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First Published in June, 20072

© The Electoral InstituteIndependent National Electoral CommissionAbujaTel:E-Mail:Vol. 3 No. 1 July 2009

Printed in Abuja, Nigeria by:

ISSN: 2006-8417

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or by any information storage or retrieval system without the prior permission of the Publishers.

Editorial Advisory Board

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Professor Maurice M. Iwu Chairman, INECBarrister Victor Chukwuani National Commissioner, INECBarrister Philip Umeadi, Jnr National Commissioner, INECMr. S. A. Soyebi National Commissioner, INEC

Editorial Consultants(1)Professor H. A. Asobie University of Nigeria, Nsukka(2) Professor J. A. A. Ayoade University of Ibadan, Ibadan

EditorsMs. Eyum Ode Ag. HOD Research & DocumentationMr. Tunde Ojedokun Chief Research OfficerMr. Shehu Wahab Chief Research OfficerMr. Chukwuemeka Nwachukwu Chief Research OfficerMr. Chijindu Chuta Chief Research OfficerMrs. Salamatu Faruk-Yahaya Senior Research Officer

Managing EditorDr. Frank O. OzohCoordinator of The Electoral Institute

About the Journal

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The broad objectives for the establishment of ‘The Nigerian Electoral Journal’ are as follows: -

i. To publish the results of research studies and scholarly papers on electoral matters.ii. Involving election managers in thinking and developing ideas towards creating a

proper mindset for election management.iii. Beginning a culture of professionalizing election management through a journal on the

subject. iv. Providing a means of educating INEC Management staff on the critical subject of

election management.v. Building an invaluable bank and literature in election management knowledge for the

education of the general public

Guidelines and Notes to Contributors

1. Articles should be original and well researched may cover any of the following Areas: Information and Communications Technology in Election Management; Electronic Voting System (EVS) in Election Management; Gender Issues in Politics; Political Parties and National Development; Election Personnel Development; Global Trends in Election Management; Voter and Civic Education; Elections, Democracy, Leadership and Capacity Development; Delimitation of Election Boundaries; Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) in Election Management; The Role of Civil Society in Election Management; and Democracy and Economic Development

2. American Psychological Association (APA) Documentation Style to be used.3. Book reviews are Acceptable.4. Four (4) Copies (three hard and one soft) of each article are to be submitted.5. All articles should reach the Managing Editor at the following address:

The Coordinator,The Electoral Institute,

Independent National Electoral CommissionPlot 436 Zambezi Crescent,

Maitama District A5,P.M.B 0184, Garki Abuja, Nigeria.

E-Mail: Frank.Ozoh@inecnigeria.org

Table of Contents

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ArticlesThe Electoral Process and the Imperatives of Electoral Reform in Nigeria- Maurice M. Iwu ……….………………………………………………………………………………….1

Internal Democracy, Transparency in Party Administration and the

Implications for Effective Monitoring of Party Finances

-Victor A.O Adetula ……………………………………………………………………………………….12

Monitoring of the Administration and Finances of Political Parties

in Nigeria – Legal and Institutional Limitations

-Samuel Egwu ………………………………………………………………………………………………33

An Overview of Alternate Dispute Resolution Processes

- Paul Obo Idornigie …………………………………………………………………………………….42

Applying the ADRs to Political Party Disputes-Andrew 1. Chukwuemerie ………………………………………………………………………….58

Strategising for 2011 General Elections in Nigeria: Emergent Vertical Issues

- Frank O. Ozoh …………………………………………………………………………………………..75

Sources of Local Government Revenue and Strategies for Its Generation in the Nigerian Electoral Democracy -I. Aja-Nwachuku …………………………………………………………………………………………87

Book Review ………………………………………………………………………………….106

THE ELECTORAL PROCESS AND THE IMPERATIVES OF ELECTORAL REFORM IN NIGERIA*By

Maurice M. Iwu, Ph.D**6

1. Introduction

The challenge of administering the electoral process and its composite structures in an evolving democratic system as Nigeria entails dealing with complexities many of which are unforeseen. Our country is far more diverse, complex and fragmented than most people realize. Over time, Chief Electoral Commissioners of the country and other senior officers of the Electoral Commission have come to terms with this challenge as part of their duty to the nation. Over time however, it has become obvious too that there can be no limit to the complexity and plots of politics in Nigeria. Managing the electoral process in Nigeria is therefore, not only all about administering elections and matters directly pertaining to the process. It entails far more than that.

It is quite obvious that the developmental challenge before Nigeria is gross and multiple. It has been so for a long time. Increasingly, however, the challenges of Nigeria’s national existence are steadily being compounded by the failure or refusal of the leadership elite to squarely address certain elementary issues as every purposeful country does.

The need for an unambiguous and candid definition of the very essence of being of the Nigerian state, as well as a clear outline of the moral and operational principles of conduct within our society has become rather urgent. To a reasonable extent, it can be understood why the predominant concern – real or contrived - of public discourse in recent times is focused on elections and electoral matters. In truth however, much more about the social dynamics and processes within the Nigerian state require profound evaluation and reform. We shall return to that.

2. Conspiratorial Preoccupation by a Few

Once again, I make bold to state in a public discourse that there is a limit to the distance our dear country, or indeed any other country can go under such a prevailing situation as we live today, marked essentially by denial of reality and a conspiratorial preoccupation with finger pointing, mob action and unending parochial plots prompted in the main by nothing else but calculations of the interest of a few within the fold of the political elite.

*Being lecture presented at the Senior Executive Course 31 of the National Institute for Policy and Strategic Studies, Kuru, Jos in February, 2009. **Professor Maurice Iwu is the Chairman of the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC)

It is more grievous for a society when the primary source of strength and motivation for the minority that wields enormous influence in the affairs of the society is anchored not on any nationalistic zeal or brilliance, but on the fact that they have deep pocket and so have the

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capacity to buy up almost everything, including not a few otherwise thinking men in the society.

Yes, the history of the modern state, especially with the evolution of democratic governance is replete with conspiracies and effort by the elite to corner and seize control of the reins of the state power, even as there is always pretension that the majority rules. Gore Vidal, the seminal American writer captured the problem succinctly when he noted that “in theory the only moral foundation of government is the consent of the people”, but the key question that trails that common notion remains “which people? (Gore: 2003)

The elite or better still the elite with means have never hidden their ambition to control the actual power and influence in the society. This reality for instance is at the root of the system of Electoral College in the United States of America, a system which allows the majority to vote for the presidential candidate of their choice, but leaves the actual power of choosing the winner of a presidential race to a minority.

As Vidal quotes a Supreme Court Justice as coldly pointing out during the testy dispute over the result of the presidential election in USA in 2000, “the Constitution (of United States of America) does not provide any American citizen the right to vote for president”. (ibid. p. 137) That weighty duty in that bastion of democracy is reserved for a few - the Electoral College. But the law, the Constitution of the United States of America provides for that and the influence is wielded with decorum.

For a young state as ours, “the sad development is that Nigerian politics has receded from the arena of public trust to the worship of private denizens and enthronement of private mores and ethics”. (Madubuike: 2007)

3. Need for Reforms

The need for reform in the Nigerian society is much more comprehensive than is being discussed today. There is for one, a very urgent need for reform of the mentality of the political and leadership elite.

Reforms in their most meaningful character are not isolated but compound packages. The electoral process itself is also increasingly exposed to a much greater array of ‘outside’ forces. These outside forces, including economic policies, widening of the national social distance and the growing importance of international structures and agreements that impact on the electoral process are more complex, multi-sourced and multi-dimensional than ever before.

23(a) The Nexus in Political and Economic Processes

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The inextricable link between economics and politics within the modern human society is well known. This nexus leaves us with a glaring reality for instance, that sooner than later what is currently discussed as an economic phenomenon – the global economic problem otherwise known as the economic meltdown – may lead to meltdowns in such other closely related realms as politics and even social life if care is not taken. Even with the present scope of the global economic problem therefore, the nightmare is not so much of what is already at hand but with what may yet lie ahead.

As it turns out, very few societies, if any, have solid economic foundation without a matching stable political foundation and system and vice versa. Understood from this sobering perspective, the enormity of the challenge before Nigeria in the current global economic difficulties and its internal efforts to strengthen its democratic base becomes clearer. Here lies the root of the imperative for Nigeria to address in a very deliberate and definitive sense, basic issues at the foundation of its political and economic processes.

The actual issue of the moment as some continues to cast it is not reform of the electoral process in isolation. Important as that may be, there is an urgent need for a comprehensive reform that will at once encompass the intertwined spheres of politics and economics. The reform that beckons to Nigeria is that which will address among others, the access to money by individuals and the limit to which that can be used in the realm of politics; exposure of the majority within the society to exploitation, abuse and denial of their basic rights by those who cornered their common wealth in the first place; citizenship rights and opportunity available to every citizen to aspire and attain position of prominence whether in politics, the professions or public service, based primarily on talent and ability and not on the size of the pocket; obedience to the rule of law by all citizens and all groups and how best to enforce the pre-eminence of the laws of the land.

Reform must be anchored on government’s ability to anticipate the national needs rather than in response to crises that arise when those needs are unmet or as a knee-jerk reaction to contrived emergencies by opposition groups. As the OECD clearly noted in its policy review on ‘Governments of the Future’: The Challenge of Government is to move away from opportunistic reform towards more strategic reform. Strategic reform involves developing a clear vision, building a constituency, planning tactics to achieve outcomes and communicating the vision and anticipated outcomes to stakeholders and the public at large.(OECD: 2000)

3(b) Electoral Reform and the Seven Point Agenda

The appreciation of the imperative for a compound re-assessment of the state of the Nigerian nation is obviously the very basis of the simultaneous launching out by the Federal Government with the respective policy thrusts of the Seven Point Agenda and the electoral reform initiative.

3 In outlining the basic areas of (1) Power and Energy (2) Food Security and Agriculture (3) Wealth Creation and Employment (4) Mass Transportation (5) Land Reform (6) Security and

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the Niger Delta and (7) Qualitative and functional education as its primary focus under a seven point agenda, the Government of President Umar Musa Yar’Adua aligns itself to a focused pursuit of good governance, the direct expression of which manifests in the provision of the basic necessities of life to the citizenry.

Although the vision or aspiration to develop Nigeria into one of the first 20 economies of the world by 2020 is linked to the seven Point Agenda, in that the achievement of the latter can and will definitely boost the spirit of enterprise by the Nigerian fettered by backward infrastructure and daily struggle to overcome poverty. The two policy pursuits are not of equal importance in the scale of good governance and need of the Nigerian citizen.

“...Good Governance as Pre-requsite for the realization of Vision 20-2020 and the seven point Agenda” rightly establishes once more the inextricable link between politics and economics. In other words, to get the economic bearing of the nation right and to attain the lofty economic goals of the country in the future, the political bearing just have to be right too. Conversely, to get the politics right - electoral reforms and all that- the dynamics within the economy including the basic discipline in the allocation of resources and use of even private fund must be reined in. That is the way it is in every other society that has succeeded in establishing order and the rule of the law.

The bane of Nigeria’s political and economic development has not been so much of lack of idea - even in the market place - of what needs to be done as a failure of will and commitment to do the right things. As it has been in the economy, so it has been in politics.

The very fact for instance, that the issues which make up the Seven point Agenda are still basic problems in our society and therefore are of primary concern for the government of the day speak of the prolonged failure of the Nigerian state to overcome basic impediments to its development. In truth, as Dan Agbese pointed out in a different context in a different era, “The promise to take on these problems had a familiar ring but it reflected how truly slowly the country had travelled even in its undue haste in the years of military rule”(Agbese: 2000)

The poignant quote above rings true to various efforts today in the realms of politics and economics, even as it does not in any way vitiate the need and the commitment to lift the processes of our national life to a higher pedestal. The essence of a reform after all, is to ensure consistent enhancement of structures and elements of a chosen sphere of human activities. This is the point that seems to be badly missed by those who seem to understand the present initiative for reform in the electoral process as an event and not a process.

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4. Politics and Electoral Democracy: the Paradox of Aspiration and Reality

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The trajectory of Nigeria’s politics and electoral democracy has not been any different from the track and character of Nigeria’s national life in it’s nearly half a century existence as a sovereign state. On one hand there is a lofty ambition and aspiration to have the best. On the other hand strangely, there is always a proclivity for tendencies that can only yield the opposite of the declared aspiration for lofty ends. The outcome of this contradiction has been a consistent gap between where the country and its people will like to be and where they truly are. And when the reality comes home as it invariably does, the unfortunate and unhelpful recourse seems to be to look for a scape goat and to sink deeper into denial of the truth instead of confronting the challenges.

Even at this, there has been some remarkable progress in both the realm of political development and economic performance in Nigeria especially in the last decade. The challenge is how to manage the progress and also how best to checkmate the ploy of the self-serving elite clique that has no qualms about derailing the progress of the society if they cannot control the trajectory of development.

5. The 2007 Elections and the Environment

It is now ten years since Nigeria resumed the path of electoral democracy. This is the longest the country has been on the road of democracy. That in itself is progress. Progress is being on a positive path where one had not attained hitherto.

On this pedestal, the truth about democracy and the electoral process in the country which is solidly standing before the world, but which some people are struggling to deny is that the 2007 elections were a landmark for the country.

Those who insist on celebrating the lapses in the 2007 elections have not been sincere to themselves and they have not been charitable to the nation. The germane questions to ask before searching for lapses to hold up about the elections are; what have been the foundation and the texture of the country’s democratic system or the background to the elections that would support anyone expecting a flawless process? Two, what were the very roles of the respective individuals in the establishment of a conducive setting for the flawless elections they now proclaim a taste for?

The contradictions of Nigeria’s political environment are simply huge and the dishonesty of those who are presently hoodwinking the larger society by turning on the Electoral Commission reflects the enormity of the challenge of political development in the country.

Here is a system in which individuals primitively acquire such enormity of resources that embolden them to challenge the state and become laws unto themselves with their own army and all; a system in which political parties brazenly deny their members who won primaries the

ticket they won and allocate same to others for one reason or another; a system in which some individuals solely pick candidates for a political party in an election; a setting in which majority of the political aspirants do not believe there is any benefit in campaigning and

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convincing the electorate, but that with money and massive arsenal of coercion the electorate will be subdued; an environment in which politicians are perpetually bidding to buy electoral officers, often at sums of money that could transform a whole town; a system in which the very laws guiding elections are not known until few months to the elections – this is the environment of Nigeria’s electoral democracy from whence elections without flaws are expected.

How does the society curb the excesses of individuals and ensure that all citizens are subject to the same law, irrespective of their position or wealth? This should be the beginning of the reform not only of the electoral process in Nigeria, but also of all social engagement therein. While it is true that “despite the mechanisms that elicit or enforce conformity, no society or group within society is ever totally free from some disregard for its standards of propriety, some deviation from its norm…” (Chinoy : 1967) what cannot be in tandem with a society in genuine pursuit of development is a situation in which political warlords thrive, each a controller of as vast a section of the society as his resources and army can control. There is nothing democratic in such a setting and the condition cannot be conducive for a flawless election. Such certainly, is not the environment of election in United States of America. Such is not the setting in Ghana.

It is not difficult to establish against the backdrop of such troubled electoral system as we have that reform is imperative if the country expects to achieve not just the visions captured in Vision 20-2020 and the Seven Point Agenda, but also all other aspirations and targets of social and economic development.

6. INEC, Reforms and the Electoral Process

Reforms are healthy and desirable undertakings. There is indeed, nothing esoteric and far away in them, not in an electoral reform as a means to enhancing the electoral process and political development of the society. It is one of those weaknesses or distortions in the appreciation of public policy and governance issues in our society that a necessary matter of electoral reform has been made to acquire the connotation of another political campaign slogan. It is not so. It has also been suggested recently by Alhaji Adamu in a recent opinion piece in the Daily Trust newspaper that the orchestrated and persistent attack on the Commission and its leadership is only an attempt to install a leadership that will do the bidding of the sponsors of these attacks. As he put it: “Now that 2011 elections are around the corner, politicians are back at their old games, this time, from what I can see from media reports, the idea is to push Iwu out and scheme in their preferred candidates with the plan to get their chosen chairman of the EMB to help them win elections.”(Hamisu: 2009)

Electoral reform, especially in an evolving democracy in a heterogeneous society -- marked variously by rampaging primitive accumulation of resources and unrestrained deployment of

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the resources, pocket nationalism, weak enforcement of the laws of the land, a stubborn persistence of the syndrome of the African big man with its attendant disdain for the laws of the land and sundry manifestations of indiscipline -- simply entails taking steps to reinforce the structures of the system and strengthening the capacity of the system to enforce compliance to the guiding rules of engagement in the realm.

It is important to note at this point that the electoral system is a composite entity. It consists of multiple stakeholders and participants all of whose conducts and activities impact on the progress or otherwise of the processes that build up the system. As the challenging 2007 election experience showed so tellingly,” even for the comprehensive preparation, the Electoral Commission had little control over the tendencies and actions of the political class, as well as the political environment that prevailed before and during the elections”. (INEC: 2007)Any understanding of reform or necessity for reform of Nigeria’s electoral process as entailing nothing more but changes within the Election Management Body is, indeed, puerile.

The electoral processes in Nigeria are still tender and evolving. With uninterrupted democratic governance having only thrived for ten years and this coming on the heels of prolonged military rule with its impact on the mentality and values of the society, the structures of electoral democracy in the society are yet to stabilize. The leadership of the Independent National Electoral Commission realized right from the onset that the environment of election in the country is still not only fragile, but is loaded with inadequacies which must be addressed effectively for them not to overwhelm both the elections and the election management body.

Indeed, very early in its preparation for the 2007 elections, the Commission identified some critical issues which needed to be tackled for a conducive environment of elections to be secured in the country.(Iwu: 2007) These problem issues were isolated under four basic headings; (a) the ever looming danger of violence in elections, (b) the pervasive use and influence of money in elections, (c) gender inequity in politics and (d) the unhealthy mindset of Nigerians on election.

The Commission has always realized the need for reforms in the election management body and its operations. The last three and half years have indeed been marked by profound reforms in the electoral process and management. The numerous changes introduced within the process through these years are seen rightly as means to a better and stronger electoral process in the future and as an adaptive response to problems observed in past elections. There are three fundamental criteria for evaluating an electoral reform: a) technical merit, b) to achieve a true break from the past error or practice that the society will want to correct, and c) legitimacy. Most of the sponsored suggestions in the pages of newspapers and other mass media are not aimed at enhancing the electoral process but actually to undermine it. One of the major innovations introduced in the 2006 Act is the establishment of the Independent National Electoral Commission Fund (Section 3 of the Electoral Act) and Section 4

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of the Act also provides for the establishment of yet a separate fund to defray all expenditure incurred by the Commission except those included under the INEC Fund. Full implementation of the two clauses of the Act will go along way towards ensuring financial autonomy of INEC and the much canvassed independence of the Commission.

As part of its efforts to have in place skilled and competent electoral management staff as well as knowledgeable ad-hoc personnel, the Commission established ‘The Electoral Institute’. A major reform measure conceived as a coordination mechanism to achieve sustainable capacity development of various cadres of personnel. The basic goals of the Institute are to facilitate capacity building and professionalism in the Commission through training and manpower development of the Commission’s staff; engage in vigorous voter education activities with a view to achieving an increased and effective participation of the electorates in the electoral process; and to carry out electoral research and documentation.

Another major change introduced since 2005 is the direct appointment of the Secretary of the INEC by the Commission itself, a position which hitherto was made by the Federal Government through the secondment of serving permanent secretary. Other changes introduced in the 2006 Electoral Act following submission by the Commission include:

1. The conduct of voter and civil education by INEC;2. Closure of Registration of Voters and Political Parties at least 120 days and 180 days

respectively before elections;3. Notice of Election given 150 days before date of general election;4. Submission of lists of candidates not later than 120 days before the date of election;5. Change/replacement of candidates to be made not later than 90 days before date of

election;6. Determination of maximum election expenses for candidates to various offices to

check the negative influence of money in politics; and7. More stringent punishments for electoral offences as deterrence to violence and

perpetration of electoral fraud in elections.

The introduction of the electronic voters register - a dynamic system that has put behind Nigerians the rather strenuous practice of the whole country queuing up for a few weeks just to register to vote in elections stands as one of the key reforms of the electoral process in recent years. Then there was the introduction before the 2007 elections of the Political party Finance Manual, a publication which introduced a certain order and accountability in the management of political party finances.

In the wake of the 2007 elections and the disenchantment with the ad hoc staff recruited literally from the streets to help conduct elections, the Commission has incorporated the members of the National Youth Service Corps as a critical part of election conduct in the country. This has led to a great improvement in the conduct of elections as observed in the re-run elections.

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The Commission has also embarked on the delimitation of constituencies in order to correct the imbalance in the present electoral map. A fair and accurate delimitation process is fundamental to the long-term political stability of representative governance. The present districting of the country into 109 Senatorial districts, 360 Federal Constituencies and 990 State Constituencies was carried out 12 years ago by the defunct National Electoral Commission. There are serious deficiencies in the existing electoral map, which should be corrected before the 2011 general elections. INEC has initiated the development of a Delimitation Action Plan, which will provide a technical platform for the more equitable delineation of electoral constituencies in the country. The 1999 Constitution mandates the Commission to undertake periodic review of the division of State and Federal Constituencies at intervals of not less than ten years or after a census. The delimitation exercise will provide the nation the opportunity not only to correct some of the errors and imbalances in the present division but also to establish a technical platform to address the sensitive issue of minority representation. Again, this will reduce potential areas of conflict and violence during elections.

These are crucial reforms of the electoral process initiated on its won by the Election management Body. Reform of the Election Management Body without a matching reform in the surrounding system and the orientation of participants in the general process is however, seriously handicapped.

While there can be no denying the existence of weaknesses and shortcomings in some aspects of the operations of the election management Body, the truth is that the current campaign to shift every attention of electoral reform to the Electoral commission is nothing more but a deliberate ploy by political interest groups to divert attention from the issues that really need to be tackled. “It may be painful and unflattering to acknowledge, but the reality is that Nigeria, though mightily endowed, has continued to be held down by bankrupt policies and self-serving politicians. Thus has the country remained a largely underdeveloped political system, a place where election is more often than not defined by key participants in the process as war by another name.” (Ibid: 2007)

So much has been improved upon in Nigeria’s electoral system in the last few years, but so much still requires to be done. The reform of the electoral process must, as of necessity, be consistent, deliberate and extensive. It needs to be emphasized however, that the greatest corrosive damage to the electoral process in the land is wrought more by the self-serving and contemptuous conduct of few members of the political elite – the deep pockets – than any other factor. As these same entities seize the front row of the moment to become prominent chorus leaders and proponents of electoral reform, the danger of distortion to the profound reform the system craves is apparent.

The basis for reform of Nigeria’s electoral processes is clear and unarguable. What is at issue is whether the country will put its hands on the right spot of its needs. For a nation that has over time shown a certain disturbing inclination to ambivalence in matters that should attract very serious attention from it, the fear exits no less about the prospect of the current sing song of electoral reform.

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There are actually only four outstanding areas of suggested reform of the electoral process, which will require constitutional amendment. These are:

I) Mode of Appointment of Chairman and Members of the Commission as well as the Resident Electoral Commissioners;

II) Funding of the Commission through the first charge on the Consolidated Revenue Fund;

III) Adjudication of post-election disputes before the swearing-in of the declared winners; and

IV) Introduction of a system of proportional representation.

7. Some Observations

The 2007 elections broke the jinx of transiting from one democratically elected government that completed two terms in office to another. The 2011 elections will no longer contend with that burden of history. But there will be ample challenges of its own time. What the nation does to progressively enhance the electoral process should be of greater concern and meaning than how much energy is exerted as seem to be the case at the moment with what would have been.

The Independent National Electoral Commission believes that the hiccups that attended the 2007 polls would have been reduced if technology had been incorporated through such means as the electronic voting machine. The Commission believes that there would have been added value and improvement in the general polls if the political parties had obeyed the provisions of their respective constitution in their primaries and maintained a certain level of standard in their actions.(INEC, Ibid) The process of the elections would have been better if various individuals in positions of authority and influence obeyed the laws of the land and did not operate above the law.

Finally, I acknowledge the fact that crises offer great opportunities for reform, but strategic reform that happens in tranquil environment brings lasting change. In order words, our first point of discussion is that we are here today because of the successful conduct of the 2007 elections. We have to acknowledge that fact.

8. Conclusion

The issues I have presented here and more could indeed constitute the template on which the reform of the electoral process could be undertaken for a better electoral system in the days ahead. However, it is obvious from recent media reports that the very same forces that are bent on frustrating our collective hope for a better Nigeria are really not in support of any meaningful reforms of the electoral system but are only interested in having a Commission that will do their bidding.

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NOTES AND REFERENCES1. Vidal Gore (2003): Inventing a Nation, Yale University Press, New Haven &

London

2. Ibid,p.137

3. Madubuike Ihechukwu (2007): Politics, Leadership and Development in Nigeria, Roots Books and Journals, Abuja

4. OECD (2000) Government of the Future. Paris.

5. Agbese, Dan (2000): Fellow Nigerians. Turning Points in the political History of Nigeria, Umbrella Books

6. Chinoy, Ely (1967): Society Random House, New York

7. Hamisu, Adamu, (2009):“New Fixation with Iwu Bashing,” Daily Trust (February 23)p.14

8. INEC (2007): The Official Report of the 2007 General Elections. Abuja.p.4

9. Iwu, Maurice M(2007): Sustaining Democracy in Nigeria: Now that the Jinx of Civilian to Civilian Transition is Broken, What Next?, INEC, Abuja

10. INEC, Ibid. (2007)

11. INEC (2007): The Official Report on the 2007 General Elections, Abuja

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Internal Democracy, Transparency in Party Administration and the Implications for Effective Monitoring of Party Finances*

By

Victor A.O Adetula, Ph.D**

I. Introduction and background

Well-functioning political parties are essential for the success of transition to democracy as well as its consolidation. However, in the particular case of Nigeria, there have been limited opportunities for the development of political parties and other essential institutions for the consolidation of democracy. Political party activities resumed in Nigeria towards the end of 1998 after a long period of military rule during which party activities were banned. Only three political parties – Alliance for Democracy (AD), All Nigerian Peoples Party (ANPP) and People Democratic Party (PDP) - contested elections in 1999. Although in 2003 there were thirty parties in place but only two parties - PDP and ANPP - dominated the Presidential and National Assembly elections. And during the 2007 national elections there were more than fifty registered parties with varying level of capacity to influence electoral politics. However, many of these parties lack the necessary skills and experience for effective partipation in electoral competition.

The effectiveness (or otherwise) of political parties determines on how close or distant they are to meeting the criteria below. These are: (i) continuity (that is, a life span exceeding the dominance of the party’s founders); (ii) a nationwide organization; (iii) the desire to exercise power; and (iv) consistent efforts to garner significant popular support (Joseph LaPalombara and Myron Weiner: 1966). However, the overall success of political party depends in the main on the level of internal democracy within the party. Arguably, many political parties in Nigeria have not met these criteria. Political parties in Nigeria are confronted with the problems of inadequate resources, poor staffing, and lack of organizational capacity. But more importantly these political parties lack internal democracy in their structures and operations. This is also compounded by the fact that the affairs of most political parties are shrouded in obscurity and generally lacking in transparency and accountability. For instance, in many of these parties the decision making process, resources allocation, and the nomination of candidates for political appointments are dominated by a few rich and influential members.

Although there seems to be a general lack of public confidence in the Nigerian electoral system, however, Nigerians by their actions acknowledge elections as a key democratic institution and prefer to use “regular, open and honest elections” rather than “other methods” to choose leaders. These responses no doubt signal all vital stakeholders in the Nigerian electoral process to the need for a broad-based electoral reform which among other things should target the country’s democratic institutions which at present are very weak and undeveloped, and grossly incapable of positively influencing the direction of electoral politics in the country. ____________________________________________________________ *Paper presented at the Workshop on “Effective Monitoring of the Administration and Finances of Political Parties” organized by The Electoral Institute, INEC at the Arewa House, Kaduna. December 2008.**Victor Adetula is a Professor of Political Science at the University of Jos, Jos, Nigeria.

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One critical area for the reform is in the methods of political financing including unrestrained private funding of political parties and candidates that has further complicated the problem of political corruption in Nigeria. The weakness of the legal framework to control the use of money in politics, the long-time indifference of Nigerians to the problem of party finance, and the rent-seeing behaviour of the political elites and their parties constitute major challenges to the Nigerian electoral system. On the matter of transparency and accountability in party funding, many of the political parties in the country lack the expertise and resources to maintain proper records. In 2005, a report by the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) on the audited accounts of thirty political parties for the years 1999 to 2003 shows “that most of if not all 30 parties did not keep books and records along with significant accounting failures, including the failure to account for vehicles, failure to prepare a budget, and “personalization of party funds… even the ruling Peoples Democratic Part (PDP) whose members hold the office of president, approximately 75% of the seats in the National Assembly, as well as most of the seats of government in the states, had no proper accounting records”. (Amy M. Loprest: 2005)

The 2003 general elections presented opportunities and challenges that necessitated electoral reform in Nigeria (INEC in response to the criticisms and complaints over the 2003 elections organized a workshop seminar for a cross section of stakeholders in Kaduna in July of 2003. One of the key recommendations emanating from the seminar was the urgent need to reform the legal regime for the electoral process. Also, in November 2003, an INEC-Civil Society workshop on the reform of the legal regime was held in Abuja with the participation of political parties). One recall in particular, the various post-election reviews and assessments by the Independent National Electoral Commission and other stakeholders in the Nigerian electoral process, which we considered indicative of new policy consciousness and official perception of the problem of electoral administration in Nigeria. For example, former President Olusegun Obasanjo at various times publicly showed deep concern for the high cost of election campaigns in the country. He particularly drew attention to the option that political parties, rather than individual office seekers, should canvass for votes in elections. Also, President Obasanjo, in an address at the INEC-Civil Society Forum Seminar in 27 November 2003, laments at the dangers associated with uncontrolled use of money during elections. Judging by the concerns expressed from several quarters, the time appeared ripe for the re-examination of the very foundation of Nigeria’s electoral system.

The outcomes of the 2007 general elections further raised awareness especially among the various stakeholders for the need for an overhaul of the Nigerian electoral system. One area that has received the widest publicity by INEC, and also comments and reactions form the general public is the need to introduce reforms that will regulate monetary transactions by parties, politicians and candidates at all levels of the electoral process. Also, there were concerns on how to emphasis disclosure of information on political party finances with the understanding that disclosure will curb political corruption, prevent the inflow of funds from undesirable sources and, enable the public to know more about the sources of funds into the coffers of parties and candidates. There was marked

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dissatisfaction with the provisions in the 1999 Constitution which many found incapable of regulating party financing.

Under the 1999 Constitution, INEC has constitutional responsibility to monitor the finances of political parties, conduct an annual examination and audit of the funds of political parties and publish a report for the public information. Section 228 ( c) of the 1999 Constitution gives power to the National Assembly to provide for an annual grant to the Independent national Electoral Commission (INEC) for disbursement to political parties on a fair and equitable basis to assist them the discharge of their functions. The responsibility to monitor the use of money in the campaign activities of politicians and their parties poses some challenges for the Commission. For instance during the 1999 elections there were complaints and allegations by civic group about large donations by influence political figures and businessmen to some parties. The Transition Monitoring Group - a coalition of civil society organizations, in statement on the conduct of the PDP, ANPP, UNPP, and NDP primaries in January 2003, complained that “there was widespread bribery of delegates with sacks stuffed with money to influence their votes”. Also, Sarah Jibril, one of the presidential candidates in the 2003 elections petitioned the leadership of her party over alleged misappropriation of grants from INEC. The Commission was able to investigate some of the reported cases and even monitored party finances to some extent. For instance, following the reported allegation of mismanagement of funds released to political parties by INEC, the Commission in September 2003 ordered the audit of the account of four political parties. But for very long time INEC was unable to perform audits or issue reports on the finance of political parties due mainly to lack of cooperation from most of the political parties.

The problem of unregulated use of money in politics was not exclusively that of the 1999 Constitution. For example, Section 84 (3) of the Electoral Act 2002 under which the 2003 elections were conducted states that “Election expenses of Political Party shall be submitted to the Commission in a separate audited return within three months after polling day and such shall be signed by the party’s auditors and countersigned by the Chairman of the Party as the case may be and shall be supported by a sworn affidavit by the signatories as to the correctness of its contents”. In the case of the 2003 elections the deadline for the submission of the audited report of political parties was 3 August after the final pooling day of 3 May 2003. Most of the political parties violated the deadline and by the end of 2003 only few eventually submitted their reports to the Commission. Under the 2006 Act there are two main sources of funding for political parties. Public funding comes from the government and private funding, on the other hand, has to do with monies and material contributions made to the political parties. This includes membership dues, levies, proceeds from lunching, fines, proceeds from investments, interests on savings, voluntary donations, etc.

The INEC audit report on all the political parties is yet to be made published months after the 2007 elections. Despite the extension of deadlines given to parties for the submission of their financial reports to INEC, only 26 out of the fifty political parties have submitted their reports. Reasons for this delay may range for indifference to fraud as it was the case in 2003. In the words of Dr I. J Igbani, then

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INEC National Commissioner and Chairman of Political Party Monitoring Committee (PPMC), “During the audit of the 2003 accounts of the political parties, the Commission observed certain shortcomings in the submissions by many political parties. These include: (a) unaccounted political party expenditures; (b) unconfirmed and unidentified sources of funds; and (c) poor financial record keeping”. A breakdown of the report shows that, the ruling Peoples Democratic Party (PDP) and the All Nigeria People’s Party (ANPP) had no proper accounting records while the Alliance for Democracy (AD) had no conventional record. Seventeen of the political parties had no record of accounting at all. In addition to improper accounting record, the ANPP, which happens to be one of the oldest parties, is said to have operated without a budget. As a corollary to that, financial scandals have become recurring decimals among the Nigerian political parties. This has brought about public disillusionment as well as undermining of public confidence in the political process.

Data on the cost of election campaigns during the 2007 elections is still not available. The laws provide that INEC must report cases of contravention to the law enforcement agencies. Unfortunately, the law only requires disclosure of contributions after, not before elections. Even at that both the parties and INEC failed to make public the financial reports of political parties as stipulated in the electoral laws. INEC has never lived up to its responsibility in this respect since 1999 when it first conducted national elections. Although there is a structure within INEC with responsibility for party finance monitoring, not much has been accomplished in terms of ensuring disclosure of sources of party funding or even adequate reporting of campaign expenses. The Commission published a political finance manual for the use of political parties and appointed external auditors. It is evident that the political parties and INEC are not working together in this area. For example, majority of the political parties claimed not being aware of the existing of the political finance manual published and distributed by INEC. At the end of an extended deadline for the submission of financial reports by political parties on 31 January, 2008, only twenty-six out of about 50 registered parties submitted anything close to financial reports.

On the part of the civil society, there is today a significant growth in the awareness about the danger of unregulated use of money in politics and its links with corruption. However, only very few organizations seem to be tracking campaign expenses. While political parties accuse one another of vote buying during elections, there seem to be indifference as to the unregulated use of money during party primaries. Worst still, disclosure is not yet part of the dominant political culture in the country.

In this paper we take note of the importance of in Nigeria; their central role towards the consolidation of democracy. Also, we take cognizance of the importance of the principle and practice of internal democracy in democratic institutions. We note the relevant provisions in the 1999 Constitution and 2006 Electoral Act in relation to the role and importance of political parties in representative democracy. Specifically in this paper we discuss the need to democratize the structures and operations of political parties in Nigeria in such a way that decision making will benefit from broad participation by members, and leaders of the party become more accountable to the membership.

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Also, we demonstrate that internal democracy and transparency in party administration is a necessary condition for effective monitoring of party finance.

II. Problem of money politics and party finance

Since the return to electoral politics in 1999, and most especially after the 2003 general elections, Nigeria's political parties have been severally criticized by the media, academic observers and indeed the electorate for corruption especially the unbridled use of money in politics. The anti-corruption initiatives of the administration of Chief Olusegun Obasanjo provided a suitable environment for some civil society groups to engage governments and other stakeholders on the issue of corruption and its effect on governance. There is already an awakened consciousness in Nigeria about the danger of political corruption including political finance malpractices. However, the question is why the rising consciousness has not been translated into new social values and attitudes especially for stakeholders in the Nigerian electoral process – government, election management bodies, political parties, civil society – especially in the ways they interact with money and politics.

In nation-wide survey on the perceptions of Nigerian on corruption and governance conducted in 2001 by a consortium of experts from Nigerian universities, over 80 per cent of sampled population regarded corruption as “serious”. Also, the respondents ranked political parties among the most corrupt institutions in the country (NIGERIA: 2003). Also, another report of surveys conducted by the International Foundation for Electoral System (IFES) in 2007 shows the public perceptions on “corruption in the realm of politics”. The report reveals that majority of Nigerians think it is wrong for an ordinary person to sell a vote in return for goods or money. However, more than a third of the sampled population thinks it is understandable to do so. Furthermore, most think it is wrong for political parties to offer money to people in return for their vote, but a third think it is understandable for them to do so. All the same, a quarter of Nigerian adults admit that someone tried to offer them a reward or gift to vote for a certain candidates in the election”. (IFES: 2007)

Today in Nigeria, ‘money politics’, ‘vote buying’, ‘godfatherism’, ‘share the money’ have become regular household phrases and slogans in Nigeria to portray the moral decadence of politicians. These usages adequately describe the rent-seeking behaviour of politicians, political parties and voters. Such include the practices of accepting bribes from patrons and distributing money to buy votes. This has implication for governance process including political participation. A portion of the Communiqué issued by the Nigerian Political Science Association at the end of a one-day round-table on the theme ‘ Understanding the Electoral Process in Nigeria’ on 1 February 2007 states as follows: “The role of money in politics is strong. ‘Godfathers’ 'money bags’ and incumbents use Police orderlies and state security paraphernalia to intimate voters and undermine elections”.

Money politics is fast shrinking the political space, becoming a key variable in determining who participate in electoral politics, and how? For example, the nomination fees for party members seeking elective positions have become so high that only the rich few and the daring ‘political entrepreneurs’ can participate in party primaries. In 1992, for example, presidential “hopefuls’ spent over one billion naira during the primaries while other ‘not-so-rich’ contenders had about 120 million naira as budget for primaries. Although the ‘abiku’ political transition programme of the administration of General Ibrahin Babangida under which such recklessness took place was aborted, this trend of unrestrained use of money for political influence persists to date.

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Money continues to drown votes and voices in Nigeria as godfathers openly confess about their shady deals; how they fund or sponsored elections for their ‘godsons’ and even purchased electoral victory. Businessmen and women are not left out in this illegitimate and illicit use of money for political influence. In a recent interview General T.Y Danjuma admitted as follows: “I helped to finance his (President Olusegun Obasanjo) first term election. I raised $7 million. Slightly more than half of it came from my business associates”. General Danjuma also added that “Not once did he (Obasanjo) did he find out from me where this money came from. Was it from me, from my business associates, whether l stole it or whatever – he didn’t ask me! (The Guardian: 2008) There are many of such which are found in the political apocrypha of Nigeria and on the conscience of many political merchants.

The links between party financing and corruption are so important that to ignore party financing is simply to open wide the door for corruption, in addition to the betrayal of public trust and the escalating of cost of politics in the country. In a national representative survey of Nigerians, when asked about their assessment of the 2003 elections, only 9 per cent believe the elections were “completely free and fair”, while 41 per cent feel the elections were “not free and fair” at all, and another 22 per cent believe the elections showed “major problems” ( www. Afrobarometer.org: 2005) Vote buying has been reported in all the elections held since 1999. As many as 28 per cent of voters, were offered gifts during the 2003 campaign. (Afrobarometer.org: 2005) Based on the public perception of the vote-buying transaction, voters are usually offered money (68 percent of all attempts), commodities (such as food or clothing, 26 percent) or jobs (6 percent). In the current and previous elections, voters were most commonly offered a (modal) inducement of 500 naira. (Afro barometer. org: 2007)

Analysis of the survey by Afro barometer reveals that “the median price of a vote payment rose between 2003 and 2007, from 1750 naira to 2250 naira, largely because the proportion of large payments (10,000 naira or more per vote) is apparently increasing over time”. (Afrobarometer.org: 2007) Among Nigerian eligible voters interviewed in a February 2007, more than one in ten eligible voters agree that, even by midway through the election campaign in February 2007, “a candidate or someone from a political party had offered you something in return for your vote” (12 percent). Although this level of direct experience with vote buying is slightly lower than in 2003 (16 percent), actual vote buying in the 2007 elections in Nigeria matched that of 2003. (Afrobarometer.org: 2007) We found reason to quote Afro barometer source in ex tenso:

In total, the Afro barometer recorded 485 cases of vote buying as experienced by 296 respondents out of a random sample of 2410 Nigerians. Because there were more crimes than victims, it follows that many individuals (196, or about two-thirds of all victims) were approached from more than one partisan group. The largest political parties were the most active in vote buying. According to the survey respondents, the Peoples Democratic Party made 40 percent of all reported attempts to buy votes, followed by the All Nigeria Peoples Party (31 percent) and the Action Congress (10 percent)…In part because of competing inducements; vote buying is probably an ineffective strategy for securing votes. (Afrobarometer.org: 2007)

No doubt that vote buying has contributed significantly to the lack of confidence among Nigerians in the electoral system. This is turn has disposed some people toward violence as a

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means of securing the removal of leaders which highlights the relationship between violence and the abuse of money in politics. Also, and with particular reference to the prospect of political finance reform in Nigeria, we support initiatives that call for new restrictions on political finance activities, better enforcement of existing laws, and more disclosure and a greater public awareness of the role of money in politics. Indifference to the problem of political finance encourages deterioration of politics. We take due cognizance of the importance and role of money in politics. More than that, we do agree that real politics is not about raising money for election campaigns as it is about engaging in public discourse, and also the collective action guided by that discourse. Political finance reform should focus on how to create an environment, and as well develop a strategy that will create the necessary legal and institutional framework for ‘ordinary’ people to participate in real politics without intimidation. Evidence abounds across the world to the fact that unregulated use of money in politics promotes large and systematic political inequalities.

The disappointing stories above notwithstanding, there are historical evidences that reveal the essence of mass participation in the activities of political parties in Nigeria. For example, the early nationalist parties were strengthened by a clusters of civil groups which included group of workers (such as trade unions) women groups (such as the Federation of Nigerian women Societies), students and youth groups (such as the Zikist Movement). Besides providing the necessary training ground for Nigeria’s first generation of political leaders, civic organizations were actually the springboards for early nationalist parties in Nigeria (Richard L. Sklar: 19). We note also that before and after independence, especially during the very first few years after independence, Nigeria experienced the vibrancy of civil associations such as the farmers associations in the south-west, traders’ associations in the north, and hometown and community associations that spread across the country, wielding influences in the various political parties in existence. The intervention of the military in politics among other things distorted the growth and development of political parties and other democratic institutions. This in turn prevented the development democratic political culture and values such as transparency and accountability.

However, the problem of unregulated use of money in politics did not just begin today. There are antecedents in the history of modern Nigeria, beginning with the politics of nationalism in the 1950s, similar to the rent-seeking behaviour of parties, politicians and voters .For example, the absence of strict legislation to regulate party finance made it possible for politicians and political parties to engage in illegal party financing and corruption in the Nigeria’s First Republic. The electoral laws under which elections were conducted in the period of the 1950s and 1960s were derived from the provision of the British Representation of the Peoples Act of 1948/9 and regulations made in it. The 1959 elections were conducted under the provision of the Nigeria (Electoral Provisions) Order-in-Council, LN 117 of 1958 enacted by the British Parliament. During this period there was no clearly defined regulatory framework on party finance and the funding political parties was dominantly through private funding as parties and candidates were responsible for election expenses. Two dramatic cases of corruption involving political parties were judicially investigated. In 1956, the Foster Sutton Tribunal of Enquiry investigated allegation of impropriety in the conduct of some politicians from the National Council of Nigerian Citizens (NCNC) with business interests in the African Continental Bank (ACB). Similarly in 1962 the Coker Commission of Inquiry was set up to look into the affairs of six Western

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Nigeria public corporations that were allegedly involved in corruption with the leadership of the Action Group.

During the Nigeria’s Second republic (1979 -1983) a combination of private and public funding was used for the first time. The political parties occupied the central position in the politics of the Second Republic. The1979 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria clearly states that “No association other than a political party [was allowed to] canvas for votes for any candidate at any election or contribute to the funds of any political party or to the election expenses of any candidate at an election”. The 1979 Constitution in Section 205 states empowers the National Assembly to make laws “for an annual grant to the Federal Electoral Commission from disbursement to political parties on a fair and equitable basis to assist them in the discharge of their function”. Government accordingly rendered financial assistance to the parties by way of subventions. In addition, private funding, except from outside Nigeria, was allowed, according to Section 205 of the 1979 Constitution. There was no limit on how many corporate bodies and individuals could contribute to political parties. Apart from the ban on political parties from receiving external funds as in Section 205 of the 1979 Constitution and the prohibition of associations other than political parties from making contribution to the funds of political parties or the election of any candidates at any election, as in Section 201 of the 1979 Constitution, there were no any stricter constitutional or statutory regulation on the use on party financing such as those of disclosure of donations to political parties. The result was illegal use of money to influence decision making in political parties and the political process in general.

Although the 1979 Constitution provide for some form of check especially with respect to external control of political parties. But even that was not achieved in the 1979-1983 elections. The loopholes were exploited by the financially and politically ambitious few that eventually were able to use their wealth to hijack political parties of their choice. With unbridled use of money little or no attention were paid to political mobilization by those seeking elective positions. Politicians attached much importance to money which they used to buy the votes of the electorates. One example was the occasion in Lagos in 1982 where, ten members of one of the political parties donated N5 million naira at a fund-raising ceremony. The experiences of the 1979 and 1983 elections were such that political parties and politicians had unrestricted freedom to use money from both legal and illegal sources to finance their campaigns and other activities associated with their election expenses. During the Second Republic the role and activities of ‘contractors’ in government and political parties, and other cases of political ‘patronage’ became very rampant. The reports of the various special tribunals that tried politicians and office holders revealed gross abuse of public office and impropriety in dealing with political parties. The 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria basically reproduces that of 1979 with some substantive amendments. Under the 1999 Constitution, INEC has constitutional responsibility to monitor the finances of political parties, conduct an annual examination and audit of the funds of political parties and publish a report for the public information.

The responsibility to monitor the use of money in the campaign activities of politicians and their parties poses some challenges for the Commission. For instance during the 1999 elections there were complaints and allegations by civic group about large donations by influence political figures and

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businessmen to some parties. The Transition Monitoring Group - a coalition of civil society organizations, in statement on the conduct of the PDP, ANPP, UNPP, and NDP primaries in January 2003, complained that “there was widespread bribery of delegates with sacks stuffed with money to influence their votes”. Also, Sarah Jibril, one of the presidential candidates in the 2003 elections petitioned the leadership of her party over alleged While INEC misappropriation of grants. The Commission was able to investigate some of the reported cases and even monitored party finances to some extent. For instance, following the reported allegation of mismanagement of funds released to political parties by INEC, the Commission in September 2003 ordered the audit of the account of four political parties. But for very long time INEC was unable to perform audits or issue reports on the finance of political parties due mainly to lack of cooperation from most of the political parties.

Section 84 (3) of the Electoral Act 2002 states that “Election expenses of Political Party shall be submitted to the Commission in a separate audited return within three months after polling day and such shall be signed by the party’s auditors and countersigned by the Chairman of the Party as the case may be and shall be supported by a sworn affidavit by the signatories as to the correctness of its contents”. In the case of the 2003 elections the dues date for the submission of the audited report of political parties was 3 August after the final pooling day of 3 May 2003. Most of the political parties violated the deadline and by the end of 2003 only few had submitted their reports to the Commission.

Admittedly details of subventions to political parties are not readily available. Also, there are no available record on the exact amount of money spent by candidates and political parties in Nigeria. However, there are indications of heavy reliance on private funding in all the three elections in Nigeria since 1999 more so that virtually all the parties lack the organizational capacity to generate their own income through legitimate means. According to former President Obasanjo, “the parties and candidates together spent during the last elections, more than would have been needed to fight a successful war”. This view of President Obasanjo is corroborated by a perceptive writer who observed that “More than any election in Nigeria’s chequered political history, the 2003 national elections was determined by how much money candidates had. The electoral process has become so expensive that only the rich or those dependent on rich backers can run” The writer also noted that “There is also the disturbing trend of questionable business people backing candidates with ‘grey money’”. The increasing influence of ‘godfatherism’ in contemporary Nigerian politics can be linked to the influence that money in electoral politics through uncontrolled party financing as was witnessed in both Anambra and Oyo states where State Governors have had to ‘negotiate’ and ‘renegotiate’ peace with ‘godfathers’ and ‘money bags’ politicians who claimed helped them to win elections ‘by all means’! The absence of effective regulation of the amount of private funding that political party can receive from private sources made all forms of political mercantilism attractive and possible.

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For the 2003 general elections political parties received funding from the public purse via grant approved by the National Assembly in pursuant of Subsection (1) of Section 80 of the Electoral Act of 2002. This money was however insufficient to sustain parties and they therefore had to obtain funding from private sources. One of the sources of funding for political parties during the 2003 elections was the support from the Nigerian business community. For example, Corporate Nigeria was the chief fund raiser of the Obasanjo/Atiku campaign. While there was no law against political donations by private individual, the Companies and Allied matters Act (1990), Section 308 of the Companies and Allied Matters Act, prohibits corporate bodies from making political donations. Some have spoken about the contradictions in the two laws and suggested the need to set an explicit reference to permitted sources of funding (including corporate donors, state owned companies, state institutions).

The 2007 general elections was conducted with the 2006 Electoral Act that which enactment was the hallmark of the electoral reform process led by the Obasanjo administration. But there still a lot of unresolved issues around party finance and corruption. Public funding is guaranteed for political parties in Section 228 (C) of the 1999 Constitution as well as Sections 90 and 91 of the Electoral Act 2006. ( Electoral Act 2006 was signed into law on 6 June 2006 and amended February 2007 by NASS)

Section 90 of the Electoral Act 2006 says the National Assembly may approve a grant for disbursement to the political parties contesting elections. Also, Section 91(1) says that National Assembly may make an annual grant to INEC for distribution to political parties to assist them in their operations. These funds, according to Section 91(2) (a & b) are to be shared on a ratio 10: 90 in favour of parties that have representation in the National Assembly. However, following the decision of an Abuja Federal High Court on the case filed by the Citizen Popular Party (CPP) and nineteen other opposition parties (The judgment was delivered 15 December 2006 by Justice Abimbola O. Ogie of Federal High Court, Abuja) INEC was left with no other option but to share the funds for political parties equally. Apart from the public funds, electioneering campaigns and other party activities for the 2007 elections were supported through private sources which include monies and in-kind contributions made to the political parties or candidates, subscriptions, fees and levies from membership of the party, ( Thisday: 2007) fines, proceeds from investments made by the party; subventions and donations; gifts and grants by individuals or groups of individuals as authorized by the law; loans; interests on savings; sale of party nomination forms etc. ( See Sections 92, 93(9) of the Electoral Act 2006 and Article 18 of the 2001 Peoples Democratic Party (PDP) Constitution as amended in 2006)

III. Legal Framework for Political Parties

1999 Constitution and political parties

The 1999 Constitution gives no association except political parties the power to “canvass for votes for any candidates at any election or contribute to funds of any political party or to the

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election expenses of any candidate at an election” (Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, Section 221).

The Constitution places restrictions on the formation of political parties, and no association is allowed to perform the functions of a political party unless:

(i) the names and addresses of its national officers are registered with the Independent National Electoral Commission;

(ii) the membership of the association is open to every citizen of Nigeria irrespective of his place of origin, circumstance of birth, sex, religion or ethnic grouping;

(iii) a copy of its constitution is registered in the principal office of the Independent National Electoral Commission in such form as may be prescribed by the Independent National Electoral Commission;

(iv) any alteration in its registered constitution is also registered in the principal office of the Independent National Electoral Commission within thirty days of the making of such alteration;

(v) the name of the association, its symbol or logo does not contain any ethnic or religious connotation or give the appearance that the activities of the association are confined to a part only of the geographical area of Nigeria; and the headquarters of the association is situated in the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja. (Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, Section 222, a-f)

Section 223 (1) stipulates that the constitution and rules of every political party must: (i) provide for the periodic election on a democratic basis of the principal officers and members of the executive committee or other governing body of the political party; and (ii) ensure that the members of the executive committee or other governing body of the political party reflect the federal character of Nigeria. The Constitution allows the parties to formulate their programmes as well as their aims and objectives shall confirm with the provisions of Chapter II of the Constitution (Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, Section 224

(vi) ). There are provisions on the finances of political parties. Under the 1999 Constitution, the Independent National Election Commission (INEC) has constitutional responsibility to monitor the finances of political parties, conduct an annual examination and audit of the funds of political parties and publish a report for the public information. Section 228 ( c) of the 1999 Constitution gives power to the National Assembly to provide for an annual grant to the Independent national Electoral Commission (INEC) for disbursement to political parties on a fair and equitable basis to assist them in the discharge of their functions.

Accordingly, the National Assembly approved a N600 million budget for the 30 registered parties in the April 2003 general elections. INEC disbursed N180 million to all the political parties at N6 million each in, line with section 80 ( 2) (a) of the Electoral Act 2002 that “30% of the grant shall be shared among the political parties participation in respect of a general elections for the grant has been made”. Also, in accordance with Section 80 (2) (b) of the Electoral Act 2002, N420 million was disbursed by INEC to seven political parties which include: the AD, ANPP, Peoples’ Democratic Party

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(PDP), All Peoples’ Grand Alliance, (APGA), National Democratic Party (NDP), Peoples Redemption Party (PRP), and United National Peoples Party (UNPP).

The responsibility to monitor the use of money in the campaign activities of politicians and their parties poses some challenges for the Commission. For instance, during the 1999 elections there were complaints and allegations by civic group about large donations by influential political figures and businessmen to some parties. The Transition Monitoring Group - a coalition of civil society organizations, in statement on the conduct of the PDP, ANPP, UNPP, and NDP primaries in January 2003, complained that “there was widespread bribery of delegates with sacks stuffed with money to influence their votes”. Also, Sarah Jibril, one of the presidential candidates in the 2003 elections petitioned the leadership of her party over alleged misappropriation of grants from INEC. The Commission was able to investigate some of the reported cases and even monitored party finances to some extent. For instance, following the reported allegation of mismanagement of funds released to political parties by INEC, the Commission in September 2003 ordered the audit of the account of four political parties. But for very long time INEC was unable to perform audits or issue reports on the finance of political parties due mainly to lack of cooperation from most of the political parties.

Section 84 (3) of the Electoral Act 2002 states that “Election expenses of Political Party shall be submitted to the Commission in a separate audited return within three months after polling day and such shall be signed by the party’s auditors and countersigned by the Chairman of the Party as the case may be and shall be supported by a sworn affidavit by the signatories as to the correctness of its contents”. In the case of the 2003 elections the dues date for the submission of the audited report of political parties was 3 August after the final pooling day of 3 May 2003. Most of the political parties violated the deadline and by the end of 2003 only few had submitted their reports to the Commission.

It is common knowledge that political parties to some extent are funded by the Nigerian taxpayers. This makes accountability and transparency in party financing very imperative and also an issues of great national value. Admittedly there are no available record on the exact amount of money spent by candidates and political parties. However, there are indications however of heavy reliance on private funding in last two elections in Nigeria. More so that virtually all the parties lack the organizational capacity to generate their own income through legitimate means. According to President Obasanjo, “the parties and candidates together spent during the last elections, more than would have been needed to fight a successful war” ( An Address delivered by President Olusegun Obasanjo at the INEC-Civil Society Forum Seminar on 27th November 2003).

This view of Mr. President is corroborated by a perceptive writer who observed that “More than any election in Nigeria’s chequered political history, the 2003 national elections was determined by how much money candidates had. The electoral process has become so expensive that only the rich or those dependent on rich backers can run” The writer also noted that There is also the disturbing trend of questionable business people backing candidates with ‘grey money’”. The increasing influence of ‘godfatherism’ in contemporary Nigerian politics can be linked to the influence that money in electoral politics through uncontrolled party financing as was witnessed in both Anambra and Oyo states where

29

State Governors have had to ‘negotiate’ and ‘renegotiate’ peace with ‘godfathers’ and ‘money bags’ politicians who claimed helped them to win elections ‘by all means’! The absence of effective regulation of the amount of private funding that political party can receive from private sources made all forms of political mercantilism attractive and possible.

Electoral Act 2006 and Political Parties

On 6 June President Olusegun Obasanjo signed the Electoral Bill into law to become the Electoral Act, 2006. With this the electoral reform process that started almost immediately after 2003 elections recorded a significant landmark. The new electoral law has substantial provisions on political parties especially on the regulation of political party financing. In all, the Electoral Act, 2006 has 27 Sections dealing with political parties (Sections 78 to 105). The Act in Section 78 addresses issues relating to the registration, regulation and financial/performance accountability of political parties. The power of the Commission INEC to register political parties is well set out. If a political party meets the requirements of registration, INEC must register it within thirty days. If the Commission fails to do so, the party shall be deemed to have register. Should the Commission decide not to register a political party, then that decision may be challenged in a court of law provided the action commences within thirty days of receipt of notification from the Commission (| Electoral Act 2006, Section 79). In the past the registration of new political parties has encountered some difficulties. It would appear that the Act sets out to correct past mistakes in this regard.

Section 80 of the Act requires political parties to be corporate bodies. In this way they may sue or be sued in their corporate names. Section 81 provides for the enforcement of the provisions in Section 227 of the 1999 Constitution on the prohibition of quasi-military organizations. Under Section 82 the Commission is required to keep a register of symbols for use in elections. Section 84 deals with the merger of political parties. However, the Act is silent on the issue of alliances or coalition. Part of the Commission’s duty is to monitor and keep records of the activities of political parties. Sections 85 and 86 of the Act require political parties to notify INEC of party conventions, conferences and meeting.

It is interesting to note that the Act pays considerable attention to the danger of unregulated use of money in the electoral processes. Section 87 reaffirms the requirement in the 1999 which prevents political parties from holding funds or receiving funds from outside Nigeria. The Act further sets out the fines for the violation of the provision in the Constitution. Also, any party contravening this particular section will not be eligible for a grant. Section 91 provides for the National Assembly to make annual grant to INEC for distribution to the registered political parties to assist them in their operations. INEC shall distribute such grants as follows: (i) 10% of the grant shall be shared equally among all the registered political parties; (ii) the remaining 90% of the grant shall be shared equally among all the registered political parties in proportion to the number of seats won by each party in the National Assembly. Section 88 requires every political party to submit a detailed annual statement and analysis of the sources of its funds and other assets. These statements shall be examined and audited by Commission, and their findings shall be published in three national newspaper. Each political party must submit a separate audited account covering election expenses

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within 90 days of an election. Any party which fails to comply is liable (upon conviction) to a fine. In case of failure to submit an audited within a stipulated period, a court may impose a penalty of N200, 000 per day until it is submitted to the Commission.

Section 93 replaces Section 84 of the 2002 Act along with 100 and 101. These provisions limit the amount to be spent by the Presidential and Governorship candidates to N500, 000,000 and N100, 000,000 respectively (see Section 93 Sub-section1- 3 of the Electoral Act 2006). The expenses to be incurred by candidates to the Senatorial Seat are pegged down to N20, 000,000, N10,000,000 for the seat for House of Representative, N5,000,000 for State House of Assembly and Chairmanship elections, and N500, 000 in the case of Councillorship election. Section 93 (Subsection 8 paragraph b) disregards “any expenditure incurred before the notification of the date fixed for the election with respect to services rendered or material supplied before such notification” in the determination of the “total expenditure incurred in relation to the candidature of any person at any election”. This is commendable. If and when implemented this provision should be able to regulate financial donations to candidates' electioneering campaigns even before they are nominated or even the notification of the date fixed for elections. Data on the actual cost of election campaigns in the country is hard to get. No organizations seem to be tracking campaign expenses. Worst still, disclosure is not yet as popular among politicians. Nevertheless, it is generally assumed that the cost of election campaigns is high in the country. (In Nigeria one indicator of the high cost of election campaign is the cost of candidate's posters and bills. The printing of posters with the picture of candidate is usually the start off point in the campaign. Given that candidate posters ought to be out almost a year before the election indicates how much is spent on the posters as well as its distribution, ensuring that they appear in strategic places).

There is the effect of inflation on election expenses that makes any forecast about future expenses on elections unreliable. In this circumstance, stating a particular amount as the limit of election expenses is not considered realistic. Section 91 of the Act provides for the National Assembly to make annual grant to INEC for distribution to the registered political parties to assist them in their operation. INEC shall distribute such grant as follows: (a) 10% of the grant shall be shared equally among all the registered political parties; (b) the remaining 90% of the grant shall be shared among the registered political parties in proportion to the number of seats won by each party in the National Assembly. With the possibility of INEC registering about 50 political parties, and a maximum allowed expenditures ranging from N500,000,000 (for presidential election) down to N500,000 (for local government elections), 10% shared of the grant might turn out to be a ridiculously small amount for each party. The truth is that in Nigeria candidates raise and spend considerable amounts of money in their election campaigns. According to Section 93 (Sub-section 9) of the Electoral Act, 2006, “No individual or other entity shall donate more than N1, 000,000 to any candidate. Rather than stating a particular amount as the limit of expenses on election, it may be worth considering empowering INEC to from time to time issue guidelines that deal with the problem of campaign finance.

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Section 93 (Sub-section 11) stipulates that “Any individual who knowingly acts in contravention of subsection 10 shall be liable to N500, 000 fine or 9 months imprisonment or both”. The target on individual (and not necessarily the party) for sanction for violation of electoral regulation is another improvement; it makes the individual responsible for his/her electoral behavior. Section 94 of the Electoral Act 2006 requires political parties to submit to INEC an audited return within six months after an election. Sub-section 3 stipulates that “such return shall be signed by the party's auditors and counter-signed by the Chairman of the Party and be supported by a sworn affidavit by signatories as to the correctness of its contents. While this provision is a welcome development toward checking

illegal deployment of funds, it has not sufficiently criminalized any act of failure to forward such returns. The provisions in Section 95 (1- 4) provide for disclosure by political parties. Sub-section 1 states that “No political party shall accept or keep in its possession any anonymous monetary or other contributions, gifts, properties, etc from any source whatsoever”. The principle of disclosure which is backbone of party finance regulation is further entrenched in the new electoral law via Sub-sections 2- 4 that require political parties to “keep an account and asset book” for all monetary and other forms of contributions received by the parties, as well as the details (name and address) of contributors to the party. Sub-section 3 specifically states that “No political party shall accept any money or other contribution exceeding N100, 000 unless it can identify the source of the money or other contribution to the Commission.

III. Political Parties and Internal Democracy

The electoral system of a country is the critical institution which shapes and influences the rules of political competition for state power because it determines what parties look like, who is represented in the legislature, how accountable these representatives are to the electorate and above all who governs. It is good to know that the way an electoral system operates go a long way in determining the degree of public confidence and support for the democratic system itself. Electoral system regulates elections and other related activities. Both the 1999 Constitution and the 2006 Electoral Act provides the legal and constitutional framework for the operations of political in Nigeria. Because of the “illiberal” nature of the legal framework that governs party activities in Nigeria individuals within political parties have emerged, through political or financial control, with enormous power which they use to control and dominate the affairs of their political parties.

These individuals, commonly referred to as ‘godfathers’ now determine who gets what within their respective parties. These godfathers are responsible for the current problem of factionalism, which has affected virtually all major parties in Nigeria. (International – IDEA). It is only effective regulation of

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the use of money in politics that can reduce the influence of godfathers and promote the culture of internal democracy in the operations of political parties. Presently, these “political notables or dreaded political rascals who are recalcitrant to the deterrence of the legal regime” dominate their respective political parties to the extent that they have the capacity to “sway political support such that they can determine the electoral fortune of candidates” (IFES: 2008). They are able to do this because they “are strong party men and can also determine the nomination process because they often wield much influence on the party machine

The 1999 Constitution defines political parties narrowly and reduces the essence of political parties only to canvassing for votes during elections. The conditions and requirements stipulated in the Constitution such as having headquarters in Abuja, and having names, symbols or logos that do not have religious or ethnic connotations are rather too stringent and illiberal. As a result only very few “money bags” “have the capacity to unite money wielding forces from different parts of the country” (IFES: 2008). to qualify for registration with INEC. A recent study conclude that “In effect, the major factor in party formation in Nigeria is not the aggregation of people with similar ideological interests but the establishment of ethnic coalitions led by regional barons with strong financial backing” (IFES: 2008). Although the constitutional provisions on political parties are intended to check external control of parties through irregular use of money. This is far from being achieved as ‘money politics’, including paying of bribes to party officials and to voters to support a particular candidate, have continue to undermine the consolidation of multiparty politics in Nigeria (IFES: 2008).

The marginalization of women, youths and persons with disabilities in the operations and activities of political parties constitutes major challenge to internal democracy. Although structures are listed in the manifestoes and other official documents of virtually all the political parties, however, decision-making has regularly involved only very few members of the “elders of the party” usually supported by the money-bags. Often this has generated intense intra-party conflicts. One common trend is the culture of “results by declaration”, where party caucus nullifies primary elections and give automatic tickets they consider as popular to contest election on the platform of the party. In some cases they caucus out rightly declare the loser candidate as the winner.

The civil society and the political parties are critical stakeholders in the Nigerian electoral process. They are will continue to be useful, for instance, in the consideration of how campaign finance activity is reported and disclosed, how government regulators and outside organizations monitor campaign spending, and how effectively violations of campaign finance laws are prosecuted and punished. Also, both the civil society and political parties have responsibility to promote civic and voter education on the negative consequence of irregular party financing on democracy. The political parties have responsibility to promote transparency and accountability in their operations. Civil society groups are showing more interests in election related issues especially issues relating to campaign finance for parties and individual candidates. Civil society groups are becoming more visible in the electoral process in Nigeria. Political corruption, in its several forms, including unregulated use

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of money in politics, has not yet received adequate attention in the policy environment, civil society circles or even the research community in Nigeria. All these platforms are generally lacking in necessary information, skills and knowledge to engage the issues. These challenges, coupled with the lack of political support for anti-corruption initiatives in the country, have made the task of mapping the trends and patterns in ‘money and politics’ certainly not an easy one. The task is further complicated by the fact that the activities and operations of many governmental agencies and political parties in the country are shrouded in secrecy, which is often mystified as ‘strategies’ or “winning tactics”!

Civil society groups in Nigeria only got their first taste of organized electoral participation in 1998/99. During the 1999 elections the Transition Monitoring Group (TMG) – a coalition of civil society groups working to promote democracy and good governance in Nigeria - coordinated the activities of many civil society groups that participated in the elections. By 2003 the scope and quality of participation by civil society organizations has extended significantly: Four other large civil society - the Labor Election Monitoring Team; the Federation of Muslim Women’s Associations of Nigeria (FOMWAN), the Muslim League for Accountability; and the Justice, Development and Peace Commission of the Catholic Church (JDPC) - joined TMG in election observation. Also, a number of smaller women’s groups and conflict mitigation networks participated. Apart from observing elections, Nigerian civil society was also involved extensively in civic education, with support from donor agencies notably United States Agency for International Development (USAID), the UK Department for International Development (DfID and the European Union (EU). This admittedly reflects the newly emerging trend in development assistance which sees political party reform as major area requiring systematic intervention.

By 2007 not much of improvement was recorded in the area of civil society engagement with the issues of political financing. However, there is existence today a network of civil society groups and other stakeholders – the Political Finance Monitoring Group (PFMG). Members of this network meet periodically to discuss methods for developing solutions to the problems of political finance. The expansion of groups involved in this network and its consolidation is desirable. It is will be a measure of the ability of the Nigerian civil society to watch over the electoral process especially the influence of money in politics. There is a section of the vital stakeholders in the Nigerian electoral process that thinks that the electoral processes initiated by President Yar Adua holds out great prospect for democratic consolidation in the country. Attention of Nigerians is regularly drawn to the commitment of the new administration, the favourable disposition of the international community towards and their support for electoral reform, the personality and pedigree of the members of the Electoral Reform Panel. Whereas there is the sense in which all these variable add value to the process, much however depends on the existence of appropriate political culture that support the enterprising nature of members of the Electoral Reform Panel.

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Both the 1999 Constitution and the 2006 Electoral Act define the functions and responsibilities of INEC in relation to elctions in Nigeria. The registration of political parties is one of the important functions of the Commission. A political party is not technically a political party until it is certified as one through registration by INEC in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution. The Commission also formulates rules and regulations governing political campaign, and also monitors the campaigns. The Commission is empowered by the Constitution to monitor the organizations and operation of the political parties at all levels including their finances. In the case of the 2003 elections, INEC sent delegates of its officials to observe party conventions and congresses.

Under the 1999 Constitution, the Commission has constitutional responsibility to monitor the finances of political parties, conduct an annual examination and audit of the funds of political parties and publish a report for the public information. Section 228 ( c) of the 1999 Constitution gives power to the National Assembly to provide for an annual grant to the Commission for disbursement to political parties on a fair and equitable basis to assist them the discharge of their functions. The responsibility to monitor the use of money in the campaign activities of politicians and their parties poses some challenges for the Commission. For instance, during the 1999 elections there were complaints and allegations by some civic groups about large donations by influence political figures and businessmen to some parties. The Transition Monitoring Group - a coalition of civil society organizations, in statement on the conduct of the PDP, ANPP, UNPP, and NDP primaries in January 2003, complained that “there was widespread bribery of delegates with sacks stuffed with money to influence their votes”. Also, Sarah Jibril, one of the presidential candidates in the 2003 elections petitioned the leadership of her party over alleged While INEC misappropriation of grants. The Commission was able to investigate some of the reported cases and even monitored party finances to some extent. For instance, following the reported allegation of mismanagement of funds released to political parties by INEC, the Commission in September 2003 ordered the audit of the account of four political parties. But for very long time INEC was unable to perform audits or issue reports on the finance of political parties due mainly to lack of cooperation from most of the political parties.

Section 84 (3) of the Electoral Act 2002 states that “Election expenses of Political Party shall be submitted to the Commission in a separate audited return within three months after polling day and such shall be signed by the party’s auditors and countersigned by the Chairman of the Party as the case may be and shall be supported by a sworn affidavit by the signatories as to the correctness of its contents”. In the case of the 2003 elections the dues date for the submission of the audited report of political parties was 3 August after the final pooling day of 3 May 2003. Most of the political parties violated the deadline and by the end of 2003 only few had submitted their reports to the Commission .

The task of administering elections is vast and complex. For effective monitoring of the operations and activities of political parties, there is need to put in place a multi-track approach which entails strengthening the capacity of INEC to deal with the problem of party finance, building the capacity of

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political parties keep proper records of financial transactions, and also supporting civil society organizations to monitor expenditures on elections.

IV. By way of conclusion

Key elements and issues in the democratization of the structures and operations of political parties such as the enactment and enforcement of legal regulation on the activities of political parties and its finance-related aspects often in most cases do not receive adequate attention in the transitional phases of democratic experiment. As the Nigerian political transition progresses towards the consolidation of the foundation for democracy, the need for well-functioning party system that provide for strong parties that seriously consider internal democracy and transparency as important democratic values including adherence to clear set of rules and strict control over political funds cannot be overemphasized. This is the context in which present effort by the administration of President Ya’Adua to undertake electoral reform is seen as progressive movement toward democratic consolidation in Nigeria.

On the particular issue of regulating party finance through effective monitoring among other things, the objectives of regulations concerning political money we note can vary considerably, depending on the stage of democratic transition. In the case of Nigeria, while one notes the relevant provisions in the 1999 Constitution and the 2006 Electoral Act, the enforcement of these provisions and also future attention to the problem of party finance should target the following: (i) controlling fraud and political finance related corruption; (ii) promoting active and efficient political parties; and (iii) ensuring openness and transparency in the electoral process. Based on what exist on ground in Nigeria, the above can be translated to reviewing the existing legislation to pay more attention to implementation.

Also, rules and regulations to promote financial transparency and accountability in the activities and operations of political parties should be encouraged. We therefore recommend the introduction of verifiable disclosure and procedures and enforceable ceilings for all finances, whether party’s or candidate’s. Easy accessibility to basic information as who gives to whom and for what should be guaranteed. There is need to draw the line on the limits of contributions as well as decide whether it is more prudent to contribute to the party, and not candidates. Data on the actual cost of election campaigns in Nigeria is hard to get. Most non-governmental organizations seem not interested in tracking campaign expenses. Worst still, disclosure is not yet as popular among politicians. Nevertheless, it is generally assumed that the cost of election campaigns is high in Nigeria. (In Nigeria one indicator of the high coat of election campaign is the cost of candidate’s posters and bills. The printing of posters with picture of the candidates is usually the start off in the campaign. Given that candidates posters ought to be out almost a year before the election indicates how much is spent on the posters as well as its distribution, ensuring that they appear in strategic place. ) There is also the effect of inflation on election expenses that makes any forecast about future expenses on elections unreliable. In this circumstance, stating a particular amount as limit of election expenses as it is in the 2006 Electoral Act is unrealistic.

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Much of what should be done to promote transparency in the affairs of political parties can be accommodated within a multi-track approach by INEC. This however entails strengthening the capacity of INEC to deal with specific problems such as monitoring party financing, building the capacity of political parties to keep proper records of financial transactions, and also supporting civil society organizations to monitor expenditures on elections. The civil society and the political parties are critical stakeholders in the Nigerian electoral process. They are will continue to be useful, for instance, in the consideration of how campaign finance activity is reported and disclosed, how government regulators and outside organizations monitor campaign spending, and how effectively violations of campaign finance laws are prosecuted and punished. Also, both the civil society and political parties have responsibility to promote civic and voter education on the negative consequence of irregular party financing on democracy. The political parties have responsibility to promote transparency and accountability in their operations.

Reliable data on the costs of election campaigns and other related activities in Nigeria is hard to get. Expectedly research in the area of party finance is underdeveloped in the country. It therefore follows that advocacy for policy changes are rarely based on adequate information and good knowledge of the various dimensions of the problem. These notwithstanding, there are growing concerns about high costs of election campaigns and other related activities and the implications for political corruption in the country. Party finance reform definitely requires further research, to identify and define issues more precisely. Therefore efforts at electoral reform should necessarily consider the importance of scientific research which entails data and information gathering, analysis and re-analysis. There is need to generate a lot of information and data on different aspects of party finance in the country. Research programmes would be needed to generate reliable and regular flow of data on other related areas of money and politics and its effects on electoral politics.

There is rising consciousness about the dangers of political corruption in the country and also the need to control the influence of money in politics as a part of electoral reform process. This consciousness, however, needs to be consolidated into concrete policy frameworks and programmes, drawing upon global best practices. This no doubt requires a public advocacy component that will target behavioural charge. In this calculation the role of the civil society is paramount. Enacting laws and creating institutions will not, per se, achieve the desired goals. For this to be achieved there is need for a multi-track approach which entails strengthening the capacity of INEC to deal with the problem of party finance, building the capacity of political parties to keep proper records of financial transactions, and also supporting civil society organizations to monitor expenditures on elections.

While it cannot be said that there is any controversy about the need to democratize the structures and operations of political parties within the context of the on-going electoral reform in Nigeria, the complexities of strategies and modalities requires in-depth attention than have been given by all the stakeholders including the political parties. On the one hand, one can argue with some conviction that

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the prospects for effective democratization of structures and operations of political parties in Nigeria are very bright. The open show of commitment to electoral reform by the administration of President Yar’ Adua which seems to be receiving the support of the international community is a plus in this regard. On the other hand, dominant social forces within Nigeria also demonstrate lack of interest in issues that include promoting internal democracy, transparency and accountability, and regulating political finance. The dominance of money-driven political culture that pervade almost every fabric of social life in Nigeria, supported and encouraged by the continued attraction to ostentatious living by many, the growing influence of the godfathers, lack of political will and readiness on the part of the political class to undertake and support electoral reform, and the general apathy and lack of capacity and courage on the part of many civil society organizations and political parties in Nigeria to organize across ethnic and regional sentiments, all have tendency to limit the prospect of democratizing the structures and operations of political parties.

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NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. Joseph LaPalombara and Myron Weiner, (eds.) (1966): Political Parties and Political

Development, Princeton University Press.

2. Richard L. Sklar, Nigerian Political Parties: Power in an Emergent African Nation, New York, London and Lagos

3. Victor A.O Adetula (ed.) (2008): Money and Politics in Nigeria, International Foundation for Electoral System

4. Amy M. Loprest, (2005): Transparent Public Funding in Nigeria: Review and Recommendations, (March).

5. NIGERIA: Corruption and Governance Diagnostic Study, Analysis of Survey Results , 2003,

6. IFES, (2007): A Nigerian Perspective on the 2007 Presidential and Parliamentary elections: Results From Pre-and Post –Election Surveys (August)

7. FGN (2006): An Address delivered by President Olusegun Obasanjo at the INEC-Civil Society Forum Seminar on 27th November 2003.

8. FGN (2006): Electoral Act 2006, Abuja

9. FGN (1999): Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999, Lagos

10. The Guardian, Sunday, February 24, 2008, p.71

11. This Day Newspaper of 4 July 2007 The source is the Afrobarometer survey that was carried out in Nigeria from September- December 2005. See <www. Afrobarometer.org>

12. www.afrobarometer.org

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Monitoring of the Administration and Finances of Political Parties in Nigeria – Legal and Institutional Limitations*

by

Samuel Egwu, Ph, D**

Introduction and the Problematique

Political parties are the institutional foundation of electoral democracy. Consequently, the establishment of political parties and the unfettered freedom of citizens to form and belong to political parties of their choice are critical to the practice of democracy. In addition to their core functions of mobilization, socialization and integration, and running candidates for elections, political parties perform other vital functions of providing a critical link between citizens and policy makers. It is legitimate to suggest that the health of any democracy can be measured by the viability of the party system.

Nigeria’s present party system is characterized by institutional weakness, which is at the core of the problem of “electoral authoritarianism”. This institutional weakness and the irresponsible and self-serving interests of party leaders have consistently undermined the credibility of electoral democracy since 1999. Nigeria’s party system largely reflects the nature of patronage politics and the phenomenon of elite capture of state resources. This system of patronage politics has been strengthened by long years of military rule and the emergence oil-based accumulation and national wealth. Political parties become formal mechanisms for legitimizing elite capture of state resources. The control of the patronage system from a strong presidency at the national level to the state level where governors are also ‘powerful’ in a top down fashion affects the operation of the party system in ways that negate accountability to their members and citizens and their alienation from the decision-making processes. (President at the national level and governors at state levels are respectively designated “party leaders”). The consequence is that party politics and elections become a framework of accommodation for the narrow interests of the political elite. The essence of patronage politics is that, office holders use the state to generate income for themselves and their close associates (both sponsors and clients) and then use the accumulated wealth to purchase the election results they desire.

Among others, there are two key challenges of the party system which this paper seeks to address. The first relates to the organization and administration of political parties as public institutions on account of the prevailing regime of public funding. Precisely because existing parties are not membership driven and are hardly linked to established social base, there is low level of accountability to their members and the public at large.

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____________________________________________________________ *Paper presented at the Workshop on “Effective Monitoring of the Administration and Finances of Political Parties” organized by The Electoral Institute, INEC at the Arewa House, Kaduna. December 2008.**Sam Egwu is a Professor of Political Science at the Kogi State University, Ayangba,

This is well demonstrated by the pervasive problem of absence of internal democracy in political parties. The problem of internal democracy is linked to the role of party ‘godfathers’ and gate keepers who use their vast social and economic connections to determine how political parties are run and candidates selected for elections outside of the procedures prescribed in the party constitutions. They do not only undermine the formal channels of political parties, they seek to control those they sponsor into ‘elected’ positions by choosing juicy cabinet positions and the award of lucrative contracts.

The second problem relates to the regulation of finances of political parties. Aside from the absence of internal capacity within political parties to report on their finances and manage their resources in a transparent and accountable manner, there is a related challenge of monitoring, tracking and reporting on monies raised by political parties outside the grants from governments especially from diverse sources which may include money from ‘infamous’ sources. This is a matter of concern because of the role of money and its dysfunctional impact on voters’ behaviour and the health of electoral democracies, be it established or transitional democracies.

Indeed, the undue influence of political money on voters’ behaviour and electoral outcome highlights one of the central dilemmas of representative democracy. Money is central to the organization of political activity, yet its uncontrolled and unregulated use can undermine the central value of liberal democracy underpinned by the logic that the political market place should decide who holds public power on behalf of the people. The publication of International IDEA titled, “Democracy in Nigeria: Continuing Dialogue(s) for Nation-Building”, aptly captures the problem quite poignantly:

Excessive or uneven use of money during electioneering campaigns interferes with the possibility of all parties and candidates conveying their message to the electorate on an equal basis. Money also undermines democracy as a contest of ideas, because the influence of money on the democratic process can dilute or compromise the genuine expression of the popular will. Any government constituted from corrupted “money politics” denies the fundamental tenets of the electoral processes as the popular will and cannot guarantee democracy, accountability and transparency. ( International IDEA: 2001)

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Nigeria’s former President, Chief Olusegun Obasanjo underscores the Nigerian situation in his address to the INEC-Civil Society Forum Seminar on November 27th 2003 in the following epigrammatic words:

With so much resources being deployed to capture elective offices, it is not difficult to see the correlation between politics and the potential for high level corruption. The greatest losers are the ordinary people, those voters whose faith and investment in the system are hijacked and subverted because money not their will, is made the determining factor in elections…. More worrisome, however, is the total absence of any controls on spending by candidates and political parties towards elections…..we prepare for elections as if we are going to war, … the parties and candidates together spent during the last elections, more than what would have been needed to fight a successful war. The will of the people cannot find expression and flourish in the face of so much money directed solely for achieving victory. Elective offices become mere commodities to be purchased by the highest bidder, and those who literally invest merely see it as an avenue to recoup and make profits. Politics become business, and the business of politics becomes merely to divert public funds from the crying needs of our people for real developments in their lives.

The realization that “money politics” has negative impact, not just on the voters, but on the entire democratic landscape, explains the imperative of the continuous reform of the legal framework of elections and the development of elaborate enforcement mechanisms. But this remains a daunting challenge in transitional democracies where a combination of the politics of patronage, a weak culture of rule of law, and high levels of illiteracy among others, tend to reinforce the negative impact of material inducements on voters’ behaviour.

This paper discusses focuses on the legal and institutional limitations of existing framework for monitoring the administration and finance of political parties. It specifically examines the provisions in the 1999 Constitution and the subsisting electoral law as they relate to the monitoring of the administration and finance of political parties. While the paper identifies the need to strengthen the existing framework for monitoring the administration and finances of political parties, it seeks to draw attention to the fact that we need to reflect on the larger political economy environment to come to terms with the forces that subvert electoral democracy in Nigeria.

The Legal/Institutional Framework for Administration and Finances of Political Parties

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The framers of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria had in mind the need to regulate the activities of political parties in the electoral process. This because of the general tendency associated with political parties to maximize opportunities to capture power which is the essence of their existence. The proclivity of political parties to concentrate on the power game even at the detriment of the constuitive and regulative rules of the game takes on a greater dimension because of the fluidity of the political environment, the profitability of state power and the prevailing culture of impunity in which electoral malfeasance is hardly punished. There are therefore relevant sections of the Constitution which provides for the regulation of the activities of political parties.

The Constitution provides that the process of bringing political parties into existence and the regulation of their administration be superintended over by the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC). For example, Section 15 (b) of the Third Schedule of the Constitution recognizes the power of the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) to register political parties in accordance with Section 222 of the Constitution. INEC has used this power in the continuous liberalization of the political atmosphere in the series of registration of political parties which have brought the number of parties to fifty at present. The Constitution equally gives INEC the power to carry out oversight over political parties by making it mandatory for INEC to attend party conventions and ensure that political parties comply with their own constitutions and rules. What this means is that the power of INEC includes ensuring that political parties obey their own rules and exhibit high levels of transparency and internal democracy in the conduct of their affairs especially in the selection of candidates for the purposes of elections.

Regulation of finances of political parties appears more critical to the survival of democracy because differential access of parties to money is capable of vitiating a level playing field which is at the core of the principle of political equality and equal opportunity. In the Nigerian political clime where ‘money politics’ has been elevated to a high level, unrestrained role of money has the following negative effects:

1) Disconnection between elections and the notion of a mandate in the sense that candidates who are ‘voted’ into power assume that they have rendered upfront payment for the mandate. This is a critical issue that has been extensively discussed and documented. 1 (Jibrin Ibrahim and Sam Egwu: 2005)

2) Providing incentives for channeling money from infamous sources including self-seeking private sector actors and organized crime. Such can become the basis for holding government to ransom, and in most instances, to undermine public interest.

3) It tends to promote the interests of political parties in power and incumbent candidates who have the leverage to channel state resources into election campaigns, or attract campaign

1

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funds from organized private sector and foreign sources to the disadvantage of opposition parties and weak candidates.

4) It elevates to the highest level the politics of patronage and the phenomenon of ‘godfatherism’ as one ‘powerful’ individual underwrites the cost of elections by inducing voters through

In relation to the regulation of the finances of political parties, key institutions have been charged with varying responsibilities. The public funding of political parties guaranteed by Section 228 (c) of the Constitution as well as Sections 90 and 91 of the 2006 Electoral Act give powers to INEC and the National Assembly. In the first place, political parties receive their grants through INEC. However, the power to appropriate for this purpose lies with the National Assembly. It appears from the provisions of the Electoral Act that two types of funding are available to the political parties. For example, in addition to the provisions of Section 90 of the Electoral Act 2006 which empowers the National Assembly to approve disbursement to political parties contesting elections, Section 91 (1) gives indication that the National Assembly can make annual grants to political parties to assist them in their operations. Following judicial intervention in response to the challenge by opposition parties to the lopsided formula in the disbursement of funds to political parties (10:90 ratios in favour of parties with representation in the National Assembly), all the political parties are entitled to the same amount of money.

Alongside the regime of public funding of political parties, the existing legal framework recognizes private funding of political parties. This embraces monies and in-kind contributions made to political parties and candidates, and includes fees and levies, proceeds made from investments made by the parties, subventions and gifts from individuals as well as sale of party nomination forms, etcetera. However, contributions from individuals are not expected to exceed one million naira. The Companies and Allied Matters Act clearly prohibits corporate organizations from donating monies to political parties and to further partisan political interests. In the same vein, the law prohibits political parties from receiving money from foreign sources as entrenched in Section 225(3)(a)(b), of the Constitution to the effect that no political party is allowed to “hold or possess any founds or other assets outside Nigeria, or be entitled to retain any funds remitted or sent to it from outside Nigeria”. The Constitutional provision on this is reinforced by the Electoral Act 2006. Money from foreign sources is not only to be disclosed but forfeited to INEC, and persons involved are to be fined.

INEC is further charged with the responsibility to monitor the organization and operation of all political parties, including their finances, the examination of their annual accounts and auditing, their annual reports, and the publication of statement of asset and liabilities. The law then makes it mandatory for every political party to maintain a record of contributions and amount received. Whether INEC is equipped to discharge this responsibility remains contentious, although a modest start has begun with the recent publication of audited accounts of over 45 political parties in three major dailies, even though the law requires this to be done in two national dailies.

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Disclosure provisions have been entrenched into the Electoral Act 2006. Considered as one of the most innovative provisions in the Electoral Act 2006, is the requirement that political parties disclose monies received from sources other than grants made by government for the purpose of monitoring their finances. However, as all other provisions in the law, enforcement has remained a key challenge.

But there are obvious gaps in the law regarding party financing especially as it relates to electioneering and campaign expenditure. For example, the law allows only N20 to be expended on the head of each voter in an electoral ward of not more than 500 people. That is, a politician or political party is not expected to expend more than ten thousand naira (N10,000) in electioneering activities in each ward. Although there are practical difficulties associated with determining whether candidates and parties have over spent, the reality on ground seems to suggest that the amount prescribed falls short of what is required.

A related problem is that the target of the law is the expenditure of political parties to the exclusion of the expenditure of the individual politicians involved. Where individual politicians are not personally held responsible for their conduct with respect to electoral funding, it becomes difficult to track records of financial mismanagement and fraud that takes place in the electoral processes. In fact, it would seem that not focusing on the candidates at elections creates a very big loophole that makes the entire exercise of tracking campaign financing and expenditure almost fruitless.

While there is need to continuously re-appraise the existing legal framework and carry out appropriate reforms, it is important to appreciate that political parties themselves are at the centre of the problem. The institutional weakness of the party system is best illustrated by the absence of internal democracy and the fact that a number of them do not exist beyond the activities of one individual or a collection a few individuals.

The institutional weakness of political further impinges on the capacity of INEC to carry out is oversight over their finances. As INEC itself has established, almost all the political parties in Nigeria exhibit the following lapses:

Lack of proper accounting system. Non-existence of register of fixed assets and liability. Absence of self-audit (internal and external. Lack of operational budget or even simple detail of expenditure and income

expectation. Poor memberships register. Lack of internal control measures leading to failure of parties to comply with

constitutional provisions regarding finances and their management.

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Non-compliance by almost all the parties to the standard guidelines as contained in the Political Party’s Manual and Handbook.

This is reinforced by the lack of internal capacity within INEC, the problem of inadequate funding, the political pressure mounted by the ruling party, and the fact that it appears over burdened by the numerous activities required of one institution in the context of electoral administration.

The Way Forward

INEC has published audited accounts of the political parties in Nigeria, and, has, in accordance with the provisions of the law, made the audited account available to the Nigerian public in three major newspapers. This is unprecedented in the history of electoral democracy in Nigeria. However, it is difficult to make any progress without building the capacity of individual political parties and reforming the party system in general. It would seem that two major recommendations by the Electoral Reform Committee may go along way in improving the environment for a more transparent operation of political parties including their administration and finances. These relate to the recommendation to unbundle INEC by establishing the Political Parties Registration and Regulatory Commission (PPRC) and the drastic reduction in the number of political parties to a maximum of seven.

It is important to suggest that the problem has less to do with the provisions of the law than with the weak enforcement mechanisms. We have witnessed trends since the emergence of the fourth Republic that are capable of undermining the credibility of the electoral process in terms of how money from private sources have been channeled into politics in obvious contravention of existing laws. For instance, in the countdown to the 2003 elections, a group of Nigerian business elites under the umbrella of “Corporate Nigeria” came together to contribute huge sums of money to the presidential campaign of Chief Olusegun Obasanjo. Similar donations were made to incumbent governors in many states of the country.

More recently, opposition parties protested the donation of huge sums of money to the ruling PDP by some Nigerian business men and corporate organizations. While individuals like Femi Otedola gave the party N1 billion, Alhaji Aliko Dangote promised to give N3billion and Strabag made commitment to give huge material support to the party. Such individuals and corporate organizations are capable of using the influence arising from this to bend public policies in their favour or get huge contracts as rewards.

Democracies employ different strategies to control the flow of money into politics by creating a framework within which political parties and candidates can operate. They rest on three pillars: i) full disclosure; ii) independent enforcement agency; iii) reasonable public funding. (M. Walecki: 2004)

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1) Disclosure requires systematic reporting, auditing, public access to records and publicity. The essence is that the accounts of politicians must be made the subject of public knowledge and political debate.

2) Enforcement requires an independent agency endowed with the necessary legal powers to supervise, verify, investigate, and if possible, institute legal proceedings. This raises the question of the independence and funding regime of such an agency, and the mode of sanctions it applies to offenders, be they candidates or political parties. Yet, we need to bear in mind the efficacy of enforcement is measured more by the certainty of apprehending offenders and imposing light administrative fines/sanctions rather than the severity of punishment.

3) Sufficient and transparent funding of political parties. It is one sure means of dealing with practices of abusing state resources and plutocratic funding that fuels the financial corruption of politics. It limits the possibility of private and external forces to capture political parties and their policy-making capacities.

Nigeria can and should learn from the experience of other countries first in designing political finance laws and the mechanisms for enforcing the laws. Experience shows that institutions to checkmate the inflow of money into politics must be independent of the executive and the ruling party, and must be adequately as first line charge from the Consolidated Revenue of the Federation. Furthermore, a system of inter-agency collaboration needs to be put in place and strengthened to enable healthy exchange of information with bodies set up to deal fight corruption.

Conclusion

The design of the legal and institutional framework for the monitoring of the administration and finances of political parties cannot be done outside of a deliberate effort to engineer a viable party system in which political parties focus on policy development and issue-based campaigns, promote internal democracy and become more responsive and responsible to their members and the citizenry at large.

For instance, political parties can be made to respond to their regular evaluations and assessments which are put in the public domain. This can be done by supporting research on political parties that will include periodic assessment of political parties on the basis of a carefully designed governance index and ensuring that such knowledge-based assessment is widely shared with stakeholders (especially the envisaged platform for inter-party dialogue) and the citizenry at large. It could provide incentives to political parties to be more responsible and responsive if a certain percentage of public funding is tied to the performance of political parties in such periodic assessment and ranking. Well funded “think tanks” that can attract good academics can adapt existing governance index for political parties. For instance, there is a governance index for political parties in West Africa with fifteen indicators derived from political parties’ laws and practices in West Africa as well as the ECOWAS Supplementary Protocol on Good Governance and Democracy. Some of these indicators are: participation in election, national character, democratic dialogue, gender balance, inclusiveness, internal party democracy, transparency and accountability, rule of law, media freedom, party

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financing, international partnerships, secularism, changing of electoral laws and manipulation of election date. Survey based on these indicators can be complemented by sources like report of election observers, report of the National Electoral Authority, media reports, CSO reports and interviews, interviews with political parties, etc

In the final analysis, ensuring that political parties become more transparent and accountable through the monitoring of their administration and finance is a long haul that can be achieved over time by improving the legal and institutional framework as well as a massive programme of civic and political education. It is, indeed, the latter that holds the key to deepening democracy, because at the heart of the matter is the challenge of building democratic citizenship and providing a space for civil society to engage with a wide range of actors in the democratic process including election management and political parties.

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REFERENCES

1. International IDEA (2001): Democracy in Nigeria: Continuing Dialogue(s) for Nation-Building. Stockholm: Sweden

2. Jibrin Ibrahim and Sam Egwu (2005): Elections 2007: Defending the Peoples’ Mandate.Global Rights. Abuja

3. M. Walecki (2004) ‘Political Money and Corruption’ IFES Political Finance White Paper Series.

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An Overview of Alternate Dispute Resolution (ADR) Processes*

byPaul Obo Idornigie, Ph.D FCIS, MC**

Discourage Litigation. Persuade your neighbours to compromise whenever you can. Point out to them how the nominal winner is often the real loser - in fees, expenses, and waste of time - Abraham Lincoln

INTRODUCTION

At one time, the thought of someone seeking legal redress especially in civil matters was that of suing and "going to court". Indeed in the case of pre-election disputes, attempts have been made to stall the electoral process by interlocutory applications or substantive suits filed in courts. However it has become a notorious fact that disputes, unlike wine do not improve by aging: many things happen to a cause and to parties in a dispute by the simple passage of time. Delay in settlement or disposal of conflicting claims is indeed a primary enemy of justice and peace in a community. This is compounded in the case of election disputes which by the provisions of section 140(3) of the Electoral Act, 2006 ought to be resolved before the constitution of Election Tribunals.

The question that has been with civilization since the dawn of recorded history has been how to find a reliable, expeditious and satisfactory dispute settlement mechanism which is inexpensive, reasonably quick and accessible to the whole community. This is a realization of the fact that in such communities, disputes are bound to arise. More fundamentally, in a democratic system especially in emerging economies where electoral processes and ethos have not been fully institutionalized, various disputes have arisen.

Litigation has been the main forum for resolution of disputes including election and political disputes. However, the judicial process tends to transform social, political and economic disputes into legal disputes. Not only are some problems ill suited to a proper or full resolution through the adversarial process, the process may accentuate and exaggerate disputes rather than resolve them. As the courts grew, delays, formalities, technicalities, publicity, alleged corruption and the like crept in. The "win/lose" syndrome associated with litigation is so well known.

Disposal of post-election petitions have taken their toll on the judiciary. In this regard, Nigeria's political history has been chequered. There is now a realization that rights and revenge are not the focus of most disputes: many disputes involve misunderstandings, accidents or other situations where getting the problem resolved quickly is more important

___________________________________________________ *Being paper presented at a Workshop on “Resolving Political Disputes in A Democratic Setting – The Place of Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR)” organized by INEC at Musa Yar’Adua Centre, Abuja in Dec, 2008.**Dr. Idornigie is the General Counsel/privatization Advise, bureau for Public Enterprise, Abuja, Nigeria.

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than placing blame. Some other disputes especially election disputes border on the needs and interests of the parties and society and not their legal rights. These led to a re-thinking and hence the idea of applying ADR processes to pre-election disputes.

This development is expected because the spirit of reform is in the air. Thus from resolving pre-election and political disputes in a fixed and identifiable place called a court or courtroom, we are proposing that such disputes should be taken away from the courtrooms to any place - "out of court" for neutrals to resolve. The focus on interests and needs of the parties and the society rather than the rights of the individual changes the way in which pre-election disputes are categorized, analyzed and processed. This requires a total re-orientation and change of attitude. Nigeria! as a country is bigger than all of us. Consequently, individual interests should not prevail over national interests. The thrust of this presentation is that pre-election and political disputes should move away from a formal process to informal process albeit within the limit of the law. In this presentation! Therefore, we will give an overview of the ADR processes in the context of pre-election and political disputes.

MEANING OF ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION (ADR)

ADR may be defined as a range of procedures or processes that serve as alternatives to litigation through the courts for the resolution of disputes, generally involving the intercession and assistance of a neutral and impartial third party. In some definitions, and more commonly, (most jurisdictions), it excludes not only litigation but all forms of adjudication.(Brown& Marriot: 1999) It can also be defined as a system of dispute resolution which is non-binding and by non-binding is meant the absence of imposed sanctions. In other words, the parties are under no obligation to comply with any decision or determination resulting from the process, if indeed there is one. Nor are the parties obliged to participate in or continue with the process in the absence of express contractual provision to that effect. (Sutton, St David et all: 2007)

The word "alternative" in ADR has generally been understood to refer to he alternatives to litigation. Arbitration was originally widely included as part of ADR. However, as arbitration has entered the mainstream of dispute resolution processes, and in the light of its adjudicatory nature, the current tendency has shifted away from regarding arbitration strictly as part of the ADR processes and has tended to limit this word to consensual processes.(Brown & Marriott: Op Cit.) To this extent, therefore, arbitration is not part of ADR processes. However, for purposes of this presentation, we will consider arbitration as part of the ADR processes. We will also consider mediation/conciliation and negotiation. Indeed, at the core of ADR is mediation/conciliation.

It is now generally recognized that other processes and forms include private judging, expert determination/appraisal! med-arb, Ombudsman, early neutral evaluation, mini-trial (executive tribunal), and court annexed arbitration.(Ibid: 1999) Broadly, all processes can be divided into two: adjudicatory and consensual and the hybrid combinations in between them.

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An argument is developing whether the letter 'A' in the acronym should stand for the word "appropriate" and not the word "alternative". (Mackie K et all: 2000) Karl Mackie points out the paradox in the fact that most proponents of ADR now agree that the word "alternative" is inappropriate.(Ibid: 1999) This is so because much of ADR's value lies in the notion of a spectrum of dispute resolution mechanisms, with alternatives adding to, rather than replacing the litigation option. It is safe to assert, therefore, that ADR also describes processes which add to and enhance the range of resources and mechanisms to settle disputes. Essentially the processes change our focus on how disputes are categorized, analysed, and processed.

ADR is like a confluence with many tributaries.(For example, in the case of Arbitration, we have pure commercial arbitration, maritime arbitration, construction arbitration, rent review and property valuation arbitration, commodity trade arbitration, agricultural property arbitration and consumer disputes arbitration. Similarly the fields of activity in Mediation include commercial and civil disputes, family disputes (separation, divorce, etc), employment disputes, community and neighborhood issues, victim/offender mediation and reparation (restorative justice), environmental issues and international issues. In the case of Negotiation, virtually everything can be negotiated.) What we are proposing is that pre-election disputes should be part of the tributaries. Lest we are misunderstood, we are merely saying that there are alternatives to litigation. Of course, we still go to court when the goal is to protect someone’s rights, clarify a point of law or set a standard for public behaviour. However, it is advisable to establish a nexus between a dispute and a process so as to determine the process that is most appropriate. Thus we should know when to go to court or go out of court. With a proper framework developed by the Independent National Electoral Commission ("the Commission”), we can integrate the ADR processes into the electoral process either by exercising the statutory powers vested in the Commission or amending the Electoral Act. It is noteworthy that paragraph 15(f) of Part 1, Third Schedule to the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria empowers the Commission to monitor political campaigns and provide rules and regulations which shall govern the political parties while section 161 of the Electoral Act 2006 provides that the Commission may, subject to the provisions of the Act, issue regulations, guidelines, or manuals for the purpose of giving effect to the provisions of the Act and for its administration. It is submitted that the cumulative effect of all these is that the Commission can make rules on ADR for political parties. This can also be achieved through the amendment of the Electoral Act.

THE PHILOSPHY OF ADR

With the growth and development of ADR, it has become increasingly clear that there is no single philosophy underpinning it, rather a number of different strands, sometimes but not always overlapping. The philosophy includes:

It is more beneficial for parties to resolve their differences by negotiated settlement rather than through contentious proceedings. This is a fundamental precept in our traditional African society where a dispute is seen as a social disequilibrium.

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ADR processes preserve or enhance personal and political relationships that might otherwise be damaged by the adversarial process.

Settlements are more creative, satisfactory and lasting than those imposed by the

court or other third parties.

ADR is a forum in which parties are helped to adopt a problem-solving approach in order to find a win-win outcome with the neutral exploring underlying issues in order to understand those that have been presented.

The underlying philosophy may be the same but their application to different fields, for example, commercial, politics, family, labour tend to have their own culture of practice and within each field, there may be differences which may be significant.

The cost-saving element of ADR is based on the assumption that it will be effective and saves the judicial system from overload.

The issue of appropriateness of dispute resolution forms is central to any philosophy behind ADR. Diverse kinds of disputes involving varying circumstances and parties with a range of differing possible concerns and interests may well require different kinds of procedures and approaches.

It is consensual, non-adjudicatory and generally non-binding

In Nigeria, it is a reinstatement of customary jurisprudence. It is a mechanism that serves the real needs and interest of the participants and society.

Resolving to settle disputes using ADR is not a sign of weakness of one's case but rather an appreciation of the diverse tools available to resolve disputes. Indeed, as Legal Practitioners, we should be architects and engineers of appropriate dispute prevention and resolution processes.

An attempt to pre-empt future disputes by putting in place the appropriate dispute resolution mechanism while the parties are still on good terms.

ARBITRATION

Arbitration is a mechanism for the resolution of disputes which takes place, usually in private pursuant to an agreement between two or more parties, under which the parties agree to be bound by the decision to be given by the arbitrator according to law or, if so agreed, other considerations after a fair hearing, such decisions being enforceable at law. (Bernstein: 2003)Arbitration begins as a private agreement between the parties, continues by way of private proceedings, in which the wishes of the parties are of great importance and ends with an award that has binding legal force and effect and which, on appropriate conditions, the courts of most

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countries of the world will recognize and enforce. The process has a public effect, implemented with the support of the public authorities of each state and expressed through its national law. Thus arbitration is adjudicatory. In Nigeria, arbitration is regulated by the Arbitration and Conciliation Act. (Laws of the Federation of Nigeria: 1990)

Arbitration is Anchored on Fundamental Principles (Idornigie: 2004): - a) Principle of Party Autonomy (Ibid: 2003)b) Principle of Arbitrability (Ibid: 2004)c) Principle of Separability (Ibid: 2005)d) Principle of Judicial Non-Intervention(laws of the Federation of Nigeria, op Cit) and e) Kompetenz kompetenz

The arbitral process is not a challenge to or in competition with the judicial powers vested in the courts or ousts the court's jurisdiction. Arbitral proceedings are not the same thing as negotiations for settlement out of court. This is so because an arbitral award is final, binding and enforceable while the terms of settlement cannot and do not operate as a final and conclusive judgment of the court unless and until the court adopts the terms of the settlement as consent judgment.

Significant Features –

The agreement to arbitrate - is the foundation stone of modern arbitration. It must be valid. This is recognized by national laws and international treaties e.g. the 1958 New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards and UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration - recognition will be refused if the arbitration agreement is invalid. Note however 'arbitration without privity' or 'investment treaty arbitration'.

May be an arbitration clause or a submission agreement. If arbitration clause note the principle of separability; arbitration may be ad hoc or institutional

Form of agreement -in writing, signed by the parties The choice of arbitrators - this distinguishes arbitration from litigation. Consider

nationality, qualification, experience; appointment of arbitrators, default provisions, challenge of arbitrators. Section 7 of the Act provides that the parties may specify the procedure to be followed in appointing an arbitrator but where they fail to specify, in the case of an arbitration with three arbitrators, each party shall appoint one and the two shall appoint the third and if the parties fail so to do within a period of 30 days the appointment shall be made by the court and in the case of international arbitration by the appointing authority. (Laws of the Federation of Nigeria: Op Cit) It has been held in Bendex Engineering Corporation & Anor v Efficient Petroleum Itd (supra) that where an application is made to the High Court for the appointment of arbitrators, the fundamental parameters within which the court is enjoined to exercise its discretion are defined by the following three factors: (a) whether there is an arbitration agreement; (b) whether the dispute alleged by the applicant falls within the nature of disputes contemplated in the agreement; and (c) whether the parties have failed or neglected to appoint arbitrators. The court is not cloaked with any jurisdiction or duty to inquire into

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the sustainability or otherwise of the alleged dispute between the parties. However, section 7(4) of the Act provides that the decision of the court under subsections (2) and (3) of the section shall not be subject to appeal.(ibid:1999)

The decision of the arbitral tribunal - this distinguishes arbitration from mediation/conciliation - its final, binding, generally non-appealable but can be set aside. When an award is final, it is binding and conclusive and not appealable: Kano State Urban Development Board v Fanz Construction Ltd, supra and Onwu & Orders v Nka & Ors (1996) 7 SCNJ 240 at 255. Although there is no appeal, an award can be set aside under certain conditions provided for in sections 29, 30 and 48 of the Act, (3 NWLR) 710), The decision operates as res judicata.

The enforcement of the award - though proceedings are private but gives rise to public legal consequences - an award enforced like the judgment of a court (Ibid; 1999). An award can be corrected.(ibid) However, where the tribunal assesses the evidence wrongly or misconstrues or fails to appreciate the law, it cannot correct the resulting errors in the award under this heading.(1 Lloyd’s Rep: 1985) The tribunal is also empowered to interpret a specific point or part of the award or make an additional award within specified periods. The award is enforced in the same manner as a judgment or order of the court. Although the application can be made ex parte, it is advisable to put the other party on notice by Originating Summons or Originating Motion on Notice (3 NWLR 244).

Formalities, Confidentiality and Privacy - this also distinguishes arbitration from litigation - does privacy ensure confidentiality? Consider persons (especially witnesses and experts) and materials - how do you ensure confidentiality when an application to set aside an award or enforce an award is made to court?

Preliminary Meeting

One of the attractions of arbitral proceedings is that it is less formal than court proceedings. Thus the proceedings are usually tailor-made to suit the particular needs, interests and expectations of the parties, the arbitral tribunal and the witnesses. After the composition of the arbitral tribunal, a preliminary meeting or meeting for directions is usually held to determine how the proceedings will be conducted. If there is any legal representation, the legal practitioners are also present. The following matters are usually considered at such meetings:

Commencement Confirmation of the appointment of arbitrators; how to identify the issues - by pleadings or statement of case; place of arbitration; issues for determination whether interim orders are appropriate; whether there will be discovery, inspection and interrogatories; hearing or documents only; means of obtaining evidence, whether expert evidence will be adduced; mode of note-taking - full long hand, jotting down points or verbatim reporting; how to deal with issues of costs and deposit for costs,

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arbitrator's remuneration and confidentiality restrictions Venue and sittings

At the close of the meeting, a Procedural Order is usually issued setting out the orders ,

directions and timetable for the conduct of the proceedings, a copy of which is given to each party.

Traditional hearing involves: (i) opening statement for the claimant; (ii) evidence in chief of the claimant's first witness; (iii) cross-examination and reexamination the claimant's first witness - (ii) and (iii) are repeated for each successive witness; (iv) Opening statement (if any) for the respondent; (v) evidence in chief of respondent's first witness; (vi) cross-examination and reexamination of respondent's first witness an this is repeated for each successive witness; (vii) closing speech for the respondent; and (viii) closing speech for the claimant. Section 23 of the Act gives powers to the court or judge to order attendance of witnesses by issuing subpoena. Under section 21 of the Act, the tribunal may proceed ex parte if without showing sufficient cause a party fails to appear or file his pleadings.

Role of the Courts (Op Cit at 313) - section 57 of the Act defines "court" as the High Court of a State, the High Court of the FCT or the Federal High Court. Section 34 of the Act provides that the court shall not intervene except as provided in the Act. (Idornigie, Op Cit No 16 at 401)The court has powers to intervene in the following areas: stay of proceedings (ibid: Sections 4 and 5); revocation of arbitral agreement (ibid: Section 2), appointment of arbitrators (Ibid: Section 7), attendance of witnesses (Ibid: Section 23), production of documents (ibid), setting an aside of award(ibid; S29, 30, 48); remissions of award(ibid; S 29 (3)), enforcement of an award and refusal of enforcement(ibid: S31, 32, 51 and 52). In practice, what happens if an application is made to enforce and award and another is made to set aside the same award. Which application has priority? It is the application to set aside that has priority while that to enforce is stayed: Shell Trustees (Nig) Ltd v Imani & Sons Ltd (2000) 6 NWLR (part 662) 639.

MEDIATION/CONCILIATION

In most standard works on ADR, the key area is mediation/conciliation and not arbitration. To be a good mediator, skills in negotiation are relevant. In most texts and jurisdictions, conciliation and mediation are used interchangeably though mediation has become the preferred term.(laws of the Federation of Nigeria; 1990) Indeed in the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Conciliation "conciliation" is defined as "a process, whether referred to by the expression conciliation, mediation or an expression of similar import, whereby parties request a third person or persons ("the conciliator") to assist them in their attempt to reach an amicable settlement of their dispute arising out of or relating to a contractual or other legal relationship".(United Nations General Assembly Document:2003) Sometimes mediation is understood to involve a process in which the mediator is more pro-active and evaluative than in conciliation but sometimes the reverse usage is employed.(Brown & Marriott op Cit) The common feature between the two is that the resolution of disputes is by consensus and is entirely a decision of the parties and not of the third party neutral, i.e. the conciliator or mediator. In both cases, a

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neutral is appointed by the parties. The neutral's role involves assisting the parties, privately and collectively, to identify the issues in dispute and to develop proposals to resolve me. Quite unlike an arbitrator, the mediator/conciliator decides nothing and awards nothing. Consequently, the mediator/conciliator is not bound to observe the strict rules of natural justice. In carrying out his functions, he is like a shuttle diplomat: he "caucuses".

The settlement of a dispute usually starts with negotiation. It is when this fails that mediation is adopted. Mediation is not only a flexible process but offers more opportunities beyond the exchange of money or other tangible things. Because it focuses on the needs and interests of the parties, feelings, egos and business considerations are given prominence in the settlement process. In Nigeria, the legal instruments regulating mediation/conciliation of commercial disputes is the Arbitration and Conciliation Act ( Act : S 37 – 42 &55) and the various High Court Laws.

Significant Features of Mediation

Commencement - A party wishing to initiate conciliation sends to the other a written request to conciliate. The request shall contain a brief statement setting out the subject of the dispute. Proceedings shall commence on the date the request is accepted by the other party.

Conciliation body - consisting of one or three conciliators to be appointed by the parties and after examining the case and hearing the parties, if necessary, the body shall submit its terms of settlement to the parties.(Ibid: S40 & 42) If the parties agree to the terms of settlement submitted, the conciliation body shall draw up and sign a record of settlement.

Options open to Parties - if they disagree, they may refer the dispute to arbitration in accordance with any agreement between them; or take any action in court as they may deem fit. This is so because the conciliation proceedings are without prejudice to taking further legal action or resorting to arbitration. However, the parties can agree to adopt the UNCITRAL Conciliation Rules (UN Resolution: 1980) or any other rules (Act Op cit) Evidence in Other Proceedings - One fundamental issue that arises from resorting to arbitration or litigation where conciliation proceedings fail is whether the views{ suggestions{ admissions or indications of willingness to settle might be used to the detriment of the party who made them. This possibility may discourage parties from actively trying to reach a settlement during conciliation proceedings, which may greatly reduce the usefulness of conciliation. In order to address this issue, the UNCITRAL Conciliation Rules provide in Article 20 thus:

The parties undertake not to rely on or introduce as evidence in arbitral or judicial proceedings, whether or not such proceedings relate to the dispute that is the subject of the conciliation proceedings:(a) Views expressed or suggestions made by the other party in respect of a possible settlement of the dispute; (b) Admissions made by the other party in the course of the conciliation proceedings;(c) Proposals made by the conciliation;(d) The fact that the other party had indicated his willingness to accept a

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proposal for settlement made by the conciliation.

If parties use no conciliation rules or use rules that do not contain a provision such as Article 20 of the UNCITRAL Conciliation Rules, under many legal systems the parties may be prevented from giving evidence of such admissions (Evidence Act; s 25) Conciliator as Arbitrator - if the conciliation proceedings fail, can the conciliator be appointed an arbitrator where the parties resort to arbitration or a counsel of the other party in judicial proceedings? Generally the conciliator cannot. This is so because Article 19 of the UNCITRAL Conciliation Rules provides thus:

The parties and the conciliator undertake that the conciliator will not act as an arbitrator or as a representative or counsel of a party in any arbitral or judicial proceedings in respect of a dispute that is the subject of the conciliation proceedings. The parties also undertake that they will not present the conciliator as a witness in any such proceedings.

It is noteworthy that in some jurisdictions like the United States, a mediator can be appointed an arbitrator - med-arb. This is premised on the fact that prior knowledge on the part of the arbitrator might be regarded by the parties as advantageous (in particular because that knowledge will allow the arbitrator to conduct the case more efficiently).

In the case of international commercial agreement, the parties may agree in writing that disputes in relation to the agreement shall be settled by conciliation under the Conciliation Rules set out in the Third Schedule to the Act.(Ibid: S35) These Rules are the same as the UNCITRAL Conciliation Rules.(supra) In any case, the rules are optional. The parties can adopt them or other Rules like that of the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC). Role of Courts - One striking difference between mediation and arbitration is the fact that there is no provision for intervention by the domestic court in the case of mediation.(Act: Op Cit: S34) However, the settlement agreement can be the basis of litigation. Disadvantage - One of the major potential disadvantages of mediation is the possibility that the time and money spent in the proceedings will be in vain if the parties do not reach a settlement. We submit that the attractiveness of this process would be greatly increased if a settlement reached during the proceedings would have executory force so that a party to the settlement would not be compelled to litigate in order to achieve what has been agreed upon. One way of obviating this difficulty is by making the mediator an arbitrator so that the arbitration proceedings will be limited to recording the settlement in the form of an arbitral award on agreed terms as provided in Article 34(1) of the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules (Act: 1st Schedule). We further submit that our Jaws be amended so that such settlements reached are enforceable by treating them as an arbitral award on agreed terms. Fortunately Article 14 of the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Conciliation provides that an enacting state may insert a description of the method of enforcing agreements or refer to provisions governing such enforcement.

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NEGOTIATION

Jurisprudentially, negotiation is not an ADR process. However whoever is involved in ADR processes must be very conversant with theories of negotiation and skills, strategies and styles involved in negotiation. This is so because negotiation is a process involving discussions, concessions, compromises, communications, persuasion and bargaining. It is a process in which the parties to the dispute meet to reach a mutually acceptable resolution. In Successful Negotiation (Maddeux: 1999); it is defined as "the process we use to satisfy our needs when someone else controls what we want". Thus negotiation normally occurs because one has something the other wants and is willing to bargain for it. To be effective, the parties should be willing to change their positions as a consequence of the negotiation. Negotiation can be done by the parties themselves or through representatives. The representatives are not neutrals but negotiate with one another. The parties retain power to agree on terms but when representatives are used, the parties have little control over the process although they have control over the outcome. Generally negotiation involves giving up something in order to get something in return. It is usually the first stage in the dispute resolution process. One fundamental attribute of the ADR paradigm is that it is consensual. It also empowers the powers to control the process and outcome - depending on the process adopted.

Theories of Negotiation

We do not intend to go into the theories of negotiation. However, there are two main strategies, namely, the problem-solving approach and the competitive approach. Where the problem-solving approach is used it increases the joint gains for both or all parties. The problem-solving approach is also sometimes called "integrative" bargaining or cooperative strategy or win/win strategy while the competitive approach is sometimes called "positional" or "distributive" or "distributional" bargaining or win/lose strategy in the sense that there are limited resources for distribution and the more that one party achieves, the less there will be for the other.(Brown & Marriott: Op Cit) To adopt the problem-solving strategy you must

Separate the people from the problem - avoid personality differences Focus on interest and not positions Generate a variety of options especially those creating mutual benefits Establish objective and fair criteria for a resolution rather than the

judgment of either party.

Best/Worst Alternative to a Negotiated Agreement (B/WATNA) Although the problem-solving approach fits the ADR paradigm, this approach has been scholarly developed by Fisher and Ury (Haynes: 1981), and they introduced concepts like Best Alternative to a Negotiated Agreement (BATNA). On the other hand, John Haynes developed the concept of Worst Alternative to a Negotiated Agreement (WATNA)(Haynes: Ibid). While BATNA informs each party what the best outcome would be if the issues were not settled by negotiation and to determine at what point negotiations should be discontinued and other options exploited, WATNA informs the parties what the worst outcome would be if the issues

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were not settled by negotiation. It is imperative, therefore, that negotiators should be aware of their own and the opponent's best and worst alternative to a negotiated settlement, and by focusing on these they are better able to make decisions whether or not to settle and on what terms to do so.

In practice, the problem usually is where one party adopts the problem-solving approach and other the competitive. Fortunately William Ury addressed this question by showing how to use a problem-solving approach in order to "disarm tough bargainers, dismantle stone walls, deflect attacks and dodge dirty tricks." (Ury: 1991) Again considering the BATNA and WATNA can be used to disarm a competitive negotiator. Just like mediation, negotiation is a process that requires a lot of skills and tactics.

Tactics/Skills

The tactics include Control of the Agenda - by arranging the items to suit your convenience Deadline - time of the essence Overwhelming numerical strength Threats - take it or leave it Contextual manipulation - the venue, furniture, lighting, noise Limited Authority or lack of authority Psychological - good guy/bad guy, emotional Behavioral - boredom, anger, staging a walk out Piecemeal - items to be taken piecemeal Puffs - better offers somewhere, distorting facts

Stages in Negotiation

As a process it passes through stages and each stage has its specific activities and tasks. For example, in the conduct of actual negotiation, we have four stages, namely, Opening Stage, Bargaining Stage, Closing Stage and Execution Stage. However in the course of the preparation, you must know the parties, their interests, possible barriers, power analysis and establish the BATNA/WATNA. (Mackie et al: Op Cit)

OTHER DISPUTE RESOLUTION MECHANISMS

For the purpose of pre-election disputes, the following mechanisms are also recommendeda) Evaluation – Independent neutral makes an evaluation of the case, usually its merits

or some aspect, which is not binding on the parties but helps them in their decision-making

b) Early Neutral Evaluation – a form of evaluation in which the neutral evaluator makes an early assessment of the merits to help parties narrow and define issues, also helps promote efforts to settle. If it is court-annexed, it seeks to reduce pre-trial costs and delay by requiring the parties to confront the strengths and weaknesses of their cases

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at an early stage through the assistance of a skilled neutral. Early neutral evaluation combines elements of mediation and non-binding court annexed arbitration

c) Neutral Fact-Finding Expert – neutral expert is appointed by the parties to investigate issues of fact, technicality or law, produces a report, helps towards settlement and if agreed, the report may be used in adjudication.

d) Mini – Trial (Executive Tribunal or Structured settlement Negotiations) – lawyers for the parties present their cases to a panel comprising the parties and a neutral. The neutral helps clarify the issues and evaluates the merits, and may also have a mediatory role. No binding determination is made, but the process helps the parties evaluate realistically. The goal is for the parties to reach a mutually satisfactory resolution. Mini-trials are tailored to the needs of the participants and many embody a number of dispute resolution processes. The parties can agree that the opinion of the neutral will be binding or merely advisory. Thus neutrals can act as mediators. This is recommended for inter-party pre-election disputes.

e) Med-Arb – begins as mediation. If the parties do not reach an agreement, they proceed to arbitration which may be performed either by the person who mediated or by another. This process is finding employment in various arenas, including the industrial sector.

CONTRACTING IN ADVANCE TO USE ADR

An ADR contract is a clause in an agreement by which the contracting parties agree to attempt to resolve any disputes between them by the use of one or more ADR processes. It may be a very simple, short clause or alternatively set out a lengthy and complex process. It may specify a particular ADR procedure, such as negotiation, mediation or arbitration or leave the parties to agree on one as and when particular disputes arise.

Other than Arbitration, other forms tend towards a non-binding outcome and ‘without prejudice’ approach designed to provide an opportunity for the dispute to be discussed, resolution explored in a relatively risk free and confidential environment.

The existence of the clause provides ample justification for ADR to be suggested, discussed and entered upon freely and voluntarily and on an equal basis without any assumptions about relative strength of each party’s case.

In drafting such a clause, the following factors should be taken into account: Length and detail – essentially the clause merely needs to stipulate that in the event of a dispute arising, the parties will attempt to resolve it by ADR in which case the details would be worked out when the dispute arises.

Content –

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Is the ADR process to be agreed or a stipulation of an agreed process? Will there be timetable for compliance with the clause or procedural stages? Is the ADR a condition precedent to litigation? Does the neutral need any special qualification or should be identified? Is it an Institutional ADR and if so which institution or organization? How will costs be apportioned? Is a tiered process to be used, for example direct negotiations, followed (if necessary)

by mediation, followed (if necessary) by adjudication, arbitration or litigation?

Enforceability - generally an agreement to negotiate is unenforceable but if this is provided in a Party's Constitution, it becomes binding on members. However a court can require compliance with certain procedures as a condition precedent to issue of litigation or arbitral proceedings (a Scott v Avery Clause). This does not oust the court's jurisdiction but merely delays the courts assuming jurisdiction. Consider the effect of the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Conciliation and the draft Federal Arbitration and Conciliation Act. These instruments provide for enforceability of settlement agreements like arbitral awards.

CONCLUSION

In this presentation, we have discussed the contours of the alternative dispute resolution (ADR) processes. We are not saying that all disputes are amenable to the ADR processes but that we must choose the appropriate process for a particular dispute. This requires legal engineering such that the process should fit a dispute - there must be a nexus between them...

The fields to which ADR principles can be applied are never closed. Thus the categories can be enlarged. Unlike a completed house or painting, ADR processes are like works in progress. Thus for pre-election disputes whether inter- or intra-party, adopt ADR and not litigation. To achieve this, the parties need to amend their Constitutions to accommodate ADR processes. Political parties need to re-orientate their members to imbibe ADR processes." It is recommended that the Commission should establish a framework for settling inter-party pre-election disputes. It is also recommended that post-election, attempts made pre-election to settle a dispute should be taken into account. Until these recommendations are incorporated into the reform of the electoral process, it is recommended that the provisions in the Constitution and the Electoral Act be used to make rules, regulations, guidelines and manuals for political parties. Such instruments should provide for ADR processes, as appropriate. Discourage litigation in pre-election disputes; compromise and make concessions in the national interest and consider the opportunity and transaction costs of litigation.

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NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. Brown, H and Marriott, A (1999): ADR Principles and Practice (2nd Edn): Sweet & Maxwell,), London

2. Macfarlane, J (ed) (1997): Rethinking Disputes: The Mediation Alternative, Cavendish Publishing Ltd, London

3. Mackie, K et al (2000): The ADR Practice Guide: Commercial Disputes Resolution (2nd Edn,) Butterworths. London, Dublin and Edinburgh

4. Riskin, Leonard. L and Westbrook, James. E (1997): Dispute Resolution and Lawyers (2nd Edn), West Group, Minnesota.

5. Sutton, St David et al (2007): Russell on Arbitration (23rd Ed), Sweet & Maxwell London

6. Redfern, A and Hunter, M (2003): Law and Practice of international Commercial Arbitration (3rd Edn) Sweet & Maxwell, London

7. Orojo, J 0 and Ajomo, M A (1999): Law and Practice of Arbitration and Conciliation in Nigeria, Mbeyi & Associates (Nigeria) Ltd, Lagos p.4

8. Tackaberry, J and Marriott, A (2003): Bernstein's Handbook of Arbitration and Dispute Resolution Practice (4th Edn) Sweet & Maxwell, London

9. FGN (1990): Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, FGN Printers, Lagos

10. UNCITRAL (2003) Model Law on International Commercial Conciliation (United Nations General Assembly Document No. A/RES/57/l8 of24 January,)

11. Idornigie,P.O (2004) “Anchoring Commercial Arbitration on Fundamental Principles” The Arbitrator & Mediator, Journal of The institute of Arbitrators & Mediators, Australia

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12 ………… Ibid (2003) “The Principle of Party Autonomy in Arbitral Proceedings: A Myth or Reality” The Arbitrator & Mediator VoL22, NO.3, December,

13 ……….. Ibid (2004) 'The Principle of Arbitrability Revisited' Journal of International Arbitration VoL21, Issue 3,

14 The Journal of the Chartered institute of Arbitrators, (2005) Vol. 71, No.4 November London,

15 Ibid; (2002) Vol. 68, Number 4, November

16 Nigerian Weekly Law Report (2001)

17 Nigerian Bar Journal, (2003) Vol. I, No 3 July

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APPLYING THE ADRS TO POLITICAL PARTY DISPUTES*by

Andrew I Chukwuemerie, Ph. D**

Introduction

In this discussion we shall classify arbitration as one of'ihe Alternative Dispute Resolution Mechanisms (the ADRs) fop convenience. Otherwise, arbitration is no longer so classified. Though it is an alternative to litigation in the general sense, it is no longer regarded as an ADR in the technical sense. Experts have since come to accept it as a different dispute resolution mechanism from both litigation and the ADRs. (Russel: 1997)Dispute resolution media are therefore generally classified as litigation, arbitration and the ADRs. The ADRs consist of conciliation, mediation, negotiation, rent-a-judge, med-arb, arb-med and other modes and combinations of modes that are being fashioned out by commercial men, their legal advisers and ADR practitioners in response to practical needs in the market place of life. Henceforth, therefore, a reference to the ADRs shall be to arbitration and the conventional ADRs already listed above.

This writer has shown in a number of other works that in all pre-colonial African traditional societies (including the ones that eventually made up the present day Nigeria), such ADRs as conciliation, mediation, negotiation as well as arbitration were in constant employment to resolve disputes (The Recent Odyssey of Customary Law Arbitration in Nigeria’s Apex Courts: 1998) We have also shown that in their employment and use Africa has, at least in some areas, normally been ahead of the rest of the world.(The Internationalisation of African Customary Law Arbitration: 2006) For instance, though in Europe and the Americas, those mechanisms have over the ages been used for commercial disputes, Africans did (and can presently) use them for the resolution of practically all sorts of disputes including public sector disputes such as tortuous human lights infringements and disputes most of which (in Africa) often have their roots in political differences and disagreements.(Afr. Human Rights LJ 103: 2007) Therefore, in advocating the resolution of political disputes through the ADRs this paper shall only be canvassing a return to what had always been the practice amongst Nigerians but which was only affected negatively by the interregnum of the colonial process.

The paper seeks to show how pre-election disputes in a political party and indeed practically all inter-party and intra-party disputes may be resolved through arbitration and the ADRs. We intend to show that it will be for the general good of all political parties, politicians and indeed __________________________________________________ *Being paper presented at a Workshop on “Resolving Political Disputes in A Democratic Setting – The Place of Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR)” organized by INEC at Musa Yar’Adua Centre, Abuja in Dec, 2008.** Andrew I. Chukwumerie is a Professor of Law at the Ebonyi State University, Abakaliki, Nigeria.

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the entire polity for the necessary legal structures to be erected for the adoption of those mechanisms for the resolution of such disputes. It may be necessary to point out at this point that in adopting such a legal regime Nigeria may well be blazing a trail. The fact that it has not been done before, especially in the Western world, is not a reason why it should not be done here and soon too.

We first examine the different types of political disputes that occur in Nigeria which we propose can be dealt with through the ADRs. We then show that litigation, which Nigerians (including politicians and political parties) have normally generally resorted to for the adjudication of disputes, is incapable of actually resolving disputes. To show that on the contrary the ADRs have the capacity to properly and thoroughly resolve political disputes, we examine some of the several advantages which the ADRs enjoy over litigation, that are relevant to this discussion. The legal and other challenges against the resolution of political disputes through the ADRs are discussed together with their solutions. The paper ends with a conclusion.

Political Disputes In View

Political parties and politicking are avenues for the pursuit of power. Disputes are therefore inevitable amongst them. In every age and clime, the pursuit and maintenance of power and influence amongst persons and nations/peoples is the source of most of mankind's wars and conflicts. [This is true whether it is the home, the larger family, association, even a company involved principally in commercial enterprise, a community, a nation or a country that is under consideration.] (Green, R: 2000) In partisan politics, it is particularly so in an environment like Nigeria's where selfless service does not often seem to be the primary motive for seeking political power. Again, internal democracy and fairness to all members do not always (not to say often or at all) seem to constitute the hallmark of political party administration. Inter and intra party disputes arise out of those situations.

A. Intra and Inter Party Disputes

More than anything else, intra party disputes seriously weaken a political party. It is also particularly so in a setting like contemporary Nigerian politics where party supremacy and discipline seem to be quite low. [Definitely lower than what it was in the First and Second Republics. Political scientists may vary in their assessment of the causes but It seems rather clear that desperation on the part of some political actors (rooted in unbridled selfishness, godfatherism and unnecessary sectionalism/tribalism etc) makes it difficult for them to submit to the party or to allow fairness to have a free reign in every matter.] The disputes easily develop and fester. They include disagreements over elections or appointments into party offices; the choice of party flag bearers for Local Government, state and national elections; the sharing of appointive offices after a party has won elections or been invited to join a government by a winning party; the handling of party funds; recognition of particular members' importance in the party; the godfather syndrome; deep seated sectional/tribal sentiments and rivalry etc. They lead to further disputes and eventually to formation of camps (real camps and

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propaganda camps), decamping of members and in some cases the actual demise of the party in question.Inter party disputes are mostly rooted in deep seated controversies over whether or not a particular candidate has been properly elected and declared, and press wars (sometimes characterised by incorrect assertions) between parties in power and their opposition.

B. Other Political Party Disputes

Some inter party disputes invariably touch on and include the electoral umpire, INEC. They are mainly disagreements between parties over how a certain thing has allegedly been done or not done to favour or disfavour one party or the other. Often, however, a party or the other makes such matters take on the nature of a new kind of dispute between them and INEC. [Like every other human institution, lNEC is obviously not imbued with perfection in the way it does things and can hardly make any such claim. An examination of its degree of imperfection, good faith etc is beyond the scope of this discussion. Our concern is the way and manner such disputes should be handled to achieve the best for the disputants - the political party in question in any particular dispute and INEC.] The recent complaint and threat of Court Action by some parties over the perceived silence of INEC over the launching by PDP for funds with which to build its national Headquarters may be cited as a recent example. Again, whether such disputes are properly resolved or not goes to affect the confidence or otherwise with which the parties, especially those in the opposition, behold INEC and its activities. It also affects how INEC beholds such parties and the sincerity of their opposition process and issues that they may subsequently raise against INEC and its activities. Those disputes need to be properly resolved through the ADRs.

Political parties also seem to be developing a new genre of political disputes in the country - a rather surprising one sided kind of dispute between any party that loses a Court case and the judiciary. Though the judiciary is by no means a disputant with any political party (or any litigant for that matter), in recent times any party that loses a case in Court (particularly an election petition) sees the judiciary as an opponent that is bedeviled with all sorts of vices and deserving of nothing but the harshest forms of criticism. Meanwhile when the same party wins a case the same judiciary is declared upright, courageous and the last hope of the common man indeed. [Such things only show how mature or sportsmanly some of the politicians are not. All impartial observers agree that the judiciary has creditably acquitted itself in the country in the past decade and has indeed been the strongest chord that has held the country together in the face of several acts of political carelessness and developments since 1999.] Such 'disputes' are beyond the scope of this discussion and indeed are not actually disputes properly so called since they are one sided. The silence with which the judiciary treats such unfair criticisms whilst continuing in its rigorous self assessments and improvement is an ample response to or settlement of such 'disputes'.

These different types of disputes referred to above can be pre or post an election. The discussion shall cover pre and post election disputes petitions. We shall see that under the law

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as it presently stands, election petitions can not be settled through the ADRs and that there may not be any need for a change of legal policy on the point.

Why Embrace the ADRs? A. The Need for Actual Dispute Resolution

The first need for the embrace of the ADRs for the settlement of political disputes is the need for the disputes to be actually settled. In the present dispensation, the disputes are hardly properly resolved. Presently, most Nigerian political parties resort to the Courts or to settlement through "the party's instructions". Properly resolving a dispute means settling it i.e. removing the source of the misunderstanding and returning the parties to their pre-dispute relationship or situation. Such a resolution engenders the removal of hurts and offences, healing of the mind and ego of the disputants. It invigorates them for continued (and possibly greater) productivity. In a political party setting, it works needed unity ensuring that everyone continues to put in his best for the party rather than engaging in anti-party activities or just lying low waiting for the appropriate time to decamp or "revenge" within the party.

If a misunderstanding is not so dealt with, it has not been resolved. There may have been a dispute management effort but not a dispute resolution. It is such dispute management without resolution that happens ever so often in litigation, the dispute resolution medium seemingly favoured by the Nigerian elite including politicians. [The preference is not often a matter of deliberate choice but because litigation is the mechanism the system made most familiar to the elite. Though the traditional Nigerian societies had always had a vigorous resort to the ADRs for the resolution of all manners of disputes (since those media have always been more consistent with the African practice of each person being the brother's keeper), the colonial interregnum disrupted the practice and promoted Western style litigation above all other dispute resolution media. To worsen things, whilst arbitration was developing in the West even the Western style arbitration was in stifle here. When it was to be rejuvenated, educated Nigerians were already seeing it as part of the detested colonial process, coupled with the repulsive bias and stereotype mindset with which several western arbitrators on the international circuit were already treating Third World interests to the knowledge of Nigerians and other Third World elite.] Traditionally, what a Court does over a dispute that comes before it is to deliver a judgement based on the parties' legal rights and liabilities. The Court is ill-equipped to, and indeed does not; concern itself with whether or not the judgment achieves peace amongst the parties. Practically every judgement is therefore an imposed term for the cessation of combat. Just as happens in every other war, if parties desire to achieve peace they will have to go beyond the judgement. They have to negotiate amongst them expressly or otherwise or settle by some other means. [This very often includes, not by any design of the parties or the Court, the forgiveness and healing engendered by the passage of time.] Therefore, when a dispute develops between party members on election into a party office, nomination of a candidate for an election, the contribution or management of election funds etc and it is taken to Court, the Court can only deliver a judgement that compels cessation of open combat but does not secure peace. It is the same when all the party does is to hand down

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an instruction "from above" to the disputing parties or sides without necessarily hearing them out. [Considering the vast membership and geographical spread/stretch of a party properly so called, it can hardly hope to hear out details of even a fraction of the disputes that arise within it. Even concerning those that it attempts to hear out the disputants, very often what happens is that it hands the dispute over to some of its members to handle and report - persons who may well handle the matter under the influence of some vested interests often unknown to party authorities. Even when there are no such interests, those persons are not likely to be skilled in dispute resolution. Dispute resolution is undoubtedly an art. Either way, the dispute is not really resolved.] A grave yard 'settlement' is achieved in each case. The parties may "accept" the judgement or the party's decision and may, in the latter case, even embrace themselves but the real dispute remains. At the least opportunity, the parties react to the perceived injustice.

B. Quality of the Resolution i. Quality of Arbiters It is possible to have a dispute apparently resolved but the resolution is not such as to achieve an enduring justice. The ADRs afford disputants the opportunity to stipulate the quality of their would-be dispute resolvers and to in fact choose those resolvers by themselves. They are thus able to insist on persons with requisite knowledge not just of the relevant area of law but also of the dynamics of the area of human endeavour from which the dispute has arisen. That is not possible in Court litigation or when the party simply hands down an instruction crafted by persons who mayor may not be imbued with the skills for effective resolution of the dispute in question. If a political dispute is to be arbitrated or mediated, for instance, the parties should be able to choose as arbitrator(s) or mediator(s) persons who have knowledge of the relevant areas including the area of decent politicking. In addition, the mere fact that a party participated in choosing the arbitrators or mediator(s) gives a really satisfying feeling of "this is my/our own" and enhances acceptability of the award or other end product of the process.

ii. Informality and Quality of Proceedings

Each of the ADRs is normally conducted in a relaxed and more or less informal atmosphere. This ensures that the parties and their witnesses are not hampered or hindered by the frightening rigidity and formality of the Courts. This disposes the witnesses to being truthful in their testimony, which in turn engenders the achievement of quality justice based on the true facts. The informality of the ADR processes is infinitely invaluable. (15 J. Int. Arb 1: 1997)

C. Speed of Dispute Resolution

One of the problems bedeviling the political process in Nigeria is the delay in determination of disputes. Sometimes a political party gets into an election with unresolved disputes over who has been chosen in the primaries as its candidate. The Courts are completely unable to do anything effective with such time bound matters. The party machineries are often under

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pressure at such times and too encumbered by deference to party men in government and to other vested interests to be fair, just and effective in resolving such disputes. On the other had, each of the ADRs - being much faster than litigation and far more effective than the party machinery - can very quickly and effectively handle such disputes. Time frames will be met. Even if parties themselves, or any of them, becomes dilatory, structures exist (or can be erected) with which the dispute can still be timeoulsy handled. For instance, s. 21 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act (ACA) (Cap. A18, LFN: 2004) enables arbitrators to proceed to conclusion even if a Claimant or Respondent fails to appear' to present its/his case.

D. Cost Effectiveness of Resolution

All things considered, the ADRs are cheaper means of dispute resolution in the long run. Because litigation is relatively quite cheap in the country, the ADRs may appear dearer in the short run than litigation. The parties have to pay the arbitrators, mediators etc and bear other overhead costs in addition to paying their own lawyers, which is not the case in litigation. However, the ADRs are still relatively cheap in the country even if not as cheap as litigation. At any rate, the parties to a political dispute are not normally hampered by costs. What is more, it is far more cost effective fro their disputes to be resolved timeously than to have the disputes prolonged on account of very little money to be saved otherwise.

E. Confidentiality and Protection of Party/Personal Secrets

The ADRs are purely private proceedings to which members of the public are not admissible except with the consent of the parties. The dispute resolvers, arbitrators for instance, are also forbidden from divulging information gathered in the course of the proceedings to other people. Even a Court of law is disentitled from requiring them to testify on such matters.

Parties are therefore able to testify on their secrets in the proceedings and same will still remain secrets. On the other hand, any that transpires in Court becomes a matter for public knowledge. A party with sensitive personal or legitimate secret information, including a political party, will often not want the secrets divulged in any proceedings. On account of that, the ADRs are the most suitable for the resolution of political party disputes.

F. Absence of Corruption, Declining Erudition and Deference to Power

We have been able to show elsewhere that there may indeed be an extremely few corrupt and lazy persons in the Nigerian judiciary give the false impression that a sizeable fraction of the judiciary may be corrupt or declining in erudition. (Tobi, N: 2007)Even in advanced jurisdictions, undue deference to executive power has sometimes occurred in Court. [In England of the 1940s it was disturbing in manifestation that Lord Atkin had to issue his eternally refreshing rebuke to his learned Brothers in Liversidge v. Anderson (1942) Ac 206, 240) (“I view with apprehension the attitude of judges who on a mere question of construction when face to face with claims involving the liberty of the subject show themselves more executive minded than the

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executive”)]In the adjudication of political disputes the possibility of corruption and deference to power are greater possibilities or realities than at other times. We also showed in the work under reference that such problems are extremely remote possibilities in arbitration and conventional ADRs.

Arbitration and the ADRs are private sector tasks plied by people who would normally not be cajoled into corruption or wrongdoing by money however huge. At the risk of repetition, Nigerian judges are, mainly upright, courageous learned gentlemen who eschew bribery and corruption. Be that as it may, a private plier of a lucrative trade like arbitration is more likely to absolutely shun every shade of corruption, monetary or otherwise than a salary earner even if the salary earner is on the Bench. The often touted few cases of corruption in the judicial handling of disputes is likely to be completely erased with respect to political disputes if they are handled by arbitrators, conciliators etc

Legal and Other Challenges

A. Public Policy/ Constitutional and Other Legal Considerations

Outside the customary law, the major difficulty with the settlement of disputes outside the Courtroom is normally the question whether or not public policy permits the employment or the particular dispute resolution mechanism in question.[It is beyond the scope of this paper to examine the position of the customary law on this matter. It is enough to state here that the problem of unarbitrability hardly exists in the customary law save and except to the extent to which statutory law has affected the customary law.]

That notwithstanding, the question does not seem to have received serious attention in connection with the traditional ADRs. It is in arbitration that the issue of arbitrability is a notorious one to which many a mind will normally be addressed. A dispute is generally not arbitrable if it cannot be the subject of accord and satisfaction or if by specific legal prescription it is exempted from arbitration. Examples are crimes and matrimonial causes. It has not been seriously considered in legal doctrine whether for being unarbitrable a dispute is excluded from settlement through conciliation, mediation and negotiation. It seems to follow however that if a matter is not a proper subject of accord and satisfaction, then it cannot be subjected to those dispute resolution media. They are, like arbitration, based on accord and satisfaction.[For instance, parties to a statutory marriage should be unable to award divorce and maintenance orders to themselves through conciliation, mediation or even a negotiation between them however mutually acceptable the terms may be. The public interest in the maintenance of the marriage institution is so high for all about the legal dissolution a marriage to be left to the idiosyncrasies of parties, particularly estranged parties.] Be that as it may, if any dispute is not excluded from arbitrability by public policy there is nothing in law and practice that excludes it from resolution through any of the traditional ADRs.

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In the light of the foregoing, once we determine that any political party dispute is not excluded from arbitrability in Nigerian law, it will follow that public policy does not exclude it from being subjected to any of the traditional ADR mechanisms. The common law, as a part reflection of the Nigerian public policy on the point, restricts only very few disputes from arbitrability - such disputes as crimes and matrimonial causes.(10 NWLR (pt. 586) 106, 116: 1998) Statutes exclude only disputes on copyrights under the Copyright Act (CAP C28 s.46 LFN: 2004) and patents under the Patents and Designs Act.(Ibid: Cap P2 s. 26) All other disputes including political party disputes are arbitrable. (UNCITRAL Model Law: 1999) Surprising yes, but true! We will now see how.

The other Nigerian legislations, including the Constitution, concern themselves with jurisdiction as between the Courts and do not tamper with the arbitrability of disputes. For instance, s. 251(1)(n) of the 1999 Constitution confers jurisdiction on the Federal High Court "to the exclusion of any other court" on civil causes and matters relating to mines and minerals including oil fields, oil mining, geological surveys and natural gas. That the Court's exclusive jurisdiction is only as between Courts is made clearer when the provision is read together with the Petroleum Act. (Op Cit: Cap P10) Under art. 41 of its First Schedule the Act requires any question or dispute arising in connection with any licence or lease to which the Schedule applies (i.e. an Oil Exploration Licence, Oil Prospecting Licence and Oil Mining Lease) to be "settled by arbitration unless it relates to a matter expressly excluded from arbitration or expressed to be at the discretion of the Minister". Nothing in the Nigerian Oil and Gas sector is expressly excluded from arbitration by any law. The legal position is therefore that any dispute with respect to any of those licences or leases will be arbitrated.(Ibid: Cap 120) However, if any other matter that concerns oil fields, oil mining etc (and indeed if any of the matters covered under the Act and its First Schedule should - by virtue of the Minister's discretion for instance -) is to be taken to Court, it must be the Federal High Court. Therefore, the fact that the Federal High Court has exclusive jurisdiction if or when the matter gets to Court does not mean that such a matter may not be adjudicated or settled any how else. Otherwise, it would mean that once a dispute arises over any matter covered by the subsection (and indeed every thing under s. 251), the parties must go to Court (the Federal High Court) and may not settle the matter by any other means whatsoever before or after going to Court. The Nigerian Constitution definitely did not intend to institute such a drastic and unrealistic legal regime. No known legal system imposes on parties to a civil dispute a duty to go to Court willy nilly.

In the same way, the Trade Disputes Act, (Ibid: Cap T8) at s. 21 confers jurisdiction on the National Industrial Court "to the exclusion of any court" on trade disputes as outlined in the section. The same Act at ss. 8 and 9 endows a conciliator appointed for the purpose as well as the Industrial Arbitration Panel (lAP) with jurisdiction to entertain a matter and settle it if they can before even the matter gets to the Court. In fact, it even imposes a duty on the parties to have a resort to a conciliator and the lAP before approaching that Court. If the conciliator or the IAP is able to settle the matter, it does not get to the Court at all and its "exclusive jurisdiction" is otiose. [It is in the same manner, and no other, that the exclusive jurisdictions of the Supreme Court (s. 232 on inter state and Federal v. State disputes, s. 233 on appeals from the Court of Appeal, which section even says "to the exclusion of any other court of law" ), the Court of

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Appeal (s. 239 on presidential elections, s. 240 on appeals from High Courts and their equivalents) must be understood. Therefore, States A and B that have any arbitrable dispute may decide not to go to the Supreme Court but to arbitration or to a mediator. It is only if they decide to go to Court at all that the exclusive jurisdiction of the Supreme Court becomes relevant. A fotiori, 2 parties may after the Court of Appeal has delivered judgement on their matter decide to go to arbitration, a mediator or even a conciliator and not the Supreme Court. The arbitrator(s), for instance, definitely can render an award different from the Court judgement, which would also be binding on the parties. However, the Courts need not be worried whether or not the arbitrator is sitting on appeal over the Court of Appeal judgement. No, he would be incompetent to do so. But it can deliver an award which the parties may decide to obey or enforce in abandonment of the Court judgement. The analogies can further be drawn with respect to the exclusive jurisdiction of the Court of Appeal and lower Courts. It is simply amazing how creative the Nigerian law can be used in these matters for the effective resolution of disputes and achievement of enduring justice, not just technical justice.]

In the same way, apm1 from with respect to election petitions, neither the Constitution nor the Electoral Act excludes any intra party or inter party dispute from arbitration, conciliation, mediation, negotiation or indeed any other dispute resolution mechanism.[ In addition to what has been said in the immediate foregoing footnote, it should be clearly noted that no Court in Nigeria presently enjoys the kind of unlimited jurisdiction which the State High Courts enjoyed under s. 236 of the 1979 Constitution. A combination of the jurisdictions of the Federal High Court under s. 251 and the State High Courts as well as the High Court of the Federal Capital Territory under ss. 270 and 257 respectively does not even amount to an unlimited jurisdiction even if they were vested in one Court, which is not the case. Since every Court now has a circumscribed jurisdiction, the country has moved from presumptive jurisdiction to specifically prescriptive conferment of jurisdiction. Thus, no Court or other tribunal can claim to have a jurisdiction that is exclusive to not only other Courts but also all the other dispute resolution mechanisms unless there is a statute specifically (not impliedly) conferring same. What is more, even the unlimited jurisdiction of a State High Court under the 1979 Constitution was also as between Courts and did not exclude other dispute resolution mechanisms from validity or effectiveness.] There is no specific provision on how political party disputes other than election petitions may be settled. They are therefore covered, with respect to adjudication by Courts and public tribunals, by the general provisions of ss. 6 and 36 of the Constitution. Section 6 vests the "judicial powers" of the Federation and federating states in the Courts. "Judicial" simply means "of, relating to, or by the court" and "judicial power" means, the ".... authority vested in courts and judges to hear and decide cases and to make binding judgements on them ... "(Garner, B: 1999) Therefore, the section covers only litigation and does not touch the powers of dispute resolution through the private dispute resolution mechanisms.

In consolidation of s. 6, s. 36(1) provides that in the determination of his civil rights and obligations a person shall be entitled to a fair hearing within a reasonable time by a Court or other tribunal established by law and constituted in such manner as to secure its independence and impartiality. Subsection (3) requires the proceedings (including the announcement of decisions) of a Court or a tribunal relating to the matters mentioned in subsection (1) to be held

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in public. We have since shown elsewhere that an arbitration tribunal falls outside the "other tribunal established by law", which are rather public tribunals.(Chukwuemerie: Op Cit: note 4 supra) The section does not pretend, for instance, that from the date it came into force all arbitral tribunals in Nigeria must now hold public hearings and render their awards in public. Such a position would have made them public rather than private proceedings and effectively destroyed confidentiality which is ope of their attractive hallmarks. (The essence and bedrock of the ADRs rests in extensive party autonomy, private hearing and declaration of award, and confidentiality. Without those things the ADRs can hardly be preferred over and above litigation.) In that case, any arbitration conducted in private would amount to a breach of the parties' right to public hearing and public pronouncement of decision.

Such a legal regime would hardly be consistent with the country's deliberate and concerted efforts (already made through modern and progressive arbitration statutes) to attract direct foreign investment and to make her shores attractive venues for transnational arbitral proceedings. (Such statutes as the Arbitration and Conciliation Act which was enacted in 1988 as one of the earliest arbitration statutes to be enacted across the world based on the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration, 1985 soon after the Model Law was made and indeed the first in Africa; the ICSID (Enforcement of Awards) Act note 12 supra.) It is inconceivable that the country would in 1999 want to remove or destroy the prime characteristics and advantages of arbitration over litigation (privacy etc) by requiring all arbitral proceedings to be held in public.

It should also be noted that despite such efforts, Western style ADRs are in Nigeria, nay Africa and the Third World, relatively new and not as known as litigation though their customary law equivalents are in upbeat prosperity. In fact, until recently many African minds conceived dispute resolution through the legal process outside the customary law simply as Court litigation. Even as lately as 1998/99 when the 1999 Constitution was fashioned, the ADRs were not as popular (even if known at all) with most of the military personnel and civilians who made the Constitution as litigation had always been. In consequence, arbitral tribunals and the conventional ADRs were not had in view or contemplation when the Constitution was being drafted. The words "other tribunal" was therefore not a reference to arbitral tribunals but to official or public quasi-judicial tribunals such as tribunals of inquiry set up by government.

Again, the requirement of both independence and impartiality of an arbitration tribunal and its duty to treat the parties equally consistent with the strict principles of fair hearing is firmly provided for at ss. 7 and 8 of the ACA. It is not normally so with the Courts and official or public tribunals as such provisions are missing from their constituting statutes. (The High Court Laws of Eastern, Northern and Western Regions which apply in all the State High Courts in the country contain no such provision. So also the Court of Appeal Act and Supreme Court caps C36 and S 15 respectively. Nor does the Tribunals of Enquiry Act cap T21 contain any such provision.) The provision are missing because the Constitutional provisions on fair and public hearing unflinchingly bind those Courts and public tribunals. The provision appears in the ACA because the draftsmen, knowing that the Constitutional provisions do not apply to arbitral tribunals, had to make the provisions for arbitral tribunals. If such provisions were not made in the ACA or in

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other arbitration statutes, arbitral tribunals would infringe no statutory law if they did not observe fair hearing!

Article 7(a) of the African Charter grants every individual the right of access to "competent national organs" and art. 7(d) grants him "the right to be tried within a reasonable time by an impartial Court or tribunal" The phrases do not seem to have come up for interpretation by the African Commission or an African Court. However, a jurisprudence which supports our view has been developed around art. 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights which has a similar provision - for determination of civil rights and obligations by "by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law". It has been held repeatedly, inter alia, that "tribunal established by law" in that provision does not include an arbitral tribunal in a voluntary arbitration.(Deweer v. Belgium (1980) 2 EHRR 439) It has equally been held that for a tribunal to be a "tribunal established by law" it needs to, amongst other things, exercise judicial functions, be independent of the executive arm of government and the parties, have a duration of its members' term of office and have guarantees afforded as to its procedure. (Le Compte, Van Leuven & De Meyeer v. Belgium, Decision of the European Human Rights Court of May 27, 1981) These are persuasive decisions to guide our thoughts.

The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, of which Nigeria is a member, provides at art. 14, inter alia, that in the determination of his rights and obligations in a suit at law, everyone shall be entitled to a fair a:ld public hearing "by a competent, independent and impartial tribunal established by law". In addition, "any judgement rendered ... in a suit at law shall be made public" except where the interest of juvenile persons otherwise requires or the proceedings concern matrimonial disputes or the guardianship of children. Though the General Comment 13 of the UN Human Rights Committee, (adopted by the Committee on April 12, 1983 at its 516th meeting) which has no binding effect on any country, suggests that the article applies to all courts and tribunals within the scope of that article whether ordinary or specialised, different countries such as Hong Kong/China have interpreted it as exclusive of arbitral tribunals. (In R v. Town Planning Board exparte Kwan Kong Co. Ltd (995) 3 HKC 254 Wang, J held inter alia,

"Suit at law' therefore means very clearly a legal proceeding in a Court of law. I do not believe that when reference is made to a suit at law, any lawyer or layman will have any doubt that the words can have one meaning, namely, a legal court proceeding ... The usage of the words in a suit at law' in connection with judgement delivered in public can leave no doubt that the reference there is unmistakably to a formal judgement in legal court proceedings delivered in public, something familiar to everyone brought up under the common law system of Hong Kong. The 'suit at law' can therefore only mean a formal suit, action or proceeding brought in court by one party against another party.")

In the light of all the foregoing, it can confidently be asserted that all political party disputes and disputes between politicians are resolvable through the ADRs. There is nothing in the law or public policy against it. It is not just so; even disputes that are more in the public domain

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such as human rights violations areas already indicated, capable of being settled through arbitration and the conventional ADRs.

Though election petitions are not our core concern in this paper, it is apposite at this point to briefly examine the law on their resolution through the ADRs. The Constitution and the Electoral Act, 2006 (Act NO.2 of 2006) have to conferred exclusive jurisdiction on the Court of Appeal and Election Tribunals to the exclusion of other modes of dispute settlement. Though s. 239 of the Constitution confers jurisdiction on the Court of Appeal for presidential elections only "to the exclusion of any court of law in Nigeria", s. 285(1) and (2) confer jurisdiction on the National Assembly Election Tribunals and the Governorship and Legislative Houses Election Tribunals come under that. Some of the disputes will directly touch on the rights of members as individuals/citizens. What is more, election issues are on the Concurrent List over which the Federation and the states share legislative competence. Even the departmentalisation or division of competence between the Federation and states attempted by clauses 11 and 12 of the List is not helpful in this matter. As a result of these things, even if a model statute is agreed on and drafted for the regulation of the settlement of political disputes though the ADRs, it will have to be enacted by the different states Houses of Assembly. Experience with the Child Rights Bill and such other model Bills suggests that unless strong political will and influence are exercised "from above" it may well take a long time before all the states or even a majority of them will enact such a statute.

C. The Do or Die Attitude of Some Politicians

As already indicated, one problem that may militate against the effective resolution of political party disputes through the ADRs is the desperate, do or die attitude with which some politicians seem to approach politics, power and influence. The violence that attends political campaigns, monitoring of the voting process on election days and in some cases the declaration of results are very surprising. Unless there are express legislative prescriptions requiring such politicians to submit to the ADRs, they are not likely to do so. Even after being compelled to so submit, some of them may still explore every possible avenue to scuttle the process. The attitude also manifests in a winner-takes-all disposition. Dispute resolution media like mediation are completely inconsistent with such dispositions and results. A mediator will seek a win-win situation for both sides and such a politician, particularly when he perceives himself as holding the longer end of the stick than the other party, may not be amenable to such a resolution. He may only accept the result of mediation, for instance, if legislation compels him to accept whatever the mediator's eventual opinion is i.e. making his consent irrelevant. Such a process would no longer be mediation properly so called. It would be lacking in the very thing that makes mediation an effective medium of dispute resolution - mutuality of the end product. Any such mediation may have the same problem of judgment without settlement which litigation presently has. It may not be a solution to the present problem but a replacement of one problematic mode of dispute resolution with another.

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D. Fight-to-Finish Attitude of Party Legal Advisers and Lawyers

A major problem with the ADRs in the developing world is the unduly adversarial disposition of many a lawyer. Some such lawyers, living in deference to the illiterate or semi literate gallery, take on a fight-to-finish attitude so as to show that they are "tough lawyers". They erroneously behold such theatrics as synonymous with effective lawyering. They therefore often advise their clients against amicable settlement of matters. Desperate politicians often seem to find soul mates in such lawyers and hire them. Such lawyers may do any thing they can to frustrate the resolution of political disputes through the ADRs which they may consider 'weak' means of sorting out political differences. Happily, such lawyers are getting more and more into the minority in the country and even for that minority there is a solution as we shall see shortly. "to the exclusion of any court or tribunal" with respect to National Assembly, governorship and House of Assembly election matters. It is arguable that "tribunal" in the provision is also a reference to a public tribunal; so that the jurisdiction conferred is not exclusive of arbitral tribunals for instance. Be that as it may, s. 140 of the Electoral Act prescribes an election petition filed at a competent tribunal or Court as the only way of challenging the election and return at an election. In the light of such a clear provision, no other dispute resolver other than an Election Tribunal as constituted under s. 285 of the Constitution or the Court of Appeal acting as such under s. 239 can entertain an election petition as a Court or tribunal of first instance. There is therefore no room in the present/legal regime for an election petition (or dispute over the propriety or otherwise of the conduct of an election or declaration of a particular candidate as winner) to be taken to arbitration or any of the conventional ADRs.

Whether or not such disputes (election petitions) should be resolvable by arbitration or any of the conventional ADRs is highly debatable. The desperate winner takes-aIl-disposition of many a politician when it comes to election results is by no means consistent with the cordial, informal truth based environment within which the ADRs are normally best conducted. For such politicians (who clearly seem to be in the majority) the stakes may well be considered so high as to accept anything not backed by the fierce coercive powers of the State. The Courts and election tribunals operate with such coercive powers but which arbitrators, mediators and conciliators clearly lack. Many politicians still find it difficult to accept the judgements of Courts and election tribunals without unnecessarily abusing or harshly criticising the judge(s) however clearly rooted in law and justice the judgement may be. They are not likely to accept the awards of arbitrators, much less so the opinions of mediators etc. Secondly, there may be much room for abuse of the system if ARDs are used for election petitions. The number of competent arbitrators, mediators etc that will be needed for such volume of work is presently not available in the country. The effect will be that the all comers syndrome with which successful things are often greeted in the country in recent times will set in and ruin the system. (For an examination of how that is already creeping into arbitration in the country (a practice whereby many persons who have not had any training whatsoever in arbitration pass themselves off as arbitrators) see this writer in Preliminary Meetings, Preliminary and Interlocutory Orders in Secured Credit Arbitrations (2005) Nig. Bar Jnl 108)

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With respect to other political disputes other than election petitions, a major problem with the employment of the ADRs for their settlement is that though there is no law against it, there is as yet no law specifically enabling it or governing the procedure. The ACA covers only the arbitration and conciliation of commercial disputes. Though "commercial" is very liberally defined (s. 57) it does not cover political disputes. There is no statute at all on mediation and negotiation. With respect to political disputes, there is need for clear provisions covering these media of dispute resolution and the procedure that may be adopted. In the absence of that, some recalcitrant parties may frustrate any resort to those dispute resolution media. The greater difficulty is even the fact that arbitration, mediation etc are not in the Exclusive Legislative List over which the National Assembly can legislate for the entire country. Though the regulation of political parties is on that List (item 56), not all issues in political disputes can

E. The Nature of Some Outcomes

Another major challenge to the use of the conventional ADRs for the resolution of disputes is the fact that their outcomes are at best in the nature of an agreement or contract. If a party defaults in executing the terms, the other party may only resort to litigation or arbitration to enforce compliance. As a result, they are ordinarily not effective with high stake disputes. In the present Nigerian political terrain, almost every political dispute is made out as a high stake dispute.

It must be noted however that, arbitration does not have that kind of difficulty though it is not free of difficulties with respect to enforceability. An award is immediately enforceable but an application for enforcement can sometimes snake all the way from the High Court to the Supreme Court, wasting time and resources.

The Way Forward

Obviously, the major challenges against using ADRs for political disputes are the absence of a legal framework for their use, difficulties with the enforceability of the outcomes/decisions of most of them, and the possible absence of requisite co-operation on the part of some disputants. Those problems can be easily dealt with by an Act of the National Assembly and Laws of the State legislatures, as we shall see anon.

i. Enactment of Enabling Statutes and Provisions in Parties' Constitutions

It is quite possible for a model Bill to be drafted for enactment by the National Assembly and the different State Houses of Assembly to govern the resolution of political disputes (possibly with the exception of election petitions) through the ADRs. The statutes would provide for reference of intra and inter party disputes other than election petitions to arbitration and the conventional ADRs in the manners to be provided also. IJ\TEC or relevant Committees of the National Assembly can start the preliminary work by gathering experts in the fields of arbitration and the conventional ADRs as well as draftsmen to craft a Bill. It could even start

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with a colloquium as a follow up to this workshop. It is an opportunity that should not be missed at all for the good of the political process in our country.

Though delays have been encountered in enacting other model statutes in the states, this one can have a different experience. If the political parties that control the National Assembly and the states (the Executive and, or the Houses of Assembly) see the need for the statute, they can simply convince (instruct?) their members in those legislatures to ensure speedy passage and it will be done.

There may also be a need for political parties to insert into their Constitutions a provision requiring such disputes to be referred to arbitration or the conventional ADRs. The enabling statutes and parties' Constitutions may prescribe minimum qualifications and experience for would be arbitrators etc in political disputes. The power to make original or default appointments of arbitrators etc could also be vested in a trusted institution such as the Chief Justice of Nigeria or the President of the Court of Appeal.

ii. Immediate Enforceability of Decisions/Outcomes

Despite the problems already pointed out hereinbefore about enforceability of the outcomes of ADRs, let it be noted that flexibility and creativity are hallmarks of those dispute resolution media. This ensures that they cal always be adapted to suit various circumstances. Thus it is possible to work out a situation in which their end products can become immediately enforceable as has been done in the Multidoor Court houses in the country. In Lagos State, for instance, there is an ADR judge. Once he appends his signature on a settlement reached in an ADR proceeding in the Multidoor Courthouse, the terms of the settlement become immediately enforceable as a Court judgement. The same arrangement can be worked out for settlements reached in ADR proceedings over political disputes of the genre discussed in this paper.

With respect to arbitration, the Act and state Laws that we canvass for can also remove the enforceability of political disputes awards from the regular Courts and vest same in the Supreme Court or Court of Appeal or at least in particular Divisions of the High Courts. It can also be provided that the decision of the Court of Appeal on such applications is final. That way, attendant delay will be erased.

iii. Non Co-operation by Parties and, or their Lawyers

As already indicated, the ADRs have the great virtue of flexibility and adaptability. The statutes which this paper canvasses for can prescribe ways and means by which proceedings can go on in spite of any party's recalcitrance or non co-operation. Section 21 of the ACA is already a good example in this regard. It also very often happens now that when fight-to-finish parties or lawyers appear before arbitrators who know their onions, those parties and lawyers quickly

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learn to abandon their unhelpful traits and embrace needful culture. It can happen with respect to political disputes when they are processed through arbitration and the conventional ADRs. Conclusion

This paper has tried to show that in Nigeria all political disputes except election petitions are resolvable through the ADRs. However, some weaknesses in the legal regime need urgent firming up by way of statutory provisions. It hopes to have also shown that such resolution, when embraced will be far more effective than what presently obtains with respect to such disputes in the Courts and in party machineries; and that resort to them has indeed become imperative for the good of the country’s political process.

It is hoped that the suggestions made in the paper, such as the initiation of efforts for the enactment of enabling laws, will be taken seriously by INEC and other stakeholders. If they do and resort is had to the ADRs for the resolution of political disputes in the country, it will commence the necessary march to greater political maturity and civility in the country. That will position the country to occupy its pride of place in the comity of nations where political maturity and grace are hallmarks of politicking and statecraft. To do nothing in this regard will amount to grievous disservice to the country.

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NOTES AND REFERENCES1. Russel: (1997) Arbitration (21st edition)Sweet & Maxwell, London

2. Abia State University Law Journal (1998) “The Recent odyssey of Customary Law Arbitration and Concilliation in Nigeria’s Apex Courts”

3. Robert Greene, (2000) The 48 Laws of Power, Profile Books, London.

3. Garner, Bryan A (1999) Black Law Dictionary, (7th edition), West Group, St. Paul, Minn.

4. Chukwuemerie, A (2006) “Alternative Dispute Resolution Mechanisms as Frameworks for Bank Debt Recovery in the Post Consolidation Era” Justice Gazette 45.

……….. Ibid (1998) “Commercial Arbitration as the Most Effective Dispute Resolution: Still A fact or Now a Myth? 15 Journal of International Arbitration 4

……….. Ibid (2007) “A Synergy of Opposites: Effective Commercial Justice, Rights and Liberties in African Jurisprudence” in Growing the Law, Nurturing Justice: Essays in Honour of Niki Tobi, JSC, Lawhouse Books, Port Harcourt

7. The Recent Odyssey of Customary Law Arbitration and Conciliation in Nigeria's Apex Courts (1998) 5 ABSU LJ 1 Commercial and Investment Arbitration in the African Customary Law: Myths or Realities? (2007)

8. Journal of International Arbitration (1999)

9. Journal of World Investment, Volume 4

10. Nigerian Bar Journal Volume 55

11. Human Rights Law Journal 103

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STRATEGISING FOR 2011 GENERAL ELECTIONS IN NIGERIA: EMERGENT VERTICAL ISSUES*

By

FRANK O. OZOH Ph. D**

INTRODUCTION

In order to have focus and to be able to achieve predetermined targets and objectives, an authority has to organize its resources in a manner that will enable it achieve certain goals within a specified period of time. In this, we can say that a plan is an ex-ante organization of resources by an authority to achieve some predetermined targets and objectives within a given period of time.

Therefore, a plan can be characterized by the following features:-

i) anticipated material, human and financial resources,ii) anticipated targets, goals and objectives,iii) the existence of an Authority-(Institution, an organization or a person) andiv) the objectives that can be realized within a time frame.

For these reasons therefore, the Commission has been embarking on strategic plan of action preparatory to the conduct of general elections in Nigeria. Through planning, INEC has been able to lay a solid foundation for an effective electoral process.

Within the context of an election management body, EMB, strategic planning refers to all the preparatory activities for a forthcoming electoral event which should take place after the conclusion of the previous electoral cycle, and ideally after a reform process that refined and adjusted the inconsistencies and the problems that emerged during the previous cycle.

Usually, the strategic plan period is located within the second stage in the pre-electoral period of the electoral cycle.

2. OBJECTIVES OF ELECTORAL STRATEGIC ACTION PLANThe objectives of electoral strategic action plan include but not limited to:

i) eliminating laxity of coordination and incorrect assumptions,ii) minimizing unforeseen delays and unforeseen institutional crisis,_ iii) enabling the smooth flow of funds on a timely basis by eliminating insufficient or

unrealistic budgetiv) enabling staff recruitment and training within time,v) enabling the procurement and distribution of materials within time frame for the

elections,vi) enabling international agencies for electoral assistance know that a recipient EMB is

going to utilize aids given to it properly.*The draft paper of this article was read at the INEC Strategic Plan of Action (2009-2011)

held at the National Teachers Institute (NTI) Kaduna from 16th -20th September, 2009.

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**Dr. Frank O. Ozoh is the Coordinator, The Electoral Institute (TEI), INEC Headquarters, Abuja.

3. THE SECOND STRATEGIC ACTION PLAN (2004-2007) AND THE ELECTORAL INSTITUTE, (TEI)

Firstly, it should be noted that the first Strategic Plan of 1999 and the second Strategic Action Plan of 2004-2007 did not take account of the establishment of the Electoral Institute (TEI). Thus, manpower development and capacity building efforts in election management and administration in the Commission were uncoordinated. Secondly, there was a dire need for a drastic change in the mindset, orientation and general disposition towards elections and politics in Nigeria. Also, there was need to bring electoral practitioners and the electorate in sync with the enabling mentality and values of electoral democracy in Nigeria. For these reasons, the Commission under the leadership of Professor Maurice M. Iwu, established the Electoral Institute TEI in June 2005, a period well covered by the second strategic action plan.

Secondly however, some of the activities performed presently by the Institute were well enumerated in the objectives of the plan outlay. The objectives as they relate to TEI and as presented in the review are mainly on the following:-

Capacity building, Voter /civic education and information, and Collaboration with international agencies for electoral assistance

I. CAPACITY DEVELOPMENT

This aspect saw the establishment of the various departments including, Training, Research and Documentation units of the Electoral Institute. Regularly, they organize training in manpower development, technology and election management. This is done to enhance the managerial, administrative and operational skills of the staff of the Commission and other stakeholders. It is an activity that is constantly needed to reinforce and strengthen the institutional pillars of the electoral authority. Also, it allows the survival of strong personnel turnover, enables the retention of enough institutional memory to train new staff, conduct research and document relevant process.

In addition, the Electoral Institute collaborates with three major Nigerian universities namely, University of Nigeria Nsukka (UNN), University of Ibadan (UI) and Ahmadu Bello University (ABU), to offer professional programmes, including Diploma in Election Administration (DEA) and Postgraduate Diploma in Election Administration (PGDEA).

For the purpose of organizing workshops, seminars and conferences, the Training and Research units make use of TEI campuses at Oghara in Delta state and Minna in Niger state (about to take-off). These

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satellite centres will also offer certificate programmes in election management and administration. This is to ensure professionalisation of election management and administration.

II. VOTER / CIVIC EDUCATION AND INFORMATION

The department was established to address the problems of poor voter education and voter mobilization. Through sustained civic and voter education, the directorate will seek to liquidate “the culture of conquest and usury, intimidation through violence, bribery and every form of corrupt practices”, through the spread of knowledge of best civic practices consistent with good electoral process in all walks of life.

Voter education expounds the tips on procedures for voter registration and the actual voting process, electoral offences and the sanctions for their breach. The exercise covers pre and post electoral periods in the electoral cycle.

III. COLLABORATION WITH INTERNATIONAL AGENCIES FOR ELECTORAL ASSISTANCE

The Electoral Institute collaborates with International Agencies for Electoral Assistance. In the past, these International Agencies include: International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES), British Department for International Development (DFID), the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), the European Commission (EC) and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) under the Initiation Plan (IP) executed by the UNDP through the Direct Implementation Modality (DIM). It is to be noted that, INEC-IFES collaboration does not fall within the UNDP-JDBF (Joint Donor Basket Fund) as managed by the UNDP under the DIM.

AREAS OF COLLABORATION WITH THE UNDP-JDBF (i) and (ii) INCLUDE:-

Assisting political parties in dealing with priority issues Improved capacity for management of the electoral process Improved capacity and performance in civil society Reinforced role of the media in the electoral process and; More empowerment of women in the democratic process

In addition to the original three departments of Voter Education, Training, Research and Documentation, the Commission in the quest of increasing capacity development and address some factors that adversely impacted on the conduct of the 2007 General Elections, has added two separate departments of Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) and Civil Societies and Gender Desk.

IV. ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION

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As many courts within and outside the country are amending their civil procedure rules to include out of court settlement, the Commission has shown the importance of mediation in resolving disputes that are related to political and electoral processes and systems in Nigeria by establishing the ADR department in the Institute.

The ADR department in the short period of its existence is blazing the trail to provide and enhance access to justice which does not only mean access to the courts, lawyers and judicial process, but providing opportunity for a just, economical and timely outcome of justice in our electoral process. The mechanism involves possible resolution through mediation, arbitration, neutral evaluation or any other ADR procedure where mediators help the parties negotiate a neutral agreeable settlement.

Nominations of candidates from party members and aspirants were fraught with violence and manipulations leading to the emergence of unpopular and unholy consensus candidates, stolen mandate and prolonged legal and judicial processes that adversely impacted on the outcome of the 2007 General Elections.

In this, TEI through the establishment of its ADR department is to among other things:-

advise political parties to embrace ADR following disputes arising from intra-party and inter-party squabbles; administrative panel indictments and disqualifications;

lead the campaign of creating awareness on the need for political parties, aspirants and candidates, civil society organizations(CSOs), staff and executives of the Commission (INEC)and other litigants on ADR;

help lawyers in the Commission and those of the political parties, candidates and aspirants change their mindset on the true purpose of ADR and embrace it within the political process;

help in the training of lawyers within and outside the Commission as mediators and educate clients on the usefulness of ADR;

offer electoral litigants and those seeking quick resolution of their cases an alternative as the fastest and quickest way of resolving disputes;

take care of the frustrations coming out of the traditional courts bugged down by delays, allegations of manipulation and procrastination;

expound the role of mediators in intervening in disputes and offering service on probono basis, educate and imbibe attributes of mediator and maintain code of conduct, and

enable courts and tribunals clear backlog of politically or electoral related cases. These include among others, protests and petitions arising due to ward, local government area, state and national primaries, congresses and election of delegates or nomination of candidates for elections and party leadership or executives.

V. CIVIL SOCIETY AND GENDER DESK

The Civil Society and Gender Desk was established first in 2006 in the office of the Honorable Chairman of the Commission. Later on, it was enlarged and put under the Public Affairs Department. Presently, the Civil Society Organizations and Gender Desk is housed in the Institute (TEI).

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In general, the CSOs and Gender Desk prepares their variety of Non-Governmental Organization (NGOs) to play major roles in electoral process in Nigeria. These are to:-

help in the campaign for free, fair, clean and transparent elections; help election campaigns of candidates and parties to be more policy oriented; help to mobilize public opinions against political parties and politicians’ involvement in illegal

electoral activities; help observe very closely the electoral process, the election environment, particularly in the pre-

election, the e-day and the post-election periods with a view to suggesting revisions in the relevant laws and electoral reforms. In this process, the Desk also collaborates with the mass media, academics, International Agencies for Electoral Assistance and Women Organizations to raise political awareness and ethical practices toward achieving free, fair and transparent elections;

also the Desk is profoundly involved in promoting and monitoring gender participation and action in general elections in Nigeria. In this, the Desk partners with the United Nations Development Programme-Joint Donor Basket Fund (UNDP-JDBF) under the Direct Implementation Programme (DIM) and Initiation Plans (IP) including Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), Department for International Development (DFID), European Union (EU) and with technical support from United Nations Fund for Women (UNIFEM);

it participates to attenuate the lopsided representation of female gender in the electoral process in preparation and build-up to effective gender participation in the electoral process thereby, increasing awareness on gender stereotypes and strengthening gender participation and action. This it does, by making pre-election and e-day gender assessment, with a view to advising the Commission on gender related policy issues.

It is hoped that in the 2011 General Elections, the activities of the various departments will bring about increased gender balance, quality and objective elections observation, reduce greatly lack of internal party democracy and squabbles, and other vices witnessed in the 2007 General Elections.

4. PLAN STRATEGIES AND THE ELECTORAL CYCLE

Elections are no longer one – off event in every four to five years. Therefore, the electoral process must be seen as an ongoing activity within a cyclical period rather than being driven by an event of a particular propinquity or at a discrete point in time. There is a chain of activities in an electoral process, not necessarily causative in nature but, are loosely cyclical. These activities put in a clock-wise direction are referred to as the “The Electoral Cycle” (see Figure 6.1). It expounds the development of synergies of activities and their desirability in an electoral process within and outside the EMB.

Broadly speaking, The Electoral Cycle can be divided into three major periods, viz:-

I. The Pre-Electoral or Pre-Voting periodII. The Electoral or Voting period

III. The Post-Electoral or Post-Voting period

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Furthermore, this could be sub-divided into Eight Electoral Cycle Periods viz:-

1) THE PRE-ELECTORAL OR PRE-VOTING PERIOD

I. The Legal Framework Stage, Including Constitution; Legislation; Electoral Systems and Boundaries; Electoral Bodies; and Codes of Conduct.

II. The Strategic Planning and Implementation Stage, including budgeting; funding and financing; election calendar; recruitment; procurement; logistics and security.

III. The Training and Education Stage, including operational training for elections officials; civic education; voter education and information.

IV. The Voter Registration Stage, including voters’ registration; observers’ accreditation; domestic observers; parties and candidates.

V. The Electoral Campaign Stage, including campaign coordination; breaches and penalties; party financing; code of conduct and media access.

2) THE ELECTORAL OR VOTING PERIOD

VI. The Voting Operations and Election Day Stage, including vote counting; voting; special and external Voting.

VII. The Verification of Results Stage, including official results; complaints and appeals; tabulation of results.

3) THE POST-ELECTORAL PERIOD

VIII. The Post-Election Stage including voter lists update; audits and evaluations; legal reform; archiving and research; institutional strengthening, professional development and dispute resolution.

However, it would be noted that the pre-electoral period and the post-electoral period could be merged into the post-electoral period thereby, reducing the electoral cycle into two broad electoral periods only.

Having presented the Electoral Cycle in this manner, one could observe that the activities that we perform at the Electoral Institute (TEI) are usually located within the pre-electoral period and the post electoral periods only, precisely the 3rd and 8th stages of the Electoral Cycle. These include operational

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training for electoral officials, civic and voter education, institutional strengthening, professional development, archiving and research.

5. CONCERN OVER DISTORTIVE FACTORS

During the period under review, the distortive factors which adversely affected the strategic plan and its execution, particularly against the 2007 General Elections can be enumerated as follows:-

I. Late release of the enabling statute which came out in May, 2006; two years after the proposal was submitted to the National Assembly.

II. Late release of funds which preceded Commission’s bounced cheques in September, 2006.

III. Controversial third term agenda and its ramifications on the conduct of the elections.

IV. Lack of internal party democracy and the attendant squabbles between politicians and candidate nominations’ irregularity.

V. The use of ad-hoc staff who by nature are susceptible to manipulations; who have no allegiance and are not under the disciplinary ambience of the Commission.

VI. Incessant ‘legislative-adjudications’ on INEC, its preparations and the conduct of elections

VII. Time lag for election petitions, coupled with debilitating ‘adjudicative-legislations’.

VIII. Negative mindset and cynicism

IX. Insecurity of life and property as witnessed by the worst incidences of politically-related killings. Often, the political feuds over elections degenerate into bloody confrontation. Luckily, this was not our portion in the 2007 General Elections.

X. Squabbles in the presidency and the attendant litigations over disqualifications and eligibility of presidential candidates.

XI. Inability of some contractors to meet supply targets, particularly the Direct Data Capture (DDC) equipment for voter registration exercise.

XII. Excessive use of money, thugry, Godfatherism and other forms of violence by politicians against their opponents which, led to “Ozovian Effect”, a situation where “bad politicians” drive “good politicians” away from political relevance and circulation.

Consequently, these factors impacted negatively on the conduct and outcome of the 2007 General Elections

6. REFORMS FOR THE 2011 GENERAL ELECTIONS

These include among others:-

doing away with ad-hoc staff and using National Youth Service Corps (NYSC) members and civil servants during election or voting period, (the E Day);

funding from the first line charge of the consolidated revenue;

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establishment of election observation board, to make for objective and unbiased observation;

putting time limits within which courts can stop elections. Since courts reserve the right to order for extension of time in the conduct of elections or re-runs in established cases of infringements, therefore there is the need to put time limits within which courts can stop the conduct of elections and re-calls.

7. OBSERVATIONS

The success of the Strategic Action Plan of 2004-2007 periods can be measured by the overall success of the 2007 General Elections.

Firstly, the 2007 elections as the third in the series of national elections conducted by INEC since the nation’s return to democratic governance in 1999 marked a watershed in the annals of the conduct of elections in the country. The Commission went the extra mile in ensuring not only that the elections were held, but also given the polluted environment under which the elections were held that they were substantially free and fair. This was a big leap in Nigeria’s democratic process and for one; the election effectively broke the jinx of several attempts by the country to successfully transit from one democratically elected government to another.

Secondly, going by the outcome of the elections petitions’ panels against the governorship elections, the Commission was right in more than seventy seven per cent of the total results so far pronounced by the courts. This includes the net outcome in states like Adamawa, Bayelsa, Cross River, Edo, Ekiti, Kogi, Ondo and Sokoto.

It is to be noted that, the outcomes in Rivers and Anambra states in the 2007 governorship elections were upheld by the Appeal Tribunals. However, the former was affected by irregularity in the nomination of candidate within the Peoples Democratic Party (PDP) and the latter by tenure issue of years that was yet to expire affecting the incumbent governor, Mr. Peter Obi.

Regarding the presidential election result, a total number of Nine (9) Justices of the Appeal and Supreme Courts upheld the outcome as having substantially complied with the provisions of the Electoral Laws as against three (3) Justices on the minority side.

Since Election Tribunals are part and parcel of the electoral process, therefore and analytically speaking, the outcome of the 2007 General Elections enabled by the Strategic Action Plan of 2004-2007, including the organizational prowess of the Hon. Chairman, Professor Maurice M. Iwu and the National Commissioners, was a huge success. This is despite the adverse environment under which these elections were held.

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8. CONCLUSSION

Given the polluted environment under which elections are held in Nigeria; given the strategic repositioning of the role of TEI in achieving professionalism in election administration and management, and given the quality of reform undertaken by the Commission within this electoral cycle, there is little doubt that INEC Strategic Action Plan (2009-2011) will go a long way in achieving free, fair and transparent elections in 2011 General Elections.

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REFERENCES

1. Davidson Iriekpan (2009): “Banks Advised to Adopt ADR in Dispute Resolution”,

Business World, Thisday, Vol. 14. No 5265 p 4 (Sept.21).

2. European Commission (2006): EC Methodological Guide On Electoral Assistance,

Europe Aid Co-operation Office, Rue de La Lio / Wetstraat 41, B-1049, Bruxelles Brussels (Re-printed October, 2008).

3. International IDEA (2006): Electoral Management Design: The International IDEA Handbook,International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, SE-10 334 Stockholm, Sweden.

4. Iwu, M. A. (2008)a: The April 2007 Elections in Nigeria: What Went Right, First

Distinguished Lecture under the Professional Programme in Election Administration,

Department of Political Science, University of Ibadan, Ibadan. (2008)

………… (2008): Beyond 2007 Elections: Framework for Sustaining Democracy in Nigeria, 2008 Departmental Lecture, Department of Political Science, University of Nigeria, Nsukka.

………… (2008): The Electoral Institute and the Search for Democratic Consolidation and Economic Development in Nigeria, The Executive Lecture Series, TEI Oghara Centre, Delta State.

7. Jong-Bin Yoon (2006): Making Democratic Reforms Feasible: South Korea in

Comparative Context, Department of Political Science and Diplomac Myong Ji University, Soul South Korea.

8. Ozoh, F.O. and Onwumere, J.U.J Eds. (2006): Planning for Economic Development with

Illustrations from Nigeria,Don-Vinton Ltd, Lagos.

9. UNDP (2007): UNDP Electoral Assistance Implementation Guide, Democratic Governance Group, Bureau for Development Policy, UNDP, 304 East 45th Street, 10th Floor, New York, NY10017 USA.

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10. Uti, N. & Ezugwu, M. C. (2008): Gender Dynamics in Nigerian Politics: A Report of Gender Observation in 2007 General Elections in North West Geo-Political Zone of Nigeria, Centre for Women Studies and Intervention (CWSI) and Global Agenda for Total Emancipation (GATE) Madol Press Ltd., Abuja.

11. Train4Dev.Net (2009): “EC-UNDP-IDEA, Joint Workshop on Effective Electoral Assistance: Participants’ Manual,” Under Joint Donors Competence Development Network. UNDP-Brussels Office 14, BE-1000, Brussels Belgium (June)

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SOURCES OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT REVENUE AND STRATEGIES FOR ITS GENERATION IN THE NIGERIAN ELECTORAL DEMOCRACY

By

I.AJA-NWACHUKU, Ph.D.*

Introduction:

Local government o=is the third tier of government in the Nigerian federation. Over 75% of the local government areas (LGAs) are situated within the rural area. The majority of Nigerians who live in this sector are exposed to the harsh socio-economic conditions characterised by poor or non-existent physical, social and institutional infrastructure. For instance, the roads where they exist are in poor conditions, good transportation and educational systems are virtually absent, while health facilities and pipe-borne water are lacking, no electricity, banks and modern agricultural facilities. In addition, the expectation of employment outside subsistence agriculture is very low, as a result, majority of the people live below poverty line. The aftermath of this type of situation is high rural-urban migration in anticipation of improved living of standard. Therefore, there is need to provide required physical, social and institutional infrastructures, which are necessary pre-requisite for rural and economic development and growth, so as to improves the quality of life at the grassroots.

The local government’s ability to provide the quantity and quality of services required in improving the standard of living of its citizenry and acting as catalyst to rural development depends on the size and volume of finance at its disposal. Finance is the first need to modern government, which is indeed the breath of its nostril. Thus the importance of revenue in local government administration cannot be over emphasized. Finance within the context of this chapter may simply be defined as money or revenue available to the local government to carry out its constitutional responsibilities.

Rationale for Improved LG Revenue:

The rationale for improved sources of local government revenue include; it’s increased constitutional responsibility and the present value of naira (Aja-Nwachuku, 1992)

I. Increased Constitutional Responsibility of Local Government:

The 1999 constitutional stipulates under the fourth schedule the functions of the local government council to include:

___________________________________________________________*Dr I.Aja-Nwachuku was a former Minister of Education of the Federal Republic of Nigeria.

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a) The provision and maintenance of primary adult and vocational education (this was formally under the federal government especially during the era of primary and universal education). Towards the early part of 1980’s it was transferred to the states, then later back to federal government and since 1999 it came under the full control of local government.

b) The development of agriculture and natural resources other than the exploitation of minerals.

c) The provision and maintenance of services.d) Construction and maintenance of roads, streets, drains parks open spaces and so on, as

may be prescribed from time to time by the House Assembly.e) Such other function as may be conferred on a local government councils by the House of

Assembly of the state.

The above functions show that the local government is the caretaker of the nation’s infrastructure at the grassroots. To execute and sustain the provision of these services require enormous revenue or finance. In addition, increased revenue will be needed to pay staff emoluments, provide and maintain various types of infrastructures in the presence of positive changes in the demographics of the rural areas.

ii. The Present Value of the Naira:

Many factors have led to the present value of the naira, ranging from devaluation to deficit budgeting of federal and state governments.

Devaluation describes a situation under which a country deliberately lowers the value of her currency the hope of stimulating export and discouraging imports so as to correct balance of payment problems. Devaluation as a policy instrument was introduced as one of the items in Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) package in 1986. The naira exchanged for N1,50 for US $1.00 in 1986 when SAP started but it exchanged for about N145.00 to US $1.00 in 2004. Despite the decline in the value of the naira, exports are not adequately stimulated and imports are still on the increase. The resultant effects are not stagflation (i.e. inflation and unemployment combined), marginalized and dissatisfied workers, underutilized industrial capacities and so on. In addition, planning and implementation, even at the local government areas, are at best difficult and at worst meaningless.

Deficit budgeting of the other tiers of government, especially the federal government has complicated our distressed economic situations. The central government can either borrow or print money to finance her deficit. The result is more and more stagflation. With this development the real value of naira is badly eroded and it becomes more difficult for local government to generate revenue through its traditional sources with the exclusion of federation transfers. Also in the presence of escalating or spiral inflation, the real value of the federal transfers becomes highly diminished despite its nominal increase. In summary the local government is in financial straight jacket as a result, it may be observed that for the local government councils’ chief executives to escape electoral suicide, they must improve the

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revenue generation ability of their areas. The next section will discuss the sources of revenue available to the local government councils, while this will be followed by the explanation of how the councils can strategize in order to improve their revenue bases under their control.

Sources of Local Government Revenue:

There are two major sources of revenue available to the local government namely the external and internal sources.

(i) External Sources:

The main sources of external revenue to the local government councils include governments’ transfer, discretionary and specific grants and loans.

(a) Government Transfer: This is the main external source of local government revenue or finance in Nigeria. The local government being the third tier of government is statutorily entitled to 20% of the revenue accruing to the Federation Account. Revenue from the Federation Account is periodically distributed or allocated to the various levels of government based on predetermined criteria, which border in economics and politics. Historically the revenue allocation criteria in Nigeria have undergone various modifications. In fact Nigeria has witnessed about nine fiscal commissions, six military decrees and one Act of Parliament on revenue allocations. The statutory allocations from the Federation Account are shared along the following criteria:

Equity ......................................... 40%Population.................................. 30%Land Mass/Terrain.................... 10%Internal Revenue Effort ............ 10%Social Development Factors .......10%

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In addition, the state government are statutorily required to allocate 10% of their internally generated to the local government. According to Bello-Iman (1990), governments; transfer to the local governments accounts for as 75.65%. This pattern has not changed in favour of internal revenue. Furthermore, out of this amount, over 85% of local government total recurrent receipts goes into servicing recurrent expenditures, with personal emolument and maintenance expenses claiming over 80%, while other charges take the balance (Ojofeitimi 2000).

(b) Discretionary and Specific Grants: The two major methods of giving grants according to Wrath (1978) include: percentage type and block grants.

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The percentage of grant aid is normally tied up to specific project, as a result it tends to erode the independence of the provider of the fund, ‘’he who plays the piper dictates the tune’’. Secondly, it discriminates against the poorer local government councils, for instance, if the aid is given on the basis of N1 for each N2 of the cost of the project, that is, on 50% grants aid basis, a richer local government would be able to attract more aid and provide better quality services that poorer governments. To ensure natural equality in terms of even development, countries, which practice percentage type of grant have introduced ‘’equalisation’’ grant to give a higher production of aid to those LG councils which are naturally poor.

Block grant is a form of aid in which the local governments have full discretion in the spending of the aid revenue. This type of grant exposes the local government officials to corruption especially where the management lacks integrity and is corrupt.

The federal and state government have discretionary powers within the constitution to give non specific grants to the local government councils. This type of revenue is very subjective and exposed to abuse by either the military and civilian governments at the centre and state. This is because most of the cases, the discretionary grants have been used as instrument of favouritism and political patronage thereby fanning amber of bitterness within the polity.

(C) Loans: The local government government councils can borrow from central and state governments, internal agencies, capital markets and banks. The local governments can borrow to finance short-term cash flow deficits necessitated due to short fall in revenue, or they could borrow to finance deficits in annual budgets covering operating expenses and debt charges. Also the local governments could borrow to purchase plants and equipments. However, economic theory dictates that borrowing is only prudent if the returns on capital are adequate to cover both debts charges and operating costs. Hence it is not prudent or economic reasonable to borrow t fund recurrent expenditures.

In Nigeria loans as a source of finance of local government councils were not streamlined before 1976. They could borrow to finance all sort of projects both viable and unviable ones. However, the 1976 Guidelines for Local Government Reform stipulated three distinct sanctions for future loan raising to include:

i. That loans should restricted to a minority of loans development projects which generate substantial immediate and direct revenue to cover amortization, indirect and operating costs.

ii. That loans capital can also be useful for ‘’bridging’’ to enable a project to go on in advance statutory allocation payment and

iii. That the maximum period for any loan should be ten years.

The above criteria set out the requirement or framework for taking loans by all Nigerian local government councils. The criteria tend to limit the time and scope of borrowing by the local government authorities.

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It is interesting, however, to observe that discussing with some local government chief executives or chairpersons on the issue, they stated that they borrowed mainly to fund short-term cash flow deficits or to financial deficits in their annual budgets occasioned by debt charges and operating costs. The main source of the loans, they stated that the commercial banks where they banked their revenue constituted the major source of borrowing. On eh issue of development loans, they stated that the, local government councils were restricted not in terms of the amount, maturity and purpose since such loans must be guaranteed by state government.

(ii) Internal Sources:

Under the constitution, each tier of government is given power to generate revenue. Such power prescription is described as the fiscal structure. Sometimes, one level of authority may have the power to raise or impose certain taxes while the power to collect them is reposed in another authority. Also the right to the revenues raised thereby may be shared on predetermined basis or allocated fully to another authority different from the one that imposed the taxes. Such transfers of proceeds or right to the proceeds of the taxes and revenues define the body of fiscal relations between tiers of government. Furthermore, the ability to raise, collect and use revenues constitutes the fiscal capacity of the particular tier of government.

The fiscal capacity of the local government councils is lower than other tiers of government within the Nigerian polity. The internal sources of finance available to the local government councils may be broadly categorized into taxation, fees and charges and commercial ventures.

(a) Local Government Taxes:

The most important source of internal revenue is tax paid on property or levied on individuals (poll tax or community/development levy) personal income tax as well as company tax is outside the local government jurisdiction. Table one shows Nigerians’ Tax jurisdiction under 1999 constitution, most of the highest income yielding sources of tax revenue in Nigeria are fully under the jurisdiction of federal government, the next category in terms of income generation ability is under the state government, while those sources of tax revenue under the local government are namely, property tax, market trading licensed tax, motor park tax and poll tax or capitation tax. Te revenue jurisdictions under the local government are not as high revenue yielding as those outside their control. This apparently shows that there is very limited latitude for local governments to generate finance through taxation. Apart from these limitations, with exclusion of property tax which is under developed, the other types of taxes are be-deviled with touts and incompetent local government staff.

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(b) Fees and Charges:

The local government councils, under the constitution are mandated to provide services for which fees are charged. The provision of these goods and services for fees help in resource allocation since only those who genuinely want these services demand them. Hence public services for which fees and charges are levied are better managed if their provisions are to be continued. Therefore, fees and charges are in more efficient system than the alternative system of free provision.

In Nigeria, the list of some of the fees and charges which the local government councils can harness is shown on table 2. The list provides a good shopping list for local government councils to tap from, especially those not currently in operation given the particularity of the environment.

TABLE 1: NIGERIA’S MAJOR TAX JURISDICTION, 1999

S/N Federal Government State Government Local Government1 Companies Income Taxes Personnel Income tax (on

residents off the state)Tenementrate

2 Petroleum Profit Tax Capital Gain tax (on individuals only)

Shop and Kiosk Rates

3 Added Tax Stamp Duties (on individuals only)

Liquor license fees

4 Education tax (on Companies only) Road taxes, eg. Vehicle license

Slaughter slab fees

5 Capital Gain Tax (on Corporate Bodies and Abuja Residents)

Betting and Gamming taxes

Marriage, birth and death registration fees

6 Stamp Duties (on Corporate Bodies) Business premises and registration levies

Street name registration fee

7 With-holding Tax (on Companies) Development levy (Max of N100 per annum on taxable individuals only)

Market/Motor park fees (excluding state-owned markets)

8 Personal income tax (on personnel of the Armed Forces, Police, External Affairs Ministry and Residents of Abuja)

Street name registration fees (State Capital only)

Domestic Animal license fees

9 Mining Rents and Royalties Rights of occupancy fees (State Capital only)

Bicycle, Trunks, Canoe, Wheelbarrows

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10 Custom Duties (i.e. Import and Export Duties)

Market fees (where market is financed by state government)

Carts and Canoe fees. Right of occupancy fees (excluding state capital)

11 Excise Duties Miscellaneous revenue (e.g. rents on property)

Cattle tax

12 Miscellaneous revenues (farming fro oil states. Rents on property, etc)

Merriment feesRadio and TV license feesVehicle Parking feesPublic Conveniences, Sewage and Refuse Disposal feesBurial Ground and Religious places permit feesSignboard and BillboardAdvertisement Permit fees

Source: Federal Ministry of Finance

Commercial Ventures: All over the world, local government councils where they exist engaged in commercial ventures to argument their sources of revenue. For instance, in Nigeria virtually every local government council owns a transport outfit, primarily to alleviate the transport problem of its locality. Secondly this transportation business is expected to generate revenue or at worst break even in order to ensure continuity in its operation. Furthermore, it is expected that the local government will go into purely commercial ventures with the aim of generating employment and making profit so as to enhance the funding of their activities. Typical areas of such operations include the establishment of cottage industries - salt production, pottery, cloth weaving, basket and cane products making, blacksmithing, poultry farming, recreational facilities, low – cost houses, cooperative shops, and so on. These activities or venture use local raw materials and have low set up cost and contributes towards employment and revenue

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generations. Also local governments should venture into commercial agriculture and afro-allied industries to process their outputs.

Table 2: LIST OF FEES AND CHARGES AVAILABLE TO LOCAL GOVERNMENT COUNCILS1. Bicycle license. 2. Canoe license. 3. Dog license.4. Commercial vehicle/Motorcycle and Taxi Permit.5. Liquor/palm wine/cigarette license. 6. Squatters/Hawkers Permit. 7. Wharf Landing Permit. 8. Motor Seller Promotion.9. Slaughter. 10. Radio/Television license. 11. Night Soil Disposal fee.12. Registration of night soil contractor fee. 13. Birth and Death registration fees.14. Dispensary and Maternity fees. 15. General contractors’ registration fees.16. Sand dredging fees. 17. Minor trade license. 18. Forestry/Firewood exploration fees.19. Sawing mile license. 20. Commercial grinding mill license. 21. Abattoir fee.22. Eating houses licenses. 23. Kiosk licenses. 24. Registration of meat van.25. Cattle dealer license. 26. Dried fish/Meat license. 27. Butchers license.28. Cold Rooms license. 29. Auctioneer license. 30. Gold smith and Gold seller license.31. Dane Gum/Haunting license. 32. Marriage Registration fees. 33. Entertainment, Drumming and Temporary booth permit. 34. Control of noise permit fee.35. Burial ceremony fee. 36. Naming and Street registration fee. 37. Tent or Sea beach permit. 38. Wedding/Naming/Traditional Title taking ceremony fees.39. Pest control disinfection. 40. Laboratory test fees. 41. Tender fees. 42. Minor Industry license. 43. Petty traders’ license. 44. Felling of trees fees.45. Produce buying license fees. 46. Printing/Spraying and Sign writing.47. Workshop license. 48. Welding machine license. 49. Battery Charges license.50. Panel Beater license. 51. Cloth Dyer license. 52. Motor mechanic/Car wash dot license.53. Surface Tank kerosene. 54. Hair Dressing, Barbing salon. 55. Advertisement Rate license.56. Workshop receipt. 57. Hiring Charges. 58. Survey fees. 59. Customary certificate of occupancy. 60. Market fees. 61. Cattle market fees.62. Proceeds from sales of mechanic. 63. Earnings from industrial undertaken.64. Rent of local government quarters. 65. Rent on landed property. 66. Photo studio license67. Electric workshop. 68. Printing press license. 69. Vulcaniser’s license. 70. Clock watch repairer license. 71. Registration of Laundry and Dry cleaners fees.72. Building material license. 73. Photostat/Typing institute license. 74. Sewing Institute license. 75. Building Fees.

Strategies for Improved Revenue Generation in Local Government Councils

That the statutory responsibilities of the local government councils since the 1976 local government reform has enormously increased is not gainsaying but a truism. Also the public expectations on the role that local government councils should play to enhance the living of standard at the grassroots is equally very high. Thus to be able to effect long-term financing, in order to meet the various challenges at grassroots development, requires the adoption of proactive strategies to source additional revenues.

This section will therefore propose private sector financial management strategy model as relevant for improving revenue generation ability of local government councils. Strategic

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planning is usually a long-term plan. Its application in any organisation helps in the achievement of set objectives. The strategic model for our case would follow six stages:

a. Define the objectives of the local government:

The objectives of the local government councils are to be subsumed in the national objectives of the federation. The national objectives of Nigeria are usually outlined in the national development plan. For instance, in 1981 (ie. From 4th National Development Plan 1981 – 1985), the national objective was articulated as:

‘’greater self reliance, increased productivity, reduction in rural-urban migration, promotion of new national orientation conducive to greater discipline, better attitude to work and cleaner environment’’.

Along the logic of national objectives, the objectives of the local government councils may be defined as:

i. To improve the living standard of people in the rural areas onsustainable basis.ii. To increase food production and income.

iii. To provide basic, physical, social and institutional infrastructures.iv. To stem rural-migration by introducing poverty alleviation projects.

The chief executives and their teams in the local government councils are expected to have clear thought on what their objectives are, that is, what they hope to achieve at the end of their tenure in office. These objectives should be clear and well explained to all concerned.

b. Situational Analysis:

An Igbo adage states that he who does not know the beginning if his journey will most likely not know when he reaches his destination. It is important that at the beginning of the chief executives’ tenure a proper stock is taken on what are on ground. This implies that the inventory of the physical social and institutional infrastructures existing on the ground should be taken as well as those needing repairs. For instance, how many culverts and roads need repair or construction? What are the states of the hospitals or health centres, what are the conditions of the schools and so on. In addition, there is the need for manpower audit. The situational analysis would help to highlight the magnitude of the work to be done and resources needed.

c. SWOT Analysis:

The third stage of the strategy for improving revenue generation is called the SWUT analysis, an acronym for strengths, weakness, opportunities and threats. The strength of the local government councils to improve revenue includes:

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i. Better knowledge of their environment.ii. Availability of local raw materials which could be used in cottage industries.

iii. Availability of cheap labour for large agriculture if the need arises.iv. Chief executives should be more accessible to all concerned.

The weakness or constraints of the local government councils to improve revenue include:

I) Lack of financial autonomy and uncertainty in the actual funds available: External funds from the Federation Accounts are not usually remitted directly to the local government councils. In addition, the states government are in the habits of making unanticipated deductions at sources from the funds meant for the councils.

II) Corruption: The local government councils over years have become centres of corruption as evidenced by the expense preference behaviours of their chief executives. Hence the public view tax payment as a mere subsidy to the corrupt life style of the local government chief executives and their teams.

III) Poor provision of amenities: The public finds it difficult to pay for services which are not provided, for instance, refuse disposal fees, water rate for dry taps, market without rest rooms, and so on.

IV) Unskilled Manpower: Many staff of the local government council is not well trained to carry out their responsibilities. It is common to see a historian doing the job of a treasurer or head of personnel. Some of the staff lacks basic knowledge of accounting or bookkeeping, hence it becomes difficult to take simple management decision to enhance the revenues of the local government councils. In addition, employment of staff is usually based on political patronage rather than on need, skill and experience. Thus there is overstaffing with the associated unnecessary expenditures.

V) Lack of adequate population data: The local government councils do not have adequate data on human population, property and so on, on which relevant taxes could be levied.

Opportunities available to the local governments to improve revenue include:

i. to identify new taxes not currently being levied in the area.ii. to identify new services to provide for fees of restroom fees in the

markets and motor park.iii. to identify new commercial ventures.iv. to identify new and improved methods of collecting existing revenues.

Threats to the local government councils to improve revenue include:I) The presence of touts.II) Lack of staff to monitor the revenue drive.

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III) The complacency of the chief executive who feels satisfied with the external sources of fund especially from the federation account and allocation from the states.

IV) The presence of corrupt staff that forge various receipts of the local government councils for their selfish purposes.

d) Preparation of Budget:

The budget is simply the description of the planned programme or activities by the local government in numerical values. Hence the budget will show the description of the procedures to improve revenue with the associated costs. The budget will outline the expenses matched by revenue. If the expenditures are higher than the revenue, then the councils will be required to identify methods of financing the budget deficit at the cheapest cost. The most optimal source of revenue to bridge the gap should be chosen. Thus the budget will highlight on time the needed funds, sources and cost of such funds. Based on the budget, the pro forma revenue of income statement will be prepared. This pro forma statement will show the revenue expected or planned from internal sources. It will therefore show whether new methods of revenue generation have enhanced the internal revenue of the local government council.

e) Implementation of the Revenue Generation:

Based on the above steps, the local government councils will do all within to tap all sources of identified new revenues as well as improve on the collection of the existing ones.

f) Monitoring:

Monitoring this strategy for sourcing revenue will enable the chief executives and their teams to periodically review the revenue generation procedures. This will ensure that problems are promptly identified and ratified.

Summary and Conclusion

The local government is a government at the grassroots. Most local government councils operate mainly at the rural areas, where basic physical, social and institutional infrastructure are non-existent or at best in poor government councils to their citizen as well as increased expectations from the rural pubic have necessitated sourcing of more funds by the local government. The major sources of revenues by the local governments are external and internal sources. The external sources of revenue include government transfer, discretionary and specific grants and loans. While the internal sources of revenue available to the local government councils are taxes, fees and commercial ventures.

The ability of the local government to increase the scale and magnitude depends on the innovativeness and creativity of the chief executives and on how to apply modern financial management techniques. This chapter, therefore, recommends the application of financial

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management strategy model made up of six steps as panacea for increasing internally generated revenues at the local government level of governance. Hence it includes that large scale of latitude exists for local government councils to enhance their revenue generation through strategic thinking and planning on how to raise funds outside their statutory transfer and traditional methods of internally raising of revenues.

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NOTES AND REFERENCE

1. Aja-Nwachuku (1992): "Options for Financing Local Government Developmental Programmes” Paper presented at the Abia State University Work-Shop/Seminar on Financing Local Government In Nigeria, Enitona Hotel. Aba, June 3rd - 5th.

2. Gani F. Mbanefoh (1990): ‘’Potential Sources of Income for Local Government In Nigeria’’ In Local Government Finance In Nigeria, Bello-Imam I.B. (ed), NISER, Ibadan. Pp.140 - 155

3. Ojofeitimi Tunde (2000): ’’Managing at the Grassroots Local Government and Rural Development’’ in Management Challenges in the 21st Century, J.Y Maiyaki (ed), Centre for Management Development. Pp.203-222

4. Okigbo Pius (1987): ‘’Economic Implication of the 1979 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria’’ In Essays in the Public Philosophy of Development Vol. 1 Issue in Nigerian Development by Pius Okigbo, Fourth Dimension Publisher. Pp.190 - 221

5......... (1993): ‘’Revenue Allocation in Nigeria, 1945-1960: A Historical Survey’’ In Essays in the Public Philosophy of Development Vol. 2 Change and Crisis in the Management of the Nigerian Economy by Pius Okigbo, Fourth Dimension Publishers. Pp.247-273

6........ (1993): ‘’On Revenue Allocation: A Critique of the Aboyade Technical Committee Report (1997)’’ In Essays in the Public Philosophy of Development Vol. 2 Changes and Crisis in the Management by Pius Okigbo, Fourth Dimension Publishers. Pp.274-293

7. Sarah O. Alade, Job O. Ebajemito, Sam C. Rapu and Moses Tule (2003): ‘’Fiscal Federalism And Macroeconomic Governance’’ In Contemporary Economic Policy Issues In Nigeria, O.J. Nnanna, S.O. Alade and F.O.Odoko (eds), CBN. Pp.3-54

8. Wrath Ronald (1978): ‘Local Administration in West Africa, George Allen and Unwin, London. Pp.119-135

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BOOK REVIEW*

Money and Politics in Nigeria edited by: Victor A. AdetulaIFES – NIGERIA 2008ISBN: 978-978-086-544-3

The book “Money and Politics in Nigeria” is a collection of addresses and papers that were presented by scholars at two seminars on the theme of “money and politics” held by the International Foundation for Election Systems (IFES) at both the University of Jos and the University of Ibadan in May, 2006. The purpose of the collection is to bring to the fore different aspects of the problem of money and politics that has begun to attract the attention of various stakeholders in the Nigerian electoral process. In the Introduction, the editor himself presented an overview of money and politics in Nigeria. He observed that with the return to electoral politics in 1999 and the subsequent 2003 general elections there have been criticisms of the political parties by various stakeholders, of corrupt and unbridled use of money in politics. He referred to a 2007 nation-wide survey conducted by a consortium of experts from Nigerian Universities; in which political parties were ranked third by respondents on the perceptions of Nigerians regarding corruption and governance. Similar surveys, he wrote, by the International Foundation for Election Systems (IFES) also have exposed the ‘corruption in the realm of politics’ and how such cultures like ‘vote selling in return for money or goods’, vote buying by political parties, ‘godfatherism’ and money sharing have become acceptable practices in the Nigerian polity. Money politics, the editor further wrote, is shrinking the political space and fast becoming a key variable in determining who participates in electoral politics and how.

Furthermore, In attempting to recall how Nigeria arrived at the present level of unregulated use of money in its politics, the editor recounted that the antecedents to the problem began even with the politics of nationalism in the 1950s with the rent-seeking behavior of parties, politicians and voters; and in the first republic when there was absence of strict legislation to regulate party finance that made it possible for politicians and political parties to engage in illegal party financing and corruption. He observed that electoral laws of that time such as the Nigeria (Electoral Provisions) Order-In-Council, LN117 of 1958 that was enacted by the British Parliament did not also define regulatory framework on party finance. Political party funding was therefore ensured through private means as candidates took charge of election expenses. The editor noted that as far back as 1956, allegations of impropriety in the conduct of some politicians in the NCNC with business interests in the African Continental Bank (ACB) was investigated by the then Foster Sutton Tribunal of Enquiry.

During Nigeria’s second republic, a combination of private and public funding of electoral politics was used for the first time. While the 1979 Constitution in Section 205 provided subventions to the parties through an annual grant, private funding was also allowed except from outside the country. Associations other than political parties were also prohibited from contributing to the funds of political parties or the election of any candidate at an election. __________________________________________________________ *The Reviewers, Tunde Ojedokun and Shehu Wahab are both Chief Research Officers in The Electoral Institute, INEC

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The editor however, observed that the relevant sections of the law then did not focus on disclosure of donations and therefore there was illegal use of money to influence decision-making in political parties. He also recounted that though there were some checks in the 1979 Constitution especially with respect to external control of political parties, there were still loopholes that few rich politicians exploited and used their money to hijack political parties of their choice. With the unbridled use of money in the second republic, the editor recounted that no attention was paid to political mobilization by those seeking elective positions; rather much importance was attached to money with which votes were bought.

The editor further noted that under the 1999 Constitution, the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) was given responsibility to monitor finances of political parties, conduct annual examination and audit of the accounts and publish a report for public information. He however noted that the challenges to fulfilling these responsibilities are numerous especially with the glaring absence of details/records of subventions and donations to political parties, and the absence of exact amount of money spent by candidates and political parties in Nigeria. In addition, the clear indication of heavy reliance on private funding in all the three general elections since 1999 makes funds accounting in politics almost impossible.

In Chapter One, a paper titled “Political Money and Corruption: Limiting Corruption in Political Finance” by Marcin Walecki, stresses the influence of political finance in relations between parties, politicians, party membership and the electorate.

The importance of money in a democracy according to the author cannot be over-emphasized because much of democratic political activities could not occur without it. He further stated that, there are three motives for providing political funds namely, Idealistic or Ideological motive, Social motive, social honours or access, and financial motive, striving for material benefits.

The author also emphasizes the distinction between political finance and political corruption. The meaning of political finance-related corruption is often unclear because corrupt political finance involves behaviour on the part of a candidate or a party in which they improperly or unlawfully conduct financial operations for the gain of a political party. The range and scope of illegal political funding depends on country’s specific funding regulations, while irregular political finance emerges in the gap between a country’s legal provisions and the reality of its corrupt political funding practices. The irregular or informal political finance system in this case refers to legal contributions from disreputable sources or acceptance of money in return for favours. The author analysed the measures concerning political financing which he stated are divided into regulations and subventions. The regulation of political expenditure generally involves restrictions concerning direct vote buying or limitations on the expenditures of political parties or individual candidates.

Corrupt political funding it was stressed undermines the democratic system. Together with other forms of political corruption it leads to a compromising of democratic ideals, the growth

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of political apathy among voters and mistrust of the authorities, as well as the consolidation of authoritarian tendencies in the state.

To limit corrupt in political finance, it was pointed out that the following measures should be adopted;

- Political parties should introduce internal control mechanism including financial agents, accounting procedures, codes of conduct, financial checks and balances etc.

- State enterprises and other public bodies should remain politically neutral.- State support to political parties should be realistic and based on objective and fair

criteria.- An independent and professional audit should review the campaign and the party’s

financial reports

Chapter Two which is titled “Electoral Act 2006, Civil Society Engagement and the Prospect of Political Finance Reform in Nigeria” and authored by Victor Adetula, addresses the concerns and efforts being put in place to reform party finance in Nigeria. The 2006 Electoral Act which came to effect on June 6th 2006 following its accent to law by President Olusegun Obasanjo was the focal point of analysis.

The author observed that following the unbridled deployment of illegal and illicit funds in the 2003 General Elections and the massive interest shown by major political stakeholders to address this problem, the Act was promulgated with several new provisions aimed at regulating political party finance. In the words of the author, “the new electoral law has substantial provisions to regulate political party financing and this has provoked some questions that are central to this chapter”. Such questions are that “Does the Electoral Act 2006 provide for sufficient avenues and agents of political finance reforms? Does the Act adequately address the problems of unregulated use of money in politics? Does the provision in the Act provide the necessary legal foundation for political finance reform? What is the prospect of political finance reform in Nigeria?”

In order to underscore the gravity of the problem, the author took an historical excursion into the Nigerian political history since representative democracy was introduced during colonialism particularly in the elections leading to the independence of 1960. In his elaboration of the experiences of that period, he paid attention to the negative impact which the military regimes and the petro dollar had on the politics of the Second Republic.

The chapter also examined the 1979 Constitution and it was noted that some forms of checks especially with respect to external control of political parties were addressed. However, it was also noted that the experience of the 1979 – 1989 civilian era showed that loopholes in the Constitution were exploited and that illegal funds found their way into the political parties. The author noted that the reports of the various special tribunals that tried politicians and public office holders revealed gross abuse of public office and impropriety in dealings of political parties.

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The 1999 constitution gave the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) constitutional responsibility to monitor the finances of Political Parties, conduct an annual examination and audit of the funds of Political Parties and publish a report for the public information. The responsibility to monitor the use of money in campaign activities of Politicians and their parties posses some challenges for the commission. For instance the Transition Monitoring Group, a coalition of civil society organizations, in a statement on the conduct of the PDP, ANPP, UNPP and NDP primaries in January 2003 complained that “there was widespread bribery of delegates with sacks stuffed with money to influence their votes.

However, there are indications of heavy reliance on Private funding in last three elections in Nigeria. Virtually all the parties lack organizational Capacity to generate their income through legitimate means. According to President Obasanjo, “The parties and candidates together spent during the last elections, more than would have been needed to fight a successful war”. As contesting elections has become so expensive, only those who are wealthy or who have wealthy backers can run. The increasing influence of “godfatherism” in contemporary Nigeria Politics can be linked to the influence of money in electoral politics through uncontrolled party financing as was witnessed in both Anambra and Oyo States where States Governors had to negotiate and renegotiate peace godfathers and money bag politicians. The absence of effective regulation of the amount of private funding that political party can receive from private sources made all forms of political mercantilism attractive and possible.

The 2006 Electoral Act is seen as progressive movement toward democratic consolidation in Nigeria. Therefore, Political Parties, Civil Society Groups and other Critical Stakeholders in the Nigerian Electoral Process will need to stand up to the challenges. The new law appears to have focused on political party finance reform via the following key areas;

(i) Controlling fraud and political finance related corruption;(ii) Promoting active and efficient political parties; and (iii) Ensuring openness and transparency in the electoral process.

However, much still need to be done to get the political parties to imbibe the principles of financial transparency and accountability in their activities and operations. In terms of monitoring party financial/campaign finance, the involvement of civil society organizations in Nigeria has not included awareness creation around the danger of unregulated use of money in politics.

The above notwithstanding, civil society groups, the media academics and professional groups will continue to be useful and relevant in the struggle to promote transparency and accountability in the electoral process. For instance, they could get involved in the monitoring and tracking of how campaign financial activities are reported and disclosed, how government regulators and outside organizations monitors campaign spending, and how effectively violations of campaign finance laws are prosecuted and punished. Also, civil society groups have the responsibility to promote civic and voter education on the negative consequence of irregular party financing on democracy.

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In chapter three titled “Funding of Political Parties and Candidates in Nigeria: Analysis of the Past and Present”, the author, Ezekiel Adeyi, summarized political party funding as it relates to the contestants at elections and their candidates before and after independence. According to the author, funding of parties were done through levies, dues and generous donations by members in the period before independence. It was the leadership of the various political parties that was largely in charge of coordination, and this was possible because the early parties enjoyed supremacy over any individual or group interests within the parties. Also the early nationalists were focused, and were not distracted by money; they wanted to ensure the end of colonialism. The nomination of candidates was by consensus and not through primary or shadow election. This process did not give room for ‘do or die’ politics which is now rampant among modern political parties in Nigeria. After the 1979 elections, party patronage became the order of the day. Contracts were awarded exclusively to party royalists. The consequence was massive political corruption and fiscal recklessness at all levels of government. The transition programme of General Ibrahim Babangida introduced a new trend in party funding in Nigeria. Candidates’ financial support to the party dwindled and the consequence was that, the parties were reduced to clearing houses where candidates came only to obtain tickets for elections. This trend made it more difficult to track campaign on income and expenditure of the political parties and those of the candidate. The parties gradually came under the influence of the ‘money bags’ that were able to pay their ways through the most different situations. Evidence of this trend can be seen in the primaries that led to the emergence of the two candidates that contested the presidential election in June 1993. There was no guideline or law regulating on how to source for funding by the candidates and parties.

The 1999 elections witnessed the same reckless spending on the part of both the parties and candidates. Candidates raised funds for their campaigns independent of their political parties, several millions of naira was realized but no records were kept or even made available as no regulatory body is put in place to check the candidate and the parties.

The 2003 elections further consolidated the trend as can be seen in the confession of the former Plateau State Governor, Chief Joshua Dariye who donated the funds meant for ecological development of the state to the PDP, the campaign organization of former President Olusegun Obasanjo.

The trend today where sources of funding for parties and candidates campaigns can not be recorded because of abuse and misuse has implications for election related conflict that escalate into serious violence and threaten national security. The absence of party discipline in virtually all the existing political parties can be linked to the influence of money in party politics.

The author called for regulation on campaign expenses for all elections, limited financial support to registered party members, proper auditing of party’s account on yearly basis to encourage transparency and accountability, and removal of nomination fees for candidates.

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Chapter Four which is titled “The Role of INEC, ICPC and EFCC in Combating Political Corruption” is written by Remi E. Aiyede. In the paper, he examines political corruption in the light of the recent developments in the fight against the menace by the anti-corruption and regulating agencies in Nigeria. Taking off from the same premise as previous authors, the concept of political corruption as the violation of established rules for personal gain and profit either for one’s party, class, tribe, friends or family was examined. This takes various forms ranging from bribery, extortion, influence peddling, fraud, embezzlement and nepotism. Corruption often times facilitates organized crime activities such as drug trafficking, money laundering and criminal prostitution etc.

Political corruption undermines democracy and good governance by flouting or even subverting formal processes. In elections and legislative bodies, it reduces accountability and distorts representation in policymaking, in judiciary it compromises the rule of law while in the public sector corruption results in unfair and inefficient provision of services. Generally, corruption erodes the instructional capacity of government as procedures are disregarded, resources are siphoned off and public offices are bought and sold.

According to the author, the framework of electoral governance provide a field for us to interrogate the two major anti-corruption agencies in Nigeria’s fourth Republic namely the Independent Corrupt Practices and other related Offences Commission (ICPC) and the Economic and Financial Crime Commission (EFCC) and their role in relation to the electoral management body, the (INEC).

INEC it was observed has acquired experience in conducting elections into all public offices in Nigeria since 1998. It organized all transitional elections that ushered in the 4 th Republic on May 29, 1999, 2003 and 2007 general elections, it remains the most visible and critical organ of electoral governance for 20011 elections. One of the major problems of INEC is finance. Not only is the body unable to muster enough funds at critical movements to prosecute elections, embezzlement and mismanagement of funds are also major problems. Some of its officials have been charged to court by the EFCC for fraud in the award of contracts. The INEC chairman has expressed commitment in checking electoral fraud in 2007 using electronic voting system but the move has been stopped by the electoral act of 2006. Thus a lot need to be done to position INEC for the fight against political corruption and for cooperation with the EFCC and ICPC and other law enforcement agencies.

The Independent Corruption Practices and other related Offences Commission (ICPC) was inaugurated to receive complaints, investigate and prosecute offenders, educate and enlighten the public against bribery, corruption and related offences. The ICPC has been able to prosecute a few public officers and has several cases pending in court. It is collaborating with anti-corruption NGOs and has established anti- clubs in schools. It has also set up anti corruption and transparency monitoring units in Ministries and Parastatals across the country. The author observed that though, the ICPC has a potential for combating corruption , its capacity is

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however, weak, and therefore there is need to shore up its capacity for it to effectively perform its statutory role.

The Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) which was set up by the Olusegun Obasanjo administration to combat economic and financial crimes was empowered to prevent, investigate, prosecute and penalize economic and financial crimes offenders and also charged with the responsibility of enforcing the provisions of other laws and regulations relating to economic and financial crimes such as the Establishment Act (2004), the Money laundering Act 1995, the Advance Fee Fraud and other Fraud Related Act 1995, the Banks and other financial Institutions Act 1991, and Miscellaneous offences Act. The EFCC investigates cases of abuse of office, official corruption, bribery of government officials , diversion of public funds through fraudulent award of contracts, corruption in land allocation, tax fraud, capital market fraud, money laundering, oil bunkering, etc. the EFCC is quite useful in combating electoral fraud because it is a veritable instrument for promoting good governance. It has recorded successes convicting and sentencing individuals including men in high places who have been involved in economic and financial crimes. The EFCC partners with several international policing and intelligence organizations to deal with money laundering including cases involving some State Governors in Nigeria.

There is no doubt that the INEC, ICPC and EFCC have to cooperate in combating corruption in the electoral process. The most important foundation is for these agencies to be made independent of the executive. These organizations need a leadership that will assert its independence and build up its integrity. Part of these has been achieved through the Electoral Act 2006 which guaranteed the INEC to appoint its Secretary. The EFCC has shown a good capacity to track the movement of money. It has the requisite skills, experience and linkages to deal with such matters. Perhaps, there should be a campaign finance commission with representatives of the EFCC and ICPC in its membership. Also, other members of this commission should be drawn from all registered political parties and such members should not be removed except by two-third decision of the Senate.

In Chapter 5, the author, Kachollom C. Best, discusses “ Gender, Money and Politics in Nigeria” by first describing gender as the widely shared expectations and norms within a society about appropriate male and female behavior, characteristics and roles. He went on to say that it is a social and cultural construct that differentiates women from men and defines the ways in which women and men interact with each other. According to the author, these interactions are largely on an unequal basis, which informed the principle behind many conventions that sought to create a more just world for everyone, particularly the women who though have a numerical majority, are a gender minority due to their organization in public living and relegation to the domestic setting particularly in patriarchal societies like Nigeria. These have greatly affected the participation of the female gender in politics.

The role of money in politics especially for those seeking political office has become the norm. The use of money in campaigns to secure votes is an open secret in Nigeria. The author

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presents a survey conducted by women’s rights Advancement and Protection Alternatives (WRAPA)n in Nigeria which shows that in 2007 elections, 905 of the female aspirants lost in primaries due to lack of finance as they lacked resources to set up and run campaign structures, offices and for logistics. The Human Development report (HTR) of 2007 also showed that 70% of Nigerians are poor and &0% of the poor are women.

The issue of violence and thuggery also discourage women from politics particularly that intimidation is seen by those who exert influence as their preserve. Women are generally not known to resort to violence in the scale found in politics. Seventy percent of women aspirant interviewed by WRAPA indicated that the result to violence had greatly affected their performance at 2007 primaries. Moreover, those desperate enough to contemplate matching violence with violence may face financial constraints in employing the services of thugs.

Chapter 6 titled ‘’Money Politics and Electoral Violence in Nigeria’’ was written by Sam O. Smah. He stressed the need to reform the funding of electoral processes to make it as transparent as possible and also the need to control the use of political money, which poses serious risks for the overall development of the society. Money is needed and is used in all electioneering activities all over the world. The problem of money in politics arises only when set limits, sources and uses are either violated or abused by politicians and other relevant actors. According to the author, the history of social and political development in Nigeria has been characterized by systematic truncation of aspirations for genuine social other beginning with the arbitrary colonial amalgamations to the post - independence election rigging. One of the quickest means of winning elections is to vote – buy the electoral – institutions, which are by law supposedly saddled with the responsibilities of ensuring equity, justice and transparency at the polls. Thus, elections are not free and fair and results are manipulated to favor losers. In addition, Institutional vote – buying breeds official hostilities towards the people who have legitimately won in elections. This is one of the factors responsible for electoral violence in Nigeria.

In addition, it was observed that the provisions in both the 1999 Constitution and the Electoral Act 2006 were defective in that they did not recognise any limit on funds to be generated by political party at home. Worst still, the source from which such money should not come were not spelt out. This gives incumbent ministers, state governors, and local government chairmen interested in o=contesting election unbridled opportunities to withhold public funds and laundered some for future political activities. Instances of politics of money can be seen in the removal of former governors of Anambra and Oyo State respectively, where Chris Uba and Late Alh. Lamidi Adebibu used both money and violence to run their state. The author further enumerated four major risks associated with unregulated money in politics. The risks are:

It gives undue advantage to some over others and constraints competition thereby creating an uneven plain field;

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It creates unequal assess to office; Those who donate fund will control politicians they finance, with them serving as God-

fathers; and Illicit money corrupts the system and undermines the rule of law.

Thus in democracy, the electoral process must be as transparent as possible if the main aspiration is to build the virile society based on equality, equity, fairness and justice. Funding of electoral processes must be reformed to make assess and participation possible for a broader spectrum of society. The use of political money must be controlled, as unregulated flow and application of such money is a sign of inequality, instability and insecurity, which pose serious risks for the overall development of the society.

The issue in focus in Chapter 7 is ‘’God-father politics in Nigeria’’. Here the author observes the political influence of God-fathers in that they determine the electoral fortune of candidates. The category of these godfathers, whether they are party chieftaincies or constituency colossus become effective gate keepers of the party. The author went on to compare and contrast the godfatherism in the first, second and third republics. In the first and second republic, the political parties were structured along communication lines and controlled was well defined. The political leaders thrown up by these parties derived their powers from the constitutions of the parties. Their control over the party was also the function of their charisma. They did not demand it, the respect was voluntary, not forced. The third republic witnessed the attempt to reduce the possible transformation of charisma into personality cult that reduced civic – minded political concerns. The republic registered only two (2) political parties, which was a deliberate attempt to prevent the emergence godfathers in politics as it was mass – formed and mass – owned. Unfortunately, the parties only had a brief existence as they were dissolved by the Abacha administration on November 17, 1993.

There are two conditions that perpetuate and facilitate the supremacy of godfather. First, godfathers need official protection; there is a high correlation between godfatherism and incumbency. Therefore, as things stand today, impunity which is the hallmark of godfatherism is feasible only when it is supportive of federal incumbency. The second condition under which godfatherism flourishes according to the Arthur is when party supremacy is replaced by government supremacy over the party. Party supremacy therefore operates to protect government against itself. In Nigeria, two factors tend to work against party supremacy; these are party finance and benefactors’ position of government.

In order to effect electoral change, godfathers bribe election officials to win in elections. They also bribe the police and other security agents. The initial support given by the godfather then becomes an investment with a high rate of returns. The godfather makes substantial decisions on governance, appointments and is a recipient of either major juicy contracts or earns

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inordinate stipends. This can be seen in the case between Chris Uba and Ngige (2003) in Anambra State and that of Alhaji Adedibu Lamidi and Senator Rasheed Ladoja.

Godfatherism has created more problems than enough. It has created doubt about the legitimacy of the process and the elected. The Arthur therefore, is of the opinion that godfatherism is one of the biggest dangers to democracy today and paradoxically it only survives with government support.

In Chapter Eight titled ‘’Money Politics, Political Corruption and Local Government Elections in Nigeria’’, the author try to examine some of the past attempts at organizing local government elections, the influence of money politics and also hoe political corruption hindered the effectiveness of service delivery at the local government level. He does this using the elite theory which is of the assumption that, in every society a minority of the population makes major decisions I society which affects all. The author went further to give conceptual clarifications of local government, money politics, political corruption, legal and political context of party finance, 1999 constitution and local government elections, chronology of local government administration from 1976-2007 and political corruption at the local government level. He is of the view that, almost all the local government chairmanship and councillorship aspirants overshot their maximum expenditure line stipulated by section 93(6) of the constitution which says that, “In the case of chairmanship election, the maximum amount of election expenses to be incurred shall be (N5, 000, 000) while subsection seven of the same section says “In the case of councillorship election, the maximum amount of election expenses to be incurred shall be (N500, 000).” With some of them running bankrupt for contesting local elections, it stand to reason the first thing they want to do is to recoup their investment with interest.

There are also political barons to settle. For those whose elections were sponsored by these crops of political investors, payback starts from the date of inauguration to the end of their tenure in office. This is why political corruption and misuse of administrative resources is increasing at local and other levels of government. This is why many chairman and councilors will be in office for three years and will have no development projects to show for their 36 months in office. The author therefore suggest that, The Capacity of Civil society groups, anti-corruption agencies like EFCC and ICPC and the media needs to be built to monitor campaign finance as well as act as whistle-blowers on activities of political parties, candidates and State Independent Electoral Commissions (SIECs) when there is a breach of law.

In Chapter Nine, with the subject title “Vote Buying in Nigeria” and authored by Emmanuel Ojo, attention was devoted to examining in great detail the issue of vote buying as an important feature of political corruption in Nigeria. The author undertook both a historical and comparative perspective of the subject as he noted that vote buying as a phenomenon is

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neither system specific and space bound. It is common to all political systems, be it advanced or developing, mediaeval or contemporary. It only differs in magnitude and manifestations from one polity to the other. The author analyzes the act of vote buying from pre colonial era to date, according to him “the incumbents certainly enjoyed an enormous advantage by virtue of their control of the financial purse strings.” This enabled them to offer voters certain material inducements in return for their compliance on polling day.

Borrowing from A. E Davies perceptive work, the author identifies some predisposing factors responsible for vote buying in Nigeria. These include:

I. The inability of the political parties and the contestants to put in place comprehensive manifestoes for scrutiny by the voters.

II. Focusing on personalities rather than on issues.III. Excruciating poverty among the masses of the people.IV. The political cynicism on the part of voters that political office holders are incurable

corrupt.

The negative effect of vote buying according to the author is that, good materials that are capable of making positive impacts in the system are completely from the democratic processes simply because they cannot afford the cost. Many Senior Civil Servants retirees and academics have general sufficient experiences during their long years in service for them to provide effective leadership in the polity but for being poor or not financially strong to withstand the cost, they shy away from politics. The author recommends that, Nigerians should be re-oriented about societal values that everything is not money. Where candidates are found to have violated expenditure limits, such candidates should be disqualified and political parties should be organized in such a way that all members would contribute to the cost of running both the party and funding of election campaign by candidates. The economy also must be improved upon because, where poverty is reduced to the barest minimum, the voters can make independent electoral decisions.

Chapter Ten which was authored by Dung Pam Sha, also examined the issue of vote buying. In the paper titled “Vote Buying and the Quality of Democracy” the author observes that, vote buying occurs when competition for power amongst contending political groups is stiff. He states some factors that motivate parties and candidates to buy votes to include; capturing state power, maintaining authoritarian control of political office and keeping opposition out of power. The struggle to control the apparatus of the state becomes intense because such control guarantees wealth, power and authority. The author noted that, vote buying promotes the primacy of money in politics to the detriment of merit, ideology free and fair political competition. Secondly, vote buying promotes elitist politics and weakens popular participation that is only persons with resources get access to political offices in Nigeria. Thirdly, the political parties that bought votes monopolize power to the exclusion of financially weak parties. Fourthly, political institutions are currently inhabited by some politicians with stolen mandates through vote buying. Lastly, the author observes that regimes that have forcefully come to

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power through vote buying, such regimes spend considerable time recouping from its political investment usually through the pilfering of state resources. In such situations according to him, little resources are available for the fulfillment of campaign promises.

The author concludes by suggesting that, since vote buying posed a threat to the growth and development of democracy, INEC, political parties and civil society should be empowered and granted absolute autonomy to handle cases relating to vote buying. And the law of vote buying should be written in simpler language and made accessible to the electorates.

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