VOL.526,JULY4,2007 533

Viesca vs. Gilinsky

G.R.No.171698.July4,2007.*

MARIA SHEILA ALMIRA T. VIESCA, petitioner, vs.DAVIDGILINSKY,

**respondent.

Courts; Judgments; Compromise Agreements; A compromiseagreement that is intended to resolve a matter already underlitigation is normally called a judicial compromise—once it isstamped with judicial imprimatur, it becomes more than a merecontract binding upon the parties.—A compromise agreement hasbeen described as a contract whereby the parties, by makingreciprocal concessions, avoid a litigation or put an end to onealready commenced. A compromise agreement that is intended toresolveamatteralreadyunderlitigationisnormallycalledajudicialcompromise.

_______________

*THIRDDIVISION.

**InthePetitionforReviewasfiledbeforethisCourton17March2006,

petitioner impleaded JudgeRebeccaR.Mariano of theRegionalTrialCourt,

Branch136,MakatiCity.SuchshouldnothavebeenthecasesinceSection4of

Rule45oftheRevisedRulesofCourtprovides:

SEC.4.Contents of petition.—Thepetitionshallbefiledineighteen(18)copies,withthe

original copy intended for the court being indicated as such by the petitioner, and shall (a)

state the full name of the appealing party as the petitioner and the adverse party as

respondent, without impleading the lower courts or judges thereof either as

petitioners or respondents; (b) indicate the material dates showing when notice of the

judgmentorfinalorderorresolutionsubjectthereofwasreceived,whenamotionfornewtrial

orreconsideration,ifany,wasfiledandwhennoticeofthedenialthereofwasreceived;(c)set

forthconciselyastatementofthemattersinvolved,andthereasonsorargumentsreliedonfor

theallowance of thepetition; (d) be accompaniedbya clearly legible duplicate original, or a

certifiedtruecopyof the judgmentor finalorderorresolutioncertifiedbytheclerkofcourtof

thecourta quoandtherequisitenumberofplaincopiesthereof,andsuchmaterialportionsof

the recordaswould support thepetition;and (e) containa sworn certificationagainst forum

shoppingasprovidedinthelastparagraphofsection2,Rule42.

534

534 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED

Viesca vs. Gilinsky

Onceitisstampedwithjudicialimprimatur,itbecomesmorethana

merecontractbindingupontheparties.Havingthesanctionofthecourtandenteredasitsdeterminationofthecontroversy,ithastheforce and effect of any other judgment. Such agreement has theforceoflawandisconclusivebetweentheparties.Ittranscendsitsidentity as amere contract binding only upon the parties thereto,foritbecomesajudgmentthatissubjecttoexecutioninaccordancewiththeRules.Thus,acompromiseagreementthathasbeenmadeanddulyapprovedbythecourtattainstheeffectandauthorityofres judicata, although no execution may be issued unless theagreementreceivestheapprovalofthecourtwherethelitigationispendingandcompliancewiththetermsoftheagreementisdecreed.Thesettlementofdisputesbroughtbeforethecourtsisencouraged.Infact,intheCivilCodeandintheRevisedRulesofCourt,courtsare directed to persuade the litigants in civil cases to agree uponsomefaircompromise.

Same; Same; Same; A trial court cannot modify, by motion ofone of the parties, a Compromise Agreement—a compromiseagreement has the force of res judicata between the parties andshould not be disturbed except for vices of consent orforgery.—Clause II(b) states that “(t)he child shall be allowed tospendthenightwiththe fatheronceaweek.”Thesentenceseemssimpleenoughtobeunderstoodbyalayman.Petitionerclaimsthatthe parties did not specify the day and time of the week whenprivate respondent could enjoy the overnight company of LouisMaxwell in order to give the parties “some flexibility” and to givethemtheopportunity toarrange theschedule themselves.But theparties have overstretched the indeterminate language of saidprovision. Indeed, the parties have been at odds over theinterpretation and implementation of this plain provision of theCompromiseJudgmentandthiscouldhavecausedmuchconfusionin the mind of the young Louis Maxwell who had to be broughtfromoneplacetoanotheratsuchunholyhoursofthenightonlytobeawakenedfromdeepslumberintheearlyhoursofthemorningtobetakentoanotherplace.Andyet,allofthesecouldhavebeenavoidedhadthepartiesoptedtobemorespecificintheiragreement.Thequestionthusbecomes:canthetrialcourtmodify,bymotionofone of the parties, a Compromise Judgment? We hold in thenegative.To reiterate,a compromise judgmenthas the forceofresjudicatabetweenthepartiesandshouldnotbedisturbedexcept

535

VOL.526,JULY4,2007 535

Viesca vs. Gilinsky

for vices of consent or forgery which private respondent does notallegeinthiscase.

Same; Same; Same; Parent and Child; Custody; It is high timethat the matter­of­fact treatment usually accorded by trial courts tomotions to approve compromises were abandoned in favor of themore positive activist attitude the situation demands—in acting insuch a situation, the judge should bear in mind that the objective isto end the disagreement between the parties, not to begin a new one;If the parties and their counsel are unable to do it, the judge isexpected to assist them in attaining precision and accuracy of

language that would more or less make it certain that any disputesas to the matters being settled would not recur, much less give riseto a new controversy.—We cannot totally blame the trial court forhaving granted respondent’s Very Urgent Motion to Enforce andEnjoyVisitorialRights.Perhaps, in its desire to finally put to restthe bothersome issue concerning Clause II(b) of the CompromiseJudgmentandtopreventfuturedisagreementsbetweentheparties,thetrialcourtsawthewisdom,asthisCourtdoes,inprovidingthespecificsinthesaidindefiniteportionoftheCompromiseJudgment.AswepreviouslyheldinthecaseofHernandez v. Colayco,64SCRA480 (1975)—This is not the first unfortunate instance that acompromise judgmentofa trial courthasgiven rise to subsequentprolongedcontroversy,onlybecausethetrialjudgefailedtoexercisethe required degree of care in seeing to it that neither ambiguitynor incompleteness of details should characterize the agreement,much less the judgment rendered on the basis thereof. Theexpressed desire of the parties to end their judicial travails bysubmittingtoacompromisedeservestheutmostattentionfromthecourt, and no effort should be spared in helping them arrive at adefinite and unequivocal termination of their problems anddifferences.Itishightimethatthematter­of­facttreatmentusuallyaccorded by trial courts to motions to approve compromises wereabandoned in favor of the more positive activist attitude thesituationdemands. Inacting insuchasituation, the judgeshouldbearinmindthattheobjectiveistoendthedisagreementbetweentheparties,nottobeginanewone.Thus, if the parties and theircounsel are unable to do it, the judge is expected to assistthem in attaining precision and accuracy of language thatwould more or less make it certain that any disputes as tothe matters being settled would not recur, much less giverise to a new controversy.

536

536 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED

Viesca vs. Gilinsky

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The rule on immutability forpurposes of execution does not attach to a judgment that ismaterially equivocal or which suffers from either patent or latentambiguity.—Resultantly,aremandofthiscaseisnecessarytoallowthe parties themselves to resolve the matter regarding theimplementation of Clause II(b) of the Compromise Judgment. Inthisregard,theruleonimmutabilityforpurposesofexecutiondoesnot attach to a judgment that is materially equivocal or whichsuffers from either patent or latent ambiguity. To obviate furtherdiscord between them and to preclude their recourse to the trialcourteverytimeoneofthemperceivesaviolationcommittedbytheother of Clause II(b) of the Compromise Judgment, we direct thetrialcourttobeonguardandensurethatthepartieswouldlayoutin concrete, specific details the terms of their agreement as to thisspecific matter as well of the appointment of Louis Maxwell’saccompanyingguardian.

Judges; Disqualification and Inhibition of Judges; The testthat must be applied in questions involving the propriety of thedenial of a motion to inhibit is whether the movant was deprived ofa fair and impartial trial.—ThisCourthasruledthattodisqualify

or not to disqualify is a matter of conscience and is addressedprimarilytothesenseoffairnessandjusticeofthejudgeconcerned.Said discretion is granted to judges, since they are in the betterpositiontodeterminethe issueofvoluntary inhibition,as theyaretheoneswhodirectlydealwiththepartiesintheircourtrooms.Thetestthatmustbeappliedinquestionsinvolvingtheproprietyofthedenialofamotiontoinhibitiswhetherthemovantwasdeprivedofa fairand impartial trial. Inthiscase,weholdthatpetitionerwasnot deprived of her day in court, for she was able to file hercomments on and/or objections to the motions filed by privaterespondent. She, therefore, was able to ventilate her positions ontheissuesbroughtbeforethetrialcourt.

Same; Same; A single comment uttered by a judge in the courseof the proceedings should not be taken to be generally illustrative ofher conduct in hearing and determining the outcome of the entirecase—such isolated remark should not be taken to mean that shehas crossed the line separating cold impartiality from unbridledbias.—As regards Judge Mariano’s remark regarding petitioner’sobstinacy,weagreewithprivaterespondentthatthesameisnotasufficient ground for public respondent to inhibit herself. Indeed,“(o)pinions

537

VOL.526,JULY4,2007 537

Viesca vs. Gilinsky

formed in the course of judicial proceedings, as long as they arebasedontheevidencepresentedandconductobservedbythejudge,eveniffoundlaterontobeerroneous,donotprovepersonalbiasorprejudice on the part of the judge.” Moreover, a single commentuttered by the public respondent in the course of the proceedingsshould not be taken to be generally illustrative of her conduct inhearing and determining the outcome of the entire case. Suchisolatedremarkshouldnotbetakentomeanthatpublicrespondenthas crossed the line separating cold impartiality from unbridledbias.

PETITIONforreviewoncertiorariofadecisionoftheCourtofAppeals.

ThefactsarestatedintheopinionoftheCourt.Martinez and Perez Law Officesforpetitioner.Alampay, Gatchalian, Mawis and Alampayforprivate

respondent.

CHICO­NAZARIO,J.:

ThisisaPetitionforReviewonCertiorarioftheDecision1of

the Court of Appeals promulgated on 19October 2005 inCA­G.R. SPNo. 90285 which affirmed, withmodification,the Order dated 16 June 2005 rendered by the RegionalTrial Court, Branch 136, Makati City, in Civil Case SPProc.CaseNo.M­5785.

Thefactsofthecaseareasfollows:Petitioner and respondent, a Canadian citizen, met

sometimeinJanuary1999attheMakatiShangri­LaHotel

where the formerworkedas ahotelmanager.After a fewmonths, a relationship blossomed between the two.On 22October2001,

_______________

1 Penned byAssociate Justice JuanQ.Enriquez, Jr.withAssociate

Justices Conrado M. Vasquez, Jr. and Vicente Q. Roxas, concurring;

Rollo,pp.32­42.

538

538 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED

Viesca vs. Gilinsky

their son Louis Maxwell was born.2 On 30 October 2001,

respondent executed an Affidavit ofAcknowledgment/Admission of Paternity

3 of the child.

Subsequently, theCivilRegistrar ofMakatiCity issuedaCertification granting the change of Louis Maxwell’ssurnamefrom“Viesca”to“Gilinsky.”

4

Unfortunately, the relationship between petitioner andrespondent souredand theypartedwaysduring the earlypartof2003.

On6February2004,respondentfiledaPetitionprayingthathebeentitledtothecompanyofLouisMaxwellatanytimeofanygivenday;hebeentitledtoenjoythecompanyof LouisMaxwell duringweekends and on such occasionsthechildshallbeallowedtospendthenightwithhisfather;andhebeentitledtoenjoyayearlythree­weekvacationinanydestinationwithhischild.

5Thecasewasraffledoff to

publicrespondent’ssalaandwasdocketedasSPProc.CaseNo.No5785.

Duringthependencyofrespondent’spetition,thepartiesarrived at a compromise agreement. This compromiseagreementwassubmittedbeforethetrialcourtandbecamethe basis of theCompromise Judgment issued on 12May2004.

6WereproducetheCompromiseJudgmentbelow—

COMPROMISE JUDGMENT

ActingonthejointmotiontorenderjudgmentbasedonCompromiseAgreementandfindingtheallegationsthereintobeofmerit,sameisherebygivenduecourse.

Judgment is therefore rendered based on the compromiseagreementwhichisquotedhereunder.

_______________

2Id.,atp.230.3Id.,atp.231.4Id.,atp.403.5CARollo,pp.36­37.6Rollo,pp.132­136.

539

VOL.526,JULY4,2007 539

a.

Viesca vs. Gilinsky

“COMPROMISEAGREEMENT

KNOWALLMENBYTHESEPRESENTS:

This Agreement entered this 22nd day of April 2004 by andbetween:

DAVID GILINSKY, of legal age, single and residing at Suite2828, Makati Shang­rila Hotel, Ayala Avenue corner MakatiAvenue,MakatiCity,hereinafterreferredtoasthe“FATHER”

—and—

SHEILAT.VIESCA,oflegalage,singleandaresidentofLot2,Block 39, Phase 5, Fort Bonifacio, Taguig, Metro Manila,hereinafterreferredtoasthe“MOTHER.”

WITNESSETH:

WHEREAS, the parties are the biological parents of minorLOUISMAXWELL(the“CHILD”)bornon22October2001;

WHEREAS, as a result of disputes and differences, the partiesarenowlivingseparatelyandapart;

WHEREAS, the parties desire to provide for a completesettlement of the issuespertaining to the custody, visitorial rights,supportandmaintenanceofthechild;

WHEREAS, each party acknowledges his or her personalobligations as parent of the child and, by these presents, eachherebyundertakestorendertheperformanceoftheseobligationstothechildandcomplywithhisorherdutiesasaparent;

NOW, THEREFORE, for and in consideration of the promisesand dispositions made in this agreement, the parties hereto haveagreedasfollows:

I.CUSTODYOFTHECHILD

The mother shall continue to have custody over LOUISMAXWELL while the father shall exercise visitorial rights ashereunderstated.

Bothparties,bythesepresents,undertaketotakeeverymeasurenecessary,desirableandproper,toconsiderthebestinterestofthechildatalltimes,whetherwiththemorawayfromthem.Anyact,wordormanipulativeschemethatmaycausethealienationof

540

540 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED

Viesca vs. Gilinsky

feelings or loss of respect or that either one or both of them, fromeitheroneoftheparties,shallneverbetolerated.

II.VISITATIONRIGHTS

Asthechildwillcontinuetobeinthecustodyofthemother,thefather,asthenon­custodialparentshallbeentitledtothefollowingsupervisedvisitationrights,towit:

He shall be entitled to the company of the child everySaturdayand/orSundayafternoon;

b.

c.

a.

b.

i.

ii.

iii

iv.

v.

Thechildshallbeallowedtospendthenightwiththefatheronceaweek;

Nothing herein shall prevent the father from visiting thechildduringreasonablehourintheafternoonofanydayofthe week at themother’s residence in the presence of themother or her duly designated representative, and withpriornoticetothemother.

One year after the signing of this agreement, the parties shallmeettodiscussandresolvethematterpertainingtotheentitlementof the father to enjoy a yearly, three­week vacation in anydestinationwiththechild.

Intheexerciseand/orenjoymentoftheaboverights,themothershall have the right to designate any person of suitable age toaccompanythechild.

III.SUPPORT

The father shall give monthly financial support of USDollars Five Hundred (US$500.00) or its Peso equivalentwithin the first five days of themonth effective upon thesigning of this agreement. The amount shall be subject tosuch yearly adjustment of such rate equal to the inflationratedeterminedbytheappropriategovernmentagency.

On top of the said monthly financial support, the Fathershallprovide:

fullmedicalanddentalexpensesand/orinsurancecoverageforthechild;

fulleducation forthechildatColegioSanAgustin,Makatioranyothersuitableschool;

collegeEducationInsuranceforthechild;

541

VOL.526,JULY4,2007 541

Viesca vs. Gilinsky

monthly car amortization of Ten Thousand Pesos(P10,000.00) or One Fourth (1/4) of the currentamortizationwhicheverislower;

MonthlyamortizationdueasofthedateofthisAgreementfortheRockwell­ManansalaCondominiumunituntilitsfullpaymentandtransferoftitle,includingitsassociationduesand charges. The mother here affirms/confirms she isholdingtitletothecondominiumintrustforthechild.

Themothershallensurethatallarrearsand/oroutstandingobligations

prior to the execution of this agreement shall have been settled and

paid. As soon as the above have been fully complied with, the father

shallpaytheensuingmonthlyamortization.

IV.COURTAPPROVALOFAGREEMENT

Thisagreementshallbegovernedbyandconstrued inaccordancewiththelawsoftheRepublicofthePhilippines.Thepartiesheretoshall,ingoodfaith,strictlyabidebythetermshereof.

Thepartiesagreetosubmitthiswrittenagreementforthecourt’s

approval.

V.JUDICIALRELIEF

ShouldeitheroneofthepartiesfailtocomplywiththetermsandconditionsofthisAgreement,theaggrievedpartymayseekjudicialreliefagainsttheerringpartyandapplywiththepropercourtforawrit of execution against said erring party to enforce his or herobligations imposed in this Agreement. The offending party shallpay for the cost of litigation, attorney’s fees, other expenses, andinterestincurredinsuchapplicationforawritofexecution.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, we have hereunto affixed ourrespectivesignaturesonthedateandplacehereinabovementioned.

(SGD.)DAVIDGILINSKY (SGD.)SHEILAT.VIESCA7

Father Mother

On 5 April 2005, respondent filed an “Urgent Motion forIssuanceofWritofExecution.”Itwasallegedinsaidmotion

_______________

7Id.

542

542 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED

Viesca vs. Gilinsky

thatpetitionerhadrepeatedlyrefusedtoabidebythetermsof the compromise judgment, particularly the provisionallowingLouisMaxwell tospendanightwithhimatanydayof theweek.Respondent likewisestated inhismotionthat he had already filed a Petition to cite petitioner incontemptwhichwasraffledofftotheRegionalTrialCourt,Branch59ofMakatiCity.

8

Respondent’s Urgent Motion for Issuance of Writ ofExecutionwasscheduledtobeheardon8April2005.Noticethereofwasreceivedbypetitioner’scounselon5April2005.

9

On7April2005,petitioner’scounselfiledaManifestation10

requestingthatthehearingonsaidmotionbereset,ashehadtobe inBalanga,Bataanonthedateandtimeofthescheduledhearing.HealsoprayedthathebegivenaperiodofsevendayswithinwhichtofilehisComment/Oppositionto respondent’s Urgent Motion for Issuance of Writ ofExecution.

Despite petitioner’s Manifestation, the trial court stillproceeded to hear respondent’s urgent motion on 8 April2005 and issued the Writ of Execution prayed for byrespondent.

11

On 9 April 2005, the court sheriff together withrespondent tried to serve the Writ of Execution uponpetitioner at her residence in Taguig City. Petitioner’smotherinformedthesheriffandrespondentthatpetitionerwas then at her office. The sheriff then asked petitioner’smothertoinformpetitionerabouttheserviceoftheWritofExecution.Afterabouthalfanhour,petitioner,herfather,andher lawyerAtty.JorgeManuelarrived.Atty.ManuelreceivedthecopyoftheWritofExecutionbutinformedthe

court sheriff that they would not comply with the court’sorderandwouldchallengethewrit.

12

_______________

8CARollo,pp.60­61.9Id.,atp.59.10Id.,atp.84.11Rollo,pp.260­261.12PerSheriff’sReportdated11April2005;Id.,atp.262.

543

VOL.526,JULY4,2007 543

Viesca vs. Gilinsky

As expected, petitioner filed a Motion to Quash Writ ofExecution

13 insisting that said writ was issued with

“indecent haste” violative of her right to due process, andthat the writ varied the terms of the CompromiseAgreement since it failed to take into consideration theparties’ understanding that in the enjoyment ofrespondent’s visitorial rights, petitioner “shall have therighttodesignateanypersonofsuitableagetoaccompanythechild.”

14

On15April 2005, petitioner’sMotion toQuashWrit ofExecutionwasheard.WhattranspiredduringthehearingwassummarizedbythetrialcourtinitsOrdergiveninopencourtasfollows:

“The Court heard the arguments raised by the counsel for the[herein petitioner] and the reply/comment thereto made by thecounsel for the [herein respondent]. The [herein petitioner] thrucounselimposedcertainconditionsifeverthevisitorialrightsofthe[hereinrespondent]wouldbegranted.Though[hereinpetitioners]wishedthatthoseconditionsbecontainedinanaffidavit,whichtothemindofthecourtwouldonlydelaytheresolutionofthemotion,thecourtthereuponorderedthatthestatementofthepetitionerbemadeorallybutunderoath,thus,[hereinrespondent]wasplacedinthewitnessstand.

Thereafter,thecourtruledtodenythemotiontoquashthewritof execution filed by [herein petitioner] thru counsel for lack ofmerit and grant the prayer of the [herein respondent] that he beallowed to exercise his visitorial rights over the minor LUISMAXWELL VIESCA today under the conditions imposed by the[hereinpetitioner],someofwhicharecontainedinthecompromiseagreement to which [herein respondent] promised under oath toobeythesame(sic).

WHEREFORE, let the [herein respondent] DAVID GILINSKYexercise his visitorial rights over the minor LUIS MAXWELLVIESCAonthefollowingconditions,towit:

_______________

13Id.,atpp.263­269.14Id.,atp.265.

544

1.

2.

3.

“3.

544 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED

Viesca vs. Gilinsky

[Herein respondent] shall surrender to the court hispassporteverytimeheiswithhischild;and

[Hereinrespondent]shallnotsecure/applyanotherpassport(sic)forhissonLUISMAXWELL;and

[Hereinpetitioner]shallexerciseherrighttodesignateanyperson of suitable age to accompany the child whenever[hereinrespondent]wouldexercisehisvisitorialright.

[Herein Petitioner] is commanded to bring the minor child LUISMAXWELL VIESCA to court not later than 3:00 o’clock thisafternoon, to be pick­up (sic) by the [herein private respondent],upontheserviceofhisordertothe[hereinpetitioner]bythesheriffofthiscourt.

Failureofthe [hereinpetitioner]tocomplywiththisordershallbea ground for contempt of this courtANDSHALLBEDEALTHWITHSEVERELY.”

15

In addition, petitioner alleges that in the course ofargument between the parties during this hearing, JudgeRebeccaMarianowasnotable tocontainherbiasagainstpetitioner when she reproved the latter’s “stubbornrefusal”

16 to comply with the Compromise Judgment.

BelievingthatJudgeMarianohadshownherpartialityinfavorofrespondent,petitioner’scounselmovedinopencourtforherinhibition.

17Tothis,JudgeMarianoremarked:

COURT

ALRIGHT, before I inhibit myself, the MOTION TO QUASH isDENIED andmy position granting visitorial rights of the child isGRANTED.

18

Subsequently,respondentfiledaManifestationwithMotiontoWithdrawMotionforTemporaryReliefofSupport

_______________

15Id.,atpp.270­271.16Id.,atp.8.17Id.18Id.,atpp.8­9citingTSN,15April2005,p.48.

545

VOL.526,JULY4,2007 545

Viesca vs. Gilinsky

dated 25 April 200519 to which petitioner filed her

Comment20asorderedbythetrialcourt.Intheirpleadings,

thepartiespresenteddisparateaccountsofwhattranspiredafterthehearingon15April2005.

Accordingtorespondent—

At3:00o’clockp.m. of saidafternoon, [herein respondent],together with undersigned counsel, promptly went to thecourttoawaitthearrivalofhisson,LouisMaxwell.

4.

5.

6.

At or about 4:00 o’clock, This Court’s sheriff informedundersigned counsel thathehad just serveda copy of theorderupontheadversecounsel.

Undersigned counsel immediately conferred with Atty. E.Perez, [herein petitioner’s] counsel, to arrange theimplementation of the above­quoted Order. Atty. Perezinformedundersignedofhisclient’sinabilitytocomplywiththe3:00o’clockmandategiventhattheOrderwasservedtoher only at 3:25 p.m., to which the undersigned counselrespondedbysayingthat[hereinpetitioner]couldstillhaveLouisMaxwell brought to court even after the designatedtime.

Despite the clear and unequivocal tenor of This Court’sOrder, Atty. Perez informed the undersigned counsel thatsince [herein petitioner] was still at work, his client couldonly bring the child at the lobby of Shangri­la hotel,Makati,ataround8:00o’clockp.m.ofthatday.

Undersigned counsel immediately rejected the proposedarrangementforthesamedoesnotonlyruncountertotheexpressmandateofThisCourt’sOrderbutmoreimportantlywoulddeprive[respondent] of spending quality time with his son—the raisond’etreofthestipulationintheCompromiseAgreementprovidinganovernightstay.Undersignedcounsel,moreover,explainedthat8:00o’clock p.m. is unreasonable and oppressive, not for [hereinrespondent] but more for the child, as the proposed time is theexpectedbedtimeofthree­yearolds.

Theadversecounsel,however,remainedinsistentthatthechildcouldonlybebroughtbythe[hereinpetitioner]at8:00o’clock

_______________

19Id.,atpp.437­445.20CARollo,pp.104­111.

546

546 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED

Viesca vs. Gilinsky

p.m.and intimated that since the court order cameasa “surprise”andwas served at past 3:00 p.m., [herein respondent] should notexpect[hereinpetitioner]toalterherscheduleatsuchshortnotice.

The undersigned counsel finally relented to the 8:00 o’clockarrangement as itwas clear that the adverse counsel and [hereinpetitioner] was (sic) unaffected by [herein respondent’s] earnestdesiretospendqualitytimewithhisson.

7.Albeittherepresentation[hereinpetitioner’s]counselthathisclient committed to bring the child at 8:00 o’clock at Shangri­la,Makati,[hereinpetitioner]arrivedatpast9:00o’clockp.m.[Hereinpetitioner]notonlybroughtthechildbutlikewisebroughtwithherthechild’sgrandmother (hereinpetitioner’smother)andseveralofher friends. And instead of allowing only one person to act asguardianoverLouisMaxwell,[hereinpetitioner]insistedonhavingbothherselfandhermotheraccompanyLouisduringhisovernightstay with [herein respondent]. [Herein respondent] had no choicebuttoaccedetosuchdemandlesthebedeprivedoncemoreofthe

a.

b.

enjoymentofhisright.xxxx10.Furthermore,[hereinpetitioner]arrivedatpast9o’clockp.m.

despite her undertaking that she will bring the child to [hereinrespondent]at8o’clockp.m.;[hereinpetitioner]alsoimposedontwoguardians:herselfandhermother,insteadofonlyoneguardian,asprovided in theCompromiseJudgment;The childwasnotallowedby[hereinpetitioner]tosleepin[hereinrespondent’s]roomandwasmadetosleepinherseparateroomwithhermother;finally,ontheargument thatovernightstaysimplymeanssleepingover, [hereinpetitioner] left with Louis and her mother at 6 o’clock in themorningof16April2005.”

21

Ontheotherhand,petitionercountered—

“4.ItisclearthereforethattherewasnothingintheoralargumentnorintheOrdergiveninopencourtthatthechildwassupposedtobe brought to Court at 3:00 p.m. that same day to accommodate[herein respondent’s] request for visitorial rights. Neither is theremention of the specific time in the Compromise Judgment. Itappearsthatitwas[hereinrespondent]whohadprior

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21Id.,atpp.438­442.

547

VOL.526,JULY4,2007 547

Viesca vs. Gilinsky

noticeoradvancedinformationastothecontentsoftheOrderfromhisManifestationthat—

“3.At3:00o’clockp.m.ofsaidafternoon,[hereinrespondent],together

with undersigned counsel, promptly went to the court to await the

arrivalofhisson,LouisMaxwell.”

“5.Undersigned counsel received a copy of theOrder dated 15April 2005 only at 4:15 p.m. of that same day, hence, it wasimpossiblefor[hereinpetitioner]tocomplywithOrdercommandingher to bring the child “to court not later than 3:00 o’clock thisafternoon.”Bethatasitmay,counselimmediatelygotintouchwith[herein petitioner] to advise her to comply with the Order but[hereinpetitioner]statedshecouldnotleaveherofficeimmediatelybecauseofpriorcommitmentandinsteadsuggestedthatshewouldbring the child to [herein respondent] ShangrilaHotel resident intheevening.Hereoncounsel relayed the information/suggestion to[herein respondent’s] counsel and after a series of calls, anarrangementwasmade for the evening.What actually happenedthatevening,thepartieshaddifferentaccounts.

6.[Hereinpetitioner]maintainsthat—

Shearrived lateat littlepast9:00o’clockbecauseofheavytraffic.ItwasaFriday,paydayandlastdayforincometaxpayment.

[Herein respondent] conveniently failed to mention thatwhen [herein petitioner] arrived with the child LouisMaxwell at the hotel lobby, they were met by [herein

“a.

b.

respondent] together with three (3) Manulife insuranceagents and a physician. [Herein respondent] and theinsurancemen tried almost to coercion to convince [hereinpetitioner] to agree that the child be subjected to medicalexamination that night so that [herein respondent] couldsecure a multimillion insurance policy for the child withDavid Gilinsky as the sole beneficiary. [Herein petitioner]naturallydidnotagree.[Hereinpetitioner]doesnotwanttospeculatebutthecircumstances,timeandmanneroftakingthe policy appears to be dubious. The fact remains thatwhateverdesireof[hereinrespondent]tospendqualitytimewiththechildwascloudedwhenheallowedthese

548

548 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED

Viesca vs. Gilinsky

insurancemen toget in thewaywhen theyshouldnotbethereinthefirstplace.”

22

On26April2005,petitionerfiledan“Ex ParteReiterativeMotion to Inhibit” claiming that JudgeMariano could nolonger handle the case “with the cold neutrality of animpartial judge”

23 because of her statement pertaining to

petitioner’s failuretoabidebytheCompromiseJudgment.Respondentfiledhisoppositionthereto,arguingthatJudgeMariano’s remarkwasmerelybasedonherobservationofpetitioner’sbehaviorandattitudeduringtheproceedingsofthiscase.

24

On17May2005,respondentoncemorefiledaMotionforthe Issuance of a Writ of Execution, contending thatpetitioner had repeatedly failed to comply with theiragreement as regards his visitorial rights over LouisMaxwell.Respondentclaimedthatpetitionerreliedonthefact that as the Compromise Judgment did not state thetime when LouisMaxwell should be in his company, shehad insisted on an 8:00 o’clock p.m. to 6:00 o’clock a.m.schedule. Respondent also lamented petitioner’s habit ofreneging,atthelastminute,ontheiragreementsoverLouisMaxwell’s weekend visits with him and petitioner’sinsistence that two guardians accompany Louis Maxwellduring his overnight stays.

25 Thus, respondent prayed for

thefollowing:

Tocommand[hereinpetitioner]tobringthechildtoeither This Court or to the [herein respondent’s]residencenot later than3:00 p.m. of 20May2005andforthechildtobeallowedtoleavethecompanyof the [herein respondent] at 4:00 p.m. of 21May2005;andTodirectthe[hereinpetitioner]pay(sic)theamountofP295,000.00,asandbywayofattorney’sfees.

_______________

22Id.,atpp.10­11.23Id.,atpp.158­159.

a.

24Id.,atpp.415­419.25Id.,atpp.430­431.

549

VOL.526,JULY4,2007 549

Viesca vs. Gilinsky

Otherreliefjustandequitableunderthecircumstancesarelikewiseprayedfor.”

26

InherComment,27petitionerassertedthatJudgeMariano

should no longer rule on respondent’smotion, since therewasapendingmotion forher to inhibit.She likewise tookthe opportunity to refute respondent’s allegations withregardtoherpurportedfailuretoobservethetermsoftheCompromiseJudgment.Petitionerclaimedthaton14May2005,LouisMaxwellfellsickandsoshewasunabletobringhimtoprivaterespondent.Infact,petitioner’scounselevensent a letter dated 16 May 2005 to respondent’s lawyerexplaining her “version of the story.”

28 She also posed

objection to respondent’s plea that Louis Maxwell bebroughteithertothetrialcourtortohimsincethechildwasstillsick,andtakinghimoutofthehousewouldonlyworsenhis condition. Moreover, petitioner argued that to grantrespondent’sprayerwouldcontravenetheprovisionsoftheCompromiseJudgmentunderwhichhisentitlementtothecompanyofhissoneveryweekendisaseparateanddistincttermfromhisrighttospendanightwiththechild.Shealsoclaimedthatasagreedupon,respondentshouldbetheoneto pick up the child and to return him to her. Finally,petitionerassailedrespondent’sprayerforattorney’sfeesforlackofbasis.

Meanwhile, Judge Mariano issued an Order dated 16May 2005, directing the parties to attend an in­chamberconferenceon20May2005relativetorespondent’sMotiontoWithdrawSupportandpetitioner’sEx ParteReiterativeMotiontoInhibit.

29

In respondent’s Comment to the present Petition, it isclaimedthatthefollowingtermswereagreeduponbythe

_______________

26Id.,atpp.432­433.27CARollo,pp.108­111.28Id.,atp.109.29Rollo,p.436.

550

550 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED

Viesca vs. Gilinsky

parties during the in­chamber conferenceheld on 20May2005:

The respective counsels of eachpartywillmeet on26 May 2005 to agree on the time frame for the

b.

c.

d.

e.

“a)

sleepoverprovision;Pendingtheconclusionoftheagreement,thechildwill be fetched from thePetitioner’s residence at 6o’clockp.m.andwillbebroughtbackat9o’clocka.m.the followingday,effectiveMay2021andMay27­28.Private Respondent is to surrender his passportduringthesevisits.Petitioner’s mother will act as the designatedguardian;andThe withdrawal of the parties’ respective motions,i.e., Petitioner’s Reiterative Motion to Inhibit andMotiontoWithdrawSupport.”

30

The 20­21 May 2005 sleepover proceeded as scheduled.31

However, discord between the parties resurfaced whenrespondentwasunabletospendtimewithLouisMaxwellon27­28May 2005. It appears that petitioner’smother, whowas the designated accompanying guardian, got sick andbecauseofthis,respondentdidnotenjoythecompanyofhisson. Once more, respondent sought the trial court’sintervention through his Very Urgent Motion to Enforceand Enjoy Visitorial Rights dated 30 May 2005.

32

Respondentaverredthereinthaton27May2005,hesenthis driver to fetch Louis Maxwell and his maternalgrandmotherpursuanttotheagreementforgedon20May2005.Whenhisdriverreachedpetitioner’sresidence,hewasinformed that Louis Maxwell and his grandmother couldnot go with him, as the grandmother was allegedly sick.RespondentclaimedthatLouisMaxwell’s

_______________

30 Id., at p. 373; In her Reply dated 10 October 2006, petitioner

contends that she never agreed to the withdrawal of her Reiterative

MotiontoInhibit.31CARollo,p.126.32Id.,atpp.114­124.

551

VOL.526,JULY4,2007 551

Viesca vs. Gilinsky

grandmotherwasmerelyfeigningsicknesssincesherefusedhisoffertogetmedicalhelp.Besides,hadpetitionerreallyintended to abide by their agreement, respondent arguedthat she could have appointed one of her brothers or hersister to accompany Louis Maxwell during his sleepover.Thus,respondentconcludedthatthetotalityofpetitioner’sconduct unmasked her lack of interest in observing theCompromise Judgment, particularlyClause II thereof.Hethereforeprayedforthefollowingreliefs:

To allow (him) to have the company of his son onWednesday,June1, 2005,beginning6:00p.m.up to9:00a.m.ofthefollowingday.Forthispurpose,forthisCourtto

b)

c)

d)

further allow (him) to fetchhis son at [herein petitioner’s]residenceandbringhimbackat[hereinpetitioner’s]abodenotlaterthan9:00a.m.ofthefollowingday.

Todesignatethehoursof6:00p.m.ofanygivenFridayto9:00a.m.ofthefollowingday,astheregulardayandhoursatwhichthe[hereinrespondent]canenjoythecompanyofhissonpursuanttoClauseIIoftheCompromiseJudgmentdatedMay12,2004.

TodesignatetheCourtSheriffand/oranyothercourtofficerto act as the accompanying guardian of Louis MaxwellViescaGilinskyduringtheimplementationoftheprayedforrelief under paragraph (a) hereof and of the sleep­overprovision mentioned in Clause II of the CompromiseJudgment.

Tocommand[hereinpetitioner]topaytheamountofThirtyThousand Pesos (P30,000.00), as and by way of cost oflitigation, attorney’s fees and other expenses pursuant toClauseVoftheCompromiseJudgment.

Justandequitablereliefsprayedforunderthecircumstances.”33

Respondent requested that his Very Urgent Motion toEnforce and Enjoy Visitorial Rights be heard on 1 June2005 notwithstanding the three­day notice rule requiredunderthe

_______________

33Id.,atpp.121­122.

552

552 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED

Viesca vs. Gilinsky

RevisedRulesofCivilProcedure,ashewasabouttogoonatwo­weekbusinesstripon3June2005.

Petitionerposedherobjectiontorespondent’smotion,asit violated the three­day notice rule. She also denied thatthe27May2005incidentwasherfaultashermotherwasreallynotfeelingwellthatday.Shedenouncedrespondent’sfixationover thecancellationofLouisMaxwell’ssleepoverthat night, in total disregard of the fact that the 20May2005scheduledsleepoverpushedthroughasagreedupon.She claimed that she did not have any reason to depriverespondentofhisrightsundertheCompromiseJudgment,and so there was no need for respondent to file his VeryUrgentMotiontoEnforceandEnjoyVisitorialRights.

34On

1June2005,JudgeMarianorenderedthefollowingOrder:

O R D E R

Set for today’s hearing is theVeryUrgentMotion toEnforce andEnjoy Visitorial Rights filed by the [herein respondent] and theComment thereto filedby the [hereinpetitioner].TheCourtheardtheargumentsbetweenthepartiesaccusingeachotherofviolationofthecompromiseagreement.

The [hereinrespondent]wanted topresent testimonialevidencetoprovehisallegation in themotionbutwhichwasdeniedby theCourtforlackofmaterialtime.

TheCourtlikewiseremindedthepartiesthefactthatthe[hereinrespondent] surrenders his passport everytime he exercises hisvisitorial right was voluntary on his part and not as part of thecompromiseagreement.

WHEREFORE,thecourtruledthatthe[hereinrespondent]canexercisehisvisitorialrighttodayat6:00o’clockintheeveningtobeaccompaniedbythesheriffofthiscourt.Ifthe[hereinpetitioner]isnot available nor the grandmother to accompany theminor child,the court instructed the [herein petitioner] to appoint anotherpersonwhocanaccompanythechildsoasnottoavoidanydelayinfetching

_______________

34Id.,atpp.125­129.

553

VOL.526,JULY4,2007 553

Viesca vs. Gilinsky

theminor child.Likewise themotionwas reset toJuly1, 2005,at10:30o’clockinthemorning.

Considering that the very urgent motion filed by the [hereinrespondent] was commented or objected to by the [hereinpetitioner’s]counsel,letthe[hereinrespondent],thrucounselfileareplywithinfive(5)daysfromreceiptofthisOrderandthe[hereinpetitioner]isgiventhesameperiodoftimefromreceiptofthereplywithinwhichtofilearejoinder,ifshesodesires.

SOORDERED.Giveninopencourt,this1stdayofJune2005,atMakatiCity.

REBECCAR.MARIANOJudge

35

On 16 June 2005, Judge Mariano proceeded to resolverespondent’sveryurgentmotioninthefollowingmanner:

O R D E R

Before theCourt is theVeryUrgentMotion toEnforceandEnjoyVisitorial Rights filed by the [herein respondent] thru counsel,alleging among others, that [herein petitioner] had once againprovenherselftobeunfaithfultoherpromisesandrepresentations,citingtheincidentwhichhappenedon27May2005,thescheduledmeeting of the [herein respondent] andhis son.On the saiddate,[herein petitioner’s] grandmother (sic) became sick, however, thelatter refused the offer of the petitioner to getmedical help. Saidalleged illness became more doubtful when the grandmotherinsisted onbeingwell enough to push throughwith the visitationbut at 9:00 o’clock in the evening instead of 6:00 o’clock in theevening,aspreviouslyagreeduponbytheparties.

OntheCommentfiledbythe[hereinpetitioner],shestatedthatthepresentmotion should be denied because it violates the three­day notice rule and there is no good cause to set the hearing onshorternotice.

Weshallnowruleonthemotion.

1.

2.

3.

Under Section 4, Rule 15 of the Revised Rules of Court andfollowing the pronouncements by the High Court in the cases ofCled

_______________

35Rollo,p.81.

554

554 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED

Viesca vs. Gilinsky

era, et al. vs. Sarmiento, et al.,39SCRA552;Estipora vs. Navarro,69 SCRA 285, the motion under consideration should have beendismissed ourtright, however, the above­cited provision or thesocalledthree­daynoticeruleisnotabsolute.Likeanyotherrule,itadmits of exception, i.e. urgent motions (Remedial LawCompendium, Vol. 1, Regalado). Moreover, in the interest ofsubstantial justice, thisCourt finds it imperative andnecessary tobrush­aside any technicality since the issue involved herein isbasically the natural right of a father to enjoy the company andpresenceofhisbelovedson.TothemindoftheCourt,thebestandmost applicable law in cases of this nature is the conscience ofuntroubledandunprejudicedmajesty.Finally,therightofcustodyaccordedtoparents’springsfromtheexerciseofparentalauthority(Santos Sr. vs. Court of Appeals,242SCRA407).Hence,themotionunderconsiderationisherebygivenduecourse.

Accordingly, [herein petitioner] is ordered to perform thefollowing,towit:

Allow [herein respondent] to enjoy the company of LouisMaxwellon24June2005andoneveryFridayofeachweekstarting from 6:00 pm to 9:00 am of the following day,pursuanttoClauseIIofthecompromiseJudgmentdated12May2004;

TheDeputySheriffofthiscourtisherebydesignatedtoactas the accompanying guardian of Louis Maxwell ViescaGilinskyduringtheimplementationoftheprayedforreliefunderparagraph1hereof;

Paythe[hereinrespondent]theamountofThirtyThousandPesos (Php 30,000.00), as and byway of cost of litigation,attorney’sfeesandotherexpensespursuanttoClauseVoftheCompromiseAgreement.

As regards the prayer under paragraph (a) of the motion, thesameisdeniedforbeingmootandacademic.

SOORDERED.GiveninChambersthis16thJune2005,MakatiCity.

REBECCAR.MARIANOJudge

36

_______________

36Id.,atpp.79­80.

555

VOL.526,JULY4,2007 555

Viesca vs. Gilinsky

Duringthehearingon1July2005,itwasclarifiedthattheDeputy Sheriff would act as accompanying guardian ofLouis Maxwell only in case of the unavailability ofpetitioner orher failure to designate the child’s overnightcompanion.

37

Aggrieved, petitioner elevated the case via Petition forCertiorari and Prohibition before the Court of Appealsseekingthereversalandsettingasideofthe16June2005Orderof thetrialcourtaswellas itsOrdersdated1June2005and8April2005.

38

In her petition with the Court of Appeals, petitionercontended that the assailed Order dated 16 June 2005altered or amended the Compromise Judgment. Sheassertedthatbyapprovingrespondent’sprayerthathebegiven the right to enjoy LouisMaxwell’s company “everyFridayofeachweekstartingfrom6:00p.m.to9:00a.m.ofthe following day,” JudgeMariano alteredClause II(b) ofthe Compromise Judgment which states that “(t)he childshallbeallowedtospendthenightwiththe fatheronceaweek.” As the Compromise Judgment did not specificallyprovide for the day and time of the week when LouisMaxwellshouldbeinthecompanyofrespondent,thetrialcourtexceededitsjurisdictionwhenitrenderedits16June2005Order. Inaddition, shecontends thatbydesignatingtheDeputySheriffofthecourttoactastheaccompanyingguardianofthechildduringthelatter’ssleepovers,thetrialcourt again disregarded the terms of the CompromiseJudgment with respect to the appointment of LouisMaxwell’s guardian whenever he visits with respondent.These alterations, petitioner argues, should not bepermitted since a compromise agreement, once it wasapprovedbythecourt,hastheforceofres judicatabetweenthepartiesandshouldnotbedisturbedexcept forvicesofconsentor

_______________

37CARollo,pp.313­314.38Id.,atpp.1­23.

556

556 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED

Viesca vs. Gilinsky

forgery.39 The court is not allowed to impose a judgment

differentfromthetermsoftheagreement.40

PetitioneralsoinsistedthatJudgeMarianoshoulddesistfromfurtherhearingthecasebelow.

On 19 October 2005, the Court of Appeals partiallygranted the petition by deleting the award of P30,000.00that the trial court awarded to private respondent in itsOrder of 16 June 2005. The dispositive portion of theDecisionoftheCourtofAppealsstates:

A.

B.

“WHEREFORE,thepetitionisPARTIALLYGRANTEDinthattheOrder dated June 16, 2005 is MODIFIED. The award of ThirtyThousand Pesos (Php30,000.00), as and by way of litigation cost,attorney’s fees and other expenses pursuant to clause V of theCompromise Judgment in favor of private respondent isDELETED.”

41

Petitioner’sMotion for Reconsideration was denied in theResolutionpromulgatedon24February2006.

42

Hence,thepresentrecourseraisingthefollowingissuesforourconsideration:

_______________

39Rollo,p.265citingArticles2037and2038oftheCivilCodewhich

respectivelyprovide:

Art.2037.Acompromisehasupontheparties theeffectandauthorityofres

judicata;but thereshallbenoexecutionexcept in compliancewitha judicial

compromise.

Art. 2038. A compromise in which there is mistake, fraud, violence,

intimidation, undue influence, or falsity of documents, is subject to the

provisionsofarticle1330ofthisCode.

However,oneofthepartiescannotsetupamistakeof factasagainstthe

otherifthelatter,byvirtueofthecompromise,haswithdrawnfromalitigation

alreadycommenced.

40CitingPhilippine Bank of Communications v. Echiverri, G.R. No.

L­41795,29August1980,99SCRA508,527.41Rollo,p.42.42Id.,atpp.44­45.

557

VOL.526,JULY4,2007 557

Viesca vs. Gilinsky

WITHALLDUERESPECT, THECOURTOFAPPEALSERREDIN DECIDING A QUESTION OF LAW, NOT THERETOFOREDETERMINED BY THIS HONORABLE COURT, AND/ORDECIDINGITINAWAYNOTINACCORDWITHLAWORWITHAPPLICABLE DECISIONS OF THIS HONORABLE COURTCONSIDERINGTHAT—

THE TRIAL COURT AMENDED OR ALTERED THETERMSOFTHECOMPROMISE JUDGMENTWITHOUTTHECONCURRENCEOFBOTHPARTIESTHERETO.

RESPONDENTJUDGEISSUEDTHEASSAILEDORDERAMENDINGTHECOMPROMISEJUDGMENTINHASTEAND WITHOUT EVIDENTIARY SUPPORT AS IT WASISSUED WITHOUT WAITING FOR THE SCHEDULEDHEARING OF THE MOTION FILED BY PRIVATERESPONDENT AND DESPITE THE PENDINGMOTIONTOINHIBIT.

43

Thepetitionispartlymeritorious.A compromise agreement has been described as a

contract whereby the parties, by making reciprocalconcessions,avoidalitigationorputanendtoonealready

commenced.44Acompromiseagreementthat is intendedto

resolveamatteralreadyunderlitigationisnormallycalleda judicial compromise. Once it is stamped with judicialimprimatur,itbecomesmorethanamerecontractbindingupon the parties. Having the sanction of the court andenteredas itsdeterminationof the controversy, ithas theforce and effect of any other judgment.

45 Such agreement

hastheforceoflawandisconclusivebetweentheparties.Ittranscendsitsidentityasamerecontractbindingonlyuponthepartiesthereto,foritbecomesajudgmentthatissubjecttoexecutioninaccordancewiththe

_______________

43Id.,atp.16.44David v. Court of Appeals,G.R. No. 97240, 16 October 1992, 214

SCRA644,650.45Armed Forces of the Philippines Mutual Benefit Association, Inc. v.

Court of Appeals,370Phil.150,163;311SCRA143,154­155(1999).

558

558 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED

Viesca vs. Gilinsky

Rules.46Thus,acompromiseagreementthathasbeenmade

and duly approved by the court attains the effect andauthority of res judicata, although no execution may beissued unless the agreement receives the approval of thecourtwhere the litigation ispendingandcompliancewiththetermsoftheagreementisdecreed.

47

The settlement of disputes brought before the courts isencouraged. In fact, in theCivilCode and in theRevisedRulesofCourt,courtsaredirectedtopersuadethelitigantsincivilcasestoagreeuponsomefaircompromise.

48

Unfortunately in the case before us, the compromiseagreemententeredintobetweenthepartiesfellwayshortofitsobjectiveoffinallyputtinganendtotheirdispute.Thesheer number of incidentswhich cropped up shortly afterthe trial court’s approval of the compromise agreementrevealsthatthecompromisejudgmentfailedtobringpeaceto the parties. Interestingly enough, the only points ofdisagreementareClauseII(b)oftheCompromiseJudgmentwhichpertainstotheovernightvisitsofLouisMaxwellwithrespondent and the last paragraph of the same clauseregarding the appointment of the child’s accompanyingguardian.

Clause II(b) states that “(t)he child shall be allowed tospendthenightwiththefatheronceaweek.”Thesentence

_______________

46Manila International Airport Authority (MIAA) v. ALA Industries

Corporation,G.R.No.147349,13February2004,422SCRA603,611.47Martir v. Verano,G.R. No. 170395, 28 July 2006, 497 SCRA 120,

126­127.48Art.2029,CivilCode:

TheCourtshallendeavortopersuadethelitigantsinacivilcasetoagreeupon

somefaircompromise.

Rule18,Section2(a)oftheRevisedRulesofCourt:

Sec.2.Nature and purpose.—xxx.

(a) The possibility of an amicable settlement or of a submission to

alternativemodesofdisputeresolutions.(Emphasissupplied)

559

VOL.526,JULY4,2007 559

Viesca vs. Gilinsky

seems simple enough to be understood by a layman.Petitioner claims that the parties did not specify the dayandtimeoftheweekwhenprivaterespondentcouldenjoytheovernightcompanyofLouisMaxwellinordertogivetheparties“someflexibility”andtogivethemtheopportunitytoarrangetheschedulethemselves.

49Butthepartieshave

overstretchedtheindeterminatelanguageofsaidprovision.Indeed, the parties have been at odds over theinterpretationandimplementationofthisplainprovisionofthe Compromise Judgment and this could have causedmuch confusion in themind of the young LouisMaxwellwhohad to be brought from one place to another at suchunholyhours of thenight only tobeawakened fromdeepslumber in the early hours of themorning to be taken toanotherplace.Andyet,allofthesecouldhavebeenavoidedhadthepartiesoptedtobemorespecificintheiragreement.Thequestion thusbecomes: can the trial courtmodify, bymotionofoneoftheparties,aCompromiseJudgment?Weholdinthenegative.

Toreiterate,acompromisejudgmenthastheforceofresjudicata between the parties and should not be disturbedexcept for vices of consent or forgery

50 which private

respondentdoesnotallegeinthiscase.More importantly and as correctly pointed out by

petitioner, it is settled that neither the courts nor quasi­judicial bodies can impose upon the parties a judgmentdifferent from their compromise agreement or against thevery terms and conditions of their agreement

51 without

contravening the universally established principle that acontractisthelawbe­

_______________

49Rollo,p.20.50Binamira v. Ogan­Occeña,G.R. No. L­27777, 23March 1987, 148

SCRA677,683.51Philippine Bank of Communications v. Echiverri, supranote40at

p.527.

560

560 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED

Viesca vs. Gilinsky

tween the parties.52 The courts can only approve the

agreement of parties. They can not make a contract forthem.

53

Nevertheless,wecannottotallyblamethetrialcourtforhavinggrantedrespondent’sVeryUrgentMotiontoEnforceandEnjoyVisitorialRights.Perhaps,initsdesiretofinallyputtorestthebothersomeissueconcerningClauseII(b)ofthe Compromise Judgment and to prevent futuredisagreementsbetweentheparties,thetrialcourtsawthewisdom,asthisCourtdoes,inprovidingthespecificsinthesaidindefiniteportionoftheCompromiseJudgment.AswepreviouslyheldinthecaseofHernandez v. Colayco

54—

“This is not the first unfortunate instance that a compromisejudgment of a trial court has given rise to subsequent prolongedcontroversy, only because the trial judge failed to exercise therequired degree of care in seeing to it that neither ambiguity norincompletenessofdetailsshouldcharacterize theagreement,muchless the judgment rendered on the basis thereof. The expresseddesireofthepartiestoendtheirjudicialtravailsbysubmittingtoacompromise deserves the utmost attention from the court, and noeffort should be spared in helping them arrive at a definite andunequivocalterminationoftheirproblemsanddifferences.Itishightime that the matter­of­fact treatment usually accorded by trialcourtstomotionstoapprovecompromiseswereabandonedinfavorof the more positive activist attitude the situation demands. Inacting insuchasituation, the judgeshouldbear inmindthat theobjective is to end the disagreement between the parties, not tobegin a new one.Thus, if the parties and their counsel areunable to do it, the judge is expected to assist them inattaining precision and accuracy of language that wouldmore or less make it certain that any disputes as to thematters being settled

_______________

52Municipal Board of Cabanatuan City v. Samahang Magsasaka, Inc.,

G.R.No.L­25818,25February1975,62SCRA435,438439.53De Guia v. Romillo, Jr.,G.R.No.51143,22March1990,183SCRA

480,484.54G.R.No.L­39800,27June1975,64SCRA480,487.

561

VOL.526,JULY4,2007 561

Viesca vs. Gilinsky

would not recur, much less give rise to a new controversy.”(Emphasissupplied.)

Resultantly,aremandofthiscaseisnecessarytoallowtheparties themselves to resolve the matter regarding theimplementation of Clause II(b) of the CompromiseJudgment. In this regard, the rule on immutability forpurposesofexecutiondoesnotattachtoajudgmentthatismateriallyequivocalorwhichsuffersfromeitherpatentorlatentambiguity.

55Toobviatefurtherdiscordbetweenthem

andtoprecludetheirrecoursetothetrialcourteverytimeoneofthemperceivesaviolationcommittedbytheotherofClause II(b) of the Compromise Judgment, we direct the

trialcourttobeonguardandensurethatthepartieswouldlay out in concrete, specific details the terms of theiragreement as to this specific matter as well of theappointmentofLouisMaxwell’saccompanyingguardian.

TurningnowtothequestionofwhetherJudgeMarianoshould inhibit herself from the case, we rule in favor ofrespondent.

The pertinent provision of Rule 137, Section 1, of theRevisedRulesofCourtstates:

“SECTION 1. Disqualification of judges.—No judge or judicialofficer shall sit in any case in which he, or his wife or child, ispecuniarily interested as heir, legatee, creditor or otherwise, or inwhich he is related to either party within the sixth degree ofconsanguinity or affinity, or to counsel within the fourth degree,computedaccordingtotherulesofthecivillaw,orinwhichhehasbeen executor, administrator, guardian, trustee or counsel, or inwhich he has presided in any inferior court when his ruling ordecision is thesubjectof review,without thewrittenconsentofallpartiesininterest,signedbythemandenteredupontherecord.

A judge may, in the exercise of his sound discretiondisqualify himself from sitting in a case, for just or validreasons other than those mentioned above.” (Emphasissupplied)

_______________

55Id.,atp.489.

562

562 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED

Viesca vs. Gilinsky

ThisCourthasruledthattodisqualifyornottodisqualifyisa matter of conscience and is addressed primarily to thesenseof fairnessandjusticeofthe judgeconcerned.

56 Said

discretionisgrantedtojudges,sincetheyareinthebetterposition to determine the issue of voluntary inhibition, astheyaretheoneswhodirectlydealwiththepartiesintheircourtrooms.

57 The test that must be applied in questions

involvingtheproprietyofthedenialofamotiontoinhibitiswhether themovantwas deprived of a fair and impartialtrial.

58Inthiscase,weholdthatpetitionerwasnotdeprived

ofherdayincourt,forshewasabletofilehercommentsonand/orobjectionstothemotionsfiledbyprivaterespondent.She, therefore, was able to ventilate her positions on theissuesbroughtbeforethetrialcourt.

As regards Judge Mariano’s remark regardingpetitioner’s obstinacy, we agree with private respondentthat the same is not a sufficient ground for publicrespondentto inhibitherself. Indeed,“(o)pinionsformedinthecourseofjudicialproceedings,aslongastheyarebasedon the evidence presented and conduct observed by thejudge,evenif foundlaterontobeerroneous,donotprovepersonal bias or prejudice on the part of the judge.”

59

Moreover, a single comment uttered by the publicrespondent in the course of theproceedings shouldnot be

takentobegenerallyillustrativeofherconductinhearingand determining the outcome of the entire case. Suchisolated remark should not be taken to mean that publicrespondenthascrossedthelineseparatingcoldimpartialityfromunbridledbias.

_______________

56Flores v. Court of Appeals,328Phil.992,1019;259SCRA618,640

(1996).57People v. Ong, G.R. Nos. 162130­39, 5May 2006, 489 SCRA 679,

687.58Soriano v. Court of Appeals,416Phil.226,250;363SCRA725,746

(2001).59Rollo, p. 392 citingSeveses v. Court of Appeals,375 Phil. 64, 73;

316SCRA605,612­613(1999).

563

VOL.526,JULY4,2007 563

Viesca vs. Gilinsky

WHEREFORE,premisesconsidered,thepresentPetitionisPARTIALLY GRANTED. The Decision of the Court ofAppealsinCA­G.R.SPNo.90285dated19October2005,isherebyREVERSEDandSETASIDEinsofarasitaffirmedthe Order dated 16 June 2005 of the RTC, Branch 136,MakatiCityinSPProc.CaseNo.M­5785,amendingClauseII(b)oftheCompromiseJudgmentandthelastparagraphof Clause II. Petitioner’s prayer, however, that JudgeRebeccaMarianooftheRTC,Branch136,MakatiCity,bedirected to inhibit herself from hearing said case isDENIED.

JudgeMarianoisorderedtoholdfurtherproceedingstoallow the parties to agree SPECIFICALLY andDEFINITIVELY on how the overnight visits of LouisMaxwell with respondent and the appointment of saidchild’s accompanying guardian would be implementedwithinten(10)daysfromreceipthereof.Nocosts.

SOORDERED.

Ynares­Santiago (Chairperson), Austria­MartinezandNachura, JJ.,concur.

Petition partially granted, judgment reversed and setaside.

Notes.—A judge shouldnothandlea case inwhichhemightbeperceived,rightlyorwrongly,tobesusceptibletobias and partiality. (Sandoval vs. Court of Appeals, 260SCRA283[1996])

Whileajudgeisontherightpathintryingtoresolveorterminate promptly the criminal cases assigned to him,choosingandpursuingamicablesettlementasthemannerof furthering the same is not generally acceptable incriminalcases.(Re: Report on Audit and Physical Inventoryof the Records of Cases in the MTC of Peñaranda, NuevaEcija,276SCRA257[1997])

——o0o——

564

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