/story/cms.php?story id=38657 Six Arab states (Morocco, Egypt, Palestine, Jordan, Lebanon and Kuwait) were mentioned in thePew Research Center’s Pew Global Attitudes Project, Global Opinion Trends 2002–2007 (publishedin Washington, D.C., in 2007): see pp. 55–64.8 The Failed States Index 2007, op. cit.9 Ibid.


increasing in intensity in the Arab countries, particularly those undergoing politicaltransitions. These conflicts are perceived along ethnic or sectarian lines.Democratic institutions and practices, such as freedom of expression, politicalparties and elections, have traditionally been considered a means of containingdeeply rooted ethnic or sectarian differences – but may also intensify and furtherentrench them.In this context, two questions require urgent analysis. Can democracy reduce the

likelihood of political violence and enhance human security? How can democracybe explained in relation to democracy protection initiatives? The relationshipbetween security and democracy is based on the latter being seen as an integral partof comprehensive efforts to prevent conflict and build a sustainable peace. However,our knowledge of how best to combine these two processes – support for democracyon the one hand and conflict prevention/resolution on the other – is underdevelopedby actors and analysts, and the two processes are sometimes pursued at cross-purposes. The result of the actual situation as regards knowledge about democracy,particularly in relation to conflicts, remains relatively weak.There are options for tempering aspects of the political process which can help

to reduce the likelihood of a zero-sum outcome. Linking democracy to humansecurity may limit (and sometimes even end) the violence that threatens democracy.This could result in strengthening the conditions of ‘human security’ protection.However, more could be done to increase our understanding of the nexus between

democratic processes and conflict in a variety of cases. The transformation of rebelgroups into political parties is a challenge faced by policymakers and practitionersalike. For support to democracy to be successful and a stabilizing influence, it mustwork towards political change. It should not be seen as merely the export of a pre-packaged ‘democratic product’ or the imposition of a foreign model.

Human security and human rights

Human rights and human security are related issues in light of the existing Arabvisions and practices, and also in light of the status quo in Arab countries in termsof motivation and methodology. Together, they have attracted the attention ofconcerned actors in the Arab region.Human security aims to strengthen the relationships between countries and

societies and to improve the rights and freedoms of individuals. Such an analysisallows for a better understanding of the phenomenon of the state’s inability to put



its commitments to individuals and groups into practice. However, individuals stillhave a responsibility towards the state. Human security can here accentuate thechallenges that must be faced in order for them to materialize. From thisperspective, the stand taken on terrorism is very important.For several decades, the speeches and actions of activists from human rights

organizations have been targeted because they attempted to reveal and denounceinjustices and proclaimed their rejection of human rights violations while callingfor the full recognition of these rights. As these inclinations manifest a set of rightsand freedoms that cannot be ignored, they intersect with human securityinclinations which have spread noticeably in the region, as shown by the increasingliterature on this topic. One of the most important pillars of human securityemployed by the countries under discussion (through various ways in line withtheir applicable policies) is that it gives leverage to what the majority wouldconsider as the most basic and universal of human rights.The laws addressing the right to life are also linked with human security, as

can be seen from the status of capital punishment in Arab legislation. Religion isnot a major impediment to abolishing this punishment, but Arab legislatorsnevertheless seem reluctant to abolish the death penalty, particularly in caseswhere state security is at stake or in relation to drug crimes. Physical security andthe right to physical integrity constitute another basic human right. Legislationin the Arab region has attempted to protect this right and to avoid any violations,whether intentional or accidental, while stressing the principle of compensation.However, this right is far from being satisfactorily reflected in Arab legislation.10

The other sources addressing the various aspects of human security are part ofpublic law. Any violation of physical integrity is to be considered a partial violationof the right to life.The relationship between human security and human rights also highlights the

phenomena of violence and poverty, which, together, constitute an even morecomplex issue. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) lists basicneeds such as the right to work, education, life, self-determination and health care.It also includes various mechanisms to implement human rights as it prohibitstorture, slavery, religious or racial persecution and massacres. The protection and


10 In this regard, see works on criminal law in the various Arab states, such as Mohamed El AlamiMachichi, 1978, Le droit pénal, Rabat, Université Mohamed V. See also: Issam Ahmed Mohamed,1988, Théorie générale du droit à l’intégrité physique, Cairo, University of Cairo, p. 112.


encouragement of human rights seem two main dimensions of human life.Freedom of choice and absence from fear constitute the joint objectives of humansecurity and human rights. The importance of these two dimensions hascontinually isolated two camps in the human rights controversy. Thus far, thesecamps are in confrontation across the Arab region.Despite the positions of concerned states on this issue, several public debates

have been developed through these two different – even contrasting – perspectiveson the possible relationships between human rights and economic development.The relationship between the two perspectives of human security was complicated,even on the international level, as it was obscured within the international set ofhuman rights. When the UDHR was adopted into international human rightscovenants in 1966, Cold War pressures necessitated a division into ‘first-generation’civil and political rights (identified with the USA and its allies) and ‘second-generation’ cultural, economic and social rights (which appealed to the Union ofSoviet Socialist Republics [USSR] and its allies). Third and fourth generations ofrights should now be added. These consist of collective rights and the right to peace.There has been a rapidly growing rift between the various types of rights, reflectingthe different ideological priorities which still exist in the Arab region.After the Cold War, human rights actors focused on rearranging and incorporating

different generations of rights. When the conceptual focus is on the human being,and when it is not burdened by problematic Cold War history, both first- andsecond-generation rights naturally emerge as of fundamental importance. ‘Humansecurity’ has the advantage of placing human rights within a perspective that helpsovercome the controversial division of the successive generations of human rights.The successive generations of human rights that appeared in the Arab region

through state channels or through struggles waged in civil society have crystallizedinto sources, commitments or demands. They appeared dense despite their limitedinfluence on established political and cultural practices, and have produced notonly an important human rights literature, but also field struggle, positions,practices and culture.The emergence of the new ‘human security’ structure has gradually introduced

a new stage in the region’s human rights movement and given a new momentumto its system and development, thus rearranging its elements. This also reflects thedesire to maintain the harmony and logic of this momentum by ensuring thecollective ‘unity’ of the various kinds of human rights.



The situation has changed fundamentally since the establishment ofinternational criminal tribunals. However, the trials of political figures followingthe US intervention in Iraq (which were highly controversial and far fromtransparent) failed to produce any positive results. However, governments and otherinstitutions were not prevented from showing a respect for human rights as a realcommitment and a legal principle embraced by both officials and human solidarityactors. The principles derived from human rights are based on the rule that anyviolation of such rights obliges individuals or the authorities to intervene. In order for human security to be established in the Arab region, its content must

be made mandatory. In this respect, the theoretical perspective of ‘human security’inplies that it has specific purposes. It appears like an extension to national security,in other words, it falls under the competence of the government. Human rightstheories define this commitment in many different ways. Therefore, the human rightsdiscourse has had only a limited influence in the Arab region, given the absence ofany institution that is competent to impose a commitment to human rights.Meanwhile, this theoretical perspective demonstrates that the logic behind

human rights is generally based on the similar and parallel purposes of variousactors. If human security proved capable of establishing a common platform onwhich local, national and international actors could coordinate their efforts, thebasics of ‘democratic intervention’ or ‘humanitarian intervention’ might be foundfrom this perspective.The human rights discourse was heavily coloured by ideological politics during

the Cold War period, and this continues to influence many government policymakersand civil society officials in the Arab region. Because of its institutional form in thelegal community, the term ‘human rights’ may communicate a substantive moralmessage and a set of carefully specified and at times weak legal obligations. Thehuman security discourse is frequently resorted to because it can be used in socialcontexts where the human rights discourse would meet fierce opposition.The unity of the human rights system is noticeable in the Arab region, as in other

regions: the main difference between the human rights system and the humansecurity system is that the latter explicitly recognizes the need for prioritizationbased on examining its contents. Human rights actors are increasingly defending abasic concept and are supporting the unity of all categories of rights. They arealso proving the illegitimacy of selecting or categorizing the constituents of thisconcept in favour of any particular institution. In this context, ‘the elements ofthe vital core’ would of necessity be the entire set of human rights that are valid




for all nations, everywhere and at all times. From this perspective, humansecurity appears to necessitate a priority-based classification of rights, whichcurrent theories strive to avoid. Accordingly, there seem to be two contradictoryapproaches: one that regards all human rights as fundamental and equal, andanother that categorizes human rights according to certain priorities.The ‘human security’ approach defends the unlimited value of the human

rights notion, which includes, for example, the prevention of torture and genocide.The human security approach necessarily accentuates concrete threats to securityand human rights, both individually and collectively. Some human rights mightbe in conflict with each other, and might in certain situations represent realconstraints. Political will is sometimes required to take tough decisions in optingfor one of several priorities. In fact, both approaches can usefully complement eachother, and they may not be too far apart. In other words, the concept of ‘humansecurity’ may, like human rights, establish certain elements of human security asequally essential and fundamental.The present conflict between ‘human security’ and ‘human rights’ agendas

raises a great many questions, since the human security agenda often depends onpractices or arguments of a legal nature. The added value that ‘human security’brings about may impart a practical nature to human rights principles. ‘Humansecurity’ sets a practical objective for human rights that represents a special contextand prioritizes components based on the serious and sensitive state of ‘insecurity’and the capabilities of groups and the responsibilities of various actors.If the various forms of human ‘insecurity’ present a special context, ‘human

security’ necessitates prioritization of interventions. This does not mean thathuman rights provide a priority-based categorization of rights. ‘Human security’cannot be accused of failing to recognize the rights enjoyed by all individuals.Most of the significant differences between human security and human rights

are far from being conceptual, but they are seen in the instruments and institutionsthat implement human security. Human rights actors have always used legalinstruments to prevent human rights abuses or punish transgressors. Likewise,human security actors might use economic, political and perhaps military forceand try to achieve human security with the same force and determination thatcharacterize national security efforts. Clearly, a gain for human security would bea gain for human rights and vice versa. Practice will show how the variousapproaches can strengthen and complement one another.


Security, human security, democracy developmentand human rights

Following a period of relative underestimation, a new appreciative inclination isemerging, notably among security and civil society actors. After securityapproaches were denounced and human rights approaches applauded,appreciation began to gradually impose itself by disseminating the concept ofhuman security in an attempt to restore the standing of security in general. Thisnew attitude is materializing despite the fact that the ‘security approach’ – whichwas manipulated in many instances – had come under severe criticism untilrecently. The same period was characterized by the protection and promotion ofhuman rights, and that does not mean that it is over.The security perspective and the human security perspective are significantly

different, as the latter is able to achieve a multidimensional combination. In fact,it is easy to reconstruct the expansionist logic that makes the vital rights and aspiredpossessions contingent on security requirements. Instead of being influenced byauthoritative discourse, it allows the reformulation of basic political demands. Inthe current Arab context, human security appears to find suitable grounds formaking strong demands beyond human rights, which is required and aspired toon the political level.As human security, by definition, protects the vital core of all human lives in

ways that enhance human freedoms and human fulfilment, it does not contradict,but rather endeavours to encompass, human rights. It allows these rights to bereformulated so that they match real experiences more closely.As Amartya Sen puts it, the importance of human security springs basically

from its abstract ability to curtail formalism, making it ineffective as far asindividual rights are concerned.11 The lack of security impinges on physical andpsychological integrity and basic individual freedoms, meaning that the particularcircumstances of each situation must be taken into account.Security acts as a paradigm that establishes the basic needs of an individual and

determines the threshold of human dignity. Under the same system, it opens upthe desired political prospects by determining experiences of injustice.


11 Amartya Sen, 2000, Why human security?, text of a presentation at the International Symposiumon Human Security (Tokyo, 28 July). http://humansecurity-chs.org/activities/outreach.Sen2000.pdf.


We undoubtedly stand to gain (but might also lose) a great deal if we continueto interpret different expectations from a ‘security’ perspective and see politicalinstitutions only as a response to hidden fears. As we constantly scrutinize the wayin which security is considered both as a right and as an appropriation, we shouldbear in mind the relativity of the common definition that mixes politics, physicalintegrity, life and all other processes.In his report on human security and human rights, Sen explains that security

is premised upon a realistic model that is in contradiction with the rights that aretraditionally limited to the human person: freedom and equality.12 The inherentlegal nature of the human rights concept leaves open the argument of determiningthe critical private freedoms that can be considered as human rights. Conversely,human security imparts meaning to these abstract rights in the sense that itcombines freedom from want and freedom of action under legal protection.The right to security brings to the core of our daily life certain legal and ethical

requirements that would otherwise be unrecognized. Reverting to the notion ofsecurity will enable us to resolve the conflict that has existed throughout the historyof human rights between rights/freedoms and rights/obligations on the one hand,and between de facto rights and official rights on the other. Such a reversion refutesthe Marxist argument against the abstract conception of human rights nature.Since security presumes that the state and the international community will

adopt specific social objectives, certain social criteria may help to evaluate rights.Primary indications can be observed in the Arab region – although they haveneither crystallized nor been contained – because the cultural nucleus of civilsecurity is still growing.

Human security variables

The human security situation in the Arab region cannot be isolated from theinternational context, because its purpose could not be independent of theprevalent hegemony projects in the region. Nor can human security disregard basicdomestic premises, such as the nature, form and operation mechanisms of thepolitical order. Therefore, two kinds of variables need to be analysed: internationaland domestic.


12 Ibid.


International variables

The international dimensions of the ‘human security, democracy and humanrights’ trio are undoubtedly more important in the Arab region than in anyother region, as they cover the major issues in the Middle East. For a long timeIraq, Palestine, Lebanon and Sudan acted as a ‘laboratory’ for the internationalsystem, as well as a way of measuring power and influence through what is calleddemocratic intervention and the imposition of respect for human rights. In thiscontext, we might ask whether human security provides a new pretext forhegemony and power projects.

Human security and hegemony projects in the Arab region

The USA and the European Union (EU) have exploited their dominance over thereform process when dealing with the cases of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Turkeyand Israel. Development assistance and pressures are used by hegemonic states (theUSA), coalitions of states (the EU) and other important and influential states onthe one hand, and by national reform movements on the other, to impose respectfor human rights and a commitment to democracy – a topic of crucial importance.Other actors that have emerged in this area, such as al-Qaeda, are ambiguous,without territorial limits and largely exploited by the USA as a group that sabotagesthe attempt to combine human rights, democratization and the constituents ofhuman security.The ambiguous perception that Arab countries have of potential internal and

external enemies should be taken into consideration. Paradoxically, Arab regimesare asked to implement internal reforms but are at the same time accused of posinga global threat and encouraging terrorism.The declared positions on existing hegemonic forms remain highly ambiguous.

It is no coincidence that the primary concern of Arab countries – which have bothverbally and in practical terms accepted the US conditions imposed before andduring the war in Iraq – is to attempt to integrate this premise. The entire Arabworld will be negatively affected so long as the US mechanism for producing newstates is a failure.The three different reactions recorded so far were initially ambiguous but

have become clearer over time: first, a tactical acceptance of the US monopolyin several ways that are visibly connected to the US version of reform (a voluntaryacceptance of American reform based on armed force); second, the ‘laissez-faire’



standpoints, which adopt submissive and passive stances until the situationimproves; and, third, the various resistance methods that depend on fast, sometimespre-emptive, reforms.During the Cold War in the 1980s, the structure of the United Nations and the

various coalitions and spaces of Southern states, and the strategic structuringattempts of Southern Mediterranean countries, gave states wider opportunities totake initiatives, to manoeuvre and to take evasive action. Today, this is much moredifficult.In the past, Arab states were able to use contradictions to their advantage, initiate

projects, introduce counter-projects and act as they please. Today, however, the spaceshave shrunk, and horizons are circumscribed by human rights and democracy,reducing the effectiveness of the role of the state. It has become necessary to placesecurity at the heart of international political issues – without its being subjected toany systematic codes – and to reinstate national sovereignty.

Participation of Arab countries in international agreements supporting the right to life and freedom

Another link between human security and human rights can be found in the lessthan full commitment to human rights in the Arab region, where action isrestricted to signing or ratifying legal human rights instruments. Little, if anything,distinguishes the region from the rest of the world. Human security is measuredonly in the limited number of Arab states that have acceded to the internationalagreements that protect the right to life and freedom. Countries such as Qatar,the UAE, Oman, Saudi Arabia and the Comoros have not signed the InternationalConvention on Civil and Political Rights (1976). The Convention on thePrevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (1951) has not been ratifiedby Qatar, Oman, Mauritania or Djibouti. Both the UAE and Oman have refrainedfrom ratifying the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman orDegrading Treatment or Punishment (1985). The UAE, Oman, Saudi Arabia andthe Comoros have not acceded to the two Covenants on Civil, Political, Economic,Cultural and Social Rights. As of early 2008, the Human Rights Charter of theLeague of Arab States had only been ratified by Jordan, Algeria, Bahrain, the LibyanArab Jamahiriya, the Syrian Arab Republic and Palestine.13


13 Amartya Sen, 2000, Why human security?, text of a presentation at the International Symposiumon Human Security (Tokyo, 28 July). http://humansecurity-chs.org/activities/outreach.Sen2000.pdf.


Even if some Arab countries have signed the relevant treaties, this does notnecessarily mean that they will respect these treaties more than other countrieswould do. Nor does it necessarily mean that non-signatory states do not wish torespect these rights. It only means that these countries are not concerned abouttheir responsibility before the international community.14

Domestic variables

In the domestic arena, the state poses a threat to individuals by violating their rightsand practising torture in the absence of democracy, transparency and freedom.Other practices include the exclusion of others and ongoing factional, tribal andracial unrest. Here emerges the importance of the security of individuals andgroups versus the state. The struggle against an authoritarian, unjust state shouldhelp achieve other dimensions of security.

The power of the state and human security

The current situation in the Arab region does not allow for research into humansecurity without the state being seen as a basic player. The state plays a vital role infreeing individuals from fear by protecting their rights and freedoms, as well as bysupporting their right to life and physical integrity.The state’s monopoly of legalized constraint has never been used in favour of

citizens but in most cases against them in the form of oppression and persecution.Mainstream political thought now pays attention to constraining the state’s rolewhenever it tries to curb citizens’ basic rights and freedoms.In Arab political theory, the state is constantly associated with security. Leading

Arab intellectuals (such as Ibn Khaldun, Rifa’ah al-Tahtawi, al-Kawakbi and manyothers) never abandoned this approach and considered statehood as intrinsicallyderived from the principle that the legitimacy of the state springs from itscommitment to protect the security of its citizens.From their perspective, political actors stress that their nature strongly interacts and

intersects with certain elements that match human rights and democracy from a humansecurity viewpoint. The terminology describing this controversy has consequentlybecome more liable to vary with the existing forms of authority, and the legitimacy


14 Constitutional provisions provide various ways of getting round the articles that clearly discusshuman rights and human security.


and social structures of such authority (theocracy, extensions of progressive regimesof the 1960s, oil emirates, ideological states, tribal states and so on).The existence of other actors is in itself a special characteristic. There are

tendencies of pluralism, unbalanced clashing oppositions: religious, non-religious,organized actors – such as the army – that are close to becoming involved in thecurrent stage because they are the product of the 1950s and 1960s. The methodsof political transition adopted in the region were based on tailoring newconstitutional provisions for political entities, amending existing constitutionalprovisions to cope with certain political issues, or holding elections. In some Arabcountries, social movements play an important role, encouraged by the strengthof civil society, which can always find a way to take part in the reform process. Themedia also play an active role.The powers of the state in the Arab region are not subject to public

monitoring, nor do they represent the rule of law. The executive power of the state– whether a monarchy or a republic – dominates all the other powers. Parliamentis the legislative wing of the executive. The same applies to the judiciary if we takeinto consideration the influence of judges on the power of the state. The state ispreoccupied with its quest for absolute security, an impossible aspiration.Opposition activity is often labelled a threat to the rulers: the authorities see thisas justifying the practices of the security forces, who show no respect for humanrights. The most dangerous cases are those where the state resorts to ideologicalrepression and ethnic cleansing.Within the Arab context, it is therefore difficult to separate political from

economic power because in most cases they are both controlled unipolarly or byvirtue of an allegiance between the two powers. Under these circumstances, theeconomic power finds it difficult to play the defender of human rights and thepromoter of democracy, as has happened in South Asia and Latin America.

The state, the citizen and human security

Since Arab societies fall under the control of the state, one might ask whether it ispossible for this dominance to change in the future. What are the typicalcharacteristics of the defence of human rights in the Arab region? Arab constitutions,for example, usually fail to reflect the actual practices and gloomy reality in the region.The concept of the legal protection of individuals’ security is confused with theprotection of public and personal rights and freedoms. In most cases, all humanrights are enshrined in Arab constitutions except for the right to life.



On a more detailed level, many changes are being recorded according to thedominant philosophies. For example, all Arab constitutions provide for the sanctityof the home and the freedom of correspondence. However, two characteristics – areligious15 and a nationalist one16 – stand out in this respect. To explain theambiguous ties between the citizen and the state, certain structural dimensions arehighlighted: Arab states are not subject to real and effective monitoring by citizens,the media or elected, representative councils. Whereas it is true that Arab states arenot accused of absolute and constant transgressions, they are far from being‘citizen-friendly’ and continue to resort to intimidation. Their lack of respect forhuman rights is not rare.What is alarming about the absence of mechanisms to monitor the state and

ensure the separation of powers is that Arab states are similar in terms of theextremely wide-ranging powers they assume. The president of a state is also thehead of the executive, and at the same time the de facto head of the legislativeauthority because he is the leader of either the ruling party or the majority party,or because parliament is not authorized to interfere in the state’s competences. Asto constitutional monarchies, they still represent the most powerful non-opposableauthority in Arab society, particularly since they enjoy extra powers such as therights to dissolve the legislative authority and declare a state of emergency, and themultiple powers they grant themselves on the pretext of fighting structural andmomentary security threats such as combating terrorism.There are many explanations for the sense of alienation felt by many Arab

citizens within their own states. It could, for example, be considered a characteristicof Arab-Islamic states, which are the product of a union of secular and spiritualpowers. It may also be caused by the mystique manufactured by Arab ruling elitesregarding the security of the state and the regime, out of a conviction that absolutepower requires the regime’s security to be equated with that of the state. Thisalienation thrives as the calls for reform recede in the Arab region and the distrustof the Western democratic discourse directed to the Arab world grows. From thecivil action point of view (i.e. the citizen) – unlike situations where democracy ispropelled by the private sector, as in Latin America and South-East Asia,particularly the Republic of Korea – the higher echelons of the private sector appear


15 The Saudi Basic Law does not include any provision that ensures equality before the law or preventsracial discrimination. It stresses, however, equality in a juridical sense.16 See the provisions of the Syrian Constitution in this regard.


to be partners in the state’s power. Even when a regime opens up to liberalism,members of the business sector become supporters of the regime or join the rulingparty. This explains the absence of a real liberal party in the Arab region. Theprospects of Arab citizens’ participating in changing the status quo appear quitelimited in the immediate future.

Human security and reformulating the security concept

The concept of security in general, and of ‘human security’ in particular, hasrecently undergone fundamental shifts in meaning: this has also affected itsrelationship with human rights and the promotion of democracy.

Shifts in the concept of security

For researchers engaged in the field of ‘security’ over the past few decades, asignificant reconstruction work seems to have been accomplished. The earliergeneration of risks – such as threats, conflicts, crises, disputes, the various stagesof the Arab-Israeli conflict (the wars of 1949, 1956, 1967, 1973, 1982 and 2006),internal security concerns (attempts to undermine stability initiated by internaland external opponents of regimes, both secular and fundamentalist), civil wars(Lebanon, Yemen, Algeria, Sudan) and disputes over borders, territories or regionalsupremacy (Algeria–Morocco, Algeria–Tunisia, Egypt–the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya,the Syrian Arab Republic–Lebanon) – have all allowed a new, more precise conceptof security to be introduced. The elements making up this definition wereconsistent, regardless of whether or not they were isolated from one another orincluded different articulations. The internal elements were articulated withinternational dimensions: the logic of the post-colonial period, the Cold War periodand the period of legitimate or legitimized ‘authoritarianism’. The building of amodern state required a security culture based on an accurate assessment of theexternal enemies and of dangers based on the appropriate security methodologies(such as global visions, strategic reports, defence theories and so on).17


17 Abdallah Saaf, 1994, Le discours stratégique arabe, Instituto de Estudos Estratégicos e Internacionais,Lisbon, Cahiers du Lumiar.



Security perceptions have undoubtedly seen some progress recently as newfactors have arisen, even if the risks have not tangibly increased and the crisis ‘hotspots’ have remained unchanged – as can be seen in the Arab standpoint on theKurdish question, relations between the Syrian Arab Republic and Iraq, thedispute over the Western Sahara, the Arab-Israeli conflict and so on. Thearticulations and formulas of the common security system are no longer the sameas in the past, and their dimensions have also changed: the state has becomeliberal, globalized and vulnerable, and is transforming itself, delegating itstraditional powers and tasks and disposing of its sovereign duties – includingsecurity duties – by privatizing some of them. The shifts experienced by thesecurity factor, which used to be largely state-controlled, have been so far-reachingthat they have resulted in fundamental behavioural changes in the Arab region.Furthermore, it is very difficult to define terms like ‘the enemy’, the limits of theclassic sovereignty concept, the contribution of internal and external factors, andthe meaning of terrorist acts.18

The concept of ‘insecurity’ has been widened to include social issues (socialfragility and the phenomena of immigration and organized crime); practices thatviolate human rights and reveal authoritarianism and political monopolies; andexisting and potential threats, such as traditional external threats and non-traditional transboundary threats. All these changes have managed to influenceeven the various forms of public security policies and their societal acceptability,now that security is becoming increasingly technical with a reversion to ‘securitygovernance’ and demands by political and civil actors that they should monitorsecurity policies.From another viewpoint, this stage is characterized by a spiritless adoption of

the ‘hard security’ model by various security actors, as it is more or less dominatedby the ‘comprehensive security’ logic. Several issues are involved here: fromwide-ranging institutional reforms, major foreign policy trends, developmentpolicies and public social policies to sector-level poverty eradication programmesand circumstantial work plans. The ‘securitization’ controversy is a trend thatattempts to redirect all political, economic and social mechanisms towards puresecurity issues, which represent an orientation that might go beyond democraticoptions. The concern of comprehensive macro-security is not restricted to the

18 This is related to the difficulty of predicting terrorist targets.


North–South confrontation, but is also found in the Southern Mediterraneanregion and has also entered certain security domains. Knowing how to overcomethis perspective, how to abandon the exclusive security logic, how to refrain frombeing too strict when using excessive power or discussing the ‘terrorist threat’ is astrong argument in favour of a methodology that is more civilized and pays greaterattention to democracy and human rights.

New security ties

Instead of analysing the new political and institutional frameworks (humanrights, democracy, political reforms) that have led to a radical reinterpretation ofsecurity, we need to analyse the connections between actors and the controversiesthey provoke.There have been many attempts to construct a historical sociology of political

violence that allows for the development of a reading framework that helps toexplain complex and diverse reasons. The result was the analytical inclination tostudy the cultural pillars, historical practices and position of violence withinactors’ strategies.Certain analytical approaches focus on the causative cultural/sociopolitical

relationships that have been studied by many analysts. These approaches highlightproblems of similar importance ranging from political culture to sociopoliticalintegration, legal structures, educational methods, and relations with the past ingeneral and with tradition in particular. Other problems include involvement in thepolitical arena and the influence of new media and communications technologieson identity reformulation on the one hand, and on the gradual emergence of virtualtransboundary identities and the huge gulf that separates the spaces where we livefrom the spaces to which we belong on the other.The dominant mindset in the Arab region is not promising as regards

prioritizing the region’s security problem. Arab security domains are affected byother currents linked to the international dimensions of the Arab-Israeli conflict,international terrorism and international variables. In consequence, new theoreticaland practical elaborations have emerged and taken deep root in both eastern andwestern areas of the Arab region at varying levels: in the Maghreb, for example,inter-state conflicts, local terrorism, conflicting or aggressive neighbouringcountries, immigration, organized crime and drug trafficking constitute the majorsecurity concerns.



Classification of security types

Several security concepts are employed in Southern Mediterranean countriesalongside the ‘Islamist’ concept of security manifested through the case of theal-Qaeda model. Other security concepts are formulated by countries with‘Islamist’ trends, including several Islamist movements that work either under thecloak of legitimacy or Jihadism. In this context, we can perhaps distinguish betweenthe traditional concept of security and another concept of security based onpolitical, economic and social development.

The traditional concept of security

The traditional concept of security is both protective and preventive, forming atight nucleus that influences all security policies in the region. It is associatedwith countries which have a historical past as states (Egypt, Morocco), derivesits roots from nationalist movements (the National Liberation Front of Algeria,for example) and is influenced by the regional balance of power. The currentstage is characterized by two types of trends that are heading towards a balanceof power:

• the imbalance pursued by states whose regular forces are traditional in termsof military equipment and troop readiness (for example, some countriescannot afford to buy jet fighters or missiles for their defence); and

• the imbalance pursued, and sometimes achieved, by powers that considerthemselves to be engaged in resistance: these might be states within states,potential states, alternative states that actually act as petty states, para-statesor quasi-states (political-military organizations and national resistanceelements in the region).

A third type of imbalance – although it falls outside the traditional concept ofsecurity under discussion – is the radical religious imbalance which is labelled as‘terrorist’. Algeria was for a long time a model of the dominant ‘infra-state’ conflict

(during the 1990s), and this ‘infra-state’ dimension was also the distinguishingfeature of the Mediterranean region. However, the international ‘inter-state’




dimension – in other words, conflicts between states (such as the Arab-Israeliconflict) – has been modified in a limited and ineffective way.19

The ongoing discussions in Southern countries on topics like collective securitymechanisms, the ‘New World Order’, the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership(formerly known as the Barcelona Process), or the virtual pattern of collectiveregional security, are still weakly perceived as far as their resultant security issuesare concerned; they are too weak to constitute a comprehensive structuralprocedure that could prevent conflicts although collective security tracks in thesevery cases could objectively constitute this structural procedure. Experts stress theimportance and usefulness of the experiences of bilateral conflict-preventionagreements (Egypt and Israel, the Syrian Arab Republic and Israel, and so on).Despite all considerations (redline, prior notification of military movements,manoeuvres, demilitarized zones and so on), these experiences could surely be usednot only in the Arab-Israeli conflict, but in other Arab disputes. All these pointsare now part of the human rights and democracy discourse.

The concept of developmental security

Developmental security has long been an essential aspect of an approach thatlinks security to defence, and human security to development. Internationalinstitutions have supported and sponsored a security perception thatsimultaneously guarantees access to basic rights, individual and collectivefreedoms, and vital inalienable rights such as prevention, health, housing,administration, infrastructure, work and the right to physical and personalsecurity. The list of security elements has now been expanded to includedemography, economic growth, the availability of water, food security, humanresources development, the avoidance of environmental crises, the economy,international trade and cultural plurality.In addition to the critical conditions in the Arab region, there are threats and

risks that pose many non-military/non-diplomatic problems (demographicproblems, economic crises, identity crises and non-zoned construction) that cannotbe solved using the traditional methods of crisis and conflict management.

19 See the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Democracy Development Plan andthe Stability Mechanism of the European Union and the European Council (Nov. 2007).


Security defined in the light of human rights and democracyAn assessment of security and its various sectors in the Arab region would bring todirect analysis the emergence of a more civilized perception of security linked tothe problem of transition and political reform, which is the responsibility not onlyof states, but also of civil actors. In limited cases, the discourse elements and thepractices adopted by certain states against state adversaries (or other adversaries)may be used as weapons to pressure them under the pretext of democracy or humanrights. Conversely, democracy could be expressed and practised in a security context.The creation of a positive balance of power by throwing the democracy challengein the face of any opponent who is unwilling to adopt it is undoubtedly positivefrom the viewpoint of the evolution of history, but its content in terms of tactics,security and rivalry remains obvious.Since the second half of the twentieth century, Latin America has been the main

arena for testing the relationship between security and democracy. Three decadesago, the return to democracy in Spain, Portugal and Greece was welcomed.Proceeding from democratic transformation to an openness to civil movementsseems increasingly to converge. In this way, military and totalitarian dictatorshipshave brought about structural changes in their states, abolishing the independenceof the security sector and bringing it under democratic control. Many Arabcountries have long had ministries of defence but these have failed to engage inreal civil monitoring of the security arsenals (the military agencies, the police, theintelligence agencies and so on).The mechanisms being established all over the world are capable of encouraging

progress in this direction. Similarly, the procedural, organizational and culturalmechanisms created through international cooperation – such as internationalobservation of the security sector20 – may prove to be important tools in relationto the defence and security approach and the outcome of its implementation. Afederation of states like the EU is regarded as a civil power, but from an Arabperspective the EU is not interested in crystallizing a security policy of a civil power.For despite its being a civil power, it has abandoned civil prominence and remainedpreoccupied with displaying its defensive reactions.


20 Roberto Aliboni and Abdallah Saaf, 2010, Human Security: a New Perspective for Euro-MediterraneanCooperation, in 10 Papers for Barcelona 2010, ISSUE (Paris) and IEMed (Barcelona), pp. 11–27.


Besides all these considerations, recent legislative and administrativedevelopments have had a noticeable effect on the exercise of certain rights andfreedoms as a result of the fight against terrorism and the measures taken to curbimmigration. These extraordinary laws enacted by Northern Mediterraneancountries have influenced the legal and administrative system of human rights inthe Arab region (for example, anti-terrorism legislation or laws to prevent moneylaundering).21 Since this system was originally fragile, the reverse effect has beenparticularly strong, not only on the level of deteriorating applicable laws, but alsoon the level of practice. This deterioration has been paralleled by the intensification,marketing and professionalizing of terrorism.22

Human security and terrorism: combating terrorism as a top priority

Terrorism is an opportunity to make profits, and a form of force majeure thatmobilizes and sets up actors’ behaviour in the region. It also depicts the huge effortexerted by adversaries in their unending quest for imbalance.Some states’ opportunistic exploitation of the ‘anti-terrorism climate’ can be

seen in the verbal magnification of the term ‘terrorism’ that was the byproductof the rigorous conditions and the media influence, particularly after11 September. From the outset, the ‘comprehensive war on terror’ declared bythe US administration created opportunities and threats for many Arabcountries. The US administration offered privileges related to access to USassistance and the conditions for receiving it (financial and economic assistance,free exchange agreements and various facilitations) and also to securitycooperation with the USA (access to military equipment, programmes, courses,joint field operations and security agreements), in addition to political support(granting external legitimacy, diluting political reforms and accepting certainlevels of authoritarianism). The ‘war on terror’ provided an ideal opportunityfor various authoritarian political fronts to reinforce their ‘coercive’ powers, yetit has at the same time exposed these fronts to the risk of being alienated fromtheir national public opinion.


21 Ibid.22 See note 19 above.


This tactic aimed to derive gains for regimes from the new opportunities forthe states of the region and to limit risks by introducing a functional and flexibleperception of security. All bets are now placed on the significance of terrorism –the core of all manoeuvres. Some Arab countries have gained (limited quantitiesof) military equipment and become strategic allies from outside the North AtlanticTreaty Organization (NATO). Other Arab countries have managed to continuallyjustify the state of emergency and have persuaded the USA that they have beenfacing terrorism on their own for more than a decade. Accordingly, certaincountries in both the Maghreb and the Mashreq (which were once accused ofneglecting human rights) have suddenly turned into active proponents of‘democratization’ and human rights projects such as ‘The Great Middle EastProject’ and subsequent versions. The ‘war on terror’ has also justified theenactment of laws and regulations that curb democratic endeavours and stifledemands for political openness.The tendency to acknowledge terrorism as a top priority is not only a

manoeuvring tactic, but also a substantive obligation. This political and socialphenomenon forms a powerful inclination that affects Arab countries in the longrun. Indeed, terrorism represents a fundamental stage in the development of theregion’s security structures. It has made the Arab countries reconsider theirapproach to security, establish new articulations between hard security andcomprehensive security, consider new perspectives to handle terrorist threatsdepending on joint arrangements, and adopt political, economic and socialformulations combined with security issues.In addition to the outrage that follows every terrorist attack and the resultant

casualties (the number of victims and detainees), a significant recent developmentis the alliance of major groupings of local Islamist radicals with al-Qaeda branches.Recent attacks have shown the importance of all Arab countries for al-Qaeda’sstrategy, which does not only focus on recruiting fighters for Iraq – al-Qaeda’s realbattlefield. The increase in suicide bombers in the statistics for political violencein the Middle East shows that the involvement of countries in the Maghreb is noless alarming than that of countries in the Mashreq. The Arab press publish listsnot of combatants but of sacrifice-hungry ‘martyrs’. Nationals of countries inthe Mashreq have been identified in videos of the Maghreb branch of al-Qaedain Algeria, which shows that the network seems to have been facing problemsof recruitment recently. The Greater Maghreb is more involved in exportingsuicide bombers. With the ongoing speculation over what the name ‘al-Qaeda’



stands for, especially now that it is used to brand any Islamist security threat,we need to question the theories, doctrines and ideology adopted by thisnetwork – particularly since it continues to grow despite the internationalpressures it is facing.

The links between democracy, human rights and human security

Any analysis that aims to bind democracy and human rights should examinehuman security approaches from different angles: starting from the characteristicsof the status quo in the Arab region (the institutional and political scene),identifying the prevalent trends and moving to an examination of the challengesand scenarios that might impede development. The nature of this controversy hasmade this approach manageable only from this angle.

Case classification

The traditional categories used to define and describe the situation in the Arabregion are now outdated. They used to include the juxtaposition of republican andmonarchical political forms, emirates and hereditary political entities, progressiveand backward regimes, moderate and revolutionary blocs, civil and militaryregimes, and even liberal and socialist regimes. What matters today is theimplementation of democracy/democratization, the proximity to or distance fromdemocracy as a political form, and the compatibility or incompatibility of regimeswith democracy, deeming it a criterion for categorizing Arab countries. In thisregard, at least five major groups of states can be identified:

• The first group of states has opted for political liberalism. These countriesare relatively open and are making some progress towards engaging in theprocess of democratic change.

• The second group is facing the problem of national integration in additionto the challenge of democracy.



• The third group combines more complex stances, as shown in the overlappingof political, institutional and cultural progress with both the political systemof the state and the abundance of financial resources (oil, for example). Inthis group, political reforms are not being adopted, given the dominance ofthe economy at all levels.

• The fourth group questions the very nature of change despite its beinginfluenced by certain political conditions that set prerequisites for democracyand the dissemination of human rights. Although the reform discourse is nowprevalent, authoritarianism is still stable. Many regimes manage to appearready for change although, in practice, they have not made the slightest movetowards democracy. The calm reaction of some Arab capitals during a fewweeks in 2000 and 2001 gave a false image. In the meantime, important Arabregimes reacted to The Great Middle East Project each in its own way. Theysaw it as a ‘foreign import’ and stressed that it was imperative for reform tocome from within the Arab region itself.

• Other political cases, such as Iraq, Palestine, Lebanon and Sudan, pose specificquestions that reflect strategic, political and international dimensions,regional balances, special ‘state’ structures and religious, ethnic and tribalfactors.

Reading the systems

Legal systems, provisions and approaches in the Arab region may appear to derivefrom methodologicaly complex legislative and legal mechanisms. However, theycontinue to be overwhelmed by formalism even in their strictest statements. It istherefore necessary to understand the relationship between behaviours and the lawand to decipher institutional symbols.The ongoing controversies in the Arab region are not only legal and legislative, but

also concern the efficiency of public institutions. It is true that all Arab constitutionsstress the independence of the judiciary, and certain provisions stress litigants’ rights,thus leaving the issue of judicial independence open to debate.Legal procedures depend on a set of rules, both criminal and civil. Given the

procedural nature of the judiciary, it aims to protect individuals and their legalrights, and to guarantee a fair trial according to the international criteria that



correspond to international and national laws. However, certain conditions mustbe met: the independence of the judiciary and the presence of procedural laws toprotect individual rights and freedoms; respect for personal freedom; theprevention of arbitrary detention; the sanctity of the home (except with a judicialpermit); and the presumed innocence of an individual until found guilty – asprovided for in all Arab constitutions.The separation of powers is only hypothetical, and the predominance of the

president’s competences is the supreme structural factor. Over and above this, theprinciple of democracy is not mentioned consistently in Arab constitutions andlegislative and regulative provisions. Does legal symmetry ensure sound democraticpractice? Does legal asymmetry lead to a violation of the provisions of theconstitution? Arab constitutions allow the executive arbitrarily to declare a stateof emergency and to violate the rights and freedoms of individuals.The fact that law enactment differs from law enforcement means that the phrase

‘according to the applicable law’ is ambiguous. Only the authorities decide whena law is applicable – if such a law found its way onto the statute books in the firstplace. The ‘rule of law’ refers to the independence of the law from the authorities;the universality and impartiality of legal rules; equality before the law; and thenon-involvement of personal interests in the enactment of the law. As a result,rather than the rule of law, we should discuss the rule of the ruler who endeavoursto gain legitimacy. There has been some progress in the Arab region despite clearviolations in all areas. In most cases, human rights practices and internationalcriteria are not applied consistently throughout the region.As to the holding of regular elections, this appears to be well within the grasp

of Arab regimes – although respect for the principle of holding regular electionsmay have no effect on democratizing the regime. Regimes are not credible whenthey keep asserting the transparency of elections, but this credibility may beenhanced by the presence of national and international observers. In this regard,it has been shown that the democratic image of elections in the Arab region couldbe improved despite the flawed previous experiences.The authorities’ powers of endurance can be measured by extending formal

social freedoms, including the freedom to set up political parties; freedom ofassembly, and the freedom to protest and hold demonstrations; and the freedomto criticize and unmask undemocratic practices by the authorities.Appeals to the government have become routine in the political life of some

Arab countries (4,616 interpellations were made by members of parliament to the




government in a Maghreb state).23 In other political arenas, the number ofinterpellations is limited (to a mere handful in some cases). Except for instancesof dissolving parliament after a state of emergency has been declared, no acts ofimpeding or opposing the work of elected councils have so far been observed inthe practices of Arab regimes.The investigation of cases of corruption is not a sufficient criterion by which

to evaluate the rule of law in the Arab region because there are other factors thatwork together with the facts explained above, such as the absence of fair trials;hearing terrorism cases before special courts; the torture and abuse of detainees;interference by the security forces in choosing the incumbents of certain jobs; andwhether or not individuals enjoy security.The particular circumstances of Arab states and their readiness for reform are

measured not only by absolute institutional, legal and regulatory indicators, or bypurely political behaviour, but rather by a set of criteria that include the status ofwomen and good governance in the social sector. Women’s rights have not madeconsistent progress in the region, as can be seen in those countries that havereconsidered their laws in favour of women, even if the status of women has notchanged as their work skills have not improved, which signifies the global natureof democracy. As to the public sector, finding a job in the Arab politicalenvironment involves patronage and favouritism, let alone the limited socialsecurity. Even with the abundant financial capabilities of the oil-producingcountries, democratic control varies from one country to another.Even if it is important to assign resources to the social sector (education, health,

housing and employment), we should first consider how such resources areallocated by concerned governments. In addition, the relatively low expenditureon this sector – when compared to the recorded expenditures on the security sectorin many Arab countries – is of overriding significance, particularly since somecountries show no interest in making such comparisons.

23 See Arab Reform Initiative (ARI), Arab Report Index 2009, Arab Report Index 2010, Paris.



Towards a new relationship between human security, democracy

and human rights

Threats and challenges

As the dominant perception of security is being reshaped, great importance isplaced on fighting terrorism and on the new security considerations in terms ofvisions, practices and the new threats to the region. These threats are givenparticular prominence in the relationship between human security, human rightsand the promotion of democracy.24

The first challenge facing our analysis is the imbalance between human securityand state security: these are often difficult to distinguish as the latter imposes itselfon the former. ‘Social security’ should also be added to the two dimensions of thisrelationship. Several threats accidentally overlap with the above-mentioned factors:in addition to the viewpoint that sees economic development as a threat to theestablishment of democracy, or even to openness or reform, the articulation betweenreligious fanaticism (religious radicalism) and the introduction of democracycontinues to impose itself. Foreign interference in this regard is far from negligible,and the ability to alter and reorganize institutions and laws remains unclear.In some cases, the economy used to be controlled by politics; nowadays, politics

has come under the control of the economy. This has not had any importantconsequences as far as Arab regimes are concerned, which has encouraged theauthorities to become engaged in the economic and social fields. Many regimeshave suddenly found themselves engaged in political and social reforms.An awareness of the need to link economic and social factors indicates a

dichotomy between the two realms. Although the economic and social worldsdevelop, each does so independently of the other: this explains why the economicmomentum in certain rentier countries has not had a tangible effect on theirpolitical life. Since the economy no longer has an impact on politics, what influencedoes direct foreign investment have on the progress of democracy in both theMaghreb and the Mashreq?

24 See Arab Reform Initiative, 2008, Country Report on Morocco, Country Report on Sudan, Paris.


The debate over the meaning of democracy and democratization has beenobfuscated by the discussion of the cultural compatibility between Islamic anddemocratic values. The question that remains unanswered is whether Islamistsshould be admitted to the national political arena. Should democracy be acceptedno matter how many risks it involves? Will Islamists themselves unconditionallyaccept all the requirements of a democracy?This question is of importance to all Arab countries, but each one reacts to it

according to its own beliefs and ideological orientation. However, each countryconcentrates on certain aspects rather than others, and finding a common groundis merely an aspiration. Politically speaking, democracy in the Arab region requiresthe involvement of Islamists in establishing democratic rules within a purelymultilateral political game. Culturally speaking, however, democracy requires thedevelopment of political values that subjugate these rules to liberal logic. This leadsus to two basic options:

• either to ‘secularize’ religion, following the Turkish model, by making a seriousattempt to harmonize secularism with Islamic values via a political path;

• or to ‘reform’ religion (a topic that has led to heated discussions in the Arabregion), which involves examining the need to link Islam with Western values,and a progressive interpretation of the religious sciences.

Future prospects

There seem to be two possible prospects for development in the Arab region: eithera regression (for example, maintaining the status quo or changing or refurbishingthis status shape-wise or content-wise), which appears more or less impossible; oran ideal democratic transition. Although this situation sounds inconvenient,observers can monitor this regression in certain cases.It would be unrealistic, even unreasonable, to conceive of a democratic regime

making all possible concessions to the political and social powers that call formaximum and instantaneous democracy through a real distribution of authorityand transparent elections that enhance good governance and establish the rule oflaw. Human security will inevitably be faced with complex and diverse situations.It is possible, however, to conceive of a scenario that sounds reasonable and

realistic, and yet differs from the typical democratic transition. For example, far-reaching reforms could be gradually introduced by concerned actors, either driven



by certain motivations or in response to domestic or external pressures. Thesemight be major reforms on the political, economic, social and cultural levels. Sucha scenario might rest on limited initiatives combined with more communication.Examples of these types of partial, small-scale reforms already exist in the Arabregion; there are also middle-scale reforms such as the attempts to improve theeducation and health systems. It would also be possible to implement fundamentalreforms on certain levels such as authority distribution, political parties, civilsociety and so on.We must choose between two approaches: either the one that encompasses

several sectors and levels and doubles the number of reform topics raised on thesidelines of the dormant political and institutional system; or the one that adoptsthe Spanish model of transition, which was primarily based on the central politicalcore and was subsequently reflected in other areas, fields and topics (whether social,economic or cultural) after the democratic reorganization.

General trends

These trends may vary with the requirements of different political settings(according to the options explained above):

• The first category: in the two approaches mentioned above, and in relationto medium-scale and major transitory reforms, the best solution is apparentlyto maintain and strengthen the status quo, given the difficulties that mightresult from backtracking. Any such recession may let all dynamics go out ofcontrol as they normally follow different tracks in different directions. Insome countries, the form and content of empowerment are contingent onhow well the process is controlled.The governments in some Arab countries have learned from successive

experiences how to manage their liberal openness. Following their humanrights experience, these governments have changed the way they address otherissues. Similar conditions predominate in other settings, but they are differentbecause the conflict with the opposition is greater. The ability to set redlinesand impose respect for these redlines is of vital importance.

• The second category includes states that have multiple political facets andcumulative political experiences, but their common characteristics are



‘personalized authority’, weak institutions and limited or even absentfreedoms. However, some countries have authoritarian systems under thecloak of a welfare state, and are in open confrontation with Islamists. Othercountries have adopted the authoritarian approach to security while targetingthe welfare state and limited plurality. In other cases, the ‘personalized’authority is engaged in direct confrontation with Islamists. The de factomonopoly of authority in certain countries that have nominal plurality showsthe importance of having trust in the institutions.

• The third category includes states that depend on small entities and followthe liberal approach in building their economies, but their vital resources andobjectives lead them to a direct confrontation with the traditional politicalsystems. In this situation, will infrastructure determine the superstructure,even if the economy seems in many areas to be the satellite of politics? Willthe economic neutralization of the state be later translated into politicalneutralization? The building of new democracies on the model of Japan orthe Republic of Korea seems to be easier under the current circumstances.

• The fourth category includes several Arab countries with differentcircumstances, but their political reform is controlled by issues of nationalintegration (ethnic problems, tribal structures, the issue of representation),the distribution of resources and the threat of religious extremism.

• The fifth category includes countries involved in international political crises(Palestine, Iraq, Lebanon, Sudan). Political actors in these countries do nothide their relations with foreign powers. The major advantage of these statesis that they are directly influenced by the international system.

In any scenario, political change has to undergo a monitored and contractualpolitical transition and must go through several stages in order to avoid the riskof deviation, as in the case of Algeria in the early 1990s.Absolute democracy involves the risk of devising rules to control the game, such

as framed and controlled elections. The result is a bargained multiplicity that offerspremeditated flaws and shortcomings in favour of the regime before pretendingto assume a system of advanced democratic openness.



The state must remain powerful in order to guarantee the transition todemocracy. The rest of the process depends on society’s responsibility anddemocratic maturity. On the other hand, a strong political climate would removethe risk of fundamentalism, particularly the use of political violence, whethermaterial or symbolic.

Planning and areas of intervention

There are several levels on which reforms are needed, including the following:

• constitutional reforms: drafting or adopting a constitution, adding newconstitutional provisions and amending existing constitutional provisions asnecessary;

• imposing respect for the law, widening freedoms, strengthening the rule oflaw, adopting open rules for the political process, and preparing ‘collective’charters for vital sectors of the society;

• strengthening legal frameworks and references and effective legal andtechnical mechanisms;

• using contractual techniques and various forms of consensual expression(covenants, conventions, treaties and so on), whether on the holistic orsectoral level, to allow the maximum participation of the main sectors ofsociety;

• promoting inclusion, convergence and integration through public educationand motivation;

• encouraging the participation of citizens in societies where the politicalprocess is relatively weak;

• building systems that strengthen various actors, particularly political partiesand civil society;

• promoting the factors that enable participation in the decision-makingprocess: communication, deliberation, dialogue and negotiation;

• endorsing the democratic monitoring of various sectors, particularly thesecurity sector, and abandoning a unanimous style when discussing defenceand security budgets, both in parliament and in the relevant committees.Officials tend to evade direct discussions and questions on the pretext thatdefence is a vital national interest on which decisions should only be taken



unanimously. The application and evaluation of transparency, and adoptingthe principle of accountability to achieve this end, should also be encouraged;

• moving from the traditional concept of security to the concept of humansecurity, where all individuals primarily feel safe and where national securityis subject to democratic monitoring;

• ensuring organized and competitive elections which would be free and fair;• streamlining electoral procedures to allow for further participation ofindividuals, giving more credibility to elections, and linking the electoralprocess to all the institutional outcomes it entails (such as the prime ministerbeing appointed on the basis of the election results). Also determining themajority in parliament, the government and opposition groups on the basisof the election results;

• promoting good governance in all political arenas, such as public-sectorpolicies, particularly those related to justice, education, the administrationand public affairs;

• transforming the state from a theocracy to a state that regulates religionthrough clear public policies, such as regulating places of worship andappointing officials in the area of religious affairs; and

• promoting the protection of minorities through the appropriate institutionaland legal mechanisms and so on.




Select bibliography

Burgess, J. P. and Owen, T. 2004. Editors’ note – special section: what is human security?Security Dialogue,Vol. 35, No. 3, pp. 345–71.

Chorou, B. 2002. The challenge of democracy in North Africa. R. Gillespie and R. Youngs(eds), The European Union and Democracy Promotion – The Case of North Africa.London, Frank Cass, Ch. 1, pp. 6–39.

CHS. 2003. Human Security Now. New York, United Nations Commission on Human Security.EuroMeSCo. 2004. Promoting Democracy in the EMP – Which Political Strategy? Lisbon,

Euro-Mediterranean Study Commission.Krause, K. and Williams, M. C. 1996. Broadening the agenda of security studies: politics

and methods.Mershon International Studies Review, No. 40, pp. 229–54.Owen, T. Human security – conflict, critique and consensus: colloquium remarks and a

proposal for a threshold-based definition. Security Dialogue, Vol. 35, No. 3, pp. 373–87.Rojas Aravena, F. 2002. Human security: emerging concept of security in the twenty-first century.Disarmament Forum, No. 2, January.

UNDP. 2002. Human Development Report 2002. Deepening Democracy in a FragmentedWorld. New York, Oxford University Press.

UNDP, RBAS. 2005. Arab Human Development Report 2004. Towards Freedom in the ArabWorld. New York, United Nations Development Programme, Regional Bureau forArab States.

UNESCO. 2005a. Promoting Human Security: Ethical, Normative and Educational Frameworksin the Arab States.Paris, United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization.

—. 2005b. What Agenda for Human Security in the Twenty-first Century? Proceedings ofthe First International Meeting of Directors of Peace Research and Training Institutions,2nd edn. Paris, United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization.

—. 2007. Selected papers – International Conference on Human Security in the Arab States,March 2005, Amman, Jordan. Paris, United Nations Educational, Scientific and CulturalOrganization.


Biographical notes on the authors


MOHAMED ABDEL SALAM is Director of the Regional Security Program,

Al-Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies, Cairo.

BADRIA AL-AWADHI is Director of the

Arab Regional Centre for Environmental Law (ARCEL), Kuwait.

ATIF KUBURSI is former Acting Executive Secretary of the

United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia(UNESCWA), Beirut,

and Professor of Economics at McMaster University, Hamilton, Ontario, Canada.

ABDALLAH SAAF is Director of the

Centre d’Études et de Recherches en Sciences Sociales, Rabat, Morocco.

ANTOINE SFEIR is Editor-in-Chief of Les cahiers de l’Orient, Paris,

and Professor of International Relations at the CELSA, Sorbonne University, Paris IV.


AppendixFinal report of the Conference

on Human Security in the Arab RegionCairo, 15–16 December 2008


The Conference on Human Security in the Arab Region was held on 15 and16 December 2008 at the Headquarters of the League of Arab States (LAS). It wasco-organized and co-chaired by the General Secretariat of LAS, the United NationsEducational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) and the HumanSecurity Unit of the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs(HSU/OCHA). The conference was attended by representatives from thirteen Arabcountries (the People’s Democratic Republic of Algeria, the Arab Republic ofEgypt, the Republic of Iraq, the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, the LebaneseRepublic, the Kingdom of Morocco, the Sultanate of Oman, the State of Palestine,the State of Qatar, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the Republic of the Sudan, theSyrian Arab Republic and the United Arab Emirates), at least twenty-two expertsand representatives of Arab non-governmental organizations (NGOs) andrepresentatives of several international organizations, as well as the concerneddepartments of the General Secretariat.During the opening ceremony, the speech of the General Secretariat was

delivered by His Excellency Ambassador Ahmed bin Helli, Assistant Secretary-General for Political and Council Affairs. He stressed the importance of the Arabregion’s participation in the ongoing discussion of the concept of human security,a concept that has gained considerable interest at the political and academic levelsalthough a consensus has yet to be reached as to its definition. He referred to themany international reports that discuss this concept. Ambassador Bin Helli alsolisted the efforts of several Arab countries that have addressed this concept byorganizing forums to discuss and study issues relevant to the concept of humansecurity and to take account of ongoing developments in this field.The speech on behalf of UNESCO was given by Mr Pierre Sané, Assistant

Director-General of UNESCO for Social and Human Sciences. Mr Sané outlined


UNESCO’s efforts in the area of human security in the Arab region, highlightingthe international conference that was organized by UNESCO in 2005 in Jordan onthe theme of ‘Human Security and Peace in Arab States’. The conference discussedthree requirements that should be met in order to support human security: respectfor the rule of law; fostering trust in the state and building and supporting stateinstitutions; and disseminating the concept of human security in Arab societies.Ambassador Carl Tham, member of the United Nations Commission on

Human Security and former Swedish Minister of Education, gave a speech inwhich he explained how the human security concept has been developed bybroadening the traditional notions of security. He pointed out that the purposeof updating this concept has never been to replace the traditional concept ofsecurity, but that state security is an indispensable factor, albeit not the only one,in ensuring individuals’ security. The concept of human security aims to bringtogether security, human rights and development, while taking into considerationdispute resolution and addressing post-conflict situations in a manner thatguarantees that such conflicts will not recur, thus ensuring the achievement ofhuman security.In its five sessions, the two-day conference reviewed the papers presented by

five independent Arab experts. Each session addressed one of the conference’scentral topics:

• The conference’s main paper, ‘Human Security in the Arab Region’, waswritten and presented by Mr Antoine Sfeir, Editor-in-Chief of Les cahiers del’Orient, Paris, and Professor of International Relations at the CELSA,Sorbonne University, Paris IV.

• The second paper, on ‘Poverty Eradication in the Arab Region from a HumanSecurity Perspective’, was written by Dr Atif Kubursi, former Acting ExecutiveSecretary of the United Nations Economic and Social Commission forWestern Asia (UNESCWA), Beirut, and Professor of Economics at McMasterUniversity, Hamilton, Ontario, Canada. It was presented by Dr Mustafa KamalAl-Sayed, Professor of Political Science at the University of Cairo.

• A paper on ‘The Environment in the Arab Region from a Human SecurityPerspective’ was written and presented by Dr Badria Al-Awadhi, Director ofthe Arab Regional Centre for Environmental Law (ARCEL), Kuwait.

• A paper on ‘Managing Conflict and Post-Conflict Situations in the ArabRegion from a Human Security Perspective’ was written and presented by



Dr Mohamed Abdel Salam, Director of the Regional Security Program,Al-Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies, Cairo.

• A paper on ‘Establishing Democracy and Human Rights in the Arab Regionfrom a Human Security Perspective’ was written and presented by DrAbdallah Saaf, Director of the Centre d’Études et de Recherches en SciencesSociales, Rabat, Morocco.

A session was also assigned to the discussion of regional human securityexperiences, where Dr Shahrbanou Tadjbakhsh, Director of the Program for Peaceand Human Security, Centre d’Études et de Recherches Internationales (CERI),Sciences Po, Paris, concentrated on the experiences of Eastern and Western Europeand Western Asia in this regard. In addition, Dr Francisco Rojas Aravena, Secretary-General of the Latin American Faculty of Social Sciences (FLASCO), San José,Costa Rica, presented the Latin American experience.Synopses of the discussions that took place during the conference sessions are

given below.

First sessionHuman security in the Arab regionThis session discussed the background paper, ‘Human Security in the Arab Region’,which concluded that human security is a comprehensive concept that starts andends with the human person and aims to protect the vital core of all human livesin ways that enhance human freedoms and fulfilment by fostering human rights,good governance and access to economic opportunities, education and health care.Human security is therefore not limited to intra-state conflicts or ethnic orsectarian wars, but should also include other risks and threats such as naturaldisasters, poverty and disease. The concept of human security is inseparable fromthat of justice.Mr Antoine Sfeir considered that a definition of human security means bearing

in mind the individual’s feeling of being protected from foreign attacks andphysical, psychological and political violence. In this regard, human security isclosely associated with state security. States must try to avoid a direct confrontationwith the concept of human security. Meanwhile, human security may not be usedas a pretext to violate states’ sovereignty or intervene in their internal affairs underthe cloak of ‘protection’. Thus, human security means not being afraid for oneself

Appendix


or one’s property. Citizens of all countries should be able to live in an environmentthat does not represent a threat to their life, family or property. Women andchildren should also be protected from violence.Mr Sfeir also addressed Islamic fundamentalism, deeming it a threat to human

security. The phenomenon of globalization, in his view, essentially hampers humansecurity and takes no account of its human dimension. He also discussed theproblem of internal/external migration in Arab societies which he believes iscaused, inter alia, by social anxiety and the lack of human security in Arab societies.Following Mr Sfeir’s presentation, several points were discussed:

• The definition of the human security concept is still the subject of intensediscussion within the United Nations (unlike the concept of human rights,which is enshrined in the United Nations Charter, the Universal Declarationof Human Rights and in UN conventions). The concept of human securityoriginated from a Japanese perspective in the context of natural disasterinterventions. The discussion then went on to discuss the concept ofresponsibility for protection. The representative of the Syrian Arab Republicpointed out that the United Nations comprises systems of internationalinstruments, mechanisms and organizations that serve the security, safety,livelihood, food and environmental security of human persons, as well astheir safety during times of conflict. This raises questions as to whether‘human security’ – as a concept – is associated with certain transitions thathave occurred over a specific period of international relations history. Humansecurity might be outwardly humanitarian but, when implemented, mightinvolve interventionist agendas and entail violations of states’ sovereignty,probably having negative repercussions on the human person, for whoseprotection the concept was allegedly devised. This has been witnessed inseveral instances in the Arab region. Achieving stability at the state level is aprerequisite for achieving security at the individual level.

• The relationship between human security and national, regional andcollective security is controversial. Human security in its comprehensive senseshould not be taken as a substitute for, but rather as complementing, nationalsecurity. International factors and foreign occupation represent potentialthreats to human security in the Arab region.

• Mr Sfeir discussed ‘Islamic’ fundamentalism, disregarding the existence ofother fundamentalisms. Islamism should not be viewed as jeopardizing



human security. An Islamist is not necessarily a Bin Laden or an Ayman al-Zawahiri. Mr Sfeir also pointed out that Western development models havenot necessarily served human security in the Arab region.

• The discussion addressed the rise of Islamist movements from the perspectivethat their emergence was the product of economic and social givens as wellas of the absence of freedom in its broader sense. Care should be taken whencharacterizing national liberation movements or dealing with them on areligious basis.

• There is a question as to how appropriate the current international andregional systems are in addressing the broad concept of human security. TheUN Security Council, for example, approaches human security exclusivelyfrom political and military perspectives.

• The Japanese Ambassador to Egypt explained that donor aid is not given outof charity, but rather for solidarity purposes. When offering assistance,attention should therefore be focused on the areas that aim at empowerment:health care, education, technology transfer, and so on – ultimately achievinghuman security.

• The discussions also tackled the dilemma of distrust between governmentsand civil society organizations, the doubts that are raised over theseorganizations’ affiliations to foreign institutions, and governments’ fearthat the purpose of such organizations is to compromise, rather than serve,their security.

• Based on the concept of human security in its broader sense, the Arab regionis making progress when compared with other regions (see, for example, thecrime rates in the Arab region vs other regions). Progress in achievinghuman security in the Arab region, however, varies from one country toanother.

• The representative of Iraq pointed out that the problems of the Arab worldshould be highlighted, noting, however, that Iraq has witnessed positivechanges despite its security problems. He condemned the practices of theformer Iraqi regime.

• The discussions also addressed the relationship of human security to women’ssecurity. The representative of the Arab Women Organization (AWO) pointedout that the Second Arab Women’s Summit (Abu Dhabi, 2008) had discussedempowering women and achieving their security, asserting that civil society hasa central role to play in this regard, as interaction should take a ‘bottom-up’

Appendix


direction. Positive discrimination policies are still needed for Arab women,and Arab governments should adopt and impose higher-level policies. TheAWO representative also stressed the importance of education, whether forwomen or for the general public, in order to achieve human security andchange the dominant culture that compromises women’s security; shewarned that school curricula that stereotype women’s roles should bereviewed. She highlighted the importance of encouraging the rule of law,remarking that the AWO has conducted a study on laws relating to women:the problem is not the absence of laws, but rather the gap between lawenactment and law enforcement.

Second sessionRegional experiences of human security (Eastern and Western Europe, Western Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean)

Dr Shahrbanou Tadjbakhsh gave a presentation on the experiences of Eastern andWestern Europe and Western Asia. She pointed out that despite the universality ofthe human security concept, disparities exist on the level of implementation dueto the needs of various geographical regions – in this regard, she considers thathow ‘progressive’ or ‘backward’ societies are is irrelevant, especially now that WestEuropean societies are also facing human security challenges.The presentation revealed the challenges that East European countries face in

joining the European Union (EU) and the requirements imposed on them. Theserequirements do not necessarily serve to achieve human security. Although joiningthe EU is an opportunity for the acceding countries, the human security factor hasnot necessarily been taken into consideration.Dr Tadjbakhsh reviewed human security indicators in both Eastern and

Western Europe, shedding light on the absence of economic security in WestEuropean countries, the problems of the middle class, the scarcity of resourcescaused by soaring levels of consumption, and the financial crisis that has affectedmillions of people in the United States of America and Europe. She considered thatEurope’s human security problems are not necessarily associated with conditionsoutside Europe, which casts doubt on claims that the achievement of humansecurity in Europe is linked to interventions elsewhere.



Dr Tadjbakhsh referred to a conference (held shortly before the Cairoconference) in Khorasan, the Islamic Republic of Iran, on ‘Human Security inCentral Asia’. This was the first conference on human security to be held in theIslamic Republic of Iran, a country that has always adopted a very cautiousapproach to this concept. The speaker mentioned that the conference had discussedhuman security as an opportunity to face common challenges. She referred to thevarious human security approaches that were presented at the conference, such asspiritual and cultural security.Dr Francisco Rojas Aravena gave a presentation on the experience of Latin

America and the Caribbean in addressing human security issues. He remarked thatLatin America, like the Arab world, can hardly be referred to as one homogenousunit due to the contrasts among Latin American countries in terms of population,economy, illiteracy and dates of independence. Dr Rojas Aravena also noted thatseveral languages are spoken in Latin America, which makes it difficult to speakwith one voice on the foreign policy of the entire region.Dr Rojas Aravena reviewed the human security challenges faced by Latin

America (including organized crime, drug smuggling, poverty, climate change andnatural disasters). He considered internal security to be the most significant dangerthreatening the region, noting that most of its conflicts are internal, despite thefact that most Latin American regimes are open and support democracy. Hementioned that only 37 per cent of the region’s populations believe that democracyhas made their lives better, pointing out that a relationship exists betweenincreasing poverty and rising crime levels. He added that although the state issometimes the source of problems when it comes to human security challenges,the absence of the state also creates problems due to the vacuum it leaves, whichhas a negative impact on security.On the other hand, Dr Rojas Aravena considered the region to be a good

example of how to handle inter-state conflicts. He cited examples of howtransboundary and maritime disputes can be resolved through confidence-building measures in a way that leads to the containment of a dispute. He stressedthe role of academic institutions, together with government institutions, in thisarea.The speaker maintained that the relationship between global security, national

security and human security is controversial, and that in no way can we chooseeither one or the other, because the two requirements should be metsimultaneously. Human security complements, rather than replaces, national

Appendix


security. Dr Rojas Aravena confirmed that the UN should regain control over theongoing argument on human security in order to promote confidence in thisconcept.The discussions covered several points, including:

• the role of the European Court of Human Rights in promoting humansecurity;

• dealing in a proper manner with clandestine immigration, and not merelythrough a futile security approach;

• the confusion between ‘merge’ and ‘melt’, and the negative role played byEuropean states in the issue of defining minorities; and

• the quantitative definition of human security, which Dr Tadjbakhsh consideredas violating the very concept of human security. The concept of humansecurity is qualitative, varying in terms of criteria and indicators from oneregion to another, to reflect the individuality of each experience. Consequently,a quantitative criterion or a human security index is inappropriate.

Third sessionPoverty eradication in the Arab region from a human security perspective

Dr Mustafa Kamal Al-Sayed presented Dr Atif Kubursi’s paper, ‘PovertyEradication in the Arab Region from a Human Security Perspective’. The paperdiscussed the relationship between alleviating poverty and promoting humansecurity. Poverty eradication, human security and human development are stronglyintersecting factors. The feeling of poverty negates the feeling of security, which iswhy the concept of poverty is much broader than can be measured in financialterms alone. Poverty is also related to the knowledge deficit, the limited exploitationof resources, unemployment, an excessive dependence on non-renewable naturalresources, and so on. The paper demonstrated that the decrease in abject povertyin the Arab region has not been paralleled by a trend towards the equal distributionof wealth and income, and that oil production in the Arab region is important notonly to producing countries that enjoy the direct benefits, but also to all countriesin the region because oil affects the movement of labour and investments, and so



on. What is important in this respect is how oil could be exploited using rationaleconomic policies that employ its proceeds and ensure that oil dominance will bebroken in the future.The discussions focused on several points, including the following:

• Among the numerous reasons for poverty in the Arab region, politicalinstability remains one of the region’s central characteristics (see the examplesof Iraq, Palestine, Somalia, and so on): this associates tackling poverty withtackling political instability, regardless of the fact that such instability is causedby internal conflicts or external intervention. Therefore, the approachrequired to tackle poverty should be different from any approach adopted totackle problems caused by inappropriate economic policies or scarcity ofresources.

• There was a question as to the criteria that determine ‘progress’ and‘backwardness’, and whether such criteria are absolute or relative – varyingfrom one region to another.

• There was a question as to the credibility of poverty line criteria ($1 or $2a day), considering that these criteria do not necessarily reflect the actualsituation and should be reconsidered.

• A critical issue is the fact that the Arab region receives more urgenthumanitarian assistance than sustainable development support.

• Inter-Arab assistance is inadequate. A mechanism should be put into placeto manage assistance and development issues and contribute to the adoptionof policies to fight poverty from a developmental perspective.

• Poverty is also associated with unemployment and malnutrition. Certainsectors of the population are particularly affected (young people and women).

• Human security as a concept is related to ‘poverty of capacities’, because itaims to empower human beings and maximize the investment of theircapacities.

• The importance of economic integration and cooperation among Arabcountries is crucial in fighting poverty, and the role of the private sector needsto be discussed in this regard.

• The Arab Development Bank and the Arab Fund for Technical Assistanceshould play a role in supporting human development in the Arab region.

Appendix


Fourth sessionThe environment in the Arab region from a human security perspective

Dr Badria Al-Awadhi’s paper discussed factors affecting the environment in theArab region, including environmental laws in Arab countries. Dr Al-Awadhiconsidered states to be responsible for environmental protection, quotingprovisions from several Arab constitutions that provide for environmentalprotection. She referred to the Sudanese Transitional Constitution, which includesa detailed paragraph on environmental protection. She also referred to a similarparagraph in the Iraqi Constitution, and pointed out that environmentalprotection is not mentioned in the constitutions of seven Arab countries.The paper discussed the damage caused to the environment by armed conflicts,

giving the examples of the first Gulf war; the civil wars in Lebanon, Sudan andSomalia; the environmental consequences of the ‘separation wall’ in the OccupiedPalestinian Territories, and so on. The paper added that huge resources areallocated to military expenditures in Arab countries when compared to thoseallocated to education, health and other constituents of human security; this‘undermines’ human security. Dr Al-Awadhi also discussed the problems ofmanaging environmental and natural resources. She added that some Arab lawsaddress and penalize the transport and dumping of hazardous wastes. She alsodiscussed the laws relevant to encouraging environment-friendly projects.The contribution by Ms Fatima Al-Mallah, Director of Environment and

Sustainable Development at the League of Arab States, was in response to severalquestions in Dr Al-Awadhi’s paper. She suggested that law enactment per se is notan indicator of achieving environmental security, and that law enforcement isnecessary – together with environmental protection policies and programmes –to achieve environmental security. She added that environmental security, similarto human security, lacks a generally agreed definition, suggesting thatenvironmental security is achieved when people enjoy their life in an idealenvironment when certain factors are present: proper living conditions; properprotection from environmental dangers, whether natural or human-induced; theability to manage and control damages and dangers and track down theperpetrators of such acts; the availability of environment-critical information; andthe sustainability of the environmental system.



Ms Al-Mallah warned that the environmental security situation willdeteriorate further, given the dangers of climate change. She pointed out thatseveral initiatives have been approved by the League of Arab States (LAS), bothon the level of the regular Arab Summits and on that of the first ArabEconomic, Social and Development Summit (Kuwait, 2009). She added that theimplementation of such initiatives should be followed up by the Council of ArabMinisters Responsible for the Environment (CAMRE). Ms Al-Mallah noted thatLAS has drafted a model guidance law on environmental protection. She alsohighlighted the threat of hazardous wastes and the international laws governingthis topic, referring to the Basel Convention on the Control of TransboundaryMovements of Hazardous Wastes and Their Disposal. ‘Sixty-four countries haveratified a resolution prohibiting the movement of hazardous wastes outside themember states of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development[OECD],’ she explained, adding, however: ‘This resolution that was adoptedmore than ten years ago has not come into effect due to the manipulativeinterpretation of a ratification article in the Basel Convention that hampers theenactment of the resolution.’Ms Al-Mallah maintained that there are several internationally recognized

indicators for measuring environmental security, such as the environmentalsustainability indicator (countries’ ability to protect the environment over thecoming decades), although there are reservations about these indicators and theydo not cover important criteria like legal tracking. The Arab country that achievedthe highest score was Tunisia, followed by Oman. Other indicators measureenvironmental performance and the cost of environmental damage (this costamounts to an average of 4 per cent of Arab countries’ gross domestic product, orGDP). Ms Al-Mallah considered the situation of Arab countries in general as ‘notgood’ according to these indicators. Much has to be done in this regard, and climatechange poses even more challenges to the Arab world. Ms Al-Mallah noted thatthe Arabs need to build and promote their capacities to confront these challenges.‘The role of the private sector, civil society organizations and the media shouldalso be promoted,’ she added, pointing out that agreement has been reached thatthe Arab Environment Facility (AEF) should be established in order to galvanizesupport and funding to face these challenges. ‘This, however, should not absolvethe developed countries from the responsibility of offering technical and financialsupport in this regard,’ she asserted.

Appendix


The following points were discussed:

• Environmental security is an important prerequisite in achieving humansecurity in general, including water security, food security, issues ofenvironmental migration and how to limit disaster risks.

• Solving environmental problems contributes to preventing the outbreak ofconflicts. Certain conflicts in the Arab region stem fundamentally fromenvironmental problems.

• Is the problem of the environment caused by laws or by political convictions?Sometimes state-centric security is achieved at the expense of human security.In many conflicts, the environment is illegally destroyed out of a convictionthat such destruction is necessary for state security.

• There are persistent environmental effects from conflicts that occurred duringthe colonial period (environmental bombs, mines, contamination of thewaters of the Arabian Gulf, and so on).

• There is a need to create a set of Arab indicators to measure environmentalsecurity and sustainable development in general.

• Population movements sometimes have a negative effect on the environmentalsituation due to the depletion of resources. This leads to problems likedesertification and the destruction of natural resources.

• It is important for environmental awareness to be promoted in schoolcurricula and for international organizations to support Arab ministries ofeducation in this regard.

• An Arab convention should be adopted to protect the environment in times ofconflict. Attention should be paid to the problem of environmental wastesresulting from conflicts (mines left over from the two world wars, environmentaldamage in the Gulf, and so on).

• Arab countries should encourage the role of civil society in this area, and anannual Arab report should be issued on environmental protection in the Arabregion during times of peace and war.

• Attention should be paid to fighting the pollution resulting from the meansof public transport. The maintenance of public transport is necessary toprotect the environment.

• An investment in the environment is an investment in the future. Presentgenerations should see this as an obligation for future generations.



Fifth sessionManaging conflict and post-conflict situations in the Arab region from a human security perspective

Dr Mohamed Abdel Salam asserted that problems are not caused by the humansecurity concept itself, but by the misuse of this concept. He pointed out that, ratherthan analysing specific conflicts, his paper analysed the consequences of conflictson human security. ‘Armed conflicts still pose one of the greatest threats to humansecurity in the Arab region,’ he said. He added that no matter how unique the Arabcase is, such uniqueness does not rule out the possibility of making comparisonswith other regions.Dr Abdel Salam warned that traditional notions of security are dominant, and

priority is given to achieving ‘stability’, while the security of peoples is facing a realproblem in the Arab region. He considered armed conflicts to be the greatest threatfacing human security in the region, observing that these conflicts affect the livesof 75 million people – varying from ongoing conflicts to situations that areexpected to worsen. He remarked that the region is witnessing sixty-eight conflictsand is considered the most tense in terms of ‘conflict complication’.Dr Abdel Salam added that in terms of conflict patterns, the Arab region is

witnessing an unprecedented increase in internal conflicts – 84 per cent of theregion’s conflicts are internal and most of their victims are civilians. He warnedof the record rise of non-state actors, adding that these ‘asymmetrical wars’ arevery complex in terms of how their management affects human security. ‘Thebehaviour of the parties is extremely difficult to control,’ he explained. The speakeralso referred to the increase in ideological conflicts and the rising influence of thereligious factor. ‘The parties to internal conflicts are increasingly separatist,’ heexplained.Dr Abdel Salam considered the outbreak of short-term conflicts as a new

conflict pattern in a region that has seen continual conflicts. He referred to whathe calls the ‘conflict rounds’ that conflicts go through. The intervals between theeruption of a conflict and its end are never limited: wars end and conflictscontinue and wars beget other wars. (This applies to the invasion of Iraq, whichhas led to internal conflicts, and the war in Sudan, which has spawned otherconflicts, and so on.)He explained that Darfur has seen large numbers of victims and presented new

concepts that have never been used in previous conflicts in the region – with the

Appendix


practice of ‘ethnic cleansing’ being introduced for the first time. Dr Abdel Salamexplained the characteristics of the Darfur conflict, describing it in the followingterms: it is internal, it has ethnic dimensions, it involves several parties, it isextremely complicated and all the parties have so far failed to contain it. ‘The armedconflict in Darfur has been extremely serious in terms of its consequences onhuman security,’ he maintained; ‘it was in no way inevitable, it has unexpectedlyturned into the region’s most volatile conflict.’ He suggested that the Darfurconflict raises many questions regarding the likelihood of latent conflicts turninginto violent conflicts. He also described it as the worst conflict in the region andexpected it to continue.Dr Abdel Salam then mentioned that Algeria presents an example of a political

conflict that has turned into armed violence, warning that twelve cases in the Arabregion are likely to follow the same scenario. Quoting Guy Debonnet, he statedthat ‘Post-conflict situations can be worse than the conflicts themselves.’ Dr AbdelSalam also added that: ‘New conflicts might break out during the post-conflictperiod.’According to Dr Abdel Salam, attempts to control the military course of a

conflict are the most important methodology in protecting human security. Headvised that it was important to work during or prior to the outbreak of a conflictand to watch the behaviour of its parties according to a code of conduct that shouldbe agreed upon. Any violations committed should be monitored by neutral expertsin an attempt to contain the consequences of the conflict. As regards ‘earlyprevention’ efforts, Dr Abdel Salam believes that the problem concerns the currentmagnitude of the conflict phenomenon in the Arab region. ‘The experience ofexternal intervention has made early prevention more difficult,’ he added.The discussion focused on several points:

• The representative of Sudan refused to accept the description of the Darfurconflict as ‘genocide’, noting that it did not involve any intention ofannihilation, unlike the Sabra and Shatila massacre in 1982 or the Rwandagenocide in 1994, for example. He agreed, however, that Darfur is witnessinga conflict and does suffer from problems, adding that all parties understandthat the conflict must be brought to an end. But he stressed that theallegations of ‘genocide’ in Darfur should not be repeated because they areinaccurate.



• The representative of the Sudanese Human Security Initiative Organization(MAMAN) observed that the paper gave an inaccurate number of the victimsin Darfur. ‘No international reports have labelled Darfur as a genocide, whichthe author should have taken into account,’ he maintained. He also stressedthat the names of tribes in the study needed revision, adding that fullawareness is required by the state and the public to prevent an aggravationof latent conflicts and to help to alleviate, rather than increase, the presentstand-off. The increasing conflicts in Darfur are a serious problem that affectsthe movement of herdsmen because the security situation restricts theirpasturing areas. He stressed that it was important to offer assistance andfacilitate the movement of humanitarian organizations in order to help toalleviate this kind of perpetuating conflict.

• The conflict in Darfur is one of the earliest ‘environmental’ conflicts in theworld, a fact that should be borne in mind when dealing with this conflict.Other ‘latent environmental conflicts’ may lead to the outbreak of armedconflicts if not addressed.

• The relationship between state security and human security is a controversialissue. The absence of national stability compromises human security, whileensuring stability promotes human security. In this context, state securityshould be prioritized, particularly when the state is under attack. However,state security should be distinguished from regime security, as the two areconfused in the absence of citizenship. This has a negative impact on humansecurity, given the fact that internal conflicts are largely related to the securityof regimes rather than that of states.

• There was a discussion of the causes of a conflict (why it erupts and why itcontinues) and its consequences (the wider effects of conflicts on security, theeconomy and the environment), and of the ways to resolve/prevent conflicts(peace-building efforts, dealing with fundamental causes, guaranteeing thatno further complications will arise when a resolution is attempted, and so on).

• Resorting to pre-emptive diplomacy within the Arab framework will preventconflict complication. The availability and maintenance of sufficientinformation on disputes will help save the resources needed for crisismanagement.

• A democratic system intrinsically includes mechanisms to resolve internalconflicts, a characteristic that is lacking in the Arab region due to the absenceof democracy. However, democracy is not the only issue: in the circumstances

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under which the State of Israel was established (and with all theconsequences), a conflict would have broken out in any case, regardless ofwhether or not the Arab states were democratic.

• The League of Arab States must have mechanisms in place for conflictresolution and conflict prevention, while bearing in mind the differencebetween preventive diplomacy, conflict prevention, conflict resolution, post-conflict situations and peace building.

• It is difficult to differentiate between the ongoing internal, regional andinternational conflicts in the Arab region. The time frame provided by thepaper for some conflicts is inaccurate: for example, the conflict in Iraq cannotbe said to have ended in April 2003.

• The number of conflicts in the Arab region as specified in the paper is aninadequate indicator. It would have been better to specify the number ofvictims killed, injured and displaced; the economic cost of the conflict in itsbroader sense; and so on.

• The paper should have shed more light on the Arab-Israeli conflict; as well ason the internal Palestinian conflict, which could have been avoided if it hadbeen differently managed.

Sixth sessionEstablishing democracy and human rights in the Arabregion from a human security perspective

Dr Abdallah Saaf’s paper explained that democracy is the most effective politicalsystem to encourage and ensure human security. The question arises, however, asto which kind of democracy we mean. The democratic process is not only aboutelections; the essence of democracy is to achieve participation and citizenship. Sucha process does not only refer to political democracy, but also to social justice thatensures the protection of the poor and guarantees effective representation.Dr Saaf pointed out that human security is a different approach from that of

humanitarian intervention. He indicated that fear of this concept explains whyhuman security has only been addressed recently in the Arab region. Dr Saaf alsoreferred to the unity of human rights in the sense that we cannot pick and chooseamong or categorize human rights. He considered the discussion of humansecurity as an opportunity to highlight this controversy.



The discussion covered several points:

• The relationship between the state and its citizens, considering the state asconsisting of the land, the citizens and the ruler. There is no land withoutcitizens, and there is no ruler without citizens. The state is therefore nothingbut the citizens and the government is their tool. Citizens should thereforebe able to choose a government that achieves this goal. The ‘democracy game’should involve no losers: this should be taken into account when forming agovernment. It should be a win-win game.

• The controversy surrounding the definition of the three concepts, democracy,human rights and human security, considering that human security isachieved when human rights are ensured. Governments should carry outtheir responsibility to ensure human rights in order to achieve humansecurity.

• The controversy surrounding ‘democratic patterns’. Such patterns do notnecessarily achieve human rights: for example, US-style democracy has notsucceeded in Iraq.

• The importance of supporting civil society and spreading a societal culturethat enriches democracy through establishing transparency and the rule oflaw, ensuring the neutrality of security institutions, empowering women toparticipate in society and revising electoral laws.

• The deficiency at the grass-root level: this highlights the importance of raisingpublic awareness, especially since some experiences (granting women the voteand the right to nominate themselves in elections in both Kuwait and Qatar)show that the obstacles facing the democratic experience may be found at thegrass-roots level.

Closing session

During this session, gratitude was expressed to UNESCO, the League of Arab Statesand the Human Security Unit of the Office for the Coordination of HumanitarianAffairs (HSU/OCHA). Ambassador Ahmed bin Helli indicated that the conveningof this event was a major step in the right direction. During the two-day conference,participants had put forward several positive ideas in order to arrive at a conceptthat reflects the real situation and the ambitions of Arab societies.

Appendix



Mr Kazu Tase said that human security has the potential to work as a bridging,rather than a divisive, concept. The concepts relevant to security, development andhuman rights that were introduced in the UN report, ‘In Larger Freedom’,1 shouldbe taken on board, bearing in mind the opinions of the peoples for whoseempowerment the human security concept was devised. Mr Tase pointed out thatthe aim of the conference was to explore the needs of the Arab region, suggestingthat the next stage should involve implementing projects in collaboration with thepeoples of the region. He remarked that out of 177 projects funded by the UnitedNations Trust Fund for Human Security (UNTFHS) worldwide, only 2 projectshave been implemented in the Arab region, which means that a space forcooperation exists between the Fund, the League of Arab States, Arab countriesand NGOs. Mr Tase indicated that some Arab countries may consider contributingto the Fund; he hoped that this successful conference would mark the beginningof cooperation with partners from the Arab region.Mr Pierre Sané said that the conference was the last in a series of international

events organized by UNESCO to identify the needs and the vision of each regionas far as human security is concerned. He suggested that in order for the conceptto be ‘global’, it must be widely embraced and practised. He pointed out that theconcepts of human security, human development and human rights all providethat the objective of the state and the international community is to protect andachieve the interests of the individual.

1 ‘In Larger Freedom: Towards Security, Development and Human Rights for All’, Sept. 2005, Reportof the United Nations Secretary-General. See: www.un.org/largerfreedom


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