Violent Conflict and the Transformation of Social Capital: Lessons from Cambodia, Rwanda, Guatemala,...

title:

ViolentConflictandtheTransformationofSocialCapital:LessonsFromRwanda,Somalia,Cambodia,andGuatemalaConflictPreventionandPost-conflictReconstruction

author: Colletta,NatJ.;Cullen,MichelleL.publisher: WorldBank

isbn10|asin: 0821344129printisbn13: 9780821344125ebookisbn13: 9780585287881

language: English

subject

Socialconflict--Developingcountries--Casestudies,Socialcontrol--Developingcountries--Casestudies,Socialintegration--Developingcountries--Casestudies.

publicationdate: 2000

lcc: HN980.C642000ebddc: 303.6/09172/4

subject:

Socialconflict--Developingcountries--Casestudies,Socialcontrol--Developingcountries--Casestudies,Socialintegration--Developingcountries--Casestudies.

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ViolentConflictandtheTransformationofSocialCapital

LessonsfromCambodia,Rwanda,Guatemala,andSomalia

NatJ.CollettaMichelleL.Cullen

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©2000TheInternationalBankforReconstructionandDevelopment/THEWORLDBANK1818HStreet,N.W.Washington,D.C.20433

AllrightsreservedManufacturedintheUnitedStatesofAmericaFirstprintingMay2000

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CONTENTS

Acknowledgments vii

PartI.Introduction 1

1SocialCapital,SocialCohesion,andViolentConflict:BackgroundandAnalyticalConstructs

3

SocialCapital:AnEmergingConceptualFramework 6

ViolentConflictandItsInterfacewithSocialCapitalandSocialCohesion

12

PartII.TheNexusbetweenViolentConflict,SocialCapital,andSocialCohesion

17

2Cambodia:StateAbsolutism,Alienation,andSocialCapital

19

StudyMethodology 19

StructuralandCognitiveSocialCapital 22

State-SponsoredWarfareandCitizenVictimization 24

SocialCapital,SocialCohesion,andtheLegaciesofViolentConflict

26

3Rwanda:Hate,Fear,andtheDecayofSocialRelations

33

StudyMethodology 33

SocialCohesion,Trust,andViolentConflict 35

TheAnatomyofaGenocide 37

ThePerversionofSocialCapital 39

CooperationwithoutTrust 43

VerticalInfluencesandExternalFactors 49

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4GuatemalaandSomalia:ViolentConflictandtheState

51

StudyMethodology 51

SocialResponsibility,SocialInitiative,andViolentConflict

53

Guatemala:TheStateagainstthePeople 56

Somalia:StateDisintegration,Anarchy,andResilience 58

TheImpactofStateandMarketForcesonSocialCohesioninGuatemalaandSomalia

64

5Civic,Market,andStateEngagement:AComparativeAnalysis

71

CopingwithViolentConflict:TheRoleofCivilSocietyduringWarfare

72

MarketForces,Globalization,andViolentConflict 76

StateFailureandCivilWar 78

PartIII.FromCivilWartoCivilSociety 83

6ViolentConflictandPeacebuilding

85

HowtheNatureofWarDeterminestheNatureofPeaceandReconciliation

85

TheEffectsofGlobalizationonSocialCohesion 89

7PoliciesandProgramsforStrengtheningSocialCapital

93

andSocialCohesion

Cambodia:NurturingAssociationsforEconomicGrowthandDevelopment

94

Rwanda:RebuildingFamily,Community,andStateInterrelations

98

GuatemalaandSomalia:ImprovingStateCapacityandCivilSociety

100

8HarnessingSocialCapitalandSocialCohesiontoPreventViolentConflict

107

MediatingMechanisms:Policies,Markets,andCivilSociety

108

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EnsuringHumanSecurity:ManagingConflictbyConnectingandEmpoweringPeople

112

BuildingResilientCommunities:IntegratingReliefandDevelopment

115

FromPeacebuildingtoNation-Building:DesignsforSustainablePeace,Reconciliation,andDevelopment

121

Notes 124

AnnexLearningfromtheMethodologiesEmployed:MeasuringSocialCapitalwithinaContextofViolentConflict

126

Bibliography 133

Boxes

1Indicatorsofviolentconflict:Cambodia

21

2Buddhism,Cambodianculture,andsocialcapital

27

3Indicatorsofviolentconflict:Rwanda

36

4Indicatorsofviolentconflict:GuatemalaandSomalia

55

5TheBoromaConference:abottom-upapproachtoreconciliation

62

6 73

Civilsocietyandviolentconflict

7Women'svillagebankinginGuatemala:buildingcrosscuttingtiesthroughcredit

75

8Marketpenetrationandviolentconflict

77

9Statepenetrationandviolentconflict

79

10UsingdecentralizationandparticipationtotargettheruralpoorinCambodia

97

11BuildingtrusttorebuildRwanda

101

12Institutionaldevelopmentandstrengthening:theindigenouswomen'sdefensoriainGuatemala

103

13Women,grassrootsmovements,andpeaceinitiativesinSomalia

105

14Reliefandtheperpetuationofviolentconflict

117

15Bridgingthegapbetweenhumanitarianreliefanddevelopment

120

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Tables

1Studydefinitionsofsocialcapital

8

2Studyindicatorsofsocialcapital

9

3Interactionsbetweenviolentconflictandsocialcapital:Cambodia

31

4Interactionsbetweenviolentconflictandsocialcapital:Rwanda

46

5Interactionsbetweenviolentconflictandsocialcapital:Guatemala

65

6Interactionsbetweenviolentconflictandsocialcapital:Somalia

67

7Organizationalintegrityofthestate

81

8Intra-andextracommunityties

82

9Descriptionsofviolentconflicts:fourcasestudies

86

10Comparisonofthefieldsurveys

129

Figures

1Socialcohesion:theintegrationofhorizontalbridgingandverticallinkingsocialcapital

14

2Towardtheintegrationofreliefanddevelopment

119

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ACKNOWLEDGMENTSThismonographisbasedonliteraturereviewsandonfieldstudiesconductedinCambodia,Rwanda,Guatemala,andSomalia.TheresearchprojectwasdesignedandmanagedbytheauthorsNatJ.Colletta,manager,PostConflictUnit(PCU),WorldBank,andMichelleL.Cullen,postconflictconsultant,PCU.

TheCambodianandRwandanstudieswerepartofalargerWorldBankSocialCapitalInitiative(SCI)fundedbytheDanishgovernment.GuidancewasprovidedbyChristiaanGrootaert,SCItaskmanager,andThierryvanBastelaer,SCIcoordinator.

TheCambodianresearchteamwasledbyVeenaKrishnamurthyundertheauspicesofCambodianSocialServices,whichalsopreparedthefinalreportforthestudy.FieldresearchersincludedHuonSathea,KoyPharin,PhoSengBan,PrakSomonea,andRosPheak.SpecialthanksareduetoLizandToshiKato,EllenMinnotti,JanuRao,KhySambo,SuonSophiny,andCherylUrashimafortheircontributions.

TheRwandanliteraturereviewwasconductedbyLindiroKabirigi,JeanRugagiNizurugero,andGérardRutazibwa.FieldresearchwascarriedoutbyCallixteKayitaba,AnectoHanyurvinfuraKayitare,ChristineKibiriti,andSpecioseMukandutiye.ElizabethAcul,AntoinetteKamanzi,ThereseNibarere,andAnnaRutagengwaovaprovidedorganizationalassistance.ToniNtagandaKayongaandMarkusKostnercontributedvaluableinputandguidancethroughoutthestudy.

TheGuatemalanandSomalistudieswereconductedbytheItaliansocialresearchorganizationCERFEandwerefundedby

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theItaliangovernment.ThefinalreportforthosetwostudieswaspreparedbyAndreaDeclich,CERFE;Lucianod'Andrea,sociologistandscientificdirector,CERFE;andGiancarloQuaranta,sociologistandpresident,CERFE.TheirworkincorporatedtheoreticalandmethodologicalmaterialextrapolatedfromlecturesgivenbyGiancarloQuarantaandLucianod'AndreaattheSchoolofSociologyandHumanSciencesinItaly.

FieldworkinGuatemalawasconductedbyJorgeMarioMartinez,anthropologist.FieldresearchinSomaliawasundertakenbyAbdulRahmanAbdiMaalim,socialscientist.FrancescoAmbrogettihelpedoverseethetwostudiesandactedasaliaisonbetweentheBank'sPost-ConflictUnitandCERFE.

Findingsfromthefourstudieswerediscussedataseminaron"TheDepletionandRestorationofSocialCapitalinWar-TornSocieties,"fundedbytheItaliangovernmentandheldinAlmalfi,Italy,May2123,1999.MaresaBerliri,headofCERFE'sSeminarsDepartment,andChiaraGiorgioftheSeminarsDepartmentorganizedtheevent.AmongtheparticipantswhoprovidedvaluableinsightsonthefourstudieswereAbdulRahmanAbdiMaalim;AlfonsoAlfonsi,deputygeneraldirector,CERFE;AlessandraCancedda,researcher,CERFE;AndreaDeclich;Lucianod'Andrea;VolkerEichener,BochumUniversity;AnectoHanyurvinfuraKayitare;ElkeKochWeser,UniversityLaSapienza;VeenaKrishnamurthy;ThomasP.Lindemann,ruralinstitutionsofficer,FoodandAgricultureOrganization(FAO);JorgeMarioMartinez;EmmaPorio,DepartmentofSociology,AteneodeManilaUniversity;GiancarloQuaranta;MariaNoelVaeza,senioradviseronreconstruction,UnitedNationsDevelopmentProgramme(UNDP),Guatemala;andMichaelWoolcock,consultant,DevelopmentEconomicsResearchGroup(DECRG),WorldBank.

Wegratefullyacknowledgethecontributionsofthosementionedabove,andweespeciallythankOsmanS.Ahmed,PatriciaCleves,MarkusKostner,MeasNee,PeterUvin,andMichaelWoolcockfortheirinsightfulcomments.Althoughthefieldstudieswerecarriedoutbyselectresearchteamsineach

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country,thebasicstudydesignandanalysishavebeenshapedbytheauthors'experienceoverthepastseveralyearsinpromotingthesocialandeconomicreintegrationofwar-affectedpopulations.Wetakesoleresponsibilityfortheanalysis,findings,andrecommendationspresentedinthismonograph.

Finally,thisworkwouldhavebeenimpossiblewithoutthecontributionsofthemanyindividualrespondentswhowerewillingandcourageousenoughtotelltheirstoriesaboutthehumandimensionsofviolentconflictintheirsocieties.Wehopethatthismodestexploratoryendeavorprovokesfurtherresearch,policyanalysis,andprogrammaticactiontoenablewar-woundedsocietiestohealandreknitthesocialfabricnecessaryfornurturingreconciliationandachievingenduringpeaceanddevelopment.

PARTIINTRODUCTION

1SocialCapital,SocialCohesion,andViolentConflict:BackgroundandAnalyticalConstructsTheColdWar,inwhichsuperpowerssoughttomaintainaglobalbalanceofpowerwithoutresortingtonucleararms,maskedmanylocal,intrastateconflictsbyinternationalizingthem.Whatinactualitywerecivilwarsamongindigenescontendingforlocalpowerwereturnedinto''virtual"internationalconflictsfoughtbyproxy.Externallyfinancedeconomicgrowthandoutsidesupportforauthoritarianregimesconcealeddeeplyrootedinternalethnic,religious,social,andeconomiccleavages.WiththeendoftheColdWar,thisvirtualbubbleburst,leavinganunprecedentednumberofcivilwars.Ofthe108violentconflictsbetween1989and1998,92areconsideredtobeintrastate(WallensteenandSollenberg1996;Sollenberg1998).Consequently,peacekeepingandpeacebuildinghavetakenonnewprominenceastasksfortheUnitedNations.Inthefirst45yearsofitsexistence,theUNspent23percentofitsbudget,oraboutUS$3.6billion,onpeacekeeping.Inthepast10yearsthishasincreaseddramatically;77percentoftheUNbudget(roughlyUS$12.1billionperyear)hasbeenallocatedtomaintainingpeacewithinratherthanacrossnationalborders(Martin1996a).

Unlikeinterstateconflict,whichoftenmobilizesnationalunityandstrengthenssocietalcohesiveness,violentconflictwithinastateweakensitssocialfabric.Itdividesthepopulationbyundermininginterpersonalandcommunaltrust,destroyingthenormsandvaluesthatunderliecooperationandcollectiveac-

tionforthecommongood,andincreasingthelikelihoodofcommunalstrife.Thisdamagetoanation'ssocialcapitalthenorms,values,andsocialrelationsthatbondcommunitiestogether,aswellasthebridgesbetweencommunalgroups(civilsociety)

1andthestateimpedestheabilityofeithercommunalgroupsorthestatetorecoverafterhostilitiescease.Evenifotherformsofcapitalarereplenished,economicandsocialdevelopmentwillbehinderedunlesssocialcapitalstocksarerestored.

Agrowingbodyofresearchhasexaminedthephenomenonofsocialcapitalinanattempttodefinetheconceptandtheformsitmaytakeandtodescribehowitmayinfluenceandimprovethedevelopmentprocess.Effortshavealsobeenmadetodevelopindicatorsformeasuringsocialcapitalandtoarriveatrecommendationsonhowtoencourageandsupportthisdynamic.Fewstudies,however,haveactuallyanalyzedsocialcapitalandhowitinteractswithviolentconflictanimportantissue,consideringtheriseinthefrequencyofintrastateconflictandtheimportanceofsocialcapitaltosocialandeconomicgrowthanddevelopment(Olson1982;North1990;FedderkeandKlitgaard1998;Grootaert1998;Rodrik1999b;CollierandHoeffler1999).Suchanunderstandingcouldenhancetheabilitiesofinternationalactorsandpolicymakerstomoreeffectivelycarryoutpeacebuildingrelief,reconstruction,reconciliation,anddevelopment.

Inanefforttobetterunderstandtheinteractionsbetweenviolentconflictandsocialcapital,theauthors,undertheauspicesofthePost-ConflictUnit,WorldBank,undertookanexploratoryinvestigationoffourconflict-affectedcountriesCambodia,Rwanda,Guatemala,andSomaliaandtheirchangingsocialcapitaldynamics.Thedataforthismonographhavebeendrawnfromextensiveliteraturereviewsandfromeightcommunity-levelstudiesconductedinthefourcountries.

Inaquasi-experimentalstudydesign,twocommunitieswereselectedfromeachcountryonethathadexperiencedhigh-intensityconflictandonewheretheintensityofconflictwaslow.Despitethedifficultyofthetask,everyeffortwasmadetoselectmatchedpairsofcommunities,holdingconstantcommunitysize,ethnicmix,dominantmodeofsubsistence,andsocioeconomicstatus.Thefindingsareclearlylimitedbymodificationsinthemethodologyusedin

thedifferentcountriesandbytheunevenqualityofdatacollectionineachcommunity.Thesedifferenceswereinpartduetothedifferingcapacitiesofthefieldresearchteamsandthegeneraldifficultiesinundertakingresearchinwar-torncommunities,especiallyonsuchsociallyandpoliticallysensitiveissuesascommunaltrust,socialrelations,andcivicandstateperceptionsanddynamics.Anindicationoftheseverityoftheconflictsinthesecountriesisthattwo,CambodiaandRwanda,wereofficiallydeclaredcasesofgenocide(crimesagainsthumanity)bytheUnitedNations,andone(Guatemala)isconsideredbymanyobserverstohaveconstitutedagenocide.

Onthebasisoftheexploratoryinvestigation,thismonographdiscusseschangesinsocialcapitalresultingfromviolentconflict;theinteractionbetweensocialcapital,socialcohesion,andviolentconflict;andhowcivilsociety,governments,andinternationalactorscannurturethesocialcapitalneededtostrengthensocialcohesionandsopromoteconflictprevention,rehabilitation,andreconciliation.Findingsandrecommendationsfromthesefourstudiesarepreliminary,aseachcasestudywasconductedonanexploratorybasisonly.Thestudyresultsarespecifictothecountriesanalyzed,althoughsomebroadgeneralizationsmayhavewidervalidity.Furtherresearchisneededtoconfirmandsolidifytheresults.(Seetheannexforacomparativesummaryofthemethodologiesemployedandlessonsforsimilarresearchinthefuture.)

Theremainderofthischapterexaminestheconceptsofsocialcapital,socialcohesion,andviolentconflictthatunderlietheframeworksemployedinthefieldstudiesandthesubsequentanalysis.PartIIprovidesanoverviewofthecommunitystudies,includinginformationonstudybackgrounds,historicalperspectives,methodologies,andfindings.PolicyandpracticerecommendationsemergingfromthestudiesarepresentedinPartIII.Throughthisprocess,weattempttooutlinehowsocietalcohesivenesscanbestrengthenedthroughthe

accumulationofhorizontalsocialcapital(thenurturingoftrustandcivicengagementamonglikeanddiversegroups)andverticalsocialcapital(relationsbetweenthestate,market,andcivilsociety)andhowsocialcapitalcanbeacriticalmeansforcombatingsocialfragmentationandviolentconflict.Wethenposit

whatgovernmentsandinternationalactorscandotohelpwartorncountriesreturntoapathofreconciliation,reconstruction,andsustainablepeaceanddevelopment.

SocialCapital:AnEmergingConceptualFramework

Categorizingandanalyzingsocialcapitalisdifficult,fortherearemanydefinitionsofthetermandwhatitencompasses.Ingeneral,socialcapitalreferstosystemsthatleadtoorresultfromsocialandeconomicorganization,suchasworldviews,trust,reciprocity,informationalandeconomicexchange,andinformalandformalgroupsandassociations.Althoughthereismuchcontentionoverwhatinteractionsandtypesoforganizationconstitutesocialcapital,thereislittledisagreementabouttheroleofsocialcapitalinfacilitatingcollectiveaction,economicgrowth,anddevelopmentbycomplementingotherformsofcapital(Grootaert1998).

Woolcock's(1998)modelofsocialcapitalfacilitatesanalysisacrossvariouslevelsbypresentingacomprehensiveframeworkthatincorporatesfourdimensionsofsocialcapital:strongtiesbetweenfamilymembersandneighbors;weaktieswiththeoutsidecommunityandbetweencommunities;formalinstitutions(includinglawsandnorms);andstate-communityinteractions.

2Theapplicationofthismodelcanhelpenablethedirecttargetingofexternalinterventionstowardspecificdimensionsofsocialcapitaleithernurturingandutilizingexistingstocksorbuildingnewlinksthatuniteaffectedanddisparategroups.

Strongties(integration)formtheprimarybuildingblocksofsociety,unitingnuclearandextendedfamilymembersandneighbors.Theserelations,predominantlybasedonkinship,ethnicity,andreligion,arelargelyprotectionist,defensemechanismsthatformasafetynetfor

basicsurvival.(SeeGranovetter1973fortheconceptofstrongandweaktiesandGittellandVidal1998ontheconceptofbondingsocialcapital.)Weakties(linkages)aremorenetworkedandassociationalandconnectpeopletotheoutsidecommunity.Examplesarelinkswithincivicassociationsandnetworks.Thisdimensionoftenbridgesdifferencesinkinship,ethnicity,andreligion.Thesecross-cuttingrelationsareoften

affiliatedwithoffensivemeasures,suchascivicengagementandeconomicenterprise,thatgivepeoplethestrategicadvantagetheyneedtomoveahead.

Socialcapitalisalsoexpressedinmorevertical,formalinstitutionsatthemacrolevel.Thisdimensionofsocialcapital(organizationalintegrity)encompassesstateinstitutionsandtheireffectivenessandabilitytofunction,aswellasthelegalenvironmentandsocialnorms.Thelattercanincludeinfluentialandpotentialmechanismsofsocialcontrolsuchasthemedia.Thedegreeofthestate'sintegrityinfluenceswhethercivilsocietycomplements(enhances)orsubstitutesforstateservicesandfunctions.

State-communityrelationsreflecthowleadersandgovernmentinstitutionsareengagedinandinteractwiththecommunity(synergy).Whenanauthoritarianstatepenetratessociety,thereislittlespaceforhealthycivicengagementordevelopmentofnetworks.

Thedefinitionsandindicatorsusedinthefourstudiesfocusedprimarilyoninformalandlocalhorizontalrelationships,suchastrustandcross-cuttingnetworks,andtosomeextentoncertainaspectsofverticalrelationships,particularlystateandmarketpenetration,asimportantfactorsinfuelingconflictandinfluencingtheformationandtransformationofsocialcapital.TheCambodiaandRwandastudiesundertookbalancedinvestigationsofhorizontalandverticalsocialcapital.TheGuatemalaandSomaliastudiestendedtofocusmoreontheverticaldimensionsofsocialcapital.TheconceptsanddefinitionsofsocialcapitalusedasabasisforthefourcountrystudiesstemprimarilyfromtheworksofPutnam,Coleman,Fukuyama,andUphoff.

Putnam'sseminalworkonsocialcapitalelaboratesonthenatureofhorizontalrelations.Socialcapitalconsistsof"thefeaturesofsocialorganization,suchasnetworks,norms,andtrust,thatfacilitate

coordinationandcooperationformutualbenefit"(Putnam1993:36).Communitieswithpositiveeconomicdevelopmentandeffectivegovernmentsarethosesupportedby"networksofcivilengagement,"orcitizenrylinkedbysolidarity,integrity,andparticipation.Thesecivicnetworksfosternormsofreciprocitythatreinforcesentimentsoftrustwithinasocietyandimprovetheeffectivenessofcommunicationsandsocial

Table1StudydefinitionsofsocialcapitalCambodia Rwanda GuatemalaandSomaliaPutnam:"trust,norms,andnetworks"

Putnam:"trust,norms,andnetworks"

Acomplexsetoffactorsandindexeswasderivedtoenablethemeasurementofeachconcept:civilsociety,socialresponsibility,socialinitiative,andsocialcapital.

Uphoff:structuralandcognitive

Coleman:hierarchyandunequalpowerdistributionofverticalassociations;notnecessarilymutuallybeneficial

Grootaert:institutionsandtherelationships,attitudes,andvaluesthatgoverninteractions

Fukuyama:importanceoftrust,especiallyinrelationtocivicdutyandexchangeofinformation

Measuredas: Measuredas: Civilsociety,thatis,sociallyresponsibleactors,wasconsideredtheenablerofsocialcapital.Socialcapitalwasrepresentedbytwoautonomousdimensions:socialresponsibilityandsocialinitiative.

Socialcohesion,regardedasthedensityandnatureoforganizationsandnetworks(bothverticalandhorizontal)andmembers'levelsofcommitmentandresponsibilitytothesegroups

Socialcohesion,regardedasthedensityandnatureoforganizationsandnetworks(bothverticalandhorizontal)andmembers'levelsofcommitmentandresponsibilitytothesegroups

Trust,withthepropensityforcooperationandexchange(material,labor,ritualistic,andinformational)asitsproxy.

Trust,withthepropensityforcooperationandexchange(material,labor,ritualistic,andinformational)asitsproxy.

Socialresponsibilitywasviewedasaself-defensemechanismofcivilsocietythatattemptedtomitigatesocialandenvironmentalrisks(healthcrises,illiteracy,unemployment,lackofaccesstohighereducation,geographicisolation,conflicts,andsoon).Socialinitiativeencompassedeffortsaimedatgrowthandexpansionratherthanatcontrollingrisks.

Table2StudyindicatorsofsocialcapitalCambodia Rwanda GuatemalaandSomaliaStructuralsocialcapitalrepresentedby:

Proxiesforsocialcapital:

Twodimensionsmadeupsocialcapital:

Communityeventsactivitiesthatincreaselevelsofsolidarityandcollectiveactionandbuildcollectiveconsciousnessthroughsharedactionssuchasweddings,funerals,andthelike

Type,nature,andorganizationofexchange

Socialresponsibilitytheabilityofcivilsocietytomitigateriskstothepeople.Itwasassumedthatthiscapacitywashigherunderthefollowingconditions:

Informalnetworksloosestructuresunitedaroundacommonsharedpurpose

Natureandorganizationofassistance,mutualaid,andcooperation

Greaterinternaldiversificationincivilsociety

Associationsformalnetworkswithdistinctform,structure,andruleswhoseidentityandgoalsarecommonlyknown

Channelsandmechanismsforinformationalexchange

Greaternumberofactorswithineachtypeofgroup

Villageleadershipofficial(localadministration),traditional(religiousleadersorelders),orinformal(peoplewhocommandrespectonaccountoftheirwealthorcharisma)

Existenceandnatureofassociationsandreasonfortheircreation

Higherqualityofthedifferentcollectiveactors.

Linkswithexternalagenciesvillageorcommunetieswithoutsidenongovernmentalorganizations(NGOs),

Intermarriageandextendedfamilyrelations

Socialinitiativethepotentialofcivilsocietytofacilitateeconomicgrowth.Itwasassumedthatthispotentialwouldbegreaterwith:

churchgroups,andthenationalgovernment.

Intercommunityrelationsandmechanismsforconflictresolution

Greaterdiversificationandqualityoftheactorsincivilsociety

Availabilityandfunctioningofinfrastructure

Greatercertaintythatpositivelocalfactors(listedbelow)areatwork

Trust Lesscertaintythatnormativeobstacles(listedbelow)exist.

Socialprotectionandwelfare;collectiveresponsibility.

Localfactorsincludeconfidenceandtrust;materialopportunities(communicationssuchastelephoneserviceandmail;mobility,providedbyroadsandtransportationsystems;andservices,includingpersonalservices,socialandhealthservices,andfinancialservices);andcognitivecapital,orqualifiedpersonnelwithspecificskillsandknow-how.Normativeobstaclesweredefinedasformal(forexample,law),substantive,organizationalandbureaucratic,socialandcultural,andpoliticalobstacles.

organization.Trust,improvedcommunications,andtheflowofinformationenhancetheefficiencyofinstitutions(3637).Inthisway,socialcapitalis"aresourcewhosesupplyincreasesratherthandecreasesthroughuseandwhich(ascontrastedtophysicalcapital)becomesdepletedifnotused"(3738).Unlikeconventionalformsofcapital,socialcapitalisapublic,notaprivate,good.AccordingtothedefinitionsinWoolcock'smodel,Putnam'sworkmainlyreferstointegrationandlinkages.

Coleman's(1988)definitionofsocialcapitalisbroader,includingverticalassociationsthatcanbecharacterizedbyhierarchyandanunequaldistributionofpoweramongmembers.Consequently,socialcapitalcanbebeneficialtosomeanduselessorharmfultoothers,dependingonitscharacteristicsandapplication.Socialcapital"isnotasingleentitybutavarietyofdifferententitieswithtwoelementsincommon:thatallconsistofsomeaspectofsocialstructures,andthattheyfacilitatecertainactionsofactorswhetherpersonsorcorporateactorswithinthestructure....Likeotherformsofcapital,socialcapitalisproductive,makingpossibletheachievementofcertainendsthatinitsabsencewouldnotbepossible"(S98).Coleman'sworkcutsacrossvariousdimensionsofWoolcock'smodel,includingintegration,linkages,and,toasmallerextent,stateandmarketsynergywiththecommunity.

Fukuyama(1995)seestrustwithinasocietyasaprimaryfactorinitsprosperity,inherentcompetitiveness,andtendencytowarddemocracy.Trust,inhisview,isakeymeasureofsocialcapitalandisaccumulatedthroughnormsofreciprocityandsuccessfulcooperationinnetworksofcivicengagement.It"ariseswhenacommunitysharesasetofmoralvaluesinsuchawayastocreateexpectationsofregularandhonestbehavior"(153).Reciprocity,civicduty,andmoralobligationareessentialtoasuccessfulandstablesocietyandarethebehaviorsthatshouldemanatefromathrivingcivilsociety.

AccordingtoUphoff(2000),socialcapitalis"anaccumulationofvarioustypesofsocial,psychological,cognitive,institutional,andrelatedassetsthatincreasetheamountorprobabilityofmutuallybeneficialcooperativebehaviorthatisproductiveforothers,notjustone'sself"(p.216).Uphoffbreakssocialcapitaldownintostructuralandcognitivecomponents.Structural

socialcapitalreferstotherelationships,networks,andassociationsortheinstitutionalstructures,bothverticalandhorizontal,thatlinkmembers.Horizontalrelationshipsarethosethatexistamongequalsornearequals;verticalrelationshipsstemfromhierarchicalorunequalrelationsduetodifferencesinpowerorresourcebases.Cognitivesocialcapitalisthe"drivingforce"behindthesevisibleformsofsocialcapital;itincludesvalues,norms,civicresponsibility,expectedreciprocity,charity,altruism,andtrust.AlldimensionsofWoolcock'sparadigmareencompassedwithinUphoff'sdefinitionofsocialcapital.

Thus,Putnam'sandColeman'sworkemphasizesthehorizontalandverticalaspectsofsocialcapital,whileFukuyama'sworkstressestheimportancetotheformationofsocialcapitaloftrustagrosslydepletedcommodityduringwarfare.Uphoff'sworkfacilitatestheanalysisofsocialcapitalbyseparatingitscognitiveandstructuralaspects.Tofurtherdeepentheanalysisoftherelationshipbetweenconflictandsocialcapital,interactionsatthemacrolevelshouldalsobeconsidered.Thisbroadeningofthedefinitionofsocialcapitalpermitstheinclusionofgovernment,market,anddevelopmentactors,whichhaveadirectimpactonthesocialcapitalenvironmentfacingactorsatthelocallevel,andhelpsidentifymeasurestobeincludedinpolicyandoperationalrecommendations.Thesocialcapitaldimensionscloselyaffiliatedwiththemacroenvironment(notionsoforganizationalintegrityandsynergy)werebrieflyexaminedinthefourcasestudies.

North(1990)andOlson(1982)definesocialcapitaltoincludenotonlytrust,norms,andnetworksbutalsothesociopoliticalenvironmentthatshapesnormsandsocialstructures.InadditiontothelargelyinformalandoftenlocalhorizontalandhierarchicalrelationshipsintheconceptsofColemanandPutnam,thisviewencompassesmoreformalizedinstitutionalrelationshipsand

structuressuchasthegovernment,thepoliticalregime,themarket,theruleoflaw,thecourtsystem,andcivilandpoliticalliberties(Grootaert1998).

Narayan(1999)alsoemphasizestheimportanceofinclusionofthestateinsocialcapitalanalysisinherworkexaminingthedynamicsofcomplementarityandsubstitution.Narayanarguesthatthefocusmustbenotonlyoncivicengagement,ideallychar-

acterizedbyinclusive,cross-cuttingtiesthatlinkunlikeindividualsandgroups,butalsoontheeffectivenessofthestate.Astrongcivilsocietyfoundedoncross-cuttingtiesthatoperatesinaweakstateenvironmentsubstitutesforthestate'sinadequaciesandhenceisnotamodelcaseforgrowth.Ahighlevelofcivicengagement,combinedwithawell-functioningstate,complementsthestate'sabilitiesandproducesthefertilesoilnecessaryforsocialandeconomicdevelopment.

Althoughtheexactdefinitionofsocialcapitalandtheapproachestakentomeasureitvariedslightlyamongthecasestudies,theparadigmsofsocialcapitalemployedinthefourcountriesstemmedfromthekeyconceptsdescribedabove,mainlythoserelatedtointegrationandlinkages.TheapproachusedinGuatemalaandSomaliadifferedsomewhatfromthoseemployedinCambodiaandRwanda,eachofwhichalsotookaslightlydifferentapproachtowarddefiningandmeasuringsocialcapital.Table1describesthedefinitionsofsocialcapitalemployed,andTable2liststheindicatorsusedbyeachstudy.

ViolentConflictandItsInterfacewithSocialCapitalandSocialCohesion

Tobetterunderstandtheemergenceofviolentconflict,therelationshipbetweensocialcapitalandthecohesivenessofasocietyexpressedintheconstructofsocialcohesion,orthenexusofverticalandhorizontalsocialcapitalandthebalanceofbondingandbridgingsocialcapitalneedstobeexamined.AsBerkmanandKawachi(2000)note,"Socialcapitalformsasubsetofthenotionofsocialcohesion.Socialcohesionreferstotwobroaderintertwinedfeaturesofsociety:(1)theabsenceoflatentconflictwhetherintheformofincome/wealthinequality,racial/ethnictensions,disparitiesinpoliticalparticipation,orotherformsofpolarizationand(2)the

presenceofstrongsocialbondsmeasuredbylevelsoftrustandnormsofreciprocity,theabundanceofassociationsthatbridgesocialdivisions(civicsociety),andthepresenceofinstitutionsofconflictmanagement,e.g.,responsivedemocracy,anindependentjudiciary,andanindependentmedia"(175).

Socialcohesionisthekeyinterveningvariablebetweensocialcapitalandviolentconflict.Thegreaterthedegreetowhichverticallinkingandhorizontalbridgingsocialcapitalintegrate,themorelikelyitisthatthesocietywillbecohesiveandwillthuspossesstheinclusivemechanismsnecessaryformediatingormanagingconflictbeforeitturnsviolent(seeFigure1).Theweakerthesocialcohesion,theweakerwillbethereinforcingchannelsofsocialization(valueformation)andsocialcontrol(compliancemechanisms).Weaksocialcohesionincreasestheriskofsocialdisorganization,fragmentation,andexclusionandthepotentialforviolentconflict.Buildingcommunityorsocialcapacityisakeydevelopmenttaskforstrengtheningoverallsocialcohesionandtheabilitytomanageandpreventconflict(seeSen1999).

TheworkofJohanGaltung(1996)capturestheintersectionofverticalandhorizontalsocialcapitalbydescribingthestructureofviolenceasconsistingofthreebasicsocialandeconomicphenomena:exclusion,inequality,andindignity.Inmanydevelopingcountries,unequalpatternsofdevelopment,intermsofinvestmentaswellasaccesstoitsopportunitiesorfruits,havebeenamajorsourceofsocietalcleavage.Theprocessofglobalizationintegratesmarketsandvalues,thusfacilitatinggrowth,yetitisalsoasourceofincreasingexclusionandmarginalization,wideningthegapbetweenrichandpoorwithinandamongsocieties,andexacerbatingtheconditionsthatcangiverisetoviolentconflict.Theconsequentexclusionandinequalityhavebeencompoundedbythestruggleforidentityinarapidlychangingworld:traditionalvalues,roles,andinstitutionsareconstantlyunderassaultasaresultofthecommunicationsrevolutionandthepenetrationofmarketsandraisingofexpectationsineventheremotestpartsoftheglobe.Theimpactofmarketpenetrationhasbeenintensifiedbytheweakeningofthestateinthefaceofdwindlingresources,endemiccorruption,andtheriseofcivilsociety,whichcan

complementthestate'srolebutcanalsocompetewithitforlegitimacy.Asaconsequence,warsareincreasinglyfoughtovercontrolofresourcesandpowerbysocialgroupswithinstatesratherthanbystatesthemselves.

Conflictresultingfromexclusion,inequality,andindignitydoesnotinitselfnecessarilyleadtotheeruptionofwidespread

Figure1Socialcohesion:theintegrationofverticallinkingandhorizontalbridgingsocialcapital

hostilities.Thetoleranceandcopingcapacitiesofthepoorandmarginalizedarelegendandmanifold.Conflictdoesoftenengenderlarge-scaleviolenceifvariousstructuralconditionsarepresent,suchasauthoritarianruleandalackofpoliticalrights(asinRwandaandGuatemala),stateweaknessandlackofinstitutionalcapacitytomanageconflict(asinSomalia),andsocioeconomicimbalancescombinedwithinequityofopportunityandaweekcivilsociety(asseeninCambodia).Theriskofanoutbreakofviolentconflictincreaseswhentheseconditionsexistconcurrentlyorareexacerbatedbyotherproblems,suchasthemanipulationofethnicorotherdifferences(inreligion,culture,andlanguage),whichcanfurtherfragmentsocietyandintensifytheconflict(CarnegieCommissiononPreventingDeadlyConflict1997;Nathan1998;Reno1998;CollierandHoeffler1999;BerdalandMalone2000).

Socialcapitalcanbereadilypervertedtounderminesocialcohesionandfragmentsocietyforindividualandgroupgain,andthismanipulationhasthepotentialtoleadtoviolentconflict.InCambodia,theAngka(KhmerRougeleaders)employedinclusionarysocialcapitaltostrengthenthegroup'sownresolveandweakenthoseoutsidethegroup.TheRwandacaseillustratesthatpoliticalandeconomicelitesoftenuseidentitytomobilizeandpervertextantsocialcapitalasareadymeansofachievingtheirownends.TheGuatemalastudyrevealsthatgroupsandindividualssuffernumerousindignitiesatthehandsofoppressive,authoritarianregimesandagreed-drivenelitethatsetsonegroup,beitreligious,ethnic,orage-bounded,againstanotherinpursuitofassetsandpower.StrongbondingsocialcapitalwithinSomaliafortifiesclanallegiances,pittingclanagainstclanandimpedingmovestowardpeaceandreconciliation.

Withinthiscomplexmatrixoffactorsunderpinningviolentconflict,twomainfeaturesofsocialcapitalbecomeincreasinglyrelevantaspotentialkindlingforthefireofhostility.Verticalrelationsplaguedby

inequalityandanunequaldistributionofpowerandopportunity(oftenaccompaniedbyexclusionandindignity)caninstigateviolentconflict.Theabsenceofhorizontalrelationsofcross-cuttingtiesbetweenunlikegroupsina

multiculturalsocietycaneruptintohostilitiesifonegroupisseenasmonopolizingresourcesandpowertothedisadvantageoftheothers.Andif,withinthesegroups,highlevelsofbondingsocialcapitallinkonlylikemembers,differencesinaccesstoresourcesandpowermayfurtheraggravaterelationsandheightentensionsbetweenthoseincontrolandthoseexcluded.Thus,violentconflictistriggeredbythepresenceofstrongexclusionarybondsanddisempowermentcombinedwithalackofhorizontalbridgingandverticallinkingsocialcapital.

Theabovepreceptsdeepenourunderstandingoftherootcausesofconflictandillustratehowvariousformsofsocialcapital,socialcohesion,andviolentconflictinterfacewithseveralconditioningfactors,suchasinequality,indignity,exclusion,andpoorgovernance.Althoughthecommunitystudiesineachcountrytouchedonissuesrelatingtheabovefactorstoviolentconflict,theactualindicatorsusedtoassessviolentconflicttendedtocorrespondtoviolentconflictasmanifestedinsocial,economic,environmental,andpoliticalconditions.Suchindicatorsasnumberofpeoplekilled,lossofaccesstomarkets,damagetobiodiversity,anddisregardforpeaceaccordswereused(directlyorasproxies)toassessviolentconflictratherthanconflictperse,whichmayincludeintrahouseholdcontentionsorcommondisputesoverpropertyorlegalmatters.

Inalleightcommunitiesstudied,violentconflictwasviewedasbothanindependentandadependentvariable(acauseandaneffect)initsrelationshiptosocialcapital.Thatis,socialcapitalcanbeconstructiveandsupportsocialcohesionandthemitigationofconflict,butitcanalsobepervertedtohastensocialfragmentationandtheonsetofviolentconflict.

PARTIITHENEXUSBETWEENVIOLENTCONFLICT,SOCIALCAPITAL,ANDSOCIALCOHESION

2Cambodia:StateAbsolutism,Alienation,andSocialCapitalTheaimoftheCambodianstudywastoassesshow20yearsofviolentconflict,whichvariedinintensityandmode,interactedwithextantsocialcapital.Throughouteachphaseoftheconflict,thestatetargetedcommunitiesandindividuals,virtuallywagingwaragainstitsownconstituentswhileconcurrentlydestroyingthesocialfoundationsthattraditionallyserveasthegirdersforstatebuildingandcohesion.Tocompoundmatters,encroachingglobalization,hastenedbypostwarinterventionsforreconstructionandrehabilitation,hashaditsowneffectonsocialcapitalandhascontributedtotransformingtheCambodiansocialfabric.

StudyMethodology

TheCambodianstudy,conductedbySocialServicesofCambodia(SSC),includedaliteraturereviewandsixmonthsoffieldwork.Fieldresearchstaffconsistedofaninternationalresearchdirectorandfivelocalfieldstaff(threemenandtwowomen).BecauseofthepaucityofexperiencedresearchersinCambodia,fieldstaffreceivedextensivetraininginresearchmethodsandskills.Fieldresearchincorporatedinformationfromover12weeksofvillagestaysandparticipantobservation.Duringthefieldworkperiod,variousresearchtechniqueswereemployed,such

asparticipatorygroupexercises(villagemapping,resourceflowanalysis,wealthranking,andtrendsanalysis)andsemistructuredinterviewswithindividualsandgroups.Thisapproachtofieldresearchallowedgoodrelationshipstodevelopbetweenstaffandvillagers,greatlycontributingtothequantityandqualityoftheinformationobtained.

TheSSCworksinover300differentvillagesintheKompongSpeuprovinceofCambodia,andfromthesevillages12wererandomlychosenaspotentialstudysites.Comparisonsofthevillagesaccordingtovariousconflictindicatorsshowedthatallhadbeenaffectedbytheconflict.Thetwovillagesultimatelychosen,PrasathandPreyKoh,werethesamesize(populationsof651and654,respectively)buthaddifferentexperiencesofconflict.Prasath,thecontrolvillage,experienceddisplacementonlyonce,whereasPreyKohvillagersweredisplacedtwice,anditseemedthatmorepeoplehadbeenkilledtherethaninthecontrolvillage.PrasathappearedtobeaslightlypoorervillagethanPreyKoh,addinganotherdimensionofanalysis.

Inadditiontovillagestaysandparticipantobservation,twohouseholdsurveyswereimplemented,onetoestablishbaselinesocioeconomicinformationandasecondtoexploresocialcapitalissues.Thebaselinesurveyexamineddemographicdetails,landholdings,householdoccupations,andeachhouseholdmember'splaceofresidencebeforeandduringtheconflictperiod.Thesurveywasimplementedinallhouseholdsineachvillage130householdsinPrasathand114inPreyKoh.Personsunderage15makeupabout4344percentofthepopulationineachvillage;about33percentofthevillagepopulationsisbetweentheagesof15and35,andabout2324percentisover35.MostvillagersinbothPrasathandPreyKohwerebornintheirrespectivevillages.Onlyaverysmallpercentageofthepopulationofeithervillagecouldrememberdetailsoflifeduringthepreconflictperiod.

Thesurveytargetingsocialcapitalissueswasimplementedinabout30percentofallhouseholds(39randomlyselectedhouseholdsinPrasathand34inPreyKoh).Thefollowingbehavioralaspectsofsocialcapitalinthepreconflict,conflict,andpostconflictperiodswereexamined:

Problemsinimprovinglivelihoodandeconomicactivities

Sourcesofinformationonlivelihoodandeconomicactivities

Borrowingandlendingpractices

Ownershipofandlendingpracticesforlivestock,householdequipment,andtools

Laborexchange

Participationingroupsandassociations

Availabilityanduseofservices

Sourcesofassistanceduringcrises

Participationinactivitiesforthecommongood

Welfareofvulnerableindividualsandfamilies.

TheviolentconflictindicatorsusedintheCambodianstudyassessedtheimpact,intensity,anddurationoftheconflict(seeBox1).Cambodia'sexperiencewithviolentconflictwasmanifold,asevidencedbythefactthatCambodianinterviewees

Box1Indicatorsofviolentconflict:Cambodia

Effectsonthepopulation

NumberofpeoplekilledNumberofpeoplephysicallydisabledasaresultofconflictNumberofpeoplementallyaffectedTheextenttowhichviolenceisawayoflifeandisusedtosolveproblemsNumberoffamilymembersenrolledin

thearmyNumberofpeoplewholeftthevillageduringfightingChangesincompositionandsizeofthepopulation

Physicaldamage

Extenttowhichinfrastructure(includinghouses,wells,roads,trees,andtemples)wasdestroyedPhysicaltracesofwar(damagedbuildings,craters,andsoon)AreaoflandinfestedwithminesNumberoftimesvillagewasrelocatedordispersed

NatureoftheconflictDurationoffightinginthevillageTypesofgroupperpetratingtheconflict

discerneddifferentconflicteras.Theperiodofconflictasdefinedforthestudycomprisedthreeseparateeras,distinguishedbychangesinleadership:LonNol,197075;KhmerRouge,197579;andHengSamrin,197989.

StructuralandCognitiveSocialCapital

ThedefinitionofsocialcapitalusedintheCambodiastudywasbasedprimarilyontheworkofColeman,Putnam,andUphoff.Horizontalandverticalaspectsofsocialcapitalwerestudied,usingamodifiedparadigmderivedfromUphoff'swork.Thus,structuralaspectsofsocialcapitalwereemphasized,althoughinferencestounderlyingcognitivesocialcapitalwerewovenintotheanalysiswhenpossible.

Socialcapitalwasmeasuredwithinthestudycontextbyexamininglevelsoftrust,asevidencedbymeasurestosecurelivelihoodandtoengageinexchange(economic,informational,andsoon),andofsocialcohesion,asindicatedbycollectiveactionandtheprovisionofsocialservicesandwelfare.Socialcapitalwasbrokendownintovariousstructuralcomponents:

Communityevents

Informalnetworks

Associations

Villageleadership

Linkswithexternalagencies.

Aseachstructuralcomponentwasexamined,attemptsweremadetoidentifythecognitivesocialcapitalthatbuttressedthesestructuralforms.

Communityeventsareactivitiesthatincreasefeelingsofsolidarity,strengthensocialcohesion,improvecommunication,providea

learninggroundforcoordinatedactivities,promotecivic-mindednessandaltruisticbehavior,and,throughsharedexperiences,helpformasenseofcollectiveconsciousness.Weddings,funerals,andpagodaactivitiesareclassifiedascommunityevents.

Informalnetworksaremanifestedininnumerableinformalexchangesofinformationandresourceswithincommunities.Theexchangesareforthemostpartspontaneousandunregulatedandaretheoutcomeofindividualinitiativeandentrepreneur-

ship.Theyarethoughttobeshapedbyvariousfactorswithinthecommunalenvironment,predominantlymarketforces,kinship,andaffinity(naturalbondsthatexistbetweenindividualswholiveclosetogetherorhavesharedinterestsandconcerns).Rice-,water-,andplate-sharinggroupsareallexamplesofinformalnetworks.Onthepositiveside,informalnetworksrepresenteffortsatcooperation,coordination,andmutualassistanceandhelpmaximizetheutilizationofavailableresources.Theyarehighlyvaluableinprovidingindividualswithsupportmechanismsineconomicandsocialendeavors.Thesesameinformalnetworks,however,canbebasedonexploitativerelationshipsinwhichgainsareunevenlydistributed.Informalnetworkscanrunhorizontallyorvertically.

Associationsunitepeople,frequentlyfromdifferingkingroups,whoworktogetherforacommonpurposeandhaveavisibleidentity.Forthemostpart,thesegroupshaveclearlydelineatedstructures,roles,andruleswithinwhichgroupmembersoperate.Associationsnurtureeffortstowardself-help,mutualhelp,solidarity,andcooperation.Theyareregardedasthebuildingblocksofcivilsocietyandareusuallyhorizontal.Themainexampleofanassociationillustratedbythestudywasprovasdei,exchangegroupsthattradegoodsandlabor.

Villageleadershipincludesofficial,traditional,andinformalleaders.Officialleadersincludethecommunalchiefandthelocalgovernmentadministration.Traditionalleadersareusuallypeoplewhoarereveredfortheirreligiousorspiritualattributes(achars)orfortheirage,experience,andknowledge.Informalleaderswieldinfluencebecauseoftheirwealth,specialskills,orcharisma.Officialandtraditionalleadersplaykeyrolesinthepolitical,social,religious,andwelfareactivitiesofthevillagewhileshapingnetworkswithinthecommunityandbetweenthecommunityandtheoutsideworld.

Inthisstudy,verticalsocialcapitalincludestherelationsand

interactionsbetweenacommunityanditsleadersandextendstowiderrelationsbetweenthevillage,thegovernment,andthemarketplace.Thenatureandqualityofleadershipinthecommunitydeterminethelevelandqualityofdevelopmentinthevillage.Toalesserdegree,unequalexchangesinresourcesor

informationestablishpatron-clientrelationships,addinganotherverticaldimensiontovillagedynamics.

Virtuallyallexternallinkswiththevillagesareconsideredvertical.Externalcommunitylinksincluderelationswiththegovernment,nongovernmentalorganizations(NGOs),andtheprivatesectorormarketplace.

State-SponsoredWarfareandCitizenVictimization

ThirtyyearsofwarfareallbutdestroyedmostformsofsocialcapitalinCambodia,yetthethreadsofviolencepredatetherecentconflictsandarewovendeepinthecountry'spast.SincethefallofthekingdomofAngkor,politicaldisruptionandsuccessiveconflictshaveplaguedCambodia.RelativestabilitywasnotachieveduntiltheimpositionofFrenchrule,whichbeganinthe1850sandendedwiththecountry'sindependencein1954asanewconstitutionalmonarchy.ThekingdomofCambodia,ledbyPremierPrinceNorodomSihanouk,experiencedpoliticalstabilityandeconomicgrowthastheprincepushedforadvancesinhealth,education,andindustry.Towardtheendofthe1960s,however,thecountrybegantodestabilizeasaresultofeconomicdifficulties,corruption,andtheincreasingthreatofcommunism,andsupportforSihanoukdeclined(Becker1998).

Inacoupd'étatin1970,GeneralLonNoloverthrewPrinceSihanouk,whofledtoChina,wherehepubliclyformedanalliancewiththecommunistKhmerRouge.LonNolsoldiersterrorizedthecountryside,splittinganddestroyingvillageswithincombatzones.Concurrently,regionalissuescompoundedtheturbulence;theU.S.-VietnamwarspilledoverintoCambodia,andagrowingcontingentofcommunistscontinuallyclashedwithLonNolgovernmentsoldiers.DuringtheLonNolperiod,AmericanplanesrepeatedlybombedCambodianterritoryinanattempttooustVietnamesecommunists

supposedlyinthearea.Thiscampaignkilledthousandsofinnocentcitizens,destroyednumerousvillages,andrenderedmuchofthelandunusablebecauseofunexplodedordnance,chemicaldefoliation,andlandmines(Ebihara,Morland,andLedgerwood1994;Nee1995).

LonNolwassubsequentlyoustedbytheKhmerRouge,whichinApril1975formedDemocraticKampuchea.Underthe

guiseofcommunism,theAngka(''TheOrganization,"thesecretivegroupofKhmerRougeleaders),headedby"BrotherNumberOne,"PolPot,initiatedaradicalagrarianrevolution.ThisbreakwiththepastmarkedYearZero,whenmanyaspectsofCambodianlifewerefigurativelyandliterallywipedclean.Peoplewereledfromtheirhomesinthecitiesintothecountryside,wheretheyandtheirruralcounterpartswereorganizedintoworkbrigadesandmadetoprovideforcedlabor.Entirevillagesweredissolvedandrelocated;familieslosttheirhomesandpossessionsandwereoftenseparatedandassignedtodifferentcamps.PeoplewhohadlivedinthecitiesandhadbeenaffiliatedwiththeLonNolgovernmentormilitarywereclassifiedas"new"people,asweretheirfamilies.The"new"peopleweretreatedmuchmoreseverelythanthe"old"peopleruralpeasantsandthosewhohadfallenundertheKhmerRougeearlier.Fragmentationbetween"old"and"new"splitnotonlyneighboringcommunitiesbutalsovillagesand,attimes,families,breakingbothprimarybondsofkinshipandsecondarybridgesofassociation.Thepreferentialtreatmentgiventothe"old"peoplecreatedmuchresentment,althoughbothgroupsgenerallylivedunderunbearableconditionsoverworked,underfed,andterrorizedonadailybasis.Meanwhile,oppositiontotheKhmerRougewasforbidden;dissidentsweretorturedorputtodeath.ThefouryearsoftotalitarianKhmerRougeruleresultedinthegenocideofroughly2millionCambodians,whodiedfrompoliticalkillings,overwork,starvation,anddisease(Bit1991;Nee1995;vandePut1997).Anyremnantofverticalsocialcapitalbetweenthestateandcivilsocietywasshatteredinthewakeofaperverseaccumulationanduseofsocialcapitalformedbyselectcommunistintellectualsandavanguardofunemployed,uneducatedyouth,pittedagainsttheurbaneducated,professional,andbusinesssegmentsofsocietyandtheoldertraditionalpeasantry.

VietnamesetroopsovercametheKhmerRougeandformedthe

People'sRepublicofKampucheainJanuary1979.ThenewVietnamese-influencedgovernment,whichwasseenasacontinuationofexternaldominationoverCambodiansandoftheregionalgeopoliticsoftheU.S.-Vietnamwar,continuedtofighttheKhmerRougethroughoutthenextdecade,perpetuatinginstabilitythroughoutthecountry.Despitethisinsecurity,during

the10yearsofVietnameserule(theHengSamrinperiod),recoverygraduallybeganasconflictandinsecuritywaned.Progressremainedslow,however,andwasfurtherhamperedbynoncommunistgovernmentsworldwidethatwerewaryoftheVietnameseoccupiersandkeptCambodiainrelativeisolation(Chandler1992;Nee1995).

WiththeVietnamesewithdrawalin1989,thecountrywasrenamedCambodia.PrinceSihanoukreturned,after13yearsofself-imposedexile.AtransitionalgovernmentwasestablisheduntiltheParisAgreementsinOctober1991thattemporarilyformalizedthegovernmentstructure.TheUnitedNationsTransitionalAuthorityinCambodia(UNTAC)oversawthepeaceprocess,reconstruction,andrehabilitation,withmixedresults(Ebihara,Morland,andLedgerwood1994).Electionswerefinallyheldin1993,institutinganewcoalitiongovernmentheadedbyPrinceNorodomRanarridh,withHunSenascopremier.In1997anattemptedcoupdisruptedthedualgovernment,leadingtoastrengtheningofHunSen'scontrol.TheJuly1998electionsleftHunSenincommandoftherecoveringstate.

SocialCapital,SocialCohesion,andtheLegaciesofViolentConflict

DuringtheLonNolregime,traditionalsourcesofsocialcapitalwereseverelyerodedthroughoutCambodia.(SeeBox2foranexampleoftheinterrelationsofcultureandsocialcapitalintraditionalCambodiansociety.)Manyvillageswereforcedtorelocateorweresplitasaresultofwarfare,bombings,andLonNolrecruitment.Withinvillages,exchangeslowed,andsolidarityaroundthetempledissolved.Somefamiliesdidmanagetostayintactdespitemassivedislocation(Nee1995).

TheKhmerRougeusheredinanothereraoforganizedviolencethatincludedsystematicattacksontraditionalCambodiansocietyonnorms,culture,religion,organizations,networks,andeventhefamily.

Communityandfamilymemberswereencouragedtospyonandreportoneachother,destroyingtrustandplantingtheseedsofdeeplyrootedfear.Awaragainstclassdistinctionswaswaged,asattemptstoleveleconomicstatuswere

Box2Buddhism,Cambodianculture,andsocialcapital

Forthemostpart,Khmervillagelifehaslackedtraditional,indigenousgroupsandnetworksexceptthosebasedonkinshipororganizedaroundthepagoda(Ebihara,Morland,andLedgerwood1994;Cambodia1999).ThenatureofBuddhismandtraditionalCambodianculturalpracticescontributedtothedearthofintercommunitysocialcapitalandtosomeextentfacilitatedtheemergenceofthebrutalLonNolandPolPotregimes.

Buddhismstressesindividualbehaviorasthemeanstopersonalsalvationanddoesnotfosterastrongsenseofcollectivesocialresponsibility.Itdoes,however,linkCambodiansbycreatingastrongsenseofnationalidentityandbyservingasoneofthebasicinstitutionsofsociety.InmanyruralareasofCambodia,thepagoda(wat,ortemple)isaprominentfeatureofcommunityorganizationandistheonlybondingelementofsociallifeoutsidethefamily.Yetregularcontactswiththepagoda,inthepastastoday,didnotnecessarilybuildnetworksofsolidarity.SocialcapitalinCambodiahasbeenessentiallycenteredonprimarylinkswithinthenuclearandextendedfamilies.

ThestrongpresenceofthestateandtherigidityoftheCambodianpoliticalsystemhavealsoinfluencedthedevelopmentofsocialcapital.Roughly80percentofCambodiansarefarmersandliveinruralareas.AccordingtoBuddhistbeliefsandCambodiantraditions,their"lowstatus"istheresultofthemeritsoftheirpastlives.Thissituationisunlikelytochange,forthesameexplanationholdsforthepositionoftherichandpowerful.Thesebeliefsreinforcedthepoliticalstatusquoandtosomeextenthelpedjustifysocialinequalityandinjustice.Politicswasthedomainofroyalty,notfarmers.Ifrulersabusedtheirpower,theyweredestinedtosufferinthenextlifeitwasnotuptothepeopletotakecorrectiveaction.Consequently,peopletendedtofollowrulerswithoutquestion,trustedinthemwholeheartedly,andconsideredthemalmostdivine.ThisisonereasonwhymanyplacedtrustinLonNolsoonafterhetookpower,despitethemeansheusedtoachieveleadership,andwhysomanywerewillingtofollowtheKhmerRougesoldiersintothecountrysidewithoutmuchresistance(Chandler1992).

institutedbymakingeveryoneanunpaidagriculturallaborer.Bydestroyingallsocial,political,andeconomicinstitutionsinthisextremecommunisticexperiment,thebrutalKhmerRougeregimetransformedanddepletedwhatlittlesocialcapitalhadremainedfromtheLonNolperiod(Bit1991;Nee1995).

Afteradecadeofdestruction,formsofsocialcapitalgraduallybegantoreemergeduringtheHengSamrinperiod.ThisoccurreddespitetheturmoilthatcontinuedtofesteruntiltheendofVietnameserule,markedbyskirmishesbetweentheguerrillasandinvadingtroops,internalmigration,andadisruptionofagriculturethatresultedinwidespreadfamine.TheKhmerRougehadusedcollectivizationasastrategyfortransformingtheeconomyandhadbrokenupfamiliestoworkincooperatives.VietnameseeffortstorebuildCambodiaintheearly1980ssimilarlyfocusedoncollectivistcooperatives,suchasthesolidaritygroupkromSamaki,whichforbadeprivateownershipandencourageddevelopmentthroughcommunalefforts.AlthoughsomeprogressandrecoveryoccurredundertheHengSamringovernment,whenitdidend,Cambodianswelcomedthechange.

ConflictaffectedsocialcapitalinCambodiainmanyways.Someofthesewere:

Thelossofhumanlife

Thedestructionofphysicalinfrastructure,bothpublicandprivate

Thedisruptionofservices

Increasedantagonismanddistrusttowardthestate

Massivechangesintheeconomy,includingchangesinownershipofproperty

Populationdisplacement(increasedmobility)

Thebreakdownofsocialinstitutionssuchasthefamilyandreligion

Poorsecurity;breakdownoflawandorder

Extremephysicalhardshipandpsychologicaltrauma.

Postconflictformsofstructuralsocialcapitalanditscompositiondonotdiffergreatlyfromthosethatexistedbeforethewars.Inbothofthevillagesstudied,communityevents,particularlypagodaactivitiesandreligiousceremonies,mirrorpracticesoftheperiodbeforetheconflict.Norarethereprominentdifferencesinhowvillagemeetingsareheld.

Informalnetworkscontinuetobeorganizedbykinshipandaffinity,justasbeforethefightingerupted,buttheyareincreasinglybeginningtobeshapedbymarketforces.Nonfarmactivities,particularlysmallbusinessandtrade,arepromotingnewnetworksthatgobeyondthecircleofrelativesandfriends.Thesehaveincreasedtheneedformobilityandinformation,puttingpeopleintouchwiththeworldoutsidetheirvillages.Networksformallybasedontheconceptofmutualaidaregivingwaytonewnetworksbasedonrigidreciprocityandtheneedtoearncashincome,asisevidentinthedecreaseofprovasdei.Thus,informalnetworksarenotdissolvingasaresultoftheravagesofviolentconflictbutarechangingincompositioninresponsetothepowerandpermeatinginfluenceofexternalmarketforces.

Associationssponsoredbythegovernmentorinitiatedbyvillageleadersandthepagodashownovisiblechangesfromthepreconflictperiod,nordolocalassociationalinitiativessuchasricebanks,funeralassociations,andwater-users'groups.Ofthetwostudyvillages,PreyKohexhibitsmoreassociationalactivitythandoesPrasath,primarilybecauseofitshigherlevelofeconomicactivityandenergy.PreyKohsufferedmorefromconflictthandiditscounterpart,yet,despitethedeeperschismbetween"old"and"new"peopleandtheconsequentmoreprominentthreatofthebreakdownoftrustamongvillagers,associationalactivityincreased.Thissuggeststhattheconflictdidnotnecessarilydiminishthewillingnessofpeopletoworktogether.

3

Thereislittledifferencebetweenthetype,roles,andnatureofpreconflictandpresentvillageleadership(includingtraditional,informal,andofficialleaders).Ingeneral,theroleofvillageleadersinPreyKohismorevisiblethaninPrasath,primarilybecausePreyKoh

hasmoreresourcesandbetterlinkswiththeoutsideworld,givingleadersmoreresponsibilities.Prasath,withitssmallresourcebase,haspoorlinkswiththeoutsideworld,andvillageleaders,preoccupiedwithproblemswithintheirownhouseholds,arelessactive.Pagodaactivitiesaremoreorlessatthesamelevelinbothvillages,andeldersandacharsappeartobeequallyactiveinboth.

Variousfactorsseemedtosupporttherevivalofsocialcapital,including:

Resilienceaninnerstrengththatallowspeopletocontinuetocopeandtorebuildtheirlives

Astrongdrivetowardself-help

ThepowerfulroleplayedbythepagodaandBuddhisttraditionsinshapingtheidentityofpeople,andtheneedtoreestablishthisidentity

Theneedtorestorebasicvillageinfrastructurethathadbeendestroyed

Theknowledgethatthegovernmentwouldnotbeabletoprovidewhatwasneeded.

Itshouldbenotedthatsomeoftherevivalandrestorationtookplacewithintheconflictperiod(underHengSamrinrule)andhascontinuedsincetheninthevillages.

Inthepreconflictperiod,noagenciesotherthanthegovernmentoperatedinthetwovillages.Government-providedservicesandresourceswereverybasicbutmayhavebeenofbetterqualitybeforetheconflictthantheyarenow,particularlyineducationandhealth.Inbothcommunities,statepenetrationisstillweak,andthesubstitutionaleffectsofemergingcivilsocieties,particularlyintheprovisionofbasicservices,areonlybeginningtoemerge.NGOinvolvementinvillagedevelopmentandinprovidingservicesisarelativelynewphenomenonthatbeganintheHengSamrinperiod.TheconflictinCambodiahasresultedinahighlyvisibleandactiveroleforNGOs,particularlyinternationalbodies,althoughinthestudyvillagestheirrolehasbeenintermittent.Amorerecentphenomenonhasbeentheincreasinginvolvementofthebusinesscommunity,especiallyinPreyKoh.Businessesthereareclearlydrivenbytheprofitmotiveandarehighlyexploitativeoftheenvironmentandvillagers.Atpresent,thedevelopmentoflinkswithexternalagenciesinbothvillageslargelydependsoninitiativesfromoutside.

Thesurveyresultsrevealedmixedfindingsabouttherelationsbetweensocialcapitalandviolentconflict(seeTable3).Primary-grouprelationsofafamilialnatureenduredduringconflict(exceptduringKhmerRougerule),servingasadefensiveformofsocialcapitalandprovidinganindigenous,survival-orientedsafetynet.Incontrast,secondary-groupassociationslinkagestomarketpenetrationandoutward-looking,"offensive"forms

Table3Interactionsbetweenviolentconflictandsocialcapital:CambodiaHigh-conflictperiod Low-conflictperiod

Highsocialcapital

Strengthofverticalsocialcapital:ManyvillagersjoinedtheLonNolarmyinthebeliefthatitrepresentedthenextgovernment,thusproactivelyshowingallegiancetotheprobablenewrule.

CambodiansputuplittleresistanceagainsttheKhmerRougewhenbeingledintothecountryside.

BondingsocialcapitalwithintheKhmerRougeandtheAngkaallowedthosegroupstoflourishandmaintaincontrol.

Forthemostpart,conflictdidnotchangethestructureofsocialcapitalinPrasathorPreyKohbutsuppressedit.Moststructuralcomponentshaveremainedthesame:Communityeventssuchasweddings,funerals,andpagodaactivitiesInformalnetworkssuchaswater-andrice-sharinggroupsAssociations,includingexchangegroupssuchasprovasdei,whichtradegoodsandlaborVillageleadership:religious,traditional,andofficialExternallinks:governmentand,sincethewar,NGOsandbusinesses.

TherehasbeenmoreassociationalactivityinPreyKohthaninPrasath,duetohigherlevelsofeconomicactivity.Thus,conflictdoesnotseemtobeamajorfactorinthisevolution,sincePrasathwaslessaffectedbytheconflict.

Lowsocialcapital

TheLonNolregimedividedcommunitiesbysometimesforcingrecruitment.TheKhmerRougediditsbesttoeliminateallformsoftradition,religion,norms,family,andorganization.AllstructuresofCambodianlifewereattacked.Villagerswerepittedagainsteachotherand

Informalnetworksareshapedmorebymarketforcesthanbykinshipandaffinity.Oldnetworksbasedonmutualhelparebeingreplacedbynewonesbasedonrigidreciprocityandtheneedtoearncashincome.Nonfarmactivitiesarepromotingnewnetworksthatgobeyondthe

familiesweresplitasthestatewagedwaragainstitspeople.

extendedfamilyandfriends.

Thechangesfromintegrativetiesamongprimarygroups(familialrelations)tolinkagesthataremorenetwork-oriented(associationalrelations)areperceivedbyvillagersasadiminutionofsocialcapital(definedmoreaskinbonds)withinthevillageandasaresultofincreasedmarketpenetration.

ofsocialcapitalthataremoredevelopmentalthanprotectiveinnaturewerestuntedduringwarfare.

Astheconflictwaned,integrativeprimary-grouprelationsweresupplantedbysecondary-grouplinkages,whichincreasedinintensityandnumber.DespitePreyKoh'sgreaterexposuretoconflict,itsproximitytomarket-penetratingforcestransformedandstrengthenedcertaindimensionsofsocialcapitalinthepostconflictperiod,mainlythemoredevelopment-orienteddimensions.Prasath,stillisolated,ismarginalizedfrommarketpenetration,andsocialcapitalhasremainedencapsulatedinaninward-lookingsetofkin-orientedsocialrelations.TheresearchteampositedthatPreyKoh,whichisclosertothehighway,haseasieraccesstomarketactivities.Bycontrast,PrasathislocatednearthehillsanduntilrecentlyhasbeenplaguedbysporadicviolencefromKhmerRougeattacks.Theimplicationisthatalthoughviolentconflictoftenshapessocialcapitalinfavorofprimarybondingrelationsandaninward-lookingorientationtowardsurvivalintheshort-termemergencyperiod,postconflictmarketpenetrationmayeasilyreversethispatternandleadtomoreoutward-looking,associationalsocialcapitalinthemedium-tolonger-termtransitiontopeace.

TheCambodiacaseillustratestheebbandflowofhorizontalsocialcapital,dependingontherelativepenetrationofthestateandmarketforcesasinstrumentsofverticalsocialcapital.Verticalcohesivenessinthepasthasbeenpromotedbythestateandhasdependedonthesymbolicleadershipoftheking.Thesucceedinglineofoppressive,sociallyfragmentingregimesoftenpervertedextantsocialcapital.Althoughbondsofkinshipremainstrong,bridgingsocialcapitalisnowonlyslowlyemergingandisdoingsoinlargepartinresponsetomarketforces.TheintegrationofstrongbridginghorizontalandintegratingverticalsocialcapitaltoshapeacohesivesocietyremainsachallengetoCambodiaontheroadtosustainablepeaceandeconomic

development.Clearly,thefuturemilestonesonthatroadincludethestrengtheningofcivilsociety,theopeningupofdialoguebetweenthestateandcivilsociety,andprogresstowardanincreasinglyfreepress,atransparentruleoflaw(perhapsthroughtheproposedwarcrimestribunal),thepromotionoflocalelections,andamoreinclusive,participatorydevelopmentprocess.

3Rwanda:Hate,Fear,andtheDecayofSocialRelationsAlthoughRwandaseemedtobecomeungluedinstantaneouslyinApril1994withtheeruptionofgenocide,theprogressiveweakeningofbridgingsocialrelationsbetweenTutsiandHutuandtheincreasingpenetrationofthestateintocommunalaffairshadbeengoingonfordecades.Inanattempttobetterunderstandtheconflictanditsinteractionswithsocialrelationsandnorms,theRwandacasestudyexaminedhowsocialcapitalinteractedwithconflictintermsbothoftheunravelingofsocialfabricandthestrengtheningofsocialdynamicsamongHututhatenabledthegenocide.AlthoughproblematicverticalandhorizontalrelationswithinRwandaledtothecivilwar,externalfactors,suchasinternationalinterventionsandchangesbroughtaboutbymodernization,alsoaffectedsocialcapitalstocks.

StudyMethodology

TheRwandanstudywasimplementedbylocalconsultantsandentailedbothfieldanddeskresearch.Thefirstphaseofthestudy,theliteraturereview,assessedpertinenthistoricalinformationandoutlinedtraditionalformsofRwandansocialcapital.Fieldresearchintheselectedcommunitieswasconductedbytwoteams,eachconsistingofonemanandonewoman,andincluded

athree-weekperiodofparticipantobservation,sixweeksofsurveyimplementation,andthreeweeksofinterviewswithassociations,focusgroups,andkeyinformantsinthetwocommunesselected.

ThecommuneschosenfortheevaluationwereGiti,thecontrolsite,whichexperiencedlowlevelsofviolenceanddidnotfeelthefullimpactofthegenocide,owingtoitsownuniqueleadershipandhistoryofcommunalcooperation,andShyanda,thevariablesite,whichexperiencedhighlevelsoforganizedkilling.Bothcommunesareofrelativelycomparablesize:Giti'spopulationis48,000,andShyanda'sis39,000.Theysharethesamelanguage,religion,andcultureandhavesimilarsocioeconomicstatusandmodesofsubsistence,althoughGitihasbeenandismarginallymoreprosperous.IntermarriagebetweenHutuandTutsiwasandremainscommoninbothareas.

AsinCambodia,surveyswereimplementedatthehouseholdlevel,targeting1.5percentofrandomlyselectedhouseholdsinthreesectorsofeachcommune.Eachhouseholdcontained,onaverage,fivepeople.InGiti,114surveyswereconductedandinShyanda,144.Focusgroupsof5to15participantswerelargelymadeupofwidows,orphans,politicians,intellectuals,associations,businesspeople,andmixedgroups.Keyinformantswerechosenfromthetargetgroups.Questionandissueguidesforbothgroupandindividualinterviewswerederivedfromtheinitialsurveyfindings.

Throughoutthestudy,difficultiesemergedbecauseofthesensitivityofthetopicandtherecentnessofthewar.UnlikeCambodia,wheremuchtimehadpassedsincethegenocideandfewpeoplewerestillaroundwhocouldprovideintimatedetails,theRwandangenocidewasfreshinpeoples'minds,andtheunsettlingpresenceofgénocidairesamongthevictimslentanauraoffearandintimidation.Theresearchteamsthereforemadeeffortstospendmoretimethan

originallyscheduledineachcommunetobuildrelations,trust,andacceptancewithresidents.Afterthefieldteamsstrengthenedtheirrelationswithcommunalmembers,discussionsbroadenedtoencompassdetailsoftherespondents'conflictexperiences.

SocialCohesion,Trust,andViolentConflict

TheoriginalgoaloftheRwandansocialcapitalstudywastoassesshowconflictdepletedsocialcapitalandhowsocialcapitalwasrestoredfollowingtheendofthewar.Aftertheinitialfindingsfromthefieldweresubmitted,however,itbecameevidentthatconflictdidnotnecessarilydepletestocksofsocialcapitalbutinsteadtransformedthemandthatnewformsofsocialcapitalemergedduringperiodsofconflict.Thestudywasthereforebroadenedtoencompassthesevarioustypesoftransformationsandsocialcapitaldynamics,whichwereexaminedbyassessingchangesinlevelsofsocialcohesionandtrust.

Socialcohesionwasmeasuredbythedensityandnatureoforganizationsandnetworks(bothverticalandhorizontal)andbymembers'senseofcommitmentandresponsibilitytothesegroups.Thepropensityforcooperationandexchange(material,labor,ritualistic,andinformational)servedasaproxyfortrust.Inaddition,thestudyattemptedtodevelopindicatorsandmeasuresofbothverticalandhorizontalsocialcapitalthatwerespecificallytailoredforwar-tornsocieties.IndicatorsformeasuringsocialcapitalwerebasedonsocialcapitalconceptsasdescribedbyPutnam,Coleman,andFukuyamaandwereadaptedtothespecificitiesofRwandansociety.Relatedmeasuresexaminedasproxiesforsocialcohesionandtrustincluded:

Channelsandmechanismsforexchangeofinformation

Existenceandnatureofassociationsandthereasonfortheircreation(whetherbasedonsharedinterestsoronprescribedcommonality,suchasfamilialrelations)

Intermarriageandextendedfamilyrelations

Intercommunityrelationsandmechanismsforconflictresolution

Availabilityandfunctioningofinfrastructure

Types,nature,andorganizationofexchangeandinterdependence

Natureandorganizationofassistance,mutualaid,andcooperation(includingsharingofbasicnecessitiessuchaswater,firewood,andsalt)

Socialprotectionandwelfare;collectiveresponsibility.

Toconfirmthatthesefactorswereconsideredrepresentativeofsocialcapitalnotonlybytheresearchersbutalsobythosebeinginterviewed,surveyquestionsandfocusgroupinterviewssoughttoelicitwhatsocialcapitalmeanttoeachparticipant.Throughoutsurveyimplementationandwitheachfocusgroup,itbecameclearthatparticipantsandresearchershadapproximatelythesamedefinitionofsocialcapital.Althougheachfocusgrouphaditsowninterpretation,thecombinedconceptscoveredalmostallfacetsofsocialcapitalasdefinedforthestudy.Participantsinbothcommunitiesviewedsocialcapitalasincludingmutualassistance,trust,solidarity,civicduty,collectiveaction,protectionofthevulnerable,peacefulcohabitation,andonalargerscale,ajustpoliticalsystemengenderedbythestate.

IndicatorsofviolentconflictinRwandaincludedsocial,economic,environmental,andpoliticalfactors(Box3).Changesinsocialcapitalasaresultofviolentconflictwereassessedovervaryingperiodsoftime(thatis,pre-andpostconflict).During

Box3Indicatorsofviolentconflict:Rwanda

Socialfactors

NumberofpeoplekilledNumberofcommunitiesandfamiliesdestroyedNumberofpeoplephysicallydisabledasaresultoffightingNumberofpeoplerelocated

Economicfactors

DestructionofeconomicinfrastructureLossofaccesstomarketsDamagetoresourcesnecessaryfor

production

Environmentalfactors

ExtenttowhichcropswerelostandfieldsweredestroyedDamagetobiodiversityAreaoflandlaidwasteduetomassmigrationAreaoflandinfestedwithmines

Politicalfactors

DisregardforpeaceaccordsDissolutionofgovernment

theassessment,theperiodofconflictwasdefinedsolelybytheinterviewees,whoequateditwiththegenocideofAprilJuly1994.Itshouldbenoted,however,thatviolenceandconflicthaveplaguedRwandafordecadesandthatthecivilwarofficiallybeganinOctober1990.Sincetheendofthegenocide,widespreadviolencehascontinued,withrevengekillingsandcivilwaralongRwanda'sbordersandwithintheDemocraticRepublicofCongo(DRC,theformerZaire).

TheAnatomyofaGenocide

The1994massacreskilledmorepeoplemorequicklythananyothermassslaughterinrecordedhistorysome800,000diedwithinathree-monthperiodatthehandsoftheirbrethren(Berkeley1998).Historically,however,ethnichatred,whichfueledthisarmederuption,didnotexistbetweenHutuandTutsi.Duringprecolonialtimes,thetwogroupscoexistedsymbiotically,withcomplementarymodesofsubsistence(nomadicpastoralismandsedentaryagriculture).Theywereneithersimilarnorequal.Distinctionsbetweenthegroupsstemmedfrommembershipindifferentclasses,notfromdissimilarethnicbackgrounds.BeinglabeledHutuorTutsisimplymeantbelongingtoalooselydefinedcategorybasedonoccupationorclass;whereastheHutuwerecultivators,theTutsiwerepastoralistsandgenerallybelongedtotherulingandwarriorclasses.Mostimportant,groupmembershipwasnotstatic(Newbury1988;Prunier1997).

RelationsbetweenHutuandTutsiworsenedundertheBelgiancolonialadministration.BysupportingminorityTutsirule,colonizationfurtherentrenchedsocioeconomicdisparitiesandsolidifiedthedividebetweenthegroupsalong''ethnic"(ratherthanclass)lines.

4Thearbitrarydistinctionsbetweenthegroupsweresharpenedby

colonialmythology,whichrelegatedtheHutucultivatorstoalowerstatusandcategorizedthepastoralTutsiasthesuperiorrulingclass.Acensustakenin1926forcedHutuandTutsitochoosetheir"ethnic"identity.Whathadoncebeenadynamicsystemofclassesbecameastaticsystembasedon"ethnicity,"whichlaterbecamea(much-abused)toolformanipu-

lationofthemassesbyaneliterulinggroup(Lemarchand1970;Newbury1988;Prunier1997).

Intheearlyandmid-1950s,thecolonialgovernment,underpressurefromtheCatholicChurch,gavetheHutugreateraccesstosocioeconomicandpoliticalsystems.TheincreasinglibertiesextendedtotheHutubecameacauseofconcerntotherulingTutsi,who,asaminority,fearedanuprisingbythemajority.Ethnicpoliticsintensifiedin1959,andthePartyfortheEmancipationoftheHutuPeople(Parmehutu)oustedtheTutsiregimewiththesupportofBelgianforces.SkirmishesbetweenHutuandTutsispreadthroughoutRwanda,killingthousandsandforcingamassiveTutsimigration.TheHutuelite,whichgainedpowerin1961andretaineditwhenthecountrybecameindependentin1962,begantofocusonmarginalizingtheTutsiminority.Traditionalsocialandpoliticalsystemssuchastheroleofeldersandthegacacaconflict-resolutionmechanismwerereplacedbythecentraladministrationasthestatepenetratedeverdeeperintothelivesofthecitizenry.PastoralTutsiculturaltraditionswereprogressivelybanned,andexclusively"Hutu"traditionsbecamemorecloselyidentifiedwithBanyarwandaculture,whichencompassedbothHutuandTutsiaspects(Lemarchand1970;Prunier1997).

SoonaftertheHutuextremiststookpower,TutsirebelgroupsbasedinBurundi,Tanzania,Uganda,andtheDRC(thencalledZaire)begantargetingHutuofficials.Tutsi-ledincursionsintoRwandainitiatedacycleofviolence,massacres,andTutsiflightintoneighboringcountries.Thistragicpatterncontinuedoverthenext30years.ThegovernmentbecameincreasinglyrepressiveagainstTutsi,violatingtheirrightsandinstitutionallyexcludingthemfromeducationalandemploymentopportunities.Sinkingcommodityprices,increasingdebt,andgovernmentcorruptionledPresidentJuvenalHabyarimana'sregimetodeflectattentionfromtheworseningeconomiccrisisby

fuelingtheflamesofethnichatred(Prunier1997).

TutsirebelforcesoftheRwandesePatrioticFront(RPF)invadednorthernRwandainOctober1990,sparkingincreasedinsecurityandkillingsinthearea.Inresponse,Rwandansecurityforcesdistributedarmstolocalcivilianofficials,andthenational

armywasexpandedtoroughly50,000men.ManyTutsibusinessmen,teachers,andpriestswerearrestedandwereaccused,onthebasisoftheirethnicity,ofcollaborationwiththerebelseveniftheyhadnoconnectionwiththem.TheRPFcontinueditsattackswithinRwanda'sbordersthroughout1991and1992,exacerbatinghatepoliticsandviolentrhetoricagainstTutsi.Atthesametime,PresidentHabyarimanatooksmallstepstowardliberalizingthepoliticalsystem,mainlyinanefforttomaintainhispower,andtherepressionagainsttheTutsilessenedsomewhat.Moredrasticstepstoretaincontrolwereimplementedinlate1992,whentheHabyarimanaregimebegantotrainHutuextremistmilitiagroupsknownastheInterahamweandtheImpuzamugambi,whileitparadoxicallypursuedpeacetalkswiththerebelforcesin1993andearly1994(Prunier1997;Uvin1998).

OnApril6,1994,PresidentHabyarimana'splanewasshotdownoverRwanda'scapital,Kigali.GovernmentforcesandmilitiaimmediatelybeganattackingTutsiandmoderateHutu.Withinthenextthreemonths,brutalkillingsofTutsieruptedthroughoutthecountry.AlthoughsomeHutuwillinglyparticipatedinthemassacres,otherswereorderedorforcedtokill.AcampaignofTutsielimination("clearingthecountryside")targetedindividuals,neighborhoods,and(byfocusingonuniversitiesandhospitals)professions.Roughly2millionrefugeeswereforcedtoleavethecountry,andaround1millionpeoplewereinternallydisplaced.Duringthegenocide,Rwandansocietycollapsedcompletely:businessandagriculturalactivitiesceased,skilledpeopleandtheintelligentsiawereslaughteredorfled,theinfrastructurewaspurposefullydestroyed,andgovernmentoperations,includinglegal,educational,andhealthactivities,completelydissolved(DesForges1999).

AftertheRPFforcestookKigaliinJuly1994,hundredsofthousandsofHutufledtoneighboringcountries,manyofthemdestroyingeverythingintheirpathastheyleft.Refugeecampssetupforthese

Hutumassesinadvertentlysupportedtheradicalgroupsresponsiblefororganizingandperpetratingthegenocide(primarily,theInterahamwe).Meanwhile,Tutsirefugees,fromboththe1994tragediesandthe1959flight,spilledbackintoRwanda.Chaosensuedduringthismassivereturn,and

muchlooting,pillaging,andsquattingtookplace.Astimepassed,governmentattemptstorepatriateHuturefugeeswereunsuccessful,formanyfearedwidespreadreprisalkillings.

5Finally,in1996,theRPFgovernmentgrewimpatientwiththesecuritythreatwithintheborderingrefugeecampsandforcedthereturnofrefugeesfromneighboringZaire.Soonafterward,over1millionHutureturnedhomefromBurundi,Tanzania,Uganda,andZaire(Prunier1997).

Throughoutthefiveyearssincethegenocide,Interahamweforceshavekeptunited,mainlyhidingonDRCterritory.TheirincursionsintonorthwesternandsouthwesternRwandahavekepttheseregionsrelativelyunstableandcausedthemtolagindevelopment.TheMarch1999localelectionswereamajorstepforwardforthegovernment,fortheyhelpedalleviatecriticismofitslegitimacy.AlthoughRwandahasmademuchprogresssincethewar,manyRwandansarestillhauntedbyitsterror.Securingfoodandshelterhasbeendifficultformanysurvivors.Asalegacyofthegenocide,homelessorphanswanderthestreets,andwidowsandwivesofmeninprisonstruggletomakeendsmeet.Widespreadpovertyandseverelydamagedinfrastructurehampergrowthanddevelopment.Despiteallthis,theRwandanpeopleingeneralseemtohavehopeforthefuture,buttheyworryaboutInterahamweactivitiesintheDRCandaboutthesecurityofRwandanareasalongtheborderwiththatcountry(Prunier1997;Gourevitch1998).

ThePerversionofSocialCapital

Duringthegenocide,socialcapitalatrophiedasthecountry,communities,andfamiliesfellpreytohatredandviolence.Yetintegrativeformsofsocialcapitalincreasedwithinfamiliesfighting

forsurvival,amongindividualsattemptingtosaveorrescueTutsi,andinthesmallMuslimcommunitywithinRwanda,whichnevertookpartinthegenocide.Strong,exclusionarysocialcapitalalsoemergedwithinHutuextremism,withextremelynegativeramificationsforthoseexcludedshowingthatviolencecancoexistwith,orbetheresultof,strongbondingsocialcapitalamongitsperpetrators.6

AstheformalHutugovernmentbegantosplinter,aprimaryoperatingunitemergedthatcoordinatedthegenocide.CommunitiessplitasorderscallingforHututokillTutsioriginatedfromthecentralgovernmentandwerespreadthroughoutRwandabywayoflocalleaders,whohelpedmobilizethemasses.Ofthenearly60percentoftheRwandanpopulationunderage20,fewhadhopesofobtaininglandorjobs.ThisbleakrealityfacilitatedtherecruitmentofHutuandtheiracceptanceofTutsihatepropaganda.Oncethekillingbegan,HutukillednotonlyTutsiunknowntothembutalsotheirneighborsand,insomecases,evenfamilymembers.Theseindiscriminateyetintimatekillingsledtothedisintegrationofcommunesandfamiliesandfragmentedsocialcohesioningeneral.Theviolencetosomeextentalsofollowedfromthebreakdownofsocietalstructuresbroughtaboutbyearlierhatepropagandaandethnicstrife.AlthoughtherewerenumerousHutuwhohidandsavedTutsi,manyparticipatedinthekillingsoutofasenseofperceivedethnicduty,becauseofloyaltytotheHutu-controlledstate,andinresponsetooutrightthreatsagainsttheirlivesortheirfamilies'lives.Tomakemattersmorecomplex,someTutsiwithHutuphysicalcharacteristicskilledTutsitosavethemselves(Gourevitch1998;DesForges1999).

Invariousways,thegenocidewasapowerfulcommunal-buildingexercise,atleastamongparticipatingHutu.Seekingtopreservetheircontrolandresources,HutuPowergroupsachievedtheirultimatesuccessbymobilizingexclusionaryanddivisivesocialcapitalthatbonded(primarily)unemployed,uneducatedHutuyouthtoformtheInterahamwe.HighlevelsofsocialcapitalexistedbothverticallyandhorizontallyamongHuturanks,whilebridgingsocialcapitalthatlinkedHutuwithTutsiwasallbuteliminated.WithinHutuextremism,state-drivenverticalsocialcapitalfueledthesuccessofcommunal-levelHutugroupsthroughexcellentinformationnetworks,reinventedpasttraditions,andasenseofsolidarity,obligation,and

civicduty(Prunier1997).Socialcapitalwithinthegroupsincreased,aslinksbetweenthemwaned,furthersplittingsociety.Thebridgingsocialcapitalthathadexisted,eventhoughinaweakform,betweendiversecommunalgroupswasnowrapidlytransformedintopurely

bondingsocialcapitalfoundedonfearandsurvivalasHutuandTutsigroupscoalescedoneachsideofthedivide.

Intheinitialweeksofthegenocide,preciselistsofTutsianddetailsoftheirresidenceshelpedexpeditethekillingsandensurethoroughness.ThemediawereusedtospreadhatepropagandaagainstTutsi.Forexample,RadioetTélévisionLibredesMilleCollinesbroadcastlistsofHutuineachcommunewhohadnotparticipatedinthekillings,publiclypressuringthemtojointhegenocide.SuchmassinformationnetworkskepttheInterahamweinformedonwhohadbeenkilled,whohadnotyetbeenremoved,andwhohadhelpedfacilitatethekillingprocess.Byspreadinghate,fear,suspicion,andgreed,theHutuextremistswereabletowhiptheHutumassesintoamurderousfrenzy(Gourevitch1998;DesForges1999).

ExtremistHutualsogainedafollowingpartlybyinvokingtradition.TheyappealedtoprecolonialRwandansocietyandcooptedexistingvaluestructuresbyreinventingtraditionsandapplyingtheminanewway.Forinstance,thenomenclatureusedbyextremistHutugroupswassimilartothatofprecolonialmilitiasandbloodbrotherhoods.ThepropagandautilizedtofuelHutuactionsreferredtotraditionalsocialcapitalintheformofcooperativelabor(umuganda),whichhadevolvedintoforcedlaborandwasseenasabusivetoHutu.Thesloganofthe1959massacreswasrenewed:tugiregukoraakazi,"letusgoanddothework"(Prunier1997;Gourevitch1998).

Génocidaireswereunitedbythecollectiveactionofkilling,whichhelpedcreatefeelingsofcollectiveconsciousness,commonality,sharedgoals,andsolidarity.Forexample,inKinyarwanda,Interahamwemeans"thosewhoattachtogether,"andImpuzamugambimeans"single-mindedones"or"thosewhohavethesamegoal."ThemanipulationoffearandhatredagainstTutsicreatedsolidarityamongHutu.Forthosewhojoinedinthekillings,thehatepropaganda

againstTutsiwasattractivebecauseitjustifiedtheiractionsandeasedtheirconsciences.Furthermore,massparticipationinthekillingsmadeittremendouslydifficulttoassignguilttoindividuals.Inthewordsofaparticipantinthegenocide,"noonepersonkilledanyoneperson"(DesForges1999:770).

Thesuccessofthegenocidedependedinpartoncivilians'senseofcivicdutyandonthehistoricalstrengthofthecentralgovernment.Verticalsocialcapital,manifestedinalmostabsolutestatepower,hadhistoricallypenetratedRwandansocietysodeeplyastosupersedehorizontalrelationsorloyalties.Officialsfromthepolice,localadministrations,andmilitaryforceswentdoortodoorrequisitioningmentopartakeintheir"nationalduty"ofeliminatingTutsi,andHutuvoluntarilyorbegrudginglyfollowedtheseorders.KillingTutsiwasportrayedasaHutucivicduty;suchphrasesas"doyourwork"or"itisyourdutytohelpclearthefield"toeradicatetheinyenzi(cockroaches),meaningTutsiwerecurrent.Theimageofkillingasameansofself-defenseagainsttheRPFinvasionwasalsoemployed,withtheresoundingurgencyof"killorbekilled"(Prunier1997).

AlthoughthisperversemanipulationofsocialcapitalmadepossiblethemassrecruitmentofHutu,realsocialandeconomicgainsprovedanaddedincentiveforHutuinvolvement.PopulationdensityinRwandahadattainedincredibleheights;inShyandaforinstance,ithadreached668peoplepersquarekilometerby1989(Prunier1997).Aslandbecamescarcer,droughtandpoorcroppricescompoundedtheeconomiccrisis.TutsieliminationwouldbenefittheHutuwhoparticipatedinthekillingsbydecreasingthenumberofcompetitorsforland,homes,cattle,andotherpossessions.

CooperationwithoutTrust

Beforethegenocide,potentialbridgingsocialcapitalexistedintheformofexchange,mutualassistance,andreciprocity.Typically,withinRwandansocietytherewerefivetypesofassociativegroups:cooperatives;farmers'organizations(smaller,lessformalcooperatives);tontines(rotatingsavingsandcreditassociations)andotherinformalassociations;foreignandlocaldevelopmentNGOs;andchurches(Uvin1998).Althoughthesegroupsmayhavebeen

numerousandwidespread,therelationscreatedbythemwerelargelyexclusionaryandtendednottobridgegroupdivides.ThiswasespeciallytrueofNGOssupportedbyexternalaid.Anopportunitytomanagediversityand

preventviolentconflictmayhavebeenmissedastheeconomicendsofdevelopmentovershadowedthesocialgoalsofstrengtheningsocialcohesion.

ManyinternationaleffortstosupportandencouragethegrowthofcivilsocietyinRwandaweremadeinthe1980sandearly1990s,andmanyneworganizationsandNGOsappeared,thankstotheseefforts.ThemereexistenceofNGOsandothercivilsocietyorganizations,however,doesnotnecessarilypromotedemocracyorpluralism,nordoesitautomaticallyformbridgingsocialcapitalthatlinksdifferentgroups.Forthemostpart,NGOsinRwandawereapolitical,service-oriented,andcloselyaffiliatedwiththestate.Moreover,therewasnotenoughsocialorpoliticalspaceforcivilsocietytotrulyflourish.AsUvin(1998)notes,extremepoverty,inequality,clientelism,andpoorinformationnetworks,compoundedbythesocial,economic,andpoliticalmarginalizationoftheruralpopulace(themajorityofRwandans),madetheemergenceofanautonomous,highlydevelopedcivilsocietyallbutimpossible.Thus,despitetheabundanceoftheseassociativegroups,thesocialcapitalpresentwasnotsufficientlyinclusivetocounterbalancethehatepoliticsgeneratedbyHutuextremists.

Sincetheendofthegenocide,attemptshavebeenmadetoplaceHutuingovernmentpositionstobalancepoliticalpower,andspacehasbeencreatedforthereemergenceofcivilsocietyactors.ThenewsocialfabricofRwanda,however,iscomplicated,ladenwithsubgroupsandschisms.Forexample,thereisthecontentiousissueoftheresettlementoflargenumbersofreturningHutuandTutsi.Thelatteraredividedbothbythedurationoftheirstayabroadandbywheretheysoughtrefuge.ThosereturningfromUgandaareperceivedasbeingmoreelitistthanthosefromBurundi,whohaveahigherstatusthanreturneesfromtheDRC.TutsiwhostayedinRwandaandsurvivedthegenocidearesuspectedofcollaborationwiththe

génocidaires,foritisdoubtedthatanyTutsicouldhavesurvivedontheirown.TherearealsodivisionsbetweenHutuwhoparticipatedinthekillings,thosewhoaresuspectedofbeinginvolved,andthosewhodidnotparticipate.Thegenocide,whilereinforcingthesplitbetweenHutuandTutsi,alsocreatednewsocialcleavagesthat

runwithinethnicgroups.Cross-cuttingsocialcapitalshouldbenurturedtolinknotonlyHutuandTutsibutalsothosewithinthesubgroups.Overcomingthenewschismsandreconcilingolddifferencesmaytakegenerations.

ViolentconflictandthepoliticalandeconomicdisintegrationoftheRwandanstatedestroyedwhateverbroad-basedformsofsocialcapitalhadexisted.Theconflictdeeplypenetratedsuchformsofhorizontalsocialcapitalasexchange,mutualassistance,collectiveaction,trust,andprotectionofthevulnerable.Duringtheconflict,verticalrelationswerereinforced;inthepostconflictyears,theserelationshavesuffered(seeTable4).Thus,postconflictsocialcapital,althoughsomewhatmirroringpreconflictconditions,hasundergonechangeindifferentways.

TheuseofcreditinexchangeswascommoninpreconflictRwanda.Thispracticehasdiminishedovertime,inpartduetodecreasedlevelsoftrustasaconsequenceofwarfarebutalsobecauseofincreasingpovertyandthevalueplacedonmoneyandindividualism.Ingeneral,thoseinterviewedfeltthatpeoplehavebecomemorereluctanttogivegiftsandprovidefortheneedsofothers,fortheyarelessconfidentthattheseactswillbereciprocated.

Environmentaldegradation,isolation,andscarcityhavealsocausedexchangetodwindle.DiminishingsoilfertilityandscarcityoflandandwaterinGitihavehurttheproductivityofbothagricultureandcattleherding.Theseconditionshaveledtoadecreaseinsecondaryorassociationalsocialcapitalbydiminishingtheabilitytoexchangegoodsandservices.Duringthegenocide,Gitiisolateditselffromneighboringcommunesoutoffear.Ithasremainedsomewhatdistant,withlimitedexternalmarketpenetration,whichhashamperedeconomicactivity.Asaresult,povertywithinGitiisincreasing,causingevenfurtherreductionsinexchange,mutualassistance,and

giftgiving.

ExtremeandwidespreadpovertyinShyanda,alongwithadeclineintheavailabilityofgoodsandlabor,hashamperedeconomicactivity,primarilybecauseoflossofordamagetoresourcesandtheweakeningofsocialcapitalasaresultoftheconflict.Agricultureisnowalmostthesoleeconomicactivity,butthe

Table4Interactionsbetweenviolentconflictandsocialcapital:RwandaHigh-conflictperiod Low-conflictperiod

Highsocialcapital

Protectionacrossethniclines:someHutuhelpedprotectTutsiduringthewar,aswasthecaseinGiti(andsomeTutsiriskedtheirlivestosaveothers).

WithintheInterahamweandbetweenextremistHutu,bondingsocialcapitalunitedgroupsbymanipulatingandemployingexcellentinformationnetworks,collectiveaction,civicduty,solidarity,mutualbenefit,commongoalsandsharedactivity,andtraditions.

Familyrelations(nuclearandextended);intermarriagebetweenHutuandTutsi.

Multiethnicassociations:Old:agriculture,cattleherding(beneficialtocommune)

New:widows'andorphans'groups(exclusive,beneficialtomembersonly).

Gacaca(atraditionalmechanismfordisputemediationanddistributivejustice)inthepre-andpostconflicteras.

Mutualassistance;giftgiving;sharingofbeer,necessities,andcropsresurfacedbutwerenotasprevalent.

Cooperationoncommunalbuildingsandprojectssuchasroadmaintenance.

Lowsocialcapital

Killingwithincommunitiesandfamilies

Cessationbyassociationsandcommunitygroupsofcommunalactivitiessuchasfarmingandeventssuchasmeetingsandmarkets.

Cessationofalmostallgovernmentactivities;noserviceswereprovidedduringthewar.Becauseofthegovernment'sinvolvementinthekillings,moderateHutuand

Divisionswithinfamilies,notjustbetweencommunities(postconflict).

Decreasedsenseoftrustandcandorbetweenindividuals(postconflict).

Perceiveddecreaseinsocialcapitalduetomodernization,individualism,andmonetization.Local-to-globalshiftandmovefromprimarybondstosecondarylinkagesperceivedasdecreaseinsocialcapital.PerceptionthattraditionsbegantodiminishwithcolonizationandtheinfluxofCatholicism.

Tutsihadlittletrustinthegovernment.

Strongverticalsocialcapitalsupersededhorizontalrelationsandalliances..

ravagesofwarhavedecreasedcropproductivityandmadefewerpeopleavailabletoworkinthefields.Therearealsofewermentocontributetothefinancialandphysicalneedsofthecommunity,asmanyhavebeenkilledorarecurrentlyinprison.Asaresult,theburdenonwomenandchildrenhasincreasedtremendously.

Thisincreasedburdenhasnotbeenoffsetbycooperationandmutualassistance,bothofwhichhavedecreasedinthecommunes.Giti,althoughnotdirectlyaffectedbythefighting,experiencedmuchdamageduringthewar.Largenumbersofdisplacedpersonssoughtrefugeinthecommune,destroyinganddamagingbuildingsandstrainingresources.Now,highlevelsofpovertyhavemadecommunememberslessabletoprovidefortheneedsofothers,andincreasingmonetizationwithinthesocietyhasmadethemlesslikelytogivegiftsandassistance.

Theexistenceandnatureofassociationsandthereasonfortheircreation(whetherbasedonsharedinterestsoronprescribedcommonality,asinfamilialrelations)weredramaticallyaffectedbythegenocideandtheperversionofsocialbonds.Duringtheconflict,especiallyin1994,farmingactivitystoppedacrossthecountry(except,perhaps,forsmalleffortsbyindividualfamilies),andthecooperativeassociationsthatoversawtheseactivitiesdisbanded.Sincethewar,theassociationsandotherinformalnetworkshaverevivedoutofnecessity.Theseorganizations,whichprimarilydealwiththelegaciesofthewar,aregearedtowardvulnerablegroupsandhelpmeettheirownmembers'basicsurvivalneeds.Whereasprewarassociationsstrovetobetterthewelfareofpeopleinternalandexternaltothegroup,theneworganizationsarepredominantlyexclusive,althoughsomeincludebothTutsiandHutu.Forexample,widows'andorphans'associationshaveemergedinbothcommunestoassisteachofthesevulnerablegroups.InGiti,orphans'associationshavearisentoprovidefundsforschooling.InShyanda,despitethe

genocidalexperiencethere,bothHutuandTutsicooperateinwidows'andorphans'associations.Still,thereisanunderlyingfeelingofmistrustandresentment.Inonewidows'associationthatincludesbothHutuwomenwhosehusbandsareinprisonandTutsiwomenwhosehusbandswerekilledduringthewar,

memberswhowereinterviewedstatedthattheyworktogether,butonlyfortheirsurvival.Theydonotfeelthattheycandealorspeakwitheachotheropenly.Thisguardedorlimitedcross-cuttingsocialcapitalhasemergedoutofsharedcircumstances,isolation,andnewsocialcleavages,nottrust.

Manyofthoseinterviewedfeltthatthedissolutionoffamilies,whichhasoccurredinbothcommunes,hasledtothecreationofthenewtypesofassociation.Tosomeextent,peoplehaveturnedtoassociationstomakeupfortheirlackoffamilyties,whichwereattimesstrengthenedduringtheconflictbut,overall,weregreatlyharmedasaresultoftheextremestowhichviolencewascarried.Respondentsalsonotedthatrelationsbetweenfamiliesjoinedthroughmarriagehavebeengreatlyweakened:in-lawscannolongerrelyoneachotherforsupportandassistance.Eventhenuclearfamilyhasfailedtoadegree.Fathersandbrothersaredeadorinjail,andmothers,strugglingtofilltheroleofthemissingmen,oftencannotmeettheneedsoftheirchildren.Somechildrenaresentawayfromhometolivewithextendedfamilyortowanderthestreetsinhopesthataidorreligiousorganizationswillbeabletoassistthem.

Accordingtorespondents,intermarriagestilloccursbetweenHutuandTutsiinGitiandShyanda,butitisoftencriticizedinthewakeofthegenocide.CommunemembersinGitiarereluctanttomarrythoseoutsidetheirowncommuneforfearofmarryingintoamurderousfamily.

Thus,mostdimensionsofhorizontalsocialcapitalwerenegativelyaffectedbythewar,yetinthepostwarperiodtheyarebeingrevivedinvariousformstohelprestoresomesenseofnormalcy.Exchangewithinandbetweengroupsisoccurringagainbutatalowerlevelandinalteredforms,asaresultoftheconflictanditslegacy,aswellasmodernizingfactors.Feelingsofsolidarity,asevidencedbyactsof

mutualassistanceandcollectiveaction,havealsodwindled;whentheydopersist,theirmotivationshavechanged.Vulnerablegroupsareprotected,butmorebyself-helpthanthroughacommunityefforttosupportthem.Andtrust,akeyelementinsocialcapital,isstilllackingtoalargeextentinbothcommunesor,ifpresent,isfragile.

VerticalInfluencesandExternalFactors

VerticalrelationsinRwandahavetraditionallyhadagreatinfluenceoversociety.Tutsikingswereconsideredalmostdivineandwerereveredandfollowedfaithfully.Withindependenceintheearly1960s,thisverticalcontrolcontinuedasHutupowerwasconsolidatedinastrongcentralgovernment.Traditionalandinformallocalleadershipdissipatedandwasreplacedbyadministratorsappointedbythenationalgovernment.

StrongverticalinfluencemayhavehelpedspareGitiduringthegenocide,thankstotheactionsofitsburgomaster,orcommunalhead,whoforbadekillinginhiscommune.GitiwasalsoanearlypointofentryfortheRPF.Conversely,inShyanda,whichinitiallyescapedviolenceandinfactservedasaTutsirefuge,killingsbegansoonafterordersweredispatchedbytheactingprimeminister,aHutufromtheregion,whovisitedthecommunetoreproachitforitsfailuretomountagenocidalresponse.Inthiscase,strongverticalalliancesoverpoweredhorizontalallegiance,withtragicresults(DesForges1999).Sincethewar,theofficialcommunalleadershiphasmaintainedhighlevelsofcontroloverthecommunes.Localleadershipremainsundercentralcontrol,althoughthenationalgovernmentismakingstrongeffortstodecentralize.

Accordingtomanyofthoseinterviewed,socialcapitalhasalsobeentransformedbyfactorsexternaltowarfaremainlythoserelatedtomodernization:marketpenetration,monetization,andindividualismand,moreindirectly,changesstemmingfromcolonialismandthehistoricalinfluenceoftheCatholicChurch.Studyparticipantsfeltthattherehadbeenadecreaseinthelevelandachangeinthenatureofbothprimarybondingrelationsandsecondarybridginglinkagesinbothcommunes.Themajorityofthoseinterviewedviewed''traditional"socialcapitalaslocalized,primary

relationsamongextendedfamilyandsmallcommunitiesthatprovidedwelfaremechanismsandsocialprotection.Participantsinthestudyfeltthatmovestowarddevelopmentalandeconomiclinkageswiththoseoutsidethecommunityhadweakenedprimarysocialcapital.Interest-

ingly,participantsdidnotconsiderthestrengtheningofintercommunalrelationsandtradeandtheriseofnewformsofassociationsasthecontinuationofsocialcapital,albeittransformed;rather,theyviewedthesechangesasanerosionoftheRwandansocialfabric.Accordingtothoseinterviewed,increasingmonetizationandindividualism,aswellaswidespreadandworseningpoverty,weretoblameforthedecreaseinmutualassistanceandgiftgivingwithincommunes.Overall,externalfactorstotheconflict,andtheconflictitself,wereconsideredreasonsforthemanytransformationsofsocialcapitalinRwandasincetheprewarperiod.

TheshapingofsocialcapitalinRwandaisclearlyatacrossroads.Thechallengeistobalanceeconomicdevelopmentwithsocialdevelopmentinamannerthatenablesthenationtofinditswayoutofthedarknessofpovertywhilebothencouragingsocialrelationsthatcrossclass,ethnic,andgenderdividesandpreservingtheprimarytiesthatserveasthebedrockofsocietallife.Inclusivestateinstitutionsandconflict-managementmechanismsneedtobeencouragedandsupportedforacohesivesocietytothrive.Manypositivesignsofstepsinthisdirectionhavealreadyemerged,suchasthebridgingwidows'andorphans'associations;governmentmovestowarddecentralizationandincreasingparticipation;therevivalofgacaca;andamoreaccountableciviladministration.

4GuatemalaandSomalia:ViolentConflictandtheStateThenatureanddurationofconflictinGuatemalaandSomaliaprovidedifferingcontextsfortheanalysisoftheinterrelationsofsocialcapitalandconflictineachcountry.ThewarinGuatemalaspannedalmostfourdecades.There,anabsolute,oppressivestatetargetedindigenousgroupsandpeasantsandpolarizedrelationsbetweenthestateandthepredominantlyMayanpeasantry.InSomalia,bycontrast,theturmoilmountedoverthespanofadecade.FailedstatepoliciesthatbloatedthemilitaryandthecivilserviceandcoerceddivisivenessamongSomalisspedthegovernment'sdissolutionandtheconsequenteruptionofclanwarfare.Thesedifferingsituationsledtoconsistentorsimilarfindings,especiallyregardingthewaysinwhichstateandmarketforcesinteractwithviolentconflictandsocialcapitaltoshapesocialcohesionordisintegration.

StudyMethodology

ThestudiesinGuatemalaandSomaliawereconductedbyCERFE,anItalianresearchNGOthathashadprolongedfieldexperienceinbothcountries.Researchbeganwithaliteraturereviewthatanalyzedmaterialsonthecountries'historiesandonworkrelatedtosocialcapital.Duringthisphase,surveystobeusedinthefieldweredraftedandweretranslatedintoSpanishandSomali.Fieldresearch,whichwasconductedbetweenJuly1998

andFebruary1999,wasledbyCERFEstaffandwasimplementedbyalocalfieldmanagerandindigenousinterviewers.Eachin-countrygroupreceivedextensivetrainingonthetoolstobeutilizedandonsurveyimplementation.Pretestswereusedtorefinethesurveybeforeitsimplementation.

AsintheCambodiaandRwandastudies,twotownswerechosenineachcountry,onelessaffectedbyconflictandtheothermarkedbyintenseconflict.InSomaliathetownofHargeisaexperiencedmoretraumaandviolencethanitscounterpart,Boroma.(BothareinSomaliliandinthenorthwest,anareathathasafunctioninggovernment,stateinstitutions,andcivilsocietyassociationssuchascouncilsofelders,NGOs,andreligiousorganizationsthatbridgesocialdivisions.)InGuatemalathetownofNebajexperiencedmoreconflictthandidPuertoBarrios.Althougheffortsweremadetoselectmatchedpairs,controllingforthelevelofviolence,thereweredifficultiesindemographicallypairingthetowns.Consequently,therearediscrepanciesinsize,ethniccomposition,andsocioeconomiclevels.Hargeisahasapopulationof295,000,with141identifiedcivilsocietygroups,andBoromahasapopulationof64,000,with63identifiedcivilsocietygroups.PuertoBarrioshasapopulationof82,000(170identifiedcivilsocietygroups);Nebajhasapopulationof55,000(187identifiedcivilsocietygroups).

IncontrasttothestudiesinCambodiaandRwanda,whichdistinctlyendeavoredtoassesspre-andpostconflictsocialcapital,CERFEfocusedmoreonmakingadetailedsketchofthepresentpostconflictcivilsocietywithineachcountryandonmeasuringitsabilitytoprovideservicesandeconomicopportunityforitscommunities,especiallywithregardtoverticallypenetratingstateandmarketengagement.Thisorientationmeshesnicelywiththefailed-statesyndromefrequentlyascribedtoSomaliaandtheoppressive-stateframeworkappliedtoGuatemala(ZartmanandKremenyuk1995).

Thefirstphaseofthefieldresearchsoughttoidentifythesociallyresponsiblecollectiveactorsthattogethermadeupcivilsocietybycontributingtothewell-beingofthecommunity.Eighty-fiveorganizationsweresurveyedinHargeisa,44inBoroma,51inNebaj,and50inPuertoBarrios.Interviewswere

conductedwithkeyinformants,leadersatthelocallevel,andcivilservants.Inthesecondphase,CERFEstudiedthequalityofleadershipinaselectednumberofthesegroups.Atotalof84leadersinbothcountrieswasinterviewed.Inthefinalphase,organizationswerestudiedindepth20inGuatemalaand21inSomaliaandtheirleaders(totaling41)wereinterviewed.Alsoquestionedinthefinalphasewere52keyinformantsand94citizenswhowerenotmembersoftheorganizationsbeingstudied.(Copiesofthesurveyinstrumentsareavailablefromtheauthorsonrequest.)

SocialResponsibility,SocialInitiative,andViolentConflict

CERFEestablishedasingleframeworkandmethodologyforexaminingsocialcapitalinGuatemalaandSomalia.

7Theconceptofsocialcapitalwasrestrictedtocivicengagementintheprotectionanddevelopmentofcommunities,encompassingsocialcapitalatthecommunallevelthatincludesboththeprotectivefunctionsofprimary-grouprelationsandthedevelopmentaspectsofsecondarycross-cuttingrelations.Themodeldoesnotassessprimaryorbondinglevelsofsocialcapital,suchaskin-basedandtightlyknitcommunalrelationships,perse.Instead,itfocusesoncivilsociety'sprotectiveprovisionofbasicsurvivalneedsanditsabilitytocreatefertilegroundforeconomicgrowthanddevelopment.

AccordingtoCERFE'sapproach,socialcapitalisthepresenceoftwoautonomousdimensionsofcivilsociety:socialresponsibilityandsocialinitiative.Civilsocietyisdefinedasasetofcollectiveactorsgearedtowardsocialactionthatincludes(butisnotconsideredexclusiveto)actorsfromschools,churches,themedia,theprivatesector,NGOs,anduniversities.Suchsocialactioniseither"welfare"or"development"oriented.

Socialresponsibilityisseenascivilsociety'scapacitytoactasaself-defensemechanismforthecommunityatlarge,providingpeoplewithsocialprotectionorwelfarewhensocietyisthreatenedbysuchrisksashealthcrises,illiteracy,unemployment,lackofaccesstohighereducation,geographicisolation,andcon-

flict.Thisabilityisconsideredtobeaffectedbythedegreeofdiversificationwithincivilsocietyandthenumberandqualityofcivilsocietyactors.

Socialinitiativeisviewedascivilsociety'sengagementineffortstowardeconomicgrowthanddevelopment.Thispotentialdiffersaccordingtothediversificationandqualityofactors,localfactors,andnormativeobstacles.Localfactorsconsistofconfidenceandtrust,materialopportunities(communications,mobility,infrastructure;andeducation,banking,andhealthservices)andcognitivecapital(qualifiedpersonnelwithspecificskills).Normativeobstaclesincludefactorsthatareformalorlegal,substantive,organizationalandbureaucratic,socialandcultural,orpoliticalinnature.Socialinitiativeisdefinedasameasureofaspecificqualityofcivilsociety;thatis,itsorientationtowardeconomicdevelopment.Inthisregard,itiscivilsociety,nototherentities,thathasgreaterorlessersocialinitiative.

Together,levelsofsocialresponsibilityandsocialinitiativemakeupthelargerconstructofsocialcapital.Civilsocietycantendtowardsocialresponsibilitythatisinsularandmoreprotectiveinnature,asisoftenthecaseinconditionsofintenseviolentconflict,whentrustisatapremium.Alternatively,itcanpossesssocialcapitalthatismorenetworked,outward-looking,anddevelopmentorientedorisgearedtowardsocialinitiative,asmaybethecaseinperiodsofpeaceandsecurity.Thesetwoaspectsofsocialcapital(muchlikethenotionsofbondingandbridgingsocialcapital)mayvaryintheirinterplaywithconflict,thequalityofcivilsociety,andthepenetrationandroleofthestateandmarketforces.Inthisway,thestudyexaminescivilsocietyasacompositeoftwotypesofsocialcapitalthatmaysubstitutefororcomplementstateandmarketrolesandfunctions,revealingthedegreeofsocialcohesiontheintersectionbetweenstate-andmarket-drivenverticalorlinkingsocialcapitalandcivilsocietydrivenhorizontalorbridgingsocialcapital.

Theviolentconflictindicators(seeBox4)employedinGuatemalaandSomaliawerechosenbytheresearcherstoenablecomparisonoftheeffectsoftheconflictsinthetwocountries.Despitetheproblemsinascertainingtheexactperiodofconflict,variousindicatorswereestablishedtoassesstheconflicts,suchasactsof

Box4Indicatorsofviolentconflict:GuatemalaandSomalia

Possessionbycommoncitizensofweaponsforself-defenseShootingsoverthepast12monthsOutbreaksofviolencecausedbythepresenceofarmedtroopsEvacuationofstaffsofinternationalbodiesoverthepast12monthsKidnappingofpeoplefornoncriminalreasonsNeedforforeignerstousearmedescortsRaidsorpillagingHumanrightsviolationsViolenceagainst,ordisappearanceorkidnappingof,politicians,unionists,andotherpublicrepresentativesUnlawfulexecutionsArmedoutbreaksamongrepresentativesofpartiesandpoliticalmovementsCrowdviolenceorriotsPoliceinterventionstorepresspublicdemonstrationsHighlevelsofcommoncrime,suchastheft,robbery,actsofviolence,organizedcrime,andmurder;presenceofillicittradingPresenceofroadblockscontrolledbyarmedsoldiersPresenceofarmedtroopsExistenceofunsafeareasPresenceoforganizationsdevotedtoself-

defenseofthepopulationPresenceofdeathsquadsDisruptionofeducationandhealthservicesdeliveryDestructionofinfrastructureandnaturalresourcesLossofmarketandfinancialresourcesPresenceofrefugeesanddisplacedpopulations

violence,thepresenceofarmedtroops,anddamagetoinfrastructureandmarketforces.

Theperiodsofconflictselecteddifferedinlength.ThewarinGuatemalalasted35years,makingitdifficulttoassesspreconflictsocialcapital.Totakethisintoconsideration,theconflictperiodwasassociatedwiththetimeofthemostintensefighting,198083.TheSomaligovernmentfellonlyeightyears

ago,butconditionshadbeendeterioratingsincetheendoftheOgadenwarwithEthiopiain1976,andintervieweeshaddifficultyindescribingthepreconflictperiod.

Guatemala:TheStateagainstthePeople

The35yearsofcivilwarinGuatemalaresultedinroughly180,000killings,40,000"disappearances,"thedestructionofmorethan400villages,internaldisplacementofover1millionpeople,andtheflightof100,000refugeestoneighboringcountries.Severesocial,economic,andpoliticalexclusionwasacatalystfortheprotracted,brutalconflict,andtheseexclusionaryissuesremainonlypartiallyresolvedafterthepeaceaccord.Currenttensions,asbefore,arefirmlyrootedintheexceedinglyinequitabledistributionofresources;70percentofthearablelandbelongsto3percentofGuatemalans,androughly80percentofthepopulationlivesinpoverty(Costello1995).

Thecivilwarbeganin1960withafailednationalistuprisingagainstcorruptionbyarmyofficers,whothensoughtrefugeinruralareasandformedaguerrillaarmy.ThemovementwasinitiallyalignedwithCubanrevolutionaryforcesandwasconsolidatedwithinLadino(Spanish-speaking)regions.

8However,"overthenexttwodecades,politicalandsocialreformsbecamearallyingpoint,withtheindigenouspopulationsplayingamajorrole"(Kostner,Nezam,andScott1997:2).Ethnicdifferenceswereattherootoftheunequaldistributionofresources,whichwasrigidifiedbytheracist,exclusivepoliticalstructurethatpromotedLadinointerestsandculture.Mayancommunitiesbecamepoliticizedasaresponsetothesehistoricalinjusticesandtheinfluenceofliberationtheology.Manyoftheguerrillamovements,althoughledbydisenfranchisedLadinos,recruitedlargenumbersofMayansandwerebasedinindigenoushighlandareas.ByincorporatingMayanconcerns

intotheirprogramforstruggle,guerrillaforcesaugmentedtheirtroopsandwidenedthescopeoftheircause.

Demandsforgreaterfreedomanddemocracyinthemid-tolate1970sweremetwithnewwavesofrepression,involvingmassacres,deaththreats,andtheassassinationoflocalleaders

andactivists.WarfarebecameevenmorebrutalandviciousandwastargetedtowardeliminatingtheMayanpeoplelivinginareaswheretheguerrillasoperated.Entiresectorsofthepopulationbecamemilitarytargetsforthestate.In198183alone,over100,000civilianswerekilled.Itwasinthisperiodthatmostoftheinternaldisplacement,forciblerelocations,andrefugeemovementscausedbythewartookplace.Concurrently,ahighlanddeforestationcampaignwasundertakentoremovephysicalcoverforguerrillas.Ashostilitiesmounted,theguerrillagroupsandtheCommunistGuatemalanWorkersParty(PGT)alignedin1982toformtheGuatemalanNationalRevolutionaryUnion(URNG).Bythistime,however,thepoorlyarmedguerrillaswereunabletodefendtheirsupportersintheruralhighlandsagainstthefullweightofmilitaryviolence(Costello1995).

Thelarge-scalemassacresweregenerallyoverby1984.ThearmysetupnewbasesthroughouttheMayanheartlandandgreatlyincreaseditsownwealthbyseizingproductivelandandimportantstateinstitutions.Itconsolidatedcontroloverruralpopulationsbysettingupmodelgovernmentvillagesthatreceivedreturningrefugeesanddisplacedpeople.Thearmyalsoorganizedanintensemilitarizationcampaign,recruitingcivilianmalesovertheageof16intocivildefensepatrols(PACs).Althoughrecruitmentwassupposedlyvoluntary,thosewhorefusedwereconsideredguerrillasympathizers.ThePACsguardedtowns,verifiedvillagers'identification,reportedanysuspiciousactivities,andassistedinsearchesforguerrillamovements;theyconsequentlyincreasedthedivisionsandsuspicionswithinindigenouscommunities.ThePACsreachedtheirheightinthemid-1980s,whentheyhadabout900,000members(Costello1995).

Throughouttheearly1980s,thegovernment'scounterinsurgencycampaignsexacerbatedtheoriginalcausesoftheconflict.Displacementandresettlementworsenedalreadygravelandscarcity

anddistributionproblems.Inaddition,thepoliticalstructurewasfarfromdemocratic,forarmyandmilitarycommissionersweretheonlystaterepresentativesinthehighlands.Cityauthoritieswereobligedtorequirepriorapprovalforgatheringsofmorethantwopeople.Centralizationofpowercontinuedtoincrease,andtherewasatotalabsenceofaccountability.

Indigenousgroupsandthoseinruralareasborethebruntofthesemountinginjustices.

Atransitiontowardpeacebeganaroundthemid-1980swiththeadoptionofanewconstitution,theelectionofacivilianpresident,andtheintroductionofpoliticalpluralismandpersonalliberties.Concurrently,preparationsweremadefornegotiations,involvingconsultationswithpoliticalparties,theprivatesector,religiousgroups,academics,laborunions,andothermembersofcivilsociety.FormaldiscussionsbetweentheURNGandthenewlyformedgovernmentcommissionforpeace(COPAZ)beganin1991,andin1994civilsocietywasbroughtintothenegotiations.Thefinalpeaceagreement,signedinDecember1996,broughttogetheraccordsondemocratization,humanrights,displacedpopulations,indigenousrights,socioeconomicissues,andtheroleofcivilsocietyandthemilitary.

Somalia:StateDisintegration,Anarchy,andResilience

InGuatemalastatewarfareagainstthepeopleresultedinthecentralizationofgovernmentpowerandreactionarypoliciesofviolenceandfearasameansofmaintainingcontrol;inSomaliaitledtothedisintegrationofthestate.

FromthetimeitoverthrewSomalia'sciviliangovernmentin1969,themilitarygovernmentofGeneralSiadBarreengagedinsystematicrepressionandeliminationofcivilsocietyactorsinanattempttomaintainabsolutecontrolForthefirstdecade,thiswasdonethroughtheideologyof"scientificsocialism,"whichcalledforthesuppressionofprivateinitiative,theunderminingofanyformofcivilactionnotsanctionedbythestate,andthedismantlingofcentersoftraditionalauthority(bondingsocialcapital).ThepublicexecutionofreligiousleadersfordisagreeingwithBarreontheinterpretationoftheQuran

wasamajorturningpointincommunity-governmentrelationsinthishighlyreligioussociety,greatlydeepeningpublicfearanddistrustofthegovernment.ThealienationofsocietywasfurtherentrenchedbythewidespreadarrestsofWestern-trainedintellectuals,theimprisonmentofthosesuspectedofdisloyalty,theestablishment

of''orientationcenters"fortheindoctrinationofthepopulation,andtheholdingofmassralliestopropagatethe"revolutionaryideology."Thesegovernmenteffortssoughttoreengineerthesocietyandcultivateapersonalitycultalongthelinesofcertaincommunistregimes.Thisfurthererodedthetraditionalvaluesthatprovidedthefoundationsforsocialcohesion.Aubiquitoussecurityapparatuscreatedfearandsuspicionamongindividualsandgroups.Thefiringofcivilservants(oftenthemostcompetentones)suspectedoflessthantotalloyaltytothe"revolution"severelyunderminedstateinstitutionalcapacityandintegrity.Thesemeasureshadtheeffectofhighlycentralizingauthority,degradingstateinstitutions,andunderminingcivilsocietyandinformalsocialrelations.

AftertheU.S.S.R.backedEthiopiainthe197778OgadenwarbetweenSomaliaandEthiopia,theBarregovernmentswitchedalliancesfromtheEasternsocialistbloctotheWest.Tomaintainpower,theregimeabandonedsocialistrhetoricandsolicitedandobtainedthesupportoftheUnitedStates.Concurrently,itsoughtthesupportofsomeclansandtargetedcertainotherclansforcollectivepunishment,strikingoutagainsttheMajerteenclanofthenortheast(someofwhosememberswereimplicatedinamilitarycoupin1978).Ascorched-earthcampaigntargetingbothpeopleandtheirmeansoftheirlivelihoodwasbeguninthisarea.TheabsenceofanymeaningfulreactionbyotherSomalistotheplightoftheirbrethrenreflectedboththepervasivefearofthegovernmentandanunravelingofcross-cuttingsocialtiesandtraditionalvalues.Thegovernment'sactionsdemonstratedthatanyformoforganizedoppositionwouldbemetwithmaximumforce,andmanypeopleremaineddocile.In1988afull-scalemilitaryassaultwaslaunchedagainsttheIssakclaninnorthernSomalia(presentSomaliland),destroyingallthemajorurbancentersandscatteringmostoftheurbanpopulationintoEthiopiaasrefugees.Thearmysystematicallydestroyedorlootedallvaluable

assetsinmosturbancentersandspreadantipersonnelminestopreventthereturnofrefugees.

Despiteitseffortstomaintainpower,theBarregovernment,withitslegitimacyforfeitedandthearmydisintegrating,collapsedin1991.Itsdissolutionunleashedthelegaciesofdecades

ofrepression:"acultureofvengeance,"areadysupplyofweaponsacquiredthroughColdWarpolitics,intenseinterclanhatreds,andafailedeconomyinwhichclansfoughtoverwhatfewresourceswereleft(Menkhaus1998:22021).BythetimeBarrefledthecapitalinJanuary1991,somemembersofthearmedforceswerealreadyengagedinlootingembassiesandpublicproperty.Warlordsdrewonbondingsocialcapitaltocreateprivatearmies,mainlymadeupoffellowclanmembers,thatdominatedgroupswithnoaccesstoweapons.(Thesharedexperienceinturnreinforcedthebondswithinthearmedgroups.)ViolentconflicteruptedacrossSomaliaovercontrolofeconomicresourcesandvisibleassets:theportandairportofthecapital,Mogadishu;richagriculturallands;andthesouthernportcityofKismayo.

Thesuddencollapseofaninternationallyrecognizedstatewithoutanyexternalforceorthreatwasauniqueeventinthehistoryofnations.Theself-inflictedimplosionbroughtmiserytomillionsofSomalis,settingoffaprolongedfamineandmassstarvationandusheringinadecadeofanarchyandviolence.Theseeventsnotonlydestroyedtheassetbaseofthecountryandtheaccumulatedgainsofgenerations;theyclaimedhundredsofthousandsoflivesandledtothedisplacementofthousandsofSomaliswithinandoutsidethecountry'sboundaries.

State-sponsoredviolenceandthesystematicdestructionofsocialcapitalduringBarre'smilitarydictatorshipnotonlyplantedtheseedsofthedisintegrationofthestatebutalsonurturedintergroupenmities.Nosocietalgluewaslefttoholdthenationtogetheroncetheformalstatestructurescollapsed.Thedisintegrationofthestateresultedinadifferentkindofviolencedecentralized,clan-based,anddrivenbythedesiretosettleoldscoresorthestruggleoverresources.Violencewasofteneitheranarchicorledbywarlordswhohadbeenabletoappropriatesignificantcachesofweaponry.

TheearlierexperienceduringthemilitarycampaignagainstHargeisaandothercities,whenmanymembersofthearmedforcesengagedinlootingatconsiderablegainandwithoutbeingheldaccountable,mayhavedemonstratedthepotentialbenefitsandlowrisksoflooting.Theinterclanconflictsthatfollowedweremainlyovercontrolofresources.Warlordsrecruitedun-

educated,armedyoungmentofueltheir"economiesofplunder"(Menkhaus1998:221).Theserenegadegroups,whosenewstatusandwealthwouldevaporateifpeaceandstabilitywererestored,haveworkedtoundermineUNandotherpeaceefforts(AdamandFord1998).

Externalpeaceeffortsrepeatedlyfailedduetoalackofunderstandingofthesituation.Negotiationsinvolvedmembersofthe16recognizedfactionsbattlingthroughoutSomalia,butexternalactorsfailedtorealizethatthesefactionslackedthelegitimacytoruleevenovertheterritorytheyclaimed.Theabilitytogovernhaddevolvedtoamuchmorelocallevel.TheUNmissionleftSomaliain1995withoutsuccessfullyestablishinganationalgovernment.Anarchy,however,didnotensue.Sincethen,violentconflicthasplaguedpartsofsouthernSomalia,butithasremainedlocalized.

Althougheffortstosetupacentralizedgovernmentfailed,someareasnotably,theself-proclaimedSomalilandRepublic(theformerBritishSomaliland)inthenorthwestandPuntlandinthenortheasthavereestablishedmarkets,servicesandservicedelivery,andminimalformsofgovernance.(Box5describesasuccessfulgrassrootsinitiativetocreatelocalgovernmentstructures.)ThisprogresshadbeendrivenbytraditionalSomaliauthoritiessuchaseldersandreligiousleaders,businessmen,andwomen'sassociations(Menkhaus1998).Relativepeaceandsecurityandahighdegreeofsocialresponsibilityandcivicaction,includingavibrantprivatesector,continuetoprevailinthosetwoareas.Coincidentally,theseareashadalsobeenthetargetsofwidespreadgovernmentatrocitiesagainstthecivilianpopulation.Thesharedexperienceofvictimizationmayhavecontributedtoabuildupofbondingsocialcapitalinthesetwoareas.

Theemergenceofmarketforces,eveninareaswhereopenconflict

continues,oftentendstomitigateconflictandraisethecostoflooting;ownersofprivatepropertyarelikelytoseekredress,withthesupportofrelativesandclanmembers,andtopursueperpetrators.Exchangeofgoodsandservicesbetweenclansandareasencouragescross-cuttingtiesandcreatesavestedinterestinminimizingopenconflict.Marketshavealsobeenable

Box5TheBoromaConference:abottom-upapproachtoreconciliation

Inrecentyears,anumberofreconciliationconferencesandotherinitiativesaimingatbringingtogetherthewarringfactionsinSomaliahavebeensponsoredbyvariousparties,includingtheUN,theOrganizationofAfricanUnity(OAU),theArabLeague,andneighboringcountriesbutnonesucceeded.Substantialamountsofdonormoneywerespentinorganizingtheseconferences.Theparticipantsweremainlythevariousfactionleaders,manyofthemresponsibleforpastorongoingtragedies,andthemeetingswereoftenheldinoverseaslocations.Therewasusuallynocommunityorgrassrootsparticipationintheselectionofparticipantsoreveninsettingtheagenda.Theconferencesweremainlytop-to-bottominitiatives,withthefactionsusuallyposturingforexternalaudiencesratherthantalkingtoeachother.

AcontrastingcasewasaconferenceheldinBoroma,Somaliland,in1995attendedbyabout2,000delegatesrepresentingpracticallyallthemaincommunities,clans,andlocalities.Theconference,patternedaftertraditionalpeacemeetings,lastedformorethanthreemonths,withoutatimelimit.Itwaslocallyorganizedandfinanced,anditaddressedgrievancesanddifferences

atthelocallevelbeforemovingtoformalgovernanceissues,statestructures,andpower-sharingarrangements.Attheendoftheconference,apresidentandaparliamentwereelected,andvariousinterclanconflictsweresettled.TheBoromaconferencesucceededwherelarger,externallydriven,top-downconferencesdidnot.

toprovideessentialgoodsandservices,sometimesmoreeffectivelythanwhentherewasaninternationallyrecognizedgovernment.Theabsenceofrestrictivegovernmentpolicieshastendedtoencouragecompetitionandentrepreneurship.

Infrastructureservicessuchastelecommunications,power,andtransportation,includingairwhichhadbeenprovidedbythepublicsectorarenowprovidedbythelocalprivatesector.EfficienttradingsystemshaveenabledSomalitraderstopenetratemarketsinneighboringcountriesandremaincompetitive.Theprivatesector,whichisseldomboundbyregionalandtribalorclandivisions,actsasanintegratingfactor.Thelivestocktrade

(thelinchpinoftheSomalieconomy),moneytransfer,transportation,andtelecommunicationsareallinterregionalandthereforehighlyintegrative.Privateactivityhasbeenmostactiveinareaswhererelativesecurityprevails.ThusthereisarelativelyvibrantprivatesectoraroundthenortheastportofBosaso(inPuntland)andinSomaliland.InHargeisa,Somaliland,forexample,therearefourcompetingtelephoneserviceproviderswithratesthatareinternationallycompetitive.Thereisarelativeboominrealestateandconstruction,andefficienttradeandbankingservices.Alocalprivateairline(DalloAirlines)linksHargeisanotonlywithothercitiesofSomaliabutalsowithseveralinternationaldestinations:Jeddah,Dubai,AddisAbaba,andDjibouti.Amoneytransfercompany(Dahabshil),startedbyalocalentrepreneur,hasbranchesinmanypartsoftheworldandconnectsSomalisinthediasporawithrelativesathome.ItcantransfermoneyfrommostmajorcitesinEurope,NorthAmerica,andtheMiddleEasttorelativesanywhereinSomalia,orbetweendifferentlocalitiesinsideSomalia,withinacoupleofdays.

Civilsociety,includingreligiousorganizations,andclaneldershaveplayedasignificantroleinmediatinginterclanconflictsandencouragingcross-cuttingactivities.Religiousgroups,whichareactiveevenwherehostilitieshavenotyetceased,haveprovidedhealthandeducationservicesandhaveinsomeinstancessuppliedfoodtoorphansandpoorfamilies.Thesegroupsoftentranscendclanandregionallines,thushelpingstrengthencross-cuttingsocialcapital.TheroleofcivilsocietyincontainingconflictismostevidentinSomaliland,wheretraditionalleadershipandauthorityhaveremainedrelativelyintact,despitetheeffortsofthelastcentralgovernmenttosubvertit.Clanleadersareoftenmosteffectiveinbuildingbondingcapitalbetweenmembersofagroupandmediatingconflictwithinthatgroup,buttheyhavealsobeensuccessfulinmediatingandcontainingconflictbetweengroupsandclansinareasofrelativecalm.

Thesetraditionalleadershavebeenthemainelementinrestraininginterclanconflictandinlayingthebasisfortheemergenceofcivilauthority.Theyareleasteffectiveinareaswherethereisstillopenconflictorthatarerunbywarlords.

TheImpactofStateandMarketForcesonSocialCohesioninGuatemalaandSomalia

TheSomaliandGuatemalangovernmentsbothstruckoutagainsttheirpeoplesintheirattemptstomaintaincontroloverpowerandresources.IndigenousandruralgroupsinGuatemalafoughttogainpolitical,economic,andsocialrightsand,inparticular,accesstoland.Campaignsbythegovernmenttoeradicatethe"enemy"ledtoyearsofviolenceacrosstheGuatemalancountryside.Socialinitiativemovesbycivilsocietyfinallyusheredinpeaceafteralmostfourdecadesofwarfareandextermination.

TheSomaligovernmenttriedtosuppressallformsofoppositionandintheprocessfellintoanarchy,withclanbattlingclanoverpower.Tocounterthischaos,sociallyresponsiblereligiousgroupshaveprovidededucationandhealthservices.AlthoughhostilitieshavenotceasedinSomalia,varioustypesofsocialinitiativehaveemerged.Manywomen'sgroupshavetriedtopromotepeacemaking,andglobalization,especiallyintheformofmarketpenetration,hasfacilitatedsuccessfulmovestowardstabilityinthenorthwesternandnortheasternregions.

Accordingtoconventionalwisdom,thehigherthecapacityofcivilsocietyforsocialresponsibilityandsocialinitiative,thehigherthelevelofsocialcapital.Thestudyresultsshowhowtheeffectofconflictonthetwodimensionsofsocialcapitaldifferedinthecountriesstudied(seeTables5and6).

Thestudyresultsrevealtherelationshipbetweenthedevelopmentofcivilsocietyandviolentconflictisnottotallypredictable.Warcausesthedecayand,inseveresituations,theweakeningofcivilsociety,particularlybyreinforcingbonding,inward-lookingsocialcapitalinthequestforsurvivalofteninadvertentlyunderminingcross-cutting

socialcapitalthatmaybridgediversecommunalgroups.Yet,asthisstudyindicates,insomesituationscivilsocietymaycontinuetobeactive,ormaythriveevenasfightingcontinues,byprovidingwelfareandprotectionservicesinvolatileregionsthussupplantingprimaryrelations,andinmoresecureareas,creatingthespaceandconnectivitythatmarketforcesrequire.

Table5Interactionsbetweenviolentconflictandsocialcapital:GuatemalaHigh-conflictperiod Low-conflictperiod

Highsocialcapital

Emergenceofgroupsthatprovidedsocialwelfareandprotectivemechanismsduringandimmediatelyafterconflict,suchasthenumerousNGOsandothercivilsocietygroups.

Religiousleaderswholedliberationtheologymovementsandwho,withtheirfollowers,wereoftentargetedbythestatefortheirbeliefsandactions.

OrganizationsofGuatemalanwomenwhounitedtopromotepeacemaking.

TraditionalMayaninstitutions,suchasMayaspirituality,thatprovidedasafetynetforcommunitiesaffectedbyviolence,andnationalMayaorganizationsthatunitedtofightfortherecognitionoftheirrightsduringthepeacenegotiationsandinthereconstructionprocess.

TraditionalGuatemalanstructures,suchasthealcaldesauxiliares,whowereelectedbytheircommunitiesandwerechargedwithrepresentingtheminthemunicipalgovernment.Theyhadsomeadministrative,judiciary,andpolicefunctionsandwerechargedwithlocaldisputeresolution.

Lowsocialcapital

Targetingofthestate'sownconstituentsduringthewar.Thiswasacentralpolicyofthemilitaryauthoritiesandwasfacilitatedbythebreakdownofthelegalsystemanddemocraticcontrols,whichthenallowedtheviolationofhumanrights.Humanrightsviolationsoftentooktheformofprivateviolenceimplementedbysecretandparamilitaryorganizationsonordersfromhighpoliticalfigures.Inmostcases,theviolencetookplaceawayfromthetheaterofwar,oftenstrikingpeoplenotdirectlyinvolvedineitherpoliticalaffairsorguerrillawarfare.Thesystemimplementedtoperpetratethesecrimeswasdeeplyrootedinthecountry.Thismilitarypolicyfurthererodedrelationsbetweenthepeopleandthegovernment.

DiscriminationagainsttheMayas,whichhasbeen,andremains,imbeddedinGuatemalanculture,preventingthecreationofcross-cuttingsocialcapital.

Lackofcross-cuttingsocialcapital,evidencedbythehistoricallypoorrelationsbe-

(Tablecontinuesonnextpage)

Table5(continued)High-conflictperiod Low-conflictperiod

Schismswithincommunitiesassomevillagersjoinedgovernment-supportedcivildefensepatrols(PACs).ThePACs,alongwithmilitarycommissars,replacedthetraditionalalcaldesauxiliares.

tweenindigenousgroupsandtheLadinos.Althoughsocialcapitalwithineachgroupmayhavebeenhighorstable,thelackofbridgingsocialcapitalhaspreventedunderstandingbetweenthem.

Adverseeffectsonothersocialstructuresandtraditionalfigures.Elders,whoseauthorityhadalreadybeenweakenedbyCatholiccatechists,werefurtherunderminedbyrepression.Cofradias,traditionalreligiousstructures,losttheirabilitytocarryontheircomplexritualsduringthewar,andtheirleaders(mayordomos)lostmuchoftheirauthority.

Table6Interactionsbetweenviolentconflictandsocialcapital:SomaliaHigh-conflictperiod

Low-conflictperiod

Highsocialcapital

EmergenceofadefactogovernmentinHargeisaabletoprovideservicesandorder.

Increasedmarketpenetrationthroughthediaspora,promotingcross-cuttingties.

Emergenceofwomen'sinitiativesduringtheconflict,unitingclansthroughtradeandeconomicactivities("Green-Linemarkets").

Provisionbyreligiousinstitutionsofservicessuchaseducationand

Somalieldersfromdifferentclansmanagedandresolvedconflictbyusingasguidancecustomarylawsthatregulatedandcurbedpotentialconflictwithinorbetweenclans.EldersthusretainedacriticalfunctioninSomalisocietythroughtheirimportantroleinnegotiationswithothergroupsandasmediatorsfortheirowncommunities.Intheory,eldersdidnothaveauthoritativepowertodeterminetheoutcomeofaconflict;rather,theyrepresentedthepreferencesoftheirclans.

Allianceofclansthroughmarriage,whichestablishedsocialandeconomictiesbetweenthegroups.

healthcarethatthegovernmentwasunabletoprovide.

Lowsocialcapital

DissolutionofthestategovernmentofSomalia.

Clashesbetweenclansvyingforcontrolofpower,territory,andresources.

Inabilityofclanstosuccessfullynegotiateapeaceagreementdespitenumerousinternational,regional,andlocalefforts.

ThechronicdisconnectbetweentheSomalistateanditspeople.Lackofgovernmentorganizationalintegrityandsynergisticrelationsthroughoutthecountry'sindependence,exceptforashortperiodofafewyears.

Socialresponsibilityandthelevelofviolentconflictdidseemtobepositivelycorrelated.StudyresultsrevealedthatthesocialresponsibilityofcivilsocietyseemedtobemoreactiveinbothNebajandHargeisathanincommunitiesnotastraumatizedbywar.Thisdevelopment,whichwasattributedtotheneedtosecurebasicneedsandensuresurvival,emergedinbothconflictareasduringorsoonaftertheconflict.Thus,warwouldseemtohaveapositiveimpactonmobilizingfamiliesandtightlyknitcommunitiestobecomesociallyresponsibleinensuringcommunalprotectionandsurvival,predominantlywelfarefunctions.

Theresultsofthestudyfailedtoexplainunambiguouslyhowconflictaffectedsocialinitiativethatis,civilsociety'sabilitytonurtureeconomicgrowthanddevelopment.Ingeneral,levelsofsocialinitiativewereaffectedlessbyconflictthanbyotherfactors,primarilyconfidence,materialopportunities,cognitivecapital,andnormativeobstacles.(Itshould,however,benotedthatconflictdoesdirectlyaffectthesefactorsandthusindirectlyinfluencessocialinitiative.)PuertoBarriosandHargeisahadrelativelyhighsocialinitiativelevelsdespitemixedexperienceswithconflict.(PuertoBarrioswaslesstraumatizedthanNebaj,whileHargeisawasexposedtomoreconflictthanBoroma.)AreasonforthismixedresultmaybethatPuertoBarriosandHargeisaarelargerthantheircounterpartsand,perhapsbecauseoftheirsize,havehigherlevelsofmarketpenetration.PuertoBarriossufferedlessdamagetoitsinfrastructure(roadsandcommunications)thandidNebaj,whileHargeisa'sinfrastructurebenefitedfromanengagedandactivediasporacommittedtoreinvestinginandrebuildingnorthernSomalia.Theseoutsidecontacts,incombinationwithweakstatepenetrationand,therefore,fewerfinancialregulations,expeditedgrowthinHargeisa.This,inturn,providedanopeningfortheformationofbridgingsocialcapitalthroughthemarketplace.

Overall,thestudyfindingsappeartoillustrateinterestingfacetsofthetwodimensionsofsocialcapitalsocialresponsibilityandsocialinitiative,orhorizontalsocialcapitalinresponsetovaryinglevelsofstateandmarketpenetration(verticalsocialcapital).Ofthetwohard-hittowns,Nebajhadahighsocialresponsibilitylevelandalowsocialinitiativelevel,whereas

Hargeisahadhighlevelsofsocialresponsibilityandsocialinitiative.PuertoBarrioshadlowerlevelsofsocialresponsibilityandhigherlevelsofsocialinitiative,andBoromaexhibitedlowerlevelsofbothsocialresponsibilityandsocialinitiative.

ThefindingsinGuatemalastemfromvaryingdegreesofstatepenetrationanddemographics.Nebajwasoneofthemainareaswherethearmyfullyprosecuteditscounterinsurgencystrategy,withPACsbeingestablishedinallcommunities.Thetown,whichisroughly95percentMaya-Ixil,turnedinwardinresponsetothediscriminatoryandviolentpracticesofthestate.PuertoBarrioswaslesstouchedbyviolence,hadamoremixedLadinoandMayanpopulation(withsomeblacksandGarifunas,orblackCaribs),andwaslessaffectedbystatepenetrationthroughthecounterinsurgencyeffortsthanitscounterpartNebaj.Itscoredhighonsocialinitiativebutlowonsocialresponsibility.Thistranslatesintospecifictypesofhorizontalandverticalsocialcapitalthatdifferedbetweenthetowns,withNebajexemplifyingprimarybondingsocialcapitalandPuertoBarriostiltingtowardbridgingsocialcapital.

Inshort,wheretherewasspace,civilsocietyinGuatemalareactedbyformingbridgingsocialcapital.Wheretherewasdiscriminationandoppression,civilsocietycontractedintoinsular,bondingsocialcapital.Insomecases,traditionalMayaninstitutions,suchasMayanspiritualityandcommunitystructures,providedasafetynetforthosemostaffectedbyviolence,whilenationalMayanorganizationsunitedtofightfortherecognitionoftheirrightsduringthepeacenegotiationsandinthereconstructionprocess.

Thus,althoughtheremaybesomeinteractionbetweensocialresponsibilityandsocialinitiative,theyappeartodivergeduringheightenedperiodsofconflict,withakindofsurvivalistretreatintoprimarybondingsocialcapitaltakingplaceespeciallyamongthe

discriminated-againstMayanpopulation.ThisisnotunlikethebehaviorofCambodians,andtheTutsiofRwandaduringtheheightoforganizedstateviolenceinthosesocieties.

Inexaminingcivilsociety'scapacityforsocialresponsibilityandsocialinitiativeinGuatemalaandSomalia,theroleofthestateandmarketforcesisevident.Mappingthefunctionsand

responsibilitiesofcivilsocietyrevealedtheinadequaciesandthestrengthsofthestateandtheinvolvementoftheexternalmarket.Civilsocietyinbothcountriessubstitutedforstaterolesbybecomingthemainproviderofsafetynetsandbasicservices,especiallyforvulnerablegroupsinthecontextofafailedstate(inSomalia)andanoppressive,exclusionarystate(inGuatemala).InSomalia,andtoalesserextentinGuatemala,theeffectsofglobalization,intheformofexternalverticalmarketpenetrationandthespreadoftechnology,facilitatedtheformationofbridginghorizontalsocialcapitalandtheestablishmentofrelativepeaceanddevelopmentbymakingpossiblesocialspace,exchange,andeconomicgrowth.

Onthebasisoftheseinitialfindings,acloserexaminationofsocialcapitalastheabilityofcivilsocietytoengageinsocialresponsibilityandsocialinitiative,andtheinterrelationsofthesedimensionswithstateandmarketpenetration,isneededtoshedlightonthecomplexprocessofindigenoussurvival,reconstruction,development,and,ultimately,reconciliationintheaftermathofvaryingdegreesofviolentconflict.

5Civic,Market,andStateEngagement:AComparativeAnalysisCivic,market,andstateengagementunderconditionsofviolentconflicthavevaryingeffectsonoverallsocialcapitalformationandsocietalcohesion.AswastrueinCambodiaandRwanda,thedegreetowhichtheoverallsocialcohesionofGuatemalaandSomaliaisrealizedwillbeafunctionoftheintegrationofhorizontalsocialcapitalintheformofathrivingcivilsociety(bridging)andstrongprimaryrelations(bonding)withverticalsocialcapital,manifestedindynamic,inclusivestateandmarketengagement.Thisnexus,inturn,manifestsitselfinamyriadofcross-cuttingsocialandinstitutionalrelationsthatcanserveaconflictmanagement,mediation,andmitigation(prevention)function,thebasisforlastingpeaceandsustainabledevelopment.Ineachofthefourcasestudies,civicengagementemergedbothduringandimmediatelyaftertheconflictintheformofmobilizationofsocialprotectionoractivitiesforgrowthanddevelopment.Marketactivitiesemergedinthemorestableregionsofcountriesplaguedbyconflictorintheimmediateaftermathperiodandenabledbridging,intercommunityrelations.Theinterfaceofthestatewithsocialcapitalandconflictiscomplex;boththeoverpoweringpresenceofthestate(inCambodia,Rwanda,andGuatemala)anditsabsence(inSomalia)ledtothedisruptionofmostsocialrelations.

CopingwithViolentConflict:TheRoleofCivilSocietyduringWarfare

Manifestationsofsocialcapitalemergedduringconflictorimmediatelyafterthecessationofhostilitiesintheformoflocal,internalcopingmechanismsthatprovidedwelfareandsocialprotectionineachcountrystudied(seeBox6).Inthisregard,conflictseeminglyspurredintegrativesocialcapitalgearedtowardmitigatingriskswithinthecommunity.Interestingly,thisoccurrednotonlywithinnuclearandextendedfamiliesbutalsowithinthebroadercommunity,encompassingcivilsocietyactors.Thissocialcapitalbasedonprimaryassociationsresembledwhathadexistedinthepreconflictperiod,withslightvariationsonthepreviousforms.

Bothbondingandbridgingsocialcapitalemergedwithincivilsocietyintheformofmovestowardwelfareandsocialprotectionand,tosomeextent,growthanddevelopment(suchaseffortstoexpeditethepeaceprocess).DuringtheHengSamrinperiodinCambodia,astheconflictbegantowane,traditionaltypesofsocialcapital(forexample,pagodaandfuneralassociations)revived,informssimilartothosebeforetheconflict.InRwanda,newassociationsofwidowsandorphansemergedtoprovidemutualassistanceshortlyafterthegenocideceased,takingupthetraditionalrolesoffamiliesincaringforthesevulnerablegroups.InGuatemala,Mayanwomen'sassociationsemergedduringthewarandservedasacatalystforthepeaceprocess,whileindigenousgroupsunitedthroughtherecreationofinstitutionsforself-protectionandpromotion,suchastheComunidadesdePoblaciónenResistencia(CPR).Andinthemidstofnationalconflict,religiousinstitutionsinSomaliahaveestablishedschoolsandprovidedhealthservices.

Civicreactionstoconflictanditslegaciescopingmechanismsvariedbycountryandtypeofwarfare.Ingeneral,copingmechanismscanbe

internalorexternalandtraditionallyrangefromhorizontalsocialcapitalrelations,suchasfamily,extendedfamily,orclans,tomorebridgingformalandsometimesverticalorganizationssuchasreligiousgroups,localgovernments,andmarkets.

Box6Civilsocietyandviolentconflict

Cambodia

IntraditionalCambodiansociety,groupsthatlinkednon-kinwerefew.Inbothvillagesexaminedforthestudylow-conflictPrasathandhigh-conflictPreyKohsomeformsofcivilsocietyactorsexistedbeforethewar,butduringtheconflict,alltypesofcivilsocietyactorsceasedtoexist.Afterthecessationofhostilities,civilsocietyactors,notablyNGOsinvolvedinsocioeconomicdevelopment,increasedinnumberandfunction.

Rwanda

ManyeffortsweremadetostrengthencivilsocietyinRwandainthelate1980sandearly1990s,inthestudyvillagesofShyandaandGitiasinotherplaces.Yettheexistenceofcivilsocietyactorsbeforetheconflictincludingcooperatives,creditgroups,church-relatedorganizations,andNGOsdidnotleadtothegrowthofcross-cuttingsocialcapital,asevidencedbytherapidexplosionofthegenocide.CivilrelationsbetweenHutuandTutsiquicklyevaporatedoncethestateorderedTutsielimination.Aprimaryreasonwasthenarrowserviceorientationofthegroups,whichweremainlyapolitical.Democracy,inclusion,andtolerancedidnot

automaticallyresultfromthegroups'mereexistence;thesequalitiesneedtobeactivelyfostered.Inthepost-genocidesetting,newcivilsocietyactorsareexclusiveinthattheybenefitonlytheirmembers,buttheyhaveservedtoempowerthevulnerable(mainlywomenandorphans).

Guatemala

Duringthewar,Guatemalanwomen'sorganizationswereavaluablecatalystforthepeaceprocess.Tiredofwarfareandtheresultingdestitutionandtragedy,thesegroupsbegantolobbyforapeacefulsolutionbyunitingandinvolvingrelevantactors.Theconflicthasalsospurredthegrowthofnumerousassociationsofindigenouspeopletoprotecttheirexistence,wayoflife,andinterests.ThishasoccurredthroughoutGuatemala,includingbothstudysites,NebajandPuertoBarrios.Thepurposesofthegroupsrangefrompursuingpoliticalactivitiestopromotingeconomicinitiativestospurincomegenerationinthesemostlyimpoverishedruralregions.

Somalia

Inbothstudysites,HargeisaandBoroma,religiousinstitutionshavearisentomakeupforthedearthofstatehealthandeducationservices.Manywomen'sgroupshavesteppedtotheforefrontofthepeaceeffort,linkingwarringclansthroughexchangeand

women'speacediscussions.CivilsocietyinnorthernSomaliahasflourishedasaresultofthedemandforservicesandmarketopportunitiesintheabsenceofstateprovision,regulation,andcontrol.

Internalmechanismsincludesocialunits,localreligiousinstitutions,localpoliticalorganizations,andeconomicsystems.

Thesocialunit,whichincludesnuclearandextendedfamilies,isthestrongestandmostbasicofallinternalcopingmechanisms.Incrises,familiesfirsthelpthemselves,thentheirrelatives,andthentheirneighbors.Duringthetransitionfromwartopeace,thefamilyisthesocialunitthatismostlookedtoforemotionalrecovery.

Religiousinstitutions(churches,mosques,andtemples)oftenprovideleadership,comfort,andemotionalsupportindisasters.Duringreconstruction,theyareanexcellententrypointforexternalactors,sincetheyallowdirectaccesstothecommunitythroughpreexistingknowledge,relations,andcommunicationschannels.

Localpoliticalorganizationsmayprovideleadership,superviseexternalinterventionduringacrisis,andassistwithplanningandimplementationduringreconstruction.

Economiccopingmechanismsfallintothreetypes:informal,interpersonaleconomicrelationships;patronage;andmutualassistanceorganizationssuchascooperativesandlaborunions.Duringwarfareorcrisis,interpersonaleconomicrelationshipsmayemergeaspartofthewartimeeconomy,asisthecasewithmuchoftheentrepreneurshipinnorthernSomalia.Reconstructioneffortscantargettheseinformalrelationsthroughmacropolicyandcanhelpspurlocalgrowththroughmicrocreditefforts(seeBox7).Mutualassistanceorganizationssuchascooperativesshouldbesoughtoutasnaturalcounterpartsinthedeliveryofemergencyreliefandinlonger-termreconstruction.

ExternalmechanismsincludenonlocalorganizationssuchasNGOs,religiousgroups,politicalorganizations,economicinstitutions,socialandeconomicdevelopmentorganizations,and,insomecases,the

nationalgovernment.AsCuny(1994:84)statesinhisseminalwork,''Theeffectivenessofexternalmechanismsdependslargelyupontheirabilitytounderstandanddealwithculturalconstraintswithinthehostsociety,theirviewofdevelopment,andtheirabilitytocommunicateeffectivelywiththe

Box7Women'svillagebankinginGuatemala:buildingcross-cuttingtiesthroughcredit

InthehighlandsofGuatemala,awar-ravagedarea,socialcapitalhasbeenrestoredandisbeingtransformedthroughvillagebanking.There,theexpansionofsocialnetworksamongruralandsemiurbanmarginalizedwomenispayingfinancialandsocialdividends.Oftenoverlookedinstudiesofmicrofinanceprogramsistheimportanceofusingsocialandassociationalarrangementstopromotegroupsolidarityasameansofovercomingthehighcostoflendingtoclientswithfewassets.Workinginhigh-conflictsituationswhereviolenceanduncertaintyunderminetrustandconfidenceisdifficult.Humanitarianassistanceprogramscancompoundtheproblemthroughpaternalisticapproaches,turningonceself-reliantcitizensintopassivebeneficiaries.

Invillagebanks,trustplaysanenormouslyimportantroleinkeepingoperationsefficient,reducingtransactioncosts,andsmoothingrelations.Witheachsuccessfulcycleoflendingandrepayment,thestockofsocialcapitalgrows,astrustandconfidencearedeepened.StaffmembersofFINCA,theNGOfacilitatingtheGuatemalanbankingprogram,transfersits

stockofsocialcapital(networksandrelationships),aswellasitsfinancialaccountingandbankingknow-how,toMayanwomen.Theprogramlinkstheclientstootheractorsandtoprivateandpublicinformation.Ineffect,ittransformstheirexistingbondingsocialcapitalintoabroaderbridgingsocialcapitalthat,inturn,hasspin-offeffectsonproductionandmarketingand,ultimately,onincomeandwell-being.

Source:Humphreys-BebbingtonandGomez(2000).

victims."Thesegroupsmaybecomeinvolvedduringthedisaster,inthetransitionphase,inreconstruction,orinlonger-termdevelopment.Althoughthisgroupofexternalmechanismsdoesnotdirectlyincludecivilsociety,itdoesinterfacewithmanycivilsocietyactors.

Inacrisis,peopleusuallyturntothatwhichismostfamiliar,andthiscanenhancecopingmechanisms'efficacyandabilitytooperate.Ingeneral,lesscomplexsocieties,suchasruralcultures,haveshorterrecoveryperiods.Inruralsettings,externalmechanismsaremoreeffectiveandefficientiftheyoperatethrough

existinginternalmechanisms.Overlyintrusiveexternalinterventionsmayinadvertentlyinjureordisplaceinternalcopingmechanismsordecreasetheireffectivenessortheirabilitytofunction.Inmorecomplexurbansettings,itislesslikelythatinternalcopingmechanismswillbeutilized.Externalmechanismsthenbecomemoreappropriateforintervention.

Crisesmayseverelystrainindigenouscopingmechanisms,whetherinformalorformal,buttheydonotdestroythem.Often,conflictanddisasteracttoreinforcethesemechanismsandforcelocalorganizationstoimprovetheirabilities.Amajorconcernisthatexternalinterventionsmayignorelocal,spontaneouscopingmechanisms,disrupttheinternalgroups'abilitytofunction,and,insomecases,damagethelocalcopingfabric,underminingthecredibilityoflocaleffortswithinthecommunity.Thus,additiveratherthansubstitutionalstrategiesarethepreferredcourseofactionduringthetransitionfromemergencytodevelopment.

Asevidencedinearlierchapters,variousformsofsurvival-basedsocialcapitaldidemergefromwithinthesocietyduringorimmediatelyaftertheconflict,andthesevariedaccordingtothenatureofconflictthatplaguedeachcountry.Effortstoreconstructsocialcapitalinthepostwarenvironmentmustbuildfromtheseindigenous,spontaneouscopingmechanisms,whicharealreadyinplaceandfunctioning.

MarketForces,Globalization,andViolentConflict

Soonafterhostilitiesceased,newsecondarylevelsofbridgingassociationalsocialcapitalemerged,forgingthelinksnecessaryforgrowthanddevelopment(seeBox8).InHargeisa,Somaliprivateentrepreneurs(primarilyfromthediaspora)initiatedbusinessactivitiestoreinstateservicessuchascommunicationsandpublic

transportation,whilewomen'sgroupsopenedmarketsthatallowedexchangebetweenwarringclans.InPreyKoh,Cambodiantransportationentrepreneursfacilitatednewbusinesstiesbetweenhaulersandvegetableproducers.Intheimmediatepostconflictperiod,linkagesexternaltoprimarygroupstendedtoproliferate,encouragedbythepotentialinvolvement

Box8Marketpenetrationandviolentconflict

Cambodia

Bothvillageswererelativelyunexposedtotheeffectsofglobalizationandmodernizationinthepreconflictperiod.Forthemostpart,theonlyexternalactororinfluencewasthegovernment,whichprovidedafewbasicservicesineachvillage.Farming,mostlycarriedonbyindividualfamilies,continuedtobethemainactivity.Exchangeprimarilyinvolvedlaborandgoods,butsomeexchangesformoneydidtakeplace.

Prasathhaslittleeconomicactivityexceptfortradewithinthevillageinlocalagriculturalproductsandnecessities.Ingeneral,theareahadfewerresourcesthanPreyKoh,anditsproximitytoamountainous,forestedregionmakesitmorepronetosurpriseattacks.PreyKoh,closertoamainroadandthereforetomarketactivities,hasdeepermarketpenetrationandmoreexternalties.

Rwanda

BothShyandaandGitiwererelativelypoorcommunes.Mosttypesofexchangewereinagriculturalproductsand,tosomeextent,livestock.Scarcityoflandandcattle,as

wellasincreasinglanddegradation,becameproblemsaspopulationlevelscontinuallyrose.Thefallofcoffeepricesinthelate1980sfurtheraggravatedtheworseningeconomicconditions.Credit,giftgiving,andmutualassistancedecreasedasimpoverishmentgrew.

Inbothcommunes,modernizationandmonetizationhavecontinuedtotransformformsofsocialcapital.Heightenedindividualismandtheincreasedvalueplacedonmoneyhaveledtodiminishinginvolvementinactivitiestobenefittheoverallcommunityandtogreaterreluctancetoextendcredit.Mutualassistancehasalsodecreasedtoadegree.Asmoneyhasbecameamoreintegralpartofcommunalliving,peoplehavetendedtolockuptheirbelongings,perhapscreatingasenseofmistrustorlackofsecurity.

Guatemala

ThemarkethadlittleeffectineitherNebajorPuertoBarriosbeforethewar,probablybecauseofgovernmentpoliciesthatfocusedongrowthanddevelopmentinurbancentersanddidnotencouragemarketaccessanddevelopmentincertainruralareas.NebajisandhasbeenrelativelymoreisolatedthanPuertoBarriosfromeconomicactivities,exceptforthoseassociatedwithfarming.

Somalia

EconomicactivityhasemergedinbothHargeisaandBoromadespitetheconflictthatcontinuestoplaguethesouthernregionsofSomalia.MuchofthisneweconomicgrowthanddevelopmenthastakenplaceincommunicationsandtransportationandhasbeeninitiatedbytheSomalidiaspora.Thewaractuallyspurredeconomicgrowthanddevelopmentintheregion,probablybecausetherewaslessstatecontrol,lessregulation,andfewertraderestrictions.

ofadiaspora,theabsenceofstateregulationandcontrol,andthedisruptionoftraditionalconstraintsorofoverlyrestrictivegrouployalties.

ThefindingsfromtheRwandaandCambodiastudiessuggestthatmodernizationhasalsoaffectedthetransformationofthestructureofsocialcapital.Overall,localperceptionsofsocialcapitalfocusedprimarilyonwhatwasdeemed"tradition"(traditionalnorms,values,andcustoms)andthesocialcapitalconceptsaffiliatedwithbonding,orprimarysocialcapital.Interviewees'definitionsofsocialcapital,forthemostpart,didnotextendtoexternallinkages(thatis,tothestate'seffectiveness,capacitytofunction,orconnectednesstothecommunity).Participantsviewedmovestowardestablishinglinkagesasaweakeningoftheirsocialcapital.VillagersinPreyKohandPrasathandcommunemembersinGitiandShyandaallfeltthatmarketpenetrationandmonetizationhaderodedlocaltrustandmutualassistance.Inotherwords,astheysawit,movestowardglobalizationhaddissolvedtraditionalsocial,political,andeconomicstructures.Manystatedthattheythoughtmarketpenetrationhadaffectedsocialcapitalintheirsocietiesmorethanhadconflict,intermsoftheshiftoffocusfromfamilialandintracommunitytiestointercommunityrelations.

Thetransformationalreadysetinmotionbytrendstowardglobalizationineachcountrywasacceleratedbyconflictandtheresultingbreakinthenormalfunctioningofsocialcapitalsystems.Oppressiveandexploitativesecondaryrelationsandlinkagesresultedindiminishedtrustandweakenedsocialcohesion.ExternalinterventionssuchashumanitarianreliefandNGOssteppedin,tovaryingdegreesfromcountrytocountry,tofillthetraditionalprotectionandservice-supplyingrolestypicalofkinandstate.

StateFailureandCivilWar

Alackoforganizationalintegrityandsynergyofthestate,orpoorverticalsocialcapitalrelations,wasakeycauseofeachconflictexamined(seeBox9).Ineachcasethegovernmentdidnothavetheabilitytoperformstandardstaterolesandwasremote

Box9Statepenetrationandviolentconflict

Cambodia

Duringtheconflict,statepenetrationwasequallydeepinthehigh-conflictvillage(PreyKoh)andthelow-conflictvillage(Prasath).Thestatewasdistantfrombothvillagesinthepreconflictperiod,providingonlyafewbasicservicestoeither.DuringtheLonNolandKhmerRougeregimes,thestateexertedconsiderablepressureoncommunities.ManyvillagerswereforcedtojointheLonNolranks;somejoinedvoluntarilyforfearofbeingassociatedwiththe"losing"sideiftheydidnot.StatepowerundertheKhmerRougewasabsolute,andallformsofreligion,culture,tradition,organization,andfamilyweredestroyed.Peoplewereherdedfromthecitiesintoruralcampstoworkoncommunalfarms.Punishmentforanybreachofconductwassevere.WhentheKhmerRougetookoverPrasathandPreyKoh,thosewhohadbeenaffiliatedwiththeLonNolarmywerepunished,andvillagersweresplitbetween"old"and"new"people,accordingtohowlongtheyhadbeenunderKhmerRougecontrol.The"old"peoplereceivedprivilegesinpreferencetothe''new"people,dividingthevillageandincreasingasenseofdistrust.

Rwanda

Traditionally,thecentralgovernmenthasexertedextremecontroloverRwandans.

Highconflict.AfterthegenocideeruptedinKigaliandnearbyareas,manyRwandansfledtoShyanda,whichwasknownforsolidHutuandTutsirelations.However,followingavisitfromtheactingprimeminister,sensitizationsessionswereheldamongHutu,andkillingsofTutsibeganonthesameday.

Lowconflict.TheburgomasterinGiti,unlikemanycommunalleadersthroughoutRwanda,wasactuallyfromthecommuneandwasfamiliarwithhisconstituents.Whenkillingsbrokeoutontheedgeofhiscommune,heunitedHutuandTutsitosafeguardTutsiinGiti.ThecommunewasalsosparedthehatepoliticstypicalthroughoutRwandafromtheearly1960sonward.ItsshiftingadministrativetieswiththeprefecturesofKigaliandByumbaweakenedthechainofauthoritybetweenthecenterandthecommune,andthisdistanceaffordedGitithespacetorefusetojoininthekillings.Inaddition,ByumbawasanearlypointofreentryfortheRPF,whichprotectedmembersofitsethnicgroup.

Guatemala

Duringthewar,systematicviolationsofhumanrights,mostofthembythestateagainstthepeople,tookplaceinbothNebajandPuertoBarrios(aselsewhereinGuatemala).Thebreakdownofthelegalsystemandofdemocraticcontrols,whichallowedtheviolationofhumanrights,becameacentralpolicyofthemilitaryauthorities.Often,humanrights

(Boxcontinuesonnextpage)

Box9(continued)

violationstooktheformofprivateviolence,implementedbysecretandparamilitaryorganizationsonordersfromhighpoliticalfigures.Theviolencetookplaceawayfromthebattlefieldinmostcases,strikingpeoplenotdirectlyinvolvedineitherpoliticsorguerrillaactivities.

Thegovernmenthadahistoryofrepressionandviolenceagainstindigenouspeoplesandpeoplelivinginruralareas,especiallyiftheyweresuspectedofbeingaffiliatedwiththeguerrillas.Governmentruleenforcedhighlypoliticalandexclusionaryeconomicandsocialpolicies,givingasmallminorityalmostabsolutepoliticalpowerandcontrolovermostresources.ThegovernmentalsomadeeffortstosplitcommunitiesbyrecruitingvillagersasmembersofthePACs.

Somalia

SiadBarreattemptedtodestroyallclan-basedsocialinstitutionsbyrenamingclanleaders"peacekeepers"andincorporatingthemintothestatebureaucracy.HeattackedSomalitraditionsbytryingtoclaimabsolutesocialandpoliticalcontrol.Theregimesoughttocreatedependenceonthestateinitsstrategytoreplacetheclansystem.Bothcitieschosenforthestudyare

innorthernSomalia:Hargeisa,thecapitalofSomaliland,whereadefactogovernmentthatprovidesorderandserviceshasbeenoperatingsince1991,andBoroma,whichhasalocalgovernmentstructure.EvenwhilewarcontinuesintherestofSomalia,somegrowthanddevelopmenthasoccurredinthenorthernregion.Sincethereisnocentralgovernment,thelegalsysteminbothHargeisaandBoromaisweak;thus,spaceformoretraditionalconflict-resolutionmechanismssuchastheuseofeldersasinformalmediatorsofdisputeshasemerged.

fromitsconstituents,whetherbecauseofanarchyorauthoritarianrule(seeTable7).InCambodiaandRwandastatepenetrationwassometimesideologicallydriven,butitsconsistentgoalwastheretentionofpowerbythepoliticaleliteunderconditionsofincreasinginequality,exclusion,andindignity.BoththeLonNolandKhmerRougeregimesweredistantfromtheirconstituentsyetsoughttocontrolandregulatethem.InRwandathedisconnectbetweenthehighlycentralized,authoritariangovernmentandthesubjugatedmassesthelackofsynergyledtothedissolutionofstabilityandtheeruptionofhostilities.TheGuatemalangovernment,plaguedbycorruption,wasbentonretainingpowerandoncontinuedexploitationandthuswashighlyrepressiveanddictatorial,withthemilitaryinthevan-

Table7OrganizationalintegrityofthestateSynergy:stateandcommunityinterface Statecapacityandeffectiveness

Low HighLow Anarchy

(collapsedstates)Somalia

Inefficiency,ineffectiveness(weakstates)Rwanda

High Predation,corruption(roguestates)GuatemalaandCambodia

Cooperation,accountability,flexibility(developmentalstates)

Source:BasedonWoolcock(1998).

guardofstatepenetration.AcorruptandpredatorySomalistate,withlittleconnectiontothelocallevel,dissolvedasaresultofdysfunction,leadingtoarmedchaos.AlthoughthetypeofconflictandtheindigenousmanifestationsofsocialcapitalwerequitedifferentinGuatemalaandSomalia,lackoforganizationalintegritycontributedtotheviolenceinboth.Relationsbetweengovernmentandpeoplewereone-sided,withthegovernmentmaintainingabsolutepoweruntilwarfarebrokeout.

Thesamesocialdynamicsthatenableactorstoengageinintegrativerelationsorlinkagesforpositiveoutcomescanalsoresultintheformationofgroupswithverynegativeeffects,suchasyouthmilitiasor,inthespecificstudyinstances,theAngka,theInterahamwe,GuatemalanPACs,andSomalirenegadeclans.Strongsocialdynamicsandbondingwithinthesegroups,primarilymanipulatedandmobilizedbythegovernment(exceptinSomalia),madepossiblethegroups'success.Thenegativeeffectsofthisstrongperversesocial

capitalweremanifestedinexclusion,hatepropaganda,repression,and,eventually,slaughter.

InCambodiaafterthewarandinRwandabeforethewar,externalforcesofglobalizationledvillagerstoinitiatemoreexternallinkagesinthecourseofeffortstonourishcivilsociety.AsconflicteruptedinRwanda,hatepropagandageneratedbythestateencouragedHututobandtogetheragainstTutsiwithintheir

Table8Intra-andextracommunitytiesLinkages(extracommunitynetworks)

Integration(intracommunityties)

Low HighLow Anomie

CambodiaAmoralfamilialismSomalia

High AmoralindividualismRwandaandGuatemala

Economicadvancement

Source:BasedonWoolcock(1998).

communitiesandfamilies.Hutupowerthrivedontheresultingamoralindividualism,whichplacedallegiancetothestateaboveanycommunityorfamilialloyalties.InsomeregionsofSomalia,movestowardglobalizationpushedpeopletostrengthenandincreasinglydependonfamilialties.InGuatemala,fierceclanalliances,combinedwithweaklinkstoothercommunities,ledtotheestablishmentofamoralfamilialismandthusaggravatedandperpetuatedclanwarfare.SolidarityamongrebelsandindigenousgroupsinGuatemalaranhigh,asdidallegiancewithinthegovernmentandmilitarytotheirown.Governmentpolicyactedtorupturelocalcommunitiesbypittingvillageragainstvillagerincertainareasofthecountry,disruptingstrongintragroupties(seeTable8).

Thus,civic,market,andstateengagement,andhowitinterrelatedwithconflict,hadvastramificationsforthetransformationofallfourdimensionsofsocialcapital.Theidealsituationisabalancebetweencivilsocietyandstateandmarketpenetrationthatnurturesprimarybonds,encouragesbridging,cross-cuttingties,andsupportsstatefunctioningandthestate'srelationstoitspeople.Itisthemixofthese

horizontalcross-cuttingtiesandverticallinkagesthatformsthebasisfortruesocialcohesion.

PARTIIIFROMCIVILWARTOCIVILSOCIETY

6ViolentConflictandPeacebuildingThenatureofconflictshouldbetakenintoaccountinshapingthestructureofpeacebuildinginterventions(relief,reconstruction,andreconciliation)afterhostilitiescease.Analysisofconflictandtherelatedcopingmechanismsprovidemappingsofextantsocialcapitalrelationsandofthetypesofsocialcapitalthatmayneedtobeencouragedordiscouraged.Theseinsightscanbeanimportantfoundationfordevelopmentefforts.Inaddition,thepolitical,economic,andsocialmilieuofthepostconflictcountryshouldbeconsideredinthedesignofinterventions.Themilieuincludesthestageofthelocal-to-globaltransitionanditseffectsonpowerconstellations,economicexchange,andsocialrelations.

HowtheNatureofWarDeterminestheNatureofPeaceandReconciliation

TheconflictsthathaveplaguedCambodia,Rwanda,Guatemala,andSomaliahavevariedinduration,intensity,andnature(seeTable9).Cambodiaexperienced20yearsoffighting,with4intenseyearsofciviliansufferingatthehandsofthestateduringtheKhmerRougeperiod.ExternalwarfareinVietnamexacerbatedthesituation,makingthecountrypronetosporadicbombingsandinvasionsbyforeigntroops.InRwanda,simmeringtensions,beginningwiththeemergenceofviolencein1959,

Table9Descriptionofviolentconflicts:fourcasestudiesCambodia Rwanda Guatemala

DurationTheconflictspannedtwodecades,dividedintotheLonNolera(197075),KhmerRougerule(197579),andtheHengSamrinregime(197989).

SporadichostilitieshaveplaguedRwandasince1959.OfficiallythecivilwarbeganinOctober1990,withthegenocidetakingplacefromApriltoJune1994.

Typifiedbyguerrillawarfare,theconflictspannedfourdecades,withthemostintensefightingoccurringduringtheearly1980s.

Nature IntheLonNolandKhmerRougeperiods,thestatebrutallyattackeditspeople.SkirmishescontinuedintheHengSamrinera.Externalandregionalfightingexacerbatedthesituation.

Thestateorchestrated"ethnic"cleansingbymobilizingimpoverishedmassesaroundethnic-basedhatepolitics.Thispolicyledtogreatdivisionatthelocallevel,withinthecommunity,andwithinextendedandnuclearfamilies.

Theconflictprimarilytooktheformofguerrillawarfare,withthestatemainlytargetingindigenousandruralpopulations(thosemostmarginalizedandexcludedfromsociety).Somestatemobilizationatthelocalleveldidoccur,dividingcommunitiesanderodingtrust.

IntensityOfthe20yearsofconflict,10yearswerehighintensity.Communitiesandfamiliesweredividedandforcedtodohardlabor.Livingconditionswereharsh,andtorturefordissentwascommon.Over2millionpeoplediedduringthewarsasaresultofdirectcombat,bombingbyU.S.planes,state-inducedfamine,torture,ordisease.

SporadicskirmishesthroughoutRwandawerecommonaftertheRwandesePatrioticFrontinvadedinOctober1990.Thegenocidemarkedtheheightofthewarfare,withover800,000peoplekilledinthreemonths.Tutsimen,women,andchildrenwereslaughteredwithmachetes,andsomeHutudiedinreprisalkillings.

Thewarwaxedandwanedoverfourdecadesandwasmarkedbyextremehumanrightsviolations.Massacres,disappearances,andtorturewerecommon,withthestatebeingthemainperpetratoroftheseactions.Governmentandrebelpenetrationwithinvillagesdepletedtrustwithinandbetweencommunitiesandthestate.

explodedinagenocidethatleftsome800,000deadinathree-monthperiodofbrutalmassacres.TheconflictinGuatemala,typifiedbyguerrillawarfareagainstarepressivestate,flaredupandsubsidedbyturnsforalmost40years.Numeroushumanrightsviolations,includingtortureanddisappearances,thoroughlydissolvedtrustinthestateandsplitcommunitiesalongthelinesofrealorperceivedalliances.ThedissolutionofthestateinSomaliaasaconsequenceofgrossmisallocationofresourcesandpowerhascreatedavacuuminwhichclansvieforcontrolofpowerandassets.YetpocketsofpeacehaveemergedandSomaliahasstartedontheroadtorecovery.

Despitethesevaryingexperienceswithviolentconflict,therootsoftheconflictshavesomecommondenominators.Oneunderlyingthreadistheinequality,exclusion,andindignitythatresultedaselitesmanipulatedpolitical,social,andeconomicresourcestoretaincontrolduringthelocal-to-globaltransition.Asecondsimilarityistheturmoilleftinthewakeofthetransition.Thecombinedpolitical,social,andeconomicinstabilityresultingfromchangesassociatedwiththistransitionfromastate-centrictoanopensociety,fromtraditionaltonationalorinternationalstructures,andfromacentrallyplannedtoamarketeconomywithincreasingexternalmarketpenetrationfacilitatedtheemergenceofhostilitiesineachcountry.Thethirdcommonalityistheimpactofthelocal-to-globaltransitiononthenatureandstructureofsocialcapitalandtheresultingsocialcohesionorfragmentationineachaffectedcountry.

Intraditionalsocieties,systemsofeconomicproductionandexchangenurturesocialinteractionsthatserveasthebasisforcommunalsocialorganization.Throughrepeatedexchangeatthecommunitylevel,economicinteractionisembeddedinsocialrelations,helpinggroupstocohereandimpartingasenseoftrustandreciprocity.Asglobalization,ortheamalgamationofcapitalismanddemocracy,transcendscommunalborders,economicinteractionisdisembedded

fromsocialrelationsthroughtransactionsthataremoreopenandlesspersonal.Thisreformationofsocialsystemsinvolvesashiftinsocioeconomicandpoliticalorganizationfromthecommunaltothenationalorinternationallevel,transformingthestructureofatraditional

society'ssocialcapitalbasefromafamilialtoanassociationalfoundation.Political,economic,andsocialarenasexpand,replacingthesenseofcommunitybuiltonprimaryfamilialrelationshipswithastructureofsecondaryassociationsthatmakeupabroadercivilsociety.Localpowerconstellationsarereplacedbythoseatthemesoormacrolevel.Duringthistransformation,traditionalsocialmechanismsformediatingconflictandpeacefullyreconcilingdifferencestypicallybecomeweakened,alongwithothertraditionalstructuresandroles.

Organizationalchanges,particularlyasmanifestedinemergingmarketandstateforces,havefacilitatedtheexpansionofeconomicandpoliticalinteractions,creatingaglobalinterdependencethatpermeateseventhemostremotepocketsofcivilization.ThisdevelopmentisincreasingthepressurefornationstoworkwithinWesternsystems.Althoughcapitalismanddemocracymaymakepoliticalandeconomicresourcesmoreequallyavailableandincreasepersonalfreedomandjustice,theadoptionofthesesystems,particularlytheinstitutionalunderpinnings,canbeslowandwrenchingduringperiodsoftransformation.Theconfluenceoftraditionandmodernizationisturbulent,butmoreoftenthannot,ifitisrelativelyslow-movingandiseffectivelymanaged,ittakesplacewithoutcivilwar.Insomenations,however,thechangesarefarfrompeaceful.Therapidlocal-to-globalshiftcreatessocietalfissures,alienatingmanypeopleandstrippingthemoftheiridentity,status,power,andaccesstoresources.Thisoftenresultsinadestabilizationoftraditionalsocialstructures(societalfragmentation)andthecreationofpowervacuumsinthesocial,economic,andpoliticalrealms,ripeforexploitationandabuse(Newbury1988).

Itisagainstthisbackdropofsocial,economic,andpoliticaltransformationthatmodernviolentconflictsmustbeviewed.ChangesthathaveunfoldedovercenturiesintheWesthavebeenadopted,

imposed,andenforcedwithindecadesinmanynon-Westernnations.DuringtheColdWar,bipolarpoliticsimposedadegreeofinternationalstabilization,butmanycountriesstillfellvictimtothelocal-to-globaltransitionandtheassociatedideologicaldebate.BipolarpoliticsaggravatedtheconflictinGuatemalaandtosomeextentincreasedthehostilitiesbecauseofthe

politicalandfinancialsupportprovidedbytheUnitedStatestoaseriesofrepressivegovernments.ColdWarpoliticsalsogavebirthtothewarinCambodia,whereasevereanti-Westernplatformledtoanextremistcommunistexperimentthatvictimizedmillions.SomaliawasalsoshapedbyColdWarpolitics,asSiadBarreshiftedsidesbetweentheEasternblocandtheWest,buildingandmaximizinghismeansofdomesticcoercionthroughcontinuousmilitarization.AftertheColdWar,globalculturalpoliticsspecifically,FrenchmilitaryassistancetotheoppressiveHabyarimanaregimefueledandprolongedtheconflictinRwanda.

TheEffectsofGlobalizationonSocialCohesion

Thelatenteffectsofthelocal-to-globaltransitionofteninadvertentlynourishtheseedsofinequalityandexclusionalreadyplanteddeepwithineachsocietybycolonialismandpost-independencepoliticalelites.Strongsocietieswithinclusionarysocialcapitalparticularlyasmanifestedinconflict-mediatinginstitutionssuchasanefficientandnoncorruptbureaucracy,anindependentandeffectivejudiciary,afreepress,andinstitutionalizedmodesofsocialinsurance(safetynetprovisions)aremorelikelytobeabletopreventorwithstandthesocioeconomicandpoliticalshocksassociatedwithglobalization(Rodrik1999b;Easterly2000a,2000b).However,asthepastdecadeandthefourcasestudieshavedemonstrated,manynationsareunabletowardoffhostilities,fortheiralreadyunderdevelopedsocialcapitalbasehasbeenfurtherweakenedbythelocal-to-globaltransitionandalienatedbystateoppressionandmanipulation.AsSmithandNaimobserve:

Deadlyconflicthasbeenglobalized.Nowar,nomatterhowlocal,canbefullyunderstood(orprevented)withoutlookingtothelocalimpactofglobalmarkets,theglobalarmstrade,thetransborderloyaltiesofkinshipandtradition,thefearsandinterestsofotherpeopleandgovernments,and

thegrowinginfluencesofnonstateparticipants

(whethermercenariesorDoctorsWithoutBorders,AmnestyInternationalorAlcoa).Andjustastelevisioncommunicatesthewickednessofwartoaglobalaudience,normsofhumanrightsandgoodgovernanceacquireanewandglobalauthority.(SmithandNaim2000:21)

Ifglobalizationpreparesthegroundformoredisparitiesandconflict,buildingcross-cuttingsocialcapitalbecomesevenmoreimperativeformanagingandpreventingconflict.Strongandeffectivehorizontalandverticalsocialcapitalbridgesgroupswithinandbetweencommunitiesandlinksthestatewithacivilsocietythatshouldplayaroleinconflictmanagementandmediation.Whenthatsocialcapitalisabsent,conflictcanescalateintoviolence,andsocietyisliabletoretreatintoabonded,primarysurvivalistmodeaspreexistingsocialcleavagesaremanipulatedandexacerbated.

InCambodiastateactorsprimarilywagedwaragainstarelativelyuninvolved,tradition-boundcitizenry.UndertheKhmerRouge,''new"peoplewerepittedagainst"old,"anddominationwasachievedbyrhetoric,fear,andcoercion.WhereasideologyfueledtheCambodianconflict,identitywasthedrivingforceinRwanda.AsmallelitegroupmanipulatedthemassesbyusingtheTutsiminorityasscapegoatsforeconomicwoes,transforminggrievancesintogreedandhatred.Relationswereseveredbetweenthegovernmentandcommunities,withincommunities,andinsomecaseswithinfamilies.Socialcapitalinbothcaseswasmanipulatedandtransformedtomeetthepoliticalandeconomicneedsofsmallgroupsthatusedtotheirownadvantagethechangesinpowerconstellations,exchange,andsocialconditionsbroughtaboutbyglobalization.

TheGuatemalanstatewagedaviciouswaragainstitspeople,primarilythepoliticallyandsocioeconomicallymarginalizedandexcludedindigenousandruralpopulations.Governmentefforts,backedbyexternalsupporttohelpcrushthe"communistic"guerrillamovement,splitthepopulacethroughtheformationofcivildefense

patrols(PACs),dividingcommunalallegiancesand

loyalties.TheseactionsfurthererodedanyhorizontaltiesthatmayhavebridgedLadinoandnon-Ladinogroupswhileensuringthatnewlinkageswouldnotform.

InequalityandexclusioncausedthecollapseoftheSomaligovernment.MassiveamountsofsmallarmsandweaponsonhandasalegacyofColdWarpoliticsintheregionfacilitatedtheeruptionofviolenthostilities.Localizedwarsravagedthecountry.Yetsomehow,withinthischaos,ministatesemerged,withtheirownformsofgovernment,offeringservicesandorderinthefaceofanarchy.InthenorthernregionofSomaliabusinessesgrewanddevelopedasaresultofrapidmarketexpansionandincreasingdemand,withtheSomalidisasporaconnectinglocaltoglobalactors.

Ineachoftheseconflicts,thestatecommandeerednationalpowerandsupportedexclusionaryandunequalpoliticalregimes.Tostrengthenstatehegemony,governmentactorswagedwaragainstconstituentsandengagedindivisiveploys,blockingtheformationofcross-cutting,bridgingsocialcapital,whileutilizinginstabilitythatmayhaveresultedfromtheeffectsofglobalizationtofurthertheircause.Thestructureoftheconflictsthatensuedhadramificationsforthewaysocialcapitalwastransformedineachcountryandwillinturnaffectfuturestrategiesforsupportingsocialcapitalduringreconstructionandreconciliationefforts,aswellasreliefdelivery.

Socialcapitalrelationsatthemacrolevel(thegovernment'sabilitytofunctionanditsrelationtothelocallevel)needtobeaddressedinpostconflictpeacebuildingandreconstructionmeasuresineachofthecountriesstudied.Institutionsshouldservetomanageconflictbyadjudicatingdisputeswithinaframeworkoftransparentrulesandprocedures.Trustinthestateneedstoberebuilt,andleaderswillhavetoprovetheirlegitimacybyinstitutingjustandtransparentpolitical,social,andeconomicsystemsthatareinclusiveandparticipatory.

Statesynergy,ormacro-microrelations,shouldbeanintegralpartofthedevelopmentprocess.Inaddition,thestatewillneedtotakestepstosecureitselffromtheshocksincurredthroughtheglobalizationprocessandensurethatthereisnotaregression

intoconflict.Violentconflictrootedinexclusionarygovernancecreatestheveryneedforstrategiesofempowerment(Deacon2000).

Relationsbetweencommunitiesandbetweenunlikeorwarringfactionsneedtobeestablishedtoimprovethenecessarylinkagesforeconomicgrowthandthedevelopmentofcivilsociety.Primaryandsecondaryrelationswithinfamiliesandcommunitiesshouldbenourished,eventhoughthisisthelevelmostdifficulttotargetfromamacroperspective.Iftheenvironmentforsocialcapitalisrenderedconduciveforthegrowthofcivilsocietybyallowingfreedomofpress,speech,andassembly,andifenoughspaceiscreatedtoallowcivilsocietytoflourish,improvedgovernment-communityrelationswillfollow.

Becausethenatureandcausesofwararecountry-specificandpeculiartoeachcountry'suniquesituation,effortsforrelief,reconstruction,andreconciliationneedtotakenoteofthesedifferences,acknowledgethevariationsinhowthesocialfabricwasdamagedbyeachspecificconflict,andassesshowthesocialthreadsremainingaftertheconflictcanbeutilizedtohelpfacilitatethelargerpeaceprocesses.Thosedimensionsthatwerespecificallytargetedandabusedduringconflict,whetherintegration,linkages,organizationalintegrity,orsynergy,andthosethatemergeinresponsetocrisisshouldlaythefoundationforpeacebuildingandsustainabledevelopment.

7PoliciesandProgramsforStrengtheningSocialCapitalandSocialCohesionSocialcapitalcantakemanyformsandservediversefunctions,dependingonitsnatureanduse.Itcancontributetosocialcohesionorspursocialfragmentation.Itcanbeasourceofmutualaidandprotectioninthefaceofviolentconflict,or,justasreadily,itcanbepervertedtomobilizeunemployedyouthintomilitiaandbringabouthorrendousactsofgenocide.Socialcapitalcanhelpbridgeandmitigatetheexclusiverelationsthatcreatetheconditionsforconflict,oritcanreinforcehighlyexclusionarybondssuchasthosethatexistwithingangsorextremistethnicgroups.Itcansubstituteforstateandmarketfailuresorcomplementtheirprovisionofbasicprotectionorsafetynets.

Thus,socialcapitalisadouble-edgedswordwithregardtoconflictanddevelopment.Violentconflictcandestroyprimarybonds,undercuttingindigenoussocialcapitalasaformofsocialprotection.Butbyweakeningsuchprimarybonds,conflictcancreateopportunitiesforbridgestoothernetworksandcandisplacerelationsthattendtobuilddependency,limitaccesstonewinformationandopportunities,andretardchange.Undersuchconditions,socialcapitalcanserveasakeysourceofreconciliationandreconstructionindividedsocietiesthroughtheformationofbroadanddiversenetworks.Thedevelopmentofcivic

institutionsthatcutacrosstraditionalbondingsocialcapitaltoformnewlinkscrossingethnic,religious,age,income,andgenderlinescanprovidethebasisforthemediation,conflict-management,andconflict-resolutionmechanismsthatallsocietiesrequiretosustainpeaceanddevelopment.Finally,anewgovernmentpresentstheopportunitytoimprovegovernmentabilityanddeepencommunityrelations.Fordevelopmentassistancetobesuccessful,itmustfocusonbuildingsuchsocialcapitalasanintegralpartofanyconflict-preventionmeasureorpeople-centeredreconstructioneffort.

Numerouspolicyandoperationalrecommendationsforinternationalactorsconcernedaboutstrengtheningsocialcohesionbybuildingsocialcapitalcanbedrawnfromthefourcountrystudies.Thischapterpresentsrecommendationsforspecificinterventionsgearedtowardeachstate.(ForfurtherdiscussionseeMartin1996b;AdamandFord1998;Uvin1998;Nee2000.)

Cambodia:NurturingAssociationsforEconomicGrowthandDevelopment

ThedestructionoftheCambodiansocialfabriccausedbythevariousconflictsistragicandhashaddevastatingeffects,yetthecommunitieshaveremainedresilientevenwhileinexileinrefugeecampsinneighboringcountries.Reconstructioneffortsshouldbuildontheexistingprimaryrelationsandcopingmechanismsthatemergedduringthewar.Externalinterventionsshouldseektofacilitateadditionallinkagesgearedtowardeconomicgrowthanddevelopmentandtointensifycivicengagementamonggroupsandbetweenlocalgroups,thegovernment,andmarketforces.

Attemptstosupportcooperation,participation,andgroupsolidaritymaynotbeimmediatelyappropriateduringinitialdevelopmentefforts.ThedissolutionoftrustwithinCambodiansocietywasadirect

consequenceofthesocietalfragmentationbroughtaboutbytheLonNolgovernmentandbytheKhmerRouge'scampaigntomanipulatepeopleandretaincontrol

throughcoercion,suspicion,andfear.Inthepostwarera,ifthislackoftrustisnotacknowledgedandaddressed,truereconstructioncannottakeplace.Untiltrustisrebuilt,attemptstoencouragesolidarityandgroupcooperationmaybackfirebyremindingCambodiansoftheKhmerRouge'scommunalworksandthecollectivismofthekromSamakiundertheHengSamrinregime(Nee1995).Externalinterventionsmustbesensitivetothesemattersandallowcooperationtooccurspontaneously,supportingeffortsthatcreatenetworksamongpeopleandbuildaresponsiveandresponsiblecivilsociety.

Effortstoencourageparticipationbyconveningmeetingsinvillagesmaybeinadvertentlycounterproductive.Villagersmayattendmeetings,butoftentheydosobecauseofperceivedcoercion,notoutoffreewill.MeetingscalledbyexternalactorsarereminiscentofPolPotdays,whenvillagersexpectedtolistentopoliticalpropaganda,notparticipate.Furthermore,thesetypesofmeetingtendtoalienatethepoor,whospendthemeetingthinkinghowtheywillgettheirnextmealandresentthisuseoftheirtime(Nee1995).Ownershipofinitiativesiscriticaltobuildingsustainablecross-cuttingsocialcapital.

Developmentorganizationsneedtorecognizeandactonsuchthreatstosocialcapitalasacutepoverty,increasingpopulationpressure,degradationofresources,andtheemergenceofamarketeconomyintheabsenceofappropriateregulation,theruleoflaw,andsafetynetsforpoorhouseholds.Anyexternaldevelopmenteffortsintheseareasshouldbedesignedtoenhancethestate'scapacityanditsabilitytorelatetocitizensandcommunitiesinademocraticmanner.

Overall,Cambodianslacktheeconomicandsocialinfrastructureneededtocracktheshellofpoverty.Tobuildthisinfrastructure,communityparticipationandgrassrootsinstitutionsareneeded,butforthemostpart,thesefeaturesareabsentinCambodiansociety.Both

couldbefacilitatedbythestrongpresenceofsecondarysocialcapitallinkages.Decentralization,localownership,andparticipationworkonlyifcommunitiesaresociallycohesive,appropriatelyorganized,anddemocratic.Developmentactorsshouldcapitalizeontheexistingpagodanetworks,which

areorganizedandcohesive.Self-helpgroupsarealsoincreasinginpopularityandnumber(Cambodia1999).

Currentformsofsocialcapitalrelatedtothevillageeconomyensurebasicsurvivalandalivelihoodforsomepeople(socialprotection)andallowexploitationofpeopleandresourcesbyothers.Extantsocialcapitalshouldbeencouragedtomatureintoamoreresponsiblemanagementofavailableresources,basedonprinciplesofequityandsustainability.Ifpossible,developmentactorsshouldavoidorminimizeinterventionsthatreinforcethenegativeelementsofexistingsocialcapital.Thisimpliesshunningeffortsthatfocusonverticalplanningwithoutputtinginplaceaccompanyinghorizontalstructuresandaccountabilitytolowerlevels.Currently,itismoreimportanttostrengthenCambodia'shorizontalsocialcapital,encompassingbothfamilialandassociationalrelations,thantofocusonverticalsocialcapitalsuchaseffortstostrengthengovernmentcapacityalthoughworkinthisareaisalsoneeded,particularlyineffortstoeliminatecorruptionandbuildjusticeanddemocracy.

Thecurrentroleofsocialcapitalintherealmofsocialservicesandwelfareisgearedtowardmeetingthecommunity'sownneeds,buttoaverysmallandinadequateextent.Externalagenciesmuststepintosupplementthisroleand,intheprocess,allowsocialcapitaltoeffectivelyuseandshapeservices,movingfromsocialprotectiontoservicedelivery.TheUnitedNationsDevelopmentProgramme'sCarrereProjectandtheWorldBank-financedNortheastVillageDevelopmentProject(NVDP)aregoodexamplesofeffortstobuildlocalcapacityandsocialcapitalintothedevelopmentprocess.(SeeBox10fordetailsontheNVDP.)Thesearesecond-generationcommunityfundorsocialdevelopmentapproachesinwhichcommunityresourcesaremanaged,notthroughintermediaryagentsbutbythevillageitself,buildingonexistinginstitutionsandrelationsandcreatingnewones.Thegoalistoconnecttomarketsandcreatea

formofsocialcapitalthatarisesfromcommunitytraditionsandculturalandfamilialsolidaritybutthatalsoinvolvespeopleofdiversebackgroundsinnumerousoverlappingandreinforcingrelationshipscreatedbyrepeatedandpredictableeconomicandsocialexchanges.

Box10UsingdecentralizationandparticipationtotargettheruralpoorinCambodia

AnumberofruraldevelopmentprojectshavebeeninitiatedinCambodiaduringthereconciliationandreconstructionperiodthatbeganin1992,andtheyhavehadapositive,althoughlimited,impact.Atoppriorityofthecurrentnationaldevelopmentstrategyistospreadthebenefitsofdevelopmentmorewidelytoruralareas,where90percentofpoorhouseholdslive.Todate,theCambodiangovernmentanditsresponsiblelineagencieshavehadlittleon-the-groundexperiencewithplanning,managing,andcoordinatingruraldevelopmentprojects.ThedevelopmentobjectiveoftheNortheastVillageDevelopmentProject(NVDP)istointroducedecentralized,participatory,povertyreductionorientedruraldevelopmentapproachesinsomeofthepoorestareasofCambodiaandtoprovidethegovernmentwithexperienceinmanagingsuchprograms.Experienceofthiskindwillbeneededtoformulateandcarryoutacohesivenationalstrategyforruraldevelopment.TheNVDPwillalsowidentheWorldBank'sexperienceindealingwithdecentralized,participatoryprojects.

Bytargetinginstitutional,social,andeconomicissues,theNVDPwillattempttoenhanceruraldevelopmentandnaturalresourcemanagement,improvehumanresources,reducepoverty,andstrengtheninstitutionalcapacity.Inaddition,theNVDPisdesignedtoincreasethecapacityofprovincialgovernmentofficestohelplocalcommunitiesplanandmanagesmallruraldevelopmentsubprojects.Localcommunedevelopmentcommitteeswillbeexpectedtotakeonanincreasedlocalgovernmentrole,assistedbyworkingsystemsandtrainedpersonnel,incarryingoutparticipatoryruralappraisal.Theprojectwillhelpprovidepeopleintheareawithcommunityinvestmentsneededtoimprovetheirincomes.Throughparticipationinvillagedevelopmentcommittees,thepooresthouseholdswillbeabletomaketheirneedsknown.OpportunitieswillbecreatedforlocalNGOsandcontractorstodevelopactivitiesinthearea.

ThegoaloftheNVDPistohelpreaffirmCambodians'trustinthegovernmentandenhancethegovernment'slegitimacywhileincreasingitsorganizationalintegrity.Throughdecentralization,thegovernmentwillnurturemoresynergisticrelationswithruralcommunities,furtheramelioratingitsrelationswiththevillages.Participationinthedevelopmentprocesswillbuildlocal

capacity,helpstrengthenbridgingandbondingsocialcapitalties,improvelocalconflict-resolutionmechanisms,andstrengthenfaithandtrustinthegovernment.

Source:WorldBank(1999).

Rwanda:RebuildingFamily,Community,andStateInterrelations

SincetheendofthewarinRwanda,thegovernmenthasmadegreatstridestowardreconcilinggroupsandtakinginitiativestoencouragegrowthanddevelopment.However,muchworkremainstobedone:thecountryisimpoverished,andRwandansopenlyassertthatjusticetowardthoseresponsibleforthegenocidehasnotbeencarriedout.AlthoughHutuandTutsihavebandedtogethertorebuildtheirlives,theydonothaveagreatdealoftrustineachother.Recommendationsfromthestudyincludeimprovingthestate'sorganizationalintegrity,linkages,and,mostimportant,synergywiththecommunitylevel.ApriorityinsocialcapitaldevelopmentinRwandamustbetodilutethepotencyofethnic,tribal,andreligiousidentitiesbycreatingmeaningfulrelationsamongindividuals,civilsocietyorganizations,andthestate.

OwingtotheperceivedineffectivenessoftheInternationalCriminalTribunalforRwandaandthecommonviewthatitwillbeunabletoadministerjustice,effortshavebeenmadetoreinstategacaca,atraditionalsystemofjusticeexercisedbyagroupofcommunityelders,tohelpprocessgenocidecrimes.Thespecificsofhowthismechanismwouldworkinconjunctionwiththetribunalarestillunderdiscussion.ManyRwandansseethisprocedureastheonlyhopeforreconciliation,anditwouldprovideamuch-neededvenueforbothHutuandTutsitorelatetheirexperiencesandvoicetheirconcerns.Internationalactorsshouldfindsomemeansofsupportingthisprocessbutwithcaution.Eldersandsageschosenfromthecommunemaybebetterabletohandlerulingsandsentencingofthegénocidaires,sincetheyknowthesituationandthepeoplefirsthand.Thereis,however,adangerofsubjectiverulingsandinabilitytoconductfairtrialsincertaincommunes.Nevertheless,attemptsshouldbemadetoseekindividualaccountability,thushelpingtodiminishthe

tendencytoascribecollectiveguilttoallHutu(DesForges1999).

AsinCambodia,therewasmuchsensitivitytothemanipulationoftraditionalcollectiveactioninthiscaseumuganda,ortraditionalcooperativelabor,whichhadbeentransformedintoforced

laborandwhichmanyfelthadbeenpervertedbytheHabyarimanaregime.Trustincollectiveorganssuchascooperativeswillhavetobegraduallybuiltfromthegroundupsothattheseorgansareseenas"people'scooperatives"thatthepeoplethemselves,ratherthanthegovernment,initiated.

Anotherkeyfactorinthereconstructionofintra-andintercommunityrelationsistheestablishmentofafreeandobjectivemedia.Thegenocidewasabletospreadsoquicklyandeffectivelybecauseofpropagandaissuedbybiased,extremistradioprograms,journals,andweeklypapers.EffortstoensureeffectiveandfairmediamayhelppreventarecurrenceofviolencebylinkingHutuandTutsionceagaininacohesiveRwandanidentityandmaythushelpholdthegovernmentaccountable.

EffortstobuildcivilsocietyinRwandafailedinthepast,astherapidexplosionofgenocidalkillingsshowed.Manygroupsandorganizationssupportedbyinternationalagenciesfailedbecausetheseeffortswereoverfunded,toorapidlycreated,andartificiallyimposedandhadpoorinformationnetworksandaccountability(Uvin1998).FacilitatingthecreationofNGOsisnotjustamatteroffreeingthespacenecessaryfortheirexistencebutalsoofusingthesegroupstogobeyondtheboundariesoffamily,ethnicgroup,andlocationasthebasisforgroupcohesion.Thestateauthoritarianandpermeatingmostaspectsofcivilsocietywasunabletooperateinademocratic,inclusivemanner.Sociallearningandsocialchange,notjustthepresenceofnumeroustypesoforganizations,arerequiredtomakeupahealthycivilsociety.

Theprocessofdevelopingsocialcapitalwithincommunitiesandbetweenconstituentsandthestatetakesalongtime.Itmustbeinitiatedinternally,anditrequiresagradualincreaseintheabilityandwillingnesstoshapethepoliticalsphere.Pluralismanddemocracy

mustbepromotedalongwithsocialcapitalinitiatives.Throughthisprocess,peoplegainconfidenceintheirabilitytooperatewithinthepublicarena.Associetybecomesmoreopen,networksofcommunicationandcooperationarisebetweenandamongcommunities,whiledivisionsbasedonethnicity,religion,gender,andregionareovercome.Knowledgeofpoliticsandpoliticalworkingsincrease,asdoskillsinconflict

mediation,compromise,andnegotiation.Thistypeofgrowthrequiresspaceandtime,neitherofwhichwasavailableinRwanda.ThewaycivilsocietyemergedearlierinRwanda,almostwhollyguidedbyexternalmechanismsandgoals,mostlikelyhurtratherthanhelpedsocialandpoliticalgrowthanddevelopment.Becausecivilsocietygroupswerenotheldaccountableforpromotingdemocratization,theirexistenceoftenworsenedratherthanimprovedHutu-Tutsirelations.Civilsociety'sstronglinksandtiestothegovernmentmeantthatwhatdiddevelopinRwandawasratherexclusive(Uvin1998).

Projectsthatdecentralizestatepowerandincreaseparticipationbycivilsocietyactorsandindividualsshouldbeimplementedtohelprebuildfaithinthecentralgovernmentandencouragecooperationamongconstituents.Community-drivenreconstructionapproachessuchastheWorldBankCommunityReintegrationandDevelopmentProject(describedinBox11)areattemptingtocreatethespacefordevelopmentofsocialcapitalthatcantranscend''ethnic"linesthroughincreasedparticipationandthatnotonlyunitegroupswithincommunitiesbutalsolinkcommunitiestothestatethroughdecentralization.Jointcommunitydecisionmakingtoassessandprioritizecommunityneedsanddetermineandmanagetheallocationofresourcestoaddresstheseneedscanbeapowerfulsourceofreconciliationthroughreconstruction.Onemaingoalistobuildlocalinstitutionsthatpromoteinclusivedevelopmentbygivingpeopleavoiceandthatarecapableofcreatingthesocialinfrastructurenecessaryforconflictmediation.

GuatemalaandSomalia:ImprovingStateCapacityandCivilSociety

TheconflictsinGuatemalaandSomaliainflictedmuchdamageonthestructure,legitimacy,andcredibilityofthestate.Policiesforrebuildingsocialcapitalineachcountryshouldfocusfirstonimprovingthestate'sabilitytofunctionandonclearlydelineatingits

role.Therehabilitationofthestatecanthenserveasthefoundationforthefurtherdevelopmentofcivilsocietyactorsandthebuildingofcross-cuttingtiesbetweenclans(Somalia)and

Box11BuildingtrusttorebuildRwanda

Thisisthefirsttimethatweareaskedwhatweneed.Ifthisistheapproachthisgovernmentistaking,wewillfinallybeabletodevelopourcountry.Acommunityelder,ontheCommunityReintegrationandDevelopmentProject

Sincecomingtopower,andparticularlysincethemassivereturnofrefugeesin199697,Rwanda'sGovernmentofNationalUnityhasfacedregionalsecurityissuesthathavehinderedpeacefuldevelopment.Todismantlethelegacyofcentralizeddecisionmaking,thegovernmentinitiatedaninclusivecommunity-levelapproachtodevelopment.ThisapproachisdesignedtoinvolveRwandanscloselyinthemanagementoftheirownaffairsandtogivelocaladministrativestructurestheprimaryresponsibilityfordevelopmentactivities.

TheWorldBank'sCommunityReintegrationandDevelopmentProject(CRDP),approvedinDecember1998,supportsthisapproach.Itassistswar-affectedcommunities,returnednationals,andothervulnerablegroupsthroughcommunity-basedreconstruction,reintegration,anddevelopment,anditstrengthensthecapacityofcommunitiesandlocalandnationaladministrationsto

implementdevelopmentsubprojects.TheCRDPfocusesonthreetasks:transferringdecisionmakingandexpenditureauthorityfromthecentraltothecommunitylevel;buildingpartnershipsbetweenlocaladministrationsandlocalpopulationsforsectoralplanningandprojectimplementation;andbuildingtrustandcooperationwithinandbetweenlocalgovernmentandthelocalpopulation.

TheCRDPwaspreparedwiththeparticipationoflocalcommunities.Itfullyinvolvesthenationalgovernmentwhileensuringthatsubprojectsarechosen,implemented,andevaluatedlocally.Thisapproachisexpectedtoimproveeffectivenessandsustainabilitybyincreasingbothgovernmentandlocalsupport.Theprojectwillempowerruralpopulationstomakechoices,increaseself-reliance,revitalizelocaleconomies,andbringcommunitiestogetherthroughlocaldecisionmakingonandinvolvementindevelopmentactivitiesorsubprojects.

TheCRDPissupportedbyaUS$5millionlearningandinnovationcredit,anewBanklendinginstrumentdesignedtotestonasmallscalethefeasibilityofalargerproject.Theprojectisbeingimplementedin12communeswithacombinedpopulationofapproximately500,000.Ifsuccessful,itwillbereplicatedelsewhereinthecountry,

helpingtobuildamorepeacefulRwanda.

Source:WorldBank(1998).

betweenindigenousandruralgroupsandLadinos(Guatemala).Governmentsfoundedontransparency,accountability,anddemocraticprincipleswillbeabletomakegreaterheadwayinsocialandeconomicgrowthanddevelopment.InGuatemalathisprocessiswellunderway.InSomaliathereisnoofficialstategovernment,butdefactogovernmentsdoexistinthenorthernregions,andsuccessintheseareasmaypavethewayforstabilityintherestofSomalia.

Socialcapitalpoliciesandprojectsshouldstrivetobuildlinkagesamongcommunitiesandbetweencommunitiesandthegovernment.TheGuatemalangovernmentandthelocalgovernmentsinnorthernSomaliashouldfocusonincreasingthenumberofactorsincivilsocietyandshouldespeciallysupportthoseactorsthatadheretoidealsofequalityandinclusion.Increasedsupportshouldthereforebegiventogrowingenterprisesandfor-profitactorsinsocialinitiatives.Inaddition,horizontalnetworksbetweendifferenttypesofactorsshouldbecreated.Trainingforgovernmentrepresentativesinpartnershipskillsanduseofthemediatoprovideinformationoncivilsocietywillalsohelpfurtherintercommunityandgovernment-communityrelations.Normativeobstaclesthatimpedethedevelopmentofsocialcapitalcanbereducedbyconflict-resolutioninitiatives,suchaslobbyingforlegislativereform,developingformalunderstandingsbetweencivilsocietyactorsandthegovernment,andsimplifyingbureaucraticprocedures.Athrivingcivilsocietymayemergeasaresultofgovernmentsupportforanincreaseintheweight,diversity,andqualityofcivilsocietyactors,alongwithimprovementoflocalopportunitiesandconfidenceinsocialrelations.

MostdevelopmenteffortsinGuatemalahavebeenaimedatimprovingthestate'scapacityandeffectiveness.Policiesinsupportofsociety'seffortstoraiserevenues,controlsocialrisks,reducepoverty,andprovidesocialprotectiontocitizenswillhelpstrengthenprimarylevelsofsocialcapital(seeBox12).Policiesthatsupportcommunity

empowermentandproductiveinitiativesmaybeconsideredtosupportsecondarysocialcapital.Thus,therearetwodistinctspheresofaction:welfareeconomicpoliciesandsocialdevelopmentpolicies.

Box12Institutionaldevelopmentandstrengthening:theindigenouswomen'sdefensoriainGuatemala

Historically,indigenouswomeninGuatemalahavesufferedtwofolddiscrimination:asindigenouspeopleandaswomen.Theywereparticularlyvulnerableduringtheinternalviolentconflict.Toaddresstheseissues,thegovernmentofGuatemalaestablishedtheOfficefortheDefenseofIndigenousWomen'sRights(Defensoria)underthePresidentialOfficeforHumanRights(COPREDEH).ThiswasthefirstpostconflictinitiativeinGuatemalatoincorporateindigenousparticipationintothemanagementandadministrationofapublicinstitution.

ThemainobjectivesoftheDefensoriaareto(a)assistinthedevelopmentofpublicpoliciesandprogramsaimedatpreventinganddefendingagainstdiscriminationandatabolishingallformsofviolenceagainstindigenouswomen;(b)providesocialservicesandlegaladvicetowomenvictimsofviolence,discrimination,sexualharassment,andotherviolationsoftheirrights;(c)design,coordinate,andimplementtrainingprogramsanddisseminateinformationonindigenouswomen'srights;and(d)proposelegalreformsregardingindigenouswomen's

rights.

Tocarryoutthesetasks,theDefensoriawillhaveanationalofficeandeightregionalofficesmanagedandadministeredbyindigenouswomen;aconsultativecouncilcomposedofrepresentativesofthe24indigenouslinguisticcommunitiesofGuatemala;acoordinatingcouncilmadeupofmembersofthemainindigenouswomen'sorganizations;andaninterinstitutionalcommissionthatincludesasmembersthevice-ministerswhowillimplementtherecommendationsoftheDefensoriaineachministry.

ThisprojectwillpromotetheinclusionofoneofGuatemala'smostexcludedgroupsandwillbuildindigenouswomen'scapacitytointerfacewithexternalactorsandrepresenttheirowninterests.Itwillimprovesocialcapitalbothwithinthegroupandbetweenthegroupandgovernmentoffices.

ItismoredifficulttoforecasthowstateformationmayevolveinSomalia.However,itisclearthatthepenetrationofmarketforces,especiallyinHargeisa,hascreatedabroadlynetworkedassociationalformofsocialcapitalthathasservedthecommunitywellintheprocessofreconciliationandreconstruction.Bycontrast,inareaswheremarketpenetrationislimitedandtradi-

tionalclanstructurescontrolassociationalbehavior,hopesfortranscendingthesituationofviolentconflictappeardim.

MuchofthesupportgiventoSomaliatorebuildsocialcapitalandfacilitatereconstructionshouldbefocusedontheemergingeconomicsector.TradebetweenregionsinSomaliaisdeveloping,andexportsoftraditionalproductssuchaslivestockandbananasareincreasing.Mobilityisnotdirectlyhindered:airlinesareoperating,andfuelforairplanesisavailable.Communicationsarefunctioning,financialtransfersarepossible,andconsumergoodsandfoodareonhand.Thus,effortsshouldbedirectedtowardsupportingthefurtherdevelopmentoflinkagesorexternallyorientedsecondaryrelations,whichwillhelptheeconomicsectorexpand.Meanwhile,politicalinstitutionshaveemerged,primarilyatthelocallevel.Internationaleffortstosupportindigenousinstitutions,ortherevivalofSomaligovernmentcapacityandcommunityrelations,shouldencouragetheseinstitutionstodevelopspontaneouslyaslongastheyarepluralistic,inclusionary,andtolerant(AdamandFord1998).

AlthoughmanyinternationalactorshaveattemptedtoinitiatepeacemakinginSomalia,lastingpeacewillhavetocomeaboutasaresultofinternaldesireandcapacity,asinGuatemala,wherewomen'sgroupsactedasacatalystinthepeaceprocess.Inthepast,externalinfluenceshavecausedmajorproblemswithinSomalia,despitegoodintentions.Forexample,ColdWarpoliticsfosteredafocusonmilitarydevelopment,resultinginaforceof120,000soldiersforanationwith7million8millionpeople.Onecouldalsoarguethatsincetheconflictbegan,externalaidhasexacerbatedthesituationinsteadofprovidingrelief.Manydonorpaymentsmeanttobuyprotectionforaiddeliveriesinsteadwenttopurchasearms(AdamandFord1998).

DonorsseektoencourageSomaligroupstocometogetherinsomeunitarystructure,atleastpartlybecauseitiseasiertodealwitha

singleentitythanwithcompetingfactions.Thisgoalmaybeunderstandableandlogical,butitmaybethatdonor-drivenattemptstobringunityhaveactuallyincreasedfragmentation;linkinginternationalpromisesofaidtounitarygovernancehasincreasedtheamountofspoilstobewonthroughcompetition.

Box13Women,grassrootsmovements,andpeaceinitiativesinSomalia

ThedissolutionofthestateandthedisappearanceofstateservicesinSomaliahaveignitedmuchcommunitydevelopmentactiononthelocallevel.Thesegrassrootsmovementsnotonlystrivetoprovideservicesbutalsofacilitatetradeandthepromotionofhumanrightsanddemocracy.Moreoftenthannot,theeffortshavebeeninitiatedbywomen,whohavebeenempoweredasaresultoftheconflictinSomaliaandwhoalsoplayanaturalroleaspeacemakers.

Somalisocietypracticesexogamy;awomenleavesherfamilyandhometomarryintoanotherclan.Somaliwomen,withnoclanoftheirown,havetraditionallymediatedandmitigatedconflictsbetweentheirhusbands'andfathers'clans.Thisculturalpracticehasmadeconflictmediationamongclansanaturalprogressionformanywomen.Thehardshipsofwarhavealsoforcedwomentobecomemoreresponsiblefortheirownandtheirfamilies'livelihoods.Manymenhavebeenlostinthefighting,andwomenhavepickeduptheburdenofthemen'shomeresponsibilitieswhilekeepingupwiththeirownduties.Perhapspeaceeffortslookingtolong-termsolutionsshouldfocusmoreon

grassrootswomen'smovementsthanonmalepoliticalleaders.

RecentworkshopsheldbytheCenterfortheStrategicInitiativesofWomenhavebroughttogetherwomenfrommanydifferentclansinSomalia.Throughthesharingofcommonwarfareexperiences,thewomenhavebecomeevenmoreunitedacrossclanlinesintheireffortsforpeace.Anexampleoftheirresolveisthe"Green-Line"marketactivities,inwhichSomaliwomencrossoverintootherclans'territoriestoexchangegoodsanddiscusspeaceinitiatives.ExternaleffortstomakepeaceinSomaliamustlearntofocusonbottom-upmethodsthatassistgrassrootsmovements(whichareprimarilyheadedbywomen),offersupporttoareasthathavealreadyachievedpeace,andworkonisolatingdestabilizingelementssuchasthewarlordmafiososwhohaveblockedpeacemovementsoutoffearoflosingmoney,power,andstatus(PrendergastandBryden1999).

GeneralrecommendationsforinterventioninSomaliaincludeimprovingdonorcollaborationinsupportoflocalautonomy;establishingapower-sharingstructurethathelpsdecentralizepower;encouragingincreasedrolesforwomen(seeBox13);usingIslamasameanstounitethepeopleandtoestablishinstitu-

tionsforbuildingcivilsociety;encouragingafreeandunregulatedmarketeconomy;creatingspaceforlocaladaptationsofexternaltechnologiesandmanagementsystems;makinguseoftraditionalinstitutionsforlandmanagement,conflictmediation,andlegaladjudication;supportingafreepress;andimprovingandnurturingregionallinkstoenhancesecurityintheHornofAfrica(AdamandFord1998).

8HarnessingSocialCapitalandSocialCohesiontoPreventViolentConflictTheinterfaceofsocialcapitalwiththeintegrationofverticalandhorizontalrelationsandcross-cutting,bridgingtiesdetermineslevelsofsocialcohesionandasociety'scapacitytomanageconflict.Truesocialcohesionreflectsasocietywiththemeanstowithstandinternalandexternalshockswhilesuccessfullymanagingdiversityandconflictinginterestswithinthecountry.Asevidencedinthecasestudies,therearethreemainmechanismsthatcanhinderorencouragetheeruptionofhostilities:policies,markets,andcivilsociety.Thesemediatingmechanismshelpshapethesocialrelationsofasociety,bothinformallyandformally.Theyhavethepotentialtodestroyorbuildcommunitiesandtofuelordefuseviolentconflict.PeterBergerhasobserved,

Inthenewpoliticalera,theculturalresourcesthatleadtosocialcohesionandthelimitsofthatcohesioninoursocietiesareoftheutmostimportance.Itwillbetheprimarytaskofsocietiestopromotesocialcohesionasthebasicsourceofeconomicdevelopmentandecologicalsensibility(Berger1998).

MediatingMechanisms:Policies,Markets,andCivilSociety

Policies.Ingeneral,statepolicies(or,forthatmatter,thepoliciesandprogramsofinternationalagenciesorNGOs)forsupportingsocialcapitalshouldparallelthebasicpreceptsestablishedforgoodgovernance.Thatis,theyshouldbeinclusive,equitable,andempowering.Iftheyarenot,statepoliciescandescendintostate-drivenwarfare.TheexampleofRwanda,wherestatepoliciesoncitizens'rights,property,educationalaccess,andemploymentinthecivilserviceweregearedtowardisolatingandmarginalizingtheTutsiillustratesalltoowellhowpoliciescandividecommunitiesandleadtoviolentconflict.

Whenpursuingpostconflictdevelopmentorrecovery,governmentsshouldnotrusheconomicreformpoliciestomeetoutsideexpectations,forthatcoulddivertattentionfromthemorecriticaltaskofbuildinggovernmentinstitutions,theruleoflaw,democraticrights,andsocialsafetynetsbasedontherestorationofsoundrelationships(socialcapital).Thetimingandsequencingofpolicyreformarecritical.Economicpolicyreformwithoutattendantcreationofinstitutionalcapacityandreformofsocialpolicycanonlyfomentsocialfragmentationandtherecurrenceofviolentconflict.Itwillbenecessarytocarefullyshapetheformationofpoliciesatthetopandsocialpracticesatthebottom(connectingthemacrowiththemicrolevel).Theaimisfortheselevelstoreinforceoneanotherandworktowardmendingthesocialfabric,slowlyreversingingrainedhatredandassistinginthehealingandformationoftrustasanindispensableingredientinanation'scohesiveness,stability,andeconomicdevelopment.Theadmonitionto"getthepoliciesright"maystillbevalid,butitisnotsufficient."Gettingthesocialrelationsright"isnecessaryforavoidingviolentconflict.

Developmentorganizations,whetherinvolvedinconflictprevention

orinreconstructionefforts,shouldadoptpoliciesthathelpstrengthenandrebuildresponsiveverticalsocialcapitalatthestatelevel,intermsofthatstate'scapabilities,role,andlinkstocommunities.Suchpoliciesincludeestablishingimpartialitywhilemaintainingado-no-harmmentality,investinginorgani-

zationsofthepoor,andprovidingincentivesforgoodgovernancebyencouragingpositivepoliticalreformtoreduceinequityandtoimprovebasicservices,theruleoflaw,andpoliticalandeconomicparticipation.Rodrik's(1999b)research,buttressedbyothers(Rodriguez1977;Shah1998;Easterly1999),hasempiricallydemonstratedthatcountrieswhichexperiencesharpdropsingrowtharethosewithdividedsocieties(asmeasuredbysuchindicatorsasinequalityandethnicfragmentation)andlackinginthefundamentalinstitutionsnecessarytomediateconflictanefficient,noncorruptbureaucracy,anindependentjudiciary,afreepress,andavibrantcivilsociety.

Statepoliciesthatareblindtosocialanalysispoliciesthatreducesubsidiestothevulnerableintheaftermathofwar,privatizestateassetsintoaninstitutionalvacuum,raisetaxesregressively,reduceorincreasesubsidiesinfavorofoneoranothergroup,downsizeanalreadyunderpaidorunpaidcivilserviceorarmy,andrepatriaterefugeesordemobilizecombatantswithoutthecapacityorresourcestoprovideatransitionalsafetynetoremployment-generatingopportunitiesarehigh-riskventures.AsStory(1998)notedinsummingupexperiencewithstructuraladjustmentandethnicityinRwanda,thecriticalfactorsaretheextenttowhicheconomicdifferentiationandcompetitionare"ethnicized"andtheimpactofadjustmentismediatedthrough(andpossiblyreinforcing)divisionsassociatedwithparticularethnicgroups.AlthoughtheRwandangenocidecannotbeattributedtoadjustmentpoliciesperse,alessonthatcanbedrawnfromtheexperienceisthatapeople'sexpectationsofhowadjustmentwillaffectthemisasimportantastheeventualimpactitself.Aclimateofeconomicuncertainlykindledbythememoryofhistoricalinjusticescanreadilyshapepresent-dayfears,settingthestageforviolentconflict.

Markets.Thepenetrationofmarketsintosocietycanfostersecondary

networksofsocialcapital.InnorthernSomalia,globalization,intheformofexternalmarketpenetrationandthespreadofknowledge,information,andtechnology,hasfacilitatedpeaceeffortsbyenablingexchangeandeconomicgrowthdespiteadverseconditions.TheconnectivityoftheSomaliadiaspora,

easyaccesstoports,telecommunications,andaccesstocapital(throughelectronictransmittalofremittances)haveallfacilitatedthisgrowth,linkedgroupswithinthenorthernregion,andcreatednewsocialandeconomicbridges.Weakstatepenetration(especiallyinHargeisa)hasalsoenabledthisdevelopmentofmarketforces,removingthethreatofoverregulationandaninefficientbureaucracy.Thedriveofthemarkethashelpedformcross-cuttinglinksinnorthernSomaliaandencouragegovernmentalandinstitutional(civilsociety)development,whichhavereinforcedeachotheraspotentialconflict-mediatingmechanisms.Bycontrast,wehaveseenhowmarketisolationinPreyKoh,Cambodia,hasreinforcedinward-lookingbondsandagenerallackofsocialcapacitytocompeteinthemarketplace,sometimesleadingtoawideningofthegapbetweenrichandpoorthroughexploitationratherthandevelopment.Improvingthequalityofacommunity'ssocialcapitalanditsabilitytodealconfidentlywithchangingmarketaccessduringtransitioncanbecriticaltothedevelopmentofthecommunity.

Civilsociety.Anactivecivilsocietythatprotectstherightsoftheindividualandofgroupswhileengagingandholdingthestateaccountabletotheruleoflawisanotherimportantmediatingforce.Assomeobserversnote,Cambodiatodayhasonlymovedfromawarwithoutjusticetoapeacewithoutjustice.Yearsoffactionalwar,aheavilyarmedpopulace,acorruptjudiciaryandpoliceforce,andaninefficientbureaucracyallcontributetoacultureinwhichviolenceisstillthepreferredwayofgettingthingsdone(Faulder2000).

ThePolPotregimepurposelydestroyedCambodiancivilsocietyinanattempttoeraseallformsoftraditionalbonds,fromkinshiptoreligionandthearts,andtodestroymodernbridgesbytargetingprofessionalssuchasteachersanddoctors.ApervertedbondingformofsocialcapitalemergedintheformoftheAngka,''TheOrganization,"whichconsistedofaformerlyexcludedgroupsemiliterate,unemployed

youthsledbyahandfulofextremistintellectuals(whohadalsobeenexcluded).TheAngkaperpetratedoneofthecruelestgenocidesinmodernhistory.Trustbetweenindividualsvirtuallydisappearedaspeople

werereducedtospyingandinformingononeanotherandtoobeyingtheruleswithoutquestion.Thecommonsayingthenwas,"Ifyouwanttosurvive,youmustpretendtobedeafandmute"(Nee2000).

ThecombinedeffectsofcenturiesoffeudalismandmilitarismhaveleftCambodiancommunitieswithweaksociallinks.SomestudentsofCambodianvillagelifeevenquestionwhetherCambodianvillagesmayberegardedascommunitiesinarealsense(Vijghenandothers1966;Ebihara1976).Thebreakdownofbasiccommunityvalues,norms,andsocialrelationshipsandtheongoingsocialviolencehavevirtuallydestroyedsocialcohesioninCambodia.Undersuchcircumstances,peopletendtotakecareofthemselvesratherthanthinkofothers.Thetaskaheadistorevitalizethefunctioningofexistingsocialstructures,incorporatingthemintothemainstreamofdevelopmentbyempoweringpeopletoparticipateindecisionsabouttheirowncommunities'needs,resources,andactionsinshort,buildingacivilsocietycapableofmediatingbetweenindividuals,groups,andthestate.

Themediacanhelpcivilsocietytothrive.Afreepressenablespublicexpressionandinformsthepublicofgovernmentactions.DuringthegenocideinRwanda,themedia,insteadofdefusingconflict,ignitedandinflamedethnichatred.StateradioandtelevisionwentsofarastobroadcastlistsofHutuineachcommunewhohadnotparticipatedinthekillings,therebypubliclypressuringthemtojointhegenocide.

Bycontrast,thenonprofitorganizationSearchforCommonGround,whichworksforsocietalconflictresolutionintheUnitedStatesandelsewhere,isusingthemediatobuildbridgingtiesinRwanda'sneighbor,Burundi.Theretoo,animositiesbetweenHutuandTutsihaveledtothousandsofdeaths,andhateradiohasbeenusedtoinciteethnicviolence.In1995,SearchforCommonGroundlaunchedStudioIjambo("wisewords,"inKirundi)asaradioproductioncenter

whereHutuandTutsijournalistsworktogethertoprovidebalancednews,features,andevensoapoperas.Thestudioislocatedinthecountry'scapital,Bujumbura.Since,asalistenersurveyindicated,99.98percentofBurundiansconsiderthemselvestoberegularradio

listeners,thismediumisanimportantmeansofcounteractinghatepropagandawithamessageofunderstandingandreconciliation.

9

Insocietiesintransitionfromviolentconflicttopeaceandfromcrisistosustainabledevelopment,thetransformationofsocialcapitalthatstrengthenssocialcohesioncanplayacriticalroleinthetransitionfromwelfare-oriented,protectionistrelieftoanactivistdevelopmentorientation.Statepolicies,markets,andcivilsocietycanallcontributetoordetractfromthisprocess.Inthisperspective,communitiesareviewednotjustasvictimswithneedsbutassurvivorswithcapacities.

EnsuringHumanSecurity:ManagingConflictbyConnectingandEmpoweringPeople

InRwanda,inastarkexampleofsocialcapitalgoneawry,HutuelitewereabletomobilizeexclusionaryanddivisivesocialcapitalthatbondedHutuprimarilymaleunemployedanduneducatedyouthintosuchgroupsastheInterahamwe.WhilesomeHutuwillinglyparticipatedinthemassacres,otherswereorderedorforcedtokill.WithinHutuextremism,bonding,exclusivesocialcapitalpoweredthegroups'successbyprovidingexcellentinformationnetworksandasenseofsolidarity,obligation,andcivicduty.Butsocialcapitalcanalsoformbridges,enablingcross-cuttingandinclusiveties,suchasthoseamongtheindigenousGuatemalanwomen'sgroupsthathaveunitedtosustainpeaceefforts.Forexample,seeBox12inchapter7,whichdescribedtheformationoftheOfficefortheDefenseofIndigenousWomen'sRights(Defensoria),thefirstpostconflictinitiativeinGuatemalatoincorporateindigenousparticipationintothemanagementandadministrationofapublicinstitution.Thecreationoflinksbetweenexcludedgroupsandgovernmentofficesisanexample

oftheoptimalapplicationanduseofsocialcapitalstocks.

Whatconditionsreinforceexclusionarybondingsocialrelations,andwhatconditionsnurtureinclusionarybridgingsocialrelations?Howcansocietiescopewithnormativeconflictsunderconditionsofpluralismanddiversity?Howdoestheebband

flowofsocialcapitalworktoholdasocietytogetherorfragmentit?Thesecriticalquestionsarekeytounderstandingtheroleofsocialcapitalinpromotingsocialcohesionandconflictmanagementasabasicsourceofeconomicdevelopmentandhumanprogress.Connecting,empowering,andintegratingpeopleandorganizationsarebasictransformativeactionsthatemergefromouranalysistoshedlightonthesequestions.

Connections.Physicalrehabilitationandreconstructionhingeonsocialreconciliation,whichsuccessfullyconnectsadversarialgroups.InRwanda,forexample,sincetheendofthegenocideattemptshavebeenmadetoplaceHutuingovernmentpositionstobalancepoliticalpower.Meanwhile,spacehasbeencreatedforthereemergenceofcivilsocietyactors.YetthenewsocialfabricofRwandaiscomplicated,withsubgroupsandschismsthatwilltakegenerationstoheal.Cross-cuttingsocialcapitalneedstobenurturedtolinknotjustHutuandTutsibutalsothosewithinsubgroups.Buthopeprevailsasassociationsofwidowsandfemaleheadsofhouseholdsbridgeethniclinestoformnewsocialcapital.

InnorthernSomalia,thediasporahasfacilitatednotonlyaneconomicconnectednesstoglobalmarkets,buthastransformedsocialrelationshipsamonglocalclansbystrengtheningcross-cuttingtiesthroughmarkettransactionsandopenchannelsofcommunication.

Empowerment.Decentralizationandparticipationcanempowerpeopletotakeoverdevelopmentandgivethemasenseofcontrolovertheirfuture.Todismantlethelegacyofcentralizeddecisionmakingandbegintoforgethesebridginglinks,theRwandangovernmentinitiatedaninclusivecommunity-drivenapproachtodevelopmentfoundedontheconceptsofparticipationanddecentralization.ThisapproachisdesignedtoinvolveRwandanscloselyinthemanagementoftheirownaffairsandtogivelocaladministrativestructuresthe

primaryresponsibilityfordevelopmentactivities,thusnotonlyempoweringthegroupsbutalsoencouragingthemtoworktogethertobuildtheirconnectedfutures.

Effortsbyinternationalactorstobuildandstrengthencivilsocietymustbeaccompaniedbyeffortstoimproverespectforpluralism,tolerance,andparticipatory,democraticprinciples.Equalityamongsocialgroupsthatpromotestiescuttingacrossethnicity,clans,gender,age,religion,andpoliticalideologiesisnecessaryifqualitycivicengagementistoflourish.Suchcivilsocietybindstogetherpotentiallydisintegrativeelements,buildingnew,cohesivesocialidentitieswhilekeepingbondingelementsofcommunalidentityinbalance.

Whilecross-cuttingtiesarebeingestablished,assessmentsmustalsobemadeofexistingbondingsocialcapitalbases,andcaremustbetakenthatexternaleffortsdonoterodethem.Oncetheselocalcopingmechanismsareidentified,theymustbeincorporatedintothereconstructionprocess.Externalinterventionsneedtobesensitivetoindigenousorganizationsandbecarefulnottowipeoutthegroups'owneffortsandtheirtendenciestowardself-reliance.Rather,theyshouldstrengthenindigenouscapacities,especiallytobridgetonewroles,functions,andrelationships.Internationalactorsshouldensurethattheirdevelopmenteffortsdonotnurtureorencouragedependencythroughthemannerinwhichleadership,money,know-how,ormaterialsareprovided.Localactorsshouldnotbeinadvertentlyundercutbyexternalfundingforgovernmentprojectsalreadybeinghandledlocally.Developmentactorsmustbecarefulnottoundermineconfidenceininternalandexternalcopingmechanisms;theyshouldnurturethesemechanisms'capacitytohandleand,infact,leadeffortstowardchange.Externalinterventionshouldnotbecomeadisincentivetoself-help,norshouldprojectdesignandimplementationweakentheauthorityandprestigeoflocalleaders.Donoreffortsshouldseektogobeyondthepreceptof"donoharm"to"dosomegood,"enhancingcommunityself-esteemandself-reliancethroughthedevelopmentofsocialcapacityforinformalparticipationandcollectiveaction.

Thegoalofbuildingcapacityatthelocallevelshouldbetoimproveaccesstoinformationandtransparencyindecisionmakingandtoenhancelocalleaders'skillsinobtaininginformation,empoweringdecisionmaking,buildinglocalalliances,resolvingconflicts,andimplementingprojectssoasto

facilitatedecentralizationefforts.Caremustbetakenthatdevelopmentorreliefeffortsatthelocalleveldonotobscureunderlyingpoliticalrealitiesandunintentionallymaskcontradictionsandinadequacieswithinthesociety.Inhostileenvironments,extantsocialcapitalbasesshouldbeusedforpeacebuildinginitiatives,andpositiveinformationshouldbeprovidedtogroupsunderstresstodispelnegative,hate-filledpropaganda.(TheWorldBank'sRwandaCommunityReintegrationandDevelopmentProjectisanexampleofaconstructiveapproach;seeBox11inchapter7.)

BuildingResilientCommunities:IntegratingReliefandDevelopment

Buildingresilientcommunitiesinthewakeofviolentconflictisessentialtosustainablepeaceanddevelopment.Integrationcanoccuronmanylevels,fromthecooperationofdiversegroupsinstrengtheningsocialcapitalandconstructingcivilsocietytotheintegrationofstatesandcitizensthroughmarketsandpoliciesallplayingtheirrespectiverolesintransformingsocialcapitalandenhancingenduringsocialcohesion.

Duringthepostconflictperiod,whenatransitionfrominitialhumanitarianrelieftolonger-termdevelopmenttakesplace,theintegrationofpoliciesandoperationsoccursonmanydifferentlevels,withvaryingsuccess.Governmentactors,aswellasexternalinternationalorganizations(suchasbusinesspersons,donors,andNGOs)aretypicallyinvolvedinonewayoranotherintherelationshipbetweenhumanitarianreliefanddevelopmentandthusplayakeyroleinhelpingtointegrateactivities.

Itisbecomingincreasinglyclearthatreliefagenciesmustfocusmoreonsustainablesolutions,takingadevelopment-orientedapproachtotheprovisionofhumanitarianassistance,whiledevelopmentagenciesneedtohelpremedythedeficiencies(in,forexample,politicalwill,

financing,knowledge,andorganization)inthetransitionfromrelieftodevelopment.Onthebasisofstudiesexaminingsocialcapital,twoprimaryrecommendationsemergethatcouldhelpimprovethestrategiesandoperationsofbothinternationalactors.

1.Reliefshouldnotstrengthenbondingassociationsattheexpenseofbuildingbridgingnetworks.Alltoooften,reliefinadvertentlyfuelsconflictandreinforcesundemocraticprocesses,particularlywhenaccessandgoods(food)becomeinstrumentsofwar(GoodhandandHulme1999).Humanitarianactors,whilesupportingprimaryrelations,canacttostifle,oratleastdonotencourage,thedevelopmentofthelinksandtiesnecessarytoprogresstomoresustainabledevelopment.Ifnotcarefullyimplemented,reliefcanstrengthenprimarysocialcapitalandyetpreventreconciliationbystrengtheningexclusionarybondingties.Reliefcancatertoindividualratherthancommunityneeds,thuslesseningsocialcohesionand,consequently,grouptrust,normsofreciprocity,andsolidarity.Reliefcankeeppeoplealive,butinworst-casescenariositcanunintentionallypromotepolarizationandmoreconflict(Box14).

Therealchallengeinthetransitionisthefinebalancebetweensavinglivesandprovidingsustainablelivelihoodsthatconsciouslycreatesbridgingsocialcapitalwhileprovidingreliefandrehabilitation.Itisnotenoughtoprovidefood;doingsocansubtlybuilddependenceandasenseofentitlement.Agenciesmustworktoempowerthevictimstotakebacktheirownlivesandbecomeactiveproducersoffoodagain,buildingasenseofself-relianceandresponsibility.Repatriationofrefugeeswithoutsocialandeconomicreintegrationandwithoutprovidingopportunitiesformutualunderstanding,learning,andearningisarecipeforfurtherimpoverishment.Emergencydrugsandmedicaltreatmentintheabsenceofhealthservicesandsocialsecuritymaysustainlifebutwillnotendsuffering.Thecreationofsustainabilitythatpreventsdependencestemsfromtheemergenceofbridginglinkages,whichunitedisparatecommunitiesineffortsforsocialandeconomicgrowthanddevelopment.

Humanitariananddevelopmentactorsshouldjointlyassessexistingbondingsocialcapitalbasesandtakecarethattheirexternaleffortsdo

noterodethemnorblindlyreinforcethemattheexpenseoffacilitatingcross-cuttingties.Socialassessmentorconflictanalysis,includingtheexplicitrecognitionofunderlyingsocietalcleavagesassourcesofsocialconflictandtension,shouldbeacoreaspectofpreparingforassistance.Suchanalysisshould

Box14Reliefandtheperpetuationofviolentconflict

ShortlyafterthegenocideinRwanda,refugeecampsinZairewereplaguedwithlargenumbersofgénocidaireswhousedinnocentHutumassesasshieldsfromRwandaPatrioticFrontforcesbentonretributionandinternationalactorsconcernedwithpunishingtheegregioushumanrightsabusesofthegenocide.Besidesprovidingastableenvironmentandshelter,humanitarianagencieskeptHutuPowermemberswellfed.Malnutritionratesinthecampswerefarlowerthananywhereelseintheregiononapar,infact,withthoseinWesternEurope.GeneralmedicalcarewasalsoequaltothebestavailableincentralAfrica.Peoplelivingnearthecampsspokeenviouslyofrefugeeentitlements,andseveralsaidtheyhadpretendedtoberefugeestogainadmissiontocampclinics.AccordingtoGourevitch(1998:27071):

Afterhavingallessentiallivingexpensescoveredbycharity,campresidentswerefreetoengageincommerce,andaidagenciesfrequentlyprovidedenticementslikeagriculturalsuppliestodoso.ThemajorcampsinZairequicklybecamehometothebiggest,best-stocked,andcheapestmarketsintheregion.ZaireanscameformilestoshopchezlesRwandais,whereatleasthalfthetradeappearedtobeinhumanitarianaid

stuffsbeans,flour,andoil,spillingfromsacksandtinsstampedwiththelogosofforeigndonors.And,astheInterahamweandex-FAR[soldiersoftheformergovernmentarmy]steppeduptheirattacksontheTutsiherdsmenofNorthKivu,theGomacampmarketsbecamefamousforincrediblycheapbeef.(16566)

Presidedoverbytheex-FAR,andbytheInterahamwe,thecampswererapidlyorganizedintoperfectreplicasoftheHutuPowersamecommunitygroupings,sameleaders,samerigidhierarchy,samepropaganda,sameviolence.Inthisregime,thehumanitariansweretreatedratherliketheservicestaffataseedymafia-occupiedhotel:theyweretheretoprovidefood,medicine,housewares,anauraofrespectability.

focusonpatternsofdistributionofresourcesandshouldemphasizeinclusivenessofopportunitiesandvoiceamonggroupsaswellasindividuals.Oncetheselocalnetworksandassociationsareidentified,theyshouldbeincorporatedintotheprocess

ofreconstruction.Evenwhenthewebofextantsocialcapitalrelationsisused,internationalactorsmustbewaryofoverloadingtheabilitiesoflocalstaffwithoutprovidingcommensuratecapacity-buildingandtechnicalsupport.Assistance,whetherhumanitarianordevelopmentoriented,shouldbeadditive,notsubstitutional.Ironically,thesamebondingsocialcapitalthat"enables"peopletosurviveviolentconflictcanbecomea"disabling"elementfordevelopment.

2.Inthetransitionalphasefromhumanitarianrelieftodevelopment,longer-termdevelopmentalactorsshouldbemoresensitiveaboutthesupportofphysicallinkagesattheexpenseofintegrativerelations.Lackofbasicinfrastructure,particularlytransportation,communication,power,andwatersupply,isamajorhurdleforsustainabledevelopment."Wherearoadpasses,developmentfollowsrightonitsheels,"saidanoldmaninCameroon(Narayanandothers2000).Transportationandcommunicationlinksbothincreasephysicalandsocialconnectednessandeffectthepricesobtainedforcropsandproducts.Roads,eventothenextvillage,areseenasexpandingpeople'soptionsandaccesstoservices.Accesstocleandrinkingwaterandtowaterforirrigationisfrequentlyseenasmarkingthedivisionbetweenthenonpoorandthepoor(Narayanandothers2000).

Yetinthisdrivetodevelop,communitymemberscanbegintofeeldisconnectedfromtheirownfamiliesandthusperceivetheirintegrativerelationstobediminishing.Globalization,whileencouragingopenmarketsandthegrowthofbridgingnetworks,canworsenthisconditionduringpostconflictphases.Developmenteffortsshouldtrytonurtureactivitiesthathelpmaintainintegrativelinksinthecommunity,unitingmembersofnuclearandextendedfamiliesandneighborsbyencouragingcross-cuttingassociationalbehavior,whetherthroughsuchactivitiesassportsandpopularcultureorthroughtheethnicmakeupoflocalgovernmentsandenterprises.

AsFigure2illustrates,bondingsocialcapitalandrelatedhumanitarianassistancetendtoaddressthe"legacy"ofconflict(displacement,famine,disease,anddeath),whilesocialandeconomicdevelopmentthatbuildsbridgingsocialcapitaladdresses

Figure2Towardtheintegrationofreliefanddevelopment

theunderlying''causes"ofconflict(inequity,exclusion,andindignity).Akeysocialdevelopmenttaskforhumanitariananddevelopmentagenciesistoconsciouslybuildbridgingandlinking(horizontalandvertical)socialcapitalwithincommunitiesandbetweenthestateandcivilsocietywhenprovidingreliefandrehabilitationthatisnotsimplysupply-drivenandpromotesacopingratherthanchangeorientation.

TheBrookingsinitiativedescribedinBox15offersapromisingapproachtoclosingthegapbetweenreliefanddevelopment

Box15Bridgingthegapbetweenhumanitarianreliefanddevelopment

TheUnitedNationsHighCommissionerforRefugees(UNHCR),theUnitedNationsDevelopmentProgramme(UNDP),andtheWorldBankrecentlyinitiatedaprogram,spurredbyaninitiativeoftheBrookingsInstitution,toeasethediscontinuitybetweenshort-termhumanitarianassistanceandlonger-termdevelopmentinterventions.Thetransitionperiodfromhumanitarianassistanceandconflicttodevelopmenteffortsandpeaceiscomplicatedbyasetofsocioeconomic,political,andpsychologicalchallengeswithinanuncertainsecurityenvironment.Currentresponsestothesechallengesareinadequatebecauseofthedifferentapproaches,institutionalarrangements,andfundingsystemsofthetwotypesofactors.Humanitarianassistanceisoftenunsustainable,and

donorsoftenlackinterestinthetransitionperiod.

Thearbitrarycompartmentsofhumanitarianactivitiesanddevelopmentdonottransferwelltoreal-worldsocieties,wherethefragilityofpeaceandthepersistenceofviolencemakeitdifficulttodrawdistinctionsbetweenthe"conflict"and"postconflict"periods.Humanitarianoperationsfocusonquickresponseandshort-termplanning,whiledevelopmentagenciesareoftenslowandinflexible.Bothtendtofocustoomuchonmandatesratherontheneedsofthoseaffectedbywar,andneitherseemstorelyontheknowledgeandexpertiseoftheotherthatmayhelpimproveoperations.Toaddressthisgap,multilateralandbilateralinstitutionsmustbecomemorecoherentintheirstrategiesandoperations.TheUNHCR,theUNDP,andtheWorldBankhavethereforesetouttoestablishrecommendationsonhowtolinktheiroperationsandpoliciestoaddressthisshortcoming.TherecentjointmissiontoSierraLeone,Liberia,andGuineamakespossibleagroundingofmandatesintherealitiesofthesubregion.Takingasubregionalperspective,itsfocusonsuchcross-borderissuesasrefugeeandarmsflows,naturalresources,andsecurityconcernsisbringingaboutsynergyandimprovedcoordinationofpoliciesand

programsontheground.

duringthecriticaltransitionfromwartopeace.Sensitivityregardingself-relianceandsocialdevelopmentisvitalwhenprovidingrelief.Reliefanddevelopmentshouldnotbeseenassequentialprocesses.Notionsofacontinuumarelongdead.Humanitarianreliefprovidesawindowofopportunityforbuildingbridgingsocialcapitalandfacilitatinganenvironmentofgoodgovernanceanddemocraticopenness.Itisavehiclewhenlinkedwithdevelopmentforbuildingcommunicationandtrustacrossethnic,religious,sectoral,andpoliticallines.Theintegrationofreliefanddevelopmentinterventions,startingwithasharedsetofprinciplesandacommonassessmentoflocalneedsandcapacities,isakeyingredientinclosingthegaps,strengtheningsocialcapitalandsocietalcohesion,andpreventingtherecurrenceofviolentconflict.

FromPeacebuildingtoNation-Building:DesignsforSustainablePeace,Reconciliation,andDevelopment

Thechallengeofnation-buildingremainsapressingissueforthenewmillenniumasnewstatespresideoveroldsocietiesandunyieldingsocialdivisions.Theprocessofdecolonizationcontinues;nationalelitesthatonlyrecentlyachievedtheirownindependencefromforeignrulehavetodealwithdissentingcommunitiesthatnowdemandautonomyorevenindependence.Thetaskofdrawingonoldtraditions,values,andmythstocreateanewnationiscomplexandfraughtwithdifficulty.Yetsuchnewlyformed"imaginedcommunities"somehowhavetosetasideprimordialloyaltiesofbondedsocialcapitalmanifestedinreligion,clan,ethnicity,andlocality,tobetransformedintosociallycohesive,functioningnations(Shoesmith2000).Likenation-building,socialcohesionhastobebuiltbrickbybrick,fromthebottomup,perhapshorizontallyfirstandthenvertically.Byatfirstovertlytackling"safe"subjectssuchasthecommunitymanagementofbasicservicesschools,healthcenters,and

soonitispossibletoaddressthebuildingofcross-cuttingsocialcapitalby"stealth"(Khin-SandiLwin2000:3;CollettaandNezam1999).

Reconciliationitselfisaprocessofrebuildingsocialcapital.Itrequiresthecreationofpoliticalspaceandsocialrelationships

forpeacefulengagementacrossandwithinsocietalcleavagesbetheyethnic,religious,gender,age,income,orlocality,andbetweennationalandlocallevels.

Anticipatorythinkingbasedonthewillingnesstolistenandlearnandtomakefew,ifany,assumptions,isthekeytosuccessforthoseworkinginconflict-affectedcountries.Peacebuildingis,atitscore,civil-societybuilding.Measuresofcivicengagement,alongwithhumansecurityandgovernmentefficacy,transparency,andstability,arefundamentalsocialcapitalindicatorsforcomprehensivereconstruction.Socialnetworksandorganizationsareessentialassetsintheportfolioofresourcesdrawnonbythewar-affectedtomanageriskandtakeadvantageofopportunities.Peacebuildinginvolvesnotonlyeconomicreconstruction,ortherebuildingofphysicalinfrastructureandeconomicstabilization,butalsothefundamentalrevitalizationofpositivesocialcapitalandthestrengtheningofsocialcohesion.Thesolutionstoconflictpreventionlienotonlyindemilitarizationandinjump-startingtheeconomy,althoughtheseareimportant.Theyliealsoingoodgovernancetheruleoflaw,justice,andhumanrightsandinstrengtheningsocialcapitalateverylevel.Thecrucialchallengeistobuildsocietalcapacityformanagingdiversityandpreventingsocialcapitalfrombeingtransformedintoaninstrumentofexclusionandviolentconflict.Thisintegralcomponentofrehabilitation,reconstruction,andreconciliationcanbeaccumulatedonlyoveryearsofsupportandnourishment.Itthusrequireslong-term,flexibleapproachesthatallowadaptationtointerimchange.

Intheend,thevoicesofthewar-affectedcryoutforanewkindofsecurity,ahumansecuritydevoidofoppressionandfear,devoidofhunger,andrichwithopportunity,thatempowersthemtotakeresponsibilityanddecisionsthatimpacttheirownlives.Resilientcommunitiesrelyonallformsofresponsibilityandsocialcapital:

bondingprimarytiesforprotectionandsurvivalintimeofcrisis;bridginglinksforactionanddevelopmentintimeofhope;efficientandfunctionalbureaucraciesandtransparentnormsandrules;andsynergisticgovernment-communityrelationsthatallowcivicengagementtothriveastheultimateguar-

antoragainstviolentconflict.Developmentneedstonurtureandtransformsocialcapitalinordertocreateandmaintainthemechanismsandinstitutionsnecessaryforstrengtheningsocialcohesion,managingdiversity,preventingviolentconflict,andsustainingpeaceandreconciliation.

NOTES1.Whilethereisarangeofdefinitionsforcivilsociety,weusethetermtomeananetworkofcross-cuttingrelationsandinstitutionsofthepeoplethathavecapacitytoorganizeandengageinpubliclifeanddecisionmaking.

2.TheconceptofstrongandweaktiescanbetracedtoGranovetter(1973).

3.MeasNee(privatecommunication,March28,2000)notesthatPrasathhasstrongersocialcapitalandsocialcohesionandalessmarkedgapbetweenrichandpoor(atalowerincomelevelthaninPreyKoh).SocialdivisionsaremoreprominentinPreyKoh,wheremarketpenetrationisadvancedandtheopportunitiestoescapepovertyaregreater.

4.TheHutuaresaidtocompriseabout85percentoftheRwandanpopulation,theTutsiroughly14percent,andtheTwa,1percent.Traditionallyhowever,thesefigureshavebeenbasedonthenumberofcowsownedandthusmaynotbeaccurate(Prunier1997).

5.Manyrevengekillingsdidtakeplacethroughoutthegenocideandintheperiodimmediatelyfollowing,asTutsislaughteredHutuinretaliationfordeathsintheirfamilies.Althoughtheexactnumbersarenotknown,thenumbersofHutumurderedbynomeansmatchthoseofTutsikilled(Prunier1997;DesForges1999).

6.Forasimilarconclusiononsocialcapitaldynamicswithinmilitias,gangs,andguerrillagroups,seeWorldBank2000:45.

7.CertainmodificationshavebeenmadeinCERFE'soriginalterminologytohelpassimilateCERFE'sconceptstothesocialcapitalcanonandfacilitatecomparisonwiththeothercasestudies.

Originally,CERFEdefinedcivilsocietyastheenablerofsocialinitiative,orprotectiverelationsandriskmitigation(socialresponsibility,asdefinedhere),andofsocialcapital,ortheabilitytoinitiateeconomicgrowth(socialinitiative,asdefinedhere).Inthismonograph,CERFE'snotionsofsocialinitiativeandsocialcapitalarecombinedtorepresenttwodiffer-

entdimensionsofamoretraditionalconceptofsocialcapitalthatincludesbothdefensiveandoffensiverelations,moreakintothegeneralconstructsofbondingandbridgingsocialcapital.SeeCERFE(1998,1999).

8.LadinoisagenerictermappliedtothosenotofMayandescent.

9.SeetheSearchforCommonGroundWebsite,<www.sfcg.org>.

ANNEX:LEARNINGFROMTHEMETHODOLOGIESEMPLOYED:MEASURINGSOCIALCAPITALWITHINACONTEXTOFVIOLENTCONFLICTUsingWoolcock'sfourdimensionsofsocialcapital,comparativeanalysisofthedefinitionsandindicatorsofsocialcapitalemployedbythecountrystudiesrevealstheadvantagesanddisadvantagesofeachmethodandsuggestshowotherexternalresearchmayhavefurtheredunderstanding.Suchareviewalsoillustratesthestudies'contributionstotheconceptualization,assessment,andmeasurementofsocialcapital,illuminatesareasofomission,andhelpsspecifyandfocuspotentialinterventionsfordirectlyaffectingdifferentdimensionsofsocialcapitalintheprocessesofreconciliationandreconstructionofwar-tornsocieties.

ThedefinitionsandindicatorsofsocialcapitalusedintheCambodiaandRwandastudiesallowedanin-depthlookattwobasicdimensionsofsocialcapital:integrationandlinkages.TheCambodianstudyfocusedoncommunityevents,informalnetworks,associations,andvillageleadership,whichhelpedillustratethematrixofsocialrelationswithinPrasathandPreyKoh.Linkswiththegovernmentandwithexternalagencieswerebrieflycovered,revealingthenatureofverticalrelationsand,toamuchlesserdegree,theorganizationalintegrityofthestateanditssynergisticrelationswithcommunities.ThestudyinRwandaprimarilyfocusedonintegrationwithinthecommune.

Variousaspectsofintracommunalrelationswereexamined,suchasexchange,thepresenceofassociationsandgroups,intermarriageandextendedfamilyrelations,conflict-resolutionmechanisms,trust,andcollectiveresponsibilitytowardvulnerablegroups.Intercommunityties,orlinkages,wereexaminedintermsofexchange,intermarriage,andcooperationbetweenneighboringcommunes.Verticalrelationswiththelocaladministrationwerealsoassessed,sheddingsomelightonthelevelsofsynergyinRwanda,andtheanalysisoftheconflictrevealedthestate'slackoforganizationalintegrity.

TheparadigmemployedbyCERFEinGuatemalaandSomaliaalsofacilitatedtheanalysisofbothintegrationandlinkages.Socialresponsibility,orhowwellcivilsocietycanprotectpeoplefromriskandadversity,wasexaminedalongwithcivilsociety'ssocialinitiative,orpotentialtohaveapositiveeffectoneconomicdevelopmentandgrowth.Thistwo-prongedapproachtoanalyzingthecapacityofcivilsocietyencompassedbothbondingandbridgingsocialcapital,withinandbetweencommunities.Initsquesttolumpallsocialcapitaltogetherundertherubricofcivilsociety,however,theCERFEmodellargelyignoredtheimportanceofbondingsocialcapitalmanifestedinkinshipandinformalnetworksandgroups,notablyindigenousgroupsinGuatemalaandclanstructuresinSomalia.

Althoughthefourstudiesrevealedmuchaboutthemicroaspectsofsocialcapital,theywereonlyabletoforeshadowthemacroissuesdisclosedinthenotionsofstateandmarketpenetration.Overall,themodelsusedinallthecasestudiesdidnotallowforsufficientgatheringofdataonverticalelementsofsocialcapitalrelatedtostateorganizationalintegrityorsynergy.TheRwandanandCambodianstudiestangentiallycoveredfacetsofsynergyandorganizationalintegrity,butmainlythroughtheiranalysesofconflict.Byilluminatingthecapacityandfunctionofcivilsociety,theCERFE

model,althoughitdidnotfocusonorganizationalintegrityorsynergyperse,didshedlightonthesetwomacrosocialcapitaldimensions.Whencombinedwithabroaderexaminationofgovernmentrolesandabilitiesandofhowthegovernmentrelatestothecommunityindefiningandfulfillingtheseroles,CERFE'sfindingshelpedillustratehowcivil

societyoperatedinconjunctionwiththestatebyeithersubstitutingfororcomplementinggovernmentaction.

Thebalancebetweenthefourdimensionsofsocialcapitalintegration,linkages,organizationalintegrity,andsynergyiscritical,for,accordingtoWoolcock,suchbalanceproducesthemostfertilegroundforstabilityandsustainablesocialandeconomicdevelopmentandgrowth.Thisbalanceistheessenceofsocietalcohesion.Alapseinanyonedimensiondoesnotnecessarilypreventsocioeconomicdevelopment,butitcouldmeanthatgrowthishampered.Consequently,effortstonurturesocialcapitalandhencepromotesocialandeconomicadvancesmustconsidereachofthefourdimensionsofverticalandhorizontalsocialcapital.Inordertocapturethefullimpactofsocialcapitalformationonsocialcohesiveness,futurestudiesshouldincorporateamoreholisticanalysistoensurethateachdimensionisaddressed.Thisbroadeningofconceptualanalysisshould,however,beaccompaniedbyaspecificdefinitionofsocialcapitalandclearandpreciseindicatorssoasnottoincreasevaguenessandambiguityalongwithscope.

StrengthsandWeaknessesoftheSurveyMethodologies

Themethodologiesemployedinthestudieshavetheirstrengthsandweaknesses(seeTable10foranoutlineofthesurveymethods).TheCambodiananalysisusedquantitativedatatoestablishdemographicbackgroundinformationonthecommunitiesandparticipatoryqualitativeresearchtoexaminemoresubstantivesocialcapitalissues.Participantswerequestionedthroughsurveysandinindividualandgroupexercisesthatincludedmapping,diagram,andrankingexercises.Theuseofacombinationofmethodstogatherdataenabledthetriangulationoffindings.Asaresult,thefinalreportpresentedaclearanddetaileddescriptionofsocialcapitalanditsrelationtoconflictinPreyKohandPrasath,whileintegratingtheparticipants'

perceptions.

TheRwandastudyimplementedaqualitativesurveyandstrovetointegrateparticipants'perspectivesontheconcepts,definitions,andindicatorsofsocialcapitalandconflict.The

Table10ComparisonofthefieldsurveysCambodia Rwanda Guatemala

andSomaliaLiteraturereview

JuneSeptember1998

JuneSeptember1998 FebruaryJuly1998

FieldstaffPredominantlylocal;threemenandtwowomen;ledbyexternalinternationalconsultant.

Local,equallydividedbetweenmenandwomen;overseenbytheWorldBank'sPost-ConflictUnitandtheWorldBankResidentMission.

Local;staffledbyinternationalNGO(CERFE)withextensivefieldpresenceineachcountry.

FieldworkSeptember1998February1999

October1998May1999 September1998February1999

Twosurveys:onetoestablishbaselinesocioeconomicinformation(allhouseholds130inPrasathand114inPreyKoh),andasecondtoinvestigatesocialcapitalfactors(about30percentofhouseholds,randomlyselected39inPrasathand34inPreyKoh).Furtherqualitativedatagatheredthroughvillagestaysandparticipant

Householdsurveyscovering1.5percentofhouseholds,randomlyselected,inthreesectorsofeachcommune(114householdsinGitiand144householdsinShyanda).Eachhouseholdcontainedfivepeople,onaverage;Gitihasapopulationof48,000andShyandaapopulationof39,000.Thesurveystructurewasbasedonfindingsintheinitialliteraturereviewandthreeweeksofparticipantobservationineachcommune.Dataanalysisfromthesurveysisstillinprocess.Focusgroupandkeyinformantinterviewsineachcommune.Focus

Thefirstphaseoffieldresearchwasdesignedtoidentifythosesociallyresponsiblecollectiveactors(organizations)thatmakeupcivilsocietyineachstudytown:Hargeisa(Somalia):85Boroma(Somalia):44Nebaj(Guatemala):

observation(12weeks);participatorygroupexercisessuchasmapping,resourceflowanalysis,wealth

51PuertoBarrios(Guatemala):50Interviewswereconductedwithkeypersons,localleaders,andcivilservants.Hargeisahasapopulationof295,000(141civilsocietygroups)andBoroma,64,000(63civilsocietygroups).Puerto

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Table10(continued)Cambodia Rwanda GuatemalaandSomaliaranking,andtrendanalysis;andindividualandgroupsemistructuredinterviews.

groupscontained5to15participantsandtargetedmixedgroups,widows,orphans,politicians,intellectuals,associations,andbusinesspeople.Keyinformantswerechosenfromthefocusgroupstoelaborateonspecificdetails.Interviewguidesforbothgroupandindividualinterviewswerederivedfrominitialsurveyfindings.

Barrioshasapopulationof82,000(170civilsocietygroups),andNebajhasapopulationof55,000(187civilsocietygroups).Thesecondphasefocusedonthequalityofleadershipinaselectednumberoforganizations;84leadersinbothcountrieswereinterviewed.Inthethirdphase,20organizationsinGuatemalaand21inSomaliawerestudiedindepth.Atotalof41organizationleaders,52keypersons,and94citizenswasquestioned.

ConstraintsDifficultiesstemmedfromthetimeelapsedsincethepreconflictperiodmorethan30yearsago.Fewpeoplewereoldenoughtorecallwhatday-to-dayexistencewaslike,andmemorieshadfaded.

Thesensitivityofthetopicandtherecentnessofthewarmeantthatthesubjecthadtobeapproachedslowlyandindirectly.Afterthefieldteamgainedthetrustofcommunalmembers,respondentsfreelydiscussedtheirconflictexperiences.

Thecomplexityofthemodelutilizedandthelongdurationofconflictineachcountrymadeitdifficulttogetapictureofthechangesinthevariablesovertime.

researchwasparticipatoryandwasledbylocalconsultants.Itconsequentlyyieldedaverythickdescriptionofsocialcapitalwithinthecommunesfromtheparticipants'pointofviewwithoutmuchcontaminationbyexternalfactors.Itdidnot,however,supplymuchquantitativedatatofacilitateanalysisandcrosscountrycomparison.

TheapproachtakeninGuatemalaandSomaliayieldedalargeamountofquantifiabledatabutsparsequalitativeinformation.Tofacilitatecomparisonofthetwocases,thesurveyusedsetdefinitionsofsocialcapitalandconflictasprovidedbyexternalresearchers.Thestudydidnotexaminethepresenceandinteractionsofsocialcapitalandconflictovertimeandthereforeprovidedonlyasnapshotofthecurrentstateofcivilsocietyineachcountry.Althoughitwasdifficulttoascertainhowparticipantsviewedtheissuesunderscrutiny,asthereislittlequalitativeexplanatorypowerinthemethodology,thefour-countrycomparativeworkshopwasextremelyusefulinenhancingtheexplanatorypowerforresearchfindingsandassessingthemethodologiesthemselves.

LessonsforFutureResearch

Twoofthethreemainconstraintsonthefourstudiesthesensitivityofthesubjectandthetimeelapsedsincethepreconflictperiodareconstant.Anothermajorlimitation,thetimeandresourcesallottedfortheresearch,canbealtered.Futurestudiesshouldallowmoretimeforfieldresearch,especiallyinviewofthesensitivityofthetopic.Asisoftenthecase,budgetsarelimitingfactorsinthescopeandscaleoffieldinquiry.Theprimaryconstraintoncomparativeanalysisofthefourcasestudiesisthedifferenceintheapproachesutilizedinthestudies.GuatemalaandSomaliaemployedthesamemethodology,butitdifferedsomewhatfromthoseusedinCambodiaandRwanda,whichalsodifferedfromeachother.Factorsrelatingtomethodology,suchasthetimeallottedtodeskandfieldresearchandthesize,

qualifications,andcompositionoffieldteams,alsovaried.Finally,somecasesreliedonquantitativedata,whileothersfocusedheavilyonqualitativedata.

Asapreliminaryexerciseinresearchontherelationbetweensocialcapital,socialcohesion,andviolentconflict,theprojectyieldedsomerecommendationsforfuturestudies.Theyincludethefollowing:

Employthesamedefinitionsandindicatorsofsocialcapitalandconflictineachcase.Inthepretest,afewcountry-specificindicatorsmaybeaddedtodeepentheanalysis,buttheuseofanoriginalsetofindicatorsappliedtoeachcasewillallowafirmercomparisonandgeneralizationoffindings.

Combinesurveyswithparticipatorymethodssuchasindividualandgroupexercisesusingdiagram,ranking,andmappingexercises,thusmakingtriangulationpossible.

Creativelyintegratequantitativeandqualitativedata.Useinitialqualitativedatatodesignaquantitativesurvey.Theresultscanthenbereaffirmedthroughsubsequentqualitativeresearch.

Matchthemodelofsocialcapitalemployedtothedesiredoutcomes.Forinstance,ifthegoalistoproducerecommendationsforgovernmentaction,thesocialcapitalparadigmshouldincludeaspectsoforganizationalintegrityandsynergy,withafocusofallfourdimensionsonthedegreeofsocialcohesivenessandsubsequentmanagementofconflict.

Thevariationincasestudymethodsaddstothedifficultyofmakingquantitativecomparisonsacrossdatasets.Onthepositiveside,thequalitativecomparativeanalysisisrichininsights,generatingahostofobservationsandrecommendationsforfuturepolicyandprogrammaticactionsdesignedtostrengthensocialcapitalasakeyingredientinreconciliation,relief,reconstruction,anddevelopment.

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