Vargas Readings 1 - 9

8/9/2019 Vargas Readings 1 - 9

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Hubert Herring - A History of Latin America, pp. 759-768 V 1

The Dictatorship of Getulio Vargas, 1930-45

Getulio Vargas was forty-seven when he seized power. Born in Rio Grande do Sul in 1883, traarmy life, then for the law, he had served in the national congress, as minister of the treasury under WaLuiz, then as governor of his state--always with ability. There was nothing impressive, certainly nothiabout this compact little man of five feet, four inches who became president of Brazil in 1930; he metsmile, walked unguarded, talked with any who accosted him, played poor golf on Sundays and smiled joked about it. His sedate home life reassured the Brazilians. He was usually described as an honest wcollected a modest thousand dollars a month salary and did not dip into the public treasury. Even critihis loyalty to his country, while denouncing him as a dictator.

Vargas was certainly no kin to the rough tyrants who had often misruled nearby Spanish AmerTo be sure, some of his critics found it wiser to live abroad and a few went to jail for brief terms, but nfound in dark streets with bullets in their backs. The outcry against Vargas seemed incongruous to thohim: he looked so mild and amiable. Vargas, says Gilberto Freyre, must be understood against to the Jmissionary fathers who had shaped that area. Like them he was silent, introspective, subtle, realistic, cold; he was also a son of the Gauchos of Indian-Portuguese blood, telluric, instinctive, fatalistic, proudramatic. Tavares de Sa speaks of Vargas shrewd, tortuous...sophistry. This was the man who for fifteplayed state against state, group against group, man against man--always with a smile--until at last he for a time to his southern pastures.

Getulio Vargas first two years in office inspired the confidence of most Brazilians. his apologiall ills upon the republic: the empty treasury, the defaulted foreign debts, the un-honored internal leanwidespread unemployment, and the overproduction and under pricing of coffee. Brazilians accepted texplanation and hailed Vargas with relief. His first measures were reassuring. He made it clear that stmust yield to national unity, a needed reproof to the arrogant bosses of Sao Paulo, Minas Gerias, and Rdo Sul. With the consent of a frightened congress, Vargas imposed rigid censorship, removed elected officials, and named his own men as governors and as mayors. The government was now in Rio de Jaaccurately, in the hands of Getulio Vargas.

Vargas economic measures were vigorous and often wise: he imposed new taxes, removed the

tariff barriers between the states, encouraged new industries, placed further checks on coffee productimarketing, and declared a moratorium on foreign loans. Public confidence in the central government although there were rumblings of discontent as he failed to regularize his position by a legal election. for constitutional government and democratic practices finally provoked the paulistas to revolt; the up1932, in Sao Paulo attracted support from factions in other states and led to a three-month defiance oftroops, virtually a civil war. When the revolt was crushed, Vargas treated the rebels with moderation; exiled, others were briefly jailed, and some were deprived of their civil rights--but there were no execthe city of Sao Paulo later dedicated the Avenida 9 de Julho, commemorating their unsuccessful revolhimself participated in the ceremony, smiling amiably at his former enemies. The Brazilianto demand a constitutional regime. In 1933 Vargas blandly convened a constituent assembly, which pConstitution of 1934. It was similar to the Constitution of 1891 but with economic provisions reminisItalian corporative state. The new instrument reinforced national unity by vesting larger powers in the

executive, provided for social legislation to safeguard laborers in field and factory, and granted the sufwomen. The assembly then named Vargas president for a four-year term. Brazilians congratulated thupon their escape from dictatorship and return to legitimate government. The truce lasted a year. In N1935, there were barracks-revolts in Rio de Janiero and Pernambuco, involving army and navy officercivilians. The rebellion was promptly crushed, and many were jailed or deported. Vargas pinned respupon the Communists, declared a state of siege, and ruled as a dictator. Always quick to describe all cCommunists, Vargas was probably correct in naming them in this instance. The Allianca Nacional Liallied with the Third International, had been organized in 1934; its leader, able Luiz Carlos Prestes, wremembered for his spectacular march through the wilderness and respected by his bitterest critics. A


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Prestes had spent some years in Moscow and had been soundly converted to the gospel of Lenin. Brafor Communist infiltration, its people were chiefly a hungry, angry proletariat. Prestes was arrested anwithout a trial until 1945.

The threat from the Communist left was matched by no less a threat from the fascist right. A sgroup called the integralistas had been growing rapidly since 1934, led by a neurotic zealot named PliHis language was a strange mumbo jumbo of sun worship, Italian Fascism, the corporative state, anti-and the leadership principle. His devoted followers, several hundred thousand in all, wore green shirdistinctive salute, used the Greek sigma as their identifying mark, exalted God, Nation, Family, marchpossible occasions, and staged bewildering ceremonies to the rising sun. Salgado had money to spendmay have come from the German Embassy. Intergralismo reached into the army, the navy, governmenand the best families of Brazil.

A presidential election was set for January, 1938. Three forces dominated the campaign: Vargwas constitutionally ineligible for reelection; the Communists, whose leader Prestes was in jail; and thIntegralistas, perhaps the most numerous of all the parties. The old-guard parties, representing coalitimachines, named their candidates. Vargas said nothing until October, when he announced that a Comuprising was imminent and declared a state of war for ninety days, the exact period before election daSalgado theatrically offered the services of 100,000 Integralistas to protect the republic. In Novemberstruck; he spoke to the nation over the radio, proclaimed himself president for another term, dissolvedand announced a new constitution for the Novo Estado, The New State, a document written by Vargasthe help of his minister of justice, Francisco Campos. Vargas had outplayed the Integralistas, perhaps an outright fascist state. Brazilians, happily quit of the preposterous Plinio Salgado, found it hard to sNovo Estado and its ghost constitution. Latin America has seen many fake constitutions, but this creathem all. It declared a state of national emergency and provided that so long as such emergency conticonstitution was without force until approved by a plebiscite, that only then could a congress be electeVargas never mentioned the plebiscite again. So, concluded Karl Loewenstein, a constitutional cat is legal tail, or vice versa...It is the Brazilian way of talking through his hat. However, Article 180 madecongress is elected the president of the Republic shall be empowered to issue decrees on all matters offor the union.

Vargas dictatorship was now complete. He named all officials, high and low. His social progrlaunched by decree, guaranteed collective bargaining, but with trade unions controlled by the state; it

an eight-hour day, restriction on night work and child labor, medical assistance for workers and expecand security from birth to death. other decrees dealt with economic issues. The state theoretically assof all national wealth. Brazil for the Brazilians was the slogan; foreign enterprise was caught in a tangregulations.

In May, 1938, the Integralists made a last bid for power. Several hundred men, including armycivil servants, closed in upon the presidential palace where Vargas, his daughter, and a handful of servthem off with a few guns until the army finally arrived. A few hundred were arrested, some were jaileno one was executed for this bold treason. Plinio Salgado went into hiding and soon took refuge in Po1938 there were no more armed revolts, and Vargas ruled uncontested for seven years.

Vargas called his government a new kind of democracy, a disciplined democracy. But the factphrases: there were neither congress nor elections; Vargas made all appointments and ruled by decreeunions were the tool of the state as in Mussolinis Italy; economic life was dominated by the state. Despite his

arrogant rule, Vargas won credit by appointing some excellent men to office, by occasionally protectinof his courts, and by improving the administration of government throughout the nation. Karl LoewenBrazil under Vargas, found much to remind him of pre-Nazi Austria, despotism mitigated by sloppinedictatorship, but an amiable one--although its amiability lessened during the war years. Vargas had aphimself father of his people, a role in which he delighted, and on the whole the people enjoyed it.

Civil liberties were curtailed. The press, radio, and schools came under the glovedhand of Getulios pressdepartment, the DIP, presided over by the unsavory Lourival Fontes. A censor was assigned to each noffice. No unauthorized dispatch could be sent out by foreign correspondents. Foreign newspaper mefriendly and reasonable were given generous privileges; and the unreasonable found it wise to leave.


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example of Vargass ways with the press may be cited the case of O Estado do Sao Paulo, edited since the1870s with stubborn independence, democratic zeal, and good taste. Its owner-editor, Julio Mesquitgrandson of the founder, supported Vargas in 1930, continued to support him in 1932 when the paulisbut finally broke with the dictator in 1937. Mesquita went to jail for six months, then into exile. In Mpolice raided the newspapers plant, foundmachine guns and ammunition. (This startling discovery wasannounced by the government three hours before the raid.) Seventeen members of the staff were jailedays, and then released. The newspaper, a valuable property, was declared forfeited to the nation; pubshortly resumed under an editor appointed by Vargas.

Unlike the run of the mill Spanish American dictator, Vargas made good use of able men, manhad scant sympathy with his methods. Afranio de Mello Franco,Vargass minister of foreign affairs during the firstthree years, belongs to the fine tradition of Brazilians international lawyers. Born in Minas Gerais in entered the public life as a congressman in 1906. After 1917, he represented Brazil in many internatioconferences, serving as a delegate to the League of Nations, and as a judge of The Hague Court. In 19became foreign minister and represented his country at the Seventh Pan American Conference in Mon1933. After his retirement in 1934, Mello Franco arbitrated the clash between Colombia and Peru ovearea in the upper Amazon. In 1938, at the Eighth Pan American Conference in Lima, he displayed wireconciling the stubborn divergence of opinion between the United States and Argentina.

Oswaldo Aranha, ambassador to Washington and then foreign minister, was another of Vargas colleagues. Tall and fair, Aranha was the handsomest statesman to represent Brazil through the days ointo the days of peace, when he became president of the Assembly of the United Nations. His skill wasuccess in securing loans and grants of some $300,000,000 from Washington. Candid, open, friendly,Vargass most effective spokesman, persuading skeptical outsiders of the outsiders of thedictators puredemocratic intentions. While others inVargass circle made speeches which jarred democratic ears, Aranha waalways on the side of the Allies and of the United States. Cynical bystanders described him asVargass AmericanFront.

There were others. A dictator needs a faithful army, and in his minister of war, Eurico Dutra, astaff, Goes Monteiro, Vargas had competent aides. Both seemed to waver on the issue of the Axis andBoth were decorated by Hitler for valued services by Brazil to Germany. This did not prove them prosimply pro-Brazilian. They held the army together and kept in power.

Vargas is rightfully credited with efforts to improve the living conditions of his people. He maprogress in providing better housing, more medical care, and increased wages. A fair appraisal of Vartake into account the economic burdens of the land, the load of foreign debt, and the low purchasing ppeople. In 1938 a government survey reported an average monthly wage of about $11.80 for all workagriculture, commerce, and industry, both rural and urban. Jose Jobim adds further testimony, citing fexports: in 1938 Brazil sold about four dollars worth of goods per capita in world markets-- a figure cDenmarks $56.30, Argentinas $20.50. Brazils poverty appears in its federal budget which, in the years beforewar, was not much more than $200,000,000- little more than New York City was spending on schoolswar brought brief prosperity, as the demand forBrazils goods increased and American war expenditures in Brazreached high levels. But it was a fictitious prosperity at best, canceled by a disastrous inflation. Vargawork with.

Industry, which had been enlarged during and after World War I, was given further stimulus by

II. Total industrial production in 1907 was about $35,000,000; in 1920 it was $153,000,000; in 1940, $1,300,000,000; by 1943, well over $1,400,000,000. Industrial output had multiplied forty-three timeyears. The output of the textile mills, chiefly in Sao Paulo, was valued at about $30,000,000 in 1926 a$209,000,000 in 1942. In 1939 exports of textiles yielded about $1,500,000; in 1943, more than $66,0the paper industry the output was about $25,000, in 1938, almost $500,000 in 1943. There was expanproduction of chemicals, leather products, rubber goods, cement, and machinery. The state of Sao Pauchief producer of all these goods.

Vargas did much to developBrazils mineral resources, No one has computed these resources; scarcelthird of the nation has been scientifically explored. But Brazil has almost every mineral and metal--ch


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crystals, mica, industrial diamonds, molybdenum, lead, vanadium, arsenic, and bauxite. Her manganemay be the largest of any nation. She has perhaps 23 per cent of the worlds known reserves of high grore. The Itabira iron mountain in Minas Gerais is one of the largest deposits in the world. A beginninbeen made in building steel mills; two plants in Minas Gerais and one in the state of Sao Paulo had tusome structural steel. Vargas sought to enlarge the steel industry and to keep its control in Brazilian hForeign operators--United States Steel, Krupps interests, perhaps the Japanese--were more than willing to takehand, but Vargas launched his National Steel Company in 1941, got loans from Washingtons Export-Import Bank,and began construction of the Volta Redonda plant, ninety miles from Rio de Janeiro and 240 miles frThis operation necessitated railroads and ships to bring coal from Santa Catarina, manganese from MiFurther loans from Washington speeded the work. The results were not spectacular when compared woperations elsewhere, but the Brazilian company could report output for the year 1948 of 224,000 ton243,000 tons of bar steel, about 62,000 tons of rails, and numerous other items.

PresidentVargass economic concerns ranged far afield; swamp lands in the state of Rio de Janeirdrained and opened to farming; highways and railroads were extended. In 1938 the National Petroleuwas launched to survey and drill wells, and the Brazilians were hopeful of being rid of dependence upgasoline and lubricating oils. In 1939 the National Council of Hydraulic and Electrical Energy was orexploit the vast unharnessed power of thenations rivers.

Under Vargas,Brazils trade increased. During the years 1934-37, Brazil operated under a barteragreement with Germany. Locomotives, iron, coal, dyes, and chemicals were exchanged for Braziliancotton, tobacco, and oils. By 1937 Germany was selling twice as much as Brazil as was Great Britainas the United States. After 1937 German trade fell off and the American increased. During World Walooked chiefly to Great Britain and the United States. In 1943Brazils exports were about $445,000,000, and shehad favorable balance of more than a half billion dollars in balances abroad.

Vargas and World War II

As the United States drew closer to war,Vargass sympathies were unclear. His generals had beencultivated by Germany (the French had also sent military missions in the 1920s) and there was a quein the hearts of democrats that the Novo Estado resembled German and Italian models, and that a protstate was taking form on American soil. Vargas, it seemed, was sitting on the fence waiting to pick th

Perhaps his policy was symbolized by sending one son to the United States for schooling, another to GItaly; prudence called for a crown prince in each camp. In the meantime, Vargas discouraged popularfor the Allied cause. His DIP ruthlessly censored news which stressed Allied victories. As late as Janthe newspaper Diario Carioca was closed for printing an article in praise of inter-American solidarity.Russian armies were at last defeating Germany, the Brazilian presses made it appear that Germany wavictorious. This ambiguity caused grave concern in Washington. In June, 1940, after the fall of Francentrance of Italy on the Axis side, Franklin D. Roosevelt made a speech denouncing Mussolinis stab in the back.The next day Vargas spoke on a battleship in Rio de Janeiro's harbor: Virile peoples must follow the liaspirations. . . We are marching toward a future different from all we know in economic, political, anorganization, and we feel that old systems and antiquated formulas have entered a decline. Washingtowhat Vargas meant. Meanwhile, there was no doubt that the majority of thoughtful Brazilians stood wStates, with the Allies, and against the Axis. But they had no voice, no free press, and no free platform

doggerel of this period started out: Don't speak; Getulio will do it for you--dont think; the DIP will do it for you.By 1940 Washington was preparing for war, and Brazilian co-operation was important. Jeffersambassador to Rio de Janeiro, was assigned the task of persuading Getulio Vargas. It was not easy. Vmany of his aides were still uncertain as to the outcome; pro-Allied populace had little outlet for their Foreign Minister Aranha gave invaluable aid to the Allies. Caffery, an able if somewhat crusty diplomconcession to build bases which later served American planes in the African campaign. By late 1940,permissions had been granted, and American engineers were laying out army, navy, and blimp bases fin far north, south through Belem, Sao Luiz, Fortaleza, Natal, Maceio, Recife, Bahia, Caravellas, and Caffery had proved himself an excellent negotiator, Aranha a firm friend of the Allied cause.


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After Pearl Harbor all the American nations were involved; Vargas knew it, but he was still cauJanuary, 1942, Rio de Janeiro was host to a conference of the foreign ministers of all the American Realmost unanimous stand of the delegates for American solidarity against the Axis was chiefly due to AUnited StatesSumner Welles, Uruguays Guani, and Mexicos Padilla, in the face of stubborn resistance from Argentinas Ruiz Guinazu and Chiles Rossetti.Brazil was now officially on the Allied side, and on August 22declared war. The United States furnished planes, ships, tanks, guns, and ammunition. A Brazilian exforce of 25,000 fighting men was sent to Italy and acquitted itself with credit. The bases lent by Brazithe final victory.

One incident revealsVargass halfhearted commitment to the Allied cause. In August, 1944, when twas all but won, Oswald Aranha was advertised to speak to the Society of the Friends of America (a pNations body); the police padlocked the doors of the meeting place. Vargas refused to support his foreand Aranha resigned.

The End of the Dictatorship

By the first days of 1945, there were clear signs of discontent with the dictatorship. Many polgenerals, and professional people began to show their hands. For some, the stand reflected prudence; that a dictator-bossed Brazil would have scant welcome at the peace tables. For others, it was simply play for power. For many, it was a deeply rooted desire for democratic rule. In February came the debreak through. Two newspapers suddenly began to talk of the election Vargas had promised, of the nediscussion, and in favor of the candidacy of Air Brigadier Eduardo Gomes. The DIP did not silence thinference was that Vargas had decided to lose his hold. The news papers, such as were not owned by government or the Communists, published vigorous discussions ofBrazils future.

National political parties took form. The National Democratic Union nominated Gomes, it hadof most moderate Liberals, many Conservatives, and others intent upon striking at Vargas. The SocialParty, backing Eurico Dutra, Vargas minister of war, made its chief appeal to those of the extreme righVargas blessing, they thought. The Communists, led by Luiz Carlos Prestes, finally released from pristhe contest. As the year wore on, it became clear that Vargas was not to be easily deposed. A mysterimovement sprang up with the slogan Queremos Getulio, We want Getulio; Brazil was plastered with tbillboards, in the press, in pamphlets. It was then revealed that the promoter of this ostensibly spontan

outburst was paying his printing bills from a loan of $14,000,000 granted by the national Banco do BrVargas).Meanwhile, elections were scheduled for December 2. By September political prophets knew

had no intention of quitting. Rumors spread that a military coup was planned, that prisons were readieAmerican ambassador, Adolf A. Berle, Jr., took a hand. Berle had come to Brazil in January, 1945, anfriends of those in power and in the opposition. Berle now decided to speak and on September 29 helconference for Brazilian reporters; he spoke eloquently of the long friendship between Brazil and the and said that the pledge of free Brazilian elections, set for a definite date, by a government whose worStates has found inviolable, has been hailed with as much satisfaction in the United States as in Brazilpoint was clear; he hailed the election, knowing full well that Vargas proposed to continue himself in speech has been cited as another instance of American intervention in Latin Americas internal affairs-gentle and effective.

In October Vargas dismissed the capitals chief of police and installed his brother, BenjaminVargas(nicknamed O Beijo, The Kiss), who was notorious for his pilfering and exploitation of prostitution anThis affront to the dignity of the nation offended the generals, who demanded Vargas resignation. Forfuns, and troops surrounded public buildings. On October 29 Vargas resigned and flew to his farm in do Sul. Chief Justice Linhares of the Supreme Court, who became provisional president, appointed ancabinet. The political campaign continued. The queremistas were noisy, Vargas now ordered them toDutra. The election was held on schedule on December 2. Dutra won, two to one, over Gomez. The polled 10 percent of the votes. Meanwhile, Vargas was tending his cattle, still smiling.


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Benjamin Keen - A Short History of Latin America, 448-356 V 2

Vargas and the Bourgeois Revolution 1930-1954

The liberal revolution of 1930, whatever the motives of its participants, represented a victory for the ugroups who favored industrialization and the modernization ofBrazils economic, political, and social structures.But the bourgeoisie had gained that victory with the aid of allies whose interests had to be taken into aGetulio Vargas presided over a heterogeneous coalition that included conservative fazendeiros--who the revolution from jealousy of the overweening Paulista power but feared radical social change--and and tenentes who called for agrarian reform, the formation of cooperatives, and the nationalization of the sidelines was the working class, vital to the development of Brazilian capitalism but a potential threxistence. Finally, Vargas had to take account of foreign capitalist interests, temporarily weakened buapplying great pressure on the Brazilian economy when the capitalist world emerged from the depths Depression Vargas strategy of attempting to balance and reconcile these conflicting interests--that is, tthe irreconcilable--helps to explain the contradictions and abrupt shifts of course that marked his caree

Vargas Economic and Political Measures

The most pressing problem facing the new government was to find some way out of the economic cridid not abandon the coffee industry, the base of his political enemies, to its fate; he attempted to revivclassic valorization measures as the restriction of plantings and the purchase of surplus stocks and the expedient of burning the excess coffee. By 1940 some 60 million bags of coffee had been destroyed. these efforts, the level of coffee exports and prices remained low throughout the 1930s. The governmsuccess with efforts to diversify agriculture. Production of cotton, in particular, grew with the aid of creleased by the depressed coffee industry, and cotton exports rose steadily until 1940, when the outbreinterrupted their advance. But diversification of agriculture could not compensate for the steep declinBrazils import capacity, which was even lower in 1937 than in 1929. The key to recovery was found in impothrough industrialization.

The Great Depression did not create Brazilian industrialization, but it created the conditions fo

advance. Beginning as a spontaneous response to the loss of import capacity that resulted from the cadecline of exports and a falling rate of exchange, industrialization received a fresh impetus from the VHe encouraged industry through exchange controls, import quotas, tax incentives, lowered duties on imachinery and raw materials, and long-term loans at low interest rates. Thanks to the combination ofbackground conditions and the Vargas policy of state intervention, Brazilian industrialization, based eproduction for the home market, made notable strides in a few years: Industrial production doubled band 1936. As early as 1933, when the United States was still in a deep depression,Brazils national income hadbegun to increase; this indicated that for the moment, at least, the economy no longer depended, as hatraditionally been the case, on external factors but on internal ones.

Meanwhile, Vargas pursued an uncertain political course that now appeared to favor the left wrevolutionary coalition, the tenentes, and now its conservative fazendeiro wing. The tenentes appeareconsiderable influence over Vargas during the first two years of the provisional government; he used t

political lieutenants in various capacities, especially as interventores, or temporary administrators, in treplacing unreliable elected governors. Believing that a strong centralized government was needed tonecessary structural reforms, the tenentes urges Vargas to remain in power indefinitely. Some tenenteconservatives by their radical innovations; thus Joao Alberto, named by Vargas as interventores in plaelected governor of Sao Paulo, angered the Paulista elite by decreeing a 5 percent wage increase for wdistributing some land to participants in the revolution.

The Paulistas demanded the removal of Joao Alberto, but they wanted more; supported by oligelements in other states, they asked for a return to constitutional government through immediate electipreferably under the old federal constitution of 1891, which would most likely enable them to regain p


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own state. Vargas sought to appease the Paulistas with concessions: He replaced Joao Alberto with a cSao Paulo, appointed a conservative banker from the same state as his first minister of finance, and andate for the holding of a constituent assembly.

Emboldened rather than appeased, the Paulistas launched a counterrevolutionary constitutionaJuly 1932. Lacking popular support either in Sao Paulo or in other parts of the country, it collapsed afmonths of halfhearted combat. But Vargas neither punished nor humiliated the vanquished rebels. Demaintain and strengthen his ties with the Sao Paulo establishment, he made new concessions to it: He50 percent of the bank debts of the coffee planters and ordered the Bank of Brazil to take over the warissued by the rebel government. After mid-1932 the influence of the tenente group over Vargas rapidlalthough individual tenentes of moderate tendency continued to hold important positions in the regim

In February 1932, Vargas had promulgated an electoral code that established the secret ballot, major planks in the revolutionary program, lowered the voting age from twenty-one to eighteen, and evote to working women. The code, however, still denied the vote to illiterates, who formed the majorpopulation. A constituent assembly elected under this code drafted a new constitution, which was proJuly 16, 1934. This document retained the federal system but considerably strengthened the powers oexecutive. The president was to serve for four years but could not succeed himself. The assembly, coitself the first Chamber of Deputies, elected Vargas president for a term that was to extend until Januanovel feature of the new constitution, reflecting the influence of European corporatist doctrines, was tfor the election of fifty representatives of various classes and professions to the Chamber of Deputies,two hundred and fifty representatives of areas and populations.

The section of the constitution on the economic and social order stressed the government's respfor economic development. Article 119 declared that the law will regulate the progressive nationalizamineral deposits, and waterfalls or other sources of energy, as well as of the industries considered as bessential to the economic and military defense of the country.

The section on rights and duties of labor revealed the importance Vargas attached to the impostutelage over the working class, a class to be courted through concessions but denied independence ofOne of the first acts of the provisional government (November 1930) had been to create a Ministry of served as the government's agency in dealing with labor. Another decree (March 1931) authorized theorganize the workers into new unions, to operate under strict government control. The constitution ofestablished a labor tribunal system, gave the government power to fix minimum wages, and guarantee

strike. Subsequent decrees set the working day at eight hours in commerce and industry, fixed minimthroughout the country, and created an elaborate social security system that provided for pensions, paisafety and health standards, and employment security.

In exchange for these gains, obtained without struggle, the working class lost its freedom of actrade unions, formerly subject to harsh repression, but militant and jealous of their autonomy, became agencies controlled by Ministry of Labor. The workers had no voice in the drafting of labor legislatiosecurity agencies brutally repressed strikes not approved by the government.

The labor and social legislation, moreover, was unevenly enforced, and employers frequently tadvantage of theiremployees ignorance of the law. The legislation did not apply at all to the great majorityagricultural workers, who comprised some 85 percent of the labor force. Determined to maintain his the fazendeiro wing of his coalition, Vargas left intact the system of patrimonial servitude that governerelations in the countryside, just as he left intact the latifundio. The promises of agrarian reform made

campaign of 1930 and right after the revolution were forgotten.Vargass concessions to the Paulista oligarchy and the ouster of reformist tenentes from positionpower formed part of a rightward shift that grew more pronounced in 1934. This growing conservatissupport among liberal tenentes, intellectuals, and radical workers and drew especially sharp criticism Communist party. Founded in 1922, the party had dismissed the revolution of 1930 as a struggle betwfactions of the bourgeoisie. The party gained growing influence after 1930 as a result of its anti-impeand the prestige of its most famous recruit, Luis Carlos Prestes. Prestes had refused to take advantageamnesty for political exiles proclaimed after the revolution but returned in 1934 to join the Communisbecome honorary president of the Alianca Nacional Libertadora (National Liberation Alliance, or AN


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front movement that attracted middle class as well as working class support with its slogans of liquidalatifundio, nationalization of large foreign companies, and cancellation of imperialist debts. The ANLsharply critical of the inadequacies ofVargass labor and social legislation. Meanwhile, on the right there hadarisen a fascist movement (Integralismo, or Integralism), complete with the trappings of its European including colored shirts (green), special salutes, and an ideology that denounced democrats, Communand Jews as enemies of the state.

While tolerant of the Integralist movement, Vargas and an increasingly conservative Congress the leftist opposition as subversive. In March 1935, Congress enacted the National Security Act, whicgovernment special powers to suppress subversive activities. Denounced by the ANL as a monstrous clearly directed at the left. In July, on the anniversary of the tenente revolt at Copabana in 1922, Prestspeech in which he attacked Vargass failure to implement the tenente ideals and called for the creation of a trulyrevolutionary and anti-imperialist government. Vargas responded by banning the ANL and ordering tmany leftist leaders.

With the legal avenues of opposition for the left disappearing, the ANL and one wing of the Cparty began an armed uprising in November. Despite some initial successes, it was quickly crushed bforces and followed by a savage repression. There were some fifteen thousand arrests, and many pristortured, some to death. Prestes and other leaders of the revolt were captured, tried, and sentenced to in prison. The Communist party was banned and went underground for a decade.

Vargas as Dictator

The repression of the left paved the way for the establishment ofVargass personal dictatorship. A presidentialelection was scheduled for January 1938, but under the new constitution Vargas was barred from succhimself. He allowed candidates to emerge and campaign but meanwhile carefully prepared for the costrategic interventions in the states and transfers in the army that filled key posts with reliable commanwar minister, General Eurico Dutra, and the army chief of staff, General Goes Monteiro, played key roplanning and carrying out the coup.

On September 29. 1937, armed with the Cohen Plan, a crude forgery concocted by the Integralout a detailed plan for Communist revolution, Dutra went on the radio and demanded the imposition osiege. He had set the stage for the scrapping of what remained of constitutional processes. On Novem

Vargas made a broadcast in which he canceled the presidential elections, dissolved Congress as an inaand costly apparatus, and assumed dictatorial power under a new constitution patterned on European fmodels. On December 2, all political parties were abolished.

The new regime, baptized the Estado Novo (New State), copied not only the constitutional forfascist regimes but their repressive tactics. Strict press censorship was established, and prisons filled wteachers, military officers, and others suspected of subversion. The apparatus of repression included apolice force for hunting down dissidents; its methods included torture. Yet there was little organized rthe regime. Labor, its most likely opponent, was neutralized by paternalist social legislation and doperhetoric, and it remained passive or even supported Vargas.

The affinity between the Estado Novo and the European police states suggested to some observwas merely a Brazilian variant on the Continental fascist model. Such pronouncements by Vargas as decadence of liberal and individualistic democracy represents an incontrovertible fact appeared to sup

of view.Brazils growing trade and increasingly friendly relations with Germany and Italy also led to feacountry was moving into the fascist orbit. Between 1933 and 1938, Germany became the chief markecotton and the second largest buyer of its coffee and cacao. German penetration of the Brazilian econincreased, and the German Bank for South America established three hundred branches in Brazil.

ButBrazils economic rapprochement with Germany and Italy did not reflect sympathy with theexpansionist goals of the fascist bloc; Vargas, the great realist, sought only to open up new markets forto strengthen his hand in bargaining with the United States. Nor was there any true likeness between structures and aims of the Estado Novo and the European fascist systems, which arose in response to vdifferent economic and social conditions. Despite its authoritarian, repressive aspects, the Estado Nov


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to struggle against neocolonialism and the effort to achieve economic independence and modernizatioIndeed, under the new regime the state intervened more actively than before to encourage the g

industry and provide it with necessary economic infrastructure. The constitution of 1937 repeated thethe 1934 constitution on foreign exploitation of national resources. Rejecting laissez faire, the Estadopursued a policy of planning and direct investment for the creation of important industrial complexes sectors of mining, oil steel, electric power, and chemicals. In 1940 the government announced a Five-whose goals included the expansion of heavy industry, the creation of new sources of hydroelectric poexpansion of the railway network. In 1942 the government established the Companhia Vale do Rio Dthe rich iron-ore deposits of Itabira; in 1944 it created a company for the production of materials needchemical industry, and in 1946 the National Motor Company began the production of trucks. In the saVargas saw the realization of one of his cherished dreams. The National Steel Company began producVolta Redonda plant between Rio de Janeiro and Sao Paulo. Aware of the need of modern industry fosources of power, Vargas created the National Petroleum Company in 1938 to press the search for oil.

By 1941, Brazil had 44,100 plants employing 944,000 workers, the comparable figure for 1920plants with about 300,000 workers. Aside from some export of textiles, the manufacturing industries domestic market almost exclusively. State and mixed public-private companies dominated the heavy infrastructural industries and private Brazilian capital predominated in manufacturing, but the 1930s asignificant growth of direct foreign investment as foreign corporations sought to enlarge their share ofmarket and overcome tariff barriers and exchange problems by establishing branch plants in Brazil. Bforeign capital represented 44 percent of the total investment in Brazilian stock companies. Vargas mato check the influx of foreign capital, perhaps because he believed that the growth of Brazilian state ancapitalism would keep the foreign sector in a subordinate status.

The Estado Novo banned strikes and lockouts but retained and even expanded the body of protsocial and labor legislation. In 1942 the labor laws were consolidated into a labor code, regarded as onadvanced in the world. But, as noted previously, it was unevenly enforced and brought no benefits to mass of agricultural workers. Moreover, spiraling inflation created a growing gap between wages androse 86 percent between 1940 and 1944, whereas between 1929 and 1939, they had risen only 31 perceffect, inflation, by transferring income from wages to capitalists, provided much of the financing for economic growth of the 1940s.

World War II accelerated that growth through the new stimulus it gave to industrialization. Br

vast quantities of foodstuffs and raw materials, but the industrialized countries, whose economies werwar, could not pay for their purchases with machinery or consumer goods. As a result, Brazil built upexchange reserves, amounting to $707 million in 1945. Most of the economic advance of the war yeaexpansion and more intensive exploitation of existing plants or to the technical contributions of Braziland scientists.

However, Vargas adroitly exploited Great Power rivalries to secure financial and technical assithe United States for the construction of the huge state-owned integrated iron and steel plant at Volta RU.S. companies and government agencies were notably cool to requests for aid for establishing heavyLatin America. But Vargas hints that he might have to turn for help to Germany removed all obstaclesloans from the Export Import Bank made possible the completion of the Volta Redonda plant by 1946was producing 646,000 tons of steel, a major contribution toBrazils industrial growth. Volta Redonda was a greatvictory for the Vargas policies of economic nationalism and state intervention in economic life. In retu

American assistance, Vargas allowed the United States to lease air bases in northern Brazil even beforthe war against the Axis. In August 1942, after German submarines had sunk a number of Brazilian mBrazil declared war on Germany and Italy. A Brazilian expeditionary force of some twenty-five thousparticipated in the Allied invasion of Italy in 1944 and suffered relatively heavy losses in the fighting.

The paradox ofBrazils participation in an antifascist war under an authoritarian regime was not losBrazilians; the demands for an end to the Estado Novo grew stronger as the defeat of the Axis drew nsensitive to changes in the political climate and the balance of forces. Vargas responded by promisingpostwar era of liberty. In January 1945,, he announced an amnesty for political prisoners, promulgateallowing political parties to function openly, and set December 2 as the date for presidential and congr


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elections.A number of new parties were formed to fight the coming elections. Two were created by Var

They were the Partido Social Democratico (Social Democratic Party, of PSD) and the Partido Trabalh(Brazilian Labor Party, or PTB). The PSD, the largest of the new parties, united pro-Vargas industrialmachines, above all. The PTB had its base in the government-controlled trade unions and appealed towith a populist rhetoric proclaiming Vargas the Father of the Poor. The Uniao Democratica Nacional Democratic Party, or UDN) was the most conservative and chiefly represented neocolonial agrarian ancommercial interests; it was strongly pro-American. Its position with respect to economic policy was necessary to call on foreign capital for the exploitation of our idle natural resources, assure it just treatallow it to repatriate its proceeds. Of the other national parties, the most important was the CommuniPrestes, which emerged from the underground with considerable prestige and strength.

A Military Coup

Vargas announced that he would not run for president but set the stage for a well-organized campaignsupporters, called queremistas (from the Portuguese verb querer, to want), who wanted Vargas to declcandidate in the forthcoming election. Soon after issuing the decrees restoring political freedom, Vargthe left in economic policy. In June he authorized the expropriation of an organization whose practiceharmful to the national interest; the decree specifically named national or foreign enterprises known toconnected with associations, trusts, or cartels.

The authorization decree, which was aimed at keeping down the cost of living, inspired alarm conservative foreign and domestic circles. The American ambassador, Adolph A. Berle, Jr., made no conceal his suspicion ofVargass aims. Senior military officers also regardedVargass political maneuvers andleftward move with growing uneasiness. The wartime alliance with the United States had accentuatedconservatism and made them ready to accept the gospel of free enterprise and American leadership in against the Soviet Union and world communism.

On October 29, 1945, Generals Goes Monteiro and Eurico Dutra staged a coup, forced Vargas and entrusted the government to Jose Linhares, chief justice of the Supreme Court, until after the elecnew government promptly indicated its tendency by repealingVargass antitrust decree and launching asuppression of the Communist party. Ostensibly, the military had acted to defend democracy by preve

from seizing power as he had done in 1937. But its democratic credentials were more than dubious; Gand Dutra were, after Vargas, the chief architects of Estado Novo and had supportedVargass most repressivemeasures. Vargas, says Richard Bourne, was right to suspect that behind the concern for democracy thalso a hostility to state economic intervention of the sort that was building the Volta Redonda steel plaof sympathy for his labor and welfare policies.

The military coup insured that Brazil would return to the parliamentary system under conservaauspices, with two generals as the major presidential candidates, Eurico Dutra for PSD and Eduardo GUDN. Dutra won, while Vargas had the satisfaction of winning election as senator from two states ancongressman from six states and the Federal District. The newly elected Congress, sitting as a constitassembly, framed a new constitution that retained both the federal system and guaranteed civil libertieelections, but it still denied the vote to illiterates and enlisted men in the armed forces--more than halfpopulation.

Under the mediocre, colorless President Eurico Dutra (1946-1951), neocolonial interests regaithe influence they had lost under Vargas. In his foreign and domestic policies, Dutra displayed a blindanticommunist creed propounded by Washington. Vargas, wishing to broadenBrazils economic and diplomaticcontacts, had resumed diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union; Dutra found a pretext for severing relations. Alarmed by the growing electoral strength of the Communist party, Dutra outlawed the partCongress followed his lead by expelling thepartys elected representatives, seventeen congressmen and onesenator. Dutra exploited the resulting witch hunt to smash the independent, left-led labor movement; Federation, organized in 1946, was declared illegal, and the government intervened in a large numbereliminate extremist elements. The imposition of a wage freeze and the failure to raise the officially de


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minimum wage caused the real income of workers to drop sharply.With respect to economic development, Dutra pursued a laissez faire policy that meant the virt

abandonment of the Vargas strategy of a state-directed movement toward economic independence.Dutrasfinance minister, Correia e Castro, openly declared the governments bias in favor of the neocolonial relationshipwhen he described Brazil as essentially an agrarian country, adding the essence of the Latin Americanand Brazil is an integral part of this area, is a certain concentration of effort in the export of primary pfoodstuffs, as well as in the import of a wide variety of manufactured goods and processed foodstuffs.with this point of view, the Dutra government removed all import and exchange controls and allowed foreign exchange reserves accumulated during the war--reserves that Vargas had proposed to use for rBrazilian industry--to be dissipated on imported consumer goods, luxury goods in large part.

Attracted by the new economic climate, foreign capital flowed into Brazil. Direct investmentsStates rose from $323 million in 1946 to $803 million in 1951. Meanwhile, seeking to curb inflation prescription of American advisers, the government pursued a restrictive credit policy harmful to the Bentrepreneurs and industrial growth. In 1947, after the negative results of these policies had become athe foreign exchange reserves had almost disappeared, the Dutra government set up a new system of ilicensing, with a scale of import priorities according to need, and adopted an easier credit policy. Thameasures, the last two years of the Dutra regime saw a revival of economic growth.

Vargass Return to Power In 1950, having assured himself of the neutrality of the armed forces, Vargas ran for president with thethe PTB and a broad coalition of workers, industrialists, and members of the urban middle class. His concentrated on the need to accelerate industrialization and expand and strengthen welfare legislationhis past record, Vargas affirmed that his whole effort had been to transform into an industrial nation a paralyzed by the myopia of rulers wedded to the existing monoculture and to the simple extraction of materials. Riding a wave of discontent with the economic and social policies of the Dutra regime, Vadefeated his two opponents.

Vargas inherited a difficult economic situation. After a brief boom in coffee exports and prices in 194balance of trade again turned unfavorable, and the inflation rate increased. In the absence of other ma

of financing for his developmental program, Vargas had to rely largely on the massive increase in the supply, with all its inevitable social consequences. Meanwhile, his national program of state-directedindustrialization, using state corporations as its major instrument, encountered increasing hostility frominterests at home and abroad. In the United States, the Eisenhower administration decided that the Vagovernment had not created the proper climate for private investment and terminated the Joint United Brazilian Economic Commission. Within Brazil, despite his sweeping victory in the election of 1950,Vargass program faced sabotage at the hands of the rural forces that continued to dominate the majority of the governments and Congress. This hardening of attitudes signified thatVargass options and his capacity formaneuvering between different social groups were greatly reduced.

In December, 1951, Vargas asked Congress to approve a bill creating a mixed public-private pcorporation to be called Petrobras, which would give the state a monopoly on the drilling of oil and ne

Petrobras illustrated Vargas belief that the state must own the commanding heights of the economy, it represented an attempt to reduce the balance of payments deficit be substituting domestic sources of oimported oil. Vargas sought to appease domestic and foreign opponents by leaving the distribution ofhands and allowing existing refineries to remain privately owned, but almost two years passed before under great popular pressure passed the law creating Petrobras in October 1953. However, Vargas procreate a similar agency for electric power to be called Petrobras, which would supplement the power pforeign-owned public utilities, remained bottled up in Congress. The depth of nationalist feeling aroudebate over Petrobras and Electrobras convinced foreign and domestic conservatives that Vargas was dangerous road.


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Vargas labor policy became another political battleground. Under Vargas, labor regained muchfreedom of action that it had lost during the Dutra years. In December 1951, the government decreedminimum wage that only compensated for the most recent price rises. In 1953, three hundred thousanwent on strike for higher wages and other benefits. In June of that year, Vargas appointed a young proGoulart, minister of labor. Goulart, a populist in the Vargas tradition, was sympathetic withlabors demands. InJanuary 1954, observing that it is not wages which raise the cost of living; on the contrary it is the coswhich require higher wages, Goulart recommended to Vargas a doubling of the minimum wage. Thisrecommendation evoked a violent manifesto of the colonels, in which a group of officers charged thagovernment was penetrated by communism and corruption, that the armed forces were being neglectethe recommended new minimum wage would demoralize the badly underpaid officer class. Under mipressure, Vargas dismissed Goulart, but in a May Day speed to workers he announced that the increaswage would be enacted and even praised the fallen minister of labor.

The battle lines between Vargas and his foes were being drawn ever more sharply. In speechesCongress, Vargas attacked foreign investors for aggravatingBrazils balance of payments problem by their massivremittances of profits and claimed that invoicing frauds had cost Brazil at least $250 million over eighperiod. Meanwhile, attacks on him by the conservative dominated press and radio grew even bitterer;vituperative were the editorials of Carlos Lacerda, editor of the ultraconservative Tribuna da Imprensa

An effort to silence Lacerda presented Vargas enemies with a golden opportunity to destroy hiUnknown to Vargas, the chief of the pr esidents personal guard arranged for a gunman to assassinate Lacerda.The plot miscarried, for Lacerda was only slightly wounded, but one of his bodyguards, an air force mkilled. The resulting investigation revealed the complicity of palace officials and uncovered the existescale corruption in the presidential staff. The chorus of demands for Vargas resignation was joined bywhich informed him on August 24 that he must resign or be deposed. Isolated, betrayed by the men htrusted, the seventy-two-year-old Vargas found the way out of his dilemma by suicide. But he left a mwas also his political testament. It ended with the words:

I fought against the looting of Brazil. I fought against the looting of the people. I have fought bare-Hatred, infamy, and calumny did not beat down my spirit. I gave you my life. Now I offer my death. remains. Serenely I take the first step on the road to eternity and I leave life to enter history.

Jordan Young -The Brazilian Revolution of 1930 and the Aftermath, pp. 81-97 V 3

Vargas and the Political Structure: 1930 to 1945

In the years between 1930 and 1945 Brazil was dominated by Getulio Vargas. He was the govfifteen years, and every major shift in national policy carried his imprint. During this period thecountrys traditionaleconomic foundation was changed by the men from Rio Grande do Sul who surrounded Vargas and rePaulista coffee planters as the rulers of the nation. The one-crop economy gave way to a broader baseagricultural and industrial structure. Politically, the power shift is even more sharply etched. Sao PauGerais after 1930 no longer exclusively determined the affairs of the nation. Gaucho politicians swarmde Janeiro and in the next decade and a half took over the administrative machinery of Brazil.

The period 1930 to 1945 breaks clearly into three units. October, 1930, to July, 1932, was a petransition for the new regime. In July, 1932, a rebellion against Vargas broke out in the state of Sao Pacrushed by September. From September, 1932, until November, 1937, was another distinct unit of Brpolitical history. A quasi-democratic state existed, which drafted and functioned under the 1934 ConsNovember 10, 1938, to October 29, 1945, was the third and final period of the Vargas reign. Certain tdevelopments that were begun during these latter years still persist in the Brazilian contemporary poliOn October 29, 1945, Getulio Vargas was relieved of his office, and the military permitted to Brazil torepublican and democratic form of government.

From October, 1930, to July, 1932, the aims of the revolutionaries were not clearly focused an


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they had few definite plans or programs to present to the people. It was government by improvisationimmediately a power struggle began between those elements within the revolutionary party who wishabout profound social reforms, and those who desired technical reforms that would attack and solve thof the day and leave the question of deep social changes for a later period. In this second group were Vargas, Goes Monteiro and Oswald Aranha.

The more advanced and radical of the revolutionaries were in a weaker position, for they did ncontrol of the new government machinery to carry out their rather vague ideas of social reform. Manythe earlier 1922 and 1924 rebellions were in this group, but they were quickly squeezed out of power conservatives.

Thus the political reorganization that began in October, 1930, had few ideological guidelines. a pragmatic response to national problems viewed from the perspective of politicians from the state ofdo Sul. Profound social and economic reforms were not foremost on the list of objectives of the leaderevolution. Many of these may have felt there were injustices in the Brazilian political structure but thpurely of a me holistic nature. The most important items were improving the electoral machinery, estsecret ballot and reducing the economic and political power of the state of Sao Paulo in the federal postructure. But hard-core social and political reform programs were lacking. Some elements did feel theconomic conditions of their period indicated that sharp breaks with the past traditions of Brazil were area of social legislation. But the most powerful of the revolutionaries, Getulio Vargas and Goes Moncautious politicians.The provisional government set up on November 3, 1930, clearly reflected the mixed reform-aconservative character of the revolution. Getulio Vargas, Goes Monteiro and Osvaldo Aranga put togfollowing cabinet: Foreign Affairs, Afranio de Melo-Franco; Justice, Osvaldo Aranha; Treasury, Jose Whitaker; War, General Jose Fernandes Leite de Castro; Navy, Admiral Isaias de Noronha; TransportaPublic Works, Captain Juarez Tavora; Agriculture, Joaquim Francisco Campos; and Labor, Lindolfo C

Basically, the cabinet was a conservative one with reformers Color and Campos given the newministries of Education and Labor. Juarez Tavora was perhaps the most radical, but his area of operatnortheast part of Brazil, which had only a secondary relationship to the heartland of the country. The ministries were essentially puppets, since Goes Monteiro had become chief of staff and dominated theforces. Throughout the next fifteen years Vargas control of the country depended to a large extent uposupport of Goes Monteiro and his command of the Brazilian military. It was difficult to separate the c

two men.General Goes Monteiro insisted that the illusion of legitimacy and continuity within the regulamaintained. Few high-ranking generals lost their posts, and no scars were opened up within the army the revolution. Yet at the same time, Goes Monteiro was a realist. He took no chances with the army maintained an informal Revolutionary Army Staff Headquarters which kept the Brazilian military estabalance. It was only on April 18, 1931, amid much public notice, that Goes Monteiro announced thatthe Revolutionary Army Staff Headquarters were no longer needed and it was to be disbanded.

Both the Foreign Affairs and Treasury ministries were given to men who were intimately connprevious experience and family ties with their assignments. The Agriculture post was given to Assis Bassure local political unity in the state of Rio Grande do Sul. Osvaldo Aranha's appointment as Miniswas a popular one, as his flamboyant speeches kindled the imagination of the people.

To get the wheels of the government moving again, the executive office began to govern by iss

presidential decrees. These decrees were considered legal and binding and carried thePresidents signature aswell as that of the appropriate cabinet minister.Decree Law 19. 398 of November 11, 1930, set up the administrative machinery for the new p

dictatorial government. It was a relatively short document of eighteen articles, commencing with the statement that Getulio Vargas was the chief executive with discretionary power delegated to him in evthe new provisional government. The second article dissolved the Congress. Article 5 suspended all guarantees of the citizens. Article 11 changed most of the state governors and placed the various statecontrol of administrators called Interventores. These men were to be selected by Getulio Vargas and wboth executive and legislative power.


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Article 11 turned out to be quite troublesome, and created problems that plagued the new revogovernment from 1930 to 1932. Many young military officials considered personally loyal to GetulioGoes Monteiro were sent to take over control of the various states. They were to organize political macould be integrated with the central Administration. The problem was that the central government haplans for the reorganization of the country, and Brazil had no tradition of strong national control in plaprogramming.

Selection of the Interventores for Sao Paulo was a very important decision, and when former LJoao Alberto Lines de Barros was appointed on November 24, 1930, the state was stunned. He was anquantity to the Paulista elite. At this point it is apparent that the death, early in 1930, of the LieutenanCampos, who was a Paulista and might have bridged to gap between the Gauchos and the politicians oPaulo, was a greater tragedy nationally than had been supposed. Joao Alberto, a northeasterner and a member of the Luis Carlos Prestes column, was keenly aware of the injustices of the Brazilian economand felt, as did many, that the state of Sao Paulo was the direct cause of much of the poverty and misethe northeast. Northeasterners argued that they were a depressed colony of the Paulistas, supplying thcheap labor, raw materials, and secure markets for their manufacture red goods. Joao Alberto was, hotrusted by both Getulio Vargas and General Goes Monteiro, insofar as Vargas and Goes trusted anyon

The Vargas regime was aware that any successful national reform program had to be carried ouSao Paulo. All political or economic proposals by the new Interventor would naturally reflect the attitrevolutionary government in Rio de Janeiro. Thus every move by Joao Alberto was closely scrutinizeanalyzed by Paulista political leaders.

No major actions were taken in December, but on January 5, 1931, through state Decree Law 4most vocal of the opposition newspapers was taken over by the revolutionaries. Joao Alberto was notpermit any resistance to his administration. When the Interventor next encouraged the organization ocarried the interesting name Society of Friends of Russia, the Sao Paulo elite became clearly hostile. Jhad further difficulty in building support in Sao Paulo when he decided to ignore the Democratic Partysupported Getulio Vargas in the election and the revolution. The party was split on the issue of allyingJoao Alberto and had little projection outside the capital. It soon became apparent that Joao Alberto wcreate a political apparatus that would be linked closely with the Gauchos in Rio de Janeiro.

In the economic sector, the coffee interests were jolted by Decree Law 4815 of January 6, 193resulted in the reorganization of the Coffee Institute. It was now placed under the personal and direct

Interventor. This meant that all stockpiling and marketing activities of coffee, both internally and extebe directed by the Vargas machine and not by the elite of the state of Sao Paulo. From this point on, abegan in the state. On January 7. 1931, Decree Law 4819 was issued, stating that a special bureau woup to assist needy rural workers. The Joao Alberto Administration had begun to build a following am

The resentment against the Vargas regime and the Joao Alberto that continued to build up in Saamong the middle class and the elite was compounded of many factors. Foremost was the fact that Sanot being governed by Paulistas and the reforms being made were not those desired by the former polof the state. Finally, in July, 1931, Joao Alberto resigned as Interventor, as the Vargas Administration effort to ease pressure in Sao Paulo by appointing Paulista political figureheads. However, the opposicontinued to mount and, in addition to constant assertions that the Sao Paulo government was mismanPaulistas charged that Vargas was not honoring his pledge to give the Brazilians a new constitution. Pbegan to conspire against the Vargas regime. As early as March, 1931, a plan for an armed rebellion w

organized but collapsed when state military elements could not agree on a coordinated plan of action. however, was made with discontented politicians in the states of Rio Grande do Sul and Minas GeriasThe Vargas regime reacted to the growing discontent by promulgating Decree Law 21.402 on

1932, calling for elections on May 3, 1933, of representatives to a constituent assembly that would preconstitution for Brazil. The announcement came too late.

On July 9, 1932, an armed insurrection broke out in Sao Paulo against the government. The reexpected support from Rio Grando do Sul and from the commanding general of the Mato Grosso areawas forthcoming from either area. General Bertoldo Klinger flew in from Mato Grosso but brought nhim. Joao Neves and Borges de Medeiros broke with Vargas and tried to get Rio Grando do Sul to joi


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but failed with Interventor Flores da Cunha switched his position at the last minute and remained loyaJoao Neves statement to the nation rather accurately explained the political situation in Brazil at that tVargas government, he charge, was one of clubs and clans, of promises and fictions, of lies and imaginsecret groups and favored persons without a program.

The federal government moved swiftly. General Goes Monteiro, who had briefly considered jPaulista rebels, remained loyal to Vargas and dispatched government troops to surround the state. Supfederal government purred on from all the other sections of Brazil, with approximately three hundred troops involved. Nearly one hundred thousand Paulistas volunteered to fight the Vargas Administratioa popular war, in contrast to 1924, when the Paulista population was untouched and indifferent to the army rebels. Failing to make good use of initial advantages, the Paulistas on the defensive and the figreached a stalemate. Peace was negotiated on October 1, 1932, and the revolt ended. No reprisals weand Getulio Vargas promised to convene a constituent assembly promptly to prepare a new constitutiocountry.

Decree Law 22.400, issued in November, 1932, created a committee to prepare a preliminary cto be discussed and voted on by a new constituent assembly in 1934. The committee was composed ofrom Rio Grande do Sul, Minas Gerais and northern Brazil. The group split: One faction favored a faoriented constitution along more liberal lines of the nineteenth century. Vargas did not demonstrate apdisapproval of either group, though both attempted to win his favor. He apparently felt it unwise to tastand before all elements were clearly defined.In 1933 the states began selecting candidates to run for seats in the constituent assembly. In mstates which had had a one-party system before in 1930 revolution, the same situation existed in 19331930 Brazil, in the smaller states the government was able, by direct or indirect means, to elect peoplefavored. In Sao Paulo, Minas Gerais and Rio Grande do Sul, states that had developed some degree osophistication before 1930, the contests between opposing party groups were lively. The Interventorethose in the other states.

The constituent assembly which met early in 1934 consisted of two hundred and fifty represenvarious economic sectors who had the same status as the political representatives. The fifty delegates deputies for agriculture, industry, commerce, communications and labor. They were chosen through ethe members of the various economic organizations. The labor delegates were quickly dubbed pelegoof the Ministry of Labor, whose orders they followed closely.

On July 16, 1934, the new Constitution was promulgated. Basically, it was a move toward grecentralization of power in the hands of the national government. The legislative branch sustained the modification, with the Chamber of Deputies made more powerful. In addition to the traditionally elecrepresentatives, the fifty special deputies from the various economic sectors were to have seats in the CThe Senate was reduced in power. The Supreme Court remained basically the same, although it was gadditional right to declare a law unconstitutional. The presidential office was theoretically stripped ofauthority and a second term for the President was prohibited. In reality, however, the legislative brancdocile instrument of a strong chief executive. Anything and everything that Vargas wanted was grante

The constituent assembly, when it finished work on the Constitution, constituted itself the first Congress and elected Vargas President of the Republic for the four-year term 1934 to 1938.

The pace of events in Brazil in the period from mid-1934 to the coup detat of 1937 was swift. Congress, acting under the pressure of Getulio Vargas, who saw the political implications and power t

by working with labor, enacted social legislation to aid the working class. Labor courts were set up, aserious attention began to be directed to the problems of lower-income groups in Brazil.Communist activity increased during the period after the Constitution of 1934 was implemente

illegal, the Communist party created a front organization, the National Liberation Alliance, which wascontrol of Luis Carlos Prestes. In July, 1935, Vargas outlawed the front organization, but it continued against the government. In October a strike in northeastern Brazil involving a foreign-owned railroadWestern, was organized by the Alliance and violence resulted. On November 23, the National LIberaattempted a revolt against the central government. Military units were approached, and the Third Infawith headquarters at Praia Vermelho in Rio de Janeiro, a unit in Rio Grande do Norte and one in Pern


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joined the rebellion. The revolt did not succeed and was quickly put down. Luis Carlos Prestes and mwere arrested and sentenced to jail.

The rise of a Fascist party was the focus of the next major group opposing the government of GVargas. The Integralistas, led by Plinio Salgado and directed by a council of forty, were an extremelyChurch-oriented political party that attracted Brazilians by blending Catholicism, mysticism, order andsaluting, green shirt uniforms and parades. With the financial support of the German embassy, the Intactually began to make serious inroads with their appeals to the masses.In 1937 maneuvering began for the presidential elections that were to be held in the following candidates seriously sought the presidency and campaigned vigorously. One, Jose America de Almeidnortheastern Brazil, had briefly been Minister of Public Works. Although a former member of the VarJose America was not considered an official candidate of the government. Another candidate was Amde Oliveira of Sao Paulo, a popular local political leader. The sheer weight of the Paulista voting popwhatever support could be picked up in other states, in a relatively free election, would probably havecandidate the election. The third candidate was the leader of the Integralist party, Plinio Salgado, anowhose campaign was being skillfully managed by San Tiago Danas and A. Mercedes Filch.

The regime decided not to take a chance on the elections. On November 10, 1937, Vargas, witsupport of the armed forces, declared a national emergency, dissolved Congress and took over complethe country. A new constitution was proclaimed, molded this time along totalitarian lines. O Estado NState, was announced, and Brazil quietly became a dictatorship. The cabinet remained basically the sacountry calmly went about its business. Over eighty Congressmen went to congratulate Vargas and astheir loyalty. Many were later rewarded with administrative positions. The Integralistas applauded thexpecting to collaborate with Vargas.

Any effective protest to this turn of events had to come from Sao Paulo, and the efficient deplofederal troops in the city of Sao Paulo prevented this. The Paulistas did not want a repeat of 1932, andremainder of Brazil was inclined to go along with the Vargas coup.

General Goes Monteiro gave the following reasons for the golpe de estado of November 10. Fconsidered the coming presidential elections potentially dangerous to the political stability of the counvictorious Paulista candidate might reverse policies adopted by the Vargas Administration. Second, Cpresented a potential threat to the former army rebels, who were now high-ranking officers, as new legbeing considered which would severely punish officers who led rebellions against the civilian politica

Third, General Goes Monteiro noted the Interventor Flores da Cunha of Rio Grande do Sul had brokeand was attempting to enlist the support of federal troops to carry out a counterrevolution against the cgovernment. Fourth, the Cohen Plan, a terrorist conspiracy of guerilla activity against the Vargas govbeen uncovered by the secret police. (The charge has been made that this plan never existed and was fabrication by the army to justify the setting up of a dictatorship.) Fifth, General Goes Monteiro, the rthe 1937 coup is not easily explained and may lie elsewhere. The initial impact of the 1930 revolutionprevented a more serious social and political revolution. The excitement of promised reforms and expchanges had lasted until 1932, but by then there was a feeling that the revolution had run its course anpolitics had returned to its familiar mold. The only significant change brought about by the revolutioncontrol of the national government had shifted from Sao Paulo to Rio Grande do Sul. The failure of threvolt in July, 1932, saved Rio Grande do Sul from losing mastery of the central government. The sucmobilization of the army by General Goes Monteiro and the apparent unity demonstrated by the other

support of the Vargas regime during the Paulista revolt gave the Gauchos a fresh grip of the nation.Beginning in 1934 with the drafting of the new Constitution, political affairs in Brazil took on unreality. The country was not governed dictatorially, but everyone watched the Vargas AdministratioThe influence of the central government was evident in the smaller states, as it had been throughout Bhistory, but basic economic and social problems were not being solved. As a result of this lack of a suprogram on the part of the Vargas team, political extremists from both the left and the right attacked thfor not doing enough to help the people. The uncertainty and aimlessness of the Vargas Administratiobrought out by the 1937 presidential campaign. Apparently General Goes Monteiro acted with the apGetulio Vargas to end this period of indecision. The military had once again save the political life if G


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It was clear that the army trusted the Gaucho politician but did not feel the same way toward the otherwere running for the presidency.

Brazil was governed from 1937 to 1945 by laws that were issued by the executive office, the gagain was one man, Getulio Vargas. Political parties were wiped out by presidential decree on DecemTwo achievements of the regime were nevertheless to have great impact on contemporary Brazil. Theacceleration of the movement toward economic nationalism and the second, the enactment of social le There has always been a latent feeling in Brazil that the industrial development of the countryretarded by the operations of foreign investors, especially, after 1930, by United States corporations. Awas made in the first year of the Vargas regime to challenge this situation. A Decree Law of Decembestated that two-thirds of the labor force of all firms operating in the country must be Brazilian nationawas not enforced very strictly and was amended in 1939 by Decree Law 1843.

Various commissions, councils, departments, institutes and government banks were organized;the economic council that was decreed was not created. It was a blend of government planning and frenterprise.

The best example of the mixed corporation in Brazil was the Brazilian national steel company,shape in January, 1941. The steel plant at Volta Redonda, which the United States helped finance andBrazil, played a great role in pushing the country toward industrialization. The Brazilian army's interearmament, the social implications that industrialization would bring, considerations of higher standardthe Nazi threat were all involved in the decision to start the plant.

After 1937 the focus of the government domestic program was on the urban working-class groProvisions in article 137 of the 1937 Constitution included annual holidays with pay, minimum wagesday, social security, and medical institutes. Unions were legalized but were kept under close governmsupervision. Articles 145 to 153 established government control over certain industrial areas that Varplanners considered crucial.

The political implications of these moves are clear, for the growing urban proletariat became osupporting pillars of the Vargas Administration. The remained loyal to Vargas even after he had been office.

In 1938, Vargas eliminated his disillusioned right-wing opponents, the Integralistas, when theyclumsy and ill-timed attempt to kill him. Entering the presidential residence late at night, the follower

Salgado fought a running pistol duel with Vargas and his daughter before they were captured.As the German embassy was linked to the Integralista party, the open admiration that both VarGeneral Goes Monteiro had for the Nazis began to cool. At the same time, Brazilian-American relatioimprove. Osvaldo Aranha, who served as ambassador in Washington and later become Foreign Minisclosely with Jefferson Caffery, the United States ambassador in Brazil. Negotiations were worked outwhereby the Brazilian government granted the United States, first, naval bases in Recife and Bahia anshortly after Pearl Harbor, air bases and additional naval installations. Brazil declared war on GermanAugust, 1942, when five Brazilian merchantmen were sunk by German submarines. A Brazilian armyItaly under the command of General Mark Clark.

As the Allies began to win in Europe, the repercussions were felt in Brazil. In April, 1944, Vain his usual ambiguous style that the end of the war would perhaps bring free elections to Brazil. In Ahowever, Vargas broke temporarily with Osvaldo Aranha, whose enthusiastic endorsement of the Unit

through the Society of Friends of America was considered a potential threat to the political stability ofthe military. They feared that the organization might become a rallying point for democratic opponenVargas regime. The army padlocked a meeting hall one night in 1944 when Aranha was to give an imspeech, and in protest he resigned from the government.

The year 1945 was the final one of the Vargas dictatorship. It began auspiciously with the arriAmerican ambassador, a prominent New Dealer, Adolph A. Berle. In February, 1945, the OrganizatioStates convened a special Inter-American Conference on Problems of War and Peace in Mexico City. Chapultepec the member countries adopted the principle that an act of aggression by any nation againAmerican state would be considered an act of aggression against all. Argentina was not permitted to s


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closed. Vargas had returned to his native home.What had the fifteen years meant to Brazil? No one could turn the clock back. Brazil would n

to her pre-1930 condition, either politically or economically. Yet the Vargas period is not all black andFrom the political perspective, Brazil had both suffered and benefited. It suffered in that fiftee

political education had been denied to the Brazilian electorate. The give and take of a democratic soceasily learned, and the Brazilians were slowly edging toward more and more participation in politics finception of the republic in 1889 to the 1930 election. But for fifteen years decisions were made for thand a generation grew up without having voted or heard opposition politicians argue positions. Politicto develop and build followings. But more important, a deep sense of cynicism regarding politicians dthe fifteen years that the Vargas men controlled the government. Though Getulio Vargas may not havhimself, there is no question that the men around him amassed fortunes and used their power to give fothers. Personal relationships were more important than the laws of the nation. A vast network of ecopolitical power relationships developed which caused havoc and disrupted political life from 1945 to

Brazilians had benefited politically in that there existed in 1945 a pluralistic power base uninteprovided by the Vargas dictatorship. Bringing the working class into the political arena, Getulio Vargaccomplished what the Argentine governing class was unable or unprepared to do. In the urban centeBrazilian working class was able to make the transition to participation in the political activities of theviolence. The Vargas regime had permitted and encouraged the maturation of that sector of society, sothe country returned to democratic procedures, labor took a role in the give and take of everyday politreceived benefits from the political structure. The lower-income groups on Brazil were not systematicas they were in other Latin American countries. Nor did they have to tear their demands from the govthrough bloody power struggles, as occurred in Mexico, Cuba, and Colombia. The government in Bradictatorship and the period following was not an enemy of the working class, but a government that resomewhat to its demands. During the dictatorship it had been a benevolent leader; in the period that fpressure through balloting and other organized maneuvers was sufficient. Whether this type of develohave been permitted or encouraged by the Paulista elite is an open-ended question.

Another benefit of the Vargas period was the temporary breaking of the dominance of the statPaulo over the rest of the country. For too long the fortunes of Brazil had been determined by the intevery powerful and important state. What was good for Sao Paulo was good for the remainder of Brazthis may have been true; often it was not. Often Paulista businessmen made the north of Brazil their o

colony. The north and the northeast were secure markets and also the source of raw materials for soutThe Vargas period to a slight degree dislodged the complete power control of Sao Paulo over the counCredit should be given to Getulio Vargas for his conscious attempt to break down the strong re

sentiments that existed before 1930, for Brazil during the Vargas period became more of a unified natiRegionalism still existed, to be sure, and exists today in Brazil; but for the first time in modern Brazilichief of state had spoken to Brazilians from a non-Paulista base.

Thus, the Vargas epoch was a mixture of gains and benefits in some sectors, setbacks and negaresults in others. Nevertheless, by comparison with other Latin American countries during the same tBrazil the era was one of economic and social progress and continuous development.

James Cockcroft - Neighbors in Turmoil Latin America, pp. 550-551 V 4

Corporativism and Populism: The Vargas Era, 1930-1954

A civilian-military coalition toppled the Old Republic and introduced an authoritarian system that elimmost Brazilians viewed as fraudulent to begin with. The new system was led by Getulio Vargas, a shobespectacled man from a southern ranching family who spoke poorly and made sardonic jokes. Vargacareer in the army, got a law degree, and became a state governor in the late 1920s. AsBrazils new president, hegathered around him a group of liberal intellectuals and dedicated reformers, including survivors of thmovement.


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Because of the many reforms he introduced, Vargas was popular. He was even able to walk thwithout bodyguards. People called him simply, Getulio. His reforms included the vote for 18-year-olwomen (but not illiterates, the majority of the population); social security; an eight-hour workday; a mlegality for trade unions and the right to strike; construction of schools; and a career civil service base

When not co-opting opposition movements by bringing their leaders or their programs into theVargas and the military put them down. Thus in 1932 he swiftly ended a revolt by Paulista oligarchs. landowner himself, Vargas wanted Brazil to industrialize. In 1935 he crushed an uprising by a populaSocialists, former tenentes, and Communists. He arrested 15,000 and jailed the popular Prestes, by thmember of the PCB (Brazilian Communist Party, founded in 1922). Prestes was not released until 194leftist prisoners died under torture. In 1938 Vargas personally opened fire on Fascists attacking the prpalace. They were a handful of fanatics from the outlawed Integralist movement sponsored byHitlers NaziGermany and some of the oligarchy.

Vargas moved erratically between reformism and repression, elections and coups, finally consopower in 1937 by creating the Estado Novo or New State. It curtailed states rights that had favored tholigarchies. It banned strikes and lockouts. Vargass centralized, authoritarian system of governance, likePerns in Argentina, was classically populist and corporativism. In the name of class harmony and the nationsomething for everyone and incorporated the two main groups of society--employers and workers-- inunder state regulation and tutelage. By claiming to place national above regional or class based interewas able to steer Brazil down the road of industrialization without seriously disrupting existing powerVargas and his successors increased thestates role in the economy. Compared with foreign investorsBrazils oligarchs and industrialists were too cautious or too weak to lead the way. As foreign capitalistattention to resolving the Depression and producing for World War II, Brazil expanded it manufacturithe internal market. By 1941 the number of manufacturing plants was triple the number in 1920 and enearly a million workers. Vargas, although he spoke like a nationalist, welcomed foreign investment. foreign capital still accounted for nearly half ofBrazils stock holdings.

Internationally, Vargas expanded trade with Germany and then told the United States that Germanxious to set up a steel industry in Brazil. In this way he obtained a U.S. loan to help finance construNational Steel Company (1941). He also took the U.S. side in World War II, during which U.S. trainishipments helped convertBrazils armed forces into a powerful military machine. Vargas set up governmenenterprises to produce engines, trucks, materials for the chemical industry, armaments, and ships.

After World War II Brazilians in the trade unions, private industry, and the middle classes clamdemocratic rights. Proclaiming an amnesty for political prisoners, Vargas called national elections. Tthreatened to expropriate national or foreign enterprises known to be connected with associations, trusU.S. Ambassador Adolph A. Berle, Jr., later to become a prominent voice in President John F. Kennedys Alliancefor Progress, reacted by proclaiming U.S. interest in an end to Vargas Estado Novo and a return to pardemocracy.

On October 29, 1945, conservative military officers ousted Vargas and set up national electionparliamentary system. General Eurico Dutra, a coup leader, won the elections and served as presidentto 1951.Dutras government broke relations with the Soviet Union, outlawed the PCB, purged the militanationalist elements, and launched a witch-hunt against reformers and leftists. It sent interventors to ttrade unions. It squanderedBrazils foreign exchange reserves that were accumulated during the war by allounchecked imports of consumer and luxury goods. It threw open the doors to foreign capital. Direct U

investments tripled to nearly a billion dollars by 1951.In the 1950 elections Vargas, as popular as ever, won the presidency. He ran as the candidate o(Brazilian Labor Party) and had the backing of most workers, some industrialists, and

Vargas Readings 1 - 9

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