samjardimtaylor.umwblogs.orgsamjardimtaylor.umwblogs.org/.../06/MadhiWarfareFINAL.docx · Web...
Click here to load reader
-
Upload
vuongnguyet -
Category
Documents
-
view
216 -
download
1
Transcript of samjardimtaylor.umwblogs.orgsamjardimtaylor.umwblogs.org/.../06/MadhiWarfareFINAL.docx · Web...
“So 'ere's to you, Fuzzy-Wuzzy”:
The British Campaign in the Sudan 1883-1898
University of Mary Washington
Sam Taylor
History 300Y
4/22/13
When Mohammed Ahmed labeled himself the “El Mahdi” or “The Chosen One” and led
an Islamic based revolt in the British and Egyptian territory of the Sudan in 1881, the British
clearly had a large issue to deal with. Ahmed carved over a million square miles of territory for
his following to establish the first African nation ever to win independence from a foreign power
by virtue of its own military force.1 For 15 years the followers of “El Mahdi” held back the
weight of British and Egyptian might. Not until Lord Kitchener, who was determined to destroy
the Mahdi forces once and for all, took command over the Anglo-Egyptian forces were the
Mahdist forces finally finished off. Under Kitchener the British soundly defeated the Mahdi at
Atbara and Omdurman which finally re-established British and Egyptian control of the region.
The reason for such sound British victories at Atbara and Omdurman was the combination of
superior tactics and greater technology. Correspondingly, at the battles of El Obeid and
Khartoum, where the British were defeated, neither of these factors were in British favor and as a
result they were defeated by the Mahdist army. The British Campaign in the Sudan consisted of
more than these four military engagements. These four engagements represent the two greatest
defeats of the British as well as their two greatest victories during this campaign. These four
engagements also represent the start and the end of the British dealings with the Mahdist forces
and, when compared, they are a great example of how the British adapted their understanding
and attitudes when dealing with imperial native enemies. After the first set of defeats the British
and Egyptian forces made distinct changes to their military technology employed and tactics
used. Superior military technology and battlefield tactics proved to be the difference for ultimate
British victory in the Sudan.
The leader of the Mahdist revolt had a unique upbringing, which helped give rise to his
future as a revolutionary leader. Mohammed Ahmed, who eventually became ‘El Mahdi,’ was
1 Byron Farwell. Prisoners of the Mahdi (New York: Harper & Row Publishers, 1967), 3.
1
born in the Sudan in 1845 and became the key figure for the Mahdist revolt. For most of his
young life, Ahmed spent time with religious teachers and by age nine had memorized the entire
Koran.2 From an early age, Ahmed had large religious aspirations. He was known to declare that
he was the descendant of El Askari, for whom it was believed a great leader of Islam would one
day descend. Also important to his rise as a prophet, Ahmed grew up at the crossroads of the
region. In this region on the Island of Abba in the Nile, many different cultures existed.
Undoubtedly, Ahmed had a great understanding of the Sudan as a result. Yet, his primary
concern as a young man was religion. He often took part in self-flagellation to show his
devotion. Eventually Ahmed became a wandering dervish, traveling and praying all over the
region. During this period he became quite well-known for his religious devotion and his
sermons.3
Mohammed Ahmed used Islamic teachings as ideological backing for his rise as a leader.
He preached a doctrine based on the rejection of foreigners and their ways, as well as
improvement of the self through Islam. He often told his followers to “hate the Turk” and to
follow his lead on the path to heaven, which he called “the way.” During his early life Egypt
directly ruled the Sudan and the term ‘Turk’ applied to any foreigners with light skin including
Egyptians. The Egyptian ‘Turks’ became very cruel and oppressive rulers. Many of the Egyptian
rulers took unfair advantage of the land’s wealth and women.4 Ahmed said the ‘Turk,’ while
Muslim was a sinner, a lazy glutton; he drank wine and oppressed other Muslims. Ahmed called
for the people of the Sudan to purge everything that resembles the ‘Turk’.5 His doctrine became
quite popular during a period where there existed resentment in the Sudan for Egyptian rulers.
2 Farwell. Prisoners of the Mahdi, 3.3 Ibid., 6-7.4 Ibid., 4.5 Ibid., 8.
2
Ahmed eventually claimed he was a prophet, and officially adopted the name of ‘El Mahdi’,
which translates to ‘the chosen one’.6
The Mahdist movement subsequently grew and began to take a militaristic stance. His
following grew at a faster rate than the Egyptian government anticipated or could imagine
possible. Eventually El Mahdi called for a Jihad, or a holy war, against the ‘Turk’ or anyone he
saw that was against his doctrine. The Mahdi preached, “I am the Mahdi, the Successor of the
Prophet of God. Cease to pay taxes to the infidel Turks and let everyone who finds a Turk kill
him, for the Turks are infidels”.7 His large group of followers quickly transformed into an army.
The Egyptian government saw El Mahdi as a false prophet and understood they needed to
stop him and the damage his doctrine was causing. The Egyptian government committed small
forces to shut Ahmed down. His large numbers easily overwhelmed the small Egyptian forces.8
The Mahdi had created an army that was well organized and fanatic. What they lacked in
weapons and training they made up for in bravery and devotion to their leader and his cause, and
most importantly they were ready to take the offensive against any and all foreigners.
The British involvement in the Sudan was motivated by very different factors compared
to those of the Mahdi. The British did not directly control the Sudan but rather the region was
controlled by Britain through the Egyptians. Britain had no real interest in the Sudan, but if they
could help it, did not want the Egyptians to completely abandon the region since it was a key
source of revenue for Egypt.9 Also, one can speculate that having Muslim fundamentalists take
control over a piece of the British imperial project was something that did not agree with the
British Victorian hubris. In 1883, the British decided they would help Egypt crush the Mahdi
6 Farwell, Prisoners of the Mahdi, 10-12.7 P.M. Holt, The Mahdist State In The Sudan: 1881-1898 A Study of Its Origins Development and Overthrow (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1970), 59. 8 Farwell, Prisoners of the Mahdi, 13-17.9 Ibid., 19-26.
3
revolt, but not directly. They would only send military advisors to help lead an expedition
against the Mahdi.10
The British and Egyptian force that was assembled was clearly inadequate. William
Hicks, a former British officer in the Indian Army, was selected to lead this expedition. Hicks’
force was comprised of only 7,000 Egyptian infantry and 900 cavalry. The quality and morale of
these troops were very low, yet Hicks decided to go forth with the expedition.11 Winston
Churchill remarked in his book The River War, “It was perhaps the worst army that has ever
marched to war… they had no spirit, no discipline, hardly any training.” The expedition’s goal
was to capture the town of El Obeid. El Obeid was the largest and most important town of the
western Sudan. It was a commercial center and the gateway to Darfur. The Mahdist army at this
point was a very capable fighting force, especially when compared to the Anglo-Egyptian forces.
In 1882 the Mahdi had marched on and captured El Obeid with some 30,000 troops. The
Mahdist forces had adapted their fighting techniques in order to best combat the British and
Egyptians. Before El Obeid most of the Mahdist forces only had spears and swords and the
Mahdi had discouraged the use of western weapons, but seeing the effectiveness of western rifles
when first attacking El Obeid, the Mahdi understood the need for these types of weapons. The
Mahdist forces then started distributing captured arms and ammunition from previous victories to
all of their warriors.12 In comparison, the Anglo-Egyptian forces did not have a large
technological advantage. Both the Mahdi and Anglo-Egyptian forces used single-shot, breech-
loading, black powder rifles with either the Martini-Henry rifle or Remington rifle.13
10 Farwell, Prisoners of the Mahdi, 27.11 Winston S. Churchill, The River War: An Account of the Reconquest of the Sudan. (Project Gutenberg EBook, Last Updated Jan. 2013), http://www.gutenberg.org/files/4943/4943-h/4943-h.htm#link2HCH000512 Farwell, Byron. Prisoners of the Mahdi.20-22.13 Featherstone, Omdurman 1898: Kitchener’s Victory in the Sudan, 13.
4
Another issue for the Anglo-Egyptian forces was British hubris or arrogance and their
ability to be unaware of their own inadequacies. During the expedition Hicks and other officers
laughed off the Mahdi and when reading reports that even Khartoum, the Egyptian capital of the
region, was threatened, they “all laughed heartily at this…[thinking that] Khartoum [was] not
being threatened in the least.” While Hicks and his staff may have thought their force was
superior in every way, this was not the case. Hicks’ force was vastly inadequate. For example,
Hicks had under his command a body of Cuirassiers mounted with medieval war surplus. They
wore chain mail or ring mail, and used ancient two-handed long swords and some only with
lances. Yet Hicks was encouraged by victory at small skirmishes and he pressed the campaign
forward, not understanding how inadequate his force was and how potent the Mahdist army
actually was.14
Tactically the Mahdi outmatched the Anglo-Egyptian forces at the Battle of El Obeid.
Hicks continued to march towards El Obeid with no knowledge of the strength or position of his
enemy, yet the Mahdist army continued to closely monitor Hicks’ forces. The Mahdi, with an
estimated 100,000 followers, left El Obeid to meet the expedition. On November 3, 1883,
Mahdist riflemen hid in a wooded area in front of the advancing Egyptian force. With the flanks
secured, the hidden riflemen opened fire and took the expeditionary forces by surprise. When the
Egyptians fell back, the Mahdist warriors attacked from the flanks causing confusion and chaos.
The Egyptians huddled into square formation, but the square broke easily and the army was
slaughter. Hicks himself was killed and of the 10,000 in the expedition, only 100 men survived.
Incredibly only 350 of the Mahdist forces were killed. Clearly, the underestimation of the Mahdi
and the overestimation of his own forces caused the defeat of Hicks and the British and Egyptian
forces. Capturing El Obeid only continued to fuel the Jihad of the Mahdi.
14 Farwell, Prisoners of the Mahdi. 29-33.
5
In the months following the failure of the Hicks expedition, the British and Egyptians
made the decision to no longer attempt to combat the Mahdi. They were going to let the Mahdi
basically have the Sudan. The British and Egyptians only needed to evacuate the towns and
withdraw in a safe manner.15 For the capital city of Khartoum, General Charles “Chinese”
Gordon was selected to withdraw the government’s forces. Gordon, who was a former Governor
General of the region, arrived in Khartoum on February 18, 1883.
Similar to the Battle of El Obeid, tactically the Mahdi outmatched the Anglo-Egyptian
forces. Instead of planning for the complete evacuation, Gordon started to plan the
administration of the city.16 Gordon thought that safe evacuation was totally impractical. The city
must be defended by any and all means.17 Certainly Gordon was openly committed to direct
British intervention. Eventually the Mahdist forces realized that Gordon was not going to leave
peacefully and thus they laid siege to Khartoum, blocking all roads. Yet, Gordon felt it was his
duty to stay and resist the Mahdi as much as he could, while hoping the British government
would eventually directly intervene.18
Khartoum is another example of how Anglo-Egyptian over confidence was a detriment.
Gordon, in line with British hubris, thought that the revolt was caused entirely by Egyptian
misrule and the revolt would fizzle out as soon as the Mahdist followers were promised that an
English governor, who was to be independent from Egyptian rule, would govern them.19 Clearly
this was not the case and the Mahdi eventually decided to assault Khartoum directly. An advisor
to the Mahdi stated “If Gordon, a single Englishman, has caused us all this trouble, what will our
15 Winston S. Churchill, The River War. 16 Holt, The Mahdist State In The Sudan, 95.17 Charles Chenevix Trench. The Road to Khartoum: A Life of General Charles Gordon (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1978) 197-198.18 Holt, The Mahdist State In The Sudan, 99.19 Charles Chenevix Trench. The Road to Khartoum, 200.
6
condition be if an army of his countrymen join Gordon?”20 The Mahdi was taking a level-headed
and cautious approach.
Again, the Anglo-Egyptian forces were inadequate. In the city Gordon had a combined
force of 8,665 with 12 artillery pieces on the ground, 11 artillery pieces stationed on the seven
gunboats. The town was constantly under long-range fire during the lead-up to the Mahdist
assault, which did not do significant damage but was very unnerving. On January 25 Gordon
watched the enemy prepare to battle and ordered all to prepare for an attack. Yet that night
Gordon went to sleep and was not awakened until the battle was well-underway.21
At the attack on Khartoum one can see the great advantage Mahdist forces had tactically.
Mahdist forces used a large diversionary force of 20,000 troops to attack a five mile stretch of
the city’s defenses, while the main force of 40,000 attacked a single weak point in the defenses
and easily broke through. Gordon’s forces were decimated without difficulty and Gordon himself
was killed.22 This marked the true strength of the Mahdist forces. While small remnants of the
government’s forces remained in certain towns, Sudan was truly in their possession. The
humiliation and anger of the British people that came with the news of Gordon’s death would
last for over a decade.23
Cleary, the Anglo-Egyptian forces took what happened to Gordon and Hicks and learned
from their mistakes. Over the next ten years the Anglo-Egyptian army underwent a great
transformation. The British took a greater interest in the Egyptian forces and supplied more
British officers and better training. This, combined with more experience fighting the Mahdist
forces during subsequent border disputes, were invaluable experience to the ‘new’ Egyptian
20 Holt, The Mahdist State In The Sudan, 103.21 Charles Chenevix Trench. The Road to Khartoum, 273-279.22 Ibid, 290.23 Holt, The Mahdist State In The Sudan, 223.
7
army.24 In 1892, a 42-year-old Herbert Kitchener was promoted to commander-in-chief, or
Sridhar, of the British and Egyptian forces in Cairo. Slowly Kitchener surrounded himself and
his army with young British officers who met his strict prerequisites for service.25 His force
started to take shape.
The British wanted some sort of revenge for Gordon, even after all these years, During
the 1890’s popular support for British intervention in the Sudan grew greatly, and Kitchener,
eager to re-conquer Mahdist territory, welcomed this support. It was eventually decided
Kitchener would lead the Anglo-Egyptian army south, out of Cairo, in order to re-conquer the
region. This force of Kitchener consisted of 15,000 men, five gunboats, and three armed
steamers.26
Kitchener is a great example of a British commander who actually was thoughtful and did
not seem to have the same inadequacies as Hicks and Gordon. Money was a major issue for
Kitchener’s force, and in order to strain the government as little as possible, he cut costs
wherever he could, even cutting medical supplies to the bare bone, showing his ability to be
harsh when necessary. Kitchener proceeded south very cautiously and chose to build his
strength methodically, unlike past British commanders.27
The Mahdist forces had adequate leadership of their own. By this point, the Mahdi had
been dead for some time. His successor, Khalifa, effectively continued the Mahdist cause and
their nationalist goals. Seeing the threat that Kitchener’s force represented, a Mahdist force of an
estimated 18,000, advanced north towards Kitchener near Atbara, along the east coast of the
Nile. After some maneuvering by both Kitchener and the Mahdist commander Mahmoud, the
Mahdist forces were able to choose the grounds and formed an entrenched camp with their back 24 Winston S. Churchill, The River War.25 Trevor, Royle, The Kitchener Enigma (London: Michael Joseph Ltd, 1985), 94-96.26 Ibid. 101.27 Philip Magnus, Kitchener: Portrait of An Imperialist (New York: E.P. Dutton & Company, 1959), 95-100.
8
to the river.28 Mahmoud’s superior position could only be taken through a direct assault and
pitched battle.29
Again Kitchener approached the situation in a tactically correct manner. Kitchener spent
days trying to figure out how to approach the Mahdist. Kitchener claimed he was “rather
perplexed by the situation here.” Kitchener showed his virtues of patience and thoughtfulness.
Mahmoud, not being lured out by Kitchener smartly remained stationary. Kitchener finally
decided to attack on the morning of Friday, April 8, 1898. The battle started with an artillery
bombardment by the British and then Kitchener’s force positioned in a long, broad front,
advanced. Many of the British troops were yelling “Remember Gordon.” The Mahdist forces
showed incredible discipline and held fire until the enemy was close enough for real damage to
be done. After over 30 minutes of intense hand-to-hand combat led by the British brigades, the
Mahdist forces retreated. The British and Egyptian forces lost 583 causalities, 120 of which
were British and over 3,000 of the Mahdist force were killed.30
After Atbara, Kitchener stationed his troops for summer quarters and were re-supplied
and the technological advantage for the British can easily be seen. Kitchener’s forces were
bolstered by British reinforcements. Now their force consisted of 8,200 British and 17,600
Egyptian and Sudanese regulars. They had 44 pieces of artillery, and 20 Maxim guns. On the 10
gunboats and five transport steamers he also had 36 artillery pieces and 24 Maxim guns.31 The
Maxim gun was a new military technology, which could load, fire, and eject cartridges all in its
recoil, firing 650 rounds per minute. Also, since the Kitchener force left Cairo they had been
using a new superior rifle. The British used new Lee-Metford rifles which had a five round bullet
magazine, with a .303 caliber bullet which had a higher velocity and was smokeless compared to 28 Magnus, Kitchener, 119. 29 Royle, The Kitchener Enigma. 121.30 Magnus, Kitchener, 120-122.31 Royle, The Kitchener Enigma, 124-125.
9
the ammunition of the Martini-Henry rifle used by the Mahdist forces, which was a slower,
heavier, and a single shot breech loader that still used black powder. Another key advantage
technologically for the British was a revolutionary new high-explosive artillery shell that had a
greater ranger than previous rounds and implemented a multi-splintered fragmentation.32 Clearly,
the British understood the importance of having the technological advantage over the Mahdist
forces.
At the next battle of Omdurman, again Kitchener was able to show his tactical advantage.
After the summer camp, it became clear the next major engagement would be decisive. On
September 1, British cavalry spotted the Mahdist army under Khalifa with an estimated 60,000
men advancing near the city of Omdurman. Khalifa’s forces were positioned in regular and
precise line facing northeast, stretched for more than four miles from flank to flank.33 Early on
the morning of September 2, British and Egyptian forces were deployed defensively in close
order in a straight line with first rank kneeling and the second rank standing. Egyptian Cavalry
and the Camel corps combined to form Kitchener’s right flank.
The assault by the Mahdist forces shows both the technological and tactical advantages of
the British clearly. The first assault consisting of 10,000 Mahdist infantry attacked the British
center and left, but was pushed back under constant fire from the infantry rifles and the Maxim
guns. None of the enemy in this first assault made it to within 300 yards of the British and
Egyptian line. On the right flank an estimated 20,000 Mahdist soldiers engaged the Egyptian
mounted troops. While it seemed the Mahdi were initially successful, the concentrated fire from
both land-based artillery and gunboats broke the back of the Mahdist forces and they eventually
withdrew. Khalifa kept 20,000 of his best troops hidden in order to either use as a decisive blow
32 Featherstone, Omdurman 1898, 13.33 Churchill, Winston S. The River War
10
to Kitchener’s broken lines or to use as a trap when Kitchener advanced. Kitchener knew Khalifa
was concealed somewhere and advanced in a cautious echelon formation. When the eager
British brigades leading the formation broke the echelon formation in order to be the first into the
city, Khalifa took his opportunity and attacked the gap from the west. This second attack was
again repulsed as the British managed to fill the gap in time and pour in concentrated fire at a
much faster rate.34
Suddenly a third counter-attack came from the north but only after the second attack had
already failed and the well-trained British were able to react in time. This was a miscalculation
by Khalifa and if the second and third attack had been simultaneous, the outcome would have
been disastrous for the British.35 Only 48 men of Kitchener were killed, including 28 British and
434 other wounded. For the Mahdist forces over 11,000 were killed and another 16,000 were
either wounded or taken prisoner. Kitchener was applauded in English cabinet saying, “His
victory had come out with absolute accuracy, the like answer to a scientific calculation”.36 The
battle of Omdurman effectively ended the Mahdist movement and secured foreign control of the
Sudan for years to come.37 The British troops spoke very positively of the Mahdi warriors in later
years. In the famous poem “Fuzzy Wuzzy” (a nickname for a few tribes of the Sudan) Rudyard
Kipling writes “So 'ere's ~to~ you, Fuzzy-Wuzzy, at your 'ome in the Soudan; You're a pore
benighted 'eathen but a first-class fightin' man;… big black boundin' beggar -- for you broke a
British square!”.38 This poem rightfully shows how the Mahdist were seen and respected as
warriors even after defeat by the British.
34 Magnus, Kitchener, 126-130.35 Ismat Hasan Zulfo, Karai: The Sudanese Account of the Battle of Omurdurman. Translated by Peter Clark (London: Federick Warne Publishers Ltd, 1980), 226-230.36 Magnus, Kitchener, 131-137.37 Zulfo, Karai, 238-247.38 Rudyard Kipling, The Kipling Society, "Fuzzy-Wuzzy." http://www.kipling.org.uk/rg_fuzzywuzzy1.htm
11
Clearly the Mahdist revolt represented more of legitimate threat to Victorian British
military might than one would have thought. The battles of El Obeid, Khartoum, Atbara, and
Omdurman demonstrated that in the Sudan, superior military technology and tactics proved to be
the winning strategy. The British being able to put aside their ego and arrogance to assess the
real strength of their opposition after being defeated, understood and implemented the true effort
that must have be taken in order to defeat a truly motivated native force. Clearly the Mahdist
forces taught the British an invaluable lesson in imperialism.
Works Cited
12
Churchill, Winston S. The River War: An Account of the Reconquest of the Sudan. Project Gutenburg Ebook, Last Updated Jan. 2013. http://www.gutenberg.org/files/4943/4943-h/4943-h.htm#link2HCH0005
Farwell, Byron. Prisoners of the Mahdi. New York: Harper & Row Publishers, 1967.
Featherstone, Donald. Omdurman 1898: Kitchener’s Victory in the Sudan. Oxford: Osprey Publishing, 1993.
Holt, P.M. The Mahdist State In The Sudan: 1881-1898 A Study of Its Origins Development and Overthrow. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1970.
Kipling, Rudyard. The Kipling Society, "Fuzzy-Wuzzy." ooooohttp://www.kipling.org.uk/rg_fuzzywuzzy1.htm
Magnus, Philip. Kitchener: Portrait of An Imperialist. New York: E.P. Dutton & Company, 1959.
Royle, Trevor. The Kitchener Enigma. London: Michael Joseph Ltd, 1985.
Trench, Charles Chenevix. The Road to Khartoum The Life of Charles Gordon. New York . W.W. Norton & Co., 1978.
Zulfo, ‘Ismat Hasan. Karai: The Sudanese Account of the Battle of Omurdurman. Translated by Peter Clark. London: Federick Warne Publishers Ltd, 1980.
13