Value orientation as a contributing factorin protest potential in Western societies:The postmaterialism thesis reconsidered

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i

VALUE ORIENTATION AS A CONTRIBUTING FACTOR IN PROTEST

POTENTIAL IN WESTERN SOCIETIES: THE POSTMATERIALISM THESIS

RECONSIDERED

by

Scott Lawrence Spehr

A Dicrertation submitted to the Faculty of the

DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements For the Degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

In the Graduate College

THE UNIVERSITY OF ARIZONA

1997

Jl

DMI Nxunber: 9814360

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UMI 300 North Zeeb Road Ann Arbor, MI 48103

THE UNIVERSITY OF ARIZONA GRADUATE COLLEGE

As members of the Final Examination Committee, we certify that we have

read the dissertation prepared by Scott Lawrence Spehr

entitled VALUE ORIENTATION AS A CONTRIBUTING FACTOR IN PROTEST

POTENTIAL IN WESTERN SOCIETIES: THE POSTMATERIALISM

THESIS RECONSIDERED

and recommend that it be accepted as fulfilling the dissertation

requirement for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy

rrold Rusk

9/SL6/?̂

Date

Date

Date/ [

Date

Date

Final approval and acceptance of this dissertation is contingent upon the candidate's submission of the final copy of the dissertation to the Graduate College.

I hereby certify that I have read this dissertation prepared under my direction and recommend that it be accepted as fulfilling the dissertation

Jerrold Rusk Dissertation Directo

Steven E. Finkel D^e /

3

STATEMENT BY AUTHOR

This dissertation has been submitted in partial fulfillment of requirements for an advanced degree at THE University of Arizona and is deposited in the University-Library to be made available to borrowers under rules of the Library.

Brief quotations from this dissertation are allowable with special permission provided that accurate acknowledgment of source is made. Requests for permission for extended quotation from or reproduction of this manuscript in whole or in part may be granted by the head of the major department or the Dean of the Graduate College when in his or her judgement the proposed use of the material is in the interests of scholarship. In all other instances, however, permission must be obtained from the author.

SIGNED

4

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT 7

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION 9 Postmaterialism and Unconventional Political Action 9 Predicting Behavior Over Time 14 Postmaterialism as an Explanatory Theory of Behavior

17 Primary Hypotheses 19 The Data Set 22 Research Setting 24

CHAPTER TWO

THE THEORY OF POSTMATERIALISM 28 The Relationship between Social Structure and the

Theory of Value Change 28 Postmaterialism and Unconventional Political Action

The Postmaterialism Model 39

CHAPTER THREE

ALTERNATIVE THEORIES OF UNCONVENTIONAL POLITICAL ACTION . 53 Socio-Economic Status and Unconventional Political

Action 53 SES, Postmaterialism, and Unconventional Political Action 57

The Demographic Control Model 59 Relative Deprivation Theory and Unconventional

Political Action 61 Relative Deprivation, Postmaterialism and

Unconventional Political Action 64 The Relative Deprivation Model 66

Social Forces and Unconventional Political Action . 72 Social Forces, Postmaterialism and

Unconventional Political Action 75 The Social Forces Model 78

Rational Actor Theory and Unconventional Political Action 83

5

TABLE OF CONTENTS - Continued

Rational Actors, Postmaterialism, and Unconventional Political Action 89 The Rational Actor Model 91

CHAPTER FOUR

DATA AND MEASURES 96 Postmaterialism and Materialism 98

How Valid Are Our Measures of Materialism and Postmaterialism? 104

The Dependent Variable - Protest Potential .... 118 Dependent Variable Construction 121 Independent Variable Construction 123

The Postmaterialism Causal Mechanisms Model . 123 The Demographic Control Model 126 The Relative Deprivation Model 127 The Social Forces Model 129 The Rational Actor Model 131

CHAPTER FIVE

TESTING THE POSTMATERIALISM MODEL 135 Findings 137

Descriptive Statistics 137 Regression Analysis 142

Conclusion 149

CHAPTER SIX

TESTING THE ALTERNATIVE MODELS 152 The Demographic Control Model 153

Causal Mechanisms Associated with Socio-Demographic Characteristics 155

Findings 157 Conclusion 164

The Relative Deprivation Model 165 Findings 168

Descriptive Statistics 168 Regression Analysis 173

Conclusion 178 The Social Forces Model 180

Findings 182 Descriptive Statistics 182

6

TABLE OF CONTENTS - Continued

Regression Analysis 194 Conclusion 199

The Rational Actor Model 202 Findings 208

Descriptive Statistics 208 Regression Analysis 211

Conclusion 216

CHAPTER SEVEN

CONCLUSION 220 The Effect of Value Orientation on Protest Potential220

APPENDIX A: FIGURES 234

APPENDIX B: TABLES 250

REFERENCES 291

i

ABSTRACT

The theory of postmaterialism contains the proposinion

chat basic values are changing in advanced industrial

societies. Furthermore, the theory contains the

propositions that individuals in these societies can be

classified according to clusters of value oriencations and

chat political behavior can be predicted according to these

orientations. Among other things, this theory has been put

forward as a powerful explanatory model for unconventional

policical action in advanced industrial societies. This

study utilises survey material from Germany to construcc a

model chat explores the effect of value orientation on

unconventional political action. The study then goes on co

investigate the links between value orientation and ocher

leading theories of unconventional policical action.

Until now, nothing has been attempted in the way of

invescigacing empirically the specific factors put forward

as causal agents regarding postmaterialists' hypothesized

propensity to participate in unconventional political

action. Likewise, little work has been done in the way of

investigating the relationship, if any, between

postmaterialism and important other theories of such

behavior. This project then has as its central foci the

testing of the primary hypotheses regarding the basis for

value orientation and unconventional political action, and

whether postmaterialists' hypothesized propensity to

participate in such activities may be the result of an

underlying relationship between value orientation and

factors that make up much of the conceptual landscape of

other leading theories of unconventional political action.

The results indicate that value orientation does have a weak

direct effect on unconventional political acts, but that

integrating value orientation and other theories results in

more powerful explanatory models of such activity, and

serves to more fully explain the manner in which value

orientation affects political behavior.

9

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

Postmaterialism and Unconventional Political Action

"[Hiistory is a graveyard of scientific theories once

considered useful" (Everson and Paine 1973, p. 142).

"[T]he history of science is a graveyard of defunct,

inadequate, and out-dated theories" (Strickland, Wade, and

Johnston 1968, p.3).

The social upheavals commencing in the 1960's that

characterized much of the political landscape of advanced

industrial societies came as a surprise to many who had

believed that the "end of ideology" was to herald an era of

relative political tranquility in democratic polities (Bell

i960). Belatedly, efforts to explain this phenomena began

to surface in the press, the political arena, and academia.

Social scientists attempted to develop coherent theories

that could account for the sudden increase in unconventional

forms of political behavior. One of the more prominent

theories that emerged from this period was that of

j

10

"postmaterialism" (Inglehart 1971). The particulars of this

thesis will be explored in more depth in the following

chapter, but in brief the central proposal put forward is

that in Western societies macro-environmental changes have

resulted in a fundamental shift in individuals' basic

values. Primary among these profound changes were rapid

economic and technological development, the absence of total

war, and rising levels of education. All have been proposed

as contributing to a gradual turning in individuals'

hierarchy of personal concerns from an overwhelming emphasis

on material and physical security to an increasing emphasis

on the importance of individual rights and freedoms.

Especially affected are post-war generations comparatively

untouched by the material privations and insecurities common

to the experience of their parents and grandparents. This

development has been positied to have had a number of system

level political consequences, from the growing importance of

"life style" issues, the decline of social class conflict as

the axis of political conflict, a gradual decline in

support for national institutions, and, as we shall examine,

for the increase in unconventional political action (see

Inglehart, 1977, p.5). Regarding this latter hypothesis,

the theory received quite a bit of attention initially, yet

11

has fallen from grace as a leading explanatory model for

such behavior, as the phenomenon of youth protest in western

societies receded with time.

While it might at first appear that the status quo in

cerms of political behavior has now reasserted itself, this

is a serious misperception. More likely, social norms and

perceptual frameworks have conspired to make unconventional

behaviors both more conventional (at least in terms of being

more accepted, if not performed), and therefore less

psychologically obtrusive. Indeed, political behavior in

post-industrial societies (including Germany, the setting

for this study) has continued to be marked by an expansion

of the individual's potential repertoire of political acts

(Watts et al 1989,. p.11). Concomitantly, explanatory

theories of unconventional political activity have been

developed which pay particular attention to factors which

reflect individual level utility calculation or the

importance of the individual's potential repertoire of

political skills.

Can the theory of postm.aterialism contribute to our

understanding of unconventional political activity in

contemporary western society, or has it been overtaken by

theories which appear to offer a more nuanced interpretation

12

of individual level political behavior? We believe that the

concept of postmaterialism still has an important

contribution to make in regard to the explanation of

political behavior in post-industrial settings.

Postmaterialism theory is not too broad or unsophisticated

to compete with the contemporary leading theories of such

behavior, but it is true that the argument put forward for

the impact of value change on unconventional political

behavior has not been adequately developed, and certainly

not adequately tested. Ronald Inglehart's original model

posits a basic three factor matrix to explain the causal

relationship between value orientation and protest. Our

proposal is that this was an intriguing preliminary effort

aimed at explaining the causal relationship between value

change and protest, but the model is much too simple. Its

very unfortunate that this theory has never been adequately

explored, in terms of the potential overall impact of value

orientation on unconventional political behavior. Competing

theories do nothing to rectify this situation, as they do

not even address the role value preferences may play in

regard to political behavior. In this thesis, the

relationship between values and protest is more fully

developed, exploring the way that value orientation is

13

associated with a variety of important factors central to

the heretofore most impressive models of protest behavior.

This manuscript thus addresses prior oversights, and helps

restore postmaterialism theory to its rightful place as a

leading, powerful explanatory theory of unconventional

political activity.

Postmaterialism theory can contribute to our

understanding of political behavior in a number of very

important ways. One concerns the theory's proposals

concerning the genesis of preferences. Such a fundamental

but important process is ignored in most research designs

formulated to explain unconventional political behavior.

Another concerns the way in which leading theories of

political behavior rely, inappropriately, on unexplored

fundamental assuptions regarding individuals' policy

preferences. Most of the theories of political action which

examine behavior at the individual level begin by simply

assuming two things: individuals have political preferences,

and these preferences are undifferentiated causal factors in

regard to political behavior. Thus, at best, part of some

research programs is testing mechanisms hypothesized to

encourage or discourage certain behaviors directed at

achieving political preferences, whatever they might be.

14

Obviously this approach is not wholly satisfactory, from a

theoretical perspective. Why, for example, are some

individuals concerned with particular political or economic

issues when others are not? And what effect may the concern

for certain definable types of political preferences have on

political behavior?

Predicting Behavior Over Time

The variety of theoretical and quasi-theoretical models

of political behavior contain, to varying degrees, the

capacity to predict aggregate changes in behavior over time.

Postmaterialism theory is specifically targeted at this sort

of prediction, and this is at once its strength

theoretically, and its weakness, empirically. For while

postmaterialism theory is touted as a powerful predictor of

political and social developments (see Abramson and

Inglehart 1995, p.38), its continued usefulness has been

questioned, in terms of discerning future events. For

example, the slowdown in economic growth that brought

disturbing levels of unemployment to many advanced western

societies over the past two decades led many social

scientists to surmise that the emergence of a post-

15

industrial challenge to the dominance of economic and

security issues in individuals' hierarchy of personal

concerns was an epi-phenomenon, one that was merely an

artifact of a unique, and transient, historical period.

This is erroneous, as it confuses short-term transient

effects with long-term basic developments.

Demographic models, such as the standard socio-economic

model, can predict changes in levels of political activity

corresponding to demographic changes in particular settings.

These types of changes, in turn, can be foreseen. If, for

example, political activity is positively associated with

education and income, then predicted rising aggregate levels

of these characteristics should predict as well a

corresponding rise in political involvement (see, for

example. Verba and Nie 1972, pp.143-45). Similarly,

resource mobilization models of political activity propose

that individual capacity for political activity is a

function of the "tools" (Brady, Verba and Scholzman, 1995;

Traut and Emmert, 1993) along with the opportunities

(Godwin, 1988; Knoke, 1990) available to individual citizens

and groups. If these mechanisms should increase (or

decrease) in a particular political setting, then political

behavior should follow suit. These resource mobilization

16

mechanisms may change absent any particular attempts to

manipulate the social environment, as a result of a long

term aggregate change in demographic criteria such as income

or education. For group mobilization proponents change can

be deliberate, as a function of activity aimed at political

organizing a specific social segmeni;, for example.

Other prominent theories of political behavior are more

temporally static. Rational choice theory is based on the

proposition that individuals calculate the costs and

benefits associated with particular actions, including

political activity. One fundamental assumption central to

this theory is the proposition that individuals "know what:

they want and can order their wants transitively" (Riker

1995, p.24). But while wants in a political context are

difficult to pinpoint and can theoretically change over

time, the cost and benefit calculus remains immutable (a

sort of eternal verity). Thus, aggregate long-term change

can only occur at the environmental or systemic level, and

these factors are external to the model. Grievance or

relative deprivation theories again incorporate no specific

proposals regarding future aggregate levels of change in

political activity, but rather focus on fluctuating

individual perceptions of dissatisfaction and deprivation.

17

Ted Gurr even explicitly states that relative deprivation is

dependent on the unpredictability of events (1970, p.57).

Gabriel Almond recently stated emphatically that

"Inglehart's work is one of the few examples of successful

prediction in political science" (Almond 1990, quoted in

Abramson and Inglehart 1995, p. 139). The theoretical

capacity of the postmaterialism concept to make predictions

about gradual, long term political change is in itself

reason for continued interest in this theory.

Postmaterialism as an Explanatory Theory of Behavior

While postmaterialism is attractive as a potential

predictive model of political behavior over time, it also

has the capacity uo contribute to the richness of an

explanatory model of political activity. There may be a

variety of ways in which value orientation may be linked to

unconventional political behavior, some of which have been

discussed at some length, others that have only been, in one

context or another, hinted at. The explicit mechanisms

associated with postmaterialism theory and unconventional

political action have been well articulated. Unfortunately,

they have remained for the most part untested. Various

18

implicit mechanisms have been less well articulated, and

have been subject to even less empirical investigation. And

other possible relationships have been ignored. This leads

one to the conclusion that postmaterialist models of

collective political action may be seriously misspecified.

Thus, the relationship of value orientation to

unconventional political action may be significantly

misunderstood, and worse, inappropriately discounted. Many

of the ways in which postmaterialism may affect

unconventional political activity could be a function of

underlying relationships between value orientations and

factors found to be associated with unconventional political

activity in the competing theoretical models mentioned

above. Only Karl-Dieter Opp has investigated the

possibility of such relationships, when he integrated

postmaterialism into a rational actor model of protest

(1990). Given postmaterialism theory's capacity for the

prediction of future political trends, ignoring these

possible connections may be foolish. Thus the central

thesis of this work is that value orientation has direct,

and most importantly, indirect effects on individuals'

potential for unconventional political action, and that

these indirect effects remain latent, albeit significant

19

factors underlying unconventional political activity in

western societies.

Primary Hypotheses

1. Postmaterialist values will demonstrate a significant

causal relationship to the propensity to participate in

unconventional political action, as Inglehart has suggested.

Materialism will demonstrate no such relationship.

2. Postmaterialism will be positively correlated with the

causal agents previously hypothesized to account for

increased rates of unconventional participation as Inglehart

has suggested. Materialism will demonstrate no such

relationships.

3. A causal model including the particular mechanisms

explicitly put forward as responsible for postmanerialist

participation will be superior to the simple postmaterialism

model in terms of explaining participation in unconventional

political action. This follows logically from Inglehart's

proposition that postmaterialism works indirectly through

these mechanisms.

20

In addition to the above hypotheses derived from a

careful reading of the Inglehart thesis of postmaterialism

and protest, the following hypotheses are developed in the

theory section of this study:

4. Demographic factors will be important predictors of

postmaterialism, but the findings from the postmaterialism

models should remain stable after taking such factors into

account.

5. Postmaterialism will be positively associated with

important factors central to leading alternative theories of

such behavior, factors which demonstrate positive effects on

unconventional political action. Materialism will be

associated only with certain factors which demonstrate no

significant causal effect on such behavior. The results

will serve to extend the existing alternative theories of

unconventional political behavior, by accounting for the

indirect effects of value orientation on such activity, as

well as providing important insight into why

postmaterialists demonstrate a heightened potential for

unconventional political action.

Finally, the logic associated with the elaboration and

testing of our various models of value orientation and

protest leads us to our last hypothesis:

6 . A composite model, that incorporates disparate causal

mechanisms borrowed from alternative theories of

unconventional political action and found to be associated

with value orientation, will prove to be a superior model of

unconventional political action.

Accordingly, the outline of the project is as follows:

Chapter one - Introduction.

Chapter two - Postmaterialism theory as an explanation of

unconventional political action. Investigation of the logic

associated with the hypotheses linking value orientation and

unconventional political action.

Chapter three - Investigating the relationship between value

orientation and alternative theories of unconventional

political action. How closely does postmaterialism theory

correspond with SES theory, resource mobilization theory,

relative deprivation theory, and rational choice theory?

What may be the relationship between value orientation and

causal mechanisms central to these alternative theories,

22

mechanisms not previously articulated in the context of

postmaterialism theory?

Chapter four - Data and measurement.

Chapter five - Testing the postmaterialism models.

Chapter six - Testing the relationship between value

orientation and important independent variables in

alternative models of unconventional political action.

Testing the power of these models when value orientation has

been included as an integral component of such models.

Chapter seven - Review of the findings and a summation of

the conclusions to be drawn regarding the inclusion of value

orientation in models of unconventional political action.

Construction of a grand model of value orientation and

protest.

Appendices - Figures and Tables.

The Data Set

This project will employ survey data to test the

hypotheses put forward for postmaterialism theory in regard

to certain unconventional political behaviors, and attempt

to integrate, where possible, theoretical propositions

23

associated with other central theories of unconventional

political action.

The data are from a representative national survey of

714 adult citizens carried out in the (then) entire area of

the Federal Republic of Germany, including West Berlin,

between November 1987 and January 1988 and two further

representative samples carried out between December 1987 and

January 1988. One of these surveys was conducted in the

Bavarian county of Schwandorf and consisted of 501 adult

citizens. The other survey was conducted in Bockenheim, a

district in the city of Frankfurt A. M., and consisted of

494 adult citizens. The expectation is that one should

encounter significant differences in levels of certain

political behaviors between the national sample and the two

subsamples and (perhaps) between the subsamples them.selves.

All of the surveys were carried out by the Getas Institut.

In Bockenheim, the expectation is that one should

encounter a significantly politicized population - one that

should respond to the societal network and personal

normative incentives to participate in unconventional

political activity. Additionally, one would expect a higher

percentage of postmaterialists in this population - a

further postulated stimulus to political activity in

2 -

general, and unconventional political activity in

particular. Thus, Bockenheim should prove fertile ground

for a more robust test of the relative strength of the key

components of the theory of postmaterialism and

unconventional activities.

In Schwandorf, the expectation is that one should

encounter a significant number of individuals opposed to a

particular government policy that effects them directly.

Research Setting

The Federal Republic of Germany at the time this survey

was taken (winter 1987/88) demonstrated a gross domestic

product of 625 billion dollars, a per capita rate of

$14,652.

Both figures placed the F.R.G. in the top income bracket

among advanced industrial countries (OECD economic survey -

Germany, 1987).

Moreover, in the "Wirtschaftswunder" years of the

1950'3, the Federal Republic's growth rates exceeded those

of comparable European countries and the United States.

Since that time, levels of affluence have risen steadily if

not quite as spectacularly as in that formative period for

o c

The F.R.G.. The Federal Republic also has exhibited one of

the worlds lowest inflation rates over the past thirty years

(Hancock 1989, pp.131-132). Furthermore, the F.R.G. has

become the world's third largest industrial economy behind

Japan and the United States and by 1986, had become the

world's largest exporter (Marsh 1989, pp.87, 335). As a

result. The Federal Republic has been described as having

"maintained a pattern of economic performance characterized

by largely continuous growth and unprecedented prosperity"

(Hancock 1989, p.131). Concomitantly, The Federal Republic

has enjoyed a remarkable period of labor peace. Strikes

have been rare in comparison to other large Western

industrial states (Hancock 1989, p.133).

One would expect then, according to conventional

theories of class conflict or deprivation models, to

encounter in the F.R.G. a society markedly free of political

protest activities. And in a relative sense, compared to

strife torn areas of the Third World and political turmoil

that has periodically erupted in the old East Bloc since the

end of the Cold War, this holds true. Yet, the F.R.G. has

not been completely without civil strife. Indeed the

Federal Republic, compared to other democratic nations, has

demonstrated "relatively high levels of political protest"

2 6

for the past quarter century (Muller and Opp 1986, p.475).

Significant political protest against public policies began

with the Easter march movement for nuclear disarmament in

1960 and continued through the period of extra-parliamentary

opposition to the "Grand Coalition" of the two major

political parties from 1966 to 1969. After a brief lull,

mass protest resumed with the "citizen initiative"

movements of the 1970's and 1980's against nuclear power

plants and other government projects environmentalists

deemed harmful or otherwise undesirable, and with violent

confrontations between squatters and their supporters and

police in Hamburg, Berlin, Frankfurt, and other large cities

suffering from real estate speculation and accompanying

shortages of affordable housing. Additionally, a resumption

of massive peace marches and demonstrations accompanied the

NATO decision in 1983 to "modernize" their nuclear weapons

stationed in West Germany. Not only have rates of political

protest been relatively high, but the severity of civil

strife also has been notable, with considerable property

damage and injuries not infrequently accompanying these

events. Few followers of the German political scene would

take issue with the observation that "ferocious mass

demonstrations... have become a German specialty" (Marsh

1989, p.123).

The Federal Republic of Germany then, has provided and

concinues to provide researchers with a relatively ample

supply of material necessary for the investigation of

unconventional political behavior. Likewise, for

investigators of postmaterialism, the F.R.G. has been a key

area of research, as its post-war economic development has

afforded the widespread levels of affluence and economic

security postmaterialist theorizers posit necessary for che

emergence of significant numbers of holders of the new value

hierarchy. Thus the Federal Republic furnishes an

appropriate setting and adequate variation for testing

postmaterialist hypotheses concerning political protest.

2 8

CHAPTER TWO

THE THEORY OP POSTMATERIALISM

The postmaterialism thesis in its most basic form can

be stated quite simply; "the values of Western publics have

been shifting from an overwhelming emphasis on material

well-being and physical security toward greater emphasis on

zhe quality of life" (Inglehart, 1977, p.3). The reasoning

behind this proposition is more complex. This section of

Chapter two is devoted to an overview of the postmaterialism

thesis and the proposed relationship between postmaterialism

and unconventional political action.

The Relationship between Social Structure and the

Theory of Value Change

The world witnessed the widespread and relatively

rapid breakdown of colonialism following World War II. The

newly independent societies that emerged from this process

undertook a number of daunting projects, and were subject to

a number of serious developments, all of which were subsumed

under the general rubric of modernization. As a consequence

of this singular moment in history, one prime area of

interest to social scientists was the manner and the

consequences of rapid change in these largely non-industrial

countries.

Among other things, development studies attempted to

explain how modernization might affect the political

behavior of the inhabitants of this part of the world. One

basic thesis proposed that modernization disrupted

longstanding social arrangements and orientations. A result

of such disruption and disorientation was political behavior

that could range from the anomic to the pathological (see

for example, Lerner, 1958).

Profound structural and behavioral change was generally

regarded as confined to the underdeveloped world. Yet, this

was not the case. While economic, political, and social

change may have appeared more dramatic in the underdeveloped

world, structural change of a rather profound nature was

taking place in the West as well. This change was most

effectively described in Daniel Bell's "The Coming of Post-

industrial Society" (1973). According to Bell's thesis, the

growth of the tertiary sector in Western societies had

reached a point where they could no longer be referred to as

industrial, but rather were increasingly becoming service

3 0

economies. The structural changes associated with the

growing dominance of a knowledge- based service sector were

widespread and profound. Educational levels grew rapidly,

the communications and transportation industries exploded,

and, above all, the white collar work force associated with

the service sector meant the growing domination of a new

middle class of managers, administrators, technicians, and

the like.

Germany, the setting for this study, offers an

illuminating example regarding these general developments.

The Federal Republic experienced many of the changes alluded

to above in the first two decades following the war. Rapid

economic growth, a manifold increase in the number of

educated young, the growth of a nev/ middle class and

subsequent calls for increasing democratization and social

leveling were distinct features of the social and political

landscape ((Kolinsky in Smith et al 1989, pp.257-258; Baker

et al, 1981) .

In developing postmaterialism theory, Inglehart drew

heavily on Bell's post-industrial thesis as the basis for

his work. What he proposed was that the profound structural

changes taking place in highly industrialized societies were

producing fundamental changes not just in ephemeral

3 1

attitudes or transient behaviors, but also in the more deep-

rooted, less mutable basic values of individuals in these

societies. Inglehart employed the previously developed

psychological notion of needs hierarchies to suggest that

Western publics were becoming less preoccupied with basic

safety and sustenance needs and more concerned with

aesthetic, intellectual, "belonging", and esteem needs.

Moreover, a previously developed sociological theory

concerning the long lasting effects of formative years on

adult orientations implied that this change in needs would

be predictable and permanent. Inglehart referred to this

development as a "silent revolution" taking place in the

Western world (Inglehart 1971; 1977). And Inglehart implied

that although none of these interests were specifically

political, they had obvious, and im.portant, political

implications.

In essence, while Bell proposed that the fundamental

structural changes that had been taking place in the West

would have widespread ramifications for the very way that

such societies would function in the future, Inglehart took

this thesis to a more basic level v/ith his value change

proposal.

3 2

Inglehart's proposals rested heavily on the structural

and historic factors cited above as an explanation of

fundamental value change. But at least initially,

Inglehart's explanation for this value change gave special

significance to the scarcity and socialization hypotheses.

These hypotheses are based on the work of the psychologist

Abraham Maslow, and the sociologist Karl Mannheim,

respectively.

Maslow's scarcity hypothesis proposes that one places

the greatest subjective value on those things that are in

relatively short supply, and discounts those things which

are relatively abundant. Hence in a situation where basic

material things - food, shelter, physical security, etc. -

are scarce, material needs take on overwhelming importance,

under circumstances where such basic needs are regarded as

secure, individuals turn their attention to less fundamental

things. These Maslow referred to as "higher order needs" -

belonging, esteem, esthetic considerations, etc., (Maslow,

1954). Inglehart devised an interesting economic uwist on

this thesis by proposing that, in postindustrial societies,

the "decreasing marginal utility" of continuous material

accumulation in affluent circumstances contributed to the

3 3

comparative attractiveness of higher order needs (Inglehart,

1987) .

Mannheim's socialization hypothesis proposes that one's

basic values reflect conditions that prevailed in one's

preadult years (1928, in Kecskemeti et al 1952). In this

regard, one's immediate circumstances do not dictate, at

least not completely or fundamentally, the importance one

attaches to different needs. Thus, if one were subject to

continuous material deprivation as a child, one would

continue through life attaching substantial importance to

material security, even to the point of accumulating

material goods far beyond what might be necessary to meet

one's present or future needs. Many individuals socialized

during the Great Depression, or who experienced the

privations associated with protracted war during their

childhood might display such behavior.

Alternatively, individuals raised in circumstances of

peace and material security might tend to regard such

conditions as natural, scarcely considering that material

and security needs could ever go unmet for any significant

amount of time, even in circumstances of immediate relative

impoverishment.

3 4

Inglehart indicates that individuals born into Western

societies since the end of World War II are more likely to

reflect the relative influence of these

psychological/economic and social forces. He hypothesizes

that this segment of society focuses less on material and

security needs, which they take as given, having been raised

under materially secure conditions, and more on the non-

material quality of life issues alluded to above that come

to the fore once basic material needs are satisfied (see

Inglehart 1970 pp.991-992, 1981 pp.76-77, 1990 p.66).

Inglehart refers to these people as postmaterialists. Those

who remain concerned with security needs he refers zo as

materialists. Others may be mixed in their orientations.

One of Inglehart's major contributions to the study of

both political culture and political behavior is the attempt:

to ground a political culture proposal - the value change

thesis - in quantifiable terms that allow it to be tested

empirically. To this end, to identify postmaterialists,

materialists and mixed types in societies and cohorts,

Inglehart devised a twelve item battery of survey questions

designed to indicate materialist or postmaterialist

orientations. This series of questions was designed to tap

Maslow's needs hierarchy thesis. Responses were gathered by

3 5

presenting respondents with a series of three cards, each

proposing four goals. The respondents were asked to

indicate which goal they considered most important and which

they considered second most important on each individual

card. The procedure used is reproduced below.

There is a lot of talk these days about what

the aims of this country should be for the

next ten years. (HAND RESPONDENT CARD A.)

On this card are listed some of the goals

which different people would give top

priority. Would you please say which one of

these you, yourself, consider most important?

CARD A

A. Maintaining a high rate of economic growth.

B. Making sure the country has strong defense

forces.

C. Seeing that the people have more say in how

things get decided at work and in the community.

D. Trying to make our cities and countryside more

beautiful.

3 6

(HAND RESPONDENT CARD B.) If you had to

chose, which one of the things on this card

would you say is most desirable?

CABO B

E. Maintaining order in the nation.

F. Giving the people more say in important government

decisions.

G. Fight rising prices.

H. Protecting freedom of speech.

Here is another list. (HAND RESPONDENT CARD C.)

In your opinion, which one is the most important?

CARD C

I. Maintain a stable economy.

J. Progress toward a less impersonal, more htimane

society.

K. The fight against crime.

L. Progress toward a society were ideas are more

important than money.

What comes next?

Now would you look again at all of the goals

listed on these three cards together and tell me

3

which one you consider the most desirable of all?

Just read off the one you choose.

And which is the next most desirable?

And which of all the aims on these cards is least

important from your point of view?

(Inglehart 1990, pp.132-133)

Survey respondents who consistently give top priority

to order, price stability, high economic growth, strong

national defense, a stable economy, and fighting crime are

classified as pure materialists. Those who consistently

give top priority to expanded political participation,

freedom of speech, more democracy on the job and in the

community, a friendlier, less impersonal society, a society

less concerned with wealth and more with ideas, and

beautiful cities and countryside are classified as pure

postmaterialists. Respondents who indicate preferences for

some items from each group are classified as various mixed

types (Inglehart 1990 pp.74-75). Factor analyses of survey

results have shown a distinct tendency for these items to

load or be ranked together by respondents, with the

exception of the beautiful cities item which was apparently

3 8

subject to alternative interpretations by respondents

(Inglehart 1990 pp.134-139).

Pooled survey results from Western Europe indicate that

in postwar generations postmaterialists comprise a

significant percentage of the general population, even

outnumbering materialists (see table 2.1). If these

attitudes are the result of generational characteristics

rather than the result of life-cycle patterns, a conclusion

which data from surveys repeated at regular intervals seem

to support (Abramson and Inglehart 1995, pp.12-15), and if

Inglehart's fundamental propositions are valid, then

generational replacement will result in a long-term trend

toward postmaterialism taking place in the West. Thus, the

structural changes that have taken place in Western

societies since the end of World War II have allowed,

perhaps for the first time in history, a significant segment

of society to turn from a preoccupation with securing basic

material needs and to focus instead on higher order needs.

3 9

Postmaterialism and Unconventional Political Action

The Postmaterialism Model

The proposition that an important connection exists

between postmaterialism and unconventional political action

is vitally important to the postmaterialism thesis, because

Ronald Inglehart introduced this thesis into social science

specifically in reaction to such behavioral changes.

In the realm of development studies it became almost

axiomatic that rapid modernization is frequently accompanied

by violence and disruption (see e.g. Huntington, 1968). On

the other hand, it was believed that Western industrial

countries had reached a point in terms of development that

rendered them impervious to such political upheavals. The

West was already industrialized, and over time had developed

economic arrangements that had broken down the overt

barriers to participation in the social and political

institutions of Western society. By the 1950's. Western

societies had been assumed to have reached a modernized

state (Apter, 1965 p.2). This end-state, in turn, was

assumed to have eliminated or at least blurred basic

political antagonism between the classes (see e.g. Dahl

4 0

1961; Bell, 1960). Further fundamental dislocations

associated with modernization were not anticipated.

As noted in the introduction, the outbreak of large

scale demonstrations directed at governmental and other

authorities and their political decisions signified a

remarkable change in political behavior in the West. This

development was wholly unexpected. Previously it had been

most consistently proposed that large scale street

demonstrations and the like were most often the result of

the frustration and discontent of the least privileged

members of society, concerned with their own material

deprivation. Bread riots, for example, have been a

recurring theme throughout history, in widely disparate

societies. Similarly, in industrial societies, street

demonstrations and other direct challenges to economic and

political arrangements were associated with the working

classes, union organizations, and the like. As Inglehart

has pointed out, 'Muring the 1950's and early 60's writers

with viewpoints as diverse as those of Aron, Bell, Keniston

and Marcuse called attention to the decline of ideological

conflict [in the West] with various degrees of approval or

dismay. Implicit in the discussion was the assumption that

4 1

radical protest movements could be based only on the working

classes" (italics in the original) (Inglehart 1977, p.208).

Yet the increase in unconventional political activity

in Western societies beginning in the mid 1960's has been

fueled in large part by the participation of individuals

with, in many cases, a quite different demographic profile

than before. For now the protestor is oftentimes young,

well educated, and from a distinctly middle class

background. In short, it has become the relatively

privileged who have displayed a marked "adversarial stance"

regarding key public policies and even basic social and

political arrangements in their own systems (Inglehart, 1990

p. 67), and who are not disinclined to use unorthodox or

disruptive tactics in opposition to such.

In Germany, unconventional political behavior took on

just such a new cast. While "petitions and street

demonstrations" in the 1950's were the work of established

organizations like unions, by the late 1960's the "critical

intelligentsia" (Pallak in Nelles and Oppermann 1980, p.253)

were more likely to lead such activities (Pultzer in Smith

et al, 1989 pp. 82-85). How to explain these developments

taking place in the West was a central problem facing

political theorists and social scientists.

A ̂ c,

Inglehart proposed that value change was affecting

political participation in post-industrial societies. He

suggested that postmaterialists would be relatively more

likely than materialists to participate in politics in

general. Inglehart states that "there is evidence that the

value priorities of Western publics have gradually been

shifting from materialist toward postmaterialist values. If

this trend has indeed been occurring, it...should tend to

raise the political participation rates of mass publics"

(Inglehart 1979, p.378; 1990, p.335).

As noted, economic prosperity and educational levels

have risen dramatically in the West since the end of World

War II. Both education and income are associated with

rising levels of political involvement, as the civic culture

thesis of democratic politics makes clear (Almond and Verba,

1963). However, this behavior was generally considered to

not only support the status quo, but to do so in a

conventional manner, such as particularized contacting and

taking part in local politics through established

organizations. Widespread elite challenging activity such

as participation in demonstrations, boycotts, petition

drives, and the like has not been traditionally part of this

repertoire. In fact, such behavior had been considered the

antithesis of responsible citizenship associated with the

more highly educated, affluent segments of society. Yet,

just such activities have now been demonstrated to be

positively associated with education and economic well-being

in highly industrialized Western societies (Baker et al,

1981).

Since the end of the Second Industrial Revolution, the

political arena in the West has been dominated by two

opposing groups, the bourgeoisie, or owners of production,

and the working classes, or wage laborers. All Western

political systems have reflected this fundamental division

of economic/political interests. The major political

parties in Western societies have tended to reflect the

economic interests of these two classes, to a greater or

lesser extent, dependent on an individual society's history

of industrialization and other idiosyncratic factors. Thus

all Western political systems have revolved around the power

struggle between a middle class party that desires to

preserve or extend the interests of the property owning

classes, and a labor party, socialist party or communist

party that professes to represent the economic interests of

the workers, or propertyless classes. In essence, "the

battle lines of industrial society led naturally to class

4 4

based parties" (Baker et al, 1981 p.293). In recent decades

however, the growth of a new middle class of professionals

who may frequently emphasize non-economic political goals

has contributed to a growing lack of fit between a society's

traditional party system and political issues being raised

by this segment of society (Dalton in Smith et al, 1989).

For example, a fundamental premise upon which both

parties of the Right and parties of the Left agree is the

desirability of economic growth. Such growth benefits both

producers and their employees, in terms of profits,

employment, wage levels, welfare schemes, and patterns of

consumption. Put another way, some system critics propose

that there exists "a secret connection between capitalism

and the labor movement" based on their shared desire for

continued progress in material accumulation (Pallak in

Melles and Oppermann, 1980 p.254) (my translation).

However, for increasing numbers of the new class,

postmaterial goals of ,say, pollution control, or a less

hierarchically arranged work environment, may clash with a

continued emphasis on ever more economic growch, as

environmental safeguards and a less efficient workplace may

negatively impact economic growth rates. Thus it can be

that old adversaries find themselves on the same side of the

4 5

fence on some fundamental issues, opposed to dissident

voices which reflect a political position unrepresented

within the framework of the conventional party/interest

arrangement.

Traditional democratic politics in Western societies

demonstrate a pattern of elite directed activity, dominated

by hierarchically organized political parties and

institutionalized interest groups. These organizations

frame political issues and propose political and social

policies in such a manner that input from the vast majority

of the public is restricted to passing judgment on the

activities of elected representatives at regular intervals.

Henig points out for example, that Western democracies have

been essentially governed by political parties in

conjunction with economic interest groups and other

organized factors, whereas the "vague ideas and interests of

the wider public" find expression only within the context of

the "electoral system" (1979, p.308). The increasing

competence of publics in Western societies to understand the

intricacies of the political policy making process has led

to a partial breakdown of this arrangement. Elite

challenging political behavior that attempts to directly

effect the formulation of political policy has increased in

the post-war era (Inglehart 1990, pp.5, 336).

From an institutional perspective, even more vexing

than nev/ issues that challenge the existing economic

paradigm of political divisions, are a range of political

issues associated with lifestyle questions which fall

generally outside the parameters of economics. With the

growch of a "self-directed" social segment that champions

the erosion of moral strictures associated with women's

roles in society, sexuality, religion, and conventional

behavior in general, .political debate has centered

increasingly on the movement to promote or inhibit

"progress" in these areas. Again, the party system as it

has evolved until recently has not been equipped to offer a

coherent choice to opponents on questions such as these,

when coupled with the differences on economic questions

associated with class politics.

Recent decades have witnessed the partial

transformation of the left by these new interests (Burklin

in Wallach and Romosser 1985, p.196). In the United States

for exa.mple, the Democratic Party is regarded as

substantially more sympathetic to the interests of the

wom.en's movement, to "gays", to environm.entaliscs, and the

4 7

like. On the other hand, the Republican Party touts itself

as the defender of "family values" defined as opposition to

abortion and pornography and support for prayer in schools,

etc. Socially conservative members of the working classes

and lower middle class may have, in many cases, defected to

the Republicans, based on these issues. As a result, the

Republican Party finds itself with a severe internal schism

between the middle class, business oriented laissez-faire

wing of the Party and the new socially conservative wing.

The Democrats suffer from a similar identity crisis.

Partially in response, a growing number of individuals

identify with neither party (see, for example, Welch et al,

1995, pp.142-144 for a synopsis of the current pattern of

dealignment and realignment in American party politics). In

Germ.any, due to systemic differences, this development has

been somewhat muted, but has resulted in the appearance of a

Green Party to the left of the Social Democrats, founded by

a dissident youth wing of that party (Dalton in Smith et al,

1989). This "anti-party party" has been marked by a

decidedly favorable stance regarding unconventional

political activity. The Greens have also been referred to

as the quintessential postmaterialist party by Ronald

Inglehart (1990). Similar weakness, dealignment, internal

4 8

divisions and party fragmentation have marked party politics

in Britain, the Netherlands, France, etc., (Henig, 1979) .

Writing of the transformation of conservatism in France for

example, one commentator has pointed out how the issues that

are stressed by the forces of the "far right" - "law and

order", immigration, and unemployment - have become a major

part of the agenda of the traditional right in many

respects. Additionally, these issues have become

interrelated in the minds of some in that "immigrants... are

equivaleni; to crime and disruption", and "race and

crime...race and unemployment" have been brought together as

a coherent political program for a political grouping in

postindustrial society that no longer conforms to a

"sociological profile" associated with the "natural

constituency" of the far right. In essence, the far right

has moved "from fringe to mainstream" (Christie, 1995,

p.95). Thus while the new middle class and New Left may

both be phenomena associated with postmaterialism {sometimes

referred to as the new politics), the former as precursor,

the latter as political artifact, the new right may be a

manifestation of the material and security fears of a

seemingly disparate group of individuals that transcends

"the boundaries of class, ideology and narrow vested

interests" {Christie, 1995, p.98; see also Chapin, 1997, fo

an investigation of this development in Germany). In any

event, value change has had a profound effect on political

party systems in advanced industrial societies (Baker et al

1981, p. 159) .

This, in turn, has had a profound effect on political

behavior. Political parties function to channel

participation into conventional modes - voting and other

manifestations of electoral politics. On the other hand,

Inglehart finds evidence that postmaterialist values

especially increase the occurrence of unconventional

political action. Inglehart stares that postmaterialists

are "relatively apt" vis-a'-vis materialists to engage in

unconventional political action (Inglehart 1979 in Barnes

and Kaase p.378;1990 pp.310,312). To account for this

influence Inglehart proposes the following explicit reasons

1) secure in their physiological needs, postmaterialists

have more "psychic energy" to invest in other areas.

Politics is one possible area of activity. 2) As a minority

in society in general their priorities tend to be given les;

attention then they believe is appropriate. Thus they are

dissatisfied with current political policies. 3) Property

damage as a possible result of unconventional political

5 0

action is regarded less negatively by postmaterialists

because property is given a "lower priority" by

postmaterialists than it is by materialists (Inglehart 1990

p. 310) .

The hypotheses put forward for postmaterialism and

unconventional political action then are rather straight

forward. We expect to find a positive, significant causal

relationship between postmaterialism and unconventional

political action. Furthermore, we expect to find a

positive, significant causal relationship between the

explicit causal mechanisms and such behavior. Finally, in

the context of a model that controls for such mechanisms, we

expect that the direct causal relationship between

postmaterialism and unconventional political action will

become insignificant, in keeping with Inglehart's proposals.

In regard to materialism, we have stated that we

expect to find no relationship between materialism and

protest potential. Consequently, we also expect no

relationship between materialism and the causal mechanisms

alluded to above. What we mean when we state that we do not

expect the above is simply that there is nothing in our

theoretical argument which should lead us to expect an

effect of materialism on protest, or the causal agents

5 1

proposed to generate protest, not that we have developed a

specific notion of how this concept should or should not

affect political behavior or attitudes. Therefore it is

perhaps more accurate to say that we remain agnostic on this

point.

In order to test the above propositions, our first task

is to determine whether we can establish an empirical link

between postmaterialism and unconventional political action,

before proceeding to investigate the relationship between

postmaterialism and other theories of unconventional

political activity. Initially then, the first step is to

construct indexes that measure postmaterialism and

materialism. Once this has been successfully accomplished,

the following step is to test Inglehart's related

proposition - that postmaterial preferences have a positive

causal connection to political protest.

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The next step is to test the effects of the explicit

proposals as to why postmaterialists are more inclined to

engage in unconventional political action. These proposed

causal mechanisms have never before been subject to

empirical investigation. Thus we extend the model by

testing Inglehart's key theoretical assumptions regarding

political protest.

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The manner in which the variables tapping

DOStmaterialism, materialism, protest potential, psychic

energy, policy dissatisfaction and property damage have bee

constructed can be found in Chapter Four.

5 3

CHAPTER THREE

ALTERNATIVE THEORIES OP UNCONVENTIONAL POLITICAL ACTION

Socio-Economic Status and Unconventional Political Action

It is widely accepted that the standard socio-economic

model of political participation is a powerful predictor of

political behavior in advanced Western societies (Leighley,

1995). Especially for conventional political activity,

factors reflecting individuals' economic and social status -

primarily income and education - have been recognized as

having a significant positive effect on individual political

activity (Almond and Verba, 1953; Nie, Powell and Prewitit,

1969; Verba, Nie and Kim, 1971; Berleson, Lazerfeld and

McPhee 1954). Explanations of t-my such extraneous factors

are associated with specific political behavior revolve

around the proposition that elevated skill levels associated

with high levels of education and income (and increasing

age)(see, e.g., Brady, Verba and Scholzman, 1995; Traut and

Emmert, 1993), along with the inculcation of democratic

norms associated with education (Dahl, 1971), generate an

increase in participation.

The manner in which the primary demographic criteria

influence political behavior are often interrelated and

reinforcing. Education, for instance, is proposed to

increase political participation by stimulating an interest

in politics and the awareness of the relationship between

one's political interests and public policy (Almond and

Verba, 1963). Education is also correlated with relatively

recent birth cohorts. That is, educational opportunities

have grown significantly in recent decades. Thus education

may act as an intervening factor in regard to the observed

relationship between youth and unconventional political

participation. There may continue to exist, however, a

residual effect of youth on such behavior even in the face

of educational controls. There are plausible possible

explanations for such residual effects. For example, che

young may suffer less, in certain cases, from the effects o

time costs or social approbation associated with

unconventional political activity (Milbrath and Goel, 1977

p.166). Or, social networks may be more supportive of such

activity than they are for older individuals, for whatever

reason.

Similarly, education is associated with income. It ma

be that an observed relationship between income and

5 5

political participation may be mitigated by the effects of

education, or vice-versa. Another possible explanation of

the association between income and participation may have to

do with efforts to recruit individuals for political

activity - such efforts have been found to be

disproportionately directed at those with higher incomes.

Additionally, both education and income may be positively

associated with subjective feelings of political efficacy.

These feelings may in turn be the result of elevated

potential political skill levels resulting from education or

affluence that indeed render individuals objectively more

politically efficacious.

Gender too, may have an indirect effect on political

activity. For instance, women have been found to be less

inclined to approve of potentially violent political acts.

Why this is so is not entirely clear, but a plausible

hypothesis is that gender roles and conditioning are

responsible for women's reluctance to engage in such

actions. If this is so, girls subject to less traditional

role expectations may as adults display a lessened

reluctance to take part in such activities. Less

restrictive role expectations may in turn be associated with

class - again income and education are implicated, although

5 6

this time perhaps more closely with an individual's parental

levels.

In sum, the standard SES model of political activity

suggests that the better educated, more affluent, and

younger members of society are more likely to develop an

interest in politics, be aware of the relationship between

their political interests and public policy, suffer less

from the effect of time costs associated with political

activity, be recruited for political activity, be

objectively more politically efficacious, and exist in a

relatively politically tolerant social milieu that would be

less likely to attach negative sanctions to politically

unconventional acts. Furthermore, women have been found to

be less inclined to participate in potentially violent

political acts. These mechanisms are put forward as

responsible for the causal relationship between education,

income or class, youth, gender, and unconventional political

activity.

It is important in terms of this study, to recognize

that the standard socio-economic model rests on the

fundamental assumption that there is nothing inherently

associated with education, income, or age that spurs

political activity. Rather, these conditions are regarded

as associated with mechanisms which, in turn, have a direct

effect on political behavior. These include, for example,

participatory norms, organizational memberships, reduced

relative costs in terms of time and effort needed to gather

political information, etc. In effect, the standard SES

model treats socio-demographic characteristics as proxy

variables that become irrelevant when these mechanisms are

taken into account. Once this is recognized, it becomes

possible to formulate and to test such proposals for their

relative explanatory strength for protest potential by

including the appropriate demographic criteria in an

expanded multi-variate model.

SES, Postmaterialism, and Unconventional Political Action

As the above discussion indicates, demographic criteria

should be highly correlated with value orientation in

Western societies. Postwar generations, having been

socialized in an environment marked by a growing economy,

widespread affluence, the absence of war, and increasing

educational opportunities and information, as well as

growing cognitive sophistication, should be significantly

more postmaterialist than cider cohorts. Hence age,

income, education, and postmaterialism should all

demonstrate positive correlations (Abramson and Inglehart,

1995) .

Thus, proponents of the postmaterialism thesis would

certainly expect a positive relationship between

postmaterialism and youth, high levels of education, and

income. What proponents of the standard socio-economic

model should not expect is a robust residual independent

effect of postmaterialism on political behavior once such

criteria are taken into consideration, because models of

political behavior based on socio-economic criteria do not

include an independent effect of value orientation in their

explanatory schema. Such models would by implication,

assume that any causal relationship between postmaterialism

and protest would be dependent on the relationship between

postmaterialism and demographic criteria. Thus the central

question is this: Is the relationship between

postmaterialism and protest primarily a reflection of

postmaterialists' social and demographic characteristics?

We reject this proposition. Rather, we propose that

SES factors are crucial for postmaterialism theory as

antecedent variables. But while age, education, and income

are positively related to postmaterialism, postmaterialist

propensity for protest is not wholly a function of the

postmaterialist demographic profile. Postmaterialism leads

to heightened interest in politics, policy dissatisfaction,

and lessened objection to property damage. These factors

are in turn causally related to unconventional political

participation.

The Demographic Control Model

As noted earlier, proponents of the standard SES model

of political activity point to specific causal agents as

responsible for the effect of specific social and

demographic conditions on variations in political activity.

Postmaterialism theory contains the proposition that

postmaterialists are, by definition, disproportionately

middle class, highly educated, and relatively young

(Abramson and Inglehart, 1995). Postmaterialism theory also

contains the proposition that postmaterialists engage

disproportionately in unconventional political action. As

the specific individual socio-demographic characteristics

put forward as associated with postmaterialism have also

been found to be associated with political participation (in

the case of youth, with unconventional participation but not

6 0

with conventional participation), then it is possible that

the observed relationship between postmaterialism and

unconventional political action may be spurious.

The initial hypotheses to be tested then, concern the

relationship between postmaterialism and age, education,

income, and gender. We expect to find a strong positive

relationship between education, income, and postmaterialism

and a strong negative relationship between age and

postmaterialism. We expect to find no significant

relationship between postmaterialism and gender.

Furthermore, we expect to find significant independent

effects on the dependent variable for all of these factors,

including postmaterialism. Path analysis can map the

relationship between postmaterialism and socio-demographic

factors, and a simple regression model of postmaterialism

and unconventional political action that controls for age,

education, income and gender can test the hypotheses.

6 1

-i5ra::hi ; Ccntr " ! Model

A

^ y

The manner in which the variables measuring age,

income, education, and gender have been constructed can be

found in Chapter Four.

Relative Deprivation Theory and Unconventional Political

Action

Relative deprivation as a "formal object of study"

emerged from research conducted during the Second World War

on American soldiers. At this time it referred to a

psychological state resulting from evaluating one's own

well-being "by comparison with levels of benefit obtained by

others." Individuals were postulated to feel resentment and

anger if they believe that they are being deprived relative

CO comparable others. In this sense, the condition is

specifically put forward as the result of inter-personal

comparison. However, later work implies that relative

deprivation is more simply the desire for some "unattained

ouucome" coupled with the feeling that one "deserves" the

outcome. In t.his sense, "referent cognitions" can refer to

intra-personal (perceived state versus desired state), as

well as inter-personal comparison (Folger, in Masters and

Smith 1987, pp.184-185, 187; see also Crosby, 1976; 1982).

Both of these variations of relative deprivation can be

regarded as "egotistical" relative deprivation.

One further formulation of the relative deprivation

thesis is referred to as collective relative deprivation.

In this construct, relative deprivation is manifest through

an individual's feelings of closeness to a particular group,

coupled with the perception that the group is relatively

deprived. This type of relative deprivation has been found

to be associated with collective protest action (Grant and

Brown, 1995) .

The relative deprivation thesis of unconventional

political action proposes that there exists a monotonia

6 3

causal relationship between relative deprivation and

political discontent. This in turn is proposed as resulting

in civil disturbances. When individuals feel that they are

relatively deprived they become discontented and react.

This reaction can take the form of unconventional political

action, including rebellion and other acts of a violent

nature. In this sense, relative deprivation theory rests on

a more fundamental proposition, the frustration-aggression

thesis.

Although the relative deprivation theory of

unconventional political action has been embellished in

various ways (see for example, Gurr's list of hypotheses

associated with his development of this theory, 1970), the

basic proposition stands. As Gurr has stated: "[d]isconcent

arising from the perception of relative deprivation is the

basic, instigating condition for participants in collective

violence" {Gurr, 1970, p.13; see also Runciman, 1966; Walker

and Pettigrew, 1984).

6 4

Relative Oeprivatxon, Postmateriallsm and Unconventional

Political Action

Relative deprivation theory is closely linked to

modernization studies, which tend to conform to the "gap"

theory of civil unrest in modernizing societies (Huntington,

1968). According to this thesis, modernizing societies'

fledgling institutions cannot keep pace with the aspirations

of their citizens, and unrest is often the result. A

central feature of the modernization thesis is that rapid

social change can cause political upheaval, and the basic

thesis of relative deprivation theory follows suit - general

societal change that results in a critical mass of

discontented citizenry, frustrated by the perception of

public policy that does not meet their needs can result in

civil unrest. Here one discovers the nexus which can serve

to link relative deprivation theory to postmateriallsm

theory. The postmateriallsm thesis also contains the

proposition that continuing modernization processes have

resulted in social changes in Western societies that in turn

have caused the growth of postmateriallsm (Inglehart, 1977).

The political institutions in these societies responsible

for framing public policy have not responded as rapidly as

J

oo

necessary to accommodate postmaterialists, resulting in a

growing body of discontented individuals. This has been

posited as one of the primary reasons that postmaterialists

are more discontented than are materialists. This factor is

a central feature of the explicit postmaterialism

explanation of unconventional political action. But

relative deprivation as it is formulated in at least the

first two of the variations described above refers more or

less explicitly to relative material deprivation.

Furthermore, Gurr states emphatically that "the intensity of

relative deprivation is greatest with respect to discrepancy

affecting economic values, less with respect to security and

communality values, least with respect to participation,

self-realization, status, or ideational coherence values"

(1970, p.71). Thus one would expect to find a stronger

relationship between materialism and egotistical relative

deprivation. It would be highly significant then, within

the framework of relative deprivation theory, if

postmaterialism is found to be causally related to

discontent and this type of relative deprivation. If this

is the case, one would have cause to question the real

nature of the concept of relative deprivation, at least in

the context of postindustrial societies.

6 6

The Relative Deprivation Model

The major hypotheses are straight forward. First, we

dc expect: to find a significant, positive relationship

between intra-personal relative deprivation, specifically

targeted group relative deprivation and postmaterialism

despite the fact that pos^materialists are hypothesized to

have a higher educational and income level than the average

citizen. Second, we expect to observe a continued direct

effect of postmaterialism on unconventional political

action, when included in a model of relative deprivation, as

discontent is only one factor put forward as responsible for

postmaterialists' unconventional political participation.

Third, we expect to find a significant, positive

relationship between materialism and inter-personal relative

deprivation and specifically targeted group relative

deprivation. However, we expect these types of deprivation

to have no effect on unconventional political activity, in

part at least, due specifically to the association between

these types of deprivation and protest adverse materialists.

That is, we propose that relative deprivation will have a

significant relationship to protest when it is associated

with postmaterialism. iMaterialists may feel relatively

deprived but they will not protest. Not so for

postmaterialists.

Our first proposition points out one of the problems

associated with proposing that relative deprivation causes

social unrest without recourse to micro-level data.

Relative deprivation is routinely defined as the gap between

individual aspirations and achievements. This is one of the

forms of relative deprivation to which postmaterialists

should show a relationship. However, an alternative

formulation is that deprivation derives its relative nature

from individuals' tendencies to compare their personal

circumstances to those of others. This type of relative

deprivation should show no relationship to postmaterialism.

Without the ability to directly measure relative deprivation

at the individual level, and to differentiate between the

cwo leading conceptual constructs of relative deprivation,

it is virtually impossible to falsify the fundamental causal

proposition. Whether one finds that the wealthier, better

educated or the poorer, less well educated are engaging in

unconventional political activity, one always has the

opportunity to propose that it is a relatively deprived

condition that is generating the activity in question. In

the case of the former, it is the discrepancy between

6 8

aspirations and reality that is the causal factor. In the

case of the latter, it is che discrepancy between an

individual's condition and that of others in society that

can be posited as the causal factor. By utilizing the

survey material available for this study, one can determine

the relative strength of each measure and furthermore one

can control for the extraneous (in regard to t.his model)

factors that can compound tautological tendencies associated

with aggregate models of relative deprivation (see e.g.

Greene, 1974 pp. 150-152).

The survey instrument utilized in this study allows for

the construction of four alternative relative deprivation

variables. The first directly taps respondents' perceptions

of their personal financial situations, and how these

perceptions compare to their individual aspirations given

their individual level of education. The second allows

respondents to compare their situation in general to others

in the Federal Republic, and to judge whether any

discrepancy is justifiable or not. Moreover, respondents

were queried concerning the responsibility of the government

for their situation. Thus the survey instrument allows for

the construction of two alternative versions of egotistical

relative deprivation, one comparing respondents feelings

6 9

concerning intra-personal deprivation which we will

hereafter refer to as income deprivation, the other

comparing respondents' feelings of general deprivation

relative to others in society, v/hich we will hereafter refer

to as welfare deprivation.

Finally, the survey instrument allows the construction

of collective relative deprivation variables for both

postmaterialism and materialism, by asking respondents to

identify a particular group which represents their primary

source of identification, the degree to which they feel

identity to this group, and the perception of whether this

group is receiving all that it deserves. The choices

include