Vigilantes in the Philippines

Vigilantesin the Philippines

From Fanatical CultsTo Citizens'

Organizations

Ronald ]. May

Foreword by Belinda A. Aquino

PHILIPPINE STUDIESOCCASIONAL PAPER NO. 12

CENTER FOR PHILIPPINE STUDIESSCHOOL OF HAWAIIAN,

ASIAN AND PACIFIC STUDIESUNIVERSITY OF HAWAI'I AT MANOA

1992

Copyright 1992Center for Philippine Studies

University of Hawai'i at Manoa

Printed by Printa-QuickHonolulu, Hawaii 1992

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Vigilantes in the Philippines

Contents

Foreword

Introduction

Part IThe Rise of Vigilantism

Part IIVigilante Groups and the Government

Part IIIVigilantism in Historical Perspective

Endnotes

R.eferences

v

Vll

I

7

43

57

67

73

Vigilantes in the Philipines

Foreword

vii

One of the most alarming problems the Aquino

administrationhadto face when itreplaced theMarcos dictatorship

following the 1986 "people power revolution" in the Philippines

was the rapid growth of vigilante groups, especially in certain

parts ofthe Visayas and Mindanao. Whilevigilantism is not anew

phenomenon in Philippine society, the more recent wave of

vigilantegroups in the post-Marcosperiod wasessentiallydirected

against communists, in particularthe New People's Army (NPA).

However, many of the victims of "vigilante justice" in recent

years have been innocent civilians, poor farmers, human rights

and church workers, lawyers, journalists, religious, and other

individuals who have advocated such measures as land reform

and the withdrawal of American bases from Philippine territory.

Even more disturbing was the revelation of the fact-rmding team

headed by former U.S. Attorney General Ramsey Clark in May

1987 thatcertainforeign organizationslike theUnificationChurch-

viii Ronald J. May

affiliated CAUSA (Confederation of the Associations for the

Unification of the Societies of the Americas) and WACL (World

Anti-CommunistLeague) were actively engaged in encouraging,

ifnot organizing, these right-wing groups. The team also found

evidence of sophisticated counter-insurgency work being

undertaken in Mindanao areas by elements of the Philippinemilitary with U.S. technical assistance.

Thislatest title in thePhilil1JlineStudiesOccasional Papers

Sl:J:il:s by Ronald J. May exploresand analyzes the various factorsthat have contributed to the development of the vigilante

phenomenon in Philippine society, particularly since the second

half of the 1980s. Most of the vigilante groups studied byProfessor May were on Mindanao, a region that has a long history

ofsocial tension andpoliticalinstability, not to mentionlawlessness

involving various groups in certain areas. Other right-winggroups in the Visayas, especially in places like Negros, Cebu, and

Leyte, are also analyzed by the author. The phenomenon is not aspervasive in Luzon.

This study is useful for a fuller understanding ofa serious

problem that has plagued the country, especially during the

Marcos regime and Aquino administration. There are various

dimensions to the vigilante phenomenon-social, political,

cultural, and quasi-religious-that need to be appreciated and

understood. This work is a major contribution to an area of

Philippine political anthropology that has been the subject ofresearch by scholars on the country's subcultures.

Vigilantes in the Philippines ix

The author, Ronald J. May, has been associated with the

Department of Political and Social Change of the Research

School of Pacific Studies at the Australian National University in

Canberra for several years. Currently he is a SeniorFellow in the

Department. He isalso an associate ofthe PeterGowing Memorial

Research Center in Marawi City in Mindanao, Philippines. One

of his major research interests is Mindanao culture but he has

written on other aspects of Philippine society and culture.

Belinda A. Aquino, EditorPhilippine Studies Occasional Papers Series

University of Hawai'i at ManoaJuly 1992


Introduction

1

In April 1987 the pages of many of the world'snewspapers carried a gruesome photograph of threeyoung Filipinos, armed with bolos (traditional longbladed weapons), holding up the severed head of analleged communist guerrilla. The young men, who hadhacked their victim to death and allegedly drank hisblood to ward offhis ghost, were identified as membersof a notorious right-wing religious cult group, Tadtad,which has been operating in the Philippines' southernisland of Mindanao. What made the photographparticularly noteworthy was not so much the violence itdepicted - since violence has been endemic in thesouthern Philippines for some time - but the fact thatTadtad is one ofa numberofanti-communist "vigilante"

2 Ronald J. May

groups which received overt endorsement from thePhilippine government of Corazon Aquino. Indeed,coincidentwith the slaying ofthe suspectedcommunists,the president publicly endorsed the activities of one ofthe region's largest vigilante groups as a manifestationof "people power."

In recent years much has been written aboutvigilante groups in the Philippines and their role in theAquino government's counter-insurgency program.Evidence has even been adduced to suggest that thespread of vigilantism has been encouraged by a strategyof low intensity conflict supported by Americangovernment and private interests (see, for example,Clark et al. 1987; Bello 1987; Delacruz et al. 1987).However, there has been little attempt either to link theriseofvigilantes toearlierpopularmovements, toexaminetheir immediate social and political origins, or to explainthe extent ofsupport for such groups in the post-MarcosPhilippines. Such questions are inherently difficult:groups like Tadtad tend to be, by theirnature, inaccessibleand often incoherent; what primary information isavailable, from the groups themselves or from theiractual or prospective victims, can seldom be takenwholly at face value. And their activities, embracing thedarkeraspects ofhumanbehavior, are sometimes difficultto comprehend. Nonetheless, we know enough about

Vigilantes in the Philippines 3

some of the so-called vigilante groups, and theirantecedents, and about the way they have recently beenmanipulated, to make such questions worth pursuing.

This paper thus attempts to describe the apparentproliferation of vigilante groups in 1987-88, to criticallyexamine recent policy initiatives by the Philippinegovernment, and to place the rise of vigilantism in abroader historical context.

Part I


The Rise

of

Vigilantism

7

Several sources suggest that the proliferation ofvigilante groups began in early 1987.1 A PhilippineSenate Committee on Justice and Human Rights Reporton Vigilante Groups (1988), for example, begins withthe comment: "Starting February 1987, there have beenpersistent reports on the proliferation ofvigilante groupsin many parts of the country .... An upsurge of thesecomplaints was noted in October 1987." (SenateCommittee, 1988:5) The sudden growth of vigilantegroups has been related to the breakdown, early in 1987,

8 Ronald J. May

of negotiations aimed at a reconciliation between the

Philippinegovernmentand theCommunistNewPeople'sArmy (NPA). A 1988 report of the New York-based

Lawyers Committee for Human Rights (LCHR), forexample, stated:

Although rooted in the Marcos era,vigilantism did not become a widespreadphenomenon until recently. flourishing noticeablyafter the collapse of ceasefrre negotiations inearly 1987. By late 1987, over 200 vigilanteforces were thought to be operating, and thenumbers have continued to multiply (LCHR1988:xi).

In fact, however, these observations have to bequalified on at least two accounts. First, the term"vigilante" has been used to cover quite a diverse rangeof groups, from what the LCHR (l988:xi) describes as"self-organized, unarmed and generally law-abidinggroups that perform a neighborhood watch role," tofanatical anti-communist religious sects armed andsupported by the military. A Philippine Alliance ofHuman Rights Advocates (PAHRA) Update (15 July1987) for example, distinguishes between "right-wingvigilantes," "fanatical cults," and"armedbandits," thoughinpractice thedividing line betweenthese threecategoriesis by no means clear.2 Moreover, the PARRA list does


not include a number of military or para-military units(particularly units of the former Civilian Home DefenseForces [CHDF], private armies of big politicians andlandowners, and "lost commands") which have beeninvolved in vigilantism.

Secondly, many of the groups which have figuredin the discussion of vigilantism since 1987 were inexistence before - often well before the fall ofMarcos.

It is no coincidence that the initial focus ofvigilantism was on Mindanao. Mindanao has a "WildWest" tradition of lawlessness and violence (May,forthcoming). In the late 1960s, social tensions inMindanao were manifested in accelerating conflictsbetween indigenous Muslim communities, immigrantsettlers (mostly from the Visayas), emerging Christianlandowner-politician interests, and indigenous tribalpeople. In such conflicts, the Armed Forces of thePhilippines (AFP) and Philippine Constabulary/Integrated National Police (PCIINP) units frequentlysided with the Christian settlers and landownerpoliticians.

Around 1970, in the region of Cotabato andnorthern Lanao, a group of Ilonggo settlers and tribalTiruray, calling themselves /laga ("Rats"), fought withgroups ofMuslim "Blackshirts" and "Barracudas." The[/aga, itwas reported, wore vests inscribed with Biblical

10 Ronald J. May

quotations, belts which carried bottles of oil and pagesripped from the New Testament, and amulets (antinganting) which they believed rendered them invincible(Far Eastern Economic Review [FEER), 22 May 1971).The Muslim-Christian conflict was in part over land andin part was fuelled by religious intolerance; but it alsohad political dimensions. In the 1971 elections the Ilagaand, it was alleged, local police and PhilippineConstabulary (PC) units supported the gubernatorialcampaign ofan llonggo Christian PC commander, whilethe Blackshirts and Barracudas were linkedrespectivelyto prominent Muslim politician Udtog Matalam, thefounder in 1968 of a Muslim Independence Movement(MIM) in Mindanao, and Ali Dirnaporo, subsequentlygovernor of Lanao del Sur and a Marcos crony. Notingthe separatist demands of the MIM, a Far Eastern&onomic Review report in 1971 commented: "Thislarge 'blackshirt' army could be an even greater dangerto the government than the Huks."3 (PEER 11 September1971)

Subsequently, as the Muslim insurgency gainedmomentum, military authorities exploited ChristianMuslim antipathies in their campaign against the MoroNational Liberation Front (MNLF). In 1973, a LocalSelf-Defense Force (LSDF) was formed inMindanao. Acontemporary account reported: "Thousands of

Vigilantes in the Philippines11

'volunteers' have been rearmed to form a second line ofdefense . . . [consisting] largely of Christianfanatics ...who are trigger-happy and eager to avengefriends or relatives." Noting that there were alreadyreports ofindiscriminate killing ofMuslims and burningof mosques by the LSDF, and that the army found itdifficult to control them, the report went on to suggestthat there was a very real danger that the LSDF wouldescalate the conflict into a religious war (FEER 14 May1973).

However, this warning was not heededby militaryauthorities, who throughout the 1970s and early 1980scontinued to employ paramilitary groups in counterinsurgencymeasures against the MNLFandsubsequentlythe Communist New People's Army (NPA). In 1975Muslims in the town ofLamitan, Basilan, were said to beparticularly fearful ofa Christianvigilante group, MundoEscurro (Black World), which was accused ofkidnappings, killings, and mutilations of suspectedMNLF supporters. Yet a regional military commanderreportedly described Mundo Escurro as "a law-abidinggroup whose members oftenaidhis troops inoperations."(FEER 9 May 1975)

In the provinces of Zamboanga del Norte andMisamis Oriental, in northeastern Mindanao, two otherfanatical religious sects, Rock Christ and 4Ks, were also

12 Ronald J. May

co-opted by the AFP and PC in operations against theMNLF and NPA. Both seem to have originated amongpoor immigrant rural settlers from the Visayas in the1970s. Like otherfanatical religious sects, their activitiesincluded elaborate rituals, a belief in the power ofanting-anting, and a propensity for bloodthirsty attackson perceived enemies, who were often decapitated orotherwise mutilated. Rock Christ was affiliated with thecharismatic Philippines Benevolent MissionaryAssociation and allegedly supported by the AFP's 125thAirborne Company based in Pagadian City. Some of itsmembers were recruited into the CHDF after 1976, andits founder, who was killed by NPAassassins in 1981, issaid to have been a reservist colonel. After 1981, RockChrist appeared to have broken up and its members tohavejoined either 4Ks or Tadtad. 4Ks was opemting inCIarin, Misarnis Oriental in the mid 1970s. Around 1984itwas reorganized as Kapunungan sa mga Kabus Kontrasa Komunista (Organization of the Poor AgainstCommunism), with the backing ofthe military.4 In thatyear 4Ks members were accused of hacking to deathsuspected NPA cadres and using their blood in a sectritual, but legal action against several accused collapsedwhen key witnesses were murdered. Further massacresof suspected NPA supporters were attributed to 4Ks inthe mid-1980s and in retaliation in 1986 and 1987, NPA


sparrow units assassinated 4Ks' leader, SeverinoBodiogan, and his son. In Davao del Norte, anothergroup ofreligious fanatics, the Remnants ofGod, operatedin a similar fashion, with AFP backing.

In Bukidnon, another region of heavy postwarimmigration, fanatical "Rizalista" organizations appearedin the 1960s. Although in the 1970s they were initiallyinvolved primarily in action against loggers, immigrantsettlers and big corporations - andeven the PC - some"Rizalistas," notably the Caballeros de RizalAgriculturalEndeavor; which spread from Surigao del Norte toBukidnon (where it became associated with the tribalHigaonon Datus' Association), were supported by themilitary as counter-insurgency forces (Cullen 1979;Edgerton 1983).

Another fanatical religious sect to emerge inMindanao in the 1970s was Sagrado Corazon Senor(Sacred Heart of the Lord), better known as Tadtad(tadtad means to chop). A photograph in Asiaweek (14June 1987) shows "the Master" of Sagrado CorazonSenor; Sagrado Catiil SadeJr., at the sect's Holy Templeof Power in Initao, Misamis Oriental. It quotes Sade,who is described as "proclaiming himself to be JesusChrist," as saying that the movement was established in

the early years ofmartial law "to rout the forces of Satanby building an 'Army of Light '" Sade is said to be a

14 Ronald J. May

retired military officer. The movement claims to have4.5 million members in Tadtad groups throughout thecountry. While that is undoubtedly a vast exaggeration,itdoes appear to havethousands offollowers inMindanao,having grown rapidly in the early 1980s, especially inthe province of Davao del Sur, and it has missions inBohol, Leyte, Siquijor, Cebu, Samar, Novaliches,Pampanga, and Batanes. At the same time, Tadtad hasbeen accused of putting extreme pressure on people toform vigilante groups, marking the houses of nonmembers and "frequently threatening to killneighborhood leaders" if they fail to organize vigilantegroups (LCHR 1988. Also see Morderno 1985; Fay1987).

In a 1987 study of the Tadtad, Valencia andMcAndrew describe the movement's rituals and beliefs:

Prospective members of the Tadtad arerequired to undergo a rite of initiation. Thoseseeking admission to the cult must kneel in prayerfor several hours in preparation for the momentwhen their outstretched arms will be hacked by abolo-wielding cult leader reciting Latin or Latinsounding prayers known as oraciones. If theinitiates' faith is strong, their limbs, it is said, willnot be severed....

Tadtad believers are divided into twogroups: the missionaries and the combatants. Themissionaries, composed mostly of women, arecommissioned to promote faith among non-


believers and do this normally through thepropagation of traditional healing. Thecombatants, by comparison, composed mostly ofmen, are armed with bolos and guns andcommissioned to protect the cult and the country.The combatants, distinguished by red bands tiedaround their heads, arms, and legs, are often seenaccompanying military man [sicJ on patrols.

...the objectives of the Sagrado CorazonSenor are absolute devotion to God, selfpreservation, and the defense of the country. Forthese reasons, the cult has vowed to fight thoseconsidered to be enemies of the state. Theseinclude communists as well as members ofprogressive organizations....

Members wear a pouch around their neckcontaining a small likeness of the Philippine flagand a white stone covered in a red cloth. Somemembers also wear a small bottle of oil aroundtheir waist. Such anting are saidto makemembersinvincible to bullets....For an anting-anting to beeffective, one must forego pork, sex, and alcoholon certain days (Valencia and McAndrew,1987:21-22).

Valencia and McAndrew (ibid.:24) report that inthe five years to 1987, "the atrocities of the Tadtad havereached astonishing proportions. Hundreds of peoplehavebeenkilled (often choppedto pieces) and thousandsforced to flee their homes under the terror of this cult."In Cagayan de Oro, a particularly vicious splinter groupofTadtad, The Bolo Battalion, was accused ofa numberof killings of suspected NPA in the mid-1980s. Yet

16 Ronald J. May

Tadtad has operated with the covert, and sometimesovert, support of military and civilian officials (seebelow), and its members were frequently integrated intotheCHDF.

Another development in Mindanao in the 1970swas the emergence of "lost commands." The mostnotorious of these was the "Lost Command" ofColonelCarlos Lademora. Before resigning in 1979, followingcharges of civil rights abuses by his men, Lademora hadbeen a provincial PC commander in Agusan del Sur inEastern Mindanao. His "lost command" (known as"Charlie's Angels"), which is said to have includedregular PC officers and men, as well as military desertersand criminals, embarked upon a bloodthirsty and oftenindiscriminate campaign against suspected MNLF andNPA supporters in the late I970s and early 1980s, withat least tacit support from the military. It was alsoinvolved in a range of criminal activities, from strikebreaking and illegal gambling to landgrabbing andextortion.5

One colorful military figure, Colonel AlexanderNoble (who later turned renegade and led an abortiveMindanao-based coup attempt in late 1989), alsoestablished his early reputation in Agusan del Sur in thelate 1970s, when he organized and trained a group ofHigaonon tribesmen as an auxiliary counter-insurgency


force against the NPA. This is one of several instancesin which groups of tribal people were recruited ascounter-insurgency forces against the MNLF and NPA.Otherexamples include the Kontra Moro Brigade amongthe Tholi of South Cotabato; the Higaonon Vatus'Association in Bukidnon; the Surit-Surit Battalion, agroup of Mansaka and Ata tribal people operating inDavao del Norte with homemade weapons; and theLandasan(LordDivineService)andMindahilaBrigadein NorthCotabato.The semi-privatepresidential advisorybody on national minorities, PANAMIN, played anactive role in the 1970s and early 1980s recruiting andtraining tribal people in anti-communist vigilantism, inassociation with the CHDF. (See, for example, Cullen1979; 1CLResearch Team 1979;Amnesty International1982; Fay 1987; Tribal Forum February-March 1982.)

The NPA began to consolidate its position inMindanao from around the mid-l 970s, and by 1983 hadestablishedmunicipal and provincial councils (Midweek10 June 1987, interview with "Vietor Aguilar"). Aparticular stronghold was the southern city of Davao,about which an Australian journalist wrote in 1987:

DavaoCityconcentrateseveryPhilippinesproblem you can thinkof-a high birthrate, landshortage, absentee owners, prostitution andgamblingrackets, corruptpoliceandmilitary and,ofcourse, the NPA whose avenging Marxist zeal

18 Ronald J. May

not infrequently cloaks a penchant for unabashedthuggery (Peter Hastings in Sydney MorningHerald 25 March 1987).

In the early 1980s there were frequent killings ofpolice and civilians in Davao City, most of the former(and many of the latter) attributed to the NPA (see, forexample, Asiaweek 12 April 1987). It was here thatvigilantism, in the form of Alsa Masa, first attractedwidespread public attention.

Alsa Masa (Masses Arise or People's Uprising)appears to have been formed in the Davao suburb ofAgdao in early 1984 by a barangay captain, Wilfredo"Baby" Aquino, said to be a staunch Marcos loyalist andanti-communist. Agdao is a low-income settlement,populated largelyby immigrants from the Visayas (manyofwhom, Hastings suggests, were petty criminals fleeingjustice), and by 1984 had, like much of the Davao area,come strongly under the influence of the NPA, earningthe popular appellation "Nicaragdao." Ostensibly, AlsaMasa was formed among a group ofnon-communists toresist the financial and other impositions of the NPA.However, as one report says, "Aquino's A/sa Masabecamenotorious for its own lawless activities, includingliquidations ofsuspected rebels." (LCHR 1988:24) Andin late 1985, following the murder of "Baby" Aquino,reportedly by NPA assassins, it was unofficially


disbanded, though it seems to have survived as a smallstreetgang. During 1985, however, the NPAin southernMindanao was heavily infiltrated by "deep penetrationagents" (DPAs) of the military, and in an outburst ofparanoia, the local organization instigated a series ofpurgesandapparently indiscriminatekillings ofsuspectedDPAs. As a result of this, the NPA in Davao alienatedmuch of its popular support and when in April 1986 agroup ofex-NPAmembers, led by Rolando "Boy" PonsaCagay, revived Alsa Masa as an anti-communist group(Cagay claims to have had a close friend killed by theNPAon suspicion ofbeing a DPA), they attracted supportfrom both the urban poor and the middle class in Davao.Aresident ofAgdao was quoted as saying in 1987: ""Weare tired of the communists' taxation and killings. Theyhave no respect for God." (Post-Courier 29 May 1987)

Initially the revival ofAlsa Masa was opposed bythe then local PC commander, Lt. Col. Jesus Magno.However, in July 1986, Magno was replacedbyahardlineanti-communist, Lt. Col. Franco Calida, who activelyencouraged the growth ofthe vigilante group. By March

1987, Alsa Masa was said to have 9,628 members inDavao City, including 3,000 former NPA members

(Manila Bulletin 12March 1987; inJanuary 1988 Calidaclaimed a million supporters). These members patrolledthe city, operated checkpoints on roads in and out of the

20 Ronald J. May

city, collected intelligence for the PC and reported onany strangers, and exercised the right of citizen arrest.Initially Calida denied that Alsa Masa members werearmed (though observers refuted this), but in testimonybefore the Senate Committee on Justice and HumanRights, he admitted thatAlsa Masa had been organized"in coordination with our military and policedetachments," (Senate Committee 1988:8-9) and thatAlsa Masa members had been inducted into the CHDFand issuedwith arms. The (US) Lawyers' Committee forHuman Rights (LCHR) described Alsa Masa as "moreclosely supervised" and "substantially less abusive"than other vigilante groups, while at the same timeacknowledging that its early activities "included harshlycoercive practices and several instances ofextrajudicialexecution." (LCHR 1988:25) Local sources, however,report widespread harassment of non-supporters(including cause-oriented groups, labor organizers,churchworkers, and, during the 1987elections, supportersof the left-wing Partido ng Bayan [PnB]); "taxes"("democratic extortion") on individuals and businessesto support the organization; enforced membership, withill cards costing 35 pesos; and illegal "arrests." A NewYorkTimesreport(4ApriI1987)quotes Calida as saying:"In the fight between democracy and communism, thereis no way to be neutral. Anybody who would not like to

." "",, .,., , I.,' ,

Vigilantes in the Philippines21

join Alsa Masa is a Communist." By the end of 1987Alsa Masa's activities had resulted in large scaleevacuation from some barangays.

The revival ofAlsa Masa in 1986 was supportedby a number of prominent local citizens, includingflamboyant local radio announcer Jun Porras Pala, whobecame known as "the Voice of Alsa Masa."6 Pala, aconfessed admirer of the tactics of Hitler and Goebbels,frequently picturedinhis sandbagged studio with his .38pistol and hand grenade (see, for example, Asiaweek 12April 1987), became a source of vitriolic attacks onhuman rights activists, religious groups and causeoriented organizations. In June 1987, however, Palasplit with Calida and formed his own Contra Force.Subsequently he seems to have shifted somewhat to theleft (see below).

By mid-1987 Alsa Masa was credited withreversing the growth of NPA support in Davao (thoughothers claim that the NPA had largely withdrawn fromDavao by 1986). Calida himself is credited with therevealing comment: ''There are almost no Communistsleftin DavaoCity today, just the priests and the nuns, andwe'll go after them next." (Midweek 3 June 1987)

AlsaMasa has beendescribedas "themostpopularand considered forerunner of the different vigilantegroups." (De Guzman, in testimony before Senate

22 Ronald J. May

Committee 1988:8) As such, it appears to have attractedthe membershipofa numberofothergroups onMindanao,including Tadtad, and to have lent its name to vigilantegroups elsewhere in the country '''which have little incommon with the Davao group other than the name theyborrowed." (LClfR 1988:25) Despite well documentedaccusations of human rights abuses by Alsa Masamembers, in 1987 senior members of the Aquinogovernment praised the movement for its counterinsurgency efforts and held it up as an example to others(see below).

Another group which was accorded officialendorsement was NAKASAKA (NagkahiusangKatawhang alang sa Kalinaw, People Unitedfor Peace).NAKASAKA was established in Davao del Sur in 1987by the then Officer-in-Charge (OIC) Governor DouglasCagas (a former human rights lawyer) and Col. JesusMagno, then regional military commander, as, it wasclaimed, an unarmed, non-violent "quasi-police group"to counter NPA abuses of the civilian population (Clarket al. 1987:18). It appears to have been intended thatNAKASAKA would bring together under governmentcontrol several existing vigilante groups, and indeedAlsa Masa and Tadtad members were incorporated,though Cagas subsequently denied association withTadtad. According to Region 11 anti-insurgency plans


(quoted in FinancialPost 2November 1987), its functionwas to assist in "the attraction, surrender, or defeat ofrebels bypeoplepower." To achieve this, NAKASAKA,was to organize barangay residents, conducting nightlypatrols (ronda) and checking the movement ofpeople soas to be able to alert the military when suspected NPAwere sighted. "Prayer sessions, rosaries, Bible readingand invocations" were to be conducted at every guardshift "for enlightenment and spiritual strength of theNAKASAKA members." Membership was nominallyvoluntary, though Cagas was quoted as saying that allcitizens were expected to join and that those decliningmembership "will be asked to defend their decision."(Clark et al. 1987) Members were to receive regularmilitary training andinstructionaimed "to develop valuessuch as love of God, nationalism, respect for elders andwomen, human rights, and others." NPA surrendereeswere to be subjected to a "rehabilitation process"(gambalay) involving social reorientation skills trainingand "spiritual formation." The provincial government,national line agencies, and private sector and religiousgroups were to participate in this program, andresettlement plots andsoft loans for "livelihoodprojects"were to be provided from a Local GovernmentDevelopment Fund. NAKASAKA's activities were tobe supervised by local police or military units and

24 Ronald J. May

monitored by the Provincial Coordinating Council andDepartment of Local Government.

During 1987 NAKASAKA was frequently hailedas a model for civilian involvetrent in counter-insurgency,even by President Aquino, and it was said to have strongsupport from local businesses. Nevertheless NAKASAKAtrembers often carried guns or bolos, there were frequentreports of harassment of citizens who preferred not tojoin the movement, and NAKASAKA members wereaccused of "extrajudicial executions" and other humanrights abuses (for example, see Clark et al. 1987).

Perhaps encouraged by the official endorsementofvigilantegroups, othergroups which hadbeen involvedin operations againstCommunistand Musliminsurgentsduring the Marcos administration became more visible,more active, and were frequently overtly encoumged bysome military and civilian authorities. And new groupsemerged.

One such group was Kuratong Baleleng.(Kuratong is a bamboo percussion instrumenttraditionally used to summon villagers together or warnthemofdanger; Baleleng is a folkloric figure.) KuratongBalelenghadits originsinOzamis City,Misamis Oriental,where it emerged under the leadership of Octavio"Ongcoy" Parohinog. A former CHDF commander,Parohinog has been described as a "notorious criminal,"


associated with petty crime in Ozamis City and havinglinks to a national criminal syndicate (see, for example,Manila Chronicle 23 June 1987; LCHR 1988). KuratongBaleleng is said to have been formed as a counterinsurgency force inMay 1987following theassassinationby the NPA of a prominent Marcos-loyalist communityleader and former Presidential Security Commandmember, who was related to Parohinog. By August1987, the movement claimed 66 members and was saidto have received weapons from the Southern Commandmilitary headquarters in Zamboanga City; its counterinsurgency activitieshadspreadto theadjoiningprovincesof Misamis Occidental, Zamboanga del Sur, andZamboanga del Norte. Kuratong Baleleng conductedhouse-to-house searches for NPA supporters andorganized public oath-taking by alleged NPAsurrenderees; it was accused of carrying out executionsand ofbeing responsible for disappearances, and is saidto have had an "official" death list of human rightsactivists, church workers and government officials.However, according to reports, "the group's rebirth as acounter-insurgency force has not blunted its criminalactivities. Instead the status it acquired with militaryauthorities has seemingly emboldened its members toplunderlocalresidents with asenseofimpunity." (LCHR1988:110) Kuratong Baleleng is alleged to have been

26 Ronald J. May

involved in extortion - imposing "taxes" on localbusinesses and demanding money and rice from localvillagers - and to have operated as a private army ofcertain political patrons; in 1988 it was employed as astrike-breaking force by a logging company in Misalip,Zamboanga del Sur. In late 1987, Kuratong Balelengattracted national attention when, following statementsbyMindanaopolitician andLocal Government SecretaryAquilino Pimentel, AFP chief General Ramos promisedan investigation into its activities; but no action appearsto have been taken.

Another group of vigilantes which achievednotoriety, both on Mindanao and in the Visayas, in 198788 was a collection of fanatical sects, variously titled(according to the color oftheirheadbands) Pulahan ("theRed Ones"), Greenan ("the Green Ones"), [tuman ("theBlackOnes"), Putian ("TheWhiteOnes") andPula-Puti("Red-White"). Like Tadtad, these groups performedreligious rituals, believed in the power ofanting-anting,and were involved in a number of brutal killings which,in one case (in Negros), involved the public display ofthe severed head of a woman NPA suspect and inanother, the cutting out ofa man's liver. They were alsoaccused of extortion. Most of the groups drew theirmembership from among poor peasants in fairly remoteareas (though a photograph in Asiaweek 14 June 1987


shows a group of Pulahanes, with their distinctive redheadbands, wearing anting-anting andcarryingbolos, inDiangga, Davao City, "where they work on a bananaplantation"). Some appear to have been recruitedexclusively from among tribal minorities. The majoritywere reported to have received training and weaponsfrom the AFP and PC; some were inducted into theCHDP.

In June 1989, the Ituman came into publicprominence following an incident in Sitio Rano, Digos,Davao del Sur. In what became known as "the Digosmassacre," a NPA unit which engaged members of theItuman in the foothills of Mount Apo proceeded to kill37 villagers, mostly women and children, and decapitatethe Ituman leader and his brother, a United Church ofChrist of the Philippines (VCCP) pastor.7 Subsequentinvestigations by the government, civil rights groupsand by the Left's National Democratic Front (NDF) casta spotlight on the Digos Ituman, a group ofManobo andUpo tribal people brought together by Ruben Ayap in1987, and adherents to the Lord Divine Service. TheItuman, apparently reluctantly, had become caught up inthe long-running war between the NPAand theAFP/PC.(See Manila Chronicle 30 June, 9,16, 19 July 1989;Pilipinas [NDF] September 1989.) The immediateaftermath of the Digos massacre was a spate of

28 Ronald J. May

assassinations of suspected NPAin the Davao area, andan announcement that 200 Ituman would be recruitedinto Civilian Armed Forces Geographical Units(CAFGU). (See below.)

Other anti-communist vigilante groups identifiedin Mindanao iII 1987-88 included Masa Laban saKomunista (People's Fight against Communism,MALKOM) in General Santos City, South Cotabato;MMASADA (Mata Masa sa Dakbayan, "Eyes of theCity'sMasses" or"CivicWatch")iniliganCity; KOMUT(the Koronadal Movement for Unity andTranquillity) inSouth Cotabato; Sikad (Serbisyo sa Katiling alang saDemokrasya, Association for Serving Democracy) inDavao Oriental; Kilusang Laban sa Komunista(Movement Against Communism, KLK); Alsa Moro, aMaguindanao-based group comprising mostly MNLFsurrenderees; the Christian Mindanao LiberationOrganization-Mindanao Liberation Army (CMLOMLA), a group founded by Pedro Rivera Montojo inMisarnis Oriental, which demanded "full autonomy" forMindanao, but appears to have been largely motivatedby fears of Christian subjugation in the autonomousMuslimMindanaoprovidedforin the 1987 constitution;and a regional umbrella group, the Mindanao AntiCommunist Crusade.

Vigilantism, however, has not been confined to


Mindanao: of the 127 right-wing vigilantes identified inthePAHRA Update ofAugust 1987,53 were inMindanao,41 in the Visayas, and 33 in Luzon, including six inMetro Manila.

Among a numberoffanatical religious sects in theVisayas which were used by the military before 1986were the Knights of Rizal and various other Rizalistagroups, Philippine Divine Missionaries for Christ, RockChrist, White Rock, Power of the Spirit, Alpha Omega,Walay Sapatos (No Shoes), Tres Cantos (ThreeCorners),Salvatore, Dalan sa Langit (Way to Heaven),Missionaries for Social Transcendental Inc. (MSTI), thePhilippine Benevolent Missionaries Association,Pulahan, and Tadtad.

In Cebu, a US-Philippine Fact-Finding Mission(Clark et al. 1987:20) in May 1987 reported "anticommunist hysteria" and "vigilante violence" (LCHR1988:20). The following year a Lawyers Committee forHuman Rights report stated: "The vigilante movementin Cebu is highly sophisticated, and the province hasbecome a nerve center for the national movement"(LCHR 1988:70).

A leading figure in the vigilante movement inCebu is Pastor "lun" Alcover, a former NPA memberwho left the NPA in the late 1970s (some say hesurrendered to the government after a factional fight in


and BASKOM (Bagong Alyansa Sapak sa Komunista,New Alliance Against Communists), led by a reputedformer NPA commander, Carlito Sanday. In the latter

30 Ronald J. May

which a close friend was executed, others that he wasexpelled for "sexual and financial opportunism.").Alcover appears to have been the founder of SUKOL(Sundalo Batok sa Komunismo ug Alang sa Linupigan,

Soldiers Against Communism and for the Oppressed[sukol means fight], a group which in 1987 claimedresponsibility for a grenade attack on a prominent localcivil rights lawyer, and a leading member of CACA(Citizens Against Communism Army), and of KADRE(Kalihukan sa Demokratikong Reporma, Movement forDemocratic Reform), an anti-communistgroup claiming2,000 members and reportedly armed and supervised bythe military, backed by local mine owners, and involvedin strike-breaking and marijuana growing. Alcover wasalso instrumental in the formation of the NationalCoalition Against Communism (NCAC), an umbrellaorganization formed in 1987 and by September of thatyearclaiming 30 member organizations representing 1.7million members. In the 1987 congressional electioncampaign (during which eight PnB activists were killedin Cebu), Alcover supported the candidacy of theconservativeformer DefenseMinisterJuanPonceEnrile.There was also in Cebu a Philippine Alliance AgainstCommunism (PAAC; paac means bite in Cebuano),founded by Cerge Remonde, which was a coalition ofmulti-sectoral organizationspatternedon theLeft's NDF,

" I , .. , ,·1·. ~··I' "·"··~'····"·•• ·l I 'I ,

32 Ronald J. May

with the heads of two NPA suspects. In late 1987, thesituation in Leyte attracted public attention aftermetropolitan police in Manila under Western Police


armies, an unsourced report listed 40 vigilante groups inNovember 1987 and commented,

Most of the private armies/vigilantes [inNegros Oriental] are members ofreligious fanaticsor bandit groups. They are armed with assortedweapons supplied by the military or bythemselves.... Most have gruesome records ofsaivagings, rapes, arson,landgrabbing, terrorismand harassments.

Among those listed were a local Alsa Masaorganization; several religious cult groups includingKKK (Kristiana Kontra Komunismo, ChristiansAgainstCommunism8); groups allegedly involved in criminalactivities, such as Disoamahan and Tulisan nga Grupo,and a number of PC Forward Command organizations,several of which were associated with the renegademilitary elements in 1987-1990. There was also onNegros an organization, El Tigre, which consisted of anetwork of armed groups, mostly organized by sugarcanegrowers andotherlandlords, predominantlyMarcosloyalists, frequently with close military attachments,who were involved in opposition to land reform and totrade unions, and in some instances supported the rightwing Movement for Independent Negros (MIN). AnumbrellaNegros Citizens'AllianceAgainstCommunismand aNegros ConcernedCitizens Group (with links to El

34 Ronald J. May

Tigre) also came into existence in 1987.Samar, also an area of strong NPA activity in the

1980s, similarly produced a spate of vigilante groups,including Magkaisa (Unite) in Western Samar, andNORSACAL (North SamarAnti-CommunistAlliance).

Vigilantism seems to have come more slowly toLuzon, but proliferated there in the latter part of 1987.Among a number of groups listed in Business Day (25March 1987) were: the Counter-Insurgency Command(CIC), led by Emile ally Alberto Maguidad, and aSpecialAnti-Terrorist Group (SATG) ofEnrile loyalists,both in Cagayan; Kilusan Laban sa Komunismo(Movement Against Communism), a group of militaryrenegades in Isabela ledbyLt. Col. Reynaldo Cabauatan;and New Filipino Crusaders, an intelligence-gatheringgroup with CHDF links. Also operating in northernLuzon was a group, Alsa Bayan (a local version ofAlsaMasa) associated with former PC commander andsubsequentCagayan governor, Col. RodolfoAguinaldo.Aguinaldo, with his personal army of tribal Agtas, the"Cagayan I00," had openly supported the August 1987coupattemptagainstAquino, aspartofananti-communistcrusade, and was again involved in the aborted coup ofDecember 1989; he was also said to be involved inlogging andgambling rackets (Manila Chronicle 5March1990). Other groups included a Central Luzon branch of


KADRE; Guerilyang Tagapagtanggol ng Masa(GuerrillasProtecting the Masses), Kilusan ng PilipinongMagsasaka (Filipino Farmers Movement) and People'sMilitia Force (PMF) also in Central Luzon; GuardianAngels, Bagong Alyansang Makabansa (Patriotic NewAlliance, BANSA) and Alyansa ng Magsasaka Labansa Komunismo (Alliance of Farmers AgainstCommunism, ALMAKA) in Nueva Ecija; the Peace andOrder Brigade in Pampanga; KILCOM (MovementAgainst Communism) and Movement Against Violencein Bicol; Yellow Union, an Aquino-loyalist group inMasbate; and KATAD (Kapatiran ng mga MindorefioTungo sa Adhikaing Demokratiko, Brotherhood ofMindorefios Advocating Democratic Principles), andANAKPAWIS on Mindoro. Several of these wereinitiated by provincial officials; most had links with theAFP or PC/INP. (INP stands for Integrated NationalPolice.)

InMetro Manilaitself, there were several vigilantegroups evident by early 1987, including Magic Eye,organized by Manila Mayor Gemiliano Lopez (maskedmembers of Magic Eye were used to pick out suspectedNPA supporters from line-ups of barangay residentsa technique which had been used earlier against theHuks); Citizens for Peace and Order, an organization offormer military personnel, organized by retired Major

36 Ronald J. May

General Benjamin Vallejo; the Youth IntelligenceGroup,organized by the Quezon City OlC Mayor to assist thepolice and military; the Association of DemocraticVigilantes and Concerned Entrepreneurs (ADVANCE),backed by several business groups; and the UnitedVigilantes Association, which seems to have been anumbrellagroup. Following anescalation ofNPAactivityin Manila during 1987, General Lim announced that hewould use vigilantes against NPA guerrillas and calledfor volunteers.9 Within a week it was reported that over5,000 people, some with their own firearms, had queuedup outside police stations seeking to enlist. One aspect ofthis mobilization was the formation in Tondo - one ofManila's poorest areas - of the Manila Crusaders forPeace and Democracy (MCPD). The MCPD, initiatedby local police commander, Major Romeo Maganto,were described as an unarmed force to be used asinformation gatherers - though weekly training wassaid to include self-defense, combat shooting, andintelligence operations (Manila Chronicle 11, 12November 1987;Age (Melbourne) 13 November 1987).In July 1989, Maganto was suspended and his MCPDdisbanded. However, six months later he was appointedas Metro Manila Field Force commander and a newMetro Manila CPD was created.

Among severalorganizations claimingto represent


vigilante groups nationally, Alcover's National CoalitionAgainst Communism, and an apparently Manila-based

National Movement for Freedom and Democracy werethe most prominent.

In an article published in Septemberl988, frequentcommentator on Southeast Asian affairs, Justus van derKroef, suggested that the number ofvigilante groups hadpeaked in early 1988 and since declined (van der Kroef1988b). The evidence for such a conclusion is thin.Although the term"vigilante" has been generally rejectedin official circles, 10 and although vigilante-type groupshave received less publicity since 1987, human rightsgroups such as Task Force Detainees of the Philippines,the EcumenicalMovement for Justice and Peace, and theNational Movement to Disband Vigilantes continue toreport widespread abuses by vigilante groups, and localsources of information suggest they are still active inmany parts of the country. A report of the government'sNational Peace and OrderCouncil in late 1989 identified152 active "armed groups or private armies" (ManilaChronicle 7 November 1989), and a rally of vigilantegroups in Davao in July 1989, held to mark the thirdanniversary ofAlsa Masa, was reported to have attractedbetween 10,000and50,000. marchers (Manila Chronicle17 July 1989). Nevertheless, there do appear to havebeen changes in the nature and perhaps the scale of

38 Ronald J. May

vigilantism.For one thing, some of the more prominent early

groups have split or have come into conflict with oneanother. Thus, for example, Davao's lun Pala, havingsplit fromAlsa Masa in 1987, was in 1988 reported to bemoving towards "independent social democracy,"questioning thevirtues ofvigilantism("Anti-communismis not enough ... the Government must solve the rootcause of Communism ... poverty and injustice"), andeven opposing thepresenceofUS bases in thePhilippines(Manila Chronicle 9 May, 9 August 1988). There havebeen several other reported splits in Alsa Masa (forexample, see Manila Chronicle 10 April 1989) and inCebureports offighting between local Tadtadgroups andKADREovercontrol ofmarijuanadistribution. Secondly,as vigilante groups began using their position to settlepersonalandcommunaldisputesandbecameincreasinglyinvolved in the sorts of activities attributed to the NPAand "criminal elements," which they had ostensibly setout to eliminate - notably "revolutionary taxes" and"criminal extortion," enforced recruitment, and generalharassment of the population - they alienated growingnumbers of the population. Among tribal people inremoteareas, inparticular, therewerefrequentcomplaintsduring 1989 about the activities of vigilante groups andCAFGUs (see below), whose members were often


recruitedfrom among vigilantes (see, for example, ManilaChronicle 2, 11, 30 June 1989; 9 July 1989; 25 August1989; 5 November 1989). There have even been reports

(see, for example, Manila Chronicle 8 May 1989) ofmembers of vigilante organizations drifting back to theNPA. Thirdly, the formalization of the government'smulti-tieredcounter-insurgencyprogram since 1988 (seebelow) has perhaps brought some of the more extremegroups under a greater degree ofcontrol, especially afterright-wing and Marcos-loyalistcivilian groups and someCHDF/CAFGUs apparently supported renegade militaryfactions in several abortive coup attempts against theAquino government in 1987-90. Notable in this respectwas General Ramos's order in early 1990 to disband anumber of CAFGUs, notably those associated withoppositionist sugar planters in Negros and with militaryofficers sympathetic to renegadeAFPfactions (seeManilaChronicle 7, 26 March 1990).

In this respect, van der Kroef is correct insuggesting that, as the climate for the growth ofvigilantism has become somewhat less favorable, manyof those who emerged as vigilantes in 1987 have turned(orreturned) to the more traditional pursuits ofbanditry,hired guns or employment in the private armies of

businessmen and politicians. 11

Part II


Vigilante Groups

and the

Government

Although the proliferationofvigilante groups andtheirinvolvementin thePhilippinegovernment's counterinsurgency program have frequently been pinpointed to1987, following the breakdown of thegovemment-NPApeace talks in January, the co-opting of popularmovements, private armies and so-called fanatical cultswas already a well-established strategy of counter-

44Ronald J. May

insurgency under President Marcos, and even muchearlier.

During theSpanish colonialperiod, therecruitmentof local groups as paramilitary forces was an essentialstrategy in maintaining the tenuous grip of the smallEuropean population, and converted indio troops wereused in the protracted wars against the Moros.Subsequently, attempts were made to enlist Filipinocivilianforces in the process ofAmerican"pacification."Hurley records, for example, that in operations against"bandits" in Cebu in 1903, the colonial PhilippineConstabulary (anticipating the tactic of "hamletting")gathered the people of one district into several smalltowns surrounded by high stockades; "Each small groupwas then organized with a volunteer force offorty to fiftymen, armed with spears and bolos, to assist theConstabulary as lookouts, auxiliaries, and cargadores(baggage carriers), against the bandits." (1938:156)

During the 19208and 19308,itbecameincreasinglycommon for wealthy landowners and politicians tomaintain their own private armies, or to hire "goons,"and to use them to intimidate tenants, break strikes, anddeliver the vote. Sturtevant (1976) refers to several suchgroups, including Batung Maputi (White Stone) inPampangain the 1920s, the National Volunteers (whichSturtevant specifically refers to as a "vigilante group"),


established by the governor of Cavite in the late 1903s,and Cawal ng Capayapaan (Soldiers of Peace), fonnedby the governor of Pampanga in the late 1930s andemployed as strikebreakers.

Following the Japanese occupation of thePhilippines in 1941, the Philippine Constabularycooperated with the Japanese high command but groupsofFilipinos joined the resistance, and some as membersof the Hukbalahap (Hukbo ng Bayan Laban sa Hapon,People's Anti-Japanese Anny), and some as guerrillaswith the US Anned Forces in the FarEast (USAFFE). OnLeyte, Baclagon (1952:271) records:

The early groups first called themselves"vigilante groups" because they had pledgedthemselves not only to fight the Japanese but alsoto eliminate the bandit groups which instituted areign ofterrorin Leyte by engaging in brigandage,murder, and rape.

On the other hand, on Samar the Japanese revivedthe Pulahan movement and used it to suppress resistance(Arens 1959).

After the war, "peace officers" - later "civilianguards" - were appointed to assist in the restoration ofpeace and order. Among these were fonner USAFFEguerrillas, prewar members of private armies of

46 Ronald J. May

landowners, and landlessunemployed who tookwhateverjobs were available. But members of the progressiveHukbalahap were largely overlooked in thereestablishment of govemment. Kerkvliet (1979: 124125) comments:

Landlords were theones who wanted thesepeace officers or civilian guards to restore peaceand order after liberation. But they had in mindmore than cracking down on thieves and highwaybandits. They were especially anxious about thegrowing peasant movement. Civilian guards,therefore, became basically armed groups thatlandlords used and that the local government andMilitary Police sanctioned.

Disillusioned by lack of recognition and by theabsence of change in postwar social conditions, someHuks, many of them members of prewar peasantorganizations, turned to insurgency through the HukbongMapagpalaya ng Dayan (HMB, People's LiberationAnny). (See Fegan, forthcoming.)

Civilian guards were subsequently used by thePhilippine Constabulary (pC, as the Military Police wasrenamed in 1948) as their "eyes and ears" in counteringthe Huk insurgency. But frequent abuses of the civilianpopulation by the PC and civilian guards quickly earnedthem a bad reputation; one of Kerkvliet's infonnants

,., ~ •.• l.,' I "


recalled of a particularly infamous PC unit, which worea skull and crossbones insignia, "The Nenita unit brokebones, killed, and cut off people's heads." (Kerkvliet1979: 160) In response to growing popular resentment,which had the effect of accelerating a drift of thepopulation to theHuks, thecivilianguardsweredisbandedin the early 1950s, though some members of the civilianguards remained on the payroll of big landowners andpoliticians.

In the early years of the Marcos regime thecontinued threatofteft-wing insurgency led to therevivalof what were then called Barrio Self-Defense Units(BSDU) and, in 1976, to the creation by presidentialdecree of the Integrated Civilian Home Defense Force(later, dropping the "Integrated," CHDF), a civilianauxiliary force under the command of the PC. CHDFvolunteers were given weapons, uniforms, and rations,but they were not part of the regular military and "notsubject to normal military discipline." (Selochan1990:148-49) By the end of the Marcos administrationthe CHDF numbered some 76,000 personnel.

Also, as described above, from around the early19708, the AFP and PC were providing assistance toextremist organizations which they coulduse in counterinsurgency operations, or as sources of informationabout suspected NPA and MNLF supporters. This was

48 Ronald J. May

particularly the case in places like Mindanao, where theNPA and MNLF had local advantages but where thegovernment could exploit longstanding social tensions.Frequently local military commands appear to havegiven covert support to extremist religious sects orprivate armies, or to have in effect turned a blind eye totheactivities of"lostcommands" orbanditgroupswhichserved their purpose. Key members ofextremist groupsand private armies were often integrated into the CHDF,where they received weapons, training, and officialstatus. NPA and, especially MNLF surrenderees, werealso integrated into the CHDF; in the early 1980s a"People's Liberation Organization" (PLO), consistingof MNLF surrenderees, was being supported by themilitary in operations against the NPA.

As early as 1970it was suggested that the armingof civilian BSDUs was intensifying violence in Luzon(FEER 20 August 1970). An Amnesty Internationalreport of 1982, referring to the ICHDF, says:

In some areas recruits are reported toinclude criminals and the personal bodyguards oflocally powerful figures. Another source ofrecruitment is reported to be members ofirregularquasi-military political, religious or criminalgroups. (Amnesty International 1982:27)

By 1986 the CHDF had acquired such a badreputation for human rights violations and general abuse

,'.. , .,'., I I I, ,


of its authority that one of the first decisions of theAquino government was to accede to demands for itsdissolution. Such a commitment, in fact, was writteninto the 1987 Constitution (art. XVllI [24]). During1986-87 some of the more unsavory elements of theCHDF were dismissed (many subsequently joinedvigilante groups) and CHDF numbers were reduced. InJuly 1987, it was announced that the CHDF would bereplaced by CAFGUs under direct AFP control, but itwas another 12 months before steps were taken toestablish CAFGUs, and it is not obvious that the changemade much difference at the local level. (See ManilaChronicle 25 October 1988) In early 1989, there wereproposals to deputize CAFGUs to supervise barangayelections, but these were rejected by the chairperson ofthe Commission on Elections (Manila Chronicle 4February 1989). Subsequently, there have been demandsfor the disbanding ofCAFGUs and their replacement bya system of armed forces reservists.

Meanwhile, faced with a rapidexpansion ofarmedvigilante groups, the Aquino government reactedambivalently. In mid-March 1987, in directing DefenseSecretary Rafael Ileto and Local Government SecretaryJaime Ferrer to disband the CHDF and private armedgroups, the president was reported as specificallyincluding anti-communist vigilante groups such as Alsa

50 Ronald J. May

Masa and NAKASAKA in Davao. The same month,however, Ferrerendorsed the activities ofNAKASAKAand undertook to seek government funding for similargroups elsewhere, and AFP Chief-of-Staff, GeneralRamos, and retired General Jose Magno, went further,saying that Alsa Masa deserved "full support andencouragement in dismantling communism" in Davaoand throughout the country. (Philippine Daily Inquirer12 March 1987;Asiaweek 12April 1987) By the end ofMarch, peace negotiations having brokendown and withAquino herself under increasing pressure from the AFP,the president, on avisit to Davao, spoke ofNAKASAKA(which she referred to as an unarmed citizen's group) asa welcome manifestation of"peoplepower." (Asian WallStreet Journal 30 March 1987) A shift of policyappeared to be confirmed by the president in a speech tothe Philippines Military Academy at the end of Marchand on 1April 1987 the cabinet endorsed "voluntary andspontaneous [groups] of citizens for self-defense inareas where there was an insurgency." (Business Day 2April 1987)

The president had in mind, however, certainconditions on the operation of what General Ramospreferred to call "civilian volunteer self-defenseorganizations" (CVSDO), or citizens' volunteerorganizations (CVO), namely that they be unarmed,


popularly supported (there had been widespreadaccusations ofvigilante groups using coercion to recruitmembers), and effective against insurgents. Guidelinesgoverning CVSDO were drafted in May 1987 but notformally adopted until October (by which time Ramoshad, in April, introduced AFP guidelines, which largelyanticipated those approved in October). Inter alia, theGuidelines provided that

Nonnally the volunteer organizationsshallbe under local civil government supervision andtheiractivities must be sanctioned by the barangayand municipal authorities, and coordinated withthe local military and policy authorities;

However, the "armedcomponent" of CVOs "shallbe under the supervision of the military and police."(Guidelines on Civilian Volunteer Self-DefenseOrganizations, 30 October 1987 art. iv [cD TheGuidelines also made provisionfor a national overseeingInter-Agency Subcommittee on Citizens' VolunteerGroups (with representatives from theAFP, Departmentsof Defense and of Local Government, and theCommission on Human Rights) and correspondingregional bodies.

By October 1987, President Aquino's position

had shifted to the point where, in a speech in Davao,

52 Ronald J. May

referring to Alsa Masa, she said:

We lookup to you as an example.... Whileotherregions are experiencing problemsinfightingthe insurgency, you here ... have set the example(Manila Chronicle 24 OCtober 1987; FEER 5November 1987).

The same month the chairman of a regionaldevelopment task force, presidential consultant JesusAyala, also advocated the use of vigilantes in thegovernment's counter-insurgency program, endorsingAlsa Masa, NAKASAKA and other groups (FinancialPost 2 November 1987). Anti-communist CVOs werealso endorsed by church leader Jaime Cardinal Sin.

This position was not shared by a PhilippineSenate Committee on Justice and Human Rights inquiryinto vigilante groups, chaired by Senator WigbertoTaiiada. After receiving testimony from a variety ofsources, the committee reported amongst its findings:that the record of complaints against vigilante groups(some of whose leaders and members "are policecharacters with criminal records") pointed to "a trend ofescalating human rights violations against innocentcivilians"; that the organized"proliferation"of vigilantegroups violatedthe new Constitution; thatcertainmilitaryofficers allowed members of vigilante groups to carry

Vigilantes in the Philippines 53'

high-powered firearms in violation of existing law; andthat peace and order councils [see below] "may bewittingly or unwittingly used to legitimize armedvigilantes and other paramilitary groups." (SenateCommittee 1988:14-21) The committee's reportrecommended that vigilante groups be disbanded andthat theCVSDOguidelines (whose legality thecommitteechallenged) be recalled.

The report drew criticism from General Ramos(Ramos replaced Ileto as Defense Secretary in January1988), who expressed the view that the abolition ofCVOs "wouldjeopardize the country's defense system"(Manila Chronicle 24 April 1988), and from the newLocal Government Secretary, former DavaoCongressman Luis Santos, who said that vigilantes werea "very potent weapon in the fight against communismand subversion." (Manila Chronicle 27 April 1988)

In fact, by 1988 vigilantes - as CVOs or BantayBayan ("People's Watch") - had become a generallyaccepted part of the Aquino government's "total war"against insurgency. Military tactician (and former NPAstrategist) Victor Corpus, for example, outlined a "threetiered" counter-insurgency defense system whichcomprised "military mobilized forces" (the AFP,especially through "specialoperations teams" or SOTs),"territorial forces" (PC/INP and CAFGU) and "the

54 Ronald J. May

mobilization of the populace" through CVOs or BantayBayan. The latter he described as "an organizationpatterned after the CPPINPA's barrio revolutionarycommittees," whose chief tasks were intelligencegathering and maintaining security in thebarrios (Corpus1988:174-76; 89-91. Also see FEER 4 August 1988;Manila Chronicle 15 Apri11989; Kitanglad 1988).

In theory, CVOs were to be thoroughly screenedby peace and order committees (POCs) set up under theDepartment of Local Govemment,12 but in fact suchscreens often seem to have used a very large gauge, andin some cases, CVOs have come under direct militarycontrol (see, for example, the complaints of MayorAgatep, reported in Manila Chronicle 30 July 1989).

Vigilante groups of different hues thus continueto operate around the countryside, frequently incollaboration with AFP or CAFGU units, and notinfrequently in theinterests oflocalpoliticians, landlords,and criminal elements.

PART III


Vigilantism

in Historical

Perspective

57

Most commentators on recent vigilantism in thePhilippines, while decrying its often savage and arbitrarynature, seem to have been content to describe thephenomenon as a regime-supported - if not regimeinitiated, andin someaccounts US-sponsored-responseto left-wing insurgency. 13 Certainly, it has been, in part,just that. But the proliferation of vigilante groups in

58 Ronald J. May

1987-88, the apparent extensive popular support forthem, and theinvolvementofa largenumberofso-called''fanatical cults," all raise questions which call for morefundamental explanation. Why, for example, didvigilantism spread as it did in 1987, in the wake of thepeople power revolution, not only in rural areas andprovincial towns butinMetroManila, whereeven amongthe urban poorofTondoprospective recruits volunteeredin such numbers that they had to be turned away? Whoin fact were these vigilantes? And why were so many"fanatical cults" - movements rooted in a "littletradition" of popular protest, the tao (ordinary people)seeking kalayaan (liberty) - fanatically anti-left?

Any attempt at explanation must begin byrecognizing that there have been several strands tovigilantism.

Perhaps easiest to explain are those groups -likeElTigre, ADVANCE, andKuratong Baleleng-directlytied to landowner, business or politician interests, or toorganized crime. In such cases anti-communistvigilantism provided a convenient front for the selfinterests of those who supported organized groups as ameans of containing recalcitrant workers, tenants, civilrights activists and political opponents, orwere involvedin criminal activities; they also provided a source ofemployment or other benefits for poor, landless and


unemployed rural and urban dwellers, some of whomused the opportunity to settle old scores, or to indulge aproclivityfor violent behavior. Thereis a direct continuityhere not only with the private armies and goons oflandowner-businessmen-politicians, which have longbeen a feature of the Philippines political landscape, butalso with earlier vigilante groups such as the NationalVolunteers and Cawal ng Capayapaan in Cavite andPampanga,andwiththeformerCHDFandearlierBSDUsand civilian guards. With respect to the last of these,Kerkvliet (1979:125) recalls:

The unfortunate part, residents ofTalaveraquickly pointed out, was that men who werecivilian guards frequently had no quarrel with thepeasants they abused ... most civilian guardswere unemployed or landless "little people" whoneeded work and tookwhateveremployment theycould find. 'They were used by hacenderos," saidHilario Felipe, "against other little people - us- who were really like them."14

That such groups proliferated in the aftermath ofthe 1986 people power revolution perhaps reflects thedegree of breakdown of central state control and theprovincialization of Philippines politics, which tookplace after the overthrow ofFerdinand Marcos (see, forexample, May 1987). In this situation, local politiciansand warlords, and some regional military commanders,

60Ronald J. May

took the opportunity to assert their relative autonomy,and the failure of the Aquino government to resolve thecommunist insurgency provided them with a rationalefor unilateral action. In many instances, most notably inNegros, landowner-businessmen-politicians acted inconcert with local military elements, some of whomsubsequently supported right-wing challenges toPresident Aquino.

Also comparatively easy to explain are vigilantegroups which developed as a genuine reaction to theexcesses of particular NPA commands - who, likevigilante groups, imposed "taxes," energetically soughtrecruits, and punishedinformers15 - or to the activitiesof local criminals. Disenchantment with the NPA(whether or not attributable to the work of DPAs) wasundoubtedly a factor in the initial attraction of groupslike Alsa Masa and NAKASAKA in Davao and theMCPD inMetro Manila. And there is little doubt that thecircumstances which culminated inthe"DigosMassacre"in 1989 were replicated to a greater or lesser degreeelsewhere, among remote communities caught in themiddle of the war between the NPA and military. Thereis nothing particularly new in this situation; writingabout thecolonialPC'scampaignsagainst local insurgentmovements earlier in the century, Vic Hurley observed:


Thepeaceablefanner wasinanunenviableposition. As anonmemberofthe secretgroups, hewas subject to constant raid and extortion; as amember, he was harried byanny andConstabulary(1938:120).

61

As in the past, some probably joined vigilantegroups because, as the post-1986 euphoria dissipated,they believed that vigilantes represented the winningside.

More difficult to explain is the part played inrecent vigilantism by what have been loosely referred toas "fanatical cults." It is these groups which haveattracted most attention to the vigilante phenomenon, asmuch, perhaps, for their magico-religious orientationand violent behavior as for the scale of their operations.

Such groups have a long history. Hurley's accountofuprisingson Samar at the turn ofthecentury(l938:131132), for example, recalls names and describes ritualswhich would be familiar to those reading accounts ofvigilantism in 1987-88:16

As thepulajan [pulahanJ movement grewin strength it became impregnated with a tone ofreligious ritual and frenzy.... Their weapon was aheavy crescent-shaped bolo.... Their battlepreparationsconsistedofbottlesofholy oil, prayerbooks, consecrated anting-antings, and otherreligious paraphernalia. The mode ofattack was a

62 Ronald J. May

massed bolo rush. Theirbattlecry wasthatdreadful"Tad-Tad" which means "Chop to pieces."

David Sturtevant, in his pioneering study ofpopularuprisings in the Philippines, 17 initially identified

as the central theme of his study "the transition frommysticism to relative sophistication" (1976:18), andhailed the 1930s Sakdal Party of Benigno Ramos asmarking "the shift from blind responses against real orimagined sources of frustration toward nationalmovements dedicated to purposeful change" and, withthe Socialist Party of the Philippines, breaking "thetraditional supernaturalistic mold of rural rebellions."(Ibid.:255)18 Butin anepiloguewritten after the LapiangMalaya uprising in Manila in 1967 (see Sturtevant1969), he refers to the "predictable revival ofmillennialism" and concludes:

By 1970the peasantry's turbulent heritageappeared to have moved full circle: fromsupernaturalism to secularism to supernaturalismagain (1976:260, 263).

Recent Philippine scholarship (following aEuropean tendencyestablishedby such people as Linton,Cohn, Wallace, Redfield, Hobsbawm, Wertheim, andLanternari)19 has paid particular attention to what have


variously been described as religio-political, mystical,millennial, messianic, nativistic, andcharismaticpopularuprisings from the Cofradia de San Jose ofApolinario delaCruz in the I840s, through the Babaylanes, Dios-Dios,Guardia de Honor, Pulahan, Santa Iglesia, Colorum andKatipunan movements of the late nineteen and earlytwentieth centuries, to the more recent Sakdal andLapiang Malaya uprisings.20 Such studies have tendedto emphasize the nationalistic ("patriotic" as well asanti-colonial) and class (anti-hacendero, anti-ilustrado)attributes of such movements, acknowledging RobertRedfield's distinction between the "Great" and "Little"Traditions.

Like these earlier "popular movements," the socalled "fanatical cults" which appear to have enjoyed arecrudescencein the 1970sandwerean importantelementofvigilantismin the late 1980s, consistedpredominantlyofpoorpeasants, particularly rural inmigrant settlers andtribal minorities in remote areas.21 But ifsuch groups arethe heirs to the nationalistic and class traditions ofpopular protest, one must ask, why in the 1970s under

Marcos, and even more so after 1986, did they alignthemselves not with the revolutionary left but with the

conservative and repressive forces of the military andright-wing politicians? It is not a sufficient answer(though it is true) that people were coerced into joining

64 Ronald J. May

vigilante groups; there is too much evidence ofspontaneous popular support. Apartial explanation maylie in the essentially religious nature of most of thegroups, who might thus see "godless" Communists as agreater threat than the military. Ithas also been suggestedthat since the NPA, too, has found popular movementsamong remote inmigrant and tribal communities a fertileground for recruitment, it is often simply a question of"who gets to them fIrst." (Rex Aguado, in ManilaChronicle 30 July 1989)

But the rush of people, especially young men, tojoin Alsa Masa in Davao in 1987 and the MCPD inManila in 1989 suggests that these explanations are notsufficient. The conclusion seems inescapable that after1986 a good number of "little people," heirs to thetradition of popular protest, believed that left-winginsurgency posed a threat to the gains of the peoplepower revolution which outweighed any promises of abetter society. That they were encouraged andmanipulated by Marcos loyalists and other reactionaryright-wing elements, including some regional militarycommanders and civilian and church officials, andexploitedby amotley arrayofopportunistic and criminalelements who stood to gain from a weak: central state, isboth obvious and unsurprising. But this does not alter thefact that, just as in thepast somepoorpeasants sidedwith


government against uprisings, from the Cofradia de SanJose to the Huks, so in the 1970s and the 1980s somepoor rural and urban dwellers took sides against the left.

IT there is a general conclusion to be drawn fromthis, it is perhaps that "the masses," the "little people,"the tao, "thepeasants" are less homogeneous aggregatesthan many nationalist historians tend to suggest. Thus,for example, Ileto, writing about the Cofradia, records(1979:78) thatwhen in 1841 Spanishauthoritiesattackedthe CommuneatAritao, troops fromManilawereassistedby"peasantvolunteers from the surroundingprovinces,"And Sturtevant, despite his claim (1976:116) that "Fewbandits, after all, victimized the poor," notes that as theGuardia de Honor attracted a wider range of followers,including bandits (tulisanes) and fugitives from the law,"small farmers ... turned against the movement when itunleashed its fury on the poor," (ibid.: 112) and says oftheBabaylan andPulahanmovements: "Sectariansadismgradually turnedhamletdwellers againstboth.... Visayanpeasants accepted the colonial government because itrepresented a lesser evil," (ibid.: 131)

In fact, in periods of agitation for change, alongwith the tao seeking lwlayaan. the Robin-Hood-sty1esocial bandits and the visionaries (Sturtevant [ibid.: 121]refers to "religious Robin Hoods"), there have alwaysbeen the opportunists, the bullies, the individuals and

66 Ronald J. May

groups with scores to settle, and those who simply seechange as threatening. In the aftermath of the peoplepowerrevolution of1986,paradoxically, such tendenciesappear to have been, at least temporarily, on theascendancy.


Endnotes

67

IThe following account draws on a number of sources,

including reports in several Philippine and foreign newspapers,

FarEastern EcoTUJmic Review (FEER) andAsiaweek; publications

oftheTaskForce Detainees ofthe Philippines (TFDP), Philippine

Alliance of Human Rights Advocates (PAHRA), Ecumenical

Movement for Justice and Peace (EMJP), and Episcopal

Commission 011 Tribal Filipinos (ECTF); reports of Amnesty

International and of US-Philippine and Australian fact-finding

missions; and interviews, conducted mostly in Mindanao, over a

number of years. Perhaps the best general surveys of vigilante

groups in 1987-88 are Clark etal. (1987), Delacrnz etal. (1987),

68 Ronald J. May

LCHR (1988) and Senate Committee (1988), though van der

Kroefs analysis (1988a,b) is also useful.

2 For what it is worth, aPAHRA Update in August 1987

gave the following breakdown: right-wing vigilantes 127;fanatic

cults 63; armed bandits 15. Cf. van der Kroefs (1988b: 642)

distinction between "those inspired by reputedly spontaneous

'people power' that ... seek a broad base from which to ferret out

NPA infiltrators," "religious charismatic or cult1ike armed

organizations," and "the armed retainers of politicians

businessmen, landowners, or sugar barons committed not only to

struggle against local NPA insurgents, but also against the

implementation ofgovernment policies believed to be harmful to

their interests.

3The Huk insurgency will be discussed laterin this study.

4 There is some confusion about this group. A 1982

Amnesty International report refers to the early 4Ks group as

Kasalanan, Kaluwasan, Kinabuhi, Kabus (Sin, Salvation, Life,

Poverty). Others refer to KKK (Kusog sa Katauhan Alang sa

Kalinaw), as People's Power for Peace operating in Davao. A

July 1987 PAHRA Update refers to 4Ks, Katilingban Kalihukan

Kontra Komunismo (Coalition of Associations Against

Communism) as a South Cotabato group.


5Por a more detailed account of the colorful career of

ColonelLademora, seeOcampo in FEER 19March 1982;Amnesty

International (1982); and reports in Bulletin Today 24 and 29

September 1981.

6Pala was employed by radio station DXOW, which was

owned by Marcos crony Eduardo Cojuangco. DXOW was closed

by the government in December 1989.

7The killing of the UCCP pastor was ironic, since the

UCCP had been an outspoken opponent of vigilantism, and its

members had suffered harassmentfrom the military and vigilantes

as aresult ofthis opposition. (See, for example, Manila Chronicle

3 April, 15 May 1989).

8Notwithstanding its "Christian" label, the KKK in 1987

claimed responsibility for bombing the residence of progressive

local bishop Antonio Fortich.

9According to a Manila Chronicle report (13 December

1987), between January and early November 1987, 88 people,

mostlypoliceand military personnel, werekilled by NPAassassins

in Manila. NPA"sparrow" units were also specifically targeting

the organizers of vigilante groups. The event which triggered

70 Ronald J. May

Lim's decision was the killing of a highly-decorated, and

apparently popular, police captain and an "anti-communist

community leader" in November 1987. See Asiaweek 20

November 1987.

10m early 1989, however, the newly appointed chairman

of the House Committee on Human Rights said: "I defend the

Alsa Masa (United) concept in Mindanao." (Manila Chronicle 5

February 1990)

lIOn the subject of emerging vigilante-politician links,

specifically, see Manila Chronicle 17 November 1989.

12POCs, comprising local civil and military officials,

clergy, and civic leaders, were created in 1988 to coordinate

government programs aimed at insurgency and criminality.

According to a Manila Chronicle (30 July 1989 ) report, some

1665 POCs were set up across the nation in July 1989 but were

"completely immobilized" by lack of funds.

13The major exception is van der Kroef (1988a, b).

14compare this to the somewhat cynical comments of

Filipino political scientist Remigio Agpalo (1965:13): "The tao,

thinking of his survival and his family first, cares not for high-


sounding policies, or ideologies, or principle ofgood government

and administration. He is more interested in which party or group

will give him a job."

15 See Cullen (1984); Fr. Cullen, SJ, a prominent church

activist in the prelature of Malaybalay, Bukidnon, who was

detained in 1972 for alleged involvement with the undergound

left, is critical of the NPA which he accuses of "applying

pressure" to barrio people, especially Catholic chapel leaders.

16 For a later account of the Pulahan, see Arens (1959).

17 Sturtevant's PhD dissertation was submitted in 1958

and published in a revised form in 1976, though some of the

material was published in Sturtevant (1969) and elsewhere.

18Sirnilarly, Constantino (1975) suggests a movement

from mystical, millennial movements to secular and class

conscious ones; even Ileto, whose Pasyon and Revolution seeks

"tobring to life themasses' own categortiesofmeaning" (1979: lO

ll) refers (ibid.:3) to the " 'backward' ways of thinking (reflected

in the Lapiang Malaya)."

72 Ronald J. May

19But, interestingly, ignoring a Melanesianist tradition,

represented, for example, in the writings of Worsley, Lawrence,

Burridge, May and Oesch.

20See, for example, Sturtevant (1969, 1977), Foronda

(1961), Hart (1967), Cullamar (1986), Constantino (1975),

Shoesmith (1978), Ileto (1979), Flores-Tolentino (1982), and

Mallari (1983).

21In an article in Manila Chronicle 30 July 1989 ("War

comes to the tribals"), Rex Aguado attempts to argue, citing a

Mindanao State University professor, that some of the more

vioientaspects ofvigilante group behavior, such as thebeheading,

mutilation, and cannibalism of victims, can be traced to "the

ancient tribal practice of headhunting" and traditional tribal

beliefs that a warrior could gain strength (Kusog) through eating

the heart or brains or drinking the blood of a slain enemy.


References

73

Agpalo, R., 1965. Pandanggo Sa Ilaw: The Politics ofOccidentalMindoro. Quezon City: University of the Philippines.

Amnesty International, 1982. Reportofan AmnestyInternationalMission to the Republicofthe Philippines 11-28Novemher1981. London: Amnesty International Publications.

Arens, R., 1959. 'The Early Pulahan Movement in Samar," TheJournal of History vii(4):303-370. [Reprinted in LeyteSamar Studies xi (2)1977:57-113.]

Baclagon, U.S., 1952. Philippine Campaigns. Manila: GraphicHouse.

Bello, W., 1987. Creating the Third Force: US Sponsored LowIntensity Conflict. San Francisco: The Institute for Foodand Development Policy.

74 Ronald J. May

Clark,R., etal., 1987.Right-Wing Vigilantes andU.S. Involvement.Report ofa U.S.-Philippine Fact-Finding Mission to thePhilippines 20-30 May 1987. n.p. [Manila?]: PhilippineAlliance of Human Rights Advocates (PAHRA).

Constantino, R., 1975. The Philippines: APastRevisited. QuezonCity: Tala Publishing.

Corpus, V.N., 1989. Silent War. Quezon City: VNC Enterprises.

Cullamar, E.T., 1986. BabaylanisminNegros: 1896-1907. QuezonCity: New Day.

Cullen, V.G., 1979. "Social Change and Religion Among theBukidnon," Philippine Studies 27:160-75.

Delacruz, E., Jordan, A. and Emmanuel, J. (eds.), 1987. DeathSquads in the Philippines. San Francisco: Alliance forPhilippine Concerns.

Edgerton, R.K., 1983. "Social Disintegration on a ContemporaryPhilippine Frontier: The Case of Bukidnon, Mindanao,"Journal afContemporary Asia 13 (2):151-175.

Fay, C., 1987. Counter-Insurgency and Tribal Peoples in thePhilippines. A Report by Survival International, USA.

Fegan, B. forthcoming "Goons: Protectors of the Rich," in R. J.May (ed.), Goons, Rascals and Rebels.

Flores-Tolentino, V.V., 1982. 'The 'Moncadistas' ofMindanao.A Study in a Religious Movement," Kinaadman iv:1-36.

Foronda, M.A., 1961. Cults Honoring Riwl. Manila: R.P. Garcia.

Hart, D.V., 1967. "Buhawi of the Bisayas: The RevitalizationProcess and Legend-making in the Philippines," in M.D.Zamora(ed.),Studies in PhilippineAnthropology. QuezonCity: Alemar-Phoenix, pp. 366-396.


Hurley, V., 1938. Jungle Patrol: The Story of the PhilippineConstabulary. New York: Dutton.

ICL Research Team, 1979. A Report on Tribal Minorities inMindanao. Manila: Regal Printing.I1eto, RC., 1979.Pasyon and Revolution. Popular Movements in thePhilippines, 1840-1910. Quezon City: Ateneo de ManilaUniversity Press.

Kerkvliet, B.T., 1979. The Huk Rebellion. A Study of PeasantRevolt in the Philippines. Quezon City: New Day.

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Lawyers Committee for Human Rights (LCHR), 1988. Vigilantesin the Philippines:A ThreattoDemocraticRule. New York:LCHR

MalIari, F.A., 1983. "The Remontadas of lsarog," Kinaadmanv:103-1I7.

May, R.I., 1987. "A Perspective from Mindanao," in P. Krinks(ed.), The Philippines Under Aquino, Canberra: TheAustralian Development Studies Network, pp.71-84.

___, forthcoming. "The Wild West in the South: a recentpolitical history ofMindanao," in RI. May and M. Turner,Mindanao: LandofUnfulfilledPromise.QuezonCity: NewDay.

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Selochan, V., 1990. "Professionalization and Politicization of theArmed Forces of the Philippines." Unpublished doctoraldissertation, Australian National University.

76 Ronald J. May

Shoesmith, D., 1978. 'The Glorious Religion of Jose Rizal:Radical Consciousness in aContemporary FolkReligiousMovement in the Southern Philippines," in D.B. Miller(ed.), Peasants and Politics. Grassroots Reaction toChange inAsia. New York: St. Martin'sPress, pp. 149-79.

Senate Committee on Justice and Human Rights (Republic of thePhilippines), n.d. [1988]. Report on Vigilantes. n.p.

Sturtevant, D., 1969. Agricultural Unrest in the Philippines.Guardia de Honor-Revitaliwtion Within the Revolutionand Riwlistas - Contemporary Revitalization in thePhilippines. Ohio University, Papers in InternationalStudies, Southeast Asia Series No.8.

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Valencia, N.P. andMcAndrew, J.P., 1987. ''The Tadtad: ReligiousFanaticsas Agents ofStateRepression," inJ.P. McAndrew(ed.), Monks, Dreamers, Preachers andRebels. ReligiousSolutions to the Problem of Meaning in a PeripheralCapitalist Society. Manila: Asian Social Institute, pp.1931.

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