USAID POLITICAL PARTY DEVELOPMENT … well outside the context of an election and to develop an exit...

CENTER FOR DEMOCRACY AND GOVERNANCE“...promoting the transition to and consolidation of democratic regimes throughout the world.”

USAID POLITICAL PARTYDEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE

April 1999

Technical Publication Series

Center for Democracy and GovernanceBureau for Global Programs, Field Support, and Research

U.S. Agency for International DevelopmentWashington, D.C. 20523-3100

TO ORDER THIS DOCUMENT FROM THE DEVELOPMENT EXPERIENCE CLEARINGHOUSE:

C Please reference the document title (USAID Political Party Development Assistance) and documentidentification number (PN-ACE-500).

C USAID employees, USAID contractors overseas, and USAID sponsored organizations overseas mayorder documents at no charge.

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Fax orders to: (703) 351-4039 Attn: USAID Development Experience Clearinghouse (DEC)E-mail orders to: [email protected]

ABOUT THE TECHNICAL PUBLICATION SERIESThe USAID Center for Democracy and Governance Technical Publication Series was launched in March1998. The series includes publications intended principally for USAID personnel; however, all personsinterested in the sector may benefit from the series. Authors of individual publications may be USAIDofficials and/or other individuals from the public and private sector. The Center for Democracy andGovernance reserves the right to review and edit all publications for content and format and all are subjectto a broad USAID review process. The series is intended in part to indicate best practices, lessons learned,and guidelines for practitioner consideration. The series also includes publications that are intended tostimulate debate and discussion.

A list of other relevant publications and ordering information are included at the back of this document.

ABOUT THIS PUBLICATIONThis guide is intended to help USAID field staff make informed decisions with regard to developing politicalparty development assistance activities. It analyzes a history of USAID involvement in this area and outlineslessons learned to be incorporated into future programming.

Comments regarding this handbook and inquiries regarding USAID’s ongoing work in the area of politicalparty development assistance should be directed to

Mark Feierstein, Team Leader, Elections &Political ProcessesTel: (202) 712-1911Fax: (202) [email protected]

Ron Shaiko, Elections & Political ProcessesTel: (202) 712-4485Fax: (202) [email protected]

Center for Democracy and GovernanceBureau for Global Programs, Field Support, and ResearchU.S. Agency for International DevelopmentWashington, DC 20523-3100

ABOUT THE CENTERThe Center for Democracy and Governance is the U.S. Agency for International Development’s focalpoint for democracy and governance programming. The Center’s role is to provide USAID and otherdevelopment practitioners with the technical and intellectual expertise needed to support democraticdevelopment. It provides this expertise in the following areas:

CC Rule of LawCC Elections and Political ProcessesCC Civil SocietyCC Governance

For further information regarding the Center or the Technical Publication Series, please contact theCenter for Democracy and Governance Information Unit at (202) 661-5847.

The Center would appreciate your comments as to the appropriateness and utility of this handbook.Please contact the Center with any comments or suggestions.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Ronald G. ShaikoRon Shaiko received his Ph.D. in political science from the Maxwell School of Citizenship and PublicAffairs at Syracuse University. He is currently on leave from American University, where he is anassociate professor of government and academic director of The Lobbying Institute in the Center forCongressional and Presidential Studies. His publications include two books and more than two dozenarticles and book chapters on elections, political parties, interest groups, and lobbying. His areas ofspecialization are comparative electoral systems, comparative political party systems, interest groups(NGOs), and political advocacy (lobbying). Ron is a Democracy Fellow at the Center for Democracy andGovernance, where he serves on the elections and political processes team.

Ron would like to thank Mark Feierstein, Jerry Hyman, Pat Isman-Fn’Piere, Nadereh Lee, KaraMcDonald, Katherine Nichols, Dana Peterson, Jim Vermillion, and Jennifer Windsor of the Center forDemocracy and Governance for their helpful comments, criticisms, and suggestions on this paper, as wellas Larry Garber while he was with USAID’s Bureau of Program and Policy Coordination. Ron alsothanks Amy Young, Chris Sabatini, Erin Soto, and Kim Mahling-Clark for their initial work at the Centeron this effort, prior to his arrival at USAID. He wishes to thank Benjamin Crosby, Nicole Dannenberg,David Timberman, and Mark Walker of Management Systems International for their work on Section VIof this paper. Finally, Ron would like to acknowledge the senior leadership staffs of the NationalDemocratic Institute for International Affairs and the International Republican Institute for their closereading of the paper and for their thoughtful and constructive comments.

USAID POLITICAL PARTY DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE

CONTENTS

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

I. INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

II. POLITICAL PARTY DEVELOPMENT ANDDEMOCRATIC STRATEGIC PLANNING . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

A. Why Parties Matter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7B. Constraints on Political Party Development . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8C. Regional Perspectives on Party Development . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

III. GOALS OF USAID POLITICAL PARTY DEVELOPMENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

A. Organizational Development of Political Parties . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13B. Political Parties as Linkages Between Citizens and Government . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13C. Political Parties as Organizers of Government and Opposition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

IV. USAID EXPERIENCE IN SUPPORTING POLITICAL PARTY DEVELOPMENT . . . . 15

A. Implementing Partners . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16B. USAID’s Political Party Assistance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18

V. GUIDELINES FOR IMPLEMENTATION OFUSAID POLITICAL PARTY SUPPORT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21

A. USAID Policy Statements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21B. Specific Implementation Concerns . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24

VI. IRI AND NDI: POLITICAL PARTY ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31

A. Goals of IRI and NDI Political Party Development Programs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31B. Defining and Measuring Impact . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32C. Which Models, Which Parties? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33D. Program Formats . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35E. Principal Areas of IRI and NDI Program Activity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36F. Synthesis of IRI and NDI Political Party Assistance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42

VII. FUNDING POLITICAL PARTY DEVELOPMENT: THE NED OPTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45

VIII. CONCLUSIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47

USAID Political Party Development Assistance 1

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

USAID political party development assistance is designed to facilitate the democratic process in newlydemocratizing countries, rather than to influence specific political outcomes. Promoting andstrengthening the broader political process through political party development assistance require long-term support for specific organizational, behavioral, and governance aspects of democratic parties, ratherthan the pursuit of short-term electoral goals. Within this long-term, process-oriented framework, USAIDpolitical party assistance has three goals: 1) the establishment and organizational development of viable,competing democratic parties at national, regional, and local levels; 2) the provision of organizedelectoral choices to citizens through political parties; and 3) the democratic governance of societiesfacilitated by political parties in government and opposition. These aims fall within USAID’s democracyassistance mandate and represent manageable, neutral, and efficacious objectives for political partydevelopment support.

During the past decade of USAID political party development assistance, political parties and theirleaders in more than 50 countries have benefited from technical assistance and training activitiesprovided principally by USAID’s key implementing partners, the International Republican Institute (IRI)and the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs (NDI). As USAID experiences in politicalparty development assistance have multiplied, patterns of support have emerged. Reflecting theaforementioned goals, the three core areas of political party assistance programming includeorganizational development/institutional capacity building, development and mobilization of citizensupport for political parties and their candidates, and the strengthening of political parties in government.Of these three focus areas, programming in organizational development is most prevalent. In addition tothe substantive foci of political party assistance, regional patterns of political party development supporthave also emerged. To date, political party development assistance programming has been undertaken inall regions of the world, but is most prevalent in Europe and the New Independent States (ENI) andAfrica (AFR) regions.

The Center for Democracy and Governance (the Center) is committed to political party developmentassistance as a crucial element in developing and sustaining democratic societies throughout the world. Inlight of past assistance programming, this technical publication is offered to USAID personnel as well asto the wider audience that shares USAID’s interest in and support of political party developmentassistance. In the course of USAID political party development work over the past decade, four specificprogramming concerns have been identified as requiring attention throughout the process of designingand implementing political party development assistance activities. These concerns are the degree ofinclusiveness of programming regarding eligible political parties, the degree political party developmentassistance may influence the domestic affairs of a country being assisted, the degree such programmingdirectly or indirectly influences the outcome of elections, and the timing of such programming.

Political party development assistance provided by USAID through its implementing partners isconstrained by a variety of policy statements and federal statutes. As a result, political partyprogramming must address the aforementioned concerns. Regarding inclusiveness, programimplementers should be as transparent and inclusive as possible when soliciting parties to participate inassistance activities. Not all parties are eligible for assistance, however. Parties must demonstrateadherence to democratic policies and operating principles. When dealing with governing or rulingparties, such parties must support free, fair, and open elections and may not suppress democraticcompetition or inhibit the abilities of opposition parties to organize and mobilize political support.

USAID Political Party Development Assistance2

Regarding the need to avoid interference in the domestic affairs of sovereign states, political partydevelopment program implementers must be clear in the criteria used to select political parties toparticipate in program activities and must adhere to domestic laws and regulations regarding assistance topolitical parties. Training activities should address the roles of political parties in governance andopposition in a generic fashion without regard to specific party policies and platforms.

In order to avoid directly or indirectly influencing the outcome of elections, political party assistanceactivities should be executed in an inclusive fashion and in an equitable manner and should not includedirect financial or in-kind support to individual political parties. Finally, the timing of political partyassistance activities may raise concerns of undue influence on the electoral process. In order to avoidsuch conflicts, party development programs should be concluded roughly one month prior to an election.The only exception to this limitation is distinctly non-campaign training such as party pollwatchertraining, which may continue up to election day. It is important to begin political party developmentprograms well outside the context of an election and to develop an exit strategy during the initialplanning stages of such programming.

We hope that this document provides the reader with a clearer understanding of the substance andbreadth of USAID political party development assistance, the statutory and policy constraints on suchUSAID-supported programming, the methods and approaches to political party assistance programmingby the key implementing partners, IRI and NDI, and the limitations and possibilities for future politicalparty development assistance around the world.


I. INTRODUCTION

Political parties and their roles in democraticdevelopment have changed significantly in thepast two decades, both in industrialized westerndemocracies and in newly developingdemocratic nations. While the changes haveresulted in a weakening of the connectionsbetween citizens and the state, there remainswidespread consensus that political parties areessential elements in democratic societies.

More than 50 years ago, E. E. Schattschneiderstated bluntly that

Political parties created democracy and thatmodern democracy is unthinkable save in termsof parties. As a matter of fact, the condition ofparties is the best evidence of the nature of anyregime. The most important distinction betweendemocracy and dictatorship can be made in termsof party politics. The parties are not thereforemerely appendages of modern government; theyare in the center of it and can play a determinativeand creative role in it.1

Much more recently, Alan Ware viewedpolitical parties as pervasive elements incontemporary societies:

In contemporary states it is difficult to imaginethere being politics without parties. Indeed, inonly two kinds of states today are parties absent.First, there are a few small, traditional societies,especially in the Persian Gulf, that are still ruledby the families who were dominant in the regionthey control long before the outside worldrecognized them as independent states. Thenthere are those regimes in which parties and partyactivities have been banned; these regimes are runeither by the military or by authoritarian rulerswho have the support of the military.2

Finally, in a recent conference convened by theNational Endowment for Democracy’sInternational Forum for Democratic Studies,many of the world’s leading political partiesscholars and practitioners gathered inWashington, DC to “address the current andfuture prospects of political parties.” Theconference participants took a critical look atthe state of parties in industrialized westerndemocracies as well as in newly democratizingcountries around the world. The prevailing viewof conference participants was articulated byJuan Linz:

Today, in all countries of the world, there is noalternative to political parties in the establishmentof democracy. No form of nonpartyrepresentation that has been advocated has everproduced democratic government. Thus we arefaced with a world of democracies based onparties.3

Not all participants, however, were convincedthat political parties are necessary fordemocratic development. Phillipe Schmitterprovided the most succinct critical assessment:

Political parties are not what they used to be.They no longer structure electoral choices asclearly and decisively, command citizenattachments as passionately and persistently, formgovernments with as much discipline anddistinctiveness, or aggregate interests as widelyand explicitly as they once did. Clearly, politicalparties everywhere, both in the industrializedcountries and in the developing world, arebecoming less and less able to perform these corefunctions. In short, they are no longerindispensable for the consolidation andperpetuation of democracy.4

1E.E. Schattschneider, Party Government (NewYork: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1942), p. 1.

2Alan Ware, Political Parties and Party Systems(New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), p.1.

3International Forum for Democratic Studies,Political Parties and Democracy: ConferenceReport, (Washington, DC: National Endowment forDemocracy, November 1996), p. 4.

4International Forum for Democratic Studies,Political Parties and Democracy: ConferenceReport, (Washington, DC: National Endowment forDemocracy, November 1996), p. 3.


Some analysts would argue that Schmitter’sdescription of the weak state of political partiesmakes the most compelling case forstrengthening political parties in order topromote democracy. But detractors of politicalparty development assistance argue that thedecline in parties reflects trends that are notlikely to be reversed: the rise of civic groupsthat carry out tasks traditionally associated withpolitical parties and changing modes ofcommunications that alter the frequency andtype of interaction between party officials andcitizens.

Since the late 1980s, USAID, through a varietyof democracy programming mechanisms, hasfocused increased attention and resources on thedevelopment and institutionalization of politicalparties in newly democratizing nations aroundthe world. As crucial political institutions indemocratic societies, political parties serve toorganize, aggregate, and articulate the politicalinterests of citizens in the political arena. Unlikesocial movements, voluntary associations,interest groups, or other nongovernmentalorganizations (NGOs), political parties haveresponsibilities for fielding candidates forelective office and, in turn, for governance ofthe political system or for providing “loyalopposition” to the party or parties in power.5

USAID has funded political party developmentactivities in more than 50 countries, accountingfor more than $45 million in support during thepast four years (FY 1994-FY 1997). WhileUSAID support for political party developmentrepresents less than 3 percent of overalldemocracy and governance funding and wellunder 20 percent of elections and politicalprocesses funding during the past three years,these political party activities are often the mostclosely scrutinized by the Agency and by therelevant funding and oversight committees inCongress. This scrutiny is due in large part tothe overtly political nature of political parties.Since these institutions do have theresponsibilities for governance or opposition inpolitical systems, any assistance provided byUSAID to these entities may be viewed asundue interference in the domestic politicalaffairs of sovereign countries.

Due to the salience of political partydevelopment activities within the Agency andthe increased attentiveness of external politicalactors, it is worthwhile to assess the history andcurrent state of political party developmentprogramming funded by USAID. The analysisbegins in Section II by situating political partydevelopment within the overarching democracystrategy of USAID. Political parties can playcrucial roles in consolidating democraticprinciples in transitional societies. It isimportant that USAID missions are aware ofthese roles as parties may serve as organizingand mobilizing institutions through which otherdemocracy and governance activities may flow.In addition, it is important to note that political

5The idea of political parties serving as a loyalopposition to the government in power was firstarticulated in the British House of Commons in 1826by John Cam Hobhouse: “It was said to be very hardon His Majesty’s ministers to raise objections to thisproposition. For his own part, he thought it was morehard on His Majesty’s opposition (a laugh interrupts)to compel them to take his course.” The phrase wasimmediately taken up in the debate and continued tobe used thereafter. While the phrase was introducedin the 1820s, it was not until the passage of theSecond Reform Acts of 1867 and 1868 that a trueorganized party opposition was formed. With thebroadened enfranchisement of male working-classproperty owners and the development of a strong anddisciplined two-party system within the British

Parliament and throughout the country, HerMajesty’s loyal opposition truly became thealternative (or shadow) government. In thecontemporary context of developing political partiesin newly democratizing countries, it is especiallydifficult to organize nascent political parties and theirrepresentatives in elective offices into either coherentgoverning party coalitions or organized partyopposition forces.


party development programs, while oftenundertaken in conjunction with election-specificactivities, should be viewed as long-termdemocratization efforts as political parties intransitional and newly democratized societiesmay fulfill important non-electoral functions.After establishing the place of parties indemocratic strategic planning, the broad goals ofpolitical party development will be outlined andlinked to the strategic objectives for electionsand political processes assistance in Section III.

Following the review of USAID’s goals in thisarea, Section IV will present and analyzecompleted and ongoing political party activitiesfunded by USAID in the 1990s in order todiscern common themes and patterns of politicalparty support globally and within particulargeographic regions.

In Section V, existing USAID policy statementsregarding political party activities and programswill be presented and assessed. In addition toSection 116(e) of the Foreign Assistance Act of1961 and its subsequent amendments, there areseveral policy statements that constrain politicalparty development assistance by USAID. Thenclear guidelines for the implementation ofpolitical party development assistance withinthe current USAID policy framework will bepresented.

Finally, attention will turn in Section VI to theimplementing partners who carry out virtuallyall the political party development work ofUSAID—the National Democratic Institute forInternational Affairs (NDI) and the InternationalRepublican Institute (IRI). These two nonprofitNGOs were formed with the creation of theNational Endowment for Democracy (NED) in1983. Each institute derives the bulk of itsfunding from USAID, but also receives directsupport for political party developmentactivities from NED. The relationship betweenthese two funding sources—USAID andNED—will be explored in Section VII.

The paper concludes with a synopsis ofUSAID’s experiences in political partydevelopment and lessons learned.


II. POLITICAL PARTYDEVELOPMENT ANDDEMOCRATICSTRATEGIC PLANNING

A. Why Parties Matter

One of USAID’s six strategic goals is buildingsustainable democracies—as an end in itself andbecause it is a critical element in promotingsustainable development. This goal is achievedthrough the establishment of democraticinstitutions, free and open markets, an informedand educated populace, a vibrant civic society,and a relationship between state and society thatencourages pluralism, participation, andpeaceful conflict resolution. The promotion ofdemocracy is a long-term process that willrequire sustained commitment, and timely andpolitically adept interventions.6 Thedevelopment and institutionalization ofcompetitive political parties serve this strategicgoal well. USAID support for political partydevelopment fosters the consolidation ofdemocratic principles in disparate societiesaround the world. Political parties can play avariety of important roles in the democraticconsolidation:

Expression and Choice: Democratic partiesand party systems provide citizens with choicesin elections. As individual democratic politicalparties field candidates for elective offices, theyseek to represent and express the collectiveinterests of their constituents. Expression ofdistinct sets of constituent interests in theelectoral process results from the competitionbetween parties in a party system. As multipleparties attempt to represent the interests of their

constituents, they provide voters with alternativepolicies and candidates that represent theessence of democratic choice andaccountability. If the party system is dominatedby one party, then choice and, therefore,expression become limited.

Electoral Competition and Political Dialogue:In competing for office and governing, politicalparties and their representatives play a crucialrole in framing public policy choices,structuring electoral competition, and shapingpolitical discussion among citizens. How partiesperform the roles of mobilizing public support,developing policy agendas, and debating andformulating public policies will determine thelegitimacy and sustainability of democratic rulesand norms. In emerging democracies, politicalparties and their elected representatives are theprimary political actors responsible forlegitimizing and sustaining the laws and normsthat govern political participation andcompetition.

Aggregation and Articulation of SocietalInterests: Unlike social movements or interestgroups, political parties are institutions that seekto represent more than a single, narrow interestin a society. In democratic political systems,parties organize and channel collective societalpreferences in ways that enable greaterresponsiveness and reduce the threat thatinterest group demands made on the state willbe able to capture state institutions and cripplethe public policy making process. In aggregatingand articulating party programs, political partiesprovide coherent and manageable political cuesto citizens who might otherwise beoverwhelmed by the complexities of publicpolicy making.

Political Socialization: Democratic politicalparties socialize citizens to democratic valuesand behaviors. Parties are often responsible formobilizing voters for elections, integrating newconstituencies into the political system, andgenerating support for or opposition to publicpolicies under debate. In performing these

6USAID’s Strategies for SustainableDevelopment: Building Democracy, (Washington,DC: U.S. Agency for International Development,January 1994), p. 2.


functions, political parties help to socializecitizens to the practices of a democratic system.Even more directly, in many democratizingsystems, parties are responsible for civic andvoter education programs that seek to facilitatethe political participation of increasing numbersof citizens. Finally, political parties maysocialize rather than galvanize political conflict.Broad-based political parties allow for societalconflicts to be debated widely, cutting acrossethnic, tribal, regional, or religious lines.

Leadership Selection and Governance:Democratic parties select the candidates whowill ultimately fill elected posts. The strength ofpolitical parties and their elected representativesin providing coherent, programmatically-basedpolitical leadership in the organization andoperation of government or opposition mitigatespersonalistic political tendencies and ensuresgreater continuity, both in terms of leadershipand public policy making.

These roles are central to the establishment andmaintenance of stable democratic societies.When political party systems fail to performthese functions, the very survival of democraticpolitical systems is threatened. Ultimately,issues of political competition, democraticexpression, and political choice—the keycomponents of any democratic society—revolvearound political parties.

B. Constraints on Political Party Development

Optimally, political party developmentassistance should serve to strengthen thecapacities of political parties to perform each ofthe aforementioned roles. Unfortunately,political environments within newlydemocratizing countries are not alwaysconducive to facilitating political expression andchoice, competition and dialogue, aggregationand articulation of interests, politicalsocialization, and leadership selection andgovernance. It may well be that there does notexist the political space or political will

necessary to organize political competition inthe form of political parties. Further, based onexperiences with political parties, citizens maynot view such institutions as legitimate meansfor expressing political choices.

Citizens might also question the value ofpolitical parties. Citizen disaffection withpolitics can be more a reflection of decliningliving standards, for which institutions likepolitical parties are held responsible, than thelack of outreach of political parties toconstituents. It is not self-evident that partiesthat make an effort to be more responsive andrepresentative are necessarily more effectivegovernment administrators. In fact, the conversecan be true. Moreover, encouraging parties toengage in more effective organizationaltechniques—a typical developmentprogram—will not necessarily create politicalsystems with greater political and civil liberties.

At base, there must be some degree ofdemonstrable political will, either among thecitizenry or at the elite levels of society, in orderfor political party development to servedemocratic ends. Without such willingness touse political parties as legitimate means ofpolitical expression, the probability of successof party programming is greatly diminished. It isvital that USAID missions assess the politicalenvironments closely in order to identify thepotential avenues of opportunity for politicalparty development programming. As a result,such programming may reflect receptivity at thegrassroots level to party development or focuson organizational development assistance at theparty leadership level. C. Regional Perspectives on Party

Development

In addition to the general constraints on politicalparty development, it is also important to notethat political parties may adopt democratic rolesin societies throughout the world in ways thatmay or may not mirror the American or othertraditional western democratic experiences with


political parties. In some countries and regionsof the world, the vitality of party politics farsurpasses that of the United States. In othernations and regions, parties are nascent or arepoorly developed over time. Attentive to thesesignificant differences, USAID has undertakenpolitical party development activities in allregions of the world, but most prominently inEurope and New Independent States (ENI),Africa (AFR), and to a lesser extent in LatinAmerica (LAC) and Asia and the Near East(ANE), as will be presented in Section IV. Ineach region, the roles of political parties infacilitating democratic development aredifferent, but equally important.

In the post-communist democracies acrossEastern Europe, political parties are slowlyemerging as key elements in democraticsocieties. Assessing political party developmentin this region, Herbert Kitschelt writes:

If democratic governance is about establishinglinkages of accountability and responsivenessbetween citizens and competing elites,democracies must create organizational vehiclesthat overcome problems of collective action andsocial choice. Problems of collective action occurin citizens’ demand and politicians’ supply ofcandidates for representative office. By poolingresources in a party, candidates can moreeffectively address electoral constituencies.Efforts to overcome collective action problemsthus warrant investments in organizationalinfrastructures that coordinate politicians andvoters. Social choice problems result from thecomplexity of political agendas. Moderndemocracies build on the principle of territorialrepresentation through electoral districts, not thefunctional representation of policy areas andsectional interests. In legislatures, representativesare asked to take policy positions on an uncertainand indefinitely variable set of issues that areplaced on the agenda. Under conditions of highissue complexity, democratic politics can preventthe problem of “chaos” in social choiceprocedures only by investments in consensusbuilding across representatives who agree oncomplex bundles of policy choices over whichthey establish a common preference ordering.

Party formation is the most prominent democraticmode of crafting such policy bundles. In theelectoral competition, parties present them tovoters as party ‘programs...’ In post-communistdemocracies, no other vehicle of interestaggregation than political parties is in sight thatwould address problems of both collective actionand social choice.7

The roles of political parties in democratictransitions in Africa are more varied.

Africa is the latest of the world’s major regions tobe hit by democracy's ‘third wave.’ Widespreadpopular protests, stimulated by broad basedinternal dissatisfaction with authoritarian,‘neopatrimonial’ regimes and the spread ofdemocratization in other world regions, haveresulted in transitions to democracy, at least to thepoint of holding elections, after limited resistancefrom existing authoritarian regimes in mostcountries and extensive resistance in a few. Theprocess of transition has varied among countriesin ways that can be explained primarily byvariations in socioeconomic conditions,institutional legacies, and balances amongpolitical forces. Many analysts have argued thatpolitical parties play a crucial role in democracy,democratic transition, and democraticconsolidation, although there are disagreementsabout the nature of that role and how much itvaries in the different stages of thedemocratization process. Parties were centralactors in the transition from colonialism toindependence in Africa. Consequently, attemptsto reinvigorate democracy in this region, whetherafter the fall of specific military regimes from thelate 1960s through the 1980s or as part of thegeneral democratization trend of the 1990s, have

7Herbert Kitschelt, “The Variability of PartySystem Development in Post-CommunistDemocracies: A Sketch,” paper delivered at theConference on Political Parties and Democracy,International Forum for Democratic Studies NationalEndowment for Democracy, Washington, DC,November 18-19, 1996, pp. 1-2, 18.


inevitably involved the establishment of newparties.8

As a result of the neopatrimonial heritage ofmost African nations, however, Africantransitions have tended to produce similar kindsof party systems consisting of a proliferation oforganizationally weak parties, overshadowed byone or two dominant parties.9

Throughout Latin America, political partieshave, with varying degrees of success, sought tobecome legitimate, institutionalized politicalactors in democratic political systems. ScottMainwaring and Timothy Scully argue that theinstitutionalization of party systems is crucial tothe process of democratic consolidation in theregion.

Parties are in one regard even more important inLatin America than in most establisheddemocracies, where parties are more organizedand institutionalized. The state has had apervasive influence in Latin Americandevelopment, and, at the same time, mechanismsfor influencing the polity from society, interestgroups and social movements, are generallyweaker than in the advanced industrialized

democracies. For this reason, obtaining access tostate power is more important in most of LatinAmerica than it is in the advanced industrializeddemocracies. In most of Latin America, politicalconnections are needed to gain access to stateprivileges and favors. Although parties usually donot themselves directly control state resourcesand privileges, they are stepping-stones to power.Because parties control access to policy-makingpositions, the way they function is a key inaffecting the performance and viability of LatinAmerican democracy.10

In the Middle East and throughout Asia,political party developments have been lesssystematic, as have democratic transitions moregenerally. In these regions of the world, as wellas in other regions to a lesser extent, the growthof Islamist parties has been pronounced. Thereis ongoing debate regarding the relationshipbetween political Islam and democraticconsolidation. Regardless of one’s perspective,however, the breadth of integration of Islamistvalues and practices into the lives of itsadherents has consequences for the politicalsystems in which they live.

The comprehensiveness of the pattern of social,political, and economic care built by the Islamistsmeans that it is not unusual to talk of a structureof a state within a state. This underlines thestrength of Islamist political parties, in terms ofenhancing their social and economic credibility,as well as in turn, boosting their politicalstature.11

The growth of political Islam, along with thedevelopment of other religion-based politicalparties in these regions and around the world is

8See James R. Scarritt, “The Role of PoliticalParties in African Democratization,” paper presentedat the Annual Meeting of the African StudiesAssociation, San Francisco, CA, November 23-26,1996, p. 1. For assessments of “third wave”transitions, see Guillermo O’Donnell and Phillipe C.Schmitter, Transitions from Authoritarian Rule:Tentative Conclusions about UncertainDemocracies, (Baltimore, MD: Johns HopkinsUniversity Press, 1986) and Samuel P. Huntington,The Third Wave: Democratization in the LateTwentieth Century, (Norman, OK: University ofOklahoma Press, 1991). See also, Scott Mainwaring,“Party Systems in the Third Wave,” Journal ofDemocracy, (July 1998), pp. 67-81.

9For more detailed analysis of neopatrimonialismin Africa, see Michael Bratton and Nicolas van deWalle, “Neopatrimonial Regimes and PoliticalTransition in Africa,” World Politics, (October1994), pp. 453-489.

10Scott Mainwaring and Timothy R. Scully,“Introduction: Party Systems in Latin America,” inMainwaring and Scully, eds., Building DemocraticInstitutions: Party Systems in Latin America, (PaloAlto, CA: Stanford University Press, 1995), p. 4.

11Azza M. Karam, “Islamist Parties in the ArabWorld: Ambiguities, Contradictions, andPerseverance,” Democratization, (Winter 1997), p.168.


yet another important factor to consider in theprocess of democratic consolidation. Today,Islamist parties are competing with secularparties in a growing number of countries aroundthe world. In Asia, secular parties are thriving inMuslim societies such as Pakistan andBangladesh as well. It is interesting to note thatin decades past there was a popular perceptionthat Latin American culture, particularly with itsstrong Catholic value system, was incompatiblewith democratic political values. With this inmind, it is important not to rush to judgmentregarding the compatibility of Islam anddemocracy. Rather, attentiveness to thedevelopment of political Islam throughout theworld, particularly as manifest in Islamistparties, is in order.

In these four developing regions, politicalparties have proven to be vital elements in thedevelopment and consolidation of democraticpolitical systems. While these institutions maybe found in various stages of development, mayperform different roles in various regions of theworld, and may not mirror the American orother western experiences, political parties areserving political systems well in pursuing thepath toward democratization.

III. GOALS OF USAIDPOLITICAL PARTYDEVELOPMENT

Establishing democratic institutions, free andopen markets, an informed and educatedpopulace, a vibrant civil society, and arelationship between state and society thatencourages pluralism, participation, andpeaceful conflict resolution—all of thesecontribute to the goal of building sustainabledemocracies. USAID’s Strategic Framework,adopted in 1995, identifies four strategicobjectives for the democracy sector: a)strengthened rule of law and respect for humanrights; b) more genuine and competitivepolitical processes; c) increased development ofa politically active civil society; and d) moretransparent and accountable governmentinstitutions.

The overarching goals of USAID political partydevelopment assistance are related to facilitatingthe democratic process in newly democratizingcountries, rather than influencing specificpolitical outcomes. Promoting and strengtheningthe broader political process through politicalparty development assistance require long-termsupport for specific organizational, behavioral,and governance aspects of democratic parties,rather than the pursuit of short-term electoralgoals. Within this long-term, process-orientedframework, there are three goals of USAIDpolitical party development assistance: 1) theestablishment and organizational developmentof viable, competing democratic political partiesat national, regional, and local levels; 2) theprovision of organized electoral choices tocitizens through political parties in elections;and 3) the democratic governance of societiesfacilitated by political parties serving asmanagers and organizers of government andopposition. These aims fall within USAID’sdemocracy assistance mandate and representmanageable, neutral, and efficacious objectivesfor political party development support.

A. Organizational Development of Political Parties

USAID and its implementing partners havetargeted significant resources to theinstitutionalization of political parties indemocratizing countries around the world. Thedevelopment of the organizational capacities ofdemocratic political parties serves the long-termgoals of sustainable democratic development.Organized and institutionalized political partiesperform the basic but important roles of politicalrepresentation, conflict resolution, interestaggregation, citizen mobilization, and politicalleadership. When political parties fulfill thesefunctions, they serve to organize politicalchoices for voters, to shape the policy dialogue,and to maintain political continuity intransitional societies. Past and ongoing USAIDprograms in this area have provided training andexpertise in organizational development andparty building for hundreds of political partiesaround the world. Future activities and programsfocusing on the institutionalization of politicalparty organizations should concentrate on thedevelopment of party organizations beyond thenext election and should seek to build partiesnot only at the national level, but at the regionaland local grassroots levels as well. In this area,conflicts arise regarding the degree ofinclusiveness of political parties participating inUSAID party organizational training activitiesand which parties are “genuinely committed todemocratic processes.”

B. Political Parties as Linkages Between Citizens and Government

Beyond the organizational aspects of politicalparties, these political institutions must havesome meaning in the electorate as organizersand synthesizers of political dialogue. Politicalparties must attract voters with programmaticmessages that distinguish one party fromanother. Collectively, competing politicalparties produce and sustain viable party systems.The electoral viability of multiple politicalparties is a crucial element in sustainingdemocratic governance. USAID programsshould facilitate party systems consisting of


multiple, democratic, and well-organizedparties. Political party assistance in this areashould serve to ensure that a number of partiesare sufficiently organized in a party system toprovide broad political representation andmeaningful alternatives in elections and ingovernance, that opposition parties are notsuppressed, and that there is consensusregarding the legitimacy of democratic electoralcompetition. In this area, conflicts ariseregarding the levels and types of support thatconstitute direct or indirect influence on theoutcome of an election as well as the timing ofassistance programs.

C. Political Parties as Organizers of Government and Opposition

To date USAID political party assistanceprograms have paid less attention to the role ofpolitical parties in governance or in opposition.While significant work has been done withparties in strengthening the legitimacy of thebroader political and electoral processes throughtraining of party pollwatchers in electionmonitoring and in involving political parties inelectoral law reform efforts, significantlegislative party building activities have beenundertaken in only a handful of countries.Although the Center and USAID missions in allregions currently support extensive legislativestrengthening programs through mechanismsmanaged by the Center’s Governance Team, thefoci of these programs are most often structuraland institutional in nature rather than political.Future programming in this governance area aswell as in post-election assistance programmingthrough Elections and Political Processes Teammechanisms, namely the Consortium forElections and Political Processes Strengthening(CEPPS), should incorporate programmingactivities that support the development ofpolitical parties within the political institutionsof democratic governance.


IV. USAID EXPERIENCEIN SUPPORTINGPOLITICAL PARTYDEVELOPMENT

Since it began its support of political partydevelopment in Hungary in 1989,12 USAID hassupported the development of democraticpolitical parties in more than 50 countriesthrough country-specific programming as wellas through regional political party training andassistance programs. In LAC, USAID hasconducted political party development activitiesin Haiti, Nicaragua, and Paraguay. In addition, aregional political party conference held in Chileattracted party leaders from 14 Latin Americancountries. In ANE, USAID has providedpolitical party assistance in Cambodia,Mongolia, Morocco, Nepal, and Yemen.

While political party assistance in the LAC andANE regions has been comparatively limited,USAID support for political party developmentin AFR and in ENI has encompassed a widevariety of countries in different stages ofdemocratic transition. In AFR, USAID hasconducted political party programs in Angola,Benin, Burundi, Cameroon, Côte d’Ivoire,Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau,Malawi, Namibia, Niger, Senegal, South Africa,and Zambia, as well as regional partyconferences. In the ENI region, USAID partyassistance programs were implemented inAlbania, Armenia, Bosnia, Bulgaria, Croatia,Estonia, Georgia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania,Macedonia, Poland, Romania, Russia, Slovakia,

Ukraine, and Yugoslavia. An ENI regional partyconference was held in 1998.13

While the political environment varies countryto country, USAID-funded political partydevelopment assistance may be categorizedgenerically across countries and regions.Broadly defined, the political party assistanceactivities undertaken by USAID and its granteesmay be organized under the classic tripartiteconceptualization of political parties—parties asorganizations, parties in governance, and partiesin the electorate.14 In surveying the variousUSAID political party development programsimplemented throughout the world,15 there isdisproportionate attention paid to theorganizational aspects of party development asvirtually all party programs have someorganizational component included, followed byassistance targeted at party development in theelectorate and party assistance in governance.Within the roughly 20 categories of assistanceprogramming found in the three broad areas,there is widespread application of each type ofprogram across regions. For each area, specificprograms are presented along with the countriesin which such programming has been

12David Breg, USAID Political PartyDevelopment Activities, (Washington, DC:CDIE/DI/RRS, U.S. Agency for InternationalDevelopment, March 1996), p. 5.

13Political Parties Matrices: Africa, LatinAmerica/Caribbean, Central and EasternEurope/The Former Soviet Union, and Asia andNear East, (Washington, DC: Management SystemsInternational, Inc., 1998); and David Breg, USAIDPolitical Party Development Activities, pp. 1-2.

14The tripartite conceptualization of politicalparties in the United States was first presented byV.O. Key, Jr. More recently, Paul Allen Beck andFrank Sorauf have incorporated this framework intotheir popular political parties textbooks; see PaulAllen Beck and Frank J. Sorauf, Party Politics inAmerica, 7th ed., (New York: HarperCollins, 1991);and Paul Allen Beck, Party Politics in America, 8thed., (New York: Longman, 1996).

15Political Parties Matrices: Africa, LatinAmerica/Caribbean, Central and EasternEurope/The Former Soviet Union, and Asia andNear East, (Washington, DC: Management SystemsInternational, Inc., 1998).


implemented. Overwhelmingly, these activitiestake the form of training seminars andconferences, targeting party leaders, electedrepresentatives, and candidates who represent adiverse range of political parties. Such activitiesmay also involve the training of trainers in orderto implement programming to a wider range ofparticipants within each country. On occasion,training may be targeted at a particular politicalparty when attempting to reach and train partyleaders in a serial manner.

A. Implementing Partners

To date, virtually all of USAID’s funding forpolitical party development has gone to the twoU.S. political party institutes, the InternationalRepublican Institute (IRI) and the NationalDemocratic Institute for International Affairs(NDI). The extensive experience the twoinstitutes have with political party developmentwork offers a wealth of insights into theopportunities and challenges of work in thisarea.

IRI and NDI, as political party institutes, devotea significant amount of their program activitiesto working with political parties internationally.IRI focuses on political party and parliamentarydevelopment work with a primary focus ongrassroots training. These activities arecomponents of programs specifically for parties,elections, and parliamentary programs. NDI’soverall portfolio is somewhat more mixed, withpolitical party work being roughly matched byits other activities in the areas of civil society,legislative strengthening, local government,elections, and civil-military relations combined.Much of the NDI and IRI programming is basedon political assessments conducted prior todeveloping program strategies.

The institutes rely primarily on funding fromUSAID, with more limited funding provided bythe National Endowment for Democracy

(NED).16 Occasionally they are also able to fundpolitical party programs using nongovernmentalsources such as private donations andfoundation funding. NED funding is valued bythe institutes because it represents a stable, ifrelatively small, source of funds that can bedrawn on relatively quickly. In contrast, USAIDfunding is valued because it tends to allow forlarger and longer-term party developmentprograms. But both institutes express frustrationwith the long period of time it can take to secureUSAID funding in general. Several individualsalso cite the field activity monitoring by USAIDmissions as less-than-desirable in capturing theimpact of long-term assistance to politicalparties. The Center can serve as a resource toprovide assistance on resolving issues related tothe implementation and monitoring ofdemocracy-governance activities.

Despite their reliance on federal funding, bothinstitutes view themselves essentially as NGOsand emphasize the critical importance ofmaintaining some distance from the U.S.government. This distance is needed so that theinstitutes are not perceived to be pursuing anarrow, bilateral U.S. government agenda. Inaddition, this allows them to draw upon foreignpolitical leaders and other trainers who wouldmost likely not be willing to participate inprograms perceived to be orchestrated by theU.S. government. The degree to which IRI andNDI emphasize their party affiliations dependson the country and the situation. In general, IRIemphasizes its ties to the Republican partysomewhat more than NDI emphasizes its ties tothe Democratic party. However, there are timeswhen NDI also emphasizes its connection to theDemocratic party. IRI works in fewer countries than NDI; typicallyit works in countries it views as beingstrategically important to U.S. national foreign

16Well over 75 percent of the annual budgets ofIRI and NDI are derived from USAID grants andcooperative agreements.


policy interests. NDI tends to work morebroadly. Since 1992, most of IRI’s and NDI’spolitical party work has been concentrated inCentral and Eastern Europe, the former SovietUnion, and southern Africa. This is a reflectionof the needs that have arisen from the politicalchanges in these regions, the significance ofthese regions to the United States, and theavailability of USAID funding for democracybuilding.

To date, NDI has done relatively less partydevelopment work in Asia, Latin America, andAfrica. One reason for this is the assessmentthat many parties in Latin America and Asia arenot seriously committed to reform. In addition,there are comparatively fewer resourcesavailable for political party assistance work inthese regions. NDI has of late been morefocused on key elections in West Africa,working with parties in governance programs insouthern Africa and with civil societyorganizations (CSOs) through citizenparticipation programs. While the absence oflong-term funding for Asia and Latin Americaprograms has kept NDI working on a smallerscale, it plans to focus more on parties in theseregions in the future.

IRI has not done a significant amount of partywork in Asia, Latin America, or Africa either,but for somewhat different reasons. Mostnotably, IRI appears to prefer to focus oncountries that are transitioning out ofauthoritarian systems, which limits itspossibilities in Asia and Latin America. Whileseveral countries in Asia, including China,Indonesia, and Vietnam, carry significant weightin terms of U.S. foreign policy, IRI has opted tofocus upon other types of programs that aremore acceptable to the ruling regimes. Thesehave included programs to support localelections in China and parliamentary programsin Vietnam.

The two institutes have also taken somewhatdifferent approaches to working in closed orpre-transition political systems. For instance,

IRI has undertaken programs with governmentbodies, including parliaments and electoralcommissions, in strategically importantauthoritarian countries in order to promotepolitical or economic liberalization and hasundertaken programs working againstauthoritarian governments, in Cuba and Burma,for example. NDI, however, has been unwillingto undertake programs in authoritariancountries, preferring to limit its work in suchenvironments to strengthening civil societygroups or other recognized advocates ofdemocracy.

Another subtle but significant differencebetween the two institutes is the degree to whichthey see themselves as “international” or“American” organizations. It appears that IRIprefers to remain essentially “American” whileNDI emphasizes its “international” characterand orientation, although IRI, in recent years,has begun training and hiring more non-Americans as field trainers. Several of NDI’ssenior staff members and a number of its fieldrepresentatives are non-Americans, while themajority of NDI’s international trainers andelection monitors are non-American. Inaddition, NDI is in the unique position of havingobserver status in three of the four politicalparty internationals.17 This participation in theinternationals links NDI to a global network ofparty leaders, and gives it credibility withmember parties that might otherwise besuspicious of an American organization fundedby the U.S. government. Both institutes havepursued regional party-to-party linkages through

17Party internationals are worldwideorganizations of national and regional politicalparties with similar policies and values. Currentlythere are four democratic party internationals: TheChristian Democrat International, the InternationalDemocrat Union, the Liberal International, and theSocialist International. See National DemocraticInstitute for International Affairs, Political Partiesand the Transition to Democracy, (Washington, DC:NDI, 1997), Appendix I.


regional party programming funded through theCEPPS mechanism, managed by the Center.

Finally, it is worth noting that in countrieswhere both IRI and NDI work, their presencealone sets a positive example on severaldifferent levels. First, it is a sign of U.S.engagement and willingness to provideassistance. Second, it can serve as an example ofthe feasibility and benefits of bipartisanship.Third, the institutes themselves provideexamples of how NGOs can be independentfrom but work in cooperation with U.S.government agencies. There are potentialdownsides to dual programming with IRI andNDI, however. First, there is the potential forduplication of effort. Second, there may lessthan cooperative relations between the twograntees as each seeks to develop parties in itsown way. Both of these potential problems canbe averted by attentiveness to programdescriptions as well as coordination of activitiesby USAID mission staff. A fuller discussion ofthe activities carried out by USAID’s twoprincipal implementing partners will follow inSection VI.

B. USAID’s Political Party Assistance

As previously mentioned, USAID’s politicalparty assistance to date has concentrated onthree aspects: organizational, electoral, andgovernment/political processes. This sectionwill detail specific programs that have beenimplemented using each of the foci, and inwhich countries they have been applied.

1. Organizational Focus

The following activities, while havingimplications for party developments in theelectorate and, to a lesser extent, for thegovernance role of parties, are largely focusedon the organizational aspects of partydevelopment and institutionalization.

1. Political party planning: strategic planning, development of research

skills for planning purposes(surveys/focus groups)

Country programs: Benin, Haiti, Hungary,Lithuania, Mongolia, Romania, Russia,South Africa, Yugoslavia

2. Organizational development: party building, professionalization, training in organizational management

Country programs: Albania, Benin,Cambodia, Croatia, Malawi, Mongolia,Mozambique, Paraguay, Russia, SouthAfrica, Ukraine, Zambia

3. Local/regional party organization: organizational linkagesSnational-local, coordination of organizational activities,programs

Country programs: Botswana, Georgia,Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Mongolia,Morocco, Namibia, Poland, Romania,Russia, South Africa, Zambia

4. Resource development: allocation of budgetary resources within party organizations

Country programs: Armenia, Benin, Côted’Ivoire, Mozambique, South Africa,Zambia

5. Message development: policy agenda formation, party image building, party platform development

Country programs: Benin, Bosnia,Bulgaria, Cambodia, Central Asia RegionalProgram, Côte d’Ivoire, Georgia, Guinea,Haiti, Latvia, Macedonia, Mozambique,Nicaragua, Paraguay, Russia, South Africa,Yugoslavia, Zambia

6. Membership recruitment: membership development, membership management,volunteer recruitment, volunteermanagement


Country programs: Armenia, Benin,Cambodia, Côte d’Ivoire, Hungary, Latvia,Yugoslavia, Zambia

7. Fundraising: the financing of party/candidate campaigns, campaign finance laws

Country programs: Haiti, Hungary, LatinAmerica Regional Program, Malawi, SouthAfrica, Yugoslavia

8. Media relations: media training, developing messages for media coverage

Country programs: Armenia, Haiti,Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malawi,Mozambique, Slovakia, South Africa,Zambia

2. Electoral Focus

The activities identified below seek to assistpolitical parties in linking their organizationsand their attendant messages to potentialconstituencies in the electorate.

1. Communications strategies: communications skills, party outreach, intraparty communications

Country programs: Angola, Benin, Bosnia,Cambodia, Georgia, Hungary, Latvia,Macedonia, Mongolia, Paraguay, SouthAfrica, Yugoslavia

2. Voter participation: voter identification,voter mobilization, voter contacting, get-out-the-vote efforts

Country programs: Africa RegionalProgram, Angola, Armenia, Bulgaria,Burundi, Cambodia, Haiti, Hungary,Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Malawi,Russia, South Africa, Yemen, Yugoslavia

3. Campaign strategy/planning: campaign management, administration

Country programs: Albania, Armenia,Burundi, Côte d’Ivoire, Croatia, Malawi,Mongolia, Mozambique, Poland, Russia,Slovakia, South Africa, Ukraine, Zambia

4. Candidate recruitment: candidate selection, candidate training, leadership training

Country programs: Africa RegionalProgram, Côte d’Ivoire, Croatia, Haiti,Latin America Regional Program, Latvia,Macedonia, Namibia, Nepal, South Africa,Ukraine

5. Grassroots outreach: grassroots participation, grassroots mobilization, door-to-door canvassing

Country programs: Angola, Benin,Bulgaria, Haiti, Lithuania, Macedonia,Malawi, Poland, Romania, Russia,Slovakia, South Africa, Yugoslavia,Zambia

6. Women and youth: programming targeted at mobilizing and training women and youth in political party activism

Country programs: Côte d’Ivoire, Haiti,Latin America Regional Program, Poland,Romania, Russia, South Africa, Ukraine,Zambia

3. Governance/Political Process Focus

The final area of political party assistanceincludes those activities with implications forgovernance or for the democratic politicalsystem of each country.

1. Legislative party building: party transitions in government, organizing political opposition in government

Country programs: Africa RegionalProgram, Burundi, Hungary, Malawi,


Mongolia, Morocco, Paraguay, SouthAfrica, Zambia

2. Legal framework: electoral law reform, constitutional framework, ballot security/fraud

Country programs: Africa RegionalProgram, Burundi, Central Asia RegionalProgram, Haiti, Macedonia, Malawi,Mongolia, Mozambique, Namibia, Senegal,South Africa

3. Coalition building: inter-party relations in legislatures

Country programs: Bulgaria, Georgia,Lithuania, Malawi, Mongolia, Morocco,Namibia, Russia, Slovakia

4. Party pollwatcher training: election monitoring

Country programs: Africa RegionalProgram, Angola, Bosnia, Burundi,Cambodia, Croatia, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau,Lesotho, Macedonia, Malawi,Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa,Yemen, Zambia


V. GUIDELINES FORIMPLEMENTATION OFUSAID POLITICALPARTY SUPPORT

A. USAID Policy Statements

Currently, political party development workundertaken by USAID and its grantees is shapedby statutory language found in the ForeignAssistance Act of 1961, several broad Agencypolicy guidelines relating to democracy andgovernance assistance, and guidance on politicalparty assistance provided by the Center and itsElections and Political Processes Team.

1. Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, Section 116(e)

Section 116(e) of the Foreign Assistance Actauthorizes development assistance (DA) support“for studies to identify, and for openly carryingout, programs and activities which willencourage or promote increased adherence tocivil and political rights,” thereby allowing DAfunding for democracy and governanceassistance, including political party assistance.Section 116(e) concludes, however, with thefollowing caveat: “None of these funds may beused, directly or indirectly, to influence theoutcome of any election in any country.”Section 116(e) is more broadly applied to anydemocracy and governance support provided byUSAID.

2. USAID Policy Paper: Democracy and Governance

The first contemporary USAID policy statementon political party assistance was issued in 1991as USAID Policy Paper: Democracy andGovernance:

First, USAID assistance for democratic politicaldevelopment must in principle be provided to thefull range of groups genuinely committed to the

democratic process. Where a USAID programinvolves assistance for labor unions, otheradvocacy groups or (in rare instances) politicalparties, this must be provided without referenceto specific policy positions taken by competingcandidates or parties (so long as those positionsare not themselves anti-democratic). Assistanceshould be offered equitably to all groupscommitted to the democratic process, regardlessof their specific platforms or programs. In thissense, USAID assistance must be nonpartisan.The focus of the Democracy Initiative is ondemocratic political development, not onpromoting particular outcomes to political debatesin recipient countries. This is true even when thedomestic political debate is critical of the UnitedStates.

In any specific case, the boundary betweenpermissible nonpartisan support for thedemocratic process and any inappropriateactivities must be clear, broad, and unassailable.It is the responsibility of USAID field staff andregional bureaus to ensure that all USAIDactivities conform to the requirements of law andare demonstrably above accusations ofinappropriate and unwarranted interference in thedomestic affairs of sovereign states. Justificationsbased on narrow or technical reasons will not besufficient to guard against possible abuse or toensure that the Democracy Initiative is alegitimate development program.18

3. USAID’s Strategies for Sustainable Development: Building Democracy

The Building Democracy policy guidance,issued in 1994, identifies the broad parametersof democracy programming, but also offersspecific guidance for political party assistance:

The specific types of democracy programsundertaken or supported by USAID will depend

18USAID Policy Paper: Democracy andGovernance, (Section III: Objective and Scope of theDemocracy Initiative, Handbook 1), (Washington,DC: U.S. Agency for International Development,1991), pp. 12-13.


upon the social, political, economic, and culturalrealities of a country, including the initiativestaken by its citizens, and upon availableresources. In sustainable development countries,and to a lesser extent, transition countries,democracy programs will form part of anintegrated country plan, which will have bothshort-term and long-term objectives. In countrieswith limited USAID presence, democracyprograms will focus on discrete objectives, e.g.,supporting non-governmental organizations.

USAID’s democracy programs will support...political parties and other national mechanisms ofpolitical expression in a strictly nonpartisanmanner and, consistent with statutory limitations,in a manner that does not influence the outcomeof an election.19

4. Technical Annex C: Democracy

This guidance elaborates on the BuildingDemocracy guidance cited above as well as theguidance presented in the Democracy andGovernance Policy Paper; it seeks to aid USAIDpersonnel in the selection of democracyactivities from among programmaticalternatives. Regarding elections and politicalprocesses programming, Technical Annex Cprovides the following guidance:

In designing electoral assistance programs, thefollowing points should be kept in mind:...effective participation by political parties iscritical to the success of an electoral process,although USAID must be particularly scrupulousin avoiding even the perception that it is favoringa particular candidate or party through theprovision of financial or technical assistance.20

The annex concludes with democracy programoptions; for political parties programming thefollowing options are presented: organizationaltraining, election preparation training,delineating the role of political parties ingovernment and opposition, and training localleaders for competitive electoral politics.

5. Managing Democratic Electoral Assistance: A Practical Guide for USAID

While the bulk of this guide is directed atelections assistance, there is specific guidanceregarding political party developmentassistance.21 Political party developmentassistance

Is a politically sensitive undertaking, as it isanticipated that it can easily become partisan andso reduce the benefits which derive fromnonpartisanship. On the other hand, politicalparty development is essential to effectiveelections in the sense that many parties need tolearn how to formulate policies, propagate them,select candidates, and prepare for varying roles ofvictor, loser, or coalition partner.... Anyassistance to political parties should be incompliance with the following restrictions: I) Bylaw, USAID assistance may not be used toinfluence the outcome of any election; ii) Anydirect or indirect support for campaigns for publicoffice is strictly prohibited; iii) Where USAIDfunded assistance is provided to political partiesor groups in civil society that have politicalmissions, it must be completely nonpartisan,impartial, available to all parties or groupsgenuinely committed to the democratic process,and provided without reference to specific policy

19USAID’s Strategies for SustainableDevelopment: Building Democracy, (Washington,DC: U.S. Agency for International Development,January 1994), pp. 4-5.

20Technical Annex C: Democracy, (Washington,DC: Center for Democracy and Governance, U.S.Agency for International Development, 1995), pp.12, 26.

21The Managing Democratic ElectoralAssistance: A Practical Guide for USAID manual iscurrently being substantially revised, updated andexpanded to include more detailed coverage ofpolitical party development assistance and will alsobe linked to the Managing for Results frameworkprovided by the Center. The new Elections andPolitical Processes Manual and supplementarymaterials will be disseminated in 1999.


positions taken by competing candidates orparties; iv) Assistance must be intended topromote or strengthen the democratic process asopposed to bolstering a particular party, coalition,or alliance; v) Any assistance should be providedequitably to all groups committed to thedemocratic process, and channeled through ‘otherappropriate institutions’ such as the Democraticand Republican party institutes,22 with minimaldirect USG involvement consistent withappropriate oversight; vi) USAID funds must notbe used for the financing of campaigns orcandidates for public office; vii) USAID fundsmust not be used for any payments to individualsthat are intended to influence their votes; viii)USAID funds must not be used for any directcontribution to a political campaign, or for anysalary, wage, fee, honoraria, or similar payment toany candidate, political party leader, or campaignofficial; ix) USAID funds must not be used forany public meetings that endorse or feature acandidate for public office; and x) USAID fundsmust not be used for any private polls designed tohelp political campaign strategies in favor of anycandidate, party or alliance.

The section of the guide relating to politicalparty development concludes with the followingguidance:

Working with political parties has to be done in atransparent way which ensures to the satisfactionof all that courses, seminars, etc. are open to allparties and that the process is primarily aimed notat strengthening individual political parties but atenhancing the election process and the post-election management of legislative affairs. It isbest left to NGOs to implement; but to the extentthat they make use of USAID money, the stresson a nonpartisan approach must be clear.23

The political party assistance guidelinesoutlined above provide further clarification ofwhat USAID-funded programs can and cannotundertake in supporting political partydevelopment. They reiterate the rule thatUSAID work exclusively with political partiescommitted to the democratic process and therequirement that, within that group of parties,USAID assistance has to be nonpartisan innature. But more specifically, the guidelinesalso begin to draw distinctions between whatconstitutes acceptable party assistance and whatconstitutes prohibited means of influencing theoutcomes of elections, such as direct financialsupport for campaigns or political candidates (ii,vi, and viii), financial support to buy votes (vii),funds for partisan meetings and rallies (ix), orpartisan technical support (x).

Nevertheless, several important questionsregarding the implementation of political partyassistance remain unanswered. First, there is thequestion of how one determines what constitutesa democratic party or a party adhering todemocratic processes. A second, relatedquestion is, if USAID eliminates particularpolitical parties from its political partyassistance programming, are not the targetedfunds indirectly influencing the outcomes ofelections? Implicit in the aforementionedUSAID guidance on the distinctions betweendemocratic parties that could receive technicalassistance and anti-democratic parties that couldnot is the conclusion that USAID is supportingthe broad outcome of the electoralprocess—democratic governance. Thus, thephrase, “leveling the playing field,” has oftenmeant improving the chances of democraticparties over anti-democratic parties, assumingthat all democratic parties are assisted equally.

A third question is more technical in nature.While several of the restrictions listed above,such as the prohibition on campaigncontributions and the use of USAID resources toinfluence voters through direct payments, areexplicit, the more general prohibition of indirect

22The two party institutes are NDI and IRI; these501(c)(3) nonprofit organizations, created with theNED in 1983, and their roles in political partyassistance will be discussed in detail in Section VI.

23David Hirschmann, Managing DemocraticElectoral Assistance: A Practical Guide for USAID,(Washington, DC: Center for Democracy andGovernance, U.S. Agency for InternationalDevelopment, 1995), pp. 39-41.


or direct support for campaigns is less clear.What activities, in fact, constitute unacceptabledirect or indirect campaign support or technicalassistance? As was discussed in Section IV,USAID has provided technical assistance topolitical parties in areas such as voteridentification and mobilization, messagedevelopment, platform writing, and candidatetraining. While such programming is beingoffered to all democratic parties, these activitiesare essentially campaign support and assistance.The next sub-section offers guidance onanswering these questions by addressing somekey implementing concerns: inclusiveness,interference in the domestic affairs of sovereignstates, electoral influence, and timing.

B. Specific Implementation Concerns

The USAID policy statements and guidance onpolitical party assistance, presented in SectionV(A) above, are the core directives for politicalparty programming. As was mentioned there,these statements and guidance do not fullyaddress the nuances of party assistance in thewide variety of political contexts present today.Rather than opt for a country-by-countryapproach to guidance for implementation ofthese policies and guidance, however, theCenter seeks to address the various questionsand issues that have arisen in the context ofpolitical party development programming and toprovide guidelines for program implementationthat, while not universal in scope, will beapplicable to the most often encounteredproblems in party assistance.

Reviewing the specific language presented inthe policy statements and guidance, several keyphrases emerge as the most important andcontroversial elements of political partyassistance policy. First, Section 116(e) of theForeign Assistance Act prohibits the use ofdevelopment assistance funds “directly orindirectly, to influence the outcome of anyelection in any country.” Second, the 1991Democracy and Governance Policy Paper statesthat party assistance should be “offered

equitably to all groups committed to democraticprocesses,” and that such assistance should notrepresent “inappropriate and unwarrantedinterference in the domestic affairs of sovereignstates.” Further, the Building Democracyguidance states that party assistance programsshould be implemented “in a strictly nonpartisanmanner.” More specifically, Technical Annex Cstates that program implementation “must beparticularly scrupulous in avoiding even theperception that it is favoring a particularcandidate or party” when providing partyassistance. Finally, the Managing DemocraticElectoral Assistance manual provides specificprohibitions for political party assistance.USAID party assistance may not provide

1) Direct or indirect support for campaigns forpublic office, 2) financing of campaigns orcandidates for public office, 3) payments toindividuals that are intended to influence theirvotes, 4) any direct contribution to a politicalcampaign, or any salary, wage, fee, honoraria, orsimilar payment to any candidate, political partyleader, or campaign official, 5) funds used for anypublic meetings that endorse or feature acandidate for public office, and 6) funds used forany private polls designed to help politicalcampaign strategies in favor of any candidate,party or alliance.

These key provisions have generated conflicts inpolitical party assistance programming andimplementation in four broad areas: thenecessary levels of inclusiveness in selectingparty participants, interference in the domesticaffairs of sovereign states, the electoralinfluence of party programming, and the timingof political party assistance.

1. Inclusiveness

There are three main areas of concern with theissue of inclusiveness: 1) working with partiesthat are genuinely committed to democraticprocesses, 2) leveling the political playing field,and 3) choosing viable democratic parties. Thefirst concern lies at the heart of political partyassistance. As stated above, party development


programming should be provided only to partiesthat support the democratic process; in no casesshould party assistance be provided to anti-democratic parties or organizations that promoteviolence. In order to comply with thesestandards, USAID missions and their partnersmust differentiate between those democraticparties eligible for assistance and those anti-democratic parties that should be excluded fromassistance. The party institutes tend to useinternal party democracy as a means ofevaluating support for the democratic process.In its Political Parties and the Transition toDemocracy primer, NDI outlines severalnecessary conditions for democratic parties:

A party’s commitment to democratic principlesshould be reflected not only in its writtenconstitution, but also in its day-to-day interactionbetween leaders and members. That is, a partymust be committed to practicing democraticbehavior. A democratic party will allow membersto express their views freely, promote themembership of women, encourage participationby all members, be tolerant of different ideas,abide by agreed upon rules and procedures fordecision-making, and hold leaders accountable tomembers and supporters.24

While these are important criteria for judginginternal organizational democracy, the policymandate addresses commitment to thedemocratic process, which is captured only inpart by measures of internal party democracy. Infact, there is significant empirical research onpolitical parties and political organizations thatdemonstrates that truly democratic principlesare rarely adhered to in organizationalgovernance. In fact, USAID providessignificant, direct organizational funding toNGOs all over the world, yet has no fixedstandard for internal organizational democracyas a condition of funding. More important to theissue at hand is whether the political party

supports the broader democratic process. Indemocratic societies, organizational democracyis a moot issue as long as citizens are able tojoin and quit political parties without negativeconsequences. If citizens feel they are not beingrepresented within the organization or party,they will leave and the organization will sufferthe consequences of decreased financial andelectoral support.

As a result, the evaluation of support fordemocratic processes should be framed by thefollowing set of questions:

1) Is the party, both in rhetoric andpractice, committed to democraticprinciples, both organizationally25 andprogrammatically?

2) Does the party leadership engage inelections and use democratic institutionsand rules to further its political agenda?

3) Are party platforms and party leadershipchosen and/or validated democraticallyby party rank-and-file membership?

4) Has the party and its leadership agreedto respect the outcomes of the electoralprocess?

5) Does the party leadership have a historyof engaging in violence or in attemptingto undermine or overthrow democraticinstitutions?

24Political Parties and the Transition toDemocracy, (Washington, DC: National DemocraticInstitute for International Affairs, 1997), p. 5.

25Organizational democracy should be broadlyinterpreted. The freedom of citizens to enter and exitpolitical party membership ranks or to vote for oragainst party candidates without political oreconomic sanctions is the key criterion fororganizational democracy. Virtually all politicalorganizations are governed oligarchically; pureorganizational democracy is unattainable inorganizations of any significant size.


6) If the party (and/or its leadership) doeshave a history of violence and anti-democratic behavior, has the currentparty leadership made crediblerenunciations of past anti-democraticbehavior, backed by actions thatdemonstrate democratic transformation?

7) Does the party have ties to violentgroups or organizations?

8) Does the party obey political party,election, and campaign laws?

9) Does the participation of the party helplevel the playing field?

These questions should be applied to all partiesin country. Parties that are determined to beanti-democratic are therefore ineligible toreceive direct or indirect USAID assistance.Beyond these broad evaluative questions,special attention should be given to thedemocratic nature of governing political parties.When evaluating governing or ruling parties,additional questions should be addressed:

1) Does the governing party adhere toopen, free, and fair elections standards?

2) Does the governing party attempt to usegovernmental power to suppressdemocratic competition through controlof media, electoral administration, orother institutions?

3) Does the governing party inhibit theabilities of opposition parties toorganize and mobilize political support?

4) Does the governing party control theelection administration infrastructure?

Finally, USAID may wish to make exceptionsfor inclusion of individual party leaders.Individuals or factions within a political party ormovement that has been determined not to meetdemocratic standards may be included in larger

multi-party forums if the individuals or factionshave made clear and distinct renunciations ofthe parent party and have also demonstrated thatthey have distanced themselves from the coreparty leadership and its anti-democraticphilosophies and activities. In addition, it shouldbe determined that the participation of theseindividuals and/or factions can serve toinfluence their parties or have a broader impacton party democratization.

Once the democratic nature of parties isassessed, the question of inclusion again mustbe addressed. It is often the case that not alldemocratic parties are in need of USAID partyassistance. Well-organized, democratic,competitive political parties with extensiveorganizational infrastructures and an organizedand active citizen membership should not be thetargets of party assistance. In seeking to developcompetitive political party systems, USAIDprogramming should be targeted at those partiesthat are struggling to be competitive andinstitutionalized. Often discussed as leveling theplaying field, USAID programming shouldtarget challenging parties rather thanentrenched, dominant parties with broad-basedsupport. With finite resources, USAID partydevelopment efforts should be geared at gettingthe most bang-for-the-buck; therefore,programming should serve the broader goal ofstrengthening the democratic political andelectoral processes by expanding the partysystem beyond the dominant party or parties.

Related to this issue is the determination ofviability of nascent political parties. Concernsabout sustainability obviously affect partyassistance. In many democratizing countries,new political movements have emerged thateither lack significant organizational bases orrepresent only a narrow sector of society. Oftenunder the direction of a single leader or smallcadre of leaders, these movements or factionsfall short in the areas of sustainableorganizational infrastructure and broad supportbase typically associated with political parties.USAID support for these incipient, single-


person or single-issue movements raises issuesregarding the sustainability of assistance tonurture the development of such groups and therisk of fragmenting the political arena. Inaddition, parties or movements with suchlimited organizational bases increase the risk ofunaccountable, arbitrary, or even authoritarianpolitics by leaders.

Nevertheless, in some instances, where thepolitical system is emerging along with thesemovements following a prolonged period ofauthoritarian government or conflict, thesepersonalistic, small movements may representthe main democratic alternatives to morepowerful authoritarian parties. Thus, wherepossible, USAID party developmentprogramming should avoid providing assistanceto personalistic or single-issue parties. In caseswhere there are few alternatives, assistanceshould focus on forging a broader coalition ofgroups and strengthening the organizationalviability of parties, individually or as a mergedpolitical front of parties.

2. Interference in the Domestic Affairs of Sovereign States

Related to the issue of inclusiveness, theomission of certain political parties, particularlygoverning parties and/or communist parties,may lead to charges of intrusion into thedomestic affairs of sovereign states by theomitted party or parties. As USAID partydevelopment programming at the organizationaland electoral levels often strengthens andfacilitates democratic forces within newlydemocratizing nations, a ruling party may feelthe work of NDI or IRI represents undueinfluence on its political system, just as rulingparties or coalitions may be affronted byinternational donor support of CSOs that may becritical of their governments. The recent work ofIRI in Russia with the Russia is Our Home partyin an area of the country dominated by theCommunist party is illustrative of this problem.The Communist party attempted to challenge thework of IRI before the Central Election

Commission on the grounds that IRI attemptedto influence domestic politics by strengtheningthe organizational capabilities of a rival party.The commission found no violations of Russianlaw on the part of IRI. In these instances, theparty institutes must be able to demonstrateclearly their reasons for selecting only one or afew parties with which to work. At the sametime, they must be cognizant of existing lawsand regulations regarding external support forpolitical parties. While USAID programmingincludes reform of electoral and party laws thatare restrictive and that inhibit free and faircompetition of ideas and candidates throughpolitical parties, USAID will not fund programsand activities that are in direct violation ofexisting domestic laws.

In addition to lack of inclusiveness as anelement of interference in the domestic affairsof a country, the USAID party buildingprograms within governments also represent apotential area of excessive interference as theparty institutes work with political partieswithin legislatures in order to provide internalcoherence to both governing and oppositionparties. Such activities should include trainingin the roles of political parties in organizing thegovernment and opposition in a generic fashion,rather than specific policy-related activities.

Further, the work of NDI, IRI, and theInternational Foundation for Election Systems(IFES) with electoral administration agenciesthat are directly tied to the governing party orparties may also be viewed as undue influenceon the domestic political system by oppositionparties. In these instances, it must be clear thatthe efforts of the party institutes and IFES inparticular to work with electoral commissionsthat are not independent of the governing partyor parties serve as checks and reformingelements on the political system rather than aslegitimizing efforts for partisan regimes. Inthese instances, IFES and the party institutesshould work in concert, with IFES working withthe governing party and its institutions ofelectoral management and NDI and IRI working


with opposition parties, as was the case inSlovakia in 1998.

3. Electoral Influence

The strong language included in TechnicalAnnex C cited above, together with the six areasin which USAID direct party assistance may notbe used in relation to influencing the outcome ofan election, directly or indirectly [Section116(e)], constitutes the broad guidelines forlimiting political party development activities inthe electoral context. Current USAID policiesdraw clear distinctions between the directfinancial support for NGOs, CSOs, or interestgroups on the one hand and political parties onthe other. As the former types of entities haveno formal responsibilities for governance nor forpolitical opposition within government, USAIDcivil society programming includes directfinancial grants to organizations and, in someinstances, total financial support of NGOs andinterest groups. Conversely, political partysupport should not take the form of directfinancial support to party organizations as suchgrants, while nominally targeted at buildingorganizational infrastructures, may be directedat specific elections and candidates. As a result,political party programming in the electoralcontext “must be particularly scrupulous inavoiding even the perception that it is favoring aparticular candidate or party” through directfinancial support. Political party programmingshould not result in direct financial benefit toany single political party in the political systemwithin which USAID programming isundertaken.

Party support programming in this area is leastlikely to run afoul of the Section 116(e)limitation when it is carried out in an inclusivefashion, administered in an equitable manner,and does not include direct financial or in-kindsupport to individual political parties.

4. Timing

The final issue to be addressed in theseguidelines is the timing of political partyassistance programs. This issue is directlyrelated to the indirect or direct influence of theoutcome of an election discussed above. In orderto remain above reproach from internal politicalforces within countries in which programming isundertaken as well as from U.S. interestsattentive to the internal politics of these nations,USAID programming should conclude or revertto clearly non-campaign activities within 30days prior to an upcoming election. Workshops,training sessions, and other activities,particularly those targeted at only a selectnumber of parties, should not appear to bedirectly connected to impending elections. Oneexception to this provision is training for partypollwatchers. Since this activity serves tolegitimize the electoral process and no direct orindirect electoral benefits are accrued byindividual political parties or candidates,training of party pollwatchers may take place upto election day. Another exception wouldinvolve the conducting of multi-party forums inthe context of conflictual electoralenvironments, wherein USAID-supportedforums serve to promote political dialogueacross political parties and to facilitate free andfair elections.

The more general timing issues of when to beginpolitical party assistance programs as well as thedevelopment of an exit strategy to concludepolitical party assistance are equally important.Political party assistance programming shouldbe viewed as a series of interrelated activities. Afull-service party development plan incorporateseach of the major substantive areas presentedearlier: organizational, electoral, andgovernmental. The timing of the implementationshould not be dictated by the electoral calendar.In fact, putting off planning of partydevelopment activities until even the year beforean election places undue and unnecessaryburdens on program implementers to achievemultiple results simultaneously. Optimally,party organizational strengthening work shouldbegin well outside the context of an election. In


fact, such programming may begin as post-election assistance in the aftermath of a lessthan successful performance by democraticparties. Organizational work in this contextdiffers little from civil society organizationalwork that seeks to develop grassrootsmembership support. Of course, USAID treatsCSO support quite differently from partysupport work as CSOs and NGOs moregenerally may receive direct support fromUSAID, while political parties may not.

Outside the immediacy of an election campaign,party leaders are more attentive to trainingfocused on organizational sustainability andmembership recruitment. As political partyleaders develop organizational skills, the logicalprogression of programming is to preparepolitical parties for elections. Like theorganizational aspects of party development, themenu of training options outlined above isextensive. Even within the electoral context, theearlier the commitment to programming supportthe more comprehensive the training andassistance may be. Again, six months before anelection is too late to begin extensive electoralwork with political parties. Unfortunately, long-term planning for comprehensive political partydevelopment is difficult, particularly incompetition with other programming in theelections and political processes field.Nonetheless, USAID missions should regardpolitical party programming as a central elementin their democracy and governance strategies.

Perhaps the least programmed area of politicalparty development is strengthening politicalparties in their roles as organizers ofgovernment or opposition in government. Thisarea is worthy of increased attention for, asdemocratic parties begin to find electoralsuccess sufficient to capture the support of amajority of citizens, they are immediately thrustinto the position of governance with all of theattendant responsibilities. So, too, democraticpolitical parties outside the government orruling coalition have the responsibility ofproviding loyal opposition to government.

Disorganized and ineffectual oppositionstrengthens the will of the government. Whetherundertaken as post-election assistance orprogrammed outside the context of elections,party strengthening in governance is a crucialelement to political party developmentprogramming.

Concluding political party assistance is often asdifficult as determining when and where to start.Optimally, an exit strategy should be developedduring the initial planning stages of politicalparty assistance programs. While USAIDmissions are constrained by the annual reviewand appropriation processes, programmingshould not be solely driven by the fiscal yearcalendar. Election calendars may or may not beuseful demarcations in party assistanceplanning. If a mission is undertaking election-specific party assistance, then perhapsprogramming should conclude following theelections. In the best of situations, the relativeprogress of the parties in achievingorganizational sustainability, electoral success,or competent governance skills should befactors to consider when deciding to concludesuch programming. To the extent possible, theparty institutes should strive to link the partieswith which they are working to larger, regionalor global party networks so they may continueto receive information, guidance, and supportafter USAID funding concludes. In addition,there should be continual coordination withother international donors that support politicalparty development as USAID is not alone insupporting the development and sustainability ofdemocratic political parties.

While there are far more constraints on the useof USAID funds for party assistance than on anyother international governmental ornongovernmental entity, the support of partydevelopment by USAID represents the mostsignificant single source of party assistanceglobally. It is incumbent upon USAID missionsas well as NDI and IRI to plan partydevelopment programs thoughtfully andimplement these resulting activities effectively.


VI. IRI AND NDI:POLITICAL PARTYASSISTANCEPROGRAMS26

This section describes in greater detail USAID’spolitical party development programs carriedout by IRI and NDI, as the two key partnersimplementing USAID political partydevelopment assistance. It draws on theinstitutes’ reports to USAID and onconversations with institute and USAID staffmembers and with other regional specialists andpolitical scientists. It includes a discussion bothof the institutes’ “core” political partydevelopment work, with a focus upon the threeareas: enhancing electoral competition,developing broad-based, viable, and internallydemocratic parties, and participating effectivelyin governance. Additionally, the sectionexamines “supplemental” work with parties in anumber of other important areas.

A. Goals of IRI and NDI Political Party Development Programs

In line with USAID’s aim to facilitate thedemocratic process in newly democratizingcountries, the overarching goal of IRI and NDIpolitical party development programs is to assistthe development of political parties, and to alesser degree, multi-party party systems thatcontribute to democratic politics andgovernance. Implicit in this is the belief thatparties should be broad-based and internallydemocratic and have the skills andorganizational capacity to compete in elections,recruit and maintain members, communicateeffectively, govern effectively, and serve as

loyal opposition. In addition, they believe thatparty systems need to strike a balance betweenthe need for representation of all major sectors,and the need for a level of cohesion and stabilitysufficient for effective governance. They alsofeel that this balance should be taken intoaccount in party program design.

Reflecting this and USAID’s emphasis on theorganizational aspect of political partydevelopment, most IRI and NDI party programsseek to give parties the skills and organizationalcapacity they need to do the following: a)compete in elections; b) develop into broad-based, viable, and internally democraticorganizations; and c) participate effectively ingovernance—either as the ruling party, as amember of a governing coalition, or asopposition. Some institute programs placespecial emphasis on coalition building,improving relations among parties, andpromoting electoral/party law reform. Arepresentative of IRI also pointed to the specificskill-based nature of programs, so as to ensurethat participants are given essential know-howin a particular area and further guided throughthe application of their newly learned skills bycontinuous support through the course of amajor event. This may, for example, involve acampaign training program, whereby local partyleaders are trained in specific techniques andthen supported in using those skills throughtheir campaigns.

The institutes point to a variety of otherobjectives and desired outcomes of their partydevelopment programs. Such goals contribute totheir stated commitment to creating healthyparties and party systems. In countries with adominant ruling party, party developmentprograms can help to “level the playing field” toenable greater political competition betweenparties. In countries with new or poorlyinstitutionalized parties, party developmentprograms can help to make them viable andeffective participants in democratic politics andgovernance. In countries with unstable multi-party systems, party development programs can

26The author wishes to acknowledge the work ofBenjamin Crosby, Nicole Dannenberg, DavidTimberman, and Mark Walker of ManagementSystems International in the preparation of thissection.


encourage parties to form coalitions or to merge.In polarized or conflicted countries, partydevelopment programs can reduce mistrust andconflict between parties and encourage partiesto “play by the democratic rules of the game.”Finally, in countries with institutionalized, buthighly personalistic and hierarchical parties,party development programs can encouragegreater participation and internaldemocratization.

B. Defining and Measuring Impact

Both IRI and NDI see the creation of electorallycompetitive parties as a means to an end, not anend in itself. While an important objective of theinstitutes’ political party work is to makedemocratic parties electorally competitive,producing electoral victories does not fall undertheir direct mandate. Instead, NDI seeks toproduce parties that have the ability to gainrepresentation, that have a say in shaping policy,and that have a voice in public affairs. NDI staffalso emphasize the importance of sustainabilityover election cycles and over periods of beingboth in and out of power. IRI views its goal ascreating parties that have the depth of leadershipand organization that will make themsustainable over successive election cycles. Asan example of this, IRI emphasizes theimportance of building second and third tierparty leadership and stable grassroots structuresin its Mongolia program.

In some cases there have been “high impact”outcomes from party development programs.Examples include IRI’s programs to aiddemocratic parties or coalitions in challengingnon-democratic regimes in Mongolia andBulgaria. In recent years, helping to create orsustain democratic parties in highly conflictualsocieties as in South Africa and strengtheningmoderate parties in highly polarized societiessuch as NDI’s programs in Bosnia, Chile, andPoland have been timely and effective. InPoland, for example, NDI has worked since1996 to strengthen party organizations at thelocal level. Local party branches have since

developed and implemented action plans torecruit new members, raise funds, and improvecommunications with party headquarters.Women and youth have also come to play amore prominent role in party operations,including running as electoral candidates. Thework has also resulted in a core group of Polishparty trainers that are capable of continuing toprovide party assistance.

Other less visible, but equally significantexamples of impact over the long term includethe following: 1) broadening the membershipbase of parties, including extensive training inpolling techniques by IRI in Slovakia and door-to-door campaigning techniques promoted byNDI in Poland; 2) strengthening the linksbetween party leaders and their members,including work by NDI in rural communities ofCentral and East Africa and by IRI in Lithuania,Mongolia, Nicaragua, and Yugoslavia; 3)increasing the participation of women, mostnotably NDI’s programs in Kenya and Nepaland IRI’s programs in Angola, Cambodia,Russia, and Thailand; 4) fostering youthleadership, including several IRI programs inLatin America and Central and Eastern Europeas well as in Russia and Ukraine; and 5)improving the effectiveness of parties andcoalitions in parliament, such as NDI’s programin Georgia and IRI’s programs in Mozambiqueand Angola.

The institutes make several points about gaugingthe impact of their party development programs.First, democratic development is necessarily avery complex and long-term process. It isunrealistic to expect too much from a programthat is less than a year in duration or a series ofsuccessive short-term programs that do notallow for long-term planning.27 Moreover, theimpact of democracy programs often takes anumber of years to become evident, is oftendifficult to quantify, and may come in

27Typical USAID-funded programs range in lengthfrom six months to three or more years.


unexpected ways. Particularly in the case ofpolitical party and electoral programs, pressureto demonstrate immediate impact can lead topolitically inappropriate interventions. Theimportance of distinguishing short-term partydevelopment programs that are specificallydesigned in response to rapid transitions, snapelections, or other unexpected developmentsfrom those with the objective of long-term partydevelopment is integral to a clear analysis ofparty programs.

C. Which Models, Which Parties?

Apart from the availability of USAID and NEDfunding for political party assistance programs,there are two key substantive issues that shapethe overall character of IRI and NDI programs:1) the models of political parties and types ofpolitical techniques used by the institutes; and2) the inclusiveness or selectivity of participantsin party development programs. Each of theseissues is briefly addressed below:

1. Model(s) for Party Development

There are many good reasons for doubting therelevance and applicability of the U.S. model ofpolitical parties and of modern, high technologyU.S. election campaign techniques for most newand low-income democracies. These reasonsinclude the following: a) vastly differenttraditions and levels of socio-economicdevelopment and media penetration; b) therelative scarcity of other majoritarianpresidential systems; c) the parliamentary,proportional-representation nature of many newsystems, which makes for very differentparliamentary dynamics and constituencyoutreach; and d) in most new democracies,party-list elections, making parties moreimportant than individual candidates.

As a result, few foreign political parties activelyseek to emulate U.S. parties. Americancampaigns are seen as being excessivelypersonalistic and overly dependent uponpurchased media. Furthermore, many U.S.

campaign techniques are not seen as beingapplicable or affordable. At the same time,however, American techniques are widelyregarded as being state-of-the-art and, therefore,are of general interest to some parties, especiallythose in wealthier European countries. Arepresentative of NDI, for example, observedthat most post-communist societies want theAmerican experience and look to U.S. modelsfocusing on personalized, grassroots politicalorganizations. In these and other regions, manyparties are confronted by the seeming inexorablespread of mass media and political marketing. Inaddition, the widespread erosions of traditionalsocial and political relationships due to rapidurbanization and economic change are at theforefront of the political arena. These changesmake some, though certainly not all,“American” campaign techniques seemincreasingly relevant.

The institutes readily profess their awareness ofthe limited applicability of contemporary U.S.models and modern techniques. They maintainthat, in most cases, they consciously shy awayfrom promoting the American model. This is notto say that some of the traditional Americantechniques of mobilization and electioneeringare not applicable. In fact, many of thetechniques taught by IRI and NDI for politicalorganizing and campaigning are so basic as tobe virtually universal. Even those techniquesthat are more distinctively “American” aregenerally modified so as to be relevant to localconditions. In addition, many of the NDI and IRItrainers are drawn from countries with politicalexperiences and systems that are directlyrelevant to the country where the program isoccurring. For example, NDI organized aprogram to bring Serbian opposition partyleaders to Poland to receive advice and guidancefrom Polish party activists on their currentpolitical situation, based on the similarexperiences of the Poles in recent years.

2. The Issue of Inclusiveness


A key intent of existing USAID guidelines onpolitical party assistance is to ensure that U.S.government assistance does not promote certaincandidates, parties, or policies at the expense ofother democratic candidates or parties.Therefore, assistance should be made availableto all political parties that are committed to thedemocratic process and should not be used toinfluence electoral outcomes, directly orindirectly; in addition, political party assistanceshould be neutral in terms of its politicalcontent.

IRI and NDI both subscribe to the principles ofinclusiveness and nonpartisanship. IRI has atendency to work with parties it regards ascommitted to democracy, and to excludeauthoritarian parties; whereas NDI placesgreater emphasis on being more inclusive. Therehave been a number of instances when U.S.policy, political conditions, or programmaticconsiderations have caused one or bothinstitutes to work with a narrower range ofparties. Representatives from NDI and IRI offera number of reasons for being selective whenorganizing political party assistance programs.

First, “leveling the playing field” in one-partydominant polities requires that the oppositionparties receive all or most of the assistance.Second, although they may be non-violent andsupport electoral competition, there are partiesthat espouse views that are inimitable topluralistic democracy. Included in this groupwould be certain ethnic, nationalist, andreligious parties. Third, some formerlycommunist parties, although they claim toaccept democratic politics and governance, havebeen unwilling or unable to reform essentiallyLeninist, top-down party structures. Fourth, incountries with a large number of parties,working with all or even most parties diffusesthe impact of their assistance. Some parties (so-called “sofa” or “taxi cab” parties) are too smallor unsustainable to warrant assistance. Forassistance to be effective, it needs to be focusedon a limited number of viable, receptive parties.Finally, to be effective in their work with

parties, the institutes’ representatives must betrusted by the parties. The more parties therepresentatives work with, the less they aretrusted by each party. The institutes have exercised selectivity inseveral instances. Among them are NDI’sprogram in Bosnia, where NDI works almostexclusively with multi-ethnic parties. The goalhas not necessarily been for them to win, butrather for them to become strong enough to playa moderating role. In Croatia, NDI and IRI haveconcentrated on democratic opposition partiesthat have been disadvantaged and marginalizedby ultranationalist sentiment and one-partydominance. And in Poland, NDI works with allparties, but primarily with the center and center-right in order to diminish factionalism. Otherexamples include South Africa, where IRI andNDI assistance, prior to the 1994 elections, waslimited to parties and movements that had notpreviously competed in multi-party nationalelections and whose support was drawn fromhistorically disenfranchised segments of thepopulation.

NDI is open to working with formerauthoritarian and communist parties if they aredetermined to be committed to reform, such asthose in Poland and in Hungary. An NDIrepresentative pointed to the dilemma ofworking with post-communist parties, citing theall-too-common trend of post-communist partiesbearing new hats and names but essentiallymaintaining communist party goals andplatforms. IRI is less inclined to work withformer communist parties.

In addition, an issue that frequently arises inAfrican cases is the question of how to workwith reformist elements or branches ofotherwise undesirable large party machines. Inthe case of Côte d’Ivoire’s PDCI party, areformist branch broke off and formed its ownseparate party. Conversely, the question ofwhether to exclude non-reformist actors withinthose dominant parties is a prominent one. Suchwork must be undertaken with the utmost care


and slow pace, with serious and consistentevaluative attention given to whether theprogram can make an impact on the status quo,or whether the task is too daunting.

In many situations, there are very compellingpolitical reasons to work with all or mostdemocratic political parties. But in some, but byno means infrequent situations, there arepersuasive political and programmatic reasonsfor being more selective. In some of these cases,the issue is not so much whether or not to beselective, but how selective to be and based onwhat criteria. Both NDI and IRI conduct in-depth assessments to evaluate the generalpolitical conditions of a country, the democraticcharacteristics of political parties, and theorganizational and political capacities of partieswhen designing their political party assistanceprograms. In rare instances involving the mostpolitically charged environments, the decision-making processes regarding political partyassistance programs are elevated to levels withinthe U.S. government above USAID missionjurisdiction. In these instances, the USAIDmission and implementing partners often receiveinstruction and direction through ambassadorialchannels. In a very few isolated instances inwhich the decision-making process included theState Department and the ambassador, the partyinstitutes have refused to accede to the directionof the ambassador regarding the inclusiveness orexclusiveness of party participation and havewithdrawn their programs. As private, nonprofitinstitutions, it is within the rights of theseinstitutes to reject support for political partyprogramming.

D. Program Formats

Both institutes tend to use the same generaltypes of programming formats, although thesubstance of their activities varies considerably.The types of formats most frequently usedinclude multi-party training seminars andworkshops, multi-party roundtables andconferences, single-party training seminars andworkshops, single-party consultations, foreignstudy and/or training missions, and visits ofinternational delegations.

These seminars, conferences, and workshops areconducted at the national, regional, and locallevels. Most involve the participation of foreigntrainers and resource people. Many trainingactivities involve hands-on exercises includingsimulations and role playing. Many also useguides, manuals, check-lists, and other materialsproduced by the institutes. Frequently seminarsand workshops are combined with individual orsingle-party consultations and training sessions.

There are some differences in emphasis withregard to program design both between andwithin the two institutes. IRI has tended to placegreater emphasis on single-party seminars andworkshops. NDI has emphasized the importanceof building international, regional, and sub-regional networks of democratic parties andCSOs, while IRI is beginning to place moreemphasis on this approach. Within eachinstitute, the varied character of programsreflects differences in conditions across regions,the priorities and perspectives of regionaldirectors, and differences with regard to theavailability of funding.

Both institutes increasingly are recruiting fieldstaff with the expertise needed to address thespecific needs of parties in a given country. As aresult, these representatives are doing a largershare of the training themselves. Short-terminternational experts are still used to bringadded expertise and prestige to programs,though the field representatives do the follow-ontraining after visits of international experts. IRI


has, in the past, tended to use more Americantrainers and resource people, while NDI hastended to have more of a mix of American andnon-American trainers. Both institutes are alsoplacing greater emphasis on training local partyactivists so that training skills are transferredand will survive beyond the life of the institutesprograms, including recent efforts of IRIdirected at training local activists as trainers inBulgaria, Lithuania, Russia, and South Africa.

E. Principal Areas of IRI and NDI ProgramActivity

The majority of IRI and NDI party developmentprograms are intended to assist parties in threecritical areas following the tripartiteconceptualization of political parties outlined inSection IV: a) competing in elections, b)developing into broad-based, viable, andinternally democratic organizations, and c)participating effectively in governance.28 Giventhe concentration of the institutes’ programs inthese three areas, they can be considered the“core” of USAID-funded political partyprogramming. Additionally, the institutesfrequently undertake programs intended to doone or more of the following: a) facilitatecoalition building; b) improve relations betweenor among parties; c) promote election and partylaw reform; d) increase the participation andleadership of women as political actors; and e)provide international exposure and support forfledgling democratic parties. In general, thesecan be considered “supplemental” activities,although in some countries they are central tothe party development program. These “core”and “supplemental” programs are discussedbelow.

1. Core Programs

To date, IRI and NDI have concentrated onproviding “how to” or “nuts and bolts” trainingto parties to enhance their electoralcompetitiveness and help them to becomebroad-based, viable, and internally democraticorganizations. A third “core” program area ofhelping parties to play effective roles in goodgovernance has had less emphasis in theinstitutes’ overall programming. The three areclosely related and frequently overlap, but aresufficiently different so as to warrant separateconsideration.

a. Enhancing parties’ electoralcompetitiveness

Elections are critical to democracy and partiesare critical actors in elections. Parties competingin elections give voters a choice ofrepresentatives and policies. But for parties towant to participate in elections, they must feelthat they can be competitive. And in order forthem to accept the outcome, they must haveconfidence in the fairness of the electoralprocess. While elections are particularlyimportant in transitional, new, or even relativelyconsolidated democracies, elections that areissueless, violent, or boycotted can seriouslyundermine the legitimacy of democraticinstitutions and leaders.

Elections are often the institutes’ access pointfor working with and gaining the trust ofpolitical parties and their leaders. IRI and NDIprograms to develop campaign skills forcandidates within parties typically includetraining in the following areas: development andimplementation of campaign strategies, publicopinion polling, message development,communications and media relations,recruitment of party members and volunteers,fundraising, and the development andimplementation of get-out-the-vote campaigns.

There is ample evidence that many campaignskills taught in institute-led trainings have beenadopted and used effectively by parties aroundthe world. In many cases it has led to more and

28The tripartite conceptualization of politicalparty assistance is used explicitly by NDI; see LisaMcLean, Political Party Development, (Washington,DC: National Democratic Institute for InternationalAffairs, 1996), pp. 5-6.


better choices for voters and more issue-basedcampaigns. In some cases this type ofprogramming has contributed to electoralvictories by democratic forces; in others it hasmeant stronger than expected showings. Thishas been the case in particular with NDI’sprogram in Bosnia and IRI’s programs inMongolia, Romania, Russia, and Slovakia.

b. Developing broad-based, viable, andinternally democratic parties

The ability to field competitive candidates inelections is an essential function of politicalparties, but it does not guarantee thedevelopment of broad-based, viable, orinternally democratic parties. For this to occur,there must be an evolution from personalisticparties to more broad-based and institutionalizedparties.

There are many challenges in the developmentand institutionalization of political partyorganizations. Party leaders may be morefocused on winning elections than on buildingbroad-based and sustainable parties. Afterelections, the organizational gains made duringa campaign are often not maintained. Gettingand maintaining the attention of party leaderswhen they are in government is a majorchallenge. It also may be difficult to persuadethose leaders to view party development assomething that has value separate from makingparties electorally competitive. In turn, partyleaders may be wary of making changes in theirparty’s formal or informal procedures andstructures if they might result in a weakening oftheir authority.

Many of the skills used in campaigns are alsoapplicable to long-term party development.Additionally, IRI and NDI programs devoted toparty development typically include training inthe following:

C Drafting party by-laws and codes of conductC Building local party chaptersC Increasing and broadening membership

leadership developmentC Using polling, surveys, and focus groupsC Developing messages and platformsC Communicating with members and the

publicC Mobilizing resources and fund raisingC Enhancing internal party democracy

Examples of such programs include NDI’sprogram in Poland and IRI’s program inUkraine, where activities have focused uponlocal party branches and contributed to both a“renewal of democratic parties” and a morestable party system. NDI’s program in SouthAfrica has an extensive constituency outreachcomponent aimed at strengthening local partyorgans and improving local-center relationswithin the party, as well as providing techniquesfor outreach to the citizenry at large. IRI hasconducted similar programs in Poland, Russia,and Yugoslavia. In Bosnia, NDI’s program hascontributed to the survival of multi-ethnicparties and has assured them a voice.

The development of regional and/or local partychapters has become a major aspect of most IRIand NDI party development programs. There aregood reasons to emphasize the development oflocal party chapters: it broadens theorganizational and geographic base of parties.Local chapters connect national leadership tothe grassroots level and serve to contribute tothe development of new party leaders. Localparty leaders are often more receptive to trainingthan national leaders, as party assistance isgenerally viewed as less “political” when it isout of the capital. But such localized work canalso be expensive, requires a significantcommitment of time, and involves a degree oftrial and error. This is particularly true in rapidlychanging political environments. With regard toincreasing and broadening membershipdevelopment, most emphasis has been placedupon recruiting individual members as opposedto organizations or associations such as NGOsor unions. In many Central and EasternEuropean countries, such as Croatia andMacedonia, parties traditionally have separate


youth and women’s organizations. These caseshave provided openings for work to expandthose constituencies.

Leadership development is critical to the long-term success and sustainability of parties. Oneof the reasons many parties, especially those inLatin America and South Asia, have lost theirpopular appeal is because they are notgenerating new and effective political leaders.Leadership development must occur on both thenational and the local levels. Women in politicsprograms often serve as an effective means bywhich to train new leadership. In addition,tapping into the vast pool of youthleadership—typically enormous populations indeveloping nations—can be a great resource forbringing about fresh new leadership. Nationalparty leaderships must have the depth to survivethe high degree of turnover that characterizesmany parties—particularly relatively newparties. Local level leadership developmentserves to both strengthen parties at the locallevel and broaden the pool from which newnational leaders are drawn. For example, thenext generation of leadership of the AfricanNational Congress in South Africa may wellcome from the provinces where IRI hasconducted local political party programming. Itis important that USAID programmingcontinues to support new and innovativeapproaches to leadership development inpolitical parties, both within countries and at theregional levels.

Effective message development often leads togreater differentiation among parties. It tends toprompt parties to broaden their platforms andstrengthens the links between parties and voters.In essence, it allows for party leaders to reachout to their constituents to discover what issuesmatter most to them, and create new platformsand campaigns based upon such popularopinion. The use of polling, surveys, and focusgroups often helps to make parties morecompetitive and more responsive to membersand the public. Moreover, in racially orethnically divided societies, IRI and NDI have

introduced polling as a way to show partyleaders that citizens are concerned with issuesother than race and ethnicity, therebyencouraging parties to broaden their platformsand constituencies. The challenge of fundraising is a critical issue toparties in many countries, particularly in manylow-income countries of Africa and South Asia.Ruling parties usually have access togovernment resources or funding fromoligarches and/or big business. At the sametime, in countries with a rapidly increasingpenetration of the mass media, campaigns arebecoming increasingly dependent uponexpensive advertising, further increasing thesignificance of funding. But new or oppositionparties frequently lack a stable or broad base offinancial support. Inadequate funding can makeit very difficult to contest elections or to build anational party. The absence of a broad fundingbase also gives greater influence to individualsand groups in the parties who do have money,thus reinforcing the tendency for personality-driven parties.

Both institutes assert that internaldemocratization is an important dimension of allof their party development programs. Typicallytheir programs include components on how tomake party by-laws, leadership, candidateselection, and other formal decision-makingprocesses more democratic. But in the face ofthe possibility that party leaders will feelthreatened by greater internal democracy, itappears that the institutes rarely press very hardfor internal reform or make it a condition fortheir assistance. The institutes make aconvincing case that “head on” assaults on thepower of entrenched leaders usually are bothineffective and counterproductive. In addition,they correctly point out that there are other waysto enhance internal democracy, includingmaking decision-making more bottom-up andparticipatory, improving intra-partycommunication and the flow of information, andbroadening both the sources of and the controlover funding.


Placed in the larger context of organizationaldevelopment, however, internal democracy is asecondary concern as USAID civil societyprogramming provides direct funding to CSOswithout any fixed standard for internaldemocratic processes. Furthermore, indemocratic organizational governance, thefreedom to join or quit a political party or aninterest group is the ultimate measure ofdemocratic practices. A strict standard oforganizational democracy would not be met byeither of the two major parties in the UnitedStates.

c. Helping parties to participate effectively ingovernance

Both capabilities of parties and the character ofthe party system influence the quality ofgovernance in a number of important ways.Parties must be able to participate effectively ingovernance, whether in an executive capacity, inparliament, in local government, or in theopposition. IRI and NDI programs intended tostrengthen the ability of parties to play aneffective role in governance include training inthe following:

C Coalition-building and inter-party relationsC Understanding legislative and legal

proceduresC Creating effective legislative caucuses and

committeesC Interacting with advocacy groups and the

mediaC Communicating with constituents and the

general publicC Training party members involved in local

governmentC Training party representatives on role of

opposition in governance IRI and NDI have done relatively few programson governance targeted explicitly to parties dueto greater demands for election and generalparty development and the fact that governanceprograms usually have the legislative

institutions as their primary focus, rather thanparties within the institutions.

For example, IRI’s post-election program inMongolia and NDI’s parties in parliamentprogram in Georgia were effective andsuccessful governance programs utilizingpolitical parties as a major component of theactivities. In both South Africa and Malawi,NDI’s work with legislatures on constituencyoutreach has contributed to party-building. Inaddition, IRI training of local governmentcounselors in the KwaZulu/Natal region ofSouth Africa has enabled the development andimplementation of effective economicdevelopment plans. Both institutes see the needfor greater focus on governance in their partyprograms and greater focus on parties as actorsin their governance programs.

2. Supplemental Program Activities

“Supplemental” program activities are activitiesthat may be very important to the institutes’party development programs, but are not alwaysincluded as part of the “core” party buildingprograms. They tend to address the frequentlysituational needs of individual parties or aredirected at affecting the broader political orlegal environment in which parties operate.“Supplemental” programs include activitiesintended to facilitate coalition building, improveinter-party relations, promote election and partylaw reform, increase the participation of womenand youth, and provide international exposureand support.

a. Coalition building

In many countries there has been a proliferationof political parties. Coalition building canenable small parties to create viable electoralblocs and frequently it is essential to governingin multi-party systems. Additionally, oppositionparties may need to form coalitions to enhancetheir effectiveness. Because of this, the abilityof parties to form and maintain coalitions can be


very important to meaningful elections andeffective governance.

While coalition building skills should be taught,it is important not to promote coalitions whenconditions or circumstances are not conduciveto such a process. Excessive multi-partyism orfragmentation may be a post-transitionphenomenon, a function of the electoral system,or a reflection of underlying social cleavages. Insome post-transition countries, a large numberof parties may form initially, especially as anti-authoritarian opposition movements becomefragmented. It may be better to allow for anatural and more sustainable, if more gradualconsolidation of parties through a series ofelections. Moreover, there are also down sidesto coalition building. In some African countries,coalition building between the government andthe opposition may in fact result in cooptation ofthe opposition and a dangerous diminution ofgenuine multi-party politics.

Coalition building skills vary in breadth butinclude such activities as introducing models forjoint decision-making and candidate selection,melding platforms, and responding to the needsof smaller coalition members. A number of IRIand NDI programs have emphasized coalitionbuilding in order to encourage a unitedopposition or in response to a fragmented andunstable party system, including IRI programs inBulgaria, Romania, and Slovakia and NDIprograms in Chile, Nicaragua, and Poland.

b. Improving inter-party relations

In new or fragile democracies, it is critical to beespecially careful to avoid party-based violenceand extremism, and to keep parties committed tocompeting within the democratic system.Reducing tension and mistrust between oramong parties can be critical in conflict-riddenor post-conflict situations where parties have ahistory of fighting each other. This is also truein a variety of other violence-prone situationscharacterized by extreme partisanship.

Programs to improve inter-party relationstypically are carried out in the time immediatelypreceding potentially contentious or violentelections. But they also can be useful in tensepost-election situations or when one or moreparties are threatening to boycott parliament.Programs can include multi-party roundtables,efforts to get parties to adopt electoral codes ofconduct, and seminars and study missions forparties that address procedural or policy issuesthat threaten a breakdown in the parliamentaryprocess. For example, pre-election inter-partysymposia conducted by IRI in Haiti helped inreducing violence during the election. InYemen, NDI has played a mediating role, and,as a representative noted, “it is only underNDI’s auspices that all parties will cometogether.”

c. Promoting election and party law reform

Election and party laws are critically importantto the functioning of parties in countries where abasic respect for rule of law with a functioningjudicial system exists. Laws that determine theconfiguration of the electoral system are oftenembedded in or reflective of constitutionalprovisions; therefore, they are not frequently oreasily changed. However, laws and regulationsgoverning the administration and conduct ofelections—such as the duration of the campaignperiod, rules governing parties and monitors,and regulations governing campaignexpenditures—are acts of legislation oradministrative regulations. The same is true forlaws and regulations governing the formation,membership, conduct, and financing of politicalparties.

Design and reform of electoral systems, whenopportunities present themselves, can bepowerful tools for addressing the problems offragmented or highly factionalized partysystems. To date, the party institutes have beeninvolved in electoral system design/reform onlyinfrequently. Typically, programs such as theseprovide political leaders and decision-makerswith information regarding models of electoral


systems. IFES, an NGO that is linked to NDIand IRI through the USAID-funded CEPPSmechanism, does undertake significantprogramming in this area.

Fair election laws arrived at with theparticipation of all concerned parties are criticalfor legitimate elections. Legitimate elections, inturn, produce both credible victories andcredible defeats. Of the two, credible defeats areprobably more important in new democracies:the losers must accept the defeat. Credibledefeats also stimulate leadership and policychanges within defeated parties. IFES frequentlygives advice and comments on draft election andparty laws; to a lesser extent, NDI and IRIprovide assessments of electoral and party laws.The party institutes and IFES also encourageelection commissions to consult with parties andcitizens groups. Finally, it is also important toeducate parties about their legal recourse,should meaningful channels exist, and toencourage advocacy for reform well in advanceof elections. Examples of programs focusedupon electoral law include NDI’s 1992 programpreceding the elections in Albania, where theinstitute worked with political leaders to “draftan accountable and inclusive” election law. InSenegal, NDI’s support of election reformprevented a boycott of the election. NDI alsoworked with parties and NGOs in Bosnia toadvocate for electoral law reform. And inRussia, NDI conducted seminars anddisseminated information on the election law.Similarly, IRI has conducted electoral lawdrafting programs in Cambodia, Mexico,Nicaragua, and Russia.

d. Promoting the participation of women andyouth

Programs aimed at increasing women’s politicalparticipation in emerging democracies havegrown in strength and number in the past severalyears. In addition, there has been markedsuccess with programs to tap into youthleadership for increased political activism. Suchprograms, often used as entrées to democracy

assistance in countries at early stages of politicaldevelopment, are in many contexts essential topromoting an inclusive, representativedemocratization process.

Although women-in-politics programs varywidely in scope, from leadership and advocacytraining to voter education to candidate trainingto “effectiveness in governance” seminars, allseek to address the concerns of particularpolitical environments in enhancing the role ofwomen in public life. This type of programmingis an integral component of political partydevelopment assistance. Not only do women inpolitics programs work to strengthen politicalparties’ constituent connection to the femalehalf of the population, but they provide supportfor women to be leaders in their communitiesand to articulate issues of political concernthrough the competitive electoral process.Parties can only benefit from the contribution ofwomen leaders as they strive to be morerepresentative and influential politicalinstitutions in democratizing societies.

While women-in-politics programs havepreviously been categorized as distinct andseparate components of democracy assistance,their link to political party development is clear.Currently, both formal and informal barriers towomen’s full participation exist at both localand national levels in societies around the globe.Women and other previously excluded ormarginalized political actors often benefit fromprograms specifically targeted at furthering theirpolitical skills and participatory capacities.

e. Providing international exposure andcontacts

The two institutes also stress the importance ofexposing nascent democrats to democraticpractices and to connecting them to otherdemocrats around the world. In Africa and theMiddle East, there is a particular need to debateand understand democratic institutions andprocesses, to show models that can work inthose regions, and to reassure traditional elites


that they can survive democratic transitions.And, at the time of publication, in pre-transitioncountries like China and countries in the midstof democratic transitions such as Indonesia andNigeria, struggling democrats value theknowledge, expertise, and solidarity that comefrom contacts with other democrats. In Central and Eastern Europe, for instance,NDI has brought in leaders from other countrieswho have been through difficult transitions,such as Poles, Czechs, and Hungarians, to giveguidance and support to leaders in countriesgoing through transitions. Similarly, NDIapplied a similar approach in East and CentralAfrica. In that program, a delegation of severalparty international representatives was broughtto speak at seminars in the Benin, CentralAfrican Republic and Congo-Brazzaville, inorder to discuss concepts of Western democraticpolitical thought. IRI has conducted regionalprograms in Central and Eastern Europe as wellas in Russia through the Moscow School ofPolitical Studies.

F. Synthesis of IRI and NDI Political Party Assistance

In reviewing the body of work undertaken byIRI and NDI during the 1990s, 10 generalconclusions may be reached regarding theformulation and implementation of USAID-funded political party assistance. First, partyassistance programs must be cognizant of andtempered by fundamental political, institutional,socio-economic, and cultural conditions thatmay limit the potential impact of political partytraining and technical advice. This is not anargument against political party programs;rather, it is an argument for well-designed,multi-dimensional, and long-term programs.Second, for party assistance programs tosucceed, they must address both the needs ofpolitical parties, as determined by the partyleaders themselves, and also encourage or pushparty leaders to look beyond traditionalhierarchical organizational approaches or short-term needs, such as winning elections. Third,

IRI and NDI party development programs havefocused most often and had the greatest impactin situations where there have been major orpartial political openings that allow new partiesto emerge and face the challenge of contestingelections. IRI and NDI have been much lessactive in countries with established politicalparties where the challenge is party reform,though this is changing in Latin America whereboth institutes have refocused their attention onpolitical party development. Political partyreform is destined to become a central challengein future development programming as partiesand party systems mature. Fourth, in recentyears, there have been numerous examples ofthe institutes being more selective or lessinclusive with regard to the parties with whichthey work.

Fifth, most IRI and NDI programs have focusedon helping parties mount successful electioncampaigns. There are several reasons for thispattern of support: 1) elections have been keyevents in many regions over the last six years; 2)elections have been the primary concern ofparties; and 3) USAID funding has beenavailable for political party assistance in thecontext of upcoming elections. Assisting partieswith election campaigns is usually a goodstarting point from which to work with partieson other issues. It is relatively easy to train aparty cadre to run campaigns; it is a technical,time bound exercise with a set of techniques thatare relatively universal and have clear criteriafor evaluating success or failure. It is muchharder to alter the organization and behavior ofparties outside of elections. The challenge is tomove from helping with election campaigns tolong-term party building. It is not always easy tofollow election-related party work with long-term party development work, however.Embassies and missions are more likely toallocate funding for elections assistance than forpost-election political party development work,although both institutes have advocated a morecontinuous approach. After elections, winningparties are often less interested in partydevelopment while losing parties are often


dispirited and disorganized. Most campaigntechniques, such as membership developmentand fundraising, can be employed to maintainparties after elections.

Sixth, working with parties on regional andlocal levels is key to long-term partydevelopment. Unfortunately, it is expensive,requires time and effort outside the capital, andinvolves a degree of trial and error, especially inrapidly changing political environments.Seventh, modern, advanced Americantechniques and models are of limited relevanceto parties in most new or developingdemocracies. They need to be modified andcombined with relevant grassroots, basictechniques and models. It can be important toshow that Americans do not have all theanswers to the problems facing parties andelectoral politics. Similarly, training for partyleaders in the United States may be very useful,but only if there are clear applications to theirown party and/or electoral systems and suchtraining is a productive addition to in-countrytraining. Eighth, trust between trainers and partyrepresentatives is essential and takes time todevelop. A good field representative can act asan intermediary among parties, between factionswithin parties, and between opposition partiesand the government. Likewise, there needs to betrust between USAID and the party institutes.When USAID funds a party developmentprogram, its decision must be based onconfidence in the implementing organizationand should demonstrate some degree offlexibility when dealing with the implementingpartners.

Ninth, in limited situations, the most effectiveway of reforming party systems may be tosupport the development of selected civilsociety and labor groups in the absence of viablecompetitors to established political parties. Suchsupport may lead to the transformation of socialmovements into viable political parties, as wasthe case with the Solidarity Movement inPoland. And tenth, the concern with “U.S.intervention” in other countries’ domestic

politics must be anticipated and may bemitigated by the following actions:

C Be transparentC Have a clear and defensible set of criteria

for choosing which parties will receiveassistance

C Have both institutes work separately (withdifferent parties) or together in countrywhenever possible

C Emphasize training/technical assistanceover material assistance

C Adhere to a voluntary ban on formaltraining one month before an election, withthe exception of party pollwatcher training,which may continue during the final 30 daysof the election period


VII. FUNDING POLITICALPARTYDEVELOPMENT:THE NED OPTION

Thus far, all of the political party assistanceactivities presented have been funded byUSAID. There is another funding option,however, for political party development. TheNational Endowment for Democracy (NED)provides funding to the party institutes for partyassistance programming in addition to directassistance to NGOs around the world. Incomparison to USAID support to NDI and IRI,NED support is much more limited. With anannual budget of approximately $30 million,funded through a line item in the United StatesInformation Agency budget appropriation, NEDdivides roughly half of its annual budget equallyamong the four core institutes established withNED in 1983: IRI, NDI, the Center forInternational Private Enterprise, affiliated withthe U.S. Chamber of Commerce, and theAmerican Center for International LaborSolidarity, affiliated with the AFL-CIO. Theother half of its annual budget is allocated todirect support of democratic NGOs and toorganizational overhead. As a result, NDI andIRI each receives roughly $4 million from NEDannually.

USAID has made special note of NED and itsunique place in democracy assistance. FromBuilding Democracy, cited earlier:

USAID will ensure that its programs buildupon, but do not duplicate, the important workundertaken by the National Endowment forDemocracy. The endowment provides earlyfunding to support activities that stimulatemomentum for democratic change in pre-transitional and emerging transitionalenvironments. Its independence from the U.S.

government provides for flexibility inprogramming and in establishing partnerships.29

In an assessment of the relationship betweenUSAID and NED funding, initiated by concernsraised by the chairman of the HouseInternational Relations Committee, BenjaminGilman, two key features of NED werehighlighted:

Its status as a private organization and itsconsistent focus on supportingnongovernmental efforts to advance democracy.The NED’s independence from governmentenables it to pursue an innovative and risk-oriented grant strategy in a manner consistentwith broad U.S. national interests. While theendowment consults on an ongoing basis withthe State Department and with U.S. embassiesabroad on programmatic matters, it is not aninstrument for the direct implementation of U.S.foreign policy. At the same time, there are manyinstances where U.S. government programshave been able to replicate and expand uponinnovative NED programs that have producedpositive results. There are, of course, also anumber of cases where NED supportsorganizations or initiatives whose independencefrom government, including the U.S.government, may be essential for theircredibility in their own country and thereforefor the successful implementation of theprogram.30

Regarding the use of NED funds for politicalparty assistance programming, overwhelminglythe programs, activities, and direct assistancefunded by NED in pre-transitional countrieswithout USAID presence are targeted at NGOs

29USAID’s Strategies for SustainableDevelopment: Building Democracy, (Washington,DC: U.S. Agency for International Development,January 1994), p. 4.

30A Review of Democracy Programs Funded bythe U.S. Agency for International Development andthe National Endowment for Democracy,(Washington, DC: U.S. Agency for InternationalDevelopment, March 1, 1996), p. 2.


rather than political parties. In these instances,the choice of countries within which NED fundsactivities is not constrained by ForeignAssistance Act human rights requirements fordirect U.S. government development assistance.It is important for USAID missions to be awareof the NED option in political partyprogramming. Democracy officers should conferwith the Center as well as the implementingpartners, IRI and NDI, to identify NED-supported activities in order to ensure that ouractivities are complementary.

Although the bulk of NED-funded projects isfound in countries with USAID missions,31 NEDfunding for democracy to NDI and IRI providesthe party institutes with resources to undertakeprograms in countries without USAID presenceor in countries with USAID presence, butwithout democracy assistance programming.Due to a variety of political circumstances, thereare instances where official U.S. assistance isnot practical or is prohibited. In these instances,NED is able to provide support to dissidentmovements. Prior to the collapse of communismin Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, NEDprogramming supported fledgling pro-democracy movements in several communistcountries. NED has also been at the forefront infunding pro-democracy activities in Burma,China, and Sudan in recent years.

NED has funded NDI and IRI political partydevelopment programs in a number of countriesas well as at the regional level; most activitiesare one-time programs of short duration. From1990 to 1995, NED provided grants for single-event political party programs in 30 countries,with IRI and NDI each administering roughly

half of the programs. Multi-year programs wereundertaken in eight countries, while 16 regionalconferences were held during this timeframe. Inmany instances, these small NED grantprograms were continued with USAID supportin subsequent years.

31In FY 1994, the National Endowment forDemocracy funded programs in 83 countries; in 74 ofthose countries, USAID also had democracyprograms while in nine countries NED worked alone.See A Review of Democracy Programs Funded bythe U.S. Agency for International Development andthe National Endowment for Democracy, p. 7.


VIII. CONCLUSIONS

USAID’s political party development assistanceactivities have been fashioned by a number ofdiverse influences. The first is policy guidanceas detailed in a number of internally drivenUSAID publications, as well as by the ForeignAssistance Act of 1961.

Then the Agency’s long-term, process-orientedframework defines three key goals: 1) theestablishment and organizational developmentof viable, competing democratic political partiesat national, regional, and local levels; 2) theprovision of organized electoral choices tocitizens through political parties in elections;and 3) the democratic governance of societiesfacilitated by political parties serving asmanagers and organizers of government andopposition. These aims fall within USAID’sdemocracy assistance mandate and representmanageable, neutral, and efficacious objectivesfor political party development support.

Since it began its support of political partydevelopment in Hungary in 198932, USAID hassupported the development of democraticpolitical parties in more than 50 countriesthrough country-specific programming as wellas through regional political party training andassistance programs. These practicalexperiences have contributed significantly toUSAID programming in this area.

Building on the Agency’s knowledge andexperience base, future programming willrequire attention to four distinct concerns:inclusiveness, interference with the domesticaffairs of a sovereign state, electoral influence,and timing. In considering and working toresolve them, the Center anticipates working

even more closely with NDI and IRI to make thenext 20 years as successful as the last.

32David Breg, USAID Political PartyDevelopment Activities, (Washington, DC:CDIE/DI/RRS, U.S. Agency for InternationalDevelopment, March 1996), p. 5.

OTHER DEMOCRACY AND GOVERNANCEPUBLICATIONS FROM USAID

PN-ACB-895Alternative Dispute Resolution Practitioners Guide

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PN-ACC-390Handbook of Democracy and Governance Indicators

PN-AAX-280Weighing in on the Scales of Justice

PN-ACD-395Democracy and Governance: A Conceptual Framework

PN-ACE-070A Handbook on Fighting Corruption

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