VERBAL LEARNING AND MEMORY: Does the Modal Model …VERBALLEARNING AND MEMORY: Does the Modal Model...

0066-4308/96/0201-0143$08.00 143

Annu.Rev. Psychol. 1996.47:143–72Copyright© 1996by AnnualReviewsInc. All rightsreserved

VERBAL LEARNING AND MEMORY:DoestheModal Model Still Work?

AliceF. HealyandDanielleS. McNamara

Department of Psychology,Muenzinger Building, University of Colorado,CampusBox345, Boulder,Colorado80309-0345

KEY WORDS: memory models,primary memory, sensory memory, secondary memory, work-ing memory

ABSTRACT

Thischapterfocusesonrecent researchconcerningverballearningandmemory.A prominent guiding framework for research on this topic over the past threedecadeshasbeenthemodal model of memory,whichpostulatesdistinctsensory,primary, andsecondary memory stores. Although this model continuesto bepopular, it has fosteredmuch debateconcerning itsvalidity and specifically theneed for itsthreeseparatememorystores. Thechapterreviewsresearchsupport-ing and research contradicting themodal model, aswell asalternative modernframeworks.Extensionsof themodal model arediscussed, includingthesearchof associative memory model, theperturbation model, precategorical acousticstore,and permastore.Alternative approachesarediscussed including workingmemory, conceptual short-term memory, long-term working memory, short-termactivationandattention,processingstreams,thefeaturemodel, distinctive-ness,andprocedural reinstatement.

CONTENTSINTRODUCTION..................................................................................................................... 144BACKGROUND....................................................................................................................... 144PRIMARY MEMORY.............................................................................................................. 146

ModernExtensionsof the Modal Model ............................................................................ 148Additional Memory Systems................................................................................................ 153Unitary Memory System........................... ......................................................................... 159Summary.............................................................................................................................. 161

SENSORY MEMORY.............................................................................................................. 161Precategorical Acoustic Store............................................................................................. 161

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Processing Streams.................................. ......................................................................... 163FeatureModel..................................................................................................................... 164Summary.............................................................................................................................. 165

SECONDARY MEMORY........................................................................................................ 165Permastore .......................................................................................................................... 165Procedural Reinstatement................................................................................................... 166Summary.............................................................................................................................. 167

CONCLUSION ......................................................................................................................... 168

INTRODUCTION

This chapterfocuseson recentresearchconcerningverballearningandmem-ory. A prominentguiding frameworkfor researchon this topic over the pastthree decadeshas beenthe modal model of memory (Atkinson & Shiffrin1968, Glanzer& Cunitz 1966, Waugh & Norman 1965), which postulatesdistinctsensory,primary,andsecondarymemorystores.Although this modelcontinuesto be popular,it hasfosteredmuch debateconcerningits validityand,specifically,theneed for itsthree separate memorystores.In thischapter,we reviewresearchsupporting andresearchcontradictingthemodalmodelaswell asalternativemodernframeworks.We beginby summarizingtheempiri-cal supportfor theoriginal model.The remainderof thechapteraddressesinturn issuesconcerningeach of thethree memorystores.1

BACKGROUND

An initial statementof what hassincebeentermedthe modalmodel canbetracedto James(1890), who distinguishedbetweenprimary and secondarymemory.Jamesdescribedprimarymemoryasthatwhich is heldmomentarilyin consciousnessand secondarymemoryas unconsciousbut permanent.Animportantimpetusto modernversionsof themodalmodelwasthediscoverythat a short sequenceof items is forgottenwithin secondswhenrehearsalisprevented by a distractor task interpolatedbetweenitem presentationandrecall (Brown 1958,Peterson& Peterson1959;but seeMelton 1963).Otherfindingsthatalsoinvited the distinction betweenprimary and secondarymem-ory includedneuropsychological studies of amnesicpatientsunableto formnew long-termmemories(Milner 1966,but seeGraf et al 1984)andstudiesshowing that short-termmemory (STM)tended to relyon phonetic coding andlong-termmemory(LTM) on semanticcoding(Baddeley1966,but seeShul-man 1971).

144 HEALY & MCNAMARA

1It should be noted that this chapter is not intended to cover the entire spectrum of recent

researchon verbal learning andmemory. Forexample, spacelimitations donot allow usto reviewindirect measures(Richardson-Klavehn & Bjork 1988), mathematical models (Raaijmakers &Shiffr in 1992), or neuropsychological studies (Squire etal 1993) of memory.

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Modern descriptionsof the modal model were presentedby Waugh &Norman(1965)andGlanzer& Cunitz (1966),andthe fullest descriptionwasprovidedby Atkinson & Shiffrin (1968),who addedsensorymemoryto theprimaryandsecondarymemorydichotomy. Specifically,Atkinson & Shiffrinpostulatedthreedistinctmemorystores:sensoryregisters(with separate regis-ters for different senses,including visual, auditory, and haptic), short-termstore(STSor primarymemory),andlong-termstore(LTS or secondarymem-ory).2 In termsof a computermetaphor,thesestoresconstitute the essentialpermanentstructuralfeatures,or hardware,of the system.In addition,Atkin-son & Shiffrin postulatedvarious control processes, orsubject strategies,constituting the softwareof the system.Onecontrol processwasgiven mostextensiveconsideration:rote rehearsal.The conceptof a rehearsalbuffer inSTSwasused todescribe thisprocess.

Although muchof their empiricalwork involved thecontinuous paired-as-sociateparadigm,Atkinson & Shiffrin (1968) alsodevotedconsiderable atten-tion to performancein the standardfree-recalltask.According to the simpleversion of their model applied to free recall, eachstimulus item entersafixed-capacityrehearsalbufferanddisplacesa randomlyselecteditem alreadytherewhenthecapacity(aboutfour items)is exceeded.As longasanitemis inthe buffer, information aboutit is transferred toa permanentLTS. The amountof informationtransferredis a linear functionof thetime in thebuffer.At thetime of test,subjectsinitially outputtheitemsstill remainingin thebuffer andthenmakea fixed numberof searchesof LTS. Crucial to this versionof themodalmodel,aswell asto earlierversions,arethe assumptions that an itemmayberetainedin theSTSbuffer aswell asin LTS at thesametime andthatrecall of any particular item, including thosepresentedmost recently, canderive frominformationin bothSTS and LTS.

TheAtkinson& Shiffrin (1968)modelaccountsfor thebowedserialposi-tion function andthe effectsof suchvariablesasthe presenceof a distractortask,therateof item presentation,andthe list length.Specifically,theadvan-tagefor themostrecentlypresenteditems(therecencyeffect) is explainedbythefact thatthoseitemsremainin thebuffer at thetime of test.Theadvantagefor the itemspresentedinitially (the primacyeffect) is explainedby the factthat thoseitemsstayin the buffer longerthansubsequentitems.Becausethebuffer startsout empty,theinitial itemsarenot displacedby subsequentitemsuntil thebuffer is full. Most crucialarethemodel’s explanationsof why somevariableshavedifferent effectson the prerecency(primacyandmiddle) andrecencyportions of the serial position function. It is assumedthat when a

DOESTHE MODAL MODEL STILL WORK? 145

2Note that STM and LTM refer to retention over brief and long time intervals, respectively,

whereasSTSandLTS refer to hypothetical temporary andpermanentmemorysystems,respec-tively.

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distractor task, such asmental arithmetic, is interpolatedbetweenlist presenta-tion andrecall,themostrecentitemsareno longerin thebuffer at thetime ofrecall. Indeedunderstandardconditions,the prerecencyitemsareunaffectedbut the recencyeffect is eliminatedby a distractortask.In contrast,presenta-tion rateandlist lengthaffect theprerecency,but not therecency,portions ofthe serial position function. A fast presentationrate leadsto lower levels ofrecall for prerecencypositions becauserapidly presenteditemsremainin thebuffer for ashortertimeand,thus,lessinformationis transferredaboutthemtoLTS. Thelevel of recallfor prerecencypositionsis lower for a givenitem in along thanin a shortlist becausesubjectsareassumedto makea fixed numberof searchesof LTS, so that the probability of retrieving a particularitem islower whentherearemoreitems.Therecencyitemsarenot affectedby eitherrateof presentationor list length becausethey are recalledlargely from thebuffer rather than fromLTS.

Early problemsfor the Atkinson & Shiffrin (1968)modelwereraisedbyCraik & Lockhart(1972),who proposedinsteada levels-of-processingframe-work. Thecentralpostulate ofthatframeworkis thatinformation is encodedtodifferentlevelsandthatthelevel of processingdeterminesthesubsequentrateof forgetting.A distinction is drawnbetweenType I processing,which main-tains an item at a shallow level, and Type II processing,which promotesadeeperlevel of encoding.Demonstrationsthat maintaining information at ashallow level of processingdo not necessarilylead to enhancedlong-termretentionwere taken as evidenceagainstthe Atkinson & Shiffrin model’sassumption that transferto LTS is a function of time in the rehearsalbuffer.However, as Raaijmakers(1993)recently pointed out, the Atkinson& Shiffrinmodel made a distinction betweenthe control processes ofrehearsal andcodingthatis analogousto thedistinctionbetweenTypeI andTypeII process-ing.

PRIMARY MEMORY

Thecontroversy aboutthedistinctionbetweenprimaryandsecondarymemorystill existstoday,aswasmostevidentin a seriesof recentarticlesaddressingthequestion“Short-TermMemory:WhereDo WeStand?”Thiscurrentdebateis bestexemplified by two setsof opposingquotationsfrom articlesin thisseries.Crowder(1993)stated:“The popularityof short-termstoresgrewdur-ing a time whenwe werebusyinventing suchstoragereceptacles.Nowadaysthat attitudeseemsarchaicand, to someof us, evendownright quaint” (p.143).In contrast,Shiffrin (1993)summarizedthecurrentsituationasfollows:“Over theyears,a metatheoretical view of short-termmemoryhasdeveloped.This view, closelyrelatedto the ‘modal’ modelfrom the 1960s,is supportedby anincreasingbaseof neurophysiologicaldata,andawidevarietyof empiri-


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cal findings.…The mainproblemwith this view is the fact thatit encompassesvirtually everythingthat we areconcernedwith in humancognition—a suc-cessfulmodelwould almostbea general modelof cognition” (p. 193).

Crowder’s (1993)empirical challengesto the conceptof STM concernedboth the Brown-Petersondistractortaskandthe recencyeffect in free recall.He pointedto two observationsthatare inconsistentwith theideathatprimarymemoryis responsiblefor the rapid forgettingobservedacrossthe retentioninterval in the distractortask.First, Keppel& Underwood(1962) found thatthereis no forgetting acrossthe retention intervalon the first trial ofaseries oftrials. Second,Turvey et al (1970)showedthat thereis no effectof delayonforgetting when the retentioninterval is varied between,ratherthan within,subjects.

Crowder(1993)alsopointedto threeobservationsthatareinconsistentwiththeideathatprimarymemoryis responsiblefor therecencyeffectin freerecallbecauseof recencyeffectsfound in LTM. First, Roediger& Crowder(1976)demonstrateda recencyeffect in students’ recall of the namesof the UnitedStatespresidents.Second,Baddeley& Hitch (1977)founda recencyeffect forrugby team members’ recall of the teamsthey played againstthat season.Third, Bjork & Whitten(1974)discovereda recencyeffect in thecontinuous-distractorparadigm,in which a distractortaskfollows thepresentationof eachitem in the list including the final item, so that primary memorycould notaffect recall performance.Later, Koppenaal& Glanzer(1990) changedthedistractortaskin thecontinuous-distractorparadigmafterthelastlist item andfound depressedperformance,suggesting that recencydoesreflect a tempo-rary rehearsalbuffer. However,Neath(1993a)showedthat changingthedis-tractortaskdepressedperformanceevenfor prerecency items(see alsoThapar& Greene 1993).

Someof theseempiricalchallengesto themodalmodelcanbedismissedbytwo generalconsiderations.First, information can be encodedin secondarymemoryevenwith rapid stimulus presentation,so that retentioncan derivefrom secondarymemoryaswell asprimarymemoryin thedistractortask.Forexample,Keppel& Underwood’s (1962)finding of no forgettingon the firsttrial in the distractorparadigmis easily understoodin termsof the lack ofproactiveinterferenceon secondarymemoryin thefirst trial. Thus,secondarymemorycansupportfirst-trial retention.Second,not all bowedserialpositionfunctionshavethe samespecific shapeor the sameunderlyingcauses.Forexample,theshapeof theserialpositionfunctionsfor therecallof presidents’nameshasa much largerrecencyeffect than is typically found in free-recalltasksof episodicmemory,and frequencyof exposureto the different presi-dents’ names readily accounts for this serial position function. Likewise, Raai-jmakers(1993)recentlypointedout thatthemodalmodeldoesnotassumethatSTS is the causeof all recencyeffects.An advantagefor recencyitemscan


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alsobepredictedby themodalmodelfrom thefact that retrievalfrom LTS isoftenbasedon cuesfrom thecurrentcontext,andtherecencyitemsaremorecloselylinked to the current contextthanare earlier items.

Modern Extensions of theModal Model

Although the original modal model continues to haveits proponents,it hasbeenrevisedandextendedin recenttheoreticaldevelopments.We focushereon two of these modernextensions ofthe modal modelthat maintain asfundamentalthe distinction betweenprimary and secondarymemory. Thefirst, the Searchof AssociativeMemory (SAM) model(Raaijmakers& Shif-frin 1981,Shiffrin & Raaijmakers1992),is a directdescendentof theAtkin-son& Shiffrin (1968)modelandhasmostextensivelyaddressedfree recall.Thesecond,theperturbation model(Estes1972, Lee1992),is primarily aimedat performancein the Brown-Petersondistractortaskusingthe specificpara-digm introducedby Conrad(1967).

SEARCH OF ASSOCIATIVE MEMORY MODEL The SAM model elaboratestheAtkinson& Shiffrin (1968)modelprimarily in its descriptionof thesearchandretrievalprocessesfrom LTS thatoccurat thetime of thememorytest.At theheartof the SAMmodelis theidea that events arestored in memory asimages(i.e.asseparate,unitizedrepresentations)andthatLTS is accessedvia retrievalcues.Thestrengthof a givencuein termsof its link to a givenmemoryimageis determinedboth by preexistingrelationships andby rehearsalandcodingprocessesconductedin STS.Forexample,thelink strengthbetweenanitemcueandtheimageof anotheritem in thesamelist dependsin parton thetime thatthe two items were rehearsedtogetherin the STS buffer. The three mostimportanttypesof retrievalstrengthincludeself-strength(from anitemasacueto itself asa target), associative strength(betweendifferentitems),andcontextstrength(for linking the contextcue toa target item).

SAM hasbeensuccessfullyfit to manyaspects of free recall, paired associ-aterecall,andinterferenceparadigms,aswell asto recognition. For recall,thesubjectis assumedto generatecuesat eachstageof the search,startingwiththecontextcueandthenemploying othertypesof cues,with weightsassignedto the different cueson the basisof their salience.Becausethe sum of theweightsis assumedto be limited, theweightscanbeviewedasreflectingthelimitedcapacityof STSat thetime of retrieval.Thecuescombine multiplica-tively for recall, which allows the searchprocessto be focusedon thosememoryimagesthataremoststronglylinked to all of thecues.Eachretrievalattemptinvolvessamplingonememoryimagebasedon its strengthrelativetothatof all otherimagesstoredin LTS. A searchterminationoccursonthebasisof unsuccessfulsearchcycles,althougha recheckingprocesssometimesfol-lows initial termination.After sampling animageof anitem,recallof thatitem


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dependson its recovery,which is an exponentialfunction of the sumof theweightedstrengthsof the cuesto the image.Most impressive is the fact thatSAM can accountfor the part-list cuing effect in free recall, which is thefinding that the likelihoodof recallinga given list item decreaseswhenotherlist itemsaregivenastestcues(Raaijmakers& Shiffrin 1981).SAM’s expla-nationof thepart-listcuingeffect,unlike someothers,canalsoaccountfor itsreversal in a delayedtestingsituation (Raaijmakers 1993).

Recognition in theversionof SAM usedby Gillund & Shiffrin (1984) doesnot occur as a searchbut ratheras a function of global activation (but seeMensink & Raaijmakers1988 for a different approach).Although for recallthe overall strengthof a set of cuesto a particular target dependson theproductof the individual cuestrengths,recognitionis largely a direct-accessprocessdependenton thesumof activationstrengths.This differencebetweenrecall andrecognitionretrievalprocessesis centralto the explanationof thelist-strength effect (Ratcliff et al 1990, Shiffrin et al 1990). Strengtheningsomeitemsin a list decreasesthe free recall of other itemsbut haseithernoeffect or a positive effect on the recognitionof other items. The interferinglist-strength effectsare, therefore,attributedby SAM to retrieval processesoccurringin free recall but not in recognition.Murnane& Shiffrin (1991a)takethelist-strength findingsascrucialevidenceagainstmemorymodelsthatpostulatethat structuralinterferenceoccurswhen storing multiple inputs inmemory, such as compositestoragemodels (e.g. Murdock 1982). UnlikeSAM, thesemodelsdo not assumea distinct localizedmemorytraceor imagebutassumeinsteadthata memorytrace ispart of a combination orsuperimpo-sition of multiple traces.Ironically, however,the crucial assumption SAMmakesto accountfor the list strengtheffect involves a type of compositestorage;it is assumedthatrepetitionsof thesameitem in thesamecontextarestored ina single memory image (Murnane & Shiffrin1991b). SAM mustalsomakeanadditionalassumption, referredto asthe“differentiationhypothesis,”accordingto which theactivationproducedby anunrelateditem cue islessona strongerimagethan on a weakerimage,presumablybecausethe strongerimageis easier todifferentiatefrom thecue (Shiffrin et al 1990).

AlthoughSAM is adescendentof themodalmodel,someof its morerecentassumptions resemble those ofthe alternative levels-of-processingframework.For example,Shiffrin et al (1989)made thepoint thatthe unitsof storage usedby SAM dependon codingoperations,andlonger and deeperoperations resultin higher-orderunits. Also, in accordwith thenotionof encodingspecificity,Clark & Shiffrin (1987)postulatedcontextsensitiveencoding,which reflectsthefact that thecodingof a particularitem is influencedby theotheritemsinthe samegroup, and test performanceis bestwhen the group of test itemsmatchesthe groupof studyitems.


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Although SAM is ableto accountfor thefull rangeof accuracyfindings inexplicit, episodic memoryparadigms,it has notyetbeen appliedto fit reactiontime datain recognition,or to many implicit memoryandsemanticmemorytasks(but seeRaaijmakers1993 for someinsightsinto how SAM could beappliedin thosesituations).Otherchallengesfor SAM includecompleteex-planationsof the mirror effect in recognition memory(wherebythe recogni-tion of newitemsasunfamiliar,mirrors therecognitionof old itemsasfamil-iar; seeGlanzer& Adams1990) and the learningof crossed-listassociates(e.g. hot-slow,fast-cold;see Humphreyset al 1989).

PERTURBATION MODEL The perturbationmodel (Estes1972, Lee & Estes1981)wasdesignedto accountfor four principalfindingsfrom theBrown-Pe-tersondistractorparadigm.First, thereis a steepretentionfunction reflectingrapidforgetting.Second,therearesymmetrical bowedserialposition functionsateachretentionintervalin therecallof order,butnot item,information. Third,therearegraduallydecliningpositional uncertaintycurves,reflectingthe factthata lettersubstitutedfor anotherat recallusuallycomesfrom a neighboringserialposition.Fourth,whento-be-remembereditemsaredividedinto separatesegments,there isa recall advantagefor the mostrecently presentedsegment.

According to the perturbationmodel,codesfor immediaterecall of orderinformationarearrangedin a hierarchicalstructurecontainingmultiple levels.Theselevels include the position of the item within a segment,the segmentcontainingtheitem,andthespecifictrial on which thesegmentoccurred.Thehierarchyof codesis repeatedlyreactivated,andat eachreactivationthereissomeprobability that the relativeposition of neighboringitems,segments,ortrials will betransposed(perturbed).In theoriginal versionof theperturbationmodel,therewasa singlefreeparameter,theta,theprobabilityof a perturba-tion at a given level of the hierarchyin primary memory.In a later version(Healy et al 1987),a secondparameter,alpha,wasaddedto the perturbationmodel.This parameteris theprobability thata memorycodewill besubjecttothe perturbationprocess;hence,1-alphais the probability of storingpositioninformation insecondarymemory.In otherwords,theperturbationmodelnowhastwo free parameters,the first reflectingprimary-memory rehearsalproc-esses and thesecond reflectingsecondary-memoryencodingprocesses.

The necessityfor including thesecondary-memoryparameterwasdemon-stratedin a seriesof experimentsby Cunninghamet al (1984)andHealyet al(1987)who comparedtwo conditions,both involving thepresentationof twosegmentsof itemson a giventrial but therecallof only onesegment.Subjectswere either told in advance(precue),or at theend of the distractor task(postcue), which one ofthe two segments wasto be recalled.Performancewasconsistently abovethechancelevel andbetterin theprecueconditionthanin


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thepostcuecondition, evenat retentionintervalsupto 30sec.It wasfoundthattheperturbationmodelwasableto fit thedataonly whenthesecondary-mem-ory parameterwasincluded.Of particularnoteis thefact thatonly thesecon-dary-memoryparameter varied inthe data fits; the primary-memoryparameterwasconstantthroughout thesedatafits (andequalto thevalueusedby Lee&Estes1981).

The constantvalueof the primary memoryparameteracrossexperimentsimplies thatthereis a fixed rateof forgettingfrom primarymemorythatcanbemeasuredusing the Brown-Petersondistractor paradigm.However, Muter(1980)arguedthat the rateof forgetting from primary memoryis underesti-matedby the Brown-Peterson paradigm because,in atypical experimentusingthe distractortask,subjectsarerepeatedlytested,so that they developa highexpectancyto recall after the distractorperiod.Muter offered an alternativeparadigmin which subjectswereled to expecteitherto recall immediately orto perform a distractortask without subsequentrecall. Subjectswere testedfollowing a distractor-filled retention interval on only a few critical trials.Muter, andsubsequently Sebrechtset al (1989),found a dramaticincreaseinforgettingrateon the critical trials suchthat the probability of correctrecallapproachedfloor-level performanceafter only 2–4 sec.However,more re-cently,Cunninghamet al (1993)usedtwo newversionsof thedistractortaskto reducethe involvementof secondarymemoryprocessing.This reductionwas achievedeitherby manipulating subjectexpectancyto recall or by ma-nipulating the importanceof the to-be-recalledmaterial.With both methods,recall performancewas substantially depressedat all retentionintervals(in-cluding immediate recall); therewas no evidenceof a more rapid forgettingrate,only a changein the asymptotic performancelevel. Cunningham et alfound that the perturbationmodel provideda close fit to the obtaineddatawhenthey kept the primary-memory parameterat the level usedin previousexperimentsand variedonly the secondary-memoryparametersuchthat theinvolvementof secondarymemoryprocesseswas minimized. Theseresultsindicate that the distractortask remainsa valid paradigmto study primarymemoryand the perturbationmodel providesa valuabletool for describingforgettingfrom primary memory.

Although theperturbationmodelwasdevelopedto accountfor STM proc-esses,Nairne (1991)arguedthat the model canalsobe appliedto situationsinvolving LTM. In particular,Nairne showedthat the model with just thesingle parameter,theta,for the perturbationratecould explain the resultsofexperimentsinvolving thereconstruction of orderinformationfrom LTM. Themodelaccountedfor thesymmetricalbowedserialposition functionsandthegraduallydeclining positional uncertaintycurvesfor both list selectionandplacementof an itemin a list.


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Subsequently, Nairne (1992) reportedan experimentthat examinedtheretentionof position information over intervalsrangingfrom 30 secto 24 hand comparedthe data to predictionsbasedon the perturbationmodel. Inapplying the perturbationmodel to this situation, which spannedboth STMand LTM, Nairne againusedthe versionof the model with only the singleparameterthetareflectingperturbationrate.However,he inadvertentlyaddedanotherparameter,becausehe assumedthat there was an opportunity forperturbationonce every 6secin thefirst 30-secintervalbut onceevery24 minthereafter.In otherwords,the forgettingratewasvery rapid over the periodcorresponding to immediateretention but was considerably sloweroverlongerretentionintervals.This observationsuggeststhata two-parametermodel(onefor primarymemoryandanotherfor secondarymemory)is necessary.In fact,even with the two separateforgetting rates in Nairne’s applicationof theperturbationmodel,theobservedproportionof correctresponseswassignifi-cantlygreaterthanthepredicted proportionfor the 24-hretentioninterval.

Al though the two-parameter version of the perturbationmodel can beviewedasanextensionof themodalmodelbecauseit maintainsasfundamen-tal thedistinctionbetweenprimaryandsecondarymemory,Estes(1991)chal-lenged anotherunderlyingassumption of themodalmodel, which heterms the“trial-unit” assumption, bywhich eachtrial is consideredasadiscreteepisode.Estesobservedthatitemintrusionsonagiventrial arederivedlargelyfrom therecall responsesof theprevioustrial. Theseitem intrusionsweregiven in thesameposition as they occurredin the previousrecall output, whetheror notthat position matchedthe previousstimulus input. Itemsfrom previoustrialsthat were not recalledon thosetrials usually did not intrude into the recallresponsesof thegiventrial. Thesefindingsweretakenasevidenceagainstthetrial-unit modelandin favorof analternative continuum model, inwhich thereare no strict boundariesseparatingrepresentationsof items from successivetrials.More recently,Estes (1994) provided aformal accountof this phenome-non interms ofhisarraymodel ofclassification, with theassumption thateachto-be-remembereditem on a trial includesa contextfeaturewhich it shareswith theotheritemsfrom thesametrial, but which differs from thoseof itemsfrom previoustrials, with the differenceincreasingwith greaterdistancebe-tween thetrials.

To examineintrusionsof responsesfrom rehearsalonaprevious trial,Estes(1991)includeda conditionin which to-be-rememberedletterswerefollowedby distractor digitsand then recalledafter a delay during whichsubjectsrehearsedthe lettersaloud.He found that items rehearsedout of the correctinput positionwerelesslikely to be recalledthanwerethoserehearsedin theinputposition.Also, whentherecallandrehearsalpositionswerenot thesame,the majority of the items were recalledin their correct input position. Thisfinding suggestedthat recall order was not a simple repetitionof rehearsal.


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Unrehearseditems were likely to be recalledin their input position or in aneighboring position, althoughtherecalloccurredwith a lowerprobability andwith less precise positionalinformation than that for rehearseditems. Toexplaintheseobservations,Estescontrastedthedirect recall track,from inputto recall,with an indirect track, from rehearsalto recall.The indirect track isstrongerbecausethe rehearsalcontext,relative to the input context,is moresimilar to the recall context.By postulating two different recall tracks,Estesseemsto bemovingtowardsmemorymodelswith multiple STM systems. Weturn nextto a discussionof modelsof this type.

Additional MemorySystems

Although the modal model hastraditionally beendescribedas containing asingle primary memory store, the Atkinson & Shiffrin (1968) version diddistinguish betweentherehearsalprocessandothercontrolprocessesin STS.This distinction foreshadowedsubsequenttheorizing that has brokendownprimarymemoryinto separate systems.

WORKING MEMORY Undoubtedly the most influential model that analyzesprimarymemoryinto separatesystemsis Baddeley’s working memorymodel(Baddeley1992),whichemphasizestheactiveprocessingratherthanthepassivestorageof information thatoccursin primarymemory.Becauseof experimentsusinga dual-tasktechniquein which a concurrentmemoryloadof threeor sixdigitshadnoinfluenceontherecencypartof afree-recalltestfor wordsbuthadsmalleffectsonperformanceof reasoningandprosecomprehension,Baddeley& Hitch (1974)arguedagainsta unitarylimi ted-capacitySTS.Theyproposedinsteadamulticomponentworkingmemorymodel,includingalimited-capacityattentionalsystem,thecentralexecutive,supportedby two slavesystems,thephonological (or articulatory) loop and the visuo-spatialsketchpad (orscratch-pad).

Thephonological loop hasreceivedthemostempiricalsupport.It containsa phonological (i.e. speech-based)store along with an articulatory controlprocess.Thestoremaintainsinformation by meansof subvocalrehearsal,andwithoutsuchrehearsal,informationrapidlydecaysfrom thestoreoveraperiodof seconds.Thereareat leastsix robusteffectsthatareexplainedin termsofthe phonological loop (Baddeley1992). First is the phonological similarityeffect, wherebyimmediate recall is lower for items that are phonologicallysimilar than for those that aredissimilar, presumably becausethe similarmaterialcontainsfewer phonologically distinctive features.Secondis the ir-relevantspeecheffect,wherebyspokenmaterialirrelevantto thememorytaskand from a different speakerdisruptsimmediate memoryperformance,pre-sumablybecauseall spokenmaterial automatically entersthe phonologicalstore irrespectiveof its meaning(Salame& Baddeley1989). Third is the


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phonological sandwicheffect, in which irrelevantspokenmaterialis interpo-lated betweento-be-remembereditems. This effect is like that of irrelevantspeechand has beenexplainedin a similar manner,but both the list andinterpolateditemsareby thesamespeakerin this case(Baddeleyet al 1991).Fourth is the word-lengtheffect, wherebyimmediateserial recall of wordsdependson their spokenduration,presumablybecauseshorterwordsarere-hearsedmore rapidly than longer words. In fact, it has been shownthatsubjectsrecallroughlyasmanywordsastheycansayin 2 sec(Baddeleyet al1975).Fifth is articulatorysuppression, wherebyimmediate memoryfor visu-ally presentedmaterialis depressedby requiringsubjectsto articulateirrele-vantmaterialduringstimuluspresentation,presumablybecausethe irrelevantmaterialblocks the articulatorycontrol processand preventsother materialfrom entering the phonological store. Supportingthis description isthefindingthatarticulatorysuppressioneliminatesthephonologicalsimilarity, irrelevantspeech,andword lengtheffects(Baddeleyet al 1984).Sixth areobservationsinvolving patientswith deficienciesin immediatememorywho do not showphonological similarity or word-lengtheffects(Vallar & Shallice1990),andpatients with deficienciesin speecharticulation butunimpairedlanguageproc-essingwho do show such effects (Baddeley& Wilson 1985), presumablybecausethe former patients, but not the latter,havea defectivephonologicalstore.

Questions havebeenraisedconcerningthe usefulnessof the phonologicalloop (Baddeley1992)becausepatientswith phonologicaldeficienciesappearto havenormalfunctioning outsidethe laboratoryandshowonly minor prob-lemswith sentencecomprehension(Butterworthet al 1986).However,suchapatientwas shown to havea markedproblem learningRussian vocabulary(Baddeleyet al 1988); hence,the phonological loop doesseemto play animportantrole in long-termphonological learning.Also, Gathercole& Bad-deley(1990)foundthatsubjectswith delayeddevelopmentof languagehadareduced-capacityphonological loop. With normal subjects,a deficit in thephonological loop can be simulatedby the useof articulatorysuppression,which,similarly, hasbeenshownto disruptnew phonological learningbutnotpaired-associate learning(Papagno etal 1991).

There has been less progress in understanding either thevisuo-spatialsketchpador the centralexecutive.Secondarytasks,rangingfrom nonvisualspatialtrackingtasks(Baddeley& Lieberman1980) to nonspatial visual ob-servationtasks(Logie 1986), havebeenusedto pinpoint the natureof theprocessingof the sketchpad.Thesetaskshaveshownthat the sketchpadin-volvesbothspatialandvisualprocessingandis distinct from theverbalproc-essingassociated withthe phonological loop. The central executiveis anattentionalcontrol systemthat is in chargeof both strategyselectionandintegrationof informationfrom varioussources,including the two slavesys-


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tems. Baddeley (1992)pointed torandomly generatingletters as a usefulsecondarytask to load the centralexecutive,neuropsychological studiesoffrontal lobe damageas providing valuableinsights into the operationof thecentralexecutive,and a model of attentional control as the most promisingcandidate for thecore of the centralexecutive.

Baddeley (1992)showedhowhis tripartitesystem canilluminatethecogni-tive functionsaffected by variousdiseasesand thoseused invarious tasks. Forexample,varioussecondarytaskswere usedto disrupt the centralexecutiveandthe two slavesystemsin normalandAlzheimer’s diseasepatients(Bad-deleyetal 1986,Spinnleretal 1988). Theresults suggestedthattheAlzheimerimpairmentlay with thecentralexecutiveratherthantheslavesystems.Like-wise,studiesusinga similar methodology to analyzechessperformancepro-videdevidencethatboth thevisuo-spatial sketchpadandthecentralexecutiveplay important rolesin codingandmemoryduringchessbut thatverbalcodingis notused.

Baddeley& Hitch (1993),while retainingtheir working memorymodel,haveproposeda newexplanationfor therecencyeffect in freerecall in termsof a simple temporalor ordinal discrimination hypothesis, so that recencyreflectsregistrationin implicit memoryby a priming process.Theyproposedthat recall involves reactivatingnodesfor items in a network and that morerecentitemsareprimedandthusreactivatedmoreeasily.In supportof theirhypothesisof recencyaspriming, they assessedrecencyin terms ofTulving&Schacter’s (1990)five criteriafor priming: Theypointedto (a) intactperform-ancein amnesiafor recencyitems, (b) developmental dissociation betweenrecencyitemsandtherestof thelist, with no developmentaleffecton recencyitems,(c) drug dissociation betweenrecencyitemsand the restof the list, withno effect of drugs on recencyitems, (d) functional independence,wherebyrecall of earlier list items is influencedby different factorsthan is recall ofrecencyitems,and(e) at leastsomehint of stochasticindependence(but seeHintzman & Hartry 1990 for issuesconcerningstochasticindependence),whereby initial recall of recencyitems is independentof their subsequentrecall from LTM. Baddeley& Hitch arguedfurther that although recencyreflectsimplicit learning,it dependson theuseof anexplicit retrievalstrategyin whichthelast itemsin thelist are outputfirst.

CONCEPTUAL SHORT-TERM MEMORY AlthoughBaddeley’s (1992)phonologi-cal loop seemsto play litt le role in sentenceunderstanding,Potter(1993)hasproposedadistinctconceptualSTM (CSTM) thatis notevidentin thestandardparadigmsfor studyingSTM but playsanimportantrole in everydayreading,sceneperception,and sentenceprocessing.This conceptualmemory is laiddown anddecays veryrapidly (within 1 sec).When a visual stimulus ispresented,suchas a sentence,the conceptualoutput goesto CSTM and the


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phonological outputto conventionalSTM (i.e. thephonological loop).CSTMholdsconsiderableinformation,mostof whichis rapidlylostunlessit is relevantto a conceptualstructurethatis consolidated intoLTM.

Potterhasusedthetechniqueof rapidserialvisualpresentation(RSVP)ofpicturesor wordsto a fixed locationon a computerscreento studyCSTM. Inonesetof herstudies(Potter1976),RSVPpictureswerepresentedeitherwithimmediate rapidsemanticdetection(e.g.respondto a pictureof a picnic) or arecognitiontestfollowing thesequence. Subjectsperformed wellon thedetec-tion task,but performancewasnearchance levelson recognition. This findingis consistent withrapidlydecaying CSTM. Likewise, Potter (1993) reviewedastudy involving RSVP with words, in which words could be identified intwo-word lists at very rapid rates(fasterthan 3 words/sec),but thosesameratesyieldedmemoryspanperformancefor longerlists well belowthat in thestandardSTM taskwith slowerpresentationrates(e.g.1 word/sec).WhentheRSVP lists consistedof sentences(Potter et al 1986), even longer lists ofwordswererecallednearlyperfectlyevenat high rates,suggestingthat theywere parsed and understoodimmediately. Thus, words at fast ratesenterPotter’s CSTMbutnot conventionalSTM.

Lombardi & Potter (1992) and Potter& Lombardi (1990) proposedthatimmediate recallof RSVPsentencesinvolvesregenerationfrom a conceptualrepresentationformedfrom theactivatedpartof LTM. TheverbatimnatureofRSVP sentencerecall reflectsthe fact that the lexical items in the sentencewere activatedmore than other lexical items. In supportof this hypothesis,subjects’ sentencerecall included intrusions of closely synonymous wordsfrom an interpolatedsecondaryword-matchingdistractortask,evenwhenthesentenceswerepresentedextremelyrapidly. In anotherstudyinvolving RSVPsentencerecall (Potteret al 1993), ambiguousmisspelled words (e.g. dackwhich could be a misspelling of duckor deck) were replacedby subjectsintheir recall protocolswith the correctlyspelledwordsappropriateto the sen-tencecontext.This finding suggeststhat the sentencecontextwasprocessedconceptuallydespitetherapid rate of sentencepresentation.

Potter(1993) relatedCSTM to conceptualpriming but notedthat conceptreactivationcannotaccountfor theformationof episodic-specificlinks amongword representations,as occurswith the RSVP presentationof a sentence.CSTM provides thebasis for encoding information inLTM accordingtoPotter’s accountand can be viewedeither as aseparate episodic representationor as anactivatedpart of LTM. In the light of this latter view, Potter’sapproachcanbe seenassimilar to an approachtakenrecentlyby Ericsson&Kintsch(1995).

LONG-TERMWORKINGMEMORY Ericsson& Kintsch(1995)raisedthequestionasto whetherthestandarddefinitionof workingmemoryaslimited,temporary


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storagecan beapplied to tasks such asreading text andskilledperformancebyexperts,especiallybecausetheseactivitiescanbeinterruptedandlaterresumedwithoutmajor detriments in performance.To resolvethis question, Ericsson&Kintsch proposeda mechanismbasedon skilled useof storagein long-termworkingmemory(LT-WM) in additionto thetemporarystorageof informationin short-termworking memory(ST-WM). This work is anextensionof Chase& Ericsson’s (1982) skilled memory theory, which accountsfor a tenfoldincreasein digit spanby individualsgiven extensivetraining. This trainingovercamethe proactive interferencecausedby previousstorageof similarinformationin memory.Chase& Ericssonproposedthatsuchindividualsdrawon their acquiredknowledgeand on systemsof retrieval cues,or retrievalstructures.

Ericsson& Kintsch (1995) took issuewith the assumption that it is slowbothto retrieveinformation from LTM andto storenewinformationin LTM.Although they acknowledgedthat it does indeed take upto 1 sec tore-trieve—and10 secto store—unfamiliar information in LTM, it takesmuchlesstime for an expertto retrieveor storerelatively familiar information inLTM. Likewise,althoughtheestimateof STM capacityasaboutfour chunksof information(Broadbent1975)applieswell to a widerange of simplecogni-tive activities,for morecomplextaskssucha smallworking-memorycapacityis insufficient(Anderson 1983,Newell 1990).

To accommodate the increasedmemory performanceby chessexperts,Chase& Simon(1973)arguedthat theexpertsreliedon largerchunksin STM.However,Ericsson& Kintsch (1995) pointedto findings that chessexpertscanrecallup to ninedifferentpatternsof chesspieces(Cookeet al 1993),andthat interpolated tasks do not depress performanceby suchexperts,assuggest-ing storagein LTM ratherthanSTM. Similarly, theperformanceof memory-spanexpertsseemsto reflectstoragein LTM becauseof small decrementsinperformancewith STM interferencebeforelist recall,accuraterecallof all listsat the end of a session,and improvement specific to the type of materialpracticed.

Ericsson& Kintsch’s (1995) accountis that subjectsuse LT-WM for askilled activity when they havea largebody of relevantknowledgeandcananticipatefuture memory demands.The use of LT-WM relies on a stableretrieval structure,which is all that needsto be availablein ST-WM, alongwith a cue indicating the relevanttype of information required.In contrast,Schneider& Detweiler (1988) arguedthat LTM cannotbe usedas workingmemory becauseof the build-up of retroactiveinterference,and Baddeley(1990) usedthe finding that expertmentalabacuscalculatorscan recall nomorethanonesequenceof digits (Hatano& Osawa1983)asevidenceagainstthe useof storagein LTM for this task.Ericsson& Kintsch addressedtheseissuesby pointing out that temporaldistinctivenessandelaborativeencoding


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canovercomethe build-up of retroactiveinterferenceand that temporaldis-tinctivenessis poorin thetaskof mentalabacus calculation.

Ericsson& Kintsch (1995)usedKintsch’s (1988)construction-integrationmodelto explainhow theconstructedrepresentationof a previouslyreadtextis kept accessiblein LT-WM so that new information can be encodedandintegratedwith previous information. Glanzeret al (1984) interruptedtextreadingwith anunrelatedtaskandthenallowedreadingto resume.Theeffectwas to increasereadingtime for the first sentenceafter readingresumedbutnot to influencespeedor accuracyof answersto comprehensionquestions.Ericsson& Kintschtookthesefindingsasevidencethatthedisruptionsledto aloss of retrieval cuesin ST-WM; comprehensionwas not disruptedbecausethe information was storedin LT-WM. They further proposedthat superiortext comprehensionis dueto superiorskill encodinginformation in LT-WMandmakingit accessiblevia cuesin ST-WM. Contraryto the assumption byJust& Carpenter(1992)thatgoodreadershavemoreroomin activememorythan poorreaders(seeEngle etal 1992for asimilar view),Ericsson &Kintschproposedthat good readersproducea more extensiveretrieval structureforLT-WM so that their effectiveworking memoryis largerwithout an increasein thesize of activememory.

SHORT-TERM ACTIVATION AND ATTENTION The relationship between STMand LTM hasalsobeenexploredby Cowan(1993,1994),whopointedout thattherehavebeentwo definitionsfor STM, one(derivingfrom James 1890)thatis thecurrentfocusof attention, andtheotherthatis currentlyactivatedin LTM.Thesetwo definitions havesometimes beenusedinterchangeably,but theycannotbeequivalentgivenevidencefor activationoutsideof awareness,includ-ing priming (i.e.activation)from apreviouslyattendeditem.CowanrepresentsSTM asanestedsubsetof LTM; thecurrentlyactivatedfeaturesareasubsetofLTM, and thefocus of attentionis a subsetof the activatedmemory.

Cowanet al (1990) supportedthe hypothesis that STM includesboth at-tendedandunattendedinformationby examiningimmediateretentionfor at-tendedand unattendedstimuli. Subjectssilently (or by whispering)read anovel and simultaneously heard speech syllables presentedthrough head-phones.They weregiven comprehensiontestsandaskedto write a sentencesummarizingrecentlyreadmaterial.On crucial test trials they wereaskedtorecognizethe speechsyllablesheard,after a variable delay filled with thereading.A rapidmemorydecaywasfound for thespeechsyllables.Perform-ancewas improvedon shorterdelaysif subjectsshifted their attentionawayfrom reading,asevidencedby their not whisperingduringa shortintervaloneithersideof thetargetsyllable.If subjectsconsistentlydividedtheirattentionbetweenthe two channelsby respondingto particular syllables,then litt leforgettingof thetargetsyllableswasevidentevenat thelongest(10sec)delay.


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Thus,therewasmemoryfor unattendedsyllables,andsubtleattentionalshiftsimprovedmemory.

Cowanet al (1992)examinedSTM lossby studyingmemorydecayduringsubjects’ overt verbalrecallof a list. Theyusedwordsidenticalin numberofphonemesandsyllablesbut different in pronunciationlength.Theyfoundthatlonger words at the beginningof the list depressedforward recall, whereaslonger words at the end of the list depressedbackwardrecall. This findingsuggeststhat while subjectsrecall wordsfrom the list the otherwordsdecayfrom activation.Cowan(1993)proposedthatwhena list is recalled,memorydecaysduringword outputbut is reactivatedduringthepausesbetweenwords[see Schweickert(1993) for a candidatemodel of this process].Individualdifferencesin immediatememoryspanarethenattributednot to thespeedofpronouncingwordsbut to theefficiencyof covertprocessingbetweenwords.This hypothesisis supportedby Cowan’s (1992) finding of (a) a correlationfor four-yearold childrenbetweenspananddurationof recallbut not betweenspanandspeechrateand(b) fasterspokenrecallof lists lessthanspanlength,with the reductionin speed locatedentirelywithin thepauses betweenwords.

Centralto Cowan’s (1993)frameworkis thedistinction betweenSTM andLTM. Two findingstakenassupportof a separateSTM aretherecencyeffectand the word length effect in immediate recall. The recencyeffect in thecontinuous-distractor paradigm, which relies onLTM, has been takenasweakening thesupportfor aseparateSTM (Greene1986).However,Cowan etal (1994)providedevidencethat the word lengtheffect wasnot the sameinimmediate recallandin thecontinuous-distractor paradigm.They manipulatedthe syllable length of the words on a list and askedsubjectsfor backwardrecall.For the immediaterecallprocedure,increasedword lengthof the itemsin the secondhalf of the list depressedrecall,but the reversewasfound (i.e.betterperformancewith longerwords)for thecontinuous-distractorprocedure.Further, in supportof Cowan’s (1993) proposalthat STM is the activatedportionof LTM, Hulme etal (1991)founda linearrelationbetweenimmediatememory spanand speechrate, with a higher intercept for words than fornonwords,so thatlexical familiarity in LTM madea difference in STM.

Unitary MemorySystem

Althoughtheevidencepresentedfor additionalmemorysystemsis quitecom-pelling,Roediger(1993)persuasivelydiscussedtheinterpretiveproblemscre-ated bya proliferationof memorystores.In contrast,some theories postulateaunitarymemorysystem.We will concentrateon onesuchtheoryproposedbyCrowder& Neath(1991)becauseit wasspecificallyformulatedasanalterna-tive to the modal model.Crowder& Neatharguedthat the Brown-Petersondistractorparadigm,ratherthanisolating STM, servesto temporallymagnifytheretentionof a particularitem, asif it wereundera microscope.Theyused


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thismicroscopeanalogyto suggestthatthesameprinciplesapplyto STM astoLTM. Following Murdock (1960),theyfocusedon theprincipleof distinctive-ness,which they usedto explain serial position functionsin both STM andLTM. Murdockmeasured distinctivenessof a serialposition bycomputing thedifferencebetweenits ordinalnumberandthatof all theotherpositionsin thelist. In addition, he accountedfor the asymmetry ofthe serial positionfunctionby transformingthe ordinal numbersinto log values(seeJohnson1991for arecentdiscussion andelaborationof theseideas).This theorynecessarilyas-sumesa constantshapeof serialposition functionsacrosslearningconditions(e.g.variationsin presentationrateanditem familiarity), andindeedtheserialpositionfunction for serial learningis constantwhennormalized(i.e. plottedastheproportionof the total numberof correctresponsesmadeat eachposi-tion in the list). Neath(1993b)extendedMurdock’s formulation by usingtheactualdurationsof the interstimulusandretentionintervalswhencalculatingthe temporaldistinctivenessof an item.

Following Glenberg(1987),Neath& Crowder(1990)employedthe con-tinuous-distractorparadigmto studytemporaldistinctiveness.Theycompareda control conditionwith equaltemporalspacing(interpolatedarithmetic)be-tweensuccessivelist items to an increasingcondition, in which the spacingincreasedas the list progressed,and to a decreasingcondition, in which thespacingdecreased.Theyshowedthat for itemspresentedvisually therecencyeffectwaslargestin the increasingcondition (in which the distinctivenessofthe recencyitems was greatest)andsmallestin the decreasingcondition (inwhich the distinctivenessof the primacyitemswasgreatest).They alsocon-ducteda parallelexperimentusingtheBrown-Petersondistractorparadigminwhich they interpolateddigits betweenthe to-be-rememberedletterswith aconstant,increasing,or decreasingnumberof digits. Theincreasingconditionshowedthe most recencyand the decreasingcondition the least.Thus, theresults in thetwo situations wereparallel despite thefact thatthefirst reliedonLTM and the secondon STM.

Also consistentwith this view is a studyby Wright et al (1985)with datafrom monkeys,pigeons,andhumansviewing four slidesfollowed by a reten-tion interval andthena recognitionprobe.At immediate testing, therewasapurerecencyeffectwith no primacyeffect,whereaswith delayedtesting therewasgreaterprimacy with increasingdelayuntil therewaspureprimacyandnorecency.Crowder& Neath(1991)explainedthesefindingsby proposingthattheretrieval orientation wasinitially from therecencyendof thelist butafteradelayshifted to the primacyend.Neath(1993b)replicatedthesefindings instudieswith humansubjectsrecognizingpicturesof snowflakesthatcouldnotbeeasilyverbalized.Whereasthedurationof theretentionintervalwasvariedin this study, in a subsequentstudy, Neath & Knoedler (1994) varied thedurationof theinterstimulus intervalandalso found results consistentwith the


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distinctivenessmodel.Further,Neath& Knoedlerappliedthesamemodeltoexperimentsby Gernsbacher& Hargreaves(1988) and their own follow-upexperimenton sentenceprocessing.Theseexperimentsshoweda response-time advantagefor verifying thesecond-mentionedof two participantsafterashort retentioninterval (analogousto a recencyeffect), but an advantageforverifying thefirst-mentionedparticipantaftera longerinterval(analogousto aprimacyeffect).Thus,thedistinctivenessmodelcanaccountfor a wide rangeof memory phenomena,including STM and LTM paradigms,experimentswith animalsandhumans,andtasksrangingfrom picturerecognitionto sen-tenceprocessing.Nevertheless,it is not clear to us how this model wouldaccountfor the full rangeof empiricalphenomenawe havereviewedin sup-port ofmultistore models.

Summary

Themodalmodelhasbeensuccessfullyelaboratedbothin termsof secondarymemorysearchandretrievalprocessesandin termsof primary memoryfor-getting processes.Nevertheless,thereis strongempirical evidencethat distinc-tions are necessarybeyondthe modal model’s dichotomy betweenprimaryandsecondarymemory. Inparticular,thereis evidencefor separatephonologi-cal and visuo-spatial processingand for a distinction betweenindirect anddirect recall tracksor, similarly, betweenshort-termactivationandattention.Evidencealsopointsto anadditionalvery short-termconceptualmemoryanda more active involvementof LTM in skilled performance.The conceptofdistinctivenessaccommodatesa wide rangeof findings previouslyattributedto primarymemory,but it seemsdoubtful that it canprovidea comprehensiveaccount.

SENSORY MEMORY

We now considerthe front end of the modal model: sensorymemory.Themodal model includesseparatememoriesfor eachsense,including visual,auditory,andhaptic.Becausevisualsensory(iconic) memoryhasbeenshownto be useful for only a fraction of a second[and perhapsnot useful at alloutsideartificial laboratorytasks(seeHaber1983)], andbecausehapticandothersensesplay litt le role in verbalmemorytasks,we concentratehereonlyon auditorysensory(echoic) memory.

Precategorical Acoustic Store

The strongestevidencefor a distinct auditory sensorymemory camefromthree interrelatedobservationsin immediate serial recall of auditorily pre-sentedwords(usuallydigits): (a) therecencyeffect(theadvantagefor thelastitem of the list), (b) the stimulus suffix effect (the elimination of the recency


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effect with the presentationof a redundantword presentedafter the list asarecall cue),and(c) the modality effect (the eliminationof the recencyeffectwith visual presentationof the list). Thesefindings prompted Crowder &Morton (1969) to postulatean auditorysensorymemory,which they termedprecategoricalacoustic store (PAS); their description of PAS was sub-sequentlyextendedby Crowder(1978)to includeeffects ofauditorymasking.The storewas labeledprecategoricalbecauseit was found to be sensitive tophysical(e.g.thevoice of the speaker)but not semantic(e.g.themeaningofthewords)characteristicsof theitems.Thestorewaslabeledacousticbecauseit seemedto dependon auditorypresentationof the items.However,both ofthese characteristicsof PAS have been disputedin recent years.

Theprecategoricalnatureof PAS wasdisputedby findings indicatingthatthesuffix effectdependedon thesubjects’ interpretationof thesuffix aseitherspeechor nonspeech.For example,Neathet al (1993) usedas a suffix theword “baa.” Half of the subjectsweretold that it wasan actualsheepsoundwhile theotherhalf of thesubjectsweretold thatit wasproducedby a person.The suffix effect was observedonly for the subjectswho thought that thesuffixeswerespokenby a human.The acousticnatureof PAS wasdisputedbecauseof studiesshowingthat silently mouthedor lipreadstimuli producedsuffix effects even when thelists of to-be-remembereditems were heard(Greene& Crowder 1984).

Both of theseproblemsfor PAScanberesolvedby viewing it asa speechmemoryratherthanan acousticmemorybecauseit is well known that visualarticulatory information, such as lip movements, affects speechperception(McGurk & MacDonald1976) and that the interpretationby listenersof aspecificsoundasspeechor nonspeechaffectstheway it is perceived(Liber-man 1982).Work in speech perception hasalso revealedimportantdifferencesin the perceptionof vowelsandstopconsonants(Healy & Repp1982).ThisrevisedPAS account(Crowder1983)can,thus,easilyaccommodatethe factthat vowels but not stop consonantsshow suffix and modality effects forauditory (Crowder1971) and lipread (de Gelder& Vroomen1994) stimuli(but see Turneret al 1987for different findings withmouthedstimuli).

An important challengeto this revisedaccountof PAS is that modalityeffects have also beenreportedin paradigmsinvolving LTM, such as thecontinuous-distractorparadigm(Gardiner& Gregg1979).However,Greene(1992) pointedout that theselong-termmodality effects(unlike the parallelshort-termeffects)arenot foundfor serialrecallof digits. Hence,it maynotbenecessary touse thesameexplanationfor both short-termand long-termmodality effects.Nevertheless,alternativetheoreticalframeworkshavebeenproposedto accountfor thefull rangeof modality effects. One suchaccount isGlenberg’s (1987) temporal distinctiveness theory, which is based ontheassumption thattemporaldiscriminationis moreaccuratefor auditorythanfor


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visual presentationof items. In supportof this distinction betweenauditoryand visualinformation, Glenberg etal (1989) foundan advantagefor auditory,relative tovisual,presentation inthereproduction oftemporal rhythms. Ontheother hand,Schab& Crowder(1989) disputed this distinction becausetheyfound little auditoryadvantagein theestimation of temporaldurations.

Processing Streams

Penney(1989)alsorejectedthePASaccountof theshort-termmodality effectandproposedan alternativeaccountin termsof separateprocessingstreamsfor auditoryandvisual items.Accordingto her account,auditorily presenteditems automatically elicit both A(acoustic) and P(phonological) codes. TheAcodeis sensory-based andproduced onlyfor stimuli thatareheard.ThePcodeis internally generatedand is analogousto Baddeley’s (1992) phonologicalloop, includinginformationaboutwords,phonemes,andarticulation.Visuallypresenteditemsarenormally representedin theP code,but not automaticallyso. In addition, they elicit a visually-basedcode analogousto Baddeley’s(1992) visuo-spatial sketchpad.Penney’s support for the separate streamsinvolves five differentlinesof evidence: (a) less interference withtwo concur-rent verbal tasks when two modalities, rather than a single modality, areemployed,asin attentionalstudies;(b) improvedmemorywhenlist itemsarepresentedin two different modalities; (c) modality selectiveinterferenceef-fects,including suffix effectsandeffectsof different distractortasks;(d) theadvantagefor recallorganizedby modality, asopposedto timeof presentation;and (e) STM deficitsthatare modalityspecific.

Penney(1989) raisedtwo primary criticisms againstthe PAS model.Thefirst concernsits underestimation of boththecapacity and durationof auditorysensorymemory.Penneyarguedthat theA coderepresentsat leastfive itemsand lastsas long asa minute. Second,andmost importantly, shepointedtodemonstrations of long-termmodality effects,suchas that found by Gather-cole & Conway (1988) extending throughout a list of 30 items. Becauselong-termandshort-termmodality effectsreactdifferently to somevariables,sheproposedthat thesetwo effectsreflectdifferentmechanismsbut thatbothreflectproperties ofthe A code.Three properties ofthe A code emphasizedbyPenneyare (a) its large capacityand the fact that it doesnot decaybut issubjectto interference,(b) its specializationfor codingsequentialassociationsbetweenitems,and(c) theautomaticnature ofits generation andmaintenance.However,with Penney’s proposedlarge capacityfor the A code,it appearsdifficult to provideanexplanationfor the typical modalityandsuffix effects,which are limited tothe finalposition in immediateserialrecall.


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FeatureModel

Nairne’s (1988,1990) featuremodel is an alternativeframeworkin which tointerpretrecencyeffectsin serialrecall.Nairnepostulatedtwo typesof mem-ory trace features—modality independent,which coincide with the innervoice,andmodality dependent,which reflect perceptual aspectsof the stimuli.The modality-dependent featuresare analogousto Penney’s (1989) A codeandvisuo-spatial sketchpadcode,whereasthe modality-independentfeaturesare analogousto her P code.Nairne postulatedsimilar modality-dependentfeaturesfrom speech,lipread,andmouthedstimuli, which areall outputof alanguage-analysissystem.Thus,the modality-dependentfeaturesarepercep-tual,not sensory.In contrast,themodality-independentfeaturescorrespondtoSTM or articulatorycoding.

According to Nairne (1988),particulartracefeaturesareusedat recall ifthey arediscriminable (distinctive) andsalient(usefulor relevant).Recall isbasedon a reconstructiveprocessin which the featuresof the memorytracearecomparedwith featuresof candidateitems.Thereis nodecayasasourceofforgettingin this account(asthereis in the PAS account).Rather,forgettingresultspurely from overwriting, which occursfeatureby feature,suchthat asubsequentfeaturecanoverwritean earlierfeatureonly if it is the sametype(modality-dependent or modality-independent).Overwriting alsooccursonlyfor items in the sameperceptualgroup(Frankish1989).Recencyresultsbe-causethefinal list item doesnot suffer from overwritingof modality-depend-ent featuresunlessthereis a suffix. Themodality-independentfeaturesof thefinal list item areoverwrittenby rehearsalandotherinnervoiceactivitiesthatoccur at theend of thelist even when thereis nosuffix.

An importantaspectof Nairne’s (1988)modelis the fact thathe is abletoaccountfor the presenceof visual recencyeffects,which occurfor deafsub-jects with AmericanSign Language(Shand& Klima 1981)and for hearingsubjectswith abstract(Broadbent& Broadbent1981)andunusual(Campbellet al 1983) visual stimuli. According to Nairne, auditory featuresare notstronger,moredistinctive,or moredurablethanvisualfeatures.Visual stimuliusually fail to exhibit recencybecauseof overwriting byvisualeventsaftertheendof the list andbecausesubjectsgenerallyuseauditory,ratherthanvisual,featuresasdiscriminative cuesin recall.Nairne’s accountis, thus,similar toShand& Klima’s (1981)primary linguistic codeaccount,accordingto whichrecencyeffectsoccurwhenthe stimuli arepresentedin themodality consistentwith the dominantformat usedfor STM coding.However,by Nairne’s ac-count,subjectsmay be led by sometaskdemandsto attendto linguisticallyirrelevantvisual features.If the salienceof visual featuresis enhancedin aparticulartask,thenvisual recencyeffectsshouldoccuraccordingto Nairne’smodel,butnotaccording tothe PAS model.


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Nairne(1988)accountsfor long-termmodality effectsin a mannersimilarto that of Glenberg’s (1987) temporaldistinctivenesstheory.Time of occur-renceis associatedwith a broadertemporalregion for visual tracesbecausetheyarelargelycomposedof modality-independentfeatures,asaretheneigh-boringtraces for inner-voice activity.

Summary

Justasattemptsweremadeto usedistinctivenessasan explanationfor pre-viousfindingsattributable to primarymemory,it hasbeenused as anexplana-tion for previousfindingsattributableto auditorysensorymemory,especiallybecauseof paralleleffectsfoundin LTM. Nevertheless,thereremainspower-ful evidencefor a separatetypeof processingassociatedwith speechpercep-tion; that is, thereis supportfor a distinction betweenacousticandphonologi-cal codes or,similarly, between modality-dependentand independentfeatures.

SECONDARY MEMORY

Accordingto someversionsof themodalmodel,including thesimple versionof theAtkinson& Shiffrin (1968)modelthatwasappliedto freerecall,storagein secondarymemoryis permanent,with forgettingattributablesolely to re-trieval, rather than storage,failures. This proposeddurability of storageinsecondarymemoryis in sharpcontrastto the rapid lossof information fromprimarymemory.Hence,we concentrateour discussion of secondarymemoryon the issueof its permanencyanddurability. (For moreinclusive summariesof theliteratureon long-termretention,see Healy& Sinclair1995,Schmidt&Bjork 1992.)

Permastore

Although it is difficult to study retentionover long delay intervals in thelaboratory,aningeniousnaturalisticcross-sectionalmethodwasdevelopedbyBahrick (1984) to study retentionover periodsup to 50 years.This methodemploysa large numberof subjectswho acquiredthe sameknowledgeatdifferent times in the past.Thesesubjectsmust estimate the degreeof theiroriginal acquisition of thematerialandtheextentto which theyrehearsedthematerialafteracquisition. Retentiontestsareperformedanda retentionfunc-tion is calculatedon thebasisof thesubjects’ dateof original acquisitionandthen corrected,through multiple regression, forsuch factors as degreeoforiginal acquisitionandextentof rehearsal.Bahrickusedthis methodto studythe retentionof Spanishlearnedin the classroomby morethan700 subjectswhose lastexposure to aSpanish coursewasfrom 0to approximately 50 yearsprior to theretentiontest.Rehearsalwasvery low andnot a goodpredictorofperformanceontheretentiontest,whichwasinsteadpredictedto alargeextent


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by original acquisition level and training in other Romancelanguages.Theretentionfunction indicatedan exponentialdeclinein performanceacrossthefirst 6 years,after which there was a stableasymptote for about30 years,followed by a final declineprobablyattributable to aging.Becauseso muchknowledgewas maintained acrossthe long delayswith litt le interveningre-hearsal,Bahrick introducedthe conceptof permanentmemory,or “permas-tore.”

Although Bahrick’s (1984)findings havebeendisputed(Hintzman1993),morerecentwork hasprovidedconvergingevidencefor thenotionof permas-tore.Usingthesametechniques,Conwayetal (1991)assessedretentionovera12-yearperiodof materiallearnedin a cognitivepsychologycourse.After arapid decline in performanceacrossthe first four years,therewas a stableasymptotefor theremainingeightyears.Further,in a cross-sectionalstudyofbilingual Hispanicimmigrants,Bahricket al (1994)foundessentiallyno lossof Spanishknowledgeovera 50-yearperiodof residencein theUnitedStates.It is importantto notethat thesubjectsin this studywereat least10 yearsoldwhen they enteredthe United Statesand, thus, had a solid foundation inSpanish before immigrating and that most of them continued to speakabout as much Spanishas English after enteringthe United States.Using adifferent method,in which subjectswere given recognitiontestsfor formersingle-seasontelevisionprograms,Squire (1989) supportedthe finding thatconsiderableknowledgemay be maintainedin memoryfor a lifetime eveninthe absenceof rehearsal.However,he also found a gradualand continuousloss in performance,and no evidenceof a stableasymptote. This finding isconsistentwith demonstrations that forgetting functionsfollow a power law(Anderson& Schooler1991,Wixted & Ebbesen1991).Squireattributedthediscrepancybetweenhis findings andthoseof Bahrickto thehigherdegreeoflearningandthegreaterdegreeof internalorganizationfor thelearnedmaterialin Bahrick’s studies.

Procedural Reinstatement

Remarkabledurability of memoryhasalsobeenfoundin laboratorystudiesofskill acquisitionand retention(Healy & Bourne1995). For example,in anexperimentin which subjectswere given extensivetraining in single-digitmultiplication, Fendrichet al (1993)found considerableimprovementsin thespeedwith which subjectsprovidedthe answersto the problemsacross12sessionsof training and no deteriorationin performancespeedacrossdelayintervals up to 14monthsaftertraining.This high degreeof skill retention wascoupled,however,with astrikingspecificity intheskill acquired.Rickardetal(1994) found that extensivetraining on specific multiplication and divisionproblems (e.g. _ =4 × 7) did not transfer to parallelproblems withthecomplementaryoperation(e.g.28 = _ × 7). To accountfor theobservedskill


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durability andspecificity,Healyet al (1992a)proposeda proceduralreinstate-mentprinciple,accordingto which superiorlong-termretentionresultswhentheprocedures(themotoric,perceptual,andcognitive operations)usedat thetime of acquisition arereinstated(duplicated)at the time of theretentiontest.This proceduralreinstatementprincipledrawson thedistinction betweenpro-ceduralanddeclarativeknowledgeproposedby Anderson(1983)aswell asthenotionproposedby Kolers& Roediger(1984)thatmemoryrepresentationscannot bedivorced fromthe procedures usedto acquire them.

Theproceduralreinstatementprinciplecanbedividedinto two hypotheses,oneconcerningtheuseof proceduresduringstudyof materialandthesecondconcerningthe useof the sameproceduresduring the retentiontest.Supportfor eachof thesehypotheseswasprovidedin studiesof the generationeffect(bettermemoryfor materialthat is generatedthanfor materialthat is simplyreadby subjects)in episodicmemoryfor the list of answersto simple arithmetic problemsshownduring an experimentalsession.The relevantproce-dures in this memory task are the arithmetic operations linking the prob-lems to theanswers.Crutcher& Healy(1989)showedthatsubjects’ memoryfor thelist of answersto multiplicationproblemswasenhancedwhensubjectswere requiredduring study to perform the multiplication operationsthem-selvesas opposedto reading the answerwith the problem. Generatingorreadingthe answerper sewasnot crucial, becausereadingandverifying ananswerdid enhanceperformance,whereasusinga calculatorto generatetheanswerdid not. McNamara& Healy (1995b)showedthat enhancedmemoryfor the list of answersto arithmeticproblemsonly occurredwhen subjectswere able at the retentiontest to recall the problem operandsencounteredduring studyandusethemasretrievalcuesfor the list of answers.That is, aretention advantage wasonly foundwhensubjects wereableto reinstateat testthe arithmeticproceduresperformedat study. The proceduralreinstatementaccountof thegenerationeffect is similar to otheraccounts(e.g.McDanieletal 1990).However,theproceduralreinstatementaccounthastheadvantageofexplaininga broaderrangeof findings concerningthe generationeffect (e.g.McNamara& Healy1995a,Roediger& McDermott1993)aswell asfindingsin otherdomains,including long-termretentionof nonverbalaswell asverbalmaterial.

Summary

The modal model generallyassumesthat secondarymemory is permanent.Evidencefor durability comesfrom naturalistic cross-sectionalstudiesofknowledgeacquisitionandfrom laboratorystudiesof skill acquisition.Proce-dural reinstatementhasbeenusedto explainbothdurability andspecificityoftraining.


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CONCLUSION

Does themodalmodelstill work? Some ofthe alternative frameworks, includ-ing distinctivenessandproceduralreinstatement, canexplaina wider scopeofmemory findings, including those spanningboth short andlong retentionintervalsandbothverbalandnonverbalmaterial.However,it seemsclearfromthestudiesreviewedherethatthesealternativeframeworkscannotaccountforthe full set of findings used to support the modal model. It is also clear,though,that themodalmodelneedsto beelaboratedalongthe lines reviewedhere.In any event,this review hasconvincedus that themodalmodelis stillusefulasa meansto framethecurrentliteratureon verballearningandmem-ory.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Preparationof this chapterwassupportedin part by Army ResearchInstituteContractMDA903-93-K-0010to the University of Colorado(Alice Healy,Principal Investigator)and a JamesS McDonnell FoundationPostdoctoralFellowshipAward to DanielleMcNamara.We are indebtedto JamesParkerfor his invaluablehelppreparingthis chapterandLyle Bourne,Bob Crowder,Bill Estes,Don Foss,Bill Marmie, Bill Oliver, and Larry Pinneofor theirhelpful commentson earlier versionsof thischapter.

Any Annual Reviewchapter, aswell asany arti clecited in an Annual Reviewchapter,may bepurchased fromthe Annual ReviewsPreprints and Reprints service.

1-800-347-8007; 415-259-5017; email: [email protected]

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VERBAL LEARNING AND MEMORY: Does the Modal Model …VERBALLEARNING AND MEMORY: Does the Modal Model...

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