Uygur - Philosophical Question

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IV.—WHAT IS A PHILOSOPHICAL

QUESTION?

B Y NERMI UYGUB

IT is quite an odd fact that the intellectual activity commonlycalled philosophy is under a fog. Not only sporadically philoso-phizing laymen but also professional philosophers are rarelygiven the opportunity to discern their whereabouts. T o attr ibu tethis to order-destroying tendencies of our sophisticated timeswould, no doubt, be unjust, for one always meets with difficultiesin answering the question, ' What is philosophy?' or in deter-mining the domain of philosophy from its beginnings.

In this paper I shall attem pt to give an answer to this question.Yet a detailed examination of properties pervasive to the entiredomain of philosophy lies beyond my purpose. My intention israther to investigate only one of the numerous dimensions ofphilosophy. I seek to elucidate the specific structure of philoso-

phical questions in general, T hus, I believe, the fog that envelopsphilosophy would be largely dissipated.

T he following are points I wish to avoid : (a) T o the question,' What is philosophy ?' I shall not reply with a single completeformula. I am inclined to think that such a formula is neitheravailable nor necessary, (b) Equally, I shall not undertake tomake a list of miscellaneous questions belonging to the traditionof philosophy, for such an inventory cannot be made beforephilosophizing. Philosophy is an inquiry which often fashions

its own questions without excluding new ones. Where questionsdo not change, inquiry cannot deserve this name. If by phUoso-phia perennis we are to understand the permanence of questionsof philosophy, then philosophy is the very reverse of perennis ;it possesses no fixed framework because it is constantly renewedthrough fresh questions, (c) From this follows the reason whyI shall not have recourse to gathering the questions of philosophyout of its history. Countless questions have arisen during itslong history but this cannot ensure conclusively their being

philosophic, although some of them have persisted as a stereo-typed centre of activities for centuries. Philosophy has, in fact,undergone several revolutions regarding its store of questions.I t is usual that either a key question is transferred from the realmof philosophy to th at of science, thus transforming those philoso-phers who tried to answer it into pioneers of a certain branch of

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WHAT IS A PHILOSOPHICAL QUESTION? 6 5

science ; or questions which have given birth to various philoso-phical schools and kep t them alive for a long time are unm askedas non-philosophical ones, (d) Finally, I shall not atte m pt toprescribe new questions for th e republic of philosophers. Investi-gators can never have questions imposed from outside exceptthose arising from the subject matter of their own inquiries.

My main object is to scrutinize the typical structure of a genuine

philosophical question without regard to th e stage of research itmight animate. My chief concern is to describe only the salientcharacteristics of a philosophical question. I see my task inshowing what is contained in such a question ; I want to throw

light on what is asked in it, trying to point out, as correctly as Ican, the basic form of a question proper to philosophy. T heleading question in the present essay is : What is a philosophical

question? Here a question manifests itself which, so far as Iknow, appears for the first time in contemporary philosophy,and in particular in British philosophy, in G. E. Moore and L."Wittgenstein, to name its two classical figures. It would not,however, be too much to say tha t now adays the question dem andsto be stated more precisely and answered far more radically,

despite some laten t beginnings which can lead to fructification.It is my contention, therefore, that the fog enveloping the pro-vince of philosophy may th us be sufficiently removed.

In order to attain my aim, I shall try each time to elucidate thequestion from a different point of view. T hrough comparisonwith the specific framework of everyday questions, sometimeswith those of science, the examination and understanding of thestructural background of philosophical questions will in a greatmeasure be sharpened, although i t can only be carried out roughly

in this essay. Fina lly, I shall deal briefly with the function andimportance of the study of philosophical questions as such.

nIn analysing the structure common to philosophical questions

one difficulty which seems to confuse matters is the link between

philosophical questions and the world {or universe). For thisreason I shall now endeavour to clarify this link

Everyday questions, owing to their multiple sources and re-sponse-directions, are naturally interwoven in the voluminousnet of the world, so rich in preoccupations as well as situations.A brief consideration of tie different functions of everydayquestions will suffice to prove this. I t must be noted th at every-day questions never perform a uniform task. Such a question is

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uttered by the necessities of an almost unique situation, as caneasily be gathered from the spoken or written form.

For the most part, ordinary questions involve a hick or break,as it were, in the body of a word order usually called a question-sentence. It is to fill his hick or amend the break th at an appealis made to the person questioned. T his can be shown in the airof unsatisfactoriness which often pervades the question, as in-dicated by convenient interrogative particles like ' how ', ' who ',' how m uch ', etc., which plainly ' a sk ' the question. ' Howmany rooms are there in this house?'—puts a question which isanswered by someone who is able to replace the ' how m an y '

by the real number of rooms. T hus the ignorance of thequestioner about some worldly matter of fact is overcome by theawareness of another. T he statement, for instance, ' T here arefive rooms in this house ' proves wholly sufficient. A confront-ation of the two sentences may give rise to an impression ofobscurity, or even defectiveness, in regard to the question-sentence. T his impression is in a sense delusive. Question-sentences containing not only one but several interrogativeparticles are nonetheless complete sentences in virtue of their

syntactic status (e.g.: question : ' How many rooms has eachlodger in this block? '—answer : ' A's have four rooms, B's havefive rooms ') . T hat p art which is lacking in a question-sentenceis not th a t which is inherent in its structural form bu t in its con-ten t. T o overcome this one must have recourse to the world,viz. to relevant perceptions, actions, and experiences.

Such a recourse is structurally not required by a philosophicalquestion, because it does not contain any formal lack to be filled.' W hat is explanation?', ' W hat is meant by causa lity?', ' W hat

is this—probability? ',—all these are no doubt philosophicalquestions. Nevertheless, there is no word which perm its sub-stitution. T here is no need to replace ' what i s ' , for instance,by some o ther word. Propositions Buch a s , ' This is explanation ',' T hat is explanation ', should at no time be considered as repliesto the question, ' W hat is explanation? ' In philosophy, nosubstitute sentences can eliminate the re-asking of the very ques-tion which gave rise to them ; on the contrary, they contributeto the much more energetic re-statement of the related question.

But whoever puts forward an ordinary question is completelysatisfied when he adequately unders tands the reply provided by asubstitute sentence which m akes logically superflous the repetitionof the question as such in virtue of its now completed form.

T he link with th e world becomes more apparen t in anotherkind of everyday question, namely disjunctive questions. ' Is


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WHAT IS A PHILOSOPHICAL QUEST ION? 67

the door of the house open or sh u t? ' is the expression of a questionin which someone vacillates between two facts related to theworld-situation, only one of which is believed to be actuallyinheren t. As a rule, one can only reply to this question by goingto the door of the house where the relevant world-fact is to befound. T he correct answer excludes one of the two terms (orclauses) of the disjunction (e.g. ' T he door of the house is sh u t') .Hesitation is thus exchanged for resoluteness. From this itfollows that disjunctive questions presuppose a decision con-cerning the world which is valid for the majority of everydayquestions, in that they are principally questions whose ground

for decision is supplied by a definite fact in the world, whetherone term of the disjunction be omitted or not (e.g. ' Is the doorof the house shut? ' is in a sense identical with the question, ' Isthe door of the house open or shut? ').

But philosophical questions are in sharp contrast to these, inthat they do not incorporate any hesitation. T hey all necessarilyask something. I t may even happen tha t they express a dis-junction. Yet they can never be decided upon by facts of the world.

Let us take the question, ' "What is exp lana tion? ' At a certain

stage in our investigation we may think the question has beenuttered as, ' Does the explanation tend to find out th e causes orpurposes of facts? ' I t must be noted nevertheless th at therecourse to some world-reality can never still the hesitation,for it does not concern the clarification of a certain world-state.In a philosophical question the attention is released, as it were,from the world to concentrate on discourses on the latter. T hehesitation is directly rooted in the discourses, since it is only askingwhether the explanation of world-facts is concerned with their

causes or purposes. T o answer this question one must abstainfrom inquiring into the world-facts as such and only attempt toelucidate them ; in the case considered, therefore, the expressionof explanations. T his is true of all concepts questioned in philo-sophy. T he hesitation presented in the question, ' Is conscious-ness a mechanism or organism? ' requires primarily a thoroughinvestigation of the respective concepts ' mechanism ' and' organism '. T he ground for treating philosophical questions isthus not various world-facts—e.g. machines or living beings—but different discourses embodying these concepto.

A further particu larity helps to show the way in which philoso-phical questions, in a sense, are not concerned with the world.If they were concerned with it, i.e. with its contents, construc-tion and interconnection of facts, they would often never havebeen put forward, since the occurrence of some world-perception


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would make them superfluous. A question whose answer is

known cannot be considered as a question which is no t asked if itcan be postponed until relevant world-orientations (or relevantexperiences) are provided. He who has learned to wait generallyasks little in everyday life. But philosophical questions can neverbe eliminated through world-orientations. However satisfac-torily our perceptions of the world be expounded, they can nevercontrive the renunciation of philosophical questions. Sincewhat is asked in them is not merely the world, they cannot berendered wholly needless through any conceivable saturation ofworld-knowledge. Let us assume, for instance, tha t we havestated all possible cause-effect connections among the totality ofworld-facts. T hen there will be noneed to aak any questions aboutthe causality concerning concrete facts. Y et we would still ask,despite the perfection of our world knowledge, and perhaps owingto it, the question, ' W hat is causality? ' T his quite odd situ-ation illustrates a typical particularity of philosophical questions :the sum total neither of activities nor of knowledge concerningthe world can furnish elements in answering any philosophicalquestion, in th at ita imm ediate ground lies beyond, the world.

m

Viewed from their expression, philosophical questions oftenappear in a monotonous garment. T o make this characteristicmore apparent, it will be sufficient to add some new questionsto those I have cited : ' What is beauty? ', ' What is matter? ',' What is history?', ' What is meaning? ', ' What is science? '.All those questions are, as is evident, what-is questions. Theyunanimously perform th e same function: they ask the what-isof a certain word (or concept) contained in the question. T hereare, of course, questions which are not fitted to this pattern,being devoid of what-is, as is shown in the philosophical question,' How many kinds of ways of knowing are there? ' Nevertheless,on closer examination they will be seen to spring from the samesource as what-is questions, since they attem pt as a rule to under-stand the same concept in respect of its what-is. Indeed, thequestion, ' How many kinds of ways of knowing are there? ' can

be traced back directly to the question,' What is knowledge? ',for there exists no essential difference between that asked separ-ately by bo th questions. Most questions bearing the stamp of themonotonous what-is cannot be definitely denied the qualificationof being philosophical, although one is rarely aware of this atfirst sight.


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T he reason for this is doubtless resident in the very intention

of philosophical questions, which is directed not to the occur-rences of everyday life as such, in that their subject matter goesbeyond the network of worldly orientations through actions aswell as cognitions. I t is from the abundant variety of concreteworld-situations that everyday questions borrow their hetero-geneous functions in accordance with diverse circumstances. T oaccount for this, one has to listen, free from prejudices, to thepolymorphic as well as polytonic discourses of one's surroundings.Joy : ' Where have you come from ?'; challenge: ' Who says Iam clum sy?'; request: ' Would you please give me your fountain

pen V ; sometimes an appropriate way of teaching : ' What arethe p arts of this g un?' ; need of repeating a pleasant or unpleasantthing : ' Can I s w im ?' ; den ial: ' Was it I who has said it? ' ;astonishment: ' Do you really not want to come with me? '

Contrasted with these, all philosophical questions appear in asense to be quite ' weak', in that they both have different con-structions. T he latter have a distinct configuration: a word(or concept) transcending everyday interest in relation with a' what-is ' ; whereas the former break away from a fixed scheme.

In daily life every question iB moulded on the limited diversityof concrete and unrepeatable world-situations. Some of themare not infrequently used in surmounting, through rhetoric, themonotony of daily discourses, in preference to working out apattern to be filled by a piece of knowledge or action on the partof the person questioned. T he question, for instance, ' Was itI who has said i t ? ' expounds in certain situations a denial-sentenceserving to confirm the contention, ' I assure you, I haven't saidit, ' although it feigns to put the question on someone else. Viewed

from this standpoint, philosophical questions give the impressionof being ' dry ' or ' lifeless '. Numerous are those who think so.And it is beyond doubt, I may say, that they covertly or openlywish to underra te philosophical questions by means of thesequalifi-cations. Kightly understood, it is quite possible to apply theword ' dry' as a positive qualification in expressing a positivetrait of their peculiar construction ; they have, in fact, a simple,i.e. an uncomplicated pattern ; what they ask is expressly asked ;their what-is cannot simultaneously simulate asking withoutasking at a ll ; in other words, there is no disparity between w hatit does ask in appearance and what it does ask in reality; aphilosophical question is in no way a rhetorical question.

T he what-is determines the very construction of philosophicalquestions. What-is gives us a token to distinguish them fromother kinds of questions, especially from those of everyday life.


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I t provides us no t only with an easy ground for delimitation of a

certain type of questions, but it also supplies the very criterionto build and recognize as such a philosophical question. T hewhat-is of philosophical questions is far more than a mere annexe;it is the Tnnin basis for their being philosophical. T his canalready be shown in the small quantity of what-is questionsoutside the plane of philosophy. T he function of any everydaywhat-is varies from th at of the what-is in philosophy. He whoin everyday life fonnulates his questions with a what-is therebydemands of someone else the name of something. ' W hat is

th i s? ' amounts t o , ' Would you please tell me the name of this? 'Most children's what-is questions are included in this class.Some everyday what-is questions have, on the other hand, arhetorical purport, as is the case in reproach and disgust. ' Whatis this th at you are doing?', ' W hat is this tha t I have had tosuffer because of you? ' It is true th at an interest other than inmere questioning pervades these question-sentences, so that the' ? ' of them can be replaced without any important change by' I ' . Philosophical questions, on the contrary, do not purportto appeal to someone to name a certain thing . In putting forwardthe question, ' What is mind?' we are inquiring into somethingwe primarily know. W hat we intend knowing is not the merename of' m ind' whioh we imply tha t we know a t least nominallyin our question; our purpose is something other than this, al-though related to ' mind '. Philosophical questions constructedby the introduction of what-is have nothing at all to do withrhetoric. Obviously, ' W hat is mind? ' is neither reproach noran expression of disgust. T he question considered asks directly—beyond any rhetorio—what i t is asking in virtue of its what-is.

One circumstance, on the other hand, seems to refute thissta tem en t: though philosophical what-is questions withoutexception not only ask something, they express astonishment atthe same time. Hence the claim th at they do not ask anythingwhich is in general not a frivolous surprise concerning some con-cepts transgressing the framework of daily life. According tothis view, the question ' What is mind? ' ought to be a rhetoricalexpression of an odd behaviour in respect of ' mind '. Such anassertion, I maintain, by no means distorts the structure ofphilosophical questions, although i t touches upon a fact to be care-fully remembered. I t is true th at wonderment is inherent inevery philosophical question. But this wonderment incorporatedin every philosophical what-is, is not rhetorical, for it is neitherfrivolous nor convertible into another sentence form. I t con-statutes the sine qua non of any philosophical question. T he

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questioning and wonderment expressed by a philosophical

inquirer are not to be separated. W hat is asked in philosophyisnothing other than the pivot of wonderm ent; the subject m atterof wonderment is necessarily the impulse which gave rise toquestions. I t would prove vain to establish a link of anteriorityor posteriority between wonderment and th e what-is by means ofquestioning. W hat makes up a philosophical question is aquestion filled with wonder. Li every ' ? ' which marks the com-pletion of a philosophical question is hidden a '! '. A philosophicalquestion mirrors, therefore, not only any human behaviour whichchanges according to the peculiar disposition of individuals. I talso has trans-relative consistence from which the questioningborrows its objective charac ter: the composition of a philoso-phical question discloses the deep-seated unity of questioning andwonderment. ' W hat is mind? '—this question transgresses th estate of being an instantaneous halting place of fugitive wonder-ment. T he what-is of mind is challenged with extreme adm ir-ation and a reverence. I t would not be a misplaced attem pt toanalyse it as follows : ' I am amazed by " mind " . I cannothelp asking the question, " What is mind? " because I feel sur-

prised a t the very word " mind ". T hrough this question, Iinevitably assume the task of inquiring into the concept of mind.T hat's all th at I desire.' T his way of analysis can mutatismutandis be applied to all philosophical questions.

IV

W hat is a philosophical what-is? W hat is th at which it asks?To what kind of questions exactly does it give rise? T he answer

to these closely interrelated questions, I m aintain , may contributethe decisive light in making visible the distinctive structure ofphilosophical questions. T he whole weight of philosophicalquestions is supported by the corner stone of what-is, the soundformation of each being dependent on the appropriate use andinterpretation of what-is, as I have been trying to elucidate fromseveral angles. Nevertheless, th is effort has resulted in a some-what ' negative ' issue, in that it might have drawn attention toth at about which the philosophical what-is does not ask. Now

it may not untruly be stated that philosophical questions, in asense, do no t question the world. W hat is left is therefore th epositive survey, as it were, of what they ask straightforwardly,of the direction in which they are turned : I am confident t hatsome sections of this task have been smoothed by the previousdescriptions.


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In philosophy, the what-is asks the meaning of concepts. In

it is manifested an inquiry borne out of wonderment. T hewhat-is adheres, as i t were, to the ' m eanin g'. T he what-isamounts to ' What is the meaning of . . .V All philosophicalquestions—if they really are such—can. be moulded on thisscheme. For instance, he who asks the ques tion,' W hat is good?'has essentially a sked ,' W hat is the meaning of the word " good " ? 'if he has asked himself a philosophical question. Philosophy ispreoccupation with the meaning of concepts which the what-ishas made into its subject m atter. Every philosophical question

aims to clarify the meaning of a concept or a nexus of concepts.Preoccupation with the meaning, th at is where the distinctivemark of philosophical questions lies. As a counter to this ,ordinary questions are indifferent to ' meaning '. T he question,' Is the door of the house shut? ' seeks the statement of a definiteworld-fact. Attention here is centred directly on the world-factrather than on single words or their interconnection in question-sentences. W hat is required is the door of the house such as it isin reality. Consequently, any expression permitting an answerto the questioned state of the door, e.g. the drawing of convenient

signs in the air, would have proved sufficient to answer the ques-tion. Certainly, the question, ' Is the door of the house shut? 'has a meaning differing in no way from th at of, " Is the door ofthe house shut? " T he question's main concern is only with thefact and not with the ' m eanin g'. In everyday life questionslook on the world ; to follow them up, e.g. to answer them, onehas to plunge into the world. But in philosophy questions exhibitan uneasiness as to the meaning of some word ; it is an appeal todig into the meaning of these concepts. World and meaning—

here are the two dimensions of inquiry readily opened to everydayand philosophical questions respectively.

T his division may induce some people to form a ba tch ofopinions which, distorted as they a re, are to be avoided. Someof them such as, ' T he world is without m ea n in g ',' T he meaninghas nothing to do with the world.' ' T he Meaning transcendsthe w or ld ', ' Philosophy's subject m atte r is to be found in the" Other " w orld ', m ay suggest themselves with great force, sothat they have been, and are nowadays too, able to prescribe

ways of preoccupations called philosophy. Yet, I th ink there isno place for them in the realm of philosophy, especially in the formin which they are pu t forward. Nevertheless, I do not intend todwell on this subject at present. I only want to point out howthese distorted opinions arise from an erroneous view about thebehaviour of philosophical questions aa questions. T he fact


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should be clearly recognized tha t the sta tem en t,' No philosophical

questions ask about the world (or universe)', signifies they aimat some knowledge about t h e ' other ' world. Indeed, philosophycontains no question which directly and solely concerns the worldin general, neither this one nor the other. A further feature islikewise of importance in th is connection : the meaning subjectedto clarification through the initiative of a philosophical questiondoes not constitute a new world beyond the know n. The meaningin ' W hat is the m eaning of . . .? ' concerns concepts. Nowlanguage does not build up a reality transcending the world.

From this it follows none the more that philosophical questionsare dealing merely with language. T hey ask neither about theworld as world nor about language as language. T he core oftheir function may be briefly put by saying that they initiatedeepening-of-ihe-field-qf language-directed-to world. I t mus t bestressed that the totality of philosophy is permeated in thispeculiar deepening.

T o see the behaviour of philosophy in respect to its questionsit will now be convenient to grapple briefly with the words,' world ', ' language ', and ' meaning '.

T here is no need for my purpose, I think , to enter into detailsrelating to th e word ' world ' or ' universe' which, to be sure, con-stitutes one of the most baffling items of philosophical contro-versies. I t has many shades of meaning. But I may say thatI have been using it from the beginning of this essay in its every-

day sense; and tha t I have used it to point out just th at to whichit expressly referred. According to this restriction, I under-stand by it the realm through which our everyday lives are con-tinuously flow ing. Phrases, for example, like ,' So is the world ',' What an annoying world is ours ', ' 0, wonderful world ', ' Ourworld is three-dimensional', point out roughly the same reality.Viewed from this standpoint, the world is not only the scene ofeveryday deeds but also the subject m atte r of scientific approaches.Each branch of science works out a relatively independent

group of events which not infrequently are, at the same time,everyday occurrences. T he tota lity of sciences examining allthat which makes up the world—from the hive in the gardenthrough thousandfold inter-human relations to the complexphysicochemical reactions occurring on furthest galaxies—can betermed world sciences. T here is no science which does not inquireinto the world, though differently, i.e. with different methods and


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interes ts. Each science asks for itself the question ,' How is the

world-matter constituted? ' Sciences are attempts to interpretthe world.But world-interpretations imply, and yield in a sense, means

through which world-eventa are traced back to comprehensivegrounds, e.g. scientific laws, or are recognized and described asunique phenomena. T hese means set up, on the other hand, aworld in itself varying from one science to another, and theyare called in general ' language' such as word-interconnectionakin to tha t served in human interrelations, maps, graphs, mathe-matical signs, etc. To know the world through a certain languagesignifies to construct a certain side of the world by means of alanguage proper to the related science where every stage is to beconsidered as an answer to questions concerning the constitutionof th e world itself. T he question,' How is the world constituted?'often gives way to , or precedes, another one, ' How is the worldto be changed? ' T hus all sciences form a body of questions andanswers about the world.

But the questions of inquiring are not exhausted on theworld. Men's questions sometimes concern the language throughwhich we inquire about the world, so that they can be classifiedinto two groups. T here is, on the one hand, the question-pattern,' How is language made u p ? ' and on the other, ' W hat is themeaning of language?' the former being the impetus of linguisticsciences and the latte r of philosophical investigations. A briefconfrontation between these two kinds of questions will behelpful in throwing light on the distinctive properties of a philo-sophical question.

T he question, ' How is language m ade up? ' appears only

rarely in this particular shape, since it represents a type com-prising numerous questions rather than incorporating a concreteone. ' How is language made up? ' resumes almost all the pos-sible questions that animate inquiries into language in generalor into single languages. Closely viewed, there exists an essentialsimilarity of structure between the two questions, ' How is theworld made up ? ' and ' How ia language made up? ' Indeed,every world-question, e.g. ' How is the material in the seas com-pounded? ', ' Which persons attended the scene of Socrates'

drinking the hemlock? ', can be conceived as part-questions ofthe basic ,' How 1B the world made u p ? ' I t is exactly in the samerelationship that separate questions about languages {e.g. ' Howis the process of speech constructed? ', ' What is the part playedby environment on the infant in the acquisition of speech? ',' How is English expanded precisely as a state language in the


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second half of the twentieth c en tury ?') imply the main question,

' How is language made up? ' All these questions emerge in thedomain of complicated groups of science, such as languagepsychology, language geography, language history, etc. T helink binding the two questions, 'How is language made up?'and ' How is the world made u p ? ' consists in the fact th atquestions relative to language are, at the same time, questionsabout the world owing to the peculiarity that the former are ina sense directed to a special group of world-phenomena calledlanguages. T he qu estio n,' How is language made up? ' amountstherefore to the question, ' How is the class of the world-pheno-

mena termed " language " made up? 'As regards the word ' m ean ing ', it would not be an exag-

geration to say that it has not yet been given due clarification,although especially since the beginning of the twentieth centuryit has been subjected to fruitful studies. Notwithstanding th isfact, I am inclined to think that it will always lack perfect trans-parency, in that it raises a problem never to be solved, and per-haps one having really nothing to do with solutions in the currentsense of this word. B ut I do not want to discuss this issue now.

My aim at present is the elucidation of the word ' m eaning 'contained in the question p at te rn ,' W hat is the meaning of. ..? 'which will, I believe, make intelligible some features of philoso-phical questions.

What is needed is, first of all, to stress an important fact: thatthe question-pattern of philosophy, 'Wh at is the meaning o f . . . ? 'is as a question concerned with language. For the empty space(...) in the question-matrix must be filled each time with a word.What is asked, for instance, in the question ,' W hat is the m eaning

of consciousness? ' is focused on the word ' consciousness' andnothing else. No philosophical question can be accomplishedby pointing to a fact with a finger and asking at the same timethe question, ' W hat is the meaning of. . . ? ' T he reply to such aquestion requires no philosophical activity. W hat is needed isanother kind of answer varying according to the situation, namely,the name of the indicated thing in a definite language, the relation-ship of things to other things, their importance for man andsociety. On the other hand, there is no doubt tha t this sort of

question emerges within the boundary of everyday discourses.Let UB imagine someone going for a walk through a wood onSunday pointing out some whitish-thorny plants to a foresterand asking him, ' What is the meaning?' which may be giventhe reply, ' T hese are hawthorns ; some people call them buck-thorn ; they are used in dyes and medicine.' Seen from this


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angle, the question, ' W hat is the meaning?' may be held to stand

respectively for, ' W hat is the name of this? ', ' W hat is the useof this? ', ' What is the (practical) importance of this? ' thusbuilding an ambiguous body because of the obscurity of the word' meaning'.

Contrary to this fact, philosophical questions mirrored in thepattern, ' What is the meaning of . . .? ' perfectly express clearand distinct questions when the empty space is filled with wordsgiving rise to concrete questioning. T hey all ask the meaningof definite words already mentioned in the questions and not ofany realities whatsoever transcending them.

A further point should not be overlooked at this juncture: thequestion-pattern, ' W hat is the meaning of . . .? ' where theempty space is supplied with a word does not set in motionexclusively philosophical inquiries. I t demands the meaning ofa certain word, as ite contents show ; therefore, it must naturallybe placed within the framework of language studies. Indeed,a ramified body of scientific explanations is nowadays commonlycomprehended under the title Semantics or Science of Meaning,its field of activity being recognized in the thoroughgoing <vrftmin-

ation of meaning, so th at it is held by th e majority of contempor-ary scholars to constitute the fundamental basis of linguistics.T he survey of what words of various languages mean, the researchinto changes in the word-definitions through language-develop-ment, the analysis of word-groups and slides of word-meanings,the multidimensional confrontation of word-meaning belongingto the same stages of language (or languages) . . .—the fulfilmentof all these highly important tasks belong to the Sciences ofMeaning. Semantically orientated linguists, no matter what

their aims might be called, usually subject the meaning of wordsto examination from a restricted standpoint, such as that at acertain stage of a determined language. T he question, forins tance ,' W hat is the meaning of prayer? ' conceived as a seman-tic question, often has to do with a fixed language. In view ofthis, the questions:' What is the meaning of the w ord '' praye r'' inEnglish?', 'What do Englishmen understand by the word"prayer"?', 'What is found to be written in English dictionariesagainst the entry " prayer "? ' are likely to be synonymous with,' W hat is the meaning of p ray er?'

' What is the meaning of . . .? ' regarded as a mere type ofphilosophical question differs radically from semantic questionscouched sometimes in the same form. For what they respectivelyask varies distinctly. T heir purpose and therefore reply-directions are quite HiBwiTnilnr T he sem anticist's preoccupation


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WHAT IS A PHILOSOPHICAL QUEST ION? 7 7

centres on the word-meaning as mere language-content in order

to display the ' h o w ' of a definite historical phenomenon, th a tis , of a definite language with respect to what its forms and situ-ations m ean. B ut a philosopher does no t pursue his wh at-isquestion about the meaning of a word of a definite language asan historical m atte r. Although he carries on his investigationsin the field of language, he does not, however, intend to explainit as such. In philosophy , ' W ha t is th e mean ing of . . .? ' doesnot explore th e ' word '-phenom ena, or th e phenomena of words.H e does no t scru tinize the word for it6 own sake, but rather for the' world '-phenomena for which it stands ; not language as such,but ' things ' of which it ' speaks ' . H is wo rking field can neverexte nd beyo nd the region of langua ge. As philosopher, he isno t allowed to bid farewell to langua ge in order to m ake directexperiences with things, which, as a rule, concern men of science.Nevertheless, he investigates things or phenom ena. H e asksquestions about them w hich are introduced by ' w h a t ' insteadof' how '. And ' w h a t ' can, in a sense, only be seen in the realmof language.

A brief glance at a concrete philosophical question may help todistinguish th e pa rticu larity of th e philosophical wh at-is. Le t usnow deal with the question, ' What is prayer? ' as a philosophic,and not a semantic one. T his question is tan tam ou nt to this :' W ha t is th e mean ing of the p henom enon praye r w hich isexpressed by the word " pray er "? ' T he philosopher can answerthe related what-is only when he moves within the boundariesof langu age. T hus th e aim of his clarification does no t residein the ' word ' as such but rather in the meaning-content, i.e. th eworld-fact indicated by th e word in question. Un dou btedly ,

the philosopher has to carry out his inquiries in the field of adefinite, historic langua ge. H e m ay set out his question, say inEnglish. H is scope is scarcely English, say 'pr ay er ' , or 'pr ay er 'according to the English language. His m ain task is then, forinstance, directed to the various features of the meaning of thefact ' p ra y e r' , such as solicitation of some thing from God (orGods), banking God for his blessings, turning toward God insilence in order to be filled by H im . Religious witnesses as wellas achievements of those who have already carried out scientific

researches into the subject matter prayer (e.g. descriptiveacc oun ts of the Psychology of Religion, Sociology and T heology)yield, of course, the most secure support for the philosopher in hisspecific end eav our. I t should be poin ted ou t, however, th a tscientific dealing with the phenomenon prayer seek as a rule thestatement of the world in respect of its ' how ' concerning prayer >


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whereas the philosopher examines its ' w hat-is '. Herein one

meets with a problem which is never the centre of attention forthe ordinary man or scientist, e.g. semanticist. In ordinary lifea great many relations may link men with prayer : some prayhabitually, some in definite circumstances, and some do not prayat all, according to their faith or lack of faith, or some otherground. B ut no one in everyday life ever asks the question,' W hat is prayer? ' As to the man of science, whether a seman-ticist or a social psychologist, he generally takes no interest inthe what-is of the whole phenomenon of prayer, but grappleswith questions concerning either the word ' prayer ' or a definitestate (side, feature, etc.) of it such as children's prayers, primitiveprayers. Evidently there is, therefore, in a sense, no mortalexcept th e philosopher who has an accurate notion about the what-is of prayer, regardless of the fact that he might never believe inthe existence of the Unknown to which one is turned in variousforms of prayers, because it is solely he who asks the question,' What is prayer? ' Interested as I am in prayer only as an illu-stration, I shall not dwell on it at present.

The point I want to stress is this:

the philosopher's what-isare of the type asking the meaning of the words philosophically.Man's life is interwoven in the net of the complex variety ofquestions. Everyman's life is permeated by world orientations ;linguists inquire into th e ' how ' of language or languages ; andthe central question of the scientist is, ' How is the world madeup? ' As distinct from these , th e ground of philosophical ques-tions may be said to be expressed in the question, ' What is thew or ld?' Accordingly the common ground of all these maintypes of questions is evident. T heir ultimate boundary is th at

of the world ; they all ask it, however, from different perspectives.T he philosopher's main goal, as focused by the to tality of hispart-questions framed with what-is, does not reside directly inthe elucidation of world meaning. T hrough his what-is he pa rti-cipates relatively at a later stage in the discourses on the u orld. T hepossibility of a philosophical question (not any question, however,but a philosophical one) implies the prior constitution of languagemniring possible both everyday and scientific activities.

VI

A further issue which legitimately stands at the centre ofphilosophical discussions can be p ut under the heading : ' thevalue of philosophical questions as such '. A quick look at thehistory of philosophy would prove this fact though it has rarely


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been given the attention it deserves. Philosophers, whetheras individuals or as members of a school, do not unusually comeinto conflict with each other. The issue enters in to the foregroundin proportion to the degree of force with which each philosophertries to demonstrate the futility of the questions dealt with by the' opposite ' philosopher ; once this is achieved, he sees himselfperfectly j ustified in pronouncing the defeat of his opponent. Fo rthirty or forty years, especially in some circles, much has beenwritten and spoken of inappropriate questions of philosophy.W hat has been done consists as a rule in checking questions as towhether they agree or not with presuppositions already definitely

taken for granted. Hence a question held to be right by onephilosopher is trumpeted as erroneous by another. B ut I shallnot venture at present to make any evaluative criticism of con-crete questions of philosophy, because I am not in possession ofany definite philosophical' doctrine ', nor do I believe that suchan undertaking can lead to fruitful consequences. T o set outfrom ready-made answers in order to determine questions fittedto them lies beyond my inten t. In th e following, I want toclarify by m ere description the value question in general, independent

of any •presuppositions whatsoever.If the phrase ' a false philosophical question ' serves to indicate

a question's being really a question although not a philosophicalone, I maintain that this kind of question covers unlimitedexamples. Everyday life, as well as science, provides us abun-dantly with them. I t isobvious th at they can be labelled' false 'whenever they inappropriately appear in philosophical contexts,such a labelling having claim only to a relative warran t. Indeed,the so-called false questions may often play an important part in

inquiries of philosophers, whether as subject matter or illu-stration. B ut they are not the very questions which introduceand direct philosophical activ ity. T his is why an investigatorhas no claim to the title of ' philosopher' when he is tacklingquestions, e.g. scientific ones, essentially lying outside philosophy.A philosopher, for instance, asking why stones fall and studyingthe cause by means of laboratory experiments should be con-sidered to be treating a true scientific question on the (false)ground of philosophy.

Furthermore, the discarding of some philosophical questionsunder the terms of ' not genuine questions' implies that theyreally are not philosophical questions although they appear to beso. Such (pseudo-) questions can—already on account of theirlabelling—never give rise to genuine philosophical inquiries.According to the account above (V), the what-is cannot then be a


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word, the meaning of which really asks a question out of mere

philosophical in teres t: instead it may have another intent, saysemantic. But I am wholly convinced that confusion of thiskind is rarely conceivable, if the philosopher proceeds along thelines of common sense. T ha t th e questioner is not aware ofthe intention of his question seems to me to be incompatiblewith the very structure of human discourse in general and ques-tioning in particular. As one knows perfectly that one is speakingof bread and not, say, iron, so the questioner clearly sees thespecific function of the what-is as to its meaning in questioning.Nothing is so natural as the philosopher's recourse to semanticist'sexplanations and conclusions laid down in semantics. He isnot, however, to be misled in his task of looking into the pheno-mena-through-language, instead of into language, expressed as it isin his philosophical what-is. T he one is philosophical and theother linguistic.

However, confusion is forced upon us when we undertake tomake hard and fast demarcations between pseudo-questions andwords which a what-is question tries to clarify from a philosophicalpoint of view. W hat is usually done consists in dividing words

into classes in respect of their philosophical value or import onaccount of the claim th at some of them are in principle uninterest-ing for philosophy whereas others are declared to have an inherentphilosophical merit. For instance, the word ' know ledge' isheld open to philosophical what-is while the word ' house ' isdenounced as incapable of replacing the ( . . . ) in the ' W hat isthe meaning of . . .? ' T his classification, I may say, leads toa conclusion in some ready-made philosophies rather than to anexposition of unbiased descriptions. In fact, the delimitation

between the so-called pseudo-concepts and true concepts ofphilosophy (between the ' noble ' and ' proletariate ' concepts asit were) varies widely according to special requisites of variousphilosophies. One cannot help but see in this a hidden Platonism,for Plato—as it is reported—could scarcely avoid suffering thesame predicament himself in arguing against the existence of theIdea of the Horse, although in its favour.

A value assessment tending to discriminate whether a concepthas the merit of being philosophical or not involves illogical

consequences although i t might be urged for logical reasons. Asnobody can anticipate the limits, i.e. networks of concepts, towhich concrete inquiries will some day lead, no truly philoso-phical reason necessitates stamping the sentence, ' W hat isa house? ' (' W ha t is the meaning of house? ') with the seal ofthe pseudo-question. I t is a conspicuous fact th at the question,



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' W hat is a house? ' would be as much a pseudo-question of philo-sophy as the sen tence,' T he world is the house of man ' ; i.e. anuntrue proposition, since nobody would ventu re to call this pro-position untrue unless he had his starting-point in a completelygratuitous convention. Supposing th at he commits such anerror, it is not nevertheless necessary th at he might have previous-ly asked the very q uestio n,' W hat is a house? ' as a philosophicalone. So I m aintain th at the philosophical what-is can, in principle,be related to any word. A convincing backing for t.hiH argumentis established by studies concerningthe philosophy of mathem atics.Plenty of words constituting the fundamental definitions of

geometry, e.g. ' between ', ' i s called ', ' distance ', etc., areessentially bound up with a philosophical : what-is ' within theterritory of philosophy of methods, albeit, according to someinvestigators, they are deprived of any philosophical importance.

T he third charge used to diHrniRH philosophical questions ismirrored in the claim of their so-called ' meaninglessness '. Asis known, the word ' meaningless ' has become the pivot of somephilosophical trends. T he reason for such an att itud e is rootedin the emotive connotation of the word meaningless, which

suggests at least an impression of repugnancy, fear, avoidance,and condemnation. T here is perhaps no argument which couldseriously undermine a philosophical inquiry as the meaningless-ness of its questions.

However, it should be remarked that no question which asksthrough a ' what-is ' the meaning of any word can be said to bemeaningless, since possible demarcation cannot lay claim to auniversally valid meaning. T he question, for instance, ' W hatis the meaning of the world?' is a meaningless question in the

minds of some people. Consequently, it is convenient (it is said)to argue that almost all questions of philosophy are meaninglesson account of the reducibility to the fundamental question,' What-is the w or ld?' Apart from their aggressiveness, pre-tentions like these are held to be supported generally on th e basisof the following scheme : no one has yet experienced the entiretyof the world; it has never been ' give n' to anyone throughany perceptions whatever ; the word ' world ' is not the nameof any definite thing, nor does it stand for an entity, it is anempty word ; now there is no sense in asking what an empty

word is, since it cannot be investigated ; so the question, ' W hatis the world? ' is meaningless. T he premisses of this argumenttranscend in fact the attempt to describe objective implicationsof the word ' world '. A hidden theory lies at the back of them :the meaning of a word, or various arrangements of words, such

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as sentences, presupposes the perception of the entity it indicates.Yet it is obvious that such a theory of meaning imprisons themeaning of words in only one condition, and thus only partiallyconceives the meaning. Following up this theory the philoso-phical question-type ' What is the meaning of . . .? ' receives ananswer which already bars the way to any liberty in questioning.For instance, the question ' What is the world? ' is included inthe list of meaningless questions. For freer a ttention suchimperatives prove to be illogical in contrast to the appearanceof their logical necessity. T he evidence flow s readily from theabsurdity according to which the word ' meaning' amounts to

being quite meaningless. B ut, in fact, the theory attem pts tothrow light on the meaning of the word ' meaning ' held first asmeaningless, although i t continues in a quite one-sided manner.

If this explanation be true, the so-called meaningless wordsand therefore questions of the ty p e ,' W hat is the meaning o f. .. ? 'which are dismissed by some people as meaningless philosophicalquestions, are legitimate questions in the view of a free observerwho does not feel at home within the chains of the theory con-ventions. Perhaps the most philosophical question of all philoso-

phical questions is the one expressed in, ' Wh at is the meaning ofmeaning?' from which—paradoxically enough—the apostlesof meaningless philosophical questions as a rule start . B ut I donot want at present to follow up the extreme difficulties involvedin this question. I consider it sufficient if I have pa rtly broughtinto the open the meaningless act which is intended to attachthe label of meaninglessness to the questions of philosophyhaving the form, ' What is the meaning of . . .? '

vn

As regards the philosophical content of the present essay—nomatter what its actual value might be—the following positiveconclusion can directly be deduced from its entirety : ' What isa philosophical question? ' is a genuine philosophical question.Because, firstly, it is completely in accordance with the what-istype of philosophical questions. Secondly, it is by m eans of itsemergence that consciousness about philosophy reaches a signifi-

cant dimension. I t constitutes the necessary and perhaps theprimordial question to throw light on the what-is of philosophy.It does not, therefore, embody a merely possible or fortuitousinquiry into the field of philosophy among other fields ; it doesexpress, in fact, a really important question for philosophy.Multifarious difficulties, or rather deadlocks, in philosophy have,


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in the hist instance, their origin in an alternative position con-cerning that question either in ite being not asked at all or in itsbeing answered superficially, if not through hidden prejudices.I t would be be tter for philosophers, as well as laymen, to grapplefirst of all with the very question ' W hat is a philosophicalquestion? ' when they really want to know what they mayexpect of philosophical activities, if they have decided to defendthe whole territory of philosophy against the dangers of theirown fallacious operations, and save themselves from their owndisappointment, the source of such great pains. To startphilosophizing in such a way takes into account the description

of the salient peculiarities of a philosophical question in generaland would further develop philosophy at its outset from an evi-dently sound basis. T hus the advantage of philosophizingdirectly is already secured at the beginning of philosophicallabours, the seduction of meta-philosophical generalities and,moreover, the presuppositions, if not pitfalls, of ready-madephilosophy being so avoided.

Yet, surprising as it may seem, philosophical questions as suchhave in the thousands of years of the history of philosophynever been duly examined, with the exception of the abovementioned references to British contributors. I maintain th a tthe hick of interest in this direction springs either, generally,from the difficulty of loosing the chains of certain preconceivedphilosophical commitmenta, or, specifically, from disregard ofthe structure of question-forms, caused again through adherenceto some philosophical doctrine, if not to some philosophicallyelaborated system of logic or linguistics. But a close elucidationof this position lies beyond the subject-matter of the present

essay.

University of Istanbul {Turkey)


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Uygur - Philosophical Question

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