U.S.-Russia Economic Relations: Myths and Realities · 2020-04-17 · OCTOBER 2017 U.S.- Russia...

58
AUTHOR Vadim Grishin Myths and Realities A Report of the CSIS RUSSIA AND EURASIA PROGRAM U.S.-Russia Economic Relations OCTOBER 2017

Transcript of U.S.-Russia Economic Relations: Myths and Realities · 2020-04-17 · OCTOBER 2017 U.S.- Russia...

Page 1: U.S.-Russia Economic Relations: Myths and Realities · 2020-04-17 · OCTOBER 2017 U.S.- Russia Economic Relations Myths and Realities AUTHOR Vadim Grishin A REPORT OF THE CSIS RUSSIA

COVER PHOTO ADOBE STOCK

1616 Rhode Island Avenue NW

Washington DC 20036

202 887 0200 | wwwcsisorg

v++ISBN 978-1-4422-8035-9

Lanham bull Boulder bull New York bull London

4501 Forbes Boulevard

Lanham MD 20706

301 459 3366 | wwwrowmancom

A U T H O R

Vadim Grishin

Myths and Realities

A Report of the

CSIS RUSSIA AND EURASIA PROGRAM

US-RussiaEconomicRelations

O C T O B E R 2 0 1 7

Euml|xHSLEOCy280359z

The Man Pupu Nyor Rock Formations at the Northern Urals also known as Seven

Strong Man or Little Mountain of the God in the local tribe (Mansi) language

Blank

O C T O B E R 2 0 1 7

US- Russia Economic RelationsMyths and Real ities

AUTHOR

Vadim Grishin

A REPORT OF THE

CSIS RUSSIA AND EURASIA PROGRAM

Lanham bull Boulder bull New York bull London

594-71613_ch00_4Pindd 1 102017 403 PM

About CSIS

For over 50 years the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) has worked

to develop solutions to the worldrsquos greatest policy challenges Today CSIS scholars are

providing strategic insights and bipartisan policy solutions to help decisionmakers chart a

course toward a better world

CSIS is a nonprofit organ ization headquartered in Washington DC The Centerrsquos 220 full-

time staff and large network of affiliated scholars conduct research and analy sis and develop

policy initiatives that look into the future and anticipate change

Founded at the height of the Cold War by David M Abshire and Admiral Arleigh Burke CSIS

was dedicated to finding ways to sustain American prominence and prosperity as a force for

good in the world Since 1962 CSIS has become one of the worldrsquos preeminent international

institutions focused on defense and security regional stability and transnational

challenges ranging from energy and climate to global health and economic integration

Thomas J Pritzker was named chairman of the CSIS Board of Trustees in November 2015

Former US deputy secretary of defense John J Hamre has served as the Centerrsquos president

and chief executive officer since 2000

CSIS does not take specific policy positions accordingly all views expressed herein should

be understood to be solely those of the author(s)

copy 2017 by the Center for Strategic and International Studies All rights reserved

ISBN 978-1-4422-8035-9 (pb) 978-1-4422-8036-6 (eBook)

Center for Strategic amp International Studies Rowman amp Littlefield

1616 Rhode Island Ave nue NW 4501 Forbes Boulevard

Washington DC 20036 Lanham MD 20706

202-887-0200 | wwwcsis org 301 - 459 - 3366 | www rowman com

594-71613_ch00_4Pindd 2 102017 403 PM

III

Contents

iv Acknowl edgments

1 CHAPTER 1 | Introduction

4 CHAPTER 2 | Does Bilateral Economic Interaction Matter

11 CHAPTER 3 | Politics in the Driverrsquos Seat

15 CHAPTER 4 | Are the United States and Rus sia ldquoNatu ralrdquo Trading Partners

A Little Bit of History

19 CHAPTER 5 | Sector Analyses

41 CHAPTER 6 | Diversity and Constraints

47 CHAPTER 7 | Existing Trends and Future Scenarios

50 About the Author

594-71613_ch00_4Pindd 3 102017 403 PM

The author wishes to thank the participants of a draft paper discussion William Arnold Jack

Brougher Matthew Edwards Daniel Fried Andrew Kuchins Randy Levinas Gary Litman Jeff

Mankoff Cyrus Newlin Olga Oliker Ian Solomon Doug Stanglin and Angela Stent

This report is made pos si ble by the generous support of Car ne gie Corporation of New York

Acknowl edgments

Iv

594-71613_ch00_4Pindd 4 102017 403 PM

1

01

Introduction

A friend of mine a devoted connoisseur of bilateral economic relations with 30 years of experi-

ence in the field once noted that the hottest discussions about US- Russia ties occur at a time

when mutual trade is compressed into the value of a mathematical error This is exactly what is

happening now According to official statistics the value of US- Russia trade is about $20 billion

and is rolling back to the level of 20051 There is no doubt that a new set of sanctions recently

signed into law by the US president and currently being implemented will further hurt economic

interaction by reducing financial inflows limiting the transfer of technology and expertise and

dampening business confidence Many policymakers and experts have agreed that HR 3364

(Countering Amer i carsquos Adversaries through Sanctions Act2) by expanding and codifying US

sanctions targeting Rus sia opens a new cycle in bilateral relations This legislation which received

overwhelming bipartisan support creates a new economic and po liti cal framework on a bilateral

track Strong concerns expressed by President Donald Trump in his special statement about

ldquounconstitutional provisions of the ldquoflawed billrdquo3 cannot significantly limit its intended and

unintended consequences In its implementation it could have relatively broad margins of flexibil-

ity and leverage but requires the president to seek congressional approval before easing or termi-

nating sanctions against Rus sia or undertaking actions that would significantly modify US policy

toward Rus sia Additional observations regarding HR 3364rsquos pos si ble impact on US- Russia

interaction in par tic u lar industries can be found throughout this report but suffice it to say that it

will contribute to a broader curtailment of many pillars of economic cooperation for years ahead

1 US Census Bureau ldquoForeign Trade Trade in Goods with Rus siardquo Foreign Trade updated June 29 2017 https

wwwcensus gov foreign - trade balance c4621 html

2 Countering Amer i carsquos Adversaries through Sanctions Act HR 3364 115th Cong (2017ndash2018) https www

congress gov bill 115th - congress house - bill 3364

3 Donald J Trump ldquoStatement by President Donald J Trump on the Signing of HR 3364rdquo White House Office of the

Press Secretary August 2 2017 https wwwwhitehouse gov the - press - office 2017 08 02 statement - president

- donald - j - trump - signing - hr - 3364

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 1 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations2

Escalating geopo liti cal tensions have continued to significantly define Rus siarsquos economic prospects

however the countryrsquos economic model exhausted itself long before the dramatic deterioration of

relations with the West Structural bottlenecks have seriously limited Rus siarsquos growth capacity even

during the previous period of high oil prices4

The purpose of this report is to assess what has gone wrong with the US- Russia equation by

analyzing it through the prism of a bilateral economic and po liti cal trajectory while keeping in

mind the structural constraints of the Rus sian economy It will attempt to answer the following

questions

bull Do bilateral economic relations matter

bull Are the United States and Rus sia ldquonatu ralrdquo or ldquounnaturalrdquo trading partners

bull What future scenarios can we expect

In the vast lit er a ture on US- Russia economic relations analy sis of developing trends in bilateral

commerce has always been accompanied by discussions around impor tant po liti cal and eco-

nomic matters particularly regarding US legislation and regulation5 Over several de cades the

most controversial issues concerned the granting of permanent normal trading status to Rus sia

through legislation that eliminated the Jackson- Vanik Amendment and Rus siarsquos accession to

the World Trade Organ ization (WTO) The Magnitsky Act signed into law in 2012 repealed the

Jackson- Vanik provisions but added legislation providing authority for the US government to

withhold visas and freeze assets of Rus sians thought to have been involved with human rights

violations and later imposed sanctions on Rus sia because of its involvement in the Ukrainian and

Syrian crises and its cyber- enabled activities6

Some have observed deficiencies in Rus siarsquos participation in the international division of labor

(reliance on the export of energy and metals) which ldquo canrsquot serve any more as a basis for further

expansion of the countryrsquos position in world markets including the US marketrdquo7 Unfortunately

such observations have not been accompanied by quantitative and qualitative analy sis of structural

constraints in the Rus sian foreign trade model Many authors limit their policy recommendations

for fostering bilateral economic relations to a requirement for a strong initial push from respective

governments the creation of business working groups and the extension of bilateral and multilat-

eral legal grounds for economic cooperation Such instruments proved to be useful in facilitating

4 International Monetary Fund (IMF) Rus sian Federation Selected Issues (Washington DC IMF 2016)

5 ldquoAmer i carsquos New Economic Sanctions May Hurt Rus siarsquos Recoveryrdquo Economist August 5 2017 Andrey Kortunov and

Olga Oliker eds A Roadmap for US- Russia Relations (Washington DC CSISRIAC 2017) https csis - prods3

amazonaws com s3fs - public publication 170815 _ KortunovOliker _ USRussiaRelations _ Web pdf E0bdGVHlxxYRAxhO

w8zJ9tbRGwdWjEgV Самуйлов CM Братерский MB ldquoКонгресс и торговые отношения США с Россиейrdquo [US

Congressrsquos role in the US- RF trade relations] США и Канада экономика политика культура 5 no 533 (May 2014)

6 Andrew Weiss and Richard Nephew ldquoThe Role of Sanctions in US- Russian Relationsrdquo (Task Force White Paper

Car ne gie Endowment for International Peace Washington DC July 11 2016)

7 Глущенко ЮН ldquoСостояние проблемы и перспективы сотрудничества России и США в экономической сфереrdquo

[Status prob lems and prospects of Russia- US economic cooperation] Проблемы Национальной Стратегии 21 no 6

(2013) 148ndash164

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 2 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 3

trade and investment during several reset cycles in bilateral relations starting in the 1990s but

they were only partially successful

Several papers and books although focused primarily on bilateral po liti cal agendas or sectorial

analy sis underline the importance of Rus sian domestic realities Dr Angela Stent in her ldquoLimits of

Partnershiprdquo notes that state control of the commanding heights in the Rus sian economy creates

significant deterrents for US private- sector entrance into the market8 Thane Gustafson in the

ldquoWheel of Fortunerdquo asserts that Rus siarsquos growing dependence on revenue from oil exports along

with its inefficient and often- corrupt management of industry is unsustainable9 Andrew Kuchins

in his ldquoElevation and Calibration A New Rus sia Policy for Amer i cardquo has quoted some experts who

believe that the weakened Rus sian economic position may over time contribute to some rap-

prochement with the West and emphasized lack of reforms as ldquoa key obstacle not only for Rus sian

economic recovery but also for improving ties with the Westrdquo10

In a recent joint task force report Eugene Rumer Andrew S Weiss and Richard Sokolsky argue

that the concept of developing stronger economic ties with Rus sia as a foundation for improved

diplomatic relations has not worked ldquoClinton Bush and Obama all placed high hope on trade as

an engine of better relations with Rus sia All were frustrated by the fact that the two countries are

for the most part not natu ral trading partnersrdquo11 On a dif er ent note the former US envoy to

Rus sia Michael McFaul has defended the achievements of a reset policy under the Barack Obama

administration emphasizing that bilateral trade reached a rec ord level in 2011 Nevertheless he

also stresses that it was a one- time accomplishment unlikely to be repeated12

Voices of those who believe that extensive economic ties can provide stability to broader po liti cal

interaction are weaker than ever in an environment of growing protectionism and adversarial rivalry

8 Angela Stent The Limits of Partnerships US- Russian Relations in the XXI Century (Prince ton NJ Prince ton

University Press 2014) 98

9 Thane Gustafson Wheel of Fortune The Battle for Oil and Power in Rus sia (London Harvard University Press 2012)

10 Andrew Kuchins Elevation and Calibration A New Rus sia Policy for Amer i ca (Washington DC Center on Global

Interests 2016)

11 Eugene Rumer Richard Sokolsky and Andrew S Weiss ldquoTrump and Rus sia The Right Way to Manage Relationsrdquo

Foreign Affairs 96 no 2 (MarchApril 2017)

12 Michael McFaul ldquoUS- Russia Relationsrdquo (lecture Institute for Public Diplomacy and Global Communications

George Washington University Washington DC March 3 2017) https wwwc - span org video 424811 - 1 former

- ambassador - michael - mcfaul - discusses - state - usrussia - relations

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 3 102017 404 PM

4

02

Does Bilateral Economic Interaction Matter

Economic relations do not emerge out of a vacuum There are many variables that define the final

configuration of economic interactions such as a par tic u lar countryrsquos level of economic develop-

ment its business environment legal framework po liti cal climate (regime) culture and religion

history and tradition demography and geography as well as global and national economic cycles

An impor tant driver of trade relations for many economies has become participation in global and

regional trade agreements

As many studies and anecdotal evidence show bilateral economic cooperation should be sizable

and should relate to the economic growth of two countries in a way that afects their policy

interests Let us take as a reference point the BRICS countries1 a community of large emerging

economies which Rus sia belongs to Table 21 pres ents official data on US trade and investments

with BRICS states US- Russia trade in goods is disproportionally lowmdash235 times less than US

trade with China 33 times smaller than US trade with India and 28 times less than US trade

with Brazil The size of the US- Russia trade balance is comparable to the size of the US trade

balance with South Africa whose economy is almost four times smaller than Rus siarsquos If we add

trade in ser vices to the trade of goods the gaps increase significantly (Figures 21 and 22) The

diference is not only quantitative but also qualitative

The quality of trade relations can be mea sured by its diversity its share of high- tech components

resilience to economic shocks and its contribution to GDP growth On average a 10 percent

increase in a nationrsquos two- way trade relative to GDP increases GDP through a variety of channels

by at least 16 percent2

Bilateral trade and real GDP growth in the United States and Rus sia are practically uncorrelated

as shown in the summary output of multifactorial regression The coefficient of multiple determi-

nation (R Square) is close to 0 ( Table 22) At the same time the correlation of US exports to India

1 BRICS is the acronym for a select group of five developing economies Brazil Rus sia India China and South Africa

2 World Economic Forum Foreign Direct Investment as a Key Driver for Trade Growth and Prosperity The Case for a

Multilateral Agreement on Investment (Geneva World Economic Forum 2013) 11

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 4 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 5

Table 21 US Trade and Foreign Direct Investments (FDI) with China India Brazil South Africa and Rus sia 2016

China India Brazil South Africa Rus sia

Total Goods Trade 5786 677 565 13 203

Imports 4628 460 262 73 145

Exports 1158 217 303 55 58

Trade in Ser vices 696 472 317 47 na

Imports 161 268 68 17 na

Exports 535 203 249 30 na

US FDI 746 283 653 62 141

BRICS FDI in the United States

148 93 043 076 63

Supported Jobs in the United States (thousand)

911 197 308 50 84

Source United States Trade Representative (USTR) ldquoCountries amp Regionsrdquo accessed September 27 2017

https ustrgov countries - regions See US- China Trade Facts US- India Trade Facts US- Brazil Trade

Facts US- South Africa Trade Facts and US- Russia Trade Facts

201520142013

and China with the real GDP growth of these big Asian economies is significant (05) In the case of

Brazil the correlation is even higher (07) By contrast South Africarsquos small open economy is quite

sensitive to US imports from South Africa (043)3

In marked contrast to other BRICS countries Rus sia is a poor choice for export- oriented opera-

tions As a recent International Monetary Fund (IMF) study highlights Rus sia is an outlier a rare

exception among emerging market (EM) economies with virtually no preferential access to major

markets and little meaningful change over three de cades4 This complicates Rus siarsquos integration

into the global value chain (GVC) which became a significant driving force toward economic

development and trade for certain BRICS economies

3 IMF statistics authorrsquos computation

4 IMF Rus sian Federation Selected Issues IMF Country Report N17198 (Washington DC IMF July 2017)

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 5 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations6

Trade is closely connected with foreign direct investment (FDI) and both are parts of a complex

interaction known as international production sharing According to publicly available official data

US FDI in Rus sia was about $131 billion for 2013 and $295 billion for 2016 with the top industrial

sectors being software and IT ser vices financial ser vices chemicals metals coal oil and gas

and business ser vices5 If we take into account US investments made through Eu ro pean branches

of US companies and ofshore firms this number would easily triple Another component

that usually is not tracked by official statistics is reinvestments The American Chamber of

Commerce surveys in 2016 and 2017 which include this component draw a completely dif er ent

picture accumulated US corporate FDI in 90 large US companies working in Rus sia reached

5 US Department of Commerce International Trade Administration ldquoRussiamdash94- Foreign Direct Investment and

Portfolio Investment Statisticsrdquo Rus sia Country Commercial Guide July 7 2017 https wwwexport gov article

id=shyRussia - foreign - direct - investment - statistics

Figure 21 US Trade in Goods with China India Brazil Rus sia and South Africa Billion US$ 2016

Source USTR ldquoCountries amp Regionsrdquo See US- China Trade Facts US- India Trade Facts US- Brazil Trade

Facts US- South Africa Trade Facts and US- Russia Trade Facts

0

$50

$100

$150

$200

$250

$300

$350

$400

$450

$500

$550

$600

China India Brazil Russia South Africa

Exports

Imports

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 6 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 7

$8244 billion in 20176 The real level from our perspective is usually between official and private

estimations around $40 billon But even this cumulative figure is less than the US FDI in Brazil

and China

The American Chamber of Commerce surveys have also revealed other impor tant data Eighty-

five percent of US companies doing business in Rus sia entered its market 10 or more years ago

while 60 percent of them ldquolandedrdquo there 20 years ago or earlier Only one percent have started

operations over the last five years confirming an obvious fact entry into the Rus sian market is

challenging because of growing monopolism risks associated with the business climate and a

stagnating economy7

6 American Chamber of Commerce in Rus sia ldquoInvestment and Import to Rus sia 2nd Surveyrdquo (Prepared by GfK for the

American Chamber of Commerce in Rus sia Moscow May 2017) 12

7 Ibid 4

Figure 22 US Trade in Goods and in Ser vices with China India Brazil Rus sia and South Africa Billion US$ 2016

Source USTR ldquoCountries amp Regionsrdquo See US- China Trade Facts US- India Trade Facts US- Brazil Trade

Facts US- South Africa Trade Facts and US- Russia Trade Facts

0

$100

$200

$300

$400

$500

$600

$700

China India Brazil Russia South Africa

Trade in Services

Total Goods Trade

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 7 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations8

Rus sian direct investment position toward the United States declined from $215 billion in 2013 to

$83 billion in 2015 (Figure 23) Taking into account dif er ent channels and instruments the actual

volume of Rus sian investments in the United States made through ofshore Eu ro pean Canadian

and US companies may be several times greater than the available official data

Foreign investment in financial assets or foreign portfolio investment (FPI) should be included

even though Central Bank of Rus sia statistics indicate they were also quite low US investments in

equity were $345 million and in debt instruments were about $65 million in the fourth quarter of

20168 However these numbers do not reflect the real level of FPI Rus siarsquos stocks are incredibly

inexpensive while there has been impressive growth of US investments in short- term securities

and in foreign exchange (FX) operations (cash- and- carry trade) Rus sia was among the top per-

forming emerging markets in 2016 gaining 4744 percent in US dollars9 Nevertheless the gen-

eral capitalization of the stock exchange is tiny (less than 20 percent of GDP) comparable to the

capitalization of just one large US com pany such as Coca- Cola Many private sources believe that

the US FPI in Rus sia could be as high as several billion US dollars but a new set of sanctions

approved by President Trump on August 2 2017 if implemented could reverse those flows It is

still not clear whether the secretary of trea sury will prohibit participation in the oferings of Rus siarsquos

sovereign debt and the full range of derivative products A report on this subject should be sub-

mitted no later than 180 days after enactment of the law which means no later than Febru-

ary 2018 New legislation tightens prohibition on Rus sian financial companies already under

sanctions by limiting any new equity or debt with a maturity greater than 14 days (a provision that

8 Central Bank of Rus sia ldquoForeign Direct Investments in the Rus sian Federationrdquo accessed September 27 2017 www

cbr ru localization switchlanguage urlshy=shy news ampfromshy=shyru - ruamptoshy=shyen - gb

9 VanEck ldquoRus sian Stock Market Soars in 2016rdquo Seeking Alpha February 14 2017 https seekingalphacom article

4045602 - russian - stock - market - soars - 2016

Table 22 Summary Output of Regression Statistics (US Real GDP Rus sia Real GDP US- Russia Exports Imports and Total Trade)

Regression Statistics

Multiple R 0056445768

R Square 0003186125

Adjusted R Square minus0042123597

Standard Error 2616043923

Observations 24

Sources IMF statistics authorrsquos computation

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 8 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 9

previously allowed for 30 days) Similarly US persons are prohibited from taking on any new debt

that has a maturity greater than 60 days (previously it was 90 days) with Rus sian energy compa-

nies currently under sanctions10

According to the Trea sury Department Rus sia held $1029 billion in US Trea sury securities in

June 201711 Could Rus sia withdraw all its reserves from the United States and use this action as a

retaliatory mea sure Such a scenario is unlikely since there is no comparable safe- haven alterna-

tive to US dollars When Rus siarsquos US Trea sury holdings dropped 50 percent from $176 billion

(October 2010) to $90 billion (November 2011) the market did not notice12 Nevertheless Rus sian

authorities have announced they will decrease dependence on assets and payments in US dollars13

10 Countering Amer i carsquos Adversaries through Sanctions Act HR 3364

11 US Department of Trea sury Major Foreign Holders of Trea sury Securities September 18 2017 http ticdata

treasury gov Publish mfh txt

12 Ibid

13 ldquoНовый виток санкций Россия откажется от доллараrdquo [A new round of sanctions Rus sia will abandon the dollar]

Газетару August 7 2017 https wwwgazeta ru business 2017 08 07 10821937 shtml

Figure 23 Rus sia Outward FDI Position United States Equities and Debt Million US$ 2009ndash2016

Source Central Bank of the Rus sian Federation External Sector Statistics Rus sian Direct Investments

Abroad accessed September 27 2017 https wwwcbr ru localization switchlanguage urlshy=shy news

ampfromshy=shyru - ruamptoshy=shyen - gb

$6000

$8000

$10000

$12000

$14000

$16000

$18000

$20000

$22000

2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 9 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations10

Officially the country does not invest in the US stock exchange although some Rus sian oligarchs

have bought US corporate bonds and equities in large amounts The new sanctions law requires

the secretary of trea sury in consultation with the director of national intelligence and the secretary

of state to issue reports on Rus sian se nior po liti cal figures and oligarchs based on their closeness

to the Rus sian regime and their net worth as well as the exposure of key economic sectors of the

United States to Rus sian po liti cally exposed persons and parastatal entities including at a mini-

mum the banking securities insurance and real estate sectors14

Only three Rus sian companies are listed in the US exchanges

Overall the scale and scope of US- Russia economic interaction and business activity is much greater

than officially appreciated but not significant enough to be taken into consideration by policymakers

14 Countering Amer i carsquos Adversaries through Sanctions Act HR 3364

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 10 102017 404 PM

11

03

Politics in the Driverrsquos Seat

Bilateral economic relations depend to a great extent on global and national economic cycles

After the recent global financial crisis the US economy has shown surprisingly sustainable GDP

growth while the Rus sian economy was the most afected among BRICS countries by the turbu-

lence of a worldwide economic downturn in 2008ndash2009 and after a short- term rebound slipped

into stagnation (2012ndash2013) and then into full- scale recession (2014ndash2016) The countryrsquos eco-

nomic cycle however appears to be changing once again with the economy returning to a

pattern of growth albeit uneven and gradual (Figures 31 and 32) Even with sanctions still in place

conditions have improved as a result of the stabilization of Urals oil to an average annual price of

$419 per barrel in 2016 The gains were sparked in part by major crude producers agreeing to cut

production after hefty price drops in 2014 and 2015 Supported by easier financial conditions

higher oil prices and growing macro- stability Rus sia is heading toward a moderate growth rate

that is expected to reach 14 percent this year according to forecasts of the World Bank Group

(WBG) and the IMF1

Because of the significant role that politics plays in any bilateral interaction it is impor tant to

combine economic and po liti cal cycles applying a ldquoresetrdquo to bilateral economic cooperation in

addition to the po liti cal relationship I have compared po liti cal cycles and trade dynamics using the

following graphs ( Table 31 and Figure 33) These charts do not pretend to reflect with mathemati-

cal precision all shifts in the bilateral po liti cal relationship but rather attempt to visually align

impor tant economic and po liti cal moments to detect the efects of po liti cal events on the size of

bilateral trade

Figure 33 shows all pos si ble combinations economic trends at the intersection of po liti cal devel-

opments oppose or support each other in synchronization It is evident that po liti cal interference

1 International Monetary Fund Rus sian Federation Staff Concluding Statement of the 2017 Article IV Mission (Wash-

ington DC IMF 2017) World Bank Group From Recession to Recovery Rus sia Economic Report no 37 (Washington

DC World Bank 2017) http pubdocsworldbank org en 383241495487103815 RER - 37 - May26 - FINAL - with - summary

pdf

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 11 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations12

in bilateral business afairs in the early 2000s was less significant than in later years As result

growing po liti cal tensions from 2003 to 2008 did not dramatically afect bilateral economic inter-

action It is also easier to explain why 2011ndash2012 resulted in rec ord trade and investmentmdash a con-

sequence of very high oil prices GDP growth in both countries improved legislation after Rus siarsquos

accession to the WTO and the Obamandash Medvedev po liti cal reset From 2014 to 2016 a perfect

storm of developments added efficiency to Western sanctions and augmented the damaging

consequences of counter- sanction mea sures

Figure 33 also confirms that in times of reduced economic cooperation po liti cal pressures can

easily change bilateral economic trends Moreover business interests along with economic inter-

actions have a limited capacity to reverse the po liti cal mainstream

Figure 31 Economic Cycle 2014ndash2016

Source Authorrsquos evaluation of international financial institutions (IFI) data and sources from respective

countries

Sustainable Growth

Brazil

Negative Growth

Unstable Growth

Mexico

Descending Growth

Argentina

EU

US

Russia

Vietnam

China

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 12 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 13

Table 31 Po liti cal Cycles in Bilateral US- Russia Relations 1999ndash2016

2001ndash2002 The George W Bushndash Vladimir Putin Reset Rus sia supported ldquoglobal war on terrorismrdquo launched by the United States after 911 the SORT nuclear arms reduction treaty was signed by the United States and Rus sia and a successful business dialogue was developed that created the current structure of economic relations

2003ndash2008 Deterioration in bilateral relations brought on by the Iraq War Georgiarsquos ldquoRose Revolutionrdquo Mikhail Khodorkovskyrsquos arrest Ukrainersquos ldquoOrange Revolutionrdquo Kosovorsquos in de pen dence and the Georgian War

2009ndash2010 The Barack Obamandash Dmitry Medvedev Reset Rus sia served as a logistical hub for transportation and supply of US forces in Af ghan i stan United States and Rus sia signed the new START nuclear arms reduction treaty Rus sia backed tighter economic sanctions on Iran Rus sia gained access to the WTO after 18 years of negotiations

2011ndash2016 Deterioration in bilateral relations caused by the Ukrainian crisis which were followed by sanctions and counter- sanctions along with the Syrian crises and cyber- enabled activities

Source Authorrsquos evaluation of po liti cal and economic data

Note SORTthinsp=thinspStrategic Ofensive Reductions Treaty STARTthinsp=thinspStrategic Arms Reduction Treaty

Figure 32 Economic Cycle 2017ndash2019

Source Authorrsquos evaluation of IFI data and sources from respective countries

Egypt

VenezuelaEU

South Africa

Brazil

Russia

India

US

Descending Growth

Korea

China

Negative Growth

Unstable Growth

Sustainable Growth

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 13 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations14

Figure 33 US- Russia Trade Million US$ vs Po liti cal Cycle 2000ndash2016

Sources US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo Foreign Trade last modified June 29 2017

https wwwcensus gov foreign - trade balance c4621 html (see data for 2000ndash2016) authorrsquos evaluation

of po liti cal and economic data

Orange Revolution

Khodorkovskys arrest

GeorgianWar

Bush- Putin Reset

Iraq War Global Financial Crisis

Obama-Medvedev Reset

Russias WTO accession

New START Treaty

A Pefect Storm the Ukranian Crisis Oil Prices Crashing

Sanctions and Counter-Sanctions

$3000

$8000

$13000

$18000

$23000

$28000

$33000

$38000

$43000

2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 14 102017 404 PM

15

The current structure of US- Russia economic relations emerged in the early 2000s when the

model of trade and investment interaction took on a character similar to that which existed be-

tween the United States and developing economies US imports from Rus sia centered on com-

modities while technology along with food products lead American exports The primary

exception was that Rus sia supplied nuclear fuel including highly enriched uranium extracted from

nuclear weapons for US power plants and provided ser vices to the aerospace industry primarily

in satellite launches However both these exceptions can be explained as a legacy of the Soviet

past and not a harbinger of the future economic relationship (Figure 41)

In the last 15 years this trade structure has not changed significantly The only noticeable shift in

trade was a dramatic drop (to practically nothing) in exports of US agricultural products a result

of Rus siarsquos policy of import substitution and so- called counter- sanction mea sures it took in re-

sponse to US sanctions over the Ukraine crisis (Figure 42)

Promising new directions of cooperation in the IT sector and in engineering ser vices for the

aerospace industry appeared in the early 2000s1 but did not spill into other sectors and conse-

quently did little to renew economic cooperation on the whole The integration of Rus sian high-

tech ser vices into large- scale global production and value chains was constrained by the usual

culprits a lack of financial resources managerial experience skilled labor modern infrastructure

RampD investments and an adequate business environment High commodity prices incentivized the

restoration of an economic system centered on resource rents The leading role of oil and gas

extraction and transportation discouraged the development of a nonenergy sector that might

have created advanced and complex production and ser vices An import substitution policy could

not work efficiently in an economic environment plagued by the Dutch disease where currency

1 The Boeing Design Center was created in Moscow It consists of nearly 250 Boeing employees managing

a team of 1200 contract engineers from Rus sian and Ukrainian aerospace companies ldquoBackgrounder Boeing in

Rus siardquo Boeing last modified January 2017 http wwwboeing com resources boeingdotcom company key _ orgs

boeing - international pdf russia - cisbackgrounder pdf

Are the United States and Rus sia ldquoNatu ralrdquo Trading Partners A Little Bit of History

04

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 15 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations16

inflows (oil money) lead to ruble appreciation and render a countryrsquos production less competitive

During that time Rus siarsquos industry did not receive preferential access to larger markets and could

not expand its share in the global economy particularly because of its self- isolation from the

regional trade agreements (except for its participation in the Eurasian Economic Union with some

neighboring countries of the former Soviet Union) As a result neither import substitution nor

export- led strategy promoted growth and specialization in nonoil production A long- awaited

modernization and reallocation of resources from an inefficient nontrade sector to a trade sector

did not materialize

These limits were later augmented with sanctions and an extension of domestic restrictions on

cooperation with Western partners Importantly the rapid growth of state- monopoly structures in

the Rus sian economy over the past 15 years has created additional obstacles to the development

and diversification of US- Russia economic ties

Figure 41 US Imports from Rus sia US$ 2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2016)

Fish and shellfish 3

Crude oil 5

Fuel oil 37

Petroleum products other

8

Nuclear fuel materials

7

Chemicals-fertilizers 4

Steelmaking materials 5

Iron and steel mill products 4

Bauxite and aluminum 9

Other precious metals 4

Nonferrous metals other 1

Finished metal shapes 1

Synthetic rubber--primary

1

Spacecraftexcluding military

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 16 102017 404 PM

Fig

ure

42

U

S E

xpo

rts

to R

us s

ia U

S$ 2

016

Sou

rce

US

Ce

nsu

s B

ure

au ldquo

Trad

e in

Go

od

s w

ith

Ru

s sia

rdquo (s

ee

dat

a fo

r 2

016

)

Bak

ery

pro

du

cts

Win

e b

eer

an

d r

elat

ed

pro

du

cts

New

spri

nt

Pla

stic

mat

eria

ls

Ch

emic

als-

fert

ilize

rs

Ch

emic

als-

ino

rgan

icC

hem

ical

s-o

rgan

ic

Ch

emic

als-

oth

erC

ott

on

fib

er c

loth

In

du

stri

al r

ub

ber

pro

du

cts

Min

eral

su

pp

lies-

man

ufa

ctu

red

Gen

erat

ors

acc

esso

ries

Ele

ctri

c ap

par

atu

s

Dri

llin

g amp

oilfi

eld

eq

uip

men

t Sp

ecia

lized

min

ing

Exc

avat

ing

mac

hin

ery

No

nfa

rm t

ract

ors

an

d p

arts

In

du

stri

al e

ng

ines

Fo

od

to

bac

co m

ach

iner

y M

etal

wo

rkin

g m

ach

ine

too

ls

Tex

tile

sew

ing

m

ach

ines

W

oo

d g

lass

p

last

ic

Pu

lp a

nd

pap

er

mac

hin

ery

Mea

suri

ng

tes

tin

g

con

tro

l in

stru

men

ts

Mat

eria

ls h

and

ling

equ

ipm

ent

Ind

ust

rial

mac

hin

es

oth

er

Ph

oto

ser

vice

ind

ust

ry m

ach

iner

y A

gri

cult

ura

l mac

hin

ery

eq

uip

men

t C

om

pu

ters

Co

mp

ute

r ac

cess

ori

es

Sem

ico

nd

uct

ors

Tel

eco

mm

un

icat

ion

seq

uip

men

t

Bu

sin

ess

mac

hin

es a

nd

eq

uip

men

t

Lab

ora

tory

tes

tin

g in

stru

men

ts

Med

icin

al e

qu

ipm

ent

Civ

ilian

air

craf

t e

ng

ines

eq

uip

men

t a

nd

par

ts

Rai

lway

tra

nsp

ort

atio

n

equ

ipm

ent

Ves

sels

exc

lud

ing

scr

ap

Co

mm

erci

al v

esse

ls o

ther

M

arin

e en

gin

es p

arts

Spac

ecra

ft e

xclu

din

g

mili

tary

Pas

sen

ger

car

s

new

an

d u

sed

Tru

cks

bu

ses

and

sp

ecia

l p

urp

ose

ve

hic

les

En

gin

es a

nd

en

gin

e p

arts

(c

arb

ure

tors

pis

ton

s r

ing

s

and

val

ves)

B

od

ies

and

ch

assi

s fo

r p

asse

ng

er c

ars

Au

tom

oti

ve t

ires

an

d t

ub

es

Oth

er p

arts

an

d a

cces

sori

es o

f ve

hic

les

Ap

par

el h

ou

seh

old

go

od

s -

text

ile

Ph

arm

aceu

tica

lp

rep

arat

ion

s

Furn

itu

re h

ou

seh

old

go

od

s

etc

R

ug

s

Cel

l ph

on

es a

nd

oth

er

ho

use

ho

ld g

oo

ds

ne

c

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 17 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations18

Figure 43 US Trade in Goods with Rus sia Million US$ 1992ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 1992ndash2016)

Russian Financial Crisis

Oil price Increased from$2446 USD per barrel (2001)

to $9694 USD per barrel(2008)

Global Financial Crisis

Oil price high record in2011-2012

(more that $111 USD perbarrel)

Oil price crashed

$-

$5000

$10000

$15000

$20000

$25000

$30000

$35000

$40000

$45000

$50000

1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

US Imports from Russia US Exports to Russia US-Russia Trade in Goods

No doubt po liti cal ups and downs add volatility to US- Russia trade Nevertheless Rus siarsquos eco-

nomic structure exhausted itself before the Ukrainian crisis and the recent Rus sian recession Its

limitations are not only due to some mistakes in policy or negative coincidences of circumstances

but rather to deeply rooted properties in the current bilateral trade model related to structural

issues in the Rus sian economy Structural constraints such as the weak enforcement of property

rights poor business regulation and nondiversified exports weighed on Rus sian trade with the

United States From this perspective the term ldquonaturalunnatural trading partnersrdquo does not ad-

dress the unused capacity of bilateral interaction or the real challenges that kind of interaction

faces It just adds metaphysical flavor to the very specific economic and po liti cal factors that

determine the US- Russia trajectory

Overall the outlines of bilateral trade (Figure 43) resemble the famous ldquoRus sian Mountainsrdquo that

were a pre de ces sor of the modern roller coaster icy hills supported by wooden constructionsmdash a

rigid and immobile structure that sooner or later would melt This unfortunately is what is hap-

pening to US- Russia trade cooperation now

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 18 102017 404 PM

19

ARE LITTLE FISH REALLY SWEET

Low US- Russia economic interaction has at least two consequences First it limits the capacity of

policymakers to exploit trade as an instrument for geopo liti cal combat Even the question of a US

trade deficit which used to be a headache for many US trading partners has become so insig-

nificant in absolute terms (about $87 billion in 2016) that it seems hardly worth caring about

When the volume of trade between two countries becomes very small in absolute terms whether

a country is running a surplus or deficit is no longer relevant But it also renders another type of

confrontations (sometimes more dangerous) more likely since the two traders have little to lose

Second in an environment marked by low levels of bilateral trade both sides could incentivize (if

and when a desire for po liti cal rapprochement exists) the signing of new trade deals which are

elevated symbolically as a turning point in bilateral po liti cal relations (ie the sale of Boeings to

Rus sia or the delivery via tankers of Rus sian oil to US refineries) Sometimes markets themselves

pres ent ldquogiftsrdquo that can be capitalized on po liti cally US- USSR grain trade in the 1970s was one

such ldquogiftrdquo large sales of American grain to the Soviet Union helped US policymakers win favor

with the po liti cally impor tant American farming sector and permitted Soviet leaders to maintain

access to a dietary staple for the Soviet population

The strong 32 percent growth in value of US imports from Rus sia from January to May 2017

versus January to May 2016 ( Table 51) is an example of a development that has tempted officials

to pres ent it as a sign of positive change due to ldquogrowing business activitiesrdquo (this kind of statement

was heard before the bilateral summit in Germany in July 2017) although the reason for that leap

was evidently an increase in commodity prices (mainly of oilmdash see Table 52) and not a rise in

entrepreneurial interactions The primary beneficiaries of that upside rally have been two other

petro- economies Saudi Arabia and Venezuela ( Tables 53 and 54)

Sector Analyses

05

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 19 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations20

Table 51 US Imports from Rus sia Million US$ Januaryndash May 2016 vs Januaryndash May 2017

Year January February March April May Total

2016 9603 6871 11097 12257 10977 50805

2017 12215 10220 16979 13471 14147 67032

Change 271 487 530 99 289 319

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 1992ndash2016)

Table 52 Change in Urals Crude Oil Prices US$ per Barrel Januaryndash May 2016 vs Januaryndash May 2017

Januaryndash May 2016 Januaryndash May 2017 Change ($) Change ()

3601 5129 1528 424

Source Ministry of Finance of the Rus sian Federation https wwwminfin ru ru ixzz4mMIZ7XtC

Table 53 US Imports from Saudi Arabia Million US$ Januaryndash May 2016 vs Januaryndash May 2017

Year January February March April May Total

2016 15114 9036 13555 10844 14679 63228

2017 19802 20298 21650 16211 19542 97503

Change 3101 12463 5972 495 331 542

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Saudi Arabiardquo Foreign Trade last modified June 29 2017

https wwwcensus gov foreign - trade balance c5170 html (see data for 2016ndash2017)

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 20 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 21

Table 54 US Imports from Venezuela Million US$ Januaryndash May 2016 vs Januaryndash May 2017

Year January February March April May Total

2016 6657 5560 7140 8007 7922 35286

2017 13041 10864 123500 11148 12243 59646

Change 9590 9540 7297 3923 5454 6903

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Venezuelardquo Foreign Trade last modified June 29 2017

https wwwcensus gov foreign - trade balance c3070 html (see data for 2016ndash2017)

Table 55 US Exports to Rus sia Million US$ Januaryndash May 2016 vs Januaryndash May 2017

Year January February March April May Total

2016 3628 3577 7298 4657 4947 24107

2017 3144 4277 5386 6670 4806 24283

Change minus133 196 minus262 432 minus29 minus07

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2016ndash2017)

At the same time US exports to Rus sia continue to stagnate ( Table 55) due to low levels of

consumption during a two-and- a- half-year economic crisis a deep ruble devaluation sanctions

and counter- sanctions

Given the very dif er ent economic structures and resource endowments of Rus sia and the United

States it is not surprising that US- Russia trade is asymmetric and oil driven (Figure 51) A

3 percent increase in Urals oil prices translates into a one percent increase in US import growth

from Rus sia Thus in 2016 every $10 increase in Urals crude oil added $15 billion to the value of

US imports or 11 percent to the total value of imports from Rus sia

OIL ADDICTION

Oil is a core pillar of US- Russia bilateral trade A bumpy ride in oil markets afects commerce

Nevertheless Rus sian oil exports to the United States in physical terms have been rather

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 21 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations22

sustainable Starting from 2005 average annual deliveries have been above 150 million barrels

(Figure 52) Crude and heating oil have dominated while petroleum products and liquefied petro-

leum gases have not (Figure 53) In 2011 oil exports peaked at 228 million barrels but declined to

159 million barrels in 2016mdash a drop of 30 percent Rec ord high shipments of Rus sian oil to the United

States coincided with an elevation in oil prices which made the subsequent decline in oil shipment

value between 2011 and 2016 (by about 72 percent as shown in Figure 54) seem more stark The

increase in price also raised the share of oil in Rus sian exports by 74 percent in 2011 (Figure 55)

The Rus sian share in total US oil imports was around 55 percent in 2011 and 43 percent in 2016

( Table 56) In the last five years the United States has relied exclusively on consumption of Rus sian

oil for the rough equivalent of one week out of the year (Figure 56)

It is unlikely that Rus sia can significantly increase its share of the US oil market and there is a real

possibility for a downward trend There are several reasons the historically high Rus sian hydrocar-

bon export threshold of 2011 will not soon if ever be surpassed

First US energy consumption will likely be flat According to the US Energy Information Adminis-

tration (EIA) demand for petroleum and other liquids in the United States will be about 35ndash36

quadrillion British thermal units (BTUs) with minimal variation over the next 25 years1

1 US EIA ldquoAnnual Energy Outlook 2017 with Projections to 2050rdquo January 5 2017 7ndash8

Figure 51 US- Russia Trade Growth () vs US and Rus sia Real GDP Growth () 1993ndash2016

Source IMF ldquoIMF Datardquo accessed September 27 2017 http wwwimf org en Data US Census Bureau

ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo

Note rGDPthinsp=thinspreal gross domestic product

Trade

USA rGDP growth

Russia rGDP growth

-60

-40

-20

0

20

40

60

80

100

1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Gro

wth

All spikes in US-Russia trade have been connected with two main

variables volume and price of crude oil

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 22 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 23

Second the United States will become a net energy exporter between 2020 and 2030 in most

cases under dif er ent combinations of oil and natu ral gas prices GDP growth technological

breakthroughs and the availability of energy resources The role of oil imports will dramatically

fall2

Third oil price scenarios as described by the International Energy Agency (IEA) international

financial organ izations (IFIs) and many national agencies are very cautious and assume that even

by 2035 to 2040 oil prices will not to recover to the levels of 2011ndash20123

Fourth Rus sian oil production and export growth will be modest and driven by Asian economic

expansion and will comprise a decreasing share of Western markets4 According to forecasts from

2 Ibid 15ndash18

3 Ibid table 3 ldquoEnergy Prices by Sector and Sourcesrdquo World Bank World Bank Commodity Markets Price Forecasts

(Washington DC World Bank 2017) httpswwwworldbank org en research commodity - markets Organ ization of the

Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) World Oil Outlook 2016 (Vienna OPEC 2016)

4 E D Belotskaia et al Global and Rus sian Energy Outlook 2016 (Moscow Energy Research Institute of the Rus sian

Acad emy of Science Analytical Center for the Government of the Rus sian Federation 2016) http acgov ru files

publication a 12767 pdf

Figure 52 US Imports from Rus sia Crude Oil and Petroleum Products Thousands of Barrels 1995ndash2016

Source US EIA ldquoUS Imports by Country of Origin Rus siardquo Petroleum amp Other Liquids September 13

2017 http wwweia gov dnav pet PET _ MOVE _ IMPCUS _ D _ NUS _ NRS _ MBBL _ M htm

0

50000

100000

150000

200000

250000

Date 1995 1996 1997 1998 199920002001200220032004200520062007200820092010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 23 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations24

the Organ ization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) crude oil exports from Rus sia and

the Caspian region to the United States will dis appear by 20255

So why does the Rus sian Urals blend continue to be attractive for oil traders and US refineries

which could pro cess greater volumes of domestically produced lighter crude There are two main

reasons One is related to the preference of US high conversion refineries (the most sophisticated

in the world) to work with heavy oil blends produced by Canada Mexico Iraq Venezuela and

Rus sia Pro cessing heavy crude now is as profitable as pro cessing lighter crude The so- called

crack spreadmdash the diference between the cost of relatively cheap heavy crude oil and the final

price of value- added consumer products (diesel gasoline jet fuel and heating oil)mdash has become

the same as the refinery margins of light sweet crude6 This has primarily afected light oil produc-

ing countries such as Angola Algeria and Nigeria

5 OPEC World Oil Outlook 2016 306ndash309

6 ldquoHow Much for That Heavy Oilrdquo Oil Sands Magazine December 26 2015 https wwwoilsandsmagazine com

news 2015 12 26 how - much - for - that - heavy - oil

Figure 53 US Imports from Rus sia Oil and Petroleum Products US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

$-

$25000000000

$20000000000

$15000000000

$10000000000

$5000000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Liquefied petroleum gases

Petroleum products other

Fuel oil

Crude oil

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 24 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 25

Another factor afecting purchase of Rus sian oil is a new trend among oil companies for further

consolidation of scale and for integrating operations of upstream and downstream business7

There have been several waves of separation and unification of production transportation and

pro cessing in the last 50 years The current business cycle can be seen as an adaptation to a

period of low prices and oversupply Companies that buy andor produce oil in Rus sia most likely

prefer to transport and pro cess this oil in their own modern refineries in the United States At the

same time some of the newest refinery designs specifically for pro cessing heavy oils have been

built in Asia thus extending the choices of heavy oil producing countries

We should also consider that leading US and international oil traders along with oil producing

companies working with or owning US refineries frequently buy Rus sian oil on the open market

and have long- term contracts on Rus sian crude oil delivery Many Rus sian oil companies prefer to

pay for purchases or ser vices with their future production instead of cash creating situations of

ldquostickyrdquo oil imports that are difficult to replace The best- known example is an interaction between

7 ldquoEnergy and Utilities Sectorrdquo Roundtable Financier Worldwide December 2015 https wwwfinancierworldwide

com roundtable - energy - utilities - sector - dec15

Figure 54 US Imports of Oil and Petroleum Products from Rus sia vs Oil Prices Eu rope Brent Spot Price Free on Board (FOB) 1996ndash2017

Source US EIA ldquoUS Imports by Country of Origin Rus siardquo

0

20

40

60

80

100

120

140

0

5000

10000

15000

20000

25000

30000

Jan

-19

96

Jun

-19

96

No

v-19

96

Ap

r-19

97

Sep

-19

97

Feb

-19

98

Jul-

199

8D

ec-1

99

8M

ay-1

99

9O

ct-1

99

9M

ar-2

00

0A

ug

-20

00

Jan

-20

01

Jun

-20

01

No

v-2

00

1A

pr-

20

02

Sep

-20

02

Feb

-20

03

Jul-

20

03

Dec

-20

03

May

-20

04

Oct

-20

04

Mar

-20

05

Au

g-2

00

5Ja

n-2

00

6Ju

n-2

00

6N

ov-

20

06

Ap

r-2

00

7Se

p-2

00

7Fe

b-2

00

8Ju

l-2

00

8D

ec-2

00

8M

ay-2

00

9O

ct-2

00

9M

ar-2

010

Au

g-2

010

Jan

-20

11Ju

n-2

011

No

v-2

011

Ap

r-2

012

Sep

-20

12Fe

b-2

013

Jul-

20

13D

ec-2

013

May

-20

14O

ct-2

014

Mar

-20

15A

ug

-20

15Ja

n-2

016

Jun

-20

16N

ov-

20

16

USD

per

Bar

rel

Th

ou

san

d B

arr

els

US Imports from Russia of Crude Oil and Petroleum Products (Thousand Barrels)

Europe Brent Spot Price FOB (Dollars per Barrel)

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 25 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations26

Table 56 US Oil Imports All Countries vs Rus sia Thousand Barrels per Day 2011ndash2016

Years 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

All Countries 11436 10598 9859 9241 9449 10058

Rus sia 624 477 460 330 371 433

Share 546 450 467 357 393 431

Sources US EIA ldquoUS Imports by Country of Origin Total Crude Oil and Productsrdquo Petroleum amp Other

Liquids September 13 2017 wwweia gov dnav pet pet_move_impcus_a2_nus_ep00_im0_mbbl_m htm

authorrsquos computation

Figure 55 US Imports from Rus sia Share of Crude Oil and Petroleum Products Million US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

57

64

73

72

74

73

72

59

52 50

0

$5000

$10000

$15000

$20000

$25000

$30000

$35000

$40000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

US Imports from Russia

Share of Oil and Petroleum Products

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 26 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 27

the Rus sian state mono poly Rosneft and commodity trading and mining giant Glencore which

along with energy and commodities com pany Vitol participated in a $10 billion prepayment

deal with Rosneft for crude supplies in 2013

There have been a number of ongoing transactions between the Rus sian oil industry and interna-

tional oil companies including several that top the list of importers of Rus sian oil to the United

States ( Table 57) In December 2016 Glencore participated in a controversial privatization opera-

tion purchasing in tandem with the Qatar sovereign wealth fund a 195 percent stake in Rosneft

which was on the US and EU list of sanctioned firms8 Glencore has also taken a blocking stake in

midsize oil producer RussNeft BP owns a 1975 percent stake in Rosneft Chevron holds a

15 percent interest in the 935- mile- long CPC9 pipeline which transports an average of 959000

barrels of crude oil per day including 76000 barrels daily from Rus sia10 ExxonMobil has formed

8 E Mazneva and I Arkhipov ldquoRus sia Sells $11 Billion Stake in Rosneft to Glencore Qatarrdquo Bloomberg December 7

2016

9 CPCthinsp=thinspCaspian Pipeline Consortium

10 ldquoRus sia Highlights of Operations and Business Portfoliordquo Chevron accessed October 3 2017 https wwwchevron

com worldwide russia

Figure 56 Share of Rus sian Oil in Total US Oil Imports Thousands of Barrels per Day 1972ndash2016

Source US EIA ldquoUS Imports by Country of Origin Total Crude Oil and Productsrdquo

2000

4000

6000

8000

10000

12000

14000

16000

US Imports of Crude Oil and Petroleum Products (Thousand Barrels per Day)

US Imports from Russia of Crude Oil and Petroleum Products (Thousand Barrels per Day)19

7319

7419

7519

7619

7719

7819

7919

80

198

119

82

198

319

84

198

519

86

198

719

88

198

919

90

199

119

92

199

319

94

199

519

96

199

719

98

199

92

00

02

00

12

00

22

00

32

00

42

00

52

00

62

00

72

00

82

00

92

010

20

112

012

20

132

014

20

152

016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 27 102017 404 PM

Table 57 Top Importers of Rus sian Oil to the United States Thousands of Barrels 2016

VALERO MARKETING amp SUPPLY CO 54590 3616

EXXONMOBIL OIL CORP 17087 1130

CHEVRON USA INC 15217 1008

BP WEST COAST PRODUCTS LLC 10130 671

GEORGE E WARREN CORP 7272 48

PAULSBORO REFINING CO LLC 6838 453

TESORO CORP 5097 338

VITOL INC 5084 337

PHILLIPS 66 CO 4726 313

TRAFIGURA AG 4360 289

PAR HAWAII REFINING LLC 3893 258

MOTIVA ENTERPRISES LLC 3041 205

SHELL US TRADING CO 2863 19

MARATHON PETROLEUM CO LLC 2475 16

ATLANTIC TRADING amp MARKETING 2099 14

FREEPOINT COMMODITIES LLC 1439 1

GLENCORE LTD 1284 85

BEST PETROLEUM CORP 967 64

ROLYMPUS US COMMODITIES GROUP LLC 822 6

HUNT CRUDE OIL SUPPLY CO 666 4

GULF OIL LP 658 4

Source US EIA ldquoUS Imports by Country of Origin Crude Oilrdquo Petroleum amp Other Liquids September 13

2017 httpswwweiagovdnavpetpet_move_impcus_a2_nus_epc0_im0_mbblpd_ahtm authorrsquos

computation

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 28 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 29

several joint ventures with Rosneft to undertake ofshore exploration in the Black Sea and the Kara

Sea in Siberia11

According to the Sanctions Act US persons are prohibited from exporting or reexporting goods

ser vices (except financial ser vices) and technology in support of exploration or production of new

deep- water Arctic ofshore or shale oil proj ects that involve designated Rus sian entities or other

entities in which such sanctioned persons have a controlling interest or a substantial noncontrol-

ling owner ship interest defined as not less than 33 percent (previously it was 50 percent) The new

law also authorizesmdash but does not requiremdash the imposition of so- called secondary sanctions

against non- US entities that engage in activities involving the construction maintenance or

expansion of Rus sian energy export pipelines with a fair market value of $1 million or more or an

aggregate fair market value during a 12- month period of $5 million12 This provision has raised the

concerns of some Eu ro pean countries particularly Germany As result the final language of the

law included wording about coordination of this issue with allies of the United States

Shipments of Rus sian oil to the United States could be afected by activity in the US refinery

industry In early 2017 Saudi Aramco bought the United Statesrsquo largest oil refinery in Port Arthur

(Texas) and it announced plans to send more of its own crude to that refinery13 Serious concerns

exist however regarding the future of three refineries and nine pipelines owned by Citgo a US

branch of the Venezuelan state com pany PdVSA which is balancing precariously on the edge of

default Under certain conditions in the event of PdVSA bankruptcy Rosneft could claim a stake of

up to 499 percent in Citgo Such a possibility has raised concerns among politicians and US

government officials with Trea sury Secretary Steven Mnuchin calling it a ldquonational security issuerdquo14

Tables 58 59 and 510 show allocations of Rus sian oil imports to major US refineries some of

which work exclusively on Rus sian crude a total of two to three months per year In total 150940

thousand barrels of Rus sian oil were refined in 2016

Figure 57 confirms a leading position of Texas and Louisiana among the US states receiving

Rus sian crude followed by New Jersey California Mississippi Washington Hawaii and Delaware

In a paradoxical way Texas has dis appeared from the list of states as a main destination of US

imports from Rus sia (Figure 58) because Rus sian crude is mostly delivered to Louisiana ports and

registered there by US Customs as an import from Rus sia After that it transports to refineries in

Louisiana and Texas

Overall the short- term business rationale behind the sustainability of US oil imports from Rus sia

cannot overcome strong headwinds in the US energy sector facing all oil importers which will

inevitably lead to a contraction of Rus sian oil exports to the United States in the foreseeable future

11 Exxon eforts to receive a special US Trea sury waiver to drill in sanctioned Rus sia failed in 2017

12 Countering Amer i carsquos Adversaries through Sanctions Act HR 3364

13 Sarp Ozkan ldquoSaudi Aramcorsquos Port Arthur Refinery and the US Refinery Fleetrdquo Drilling Info May 11 2017

https infodrillinginfo com saudi - aramcos - port - arthur - refinery - us - refinery - fleet

14 Graham Kates ldquoTrea sury Secretary Rus siarsquos Citgo Deal a National Security Issuerdquo CBS News May 1 2017

http wwwcbsnews com news rosneft - citgo - steven - mnuchin - national - security

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 29 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations30

Table 58 Valerorsquos Refineries Pro cessing Rus sian Oil Thousands of Barrels 2016

Saint Charles Louisiana 29206 535

Corpus Christi Texas 20626 378

Wilmington California 4250 78

Total USA 54590 100

Source US EIA ldquoRefinery Capacity Reportrdquo January 1 2017

table 5 wwweia gov petroleum refinerycapacity table5 pdf

authorrsquos computation

Table 59 ExxonMobil Refineries Pro cessing Rus sian Oil Thousands of Barrels 2016

Baytown Texas 15037 88

Baton Rouge Louisiana 2046 12

Total USA 17083 100

Source US EIA ldquoRefinery Capacity Reportrdquo authorrsquos computation

Table 510 Chevronrsquos Refineries Pro cessing Rus sian Oil Thousands of Barrels 2016

Pascagoula Mississippi 12767 840

El Segundo California 2372 155

Saint Rose Louisiana 78 05

Total USA 15217 100

Source US EIA ldquoRefinery Capacity Reportrdquo authorrsquos computation

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 30 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 31

HEAVY METAL

Taken together US imports of metals and US imports of oil compose about 80 percent of US

total imports from Rus sia (Figure 59) Trade of metals like other commodities is strongly afected

by market price fluctuations Nevertheless metal imports from Rus sia have been fairly resilient to

market volatility and their average annual value has hovered at about $4 billion in the last five years

(Figure 510) This market resilience was forged at the end of the 1990searly 2000s when Rus sian

metal producers gradually modernized their plants adjusting quality of production to Western

standards and enhancing integration into global value and supply chains Some of them conquered

their share of the highly competitive US market struggling with peers from Canada and certain

BRICS countries (China India and Brazil) To attract additional resources all Rus sian large metal-

producing companies became public and were listed on stock exchanges chiefly the London Stock

Exchange (Severstalrsquo PAO Evraz MMK OAO Novolipetsk Steel Norilsk Nikel and TMK PAO) one

on the New York Stock Exchange (Mechel) and one on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange (Rusal)

Business logic pushed some of them to invest in the US metal- making industry which was hit

hard by crisis Later on some of those assets were sold (eg two US steel mills acquired by

Severstal in 2004 were purchased 10 years later by Steel Dynamics Inc and AK Steel Corp)

Figure 57 Share of US States Rus sian Oil Imports 2016

Source US EIA ldquoUS Imports from Rus sia of Crude Oil and Petroleum Productsrdquo Petroleum amp Other

Liquids September 29 2017 https www eia gov dnav pet hist LeafHandler ashx nshy=shyPETampsshy=shyMTTIM _ NUS

- NRS _ 1ampfshy=shyM authorrsquos computation

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

100

Maine

Massachusetts

Maryland

Connecticut

Georgia

Rhode Island

Virginia

Florida

New York

Alabama

Puerto Rico

Pennsylvania

Delaware

Hawaii

Washington

Mississippi

California

New Jersey

Louisiana

Texas

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 31 102017 404 PM

Figure 58 US Imports from Rus sia by State Million US$ 2013ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoState and Metropolitan Area Trade Datardquo Foreign Trade last modified

October 2 2017 https wwwcensus gov foreign - trade statistics state

Alaska

Connecticut

Delaware

Hawaii

Louisiana

Maryland

North Dakota 0

$1000

$2000

$3000

$4000

$5000

$6000

2013 2014 2015 2016

Alabama

Alaska

Connecticut

Delaware

Hawaii

Louisiana

Maryland

Maine

Mississippi

Montana

North Dakota

Mississippi

Figure 59 US Imports from Rus sia Share of Oil and Metals Million US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 1992ndash2016)

83

82

85

86

87

88

85

82

7375

0

$5000

$10000

$15000

$20000

$25000

$30000

$35000

$40000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

US Imports from Russia

Share of Oil and Metals

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 32 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 33

Obviously the market dynamic of dif er ent metals varies (eg iron steel aluminum platinum and

nickel) Caps to increase their trade and production in a ldquored oceanrdquo global environment with

anemic demand is rather limited despite Figure 510 showing a spike of iron and steel imports

from Rus sia in 2014 and aluminum in 2016 Some opportunities may exist for Russian- owned steel

plants in the United States (such as NLMK) to participate in energy proj ects resumed under Presi-

dent Trump who has required that new pipelines use only American- made steel15

Rus sia occupies a special niche in the US market for titanium products a high- end metal indus-

try Twenty years ago a long- term contract was signed between Rus sian titanium producer

VSMPO- AVISMA and Boeing The Rus sian com pany entered the selective club of Boeing suppliers

for the manufacture of components and semi- finished products Since the signing of this contract

VSMPO has delivered more than 35 percent of all titanium placed on Boeing civil aircraft16 They

are hidden in the trade data in an import category for Civilian Aircrafts and Parts (Figure 511) At

the end of 2016 Boeing announced an extension of its framework agreement with AVISMA

15 E Scheyder C Ngai and T Sylvester ldquoAmerican Steel Unlikely to Get Keystone Boost Despite Trump Orderrdquo

Reuters January 27 2017 http wwwreuters com article usa - trump - pipeline - transcanada - idUSL1N1FH1ZD

16 A Kramer ldquoTitanium Fills Vital Role for Boeing and Rus siardquo New York Times July 5 2013 http wwwnytimes com

2013 07 06 business global titanium - fills - vital - role - for - boeing - and - russia html mcubzshy=shy3

Figure 510 US Imports from Rus sia Iron Steel Bauxite Aluminum Nickel Nonferrous Metals and Other Precious Metals and Materials US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 1992ndash2016)

0

$6000000000

$5000000000

$4000000000

$3000000000

$2000000000

$1000000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 20122013

20142015

2016

Finished metal shapes

Iron and steel advanced

Iron and steel products nec

Nonferrous metals other

Other precious metals

Nickel

Bauxite and aluminum

Iron and steel mill products

Steelmaking materials

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 33 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations34

through 2022 and additional investments in the construction of a new robotic plant in Titanium

Valley a special economic zone located in the Sverdlovsk region that will open in 2018 The pro-

cessing of titanium forgings in all Boeing civil aircraft will be performed there including 787s 737

MAXs and 777Xs17 The contract extension with AVISMA may add several hundred million dollars

in value to annual US imports from Rus sia

How can such heavy reliance on imports of Rus sian titanium exist during a period of rising geopo-

liti cal tensions The answer is straightforward VSMPO- AVISMA is a highly specialized natu ral

mono poly producing 45 percent of the worldrsquos aerospace titanium Only four other countries

smelt high- grade titanium in industrial quantities the United States Germany Japan and China

Overall global production capacity is limited while demand is growing The United States cur-

rently imports around 79 percent of all the titanium it consumes each year18

17 ldquoBoeing and VSMPO Avisma to Launch Second Joint Production Siterdquo Rus sian Aviation Insider December 22 2016

http wwwrusaviainsider com boeing - and - vsmpo - avisma - to - launch - second - joint - production - site

18 Jon Ostrower and Andy Pasztor ldquoBoeing United Technologies Stockpile Titanium Partsrdquo Wall Street Journal

August 7 2014 https wwwwsj com articles boeing - united - technologies - stockpiling - titanium - parts - 1407441886

Figure 511 US Imports from Rus sia Civilian Aircrafts and Parts US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 1992ndash2016)

0

$20000000

$40000000

$60000000

$80000000

$100000000

$120000000

$140000000

$160000000

$180000000

$200000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Parts-civilian aircraft

Civilian aircraft

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 34 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 35

The Sanctions Act authorizes the secretary of the trea sury (in a nonmandatory way) to impose

restrictions (without specifying them) against Rus sian state- owned entities operating in the railway

metals and mining sectors of the Rus sian economy Despite the commanding heights of Rus siarsquos

state sector owner ship in its economy (70 percent of GDP) the metal- producing companies have

remained mostly in private hands

NUCLEAR AFFAIRS

Historically owners and operators of the 104 commercial nuclear power reactors in the United

States have purchased more than 80 percent of their uranium from foreign countries Uranium

shipping from Rus sia accounted for about 13 percent of the 58 million pounds of uranium pur-

chased overseas in 201219 At the same time the Rus sian state- owned mono poly Rosatom ac-

counts for 20 percent of Kazakhstanrsquos uranium production (which in turn comprises 11 percent of

all US uranium imports) and 20 percent of US domestic uranium production capacity (with

owner ship of exploration tracts in Wyoming)20

Nuclear fuel and nuclear power continue to be po liti cally sensitive topics both in the United

States and Rus sia Bilateral cooperation in this sector (being surprisingly stable with imports of

nuclear fuel from Rus sia at a level of $1 billion annually in the last five years [Figure 512 and 513])

is under constant po liti cal and lobbying pressure and has been a source of several po liti cal scan-

dals21 Consequently upside risks in this area of interaction are minimal and downside risks are

much higher especially when we are seeing more decommissioning of nuclear plants in the

United States than new constructions The US EIArsquos 2017 Annual Energy Outlook assumes

that about 25 percent of the nuclear capacity now operating will be removed from ser vice

by 205022

WHY IS THE GRASS GREENER ON THE OTHER SIDE

The United States continues to significantly reduce imports of chemical fertilizers as domestic pro-

duction increases In 2016 the United States imported 13 percent less ammonia and 11 percent

less urea and UAN which is a liquid urea and ammonium nitrate fertilizer Rus sia accounts for

around 40 percent of UAN imported by the United States The United States canceled antidumping

duties on imports of ammonium nitrate and urea from Rus sia in 2016 but it did not prevent import

19 US EIA ldquoThe US Relies on Foreign Uranium Enrichment Ser vices to Fuel Its Nuclear Power Plantsrdquo Today in

Energy August 28 2013 https wwweia gov todayinenergy detail php idshy=shy1273

20 Colin Chilcoat ldquoDoes Rus sia Really Own 20 Percent of the USrsquo Uranium Reservesrdquo OilPricecom May 6 2015

http oilpricecom Alternative - Energy Nuclear - Power Does - Russia - Really - Own - 20 - Of - The - US - Uranium - Reserves

html

21 Michelle Ye Hee Lee ldquoThe Facts behind Trumprsquos Repeated Claim about Hillary Clintonrsquos Role in the Rus sian Ura-

nium Dealrdquo Washington Post October 26 2016

22 US EIA ldquoAnnual Energy Outlook 2017 with Projections to 2050rdquo 81ndash82

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 35 102017 404 PM

Figure 512 US Imports from Rus sia Share of Oil Metals and Nuclear Fuel Million US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 1992ndash2016)

87

86

90

90

90

91

88

86

7882

0

$5000

$10000

$15000

$20000

$25000

$30000

$35000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

US Imports from Russia

Share of Oil Metals and Nuclear Fuel

Figure 513 US Imports from Rus sia Nuclear Fuel Materials US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

$-

$200000000

$400000000

$600000000

$800000000

$1200000000

$1000000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 36 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 37

drops twice last year (Figures 514 and 515) According to forecasts UAN imports are expected to

decline further to 15 million tons this year down over 46 percent from 28 million tons imported

last year23 The downside trend in imports of fertilizers will likely continue because of oversupply

BIG FISH

US imports of fish and shellfish from Rus sia are best understood in comparison with US fish

exports to the Rus sian market which slipped to zero in August 2014 after Rus sia issued an order

banning certain agricultural imports from the United States (Figure 516) While the volume of US

supply was not very large it was impor tant because it broke up the monopolistic dominance of a

few vertically integrated Rus sian companies that have kept prices high by restricting the entry of

new producers Seeking to implement import substitution policies Rus sia has tried to reduce

exports as well as imports of fish and seafood products in the last couple of years This symmetri-

cal approach was intended to ldquocompensaterdquo for a decrease of fish products in the domestic

23 Deepika Thapliyal ldquoPotashCorp Forecasts Sharp Drop in US Nitrogen Imports in 2017rdquo ICIS News February 7

2017 https wwwicis com resources news 2017 02 07 10076734 potashcorp - forecasts - sharp - drop - in - us - nitrogen

- imports - in - 2017

Figure 514 US Imports from Rus sia Share of Oil Metals Nuclear Fuel and Fertilizers Million US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

90

93

92

93

94

95

92

91

85

86

0

$5000

$10000

$15000

$20000

$25000

$30000

$35000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

US Imports from Russia

Share of Oil Metals Nuclear Fuel and Fertilizers

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 37 102017 404 PM

Figure 515 US Imports from Rus sia Chemical- Fertilizers US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

S-

$200000000

$400000000

$600000000

$800000000

$1000000000

$1200000000

$1400000000

$1600000000

$1800000000

$2000000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Figure 516 US Exports to Rus sia Fish and Shellfish US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

0

$10000000

$20000000

$30000000

$40000000

$50000000

$60000000

$70000000

$80000000

$90000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Fish and shellfish

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 38 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 39

consumer market caused by Rus siarsquos import ban but it has failed As result the group most af-

fected by the self- imposed counter- sanctions were Rus sian consumers

With a significant drop in fish imports a devaluation of the ruble and inflationary pressures on

seafood prices yearly consumption of fish in Rus sia has declined precipitously In 2015 alone

fish prices increased 20 percent and consumption dropped to 14 kilograms per person24 from

22 kilograms in 201425 In 2016 food rose to 355 percent of house hold expenditure as a result of

increases in food prices26 This has pushed vertically integrated fishing monopolies to sell even

more of their catch abroad rather than deliver to the Rus sian Federation (Figure 517) Thus we

cannot exclude the possibility of further growth in US fish and shellfish imports from Rus sia on a

marginal scale

24 Александр Савельев ldquoПотребление рыбы в России упало до 14 кг на человекаrdquo [Fish consumption in Rus sia fell to

14 kg per person] Экономика Интерфакс January 28 2015 http wwwinterfax ru business 492038

25 Илья Шестаков ldquoПотебление рыбы в России снизилось на 10 процентов из- за роста ценrdquo [Fish consumption in

Rus sia dropped by 10 percent due to price increases] RNS March 8 2017 https rnsonline consumer - market

Potreblenie - ribi - v - Rossii - snizilos - na - 10 - iz - za - rosta - tsen - 2017 - 03 - 08

26 Zoya Sheftalovich and Christian Oliver ldquoRus siarsquos Boom (Farming) Economyrdquo Politico November 8 2016 http

wwwpolitico eu article russias - boom - farming - economy

Figure 517 US Imports from Rus sia Fish and Shellfish US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

0

$50000000

$100000000

$150000000

$200000000

$250000000

$300000000

$350000000

$400000000

$450000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 39 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations40

SPACE ODYSSEY

Among high- end products beyond the top five groups of goods imported from Rus sia cheap and

efficient Rus sian engines have been used to launch US rockets into space for about 16 years

(Figure 518) There was a serious po liti cal strug gle around a 2014 ban on the purchase of Rus sian

RD-180 rocket engines revealing the conflicting business interests of power ful high- tech companies

This restrictive mea sure was temporary and was quickly lifted because of significant cost impacts

and risks of disruption to launch schedules27 For the same reason the Sanctions Act does not autho-

rize ldquothe imposition of any sanction or other condition limitation restriction or prohibition that

directly or indirectly impedes the supply by any entity of the Rus sian Federation of any product or

ser vice or the procurement of such product or ser vice by any contractor or subcontractor of the

United States or any other entity relating to or in connection with any space launch conducted for

the National Aeronautics and Space Administration or any other nonndash Department of Defense

customerrdquo28

Nevertheless many experts believe that US domestic alternatives to replace Rus sian engines will

be viable in five to eight years

27 Ken Dilanian ldquoWhy Does the US Use Rus sian Rockets to Launch Its Satellitesrdquo NBC News updated November 15

2016 http wwwnbcnews com why - does - u - s - use - russian - rockets - launch - its - satellites - n588526

28 Countering Amer i carsquos Adversaries through Sanctions Act HR 3364

Figure 518 Spacecraft Excluding Military US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

0

$20000000

$40000000

$60000000

$80000000

$100000000

$120000000

$140000000

$160000000

$180000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 40 102017 404 PM

41

Diversity and technological complexity are the most vis i ble advantages supporting US exports to

Rus sia Three major groups of export goods include civilian aircraft engines and parts (Figure 61)

drilling and oil field equipment (Figure 62) and industrial machines and engines (Figure 63)

Despite sanctions against the transfer of advanced oil producing and pro cessing technologies the

realization of US drilling and oil field equipment in Rus sia is sustainable although some bilateral

proj ects have been frozen

Another category of goods that has demonstrated resilience is the phar ma ceu ti cal industry (Fig-

ure 64) because most drugs in Rus sia are imported (about 70 percent of the Rus sian phar ma ceu-

ti cal market in value) Import substitution policies have had only modest results in this industry

As confirmed by American Chamber of Commerce surveys US exports to Rus sia are closely

connected to US FDI 30 percent of total imports of US companies working in the Rus sian

market come from the United States (more than $2 billion in 2016) In other words about

40 percent of all US exports to Rus sia are related to a US corporate- sector business pro cess in

the country The major sectors of activity of these companies are energy and natu ral resources

(52 percent) manufacturing (17 percent) information and communications technology or ICT

(13 percent) retail (7 percent) automotive industry (6 percent) phar ma ceu ti cal production

(1 percent) professional ser vices (05 percent) and other (2 percent)1

Some obvious constraints on US exports to Rus sia have resulted from a reduction in demand A

deterioration of bilateral relations and implementation of sanctions and counter- sanctions have

directly or indirectly afected all businesses Figures 65 and 66 provide data regarding a dramatic

drop in the sale of US agricultural production in Rus sia with all other categories of exports in

goods showing big cuts as well (see Figures 67ndash69)

Exports of civilian aircraft engines and parts put the state of Washington in first place among

other states as a leading exporter to the Rus sian market (Figure 610)

1 American Chamber of Commerce in Rus sia ldquoInvestment and Import to Rus sia 2nd Surveyrdquo 13

Diversity and Constraints

06

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 41 102017 404 PM

Figure 61 US Exports of Civilian Aircraft Engines Equipment and Parts to Rus sia US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

$2500000000

$2000000000

$1500000000

$1000000000

$500000000

$-

Figure 62 US Exports of Drilling and Oil Field Equipment US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

0

$5000000

$10000000

$15000000

$20000000

$25000000

$30000000

$35000000

$40000000

$45000000

$50000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 42 102017 404 PM

Figure 63 US Exports of Industrial Engines to Rus sia US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

0

$5000000

$10000000

$15000000

$20000000

$25000000

$30000000

$35000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Figure 64 US Exports of Phar ma ceu ti cal Preparations to Rus sia US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

0

$5000000

$10000000

$15000000

$20000000

$25000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 43 102017 404 PM

Figure 65 US Exports of Meat and Poultry to Rus sia US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Meat poultry etc

$1000000000

$800000000

$600000000

$400000000

$200000000

$-

$1200000000

$1400000000

$1600000000

Figure 66 US Exports of Soybeans to Rus sia US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

0

$20000000

$40000000

$60000000

$80000000

$100000000

$120000000

$140000000

$160000000

$180000000

$200000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 44 102017 404 PM

Figure 67 US Exports of Vehicles Engines and Parts to Rus sia US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Other parts and accessories of vehicles

Automotive tires and tubes

Bodies and chassis for passenger cars

Engines and engine parts (carburetors pistonsrings and valves)

Trucks buses and special purpose vehicles

Passenger cars new and used

$2500000000

$2000000000

$1500000000

$500000000

$-

$1000000000

Figure 68 US Exports of Medicinal Equipment to Rus sia US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

$10000000

$15000000

$20000000

$25000000

$30000000

$35000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 45 102017 404 PM

Figure 610 US Exports to Rus sia by States (2016 US$ Value) Million US$ 2013ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoState and Metropolitan Area Trade Datardquo

Iowa Kentucky

North Dakota

Oklahoma

South Carolina

Washington

0

$500

$1000

$1500

$2000

2013 2014 2015 2016

District of Columbia

Iowa

Kentucky

North Dakota

Oklahoma

South Carolina

Washington

Figure 69 US Exports of Excavating Machinery to Rus sia US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

0

$5000000

$10000000

$15000000

$20000000

$25000000

$30000000

$35000000

$40000000

$45000000

$50000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 46 102017 404 PM

47

Upon reviewing the current trend in US- Russia economic relations we must acknowledge that

the existing trade model is obsolete and exhausted Imports are resource- oriented and reflect

constraints of the Rus sian economic structure while five groups of goodsmdash oil metals nuclear

fuels fertilizers and fishmdash make up more than 90 percent of total imports from Rus sia (Figure 71)

Each of these industries has a limited capacity for growth in the foreseeable future

Rus siarsquos core export to the United Statesmdash oilmdash will inevitably decrease in the mid- term under any

scenario The value and volume of Rus sian exports to the United States are open to global market

volatility and po liti cal pressures with limited hedging mechanisms

Overall US exports to Rus sia are unsustainable due to bilateral po liti cal tensions the whims of

commodity markets and changing domestic policies Sanctions and counter- sanctions have

created additional barriers particularly in finance banking high- tech energy and agro- business

According to the American Chamber of Commerce 69 percent of US companies working in the

country consider the impact of US sanctions against Rus sia on their business as negative At the

same time 60 percent of companies do not expect big changes in business relations between

Rus sia and the United States under Trump1 as the new law codifies existing sanctions fortifies

them and extends them to new sectors

Current US investments are low due to the weak rule of law in Rus sia a lack of property right

protections and proper contract enforcement high levels of statization and monopolization in the

economy a poor business climate outdated capital stock dependence on natural- resource

sectors and of course sanction and counter- sanction mea sures Bloated administrative compo-

nents created as risk mitigation instruments have also served as impediments The countryrsquos

institutional weakness low level of productivity bud get constraints and a declining inflexible

workforce will restrain future economic growth even if commodity prices recover Rus sian eco-

nomic policy will likely continue to be statist and protectionist relying mostly on import

substitutions

1 Ibid 11

Existing Trends and Future Scenarios

07

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 47 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations48

What scenarios can be expected in such a challenging environment

One probability (no peace no war) is based on the assumption that matters will not deteriorate

further and implementation of the Sanctions Act will be cursory This will cause relatively slow

degradation in the economic field with occasional flashes of activity in selected areas (eg closer

cooperation against Islamist terrorist groups in Syria)

A second worse case or critical scenario is the intensive and full- scale execution of current sanc-

tion legislation and even the imposition of new economic punitive and restrictive mea sures which

could incite asymmetric retaliatory actions and lead to the introduction of additional protectionist

policies This in turn could trigger a further escalation of mutual confrontation and could eventu-

ally destroy the fundamentals of the current bilateral trade system Rus sian leadership has charac-

terized the Sanctions Act as a declaration of a trade war that ends all hope for improving bilateral

relations2

2 Дмитрий Медведев ldquoПодписание президентом США нового санкционного закона против России создает несколько

последствийrdquo [The US Presidentrsquos signing of the package of new sanctions against Rus sia will have a few conse-

quences] Facebook August 2 2017 https wwwfacebook com Dmitry Medvedev posts 10154587161801851

Figure 71 US Imports from Rus sia Share of Oil Metals Nuclear Fuel Fertilizers and Fish Million US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

93

94

93

94

95

96

93

92

87

89

0

$5000

$10000

$15000

$20000

$25000

$30000

$35000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

US Imports from Russia

Share of Oil Metals Nuclear FuelFertilizers and Fish

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 48 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 49

The best case and most favorable scenario looks less probable now It assumes the realization of

structural reforms in Rus sia in such a way that would adapt Rus siarsquos foreign policy to national

economic needs reduce confrontations with the West and make a concerted efort to integrate

Rus sian businesses into global supply and value chains A revitalization of the structural reform

agendamdash including eforts to diversify economic activities through de- monopolization and support

for SMEs a restructuring of the banking sector the creation of a vibrant business climate to foster

entrepreneurships and innovation the implementation of administrative and judicial reforms to

tackle red tape and endemic corruption and the reduction of state control over key sectors of the

economy via wide- spread privatization could kick- start the development of a nonoil economy and

improve long- term growth prospects Despite ongoing discussion of reform strategies deep

economic and po liti cal changes are extremely complicated over the next po liti calelectoral cycle

(2018ndash2024) particularly because of re sis tance of vested interests and growing commodity prices

The urgency to tackle structural shortcomings in natu ral resource- dependent economies usually

correlates with the price of those resources and the degree to which resource rents drive eco-

nomic activity However there may be marginal improvements in the efficiency of the current

economic system

Future US- Russia relations can be thought of through three pillars one pillar focuses on areas

where both countries maintain a competitive rivalry another looks at potential areas of interaction

under pres ent conditions a third pillar and one that has evaporated from the current bilateral

agenda concentrates on future cooperation Stronger economic ties could not only be a kind of

po liti cal shock absorber but contribute to the building of this future (particularly business contacts

aim to support future structural reforms) although po liti cal factors are depressing the prospects

for cooperation To escape deadlock it will be impor tant to establish the right balance between

politics and economics and create a model of collaboration within the framework of contention

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 49 102017 404 PM

About the Author

Vadim Grishin PhD MBA has been involved in the reform pro cess in Rus sia as adviser to the

deputy prime minister of Rus sia in 1992ndash1993 and 2006ndash2010 He has extensive experience

working with the Bretton Woods Institutions He was the board member of the World Bank Group

and served as se nior adviser at the International Monetary Fund Currently he is a con sul tant to the

chief economistrsquos office of the International Finance Corporation and teaches the economics of

transition at Georgetown University in Washington DC

50

594-71613_ch99_4Pindd 50 102017 403 PM

Blank

COVER PHOTO ADOBE STOCK

1616 Rhode Island Avenue NW

Washington DC 20036

202 887 0200 | wwwcsisorg

v++ISBN 978-1-4422-8035-9

Lanham bull Boulder bull New York bull London

4501 Forbes Boulevard

Lanham MD 20706

301 459 3366 | wwwrowmancom

A U T H O R

Vadim Grishin

Myths and Realities

A Report of the

CSIS RUSSIA AND EURASIA PROGRAM

US-RussiaEconomicRelations

O C T O B E R 2 0 1 7

Euml|xHSLEOCy280359z

The Man Pupu Nyor Rock Formations at the Northern Urals also known as Seven

Strong Man or Little Mountain of the God in the local tribe (Mansi) language

Page 2: U.S.-Russia Economic Relations: Myths and Realities · 2020-04-17 · OCTOBER 2017 U.S.- Russia Economic Relations Myths and Realities AUTHOR Vadim Grishin A REPORT OF THE CSIS RUSSIA

Blank

O C T O B E R 2 0 1 7

US- Russia Economic RelationsMyths and Real ities

AUTHOR

Vadim Grishin

A REPORT OF THE

CSIS RUSSIA AND EURASIA PROGRAM

Lanham bull Boulder bull New York bull London

594-71613_ch00_4Pindd 1 102017 403 PM

About CSIS

For over 50 years the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) has worked

to develop solutions to the worldrsquos greatest policy challenges Today CSIS scholars are

providing strategic insights and bipartisan policy solutions to help decisionmakers chart a

course toward a better world

CSIS is a nonprofit organ ization headquartered in Washington DC The Centerrsquos 220 full-

time staff and large network of affiliated scholars conduct research and analy sis and develop

policy initiatives that look into the future and anticipate change

Founded at the height of the Cold War by David M Abshire and Admiral Arleigh Burke CSIS

was dedicated to finding ways to sustain American prominence and prosperity as a force for

good in the world Since 1962 CSIS has become one of the worldrsquos preeminent international

institutions focused on defense and security regional stability and transnational

challenges ranging from energy and climate to global health and economic integration

Thomas J Pritzker was named chairman of the CSIS Board of Trustees in November 2015

Former US deputy secretary of defense John J Hamre has served as the Centerrsquos president

and chief executive officer since 2000

CSIS does not take specific policy positions accordingly all views expressed herein should

be understood to be solely those of the author(s)

copy 2017 by the Center for Strategic and International Studies All rights reserved

ISBN 978-1-4422-8035-9 (pb) 978-1-4422-8036-6 (eBook)

Center for Strategic amp International Studies Rowman amp Littlefield

1616 Rhode Island Ave nue NW 4501 Forbes Boulevard

Washington DC 20036 Lanham MD 20706

202-887-0200 | wwwcsis org 301 - 459 - 3366 | www rowman com

594-71613_ch00_4Pindd 2 102017 403 PM

III

Contents

iv Acknowl edgments

1 CHAPTER 1 | Introduction

4 CHAPTER 2 | Does Bilateral Economic Interaction Matter

11 CHAPTER 3 | Politics in the Driverrsquos Seat

15 CHAPTER 4 | Are the United States and Rus sia ldquoNatu ralrdquo Trading Partners

A Little Bit of History

19 CHAPTER 5 | Sector Analyses

41 CHAPTER 6 | Diversity and Constraints

47 CHAPTER 7 | Existing Trends and Future Scenarios

50 About the Author

594-71613_ch00_4Pindd 3 102017 403 PM

The author wishes to thank the participants of a draft paper discussion William Arnold Jack

Brougher Matthew Edwards Daniel Fried Andrew Kuchins Randy Levinas Gary Litman Jeff

Mankoff Cyrus Newlin Olga Oliker Ian Solomon Doug Stanglin and Angela Stent

This report is made pos si ble by the generous support of Car ne gie Corporation of New York

Acknowl edgments

Iv

594-71613_ch00_4Pindd 4 102017 403 PM

1

01

Introduction

A friend of mine a devoted connoisseur of bilateral economic relations with 30 years of experi-

ence in the field once noted that the hottest discussions about US- Russia ties occur at a time

when mutual trade is compressed into the value of a mathematical error This is exactly what is

happening now According to official statistics the value of US- Russia trade is about $20 billion

and is rolling back to the level of 20051 There is no doubt that a new set of sanctions recently

signed into law by the US president and currently being implemented will further hurt economic

interaction by reducing financial inflows limiting the transfer of technology and expertise and

dampening business confidence Many policymakers and experts have agreed that HR 3364

(Countering Amer i carsquos Adversaries through Sanctions Act2) by expanding and codifying US

sanctions targeting Rus sia opens a new cycle in bilateral relations This legislation which received

overwhelming bipartisan support creates a new economic and po liti cal framework on a bilateral

track Strong concerns expressed by President Donald Trump in his special statement about

ldquounconstitutional provisions of the ldquoflawed billrdquo3 cannot significantly limit its intended and

unintended consequences In its implementation it could have relatively broad margins of flexibil-

ity and leverage but requires the president to seek congressional approval before easing or termi-

nating sanctions against Rus sia or undertaking actions that would significantly modify US policy

toward Rus sia Additional observations regarding HR 3364rsquos pos si ble impact on US- Russia

interaction in par tic u lar industries can be found throughout this report but suffice it to say that it

will contribute to a broader curtailment of many pillars of economic cooperation for years ahead

1 US Census Bureau ldquoForeign Trade Trade in Goods with Rus siardquo Foreign Trade updated June 29 2017 https

wwwcensus gov foreign - trade balance c4621 html

2 Countering Amer i carsquos Adversaries through Sanctions Act HR 3364 115th Cong (2017ndash2018) https www

congress gov bill 115th - congress house - bill 3364

3 Donald J Trump ldquoStatement by President Donald J Trump on the Signing of HR 3364rdquo White House Office of the

Press Secretary August 2 2017 https wwwwhitehouse gov the - press - office 2017 08 02 statement - president

- donald - j - trump - signing - hr - 3364

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 1 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations2

Escalating geopo liti cal tensions have continued to significantly define Rus siarsquos economic prospects

however the countryrsquos economic model exhausted itself long before the dramatic deterioration of

relations with the West Structural bottlenecks have seriously limited Rus siarsquos growth capacity even

during the previous period of high oil prices4

The purpose of this report is to assess what has gone wrong with the US- Russia equation by

analyzing it through the prism of a bilateral economic and po liti cal trajectory while keeping in

mind the structural constraints of the Rus sian economy It will attempt to answer the following

questions

bull Do bilateral economic relations matter

bull Are the United States and Rus sia ldquonatu ralrdquo or ldquounnaturalrdquo trading partners

bull What future scenarios can we expect

In the vast lit er a ture on US- Russia economic relations analy sis of developing trends in bilateral

commerce has always been accompanied by discussions around impor tant po liti cal and eco-

nomic matters particularly regarding US legislation and regulation5 Over several de cades the

most controversial issues concerned the granting of permanent normal trading status to Rus sia

through legislation that eliminated the Jackson- Vanik Amendment and Rus siarsquos accession to

the World Trade Organ ization (WTO) The Magnitsky Act signed into law in 2012 repealed the

Jackson- Vanik provisions but added legislation providing authority for the US government to

withhold visas and freeze assets of Rus sians thought to have been involved with human rights

violations and later imposed sanctions on Rus sia because of its involvement in the Ukrainian and

Syrian crises and its cyber- enabled activities6

Some have observed deficiencies in Rus siarsquos participation in the international division of labor

(reliance on the export of energy and metals) which ldquo canrsquot serve any more as a basis for further

expansion of the countryrsquos position in world markets including the US marketrdquo7 Unfortunately

such observations have not been accompanied by quantitative and qualitative analy sis of structural

constraints in the Rus sian foreign trade model Many authors limit their policy recommendations

for fostering bilateral economic relations to a requirement for a strong initial push from respective

governments the creation of business working groups and the extension of bilateral and multilat-

eral legal grounds for economic cooperation Such instruments proved to be useful in facilitating

4 International Monetary Fund (IMF) Rus sian Federation Selected Issues (Washington DC IMF 2016)

5 ldquoAmer i carsquos New Economic Sanctions May Hurt Rus siarsquos Recoveryrdquo Economist August 5 2017 Andrey Kortunov and

Olga Oliker eds A Roadmap for US- Russia Relations (Washington DC CSISRIAC 2017) https csis - prods3

amazonaws com s3fs - public publication 170815 _ KortunovOliker _ USRussiaRelations _ Web pdf E0bdGVHlxxYRAxhO

w8zJ9tbRGwdWjEgV Самуйлов CM Братерский MB ldquoКонгресс и торговые отношения США с Россиейrdquo [US

Congressrsquos role in the US- RF trade relations] США и Канада экономика политика культура 5 no 533 (May 2014)

6 Andrew Weiss and Richard Nephew ldquoThe Role of Sanctions in US- Russian Relationsrdquo (Task Force White Paper

Car ne gie Endowment for International Peace Washington DC July 11 2016)

7 Глущенко ЮН ldquoСостояние проблемы и перспективы сотрудничества России и США в экономической сфереrdquo

[Status prob lems and prospects of Russia- US economic cooperation] Проблемы Национальной Стратегии 21 no 6

(2013) 148ndash164

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 2 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 3

trade and investment during several reset cycles in bilateral relations starting in the 1990s but

they were only partially successful

Several papers and books although focused primarily on bilateral po liti cal agendas or sectorial

analy sis underline the importance of Rus sian domestic realities Dr Angela Stent in her ldquoLimits of

Partnershiprdquo notes that state control of the commanding heights in the Rus sian economy creates

significant deterrents for US private- sector entrance into the market8 Thane Gustafson in the

ldquoWheel of Fortunerdquo asserts that Rus siarsquos growing dependence on revenue from oil exports along

with its inefficient and often- corrupt management of industry is unsustainable9 Andrew Kuchins

in his ldquoElevation and Calibration A New Rus sia Policy for Amer i cardquo has quoted some experts who

believe that the weakened Rus sian economic position may over time contribute to some rap-

prochement with the West and emphasized lack of reforms as ldquoa key obstacle not only for Rus sian

economic recovery but also for improving ties with the Westrdquo10

In a recent joint task force report Eugene Rumer Andrew S Weiss and Richard Sokolsky argue

that the concept of developing stronger economic ties with Rus sia as a foundation for improved

diplomatic relations has not worked ldquoClinton Bush and Obama all placed high hope on trade as

an engine of better relations with Rus sia All were frustrated by the fact that the two countries are

for the most part not natu ral trading partnersrdquo11 On a dif er ent note the former US envoy to

Rus sia Michael McFaul has defended the achievements of a reset policy under the Barack Obama

administration emphasizing that bilateral trade reached a rec ord level in 2011 Nevertheless he

also stresses that it was a one- time accomplishment unlikely to be repeated12

Voices of those who believe that extensive economic ties can provide stability to broader po liti cal

interaction are weaker than ever in an environment of growing protectionism and adversarial rivalry

8 Angela Stent The Limits of Partnerships US- Russian Relations in the XXI Century (Prince ton NJ Prince ton

University Press 2014) 98

9 Thane Gustafson Wheel of Fortune The Battle for Oil and Power in Rus sia (London Harvard University Press 2012)

10 Andrew Kuchins Elevation and Calibration A New Rus sia Policy for Amer i ca (Washington DC Center on Global

Interests 2016)

11 Eugene Rumer Richard Sokolsky and Andrew S Weiss ldquoTrump and Rus sia The Right Way to Manage Relationsrdquo

Foreign Affairs 96 no 2 (MarchApril 2017)

12 Michael McFaul ldquoUS- Russia Relationsrdquo (lecture Institute for Public Diplomacy and Global Communications

George Washington University Washington DC March 3 2017) https wwwc - span org video 424811 - 1 former

- ambassador - michael - mcfaul - discusses - state - usrussia - relations

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 3 102017 404 PM

4

02

Does Bilateral Economic Interaction Matter

Economic relations do not emerge out of a vacuum There are many variables that define the final

configuration of economic interactions such as a par tic u lar countryrsquos level of economic develop-

ment its business environment legal framework po liti cal climate (regime) culture and religion

history and tradition demography and geography as well as global and national economic cycles

An impor tant driver of trade relations for many economies has become participation in global and

regional trade agreements

As many studies and anecdotal evidence show bilateral economic cooperation should be sizable

and should relate to the economic growth of two countries in a way that afects their policy

interests Let us take as a reference point the BRICS countries1 a community of large emerging

economies which Rus sia belongs to Table 21 pres ents official data on US trade and investments

with BRICS states US- Russia trade in goods is disproportionally lowmdash235 times less than US

trade with China 33 times smaller than US trade with India and 28 times less than US trade

with Brazil The size of the US- Russia trade balance is comparable to the size of the US trade

balance with South Africa whose economy is almost four times smaller than Rus siarsquos If we add

trade in ser vices to the trade of goods the gaps increase significantly (Figures 21 and 22) The

diference is not only quantitative but also qualitative

The quality of trade relations can be mea sured by its diversity its share of high- tech components

resilience to economic shocks and its contribution to GDP growth On average a 10 percent

increase in a nationrsquos two- way trade relative to GDP increases GDP through a variety of channels

by at least 16 percent2

Bilateral trade and real GDP growth in the United States and Rus sia are practically uncorrelated

as shown in the summary output of multifactorial regression The coefficient of multiple determi-

nation (R Square) is close to 0 ( Table 22) At the same time the correlation of US exports to India

1 BRICS is the acronym for a select group of five developing economies Brazil Rus sia India China and South Africa

2 World Economic Forum Foreign Direct Investment as a Key Driver for Trade Growth and Prosperity The Case for a

Multilateral Agreement on Investment (Geneva World Economic Forum 2013) 11

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 4 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 5

Table 21 US Trade and Foreign Direct Investments (FDI) with China India Brazil South Africa and Rus sia 2016

China India Brazil South Africa Rus sia

Total Goods Trade 5786 677 565 13 203

Imports 4628 460 262 73 145

Exports 1158 217 303 55 58

Trade in Ser vices 696 472 317 47 na

Imports 161 268 68 17 na

Exports 535 203 249 30 na

US FDI 746 283 653 62 141

BRICS FDI in the United States

148 93 043 076 63

Supported Jobs in the United States (thousand)

911 197 308 50 84

Source United States Trade Representative (USTR) ldquoCountries amp Regionsrdquo accessed September 27 2017

https ustrgov countries - regions See US- China Trade Facts US- India Trade Facts US- Brazil Trade

Facts US- South Africa Trade Facts and US- Russia Trade Facts

201520142013

and China with the real GDP growth of these big Asian economies is significant (05) In the case of

Brazil the correlation is even higher (07) By contrast South Africarsquos small open economy is quite

sensitive to US imports from South Africa (043)3

In marked contrast to other BRICS countries Rus sia is a poor choice for export- oriented opera-

tions As a recent International Monetary Fund (IMF) study highlights Rus sia is an outlier a rare

exception among emerging market (EM) economies with virtually no preferential access to major

markets and little meaningful change over three de cades4 This complicates Rus siarsquos integration

into the global value chain (GVC) which became a significant driving force toward economic

development and trade for certain BRICS economies

3 IMF statistics authorrsquos computation

4 IMF Rus sian Federation Selected Issues IMF Country Report N17198 (Washington DC IMF July 2017)

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 5 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations6

Trade is closely connected with foreign direct investment (FDI) and both are parts of a complex

interaction known as international production sharing According to publicly available official data

US FDI in Rus sia was about $131 billion for 2013 and $295 billion for 2016 with the top industrial

sectors being software and IT ser vices financial ser vices chemicals metals coal oil and gas

and business ser vices5 If we take into account US investments made through Eu ro pean branches

of US companies and ofshore firms this number would easily triple Another component

that usually is not tracked by official statistics is reinvestments The American Chamber of

Commerce surveys in 2016 and 2017 which include this component draw a completely dif er ent

picture accumulated US corporate FDI in 90 large US companies working in Rus sia reached

5 US Department of Commerce International Trade Administration ldquoRussiamdash94- Foreign Direct Investment and

Portfolio Investment Statisticsrdquo Rus sia Country Commercial Guide July 7 2017 https wwwexport gov article

id=shyRussia - foreign - direct - investment - statistics

Figure 21 US Trade in Goods with China India Brazil Rus sia and South Africa Billion US$ 2016

Source USTR ldquoCountries amp Regionsrdquo See US- China Trade Facts US- India Trade Facts US- Brazil Trade

Facts US- South Africa Trade Facts and US- Russia Trade Facts

0

$50

$100

$150

$200

$250

$300

$350

$400

$450

$500

$550

$600

China India Brazil Russia South Africa

Exports

Imports

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 6 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 7

$8244 billion in 20176 The real level from our perspective is usually between official and private

estimations around $40 billon But even this cumulative figure is less than the US FDI in Brazil

and China

The American Chamber of Commerce surveys have also revealed other impor tant data Eighty-

five percent of US companies doing business in Rus sia entered its market 10 or more years ago

while 60 percent of them ldquolandedrdquo there 20 years ago or earlier Only one percent have started

operations over the last five years confirming an obvious fact entry into the Rus sian market is

challenging because of growing monopolism risks associated with the business climate and a

stagnating economy7

6 American Chamber of Commerce in Rus sia ldquoInvestment and Import to Rus sia 2nd Surveyrdquo (Prepared by GfK for the

American Chamber of Commerce in Rus sia Moscow May 2017) 12

7 Ibid 4

Figure 22 US Trade in Goods and in Ser vices with China India Brazil Rus sia and South Africa Billion US$ 2016

Source USTR ldquoCountries amp Regionsrdquo See US- China Trade Facts US- India Trade Facts US- Brazil Trade

Facts US- South Africa Trade Facts and US- Russia Trade Facts

0

$100

$200

$300

$400

$500

$600

$700

China India Brazil Russia South Africa

Trade in Services

Total Goods Trade

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 7 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations8

Rus sian direct investment position toward the United States declined from $215 billion in 2013 to

$83 billion in 2015 (Figure 23) Taking into account dif er ent channels and instruments the actual

volume of Rus sian investments in the United States made through ofshore Eu ro pean Canadian

and US companies may be several times greater than the available official data

Foreign investment in financial assets or foreign portfolio investment (FPI) should be included

even though Central Bank of Rus sia statistics indicate they were also quite low US investments in

equity were $345 million and in debt instruments were about $65 million in the fourth quarter of

20168 However these numbers do not reflect the real level of FPI Rus siarsquos stocks are incredibly

inexpensive while there has been impressive growth of US investments in short- term securities

and in foreign exchange (FX) operations (cash- and- carry trade) Rus sia was among the top per-

forming emerging markets in 2016 gaining 4744 percent in US dollars9 Nevertheless the gen-

eral capitalization of the stock exchange is tiny (less than 20 percent of GDP) comparable to the

capitalization of just one large US com pany such as Coca- Cola Many private sources believe that

the US FPI in Rus sia could be as high as several billion US dollars but a new set of sanctions

approved by President Trump on August 2 2017 if implemented could reverse those flows It is

still not clear whether the secretary of trea sury will prohibit participation in the oferings of Rus siarsquos

sovereign debt and the full range of derivative products A report on this subject should be sub-

mitted no later than 180 days after enactment of the law which means no later than Febru-

ary 2018 New legislation tightens prohibition on Rus sian financial companies already under

sanctions by limiting any new equity or debt with a maturity greater than 14 days (a provision that

8 Central Bank of Rus sia ldquoForeign Direct Investments in the Rus sian Federationrdquo accessed September 27 2017 www

cbr ru localization switchlanguage urlshy=shy news ampfromshy=shyru - ruamptoshy=shyen - gb

9 VanEck ldquoRus sian Stock Market Soars in 2016rdquo Seeking Alpha February 14 2017 https seekingalphacom article

4045602 - russian - stock - market - soars - 2016

Table 22 Summary Output of Regression Statistics (US Real GDP Rus sia Real GDP US- Russia Exports Imports and Total Trade)

Regression Statistics

Multiple R 0056445768

R Square 0003186125

Adjusted R Square minus0042123597

Standard Error 2616043923

Observations 24

Sources IMF statistics authorrsquos computation

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 8 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 9

previously allowed for 30 days) Similarly US persons are prohibited from taking on any new debt

that has a maturity greater than 60 days (previously it was 90 days) with Rus sian energy compa-

nies currently under sanctions10

According to the Trea sury Department Rus sia held $1029 billion in US Trea sury securities in

June 201711 Could Rus sia withdraw all its reserves from the United States and use this action as a

retaliatory mea sure Such a scenario is unlikely since there is no comparable safe- haven alterna-

tive to US dollars When Rus siarsquos US Trea sury holdings dropped 50 percent from $176 billion

(October 2010) to $90 billion (November 2011) the market did not notice12 Nevertheless Rus sian

authorities have announced they will decrease dependence on assets and payments in US dollars13

10 Countering Amer i carsquos Adversaries through Sanctions Act HR 3364

11 US Department of Trea sury Major Foreign Holders of Trea sury Securities September 18 2017 http ticdata

treasury gov Publish mfh txt

12 Ibid

13 ldquoНовый виток санкций Россия откажется от доллараrdquo [A new round of sanctions Rus sia will abandon the dollar]

Газетару August 7 2017 https wwwgazeta ru business 2017 08 07 10821937 shtml

Figure 23 Rus sia Outward FDI Position United States Equities and Debt Million US$ 2009ndash2016

Source Central Bank of the Rus sian Federation External Sector Statistics Rus sian Direct Investments

Abroad accessed September 27 2017 https wwwcbr ru localization switchlanguage urlshy=shy news

ampfromshy=shyru - ruamptoshy=shyen - gb

$6000

$8000

$10000

$12000

$14000

$16000

$18000

$20000

$22000

2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 9 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations10

Officially the country does not invest in the US stock exchange although some Rus sian oligarchs

have bought US corporate bonds and equities in large amounts The new sanctions law requires

the secretary of trea sury in consultation with the director of national intelligence and the secretary

of state to issue reports on Rus sian se nior po liti cal figures and oligarchs based on their closeness

to the Rus sian regime and their net worth as well as the exposure of key economic sectors of the

United States to Rus sian po liti cally exposed persons and parastatal entities including at a mini-

mum the banking securities insurance and real estate sectors14

Only three Rus sian companies are listed in the US exchanges

Overall the scale and scope of US- Russia economic interaction and business activity is much greater

than officially appreciated but not significant enough to be taken into consideration by policymakers

14 Countering Amer i carsquos Adversaries through Sanctions Act HR 3364

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 10 102017 404 PM

11

03

Politics in the Driverrsquos Seat

Bilateral economic relations depend to a great extent on global and national economic cycles

After the recent global financial crisis the US economy has shown surprisingly sustainable GDP

growth while the Rus sian economy was the most afected among BRICS countries by the turbu-

lence of a worldwide economic downturn in 2008ndash2009 and after a short- term rebound slipped

into stagnation (2012ndash2013) and then into full- scale recession (2014ndash2016) The countryrsquos eco-

nomic cycle however appears to be changing once again with the economy returning to a

pattern of growth albeit uneven and gradual (Figures 31 and 32) Even with sanctions still in place

conditions have improved as a result of the stabilization of Urals oil to an average annual price of

$419 per barrel in 2016 The gains were sparked in part by major crude producers agreeing to cut

production after hefty price drops in 2014 and 2015 Supported by easier financial conditions

higher oil prices and growing macro- stability Rus sia is heading toward a moderate growth rate

that is expected to reach 14 percent this year according to forecasts of the World Bank Group

(WBG) and the IMF1

Because of the significant role that politics plays in any bilateral interaction it is impor tant to

combine economic and po liti cal cycles applying a ldquoresetrdquo to bilateral economic cooperation in

addition to the po liti cal relationship I have compared po liti cal cycles and trade dynamics using the

following graphs ( Table 31 and Figure 33) These charts do not pretend to reflect with mathemati-

cal precision all shifts in the bilateral po liti cal relationship but rather attempt to visually align

impor tant economic and po liti cal moments to detect the efects of po liti cal events on the size of

bilateral trade

Figure 33 shows all pos si ble combinations economic trends at the intersection of po liti cal devel-

opments oppose or support each other in synchronization It is evident that po liti cal interference

1 International Monetary Fund Rus sian Federation Staff Concluding Statement of the 2017 Article IV Mission (Wash-

ington DC IMF 2017) World Bank Group From Recession to Recovery Rus sia Economic Report no 37 (Washington

DC World Bank 2017) http pubdocsworldbank org en 383241495487103815 RER - 37 - May26 - FINAL - with - summary

pdf

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 11 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations12

in bilateral business afairs in the early 2000s was less significant than in later years As result

growing po liti cal tensions from 2003 to 2008 did not dramatically afect bilateral economic inter-

action It is also easier to explain why 2011ndash2012 resulted in rec ord trade and investmentmdash a con-

sequence of very high oil prices GDP growth in both countries improved legislation after Rus siarsquos

accession to the WTO and the Obamandash Medvedev po liti cal reset From 2014 to 2016 a perfect

storm of developments added efficiency to Western sanctions and augmented the damaging

consequences of counter- sanction mea sures

Figure 33 also confirms that in times of reduced economic cooperation po liti cal pressures can

easily change bilateral economic trends Moreover business interests along with economic inter-

actions have a limited capacity to reverse the po liti cal mainstream

Figure 31 Economic Cycle 2014ndash2016

Source Authorrsquos evaluation of international financial institutions (IFI) data and sources from respective

countries

Sustainable Growth

Brazil

Negative Growth

Unstable Growth

Mexico

Descending Growth

Argentina

EU

US

Russia

Vietnam

China

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 12 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 13

Table 31 Po liti cal Cycles in Bilateral US- Russia Relations 1999ndash2016

2001ndash2002 The George W Bushndash Vladimir Putin Reset Rus sia supported ldquoglobal war on terrorismrdquo launched by the United States after 911 the SORT nuclear arms reduction treaty was signed by the United States and Rus sia and a successful business dialogue was developed that created the current structure of economic relations

2003ndash2008 Deterioration in bilateral relations brought on by the Iraq War Georgiarsquos ldquoRose Revolutionrdquo Mikhail Khodorkovskyrsquos arrest Ukrainersquos ldquoOrange Revolutionrdquo Kosovorsquos in de pen dence and the Georgian War

2009ndash2010 The Barack Obamandash Dmitry Medvedev Reset Rus sia served as a logistical hub for transportation and supply of US forces in Af ghan i stan United States and Rus sia signed the new START nuclear arms reduction treaty Rus sia backed tighter economic sanctions on Iran Rus sia gained access to the WTO after 18 years of negotiations

2011ndash2016 Deterioration in bilateral relations caused by the Ukrainian crisis which were followed by sanctions and counter- sanctions along with the Syrian crises and cyber- enabled activities

Source Authorrsquos evaluation of po liti cal and economic data

Note SORTthinsp=thinspStrategic Ofensive Reductions Treaty STARTthinsp=thinspStrategic Arms Reduction Treaty

Figure 32 Economic Cycle 2017ndash2019

Source Authorrsquos evaluation of IFI data and sources from respective countries

Egypt

VenezuelaEU

South Africa

Brazil

Russia

India

US

Descending Growth

Korea

China

Negative Growth

Unstable Growth

Sustainable Growth

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 13 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations14

Figure 33 US- Russia Trade Million US$ vs Po liti cal Cycle 2000ndash2016

Sources US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo Foreign Trade last modified June 29 2017

https wwwcensus gov foreign - trade balance c4621 html (see data for 2000ndash2016) authorrsquos evaluation

of po liti cal and economic data

Orange Revolution

Khodorkovskys arrest

GeorgianWar

Bush- Putin Reset

Iraq War Global Financial Crisis

Obama-Medvedev Reset

Russias WTO accession

New START Treaty

A Pefect Storm the Ukranian Crisis Oil Prices Crashing

Sanctions and Counter-Sanctions

$3000

$8000

$13000

$18000

$23000

$28000

$33000

$38000

$43000

2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 14 102017 404 PM

15

The current structure of US- Russia economic relations emerged in the early 2000s when the

model of trade and investment interaction took on a character similar to that which existed be-

tween the United States and developing economies US imports from Rus sia centered on com-

modities while technology along with food products lead American exports The primary

exception was that Rus sia supplied nuclear fuel including highly enriched uranium extracted from

nuclear weapons for US power plants and provided ser vices to the aerospace industry primarily

in satellite launches However both these exceptions can be explained as a legacy of the Soviet

past and not a harbinger of the future economic relationship (Figure 41)

In the last 15 years this trade structure has not changed significantly The only noticeable shift in

trade was a dramatic drop (to practically nothing) in exports of US agricultural products a result

of Rus siarsquos policy of import substitution and so- called counter- sanction mea sures it took in re-

sponse to US sanctions over the Ukraine crisis (Figure 42)

Promising new directions of cooperation in the IT sector and in engineering ser vices for the

aerospace industry appeared in the early 2000s1 but did not spill into other sectors and conse-

quently did little to renew economic cooperation on the whole The integration of Rus sian high-

tech ser vices into large- scale global production and value chains was constrained by the usual

culprits a lack of financial resources managerial experience skilled labor modern infrastructure

RampD investments and an adequate business environment High commodity prices incentivized the

restoration of an economic system centered on resource rents The leading role of oil and gas

extraction and transportation discouraged the development of a nonenergy sector that might

have created advanced and complex production and ser vices An import substitution policy could

not work efficiently in an economic environment plagued by the Dutch disease where currency

1 The Boeing Design Center was created in Moscow It consists of nearly 250 Boeing employees managing

a team of 1200 contract engineers from Rus sian and Ukrainian aerospace companies ldquoBackgrounder Boeing in

Rus siardquo Boeing last modified January 2017 http wwwboeing com resources boeingdotcom company key _ orgs

boeing - international pdf russia - cisbackgrounder pdf

Are the United States and Rus sia ldquoNatu ralrdquo Trading Partners A Little Bit of History

04

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 15 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations16

inflows (oil money) lead to ruble appreciation and render a countryrsquos production less competitive

During that time Rus siarsquos industry did not receive preferential access to larger markets and could

not expand its share in the global economy particularly because of its self- isolation from the

regional trade agreements (except for its participation in the Eurasian Economic Union with some

neighboring countries of the former Soviet Union) As a result neither import substitution nor

export- led strategy promoted growth and specialization in nonoil production A long- awaited

modernization and reallocation of resources from an inefficient nontrade sector to a trade sector

did not materialize

These limits were later augmented with sanctions and an extension of domestic restrictions on

cooperation with Western partners Importantly the rapid growth of state- monopoly structures in

the Rus sian economy over the past 15 years has created additional obstacles to the development

and diversification of US- Russia economic ties

Figure 41 US Imports from Rus sia US$ 2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2016)

Fish and shellfish 3

Crude oil 5

Fuel oil 37

Petroleum products other

8

Nuclear fuel materials

7

Chemicals-fertilizers 4

Steelmaking materials 5

Iron and steel mill products 4

Bauxite and aluminum 9

Other precious metals 4

Nonferrous metals other 1

Finished metal shapes 1

Synthetic rubber--primary

1

Spacecraftexcluding military

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 16 102017 404 PM

Fig

ure

42

U

S E

xpo

rts

to R

us s

ia U

S$ 2

016

Sou

rce

US

Ce

nsu

s B

ure

au ldquo

Trad

e in

Go

od

s w

ith

Ru

s sia

rdquo (s

ee

dat

a fo

r 2

016

)

Bak

ery

pro

du

cts

Win

e b

eer

an

d r

elat

ed

pro

du

cts

New

spri

nt

Pla

stic

mat

eria

ls

Ch

emic

als-

fert

ilize

rs

Ch

emic

als-

ino

rgan

icC

hem

ical

s-o

rgan

ic

Ch

emic

als-

oth

erC

ott

on

fib

er c

loth

In

du

stri

al r

ub

ber

pro

du

cts

Min

eral

su

pp

lies-

man

ufa

ctu

red

Gen

erat

ors

acc

esso

ries

Ele

ctri

c ap

par

atu

s

Dri

llin

g amp

oilfi

eld

eq

uip

men

t Sp

ecia

lized

min

ing

Exc

avat

ing

mac

hin

ery

No

nfa

rm t

ract

ors

an

d p

arts

In

du

stri

al e

ng

ines

Fo

od

to

bac

co m

ach

iner

y M

etal

wo

rkin

g m

ach

ine

too

ls

Tex

tile

sew

ing

m

ach

ines

W

oo

d g

lass

p

last

ic

Pu

lp a

nd

pap

er

mac

hin

ery

Mea

suri

ng

tes

tin

g

con

tro

l in

stru

men

ts

Mat

eria

ls h

and

ling

equ

ipm

ent

Ind

ust

rial

mac

hin

es

oth

er

Ph

oto

ser

vice

ind

ust

ry m

ach

iner

y A

gri

cult

ura

l mac

hin

ery

eq

uip

men

t C

om

pu

ters

Co

mp

ute

r ac

cess

ori

es

Sem

ico

nd

uct

ors

Tel

eco

mm

un

icat

ion

seq

uip

men

t

Bu

sin

ess

mac

hin

es a

nd

eq

uip

men

t

Lab

ora

tory

tes

tin

g in

stru

men

ts

Med

icin

al e

qu

ipm

ent

Civ

ilian

air

craf

t e

ng

ines

eq

uip

men

t a

nd

par

ts

Rai

lway

tra

nsp

ort

atio

n

equ

ipm

ent

Ves

sels

exc

lud

ing

scr

ap

Co

mm

erci

al v

esse

ls o

ther

M

arin

e en

gin

es p

arts

Spac

ecra

ft e

xclu

din

g

mili

tary

Pas

sen

ger

car

s

new

an

d u

sed

Tru

cks

bu

ses

and

sp

ecia

l p

urp

ose

ve

hic

les

En

gin

es a

nd

en

gin

e p

arts

(c

arb

ure

tors

pis

ton

s r

ing

s

and

val

ves)

B

od

ies

and

ch

assi

s fo

r p

asse

ng

er c

ars

Au

tom

oti

ve t

ires

an

d t

ub

es

Oth

er p

arts

an

d a

cces

sori

es o

f ve

hic

les

Ap

par

el h

ou

seh

old

go

od

s -

text

ile

Ph

arm

aceu

tica

lp

rep

arat

ion

s

Furn

itu

re h

ou

seh

old

go

od

s

etc

R

ug

s

Cel

l ph

on

es a

nd

oth

er

ho

use

ho

ld g

oo

ds

ne

c

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 17 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations18

Figure 43 US Trade in Goods with Rus sia Million US$ 1992ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 1992ndash2016)

Russian Financial Crisis

Oil price Increased from$2446 USD per barrel (2001)

to $9694 USD per barrel(2008)

Global Financial Crisis

Oil price high record in2011-2012

(more that $111 USD perbarrel)

Oil price crashed

$-

$5000

$10000

$15000

$20000

$25000

$30000

$35000

$40000

$45000

$50000

1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

US Imports from Russia US Exports to Russia US-Russia Trade in Goods

No doubt po liti cal ups and downs add volatility to US- Russia trade Nevertheless Rus siarsquos eco-

nomic structure exhausted itself before the Ukrainian crisis and the recent Rus sian recession Its

limitations are not only due to some mistakes in policy or negative coincidences of circumstances

but rather to deeply rooted properties in the current bilateral trade model related to structural

issues in the Rus sian economy Structural constraints such as the weak enforcement of property

rights poor business regulation and nondiversified exports weighed on Rus sian trade with the

United States From this perspective the term ldquonaturalunnatural trading partnersrdquo does not ad-

dress the unused capacity of bilateral interaction or the real challenges that kind of interaction

faces It just adds metaphysical flavor to the very specific economic and po liti cal factors that

determine the US- Russia trajectory

Overall the outlines of bilateral trade (Figure 43) resemble the famous ldquoRus sian Mountainsrdquo that

were a pre de ces sor of the modern roller coaster icy hills supported by wooden constructionsmdash a

rigid and immobile structure that sooner or later would melt This unfortunately is what is hap-

pening to US- Russia trade cooperation now

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 18 102017 404 PM

19

ARE LITTLE FISH REALLY SWEET

Low US- Russia economic interaction has at least two consequences First it limits the capacity of

policymakers to exploit trade as an instrument for geopo liti cal combat Even the question of a US

trade deficit which used to be a headache for many US trading partners has become so insig-

nificant in absolute terms (about $87 billion in 2016) that it seems hardly worth caring about

When the volume of trade between two countries becomes very small in absolute terms whether

a country is running a surplus or deficit is no longer relevant But it also renders another type of

confrontations (sometimes more dangerous) more likely since the two traders have little to lose

Second in an environment marked by low levels of bilateral trade both sides could incentivize (if

and when a desire for po liti cal rapprochement exists) the signing of new trade deals which are

elevated symbolically as a turning point in bilateral po liti cal relations (ie the sale of Boeings to

Rus sia or the delivery via tankers of Rus sian oil to US refineries) Sometimes markets themselves

pres ent ldquogiftsrdquo that can be capitalized on po liti cally US- USSR grain trade in the 1970s was one

such ldquogiftrdquo large sales of American grain to the Soviet Union helped US policymakers win favor

with the po liti cally impor tant American farming sector and permitted Soviet leaders to maintain

access to a dietary staple for the Soviet population

The strong 32 percent growth in value of US imports from Rus sia from January to May 2017

versus January to May 2016 ( Table 51) is an example of a development that has tempted officials

to pres ent it as a sign of positive change due to ldquogrowing business activitiesrdquo (this kind of statement

was heard before the bilateral summit in Germany in July 2017) although the reason for that leap

was evidently an increase in commodity prices (mainly of oilmdash see Table 52) and not a rise in

entrepreneurial interactions The primary beneficiaries of that upside rally have been two other

petro- economies Saudi Arabia and Venezuela ( Tables 53 and 54)

Sector Analyses

05

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 19 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations20

Table 51 US Imports from Rus sia Million US$ Januaryndash May 2016 vs Januaryndash May 2017

Year January February March April May Total

2016 9603 6871 11097 12257 10977 50805

2017 12215 10220 16979 13471 14147 67032

Change 271 487 530 99 289 319

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 1992ndash2016)

Table 52 Change in Urals Crude Oil Prices US$ per Barrel Januaryndash May 2016 vs Januaryndash May 2017

Januaryndash May 2016 Januaryndash May 2017 Change ($) Change ()

3601 5129 1528 424

Source Ministry of Finance of the Rus sian Federation https wwwminfin ru ru ixzz4mMIZ7XtC

Table 53 US Imports from Saudi Arabia Million US$ Januaryndash May 2016 vs Januaryndash May 2017

Year January February March April May Total

2016 15114 9036 13555 10844 14679 63228

2017 19802 20298 21650 16211 19542 97503

Change 3101 12463 5972 495 331 542

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Saudi Arabiardquo Foreign Trade last modified June 29 2017

https wwwcensus gov foreign - trade balance c5170 html (see data for 2016ndash2017)

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 20 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 21

Table 54 US Imports from Venezuela Million US$ Januaryndash May 2016 vs Januaryndash May 2017

Year January February March April May Total

2016 6657 5560 7140 8007 7922 35286

2017 13041 10864 123500 11148 12243 59646

Change 9590 9540 7297 3923 5454 6903

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Venezuelardquo Foreign Trade last modified June 29 2017

https wwwcensus gov foreign - trade balance c3070 html (see data for 2016ndash2017)

Table 55 US Exports to Rus sia Million US$ Januaryndash May 2016 vs Januaryndash May 2017

Year January February March April May Total

2016 3628 3577 7298 4657 4947 24107

2017 3144 4277 5386 6670 4806 24283

Change minus133 196 minus262 432 minus29 minus07

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2016ndash2017)

At the same time US exports to Rus sia continue to stagnate ( Table 55) due to low levels of

consumption during a two-and- a- half-year economic crisis a deep ruble devaluation sanctions

and counter- sanctions

Given the very dif er ent economic structures and resource endowments of Rus sia and the United

States it is not surprising that US- Russia trade is asymmetric and oil driven (Figure 51) A

3 percent increase in Urals oil prices translates into a one percent increase in US import growth

from Rus sia Thus in 2016 every $10 increase in Urals crude oil added $15 billion to the value of

US imports or 11 percent to the total value of imports from Rus sia

OIL ADDICTION

Oil is a core pillar of US- Russia bilateral trade A bumpy ride in oil markets afects commerce

Nevertheless Rus sian oil exports to the United States in physical terms have been rather

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 21 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations22

sustainable Starting from 2005 average annual deliveries have been above 150 million barrels

(Figure 52) Crude and heating oil have dominated while petroleum products and liquefied petro-

leum gases have not (Figure 53) In 2011 oil exports peaked at 228 million barrels but declined to

159 million barrels in 2016mdash a drop of 30 percent Rec ord high shipments of Rus sian oil to the United

States coincided with an elevation in oil prices which made the subsequent decline in oil shipment

value between 2011 and 2016 (by about 72 percent as shown in Figure 54) seem more stark The

increase in price also raised the share of oil in Rus sian exports by 74 percent in 2011 (Figure 55)

The Rus sian share in total US oil imports was around 55 percent in 2011 and 43 percent in 2016

( Table 56) In the last five years the United States has relied exclusively on consumption of Rus sian

oil for the rough equivalent of one week out of the year (Figure 56)

It is unlikely that Rus sia can significantly increase its share of the US oil market and there is a real

possibility for a downward trend There are several reasons the historically high Rus sian hydrocar-

bon export threshold of 2011 will not soon if ever be surpassed

First US energy consumption will likely be flat According to the US Energy Information Adminis-

tration (EIA) demand for petroleum and other liquids in the United States will be about 35ndash36

quadrillion British thermal units (BTUs) with minimal variation over the next 25 years1

1 US EIA ldquoAnnual Energy Outlook 2017 with Projections to 2050rdquo January 5 2017 7ndash8

Figure 51 US- Russia Trade Growth () vs US and Rus sia Real GDP Growth () 1993ndash2016

Source IMF ldquoIMF Datardquo accessed September 27 2017 http wwwimf org en Data US Census Bureau

ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo

Note rGDPthinsp=thinspreal gross domestic product

Trade

USA rGDP growth

Russia rGDP growth

-60

-40

-20

0

20

40

60

80

100

1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Gro

wth

All spikes in US-Russia trade have been connected with two main

variables volume and price of crude oil

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 22 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 23

Second the United States will become a net energy exporter between 2020 and 2030 in most

cases under dif er ent combinations of oil and natu ral gas prices GDP growth technological

breakthroughs and the availability of energy resources The role of oil imports will dramatically

fall2

Third oil price scenarios as described by the International Energy Agency (IEA) international

financial organ izations (IFIs) and many national agencies are very cautious and assume that even

by 2035 to 2040 oil prices will not to recover to the levels of 2011ndash20123

Fourth Rus sian oil production and export growth will be modest and driven by Asian economic

expansion and will comprise a decreasing share of Western markets4 According to forecasts from

2 Ibid 15ndash18

3 Ibid table 3 ldquoEnergy Prices by Sector and Sourcesrdquo World Bank World Bank Commodity Markets Price Forecasts

(Washington DC World Bank 2017) httpswwwworldbank org en research commodity - markets Organ ization of the

Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) World Oil Outlook 2016 (Vienna OPEC 2016)

4 E D Belotskaia et al Global and Rus sian Energy Outlook 2016 (Moscow Energy Research Institute of the Rus sian

Acad emy of Science Analytical Center for the Government of the Rus sian Federation 2016) http acgov ru files

publication a 12767 pdf

Figure 52 US Imports from Rus sia Crude Oil and Petroleum Products Thousands of Barrels 1995ndash2016

Source US EIA ldquoUS Imports by Country of Origin Rus siardquo Petroleum amp Other Liquids September 13

2017 http wwweia gov dnav pet PET _ MOVE _ IMPCUS _ D _ NUS _ NRS _ MBBL _ M htm

0

50000

100000

150000

200000

250000

Date 1995 1996 1997 1998 199920002001200220032004200520062007200820092010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 23 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations24

the Organ ization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) crude oil exports from Rus sia and

the Caspian region to the United States will dis appear by 20255

So why does the Rus sian Urals blend continue to be attractive for oil traders and US refineries

which could pro cess greater volumes of domestically produced lighter crude There are two main

reasons One is related to the preference of US high conversion refineries (the most sophisticated

in the world) to work with heavy oil blends produced by Canada Mexico Iraq Venezuela and

Rus sia Pro cessing heavy crude now is as profitable as pro cessing lighter crude The so- called

crack spreadmdash the diference between the cost of relatively cheap heavy crude oil and the final

price of value- added consumer products (diesel gasoline jet fuel and heating oil)mdash has become

the same as the refinery margins of light sweet crude6 This has primarily afected light oil produc-

ing countries such as Angola Algeria and Nigeria

5 OPEC World Oil Outlook 2016 306ndash309

6 ldquoHow Much for That Heavy Oilrdquo Oil Sands Magazine December 26 2015 https wwwoilsandsmagazine com

news 2015 12 26 how - much - for - that - heavy - oil

Figure 53 US Imports from Rus sia Oil and Petroleum Products US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

$-

$25000000000

$20000000000

$15000000000

$10000000000

$5000000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Liquefied petroleum gases

Petroleum products other

Fuel oil

Crude oil

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 24 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 25

Another factor afecting purchase of Rus sian oil is a new trend among oil companies for further

consolidation of scale and for integrating operations of upstream and downstream business7

There have been several waves of separation and unification of production transportation and

pro cessing in the last 50 years The current business cycle can be seen as an adaptation to a

period of low prices and oversupply Companies that buy andor produce oil in Rus sia most likely

prefer to transport and pro cess this oil in their own modern refineries in the United States At the

same time some of the newest refinery designs specifically for pro cessing heavy oils have been

built in Asia thus extending the choices of heavy oil producing countries

We should also consider that leading US and international oil traders along with oil producing

companies working with or owning US refineries frequently buy Rus sian oil on the open market

and have long- term contracts on Rus sian crude oil delivery Many Rus sian oil companies prefer to

pay for purchases or ser vices with their future production instead of cash creating situations of

ldquostickyrdquo oil imports that are difficult to replace The best- known example is an interaction between

7 ldquoEnergy and Utilities Sectorrdquo Roundtable Financier Worldwide December 2015 https wwwfinancierworldwide

com roundtable - energy - utilities - sector - dec15

Figure 54 US Imports of Oil and Petroleum Products from Rus sia vs Oil Prices Eu rope Brent Spot Price Free on Board (FOB) 1996ndash2017

Source US EIA ldquoUS Imports by Country of Origin Rus siardquo

0

20

40

60

80

100

120

140

0

5000

10000

15000

20000

25000

30000

Jan

-19

96

Jun

-19

96

No

v-19

96

Ap

r-19

97

Sep

-19

97

Feb

-19

98

Jul-

199

8D

ec-1

99

8M

ay-1

99

9O

ct-1

99

9M

ar-2

00

0A

ug

-20

00

Jan

-20

01

Jun

-20

01

No

v-2

00

1A

pr-

20

02

Sep

-20

02

Feb

-20

03

Jul-

20

03

Dec

-20

03

May

-20

04

Oct

-20

04

Mar

-20

05

Au

g-2

00

5Ja

n-2

00

6Ju

n-2

00

6N

ov-

20

06

Ap

r-2

00

7Se

p-2

00

7Fe

b-2

00

8Ju

l-2

00

8D

ec-2

00

8M

ay-2

00

9O

ct-2

00

9M

ar-2

010

Au

g-2

010

Jan

-20

11Ju

n-2

011

No

v-2

011

Ap

r-2

012

Sep

-20

12Fe

b-2

013

Jul-

20

13D

ec-2

013

May

-20

14O

ct-2

014

Mar

-20

15A

ug

-20

15Ja

n-2

016

Jun

-20

16N

ov-

20

16

USD

per

Bar

rel

Th

ou

san

d B

arr

els

US Imports from Russia of Crude Oil and Petroleum Products (Thousand Barrels)

Europe Brent Spot Price FOB (Dollars per Barrel)

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 25 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations26

Table 56 US Oil Imports All Countries vs Rus sia Thousand Barrels per Day 2011ndash2016

Years 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

All Countries 11436 10598 9859 9241 9449 10058

Rus sia 624 477 460 330 371 433

Share 546 450 467 357 393 431

Sources US EIA ldquoUS Imports by Country of Origin Total Crude Oil and Productsrdquo Petroleum amp Other

Liquids September 13 2017 wwweia gov dnav pet pet_move_impcus_a2_nus_ep00_im0_mbbl_m htm

authorrsquos computation

Figure 55 US Imports from Rus sia Share of Crude Oil and Petroleum Products Million US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

57

64

73

72

74

73

72

59

52 50

0

$5000

$10000

$15000

$20000

$25000

$30000

$35000

$40000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

US Imports from Russia

Share of Oil and Petroleum Products

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 26 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 27

the Rus sian state mono poly Rosneft and commodity trading and mining giant Glencore which

along with energy and commodities com pany Vitol participated in a $10 billion prepayment

deal with Rosneft for crude supplies in 2013

There have been a number of ongoing transactions between the Rus sian oil industry and interna-

tional oil companies including several that top the list of importers of Rus sian oil to the United

States ( Table 57) In December 2016 Glencore participated in a controversial privatization opera-

tion purchasing in tandem with the Qatar sovereign wealth fund a 195 percent stake in Rosneft

which was on the US and EU list of sanctioned firms8 Glencore has also taken a blocking stake in

midsize oil producer RussNeft BP owns a 1975 percent stake in Rosneft Chevron holds a

15 percent interest in the 935- mile- long CPC9 pipeline which transports an average of 959000

barrels of crude oil per day including 76000 barrels daily from Rus sia10 ExxonMobil has formed

8 E Mazneva and I Arkhipov ldquoRus sia Sells $11 Billion Stake in Rosneft to Glencore Qatarrdquo Bloomberg December 7

2016

9 CPCthinsp=thinspCaspian Pipeline Consortium

10 ldquoRus sia Highlights of Operations and Business Portfoliordquo Chevron accessed October 3 2017 https wwwchevron

com worldwide russia

Figure 56 Share of Rus sian Oil in Total US Oil Imports Thousands of Barrels per Day 1972ndash2016

Source US EIA ldquoUS Imports by Country of Origin Total Crude Oil and Productsrdquo

2000

4000

6000

8000

10000

12000

14000

16000

US Imports of Crude Oil and Petroleum Products (Thousand Barrels per Day)

US Imports from Russia of Crude Oil and Petroleum Products (Thousand Barrels per Day)19

7319

7419

7519

7619

7719

7819

7919

80

198

119

82

198

319

84

198

519

86

198

719

88

198

919

90

199

119

92

199

319

94

199

519

96

199

719

98

199

92

00

02

00

12

00

22

00

32

00

42

00

52

00

62

00

72

00

82

00

92

010

20

112

012

20

132

014

20

152

016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 27 102017 404 PM

Table 57 Top Importers of Rus sian Oil to the United States Thousands of Barrels 2016

VALERO MARKETING amp SUPPLY CO 54590 3616

EXXONMOBIL OIL CORP 17087 1130

CHEVRON USA INC 15217 1008

BP WEST COAST PRODUCTS LLC 10130 671

GEORGE E WARREN CORP 7272 48

PAULSBORO REFINING CO LLC 6838 453

TESORO CORP 5097 338

VITOL INC 5084 337

PHILLIPS 66 CO 4726 313

TRAFIGURA AG 4360 289

PAR HAWAII REFINING LLC 3893 258

MOTIVA ENTERPRISES LLC 3041 205

SHELL US TRADING CO 2863 19

MARATHON PETROLEUM CO LLC 2475 16

ATLANTIC TRADING amp MARKETING 2099 14

FREEPOINT COMMODITIES LLC 1439 1

GLENCORE LTD 1284 85

BEST PETROLEUM CORP 967 64

ROLYMPUS US COMMODITIES GROUP LLC 822 6

HUNT CRUDE OIL SUPPLY CO 666 4

GULF OIL LP 658 4

Source US EIA ldquoUS Imports by Country of Origin Crude Oilrdquo Petroleum amp Other Liquids September 13

2017 httpswwweiagovdnavpetpet_move_impcus_a2_nus_epc0_im0_mbblpd_ahtm authorrsquos

computation

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 28 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 29

several joint ventures with Rosneft to undertake ofshore exploration in the Black Sea and the Kara

Sea in Siberia11

According to the Sanctions Act US persons are prohibited from exporting or reexporting goods

ser vices (except financial ser vices) and technology in support of exploration or production of new

deep- water Arctic ofshore or shale oil proj ects that involve designated Rus sian entities or other

entities in which such sanctioned persons have a controlling interest or a substantial noncontrol-

ling owner ship interest defined as not less than 33 percent (previously it was 50 percent) The new

law also authorizesmdash but does not requiremdash the imposition of so- called secondary sanctions

against non- US entities that engage in activities involving the construction maintenance or

expansion of Rus sian energy export pipelines with a fair market value of $1 million or more or an

aggregate fair market value during a 12- month period of $5 million12 This provision has raised the

concerns of some Eu ro pean countries particularly Germany As result the final language of the

law included wording about coordination of this issue with allies of the United States

Shipments of Rus sian oil to the United States could be afected by activity in the US refinery

industry In early 2017 Saudi Aramco bought the United Statesrsquo largest oil refinery in Port Arthur

(Texas) and it announced plans to send more of its own crude to that refinery13 Serious concerns

exist however regarding the future of three refineries and nine pipelines owned by Citgo a US

branch of the Venezuelan state com pany PdVSA which is balancing precariously on the edge of

default Under certain conditions in the event of PdVSA bankruptcy Rosneft could claim a stake of

up to 499 percent in Citgo Such a possibility has raised concerns among politicians and US

government officials with Trea sury Secretary Steven Mnuchin calling it a ldquonational security issuerdquo14

Tables 58 59 and 510 show allocations of Rus sian oil imports to major US refineries some of

which work exclusively on Rus sian crude a total of two to three months per year In total 150940

thousand barrels of Rus sian oil were refined in 2016

Figure 57 confirms a leading position of Texas and Louisiana among the US states receiving

Rus sian crude followed by New Jersey California Mississippi Washington Hawaii and Delaware

In a paradoxical way Texas has dis appeared from the list of states as a main destination of US

imports from Rus sia (Figure 58) because Rus sian crude is mostly delivered to Louisiana ports and

registered there by US Customs as an import from Rus sia After that it transports to refineries in

Louisiana and Texas

Overall the short- term business rationale behind the sustainability of US oil imports from Rus sia

cannot overcome strong headwinds in the US energy sector facing all oil importers which will

inevitably lead to a contraction of Rus sian oil exports to the United States in the foreseeable future

11 Exxon eforts to receive a special US Trea sury waiver to drill in sanctioned Rus sia failed in 2017

12 Countering Amer i carsquos Adversaries through Sanctions Act HR 3364

13 Sarp Ozkan ldquoSaudi Aramcorsquos Port Arthur Refinery and the US Refinery Fleetrdquo Drilling Info May 11 2017

https infodrillinginfo com saudi - aramcos - port - arthur - refinery - us - refinery - fleet

14 Graham Kates ldquoTrea sury Secretary Rus siarsquos Citgo Deal a National Security Issuerdquo CBS News May 1 2017

http wwwcbsnews com news rosneft - citgo - steven - mnuchin - national - security

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 29 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations30

Table 58 Valerorsquos Refineries Pro cessing Rus sian Oil Thousands of Barrels 2016

Saint Charles Louisiana 29206 535

Corpus Christi Texas 20626 378

Wilmington California 4250 78

Total USA 54590 100

Source US EIA ldquoRefinery Capacity Reportrdquo January 1 2017

table 5 wwweia gov petroleum refinerycapacity table5 pdf

authorrsquos computation

Table 59 ExxonMobil Refineries Pro cessing Rus sian Oil Thousands of Barrels 2016

Baytown Texas 15037 88

Baton Rouge Louisiana 2046 12

Total USA 17083 100

Source US EIA ldquoRefinery Capacity Reportrdquo authorrsquos computation

Table 510 Chevronrsquos Refineries Pro cessing Rus sian Oil Thousands of Barrels 2016

Pascagoula Mississippi 12767 840

El Segundo California 2372 155

Saint Rose Louisiana 78 05

Total USA 15217 100

Source US EIA ldquoRefinery Capacity Reportrdquo authorrsquos computation

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 30 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 31

HEAVY METAL

Taken together US imports of metals and US imports of oil compose about 80 percent of US

total imports from Rus sia (Figure 59) Trade of metals like other commodities is strongly afected

by market price fluctuations Nevertheless metal imports from Rus sia have been fairly resilient to

market volatility and their average annual value has hovered at about $4 billion in the last five years

(Figure 510) This market resilience was forged at the end of the 1990searly 2000s when Rus sian

metal producers gradually modernized their plants adjusting quality of production to Western

standards and enhancing integration into global value and supply chains Some of them conquered

their share of the highly competitive US market struggling with peers from Canada and certain

BRICS countries (China India and Brazil) To attract additional resources all Rus sian large metal-

producing companies became public and were listed on stock exchanges chiefly the London Stock

Exchange (Severstalrsquo PAO Evraz MMK OAO Novolipetsk Steel Norilsk Nikel and TMK PAO) one

on the New York Stock Exchange (Mechel) and one on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange (Rusal)

Business logic pushed some of them to invest in the US metal- making industry which was hit

hard by crisis Later on some of those assets were sold (eg two US steel mills acquired by

Severstal in 2004 were purchased 10 years later by Steel Dynamics Inc and AK Steel Corp)

Figure 57 Share of US States Rus sian Oil Imports 2016

Source US EIA ldquoUS Imports from Rus sia of Crude Oil and Petroleum Productsrdquo Petroleum amp Other

Liquids September 29 2017 https www eia gov dnav pet hist LeafHandler ashx nshy=shyPETampsshy=shyMTTIM _ NUS

- NRS _ 1ampfshy=shyM authorrsquos computation

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

100

Maine

Massachusetts

Maryland

Connecticut

Georgia

Rhode Island

Virginia

Florida

New York

Alabama

Puerto Rico

Pennsylvania

Delaware

Hawaii

Washington

Mississippi

California

New Jersey

Louisiana

Texas

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 31 102017 404 PM

Figure 58 US Imports from Rus sia by State Million US$ 2013ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoState and Metropolitan Area Trade Datardquo Foreign Trade last modified

October 2 2017 https wwwcensus gov foreign - trade statistics state

Alaska

Connecticut

Delaware

Hawaii

Louisiana

Maryland

North Dakota 0

$1000

$2000

$3000

$4000

$5000

$6000

2013 2014 2015 2016

Alabama

Alaska

Connecticut

Delaware

Hawaii

Louisiana

Maryland

Maine

Mississippi

Montana

North Dakota

Mississippi

Figure 59 US Imports from Rus sia Share of Oil and Metals Million US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 1992ndash2016)

83

82

85

86

87

88

85

82

7375

0

$5000

$10000

$15000

$20000

$25000

$30000

$35000

$40000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

US Imports from Russia

Share of Oil and Metals

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 32 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 33

Obviously the market dynamic of dif er ent metals varies (eg iron steel aluminum platinum and

nickel) Caps to increase their trade and production in a ldquored oceanrdquo global environment with

anemic demand is rather limited despite Figure 510 showing a spike of iron and steel imports

from Rus sia in 2014 and aluminum in 2016 Some opportunities may exist for Russian- owned steel

plants in the United States (such as NLMK) to participate in energy proj ects resumed under Presi-

dent Trump who has required that new pipelines use only American- made steel15

Rus sia occupies a special niche in the US market for titanium products a high- end metal indus-

try Twenty years ago a long- term contract was signed between Rus sian titanium producer

VSMPO- AVISMA and Boeing The Rus sian com pany entered the selective club of Boeing suppliers

for the manufacture of components and semi- finished products Since the signing of this contract

VSMPO has delivered more than 35 percent of all titanium placed on Boeing civil aircraft16 They

are hidden in the trade data in an import category for Civilian Aircrafts and Parts (Figure 511) At

the end of 2016 Boeing announced an extension of its framework agreement with AVISMA

15 E Scheyder C Ngai and T Sylvester ldquoAmerican Steel Unlikely to Get Keystone Boost Despite Trump Orderrdquo

Reuters January 27 2017 http wwwreuters com article usa - trump - pipeline - transcanada - idUSL1N1FH1ZD

16 A Kramer ldquoTitanium Fills Vital Role for Boeing and Rus siardquo New York Times July 5 2013 http wwwnytimes com

2013 07 06 business global titanium - fills - vital - role - for - boeing - and - russia html mcubzshy=shy3

Figure 510 US Imports from Rus sia Iron Steel Bauxite Aluminum Nickel Nonferrous Metals and Other Precious Metals and Materials US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 1992ndash2016)

0

$6000000000

$5000000000

$4000000000

$3000000000

$2000000000

$1000000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 20122013

20142015

2016

Finished metal shapes

Iron and steel advanced

Iron and steel products nec

Nonferrous metals other

Other precious metals

Nickel

Bauxite and aluminum

Iron and steel mill products

Steelmaking materials

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 33 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations34

through 2022 and additional investments in the construction of a new robotic plant in Titanium

Valley a special economic zone located in the Sverdlovsk region that will open in 2018 The pro-

cessing of titanium forgings in all Boeing civil aircraft will be performed there including 787s 737

MAXs and 777Xs17 The contract extension with AVISMA may add several hundred million dollars

in value to annual US imports from Rus sia

How can such heavy reliance on imports of Rus sian titanium exist during a period of rising geopo-

liti cal tensions The answer is straightforward VSMPO- AVISMA is a highly specialized natu ral

mono poly producing 45 percent of the worldrsquos aerospace titanium Only four other countries

smelt high- grade titanium in industrial quantities the United States Germany Japan and China

Overall global production capacity is limited while demand is growing The United States cur-

rently imports around 79 percent of all the titanium it consumes each year18

17 ldquoBoeing and VSMPO Avisma to Launch Second Joint Production Siterdquo Rus sian Aviation Insider December 22 2016

http wwwrusaviainsider com boeing - and - vsmpo - avisma - to - launch - second - joint - production - site

18 Jon Ostrower and Andy Pasztor ldquoBoeing United Technologies Stockpile Titanium Partsrdquo Wall Street Journal

August 7 2014 https wwwwsj com articles boeing - united - technologies - stockpiling - titanium - parts - 1407441886

Figure 511 US Imports from Rus sia Civilian Aircrafts and Parts US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 1992ndash2016)

0

$20000000

$40000000

$60000000

$80000000

$100000000

$120000000

$140000000

$160000000

$180000000

$200000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Parts-civilian aircraft

Civilian aircraft

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 34 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 35

The Sanctions Act authorizes the secretary of the trea sury (in a nonmandatory way) to impose

restrictions (without specifying them) against Rus sian state- owned entities operating in the railway

metals and mining sectors of the Rus sian economy Despite the commanding heights of Rus siarsquos

state sector owner ship in its economy (70 percent of GDP) the metal- producing companies have

remained mostly in private hands

NUCLEAR AFFAIRS

Historically owners and operators of the 104 commercial nuclear power reactors in the United

States have purchased more than 80 percent of their uranium from foreign countries Uranium

shipping from Rus sia accounted for about 13 percent of the 58 million pounds of uranium pur-

chased overseas in 201219 At the same time the Rus sian state- owned mono poly Rosatom ac-

counts for 20 percent of Kazakhstanrsquos uranium production (which in turn comprises 11 percent of

all US uranium imports) and 20 percent of US domestic uranium production capacity (with

owner ship of exploration tracts in Wyoming)20

Nuclear fuel and nuclear power continue to be po liti cally sensitive topics both in the United

States and Rus sia Bilateral cooperation in this sector (being surprisingly stable with imports of

nuclear fuel from Rus sia at a level of $1 billion annually in the last five years [Figure 512 and 513])

is under constant po liti cal and lobbying pressure and has been a source of several po liti cal scan-

dals21 Consequently upside risks in this area of interaction are minimal and downside risks are

much higher especially when we are seeing more decommissioning of nuclear plants in the

United States than new constructions The US EIArsquos 2017 Annual Energy Outlook assumes

that about 25 percent of the nuclear capacity now operating will be removed from ser vice

by 205022

WHY IS THE GRASS GREENER ON THE OTHER SIDE

The United States continues to significantly reduce imports of chemical fertilizers as domestic pro-

duction increases In 2016 the United States imported 13 percent less ammonia and 11 percent

less urea and UAN which is a liquid urea and ammonium nitrate fertilizer Rus sia accounts for

around 40 percent of UAN imported by the United States The United States canceled antidumping

duties on imports of ammonium nitrate and urea from Rus sia in 2016 but it did not prevent import

19 US EIA ldquoThe US Relies on Foreign Uranium Enrichment Ser vices to Fuel Its Nuclear Power Plantsrdquo Today in

Energy August 28 2013 https wwweia gov todayinenergy detail php idshy=shy1273

20 Colin Chilcoat ldquoDoes Rus sia Really Own 20 Percent of the USrsquo Uranium Reservesrdquo OilPricecom May 6 2015

http oilpricecom Alternative - Energy Nuclear - Power Does - Russia - Really - Own - 20 - Of - The - US - Uranium - Reserves

html

21 Michelle Ye Hee Lee ldquoThe Facts behind Trumprsquos Repeated Claim about Hillary Clintonrsquos Role in the Rus sian Ura-

nium Dealrdquo Washington Post October 26 2016

22 US EIA ldquoAnnual Energy Outlook 2017 with Projections to 2050rdquo 81ndash82

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 35 102017 404 PM

Figure 512 US Imports from Rus sia Share of Oil Metals and Nuclear Fuel Million US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 1992ndash2016)

87

86

90

90

90

91

88

86

7882

0

$5000

$10000

$15000

$20000

$25000

$30000

$35000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

US Imports from Russia

Share of Oil Metals and Nuclear Fuel

Figure 513 US Imports from Rus sia Nuclear Fuel Materials US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

$-

$200000000

$400000000

$600000000

$800000000

$1200000000

$1000000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 36 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 37

drops twice last year (Figures 514 and 515) According to forecasts UAN imports are expected to

decline further to 15 million tons this year down over 46 percent from 28 million tons imported

last year23 The downside trend in imports of fertilizers will likely continue because of oversupply

BIG FISH

US imports of fish and shellfish from Rus sia are best understood in comparison with US fish

exports to the Rus sian market which slipped to zero in August 2014 after Rus sia issued an order

banning certain agricultural imports from the United States (Figure 516) While the volume of US

supply was not very large it was impor tant because it broke up the monopolistic dominance of a

few vertically integrated Rus sian companies that have kept prices high by restricting the entry of

new producers Seeking to implement import substitution policies Rus sia has tried to reduce

exports as well as imports of fish and seafood products in the last couple of years This symmetri-

cal approach was intended to ldquocompensaterdquo for a decrease of fish products in the domestic

23 Deepika Thapliyal ldquoPotashCorp Forecasts Sharp Drop in US Nitrogen Imports in 2017rdquo ICIS News February 7

2017 https wwwicis com resources news 2017 02 07 10076734 potashcorp - forecasts - sharp - drop - in - us - nitrogen

- imports - in - 2017

Figure 514 US Imports from Rus sia Share of Oil Metals Nuclear Fuel and Fertilizers Million US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

90

93

92

93

94

95

92

91

85

86

0

$5000

$10000

$15000

$20000

$25000

$30000

$35000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

US Imports from Russia

Share of Oil Metals Nuclear Fuel and Fertilizers

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 37 102017 404 PM

Figure 515 US Imports from Rus sia Chemical- Fertilizers US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

S-

$200000000

$400000000

$600000000

$800000000

$1000000000

$1200000000

$1400000000

$1600000000

$1800000000

$2000000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Figure 516 US Exports to Rus sia Fish and Shellfish US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

0

$10000000

$20000000

$30000000

$40000000

$50000000

$60000000

$70000000

$80000000

$90000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Fish and shellfish

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 38 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 39

consumer market caused by Rus siarsquos import ban but it has failed As result the group most af-

fected by the self- imposed counter- sanctions were Rus sian consumers

With a significant drop in fish imports a devaluation of the ruble and inflationary pressures on

seafood prices yearly consumption of fish in Rus sia has declined precipitously In 2015 alone

fish prices increased 20 percent and consumption dropped to 14 kilograms per person24 from

22 kilograms in 201425 In 2016 food rose to 355 percent of house hold expenditure as a result of

increases in food prices26 This has pushed vertically integrated fishing monopolies to sell even

more of their catch abroad rather than deliver to the Rus sian Federation (Figure 517) Thus we

cannot exclude the possibility of further growth in US fish and shellfish imports from Rus sia on a

marginal scale

24 Александр Савельев ldquoПотребление рыбы в России упало до 14 кг на человекаrdquo [Fish consumption in Rus sia fell to

14 kg per person] Экономика Интерфакс January 28 2015 http wwwinterfax ru business 492038

25 Илья Шестаков ldquoПотебление рыбы в России снизилось на 10 процентов из- за роста ценrdquo [Fish consumption in

Rus sia dropped by 10 percent due to price increases] RNS March 8 2017 https rnsonline consumer - market

Potreblenie - ribi - v - Rossii - snizilos - na - 10 - iz - za - rosta - tsen - 2017 - 03 - 08

26 Zoya Sheftalovich and Christian Oliver ldquoRus siarsquos Boom (Farming) Economyrdquo Politico November 8 2016 http

wwwpolitico eu article russias - boom - farming - economy

Figure 517 US Imports from Rus sia Fish and Shellfish US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

0

$50000000

$100000000

$150000000

$200000000

$250000000

$300000000

$350000000

$400000000

$450000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 39 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations40

SPACE ODYSSEY

Among high- end products beyond the top five groups of goods imported from Rus sia cheap and

efficient Rus sian engines have been used to launch US rockets into space for about 16 years

(Figure 518) There was a serious po liti cal strug gle around a 2014 ban on the purchase of Rus sian

RD-180 rocket engines revealing the conflicting business interests of power ful high- tech companies

This restrictive mea sure was temporary and was quickly lifted because of significant cost impacts

and risks of disruption to launch schedules27 For the same reason the Sanctions Act does not autho-

rize ldquothe imposition of any sanction or other condition limitation restriction or prohibition that

directly or indirectly impedes the supply by any entity of the Rus sian Federation of any product or

ser vice or the procurement of such product or ser vice by any contractor or subcontractor of the

United States or any other entity relating to or in connection with any space launch conducted for

the National Aeronautics and Space Administration or any other nonndash Department of Defense

customerrdquo28

Nevertheless many experts believe that US domestic alternatives to replace Rus sian engines will

be viable in five to eight years

27 Ken Dilanian ldquoWhy Does the US Use Rus sian Rockets to Launch Its Satellitesrdquo NBC News updated November 15

2016 http wwwnbcnews com why - does - u - s - use - russian - rockets - launch - its - satellites - n588526

28 Countering Amer i carsquos Adversaries through Sanctions Act HR 3364

Figure 518 Spacecraft Excluding Military US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

0

$20000000

$40000000

$60000000

$80000000

$100000000

$120000000

$140000000

$160000000

$180000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 40 102017 404 PM

41

Diversity and technological complexity are the most vis i ble advantages supporting US exports to

Rus sia Three major groups of export goods include civilian aircraft engines and parts (Figure 61)

drilling and oil field equipment (Figure 62) and industrial machines and engines (Figure 63)

Despite sanctions against the transfer of advanced oil producing and pro cessing technologies the

realization of US drilling and oil field equipment in Rus sia is sustainable although some bilateral

proj ects have been frozen

Another category of goods that has demonstrated resilience is the phar ma ceu ti cal industry (Fig-

ure 64) because most drugs in Rus sia are imported (about 70 percent of the Rus sian phar ma ceu-

ti cal market in value) Import substitution policies have had only modest results in this industry

As confirmed by American Chamber of Commerce surveys US exports to Rus sia are closely

connected to US FDI 30 percent of total imports of US companies working in the Rus sian

market come from the United States (more than $2 billion in 2016) In other words about

40 percent of all US exports to Rus sia are related to a US corporate- sector business pro cess in

the country The major sectors of activity of these companies are energy and natu ral resources

(52 percent) manufacturing (17 percent) information and communications technology or ICT

(13 percent) retail (7 percent) automotive industry (6 percent) phar ma ceu ti cal production

(1 percent) professional ser vices (05 percent) and other (2 percent)1

Some obvious constraints on US exports to Rus sia have resulted from a reduction in demand A

deterioration of bilateral relations and implementation of sanctions and counter- sanctions have

directly or indirectly afected all businesses Figures 65 and 66 provide data regarding a dramatic

drop in the sale of US agricultural production in Rus sia with all other categories of exports in

goods showing big cuts as well (see Figures 67ndash69)

Exports of civilian aircraft engines and parts put the state of Washington in first place among

other states as a leading exporter to the Rus sian market (Figure 610)

1 American Chamber of Commerce in Rus sia ldquoInvestment and Import to Rus sia 2nd Surveyrdquo 13

Diversity and Constraints

06

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 41 102017 404 PM

Figure 61 US Exports of Civilian Aircraft Engines Equipment and Parts to Rus sia US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

$2500000000

$2000000000

$1500000000

$1000000000

$500000000

$-

Figure 62 US Exports of Drilling and Oil Field Equipment US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

0

$5000000

$10000000

$15000000

$20000000

$25000000

$30000000

$35000000

$40000000

$45000000

$50000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 42 102017 404 PM

Figure 63 US Exports of Industrial Engines to Rus sia US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

0

$5000000

$10000000

$15000000

$20000000

$25000000

$30000000

$35000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Figure 64 US Exports of Phar ma ceu ti cal Preparations to Rus sia US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

0

$5000000

$10000000

$15000000

$20000000

$25000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 43 102017 404 PM

Figure 65 US Exports of Meat and Poultry to Rus sia US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Meat poultry etc

$1000000000

$800000000

$600000000

$400000000

$200000000

$-

$1200000000

$1400000000

$1600000000

Figure 66 US Exports of Soybeans to Rus sia US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

0

$20000000

$40000000

$60000000

$80000000

$100000000

$120000000

$140000000

$160000000

$180000000

$200000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 44 102017 404 PM

Figure 67 US Exports of Vehicles Engines and Parts to Rus sia US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Other parts and accessories of vehicles

Automotive tires and tubes

Bodies and chassis for passenger cars

Engines and engine parts (carburetors pistonsrings and valves)

Trucks buses and special purpose vehicles

Passenger cars new and used

$2500000000

$2000000000

$1500000000

$500000000

$-

$1000000000

Figure 68 US Exports of Medicinal Equipment to Rus sia US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

$10000000

$15000000

$20000000

$25000000

$30000000

$35000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 45 102017 404 PM

Figure 610 US Exports to Rus sia by States (2016 US$ Value) Million US$ 2013ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoState and Metropolitan Area Trade Datardquo

Iowa Kentucky

North Dakota

Oklahoma

South Carolina

Washington

0

$500

$1000

$1500

$2000

2013 2014 2015 2016

District of Columbia

Iowa

Kentucky

North Dakota

Oklahoma

South Carolina

Washington

Figure 69 US Exports of Excavating Machinery to Rus sia US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

0

$5000000

$10000000

$15000000

$20000000

$25000000

$30000000

$35000000

$40000000

$45000000

$50000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 46 102017 404 PM

47

Upon reviewing the current trend in US- Russia economic relations we must acknowledge that

the existing trade model is obsolete and exhausted Imports are resource- oriented and reflect

constraints of the Rus sian economic structure while five groups of goodsmdash oil metals nuclear

fuels fertilizers and fishmdash make up more than 90 percent of total imports from Rus sia (Figure 71)

Each of these industries has a limited capacity for growth in the foreseeable future

Rus siarsquos core export to the United Statesmdash oilmdash will inevitably decrease in the mid- term under any

scenario The value and volume of Rus sian exports to the United States are open to global market

volatility and po liti cal pressures with limited hedging mechanisms

Overall US exports to Rus sia are unsustainable due to bilateral po liti cal tensions the whims of

commodity markets and changing domestic policies Sanctions and counter- sanctions have

created additional barriers particularly in finance banking high- tech energy and agro- business

According to the American Chamber of Commerce 69 percent of US companies working in the

country consider the impact of US sanctions against Rus sia on their business as negative At the

same time 60 percent of companies do not expect big changes in business relations between

Rus sia and the United States under Trump1 as the new law codifies existing sanctions fortifies

them and extends them to new sectors

Current US investments are low due to the weak rule of law in Rus sia a lack of property right

protections and proper contract enforcement high levels of statization and monopolization in the

economy a poor business climate outdated capital stock dependence on natural- resource

sectors and of course sanction and counter- sanction mea sures Bloated administrative compo-

nents created as risk mitigation instruments have also served as impediments The countryrsquos

institutional weakness low level of productivity bud get constraints and a declining inflexible

workforce will restrain future economic growth even if commodity prices recover Rus sian eco-

nomic policy will likely continue to be statist and protectionist relying mostly on import

substitutions

1 Ibid 11

Existing Trends and Future Scenarios

07

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 47 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations48

What scenarios can be expected in such a challenging environment

One probability (no peace no war) is based on the assumption that matters will not deteriorate

further and implementation of the Sanctions Act will be cursory This will cause relatively slow

degradation in the economic field with occasional flashes of activity in selected areas (eg closer

cooperation against Islamist terrorist groups in Syria)

A second worse case or critical scenario is the intensive and full- scale execution of current sanc-

tion legislation and even the imposition of new economic punitive and restrictive mea sures which

could incite asymmetric retaliatory actions and lead to the introduction of additional protectionist

policies This in turn could trigger a further escalation of mutual confrontation and could eventu-

ally destroy the fundamentals of the current bilateral trade system Rus sian leadership has charac-

terized the Sanctions Act as a declaration of a trade war that ends all hope for improving bilateral

relations2

2 Дмитрий Медведев ldquoПодписание президентом США нового санкционного закона против России создает несколько

последствийrdquo [The US Presidentrsquos signing of the package of new sanctions against Rus sia will have a few conse-

quences] Facebook August 2 2017 https wwwfacebook com Dmitry Medvedev posts 10154587161801851

Figure 71 US Imports from Rus sia Share of Oil Metals Nuclear Fuel Fertilizers and Fish Million US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

93

94

93

94

95

96

93

92

87

89

0

$5000

$10000

$15000

$20000

$25000

$30000

$35000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

US Imports from Russia

Share of Oil Metals Nuclear FuelFertilizers and Fish

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 48 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 49

The best case and most favorable scenario looks less probable now It assumes the realization of

structural reforms in Rus sia in such a way that would adapt Rus siarsquos foreign policy to national

economic needs reduce confrontations with the West and make a concerted efort to integrate

Rus sian businesses into global supply and value chains A revitalization of the structural reform

agendamdash including eforts to diversify economic activities through de- monopolization and support

for SMEs a restructuring of the banking sector the creation of a vibrant business climate to foster

entrepreneurships and innovation the implementation of administrative and judicial reforms to

tackle red tape and endemic corruption and the reduction of state control over key sectors of the

economy via wide- spread privatization could kick- start the development of a nonoil economy and

improve long- term growth prospects Despite ongoing discussion of reform strategies deep

economic and po liti cal changes are extremely complicated over the next po liti calelectoral cycle

(2018ndash2024) particularly because of re sis tance of vested interests and growing commodity prices

The urgency to tackle structural shortcomings in natu ral resource- dependent economies usually

correlates with the price of those resources and the degree to which resource rents drive eco-

nomic activity However there may be marginal improvements in the efficiency of the current

economic system

Future US- Russia relations can be thought of through three pillars one pillar focuses on areas

where both countries maintain a competitive rivalry another looks at potential areas of interaction

under pres ent conditions a third pillar and one that has evaporated from the current bilateral

agenda concentrates on future cooperation Stronger economic ties could not only be a kind of

po liti cal shock absorber but contribute to the building of this future (particularly business contacts

aim to support future structural reforms) although po liti cal factors are depressing the prospects

for cooperation To escape deadlock it will be impor tant to establish the right balance between

politics and economics and create a model of collaboration within the framework of contention

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 49 102017 404 PM

About the Author

Vadim Grishin PhD MBA has been involved in the reform pro cess in Rus sia as adviser to the

deputy prime minister of Rus sia in 1992ndash1993 and 2006ndash2010 He has extensive experience

working with the Bretton Woods Institutions He was the board member of the World Bank Group

and served as se nior adviser at the International Monetary Fund Currently he is a con sul tant to the

chief economistrsquos office of the International Finance Corporation and teaches the economics of

transition at Georgetown University in Washington DC

50

594-71613_ch99_4Pindd 50 102017 403 PM

Blank

COVER PHOTO ADOBE STOCK

1616 Rhode Island Avenue NW

Washington DC 20036

202 887 0200 | wwwcsisorg

v++ISBN 978-1-4422-8035-9

Lanham bull Boulder bull New York bull London

4501 Forbes Boulevard

Lanham MD 20706

301 459 3366 | wwwrowmancom

A U T H O R

Vadim Grishin

Myths and Realities

A Report of the

CSIS RUSSIA AND EURASIA PROGRAM

US-RussiaEconomicRelations

O C T O B E R 2 0 1 7

Euml|xHSLEOCy280359z

The Man Pupu Nyor Rock Formations at the Northern Urals also known as Seven

Strong Man or Little Mountain of the God in the local tribe (Mansi) language

Page 3: U.S.-Russia Economic Relations: Myths and Realities · 2020-04-17 · OCTOBER 2017 U.S.- Russia Economic Relations Myths and Realities AUTHOR Vadim Grishin A REPORT OF THE CSIS RUSSIA

O C T O B E R 2 0 1 7

US- Russia Economic RelationsMyths and Real ities

AUTHOR

Vadim Grishin

A REPORT OF THE

CSIS RUSSIA AND EURASIA PROGRAM

Lanham bull Boulder bull New York bull London

594-71613_ch00_4Pindd 1 102017 403 PM

About CSIS

For over 50 years the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) has worked

to develop solutions to the worldrsquos greatest policy challenges Today CSIS scholars are

providing strategic insights and bipartisan policy solutions to help decisionmakers chart a

course toward a better world

CSIS is a nonprofit organ ization headquartered in Washington DC The Centerrsquos 220 full-

time staff and large network of affiliated scholars conduct research and analy sis and develop

policy initiatives that look into the future and anticipate change

Founded at the height of the Cold War by David M Abshire and Admiral Arleigh Burke CSIS

was dedicated to finding ways to sustain American prominence and prosperity as a force for

good in the world Since 1962 CSIS has become one of the worldrsquos preeminent international

institutions focused on defense and security regional stability and transnational

challenges ranging from energy and climate to global health and economic integration

Thomas J Pritzker was named chairman of the CSIS Board of Trustees in November 2015

Former US deputy secretary of defense John J Hamre has served as the Centerrsquos president

and chief executive officer since 2000

CSIS does not take specific policy positions accordingly all views expressed herein should

be understood to be solely those of the author(s)

copy 2017 by the Center for Strategic and International Studies All rights reserved

ISBN 978-1-4422-8035-9 (pb) 978-1-4422-8036-6 (eBook)

Center for Strategic amp International Studies Rowman amp Littlefield

1616 Rhode Island Ave nue NW 4501 Forbes Boulevard

Washington DC 20036 Lanham MD 20706

202-887-0200 | wwwcsis org 301 - 459 - 3366 | www rowman com

594-71613_ch00_4Pindd 2 102017 403 PM

III

Contents

iv Acknowl edgments

1 CHAPTER 1 | Introduction

4 CHAPTER 2 | Does Bilateral Economic Interaction Matter

11 CHAPTER 3 | Politics in the Driverrsquos Seat

15 CHAPTER 4 | Are the United States and Rus sia ldquoNatu ralrdquo Trading Partners

A Little Bit of History

19 CHAPTER 5 | Sector Analyses

41 CHAPTER 6 | Diversity and Constraints

47 CHAPTER 7 | Existing Trends and Future Scenarios

50 About the Author

594-71613_ch00_4Pindd 3 102017 403 PM

The author wishes to thank the participants of a draft paper discussion William Arnold Jack

Brougher Matthew Edwards Daniel Fried Andrew Kuchins Randy Levinas Gary Litman Jeff

Mankoff Cyrus Newlin Olga Oliker Ian Solomon Doug Stanglin and Angela Stent

This report is made pos si ble by the generous support of Car ne gie Corporation of New York

Acknowl edgments

Iv

594-71613_ch00_4Pindd 4 102017 403 PM

1

01

Introduction

A friend of mine a devoted connoisseur of bilateral economic relations with 30 years of experi-

ence in the field once noted that the hottest discussions about US- Russia ties occur at a time

when mutual trade is compressed into the value of a mathematical error This is exactly what is

happening now According to official statistics the value of US- Russia trade is about $20 billion

and is rolling back to the level of 20051 There is no doubt that a new set of sanctions recently

signed into law by the US president and currently being implemented will further hurt economic

interaction by reducing financial inflows limiting the transfer of technology and expertise and

dampening business confidence Many policymakers and experts have agreed that HR 3364

(Countering Amer i carsquos Adversaries through Sanctions Act2) by expanding and codifying US

sanctions targeting Rus sia opens a new cycle in bilateral relations This legislation which received

overwhelming bipartisan support creates a new economic and po liti cal framework on a bilateral

track Strong concerns expressed by President Donald Trump in his special statement about

ldquounconstitutional provisions of the ldquoflawed billrdquo3 cannot significantly limit its intended and

unintended consequences In its implementation it could have relatively broad margins of flexibil-

ity and leverage but requires the president to seek congressional approval before easing or termi-

nating sanctions against Rus sia or undertaking actions that would significantly modify US policy

toward Rus sia Additional observations regarding HR 3364rsquos pos si ble impact on US- Russia

interaction in par tic u lar industries can be found throughout this report but suffice it to say that it

will contribute to a broader curtailment of many pillars of economic cooperation for years ahead

1 US Census Bureau ldquoForeign Trade Trade in Goods with Rus siardquo Foreign Trade updated June 29 2017 https

wwwcensus gov foreign - trade balance c4621 html

2 Countering Amer i carsquos Adversaries through Sanctions Act HR 3364 115th Cong (2017ndash2018) https www

congress gov bill 115th - congress house - bill 3364

3 Donald J Trump ldquoStatement by President Donald J Trump on the Signing of HR 3364rdquo White House Office of the

Press Secretary August 2 2017 https wwwwhitehouse gov the - press - office 2017 08 02 statement - president

- donald - j - trump - signing - hr - 3364

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 1 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations2

Escalating geopo liti cal tensions have continued to significantly define Rus siarsquos economic prospects

however the countryrsquos economic model exhausted itself long before the dramatic deterioration of

relations with the West Structural bottlenecks have seriously limited Rus siarsquos growth capacity even

during the previous period of high oil prices4

The purpose of this report is to assess what has gone wrong with the US- Russia equation by

analyzing it through the prism of a bilateral economic and po liti cal trajectory while keeping in

mind the structural constraints of the Rus sian economy It will attempt to answer the following

questions

bull Do bilateral economic relations matter

bull Are the United States and Rus sia ldquonatu ralrdquo or ldquounnaturalrdquo trading partners

bull What future scenarios can we expect

In the vast lit er a ture on US- Russia economic relations analy sis of developing trends in bilateral

commerce has always been accompanied by discussions around impor tant po liti cal and eco-

nomic matters particularly regarding US legislation and regulation5 Over several de cades the

most controversial issues concerned the granting of permanent normal trading status to Rus sia

through legislation that eliminated the Jackson- Vanik Amendment and Rus siarsquos accession to

the World Trade Organ ization (WTO) The Magnitsky Act signed into law in 2012 repealed the

Jackson- Vanik provisions but added legislation providing authority for the US government to

withhold visas and freeze assets of Rus sians thought to have been involved with human rights

violations and later imposed sanctions on Rus sia because of its involvement in the Ukrainian and

Syrian crises and its cyber- enabled activities6

Some have observed deficiencies in Rus siarsquos participation in the international division of labor

(reliance on the export of energy and metals) which ldquo canrsquot serve any more as a basis for further

expansion of the countryrsquos position in world markets including the US marketrdquo7 Unfortunately

such observations have not been accompanied by quantitative and qualitative analy sis of structural

constraints in the Rus sian foreign trade model Many authors limit their policy recommendations

for fostering bilateral economic relations to a requirement for a strong initial push from respective

governments the creation of business working groups and the extension of bilateral and multilat-

eral legal grounds for economic cooperation Such instruments proved to be useful in facilitating

4 International Monetary Fund (IMF) Rus sian Federation Selected Issues (Washington DC IMF 2016)

5 ldquoAmer i carsquos New Economic Sanctions May Hurt Rus siarsquos Recoveryrdquo Economist August 5 2017 Andrey Kortunov and

Olga Oliker eds A Roadmap for US- Russia Relations (Washington DC CSISRIAC 2017) https csis - prods3

amazonaws com s3fs - public publication 170815 _ KortunovOliker _ USRussiaRelations _ Web pdf E0bdGVHlxxYRAxhO

w8zJ9tbRGwdWjEgV Самуйлов CM Братерский MB ldquoКонгресс и торговые отношения США с Россиейrdquo [US

Congressrsquos role in the US- RF trade relations] США и Канада экономика политика культура 5 no 533 (May 2014)

6 Andrew Weiss and Richard Nephew ldquoThe Role of Sanctions in US- Russian Relationsrdquo (Task Force White Paper

Car ne gie Endowment for International Peace Washington DC July 11 2016)

7 Глущенко ЮН ldquoСостояние проблемы и перспективы сотрудничества России и США в экономической сфереrdquo

[Status prob lems and prospects of Russia- US economic cooperation] Проблемы Национальной Стратегии 21 no 6

(2013) 148ndash164

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 2 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 3

trade and investment during several reset cycles in bilateral relations starting in the 1990s but

they were only partially successful

Several papers and books although focused primarily on bilateral po liti cal agendas or sectorial

analy sis underline the importance of Rus sian domestic realities Dr Angela Stent in her ldquoLimits of

Partnershiprdquo notes that state control of the commanding heights in the Rus sian economy creates

significant deterrents for US private- sector entrance into the market8 Thane Gustafson in the

ldquoWheel of Fortunerdquo asserts that Rus siarsquos growing dependence on revenue from oil exports along

with its inefficient and often- corrupt management of industry is unsustainable9 Andrew Kuchins

in his ldquoElevation and Calibration A New Rus sia Policy for Amer i cardquo has quoted some experts who

believe that the weakened Rus sian economic position may over time contribute to some rap-

prochement with the West and emphasized lack of reforms as ldquoa key obstacle not only for Rus sian

economic recovery but also for improving ties with the Westrdquo10

In a recent joint task force report Eugene Rumer Andrew S Weiss and Richard Sokolsky argue

that the concept of developing stronger economic ties with Rus sia as a foundation for improved

diplomatic relations has not worked ldquoClinton Bush and Obama all placed high hope on trade as

an engine of better relations with Rus sia All were frustrated by the fact that the two countries are

for the most part not natu ral trading partnersrdquo11 On a dif er ent note the former US envoy to

Rus sia Michael McFaul has defended the achievements of a reset policy under the Barack Obama

administration emphasizing that bilateral trade reached a rec ord level in 2011 Nevertheless he

also stresses that it was a one- time accomplishment unlikely to be repeated12

Voices of those who believe that extensive economic ties can provide stability to broader po liti cal

interaction are weaker than ever in an environment of growing protectionism and adversarial rivalry

8 Angela Stent The Limits of Partnerships US- Russian Relations in the XXI Century (Prince ton NJ Prince ton

University Press 2014) 98

9 Thane Gustafson Wheel of Fortune The Battle for Oil and Power in Rus sia (London Harvard University Press 2012)

10 Andrew Kuchins Elevation and Calibration A New Rus sia Policy for Amer i ca (Washington DC Center on Global

Interests 2016)

11 Eugene Rumer Richard Sokolsky and Andrew S Weiss ldquoTrump and Rus sia The Right Way to Manage Relationsrdquo

Foreign Affairs 96 no 2 (MarchApril 2017)

12 Michael McFaul ldquoUS- Russia Relationsrdquo (lecture Institute for Public Diplomacy and Global Communications

George Washington University Washington DC March 3 2017) https wwwc - span org video 424811 - 1 former

- ambassador - michael - mcfaul - discusses - state - usrussia - relations

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 3 102017 404 PM

4

02

Does Bilateral Economic Interaction Matter

Economic relations do not emerge out of a vacuum There are many variables that define the final

configuration of economic interactions such as a par tic u lar countryrsquos level of economic develop-

ment its business environment legal framework po liti cal climate (regime) culture and religion

history and tradition demography and geography as well as global and national economic cycles

An impor tant driver of trade relations for many economies has become participation in global and

regional trade agreements

As many studies and anecdotal evidence show bilateral economic cooperation should be sizable

and should relate to the economic growth of two countries in a way that afects their policy

interests Let us take as a reference point the BRICS countries1 a community of large emerging

economies which Rus sia belongs to Table 21 pres ents official data on US trade and investments

with BRICS states US- Russia trade in goods is disproportionally lowmdash235 times less than US

trade with China 33 times smaller than US trade with India and 28 times less than US trade

with Brazil The size of the US- Russia trade balance is comparable to the size of the US trade

balance with South Africa whose economy is almost four times smaller than Rus siarsquos If we add

trade in ser vices to the trade of goods the gaps increase significantly (Figures 21 and 22) The

diference is not only quantitative but also qualitative

The quality of trade relations can be mea sured by its diversity its share of high- tech components

resilience to economic shocks and its contribution to GDP growth On average a 10 percent

increase in a nationrsquos two- way trade relative to GDP increases GDP through a variety of channels

by at least 16 percent2

Bilateral trade and real GDP growth in the United States and Rus sia are practically uncorrelated

as shown in the summary output of multifactorial regression The coefficient of multiple determi-

nation (R Square) is close to 0 ( Table 22) At the same time the correlation of US exports to India

1 BRICS is the acronym for a select group of five developing economies Brazil Rus sia India China and South Africa

2 World Economic Forum Foreign Direct Investment as a Key Driver for Trade Growth and Prosperity The Case for a

Multilateral Agreement on Investment (Geneva World Economic Forum 2013) 11

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 4 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 5

Table 21 US Trade and Foreign Direct Investments (FDI) with China India Brazil South Africa and Rus sia 2016

China India Brazil South Africa Rus sia

Total Goods Trade 5786 677 565 13 203

Imports 4628 460 262 73 145

Exports 1158 217 303 55 58

Trade in Ser vices 696 472 317 47 na

Imports 161 268 68 17 na

Exports 535 203 249 30 na

US FDI 746 283 653 62 141

BRICS FDI in the United States

148 93 043 076 63

Supported Jobs in the United States (thousand)

911 197 308 50 84

Source United States Trade Representative (USTR) ldquoCountries amp Regionsrdquo accessed September 27 2017

https ustrgov countries - regions See US- China Trade Facts US- India Trade Facts US- Brazil Trade

Facts US- South Africa Trade Facts and US- Russia Trade Facts

201520142013

and China with the real GDP growth of these big Asian economies is significant (05) In the case of

Brazil the correlation is even higher (07) By contrast South Africarsquos small open economy is quite

sensitive to US imports from South Africa (043)3

In marked contrast to other BRICS countries Rus sia is a poor choice for export- oriented opera-

tions As a recent International Monetary Fund (IMF) study highlights Rus sia is an outlier a rare

exception among emerging market (EM) economies with virtually no preferential access to major

markets and little meaningful change over three de cades4 This complicates Rus siarsquos integration

into the global value chain (GVC) which became a significant driving force toward economic

development and trade for certain BRICS economies

3 IMF statistics authorrsquos computation

4 IMF Rus sian Federation Selected Issues IMF Country Report N17198 (Washington DC IMF July 2017)

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 5 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations6

Trade is closely connected with foreign direct investment (FDI) and both are parts of a complex

interaction known as international production sharing According to publicly available official data

US FDI in Rus sia was about $131 billion for 2013 and $295 billion for 2016 with the top industrial

sectors being software and IT ser vices financial ser vices chemicals metals coal oil and gas

and business ser vices5 If we take into account US investments made through Eu ro pean branches

of US companies and ofshore firms this number would easily triple Another component

that usually is not tracked by official statistics is reinvestments The American Chamber of

Commerce surveys in 2016 and 2017 which include this component draw a completely dif er ent

picture accumulated US corporate FDI in 90 large US companies working in Rus sia reached

5 US Department of Commerce International Trade Administration ldquoRussiamdash94- Foreign Direct Investment and

Portfolio Investment Statisticsrdquo Rus sia Country Commercial Guide July 7 2017 https wwwexport gov article

id=shyRussia - foreign - direct - investment - statistics

Figure 21 US Trade in Goods with China India Brazil Rus sia and South Africa Billion US$ 2016

Source USTR ldquoCountries amp Regionsrdquo See US- China Trade Facts US- India Trade Facts US- Brazil Trade

Facts US- South Africa Trade Facts and US- Russia Trade Facts

0

$50

$100

$150

$200

$250

$300

$350

$400

$450

$500

$550

$600

China India Brazil Russia South Africa

Exports

Imports

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 6 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 7

$8244 billion in 20176 The real level from our perspective is usually between official and private

estimations around $40 billon But even this cumulative figure is less than the US FDI in Brazil

and China

The American Chamber of Commerce surveys have also revealed other impor tant data Eighty-

five percent of US companies doing business in Rus sia entered its market 10 or more years ago

while 60 percent of them ldquolandedrdquo there 20 years ago or earlier Only one percent have started

operations over the last five years confirming an obvious fact entry into the Rus sian market is

challenging because of growing monopolism risks associated with the business climate and a

stagnating economy7

6 American Chamber of Commerce in Rus sia ldquoInvestment and Import to Rus sia 2nd Surveyrdquo (Prepared by GfK for the

American Chamber of Commerce in Rus sia Moscow May 2017) 12

7 Ibid 4

Figure 22 US Trade in Goods and in Ser vices with China India Brazil Rus sia and South Africa Billion US$ 2016

Source USTR ldquoCountries amp Regionsrdquo See US- China Trade Facts US- India Trade Facts US- Brazil Trade

Facts US- South Africa Trade Facts and US- Russia Trade Facts

0

$100

$200

$300

$400

$500

$600

$700

China India Brazil Russia South Africa

Trade in Services

Total Goods Trade

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 7 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations8

Rus sian direct investment position toward the United States declined from $215 billion in 2013 to

$83 billion in 2015 (Figure 23) Taking into account dif er ent channels and instruments the actual

volume of Rus sian investments in the United States made through ofshore Eu ro pean Canadian

and US companies may be several times greater than the available official data

Foreign investment in financial assets or foreign portfolio investment (FPI) should be included

even though Central Bank of Rus sia statistics indicate they were also quite low US investments in

equity were $345 million and in debt instruments were about $65 million in the fourth quarter of

20168 However these numbers do not reflect the real level of FPI Rus siarsquos stocks are incredibly

inexpensive while there has been impressive growth of US investments in short- term securities

and in foreign exchange (FX) operations (cash- and- carry trade) Rus sia was among the top per-

forming emerging markets in 2016 gaining 4744 percent in US dollars9 Nevertheless the gen-

eral capitalization of the stock exchange is tiny (less than 20 percent of GDP) comparable to the

capitalization of just one large US com pany such as Coca- Cola Many private sources believe that

the US FPI in Rus sia could be as high as several billion US dollars but a new set of sanctions

approved by President Trump on August 2 2017 if implemented could reverse those flows It is

still not clear whether the secretary of trea sury will prohibit participation in the oferings of Rus siarsquos

sovereign debt and the full range of derivative products A report on this subject should be sub-

mitted no later than 180 days after enactment of the law which means no later than Febru-

ary 2018 New legislation tightens prohibition on Rus sian financial companies already under

sanctions by limiting any new equity or debt with a maturity greater than 14 days (a provision that

8 Central Bank of Rus sia ldquoForeign Direct Investments in the Rus sian Federationrdquo accessed September 27 2017 www

cbr ru localization switchlanguage urlshy=shy news ampfromshy=shyru - ruamptoshy=shyen - gb

9 VanEck ldquoRus sian Stock Market Soars in 2016rdquo Seeking Alpha February 14 2017 https seekingalphacom article

4045602 - russian - stock - market - soars - 2016

Table 22 Summary Output of Regression Statistics (US Real GDP Rus sia Real GDP US- Russia Exports Imports and Total Trade)

Regression Statistics

Multiple R 0056445768

R Square 0003186125

Adjusted R Square minus0042123597

Standard Error 2616043923

Observations 24

Sources IMF statistics authorrsquos computation

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 8 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 9

previously allowed for 30 days) Similarly US persons are prohibited from taking on any new debt

that has a maturity greater than 60 days (previously it was 90 days) with Rus sian energy compa-

nies currently under sanctions10

According to the Trea sury Department Rus sia held $1029 billion in US Trea sury securities in

June 201711 Could Rus sia withdraw all its reserves from the United States and use this action as a

retaliatory mea sure Such a scenario is unlikely since there is no comparable safe- haven alterna-

tive to US dollars When Rus siarsquos US Trea sury holdings dropped 50 percent from $176 billion

(October 2010) to $90 billion (November 2011) the market did not notice12 Nevertheless Rus sian

authorities have announced they will decrease dependence on assets and payments in US dollars13

10 Countering Amer i carsquos Adversaries through Sanctions Act HR 3364

11 US Department of Trea sury Major Foreign Holders of Trea sury Securities September 18 2017 http ticdata

treasury gov Publish mfh txt

12 Ibid

13 ldquoНовый виток санкций Россия откажется от доллараrdquo [A new round of sanctions Rus sia will abandon the dollar]

Газетару August 7 2017 https wwwgazeta ru business 2017 08 07 10821937 shtml

Figure 23 Rus sia Outward FDI Position United States Equities and Debt Million US$ 2009ndash2016

Source Central Bank of the Rus sian Federation External Sector Statistics Rus sian Direct Investments

Abroad accessed September 27 2017 https wwwcbr ru localization switchlanguage urlshy=shy news

ampfromshy=shyru - ruamptoshy=shyen - gb

$6000

$8000

$10000

$12000

$14000

$16000

$18000

$20000

$22000

2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 9 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations10

Officially the country does not invest in the US stock exchange although some Rus sian oligarchs

have bought US corporate bonds and equities in large amounts The new sanctions law requires

the secretary of trea sury in consultation with the director of national intelligence and the secretary

of state to issue reports on Rus sian se nior po liti cal figures and oligarchs based on their closeness

to the Rus sian regime and their net worth as well as the exposure of key economic sectors of the

United States to Rus sian po liti cally exposed persons and parastatal entities including at a mini-

mum the banking securities insurance and real estate sectors14

Only three Rus sian companies are listed in the US exchanges

Overall the scale and scope of US- Russia economic interaction and business activity is much greater

than officially appreciated but not significant enough to be taken into consideration by policymakers

14 Countering Amer i carsquos Adversaries through Sanctions Act HR 3364

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 10 102017 404 PM

11

03

Politics in the Driverrsquos Seat

Bilateral economic relations depend to a great extent on global and national economic cycles

After the recent global financial crisis the US economy has shown surprisingly sustainable GDP

growth while the Rus sian economy was the most afected among BRICS countries by the turbu-

lence of a worldwide economic downturn in 2008ndash2009 and after a short- term rebound slipped

into stagnation (2012ndash2013) and then into full- scale recession (2014ndash2016) The countryrsquos eco-

nomic cycle however appears to be changing once again with the economy returning to a

pattern of growth albeit uneven and gradual (Figures 31 and 32) Even with sanctions still in place

conditions have improved as a result of the stabilization of Urals oil to an average annual price of

$419 per barrel in 2016 The gains were sparked in part by major crude producers agreeing to cut

production after hefty price drops in 2014 and 2015 Supported by easier financial conditions

higher oil prices and growing macro- stability Rus sia is heading toward a moderate growth rate

that is expected to reach 14 percent this year according to forecasts of the World Bank Group

(WBG) and the IMF1

Because of the significant role that politics plays in any bilateral interaction it is impor tant to

combine economic and po liti cal cycles applying a ldquoresetrdquo to bilateral economic cooperation in

addition to the po liti cal relationship I have compared po liti cal cycles and trade dynamics using the

following graphs ( Table 31 and Figure 33) These charts do not pretend to reflect with mathemati-

cal precision all shifts in the bilateral po liti cal relationship but rather attempt to visually align

impor tant economic and po liti cal moments to detect the efects of po liti cal events on the size of

bilateral trade

Figure 33 shows all pos si ble combinations economic trends at the intersection of po liti cal devel-

opments oppose or support each other in synchronization It is evident that po liti cal interference

1 International Monetary Fund Rus sian Federation Staff Concluding Statement of the 2017 Article IV Mission (Wash-

ington DC IMF 2017) World Bank Group From Recession to Recovery Rus sia Economic Report no 37 (Washington

DC World Bank 2017) http pubdocsworldbank org en 383241495487103815 RER - 37 - May26 - FINAL - with - summary

pdf

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 11 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations12

in bilateral business afairs in the early 2000s was less significant than in later years As result

growing po liti cal tensions from 2003 to 2008 did not dramatically afect bilateral economic inter-

action It is also easier to explain why 2011ndash2012 resulted in rec ord trade and investmentmdash a con-

sequence of very high oil prices GDP growth in both countries improved legislation after Rus siarsquos

accession to the WTO and the Obamandash Medvedev po liti cal reset From 2014 to 2016 a perfect

storm of developments added efficiency to Western sanctions and augmented the damaging

consequences of counter- sanction mea sures

Figure 33 also confirms that in times of reduced economic cooperation po liti cal pressures can

easily change bilateral economic trends Moreover business interests along with economic inter-

actions have a limited capacity to reverse the po liti cal mainstream

Figure 31 Economic Cycle 2014ndash2016

Source Authorrsquos evaluation of international financial institutions (IFI) data and sources from respective

countries

Sustainable Growth

Brazil

Negative Growth

Unstable Growth

Mexico

Descending Growth

Argentina

EU

US

Russia

Vietnam

China

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 12 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 13

Table 31 Po liti cal Cycles in Bilateral US- Russia Relations 1999ndash2016

2001ndash2002 The George W Bushndash Vladimir Putin Reset Rus sia supported ldquoglobal war on terrorismrdquo launched by the United States after 911 the SORT nuclear arms reduction treaty was signed by the United States and Rus sia and a successful business dialogue was developed that created the current structure of economic relations

2003ndash2008 Deterioration in bilateral relations brought on by the Iraq War Georgiarsquos ldquoRose Revolutionrdquo Mikhail Khodorkovskyrsquos arrest Ukrainersquos ldquoOrange Revolutionrdquo Kosovorsquos in de pen dence and the Georgian War

2009ndash2010 The Barack Obamandash Dmitry Medvedev Reset Rus sia served as a logistical hub for transportation and supply of US forces in Af ghan i stan United States and Rus sia signed the new START nuclear arms reduction treaty Rus sia backed tighter economic sanctions on Iran Rus sia gained access to the WTO after 18 years of negotiations

2011ndash2016 Deterioration in bilateral relations caused by the Ukrainian crisis which were followed by sanctions and counter- sanctions along with the Syrian crises and cyber- enabled activities

Source Authorrsquos evaluation of po liti cal and economic data

Note SORTthinsp=thinspStrategic Ofensive Reductions Treaty STARTthinsp=thinspStrategic Arms Reduction Treaty

Figure 32 Economic Cycle 2017ndash2019

Source Authorrsquos evaluation of IFI data and sources from respective countries

Egypt

VenezuelaEU

South Africa

Brazil

Russia

India

US

Descending Growth

Korea

China

Negative Growth

Unstable Growth

Sustainable Growth

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 13 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations14

Figure 33 US- Russia Trade Million US$ vs Po liti cal Cycle 2000ndash2016

Sources US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo Foreign Trade last modified June 29 2017

https wwwcensus gov foreign - trade balance c4621 html (see data for 2000ndash2016) authorrsquos evaluation

of po liti cal and economic data

Orange Revolution

Khodorkovskys arrest

GeorgianWar

Bush- Putin Reset

Iraq War Global Financial Crisis

Obama-Medvedev Reset

Russias WTO accession

New START Treaty

A Pefect Storm the Ukranian Crisis Oil Prices Crashing

Sanctions and Counter-Sanctions

$3000

$8000

$13000

$18000

$23000

$28000

$33000

$38000

$43000

2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 14 102017 404 PM

15

The current structure of US- Russia economic relations emerged in the early 2000s when the

model of trade and investment interaction took on a character similar to that which existed be-

tween the United States and developing economies US imports from Rus sia centered on com-

modities while technology along with food products lead American exports The primary

exception was that Rus sia supplied nuclear fuel including highly enriched uranium extracted from

nuclear weapons for US power plants and provided ser vices to the aerospace industry primarily

in satellite launches However both these exceptions can be explained as a legacy of the Soviet

past and not a harbinger of the future economic relationship (Figure 41)

In the last 15 years this trade structure has not changed significantly The only noticeable shift in

trade was a dramatic drop (to practically nothing) in exports of US agricultural products a result

of Rus siarsquos policy of import substitution and so- called counter- sanction mea sures it took in re-

sponse to US sanctions over the Ukraine crisis (Figure 42)

Promising new directions of cooperation in the IT sector and in engineering ser vices for the

aerospace industry appeared in the early 2000s1 but did not spill into other sectors and conse-

quently did little to renew economic cooperation on the whole The integration of Rus sian high-

tech ser vices into large- scale global production and value chains was constrained by the usual

culprits a lack of financial resources managerial experience skilled labor modern infrastructure

RampD investments and an adequate business environment High commodity prices incentivized the

restoration of an economic system centered on resource rents The leading role of oil and gas

extraction and transportation discouraged the development of a nonenergy sector that might

have created advanced and complex production and ser vices An import substitution policy could

not work efficiently in an economic environment plagued by the Dutch disease where currency

1 The Boeing Design Center was created in Moscow It consists of nearly 250 Boeing employees managing

a team of 1200 contract engineers from Rus sian and Ukrainian aerospace companies ldquoBackgrounder Boeing in

Rus siardquo Boeing last modified January 2017 http wwwboeing com resources boeingdotcom company key _ orgs

boeing - international pdf russia - cisbackgrounder pdf

Are the United States and Rus sia ldquoNatu ralrdquo Trading Partners A Little Bit of History

04

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 15 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations16

inflows (oil money) lead to ruble appreciation and render a countryrsquos production less competitive

During that time Rus siarsquos industry did not receive preferential access to larger markets and could

not expand its share in the global economy particularly because of its self- isolation from the

regional trade agreements (except for its participation in the Eurasian Economic Union with some

neighboring countries of the former Soviet Union) As a result neither import substitution nor

export- led strategy promoted growth and specialization in nonoil production A long- awaited

modernization and reallocation of resources from an inefficient nontrade sector to a trade sector

did not materialize

These limits were later augmented with sanctions and an extension of domestic restrictions on

cooperation with Western partners Importantly the rapid growth of state- monopoly structures in

the Rus sian economy over the past 15 years has created additional obstacles to the development

and diversification of US- Russia economic ties

Figure 41 US Imports from Rus sia US$ 2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2016)

Fish and shellfish 3

Crude oil 5

Fuel oil 37

Petroleum products other

8

Nuclear fuel materials

7

Chemicals-fertilizers 4

Steelmaking materials 5

Iron and steel mill products 4

Bauxite and aluminum 9

Other precious metals 4

Nonferrous metals other 1

Finished metal shapes 1

Synthetic rubber--primary

1

Spacecraftexcluding military

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 16 102017 404 PM

Fig

ure

42

U

S E

xpo

rts

to R

us s

ia U

S$ 2

016

Sou

rce

US

Ce

nsu

s B

ure

au ldquo

Trad

e in

Go

od

s w

ith

Ru

s sia

rdquo (s

ee

dat

a fo

r 2

016

)

Bak

ery

pro

du

cts

Win

e b

eer

an

d r

elat

ed

pro

du

cts

New

spri

nt

Pla

stic

mat

eria

ls

Ch

emic

als-

fert

ilize

rs

Ch

emic

als-

ino

rgan

icC

hem

ical

s-o

rgan

ic

Ch

emic

als-

oth

erC

ott

on

fib

er c

loth

In

du

stri

al r

ub

ber

pro

du

cts

Min

eral

su

pp

lies-

man

ufa

ctu

red

Gen

erat

ors

acc

esso

ries

Ele

ctri

c ap

par

atu

s

Dri

llin

g amp

oilfi

eld

eq

uip

men

t Sp

ecia

lized

min

ing

Exc

avat

ing

mac

hin

ery

No

nfa

rm t

ract

ors

an

d p

arts

In

du

stri

al e

ng

ines

Fo

od

to

bac

co m

ach

iner

y M

etal

wo

rkin

g m

ach

ine

too

ls

Tex

tile

sew

ing

m

ach

ines

W

oo

d g

lass

p

last

ic

Pu

lp a

nd

pap

er

mac

hin

ery

Mea

suri

ng

tes

tin

g

con

tro

l in

stru

men

ts

Mat

eria

ls h

and

ling

equ

ipm

ent

Ind

ust

rial

mac

hin

es

oth

er

Ph

oto

ser

vice

ind

ust

ry m

ach

iner

y A

gri

cult

ura

l mac

hin

ery

eq

uip

men

t C

om

pu

ters

Co

mp

ute

r ac

cess

ori

es

Sem

ico

nd

uct

ors

Tel

eco

mm

un

icat

ion

seq

uip

men

t

Bu

sin

ess

mac

hin

es a

nd

eq

uip

men

t

Lab

ora

tory

tes

tin

g in

stru

men

ts

Med

icin

al e

qu

ipm

ent

Civ

ilian

air

craf

t e

ng

ines

eq

uip

men

t a

nd

par

ts

Rai

lway

tra

nsp

ort

atio

n

equ

ipm

ent

Ves

sels

exc

lud

ing

scr

ap

Co

mm

erci

al v

esse

ls o

ther

M

arin

e en

gin

es p

arts

Spac

ecra

ft e

xclu

din

g

mili

tary

Pas

sen

ger

car

s

new

an

d u

sed

Tru

cks

bu

ses

and

sp

ecia

l p

urp

ose

ve

hic

les

En

gin

es a

nd

en

gin

e p

arts

(c

arb

ure

tors

pis

ton

s r

ing

s

and

val

ves)

B

od

ies

and

ch

assi

s fo

r p

asse

ng

er c

ars

Au

tom

oti

ve t

ires

an

d t

ub

es

Oth

er p

arts

an

d a

cces

sori

es o

f ve

hic

les

Ap

par

el h

ou

seh

old

go

od

s -

text

ile

Ph

arm

aceu

tica

lp

rep

arat

ion

s

Furn

itu

re h

ou

seh

old

go

od

s

etc

R

ug

s

Cel

l ph

on

es a

nd

oth

er

ho

use

ho

ld g

oo

ds

ne

c

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 17 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations18

Figure 43 US Trade in Goods with Rus sia Million US$ 1992ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 1992ndash2016)

Russian Financial Crisis

Oil price Increased from$2446 USD per barrel (2001)

to $9694 USD per barrel(2008)

Global Financial Crisis

Oil price high record in2011-2012

(more that $111 USD perbarrel)

Oil price crashed

$-

$5000

$10000

$15000

$20000

$25000

$30000

$35000

$40000

$45000

$50000

1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

US Imports from Russia US Exports to Russia US-Russia Trade in Goods

No doubt po liti cal ups and downs add volatility to US- Russia trade Nevertheless Rus siarsquos eco-

nomic structure exhausted itself before the Ukrainian crisis and the recent Rus sian recession Its

limitations are not only due to some mistakes in policy or negative coincidences of circumstances

but rather to deeply rooted properties in the current bilateral trade model related to structural

issues in the Rus sian economy Structural constraints such as the weak enforcement of property

rights poor business regulation and nondiversified exports weighed on Rus sian trade with the

United States From this perspective the term ldquonaturalunnatural trading partnersrdquo does not ad-

dress the unused capacity of bilateral interaction or the real challenges that kind of interaction

faces It just adds metaphysical flavor to the very specific economic and po liti cal factors that

determine the US- Russia trajectory

Overall the outlines of bilateral trade (Figure 43) resemble the famous ldquoRus sian Mountainsrdquo that

were a pre de ces sor of the modern roller coaster icy hills supported by wooden constructionsmdash a

rigid and immobile structure that sooner or later would melt This unfortunately is what is hap-

pening to US- Russia trade cooperation now

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 18 102017 404 PM

19

ARE LITTLE FISH REALLY SWEET

Low US- Russia economic interaction has at least two consequences First it limits the capacity of

policymakers to exploit trade as an instrument for geopo liti cal combat Even the question of a US

trade deficit which used to be a headache for many US trading partners has become so insig-

nificant in absolute terms (about $87 billion in 2016) that it seems hardly worth caring about

When the volume of trade between two countries becomes very small in absolute terms whether

a country is running a surplus or deficit is no longer relevant But it also renders another type of

confrontations (sometimes more dangerous) more likely since the two traders have little to lose

Second in an environment marked by low levels of bilateral trade both sides could incentivize (if

and when a desire for po liti cal rapprochement exists) the signing of new trade deals which are

elevated symbolically as a turning point in bilateral po liti cal relations (ie the sale of Boeings to

Rus sia or the delivery via tankers of Rus sian oil to US refineries) Sometimes markets themselves

pres ent ldquogiftsrdquo that can be capitalized on po liti cally US- USSR grain trade in the 1970s was one

such ldquogiftrdquo large sales of American grain to the Soviet Union helped US policymakers win favor

with the po liti cally impor tant American farming sector and permitted Soviet leaders to maintain

access to a dietary staple for the Soviet population

The strong 32 percent growth in value of US imports from Rus sia from January to May 2017

versus January to May 2016 ( Table 51) is an example of a development that has tempted officials

to pres ent it as a sign of positive change due to ldquogrowing business activitiesrdquo (this kind of statement

was heard before the bilateral summit in Germany in July 2017) although the reason for that leap

was evidently an increase in commodity prices (mainly of oilmdash see Table 52) and not a rise in

entrepreneurial interactions The primary beneficiaries of that upside rally have been two other

petro- economies Saudi Arabia and Venezuela ( Tables 53 and 54)

Sector Analyses

05

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 19 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations20

Table 51 US Imports from Rus sia Million US$ Januaryndash May 2016 vs Januaryndash May 2017

Year January February March April May Total

2016 9603 6871 11097 12257 10977 50805

2017 12215 10220 16979 13471 14147 67032

Change 271 487 530 99 289 319

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 1992ndash2016)

Table 52 Change in Urals Crude Oil Prices US$ per Barrel Januaryndash May 2016 vs Januaryndash May 2017

Januaryndash May 2016 Januaryndash May 2017 Change ($) Change ()

3601 5129 1528 424

Source Ministry of Finance of the Rus sian Federation https wwwminfin ru ru ixzz4mMIZ7XtC

Table 53 US Imports from Saudi Arabia Million US$ Januaryndash May 2016 vs Januaryndash May 2017

Year January February March April May Total

2016 15114 9036 13555 10844 14679 63228

2017 19802 20298 21650 16211 19542 97503

Change 3101 12463 5972 495 331 542

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Saudi Arabiardquo Foreign Trade last modified June 29 2017

https wwwcensus gov foreign - trade balance c5170 html (see data for 2016ndash2017)

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 20 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 21

Table 54 US Imports from Venezuela Million US$ Januaryndash May 2016 vs Januaryndash May 2017

Year January February March April May Total

2016 6657 5560 7140 8007 7922 35286

2017 13041 10864 123500 11148 12243 59646

Change 9590 9540 7297 3923 5454 6903

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Venezuelardquo Foreign Trade last modified June 29 2017

https wwwcensus gov foreign - trade balance c3070 html (see data for 2016ndash2017)

Table 55 US Exports to Rus sia Million US$ Januaryndash May 2016 vs Januaryndash May 2017

Year January February March April May Total

2016 3628 3577 7298 4657 4947 24107

2017 3144 4277 5386 6670 4806 24283

Change minus133 196 minus262 432 minus29 minus07

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2016ndash2017)

At the same time US exports to Rus sia continue to stagnate ( Table 55) due to low levels of

consumption during a two-and- a- half-year economic crisis a deep ruble devaluation sanctions

and counter- sanctions

Given the very dif er ent economic structures and resource endowments of Rus sia and the United

States it is not surprising that US- Russia trade is asymmetric and oil driven (Figure 51) A

3 percent increase in Urals oil prices translates into a one percent increase in US import growth

from Rus sia Thus in 2016 every $10 increase in Urals crude oil added $15 billion to the value of

US imports or 11 percent to the total value of imports from Rus sia

OIL ADDICTION

Oil is a core pillar of US- Russia bilateral trade A bumpy ride in oil markets afects commerce

Nevertheless Rus sian oil exports to the United States in physical terms have been rather

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 21 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations22

sustainable Starting from 2005 average annual deliveries have been above 150 million barrels

(Figure 52) Crude and heating oil have dominated while petroleum products and liquefied petro-

leum gases have not (Figure 53) In 2011 oil exports peaked at 228 million barrels but declined to

159 million barrels in 2016mdash a drop of 30 percent Rec ord high shipments of Rus sian oil to the United

States coincided with an elevation in oil prices which made the subsequent decline in oil shipment

value between 2011 and 2016 (by about 72 percent as shown in Figure 54) seem more stark The

increase in price also raised the share of oil in Rus sian exports by 74 percent in 2011 (Figure 55)

The Rus sian share in total US oil imports was around 55 percent in 2011 and 43 percent in 2016

( Table 56) In the last five years the United States has relied exclusively on consumption of Rus sian

oil for the rough equivalent of one week out of the year (Figure 56)

It is unlikely that Rus sia can significantly increase its share of the US oil market and there is a real

possibility for a downward trend There are several reasons the historically high Rus sian hydrocar-

bon export threshold of 2011 will not soon if ever be surpassed

First US energy consumption will likely be flat According to the US Energy Information Adminis-

tration (EIA) demand for petroleum and other liquids in the United States will be about 35ndash36

quadrillion British thermal units (BTUs) with minimal variation over the next 25 years1

1 US EIA ldquoAnnual Energy Outlook 2017 with Projections to 2050rdquo January 5 2017 7ndash8

Figure 51 US- Russia Trade Growth () vs US and Rus sia Real GDP Growth () 1993ndash2016

Source IMF ldquoIMF Datardquo accessed September 27 2017 http wwwimf org en Data US Census Bureau

ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo

Note rGDPthinsp=thinspreal gross domestic product

Trade

USA rGDP growth

Russia rGDP growth

-60

-40

-20

0

20

40

60

80

100

1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Gro

wth

All spikes in US-Russia trade have been connected with two main

variables volume and price of crude oil

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 22 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 23

Second the United States will become a net energy exporter between 2020 and 2030 in most

cases under dif er ent combinations of oil and natu ral gas prices GDP growth technological

breakthroughs and the availability of energy resources The role of oil imports will dramatically

fall2

Third oil price scenarios as described by the International Energy Agency (IEA) international

financial organ izations (IFIs) and many national agencies are very cautious and assume that even

by 2035 to 2040 oil prices will not to recover to the levels of 2011ndash20123

Fourth Rus sian oil production and export growth will be modest and driven by Asian economic

expansion and will comprise a decreasing share of Western markets4 According to forecasts from

2 Ibid 15ndash18

3 Ibid table 3 ldquoEnergy Prices by Sector and Sourcesrdquo World Bank World Bank Commodity Markets Price Forecasts

(Washington DC World Bank 2017) httpswwwworldbank org en research commodity - markets Organ ization of the

Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) World Oil Outlook 2016 (Vienna OPEC 2016)

4 E D Belotskaia et al Global and Rus sian Energy Outlook 2016 (Moscow Energy Research Institute of the Rus sian

Acad emy of Science Analytical Center for the Government of the Rus sian Federation 2016) http acgov ru files

publication a 12767 pdf

Figure 52 US Imports from Rus sia Crude Oil and Petroleum Products Thousands of Barrels 1995ndash2016

Source US EIA ldquoUS Imports by Country of Origin Rus siardquo Petroleum amp Other Liquids September 13

2017 http wwweia gov dnav pet PET _ MOVE _ IMPCUS _ D _ NUS _ NRS _ MBBL _ M htm

0

50000

100000

150000

200000

250000

Date 1995 1996 1997 1998 199920002001200220032004200520062007200820092010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 23 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations24

the Organ ization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) crude oil exports from Rus sia and

the Caspian region to the United States will dis appear by 20255

So why does the Rus sian Urals blend continue to be attractive for oil traders and US refineries

which could pro cess greater volumes of domestically produced lighter crude There are two main

reasons One is related to the preference of US high conversion refineries (the most sophisticated

in the world) to work with heavy oil blends produced by Canada Mexico Iraq Venezuela and

Rus sia Pro cessing heavy crude now is as profitable as pro cessing lighter crude The so- called

crack spreadmdash the diference between the cost of relatively cheap heavy crude oil and the final

price of value- added consumer products (diesel gasoline jet fuel and heating oil)mdash has become

the same as the refinery margins of light sweet crude6 This has primarily afected light oil produc-

ing countries such as Angola Algeria and Nigeria

5 OPEC World Oil Outlook 2016 306ndash309

6 ldquoHow Much for That Heavy Oilrdquo Oil Sands Magazine December 26 2015 https wwwoilsandsmagazine com

news 2015 12 26 how - much - for - that - heavy - oil

Figure 53 US Imports from Rus sia Oil and Petroleum Products US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

$-

$25000000000

$20000000000

$15000000000

$10000000000

$5000000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Liquefied petroleum gases

Petroleum products other

Fuel oil

Crude oil

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 24 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 25

Another factor afecting purchase of Rus sian oil is a new trend among oil companies for further

consolidation of scale and for integrating operations of upstream and downstream business7

There have been several waves of separation and unification of production transportation and

pro cessing in the last 50 years The current business cycle can be seen as an adaptation to a

period of low prices and oversupply Companies that buy andor produce oil in Rus sia most likely

prefer to transport and pro cess this oil in their own modern refineries in the United States At the

same time some of the newest refinery designs specifically for pro cessing heavy oils have been

built in Asia thus extending the choices of heavy oil producing countries

We should also consider that leading US and international oil traders along with oil producing

companies working with or owning US refineries frequently buy Rus sian oil on the open market

and have long- term contracts on Rus sian crude oil delivery Many Rus sian oil companies prefer to

pay for purchases or ser vices with their future production instead of cash creating situations of

ldquostickyrdquo oil imports that are difficult to replace The best- known example is an interaction between

7 ldquoEnergy and Utilities Sectorrdquo Roundtable Financier Worldwide December 2015 https wwwfinancierworldwide

com roundtable - energy - utilities - sector - dec15

Figure 54 US Imports of Oil and Petroleum Products from Rus sia vs Oil Prices Eu rope Brent Spot Price Free on Board (FOB) 1996ndash2017

Source US EIA ldquoUS Imports by Country of Origin Rus siardquo

0

20

40

60

80

100

120

140

0

5000

10000

15000

20000

25000

30000

Jan

-19

96

Jun

-19

96

No

v-19

96

Ap

r-19

97

Sep

-19

97

Feb

-19

98

Jul-

199

8D

ec-1

99

8M

ay-1

99

9O

ct-1

99

9M

ar-2

00

0A

ug

-20

00

Jan

-20

01

Jun

-20

01

No

v-2

00

1A

pr-

20

02

Sep

-20

02

Feb

-20

03

Jul-

20

03

Dec

-20

03

May

-20

04

Oct

-20

04

Mar

-20

05

Au

g-2

00

5Ja

n-2

00

6Ju

n-2

00

6N

ov-

20

06

Ap

r-2

00

7Se

p-2

00

7Fe

b-2

00

8Ju

l-2

00

8D

ec-2

00

8M

ay-2

00

9O

ct-2

00

9M

ar-2

010

Au

g-2

010

Jan

-20

11Ju

n-2

011

No

v-2

011

Ap

r-2

012

Sep

-20

12Fe

b-2

013

Jul-

20

13D

ec-2

013

May

-20

14O

ct-2

014

Mar

-20

15A

ug

-20

15Ja

n-2

016

Jun

-20

16N

ov-

20

16

USD

per

Bar

rel

Th

ou

san

d B

arr

els

US Imports from Russia of Crude Oil and Petroleum Products (Thousand Barrels)

Europe Brent Spot Price FOB (Dollars per Barrel)

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 25 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations26

Table 56 US Oil Imports All Countries vs Rus sia Thousand Barrels per Day 2011ndash2016

Years 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

All Countries 11436 10598 9859 9241 9449 10058

Rus sia 624 477 460 330 371 433

Share 546 450 467 357 393 431

Sources US EIA ldquoUS Imports by Country of Origin Total Crude Oil and Productsrdquo Petroleum amp Other

Liquids September 13 2017 wwweia gov dnav pet pet_move_impcus_a2_nus_ep00_im0_mbbl_m htm

authorrsquos computation

Figure 55 US Imports from Rus sia Share of Crude Oil and Petroleum Products Million US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

57

64

73

72

74

73

72

59

52 50

0

$5000

$10000

$15000

$20000

$25000

$30000

$35000

$40000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

US Imports from Russia

Share of Oil and Petroleum Products

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 26 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 27

the Rus sian state mono poly Rosneft and commodity trading and mining giant Glencore which

along with energy and commodities com pany Vitol participated in a $10 billion prepayment

deal with Rosneft for crude supplies in 2013

There have been a number of ongoing transactions between the Rus sian oil industry and interna-

tional oil companies including several that top the list of importers of Rus sian oil to the United

States ( Table 57) In December 2016 Glencore participated in a controversial privatization opera-

tion purchasing in tandem with the Qatar sovereign wealth fund a 195 percent stake in Rosneft

which was on the US and EU list of sanctioned firms8 Glencore has also taken a blocking stake in

midsize oil producer RussNeft BP owns a 1975 percent stake in Rosneft Chevron holds a

15 percent interest in the 935- mile- long CPC9 pipeline which transports an average of 959000

barrels of crude oil per day including 76000 barrels daily from Rus sia10 ExxonMobil has formed

8 E Mazneva and I Arkhipov ldquoRus sia Sells $11 Billion Stake in Rosneft to Glencore Qatarrdquo Bloomberg December 7

2016

9 CPCthinsp=thinspCaspian Pipeline Consortium

10 ldquoRus sia Highlights of Operations and Business Portfoliordquo Chevron accessed October 3 2017 https wwwchevron

com worldwide russia

Figure 56 Share of Rus sian Oil in Total US Oil Imports Thousands of Barrels per Day 1972ndash2016

Source US EIA ldquoUS Imports by Country of Origin Total Crude Oil and Productsrdquo

2000

4000

6000

8000

10000

12000

14000

16000

US Imports of Crude Oil and Petroleum Products (Thousand Barrels per Day)

US Imports from Russia of Crude Oil and Petroleum Products (Thousand Barrels per Day)19

7319

7419

7519

7619

7719

7819

7919

80

198

119

82

198

319

84

198

519

86

198

719

88

198

919

90

199

119

92

199

319

94

199

519

96

199

719

98

199

92

00

02

00

12

00

22

00

32

00

42

00

52

00

62

00

72

00

82

00

92

010

20

112

012

20

132

014

20

152

016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 27 102017 404 PM

Table 57 Top Importers of Rus sian Oil to the United States Thousands of Barrels 2016

VALERO MARKETING amp SUPPLY CO 54590 3616

EXXONMOBIL OIL CORP 17087 1130

CHEVRON USA INC 15217 1008

BP WEST COAST PRODUCTS LLC 10130 671

GEORGE E WARREN CORP 7272 48

PAULSBORO REFINING CO LLC 6838 453

TESORO CORP 5097 338

VITOL INC 5084 337

PHILLIPS 66 CO 4726 313

TRAFIGURA AG 4360 289

PAR HAWAII REFINING LLC 3893 258

MOTIVA ENTERPRISES LLC 3041 205

SHELL US TRADING CO 2863 19

MARATHON PETROLEUM CO LLC 2475 16

ATLANTIC TRADING amp MARKETING 2099 14

FREEPOINT COMMODITIES LLC 1439 1

GLENCORE LTD 1284 85

BEST PETROLEUM CORP 967 64

ROLYMPUS US COMMODITIES GROUP LLC 822 6

HUNT CRUDE OIL SUPPLY CO 666 4

GULF OIL LP 658 4

Source US EIA ldquoUS Imports by Country of Origin Crude Oilrdquo Petroleum amp Other Liquids September 13

2017 httpswwweiagovdnavpetpet_move_impcus_a2_nus_epc0_im0_mbblpd_ahtm authorrsquos

computation

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 28 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 29

several joint ventures with Rosneft to undertake ofshore exploration in the Black Sea and the Kara

Sea in Siberia11

According to the Sanctions Act US persons are prohibited from exporting or reexporting goods

ser vices (except financial ser vices) and technology in support of exploration or production of new

deep- water Arctic ofshore or shale oil proj ects that involve designated Rus sian entities or other

entities in which such sanctioned persons have a controlling interest or a substantial noncontrol-

ling owner ship interest defined as not less than 33 percent (previously it was 50 percent) The new

law also authorizesmdash but does not requiremdash the imposition of so- called secondary sanctions

against non- US entities that engage in activities involving the construction maintenance or

expansion of Rus sian energy export pipelines with a fair market value of $1 million or more or an

aggregate fair market value during a 12- month period of $5 million12 This provision has raised the

concerns of some Eu ro pean countries particularly Germany As result the final language of the

law included wording about coordination of this issue with allies of the United States

Shipments of Rus sian oil to the United States could be afected by activity in the US refinery

industry In early 2017 Saudi Aramco bought the United Statesrsquo largest oil refinery in Port Arthur

(Texas) and it announced plans to send more of its own crude to that refinery13 Serious concerns

exist however regarding the future of three refineries and nine pipelines owned by Citgo a US

branch of the Venezuelan state com pany PdVSA which is balancing precariously on the edge of

default Under certain conditions in the event of PdVSA bankruptcy Rosneft could claim a stake of

up to 499 percent in Citgo Such a possibility has raised concerns among politicians and US

government officials with Trea sury Secretary Steven Mnuchin calling it a ldquonational security issuerdquo14

Tables 58 59 and 510 show allocations of Rus sian oil imports to major US refineries some of

which work exclusively on Rus sian crude a total of two to three months per year In total 150940

thousand barrels of Rus sian oil were refined in 2016

Figure 57 confirms a leading position of Texas and Louisiana among the US states receiving

Rus sian crude followed by New Jersey California Mississippi Washington Hawaii and Delaware

In a paradoxical way Texas has dis appeared from the list of states as a main destination of US

imports from Rus sia (Figure 58) because Rus sian crude is mostly delivered to Louisiana ports and

registered there by US Customs as an import from Rus sia After that it transports to refineries in

Louisiana and Texas

Overall the short- term business rationale behind the sustainability of US oil imports from Rus sia

cannot overcome strong headwinds in the US energy sector facing all oil importers which will

inevitably lead to a contraction of Rus sian oil exports to the United States in the foreseeable future

11 Exxon eforts to receive a special US Trea sury waiver to drill in sanctioned Rus sia failed in 2017

12 Countering Amer i carsquos Adversaries through Sanctions Act HR 3364

13 Sarp Ozkan ldquoSaudi Aramcorsquos Port Arthur Refinery and the US Refinery Fleetrdquo Drilling Info May 11 2017

https infodrillinginfo com saudi - aramcos - port - arthur - refinery - us - refinery - fleet

14 Graham Kates ldquoTrea sury Secretary Rus siarsquos Citgo Deal a National Security Issuerdquo CBS News May 1 2017

http wwwcbsnews com news rosneft - citgo - steven - mnuchin - national - security

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 29 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations30

Table 58 Valerorsquos Refineries Pro cessing Rus sian Oil Thousands of Barrels 2016

Saint Charles Louisiana 29206 535

Corpus Christi Texas 20626 378

Wilmington California 4250 78

Total USA 54590 100

Source US EIA ldquoRefinery Capacity Reportrdquo January 1 2017

table 5 wwweia gov petroleum refinerycapacity table5 pdf

authorrsquos computation

Table 59 ExxonMobil Refineries Pro cessing Rus sian Oil Thousands of Barrels 2016

Baytown Texas 15037 88

Baton Rouge Louisiana 2046 12

Total USA 17083 100

Source US EIA ldquoRefinery Capacity Reportrdquo authorrsquos computation

Table 510 Chevronrsquos Refineries Pro cessing Rus sian Oil Thousands of Barrels 2016

Pascagoula Mississippi 12767 840

El Segundo California 2372 155

Saint Rose Louisiana 78 05

Total USA 15217 100

Source US EIA ldquoRefinery Capacity Reportrdquo authorrsquos computation

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 30 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 31

HEAVY METAL

Taken together US imports of metals and US imports of oil compose about 80 percent of US

total imports from Rus sia (Figure 59) Trade of metals like other commodities is strongly afected

by market price fluctuations Nevertheless metal imports from Rus sia have been fairly resilient to

market volatility and their average annual value has hovered at about $4 billion in the last five years

(Figure 510) This market resilience was forged at the end of the 1990searly 2000s when Rus sian

metal producers gradually modernized their plants adjusting quality of production to Western

standards and enhancing integration into global value and supply chains Some of them conquered

their share of the highly competitive US market struggling with peers from Canada and certain

BRICS countries (China India and Brazil) To attract additional resources all Rus sian large metal-

producing companies became public and were listed on stock exchanges chiefly the London Stock

Exchange (Severstalrsquo PAO Evraz MMK OAO Novolipetsk Steel Norilsk Nikel and TMK PAO) one

on the New York Stock Exchange (Mechel) and one on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange (Rusal)

Business logic pushed some of them to invest in the US metal- making industry which was hit

hard by crisis Later on some of those assets were sold (eg two US steel mills acquired by

Severstal in 2004 were purchased 10 years later by Steel Dynamics Inc and AK Steel Corp)

Figure 57 Share of US States Rus sian Oil Imports 2016

Source US EIA ldquoUS Imports from Rus sia of Crude Oil and Petroleum Productsrdquo Petroleum amp Other

Liquids September 29 2017 https www eia gov dnav pet hist LeafHandler ashx nshy=shyPETampsshy=shyMTTIM _ NUS

- NRS _ 1ampfshy=shyM authorrsquos computation

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

100

Maine

Massachusetts

Maryland

Connecticut

Georgia

Rhode Island

Virginia

Florida

New York

Alabama

Puerto Rico

Pennsylvania

Delaware

Hawaii

Washington

Mississippi

California

New Jersey

Louisiana

Texas

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 31 102017 404 PM

Figure 58 US Imports from Rus sia by State Million US$ 2013ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoState and Metropolitan Area Trade Datardquo Foreign Trade last modified

October 2 2017 https wwwcensus gov foreign - trade statistics state

Alaska

Connecticut

Delaware

Hawaii

Louisiana

Maryland

North Dakota 0

$1000

$2000

$3000

$4000

$5000

$6000

2013 2014 2015 2016

Alabama

Alaska

Connecticut

Delaware

Hawaii

Louisiana

Maryland

Maine

Mississippi

Montana

North Dakota

Mississippi

Figure 59 US Imports from Rus sia Share of Oil and Metals Million US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 1992ndash2016)

83

82

85

86

87

88

85

82

7375

0

$5000

$10000

$15000

$20000

$25000

$30000

$35000

$40000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

US Imports from Russia

Share of Oil and Metals

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 32 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 33

Obviously the market dynamic of dif er ent metals varies (eg iron steel aluminum platinum and

nickel) Caps to increase their trade and production in a ldquored oceanrdquo global environment with

anemic demand is rather limited despite Figure 510 showing a spike of iron and steel imports

from Rus sia in 2014 and aluminum in 2016 Some opportunities may exist for Russian- owned steel

plants in the United States (such as NLMK) to participate in energy proj ects resumed under Presi-

dent Trump who has required that new pipelines use only American- made steel15

Rus sia occupies a special niche in the US market for titanium products a high- end metal indus-

try Twenty years ago a long- term contract was signed between Rus sian titanium producer

VSMPO- AVISMA and Boeing The Rus sian com pany entered the selective club of Boeing suppliers

for the manufacture of components and semi- finished products Since the signing of this contract

VSMPO has delivered more than 35 percent of all titanium placed on Boeing civil aircraft16 They

are hidden in the trade data in an import category for Civilian Aircrafts and Parts (Figure 511) At

the end of 2016 Boeing announced an extension of its framework agreement with AVISMA

15 E Scheyder C Ngai and T Sylvester ldquoAmerican Steel Unlikely to Get Keystone Boost Despite Trump Orderrdquo

Reuters January 27 2017 http wwwreuters com article usa - trump - pipeline - transcanada - idUSL1N1FH1ZD

16 A Kramer ldquoTitanium Fills Vital Role for Boeing and Rus siardquo New York Times July 5 2013 http wwwnytimes com

2013 07 06 business global titanium - fills - vital - role - for - boeing - and - russia html mcubzshy=shy3

Figure 510 US Imports from Rus sia Iron Steel Bauxite Aluminum Nickel Nonferrous Metals and Other Precious Metals and Materials US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 1992ndash2016)

0

$6000000000

$5000000000

$4000000000

$3000000000

$2000000000

$1000000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 20122013

20142015

2016

Finished metal shapes

Iron and steel advanced

Iron and steel products nec

Nonferrous metals other

Other precious metals

Nickel

Bauxite and aluminum

Iron and steel mill products

Steelmaking materials

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 33 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations34

through 2022 and additional investments in the construction of a new robotic plant in Titanium

Valley a special economic zone located in the Sverdlovsk region that will open in 2018 The pro-

cessing of titanium forgings in all Boeing civil aircraft will be performed there including 787s 737

MAXs and 777Xs17 The contract extension with AVISMA may add several hundred million dollars

in value to annual US imports from Rus sia

How can such heavy reliance on imports of Rus sian titanium exist during a period of rising geopo-

liti cal tensions The answer is straightforward VSMPO- AVISMA is a highly specialized natu ral

mono poly producing 45 percent of the worldrsquos aerospace titanium Only four other countries

smelt high- grade titanium in industrial quantities the United States Germany Japan and China

Overall global production capacity is limited while demand is growing The United States cur-

rently imports around 79 percent of all the titanium it consumes each year18

17 ldquoBoeing and VSMPO Avisma to Launch Second Joint Production Siterdquo Rus sian Aviation Insider December 22 2016

http wwwrusaviainsider com boeing - and - vsmpo - avisma - to - launch - second - joint - production - site

18 Jon Ostrower and Andy Pasztor ldquoBoeing United Technologies Stockpile Titanium Partsrdquo Wall Street Journal

August 7 2014 https wwwwsj com articles boeing - united - technologies - stockpiling - titanium - parts - 1407441886

Figure 511 US Imports from Rus sia Civilian Aircrafts and Parts US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 1992ndash2016)

0

$20000000

$40000000

$60000000

$80000000

$100000000

$120000000

$140000000

$160000000

$180000000

$200000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Parts-civilian aircraft

Civilian aircraft

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 34 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 35

The Sanctions Act authorizes the secretary of the trea sury (in a nonmandatory way) to impose

restrictions (without specifying them) against Rus sian state- owned entities operating in the railway

metals and mining sectors of the Rus sian economy Despite the commanding heights of Rus siarsquos

state sector owner ship in its economy (70 percent of GDP) the metal- producing companies have

remained mostly in private hands

NUCLEAR AFFAIRS

Historically owners and operators of the 104 commercial nuclear power reactors in the United

States have purchased more than 80 percent of their uranium from foreign countries Uranium

shipping from Rus sia accounted for about 13 percent of the 58 million pounds of uranium pur-

chased overseas in 201219 At the same time the Rus sian state- owned mono poly Rosatom ac-

counts for 20 percent of Kazakhstanrsquos uranium production (which in turn comprises 11 percent of

all US uranium imports) and 20 percent of US domestic uranium production capacity (with

owner ship of exploration tracts in Wyoming)20

Nuclear fuel and nuclear power continue to be po liti cally sensitive topics both in the United

States and Rus sia Bilateral cooperation in this sector (being surprisingly stable with imports of

nuclear fuel from Rus sia at a level of $1 billion annually in the last five years [Figure 512 and 513])

is under constant po liti cal and lobbying pressure and has been a source of several po liti cal scan-

dals21 Consequently upside risks in this area of interaction are minimal and downside risks are

much higher especially when we are seeing more decommissioning of nuclear plants in the

United States than new constructions The US EIArsquos 2017 Annual Energy Outlook assumes

that about 25 percent of the nuclear capacity now operating will be removed from ser vice

by 205022

WHY IS THE GRASS GREENER ON THE OTHER SIDE

The United States continues to significantly reduce imports of chemical fertilizers as domestic pro-

duction increases In 2016 the United States imported 13 percent less ammonia and 11 percent

less urea and UAN which is a liquid urea and ammonium nitrate fertilizer Rus sia accounts for

around 40 percent of UAN imported by the United States The United States canceled antidumping

duties on imports of ammonium nitrate and urea from Rus sia in 2016 but it did not prevent import

19 US EIA ldquoThe US Relies on Foreign Uranium Enrichment Ser vices to Fuel Its Nuclear Power Plantsrdquo Today in

Energy August 28 2013 https wwweia gov todayinenergy detail php idshy=shy1273

20 Colin Chilcoat ldquoDoes Rus sia Really Own 20 Percent of the USrsquo Uranium Reservesrdquo OilPricecom May 6 2015

http oilpricecom Alternative - Energy Nuclear - Power Does - Russia - Really - Own - 20 - Of - The - US - Uranium - Reserves

html

21 Michelle Ye Hee Lee ldquoThe Facts behind Trumprsquos Repeated Claim about Hillary Clintonrsquos Role in the Rus sian Ura-

nium Dealrdquo Washington Post October 26 2016

22 US EIA ldquoAnnual Energy Outlook 2017 with Projections to 2050rdquo 81ndash82

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 35 102017 404 PM

Figure 512 US Imports from Rus sia Share of Oil Metals and Nuclear Fuel Million US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 1992ndash2016)

87

86

90

90

90

91

88

86

7882

0

$5000

$10000

$15000

$20000

$25000

$30000

$35000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

US Imports from Russia

Share of Oil Metals and Nuclear Fuel

Figure 513 US Imports from Rus sia Nuclear Fuel Materials US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

$-

$200000000

$400000000

$600000000

$800000000

$1200000000

$1000000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 36 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 37

drops twice last year (Figures 514 and 515) According to forecasts UAN imports are expected to

decline further to 15 million tons this year down over 46 percent from 28 million tons imported

last year23 The downside trend in imports of fertilizers will likely continue because of oversupply

BIG FISH

US imports of fish and shellfish from Rus sia are best understood in comparison with US fish

exports to the Rus sian market which slipped to zero in August 2014 after Rus sia issued an order

banning certain agricultural imports from the United States (Figure 516) While the volume of US

supply was not very large it was impor tant because it broke up the monopolistic dominance of a

few vertically integrated Rus sian companies that have kept prices high by restricting the entry of

new producers Seeking to implement import substitution policies Rus sia has tried to reduce

exports as well as imports of fish and seafood products in the last couple of years This symmetri-

cal approach was intended to ldquocompensaterdquo for a decrease of fish products in the domestic

23 Deepika Thapliyal ldquoPotashCorp Forecasts Sharp Drop in US Nitrogen Imports in 2017rdquo ICIS News February 7

2017 https wwwicis com resources news 2017 02 07 10076734 potashcorp - forecasts - sharp - drop - in - us - nitrogen

- imports - in - 2017

Figure 514 US Imports from Rus sia Share of Oil Metals Nuclear Fuel and Fertilizers Million US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

90

93

92

93

94

95

92

91

85

86

0

$5000

$10000

$15000

$20000

$25000

$30000

$35000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

US Imports from Russia

Share of Oil Metals Nuclear Fuel and Fertilizers

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 37 102017 404 PM

Figure 515 US Imports from Rus sia Chemical- Fertilizers US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

S-

$200000000

$400000000

$600000000

$800000000

$1000000000

$1200000000

$1400000000

$1600000000

$1800000000

$2000000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Figure 516 US Exports to Rus sia Fish and Shellfish US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

0

$10000000

$20000000

$30000000

$40000000

$50000000

$60000000

$70000000

$80000000

$90000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Fish and shellfish

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 38 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 39

consumer market caused by Rus siarsquos import ban but it has failed As result the group most af-

fected by the self- imposed counter- sanctions were Rus sian consumers

With a significant drop in fish imports a devaluation of the ruble and inflationary pressures on

seafood prices yearly consumption of fish in Rus sia has declined precipitously In 2015 alone

fish prices increased 20 percent and consumption dropped to 14 kilograms per person24 from

22 kilograms in 201425 In 2016 food rose to 355 percent of house hold expenditure as a result of

increases in food prices26 This has pushed vertically integrated fishing monopolies to sell even

more of their catch abroad rather than deliver to the Rus sian Federation (Figure 517) Thus we

cannot exclude the possibility of further growth in US fish and shellfish imports from Rus sia on a

marginal scale

24 Александр Савельев ldquoПотребление рыбы в России упало до 14 кг на человекаrdquo [Fish consumption in Rus sia fell to

14 kg per person] Экономика Интерфакс January 28 2015 http wwwinterfax ru business 492038

25 Илья Шестаков ldquoПотебление рыбы в России снизилось на 10 процентов из- за роста ценrdquo [Fish consumption in

Rus sia dropped by 10 percent due to price increases] RNS March 8 2017 https rnsonline consumer - market

Potreblenie - ribi - v - Rossii - snizilos - na - 10 - iz - za - rosta - tsen - 2017 - 03 - 08

26 Zoya Sheftalovich and Christian Oliver ldquoRus siarsquos Boom (Farming) Economyrdquo Politico November 8 2016 http

wwwpolitico eu article russias - boom - farming - economy

Figure 517 US Imports from Rus sia Fish and Shellfish US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

0

$50000000

$100000000

$150000000

$200000000

$250000000

$300000000

$350000000

$400000000

$450000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 39 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations40

SPACE ODYSSEY

Among high- end products beyond the top five groups of goods imported from Rus sia cheap and

efficient Rus sian engines have been used to launch US rockets into space for about 16 years

(Figure 518) There was a serious po liti cal strug gle around a 2014 ban on the purchase of Rus sian

RD-180 rocket engines revealing the conflicting business interests of power ful high- tech companies

This restrictive mea sure was temporary and was quickly lifted because of significant cost impacts

and risks of disruption to launch schedules27 For the same reason the Sanctions Act does not autho-

rize ldquothe imposition of any sanction or other condition limitation restriction or prohibition that

directly or indirectly impedes the supply by any entity of the Rus sian Federation of any product or

ser vice or the procurement of such product or ser vice by any contractor or subcontractor of the

United States or any other entity relating to or in connection with any space launch conducted for

the National Aeronautics and Space Administration or any other nonndash Department of Defense

customerrdquo28

Nevertheless many experts believe that US domestic alternatives to replace Rus sian engines will

be viable in five to eight years

27 Ken Dilanian ldquoWhy Does the US Use Rus sian Rockets to Launch Its Satellitesrdquo NBC News updated November 15

2016 http wwwnbcnews com why - does - u - s - use - russian - rockets - launch - its - satellites - n588526

28 Countering Amer i carsquos Adversaries through Sanctions Act HR 3364

Figure 518 Spacecraft Excluding Military US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

0

$20000000

$40000000

$60000000

$80000000

$100000000

$120000000

$140000000

$160000000

$180000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 40 102017 404 PM

41

Diversity and technological complexity are the most vis i ble advantages supporting US exports to

Rus sia Three major groups of export goods include civilian aircraft engines and parts (Figure 61)

drilling and oil field equipment (Figure 62) and industrial machines and engines (Figure 63)

Despite sanctions against the transfer of advanced oil producing and pro cessing technologies the

realization of US drilling and oil field equipment in Rus sia is sustainable although some bilateral

proj ects have been frozen

Another category of goods that has demonstrated resilience is the phar ma ceu ti cal industry (Fig-

ure 64) because most drugs in Rus sia are imported (about 70 percent of the Rus sian phar ma ceu-

ti cal market in value) Import substitution policies have had only modest results in this industry

As confirmed by American Chamber of Commerce surveys US exports to Rus sia are closely

connected to US FDI 30 percent of total imports of US companies working in the Rus sian

market come from the United States (more than $2 billion in 2016) In other words about

40 percent of all US exports to Rus sia are related to a US corporate- sector business pro cess in

the country The major sectors of activity of these companies are energy and natu ral resources

(52 percent) manufacturing (17 percent) information and communications technology or ICT

(13 percent) retail (7 percent) automotive industry (6 percent) phar ma ceu ti cal production

(1 percent) professional ser vices (05 percent) and other (2 percent)1

Some obvious constraints on US exports to Rus sia have resulted from a reduction in demand A

deterioration of bilateral relations and implementation of sanctions and counter- sanctions have

directly or indirectly afected all businesses Figures 65 and 66 provide data regarding a dramatic

drop in the sale of US agricultural production in Rus sia with all other categories of exports in

goods showing big cuts as well (see Figures 67ndash69)

Exports of civilian aircraft engines and parts put the state of Washington in first place among

other states as a leading exporter to the Rus sian market (Figure 610)

1 American Chamber of Commerce in Rus sia ldquoInvestment and Import to Rus sia 2nd Surveyrdquo 13

Diversity and Constraints

06

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 41 102017 404 PM

Figure 61 US Exports of Civilian Aircraft Engines Equipment and Parts to Rus sia US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

$2500000000

$2000000000

$1500000000

$1000000000

$500000000

$-

Figure 62 US Exports of Drilling and Oil Field Equipment US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

0

$5000000

$10000000

$15000000

$20000000

$25000000

$30000000

$35000000

$40000000

$45000000

$50000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 42 102017 404 PM

Figure 63 US Exports of Industrial Engines to Rus sia US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

0

$5000000

$10000000

$15000000

$20000000

$25000000

$30000000

$35000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Figure 64 US Exports of Phar ma ceu ti cal Preparations to Rus sia US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

0

$5000000

$10000000

$15000000

$20000000

$25000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 43 102017 404 PM

Figure 65 US Exports of Meat and Poultry to Rus sia US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Meat poultry etc

$1000000000

$800000000

$600000000

$400000000

$200000000

$-

$1200000000

$1400000000

$1600000000

Figure 66 US Exports of Soybeans to Rus sia US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

0

$20000000

$40000000

$60000000

$80000000

$100000000

$120000000

$140000000

$160000000

$180000000

$200000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 44 102017 404 PM

Figure 67 US Exports of Vehicles Engines and Parts to Rus sia US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Other parts and accessories of vehicles

Automotive tires and tubes

Bodies and chassis for passenger cars

Engines and engine parts (carburetors pistonsrings and valves)

Trucks buses and special purpose vehicles

Passenger cars new and used

$2500000000

$2000000000

$1500000000

$500000000

$-

$1000000000

Figure 68 US Exports of Medicinal Equipment to Rus sia US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

$10000000

$15000000

$20000000

$25000000

$30000000

$35000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 45 102017 404 PM

Figure 610 US Exports to Rus sia by States (2016 US$ Value) Million US$ 2013ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoState and Metropolitan Area Trade Datardquo

Iowa Kentucky

North Dakota

Oklahoma

South Carolina

Washington

0

$500

$1000

$1500

$2000

2013 2014 2015 2016

District of Columbia

Iowa

Kentucky

North Dakota

Oklahoma

South Carolina

Washington

Figure 69 US Exports of Excavating Machinery to Rus sia US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

0

$5000000

$10000000

$15000000

$20000000

$25000000

$30000000

$35000000

$40000000

$45000000

$50000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 46 102017 404 PM

47

Upon reviewing the current trend in US- Russia economic relations we must acknowledge that

the existing trade model is obsolete and exhausted Imports are resource- oriented and reflect

constraints of the Rus sian economic structure while five groups of goodsmdash oil metals nuclear

fuels fertilizers and fishmdash make up more than 90 percent of total imports from Rus sia (Figure 71)

Each of these industries has a limited capacity for growth in the foreseeable future

Rus siarsquos core export to the United Statesmdash oilmdash will inevitably decrease in the mid- term under any

scenario The value and volume of Rus sian exports to the United States are open to global market

volatility and po liti cal pressures with limited hedging mechanisms

Overall US exports to Rus sia are unsustainable due to bilateral po liti cal tensions the whims of

commodity markets and changing domestic policies Sanctions and counter- sanctions have

created additional barriers particularly in finance banking high- tech energy and agro- business

According to the American Chamber of Commerce 69 percent of US companies working in the

country consider the impact of US sanctions against Rus sia on their business as negative At the

same time 60 percent of companies do not expect big changes in business relations between

Rus sia and the United States under Trump1 as the new law codifies existing sanctions fortifies

them and extends them to new sectors

Current US investments are low due to the weak rule of law in Rus sia a lack of property right

protections and proper contract enforcement high levels of statization and monopolization in the

economy a poor business climate outdated capital stock dependence on natural- resource

sectors and of course sanction and counter- sanction mea sures Bloated administrative compo-

nents created as risk mitigation instruments have also served as impediments The countryrsquos

institutional weakness low level of productivity bud get constraints and a declining inflexible

workforce will restrain future economic growth even if commodity prices recover Rus sian eco-

nomic policy will likely continue to be statist and protectionist relying mostly on import

substitutions

1 Ibid 11

Existing Trends and Future Scenarios

07

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 47 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations48

What scenarios can be expected in such a challenging environment

One probability (no peace no war) is based on the assumption that matters will not deteriorate

further and implementation of the Sanctions Act will be cursory This will cause relatively slow

degradation in the economic field with occasional flashes of activity in selected areas (eg closer

cooperation against Islamist terrorist groups in Syria)

A second worse case or critical scenario is the intensive and full- scale execution of current sanc-

tion legislation and even the imposition of new economic punitive and restrictive mea sures which

could incite asymmetric retaliatory actions and lead to the introduction of additional protectionist

policies This in turn could trigger a further escalation of mutual confrontation and could eventu-

ally destroy the fundamentals of the current bilateral trade system Rus sian leadership has charac-

terized the Sanctions Act as a declaration of a trade war that ends all hope for improving bilateral

relations2

2 Дмитрий Медведев ldquoПодписание президентом США нового санкционного закона против России создает несколько

последствийrdquo [The US Presidentrsquos signing of the package of new sanctions against Rus sia will have a few conse-

quences] Facebook August 2 2017 https wwwfacebook com Dmitry Medvedev posts 10154587161801851

Figure 71 US Imports from Rus sia Share of Oil Metals Nuclear Fuel Fertilizers and Fish Million US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

93

94

93

94

95

96

93

92

87

89

0

$5000

$10000

$15000

$20000

$25000

$30000

$35000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

US Imports from Russia

Share of Oil Metals Nuclear FuelFertilizers and Fish

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 48 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 49

The best case and most favorable scenario looks less probable now It assumes the realization of

structural reforms in Rus sia in such a way that would adapt Rus siarsquos foreign policy to national

economic needs reduce confrontations with the West and make a concerted efort to integrate

Rus sian businesses into global supply and value chains A revitalization of the structural reform

agendamdash including eforts to diversify economic activities through de- monopolization and support

for SMEs a restructuring of the banking sector the creation of a vibrant business climate to foster

entrepreneurships and innovation the implementation of administrative and judicial reforms to

tackle red tape and endemic corruption and the reduction of state control over key sectors of the

economy via wide- spread privatization could kick- start the development of a nonoil economy and

improve long- term growth prospects Despite ongoing discussion of reform strategies deep

economic and po liti cal changes are extremely complicated over the next po liti calelectoral cycle

(2018ndash2024) particularly because of re sis tance of vested interests and growing commodity prices

The urgency to tackle structural shortcomings in natu ral resource- dependent economies usually

correlates with the price of those resources and the degree to which resource rents drive eco-

nomic activity However there may be marginal improvements in the efficiency of the current

economic system

Future US- Russia relations can be thought of through three pillars one pillar focuses on areas

where both countries maintain a competitive rivalry another looks at potential areas of interaction

under pres ent conditions a third pillar and one that has evaporated from the current bilateral

agenda concentrates on future cooperation Stronger economic ties could not only be a kind of

po liti cal shock absorber but contribute to the building of this future (particularly business contacts

aim to support future structural reforms) although po liti cal factors are depressing the prospects

for cooperation To escape deadlock it will be impor tant to establish the right balance between

politics and economics and create a model of collaboration within the framework of contention

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 49 102017 404 PM

About the Author

Vadim Grishin PhD MBA has been involved in the reform pro cess in Rus sia as adviser to the

deputy prime minister of Rus sia in 1992ndash1993 and 2006ndash2010 He has extensive experience

working with the Bretton Woods Institutions He was the board member of the World Bank Group

and served as se nior adviser at the International Monetary Fund Currently he is a con sul tant to the

chief economistrsquos office of the International Finance Corporation and teaches the economics of

transition at Georgetown University in Washington DC

50

594-71613_ch99_4Pindd 50 102017 403 PM

Blank

COVER PHOTO ADOBE STOCK

1616 Rhode Island Avenue NW

Washington DC 20036

202 887 0200 | wwwcsisorg

v++ISBN 978-1-4422-8035-9

Lanham bull Boulder bull New York bull London

4501 Forbes Boulevard

Lanham MD 20706

301 459 3366 | wwwrowmancom

A U T H O R

Vadim Grishin

Myths and Realities

A Report of the

CSIS RUSSIA AND EURASIA PROGRAM

US-RussiaEconomicRelations

O C T O B E R 2 0 1 7

Euml|xHSLEOCy280359z

The Man Pupu Nyor Rock Formations at the Northern Urals also known as Seven

Strong Man or Little Mountain of the God in the local tribe (Mansi) language

Page 4: U.S.-Russia Economic Relations: Myths and Realities · 2020-04-17 · OCTOBER 2017 U.S.- Russia Economic Relations Myths and Realities AUTHOR Vadim Grishin A REPORT OF THE CSIS RUSSIA

About CSIS

For over 50 years the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) has worked

to develop solutions to the worldrsquos greatest policy challenges Today CSIS scholars are

providing strategic insights and bipartisan policy solutions to help decisionmakers chart a

course toward a better world

CSIS is a nonprofit organ ization headquartered in Washington DC The Centerrsquos 220 full-

time staff and large network of affiliated scholars conduct research and analy sis and develop

policy initiatives that look into the future and anticipate change

Founded at the height of the Cold War by David M Abshire and Admiral Arleigh Burke CSIS

was dedicated to finding ways to sustain American prominence and prosperity as a force for

good in the world Since 1962 CSIS has become one of the worldrsquos preeminent international

institutions focused on defense and security regional stability and transnational

challenges ranging from energy and climate to global health and economic integration

Thomas J Pritzker was named chairman of the CSIS Board of Trustees in November 2015

Former US deputy secretary of defense John J Hamre has served as the Centerrsquos president

and chief executive officer since 2000

CSIS does not take specific policy positions accordingly all views expressed herein should

be understood to be solely those of the author(s)

copy 2017 by the Center for Strategic and International Studies All rights reserved

ISBN 978-1-4422-8035-9 (pb) 978-1-4422-8036-6 (eBook)

Center for Strategic amp International Studies Rowman amp Littlefield

1616 Rhode Island Ave nue NW 4501 Forbes Boulevard

Washington DC 20036 Lanham MD 20706

202-887-0200 | wwwcsis org 301 - 459 - 3366 | www rowman com

594-71613_ch00_4Pindd 2 102017 403 PM

III

Contents

iv Acknowl edgments

1 CHAPTER 1 | Introduction

4 CHAPTER 2 | Does Bilateral Economic Interaction Matter

11 CHAPTER 3 | Politics in the Driverrsquos Seat

15 CHAPTER 4 | Are the United States and Rus sia ldquoNatu ralrdquo Trading Partners

A Little Bit of History

19 CHAPTER 5 | Sector Analyses

41 CHAPTER 6 | Diversity and Constraints

47 CHAPTER 7 | Existing Trends and Future Scenarios

50 About the Author

594-71613_ch00_4Pindd 3 102017 403 PM

The author wishes to thank the participants of a draft paper discussion William Arnold Jack

Brougher Matthew Edwards Daniel Fried Andrew Kuchins Randy Levinas Gary Litman Jeff

Mankoff Cyrus Newlin Olga Oliker Ian Solomon Doug Stanglin and Angela Stent

This report is made pos si ble by the generous support of Car ne gie Corporation of New York

Acknowl edgments

Iv

594-71613_ch00_4Pindd 4 102017 403 PM

1

01

Introduction

A friend of mine a devoted connoisseur of bilateral economic relations with 30 years of experi-

ence in the field once noted that the hottest discussions about US- Russia ties occur at a time

when mutual trade is compressed into the value of a mathematical error This is exactly what is

happening now According to official statistics the value of US- Russia trade is about $20 billion

and is rolling back to the level of 20051 There is no doubt that a new set of sanctions recently

signed into law by the US president and currently being implemented will further hurt economic

interaction by reducing financial inflows limiting the transfer of technology and expertise and

dampening business confidence Many policymakers and experts have agreed that HR 3364

(Countering Amer i carsquos Adversaries through Sanctions Act2) by expanding and codifying US

sanctions targeting Rus sia opens a new cycle in bilateral relations This legislation which received

overwhelming bipartisan support creates a new economic and po liti cal framework on a bilateral

track Strong concerns expressed by President Donald Trump in his special statement about

ldquounconstitutional provisions of the ldquoflawed billrdquo3 cannot significantly limit its intended and

unintended consequences In its implementation it could have relatively broad margins of flexibil-

ity and leverage but requires the president to seek congressional approval before easing or termi-

nating sanctions against Rus sia or undertaking actions that would significantly modify US policy

toward Rus sia Additional observations regarding HR 3364rsquos pos si ble impact on US- Russia

interaction in par tic u lar industries can be found throughout this report but suffice it to say that it

will contribute to a broader curtailment of many pillars of economic cooperation for years ahead

1 US Census Bureau ldquoForeign Trade Trade in Goods with Rus siardquo Foreign Trade updated June 29 2017 https

wwwcensus gov foreign - trade balance c4621 html

2 Countering Amer i carsquos Adversaries through Sanctions Act HR 3364 115th Cong (2017ndash2018) https www

congress gov bill 115th - congress house - bill 3364

3 Donald J Trump ldquoStatement by President Donald J Trump on the Signing of HR 3364rdquo White House Office of the

Press Secretary August 2 2017 https wwwwhitehouse gov the - press - office 2017 08 02 statement - president

- donald - j - trump - signing - hr - 3364

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 1 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations2

Escalating geopo liti cal tensions have continued to significantly define Rus siarsquos economic prospects

however the countryrsquos economic model exhausted itself long before the dramatic deterioration of

relations with the West Structural bottlenecks have seriously limited Rus siarsquos growth capacity even

during the previous period of high oil prices4

The purpose of this report is to assess what has gone wrong with the US- Russia equation by

analyzing it through the prism of a bilateral economic and po liti cal trajectory while keeping in

mind the structural constraints of the Rus sian economy It will attempt to answer the following

questions

bull Do bilateral economic relations matter

bull Are the United States and Rus sia ldquonatu ralrdquo or ldquounnaturalrdquo trading partners

bull What future scenarios can we expect

In the vast lit er a ture on US- Russia economic relations analy sis of developing trends in bilateral

commerce has always been accompanied by discussions around impor tant po liti cal and eco-

nomic matters particularly regarding US legislation and regulation5 Over several de cades the

most controversial issues concerned the granting of permanent normal trading status to Rus sia

through legislation that eliminated the Jackson- Vanik Amendment and Rus siarsquos accession to

the World Trade Organ ization (WTO) The Magnitsky Act signed into law in 2012 repealed the

Jackson- Vanik provisions but added legislation providing authority for the US government to

withhold visas and freeze assets of Rus sians thought to have been involved with human rights

violations and later imposed sanctions on Rus sia because of its involvement in the Ukrainian and

Syrian crises and its cyber- enabled activities6

Some have observed deficiencies in Rus siarsquos participation in the international division of labor

(reliance on the export of energy and metals) which ldquo canrsquot serve any more as a basis for further

expansion of the countryrsquos position in world markets including the US marketrdquo7 Unfortunately

such observations have not been accompanied by quantitative and qualitative analy sis of structural

constraints in the Rus sian foreign trade model Many authors limit their policy recommendations

for fostering bilateral economic relations to a requirement for a strong initial push from respective

governments the creation of business working groups and the extension of bilateral and multilat-

eral legal grounds for economic cooperation Such instruments proved to be useful in facilitating

4 International Monetary Fund (IMF) Rus sian Federation Selected Issues (Washington DC IMF 2016)

5 ldquoAmer i carsquos New Economic Sanctions May Hurt Rus siarsquos Recoveryrdquo Economist August 5 2017 Andrey Kortunov and

Olga Oliker eds A Roadmap for US- Russia Relations (Washington DC CSISRIAC 2017) https csis - prods3

amazonaws com s3fs - public publication 170815 _ KortunovOliker _ USRussiaRelations _ Web pdf E0bdGVHlxxYRAxhO

w8zJ9tbRGwdWjEgV Самуйлов CM Братерский MB ldquoКонгресс и торговые отношения США с Россиейrdquo [US

Congressrsquos role in the US- RF trade relations] США и Канада экономика политика культура 5 no 533 (May 2014)

6 Andrew Weiss and Richard Nephew ldquoThe Role of Sanctions in US- Russian Relationsrdquo (Task Force White Paper

Car ne gie Endowment for International Peace Washington DC July 11 2016)

7 Глущенко ЮН ldquoСостояние проблемы и перспективы сотрудничества России и США в экономической сфереrdquo

[Status prob lems and prospects of Russia- US economic cooperation] Проблемы Национальной Стратегии 21 no 6

(2013) 148ndash164

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 2 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 3

trade and investment during several reset cycles in bilateral relations starting in the 1990s but

they were only partially successful

Several papers and books although focused primarily on bilateral po liti cal agendas or sectorial

analy sis underline the importance of Rus sian domestic realities Dr Angela Stent in her ldquoLimits of

Partnershiprdquo notes that state control of the commanding heights in the Rus sian economy creates

significant deterrents for US private- sector entrance into the market8 Thane Gustafson in the

ldquoWheel of Fortunerdquo asserts that Rus siarsquos growing dependence on revenue from oil exports along

with its inefficient and often- corrupt management of industry is unsustainable9 Andrew Kuchins

in his ldquoElevation and Calibration A New Rus sia Policy for Amer i cardquo has quoted some experts who

believe that the weakened Rus sian economic position may over time contribute to some rap-

prochement with the West and emphasized lack of reforms as ldquoa key obstacle not only for Rus sian

economic recovery but also for improving ties with the Westrdquo10

In a recent joint task force report Eugene Rumer Andrew S Weiss and Richard Sokolsky argue

that the concept of developing stronger economic ties with Rus sia as a foundation for improved

diplomatic relations has not worked ldquoClinton Bush and Obama all placed high hope on trade as

an engine of better relations with Rus sia All were frustrated by the fact that the two countries are

for the most part not natu ral trading partnersrdquo11 On a dif er ent note the former US envoy to

Rus sia Michael McFaul has defended the achievements of a reset policy under the Barack Obama

administration emphasizing that bilateral trade reached a rec ord level in 2011 Nevertheless he

also stresses that it was a one- time accomplishment unlikely to be repeated12

Voices of those who believe that extensive economic ties can provide stability to broader po liti cal

interaction are weaker than ever in an environment of growing protectionism and adversarial rivalry

8 Angela Stent The Limits of Partnerships US- Russian Relations in the XXI Century (Prince ton NJ Prince ton

University Press 2014) 98

9 Thane Gustafson Wheel of Fortune The Battle for Oil and Power in Rus sia (London Harvard University Press 2012)

10 Andrew Kuchins Elevation and Calibration A New Rus sia Policy for Amer i ca (Washington DC Center on Global

Interests 2016)

11 Eugene Rumer Richard Sokolsky and Andrew S Weiss ldquoTrump and Rus sia The Right Way to Manage Relationsrdquo

Foreign Affairs 96 no 2 (MarchApril 2017)

12 Michael McFaul ldquoUS- Russia Relationsrdquo (lecture Institute for Public Diplomacy and Global Communications

George Washington University Washington DC March 3 2017) https wwwc - span org video 424811 - 1 former

- ambassador - michael - mcfaul - discusses - state - usrussia - relations

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 3 102017 404 PM

4

02

Does Bilateral Economic Interaction Matter

Economic relations do not emerge out of a vacuum There are many variables that define the final

configuration of economic interactions such as a par tic u lar countryrsquos level of economic develop-

ment its business environment legal framework po liti cal climate (regime) culture and religion

history and tradition demography and geography as well as global and national economic cycles

An impor tant driver of trade relations for many economies has become participation in global and

regional trade agreements

As many studies and anecdotal evidence show bilateral economic cooperation should be sizable

and should relate to the economic growth of two countries in a way that afects their policy

interests Let us take as a reference point the BRICS countries1 a community of large emerging

economies which Rus sia belongs to Table 21 pres ents official data on US trade and investments

with BRICS states US- Russia trade in goods is disproportionally lowmdash235 times less than US

trade with China 33 times smaller than US trade with India and 28 times less than US trade

with Brazil The size of the US- Russia trade balance is comparable to the size of the US trade

balance with South Africa whose economy is almost four times smaller than Rus siarsquos If we add

trade in ser vices to the trade of goods the gaps increase significantly (Figures 21 and 22) The

diference is not only quantitative but also qualitative

The quality of trade relations can be mea sured by its diversity its share of high- tech components

resilience to economic shocks and its contribution to GDP growth On average a 10 percent

increase in a nationrsquos two- way trade relative to GDP increases GDP through a variety of channels

by at least 16 percent2

Bilateral trade and real GDP growth in the United States and Rus sia are practically uncorrelated

as shown in the summary output of multifactorial regression The coefficient of multiple determi-

nation (R Square) is close to 0 ( Table 22) At the same time the correlation of US exports to India

1 BRICS is the acronym for a select group of five developing economies Brazil Rus sia India China and South Africa

2 World Economic Forum Foreign Direct Investment as a Key Driver for Trade Growth and Prosperity The Case for a

Multilateral Agreement on Investment (Geneva World Economic Forum 2013) 11

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 4 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 5

Table 21 US Trade and Foreign Direct Investments (FDI) with China India Brazil South Africa and Rus sia 2016

China India Brazil South Africa Rus sia

Total Goods Trade 5786 677 565 13 203

Imports 4628 460 262 73 145

Exports 1158 217 303 55 58

Trade in Ser vices 696 472 317 47 na

Imports 161 268 68 17 na

Exports 535 203 249 30 na

US FDI 746 283 653 62 141

BRICS FDI in the United States

148 93 043 076 63

Supported Jobs in the United States (thousand)

911 197 308 50 84

Source United States Trade Representative (USTR) ldquoCountries amp Regionsrdquo accessed September 27 2017

https ustrgov countries - regions See US- China Trade Facts US- India Trade Facts US- Brazil Trade

Facts US- South Africa Trade Facts and US- Russia Trade Facts

201520142013

and China with the real GDP growth of these big Asian economies is significant (05) In the case of

Brazil the correlation is even higher (07) By contrast South Africarsquos small open economy is quite

sensitive to US imports from South Africa (043)3

In marked contrast to other BRICS countries Rus sia is a poor choice for export- oriented opera-

tions As a recent International Monetary Fund (IMF) study highlights Rus sia is an outlier a rare

exception among emerging market (EM) economies with virtually no preferential access to major

markets and little meaningful change over three de cades4 This complicates Rus siarsquos integration

into the global value chain (GVC) which became a significant driving force toward economic

development and trade for certain BRICS economies

3 IMF statistics authorrsquos computation

4 IMF Rus sian Federation Selected Issues IMF Country Report N17198 (Washington DC IMF July 2017)

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 5 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations6

Trade is closely connected with foreign direct investment (FDI) and both are parts of a complex

interaction known as international production sharing According to publicly available official data

US FDI in Rus sia was about $131 billion for 2013 and $295 billion for 2016 with the top industrial

sectors being software and IT ser vices financial ser vices chemicals metals coal oil and gas

and business ser vices5 If we take into account US investments made through Eu ro pean branches

of US companies and ofshore firms this number would easily triple Another component

that usually is not tracked by official statistics is reinvestments The American Chamber of

Commerce surveys in 2016 and 2017 which include this component draw a completely dif er ent

picture accumulated US corporate FDI in 90 large US companies working in Rus sia reached

5 US Department of Commerce International Trade Administration ldquoRussiamdash94- Foreign Direct Investment and

Portfolio Investment Statisticsrdquo Rus sia Country Commercial Guide July 7 2017 https wwwexport gov article

id=shyRussia - foreign - direct - investment - statistics

Figure 21 US Trade in Goods with China India Brazil Rus sia and South Africa Billion US$ 2016

Source USTR ldquoCountries amp Regionsrdquo See US- China Trade Facts US- India Trade Facts US- Brazil Trade

Facts US- South Africa Trade Facts and US- Russia Trade Facts

0

$50

$100

$150

$200

$250

$300

$350

$400

$450

$500

$550

$600

China India Brazil Russia South Africa

Exports

Imports

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 6 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 7

$8244 billion in 20176 The real level from our perspective is usually between official and private

estimations around $40 billon But even this cumulative figure is less than the US FDI in Brazil

and China

The American Chamber of Commerce surveys have also revealed other impor tant data Eighty-

five percent of US companies doing business in Rus sia entered its market 10 or more years ago

while 60 percent of them ldquolandedrdquo there 20 years ago or earlier Only one percent have started

operations over the last five years confirming an obvious fact entry into the Rus sian market is

challenging because of growing monopolism risks associated with the business climate and a

stagnating economy7

6 American Chamber of Commerce in Rus sia ldquoInvestment and Import to Rus sia 2nd Surveyrdquo (Prepared by GfK for the

American Chamber of Commerce in Rus sia Moscow May 2017) 12

7 Ibid 4

Figure 22 US Trade in Goods and in Ser vices with China India Brazil Rus sia and South Africa Billion US$ 2016

Source USTR ldquoCountries amp Regionsrdquo See US- China Trade Facts US- India Trade Facts US- Brazil Trade

Facts US- South Africa Trade Facts and US- Russia Trade Facts

0

$100

$200

$300

$400

$500

$600

$700

China India Brazil Russia South Africa

Trade in Services

Total Goods Trade

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 7 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations8

Rus sian direct investment position toward the United States declined from $215 billion in 2013 to

$83 billion in 2015 (Figure 23) Taking into account dif er ent channels and instruments the actual

volume of Rus sian investments in the United States made through ofshore Eu ro pean Canadian

and US companies may be several times greater than the available official data

Foreign investment in financial assets or foreign portfolio investment (FPI) should be included

even though Central Bank of Rus sia statistics indicate they were also quite low US investments in

equity were $345 million and in debt instruments were about $65 million in the fourth quarter of

20168 However these numbers do not reflect the real level of FPI Rus siarsquos stocks are incredibly

inexpensive while there has been impressive growth of US investments in short- term securities

and in foreign exchange (FX) operations (cash- and- carry trade) Rus sia was among the top per-

forming emerging markets in 2016 gaining 4744 percent in US dollars9 Nevertheless the gen-

eral capitalization of the stock exchange is tiny (less than 20 percent of GDP) comparable to the

capitalization of just one large US com pany such as Coca- Cola Many private sources believe that

the US FPI in Rus sia could be as high as several billion US dollars but a new set of sanctions

approved by President Trump on August 2 2017 if implemented could reverse those flows It is

still not clear whether the secretary of trea sury will prohibit participation in the oferings of Rus siarsquos

sovereign debt and the full range of derivative products A report on this subject should be sub-

mitted no later than 180 days after enactment of the law which means no later than Febru-

ary 2018 New legislation tightens prohibition on Rus sian financial companies already under

sanctions by limiting any new equity or debt with a maturity greater than 14 days (a provision that

8 Central Bank of Rus sia ldquoForeign Direct Investments in the Rus sian Federationrdquo accessed September 27 2017 www

cbr ru localization switchlanguage urlshy=shy news ampfromshy=shyru - ruamptoshy=shyen - gb

9 VanEck ldquoRus sian Stock Market Soars in 2016rdquo Seeking Alpha February 14 2017 https seekingalphacom article

4045602 - russian - stock - market - soars - 2016

Table 22 Summary Output of Regression Statistics (US Real GDP Rus sia Real GDP US- Russia Exports Imports and Total Trade)

Regression Statistics

Multiple R 0056445768

R Square 0003186125

Adjusted R Square minus0042123597

Standard Error 2616043923

Observations 24

Sources IMF statistics authorrsquos computation

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 8 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 9

previously allowed for 30 days) Similarly US persons are prohibited from taking on any new debt

that has a maturity greater than 60 days (previously it was 90 days) with Rus sian energy compa-

nies currently under sanctions10

According to the Trea sury Department Rus sia held $1029 billion in US Trea sury securities in

June 201711 Could Rus sia withdraw all its reserves from the United States and use this action as a

retaliatory mea sure Such a scenario is unlikely since there is no comparable safe- haven alterna-

tive to US dollars When Rus siarsquos US Trea sury holdings dropped 50 percent from $176 billion

(October 2010) to $90 billion (November 2011) the market did not notice12 Nevertheless Rus sian

authorities have announced they will decrease dependence on assets and payments in US dollars13

10 Countering Amer i carsquos Adversaries through Sanctions Act HR 3364

11 US Department of Trea sury Major Foreign Holders of Trea sury Securities September 18 2017 http ticdata

treasury gov Publish mfh txt

12 Ibid

13 ldquoНовый виток санкций Россия откажется от доллараrdquo [A new round of sanctions Rus sia will abandon the dollar]

Газетару August 7 2017 https wwwgazeta ru business 2017 08 07 10821937 shtml

Figure 23 Rus sia Outward FDI Position United States Equities and Debt Million US$ 2009ndash2016

Source Central Bank of the Rus sian Federation External Sector Statistics Rus sian Direct Investments

Abroad accessed September 27 2017 https wwwcbr ru localization switchlanguage urlshy=shy news

ampfromshy=shyru - ruamptoshy=shyen - gb

$6000

$8000

$10000

$12000

$14000

$16000

$18000

$20000

$22000

2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 9 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations10

Officially the country does not invest in the US stock exchange although some Rus sian oligarchs

have bought US corporate bonds and equities in large amounts The new sanctions law requires

the secretary of trea sury in consultation with the director of national intelligence and the secretary

of state to issue reports on Rus sian se nior po liti cal figures and oligarchs based on their closeness

to the Rus sian regime and their net worth as well as the exposure of key economic sectors of the

United States to Rus sian po liti cally exposed persons and parastatal entities including at a mini-

mum the banking securities insurance and real estate sectors14

Only three Rus sian companies are listed in the US exchanges

Overall the scale and scope of US- Russia economic interaction and business activity is much greater

than officially appreciated but not significant enough to be taken into consideration by policymakers

14 Countering Amer i carsquos Adversaries through Sanctions Act HR 3364

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 10 102017 404 PM

11

03

Politics in the Driverrsquos Seat

Bilateral economic relations depend to a great extent on global and national economic cycles

After the recent global financial crisis the US economy has shown surprisingly sustainable GDP

growth while the Rus sian economy was the most afected among BRICS countries by the turbu-

lence of a worldwide economic downturn in 2008ndash2009 and after a short- term rebound slipped

into stagnation (2012ndash2013) and then into full- scale recession (2014ndash2016) The countryrsquos eco-

nomic cycle however appears to be changing once again with the economy returning to a

pattern of growth albeit uneven and gradual (Figures 31 and 32) Even with sanctions still in place

conditions have improved as a result of the stabilization of Urals oil to an average annual price of

$419 per barrel in 2016 The gains were sparked in part by major crude producers agreeing to cut

production after hefty price drops in 2014 and 2015 Supported by easier financial conditions

higher oil prices and growing macro- stability Rus sia is heading toward a moderate growth rate

that is expected to reach 14 percent this year according to forecasts of the World Bank Group

(WBG) and the IMF1

Because of the significant role that politics plays in any bilateral interaction it is impor tant to

combine economic and po liti cal cycles applying a ldquoresetrdquo to bilateral economic cooperation in

addition to the po liti cal relationship I have compared po liti cal cycles and trade dynamics using the

following graphs ( Table 31 and Figure 33) These charts do not pretend to reflect with mathemati-

cal precision all shifts in the bilateral po liti cal relationship but rather attempt to visually align

impor tant economic and po liti cal moments to detect the efects of po liti cal events on the size of

bilateral trade

Figure 33 shows all pos si ble combinations economic trends at the intersection of po liti cal devel-

opments oppose or support each other in synchronization It is evident that po liti cal interference

1 International Monetary Fund Rus sian Federation Staff Concluding Statement of the 2017 Article IV Mission (Wash-

ington DC IMF 2017) World Bank Group From Recession to Recovery Rus sia Economic Report no 37 (Washington

DC World Bank 2017) http pubdocsworldbank org en 383241495487103815 RER - 37 - May26 - FINAL - with - summary

pdf

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 11 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations12

in bilateral business afairs in the early 2000s was less significant than in later years As result

growing po liti cal tensions from 2003 to 2008 did not dramatically afect bilateral economic inter-

action It is also easier to explain why 2011ndash2012 resulted in rec ord trade and investmentmdash a con-

sequence of very high oil prices GDP growth in both countries improved legislation after Rus siarsquos

accession to the WTO and the Obamandash Medvedev po liti cal reset From 2014 to 2016 a perfect

storm of developments added efficiency to Western sanctions and augmented the damaging

consequences of counter- sanction mea sures

Figure 33 also confirms that in times of reduced economic cooperation po liti cal pressures can

easily change bilateral economic trends Moreover business interests along with economic inter-

actions have a limited capacity to reverse the po liti cal mainstream

Figure 31 Economic Cycle 2014ndash2016

Source Authorrsquos evaluation of international financial institutions (IFI) data and sources from respective

countries

Sustainable Growth

Brazil

Negative Growth

Unstable Growth

Mexico

Descending Growth

Argentina

EU

US

Russia

Vietnam

China

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 12 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 13

Table 31 Po liti cal Cycles in Bilateral US- Russia Relations 1999ndash2016

2001ndash2002 The George W Bushndash Vladimir Putin Reset Rus sia supported ldquoglobal war on terrorismrdquo launched by the United States after 911 the SORT nuclear arms reduction treaty was signed by the United States and Rus sia and a successful business dialogue was developed that created the current structure of economic relations

2003ndash2008 Deterioration in bilateral relations brought on by the Iraq War Georgiarsquos ldquoRose Revolutionrdquo Mikhail Khodorkovskyrsquos arrest Ukrainersquos ldquoOrange Revolutionrdquo Kosovorsquos in de pen dence and the Georgian War

2009ndash2010 The Barack Obamandash Dmitry Medvedev Reset Rus sia served as a logistical hub for transportation and supply of US forces in Af ghan i stan United States and Rus sia signed the new START nuclear arms reduction treaty Rus sia backed tighter economic sanctions on Iran Rus sia gained access to the WTO after 18 years of negotiations

2011ndash2016 Deterioration in bilateral relations caused by the Ukrainian crisis which were followed by sanctions and counter- sanctions along with the Syrian crises and cyber- enabled activities

Source Authorrsquos evaluation of po liti cal and economic data

Note SORTthinsp=thinspStrategic Ofensive Reductions Treaty STARTthinsp=thinspStrategic Arms Reduction Treaty

Figure 32 Economic Cycle 2017ndash2019

Source Authorrsquos evaluation of IFI data and sources from respective countries

Egypt

VenezuelaEU

South Africa

Brazil

Russia

India

US

Descending Growth

Korea

China

Negative Growth

Unstable Growth

Sustainable Growth

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 13 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations14

Figure 33 US- Russia Trade Million US$ vs Po liti cal Cycle 2000ndash2016

Sources US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo Foreign Trade last modified June 29 2017

https wwwcensus gov foreign - trade balance c4621 html (see data for 2000ndash2016) authorrsquos evaluation

of po liti cal and economic data

Orange Revolution

Khodorkovskys arrest

GeorgianWar

Bush- Putin Reset

Iraq War Global Financial Crisis

Obama-Medvedev Reset

Russias WTO accession

New START Treaty

A Pefect Storm the Ukranian Crisis Oil Prices Crashing

Sanctions and Counter-Sanctions

$3000

$8000

$13000

$18000

$23000

$28000

$33000

$38000

$43000

2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 14 102017 404 PM

15

The current structure of US- Russia economic relations emerged in the early 2000s when the

model of trade and investment interaction took on a character similar to that which existed be-

tween the United States and developing economies US imports from Rus sia centered on com-

modities while technology along with food products lead American exports The primary

exception was that Rus sia supplied nuclear fuel including highly enriched uranium extracted from

nuclear weapons for US power plants and provided ser vices to the aerospace industry primarily

in satellite launches However both these exceptions can be explained as a legacy of the Soviet

past and not a harbinger of the future economic relationship (Figure 41)

In the last 15 years this trade structure has not changed significantly The only noticeable shift in

trade was a dramatic drop (to practically nothing) in exports of US agricultural products a result

of Rus siarsquos policy of import substitution and so- called counter- sanction mea sures it took in re-

sponse to US sanctions over the Ukraine crisis (Figure 42)

Promising new directions of cooperation in the IT sector and in engineering ser vices for the

aerospace industry appeared in the early 2000s1 but did not spill into other sectors and conse-

quently did little to renew economic cooperation on the whole The integration of Rus sian high-

tech ser vices into large- scale global production and value chains was constrained by the usual

culprits a lack of financial resources managerial experience skilled labor modern infrastructure

RampD investments and an adequate business environment High commodity prices incentivized the

restoration of an economic system centered on resource rents The leading role of oil and gas

extraction and transportation discouraged the development of a nonenergy sector that might

have created advanced and complex production and ser vices An import substitution policy could

not work efficiently in an economic environment plagued by the Dutch disease where currency

1 The Boeing Design Center was created in Moscow It consists of nearly 250 Boeing employees managing

a team of 1200 contract engineers from Rus sian and Ukrainian aerospace companies ldquoBackgrounder Boeing in

Rus siardquo Boeing last modified January 2017 http wwwboeing com resources boeingdotcom company key _ orgs

boeing - international pdf russia - cisbackgrounder pdf

Are the United States and Rus sia ldquoNatu ralrdquo Trading Partners A Little Bit of History

04

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 15 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations16

inflows (oil money) lead to ruble appreciation and render a countryrsquos production less competitive

During that time Rus siarsquos industry did not receive preferential access to larger markets and could

not expand its share in the global economy particularly because of its self- isolation from the

regional trade agreements (except for its participation in the Eurasian Economic Union with some

neighboring countries of the former Soviet Union) As a result neither import substitution nor

export- led strategy promoted growth and specialization in nonoil production A long- awaited

modernization and reallocation of resources from an inefficient nontrade sector to a trade sector

did not materialize

These limits were later augmented with sanctions and an extension of domestic restrictions on

cooperation with Western partners Importantly the rapid growth of state- monopoly structures in

the Rus sian economy over the past 15 years has created additional obstacles to the development

and diversification of US- Russia economic ties

Figure 41 US Imports from Rus sia US$ 2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2016)

Fish and shellfish 3

Crude oil 5

Fuel oil 37

Petroleum products other

8

Nuclear fuel materials

7

Chemicals-fertilizers 4

Steelmaking materials 5

Iron and steel mill products 4

Bauxite and aluminum 9

Other precious metals 4

Nonferrous metals other 1

Finished metal shapes 1

Synthetic rubber--primary

1

Spacecraftexcluding military

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 16 102017 404 PM

Fig

ure

42

U

S E

xpo

rts

to R

us s

ia U

S$ 2

016

Sou

rce

US

Ce

nsu

s B

ure

au ldquo

Trad

e in

Go

od

s w

ith

Ru

s sia

rdquo (s

ee

dat

a fo

r 2

016

)

Bak

ery

pro

du

cts

Win

e b

eer

an

d r

elat

ed

pro

du

cts

New

spri

nt

Pla

stic

mat

eria

ls

Ch

emic

als-

fert

ilize

rs

Ch

emic

als-

ino

rgan

icC

hem

ical

s-o

rgan

ic

Ch

emic

als-

oth

erC

ott

on

fib

er c

loth

In

du

stri

al r

ub

ber

pro

du

cts

Min

eral

su

pp

lies-

man

ufa

ctu

red

Gen

erat

ors

acc

esso

ries

Ele

ctri

c ap

par

atu

s

Dri

llin

g amp

oilfi

eld

eq

uip

men

t Sp

ecia

lized

min

ing

Exc

avat

ing

mac

hin

ery

No

nfa

rm t

ract

ors

an

d p

arts

In

du

stri

al e

ng

ines

Fo

od

to

bac

co m

ach

iner

y M

etal

wo

rkin

g m

ach

ine

too

ls

Tex

tile

sew

ing

m

ach

ines

W

oo

d g

lass

p

last

ic

Pu

lp a

nd

pap

er

mac

hin

ery

Mea

suri

ng

tes

tin

g

con

tro

l in

stru

men

ts

Mat

eria

ls h

and

ling

equ

ipm

ent

Ind

ust

rial

mac

hin

es

oth

er

Ph

oto

ser

vice

ind

ust

ry m

ach

iner

y A

gri

cult

ura

l mac

hin

ery

eq

uip

men

t C

om

pu

ters

Co

mp

ute

r ac

cess

ori

es

Sem

ico

nd

uct

ors

Tel

eco

mm

un

icat

ion

seq

uip

men

t

Bu

sin

ess

mac

hin

es a

nd

eq

uip

men

t

Lab

ora

tory

tes

tin

g in

stru

men

ts

Med

icin

al e

qu

ipm

ent

Civ

ilian

air

craf

t e

ng

ines

eq

uip

men

t a

nd

par

ts

Rai

lway

tra

nsp

ort

atio

n

equ

ipm

ent

Ves

sels

exc

lud

ing

scr

ap

Co

mm

erci

al v

esse

ls o

ther

M

arin

e en

gin

es p

arts

Spac

ecra

ft e

xclu

din

g

mili

tary

Pas

sen

ger

car

s

new

an

d u

sed

Tru

cks

bu

ses

and

sp

ecia

l p

urp

ose

ve

hic

les

En

gin

es a

nd

en

gin

e p

arts

(c

arb

ure

tors

pis

ton

s r

ing

s

and

val

ves)

B

od

ies

and

ch

assi

s fo

r p

asse

ng

er c

ars

Au

tom

oti

ve t

ires

an

d t

ub

es

Oth

er p

arts

an

d a

cces

sori

es o

f ve

hic

les

Ap

par

el h

ou

seh

old

go

od

s -

text

ile

Ph

arm

aceu

tica

lp

rep

arat

ion

s

Furn

itu

re h

ou

seh

old

go

od

s

etc

R

ug

s

Cel

l ph

on

es a

nd

oth

er

ho

use

ho

ld g

oo

ds

ne

c

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 17 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations18

Figure 43 US Trade in Goods with Rus sia Million US$ 1992ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 1992ndash2016)

Russian Financial Crisis

Oil price Increased from$2446 USD per barrel (2001)

to $9694 USD per barrel(2008)

Global Financial Crisis

Oil price high record in2011-2012

(more that $111 USD perbarrel)

Oil price crashed

$-

$5000

$10000

$15000

$20000

$25000

$30000

$35000

$40000

$45000

$50000

1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

US Imports from Russia US Exports to Russia US-Russia Trade in Goods

No doubt po liti cal ups and downs add volatility to US- Russia trade Nevertheless Rus siarsquos eco-

nomic structure exhausted itself before the Ukrainian crisis and the recent Rus sian recession Its

limitations are not only due to some mistakes in policy or negative coincidences of circumstances

but rather to deeply rooted properties in the current bilateral trade model related to structural

issues in the Rus sian economy Structural constraints such as the weak enforcement of property

rights poor business regulation and nondiversified exports weighed on Rus sian trade with the

United States From this perspective the term ldquonaturalunnatural trading partnersrdquo does not ad-

dress the unused capacity of bilateral interaction or the real challenges that kind of interaction

faces It just adds metaphysical flavor to the very specific economic and po liti cal factors that

determine the US- Russia trajectory

Overall the outlines of bilateral trade (Figure 43) resemble the famous ldquoRus sian Mountainsrdquo that

were a pre de ces sor of the modern roller coaster icy hills supported by wooden constructionsmdash a

rigid and immobile structure that sooner or later would melt This unfortunately is what is hap-

pening to US- Russia trade cooperation now

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 18 102017 404 PM

19

ARE LITTLE FISH REALLY SWEET

Low US- Russia economic interaction has at least two consequences First it limits the capacity of

policymakers to exploit trade as an instrument for geopo liti cal combat Even the question of a US

trade deficit which used to be a headache for many US trading partners has become so insig-

nificant in absolute terms (about $87 billion in 2016) that it seems hardly worth caring about

When the volume of trade between two countries becomes very small in absolute terms whether

a country is running a surplus or deficit is no longer relevant But it also renders another type of

confrontations (sometimes more dangerous) more likely since the two traders have little to lose

Second in an environment marked by low levels of bilateral trade both sides could incentivize (if

and when a desire for po liti cal rapprochement exists) the signing of new trade deals which are

elevated symbolically as a turning point in bilateral po liti cal relations (ie the sale of Boeings to

Rus sia or the delivery via tankers of Rus sian oil to US refineries) Sometimes markets themselves

pres ent ldquogiftsrdquo that can be capitalized on po liti cally US- USSR grain trade in the 1970s was one

such ldquogiftrdquo large sales of American grain to the Soviet Union helped US policymakers win favor

with the po liti cally impor tant American farming sector and permitted Soviet leaders to maintain

access to a dietary staple for the Soviet population

The strong 32 percent growth in value of US imports from Rus sia from January to May 2017

versus January to May 2016 ( Table 51) is an example of a development that has tempted officials

to pres ent it as a sign of positive change due to ldquogrowing business activitiesrdquo (this kind of statement

was heard before the bilateral summit in Germany in July 2017) although the reason for that leap

was evidently an increase in commodity prices (mainly of oilmdash see Table 52) and not a rise in

entrepreneurial interactions The primary beneficiaries of that upside rally have been two other

petro- economies Saudi Arabia and Venezuela ( Tables 53 and 54)

Sector Analyses

05

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 19 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations20

Table 51 US Imports from Rus sia Million US$ Januaryndash May 2016 vs Januaryndash May 2017

Year January February March April May Total

2016 9603 6871 11097 12257 10977 50805

2017 12215 10220 16979 13471 14147 67032

Change 271 487 530 99 289 319

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 1992ndash2016)

Table 52 Change in Urals Crude Oil Prices US$ per Barrel Januaryndash May 2016 vs Januaryndash May 2017

Januaryndash May 2016 Januaryndash May 2017 Change ($) Change ()

3601 5129 1528 424

Source Ministry of Finance of the Rus sian Federation https wwwminfin ru ru ixzz4mMIZ7XtC

Table 53 US Imports from Saudi Arabia Million US$ Januaryndash May 2016 vs Januaryndash May 2017

Year January February March April May Total

2016 15114 9036 13555 10844 14679 63228

2017 19802 20298 21650 16211 19542 97503

Change 3101 12463 5972 495 331 542

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Saudi Arabiardquo Foreign Trade last modified June 29 2017

https wwwcensus gov foreign - trade balance c5170 html (see data for 2016ndash2017)

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 20 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 21

Table 54 US Imports from Venezuela Million US$ Januaryndash May 2016 vs Januaryndash May 2017

Year January February March April May Total

2016 6657 5560 7140 8007 7922 35286

2017 13041 10864 123500 11148 12243 59646

Change 9590 9540 7297 3923 5454 6903

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Venezuelardquo Foreign Trade last modified June 29 2017

https wwwcensus gov foreign - trade balance c3070 html (see data for 2016ndash2017)

Table 55 US Exports to Rus sia Million US$ Januaryndash May 2016 vs Januaryndash May 2017

Year January February March April May Total

2016 3628 3577 7298 4657 4947 24107

2017 3144 4277 5386 6670 4806 24283

Change minus133 196 minus262 432 minus29 minus07

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2016ndash2017)

At the same time US exports to Rus sia continue to stagnate ( Table 55) due to low levels of

consumption during a two-and- a- half-year economic crisis a deep ruble devaluation sanctions

and counter- sanctions

Given the very dif er ent economic structures and resource endowments of Rus sia and the United

States it is not surprising that US- Russia trade is asymmetric and oil driven (Figure 51) A

3 percent increase in Urals oil prices translates into a one percent increase in US import growth

from Rus sia Thus in 2016 every $10 increase in Urals crude oil added $15 billion to the value of

US imports or 11 percent to the total value of imports from Rus sia

OIL ADDICTION

Oil is a core pillar of US- Russia bilateral trade A bumpy ride in oil markets afects commerce

Nevertheless Rus sian oil exports to the United States in physical terms have been rather

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 21 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations22

sustainable Starting from 2005 average annual deliveries have been above 150 million barrels

(Figure 52) Crude and heating oil have dominated while petroleum products and liquefied petro-

leum gases have not (Figure 53) In 2011 oil exports peaked at 228 million barrels but declined to

159 million barrels in 2016mdash a drop of 30 percent Rec ord high shipments of Rus sian oil to the United

States coincided with an elevation in oil prices which made the subsequent decline in oil shipment

value between 2011 and 2016 (by about 72 percent as shown in Figure 54) seem more stark The

increase in price also raised the share of oil in Rus sian exports by 74 percent in 2011 (Figure 55)

The Rus sian share in total US oil imports was around 55 percent in 2011 and 43 percent in 2016

( Table 56) In the last five years the United States has relied exclusively on consumption of Rus sian

oil for the rough equivalent of one week out of the year (Figure 56)

It is unlikely that Rus sia can significantly increase its share of the US oil market and there is a real

possibility for a downward trend There are several reasons the historically high Rus sian hydrocar-

bon export threshold of 2011 will not soon if ever be surpassed

First US energy consumption will likely be flat According to the US Energy Information Adminis-

tration (EIA) demand for petroleum and other liquids in the United States will be about 35ndash36

quadrillion British thermal units (BTUs) with minimal variation over the next 25 years1

1 US EIA ldquoAnnual Energy Outlook 2017 with Projections to 2050rdquo January 5 2017 7ndash8

Figure 51 US- Russia Trade Growth () vs US and Rus sia Real GDP Growth () 1993ndash2016

Source IMF ldquoIMF Datardquo accessed September 27 2017 http wwwimf org en Data US Census Bureau

ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo

Note rGDPthinsp=thinspreal gross domestic product

Trade

USA rGDP growth

Russia rGDP growth

-60

-40

-20

0

20

40

60

80

100

1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Gro

wth

All spikes in US-Russia trade have been connected with two main

variables volume and price of crude oil

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 22 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 23

Second the United States will become a net energy exporter between 2020 and 2030 in most

cases under dif er ent combinations of oil and natu ral gas prices GDP growth technological

breakthroughs and the availability of energy resources The role of oil imports will dramatically

fall2

Third oil price scenarios as described by the International Energy Agency (IEA) international

financial organ izations (IFIs) and many national agencies are very cautious and assume that even

by 2035 to 2040 oil prices will not to recover to the levels of 2011ndash20123

Fourth Rus sian oil production and export growth will be modest and driven by Asian economic

expansion and will comprise a decreasing share of Western markets4 According to forecasts from

2 Ibid 15ndash18

3 Ibid table 3 ldquoEnergy Prices by Sector and Sourcesrdquo World Bank World Bank Commodity Markets Price Forecasts

(Washington DC World Bank 2017) httpswwwworldbank org en research commodity - markets Organ ization of the

Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) World Oil Outlook 2016 (Vienna OPEC 2016)

4 E D Belotskaia et al Global and Rus sian Energy Outlook 2016 (Moscow Energy Research Institute of the Rus sian

Acad emy of Science Analytical Center for the Government of the Rus sian Federation 2016) http acgov ru files

publication a 12767 pdf

Figure 52 US Imports from Rus sia Crude Oil and Petroleum Products Thousands of Barrels 1995ndash2016

Source US EIA ldquoUS Imports by Country of Origin Rus siardquo Petroleum amp Other Liquids September 13

2017 http wwweia gov dnav pet PET _ MOVE _ IMPCUS _ D _ NUS _ NRS _ MBBL _ M htm

0

50000

100000

150000

200000

250000

Date 1995 1996 1997 1998 199920002001200220032004200520062007200820092010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 23 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations24

the Organ ization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) crude oil exports from Rus sia and

the Caspian region to the United States will dis appear by 20255

So why does the Rus sian Urals blend continue to be attractive for oil traders and US refineries

which could pro cess greater volumes of domestically produced lighter crude There are two main

reasons One is related to the preference of US high conversion refineries (the most sophisticated

in the world) to work with heavy oil blends produced by Canada Mexico Iraq Venezuela and

Rus sia Pro cessing heavy crude now is as profitable as pro cessing lighter crude The so- called

crack spreadmdash the diference between the cost of relatively cheap heavy crude oil and the final

price of value- added consumer products (diesel gasoline jet fuel and heating oil)mdash has become

the same as the refinery margins of light sweet crude6 This has primarily afected light oil produc-

ing countries such as Angola Algeria and Nigeria

5 OPEC World Oil Outlook 2016 306ndash309

6 ldquoHow Much for That Heavy Oilrdquo Oil Sands Magazine December 26 2015 https wwwoilsandsmagazine com

news 2015 12 26 how - much - for - that - heavy - oil

Figure 53 US Imports from Rus sia Oil and Petroleum Products US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

$-

$25000000000

$20000000000

$15000000000

$10000000000

$5000000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Liquefied petroleum gases

Petroleum products other

Fuel oil

Crude oil

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 24 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 25

Another factor afecting purchase of Rus sian oil is a new trend among oil companies for further

consolidation of scale and for integrating operations of upstream and downstream business7

There have been several waves of separation and unification of production transportation and

pro cessing in the last 50 years The current business cycle can be seen as an adaptation to a

period of low prices and oversupply Companies that buy andor produce oil in Rus sia most likely

prefer to transport and pro cess this oil in their own modern refineries in the United States At the

same time some of the newest refinery designs specifically for pro cessing heavy oils have been

built in Asia thus extending the choices of heavy oil producing countries

We should also consider that leading US and international oil traders along with oil producing

companies working with or owning US refineries frequently buy Rus sian oil on the open market

and have long- term contracts on Rus sian crude oil delivery Many Rus sian oil companies prefer to

pay for purchases or ser vices with their future production instead of cash creating situations of

ldquostickyrdquo oil imports that are difficult to replace The best- known example is an interaction between

7 ldquoEnergy and Utilities Sectorrdquo Roundtable Financier Worldwide December 2015 https wwwfinancierworldwide

com roundtable - energy - utilities - sector - dec15

Figure 54 US Imports of Oil and Petroleum Products from Rus sia vs Oil Prices Eu rope Brent Spot Price Free on Board (FOB) 1996ndash2017

Source US EIA ldquoUS Imports by Country of Origin Rus siardquo

0

20

40

60

80

100

120

140

0

5000

10000

15000

20000

25000

30000

Jan

-19

96

Jun

-19

96

No

v-19

96

Ap

r-19

97

Sep

-19

97

Feb

-19

98

Jul-

199

8D

ec-1

99

8M

ay-1

99

9O

ct-1

99

9M

ar-2

00

0A

ug

-20

00

Jan

-20

01

Jun

-20

01

No

v-2

00

1A

pr-

20

02

Sep

-20

02

Feb

-20

03

Jul-

20

03

Dec

-20

03

May

-20

04

Oct

-20

04

Mar

-20

05

Au

g-2

00

5Ja

n-2

00

6Ju

n-2

00

6N

ov-

20

06

Ap

r-2

00

7Se

p-2

00

7Fe

b-2

00

8Ju

l-2

00

8D

ec-2

00

8M

ay-2

00

9O

ct-2

00

9M

ar-2

010

Au

g-2

010

Jan

-20

11Ju

n-2

011

No

v-2

011

Ap

r-2

012

Sep

-20

12Fe

b-2

013

Jul-

20

13D

ec-2

013

May

-20

14O

ct-2

014

Mar

-20

15A

ug

-20

15Ja

n-2

016

Jun

-20

16N

ov-

20

16

USD

per

Bar

rel

Th

ou

san

d B

arr

els

US Imports from Russia of Crude Oil and Petroleum Products (Thousand Barrels)

Europe Brent Spot Price FOB (Dollars per Barrel)

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 25 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations26

Table 56 US Oil Imports All Countries vs Rus sia Thousand Barrels per Day 2011ndash2016

Years 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

All Countries 11436 10598 9859 9241 9449 10058

Rus sia 624 477 460 330 371 433

Share 546 450 467 357 393 431

Sources US EIA ldquoUS Imports by Country of Origin Total Crude Oil and Productsrdquo Petroleum amp Other

Liquids September 13 2017 wwweia gov dnav pet pet_move_impcus_a2_nus_ep00_im0_mbbl_m htm

authorrsquos computation

Figure 55 US Imports from Rus sia Share of Crude Oil and Petroleum Products Million US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

57

64

73

72

74

73

72

59

52 50

0

$5000

$10000

$15000

$20000

$25000

$30000

$35000

$40000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

US Imports from Russia

Share of Oil and Petroleum Products

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 26 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 27

the Rus sian state mono poly Rosneft and commodity trading and mining giant Glencore which

along with energy and commodities com pany Vitol participated in a $10 billion prepayment

deal with Rosneft for crude supplies in 2013

There have been a number of ongoing transactions between the Rus sian oil industry and interna-

tional oil companies including several that top the list of importers of Rus sian oil to the United

States ( Table 57) In December 2016 Glencore participated in a controversial privatization opera-

tion purchasing in tandem with the Qatar sovereign wealth fund a 195 percent stake in Rosneft

which was on the US and EU list of sanctioned firms8 Glencore has also taken a blocking stake in

midsize oil producer RussNeft BP owns a 1975 percent stake in Rosneft Chevron holds a

15 percent interest in the 935- mile- long CPC9 pipeline which transports an average of 959000

barrels of crude oil per day including 76000 barrels daily from Rus sia10 ExxonMobil has formed

8 E Mazneva and I Arkhipov ldquoRus sia Sells $11 Billion Stake in Rosneft to Glencore Qatarrdquo Bloomberg December 7

2016

9 CPCthinsp=thinspCaspian Pipeline Consortium

10 ldquoRus sia Highlights of Operations and Business Portfoliordquo Chevron accessed October 3 2017 https wwwchevron

com worldwide russia

Figure 56 Share of Rus sian Oil in Total US Oil Imports Thousands of Barrels per Day 1972ndash2016

Source US EIA ldquoUS Imports by Country of Origin Total Crude Oil and Productsrdquo

2000

4000

6000

8000

10000

12000

14000

16000

US Imports of Crude Oil and Petroleum Products (Thousand Barrels per Day)

US Imports from Russia of Crude Oil and Petroleum Products (Thousand Barrels per Day)19

7319

7419

7519

7619

7719

7819

7919

80

198

119

82

198

319

84

198

519

86

198

719

88

198

919

90

199

119

92

199

319

94

199

519

96

199

719

98

199

92

00

02

00

12

00

22

00

32

00

42

00

52

00

62

00

72

00

82

00

92

010

20

112

012

20

132

014

20

152

016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 27 102017 404 PM

Table 57 Top Importers of Rus sian Oil to the United States Thousands of Barrels 2016

VALERO MARKETING amp SUPPLY CO 54590 3616

EXXONMOBIL OIL CORP 17087 1130

CHEVRON USA INC 15217 1008

BP WEST COAST PRODUCTS LLC 10130 671

GEORGE E WARREN CORP 7272 48

PAULSBORO REFINING CO LLC 6838 453

TESORO CORP 5097 338

VITOL INC 5084 337

PHILLIPS 66 CO 4726 313

TRAFIGURA AG 4360 289

PAR HAWAII REFINING LLC 3893 258

MOTIVA ENTERPRISES LLC 3041 205

SHELL US TRADING CO 2863 19

MARATHON PETROLEUM CO LLC 2475 16

ATLANTIC TRADING amp MARKETING 2099 14

FREEPOINT COMMODITIES LLC 1439 1

GLENCORE LTD 1284 85

BEST PETROLEUM CORP 967 64

ROLYMPUS US COMMODITIES GROUP LLC 822 6

HUNT CRUDE OIL SUPPLY CO 666 4

GULF OIL LP 658 4

Source US EIA ldquoUS Imports by Country of Origin Crude Oilrdquo Petroleum amp Other Liquids September 13

2017 httpswwweiagovdnavpetpet_move_impcus_a2_nus_epc0_im0_mbblpd_ahtm authorrsquos

computation

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 28 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 29

several joint ventures with Rosneft to undertake ofshore exploration in the Black Sea and the Kara

Sea in Siberia11

According to the Sanctions Act US persons are prohibited from exporting or reexporting goods

ser vices (except financial ser vices) and technology in support of exploration or production of new

deep- water Arctic ofshore or shale oil proj ects that involve designated Rus sian entities or other

entities in which such sanctioned persons have a controlling interest or a substantial noncontrol-

ling owner ship interest defined as not less than 33 percent (previously it was 50 percent) The new

law also authorizesmdash but does not requiremdash the imposition of so- called secondary sanctions

against non- US entities that engage in activities involving the construction maintenance or

expansion of Rus sian energy export pipelines with a fair market value of $1 million or more or an

aggregate fair market value during a 12- month period of $5 million12 This provision has raised the

concerns of some Eu ro pean countries particularly Germany As result the final language of the

law included wording about coordination of this issue with allies of the United States

Shipments of Rus sian oil to the United States could be afected by activity in the US refinery

industry In early 2017 Saudi Aramco bought the United Statesrsquo largest oil refinery in Port Arthur

(Texas) and it announced plans to send more of its own crude to that refinery13 Serious concerns

exist however regarding the future of three refineries and nine pipelines owned by Citgo a US

branch of the Venezuelan state com pany PdVSA which is balancing precariously on the edge of

default Under certain conditions in the event of PdVSA bankruptcy Rosneft could claim a stake of

up to 499 percent in Citgo Such a possibility has raised concerns among politicians and US

government officials with Trea sury Secretary Steven Mnuchin calling it a ldquonational security issuerdquo14

Tables 58 59 and 510 show allocations of Rus sian oil imports to major US refineries some of

which work exclusively on Rus sian crude a total of two to three months per year In total 150940

thousand barrels of Rus sian oil were refined in 2016

Figure 57 confirms a leading position of Texas and Louisiana among the US states receiving

Rus sian crude followed by New Jersey California Mississippi Washington Hawaii and Delaware

In a paradoxical way Texas has dis appeared from the list of states as a main destination of US

imports from Rus sia (Figure 58) because Rus sian crude is mostly delivered to Louisiana ports and

registered there by US Customs as an import from Rus sia After that it transports to refineries in

Louisiana and Texas

Overall the short- term business rationale behind the sustainability of US oil imports from Rus sia

cannot overcome strong headwinds in the US energy sector facing all oil importers which will

inevitably lead to a contraction of Rus sian oil exports to the United States in the foreseeable future

11 Exxon eforts to receive a special US Trea sury waiver to drill in sanctioned Rus sia failed in 2017

12 Countering Amer i carsquos Adversaries through Sanctions Act HR 3364

13 Sarp Ozkan ldquoSaudi Aramcorsquos Port Arthur Refinery and the US Refinery Fleetrdquo Drilling Info May 11 2017

https infodrillinginfo com saudi - aramcos - port - arthur - refinery - us - refinery - fleet

14 Graham Kates ldquoTrea sury Secretary Rus siarsquos Citgo Deal a National Security Issuerdquo CBS News May 1 2017

http wwwcbsnews com news rosneft - citgo - steven - mnuchin - national - security

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 29 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations30

Table 58 Valerorsquos Refineries Pro cessing Rus sian Oil Thousands of Barrels 2016

Saint Charles Louisiana 29206 535

Corpus Christi Texas 20626 378

Wilmington California 4250 78

Total USA 54590 100

Source US EIA ldquoRefinery Capacity Reportrdquo January 1 2017

table 5 wwweia gov petroleum refinerycapacity table5 pdf

authorrsquos computation

Table 59 ExxonMobil Refineries Pro cessing Rus sian Oil Thousands of Barrels 2016

Baytown Texas 15037 88

Baton Rouge Louisiana 2046 12

Total USA 17083 100

Source US EIA ldquoRefinery Capacity Reportrdquo authorrsquos computation

Table 510 Chevronrsquos Refineries Pro cessing Rus sian Oil Thousands of Barrels 2016

Pascagoula Mississippi 12767 840

El Segundo California 2372 155

Saint Rose Louisiana 78 05

Total USA 15217 100

Source US EIA ldquoRefinery Capacity Reportrdquo authorrsquos computation

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 30 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 31

HEAVY METAL

Taken together US imports of metals and US imports of oil compose about 80 percent of US

total imports from Rus sia (Figure 59) Trade of metals like other commodities is strongly afected

by market price fluctuations Nevertheless metal imports from Rus sia have been fairly resilient to

market volatility and their average annual value has hovered at about $4 billion in the last five years

(Figure 510) This market resilience was forged at the end of the 1990searly 2000s when Rus sian

metal producers gradually modernized their plants adjusting quality of production to Western

standards and enhancing integration into global value and supply chains Some of them conquered

their share of the highly competitive US market struggling with peers from Canada and certain

BRICS countries (China India and Brazil) To attract additional resources all Rus sian large metal-

producing companies became public and were listed on stock exchanges chiefly the London Stock

Exchange (Severstalrsquo PAO Evraz MMK OAO Novolipetsk Steel Norilsk Nikel and TMK PAO) one

on the New York Stock Exchange (Mechel) and one on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange (Rusal)

Business logic pushed some of them to invest in the US metal- making industry which was hit

hard by crisis Later on some of those assets were sold (eg two US steel mills acquired by

Severstal in 2004 were purchased 10 years later by Steel Dynamics Inc and AK Steel Corp)

Figure 57 Share of US States Rus sian Oil Imports 2016

Source US EIA ldquoUS Imports from Rus sia of Crude Oil and Petroleum Productsrdquo Petroleum amp Other

Liquids September 29 2017 https www eia gov dnav pet hist LeafHandler ashx nshy=shyPETampsshy=shyMTTIM _ NUS

- NRS _ 1ampfshy=shyM authorrsquos computation

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

100

Maine

Massachusetts

Maryland

Connecticut

Georgia

Rhode Island

Virginia

Florida

New York

Alabama

Puerto Rico

Pennsylvania

Delaware

Hawaii

Washington

Mississippi

California

New Jersey

Louisiana

Texas

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 31 102017 404 PM

Figure 58 US Imports from Rus sia by State Million US$ 2013ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoState and Metropolitan Area Trade Datardquo Foreign Trade last modified

October 2 2017 https wwwcensus gov foreign - trade statistics state

Alaska

Connecticut

Delaware

Hawaii

Louisiana

Maryland

North Dakota 0

$1000

$2000

$3000

$4000

$5000

$6000

2013 2014 2015 2016

Alabama

Alaska

Connecticut

Delaware

Hawaii

Louisiana

Maryland

Maine

Mississippi

Montana

North Dakota

Mississippi

Figure 59 US Imports from Rus sia Share of Oil and Metals Million US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 1992ndash2016)

83

82

85

86

87

88

85

82

7375

0

$5000

$10000

$15000

$20000

$25000

$30000

$35000

$40000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

US Imports from Russia

Share of Oil and Metals

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 32 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 33

Obviously the market dynamic of dif er ent metals varies (eg iron steel aluminum platinum and

nickel) Caps to increase their trade and production in a ldquored oceanrdquo global environment with

anemic demand is rather limited despite Figure 510 showing a spike of iron and steel imports

from Rus sia in 2014 and aluminum in 2016 Some opportunities may exist for Russian- owned steel

plants in the United States (such as NLMK) to participate in energy proj ects resumed under Presi-

dent Trump who has required that new pipelines use only American- made steel15

Rus sia occupies a special niche in the US market for titanium products a high- end metal indus-

try Twenty years ago a long- term contract was signed between Rus sian titanium producer

VSMPO- AVISMA and Boeing The Rus sian com pany entered the selective club of Boeing suppliers

for the manufacture of components and semi- finished products Since the signing of this contract

VSMPO has delivered more than 35 percent of all titanium placed on Boeing civil aircraft16 They

are hidden in the trade data in an import category for Civilian Aircrafts and Parts (Figure 511) At

the end of 2016 Boeing announced an extension of its framework agreement with AVISMA

15 E Scheyder C Ngai and T Sylvester ldquoAmerican Steel Unlikely to Get Keystone Boost Despite Trump Orderrdquo

Reuters January 27 2017 http wwwreuters com article usa - trump - pipeline - transcanada - idUSL1N1FH1ZD

16 A Kramer ldquoTitanium Fills Vital Role for Boeing and Rus siardquo New York Times July 5 2013 http wwwnytimes com

2013 07 06 business global titanium - fills - vital - role - for - boeing - and - russia html mcubzshy=shy3

Figure 510 US Imports from Rus sia Iron Steel Bauxite Aluminum Nickel Nonferrous Metals and Other Precious Metals and Materials US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 1992ndash2016)

0

$6000000000

$5000000000

$4000000000

$3000000000

$2000000000

$1000000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 20122013

20142015

2016

Finished metal shapes

Iron and steel advanced

Iron and steel products nec

Nonferrous metals other

Other precious metals

Nickel

Bauxite and aluminum

Iron and steel mill products

Steelmaking materials

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 33 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations34

through 2022 and additional investments in the construction of a new robotic plant in Titanium

Valley a special economic zone located in the Sverdlovsk region that will open in 2018 The pro-

cessing of titanium forgings in all Boeing civil aircraft will be performed there including 787s 737

MAXs and 777Xs17 The contract extension with AVISMA may add several hundred million dollars

in value to annual US imports from Rus sia

How can such heavy reliance on imports of Rus sian titanium exist during a period of rising geopo-

liti cal tensions The answer is straightforward VSMPO- AVISMA is a highly specialized natu ral

mono poly producing 45 percent of the worldrsquos aerospace titanium Only four other countries

smelt high- grade titanium in industrial quantities the United States Germany Japan and China

Overall global production capacity is limited while demand is growing The United States cur-

rently imports around 79 percent of all the titanium it consumes each year18

17 ldquoBoeing and VSMPO Avisma to Launch Second Joint Production Siterdquo Rus sian Aviation Insider December 22 2016

http wwwrusaviainsider com boeing - and - vsmpo - avisma - to - launch - second - joint - production - site

18 Jon Ostrower and Andy Pasztor ldquoBoeing United Technologies Stockpile Titanium Partsrdquo Wall Street Journal

August 7 2014 https wwwwsj com articles boeing - united - technologies - stockpiling - titanium - parts - 1407441886

Figure 511 US Imports from Rus sia Civilian Aircrafts and Parts US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 1992ndash2016)

0

$20000000

$40000000

$60000000

$80000000

$100000000

$120000000

$140000000

$160000000

$180000000

$200000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Parts-civilian aircraft

Civilian aircraft

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 34 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 35

The Sanctions Act authorizes the secretary of the trea sury (in a nonmandatory way) to impose

restrictions (without specifying them) against Rus sian state- owned entities operating in the railway

metals and mining sectors of the Rus sian economy Despite the commanding heights of Rus siarsquos

state sector owner ship in its economy (70 percent of GDP) the metal- producing companies have

remained mostly in private hands

NUCLEAR AFFAIRS

Historically owners and operators of the 104 commercial nuclear power reactors in the United

States have purchased more than 80 percent of their uranium from foreign countries Uranium

shipping from Rus sia accounted for about 13 percent of the 58 million pounds of uranium pur-

chased overseas in 201219 At the same time the Rus sian state- owned mono poly Rosatom ac-

counts for 20 percent of Kazakhstanrsquos uranium production (which in turn comprises 11 percent of

all US uranium imports) and 20 percent of US domestic uranium production capacity (with

owner ship of exploration tracts in Wyoming)20

Nuclear fuel and nuclear power continue to be po liti cally sensitive topics both in the United

States and Rus sia Bilateral cooperation in this sector (being surprisingly stable with imports of

nuclear fuel from Rus sia at a level of $1 billion annually in the last five years [Figure 512 and 513])

is under constant po liti cal and lobbying pressure and has been a source of several po liti cal scan-

dals21 Consequently upside risks in this area of interaction are minimal and downside risks are

much higher especially when we are seeing more decommissioning of nuclear plants in the

United States than new constructions The US EIArsquos 2017 Annual Energy Outlook assumes

that about 25 percent of the nuclear capacity now operating will be removed from ser vice

by 205022

WHY IS THE GRASS GREENER ON THE OTHER SIDE

The United States continues to significantly reduce imports of chemical fertilizers as domestic pro-

duction increases In 2016 the United States imported 13 percent less ammonia and 11 percent

less urea and UAN which is a liquid urea and ammonium nitrate fertilizer Rus sia accounts for

around 40 percent of UAN imported by the United States The United States canceled antidumping

duties on imports of ammonium nitrate and urea from Rus sia in 2016 but it did not prevent import

19 US EIA ldquoThe US Relies on Foreign Uranium Enrichment Ser vices to Fuel Its Nuclear Power Plantsrdquo Today in

Energy August 28 2013 https wwweia gov todayinenergy detail php idshy=shy1273

20 Colin Chilcoat ldquoDoes Rus sia Really Own 20 Percent of the USrsquo Uranium Reservesrdquo OilPricecom May 6 2015

http oilpricecom Alternative - Energy Nuclear - Power Does - Russia - Really - Own - 20 - Of - The - US - Uranium - Reserves

html

21 Michelle Ye Hee Lee ldquoThe Facts behind Trumprsquos Repeated Claim about Hillary Clintonrsquos Role in the Rus sian Ura-

nium Dealrdquo Washington Post October 26 2016

22 US EIA ldquoAnnual Energy Outlook 2017 with Projections to 2050rdquo 81ndash82

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 35 102017 404 PM

Figure 512 US Imports from Rus sia Share of Oil Metals and Nuclear Fuel Million US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 1992ndash2016)

87

86

90

90

90

91

88

86

7882

0

$5000

$10000

$15000

$20000

$25000

$30000

$35000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

US Imports from Russia

Share of Oil Metals and Nuclear Fuel

Figure 513 US Imports from Rus sia Nuclear Fuel Materials US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

$-

$200000000

$400000000

$600000000

$800000000

$1200000000

$1000000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 36 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 37

drops twice last year (Figures 514 and 515) According to forecasts UAN imports are expected to

decline further to 15 million tons this year down over 46 percent from 28 million tons imported

last year23 The downside trend in imports of fertilizers will likely continue because of oversupply

BIG FISH

US imports of fish and shellfish from Rus sia are best understood in comparison with US fish

exports to the Rus sian market which slipped to zero in August 2014 after Rus sia issued an order

banning certain agricultural imports from the United States (Figure 516) While the volume of US

supply was not very large it was impor tant because it broke up the monopolistic dominance of a

few vertically integrated Rus sian companies that have kept prices high by restricting the entry of

new producers Seeking to implement import substitution policies Rus sia has tried to reduce

exports as well as imports of fish and seafood products in the last couple of years This symmetri-

cal approach was intended to ldquocompensaterdquo for a decrease of fish products in the domestic

23 Deepika Thapliyal ldquoPotashCorp Forecasts Sharp Drop in US Nitrogen Imports in 2017rdquo ICIS News February 7

2017 https wwwicis com resources news 2017 02 07 10076734 potashcorp - forecasts - sharp - drop - in - us - nitrogen

- imports - in - 2017

Figure 514 US Imports from Rus sia Share of Oil Metals Nuclear Fuel and Fertilizers Million US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

90

93

92

93

94

95

92

91

85

86

0

$5000

$10000

$15000

$20000

$25000

$30000

$35000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

US Imports from Russia

Share of Oil Metals Nuclear Fuel and Fertilizers

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 37 102017 404 PM

Figure 515 US Imports from Rus sia Chemical- Fertilizers US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

S-

$200000000

$400000000

$600000000

$800000000

$1000000000

$1200000000

$1400000000

$1600000000

$1800000000

$2000000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Figure 516 US Exports to Rus sia Fish and Shellfish US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

0

$10000000

$20000000

$30000000

$40000000

$50000000

$60000000

$70000000

$80000000

$90000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Fish and shellfish

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 38 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 39

consumer market caused by Rus siarsquos import ban but it has failed As result the group most af-

fected by the self- imposed counter- sanctions were Rus sian consumers

With a significant drop in fish imports a devaluation of the ruble and inflationary pressures on

seafood prices yearly consumption of fish in Rus sia has declined precipitously In 2015 alone

fish prices increased 20 percent and consumption dropped to 14 kilograms per person24 from

22 kilograms in 201425 In 2016 food rose to 355 percent of house hold expenditure as a result of

increases in food prices26 This has pushed vertically integrated fishing monopolies to sell even

more of their catch abroad rather than deliver to the Rus sian Federation (Figure 517) Thus we

cannot exclude the possibility of further growth in US fish and shellfish imports from Rus sia on a

marginal scale

24 Александр Савельев ldquoПотребление рыбы в России упало до 14 кг на человекаrdquo [Fish consumption in Rus sia fell to

14 kg per person] Экономика Интерфакс January 28 2015 http wwwinterfax ru business 492038

25 Илья Шестаков ldquoПотебление рыбы в России снизилось на 10 процентов из- за роста ценrdquo [Fish consumption in

Rus sia dropped by 10 percent due to price increases] RNS March 8 2017 https rnsonline consumer - market

Potreblenie - ribi - v - Rossii - snizilos - na - 10 - iz - za - rosta - tsen - 2017 - 03 - 08

26 Zoya Sheftalovich and Christian Oliver ldquoRus siarsquos Boom (Farming) Economyrdquo Politico November 8 2016 http

wwwpolitico eu article russias - boom - farming - economy

Figure 517 US Imports from Rus sia Fish and Shellfish US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

0

$50000000

$100000000

$150000000

$200000000

$250000000

$300000000

$350000000

$400000000

$450000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 39 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations40

SPACE ODYSSEY

Among high- end products beyond the top five groups of goods imported from Rus sia cheap and

efficient Rus sian engines have been used to launch US rockets into space for about 16 years

(Figure 518) There was a serious po liti cal strug gle around a 2014 ban on the purchase of Rus sian

RD-180 rocket engines revealing the conflicting business interests of power ful high- tech companies

This restrictive mea sure was temporary and was quickly lifted because of significant cost impacts

and risks of disruption to launch schedules27 For the same reason the Sanctions Act does not autho-

rize ldquothe imposition of any sanction or other condition limitation restriction or prohibition that

directly or indirectly impedes the supply by any entity of the Rus sian Federation of any product or

ser vice or the procurement of such product or ser vice by any contractor or subcontractor of the

United States or any other entity relating to or in connection with any space launch conducted for

the National Aeronautics and Space Administration or any other nonndash Department of Defense

customerrdquo28

Nevertheless many experts believe that US domestic alternatives to replace Rus sian engines will

be viable in five to eight years

27 Ken Dilanian ldquoWhy Does the US Use Rus sian Rockets to Launch Its Satellitesrdquo NBC News updated November 15

2016 http wwwnbcnews com why - does - u - s - use - russian - rockets - launch - its - satellites - n588526

28 Countering Amer i carsquos Adversaries through Sanctions Act HR 3364

Figure 518 Spacecraft Excluding Military US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

0

$20000000

$40000000

$60000000

$80000000

$100000000

$120000000

$140000000

$160000000

$180000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 40 102017 404 PM

41

Diversity and technological complexity are the most vis i ble advantages supporting US exports to

Rus sia Three major groups of export goods include civilian aircraft engines and parts (Figure 61)

drilling and oil field equipment (Figure 62) and industrial machines and engines (Figure 63)

Despite sanctions against the transfer of advanced oil producing and pro cessing technologies the

realization of US drilling and oil field equipment in Rus sia is sustainable although some bilateral

proj ects have been frozen

Another category of goods that has demonstrated resilience is the phar ma ceu ti cal industry (Fig-

ure 64) because most drugs in Rus sia are imported (about 70 percent of the Rus sian phar ma ceu-

ti cal market in value) Import substitution policies have had only modest results in this industry

As confirmed by American Chamber of Commerce surveys US exports to Rus sia are closely

connected to US FDI 30 percent of total imports of US companies working in the Rus sian

market come from the United States (more than $2 billion in 2016) In other words about

40 percent of all US exports to Rus sia are related to a US corporate- sector business pro cess in

the country The major sectors of activity of these companies are energy and natu ral resources

(52 percent) manufacturing (17 percent) information and communications technology or ICT

(13 percent) retail (7 percent) automotive industry (6 percent) phar ma ceu ti cal production

(1 percent) professional ser vices (05 percent) and other (2 percent)1

Some obvious constraints on US exports to Rus sia have resulted from a reduction in demand A

deterioration of bilateral relations and implementation of sanctions and counter- sanctions have

directly or indirectly afected all businesses Figures 65 and 66 provide data regarding a dramatic

drop in the sale of US agricultural production in Rus sia with all other categories of exports in

goods showing big cuts as well (see Figures 67ndash69)

Exports of civilian aircraft engines and parts put the state of Washington in first place among

other states as a leading exporter to the Rus sian market (Figure 610)

1 American Chamber of Commerce in Rus sia ldquoInvestment and Import to Rus sia 2nd Surveyrdquo 13

Diversity and Constraints

06

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 41 102017 404 PM

Figure 61 US Exports of Civilian Aircraft Engines Equipment and Parts to Rus sia US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

$2500000000

$2000000000

$1500000000

$1000000000

$500000000

$-

Figure 62 US Exports of Drilling and Oil Field Equipment US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

0

$5000000

$10000000

$15000000

$20000000

$25000000

$30000000

$35000000

$40000000

$45000000

$50000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 42 102017 404 PM

Figure 63 US Exports of Industrial Engines to Rus sia US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

0

$5000000

$10000000

$15000000

$20000000

$25000000

$30000000

$35000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Figure 64 US Exports of Phar ma ceu ti cal Preparations to Rus sia US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

0

$5000000

$10000000

$15000000

$20000000

$25000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 43 102017 404 PM

Figure 65 US Exports of Meat and Poultry to Rus sia US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Meat poultry etc

$1000000000

$800000000

$600000000

$400000000

$200000000

$-

$1200000000

$1400000000

$1600000000

Figure 66 US Exports of Soybeans to Rus sia US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

0

$20000000

$40000000

$60000000

$80000000

$100000000

$120000000

$140000000

$160000000

$180000000

$200000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 44 102017 404 PM

Figure 67 US Exports of Vehicles Engines and Parts to Rus sia US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Other parts and accessories of vehicles

Automotive tires and tubes

Bodies and chassis for passenger cars

Engines and engine parts (carburetors pistonsrings and valves)

Trucks buses and special purpose vehicles

Passenger cars new and used

$2500000000

$2000000000

$1500000000

$500000000

$-

$1000000000

Figure 68 US Exports of Medicinal Equipment to Rus sia US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

$10000000

$15000000

$20000000

$25000000

$30000000

$35000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 45 102017 404 PM

Figure 610 US Exports to Rus sia by States (2016 US$ Value) Million US$ 2013ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoState and Metropolitan Area Trade Datardquo

Iowa Kentucky

North Dakota

Oklahoma

South Carolina

Washington

0

$500

$1000

$1500

$2000

2013 2014 2015 2016

District of Columbia

Iowa

Kentucky

North Dakota

Oklahoma

South Carolina

Washington

Figure 69 US Exports of Excavating Machinery to Rus sia US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

0

$5000000

$10000000

$15000000

$20000000

$25000000

$30000000

$35000000

$40000000

$45000000

$50000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 46 102017 404 PM

47

Upon reviewing the current trend in US- Russia economic relations we must acknowledge that

the existing trade model is obsolete and exhausted Imports are resource- oriented and reflect

constraints of the Rus sian economic structure while five groups of goodsmdash oil metals nuclear

fuels fertilizers and fishmdash make up more than 90 percent of total imports from Rus sia (Figure 71)

Each of these industries has a limited capacity for growth in the foreseeable future

Rus siarsquos core export to the United Statesmdash oilmdash will inevitably decrease in the mid- term under any

scenario The value and volume of Rus sian exports to the United States are open to global market

volatility and po liti cal pressures with limited hedging mechanisms

Overall US exports to Rus sia are unsustainable due to bilateral po liti cal tensions the whims of

commodity markets and changing domestic policies Sanctions and counter- sanctions have

created additional barriers particularly in finance banking high- tech energy and agro- business

According to the American Chamber of Commerce 69 percent of US companies working in the

country consider the impact of US sanctions against Rus sia on their business as negative At the

same time 60 percent of companies do not expect big changes in business relations between

Rus sia and the United States under Trump1 as the new law codifies existing sanctions fortifies

them and extends them to new sectors

Current US investments are low due to the weak rule of law in Rus sia a lack of property right

protections and proper contract enforcement high levels of statization and monopolization in the

economy a poor business climate outdated capital stock dependence on natural- resource

sectors and of course sanction and counter- sanction mea sures Bloated administrative compo-

nents created as risk mitigation instruments have also served as impediments The countryrsquos

institutional weakness low level of productivity bud get constraints and a declining inflexible

workforce will restrain future economic growth even if commodity prices recover Rus sian eco-

nomic policy will likely continue to be statist and protectionist relying mostly on import

substitutions

1 Ibid 11

Existing Trends and Future Scenarios

07

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 47 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations48

What scenarios can be expected in such a challenging environment

One probability (no peace no war) is based on the assumption that matters will not deteriorate

further and implementation of the Sanctions Act will be cursory This will cause relatively slow

degradation in the economic field with occasional flashes of activity in selected areas (eg closer

cooperation against Islamist terrorist groups in Syria)

A second worse case or critical scenario is the intensive and full- scale execution of current sanc-

tion legislation and even the imposition of new economic punitive and restrictive mea sures which

could incite asymmetric retaliatory actions and lead to the introduction of additional protectionist

policies This in turn could trigger a further escalation of mutual confrontation and could eventu-

ally destroy the fundamentals of the current bilateral trade system Rus sian leadership has charac-

terized the Sanctions Act as a declaration of a trade war that ends all hope for improving bilateral

relations2

2 Дмитрий Медведев ldquoПодписание президентом США нового санкционного закона против России создает несколько

последствийrdquo [The US Presidentrsquos signing of the package of new sanctions against Rus sia will have a few conse-

quences] Facebook August 2 2017 https wwwfacebook com Dmitry Medvedev posts 10154587161801851

Figure 71 US Imports from Rus sia Share of Oil Metals Nuclear Fuel Fertilizers and Fish Million US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

93

94

93

94

95

96

93

92

87

89

0

$5000

$10000

$15000

$20000

$25000

$30000

$35000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

US Imports from Russia

Share of Oil Metals Nuclear FuelFertilizers and Fish

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 48 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 49

The best case and most favorable scenario looks less probable now It assumes the realization of

structural reforms in Rus sia in such a way that would adapt Rus siarsquos foreign policy to national

economic needs reduce confrontations with the West and make a concerted efort to integrate

Rus sian businesses into global supply and value chains A revitalization of the structural reform

agendamdash including eforts to diversify economic activities through de- monopolization and support

for SMEs a restructuring of the banking sector the creation of a vibrant business climate to foster

entrepreneurships and innovation the implementation of administrative and judicial reforms to

tackle red tape and endemic corruption and the reduction of state control over key sectors of the

economy via wide- spread privatization could kick- start the development of a nonoil economy and

improve long- term growth prospects Despite ongoing discussion of reform strategies deep

economic and po liti cal changes are extremely complicated over the next po liti calelectoral cycle

(2018ndash2024) particularly because of re sis tance of vested interests and growing commodity prices

The urgency to tackle structural shortcomings in natu ral resource- dependent economies usually

correlates with the price of those resources and the degree to which resource rents drive eco-

nomic activity However there may be marginal improvements in the efficiency of the current

economic system

Future US- Russia relations can be thought of through three pillars one pillar focuses on areas

where both countries maintain a competitive rivalry another looks at potential areas of interaction

under pres ent conditions a third pillar and one that has evaporated from the current bilateral

agenda concentrates on future cooperation Stronger economic ties could not only be a kind of

po liti cal shock absorber but contribute to the building of this future (particularly business contacts

aim to support future structural reforms) although po liti cal factors are depressing the prospects

for cooperation To escape deadlock it will be impor tant to establish the right balance between

politics and economics and create a model of collaboration within the framework of contention

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 49 102017 404 PM

About the Author

Vadim Grishin PhD MBA has been involved in the reform pro cess in Rus sia as adviser to the

deputy prime minister of Rus sia in 1992ndash1993 and 2006ndash2010 He has extensive experience

working with the Bretton Woods Institutions He was the board member of the World Bank Group

and served as se nior adviser at the International Monetary Fund Currently he is a con sul tant to the

chief economistrsquos office of the International Finance Corporation and teaches the economics of

transition at Georgetown University in Washington DC

50

594-71613_ch99_4Pindd 50 102017 403 PM

Blank

COVER PHOTO ADOBE STOCK

1616 Rhode Island Avenue NW

Washington DC 20036

202 887 0200 | wwwcsisorg

v++ISBN 978-1-4422-8035-9

Lanham bull Boulder bull New York bull London

4501 Forbes Boulevard

Lanham MD 20706

301 459 3366 | wwwrowmancom

A U T H O R

Vadim Grishin

Myths and Realities

A Report of the

CSIS RUSSIA AND EURASIA PROGRAM

US-RussiaEconomicRelations

O C T O B E R 2 0 1 7

Euml|xHSLEOCy280359z

The Man Pupu Nyor Rock Formations at the Northern Urals also known as Seven

Strong Man or Little Mountain of the God in the local tribe (Mansi) language

Page 5: U.S.-Russia Economic Relations: Myths and Realities · 2020-04-17 · OCTOBER 2017 U.S.- Russia Economic Relations Myths and Realities AUTHOR Vadim Grishin A REPORT OF THE CSIS RUSSIA

III

Contents

iv Acknowl edgments

1 CHAPTER 1 | Introduction

4 CHAPTER 2 | Does Bilateral Economic Interaction Matter

11 CHAPTER 3 | Politics in the Driverrsquos Seat

15 CHAPTER 4 | Are the United States and Rus sia ldquoNatu ralrdquo Trading Partners

A Little Bit of History

19 CHAPTER 5 | Sector Analyses

41 CHAPTER 6 | Diversity and Constraints

47 CHAPTER 7 | Existing Trends and Future Scenarios

50 About the Author

594-71613_ch00_4Pindd 3 102017 403 PM

The author wishes to thank the participants of a draft paper discussion William Arnold Jack

Brougher Matthew Edwards Daniel Fried Andrew Kuchins Randy Levinas Gary Litman Jeff

Mankoff Cyrus Newlin Olga Oliker Ian Solomon Doug Stanglin and Angela Stent

This report is made pos si ble by the generous support of Car ne gie Corporation of New York

Acknowl edgments

Iv

594-71613_ch00_4Pindd 4 102017 403 PM

1

01

Introduction

A friend of mine a devoted connoisseur of bilateral economic relations with 30 years of experi-

ence in the field once noted that the hottest discussions about US- Russia ties occur at a time

when mutual trade is compressed into the value of a mathematical error This is exactly what is

happening now According to official statistics the value of US- Russia trade is about $20 billion

and is rolling back to the level of 20051 There is no doubt that a new set of sanctions recently

signed into law by the US president and currently being implemented will further hurt economic

interaction by reducing financial inflows limiting the transfer of technology and expertise and

dampening business confidence Many policymakers and experts have agreed that HR 3364

(Countering Amer i carsquos Adversaries through Sanctions Act2) by expanding and codifying US

sanctions targeting Rus sia opens a new cycle in bilateral relations This legislation which received

overwhelming bipartisan support creates a new economic and po liti cal framework on a bilateral

track Strong concerns expressed by President Donald Trump in his special statement about

ldquounconstitutional provisions of the ldquoflawed billrdquo3 cannot significantly limit its intended and

unintended consequences In its implementation it could have relatively broad margins of flexibil-

ity and leverage but requires the president to seek congressional approval before easing or termi-

nating sanctions against Rus sia or undertaking actions that would significantly modify US policy

toward Rus sia Additional observations regarding HR 3364rsquos pos si ble impact on US- Russia

interaction in par tic u lar industries can be found throughout this report but suffice it to say that it

will contribute to a broader curtailment of many pillars of economic cooperation for years ahead

1 US Census Bureau ldquoForeign Trade Trade in Goods with Rus siardquo Foreign Trade updated June 29 2017 https

wwwcensus gov foreign - trade balance c4621 html

2 Countering Amer i carsquos Adversaries through Sanctions Act HR 3364 115th Cong (2017ndash2018) https www

congress gov bill 115th - congress house - bill 3364

3 Donald J Trump ldquoStatement by President Donald J Trump on the Signing of HR 3364rdquo White House Office of the

Press Secretary August 2 2017 https wwwwhitehouse gov the - press - office 2017 08 02 statement - president

- donald - j - trump - signing - hr - 3364

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 1 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations2

Escalating geopo liti cal tensions have continued to significantly define Rus siarsquos economic prospects

however the countryrsquos economic model exhausted itself long before the dramatic deterioration of

relations with the West Structural bottlenecks have seriously limited Rus siarsquos growth capacity even

during the previous period of high oil prices4

The purpose of this report is to assess what has gone wrong with the US- Russia equation by

analyzing it through the prism of a bilateral economic and po liti cal trajectory while keeping in

mind the structural constraints of the Rus sian economy It will attempt to answer the following

questions

bull Do bilateral economic relations matter

bull Are the United States and Rus sia ldquonatu ralrdquo or ldquounnaturalrdquo trading partners

bull What future scenarios can we expect

In the vast lit er a ture on US- Russia economic relations analy sis of developing trends in bilateral

commerce has always been accompanied by discussions around impor tant po liti cal and eco-

nomic matters particularly regarding US legislation and regulation5 Over several de cades the

most controversial issues concerned the granting of permanent normal trading status to Rus sia

through legislation that eliminated the Jackson- Vanik Amendment and Rus siarsquos accession to

the World Trade Organ ization (WTO) The Magnitsky Act signed into law in 2012 repealed the

Jackson- Vanik provisions but added legislation providing authority for the US government to

withhold visas and freeze assets of Rus sians thought to have been involved with human rights

violations and later imposed sanctions on Rus sia because of its involvement in the Ukrainian and

Syrian crises and its cyber- enabled activities6

Some have observed deficiencies in Rus siarsquos participation in the international division of labor

(reliance on the export of energy and metals) which ldquo canrsquot serve any more as a basis for further

expansion of the countryrsquos position in world markets including the US marketrdquo7 Unfortunately

such observations have not been accompanied by quantitative and qualitative analy sis of structural

constraints in the Rus sian foreign trade model Many authors limit their policy recommendations

for fostering bilateral economic relations to a requirement for a strong initial push from respective

governments the creation of business working groups and the extension of bilateral and multilat-

eral legal grounds for economic cooperation Such instruments proved to be useful in facilitating

4 International Monetary Fund (IMF) Rus sian Federation Selected Issues (Washington DC IMF 2016)

5 ldquoAmer i carsquos New Economic Sanctions May Hurt Rus siarsquos Recoveryrdquo Economist August 5 2017 Andrey Kortunov and

Olga Oliker eds A Roadmap for US- Russia Relations (Washington DC CSISRIAC 2017) https csis - prods3

amazonaws com s3fs - public publication 170815 _ KortunovOliker _ USRussiaRelations _ Web pdf E0bdGVHlxxYRAxhO

w8zJ9tbRGwdWjEgV Самуйлов CM Братерский MB ldquoКонгресс и торговые отношения США с Россиейrdquo [US

Congressrsquos role in the US- RF trade relations] США и Канада экономика политика культура 5 no 533 (May 2014)

6 Andrew Weiss and Richard Nephew ldquoThe Role of Sanctions in US- Russian Relationsrdquo (Task Force White Paper

Car ne gie Endowment for International Peace Washington DC July 11 2016)

7 Глущенко ЮН ldquoСостояние проблемы и перспективы сотрудничества России и США в экономической сфереrdquo

[Status prob lems and prospects of Russia- US economic cooperation] Проблемы Национальной Стратегии 21 no 6

(2013) 148ndash164

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 2 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 3

trade and investment during several reset cycles in bilateral relations starting in the 1990s but

they were only partially successful

Several papers and books although focused primarily on bilateral po liti cal agendas or sectorial

analy sis underline the importance of Rus sian domestic realities Dr Angela Stent in her ldquoLimits of

Partnershiprdquo notes that state control of the commanding heights in the Rus sian economy creates

significant deterrents for US private- sector entrance into the market8 Thane Gustafson in the

ldquoWheel of Fortunerdquo asserts that Rus siarsquos growing dependence on revenue from oil exports along

with its inefficient and often- corrupt management of industry is unsustainable9 Andrew Kuchins

in his ldquoElevation and Calibration A New Rus sia Policy for Amer i cardquo has quoted some experts who

believe that the weakened Rus sian economic position may over time contribute to some rap-

prochement with the West and emphasized lack of reforms as ldquoa key obstacle not only for Rus sian

economic recovery but also for improving ties with the Westrdquo10

In a recent joint task force report Eugene Rumer Andrew S Weiss and Richard Sokolsky argue

that the concept of developing stronger economic ties with Rus sia as a foundation for improved

diplomatic relations has not worked ldquoClinton Bush and Obama all placed high hope on trade as

an engine of better relations with Rus sia All were frustrated by the fact that the two countries are

for the most part not natu ral trading partnersrdquo11 On a dif er ent note the former US envoy to

Rus sia Michael McFaul has defended the achievements of a reset policy under the Barack Obama

administration emphasizing that bilateral trade reached a rec ord level in 2011 Nevertheless he

also stresses that it was a one- time accomplishment unlikely to be repeated12

Voices of those who believe that extensive economic ties can provide stability to broader po liti cal

interaction are weaker than ever in an environment of growing protectionism and adversarial rivalry

8 Angela Stent The Limits of Partnerships US- Russian Relations in the XXI Century (Prince ton NJ Prince ton

University Press 2014) 98

9 Thane Gustafson Wheel of Fortune The Battle for Oil and Power in Rus sia (London Harvard University Press 2012)

10 Andrew Kuchins Elevation and Calibration A New Rus sia Policy for Amer i ca (Washington DC Center on Global

Interests 2016)

11 Eugene Rumer Richard Sokolsky and Andrew S Weiss ldquoTrump and Rus sia The Right Way to Manage Relationsrdquo

Foreign Affairs 96 no 2 (MarchApril 2017)

12 Michael McFaul ldquoUS- Russia Relationsrdquo (lecture Institute for Public Diplomacy and Global Communications

George Washington University Washington DC March 3 2017) https wwwc - span org video 424811 - 1 former

- ambassador - michael - mcfaul - discusses - state - usrussia - relations

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 3 102017 404 PM

4

02

Does Bilateral Economic Interaction Matter

Economic relations do not emerge out of a vacuum There are many variables that define the final

configuration of economic interactions such as a par tic u lar countryrsquos level of economic develop-

ment its business environment legal framework po liti cal climate (regime) culture and religion

history and tradition demography and geography as well as global and national economic cycles

An impor tant driver of trade relations for many economies has become participation in global and

regional trade agreements

As many studies and anecdotal evidence show bilateral economic cooperation should be sizable

and should relate to the economic growth of two countries in a way that afects their policy

interests Let us take as a reference point the BRICS countries1 a community of large emerging

economies which Rus sia belongs to Table 21 pres ents official data on US trade and investments

with BRICS states US- Russia trade in goods is disproportionally lowmdash235 times less than US

trade with China 33 times smaller than US trade with India and 28 times less than US trade

with Brazil The size of the US- Russia trade balance is comparable to the size of the US trade

balance with South Africa whose economy is almost four times smaller than Rus siarsquos If we add

trade in ser vices to the trade of goods the gaps increase significantly (Figures 21 and 22) The

diference is not only quantitative but also qualitative

The quality of trade relations can be mea sured by its diversity its share of high- tech components

resilience to economic shocks and its contribution to GDP growth On average a 10 percent

increase in a nationrsquos two- way trade relative to GDP increases GDP through a variety of channels

by at least 16 percent2

Bilateral trade and real GDP growth in the United States and Rus sia are practically uncorrelated

as shown in the summary output of multifactorial regression The coefficient of multiple determi-

nation (R Square) is close to 0 ( Table 22) At the same time the correlation of US exports to India

1 BRICS is the acronym for a select group of five developing economies Brazil Rus sia India China and South Africa

2 World Economic Forum Foreign Direct Investment as a Key Driver for Trade Growth and Prosperity The Case for a

Multilateral Agreement on Investment (Geneva World Economic Forum 2013) 11

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 4 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 5

Table 21 US Trade and Foreign Direct Investments (FDI) with China India Brazil South Africa and Rus sia 2016

China India Brazil South Africa Rus sia

Total Goods Trade 5786 677 565 13 203

Imports 4628 460 262 73 145

Exports 1158 217 303 55 58

Trade in Ser vices 696 472 317 47 na

Imports 161 268 68 17 na

Exports 535 203 249 30 na

US FDI 746 283 653 62 141

BRICS FDI in the United States

148 93 043 076 63

Supported Jobs in the United States (thousand)

911 197 308 50 84

Source United States Trade Representative (USTR) ldquoCountries amp Regionsrdquo accessed September 27 2017

https ustrgov countries - regions See US- China Trade Facts US- India Trade Facts US- Brazil Trade

Facts US- South Africa Trade Facts and US- Russia Trade Facts

201520142013

and China with the real GDP growth of these big Asian economies is significant (05) In the case of

Brazil the correlation is even higher (07) By contrast South Africarsquos small open economy is quite

sensitive to US imports from South Africa (043)3

In marked contrast to other BRICS countries Rus sia is a poor choice for export- oriented opera-

tions As a recent International Monetary Fund (IMF) study highlights Rus sia is an outlier a rare

exception among emerging market (EM) economies with virtually no preferential access to major

markets and little meaningful change over three de cades4 This complicates Rus siarsquos integration

into the global value chain (GVC) which became a significant driving force toward economic

development and trade for certain BRICS economies

3 IMF statistics authorrsquos computation

4 IMF Rus sian Federation Selected Issues IMF Country Report N17198 (Washington DC IMF July 2017)

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 5 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations6

Trade is closely connected with foreign direct investment (FDI) and both are parts of a complex

interaction known as international production sharing According to publicly available official data

US FDI in Rus sia was about $131 billion for 2013 and $295 billion for 2016 with the top industrial

sectors being software and IT ser vices financial ser vices chemicals metals coal oil and gas

and business ser vices5 If we take into account US investments made through Eu ro pean branches

of US companies and ofshore firms this number would easily triple Another component

that usually is not tracked by official statistics is reinvestments The American Chamber of

Commerce surveys in 2016 and 2017 which include this component draw a completely dif er ent

picture accumulated US corporate FDI in 90 large US companies working in Rus sia reached

5 US Department of Commerce International Trade Administration ldquoRussiamdash94- Foreign Direct Investment and

Portfolio Investment Statisticsrdquo Rus sia Country Commercial Guide July 7 2017 https wwwexport gov article

id=shyRussia - foreign - direct - investment - statistics

Figure 21 US Trade in Goods with China India Brazil Rus sia and South Africa Billion US$ 2016

Source USTR ldquoCountries amp Regionsrdquo See US- China Trade Facts US- India Trade Facts US- Brazil Trade

Facts US- South Africa Trade Facts and US- Russia Trade Facts

0

$50

$100

$150

$200

$250

$300

$350

$400

$450

$500

$550

$600

China India Brazil Russia South Africa

Exports

Imports

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 6 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 7

$8244 billion in 20176 The real level from our perspective is usually between official and private

estimations around $40 billon But even this cumulative figure is less than the US FDI in Brazil

and China

The American Chamber of Commerce surveys have also revealed other impor tant data Eighty-

five percent of US companies doing business in Rus sia entered its market 10 or more years ago

while 60 percent of them ldquolandedrdquo there 20 years ago or earlier Only one percent have started

operations over the last five years confirming an obvious fact entry into the Rus sian market is

challenging because of growing monopolism risks associated with the business climate and a

stagnating economy7

6 American Chamber of Commerce in Rus sia ldquoInvestment and Import to Rus sia 2nd Surveyrdquo (Prepared by GfK for the

American Chamber of Commerce in Rus sia Moscow May 2017) 12

7 Ibid 4

Figure 22 US Trade in Goods and in Ser vices with China India Brazil Rus sia and South Africa Billion US$ 2016

Source USTR ldquoCountries amp Regionsrdquo See US- China Trade Facts US- India Trade Facts US- Brazil Trade

Facts US- South Africa Trade Facts and US- Russia Trade Facts

0

$100

$200

$300

$400

$500

$600

$700

China India Brazil Russia South Africa

Trade in Services

Total Goods Trade

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 7 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations8

Rus sian direct investment position toward the United States declined from $215 billion in 2013 to

$83 billion in 2015 (Figure 23) Taking into account dif er ent channels and instruments the actual

volume of Rus sian investments in the United States made through ofshore Eu ro pean Canadian

and US companies may be several times greater than the available official data

Foreign investment in financial assets or foreign portfolio investment (FPI) should be included

even though Central Bank of Rus sia statistics indicate they were also quite low US investments in

equity were $345 million and in debt instruments were about $65 million in the fourth quarter of

20168 However these numbers do not reflect the real level of FPI Rus siarsquos stocks are incredibly

inexpensive while there has been impressive growth of US investments in short- term securities

and in foreign exchange (FX) operations (cash- and- carry trade) Rus sia was among the top per-

forming emerging markets in 2016 gaining 4744 percent in US dollars9 Nevertheless the gen-

eral capitalization of the stock exchange is tiny (less than 20 percent of GDP) comparable to the

capitalization of just one large US com pany such as Coca- Cola Many private sources believe that

the US FPI in Rus sia could be as high as several billion US dollars but a new set of sanctions

approved by President Trump on August 2 2017 if implemented could reverse those flows It is

still not clear whether the secretary of trea sury will prohibit participation in the oferings of Rus siarsquos

sovereign debt and the full range of derivative products A report on this subject should be sub-

mitted no later than 180 days after enactment of the law which means no later than Febru-

ary 2018 New legislation tightens prohibition on Rus sian financial companies already under

sanctions by limiting any new equity or debt with a maturity greater than 14 days (a provision that

8 Central Bank of Rus sia ldquoForeign Direct Investments in the Rus sian Federationrdquo accessed September 27 2017 www

cbr ru localization switchlanguage urlshy=shy news ampfromshy=shyru - ruamptoshy=shyen - gb

9 VanEck ldquoRus sian Stock Market Soars in 2016rdquo Seeking Alpha February 14 2017 https seekingalphacom article

4045602 - russian - stock - market - soars - 2016

Table 22 Summary Output of Regression Statistics (US Real GDP Rus sia Real GDP US- Russia Exports Imports and Total Trade)

Regression Statistics

Multiple R 0056445768

R Square 0003186125

Adjusted R Square minus0042123597

Standard Error 2616043923

Observations 24

Sources IMF statistics authorrsquos computation

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 8 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 9

previously allowed for 30 days) Similarly US persons are prohibited from taking on any new debt

that has a maturity greater than 60 days (previously it was 90 days) with Rus sian energy compa-

nies currently under sanctions10

According to the Trea sury Department Rus sia held $1029 billion in US Trea sury securities in

June 201711 Could Rus sia withdraw all its reserves from the United States and use this action as a

retaliatory mea sure Such a scenario is unlikely since there is no comparable safe- haven alterna-

tive to US dollars When Rus siarsquos US Trea sury holdings dropped 50 percent from $176 billion

(October 2010) to $90 billion (November 2011) the market did not notice12 Nevertheless Rus sian

authorities have announced they will decrease dependence on assets and payments in US dollars13

10 Countering Amer i carsquos Adversaries through Sanctions Act HR 3364

11 US Department of Trea sury Major Foreign Holders of Trea sury Securities September 18 2017 http ticdata

treasury gov Publish mfh txt

12 Ibid

13 ldquoНовый виток санкций Россия откажется от доллараrdquo [A new round of sanctions Rus sia will abandon the dollar]

Газетару August 7 2017 https wwwgazeta ru business 2017 08 07 10821937 shtml

Figure 23 Rus sia Outward FDI Position United States Equities and Debt Million US$ 2009ndash2016

Source Central Bank of the Rus sian Federation External Sector Statistics Rus sian Direct Investments

Abroad accessed September 27 2017 https wwwcbr ru localization switchlanguage urlshy=shy news

ampfromshy=shyru - ruamptoshy=shyen - gb

$6000

$8000

$10000

$12000

$14000

$16000

$18000

$20000

$22000

2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 9 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations10

Officially the country does not invest in the US stock exchange although some Rus sian oligarchs

have bought US corporate bonds and equities in large amounts The new sanctions law requires

the secretary of trea sury in consultation with the director of national intelligence and the secretary

of state to issue reports on Rus sian se nior po liti cal figures and oligarchs based on their closeness

to the Rus sian regime and their net worth as well as the exposure of key economic sectors of the

United States to Rus sian po liti cally exposed persons and parastatal entities including at a mini-

mum the banking securities insurance and real estate sectors14

Only three Rus sian companies are listed in the US exchanges

Overall the scale and scope of US- Russia economic interaction and business activity is much greater

than officially appreciated but not significant enough to be taken into consideration by policymakers

14 Countering Amer i carsquos Adversaries through Sanctions Act HR 3364

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 10 102017 404 PM

11

03

Politics in the Driverrsquos Seat

Bilateral economic relations depend to a great extent on global and national economic cycles

After the recent global financial crisis the US economy has shown surprisingly sustainable GDP

growth while the Rus sian economy was the most afected among BRICS countries by the turbu-

lence of a worldwide economic downturn in 2008ndash2009 and after a short- term rebound slipped

into stagnation (2012ndash2013) and then into full- scale recession (2014ndash2016) The countryrsquos eco-

nomic cycle however appears to be changing once again with the economy returning to a

pattern of growth albeit uneven and gradual (Figures 31 and 32) Even with sanctions still in place

conditions have improved as a result of the stabilization of Urals oil to an average annual price of

$419 per barrel in 2016 The gains were sparked in part by major crude producers agreeing to cut

production after hefty price drops in 2014 and 2015 Supported by easier financial conditions

higher oil prices and growing macro- stability Rus sia is heading toward a moderate growth rate

that is expected to reach 14 percent this year according to forecasts of the World Bank Group

(WBG) and the IMF1

Because of the significant role that politics plays in any bilateral interaction it is impor tant to

combine economic and po liti cal cycles applying a ldquoresetrdquo to bilateral economic cooperation in

addition to the po liti cal relationship I have compared po liti cal cycles and trade dynamics using the

following graphs ( Table 31 and Figure 33) These charts do not pretend to reflect with mathemati-

cal precision all shifts in the bilateral po liti cal relationship but rather attempt to visually align

impor tant economic and po liti cal moments to detect the efects of po liti cal events on the size of

bilateral trade

Figure 33 shows all pos si ble combinations economic trends at the intersection of po liti cal devel-

opments oppose or support each other in synchronization It is evident that po liti cal interference

1 International Monetary Fund Rus sian Federation Staff Concluding Statement of the 2017 Article IV Mission (Wash-

ington DC IMF 2017) World Bank Group From Recession to Recovery Rus sia Economic Report no 37 (Washington

DC World Bank 2017) http pubdocsworldbank org en 383241495487103815 RER - 37 - May26 - FINAL - with - summary

pdf

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 11 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations12

in bilateral business afairs in the early 2000s was less significant than in later years As result

growing po liti cal tensions from 2003 to 2008 did not dramatically afect bilateral economic inter-

action It is also easier to explain why 2011ndash2012 resulted in rec ord trade and investmentmdash a con-

sequence of very high oil prices GDP growth in both countries improved legislation after Rus siarsquos

accession to the WTO and the Obamandash Medvedev po liti cal reset From 2014 to 2016 a perfect

storm of developments added efficiency to Western sanctions and augmented the damaging

consequences of counter- sanction mea sures

Figure 33 also confirms that in times of reduced economic cooperation po liti cal pressures can

easily change bilateral economic trends Moreover business interests along with economic inter-

actions have a limited capacity to reverse the po liti cal mainstream

Figure 31 Economic Cycle 2014ndash2016

Source Authorrsquos evaluation of international financial institutions (IFI) data and sources from respective

countries

Sustainable Growth

Brazil

Negative Growth

Unstable Growth

Mexico

Descending Growth

Argentina

EU

US

Russia

Vietnam

China

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 12 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 13

Table 31 Po liti cal Cycles in Bilateral US- Russia Relations 1999ndash2016

2001ndash2002 The George W Bushndash Vladimir Putin Reset Rus sia supported ldquoglobal war on terrorismrdquo launched by the United States after 911 the SORT nuclear arms reduction treaty was signed by the United States and Rus sia and a successful business dialogue was developed that created the current structure of economic relations

2003ndash2008 Deterioration in bilateral relations brought on by the Iraq War Georgiarsquos ldquoRose Revolutionrdquo Mikhail Khodorkovskyrsquos arrest Ukrainersquos ldquoOrange Revolutionrdquo Kosovorsquos in de pen dence and the Georgian War

2009ndash2010 The Barack Obamandash Dmitry Medvedev Reset Rus sia served as a logistical hub for transportation and supply of US forces in Af ghan i stan United States and Rus sia signed the new START nuclear arms reduction treaty Rus sia backed tighter economic sanctions on Iran Rus sia gained access to the WTO after 18 years of negotiations

2011ndash2016 Deterioration in bilateral relations caused by the Ukrainian crisis which were followed by sanctions and counter- sanctions along with the Syrian crises and cyber- enabled activities

Source Authorrsquos evaluation of po liti cal and economic data

Note SORTthinsp=thinspStrategic Ofensive Reductions Treaty STARTthinsp=thinspStrategic Arms Reduction Treaty

Figure 32 Economic Cycle 2017ndash2019

Source Authorrsquos evaluation of IFI data and sources from respective countries

Egypt

VenezuelaEU

South Africa

Brazil

Russia

India

US

Descending Growth

Korea

China

Negative Growth

Unstable Growth

Sustainable Growth

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 13 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations14

Figure 33 US- Russia Trade Million US$ vs Po liti cal Cycle 2000ndash2016

Sources US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo Foreign Trade last modified June 29 2017

https wwwcensus gov foreign - trade balance c4621 html (see data for 2000ndash2016) authorrsquos evaluation

of po liti cal and economic data

Orange Revolution

Khodorkovskys arrest

GeorgianWar

Bush- Putin Reset

Iraq War Global Financial Crisis

Obama-Medvedev Reset

Russias WTO accession

New START Treaty

A Pefect Storm the Ukranian Crisis Oil Prices Crashing

Sanctions and Counter-Sanctions

$3000

$8000

$13000

$18000

$23000

$28000

$33000

$38000

$43000

2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 14 102017 404 PM

15

The current structure of US- Russia economic relations emerged in the early 2000s when the

model of trade and investment interaction took on a character similar to that which existed be-

tween the United States and developing economies US imports from Rus sia centered on com-

modities while technology along with food products lead American exports The primary

exception was that Rus sia supplied nuclear fuel including highly enriched uranium extracted from

nuclear weapons for US power plants and provided ser vices to the aerospace industry primarily

in satellite launches However both these exceptions can be explained as a legacy of the Soviet

past and not a harbinger of the future economic relationship (Figure 41)

In the last 15 years this trade structure has not changed significantly The only noticeable shift in

trade was a dramatic drop (to practically nothing) in exports of US agricultural products a result

of Rus siarsquos policy of import substitution and so- called counter- sanction mea sures it took in re-

sponse to US sanctions over the Ukraine crisis (Figure 42)

Promising new directions of cooperation in the IT sector and in engineering ser vices for the

aerospace industry appeared in the early 2000s1 but did not spill into other sectors and conse-

quently did little to renew economic cooperation on the whole The integration of Rus sian high-

tech ser vices into large- scale global production and value chains was constrained by the usual

culprits a lack of financial resources managerial experience skilled labor modern infrastructure

RampD investments and an adequate business environment High commodity prices incentivized the

restoration of an economic system centered on resource rents The leading role of oil and gas

extraction and transportation discouraged the development of a nonenergy sector that might

have created advanced and complex production and ser vices An import substitution policy could

not work efficiently in an economic environment plagued by the Dutch disease where currency

1 The Boeing Design Center was created in Moscow It consists of nearly 250 Boeing employees managing

a team of 1200 contract engineers from Rus sian and Ukrainian aerospace companies ldquoBackgrounder Boeing in

Rus siardquo Boeing last modified January 2017 http wwwboeing com resources boeingdotcom company key _ orgs

boeing - international pdf russia - cisbackgrounder pdf

Are the United States and Rus sia ldquoNatu ralrdquo Trading Partners A Little Bit of History

04

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 15 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations16

inflows (oil money) lead to ruble appreciation and render a countryrsquos production less competitive

During that time Rus siarsquos industry did not receive preferential access to larger markets and could

not expand its share in the global economy particularly because of its self- isolation from the

regional trade agreements (except for its participation in the Eurasian Economic Union with some

neighboring countries of the former Soviet Union) As a result neither import substitution nor

export- led strategy promoted growth and specialization in nonoil production A long- awaited

modernization and reallocation of resources from an inefficient nontrade sector to a trade sector

did not materialize

These limits were later augmented with sanctions and an extension of domestic restrictions on

cooperation with Western partners Importantly the rapid growth of state- monopoly structures in

the Rus sian economy over the past 15 years has created additional obstacles to the development

and diversification of US- Russia economic ties

Figure 41 US Imports from Rus sia US$ 2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2016)

Fish and shellfish 3

Crude oil 5

Fuel oil 37

Petroleum products other

8

Nuclear fuel materials

7

Chemicals-fertilizers 4

Steelmaking materials 5

Iron and steel mill products 4

Bauxite and aluminum 9

Other precious metals 4

Nonferrous metals other 1

Finished metal shapes 1

Synthetic rubber--primary

1

Spacecraftexcluding military

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 16 102017 404 PM

Fig

ure

42

U

S E

xpo

rts

to R

us s

ia U

S$ 2

016

Sou

rce

US

Ce

nsu

s B

ure

au ldquo

Trad

e in

Go

od

s w

ith

Ru

s sia

rdquo (s

ee

dat

a fo

r 2

016

)

Bak

ery

pro

du

cts

Win

e b

eer

an

d r

elat

ed

pro

du

cts

New

spri

nt

Pla

stic

mat

eria

ls

Ch

emic

als-

fert

ilize

rs

Ch

emic

als-

ino

rgan

icC

hem

ical

s-o

rgan

ic

Ch

emic

als-

oth

erC

ott

on

fib

er c

loth

In

du

stri

al r

ub

ber

pro

du

cts

Min

eral

su

pp

lies-

man

ufa

ctu

red

Gen

erat

ors

acc

esso

ries

Ele

ctri

c ap

par

atu

s

Dri

llin

g amp

oilfi

eld

eq

uip

men

t Sp

ecia

lized

min

ing

Exc

avat

ing

mac

hin

ery

No

nfa

rm t

ract

ors

an

d p

arts

In

du

stri

al e

ng

ines

Fo

od

to

bac

co m

ach

iner

y M

etal

wo

rkin

g m

ach

ine

too

ls

Tex

tile

sew

ing

m

ach

ines

W

oo

d g

lass

p

last

ic

Pu

lp a

nd

pap

er

mac

hin

ery

Mea

suri

ng

tes

tin

g

con

tro

l in

stru

men

ts

Mat

eria

ls h

and

ling

equ

ipm

ent

Ind

ust

rial

mac

hin

es

oth

er

Ph

oto

ser

vice

ind

ust

ry m

ach

iner

y A

gri

cult

ura

l mac

hin

ery

eq

uip

men

t C

om

pu

ters

Co

mp

ute

r ac

cess

ori

es

Sem

ico

nd

uct

ors

Tel

eco

mm

un

icat

ion

seq

uip

men

t

Bu

sin

ess

mac

hin

es a

nd

eq

uip

men

t

Lab

ora

tory

tes

tin

g in

stru

men

ts

Med

icin

al e

qu

ipm

ent

Civ

ilian

air

craf

t e

ng

ines

eq

uip

men

t a

nd

par

ts

Rai

lway

tra

nsp

ort

atio

n

equ

ipm

ent

Ves

sels

exc

lud

ing

scr

ap

Co

mm

erci

al v

esse

ls o

ther

M

arin

e en

gin

es p

arts

Spac

ecra

ft e

xclu

din

g

mili

tary

Pas

sen

ger

car

s

new

an

d u

sed

Tru

cks

bu

ses

and

sp

ecia

l p

urp

ose

ve

hic

les

En

gin

es a

nd

en

gin

e p

arts

(c

arb

ure

tors

pis

ton

s r

ing

s

and

val

ves)

B

od

ies

and

ch

assi

s fo

r p

asse

ng

er c

ars

Au

tom

oti

ve t

ires

an

d t

ub

es

Oth

er p

arts

an

d a

cces

sori

es o

f ve

hic

les

Ap

par

el h

ou

seh

old

go

od

s -

text

ile

Ph

arm

aceu

tica

lp

rep

arat

ion

s

Furn

itu

re h

ou

seh

old

go

od

s

etc

R

ug

s

Cel

l ph

on

es a

nd

oth

er

ho

use

ho

ld g

oo

ds

ne

c

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 17 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations18

Figure 43 US Trade in Goods with Rus sia Million US$ 1992ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 1992ndash2016)

Russian Financial Crisis

Oil price Increased from$2446 USD per barrel (2001)

to $9694 USD per barrel(2008)

Global Financial Crisis

Oil price high record in2011-2012

(more that $111 USD perbarrel)

Oil price crashed

$-

$5000

$10000

$15000

$20000

$25000

$30000

$35000

$40000

$45000

$50000

1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

US Imports from Russia US Exports to Russia US-Russia Trade in Goods

No doubt po liti cal ups and downs add volatility to US- Russia trade Nevertheless Rus siarsquos eco-

nomic structure exhausted itself before the Ukrainian crisis and the recent Rus sian recession Its

limitations are not only due to some mistakes in policy or negative coincidences of circumstances

but rather to deeply rooted properties in the current bilateral trade model related to structural

issues in the Rus sian economy Structural constraints such as the weak enforcement of property

rights poor business regulation and nondiversified exports weighed on Rus sian trade with the

United States From this perspective the term ldquonaturalunnatural trading partnersrdquo does not ad-

dress the unused capacity of bilateral interaction or the real challenges that kind of interaction

faces It just adds metaphysical flavor to the very specific economic and po liti cal factors that

determine the US- Russia trajectory

Overall the outlines of bilateral trade (Figure 43) resemble the famous ldquoRus sian Mountainsrdquo that

were a pre de ces sor of the modern roller coaster icy hills supported by wooden constructionsmdash a

rigid and immobile structure that sooner or later would melt This unfortunately is what is hap-

pening to US- Russia trade cooperation now

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 18 102017 404 PM

19

ARE LITTLE FISH REALLY SWEET

Low US- Russia economic interaction has at least two consequences First it limits the capacity of

policymakers to exploit trade as an instrument for geopo liti cal combat Even the question of a US

trade deficit which used to be a headache for many US trading partners has become so insig-

nificant in absolute terms (about $87 billion in 2016) that it seems hardly worth caring about

When the volume of trade between two countries becomes very small in absolute terms whether

a country is running a surplus or deficit is no longer relevant But it also renders another type of

confrontations (sometimes more dangerous) more likely since the two traders have little to lose

Second in an environment marked by low levels of bilateral trade both sides could incentivize (if

and when a desire for po liti cal rapprochement exists) the signing of new trade deals which are

elevated symbolically as a turning point in bilateral po liti cal relations (ie the sale of Boeings to

Rus sia or the delivery via tankers of Rus sian oil to US refineries) Sometimes markets themselves

pres ent ldquogiftsrdquo that can be capitalized on po liti cally US- USSR grain trade in the 1970s was one

such ldquogiftrdquo large sales of American grain to the Soviet Union helped US policymakers win favor

with the po liti cally impor tant American farming sector and permitted Soviet leaders to maintain

access to a dietary staple for the Soviet population

The strong 32 percent growth in value of US imports from Rus sia from January to May 2017

versus January to May 2016 ( Table 51) is an example of a development that has tempted officials

to pres ent it as a sign of positive change due to ldquogrowing business activitiesrdquo (this kind of statement

was heard before the bilateral summit in Germany in July 2017) although the reason for that leap

was evidently an increase in commodity prices (mainly of oilmdash see Table 52) and not a rise in

entrepreneurial interactions The primary beneficiaries of that upside rally have been two other

petro- economies Saudi Arabia and Venezuela ( Tables 53 and 54)

Sector Analyses

05

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 19 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations20

Table 51 US Imports from Rus sia Million US$ Januaryndash May 2016 vs Januaryndash May 2017

Year January February March April May Total

2016 9603 6871 11097 12257 10977 50805

2017 12215 10220 16979 13471 14147 67032

Change 271 487 530 99 289 319

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 1992ndash2016)

Table 52 Change in Urals Crude Oil Prices US$ per Barrel Januaryndash May 2016 vs Januaryndash May 2017

Januaryndash May 2016 Januaryndash May 2017 Change ($) Change ()

3601 5129 1528 424

Source Ministry of Finance of the Rus sian Federation https wwwminfin ru ru ixzz4mMIZ7XtC

Table 53 US Imports from Saudi Arabia Million US$ Januaryndash May 2016 vs Januaryndash May 2017

Year January February March April May Total

2016 15114 9036 13555 10844 14679 63228

2017 19802 20298 21650 16211 19542 97503

Change 3101 12463 5972 495 331 542

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Saudi Arabiardquo Foreign Trade last modified June 29 2017

https wwwcensus gov foreign - trade balance c5170 html (see data for 2016ndash2017)

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 20 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 21

Table 54 US Imports from Venezuela Million US$ Januaryndash May 2016 vs Januaryndash May 2017

Year January February March April May Total

2016 6657 5560 7140 8007 7922 35286

2017 13041 10864 123500 11148 12243 59646

Change 9590 9540 7297 3923 5454 6903

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Venezuelardquo Foreign Trade last modified June 29 2017

https wwwcensus gov foreign - trade balance c3070 html (see data for 2016ndash2017)

Table 55 US Exports to Rus sia Million US$ Januaryndash May 2016 vs Januaryndash May 2017

Year January February March April May Total

2016 3628 3577 7298 4657 4947 24107

2017 3144 4277 5386 6670 4806 24283

Change minus133 196 minus262 432 minus29 minus07

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2016ndash2017)

At the same time US exports to Rus sia continue to stagnate ( Table 55) due to low levels of

consumption during a two-and- a- half-year economic crisis a deep ruble devaluation sanctions

and counter- sanctions

Given the very dif er ent economic structures and resource endowments of Rus sia and the United

States it is not surprising that US- Russia trade is asymmetric and oil driven (Figure 51) A

3 percent increase in Urals oil prices translates into a one percent increase in US import growth

from Rus sia Thus in 2016 every $10 increase in Urals crude oil added $15 billion to the value of

US imports or 11 percent to the total value of imports from Rus sia

OIL ADDICTION

Oil is a core pillar of US- Russia bilateral trade A bumpy ride in oil markets afects commerce

Nevertheless Rus sian oil exports to the United States in physical terms have been rather

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 21 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations22

sustainable Starting from 2005 average annual deliveries have been above 150 million barrels

(Figure 52) Crude and heating oil have dominated while petroleum products and liquefied petro-

leum gases have not (Figure 53) In 2011 oil exports peaked at 228 million barrels but declined to

159 million barrels in 2016mdash a drop of 30 percent Rec ord high shipments of Rus sian oil to the United

States coincided with an elevation in oil prices which made the subsequent decline in oil shipment

value between 2011 and 2016 (by about 72 percent as shown in Figure 54) seem more stark The

increase in price also raised the share of oil in Rus sian exports by 74 percent in 2011 (Figure 55)

The Rus sian share in total US oil imports was around 55 percent in 2011 and 43 percent in 2016

( Table 56) In the last five years the United States has relied exclusively on consumption of Rus sian

oil for the rough equivalent of one week out of the year (Figure 56)

It is unlikely that Rus sia can significantly increase its share of the US oil market and there is a real

possibility for a downward trend There are several reasons the historically high Rus sian hydrocar-

bon export threshold of 2011 will not soon if ever be surpassed

First US energy consumption will likely be flat According to the US Energy Information Adminis-

tration (EIA) demand for petroleum and other liquids in the United States will be about 35ndash36

quadrillion British thermal units (BTUs) with minimal variation over the next 25 years1

1 US EIA ldquoAnnual Energy Outlook 2017 with Projections to 2050rdquo January 5 2017 7ndash8

Figure 51 US- Russia Trade Growth () vs US and Rus sia Real GDP Growth () 1993ndash2016

Source IMF ldquoIMF Datardquo accessed September 27 2017 http wwwimf org en Data US Census Bureau

ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo

Note rGDPthinsp=thinspreal gross domestic product

Trade

USA rGDP growth

Russia rGDP growth

-60

-40

-20

0

20

40

60

80

100

1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Gro

wth

All spikes in US-Russia trade have been connected with two main

variables volume and price of crude oil

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 22 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 23

Second the United States will become a net energy exporter between 2020 and 2030 in most

cases under dif er ent combinations of oil and natu ral gas prices GDP growth technological

breakthroughs and the availability of energy resources The role of oil imports will dramatically

fall2

Third oil price scenarios as described by the International Energy Agency (IEA) international

financial organ izations (IFIs) and many national agencies are very cautious and assume that even

by 2035 to 2040 oil prices will not to recover to the levels of 2011ndash20123

Fourth Rus sian oil production and export growth will be modest and driven by Asian economic

expansion and will comprise a decreasing share of Western markets4 According to forecasts from

2 Ibid 15ndash18

3 Ibid table 3 ldquoEnergy Prices by Sector and Sourcesrdquo World Bank World Bank Commodity Markets Price Forecasts

(Washington DC World Bank 2017) httpswwwworldbank org en research commodity - markets Organ ization of the

Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) World Oil Outlook 2016 (Vienna OPEC 2016)

4 E D Belotskaia et al Global and Rus sian Energy Outlook 2016 (Moscow Energy Research Institute of the Rus sian

Acad emy of Science Analytical Center for the Government of the Rus sian Federation 2016) http acgov ru files

publication a 12767 pdf

Figure 52 US Imports from Rus sia Crude Oil and Petroleum Products Thousands of Barrels 1995ndash2016

Source US EIA ldquoUS Imports by Country of Origin Rus siardquo Petroleum amp Other Liquids September 13

2017 http wwweia gov dnav pet PET _ MOVE _ IMPCUS _ D _ NUS _ NRS _ MBBL _ M htm

0

50000

100000

150000

200000

250000

Date 1995 1996 1997 1998 199920002001200220032004200520062007200820092010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 23 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations24

the Organ ization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) crude oil exports from Rus sia and

the Caspian region to the United States will dis appear by 20255

So why does the Rus sian Urals blend continue to be attractive for oil traders and US refineries

which could pro cess greater volumes of domestically produced lighter crude There are two main

reasons One is related to the preference of US high conversion refineries (the most sophisticated

in the world) to work with heavy oil blends produced by Canada Mexico Iraq Venezuela and

Rus sia Pro cessing heavy crude now is as profitable as pro cessing lighter crude The so- called

crack spreadmdash the diference between the cost of relatively cheap heavy crude oil and the final

price of value- added consumer products (diesel gasoline jet fuel and heating oil)mdash has become

the same as the refinery margins of light sweet crude6 This has primarily afected light oil produc-

ing countries such as Angola Algeria and Nigeria

5 OPEC World Oil Outlook 2016 306ndash309

6 ldquoHow Much for That Heavy Oilrdquo Oil Sands Magazine December 26 2015 https wwwoilsandsmagazine com

news 2015 12 26 how - much - for - that - heavy - oil

Figure 53 US Imports from Rus sia Oil and Petroleum Products US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

$-

$25000000000

$20000000000

$15000000000

$10000000000

$5000000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Liquefied petroleum gases

Petroleum products other

Fuel oil

Crude oil

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 24 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 25

Another factor afecting purchase of Rus sian oil is a new trend among oil companies for further

consolidation of scale and for integrating operations of upstream and downstream business7

There have been several waves of separation and unification of production transportation and

pro cessing in the last 50 years The current business cycle can be seen as an adaptation to a

period of low prices and oversupply Companies that buy andor produce oil in Rus sia most likely

prefer to transport and pro cess this oil in their own modern refineries in the United States At the

same time some of the newest refinery designs specifically for pro cessing heavy oils have been

built in Asia thus extending the choices of heavy oil producing countries

We should also consider that leading US and international oil traders along with oil producing

companies working with or owning US refineries frequently buy Rus sian oil on the open market

and have long- term contracts on Rus sian crude oil delivery Many Rus sian oil companies prefer to

pay for purchases or ser vices with their future production instead of cash creating situations of

ldquostickyrdquo oil imports that are difficult to replace The best- known example is an interaction between

7 ldquoEnergy and Utilities Sectorrdquo Roundtable Financier Worldwide December 2015 https wwwfinancierworldwide

com roundtable - energy - utilities - sector - dec15

Figure 54 US Imports of Oil and Petroleum Products from Rus sia vs Oil Prices Eu rope Brent Spot Price Free on Board (FOB) 1996ndash2017

Source US EIA ldquoUS Imports by Country of Origin Rus siardquo

0

20

40

60

80

100

120

140

0

5000

10000

15000

20000

25000

30000

Jan

-19

96

Jun

-19

96

No

v-19

96

Ap

r-19

97

Sep

-19

97

Feb

-19

98

Jul-

199

8D

ec-1

99

8M

ay-1

99

9O

ct-1

99

9M

ar-2

00

0A

ug

-20

00

Jan

-20

01

Jun

-20

01

No

v-2

00

1A

pr-

20

02

Sep

-20

02

Feb

-20

03

Jul-

20

03

Dec

-20

03

May

-20

04

Oct

-20

04

Mar

-20

05

Au

g-2

00

5Ja

n-2

00

6Ju

n-2

00

6N

ov-

20

06

Ap

r-2

00

7Se

p-2

00

7Fe

b-2

00

8Ju

l-2

00

8D

ec-2

00

8M

ay-2

00

9O

ct-2

00

9M

ar-2

010

Au

g-2

010

Jan

-20

11Ju

n-2

011

No

v-2

011

Ap

r-2

012

Sep

-20

12Fe

b-2

013

Jul-

20

13D

ec-2

013

May

-20

14O

ct-2

014

Mar

-20

15A

ug

-20

15Ja

n-2

016

Jun

-20

16N

ov-

20

16

USD

per

Bar

rel

Th

ou

san

d B

arr

els

US Imports from Russia of Crude Oil and Petroleum Products (Thousand Barrels)

Europe Brent Spot Price FOB (Dollars per Barrel)

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 25 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations26

Table 56 US Oil Imports All Countries vs Rus sia Thousand Barrels per Day 2011ndash2016

Years 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

All Countries 11436 10598 9859 9241 9449 10058

Rus sia 624 477 460 330 371 433

Share 546 450 467 357 393 431

Sources US EIA ldquoUS Imports by Country of Origin Total Crude Oil and Productsrdquo Petroleum amp Other

Liquids September 13 2017 wwweia gov dnav pet pet_move_impcus_a2_nus_ep00_im0_mbbl_m htm

authorrsquos computation

Figure 55 US Imports from Rus sia Share of Crude Oil and Petroleum Products Million US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

57

64

73

72

74

73

72

59

52 50

0

$5000

$10000

$15000

$20000

$25000

$30000

$35000

$40000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

US Imports from Russia

Share of Oil and Petroleum Products

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 26 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 27

the Rus sian state mono poly Rosneft and commodity trading and mining giant Glencore which

along with energy and commodities com pany Vitol participated in a $10 billion prepayment

deal with Rosneft for crude supplies in 2013

There have been a number of ongoing transactions between the Rus sian oil industry and interna-

tional oil companies including several that top the list of importers of Rus sian oil to the United

States ( Table 57) In December 2016 Glencore participated in a controversial privatization opera-

tion purchasing in tandem with the Qatar sovereign wealth fund a 195 percent stake in Rosneft

which was on the US and EU list of sanctioned firms8 Glencore has also taken a blocking stake in

midsize oil producer RussNeft BP owns a 1975 percent stake in Rosneft Chevron holds a

15 percent interest in the 935- mile- long CPC9 pipeline which transports an average of 959000

barrels of crude oil per day including 76000 barrels daily from Rus sia10 ExxonMobil has formed

8 E Mazneva and I Arkhipov ldquoRus sia Sells $11 Billion Stake in Rosneft to Glencore Qatarrdquo Bloomberg December 7

2016

9 CPCthinsp=thinspCaspian Pipeline Consortium

10 ldquoRus sia Highlights of Operations and Business Portfoliordquo Chevron accessed October 3 2017 https wwwchevron

com worldwide russia

Figure 56 Share of Rus sian Oil in Total US Oil Imports Thousands of Barrels per Day 1972ndash2016

Source US EIA ldquoUS Imports by Country of Origin Total Crude Oil and Productsrdquo

2000

4000

6000

8000

10000

12000

14000

16000

US Imports of Crude Oil and Petroleum Products (Thousand Barrels per Day)

US Imports from Russia of Crude Oil and Petroleum Products (Thousand Barrels per Day)19

7319

7419

7519

7619

7719

7819

7919

80

198

119

82

198

319

84

198

519

86

198

719

88

198

919

90

199

119

92

199

319

94

199

519

96

199

719

98

199

92

00

02

00

12

00

22

00

32

00

42

00

52

00

62

00

72

00

82

00

92

010

20

112

012

20

132

014

20

152

016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 27 102017 404 PM

Table 57 Top Importers of Rus sian Oil to the United States Thousands of Barrels 2016

VALERO MARKETING amp SUPPLY CO 54590 3616

EXXONMOBIL OIL CORP 17087 1130

CHEVRON USA INC 15217 1008

BP WEST COAST PRODUCTS LLC 10130 671

GEORGE E WARREN CORP 7272 48

PAULSBORO REFINING CO LLC 6838 453

TESORO CORP 5097 338

VITOL INC 5084 337

PHILLIPS 66 CO 4726 313

TRAFIGURA AG 4360 289

PAR HAWAII REFINING LLC 3893 258

MOTIVA ENTERPRISES LLC 3041 205

SHELL US TRADING CO 2863 19

MARATHON PETROLEUM CO LLC 2475 16

ATLANTIC TRADING amp MARKETING 2099 14

FREEPOINT COMMODITIES LLC 1439 1

GLENCORE LTD 1284 85

BEST PETROLEUM CORP 967 64

ROLYMPUS US COMMODITIES GROUP LLC 822 6

HUNT CRUDE OIL SUPPLY CO 666 4

GULF OIL LP 658 4

Source US EIA ldquoUS Imports by Country of Origin Crude Oilrdquo Petroleum amp Other Liquids September 13

2017 httpswwweiagovdnavpetpet_move_impcus_a2_nus_epc0_im0_mbblpd_ahtm authorrsquos

computation

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 28 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 29

several joint ventures with Rosneft to undertake ofshore exploration in the Black Sea and the Kara

Sea in Siberia11

According to the Sanctions Act US persons are prohibited from exporting or reexporting goods

ser vices (except financial ser vices) and technology in support of exploration or production of new

deep- water Arctic ofshore or shale oil proj ects that involve designated Rus sian entities or other

entities in which such sanctioned persons have a controlling interest or a substantial noncontrol-

ling owner ship interest defined as not less than 33 percent (previously it was 50 percent) The new

law also authorizesmdash but does not requiremdash the imposition of so- called secondary sanctions

against non- US entities that engage in activities involving the construction maintenance or

expansion of Rus sian energy export pipelines with a fair market value of $1 million or more or an

aggregate fair market value during a 12- month period of $5 million12 This provision has raised the

concerns of some Eu ro pean countries particularly Germany As result the final language of the

law included wording about coordination of this issue with allies of the United States

Shipments of Rus sian oil to the United States could be afected by activity in the US refinery

industry In early 2017 Saudi Aramco bought the United Statesrsquo largest oil refinery in Port Arthur

(Texas) and it announced plans to send more of its own crude to that refinery13 Serious concerns

exist however regarding the future of three refineries and nine pipelines owned by Citgo a US

branch of the Venezuelan state com pany PdVSA which is balancing precariously on the edge of

default Under certain conditions in the event of PdVSA bankruptcy Rosneft could claim a stake of

up to 499 percent in Citgo Such a possibility has raised concerns among politicians and US

government officials with Trea sury Secretary Steven Mnuchin calling it a ldquonational security issuerdquo14

Tables 58 59 and 510 show allocations of Rus sian oil imports to major US refineries some of

which work exclusively on Rus sian crude a total of two to three months per year In total 150940

thousand barrels of Rus sian oil were refined in 2016

Figure 57 confirms a leading position of Texas and Louisiana among the US states receiving

Rus sian crude followed by New Jersey California Mississippi Washington Hawaii and Delaware

In a paradoxical way Texas has dis appeared from the list of states as a main destination of US

imports from Rus sia (Figure 58) because Rus sian crude is mostly delivered to Louisiana ports and

registered there by US Customs as an import from Rus sia After that it transports to refineries in

Louisiana and Texas

Overall the short- term business rationale behind the sustainability of US oil imports from Rus sia

cannot overcome strong headwinds in the US energy sector facing all oil importers which will

inevitably lead to a contraction of Rus sian oil exports to the United States in the foreseeable future

11 Exxon eforts to receive a special US Trea sury waiver to drill in sanctioned Rus sia failed in 2017

12 Countering Amer i carsquos Adversaries through Sanctions Act HR 3364

13 Sarp Ozkan ldquoSaudi Aramcorsquos Port Arthur Refinery and the US Refinery Fleetrdquo Drilling Info May 11 2017

https infodrillinginfo com saudi - aramcos - port - arthur - refinery - us - refinery - fleet

14 Graham Kates ldquoTrea sury Secretary Rus siarsquos Citgo Deal a National Security Issuerdquo CBS News May 1 2017

http wwwcbsnews com news rosneft - citgo - steven - mnuchin - national - security

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 29 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations30

Table 58 Valerorsquos Refineries Pro cessing Rus sian Oil Thousands of Barrels 2016

Saint Charles Louisiana 29206 535

Corpus Christi Texas 20626 378

Wilmington California 4250 78

Total USA 54590 100

Source US EIA ldquoRefinery Capacity Reportrdquo January 1 2017

table 5 wwweia gov petroleum refinerycapacity table5 pdf

authorrsquos computation

Table 59 ExxonMobil Refineries Pro cessing Rus sian Oil Thousands of Barrels 2016

Baytown Texas 15037 88

Baton Rouge Louisiana 2046 12

Total USA 17083 100

Source US EIA ldquoRefinery Capacity Reportrdquo authorrsquos computation

Table 510 Chevronrsquos Refineries Pro cessing Rus sian Oil Thousands of Barrels 2016

Pascagoula Mississippi 12767 840

El Segundo California 2372 155

Saint Rose Louisiana 78 05

Total USA 15217 100

Source US EIA ldquoRefinery Capacity Reportrdquo authorrsquos computation

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 30 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 31

HEAVY METAL

Taken together US imports of metals and US imports of oil compose about 80 percent of US

total imports from Rus sia (Figure 59) Trade of metals like other commodities is strongly afected

by market price fluctuations Nevertheless metal imports from Rus sia have been fairly resilient to

market volatility and their average annual value has hovered at about $4 billion in the last five years

(Figure 510) This market resilience was forged at the end of the 1990searly 2000s when Rus sian

metal producers gradually modernized their plants adjusting quality of production to Western

standards and enhancing integration into global value and supply chains Some of them conquered

their share of the highly competitive US market struggling with peers from Canada and certain

BRICS countries (China India and Brazil) To attract additional resources all Rus sian large metal-

producing companies became public and were listed on stock exchanges chiefly the London Stock

Exchange (Severstalrsquo PAO Evraz MMK OAO Novolipetsk Steel Norilsk Nikel and TMK PAO) one

on the New York Stock Exchange (Mechel) and one on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange (Rusal)

Business logic pushed some of them to invest in the US metal- making industry which was hit

hard by crisis Later on some of those assets were sold (eg two US steel mills acquired by

Severstal in 2004 were purchased 10 years later by Steel Dynamics Inc and AK Steel Corp)

Figure 57 Share of US States Rus sian Oil Imports 2016

Source US EIA ldquoUS Imports from Rus sia of Crude Oil and Petroleum Productsrdquo Petroleum amp Other

Liquids September 29 2017 https www eia gov dnav pet hist LeafHandler ashx nshy=shyPETampsshy=shyMTTIM _ NUS

- NRS _ 1ampfshy=shyM authorrsquos computation

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

100

Maine

Massachusetts

Maryland

Connecticut

Georgia

Rhode Island

Virginia

Florida

New York

Alabama

Puerto Rico

Pennsylvania

Delaware

Hawaii

Washington

Mississippi

California

New Jersey

Louisiana

Texas

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 31 102017 404 PM

Figure 58 US Imports from Rus sia by State Million US$ 2013ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoState and Metropolitan Area Trade Datardquo Foreign Trade last modified

October 2 2017 https wwwcensus gov foreign - trade statistics state

Alaska

Connecticut

Delaware

Hawaii

Louisiana

Maryland

North Dakota 0

$1000

$2000

$3000

$4000

$5000

$6000

2013 2014 2015 2016

Alabama

Alaska

Connecticut

Delaware

Hawaii

Louisiana

Maryland

Maine

Mississippi

Montana

North Dakota

Mississippi

Figure 59 US Imports from Rus sia Share of Oil and Metals Million US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 1992ndash2016)

83

82

85

86

87

88

85

82

7375

0

$5000

$10000

$15000

$20000

$25000

$30000

$35000

$40000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

US Imports from Russia

Share of Oil and Metals

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 32 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 33

Obviously the market dynamic of dif er ent metals varies (eg iron steel aluminum platinum and

nickel) Caps to increase their trade and production in a ldquored oceanrdquo global environment with

anemic demand is rather limited despite Figure 510 showing a spike of iron and steel imports

from Rus sia in 2014 and aluminum in 2016 Some opportunities may exist for Russian- owned steel

plants in the United States (such as NLMK) to participate in energy proj ects resumed under Presi-

dent Trump who has required that new pipelines use only American- made steel15

Rus sia occupies a special niche in the US market for titanium products a high- end metal indus-

try Twenty years ago a long- term contract was signed between Rus sian titanium producer

VSMPO- AVISMA and Boeing The Rus sian com pany entered the selective club of Boeing suppliers

for the manufacture of components and semi- finished products Since the signing of this contract

VSMPO has delivered more than 35 percent of all titanium placed on Boeing civil aircraft16 They

are hidden in the trade data in an import category for Civilian Aircrafts and Parts (Figure 511) At

the end of 2016 Boeing announced an extension of its framework agreement with AVISMA

15 E Scheyder C Ngai and T Sylvester ldquoAmerican Steel Unlikely to Get Keystone Boost Despite Trump Orderrdquo

Reuters January 27 2017 http wwwreuters com article usa - trump - pipeline - transcanada - idUSL1N1FH1ZD

16 A Kramer ldquoTitanium Fills Vital Role for Boeing and Rus siardquo New York Times July 5 2013 http wwwnytimes com

2013 07 06 business global titanium - fills - vital - role - for - boeing - and - russia html mcubzshy=shy3

Figure 510 US Imports from Rus sia Iron Steel Bauxite Aluminum Nickel Nonferrous Metals and Other Precious Metals and Materials US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 1992ndash2016)

0

$6000000000

$5000000000

$4000000000

$3000000000

$2000000000

$1000000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 20122013

20142015

2016

Finished metal shapes

Iron and steel advanced

Iron and steel products nec

Nonferrous metals other

Other precious metals

Nickel

Bauxite and aluminum

Iron and steel mill products

Steelmaking materials

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 33 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations34

through 2022 and additional investments in the construction of a new robotic plant in Titanium

Valley a special economic zone located in the Sverdlovsk region that will open in 2018 The pro-

cessing of titanium forgings in all Boeing civil aircraft will be performed there including 787s 737

MAXs and 777Xs17 The contract extension with AVISMA may add several hundred million dollars

in value to annual US imports from Rus sia

How can such heavy reliance on imports of Rus sian titanium exist during a period of rising geopo-

liti cal tensions The answer is straightforward VSMPO- AVISMA is a highly specialized natu ral

mono poly producing 45 percent of the worldrsquos aerospace titanium Only four other countries

smelt high- grade titanium in industrial quantities the United States Germany Japan and China

Overall global production capacity is limited while demand is growing The United States cur-

rently imports around 79 percent of all the titanium it consumes each year18

17 ldquoBoeing and VSMPO Avisma to Launch Second Joint Production Siterdquo Rus sian Aviation Insider December 22 2016

http wwwrusaviainsider com boeing - and - vsmpo - avisma - to - launch - second - joint - production - site

18 Jon Ostrower and Andy Pasztor ldquoBoeing United Technologies Stockpile Titanium Partsrdquo Wall Street Journal

August 7 2014 https wwwwsj com articles boeing - united - technologies - stockpiling - titanium - parts - 1407441886

Figure 511 US Imports from Rus sia Civilian Aircrafts and Parts US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 1992ndash2016)

0

$20000000

$40000000

$60000000

$80000000

$100000000

$120000000

$140000000

$160000000

$180000000

$200000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Parts-civilian aircraft

Civilian aircraft

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 34 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 35

The Sanctions Act authorizes the secretary of the trea sury (in a nonmandatory way) to impose

restrictions (without specifying them) against Rus sian state- owned entities operating in the railway

metals and mining sectors of the Rus sian economy Despite the commanding heights of Rus siarsquos

state sector owner ship in its economy (70 percent of GDP) the metal- producing companies have

remained mostly in private hands

NUCLEAR AFFAIRS

Historically owners and operators of the 104 commercial nuclear power reactors in the United

States have purchased more than 80 percent of their uranium from foreign countries Uranium

shipping from Rus sia accounted for about 13 percent of the 58 million pounds of uranium pur-

chased overseas in 201219 At the same time the Rus sian state- owned mono poly Rosatom ac-

counts for 20 percent of Kazakhstanrsquos uranium production (which in turn comprises 11 percent of

all US uranium imports) and 20 percent of US domestic uranium production capacity (with

owner ship of exploration tracts in Wyoming)20

Nuclear fuel and nuclear power continue to be po liti cally sensitive topics both in the United

States and Rus sia Bilateral cooperation in this sector (being surprisingly stable with imports of

nuclear fuel from Rus sia at a level of $1 billion annually in the last five years [Figure 512 and 513])

is under constant po liti cal and lobbying pressure and has been a source of several po liti cal scan-

dals21 Consequently upside risks in this area of interaction are minimal and downside risks are

much higher especially when we are seeing more decommissioning of nuclear plants in the

United States than new constructions The US EIArsquos 2017 Annual Energy Outlook assumes

that about 25 percent of the nuclear capacity now operating will be removed from ser vice

by 205022

WHY IS THE GRASS GREENER ON THE OTHER SIDE

The United States continues to significantly reduce imports of chemical fertilizers as domestic pro-

duction increases In 2016 the United States imported 13 percent less ammonia and 11 percent

less urea and UAN which is a liquid urea and ammonium nitrate fertilizer Rus sia accounts for

around 40 percent of UAN imported by the United States The United States canceled antidumping

duties on imports of ammonium nitrate and urea from Rus sia in 2016 but it did not prevent import

19 US EIA ldquoThe US Relies on Foreign Uranium Enrichment Ser vices to Fuel Its Nuclear Power Plantsrdquo Today in

Energy August 28 2013 https wwweia gov todayinenergy detail php idshy=shy1273

20 Colin Chilcoat ldquoDoes Rus sia Really Own 20 Percent of the USrsquo Uranium Reservesrdquo OilPricecom May 6 2015

http oilpricecom Alternative - Energy Nuclear - Power Does - Russia - Really - Own - 20 - Of - The - US - Uranium - Reserves

html

21 Michelle Ye Hee Lee ldquoThe Facts behind Trumprsquos Repeated Claim about Hillary Clintonrsquos Role in the Rus sian Ura-

nium Dealrdquo Washington Post October 26 2016

22 US EIA ldquoAnnual Energy Outlook 2017 with Projections to 2050rdquo 81ndash82

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 35 102017 404 PM

Figure 512 US Imports from Rus sia Share of Oil Metals and Nuclear Fuel Million US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 1992ndash2016)

87

86

90

90

90

91

88

86

7882

0

$5000

$10000

$15000

$20000

$25000

$30000

$35000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

US Imports from Russia

Share of Oil Metals and Nuclear Fuel

Figure 513 US Imports from Rus sia Nuclear Fuel Materials US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

$-

$200000000

$400000000

$600000000

$800000000

$1200000000

$1000000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 36 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 37

drops twice last year (Figures 514 and 515) According to forecasts UAN imports are expected to

decline further to 15 million tons this year down over 46 percent from 28 million tons imported

last year23 The downside trend in imports of fertilizers will likely continue because of oversupply

BIG FISH

US imports of fish and shellfish from Rus sia are best understood in comparison with US fish

exports to the Rus sian market which slipped to zero in August 2014 after Rus sia issued an order

banning certain agricultural imports from the United States (Figure 516) While the volume of US

supply was not very large it was impor tant because it broke up the monopolistic dominance of a

few vertically integrated Rus sian companies that have kept prices high by restricting the entry of

new producers Seeking to implement import substitution policies Rus sia has tried to reduce

exports as well as imports of fish and seafood products in the last couple of years This symmetri-

cal approach was intended to ldquocompensaterdquo for a decrease of fish products in the domestic

23 Deepika Thapliyal ldquoPotashCorp Forecasts Sharp Drop in US Nitrogen Imports in 2017rdquo ICIS News February 7

2017 https wwwicis com resources news 2017 02 07 10076734 potashcorp - forecasts - sharp - drop - in - us - nitrogen

- imports - in - 2017

Figure 514 US Imports from Rus sia Share of Oil Metals Nuclear Fuel and Fertilizers Million US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

90

93

92

93

94

95

92

91

85

86

0

$5000

$10000

$15000

$20000

$25000

$30000

$35000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

US Imports from Russia

Share of Oil Metals Nuclear Fuel and Fertilizers

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 37 102017 404 PM

Figure 515 US Imports from Rus sia Chemical- Fertilizers US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

S-

$200000000

$400000000

$600000000

$800000000

$1000000000

$1200000000

$1400000000

$1600000000

$1800000000

$2000000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Figure 516 US Exports to Rus sia Fish and Shellfish US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

0

$10000000

$20000000

$30000000

$40000000

$50000000

$60000000

$70000000

$80000000

$90000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Fish and shellfish

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 38 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 39

consumer market caused by Rus siarsquos import ban but it has failed As result the group most af-

fected by the self- imposed counter- sanctions were Rus sian consumers

With a significant drop in fish imports a devaluation of the ruble and inflationary pressures on

seafood prices yearly consumption of fish in Rus sia has declined precipitously In 2015 alone

fish prices increased 20 percent and consumption dropped to 14 kilograms per person24 from

22 kilograms in 201425 In 2016 food rose to 355 percent of house hold expenditure as a result of

increases in food prices26 This has pushed vertically integrated fishing monopolies to sell even

more of their catch abroad rather than deliver to the Rus sian Federation (Figure 517) Thus we

cannot exclude the possibility of further growth in US fish and shellfish imports from Rus sia on a

marginal scale

24 Александр Савельев ldquoПотребление рыбы в России упало до 14 кг на человекаrdquo [Fish consumption in Rus sia fell to

14 kg per person] Экономика Интерфакс January 28 2015 http wwwinterfax ru business 492038

25 Илья Шестаков ldquoПотебление рыбы в России снизилось на 10 процентов из- за роста ценrdquo [Fish consumption in

Rus sia dropped by 10 percent due to price increases] RNS March 8 2017 https rnsonline consumer - market

Potreblenie - ribi - v - Rossii - snizilos - na - 10 - iz - za - rosta - tsen - 2017 - 03 - 08

26 Zoya Sheftalovich and Christian Oliver ldquoRus siarsquos Boom (Farming) Economyrdquo Politico November 8 2016 http

wwwpolitico eu article russias - boom - farming - economy

Figure 517 US Imports from Rus sia Fish and Shellfish US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

0

$50000000

$100000000

$150000000

$200000000

$250000000

$300000000

$350000000

$400000000

$450000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 39 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations40

SPACE ODYSSEY

Among high- end products beyond the top five groups of goods imported from Rus sia cheap and

efficient Rus sian engines have been used to launch US rockets into space for about 16 years

(Figure 518) There was a serious po liti cal strug gle around a 2014 ban on the purchase of Rus sian

RD-180 rocket engines revealing the conflicting business interests of power ful high- tech companies

This restrictive mea sure was temporary and was quickly lifted because of significant cost impacts

and risks of disruption to launch schedules27 For the same reason the Sanctions Act does not autho-

rize ldquothe imposition of any sanction or other condition limitation restriction or prohibition that

directly or indirectly impedes the supply by any entity of the Rus sian Federation of any product or

ser vice or the procurement of such product or ser vice by any contractor or subcontractor of the

United States or any other entity relating to or in connection with any space launch conducted for

the National Aeronautics and Space Administration or any other nonndash Department of Defense

customerrdquo28

Nevertheless many experts believe that US domestic alternatives to replace Rus sian engines will

be viable in five to eight years

27 Ken Dilanian ldquoWhy Does the US Use Rus sian Rockets to Launch Its Satellitesrdquo NBC News updated November 15

2016 http wwwnbcnews com why - does - u - s - use - russian - rockets - launch - its - satellites - n588526

28 Countering Amer i carsquos Adversaries through Sanctions Act HR 3364

Figure 518 Spacecraft Excluding Military US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

0

$20000000

$40000000

$60000000

$80000000

$100000000

$120000000

$140000000

$160000000

$180000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 40 102017 404 PM

41

Diversity and technological complexity are the most vis i ble advantages supporting US exports to

Rus sia Three major groups of export goods include civilian aircraft engines and parts (Figure 61)

drilling and oil field equipment (Figure 62) and industrial machines and engines (Figure 63)

Despite sanctions against the transfer of advanced oil producing and pro cessing technologies the

realization of US drilling and oil field equipment in Rus sia is sustainable although some bilateral

proj ects have been frozen

Another category of goods that has demonstrated resilience is the phar ma ceu ti cal industry (Fig-

ure 64) because most drugs in Rus sia are imported (about 70 percent of the Rus sian phar ma ceu-

ti cal market in value) Import substitution policies have had only modest results in this industry

As confirmed by American Chamber of Commerce surveys US exports to Rus sia are closely

connected to US FDI 30 percent of total imports of US companies working in the Rus sian

market come from the United States (more than $2 billion in 2016) In other words about

40 percent of all US exports to Rus sia are related to a US corporate- sector business pro cess in

the country The major sectors of activity of these companies are energy and natu ral resources

(52 percent) manufacturing (17 percent) information and communications technology or ICT

(13 percent) retail (7 percent) automotive industry (6 percent) phar ma ceu ti cal production

(1 percent) professional ser vices (05 percent) and other (2 percent)1

Some obvious constraints on US exports to Rus sia have resulted from a reduction in demand A

deterioration of bilateral relations and implementation of sanctions and counter- sanctions have

directly or indirectly afected all businesses Figures 65 and 66 provide data regarding a dramatic

drop in the sale of US agricultural production in Rus sia with all other categories of exports in

goods showing big cuts as well (see Figures 67ndash69)

Exports of civilian aircraft engines and parts put the state of Washington in first place among

other states as a leading exporter to the Rus sian market (Figure 610)

1 American Chamber of Commerce in Rus sia ldquoInvestment and Import to Rus sia 2nd Surveyrdquo 13

Diversity and Constraints

06

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 41 102017 404 PM

Figure 61 US Exports of Civilian Aircraft Engines Equipment and Parts to Rus sia US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

$2500000000

$2000000000

$1500000000

$1000000000

$500000000

$-

Figure 62 US Exports of Drilling and Oil Field Equipment US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

0

$5000000

$10000000

$15000000

$20000000

$25000000

$30000000

$35000000

$40000000

$45000000

$50000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 42 102017 404 PM

Figure 63 US Exports of Industrial Engines to Rus sia US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

0

$5000000

$10000000

$15000000

$20000000

$25000000

$30000000

$35000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Figure 64 US Exports of Phar ma ceu ti cal Preparations to Rus sia US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

0

$5000000

$10000000

$15000000

$20000000

$25000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 43 102017 404 PM

Figure 65 US Exports of Meat and Poultry to Rus sia US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Meat poultry etc

$1000000000

$800000000

$600000000

$400000000

$200000000

$-

$1200000000

$1400000000

$1600000000

Figure 66 US Exports of Soybeans to Rus sia US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

0

$20000000

$40000000

$60000000

$80000000

$100000000

$120000000

$140000000

$160000000

$180000000

$200000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 44 102017 404 PM

Figure 67 US Exports of Vehicles Engines and Parts to Rus sia US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Other parts and accessories of vehicles

Automotive tires and tubes

Bodies and chassis for passenger cars

Engines and engine parts (carburetors pistonsrings and valves)

Trucks buses and special purpose vehicles

Passenger cars new and used

$2500000000

$2000000000

$1500000000

$500000000

$-

$1000000000

Figure 68 US Exports of Medicinal Equipment to Rus sia US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

$10000000

$15000000

$20000000

$25000000

$30000000

$35000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 45 102017 404 PM

Figure 610 US Exports to Rus sia by States (2016 US$ Value) Million US$ 2013ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoState and Metropolitan Area Trade Datardquo

Iowa Kentucky

North Dakota

Oklahoma

South Carolina

Washington

0

$500

$1000

$1500

$2000

2013 2014 2015 2016

District of Columbia

Iowa

Kentucky

North Dakota

Oklahoma

South Carolina

Washington

Figure 69 US Exports of Excavating Machinery to Rus sia US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

0

$5000000

$10000000

$15000000

$20000000

$25000000

$30000000

$35000000

$40000000

$45000000

$50000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 46 102017 404 PM

47

Upon reviewing the current trend in US- Russia economic relations we must acknowledge that

the existing trade model is obsolete and exhausted Imports are resource- oriented and reflect

constraints of the Rus sian economic structure while five groups of goodsmdash oil metals nuclear

fuels fertilizers and fishmdash make up more than 90 percent of total imports from Rus sia (Figure 71)

Each of these industries has a limited capacity for growth in the foreseeable future

Rus siarsquos core export to the United Statesmdash oilmdash will inevitably decrease in the mid- term under any

scenario The value and volume of Rus sian exports to the United States are open to global market

volatility and po liti cal pressures with limited hedging mechanisms

Overall US exports to Rus sia are unsustainable due to bilateral po liti cal tensions the whims of

commodity markets and changing domestic policies Sanctions and counter- sanctions have

created additional barriers particularly in finance banking high- tech energy and agro- business

According to the American Chamber of Commerce 69 percent of US companies working in the

country consider the impact of US sanctions against Rus sia on their business as negative At the

same time 60 percent of companies do not expect big changes in business relations between

Rus sia and the United States under Trump1 as the new law codifies existing sanctions fortifies

them and extends them to new sectors

Current US investments are low due to the weak rule of law in Rus sia a lack of property right

protections and proper contract enforcement high levels of statization and monopolization in the

economy a poor business climate outdated capital stock dependence on natural- resource

sectors and of course sanction and counter- sanction mea sures Bloated administrative compo-

nents created as risk mitigation instruments have also served as impediments The countryrsquos

institutional weakness low level of productivity bud get constraints and a declining inflexible

workforce will restrain future economic growth even if commodity prices recover Rus sian eco-

nomic policy will likely continue to be statist and protectionist relying mostly on import

substitutions

1 Ibid 11

Existing Trends and Future Scenarios

07

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 47 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations48

What scenarios can be expected in such a challenging environment

One probability (no peace no war) is based on the assumption that matters will not deteriorate

further and implementation of the Sanctions Act will be cursory This will cause relatively slow

degradation in the economic field with occasional flashes of activity in selected areas (eg closer

cooperation against Islamist terrorist groups in Syria)

A second worse case or critical scenario is the intensive and full- scale execution of current sanc-

tion legislation and even the imposition of new economic punitive and restrictive mea sures which

could incite asymmetric retaliatory actions and lead to the introduction of additional protectionist

policies This in turn could trigger a further escalation of mutual confrontation and could eventu-

ally destroy the fundamentals of the current bilateral trade system Rus sian leadership has charac-

terized the Sanctions Act as a declaration of a trade war that ends all hope for improving bilateral

relations2

2 Дмитрий Медведев ldquoПодписание президентом США нового санкционного закона против России создает несколько

последствийrdquo [The US Presidentrsquos signing of the package of new sanctions against Rus sia will have a few conse-

quences] Facebook August 2 2017 https wwwfacebook com Dmitry Medvedev posts 10154587161801851

Figure 71 US Imports from Rus sia Share of Oil Metals Nuclear Fuel Fertilizers and Fish Million US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

93

94

93

94

95

96

93

92

87

89

0

$5000

$10000

$15000

$20000

$25000

$30000

$35000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

US Imports from Russia

Share of Oil Metals Nuclear FuelFertilizers and Fish

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 48 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 49

The best case and most favorable scenario looks less probable now It assumes the realization of

structural reforms in Rus sia in such a way that would adapt Rus siarsquos foreign policy to national

economic needs reduce confrontations with the West and make a concerted efort to integrate

Rus sian businesses into global supply and value chains A revitalization of the structural reform

agendamdash including eforts to diversify economic activities through de- monopolization and support

for SMEs a restructuring of the banking sector the creation of a vibrant business climate to foster

entrepreneurships and innovation the implementation of administrative and judicial reforms to

tackle red tape and endemic corruption and the reduction of state control over key sectors of the

economy via wide- spread privatization could kick- start the development of a nonoil economy and

improve long- term growth prospects Despite ongoing discussion of reform strategies deep

economic and po liti cal changes are extremely complicated over the next po liti calelectoral cycle

(2018ndash2024) particularly because of re sis tance of vested interests and growing commodity prices

The urgency to tackle structural shortcomings in natu ral resource- dependent economies usually

correlates with the price of those resources and the degree to which resource rents drive eco-

nomic activity However there may be marginal improvements in the efficiency of the current

economic system

Future US- Russia relations can be thought of through three pillars one pillar focuses on areas

where both countries maintain a competitive rivalry another looks at potential areas of interaction

under pres ent conditions a third pillar and one that has evaporated from the current bilateral

agenda concentrates on future cooperation Stronger economic ties could not only be a kind of

po liti cal shock absorber but contribute to the building of this future (particularly business contacts

aim to support future structural reforms) although po liti cal factors are depressing the prospects

for cooperation To escape deadlock it will be impor tant to establish the right balance between

politics and economics and create a model of collaboration within the framework of contention

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 49 102017 404 PM

About the Author

Vadim Grishin PhD MBA has been involved in the reform pro cess in Rus sia as adviser to the

deputy prime minister of Rus sia in 1992ndash1993 and 2006ndash2010 He has extensive experience

working with the Bretton Woods Institutions He was the board member of the World Bank Group

and served as se nior adviser at the International Monetary Fund Currently he is a con sul tant to the

chief economistrsquos office of the International Finance Corporation and teaches the economics of

transition at Georgetown University in Washington DC

50

594-71613_ch99_4Pindd 50 102017 403 PM

Blank

COVER PHOTO ADOBE STOCK

1616 Rhode Island Avenue NW

Washington DC 20036

202 887 0200 | wwwcsisorg

v++ISBN 978-1-4422-8035-9

Lanham bull Boulder bull New York bull London

4501 Forbes Boulevard

Lanham MD 20706

301 459 3366 | wwwrowmancom

A U T H O R

Vadim Grishin

Myths and Realities

A Report of the

CSIS RUSSIA AND EURASIA PROGRAM

US-RussiaEconomicRelations

O C T O B E R 2 0 1 7

Euml|xHSLEOCy280359z

The Man Pupu Nyor Rock Formations at the Northern Urals also known as Seven

Strong Man or Little Mountain of the God in the local tribe (Mansi) language

Page 6: U.S.-Russia Economic Relations: Myths and Realities · 2020-04-17 · OCTOBER 2017 U.S.- Russia Economic Relations Myths and Realities AUTHOR Vadim Grishin A REPORT OF THE CSIS RUSSIA

The author wishes to thank the participants of a draft paper discussion William Arnold Jack

Brougher Matthew Edwards Daniel Fried Andrew Kuchins Randy Levinas Gary Litman Jeff

Mankoff Cyrus Newlin Olga Oliker Ian Solomon Doug Stanglin and Angela Stent

This report is made pos si ble by the generous support of Car ne gie Corporation of New York

Acknowl edgments

Iv

594-71613_ch00_4Pindd 4 102017 403 PM

1

01

Introduction

A friend of mine a devoted connoisseur of bilateral economic relations with 30 years of experi-

ence in the field once noted that the hottest discussions about US- Russia ties occur at a time

when mutual trade is compressed into the value of a mathematical error This is exactly what is

happening now According to official statistics the value of US- Russia trade is about $20 billion

and is rolling back to the level of 20051 There is no doubt that a new set of sanctions recently

signed into law by the US president and currently being implemented will further hurt economic

interaction by reducing financial inflows limiting the transfer of technology and expertise and

dampening business confidence Many policymakers and experts have agreed that HR 3364

(Countering Amer i carsquos Adversaries through Sanctions Act2) by expanding and codifying US

sanctions targeting Rus sia opens a new cycle in bilateral relations This legislation which received

overwhelming bipartisan support creates a new economic and po liti cal framework on a bilateral

track Strong concerns expressed by President Donald Trump in his special statement about

ldquounconstitutional provisions of the ldquoflawed billrdquo3 cannot significantly limit its intended and

unintended consequences In its implementation it could have relatively broad margins of flexibil-

ity and leverage but requires the president to seek congressional approval before easing or termi-

nating sanctions against Rus sia or undertaking actions that would significantly modify US policy

toward Rus sia Additional observations regarding HR 3364rsquos pos si ble impact on US- Russia

interaction in par tic u lar industries can be found throughout this report but suffice it to say that it

will contribute to a broader curtailment of many pillars of economic cooperation for years ahead

1 US Census Bureau ldquoForeign Trade Trade in Goods with Rus siardquo Foreign Trade updated June 29 2017 https

wwwcensus gov foreign - trade balance c4621 html

2 Countering Amer i carsquos Adversaries through Sanctions Act HR 3364 115th Cong (2017ndash2018) https www

congress gov bill 115th - congress house - bill 3364

3 Donald J Trump ldquoStatement by President Donald J Trump on the Signing of HR 3364rdquo White House Office of the

Press Secretary August 2 2017 https wwwwhitehouse gov the - press - office 2017 08 02 statement - president

- donald - j - trump - signing - hr - 3364

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 1 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations2

Escalating geopo liti cal tensions have continued to significantly define Rus siarsquos economic prospects

however the countryrsquos economic model exhausted itself long before the dramatic deterioration of

relations with the West Structural bottlenecks have seriously limited Rus siarsquos growth capacity even

during the previous period of high oil prices4

The purpose of this report is to assess what has gone wrong with the US- Russia equation by

analyzing it through the prism of a bilateral economic and po liti cal trajectory while keeping in

mind the structural constraints of the Rus sian economy It will attempt to answer the following

questions

bull Do bilateral economic relations matter

bull Are the United States and Rus sia ldquonatu ralrdquo or ldquounnaturalrdquo trading partners

bull What future scenarios can we expect

In the vast lit er a ture on US- Russia economic relations analy sis of developing trends in bilateral

commerce has always been accompanied by discussions around impor tant po liti cal and eco-

nomic matters particularly regarding US legislation and regulation5 Over several de cades the

most controversial issues concerned the granting of permanent normal trading status to Rus sia

through legislation that eliminated the Jackson- Vanik Amendment and Rus siarsquos accession to

the World Trade Organ ization (WTO) The Magnitsky Act signed into law in 2012 repealed the

Jackson- Vanik provisions but added legislation providing authority for the US government to

withhold visas and freeze assets of Rus sians thought to have been involved with human rights

violations and later imposed sanctions on Rus sia because of its involvement in the Ukrainian and

Syrian crises and its cyber- enabled activities6

Some have observed deficiencies in Rus siarsquos participation in the international division of labor

(reliance on the export of energy and metals) which ldquo canrsquot serve any more as a basis for further

expansion of the countryrsquos position in world markets including the US marketrdquo7 Unfortunately

such observations have not been accompanied by quantitative and qualitative analy sis of structural

constraints in the Rus sian foreign trade model Many authors limit their policy recommendations

for fostering bilateral economic relations to a requirement for a strong initial push from respective

governments the creation of business working groups and the extension of bilateral and multilat-

eral legal grounds for economic cooperation Such instruments proved to be useful in facilitating

4 International Monetary Fund (IMF) Rus sian Federation Selected Issues (Washington DC IMF 2016)

5 ldquoAmer i carsquos New Economic Sanctions May Hurt Rus siarsquos Recoveryrdquo Economist August 5 2017 Andrey Kortunov and

Olga Oliker eds A Roadmap for US- Russia Relations (Washington DC CSISRIAC 2017) https csis - prods3

amazonaws com s3fs - public publication 170815 _ KortunovOliker _ USRussiaRelations _ Web pdf E0bdGVHlxxYRAxhO

w8zJ9tbRGwdWjEgV Самуйлов CM Братерский MB ldquoКонгресс и торговые отношения США с Россиейrdquo [US

Congressrsquos role in the US- RF trade relations] США и Канада экономика политика культура 5 no 533 (May 2014)

6 Andrew Weiss and Richard Nephew ldquoThe Role of Sanctions in US- Russian Relationsrdquo (Task Force White Paper

Car ne gie Endowment for International Peace Washington DC July 11 2016)

7 Глущенко ЮН ldquoСостояние проблемы и перспективы сотрудничества России и США в экономической сфереrdquo

[Status prob lems and prospects of Russia- US economic cooperation] Проблемы Национальной Стратегии 21 no 6

(2013) 148ndash164

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 2 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 3

trade and investment during several reset cycles in bilateral relations starting in the 1990s but

they were only partially successful

Several papers and books although focused primarily on bilateral po liti cal agendas or sectorial

analy sis underline the importance of Rus sian domestic realities Dr Angela Stent in her ldquoLimits of

Partnershiprdquo notes that state control of the commanding heights in the Rus sian economy creates

significant deterrents for US private- sector entrance into the market8 Thane Gustafson in the

ldquoWheel of Fortunerdquo asserts that Rus siarsquos growing dependence on revenue from oil exports along

with its inefficient and often- corrupt management of industry is unsustainable9 Andrew Kuchins

in his ldquoElevation and Calibration A New Rus sia Policy for Amer i cardquo has quoted some experts who

believe that the weakened Rus sian economic position may over time contribute to some rap-

prochement with the West and emphasized lack of reforms as ldquoa key obstacle not only for Rus sian

economic recovery but also for improving ties with the Westrdquo10

In a recent joint task force report Eugene Rumer Andrew S Weiss and Richard Sokolsky argue

that the concept of developing stronger economic ties with Rus sia as a foundation for improved

diplomatic relations has not worked ldquoClinton Bush and Obama all placed high hope on trade as

an engine of better relations with Rus sia All were frustrated by the fact that the two countries are

for the most part not natu ral trading partnersrdquo11 On a dif er ent note the former US envoy to

Rus sia Michael McFaul has defended the achievements of a reset policy under the Barack Obama

administration emphasizing that bilateral trade reached a rec ord level in 2011 Nevertheless he

also stresses that it was a one- time accomplishment unlikely to be repeated12

Voices of those who believe that extensive economic ties can provide stability to broader po liti cal

interaction are weaker than ever in an environment of growing protectionism and adversarial rivalry

8 Angela Stent The Limits of Partnerships US- Russian Relations in the XXI Century (Prince ton NJ Prince ton

University Press 2014) 98

9 Thane Gustafson Wheel of Fortune The Battle for Oil and Power in Rus sia (London Harvard University Press 2012)

10 Andrew Kuchins Elevation and Calibration A New Rus sia Policy for Amer i ca (Washington DC Center on Global

Interests 2016)

11 Eugene Rumer Richard Sokolsky and Andrew S Weiss ldquoTrump and Rus sia The Right Way to Manage Relationsrdquo

Foreign Affairs 96 no 2 (MarchApril 2017)

12 Michael McFaul ldquoUS- Russia Relationsrdquo (lecture Institute for Public Diplomacy and Global Communications

George Washington University Washington DC March 3 2017) https wwwc - span org video 424811 - 1 former

- ambassador - michael - mcfaul - discusses - state - usrussia - relations

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 3 102017 404 PM

4

02

Does Bilateral Economic Interaction Matter

Economic relations do not emerge out of a vacuum There are many variables that define the final

configuration of economic interactions such as a par tic u lar countryrsquos level of economic develop-

ment its business environment legal framework po liti cal climate (regime) culture and religion

history and tradition demography and geography as well as global and national economic cycles

An impor tant driver of trade relations for many economies has become participation in global and

regional trade agreements

As many studies and anecdotal evidence show bilateral economic cooperation should be sizable

and should relate to the economic growth of two countries in a way that afects their policy

interests Let us take as a reference point the BRICS countries1 a community of large emerging

economies which Rus sia belongs to Table 21 pres ents official data on US trade and investments

with BRICS states US- Russia trade in goods is disproportionally lowmdash235 times less than US

trade with China 33 times smaller than US trade with India and 28 times less than US trade

with Brazil The size of the US- Russia trade balance is comparable to the size of the US trade

balance with South Africa whose economy is almost four times smaller than Rus siarsquos If we add

trade in ser vices to the trade of goods the gaps increase significantly (Figures 21 and 22) The

diference is not only quantitative but also qualitative

The quality of trade relations can be mea sured by its diversity its share of high- tech components

resilience to economic shocks and its contribution to GDP growth On average a 10 percent

increase in a nationrsquos two- way trade relative to GDP increases GDP through a variety of channels

by at least 16 percent2

Bilateral trade and real GDP growth in the United States and Rus sia are practically uncorrelated

as shown in the summary output of multifactorial regression The coefficient of multiple determi-

nation (R Square) is close to 0 ( Table 22) At the same time the correlation of US exports to India

1 BRICS is the acronym for a select group of five developing economies Brazil Rus sia India China and South Africa

2 World Economic Forum Foreign Direct Investment as a Key Driver for Trade Growth and Prosperity The Case for a

Multilateral Agreement on Investment (Geneva World Economic Forum 2013) 11

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 4 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 5

Table 21 US Trade and Foreign Direct Investments (FDI) with China India Brazil South Africa and Rus sia 2016

China India Brazil South Africa Rus sia

Total Goods Trade 5786 677 565 13 203

Imports 4628 460 262 73 145

Exports 1158 217 303 55 58

Trade in Ser vices 696 472 317 47 na

Imports 161 268 68 17 na

Exports 535 203 249 30 na

US FDI 746 283 653 62 141

BRICS FDI in the United States

148 93 043 076 63

Supported Jobs in the United States (thousand)

911 197 308 50 84

Source United States Trade Representative (USTR) ldquoCountries amp Regionsrdquo accessed September 27 2017

https ustrgov countries - regions See US- China Trade Facts US- India Trade Facts US- Brazil Trade

Facts US- South Africa Trade Facts and US- Russia Trade Facts

201520142013

and China with the real GDP growth of these big Asian economies is significant (05) In the case of

Brazil the correlation is even higher (07) By contrast South Africarsquos small open economy is quite

sensitive to US imports from South Africa (043)3

In marked contrast to other BRICS countries Rus sia is a poor choice for export- oriented opera-

tions As a recent International Monetary Fund (IMF) study highlights Rus sia is an outlier a rare

exception among emerging market (EM) economies with virtually no preferential access to major

markets and little meaningful change over three de cades4 This complicates Rus siarsquos integration

into the global value chain (GVC) which became a significant driving force toward economic

development and trade for certain BRICS economies

3 IMF statistics authorrsquos computation

4 IMF Rus sian Federation Selected Issues IMF Country Report N17198 (Washington DC IMF July 2017)

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 5 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations6

Trade is closely connected with foreign direct investment (FDI) and both are parts of a complex

interaction known as international production sharing According to publicly available official data

US FDI in Rus sia was about $131 billion for 2013 and $295 billion for 2016 with the top industrial

sectors being software and IT ser vices financial ser vices chemicals metals coal oil and gas

and business ser vices5 If we take into account US investments made through Eu ro pean branches

of US companies and ofshore firms this number would easily triple Another component

that usually is not tracked by official statistics is reinvestments The American Chamber of

Commerce surveys in 2016 and 2017 which include this component draw a completely dif er ent

picture accumulated US corporate FDI in 90 large US companies working in Rus sia reached

5 US Department of Commerce International Trade Administration ldquoRussiamdash94- Foreign Direct Investment and

Portfolio Investment Statisticsrdquo Rus sia Country Commercial Guide July 7 2017 https wwwexport gov article

id=shyRussia - foreign - direct - investment - statistics

Figure 21 US Trade in Goods with China India Brazil Rus sia and South Africa Billion US$ 2016

Source USTR ldquoCountries amp Regionsrdquo See US- China Trade Facts US- India Trade Facts US- Brazil Trade

Facts US- South Africa Trade Facts and US- Russia Trade Facts

0

$50

$100

$150

$200

$250

$300

$350

$400

$450

$500

$550

$600

China India Brazil Russia South Africa

Exports

Imports

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 6 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 7

$8244 billion in 20176 The real level from our perspective is usually between official and private

estimations around $40 billon But even this cumulative figure is less than the US FDI in Brazil

and China

The American Chamber of Commerce surveys have also revealed other impor tant data Eighty-

five percent of US companies doing business in Rus sia entered its market 10 or more years ago

while 60 percent of them ldquolandedrdquo there 20 years ago or earlier Only one percent have started

operations over the last five years confirming an obvious fact entry into the Rus sian market is

challenging because of growing monopolism risks associated with the business climate and a

stagnating economy7

6 American Chamber of Commerce in Rus sia ldquoInvestment and Import to Rus sia 2nd Surveyrdquo (Prepared by GfK for the

American Chamber of Commerce in Rus sia Moscow May 2017) 12

7 Ibid 4

Figure 22 US Trade in Goods and in Ser vices with China India Brazil Rus sia and South Africa Billion US$ 2016

Source USTR ldquoCountries amp Regionsrdquo See US- China Trade Facts US- India Trade Facts US- Brazil Trade

Facts US- South Africa Trade Facts and US- Russia Trade Facts

0

$100

$200

$300

$400

$500

$600

$700

China India Brazil Russia South Africa

Trade in Services

Total Goods Trade

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 7 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations8

Rus sian direct investment position toward the United States declined from $215 billion in 2013 to

$83 billion in 2015 (Figure 23) Taking into account dif er ent channels and instruments the actual

volume of Rus sian investments in the United States made through ofshore Eu ro pean Canadian

and US companies may be several times greater than the available official data

Foreign investment in financial assets or foreign portfolio investment (FPI) should be included

even though Central Bank of Rus sia statistics indicate they were also quite low US investments in

equity were $345 million and in debt instruments were about $65 million in the fourth quarter of

20168 However these numbers do not reflect the real level of FPI Rus siarsquos stocks are incredibly

inexpensive while there has been impressive growth of US investments in short- term securities

and in foreign exchange (FX) operations (cash- and- carry trade) Rus sia was among the top per-

forming emerging markets in 2016 gaining 4744 percent in US dollars9 Nevertheless the gen-

eral capitalization of the stock exchange is tiny (less than 20 percent of GDP) comparable to the

capitalization of just one large US com pany such as Coca- Cola Many private sources believe that

the US FPI in Rus sia could be as high as several billion US dollars but a new set of sanctions

approved by President Trump on August 2 2017 if implemented could reverse those flows It is

still not clear whether the secretary of trea sury will prohibit participation in the oferings of Rus siarsquos

sovereign debt and the full range of derivative products A report on this subject should be sub-

mitted no later than 180 days after enactment of the law which means no later than Febru-

ary 2018 New legislation tightens prohibition on Rus sian financial companies already under

sanctions by limiting any new equity or debt with a maturity greater than 14 days (a provision that

8 Central Bank of Rus sia ldquoForeign Direct Investments in the Rus sian Federationrdquo accessed September 27 2017 www

cbr ru localization switchlanguage urlshy=shy news ampfromshy=shyru - ruamptoshy=shyen - gb

9 VanEck ldquoRus sian Stock Market Soars in 2016rdquo Seeking Alpha February 14 2017 https seekingalphacom article

4045602 - russian - stock - market - soars - 2016

Table 22 Summary Output of Regression Statistics (US Real GDP Rus sia Real GDP US- Russia Exports Imports and Total Trade)

Regression Statistics

Multiple R 0056445768

R Square 0003186125

Adjusted R Square minus0042123597

Standard Error 2616043923

Observations 24

Sources IMF statistics authorrsquos computation

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 8 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 9

previously allowed for 30 days) Similarly US persons are prohibited from taking on any new debt

that has a maturity greater than 60 days (previously it was 90 days) with Rus sian energy compa-

nies currently under sanctions10

According to the Trea sury Department Rus sia held $1029 billion in US Trea sury securities in

June 201711 Could Rus sia withdraw all its reserves from the United States and use this action as a

retaliatory mea sure Such a scenario is unlikely since there is no comparable safe- haven alterna-

tive to US dollars When Rus siarsquos US Trea sury holdings dropped 50 percent from $176 billion

(October 2010) to $90 billion (November 2011) the market did not notice12 Nevertheless Rus sian

authorities have announced they will decrease dependence on assets and payments in US dollars13

10 Countering Amer i carsquos Adversaries through Sanctions Act HR 3364

11 US Department of Trea sury Major Foreign Holders of Trea sury Securities September 18 2017 http ticdata

treasury gov Publish mfh txt

12 Ibid

13 ldquoНовый виток санкций Россия откажется от доллараrdquo [A new round of sanctions Rus sia will abandon the dollar]

Газетару August 7 2017 https wwwgazeta ru business 2017 08 07 10821937 shtml

Figure 23 Rus sia Outward FDI Position United States Equities and Debt Million US$ 2009ndash2016

Source Central Bank of the Rus sian Federation External Sector Statistics Rus sian Direct Investments

Abroad accessed September 27 2017 https wwwcbr ru localization switchlanguage urlshy=shy news

ampfromshy=shyru - ruamptoshy=shyen - gb

$6000

$8000

$10000

$12000

$14000

$16000

$18000

$20000

$22000

2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 9 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations10

Officially the country does not invest in the US stock exchange although some Rus sian oligarchs

have bought US corporate bonds and equities in large amounts The new sanctions law requires

the secretary of trea sury in consultation with the director of national intelligence and the secretary

of state to issue reports on Rus sian se nior po liti cal figures and oligarchs based on their closeness

to the Rus sian regime and their net worth as well as the exposure of key economic sectors of the

United States to Rus sian po liti cally exposed persons and parastatal entities including at a mini-

mum the banking securities insurance and real estate sectors14

Only three Rus sian companies are listed in the US exchanges

Overall the scale and scope of US- Russia economic interaction and business activity is much greater

than officially appreciated but not significant enough to be taken into consideration by policymakers

14 Countering Amer i carsquos Adversaries through Sanctions Act HR 3364

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 10 102017 404 PM

11

03

Politics in the Driverrsquos Seat

Bilateral economic relations depend to a great extent on global and national economic cycles

After the recent global financial crisis the US economy has shown surprisingly sustainable GDP

growth while the Rus sian economy was the most afected among BRICS countries by the turbu-

lence of a worldwide economic downturn in 2008ndash2009 and after a short- term rebound slipped

into stagnation (2012ndash2013) and then into full- scale recession (2014ndash2016) The countryrsquos eco-

nomic cycle however appears to be changing once again with the economy returning to a

pattern of growth albeit uneven and gradual (Figures 31 and 32) Even with sanctions still in place

conditions have improved as a result of the stabilization of Urals oil to an average annual price of

$419 per barrel in 2016 The gains were sparked in part by major crude producers agreeing to cut

production after hefty price drops in 2014 and 2015 Supported by easier financial conditions

higher oil prices and growing macro- stability Rus sia is heading toward a moderate growth rate

that is expected to reach 14 percent this year according to forecasts of the World Bank Group

(WBG) and the IMF1

Because of the significant role that politics plays in any bilateral interaction it is impor tant to

combine economic and po liti cal cycles applying a ldquoresetrdquo to bilateral economic cooperation in

addition to the po liti cal relationship I have compared po liti cal cycles and trade dynamics using the

following graphs ( Table 31 and Figure 33) These charts do not pretend to reflect with mathemati-

cal precision all shifts in the bilateral po liti cal relationship but rather attempt to visually align

impor tant economic and po liti cal moments to detect the efects of po liti cal events on the size of

bilateral trade

Figure 33 shows all pos si ble combinations economic trends at the intersection of po liti cal devel-

opments oppose or support each other in synchronization It is evident that po liti cal interference

1 International Monetary Fund Rus sian Federation Staff Concluding Statement of the 2017 Article IV Mission (Wash-

ington DC IMF 2017) World Bank Group From Recession to Recovery Rus sia Economic Report no 37 (Washington

DC World Bank 2017) http pubdocsworldbank org en 383241495487103815 RER - 37 - May26 - FINAL - with - summary

pdf

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 11 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations12

in bilateral business afairs in the early 2000s was less significant than in later years As result

growing po liti cal tensions from 2003 to 2008 did not dramatically afect bilateral economic inter-

action It is also easier to explain why 2011ndash2012 resulted in rec ord trade and investmentmdash a con-

sequence of very high oil prices GDP growth in both countries improved legislation after Rus siarsquos

accession to the WTO and the Obamandash Medvedev po liti cal reset From 2014 to 2016 a perfect

storm of developments added efficiency to Western sanctions and augmented the damaging

consequences of counter- sanction mea sures

Figure 33 also confirms that in times of reduced economic cooperation po liti cal pressures can

easily change bilateral economic trends Moreover business interests along with economic inter-

actions have a limited capacity to reverse the po liti cal mainstream

Figure 31 Economic Cycle 2014ndash2016

Source Authorrsquos evaluation of international financial institutions (IFI) data and sources from respective

countries

Sustainable Growth

Brazil

Negative Growth

Unstable Growth

Mexico

Descending Growth

Argentina

EU

US

Russia

Vietnam

China

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 12 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 13

Table 31 Po liti cal Cycles in Bilateral US- Russia Relations 1999ndash2016

2001ndash2002 The George W Bushndash Vladimir Putin Reset Rus sia supported ldquoglobal war on terrorismrdquo launched by the United States after 911 the SORT nuclear arms reduction treaty was signed by the United States and Rus sia and a successful business dialogue was developed that created the current structure of economic relations

2003ndash2008 Deterioration in bilateral relations brought on by the Iraq War Georgiarsquos ldquoRose Revolutionrdquo Mikhail Khodorkovskyrsquos arrest Ukrainersquos ldquoOrange Revolutionrdquo Kosovorsquos in de pen dence and the Georgian War

2009ndash2010 The Barack Obamandash Dmitry Medvedev Reset Rus sia served as a logistical hub for transportation and supply of US forces in Af ghan i stan United States and Rus sia signed the new START nuclear arms reduction treaty Rus sia backed tighter economic sanctions on Iran Rus sia gained access to the WTO after 18 years of negotiations

2011ndash2016 Deterioration in bilateral relations caused by the Ukrainian crisis which were followed by sanctions and counter- sanctions along with the Syrian crises and cyber- enabled activities

Source Authorrsquos evaluation of po liti cal and economic data

Note SORTthinsp=thinspStrategic Ofensive Reductions Treaty STARTthinsp=thinspStrategic Arms Reduction Treaty

Figure 32 Economic Cycle 2017ndash2019

Source Authorrsquos evaluation of IFI data and sources from respective countries

Egypt

VenezuelaEU

South Africa

Brazil

Russia

India

US

Descending Growth

Korea

China

Negative Growth

Unstable Growth

Sustainable Growth

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 13 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations14

Figure 33 US- Russia Trade Million US$ vs Po liti cal Cycle 2000ndash2016

Sources US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo Foreign Trade last modified June 29 2017

https wwwcensus gov foreign - trade balance c4621 html (see data for 2000ndash2016) authorrsquos evaluation

of po liti cal and economic data

Orange Revolution

Khodorkovskys arrest

GeorgianWar

Bush- Putin Reset

Iraq War Global Financial Crisis

Obama-Medvedev Reset

Russias WTO accession

New START Treaty

A Pefect Storm the Ukranian Crisis Oil Prices Crashing

Sanctions and Counter-Sanctions

$3000

$8000

$13000

$18000

$23000

$28000

$33000

$38000

$43000

2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 14 102017 404 PM

15

The current structure of US- Russia economic relations emerged in the early 2000s when the

model of trade and investment interaction took on a character similar to that which existed be-

tween the United States and developing economies US imports from Rus sia centered on com-

modities while technology along with food products lead American exports The primary

exception was that Rus sia supplied nuclear fuel including highly enriched uranium extracted from

nuclear weapons for US power plants and provided ser vices to the aerospace industry primarily

in satellite launches However both these exceptions can be explained as a legacy of the Soviet

past and not a harbinger of the future economic relationship (Figure 41)

In the last 15 years this trade structure has not changed significantly The only noticeable shift in

trade was a dramatic drop (to practically nothing) in exports of US agricultural products a result

of Rus siarsquos policy of import substitution and so- called counter- sanction mea sures it took in re-

sponse to US sanctions over the Ukraine crisis (Figure 42)

Promising new directions of cooperation in the IT sector and in engineering ser vices for the

aerospace industry appeared in the early 2000s1 but did not spill into other sectors and conse-

quently did little to renew economic cooperation on the whole The integration of Rus sian high-

tech ser vices into large- scale global production and value chains was constrained by the usual

culprits a lack of financial resources managerial experience skilled labor modern infrastructure

RampD investments and an adequate business environment High commodity prices incentivized the

restoration of an economic system centered on resource rents The leading role of oil and gas

extraction and transportation discouraged the development of a nonenergy sector that might

have created advanced and complex production and ser vices An import substitution policy could

not work efficiently in an economic environment plagued by the Dutch disease where currency

1 The Boeing Design Center was created in Moscow It consists of nearly 250 Boeing employees managing

a team of 1200 contract engineers from Rus sian and Ukrainian aerospace companies ldquoBackgrounder Boeing in

Rus siardquo Boeing last modified January 2017 http wwwboeing com resources boeingdotcom company key _ orgs

boeing - international pdf russia - cisbackgrounder pdf

Are the United States and Rus sia ldquoNatu ralrdquo Trading Partners A Little Bit of History

04

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 15 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations16

inflows (oil money) lead to ruble appreciation and render a countryrsquos production less competitive

During that time Rus siarsquos industry did not receive preferential access to larger markets and could

not expand its share in the global economy particularly because of its self- isolation from the

regional trade agreements (except for its participation in the Eurasian Economic Union with some

neighboring countries of the former Soviet Union) As a result neither import substitution nor

export- led strategy promoted growth and specialization in nonoil production A long- awaited

modernization and reallocation of resources from an inefficient nontrade sector to a trade sector

did not materialize

These limits were later augmented with sanctions and an extension of domestic restrictions on

cooperation with Western partners Importantly the rapid growth of state- monopoly structures in

the Rus sian economy over the past 15 years has created additional obstacles to the development

and diversification of US- Russia economic ties

Figure 41 US Imports from Rus sia US$ 2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2016)

Fish and shellfish 3

Crude oil 5

Fuel oil 37

Petroleum products other

8

Nuclear fuel materials

7

Chemicals-fertilizers 4

Steelmaking materials 5

Iron and steel mill products 4

Bauxite and aluminum 9

Other precious metals 4

Nonferrous metals other 1

Finished metal shapes 1

Synthetic rubber--primary

1

Spacecraftexcluding military

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 16 102017 404 PM

Fig

ure

42

U

S E

xpo

rts

to R

us s

ia U

S$ 2

016

Sou

rce

US

Ce

nsu

s B

ure

au ldquo

Trad

e in

Go

od

s w

ith

Ru

s sia

rdquo (s

ee

dat

a fo

r 2

016

)

Bak

ery

pro

du

cts

Win

e b

eer

an

d r

elat

ed

pro

du

cts

New

spri

nt

Pla

stic

mat

eria

ls

Ch

emic

als-

fert

ilize

rs

Ch

emic

als-

ino

rgan

icC

hem

ical

s-o

rgan

ic

Ch

emic

als-

oth

erC

ott

on

fib

er c

loth

In

du

stri

al r

ub

ber

pro

du

cts

Min

eral

su

pp

lies-

man

ufa

ctu

red

Gen

erat

ors

acc

esso

ries

Ele

ctri

c ap

par

atu

s

Dri

llin

g amp

oilfi

eld

eq

uip

men

t Sp

ecia

lized

min

ing

Exc

avat

ing

mac

hin

ery

No

nfa

rm t

ract

ors

an

d p

arts

In

du

stri

al e

ng

ines

Fo

od

to

bac

co m

ach

iner

y M

etal

wo

rkin

g m

ach

ine

too

ls

Tex

tile

sew

ing

m

ach

ines

W

oo

d g

lass

p

last

ic

Pu

lp a

nd

pap

er

mac

hin

ery

Mea

suri

ng

tes

tin

g

con

tro

l in

stru

men

ts

Mat

eria

ls h

and

ling

equ

ipm

ent

Ind

ust

rial

mac

hin

es

oth

er

Ph

oto

ser

vice

ind

ust

ry m

ach

iner

y A

gri

cult

ura

l mac

hin

ery

eq

uip

men

t C

om

pu

ters

Co

mp

ute

r ac

cess

ori

es

Sem

ico

nd

uct

ors

Tel

eco

mm

un

icat

ion

seq

uip

men

t

Bu

sin

ess

mac

hin

es a

nd

eq

uip

men

t

Lab

ora

tory

tes

tin

g in

stru

men

ts

Med

icin

al e

qu

ipm

ent

Civ

ilian

air

craf

t e

ng

ines

eq

uip

men

t a

nd

par

ts

Rai

lway

tra

nsp

ort

atio

n

equ

ipm

ent

Ves

sels

exc

lud

ing

scr

ap

Co

mm

erci

al v

esse

ls o

ther

M

arin

e en

gin

es p

arts

Spac

ecra

ft e

xclu

din

g

mili

tary

Pas

sen

ger

car

s

new

an

d u

sed

Tru

cks

bu

ses

and

sp

ecia

l p

urp

ose

ve

hic

les

En

gin

es a

nd

en

gin

e p

arts

(c

arb

ure

tors

pis

ton

s r

ing

s

and

val

ves)

B

od

ies

and

ch

assi

s fo

r p

asse

ng

er c

ars

Au

tom

oti

ve t

ires

an

d t

ub

es

Oth

er p

arts

an

d a

cces

sori

es o

f ve

hic

les

Ap

par

el h

ou

seh

old

go

od

s -

text

ile

Ph

arm

aceu

tica

lp

rep

arat

ion

s

Furn

itu

re h

ou

seh

old

go

od

s

etc

R

ug

s

Cel

l ph

on

es a

nd

oth

er

ho

use

ho

ld g

oo

ds

ne

c

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 17 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations18

Figure 43 US Trade in Goods with Rus sia Million US$ 1992ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 1992ndash2016)

Russian Financial Crisis

Oil price Increased from$2446 USD per barrel (2001)

to $9694 USD per barrel(2008)

Global Financial Crisis

Oil price high record in2011-2012

(more that $111 USD perbarrel)

Oil price crashed

$-

$5000

$10000

$15000

$20000

$25000

$30000

$35000

$40000

$45000

$50000

1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

US Imports from Russia US Exports to Russia US-Russia Trade in Goods

No doubt po liti cal ups and downs add volatility to US- Russia trade Nevertheless Rus siarsquos eco-

nomic structure exhausted itself before the Ukrainian crisis and the recent Rus sian recession Its

limitations are not only due to some mistakes in policy or negative coincidences of circumstances

but rather to deeply rooted properties in the current bilateral trade model related to structural

issues in the Rus sian economy Structural constraints such as the weak enforcement of property

rights poor business regulation and nondiversified exports weighed on Rus sian trade with the

United States From this perspective the term ldquonaturalunnatural trading partnersrdquo does not ad-

dress the unused capacity of bilateral interaction or the real challenges that kind of interaction

faces It just adds metaphysical flavor to the very specific economic and po liti cal factors that

determine the US- Russia trajectory

Overall the outlines of bilateral trade (Figure 43) resemble the famous ldquoRus sian Mountainsrdquo that

were a pre de ces sor of the modern roller coaster icy hills supported by wooden constructionsmdash a

rigid and immobile structure that sooner or later would melt This unfortunately is what is hap-

pening to US- Russia trade cooperation now

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 18 102017 404 PM

19

ARE LITTLE FISH REALLY SWEET

Low US- Russia economic interaction has at least two consequences First it limits the capacity of

policymakers to exploit trade as an instrument for geopo liti cal combat Even the question of a US

trade deficit which used to be a headache for many US trading partners has become so insig-

nificant in absolute terms (about $87 billion in 2016) that it seems hardly worth caring about

When the volume of trade between two countries becomes very small in absolute terms whether

a country is running a surplus or deficit is no longer relevant But it also renders another type of

confrontations (sometimes more dangerous) more likely since the two traders have little to lose

Second in an environment marked by low levels of bilateral trade both sides could incentivize (if

and when a desire for po liti cal rapprochement exists) the signing of new trade deals which are

elevated symbolically as a turning point in bilateral po liti cal relations (ie the sale of Boeings to

Rus sia or the delivery via tankers of Rus sian oil to US refineries) Sometimes markets themselves

pres ent ldquogiftsrdquo that can be capitalized on po liti cally US- USSR grain trade in the 1970s was one

such ldquogiftrdquo large sales of American grain to the Soviet Union helped US policymakers win favor

with the po liti cally impor tant American farming sector and permitted Soviet leaders to maintain

access to a dietary staple for the Soviet population

The strong 32 percent growth in value of US imports from Rus sia from January to May 2017

versus January to May 2016 ( Table 51) is an example of a development that has tempted officials

to pres ent it as a sign of positive change due to ldquogrowing business activitiesrdquo (this kind of statement

was heard before the bilateral summit in Germany in July 2017) although the reason for that leap

was evidently an increase in commodity prices (mainly of oilmdash see Table 52) and not a rise in

entrepreneurial interactions The primary beneficiaries of that upside rally have been two other

petro- economies Saudi Arabia and Venezuela ( Tables 53 and 54)

Sector Analyses

05

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 19 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations20

Table 51 US Imports from Rus sia Million US$ Januaryndash May 2016 vs Januaryndash May 2017

Year January February March April May Total

2016 9603 6871 11097 12257 10977 50805

2017 12215 10220 16979 13471 14147 67032

Change 271 487 530 99 289 319

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 1992ndash2016)

Table 52 Change in Urals Crude Oil Prices US$ per Barrel Januaryndash May 2016 vs Januaryndash May 2017

Januaryndash May 2016 Januaryndash May 2017 Change ($) Change ()

3601 5129 1528 424

Source Ministry of Finance of the Rus sian Federation https wwwminfin ru ru ixzz4mMIZ7XtC

Table 53 US Imports from Saudi Arabia Million US$ Januaryndash May 2016 vs Januaryndash May 2017

Year January February March April May Total

2016 15114 9036 13555 10844 14679 63228

2017 19802 20298 21650 16211 19542 97503

Change 3101 12463 5972 495 331 542

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Saudi Arabiardquo Foreign Trade last modified June 29 2017

https wwwcensus gov foreign - trade balance c5170 html (see data for 2016ndash2017)

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 20 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 21

Table 54 US Imports from Venezuela Million US$ Januaryndash May 2016 vs Januaryndash May 2017

Year January February March April May Total

2016 6657 5560 7140 8007 7922 35286

2017 13041 10864 123500 11148 12243 59646

Change 9590 9540 7297 3923 5454 6903

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Venezuelardquo Foreign Trade last modified June 29 2017

https wwwcensus gov foreign - trade balance c3070 html (see data for 2016ndash2017)

Table 55 US Exports to Rus sia Million US$ Januaryndash May 2016 vs Januaryndash May 2017

Year January February March April May Total

2016 3628 3577 7298 4657 4947 24107

2017 3144 4277 5386 6670 4806 24283

Change minus133 196 minus262 432 minus29 minus07

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2016ndash2017)

At the same time US exports to Rus sia continue to stagnate ( Table 55) due to low levels of

consumption during a two-and- a- half-year economic crisis a deep ruble devaluation sanctions

and counter- sanctions

Given the very dif er ent economic structures and resource endowments of Rus sia and the United

States it is not surprising that US- Russia trade is asymmetric and oil driven (Figure 51) A

3 percent increase in Urals oil prices translates into a one percent increase in US import growth

from Rus sia Thus in 2016 every $10 increase in Urals crude oil added $15 billion to the value of

US imports or 11 percent to the total value of imports from Rus sia

OIL ADDICTION

Oil is a core pillar of US- Russia bilateral trade A bumpy ride in oil markets afects commerce

Nevertheless Rus sian oil exports to the United States in physical terms have been rather

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 21 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations22

sustainable Starting from 2005 average annual deliveries have been above 150 million barrels

(Figure 52) Crude and heating oil have dominated while petroleum products and liquefied petro-

leum gases have not (Figure 53) In 2011 oil exports peaked at 228 million barrels but declined to

159 million barrels in 2016mdash a drop of 30 percent Rec ord high shipments of Rus sian oil to the United

States coincided with an elevation in oil prices which made the subsequent decline in oil shipment

value between 2011 and 2016 (by about 72 percent as shown in Figure 54) seem more stark The

increase in price also raised the share of oil in Rus sian exports by 74 percent in 2011 (Figure 55)

The Rus sian share in total US oil imports was around 55 percent in 2011 and 43 percent in 2016

( Table 56) In the last five years the United States has relied exclusively on consumption of Rus sian

oil for the rough equivalent of one week out of the year (Figure 56)

It is unlikely that Rus sia can significantly increase its share of the US oil market and there is a real

possibility for a downward trend There are several reasons the historically high Rus sian hydrocar-

bon export threshold of 2011 will not soon if ever be surpassed

First US energy consumption will likely be flat According to the US Energy Information Adminis-

tration (EIA) demand for petroleum and other liquids in the United States will be about 35ndash36

quadrillion British thermal units (BTUs) with minimal variation over the next 25 years1

1 US EIA ldquoAnnual Energy Outlook 2017 with Projections to 2050rdquo January 5 2017 7ndash8

Figure 51 US- Russia Trade Growth () vs US and Rus sia Real GDP Growth () 1993ndash2016

Source IMF ldquoIMF Datardquo accessed September 27 2017 http wwwimf org en Data US Census Bureau

ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo

Note rGDPthinsp=thinspreal gross domestic product

Trade

USA rGDP growth

Russia rGDP growth

-60

-40

-20

0

20

40

60

80

100

1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Gro

wth

All spikes in US-Russia trade have been connected with two main

variables volume and price of crude oil

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 22 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 23

Second the United States will become a net energy exporter between 2020 and 2030 in most

cases under dif er ent combinations of oil and natu ral gas prices GDP growth technological

breakthroughs and the availability of energy resources The role of oil imports will dramatically

fall2

Third oil price scenarios as described by the International Energy Agency (IEA) international

financial organ izations (IFIs) and many national agencies are very cautious and assume that even

by 2035 to 2040 oil prices will not to recover to the levels of 2011ndash20123

Fourth Rus sian oil production and export growth will be modest and driven by Asian economic

expansion and will comprise a decreasing share of Western markets4 According to forecasts from

2 Ibid 15ndash18

3 Ibid table 3 ldquoEnergy Prices by Sector and Sourcesrdquo World Bank World Bank Commodity Markets Price Forecasts

(Washington DC World Bank 2017) httpswwwworldbank org en research commodity - markets Organ ization of the

Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) World Oil Outlook 2016 (Vienna OPEC 2016)

4 E D Belotskaia et al Global and Rus sian Energy Outlook 2016 (Moscow Energy Research Institute of the Rus sian

Acad emy of Science Analytical Center for the Government of the Rus sian Federation 2016) http acgov ru files

publication a 12767 pdf

Figure 52 US Imports from Rus sia Crude Oil and Petroleum Products Thousands of Barrels 1995ndash2016

Source US EIA ldquoUS Imports by Country of Origin Rus siardquo Petroleum amp Other Liquids September 13

2017 http wwweia gov dnav pet PET _ MOVE _ IMPCUS _ D _ NUS _ NRS _ MBBL _ M htm

0

50000

100000

150000

200000

250000

Date 1995 1996 1997 1998 199920002001200220032004200520062007200820092010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 23 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations24

the Organ ization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) crude oil exports from Rus sia and

the Caspian region to the United States will dis appear by 20255

So why does the Rus sian Urals blend continue to be attractive for oil traders and US refineries

which could pro cess greater volumes of domestically produced lighter crude There are two main

reasons One is related to the preference of US high conversion refineries (the most sophisticated

in the world) to work with heavy oil blends produced by Canada Mexico Iraq Venezuela and

Rus sia Pro cessing heavy crude now is as profitable as pro cessing lighter crude The so- called

crack spreadmdash the diference between the cost of relatively cheap heavy crude oil and the final

price of value- added consumer products (diesel gasoline jet fuel and heating oil)mdash has become

the same as the refinery margins of light sweet crude6 This has primarily afected light oil produc-

ing countries such as Angola Algeria and Nigeria

5 OPEC World Oil Outlook 2016 306ndash309

6 ldquoHow Much for That Heavy Oilrdquo Oil Sands Magazine December 26 2015 https wwwoilsandsmagazine com

news 2015 12 26 how - much - for - that - heavy - oil

Figure 53 US Imports from Rus sia Oil and Petroleum Products US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

$-

$25000000000

$20000000000

$15000000000

$10000000000

$5000000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Liquefied petroleum gases

Petroleum products other

Fuel oil

Crude oil

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 24 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 25

Another factor afecting purchase of Rus sian oil is a new trend among oil companies for further

consolidation of scale and for integrating operations of upstream and downstream business7

There have been several waves of separation and unification of production transportation and

pro cessing in the last 50 years The current business cycle can be seen as an adaptation to a

period of low prices and oversupply Companies that buy andor produce oil in Rus sia most likely

prefer to transport and pro cess this oil in their own modern refineries in the United States At the

same time some of the newest refinery designs specifically for pro cessing heavy oils have been

built in Asia thus extending the choices of heavy oil producing countries

We should also consider that leading US and international oil traders along with oil producing

companies working with or owning US refineries frequently buy Rus sian oil on the open market

and have long- term contracts on Rus sian crude oil delivery Many Rus sian oil companies prefer to

pay for purchases or ser vices with their future production instead of cash creating situations of

ldquostickyrdquo oil imports that are difficult to replace The best- known example is an interaction between

7 ldquoEnergy and Utilities Sectorrdquo Roundtable Financier Worldwide December 2015 https wwwfinancierworldwide

com roundtable - energy - utilities - sector - dec15

Figure 54 US Imports of Oil and Petroleum Products from Rus sia vs Oil Prices Eu rope Brent Spot Price Free on Board (FOB) 1996ndash2017

Source US EIA ldquoUS Imports by Country of Origin Rus siardquo

0

20

40

60

80

100

120

140

0

5000

10000

15000

20000

25000

30000

Jan

-19

96

Jun

-19

96

No

v-19

96

Ap

r-19

97

Sep

-19

97

Feb

-19

98

Jul-

199

8D

ec-1

99

8M

ay-1

99

9O

ct-1

99

9M

ar-2

00

0A

ug

-20

00

Jan

-20

01

Jun

-20

01

No

v-2

00

1A

pr-

20

02

Sep

-20

02

Feb

-20

03

Jul-

20

03

Dec

-20

03

May

-20

04

Oct

-20

04

Mar

-20

05

Au

g-2

00

5Ja

n-2

00

6Ju

n-2

00

6N

ov-

20

06

Ap

r-2

00

7Se

p-2

00

7Fe

b-2

00

8Ju

l-2

00

8D

ec-2

00

8M

ay-2

00

9O

ct-2

00

9M

ar-2

010

Au

g-2

010

Jan

-20

11Ju

n-2

011

No

v-2

011

Ap

r-2

012

Sep

-20

12Fe

b-2

013

Jul-

20

13D

ec-2

013

May

-20

14O

ct-2

014

Mar

-20

15A

ug

-20

15Ja

n-2

016

Jun

-20

16N

ov-

20

16

USD

per

Bar

rel

Th

ou

san

d B

arr

els

US Imports from Russia of Crude Oil and Petroleum Products (Thousand Barrels)

Europe Brent Spot Price FOB (Dollars per Barrel)

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 25 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations26

Table 56 US Oil Imports All Countries vs Rus sia Thousand Barrels per Day 2011ndash2016

Years 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

All Countries 11436 10598 9859 9241 9449 10058

Rus sia 624 477 460 330 371 433

Share 546 450 467 357 393 431

Sources US EIA ldquoUS Imports by Country of Origin Total Crude Oil and Productsrdquo Petroleum amp Other

Liquids September 13 2017 wwweia gov dnav pet pet_move_impcus_a2_nus_ep00_im0_mbbl_m htm

authorrsquos computation

Figure 55 US Imports from Rus sia Share of Crude Oil and Petroleum Products Million US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

57

64

73

72

74

73

72

59

52 50

0

$5000

$10000

$15000

$20000

$25000

$30000

$35000

$40000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

US Imports from Russia

Share of Oil and Petroleum Products

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 26 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 27

the Rus sian state mono poly Rosneft and commodity trading and mining giant Glencore which

along with energy and commodities com pany Vitol participated in a $10 billion prepayment

deal with Rosneft for crude supplies in 2013

There have been a number of ongoing transactions between the Rus sian oil industry and interna-

tional oil companies including several that top the list of importers of Rus sian oil to the United

States ( Table 57) In December 2016 Glencore participated in a controversial privatization opera-

tion purchasing in tandem with the Qatar sovereign wealth fund a 195 percent stake in Rosneft

which was on the US and EU list of sanctioned firms8 Glencore has also taken a blocking stake in

midsize oil producer RussNeft BP owns a 1975 percent stake in Rosneft Chevron holds a

15 percent interest in the 935- mile- long CPC9 pipeline which transports an average of 959000

barrels of crude oil per day including 76000 barrels daily from Rus sia10 ExxonMobil has formed

8 E Mazneva and I Arkhipov ldquoRus sia Sells $11 Billion Stake in Rosneft to Glencore Qatarrdquo Bloomberg December 7

2016

9 CPCthinsp=thinspCaspian Pipeline Consortium

10 ldquoRus sia Highlights of Operations and Business Portfoliordquo Chevron accessed October 3 2017 https wwwchevron

com worldwide russia

Figure 56 Share of Rus sian Oil in Total US Oil Imports Thousands of Barrels per Day 1972ndash2016

Source US EIA ldquoUS Imports by Country of Origin Total Crude Oil and Productsrdquo

2000

4000

6000

8000

10000

12000

14000

16000

US Imports of Crude Oil and Petroleum Products (Thousand Barrels per Day)

US Imports from Russia of Crude Oil and Petroleum Products (Thousand Barrels per Day)19

7319

7419

7519

7619

7719

7819

7919

80

198

119

82

198

319

84

198

519

86

198

719

88

198

919

90

199

119

92

199

319

94

199

519

96

199

719

98

199

92

00

02

00

12

00

22

00

32

00

42

00

52

00

62

00

72

00

82

00

92

010

20

112

012

20

132

014

20

152

016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 27 102017 404 PM

Table 57 Top Importers of Rus sian Oil to the United States Thousands of Barrels 2016

VALERO MARKETING amp SUPPLY CO 54590 3616

EXXONMOBIL OIL CORP 17087 1130

CHEVRON USA INC 15217 1008

BP WEST COAST PRODUCTS LLC 10130 671

GEORGE E WARREN CORP 7272 48

PAULSBORO REFINING CO LLC 6838 453

TESORO CORP 5097 338

VITOL INC 5084 337

PHILLIPS 66 CO 4726 313

TRAFIGURA AG 4360 289

PAR HAWAII REFINING LLC 3893 258

MOTIVA ENTERPRISES LLC 3041 205

SHELL US TRADING CO 2863 19

MARATHON PETROLEUM CO LLC 2475 16

ATLANTIC TRADING amp MARKETING 2099 14

FREEPOINT COMMODITIES LLC 1439 1

GLENCORE LTD 1284 85

BEST PETROLEUM CORP 967 64

ROLYMPUS US COMMODITIES GROUP LLC 822 6

HUNT CRUDE OIL SUPPLY CO 666 4

GULF OIL LP 658 4

Source US EIA ldquoUS Imports by Country of Origin Crude Oilrdquo Petroleum amp Other Liquids September 13

2017 httpswwweiagovdnavpetpet_move_impcus_a2_nus_epc0_im0_mbblpd_ahtm authorrsquos

computation

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 28 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 29

several joint ventures with Rosneft to undertake ofshore exploration in the Black Sea and the Kara

Sea in Siberia11

According to the Sanctions Act US persons are prohibited from exporting or reexporting goods

ser vices (except financial ser vices) and technology in support of exploration or production of new

deep- water Arctic ofshore or shale oil proj ects that involve designated Rus sian entities or other

entities in which such sanctioned persons have a controlling interest or a substantial noncontrol-

ling owner ship interest defined as not less than 33 percent (previously it was 50 percent) The new

law also authorizesmdash but does not requiremdash the imposition of so- called secondary sanctions

against non- US entities that engage in activities involving the construction maintenance or

expansion of Rus sian energy export pipelines with a fair market value of $1 million or more or an

aggregate fair market value during a 12- month period of $5 million12 This provision has raised the

concerns of some Eu ro pean countries particularly Germany As result the final language of the

law included wording about coordination of this issue with allies of the United States

Shipments of Rus sian oil to the United States could be afected by activity in the US refinery

industry In early 2017 Saudi Aramco bought the United Statesrsquo largest oil refinery in Port Arthur

(Texas) and it announced plans to send more of its own crude to that refinery13 Serious concerns

exist however regarding the future of three refineries and nine pipelines owned by Citgo a US

branch of the Venezuelan state com pany PdVSA which is balancing precariously on the edge of

default Under certain conditions in the event of PdVSA bankruptcy Rosneft could claim a stake of

up to 499 percent in Citgo Such a possibility has raised concerns among politicians and US

government officials with Trea sury Secretary Steven Mnuchin calling it a ldquonational security issuerdquo14

Tables 58 59 and 510 show allocations of Rus sian oil imports to major US refineries some of

which work exclusively on Rus sian crude a total of two to three months per year In total 150940

thousand barrels of Rus sian oil were refined in 2016

Figure 57 confirms a leading position of Texas and Louisiana among the US states receiving

Rus sian crude followed by New Jersey California Mississippi Washington Hawaii and Delaware

In a paradoxical way Texas has dis appeared from the list of states as a main destination of US

imports from Rus sia (Figure 58) because Rus sian crude is mostly delivered to Louisiana ports and

registered there by US Customs as an import from Rus sia After that it transports to refineries in

Louisiana and Texas

Overall the short- term business rationale behind the sustainability of US oil imports from Rus sia

cannot overcome strong headwinds in the US energy sector facing all oil importers which will

inevitably lead to a contraction of Rus sian oil exports to the United States in the foreseeable future

11 Exxon eforts to receive a special US Trea sury waiver to drill in sanctioned Rus sia failed in 2017

12 Countering Amer i carsquos Adversaries through Sanctions Act HR 3364

13 Sarp Ozkan ldquoSaudi Aramcorsquos Port Arthur Refinery and the US Refinery Fleetrdquo Drilling Info May 11 2017

https infodrillinginfo com saudi - aramcos - port - arthur - refinery - us - refinery - fleet

14 Graham Kates ldquoTrea sury Secretary Rus siarsquos Citgo Deal a National Security Issuerdquo CBS News May 1 2017

http wwwcbsnews com news rosneft - citgo - steven - mnuchin - national - security

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 29 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations30

Table 58 Valerorsquos Refineries Pro cessing Rus sian Oil Thousands of Barrels 2016

Saint Charles Louisiana 29206 535

Corpus Christi Texas 20626 378

Wilmington California 4250 78

Total USA 54590 100

Source US EIA ldquoRefinery Capacity Reportrdquo January 1 2017

table 5 wwweia gov petroleum refinerycapacity table5 pdf

authorrsquos computation

Table 59 ExxonMobil Refineries Pro cessing Rus sian Oil Thousands of Barrels 2016

Baytown Texas 15037 88

Baton Rouge Louisiana 2046 12

Total USA 17083 100

Source US EIA ldquoRefinery Capacity Reportrdquo authorrsquos computation

Table 510 Chevronrsquos Refineries Pro cessing Rus sian Oil Thousands of Barrels 2016

Pascagoula Mississippi 12767 840

El Segundo California 2372 155

Saint Rose Louisiana 78 05

Total USA 15217 100

Source US EIA ldquoRefinery Capacity Reportrdquo authorrsquos computation

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 30 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 31

HEAVY METAL

Taken together US imports of metals and US imports of oil compose about 80 percent of US

total imports from Rus sia (Figure 59) Trade of metals like other commodities is strongly afected

by market price fluctuations Nevertheless metal imports from Rus sia have been fairly resilient to

market volatility and their average annual value has hovered at about $4 billion in the last five years

(Figure 510) This market resilience was forged at the end of the 1990searly 2000s when Rus sian

metal producers gradually modernized their plants adjusting quality of production to Western

standards and enhancing integration into global value and supply chains Some of them conquered

their share of the highly competitive US market struggling with peers from Canada and certain

BRICS countries (China India and Brazil) To attract additional resources all Rus sian large metal-

producing companies became public and were listed on stock exchanges chiefly the London Stock

Exchange (Severstalrsquo PAO Evraz MMK OAO Novolipetsk Steel Norilsk Nikel and TMK PAO) one

on the New York Stock Exchange (Mechel) and one on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange (Rusal)

Business logic pushed some of them to invest in the US metal- making industry which was hit

hard by crisis Later on some of those assets were sold (eg two US steel mills acquired by

Severstal in 2004 were purchased 10 years later by Steel Dynamics Inc and AK Steel Corp)

Figure 57 Share of US States Rus sian Oil Imports 2016

Source US EIA ldquoUS Imports from Rus sia of Crude Oil and Petroleum Productsrdquo Petroleum amp Other

Liquids September 29 2017 https www eia gov dnav pet hist LeafHandler ashx nshy=shyPETampsshy=shyMTTIM _ NUS

- NRS _ 1ampfshy=shyM authorrsquos computation

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

100

Maine

Massachusetts

Maryland

Connecticut

Georgia

Rhode Island

Virginia

Florida

New York

Alabama

Puerto Rico

Pennsylvania

Delaware

Hawaii

Washington

Mississippi

California

New Jersey

Louisiana

Texas

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 31 102017 404 PM

Figure 58 US Imports from Rus sia by State Million US$ 2013ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoState and Metropolitan Area Trade Datardquo Foreign Trade last modified

October 2 2017 https wwwcensus gov foreign - trade statistics state

Alaska

Connecticut

Delaware

Hawaii

Louisiana

Maryland

North Dakota 0

$1000

$2000

$3000

$4000

$5000

$6000

2013 2014 2015 2016

Alabama

Alaska

Connecticut

Delaware

Hawaii

Louisiana

Maryland

Maine

Mississippi

Montana

North Dakota

Mississippi

Figure 59 US Imports from Rus sia Share of Oil and Metals Million US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 1992ndash2016)

83

82

85

86

87

88

85

82

7375

0

$5000

$10000

$15000

$20000

$25000

$30000

$35000

$40000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

US Imports from Russia

Share of Oil and Metals

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 32 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 33

Obviously the market dynamic of dif er ent metals varies (eg iron steel aluminum platinum and

nickel) Caps to increase their trade and production in a ldquored oceanrdquo global environment with

anemic demand is rather limited despite Figure 510 showing a spike of iron and steel imports

from Rus sia in 2014 and aluminum in 2016 Some opportunities may exist for Russian- owned steel

plants in the United States (such as NLMK) to participate in energy proj ects resumed under Presi-

dent Trump who has required that new pipelines use only American- made steel15

Rus sia occupies a special niche in the US market for titanium products a high- end metal indus-

try Twenty years ago a long- term contract was signed between Rus sian titanium producer

VSMPO- AVISMA and Boeing The Rus sian com pany entered the selective club of Boeing suppliers

for the manufacture of components and semi- finished products Since the signing of this contract

VSMPO has delivered more than 35 percent of all titanium placed on Boeing civil aircraft16 They

are hidden in the trade data in an import category for Civilian Aircrafts and Parts (Figure 511) At

the end of 2016 Boeing announced an extension of its framework agreement with AVISMA

15 E Scheyder C Ngai and T Sylvester ldquoAmerican Steel Unlikely to Get Keystone Boost Despite Trump Orderrdquo

Reuters January 27 2017 http wwwreuters com article usa - trump - pipeline - transcanada - idUSL1N1FH1ZD

16 A Kramer ldquoTitanium Fills Vital Role for Boeing and Rus siardquo New York Times July 5 2013 http wwwnytimes com

2013 07 06 business global titanium - fills - vital - role - for - boeing - and - russia html mcubzshy=shy3

Figure 510 US Imports from Rus sia Iron Steel Bauxite Aluminum Nickel Nonferrous Metals and Other Precious Metals and Materials US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 1992ndash2016)

0

$6000000000

$5000000000

$4000000000

$3000000000

$2000000000

$1000000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 20122013

20142015

2016

Finished metal shapes

Iron and steel advanced

Iron and steel products nec

Nonferrous metals other

Other precious metals

Nickel

Bauxite and aluminum

Iron and steel mill products

Steelmaking materials

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 33 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations34

through 2022 and additional investments in the construction of a new robotic plant in Titanium

Valley a special economic zone located in the Sverdlovsk region that will open in 2018 The pro-

cessing of titanium forgings in all Boeing civil aircraft will be performed there including 787s 737

MAXs and 777Xs17 The contract extension with AVISMA may add several hundred million dollars

in value to annual US imports from Rus sia

How can such heavy reliance on imports of Rus sian titanium exist during a period of rising geopo-

liti cal tensions The answer is straightforward VSMPO- AVISMA is a highly specialized natu ral

mono poly producing 45 percent of the worldrsquos aerospace titanium Only four other countries

smelt high- grade titanium in industrial quantities the United States Germany Japan and China

Overall global production capacity is limited while demand is growing The United States cur-

rently imports around 79 percent of all the titanium it consumes each year18

17 ldquoBoeing and VSMPO Avisma to Launch Second Joint Production Siterdquo Rus sian Aviation Insider December 22 2016

http wwwrusaviainsider com boeing - and - vsmpo - avisma - to - launch - second - joint - production - site

18 Jon Ostrower and Andy Pasztor ldquoBoeing United Technologies Stockpile Titanium Partsrdquo Wall Street Journal

August 7 2014 https wwwwsj com articles boeing - united - technologies - stockpiling - titanium - parts - 1407441886

Figure 511 US Imports from Rus sia Civilian Aircrafts and Parts US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 1992ndash2016)

0

$20000000

$40000000

$60000000

$80000000

$100000000

$120000000

$140000000

$160000000

$180000000

$200000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Parts-civilian aircraft

Civilian aircraft

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 34 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 35

The Sanctions Act authorizes the secretary of the trea sury (in a nonmandatory way) to impose

restrictions (without specifying them) against Rus sian state- owned entities operating in the railway

metals and mining sectors of the Rus sian economy Despite the commanding heights of Rus siarsquos

state sector owner ship in its economy (70 percent of GDP) the metal- producing companies have

remained mostly in private hands

NUCLEAR AFFAIRS

Historically owners and operators of the 104 commercial nuclear power reactors in the United

States have purchased more than 80 percent of their uranium from foreign countries Uranium

shipping from Rus sia accounted for about 13 percent of the 58 million pounds of uranium pur-

chased overseas in 201219 At the same time the Rus sian state- owned mono poly Rosatom ac-

counts for 20 percent of Kazakhstanrsquos uranium production (which in turn comprises 11 percent of

all US uranium imports) and 20 percent of US domestic uranium production capacity (with

owner ship of exploration tracts in Wyoming)20

Nuclear fuel and nuclear power continue to be po liti cally sensitive topics both in the United

States and Rus sia Bilateral cooperation in this sector (being surprisingly stable with imports of

nuclear fuel from Rus sia at a level of $1 billion annually in the last five years [Figure 512 and 513])

is under constant po liti cal and lobbying pressure and has been a source of several po liti cal scan-

dals21 Consequently upside risks in this area of interaction are minimal and downside risks are

much higher especially when we are seeing more decommissioning of nuclear plants in the

United States than new constructions The US EIArsquos 2017 Annual Energy Outlook assumes

that about 25 percent of the nuclear capacity now operating will be removed from ser vice

by 205022

WHY IS THE GRASS GREENER ON THE OTHER SIDE

The United States continues to significantly reduce imports of chemical fertilizers as domestic pro-

duction increases In 2016 the United States imported 13 percent less ammonia and 11 percent

less urea and UAN which is a liquid urea and ammonium nitrate fertilizer Rus sia accounts for

around 40 percent of UAN imported by the United States The United States canceled antidumping

duties on imports of ammonium nitrate and urea from Rus sia in 2016 but it did not prevent import

19 US EIA ldquoThe US Relies on Foreign Uranium Enrichment Ser vices to Fuel Its Nuclear Power Plantsrdquo Today in

Energy August 28 2013 https wwweia gov todayinenergy detail php idshy=shy1273

20 Colin Chilcoat ldquoDoes Rus sia Really Own 20 Percent of the USrsquo Uranium Reservesrdquo OilPricecom May 6 2015

http oilpricecom Alternative - Energy Nuclear - Power Does - Russia - Really - Own - 20 - Of - The - US - Uranium - Reserves

html

21 Michelle Ye Hee Lee ldquoThe Facts behind Trumprsquos Repeated Claim about Hillary Clintonrsquos Role in the Rus sian Ura-

nium Dealrdquo Washington Post October 26 2016

22 US EIA ldquoAnnual Energy Outlook 2017 with Projections to 2050rdquo 81ndash82

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 35 102017 404 PM

Figure 512 US Imports from Rus sia Share of Oil Metals and Nuclear Fuel Million US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 1992ndash2016)

87

86

90

90

90

91

88

86

7882

0

$5000

$10000

$15000

$20000

$25000

$30000

$35000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

US Imports from Russia

Share of Oil Metals and Nuclear Fuel

Figure 513 US Imports from Rus sia Nuclear Fuel Materials US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

$-

$200000000

$400000000

$600000000

$800000000

$1200000000

$1000000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 36 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 37

drops twice last year (Figures 514 and 515) According to forecasts UAN imports are expected to

decline further to 15 million tons this year down over 46 percent from 28 million tons imported

last year23 The downside trend in imports of fertilizers will likely continue because of oversupply

BIG FISH

US imports of fish and shellfish from Rus sia are best understood in comparison with US fish

exports to the Rus sian market which slipped to zero in August 2014 after Rus sia issued an order

banning certain agricultural imports from the United States (Figure 516) While the volume of US

supply was not very large it was impor tant because it broke up the monopolistic dominance of a

few vertically integrated Rus sian companies that have kept prices high by restricting the entry of

new producers Seeking to implement import substitution policies Rus sia has tried to reduce

exports as well as imports of fish and seafood products in the last couple of years This symmetri-

cal approach was intended to ldquocompensaterdquo for a decrease of fish products in the domestic

23 Deepika Thapliyal ldquoPotashCorp Forecasts Sharp Drop in US Nitrogen Imports in 2017rdquo ICIS News February 7

2017 https wwwicis com resources news 2017 02 07 10076734 potashcorp - forecasts - sharp - drop - in - us - nitrogen

- imports - in - 2017

Figure 514 US Imports from Rus sia Share of Oil Metals Nuclear Fuel and Fertilizers Million US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

90

93

92

93

94

95

92

91

85

86

0

$5000

$10000

$15000

$20000

$25000

$30000

$35000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

US Imports from Russia

Share of Oil Metals Nuclear Fuel and Fertilizers

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 37 102017 404 PM

Figure 515 US Imports from Rus sia Chemical- Fertilizers US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

S-

$200000000

$400000000

$600000000

$800000000

$1000000000

$1200000000

$1400000000

$1600000000

$1800000000

$2000000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Figure 516 US Exports to Rus sia Fish and Shellfish US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

0

$10000000

$20000000

$30000000

$40000000

$50000000

$60000000

$70000000

$80000000

$90000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Fish and shellfish

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 38 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 39

consumer market caused by Rus siarsquos import ban but it has failed As result the group most af-

fected by the self- imposed counter- sanctions were Rus sian consumers

With a significant drop in fish imports a devaluation of the ruble and inflationary pressures on

seafood prices yearly consumption of fish in Rus sia has declined precipitously In 2015 alone

fish prices increased 20 percent and consumption dropped to 14 kilograms per person24 from

22 kilograms in 201425 In 2016 food rose to 355 percent of house hold expenditure as a result of

increases in food prices26 This has pushed vertically integrated fishing monopolies to sell even

more of their catch abroad rather than deliver to the Rus sian Federation (Figure 517) Thus we

cannot exclude the possibility of further growth in US fish and shellfish imports from Rus sia on a

marginal scale

24 Александр Савельев ldquoПотребление рыбы в России упало до 14 кг на человекаrdquo [Fish consumption in Rus sia fell to

14 kg per person] Экономика Интерфакс January 28 2015 http wwwinterfax ru business 492038

25 Илья Шестаков ldquoПотебление рыбы в России снизилось на 10 процентов из- за роста ценrdquo [Fish consumption in

Rus sia dropped by 10 percent due to price increases] RNS March 8 2017 https rnsonline consumer - market

Potreblenie - ribi - v - Rossii - snizilos - na - 10 - iz - za - rosta - tsen - 2017 - 03 - 08

26 Zoya Sheftalovich and Christian Oliver ldquoRus siarsquos Boom (Farming) Economyrdquo Politico November 8 2016 http

wwwpolitico eu article russias - boom - farming - economy

Figure 517 US Imports from Rus sia Fish and Shellfish US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

0

$50000000

$100000000

$150000000

$200000000

$250000000

$300000000

$350000000

$400000000

$450000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 39 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations40

SPACE ODYSSEY

Among high- end products beyond the top five groups of goods imported from Rus sia cheap and

efficient Rus sian engines have been used to launch US rockets into space for about 16 years

(Figure 518) There was a serious po liti cal strug gle around a 2014 ban on the purchase of Rus sian

RD-180 rocket engines revealing the conflicting business interests of power ful high- tech companies

This restrictive mea sure was temporary and was quickly lifted because of significant cost impacts

and risks of disruption to launch schedules27 For the same reason the Sanctions Act does not autho-

rize ldquothe imposition of any sanction or other condition limitation restriction or prohibition that

directly or indirectly impedes the supply by any entity of the Rus sian Federation of any product or

ser vice or the procurement of such product or ser vice by any contractor or subcontractor of the

United States or any other entity relating to or in connection with any space launch conducted for

the National Aeronautics and Space Administration or any other nonndash Department of Defense

customerrdquo28

Nevertheless many experts believe that US domestic alternatives to replace Rus sian engines will

be viable in five to eight years

27 Ken Dilanian ldquoWhy Does the US Use Rus sian Rockets to Launch Its Satellitesrdquo NBC News updated November 15

2016 http wwwnbcnews com why - does - u - s - use - russian - rockets - launch - its - satellites - n588526

28 Countering Amer i carsquos Adversaries through Sanctions Act HR 3364

Figure 518 Spacecraft Excluding Military US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

0

$20000000

$40000000

$60000000

$80000000

$100000000

$120000000

$140000000

$160000000

$180000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 40 102017 404 PM

41

Diversity and technological complexity are the most vis i ble advantages supporting US exports to

Rus sia Three major groups of export goods include civilian aircraft engines and parts (Figure 61)

drilling and oil field equipment (Figure 62) and industrial machines and engines (Figure 63)

Despite sanctions against the transfer of advanced oil producing and pro cessing technologies the

realization of US drilling and oil field equipment in Rus sia is sustainable although some bilateral

proj ects have been frozen

Another category of goods that has demonstrated resilience is the phar ma ceu ti cal industry (Fig-

ure 64) because most drugs in Rus sia are imported (about 70 percent of the Rus sian phar ma ceu-

ti cal market in value) Import substitution policies have had only modest results in this industry

As confirmed by American Chamber of Commerce surveys US exports to Rus sia are closely

connected to US FDI 30 percent of total imports of US companies working in the Rus sian

market come from the United States (more than $2 billion in 2016) In other words about

40 percent of all US exports to Rus sia are related to a US corporate- sector business pro cess in

the country The major sectors of activity of these companies are energy and natu ral resources

(52 percent) manufacturing (17 percent) information and communications technology or ICT

(13 percent) retail (7 percent) automotive industry (6 percent) phar ma ceu ti cal production

(1 percent) professional ser vices (05 percent) and other (2 percent)1

Some obvious constraints on US exports to Rus sia have resulted from a reduction in demand A

deterioration of bilateral relations and implementation of sanctions and counter- sanctions have

directly or indirectly afected all businesses Figures 65 and 66 provide data regarding a dramatic

drop in the sale of US agricultural production in Rus sia with all other categories of exports in

goods showing big cuts as well (see Figures 67ndash69)

Exports of civilian aircraft engines and parts put the state of Washington in first place among

other states as a leading exporter to the Rus sian market (Figure 610)

1 American Chamber of Commerce in Rus sia ldquoInvestment and Import to Rus sia 2nd Surveyrdquo 13

Diversity and Constraints

06

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 41 102017 404 PM

Figure 61 US Exports of Civilian Aircraft Engines Equipment and Parts to Rus sia US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

$2500000000

$2000000000

$1500000000

$1000000000

$500000000

$-

Figure 62 US Exports of Drilling and Oil Field Equipment US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

0

$5000000

$10000000

$15000000

$20000000

$25000000

$30000000

$35000000

$40000000

$45000000

$50000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 42 102017 404 PM

Figure 63 US Exports of Industrial Engines to Rus sia US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

0

$5000000

$10000000

$15000000

$20000000

$25000000

$30000000

$35000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Figure 64 US Exports of Phar ma ceu ti cal Preparations to Rus sia US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

0

$5000000

$10000000

$15000000

$20000000

$25000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 43 102017 404 PM

Figure 65 US Exports of Meat and Poultry to Rus sia US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Meat poultry etc

$1000000000

$800000000

$600000000

$400000000

$200000000

$-

$1200000000

$1400000000

$1600000000

Figure 66 US Exports of Soybeans to Rus sia US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

0

$20000000

$40000000

$60000000

$80000000

$100000000

$120000000

$140000000

$160000000

$180000000

$200000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 44 102017 404 PM

Figure 67 US Exports of Vehicles Engines and Parts to Rus sia US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Other parts and accessories of vehicles

Automotive tires and tubes

Bodies and chassis for passenger cars

Engines and engine parts (carburetors pistonsrings and valves)

Trucks buses and special purpose vehicles

Passenger cars new and used

$2500000000

$2000000000

$1500000000

$500000000

$-

$1000000000

Figure 68 US Exports of Medicinal Equipment to Rus sia US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

$10000000

$15000000

$20000000

$25000000

$30000000

$35000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 45 102017 404 PM

Figure 610 US Exports to Rus sia by States (2016 US$ Value) Million US$ 2013ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoState and Metropolitan Area Trade Datardquo

Iowa Kentucky

North Dakota

Oklahoma

South Carolina

Washington

0

$500

$1000

$1500

$2000

2013 2014 2015 2016

District of Columbia

Iowa

Kentucky

North Dakota

Oklahoma

South Carolina

Washington

Figure 69 US Exports of Excavating Machinery to Rus sia US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

0

$5000000

$10000000

$15000000

$20000000

$25000000

$30000000

$35000000

$40000000

$45000000

$50000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 46 102017 404 PM

47

Upon reviewing the current trend in US- Russia economic relations we must acknowledge that

the existing trade model is obsolete and exhausted Imports are resource- oriented and reflect

constraints of the Rus sian economic structure while five groups of goodsmdash oil metals nuclear

fuels fertilizers and fishmdash make up more than 90 percent of total imports from Rus sia (Figure 71)

Each of these industries has a limited capacity for growth in the foreseeable future

Rus siarsquos core export to the United Statesmdash oilmdash will inevitably decrease in the mid- term under any

scenario The value and volume of Rus sian exports to the United States are open to global market

volatility and po liti cal pressures with limited hedging mechanisms

Overall US exports to Rus sia are unsustainable due to bilateral po liti cal tensions the whims of

commodity markets and changing domestic policies Sanctions and counter- sanctions have

created additional barriers particularly in finance banking high- tech energy and agro- business

According to the American Chamber of Commerce 69 percent of US companies working in the

country consider the impact of US sanctions against Rus sia on their business as negative At the

same time 60 percent of companies do not expect big changes in business relations between

Rus sia and the United States under Trump1 as the new law codifies existing sanctions fortifies

them and extends them to new sectors

Current US investments are low due to the weak rule of law in Rus sia a lack of property right

protections and proper contract enforcement high levels of statization and monopolization in the

economy a poor business climate outdated capital stock dependence on natural- resource

sectors and of course sanction and counter- sanction mea sures Bloated administrative compo-

nents created as risk mitigation instruments have also served as impediments The countryrsquos

institutional weakness low level of productivity bud get constraints and a declining inflexible

workforce will restrain future economic growth even if commodity prices recover Rus sian eco-

nomic policy will likely continue to be statist and protectionist relying mostly on import

substitutions

1 Ibid 11

Existing Trends and Future Scenarios

07

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 47 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations48

What scenarios can be expected in such a challenging environment

One probability (no peace no war) is based on the assumption that matters will not deteriorate

further and implementation of the Sanctions Act will be cursory This will cause relatively slow

degradation in the economic field with occasional flashes of activity in selected areas (eg closer

cooperation against Islamist terrorist groups in Syria)

A second worse case or critical scenario is the intensive and full- scale execution of current sanc-

tion legislation and even the imposition of new economic punitive and restrictive mea sures which

could incite asymmetric retaliatory actions and lead to the introduction of additional protectionist

policies This in turn could trigger a further escalation of mutual confrontation and could eventu-

ally destroy the fundamentals of the current bilateral trade system Rus sian leadership has charac-

terized the Sanctions Act as a declaration of a trade war that ends all hope for improving bilateral

relations2

2 Дмитрий Медведев ldquoПодписание президентом США нового санкционного закона против России создает несколько

последствийrdquo [The US Presidentrsquos signing of the package of new sanctions against Rus sia will have a few conse-

quences] Facebook August 2 2017 https wwwfacebook com Dmitry Medvedev posts 10154587161801851

Figure 71 US Imports from Rus sia Share of Oil Metals Nuclear Fuel Fertilizers and Fish Million US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

93

94

93

94

95

96

93

92

87

89

0

$5000

$10000

$15000

$20000

$25000

$30000

$35000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

US Imports from Russia

Share of Oil Metals Nuclear FuelFertilizers and Fish

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 48 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 49

The best case and most favorable scenario looks less probable now It assumes the realization of

structural reforms in Rus sia in such a way that would adapt Rus siarsquos foreign policy to national

economic needs reduce confrontations with the West and make a concerted efort to integrate

Rus sian businesses into global supply and value chains A revitalization of the structural reform

agendamdash including eforts to diversify economic activities through de- monopolization and support

for SMEs a restructuring of the banking sector the creation of a vibrant business climate to foster

entrepreneurships and innovation the implementation of administrative and judicial reforms to

tackle red tape and endemic corruption and the reduction of state control over key sectors of the

economy via wide- spread privatization could kick- start the development of a nonoil economy and

improve long- term growth prospects Despite ongoing discussion of reform strategies deep

economic and po liti cal changes are extremely complicated over the next po liti calelectoral cycle

(2018ndash2024) particularly because of re sis tance of vested interests and growing commodity prices

The urgency to tackle structural shortcomings in natu ral resource- dependent economies usually

correlates with the price of those resources and the degree to which resource rents drive eco-

nomic activity However there may be marginal improvements in the efficiency of the current

economic system

Future US- Russia relations can be thought of through three pillars one pillar focuses on areas

where both countries maintain a competitive rivalry another looks at potential areas of interaction

under pres ent conditions a third pillar and one that has evaporated from the current bilateral

agenda concentrates on future cooperation Stronger economic ties could not only be a kind of

po liti cal shock absorber but contribute to the building of this future (particularly business contacts

aim to support future structural reforms) although po liti cal factors are depressing the prospects

for cooperation To escape deadlock it will be impor tant to establish the right balance between

politics and economics and create a model of collaboration within the framework of contention

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 49 102017 404 PM

About the Author

Vadim Grishin PhD MBA has been involved in the reform pro cess in Rus sia as adviser to the

deputy prime minister of Rus sia in 1992ndash1993 and 2006ndash2010 He has extensive experience

working with the Bretton Woods Institutions He was the board member of the World Bank Group

and served as se nior adviser at the International Monetary Fund Currently he is a con sul tant to the

chief economistrsquos office of the International Finance Corporation and teaches the economics of

transition at Georgetown University in Washington DC

50

594-71613_ch99_4Pindd 50 102017 403 PM

Blank

COVER PHOTO ADOBE STOCK

1616 Rhode Island Avenue NW

Washington DC 20036

202 887 0200 | wwwcsisorg

v++ISBN 978-1-4422-8035-9

Lanham bull Boulder bull New York bull London

4501 Forbes Boulevard

Lanham MD 20706

301 459 3366 | wwwrowmancom

A U T H O R

Vadim Grishin

Myths and Realities

A Report of the

CSIS RUSSIA AND EURASIA PROGRAM

US-RussiaEconomicRelations

O C T O B E R 2 0 1 7

Euml|xHSLEOCy280359z

The Man Pupu Nyor Rock Formations at the Northern Urals also known as Seven

Strong Man or Little Mountain of the God in the local tribe (Mansi) language

Page 7: U.S.-Russia Economic Relations: Myths and Realities · 2020-04-17 · OCTOBER 2017 U.S.- Russia Economic Relations Myths and Realities AUTHOR Vadim Grishin A REPORT OF THE CSIS RUSSIA

1

01

Introduction

A friend of mine a devoted connoisseur of bilateral economic relations with 30 years of experi-

ence in the field once noted that the hottest discussions about US- Russia ties occur at a time

when mutual trade is compressed into the value of a mathematical error This is exactly what is

happening now According to official statistics the value of US- Russia trade is about $20 billion

and is rolling back to the level of 20051 There is no doubt that a new set of sanctions recently

signed into law by the US president and currently being implemented will further hurt economic

interaction by reducing financial inflows limiting the transfer of technology and expertise and

dampening business confidence Many policymakers and experts have agreed that HR 3364

(Countering Amer i carsquos Adversaries through Sanctions Act2) by expanding and codifying US

sanctions targeting Rus sia opens a new cycle in bilateral relations This legislation which received

overwhelming bipartisan support creates a new economic and po liti cal framework on a bilateral

track Strong concerns expressed by President Donald Trump in his special statement about

ldquounconstitutional provisions of the ldquoflawed billrdquo3 cannot significantly limit its intended and

unintended consequences In its implementation it could have relatively broad margins of flexibil-

ity and leverage but requires the president to seek congressional approval before easing or termi-

nating sanctions against Rus sia or undertaking actions that would significantly modify US policy

toward Rus sia Additional observations regarding HR 3364rsquos pos si ble impact on US- Russia

interaction in par tic u lar industries can be found throughout this report but suffice it to say that it

will contribute to a broader curtailment of many pillars of economic cooperation for years ahead

1 US Census Bureau ldquoForeign Trade Trade in Goods with Rus siardquo Foreign Trade updated June 29 2017 https

wwwcensus gov foreign - trade balance c4621 html

2 Countering Amer i carsquos Adversaries through Sanctions Act HR 3364 115th Cong (2017ndash2018) https www

congress gov bill 115th - congress house - bill 3364

3 Donald J Trump ldquoStatement by President Donald J Trump on the Signing of HR 3364rdquo White House Office of the

Press Secretary August 2 2017 https wwwwhitehouse gov the - press - office 2017 08 02 statement - president

- donald - j - trump - signing - hr - 3364

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 1 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations2

Escalating geopo liti cal tensions have continued to significantly define Rus siarsquos economic prospects

however the countryrsquos economic model exhausted itself long before the dramatic deterioration of

relations with the West Structural bottlenecks have seriously limited Rus siarsquos growth capacity even

during the previous period of high oil prices4

The purpose of this report is to assess what has gone wrong with the US- Russia equation by

analyzing it through the prism of a bilateral economic and po liti cal trajectory while keeping in

mind the structural constraints of the Rus sian economy It will attempt to answer the following

questions

bull Do bilateral economic relations matter

bull Are the United States and Rus sia ldquonatu ralrdquo or ldquounnaturalrdquo trading partners

bull What future scenarios can we expect

In the vast lit er a ture on US- Russia economic relations analy sis of developing trends in bilateral

commerce has always been accompanied by discussions around impor tant po liti cal and eco-

nomic matters particularly regarding US legislation and regulation5 Over several de cades the

most controversial issues concerned the granting of permanent normal trading status to Rus sia

through legislation that eliminated the Jackson- Vanik Amendment and Rus siarsquos accession to

the World Trade Organ ization (WTO) The Magnitsky Act signed into law in 2012 repealed the

Jackson- Vanik provisions but added legislation providing authority for the US government to

withhold visas and freeze assets of Rus sians thought to have been involved with human rights

violations and later imposed sanctions on Rus sia because of its involvement in the Ukrainian and

Syrian crises and its cyber- enabled activities6

Some have observed deficiencies in Rus siarsquos participation in the international division of labor

(reliance on the export of energy and metals) which ldquo canrsquot serve any more as a basis for further

expansion of the countryrsquos position in world markets including the US marketrdquo7 Unfortunately

such observations have not been accompanied by quantitative and qualitative analy sis of structural

constraints in the Rus sian foreign trade model Many authors limit their policy recommendations

for fostering bilateral economic relations to a requirement for a strong initial push from respective

governments the creation of business working groups and the extension of bilateral and multilat-

eral legal grounds for economic cooperation Such instruments proved to be useful in facilitating

4 International Monetary Fund (IMF) Rus sian Federation Selected Issues (Washington DC IMF 2016)

5 ldquoAmer i carsquos New Economic Sanctions May Hurt Rus siarsquos Recoveryrdquo Economist August 5 2017 Andrey Kortunov and

Olga Oliker eds A Roadmap for US- Russia Relations (Washington DC CSISRIAC 2017) https csis - prods3

amazonaws com s3fs - public publication 170815 _ KortunovOliker _ USRussiaRelations _ Web pdf E0bdGVHlxxYRAxhO

w8zJ9tbRGwdWjEgV Самуйлов CM Братерский MB ldquoКонгресс и торговые отношения США с Россиейrdquo [US

Congressrsquos role in the US- RF trade relations] США и Канада экономика политика культура 5 no 533 (May 2014)

6 Andrew Weiss and Richard Nephew ldquoThe Role of Sanctions in US- Russian Relationsrdquo (Task Force White Paper

Car ne gie Endowment for International Peace Washington DC July 11 2016)

7 Глущенко ЮН ldquoСостояние проблемы и перспективы сотрудничества России и США в экономической сфереrdquo

[Status prob lems and prospects of Russia- US economic cooperation] Проблемы Национальной Стратегии 21 no 6

(2013) 148ndash164

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 2 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 3

trade and investment during several reset cycles in bilateral relations starting in the 1990s but

they were only partially successful

Several papers and books although focused primarily on bilateral po liti cal agendas or sectorial

analy sis underline the importance of Rus sian domestic realities Dr Angela Stent in her ldquoLimits of

Partnershiprdquo notes that state control of the commanding heights in the Rus sian economy creates

significant deterrents for US private- sector entrance into the market8 Thane Gustafson in the

ldquoWheel of Fortunerdquo asserts that Rus siarsquos growing dependence on revenue from oil exports along

with its inefficient and often- corrupt management of industry is unsustainable9 Andrew Kuchins

in his ldquoElevation and Calibration A New Rus sia Policy for Amer i cardquo has quoted some experts who

believe that the weakened Rus sian economic position may over time contribute to some rap-

prochement with the West and emphasized lack of reforms as ldquoa key obstacle not only for Rus sian

economic recovery but also for improving ties with the Westrdquo10

In a recent joint task force report Eugene Rumer Andrew S Weiss and Richard Sokolsky argue

that the concept of developing stronger economic ties with Rus sia as a foundation for improved

diplomatic relations has not worked ldquoClinton Bush and Obama all placed high hope on trade as

an engine of better relations with Rus sia All were frustrated by the fact that the two countries are

for the most part not natu ral trading partnersrdquo11 On a dif er ent note the former US envoy to

Rus sia Michael McFaul has defended the achievements of a reset policy under the Barack Obama

administration emphasizing that bilateral trade reached a rec ord level in 2011 Nevertheless he

also stresses that it was a one- time accomplishment unlikely to be repeated12

Voices of those who believe that extensive economic ties can provide stability to broader po liti cal

interaction are weaker than ever in an environment of growing protectionism and adversarial rivalry

8 Angela Stent The Limits of Partnerships US- Russian Relations in the XXI Century (Prince ton NJ Prince ton

University Press 2014) 98

9 Thane Gustafson Wheel of Fortune The Battle for Oil and Power in Rus sia (London Harvard University Press 2012)

10 Andrew Kuchins Elevation and Calibration A New Rus sia Policy for Amer i ca (Washington DC Center on Global

Interests 2016)

11 Eugene Rumer Richard Sokolsky and Andrew S Weiss ldquoTrump and Rus sia The Right Way to Manage Relationsrdquo

Foreign Affairs 96 no 2 (MarchApril 2017)

12 Michael McFaul ldquoUS- Russia Relationsrdquo (lecture Institute for Public Diplomacy and Global Communications

George Washington University Washington DC March 3 2017) https wwwc - span org video 424811 - 1 former

- ambassador - michael - mcfaul - discusses - state - usrussia - relations

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 3 102017 404 PM

4

02

Does Bilateral Economic Interaction Matter

Economic relations do not emerge out of a vacuum There are many variables that define the final

configuration of economic interactions such as a par tic u lar countryrsquos level of economic develop-

ment its business environment legal framework po liti cal climate (regime) culture and religion

history and tradition demography and geography as well as global and national economic cycles

An impor tant driver of trade relations for many economies has become participation in global and

regional trade agreements

As many studies and anecdotal evidence show bilateral economic cooperation should be sizable

and should relate to the economic growth of two countries in a way that afects their policy

interests Let us take as a reference point the BRICS countries1 a community of large emerging

economies which Rus sia belongs to Table 21 pres ents official data on US trade and investments

with BRICS states US- Russia trade in goods is disproportionally lowmdash235 times less than US

trade with China 33 times smaller than US trade with India and 28 times less than US trade

with Brazil The size of the US- Russia trade balance is comparable to the size of the US trade

balance with South Africa whose economy is almost four times smaller than Rus siarsquos If we add

trade in ser vices to the trade of goods the gaps increase significantly (Figures 21 and 22) The

diference is not only quantitative but also qualitative

The quality of trade relations can be mea sured by its diversity its share of high- tech components

resilience to economic shocks and its contribution to GDP growth On average a 10 percent

increase in a nationrsquos two- way trade relative to GDP increases GDP through a variety of channels

by at least 16 percent2

Bilateral trade and real GDP growth in the United States and Rus sia are practically uncorrelated

as shown in the summary output of multifactorial regression The coefficient of multiple determi-

nation (R Square) is close to 0 ( Table 22) At the same time the correlation of US exports to India

1 BRICS is the acronym for a select group of five developing economies Brazil Rus sia India China and South Africa

2 World Economic Forum Foreign Direct Investment as a Key Driver for Trade Growth and Prosperity The Case for a

Multilateral Agreement on Investment (Geneva World Economic Forum 2013) 11

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 4 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 5

Table 21 US Trade and Foreign Direct Investments (FDI) with China India Brazil South Africa and Rus sia 2016

China India Brazil South Africa Rus sia

Total Goods Trade 5786 677 565 13 203

Imports 4628 460 262 73 145

Exports 1158 217 303 55 58

Trade in Ser vices 696 472 317 47 na

Imports 161 268 68 17 na

Exports 535 203 249 30 na

US FDI 746 283 653 62 141

BRICS FDI in the United States

148 93 043 076 63

Supported Jobs in the United States (thousand)

911 197 308 50 84

Source United States Trade Representative (USTR) ldquoCountries amp Regionsrdquo accessed September 27 2017

https ustrgov countries - regions See US- China Trade Facts US- India Trade Facts US- Brazil Trade

Facts US- South Africa Trade Facts and US- Russia Trade Facts

201520142013

and China with the real GDP growth of these big Asian economies is significant (05) In the case of

Brazil the correlation is even higher (07) By contrast South Africarsquos small open economy is quite

sensitive to US imports from South Africa (043)3

In marked contrast to other BRICS countries Rus sia is a poor choice for export- oriented opera-

tions As a recent International Monetary Fund (IMF) study highlights Rus sia is an outlier a rare

exception among emerging market (EM) economies with virtually no preferential access to major

markets and little meaningful change over three de cades4 This complicates Rus siarsquos integration

into the global value chain (GVC) which became a significant driving force toward economic

development and trade for certain BRICS economies

3 IMF statistics authorrsquos computation

4 IMF Rus sian Federation Selected Issues IMF Country Report N17198 (Washington DC IMF July 2017)

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 5 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations6

Trade is closely connected with foreign direct investment (FDI) and both are parts of a complex

interaction known as international production sharing According to publicly available official data

US FDI in Rus sia was about $131 billion for 2013 and $295 billion for 2016 with the top industrial

sectors being software and IT ser vices financial ser vices chemicals metals coal oil and gas

and business ser vices5 If we take into account US investments made through Eu ro pean branches

of US companies and ofshore firms this number would easily triple Another component

that usually is not tracked by official statistics is reinvestments The American Chamber of

Commerce surveys in 2016 and 2017 which include this component draw a completely dif er ent

picture accumulated US corporate FDI in 90 large US companies working in Rus sia reached

5 US Department of Commerce International Trade Administration ldquoRussiamdash94- Foreign Direct Investment and

Portfolio Investment Statisticsrdquo Rus sia Country Commercial Guide July 7 2017 https wwwexport gov article

id=shyRussia - foreign - direct - investment - statistics

Figure 21 US Trade in Goods with China India Brazil Rus sia and South Africa Billion US$ 2016

Source USTR ldquoCountries amp Regionsrdquo See US- China Trade Facts US- India Trade Facts US- Brazil Trade

Facts US- South Africa Trade Facts and US- Russia Trade Facts

0

$50

$100

$150

$200

$250

$300

$350

$400

$450

$500

$550

$600

China India Brazil Russia South Africa

Exports

Imports

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 6 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 7

$8244 billion in 20176 The real level from our perspective is usually between official and private

estimations around $40 billon But even this cumulative figure is less than the US FDI in Brazil

and China

The American Chamber of Commerce surveys have also revealed other impor tant data Eighty-

five percent of US companies doing business in Rus sia entered its market 10 or more years ago

while 60 percent of them ldquolandedrdquo there 20 years ago or earlier Only one percent have started

operations over the last five years confirming an obvious fact entry into the Rus sian market is

challenging because of growing monopolism risks associated with the business climate and a

stagnating economy7

6 American Chamber of Commerce in Rus sia ldquoInvestment and Import to Rus sia 2nd Surveyrdquo (Prepared by GfK for the

American Chamber of Commerce in Rus sia Moscow May 2017) 12

7 Ibid 4

Figure 22 US Trade in Goods and in Ser vices with China India Brazil Rus sia and South Africa Billion US$ 2016

Source USTR ldquoCountries amp Regionsrdquo See US- China Trade Facts US- India Trade Facts US- Brazil Trade

Facts US- South Africa Trade Facts and US- Russia Trade Facts

0

$100

$200

$300

$400

$500

$600

$700

China India Brazil Russia South Africa

Trade in Services

Total Goods Trade

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 7 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations8

Rus sian direct investment position toward the United States declined from $215 billion in 2013 to

$83 billion in 2015 (Figure 23) Taking into account dif er ent channels and instruments the actual

volume of Rus sian investments in the United States made through ofshore Eu ro pean Canadian

and US companies may be several times greater than the available official data

Foreign investment in financial assets or foreign portfolio investment (FPI) should be included

even though Central Bank of Rus sia statistics indicate they were also quite low US investments in

equity were $345 million and in debt instruments were about $65 million in the fourth quarter of

20168 However these numbers do not reflect the real level of FPI Rus siarsquos stocks are incredibly

inexpensive while there has been impressive growth of US investments in short- term securities

and in foreign exchange (FX) operations (cash- and- carry trade) Rus sia was among the top per-

forming emerging markets in 2016 gaining 4744 percent in US dollars9 Nevertheless the gen-

eral capitalization of the stock exchange is tiny (less than 20 percent of GDP) comparable to the

capitalization of just one large US com pany such as Coca- Cola Many private sources believe that

the US FPI in Rus sia could be as high as several billion US dollars but a new set of sanctions

approved by President Trump on August 2 2017 if implemented could reverse those flows It is

still not clear whether the secretary of trea sury will prohibit participation in the oferings of Rus siarsquos

sovereign debt and the full range of derivative products A report on this subject should be sub-

mitted no later than 180 days after enactment of the law which means no later than Febru-

ary 2018 New legislation tightens prohibition on Rus sian financial companies already under

sanctions by limiting any new equity or debt with a maturity greater than 14 days (a provision that

8 Central Bank of Rus sia ldquoForeign Direct Investments in the Rus sian Federationrdquo accessed September 27 2017 www

cbr ru localization switchlanguage urlshy=shy news ampfromshy=shyru - ruamptoshy=shyen - gb

9 VanEck ldquoRus sian Stock Market Soars in 2016rdquo Seeking Alpha February 14 2017 https seekingalphacom article

4045602 - russian - stock - market - soars - 2016

Table 22 Summary Output of Regression Statistics (US Real GDP Rus sia Real GDP US- Russia Exports Imports and Total Trade)

Regression Statistics

Multiple R 0056445768

R Square 0003186125

Adjusted R Square minus0042123597

Standard Error 2616043923

Observations 24

Sources IMF statistics authorrsquos computation

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 8 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 9

previously allowed for 30 days) Similarly US persons are prohibited from taking on any new debt

that has a maturity greater than 60 days (previously it was 90 days) with Rus sian energy compa-

nies currently under sanctions10

According to the Trea sury Department Rus sia held $1029 billion in US Trea sury securities in

June 201711 Could Rus sia withdraw all its reserves from the United States and use this action as a

retaliatory mea sure Such a scenario is unlikely since there is no comparable safe- haven alterna-

tive to US dollars When Rus siarsquos US Trea sury holdings dropped 50 percent from $176 billion

(October 2010) to $90 billion (November 2011) the market did not notice12 Nevertheless Rus sian

authorities have announced they will decrease dependence on assets and payments in US dollars13

10 Countering Amer i carsquos Adversaries through Sanctions Act HR 3364

11 US Department of Trea sury Major Foreign Holders of Trea sury Securities September 18 2017 http ticdata

treasury gov Publish mfh txt

12 Ibid

13 ldquoНовый виток санкций Россия откажется от доллараrdquo [A new round of sanctions Rus sia will abandon the dollar]

Газетару August 7 2017 https wwwgazeta ru business 2017 08 07 10821937 shtml

Figure 23 Rus sia Outward FDI Position United States Equities and Debt Million US$ 2009ndash2016

Source Central Bank of the Rus sian Federation External Sector Statistics Rus sian Direct Investments

Abroad accessed September 27 2017 https wwwcbr ru localization switchlanguage urlshy=shy news

ampfromshy=shyru - ruamptoshy=shyen - gb

$6000

$8000

$10000

$12000

$14000

$16000

$18000

$20000

$22000

2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 9 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations10

Officially the country does not invest in the US stock exchange although some Rus sian oligarchs

have bought US corporate bonds and equities in large amounts The new sanctions law requires

the secretary of trea sury in consultation with the director of national intelligence and the secretary

of state to issue reports on Rus sian se nior po liti cal figures and oligarchs based on their closeness

to the Rus sian regime and their net worth as well as the exposure of key economic sectors of the

United States to Rus sian po liti cally exposed persons and parastatal entities including at a mini-

mum the banking securities insurance and real estate sectors14

Only three Rus sian companies are listed in the US exchanges

Overall the scale and scope of US- Russia economic interaction and business activity is much greater

than officially appreciated but not significant enough to be taken into consideration by policymakers

14 Countering Amer i carsquos Adversaries through Sanctions Act HR 3364

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 10 102017 404 PM

11

03

Politics in the Driverrsquos Seat

Bilateral economic relations depend to a great extent on global and national economic cycles

After the recent global financial crisis the US economy has shown surprisingly sustainable GDP

growth while the Rus sian economy was the most afected among BRICS countries by the turbu-

lence of a worldwide economic downturn in 2008ndash2009 and after a short- term rebound slipped

into stagnation (2012ndash2013) and then into full- scale recession (2014ndash2016) The countryrsquos eco-

nomic cycle however appears to be changing once again with the economy returning to a

pattern of growth albeit uneven and gradual (Figures 31 and 32) Even with sanctions still in place

conditions have improved as a result of the stabilization of Urals oil to an average annual price of

$419 per barrel in 2016 The gains were sparked in part by major crude producers agreeing to cut

production after hefty price drops in 2014 and 2015 Supported by easier financial conditions

higher oil prices and growing macro- stability Rus sia is heading toward a moderate growth rate

that is expected to reach 14 percent this year according to forecasts of the World Bank Group

(WBG) and the IMF1

Because of the significant role that politics plays in any bilateral interaction it is impor tant to

combine economic and po liti cal cycles applying a ldquoresetrdquo to bilateral economic cooperation in

addition to the po liti cal relationship I have compared po liti cal cycles and trade dynamics using the

following graphs ( Table 31 and Figure 33) These charts do not pretend to reflect with mathemati-

cal precision all shifts in the bilateral po liti cal relationship but rather attempt to visually align

impor tant economic and po liti cal moments to detect the efects of po liti cal events on the size of

bilateral trade

Figure 33 shows all pos si ble combinations economic trends at the intersection of po liti cal devel-

opments oppose or support each other in synchronization It is evident that po liti cal interference

1 International Monetary Fund Rus sian Federation Staff Concluding Statement of the 2017 Article IV Mission (Wash-

ington DC IMF 2017) World Bank Group From Recession to Recovery Rus sia Economic Report no 37 (Washington

DC World Bank 2017) http pubdocsworldbank org en 383241495487103815 RER - 37 - May26 - FINAL - with - summary

pdf

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 11 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations12

in bilateral business afairs in the early 2000s was less significant than in later years As result

growing po liti cal tensions from 2003 to 2008 did not dramatically afect bilateral economic inter-

action It is also easier to explain why 2011ndash2012 resulted in rec ord trade and investmentmdash a con-

sequence of very high oil prices GDP growth in both countries improved legislation after Rus siarsquos

accession to the WTO and the Obamandash Medvedev po liti cal reset From 2014 to 2016 a perfect

storm of developments added efficiency to Western sanctions and augmented the damaging

consequences of counter- sanction mea sures

Figure 33 also confirms that in times of reduced economic cooperation po liti cal pressures can

easily change bilateral economic trends Moreover business interests along with economic inter-

actions have a limited capacity to reverse the po liti cal mainstream

Figure 31 Economic Cycle 2014ndash2016

Source Authorrsquos evaluation of international financial institutions (IFI) data and sources from respective

countries

Sustainable Growth

Brazil

Negative Growth

Unstable Growth

Mexico

Descending Growth

Argentina

EU

US

Russia

Vietnam

China

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 12 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 13

Table 31 Po liti cal Cycles in Bilateral US- Russia Relations 1999ndash2016

2001ndash2002 The George W Bushndash Vladimir Putin Reset Rus sia supported ldquoglobal war on terrorismrdquo launched by the United States after 911 the SORT nuclear arms reduction treaty was signed by the United States and Rus sia and a successful business dialogue was developed that created the current structure of economic relations

2003ndash2008 Deterioration in bilateral relations brought on by the Iraq War Georgiarsquos ldquoRose Revolutionrdquo Mikhail Khodorkovskyrsquos arrest Ukrainersquos ldquoOrange Revolutionrdquo Kosovorsquos in de pen dence and the Georgian War

2009ndash2010 The Barack Obamandash Dmitry Medvedev Reset Rus sia served as a logistical hub for transportation and supply of US forces in Af ghan i stan United States and Rus sia signed the new START nuclear arms reduction treaty Rus sia backed tighter economic sanctions on Iran Rus sia gained access to the WTO after 18 years of negotiations

2011ndash2016 Deterioration in bilateral relations caused by the Ukrainian crisis which were followed by sanctions and counter- sanctions along with the Syrian crises and cyber- enabled activities

Source Authorrsquos evaluation of po liti cal and economic data

Note SORTthinsp=thinspStrategic Ofensive Reductions Treaty STARTthinsp=thinspStrategic Arms Reduction Treaty

Figure 32 Economic Cycle 2017ndash2019

Source Authorrsquos evaluation of IFI data and sources from respective countries

Egypt

VenezuelaEU

South Africa

Brazil

Russia

India

US

Descending Growth

Korea

China

Negative Growth

Unstable Growth

Sustainable Growth

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 13 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations14

Figure 33 US- Russia Trade Million US$ vs Po liti cal Cycle 2000ndash2016

Sources US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo Foreign Trade last modified June 29 2017

https wwwcensus gov foreign - trade balance c4621 html (see data for 2000ndash2016) authorrsquos evaluation

of po liti cal and economic data

Orange Revolution

Khodorkovskys arrest

GeorgianWar

Bush- Putin Reset

Iraq War Global Financial Crisis

Obama-Medvedev Reset

Russias WTO accession

New START Treaty

A Pefect Storm the Ukranian Crisis Oil Prices Crashing

Sanctions and Counter-Sanctions

$3000

$8000

$13000

$18000

$23000

$28000

$33000

$38000

$43000

2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 14 102017 404 PM

15

The current structure of US- Russia economic relations emerged in the early 2000s when the

model of trade and investment interaction took on a character similar to that which existed be-

tween the United States and developing economies US imports from Rus sia centered on com-

modities while technology along with food products lead American exports The primary

exception was that Rus sia supplied nuclear fuel including highly enriched uranium extracted from

nuclear weapons for US power plants and provided ser vices to the aerospace industry primarily

in satellite launches However both these exceptions can be explained as a legacy of the Soviet

past and not a harbinger of the future economic relationship (Figure 41)

In the last 15 years this trade structure has not changed significantly The only noticeable shift in

trade was a dramatic drop (to practically nothing) in exports of US agricultural products a result

of Rus siarsquos policy of import substitution and so- called counter- sanction mea sures it took in re-

sponse to US sanctions over the Ukraine crisis (Figure 42)

Promising new directions of cooperation in the IT sector and in engineering ser vices for the

aerospace industry appeared in the early 2000s1 but did not spill into other sectors and conse-

quently did little to renew economic cooperation on the whole The integration of Rus sian high-

tech ser vices into large- scale global production and value chains was constrained by the usual

culprits a lack of financial resources managerial experience skilled labor modern infrastructure

RampD investments and an adequate business environment High commodity prices incentivized the

restoration of an economic system centered on resource rents The leading role of oil and gas

extraction and transportation discouraged the development of a nonenergy sector that might

have created advanced and complex production and ser vices An import substitution policy could

not work efficiently in an economic environment plagued by the Dutch disease where currency

1 The Boeing Design Center was created in Moscow It consists of nearly 250 Boeing employees managing

a team of 1200 contract engineers from Rus sian and Ukrainian aerospace companies ldquoBackgrounder Boeing in

Rus siardquo Boeing last modified January 2017 http wwwboeing com resources boeingdotcom company key _ orgs

boeing - international pdf russia - cisbackgrounder pdf

Are the United States and Rus sia ldquoNatu ralrdquo Trading Partners A Little Bit of History

04

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 15 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations16

inflows (oil money) lead to ruble appreciation and render a countryrsquos production less competitive

During that time Rus siarsquos industry did not receive preferential access to larger markets and could

not expand its share in the global economy particularly because of its self- isolation from the

regional trade agreements (except for its participation in the Eurasian Economic Union with some

neighboring countries of the former Soviet Union) As a result neither import substitution nor

export- led strategy promoted growth and specialization in nonoil production A long- awaited

modernization and reallocation of resources from an inefficient nontrade sector to a trade sector

did not materialize

These limits were later augmented with sanctions and an extension of domestic restrictions on

cooperation with Western partners Importantly the rapid growth of state- monopoly structures in

the Rus sian economy over the past 15 years has created additional obstacles to the development

and diversification of US- Russia economic ties

Figure 41 US Imports from Rus sia US$ 2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2016)

Fish and shellfish 3

Crude oil 5

Fuel oil 37

Petroleum products other

8

Nuclear fuel materials

7

Chemicals-fertilizers 4

Steelmaking materials 5

Iron and steel mill products 4

Bauxite and aluminum 9

Other precious metals 4

Nonferrous metals other 1

Finished metal shapes 1

Synthetic rubber--primary

1

Spacecraftexcluding military

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 16 102017 404 PM

Fig

ure

42

U

S E

xpo

rts

to R

us s

ia U

S$ 2

016

Sou

rce

US

Ce

nsu

s B

ure

au ldquo

Trad

e in

Go

od

s w

ith

Ru

s sia

rdquo (s

ee

dat

a fo

r 2

016

)

Bak

ery

pro

du

cts

Win

e b

eer

an

d r

elat

ed

pro

du

cts

New

spri

nt

Pla

stic

mat

eria

ls

Ch

emic

als-

fert

ilize

rs

Ch

emic

als-

ino

rgan

icC

hem

ical

s-o

rgan

ic

Ch

emic

als-

oth

erC

ott

on

fib

er c

loth

In

du

stri

al r

ub

ber

pro

du

cts

Min

eral

su

pp

lies-

man

ufa

ctu

red

Gen

erat

ors

acc

esso

ries

Ele

ctri

c ap

par

atu

s

Dri

llin

g amp

oilfi

eld

eq

uip

men

t Sp

ecia

lized

min

ing

Exc

avat

ing

mac

hin

ery

No

nfa

rm t

ract

ors

an

d p

arts

In

du

stri

al e

ng

ines

Fo

od

to

bac

co m

ach

iner

y M

etal

wo

rkin

g m

ach

ine

too

ls

Tex

tile

sew

ing

m

ach

ines

W

oo

d g

lass

p

last

ic

Pu

lp a

nd

pap

er

mac

hin

ery

Mea

suri

ng

tes

tin

g

con

tro

l in

stru

men

ts

Mat

eria

ls h

and

ling

equ

ipm

ent

Ind

ust

rial

mac

hin

es

oth

er

Ph

oto

ser

vice

ind

ust

ry m

ach

iner

y A

gri

cult

ura

l mac

hin

ery

eq

uip

men

t C

om

pu

ters

Co

mp

ute

r ac

cess

ori

es

Sem

ico

nd

uct

ors

Tel

eco

mm

un

icat

ion

seq

uip

men

t

Bu

sin

ess

mac

hin

es a

nd

eq

uip

men

t

Lab

ora

tory

tes

tin

g in

stru

men

ts

Med

icin

al e

qu

ipm

ent

Civ

ilian

air

craf

t e

ng

ines

eq

uip

men

t a

nd

par

ts

Rai

lway

tra

nsp

ort

atio

n

equ

ipm

ent

Ves

sels

exc

lud

ing

scr

ap

Co

mm

erci

al v

esse

ls o

ther

M

arin

e en

gin

es p

arts

Spac

ecra

ft e

xclu

din

g

mili

tary

Pas

sen

ger

car

s

new

an

d u

sed

Tru

cks

bu

ses

and

sp

ecia

l p

urp

ose

ve

hic

les

En

gin

es a

nd

en

gin

e p

arts

(c

arb

ure

tors

pis

ton

s r

ing

s

and

val

ves)

B

od

ies

and

ch

assi

s fo

r p

asse

ng

er c

ars

Au

tom

oti

ve t

ires

an

d t

ub

es

Oth

er p

arts

an

d a

cces

sori

es o

f ve

hic

les

Ap

par

el h

ou

seh

old

go

od

s -

text

ile

Ph

arm

aceu

tica

lp

rep

arat

ion

s

Furn

itu

re h

ou

seh

old

go

od

s

etc

R

ug

s

Cel

l ph

on

es a

nd

oth

er

ho

use

ho

ld g

oo

ds

ne

c

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 17 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations18

Figure 43 US Trade in Goods with Rus sia Million US$ 1992ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 1992ndash2016)

Russian Financial Crisis

Oil price Increased from$2446 USD per barrel (2001)

to $9694 USD per barrel(2008)

Global Financial Crisis

Oil price high record in2011-2012

(more that $111 USD perbarrel)

Oil price crashed

$-

$5000

$10000

$15000

$20000

$25000

$30000

$35000

$40000

$45000

$50000

1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

US Imports from Russia US Exports to Russia US-Russia Trade in Goods

No doubt po liti cal ups and downs add volatility to US- Russia trade Nevertheless Rus siarsquos eco-

nomic structure exhausted itself before the Ukrainian crisis and the recent Rus sian recession Its

limitations are not only due to some mistakes in policy or negative coincidences of circumstances

but rather to deeply rooted properties in the current bilateral trade model related to structural

issues in the Rus sian economy Structural constraints such as the weak enforcement of property

rights poor business regulation and nondiversified exports weighed on Rus sian trade with the

United States From this perspective the term ldquonaturalunnatural trading partnersrdquo does not ad-

dress the unused capacity of bilateral interaction or the real challenges that kind of interaction

faces It just adds metaphysical flavor to the very specific economic and po liti cal factors that

determine the US- Russia trajectory

Overall the outlines of bilateral trade (Figure 43) resemble the famous ldquoRus sian Mountainsrdquo that

were a pre de ces sor of the modern roller coaster icy hills supported by wooden constructionsmdash a

rigid and immobile structure that sooner or later would melt This unfortunately is what is hap-

pening to US- Russia trade cooperation now

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 18 102017 404 PM

19

ARE LITTLE FISH REALLY SWEET

Low US- Russia economic interaction has at least two consequences First it limits the capacity of

policymakers to exploit trade as an instrument for geopo liti cal combat Even the question of a US

trade deficit which used to be a headache for many US trading partners has become so insig-

nificant in absolute terms (about $87 billion in 2016) that it seems hardly worth caring about

When the volume of trade between two countries becomes very small in absolute terms whether

a country is running a surplus or deficit is no longer relevant But it also renders another type of

confrontations (sometimes more dangerous) more likely since the two traders have little to lose

Second in an environment marked by low levels of bilateral trade both sides could incentivize (if

and when a desire for po liti cal rapprochement exists) the signing of new trade deals which are

elevated symbolically as a turning point in bilateral po liti cal relations (ie the sale of Boeings to

Rus sia or the delivery via tankers of Rus sian oil to US refineries) Sometimes markets themselves

pres ent ldquogiftsrdquo that can be capitalized on po liti cally US- USSR grain trade in the 1970s was one

such ldquogiftrdquo large sales of American grain to the Soviet Union helped US policymakers win favor

with the po liti cally impor tant American farming sector and permitted Soviet leaders to maintain

access to a dietary staple for the Soviet population

The strong 32 percent growth in value of US imports from Rus sia from January to May 2017

versus January to May 2016 ( Table 51) is an example of a development that has tempted officials

to pres ent it as a sign of positive change due to ldquogrowing business activitiesrdquo (this kind of statement

was heard before the bilateral summit in Germany in July 2017) although the reason for that leap

was evidently an increase in commodity prices (mainly of oilmdash see Table 52) and not a rise in

entrepreneurial interactions The primary beneficiaries of that upside rally have been two other

petro- economies Saudi Arabia and Venezuela ( Tables 53 and 54)

Sector Analyses

05

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 19 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations20

Table 51 US Imports from Rus sia Million US$ Januaryndash May 2016 vs Januaryndash May 2017

Year January February March April May Total

2016 9603 6871 11097 12257 10977 50805

2017 12215 10220 16979 13471 14147 67032

Change 271 487 530 99 289 319

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 1992ndash2016)

Table 52 Change in Urals Crude Oil Prices US$ per Barrel Januaryndash May 2016 vs Januaryndash May 2017

Januaryndash May 2016 Januaryndash May 2017 Change ($) Change ()

3601 5129 1528 424

Source Ministry of Finance of the Rus sian Federation https wwwminfin ru ru ixzz4mMIZ7XtC

Table 53 US Imports from Saudi Arabia Million US$ Januaryndash May 2016 vs Januaryndash May 2017

Year January February March April May Total

2016 15114 9036 13555 10844 14679 63228

2017 19802 20298 21650 16211 19542 97503

Change 3101 12463 5972 495 331 542

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Saudi Arabiardquo Foreign Trade last modified June 29 2017

https wwwcensus gov foreign - trade balance c5170 html (see data for 2016ndash2017)

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 20 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 21

Table 54 US Imports from Venezuela Million US$ Januaryndash May 2016 vs Januaryndash May 2017

Year January February March April May Total

2016 6657 5560 7140 8007 7922 35286

2017 13041 10864 123500 11148 12243 59646

Change 9590 9540 7297 3923 5454 6903

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Venezuelardquo Foreign Trade last modified June 29 2017

https wwwcensus gov foreign - trade balance c3070 html (see data for 2016ndash2017)

Table 55 US Exports to Rus sia Million US$ Januaryndash May 2016 vs Januaryndash May 2017

Year January February March April May Total

2016 3628 3577 7298 4657 4947 24107

2017 3144 4277 5386 6670 4806 24283

Change minus133 196 minus262 432 minus29 minus07

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2016ndash2017)

At the same time US exports to Rus sia continue to stagnate ( Table 55) due to low levels of

consumption during a two-and- a- half-year economic crisis a deep ruble devaluation sanctions

and counter- sanctions

Given the very dif er ent economic structures and resource endowments of Rus sia and the United

States it is not surprising that US- Russia trade is asymmetric and oil driven (Figure 51) A

3 percent increase in Urals oil prices translates into a one percent increase in US import growth

from Rus sia Thus in 2016 every $10 increase in Urals crude oil added $15 billion to the value of

US imports or 11 percent to the total value of imports from Rus sia

OIL ADDICTION

Oil is a core pillar of US- Russia bilateral trade A bumpy ride in oil markets afects commerce

Nevertheless Rus sian oil exports to the United States in physical terms have been rather

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 21 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations22

sustainable Starting from 2005 average annual deliveries have been above 150 million barrels

(Figure 52) Crude and heating oil have dominated while petroleum products and liquefied petro-

leum gases have not (Figure 53) In 2011 oil exports peaked at 228 million barrels but declined to

159 million barrels in 2016mdash a drop of 30 percent Rec ord high shipments of Rus sian oil to the United

States coincided with an elevation in oil prices which made the subsequent decline in oil shipment

value between 2011 and 2016 (by about 72 percent as shown in Figure 54) seem more stark The

increase in price also raised the share of oil in Rus sian exports by 74 percent in 2011 (Figure 55)

The Rus sian share in total US oil imports was around 55 percent in 2011 and 43 percent in 2016

( Table 56) In the last five years the United States has relied exclusively on consumption of Rus sian

oil for the rough equivalent of one week out of the year (Figure 56)

It is unlikely that Rus sia can significantly increase its share of the US oil market and there is a real

possibility for a downward trend There are several reasons the historically high Rus sian hydrocar-

bon export threshold of 2011 will not soon if ever be surpassed

First US energy consumption will likely be flat According to the US Energy Information Adminis-

tration (EIA) demand for petroleum and other liquids in the United States will be about 35ndash36

quadrillion British thermal units (BTUs) with minimal variation over the next 25 years1

1 US EIA ldquoAnnual Energy Outlook 2017 with Projections to 2050rdquo January 5 2017 7ndash8

Figure 51 US- Russia Trade Growth () vs US and Rus sia Real GDP Growth () 1993ndash2016

Source IMF ldquoIMF Datardquo accessed September 27 2017 http wwwimf org en Data US Census Bureau

ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo

Note rGDPthinsp=thinspreal gross domestic product

Trade

USA rGDP growth

Russia rGDP growth

-60

-40

-20

0

20

40

60

80

100

1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Gro

wth

All spikes in US-Russia trade have been connected with two main

variables volume and price of crude oil

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 22 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 23

Second the United States will become a net energy exporter between 2020 and 2030 in most

cases under dif er ent combinations of oil and natu ral gas prices GDP growth technological

breakthroughs and the availability of energy resources The role of oil imports will dramatically

fall2

Third oil price scenarios as described by the International Energy Agency (IEA) international

financial organ izations (IFIs) and many national agencies are very cautious and assume that even

by 2035 to 2040 oil prices will not to recover to the levels of 2011ndash20123

Fourth Rus sian oil production and export growth will be modest and driven by Asian economic

expansion and will comprise a decreasing share of Western markets4 According to forecasts from

2 Ibid 15ndash18

3 Ibid table 3 ldquoEnergy Prices by Sector and Sourcesrdquo World Bank World Bank Commodity Markets Price Forecasts

(Washington DC World Bank 2017) httpswwwworldbank org en research commodity - markets Organ ization of the

Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) World Oil Outlook 2016 (Vienna OPEC 2016)

4 E D Belotskaia et al Global and Rus sian Energy Outlook 2016 (Moscow Energy Research Institute of the Rus sian

Acad emy of Science Analytical Center for the Government of the Rus sian Federation 2016) http acgov ru files

publication a 12767 pdf

Figure 52 US Imports from Rus sia Crude Oil and Petroleum Products Thousands of Barrels 1995ndash2016

Source US EIA ldquoUS Imports by Country of Origin Rus siardquo Petroleum amp Other Liquids September 13

2017 http wwweia gov dnav pet PET _ MOVE _ IMPCUS _ D _ NUS _ NRS _ MBBL _ M htm

0

50000

100000

150000

200000

250000

Date 1995 1996 1997 1998 199920002001200220032004200520062007200820092010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 23 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations24

the Organ ization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) crude oil exports from Rus sia and

the Caspian region to the United States will dis appear by 20255

So why does the Rus sian Urals blend continue to be attractive for oil traders and US refineries

which could pro cess greater volumes of domestically produced lighter crude There are two main

reasons One is related to the preference of US high conversion refineries (the most sophisticated

in the world) to work with heavy oil blends produced by Canada Mexico Iraq Venezuela and

Rus sia Pro cessing heavy crude now is as profitable as pro cessing lighter crude The so- called

crack spreadmdash the diference between the cost of relatively cheap heavy crude oil and the final

price of value- added consumer products (diesel gasoline jet fuel and heating oil)mdash has become

the same as the refinery margins of light sweet crude6 This has primarily afected light oil produc-

ing countries such as Angola Algeria and Nigeria

5 OPEC World Oil Outlook 2016 306ndash309

6 ldquoHow Much for That Heavy Oilrdquo Oil Sands Magazine December 26 2015 https wwwoilsandsmagazine com

news 2015 12 26 how - much - for - that - heavy - oil

Figure 53 US Imports from Rus sia Oil and Petroleum Products US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

$-

$25000000000

$20000000000

$15000000000

$10000000000

$5000000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Liquefied petroleum gases

Petroleum products other

Fuel oil

Crude oil

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 24 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 25

Another factor afecting purchase of Rus sian oil is a new trend among oil companies for further

consolidation of scale and for integrating operations of upstream and downstream business7

There have been several waves of separation and unification of production transportation and

pro cessing in the last 50 years The current business cycle can be seen as an adaptation to a

period of low prices and oversupply Companies that buy andor produce oil in Rus sia most likely

prefer to transport and pro cess this oil in their own modern refineries in the United States At the

same time some of the newest refinery designs specifically for pro cessing heavy oils have been

built in Asia thus extending the choices of heavy oil producing countries

We should also consider that leading US and international oil traders along with oil producing

companies working with or owning US refineries frequently buy Rus sian oil on the open market

and have long- term contracts on Rus sian crude oil delivery Many Rus sian oil companies prefer to

pay for purchases or ser vices with their future production instead of cash creating situations of

ldquostickyrdquo oil imports that are difficult to replace The best- known example is an interaction between

7 ldquoEnergy and Utilities Sectorrdquo Roundtable Financier Worldwide December 2015 https wwwfinancierworldwide

com roundtable - energy - utilities - sector - dec15

Figure 54 US Imports of Oil and Petroleum Products from Rus sia vs Oil Prices Eu rope Brent Spot Price Free on Board (FOB) 1996ndash2017

Source US EIA ldquoUS Imports by Country of Origin Rus siardquo

0

20

40

60

80

100

120

140

0

5000

10000

15000

20000

25000

30000

Jan

-19

96

Jun

-19

96

No

v-19

96

Ap

r-19

97

Sep

-19

97

Feb

-19

98

Jul-

199

8D

ec-1

99

8M

ay-1

99

9O

ct-1

99

9M

ar-2

00

0A

ug

-20

00

Jan

-20

01

Jun

-20

01

No

v-2

00

1A

pr-

20

02

Sep

-20

02

Feb

-20

03

Jul-

20

03

Dec

-20

03

May

-20

04

Oct

-20

04

Mar

-20

05

Au

g-2

00

5Ja

n-2

00

6Ju

n-2

00

6N

ov-

20

06

Ap

r-2

00

7Se

p-2

00

7Fe

b-2

00

8Ju

l-2

00

8D

ec-2

00

8M

ay-2

00

9O

ct-2

00

9M

ar-2

010

Au

g-2

010

Jan

-20

11Ju

n-2

011

No

v-2

011

Ap

r-2

012

Sep

-20

12Fe

b-2

013

Jul-

20

13D

ec-2

013

May

-20

14O

ct-2

014

Mar

-20

15A

ug

-20

15Ja

n-2

016

Jun

-20

16N

ov-

20

16

USD

per

Bar

rel

Th

ou

san

d B

arr

els

US Imports from Russia of Crude Oil and Petroleum Products (Thousand Barrels)

Europe Brent Spot Price FOB (Dollars per Barrel)

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 25 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations26

Table 56 US Oil Imports All Countries vs Rus sia Thousand Barrels per Day 2011ndash2016

Years 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

All Countries 11436 10598 9859 9241 9449 10058

Rus sia 624 477 460 330 371 433

Share 546 450 467 357 393 431

Sources US EIA ldquoUS Imports by Country of Origin Total Crude Oil and Productsrdquo Petroleum amp Other

Liquids September 13 2017 wwweia gov dnav pet pet_move_impcus_a2_nus_ep00_im0_mbbl_m htm

authorrsquos computation

Figure 55 US Imports from Rus sia Share of Crude Oil and Petroleum Products Million US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

57

64

73

72

74

73

72

59

52 50

0

$5000

$10000

$15000

$20000

$25000

$30000

$35000

$40000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

US Imports from Russia

Share of Oil and Petroleum Products

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 26 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 27

the Rus sian state mono poly Rosneft and commodity trading and mining giant Glencore which

along with energy and commodities com pany Vitol participated in a $10 billion prepayment

deal with Rosneft for crude supplies in 2013

There have been a number of ongoing transactions between the Rus sian oil industry and interna-

tional oil companies including several that top the list of importers of Rus sian oil to the United

States ( Table 57) In December 2016 Glencore participated in a controversial privatization opera-

tion purchasing in tandem with the Qatar sovereign wealth fund a 195 percent stake in Rosneft

which was on the US and EU list of sanctioned firms8 Glencore has also taken a blocking stake in

midsize oil producer RussNeft BP owns a 1975 percent stake in Rosneft Chevron holds a

15 percent interest in the 935- mile- long CPC9 pipeline which transports an average of 959000

barrels of crude oil per day including 76000 barrels daily from Rus sia10 ExxonMobil has formed

8 E Mazneva and I Arkhipov ldquoRus sia Sells $11 Billion Stake in Rosneft to Glencore Qatarrdquo Bloomberg December 7

2016

9 CPCthinsp=thinspCaspian Pipeline Consortium

10 ldquoRus sia Highlights of Operations and Business Portfoliordquo Chevron accessed October 3 2017 https wwwchevron

com worldwide russia

Figure 56 Share of Rus sian Oil in Total US Oil Imports Thousands of Barrels per Day 1972ndash2016

Source US EIA ldquoUS Imports by Country of Origin Total Crude Oil and Productsrdquo

2000

4000

6000

8000

10000

12000

14000

16000

US Imports of Crude Oil and Petroleum Products (Thousand Barrels per Day)

US Imports from Russia of Crude Oil and Petroleum Products (Thousand Barrels per Day)19

7319

7419

7519

7619

7719

7819

7919

80

198

119

82

198

319

84

198

519

86

198

719

88

198

919

90

199

119

92

199

319

94

199

519

96

199

719

98

199

92

00

02

00

12

00

22

00

32

00

42

00

52

00

62

00

72

00

82

00

92

010

20

112

012

20

132

014

20

152

016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 27 102017 404 PM

Table 57 Top Importers of Rus sian Oil to the United States Thousands of Barrels 2016

VALERO MARKETING amp SUPPLY CO 54590 3616

EXXONMOBIL OIL CORP 17087 1130

CHEVRON USA INC 15217 1008

BP WEST COAST PRODUCTS LLC 10130 671

GEORGE E WARREN CORP 7272 48

PAULSBORO REFINING CO LLC 6838 453

TESORO CORP 5097 338

VITOL INC 5084 337

PHILLIPS 66 CO 4726 313

TRAFIGURA AG 4360 289

PAR HAWAII REFINING LLC 3893 258

MOTIVA ENTERPRISES LLC 3041 205

SHELL US TRADING CO 2863 19

MARATHON PETROLEUM CO LLC 2475 16

ATLANTIC TRADING amp MARKETING 2099 14

FREEPOINT COMMODITIES LLC 1439 1

GLENCORE LTD 1284 85

BEST PETROLEUM CORP 967 64

ROLYMPUS US COMMODITIES GROUP LLC 822 6

HUNT CRUDE OIL SUPPLY CO 666 4

GULF OIL LP 658 4

Source US EIA ldquoUS Imports by Country of Origin Crude Oilrdquo Petroleum amp Other Liquids September 13

2017 httpswwweiagovdnavpetpet_move_impcus_a2_nus_epc0_im0_mbblpd_ahtm authorrsquos

computation

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 28 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 29

several joint ventures with Rosneft to undertake ofshore exploration in the Black Sea and the Kara

Sea in Siberia11

According to the Sanctions Act US persons are prohibited from exporting or reexporting goods

ser vices (except financial ser vices) and technology in support of exploration or production of new

deep- water Arctic ofshore or shale oil proj ects that involve designated Rus sian entities or other

entities in which such sanctioned persons have a controlling interest or a substantial noncontrol-

ling owner ship interest defined as not less than 33 percent (previously it was 50 percent) The new

law also authorizesmdash but does not requiremdash the imposition of so- called secondary sanctions

against non- US entities that engage in activities involving the construction maintenance or

expansion of Rus sian energy export pipelines with a fair market value of $1 million or more or an

aggregate fair market value during a 12- month period of $5 million12 This provision has raised the

concerns of some Eu ro pean countries particularly Germany As result the final language of the

law included wording about coordination of this issue with allies of the United States

Shipments of Rus sian oil to the United States could be afected by activity in the US refinery

industry In early 2017 Saudi Aramco bought the United Statesrsquo largest oil refinery in Port Arthur

(Texas) and it announced plans to send more of its own crude to that refinery13 Serious concerns

exist however regarding the future of three refineries and nine pipelines owned by Citgo a US

branch of the Venezuelan state com pany PdVSA which is balancing precariously on the edge of

default Under certain conditions in the event of PdVSA bankruptcy Rosneft could claim a stake of

up to 499 percent in Citgo Such a possibility has raised concerns among politicians and US

government officials with Trea sury Secretary Steven Mnuchin calling it a ldquonational security issuerdquo14

Tables 58 59 and 510 show allocations of Rus sian oil imports to major US refineries some of

which work exclusively on Rus sian crude a total of two to three months per year In total 150940

thousand barrels of Rus sian oil were refined in 2016

Figure 57 confirms a leading position of Texas and Louisiana among the US states receiving

Rus sian crude followed by New Jersey California Mississippi Washington Hawaii and Delaware

In a paradoxical way Texas has dis appeared from the list of states as a main destination of US

imports from Rus sia (Figure 58) because Rus sian crude is mostly delivered to Louisiana ports and

registered there by US Customs as an import from Rus sia After that it transports to refineries in

Louisiana and Texas

Overall the short- term business rationale behind the sustainability of US oil imports from Rus sia

cannot overcome strong headwinds in the US energy sector facing all oil importers which will

inevitably lead to a contraction of Rus sian oil exports to the United States in the foreseeable future

11 Exxon eforts to receive a special US Trea sury waiver to drill in sanctioned Rus sia failed in 2017

12 Countering Amer i carsquos Adversaries through Sanctions Act HR 3364

13 Sarp Ozkan ldquoSaudi Aramcorsquos Port Arthur Refinery and the US Refinery Fleetrdquo Drilling Info May 11 2017

https infodrillinginfo com saudi - aramcos - port - arthur - refinery - us - refinery - fleet

14 Graham Kates ldquoTrea sury Secretary Rus siarsquos Citgo Deal a National Security Issuerdquo CBS News May 1 2017

http wwwcbsnews com news rosneft - citgo - steven - mnuchin - national - security

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 29 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations30

Table 58 Valerorsquos Refineries Pro cessing Rus sian Oil Thousands of Barrels 2016

Saint Charles Louisiana 29206 535

Corpus Christi Texas 20626 378

Wilmington California 4250 78

Total USA 54590 100

Source US EIA ldquoRefinery Capacity Reportrdquo January 1 2017

table 5 wwweia gov petroleum refinerycapacity table5 pdf

authorrsquos computation

Table 59 ExxonMobil Refineries Pro cessing Rus sian Oil Thousands of Barrels 2016

Baytown Texas 15037 88

Baton Rouge Louisiana 2046 12

Total USA 17083 100

Source US EIA ldquoRefinery Capacity Reportrdquo authorrsquos computation

Table 510 Chevronrsquos Refineries Pro cessing Rus sian Oil Thousands of Barrels 2016

Pascagoula Mississippi 12767 840

El Segundo California 2372 155

Saint Rose Louisiana 78 05

Total USA 15217 100

Source US EIA ldquoRefinery Capacity Reportrdquo authorrsquos computation

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 30 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 31

HEAVY METAL

Taken together US imports of metals and US imports of oil compose about 80 percent of US

total imports from Rus sia (Figure 59) Trade of metals like other commodities is strongly afected

by market price fluctuations Nevertheless metal imports from Rus sia have been fairly resilient to

market volatility and their average annual value has hovered at about $4 billion in the last five years

(Figure 510) This market resilience was forged at the end of the 1990searly 2000s when Rus sian

metal producers gradually modernized their plants adjusting quality of production to Western

standards and enhancing integration into global value and supply chains Some of them conquered

their share of the highly competitive US market struggling with peers from Canada and certain

BRICS countries (China India and Brazil) To attract additional resources all Rus sian large metal-

producing companies became public and were listed on stock exchanges chiefly the London Stock

Exchange (Severstalrsquo PAO Evraz MMK OAO Novolipetsk Steel Norilsk Nikel and TMK PAO) one

on the New York Stock Exchange (Mechel) and one on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange (Rusal)

Business logic pushed some of them to invest in the US metal- making industry which was hit

hard by crisis Later on some of those assets were sold (eg two US steel mills acquired by

Severstal in 2004 were purchased 10 years later by Steel Dynamics Inc and AK Steel Corp)

Figure 57 Share of US States Rus sian Oil Imports 2016

Source US EIA ldquoUS Imports from Rus sia of Crude Oil and Petroleum Productsrdquo Petroleum amp Other

Liquids September 29 2017 https www eia gov dnav pet hist LeafHandler ashx nshy=shyPETampsshy=shyMTTIM _ NUS

- NRS _ 1ampfshy=shyM authorrsquos computation

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

100

Maine

Massachusetts

Maryland

Connecticut

Georgia

Rhode Island

Virginia

Florida

New York

Alabama

Puerto Rico

Pennsylvania

Delaware

Hawaii

Washington

Mississippi

California

New Jersey

Louisiana

Texas

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 31 102017 404 PM

Figure 58 US Imports from Rus sia by State Million US$ 2013ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoState and Metropolitan Area Trade Datardquo Foreign Trade last modified

October 2 2017 https wwwcensus gov foreign - trade statistics state

Alaska

Connecticut

Delaware

Hawaii

Louisiana

Maryland

North Dakota 0

$1000

$2000

$3000

$4000

$5000

$6000

2013 2014 2015 2016

Alabama

Alaska

Connecticut

Delaware

Hawaii

Louisiana

Maryland

Maine

Mississippi

Montana

North Dakota

Mississippi

Figure 59 US Imports from Rus sia Share of Oil and Metals Million US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 1992ndash2016)

83

82

85

86

87

88

85

82

7375

0

$5000

$10000

$15000

$20000

$25000

$30000

$35000

$40000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

US Imports from Russia

Share of Oil and Metals

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 32 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 33

Obviously the market dynamic of dif er ent metals varies (eg iron steel aluminum platinum and

nickel) Caps to increase their trade and production in a ldquored oceanrdquo global environment with

anemic demand is rather limited despite Figure 510 showing a spike of iron and steel imports

from Rus sia in 2014 and aluminum in 2016 Some opportunities may exist for Russian- owned steel

plants in the United States (such as NLMK) to participate in energy proj ects resumed under Presi-

dent Trump who has required that new pipelines use only American- made steel15

Rus sia occupies a special niche in the US market for titanium products a high- end metal indus-

try Twenty years ago a long- term contract was signed between Rus sian titanium producer

VSMPO- AVISMA and Boeing The Rus sian com pany entered the selective club of Boeing suppliers

for the manufacture of components and semi- finished products Since the signing of this contract

VSMPO has delivered more than 35 percent of all titanium placed on Boeing civil aircraft16 They

are hidden in the trade data in an import category for Civilian Aircrafts and Parts (Figure 511) At

the end of 2016 Boeing announced an extension of its framework agreement with AVISMA

15 E Scheyder C Ngai and T Sylvester ldquoAmerican Steel Unlikely to Get Keystone Boost Despite Trump Orderrdquo

Reuters January 27 2017 http wwwreuters com article usa - trump - pipeline - transcanada - idUSL1N1FH1ZD

16 A Kramer ldquoTitanium Fills Vital Role for Boeing and Rus siardquo New York Times July 5 2013 http wwwnytimes com

2013 07 06 business global titanium - fills - vital - role - for - boeing - and - russia html mcubzshy=shy3

Figure 510 US Imports from Rus sia Iron Steel Bauxite Aluminum Nickel Nonferrous Metals and Other Precious Metals and Materials US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 1992ndash2016)

0

$6000000000

$5000000000

$4000000000

$3000000000

$2000000000

$1000000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 20122013

20142015

2016

Finished metal shapes

Iron and steel advanced

Iron and steel products nec

Nonferrous metals other

Other precious metals

Nickel

Bauxite and aluminum

Iron and steel mill products

Steelmaking materials

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 33 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations34

through 2022 and additional investments in the construction of a new robotic plant in Titanium

Valley a special economic zone located in the Sverdlovsk region that will open in 2018 The pro-

cessing of titanium forgings in all Boeing civil aircraft will be performed there including 787s 737

MAXs and 777Xs17 The contract extension with AVISMA may add several hundred million dollars

in value to annual US imports from Rus sia

How can such heavy reliance on imports of Rus sian titanium exist during a period of rising geopo-

liti cal tensions The answer is straightforward VSMPO- AVISMA is a highly specialized natu ral

mono poly producing 45 percent of the worldrsquos aerospace titanium Only four other countries

smelt high- grade titanium in industrial quantities the United States Germany Japan and China

Overall global production capacity is limited while demand is growing The United States cur-

rently imports around 79 percent of all the titanium it consumes each year18

17 ldquoBoeing and VSMPO Avisma to Launch Second Joint Production Siterdquo Rus sian Aviation Insider December 22 2016

http wwwrusaviainsider com boeing - and - vsmpo - avisma - to - launch - second - joint - production - site

18 Jon Ostrower and Andy Pasztor ldquoBoeing United Technologies Stockpile Titanium Partsrdquo Wall Street Journal

August 7 2014 https wwwwsj com articles boeing - united - technologies - stockpiling - titanium - parts - 1407441886

Figure 511 US Imports from Rus sia Civilian Aircrafts and Parts US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 1992ndash2016)

0

$20000000

$40000000

$60000000

$80000000

$100000000

$120000000

$140000000

$160000000

$180000000

$200000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Parts-civilian aircraft

Civilian aircraft

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 34 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 35

The Sanctions Act authorizes the secretary of the trea sury (in a nonmandatory way) to impose

restrictions (without specifying them) against Rus sian state- owned entities operating in the railway

metals and mining sectors of the Rus sian economy Despite the commanding heights of Rus siarsquos

state sector owner ship in its economy (70 percent of GDP) the metal- producing companies have

remained mostly in private hands

NUCLEAR AFFAIRS

Historically owners and operators of the 104 commercial nuclear power reactors in the United

States have purchased more than 80 percent of their uranium from foreign countries Uranium

shipping from Rus sia accounted for about 13 percent of the 58 million pounds of uranium pur-

chased overseas in 201219 At the same time the Rus sian state- owned mono poly Rosatom ac-

counts for 20 percent of Kazakhstanrsquos uranium production (which in turn comprises 11 percent of

all US uranium imports) and 20 percent of US domestic uranium production capacity (with

owner ship of exploration tracts in Wyoming)20

Nuclear fuel and nuclear power continue to be po liti cally sensitive topics both in the United

States and Rus sia Bilateral cooperation in this sector (being surprisingly stable with imports of

nuclear fuel from Rus sia at a level of $1 billion annually in the last five years [Figure 512 and 513])

is under constant po liti cal and lobbying pressure and has been a source of several po liti cal scan-

dals21 Consequently upside risks in this area of interaction are minimal and downside risks are

much higher especially when we are seeing more decommissioning of nuclear plants in the

United States than new constructions The US EIArsquos 2017 Annual Energy Outlook assumes

that about 25 percent of the nuclear capacity now operating will be removed from ser vice

by 205022

WHY IS THE GRASS GREENER ON THE OTHER SIDE

The United States continues to significantly reduce imports of chemical fertilizers as domestic pro-

duction increases In 2016 the United States imported 13 percent less ammonia and 11 percent

less urea and UAN which is a liquid urea and ammonium nitrate fertilizer Rus sia accounts for

around 40 percent of UAN imported by the United States The United States canceled antidumping

duties on imports of ammonium nitrate and urea from Rus sia in 2016 but it did not prevent import

19 US EIA ldquoThe US Relies on Foreign Uranium Enrichment Ser vices to Fuel Its Nuclear Power Plantsrdquo Today in

Energy August 28 2013 https wwweia gov todayinenergy detail php idshy=shy1273

20 Colin Chilcoat ldquoDoes Rus sia Really Own 20 Percent of the USrsquo Uranium Reservesrdquo OilPricecom May 6 2015

http oilpricecom Alternative - Energy Nuclear - Power Does - Russia - Really - Own - 20 - Of - The - US - Uranium - Reserves

html

21 Michelle Ye Hee Lee ldquoThe Facts behind Trumprsquos Repeated Claim about Hillary Clintonrsquos Role in the Rus sian Ura-

nium Dealrdquo Washington Post October 26 2016

22 US EIA ldquoAnnual Energy Outlook 2017 with Projections to 2050rdquo 81ndash82

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 35 102017 404 PM

Figure 512 US Imports from Rus sia Share of Oil Metals and Nuclear Fuel Million US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 1992ndash2016)

87

86

90

90

90

91

88

86

7882

0

$5000

$10000

$15000

$20000

$25000

$30000

$35000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

US Imports from Russia

Share of Oil Metals and Nuclear Fuel

Figure 513 US Imports from Rus sia Nuclear Fuel Materials US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

$-

$200000000

$400000000

$600000000

$800000000

$1200000000

$1000000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 36 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 37

drops twice last year (Figures 514 and 515) According to forecasts UAN imports are expected to

decline further to 15 million tons this year down over 46 percent from 28 million tons imported

last year23 The downside trend in imports of fertilizers will likely continue because of oversupply

BIG FISH

US imports of fish and shellfish from Rus sia are best understood in comparison with US fish

exports to the Rus sian market which slipped to zero in August 2014 after Rus sia issued an order

banning certain agricultural imports from the United States (Figure 516) While the volume of US

supply was not very large it was impor tant because it broke up the monopolistic dominance of a

few vertically integrated Rus sian companies that have kept prices high by restricting the entry of

new producers Seeking to implement import substitution policies Rus sia has tried to reduce

exports as well as imports of fish and seafood products in the last couple of years This symmetri-

cal approach was intended to ldquocompensaterdquo for a decrease of fish products in the domestic

23 Deepika Thapliyal ldquoPotashCorp Forecasts Sharp Drop in US Nitrogen Imports in 2017rdquo ICIS News February 7

2017 https wwwicis com resources news 2017 02 07 10076734 potashcorp - forecasts - sharp - drop - in - us - nitrogen

- imports - in - 2017

Figure 514 US Imports from Rus sia Share of Oil Metals Nuclear Fuel and Fertilizers Million US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

90

93

92

93

94

95

92

91

85

86

0

$5000

$10000

$15000

$20000

$25000

$30000

$35000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

US Imports from Russia

Share of Oil Metals Nuclear Fuel and Fertilizers

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 37 102017 404 PM

Figure 515 US Imports from Rus sia Chemical- Fertilizers US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

S-

$200000000

$400000000

$600000000

$800000000

$1000000000

$1200000000

$1400000000

$1600000000

$1800000000

$2000000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Figure 516 US Exports to Rus sia Fish and Shellfish US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

0

$10000000

$20000000

$30000000

$40000000

$50000000

$60000000

$70000000

$80000000

$90000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Fish and shellfish

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 38 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 39

consumer market caused by Rus siarsquos import ban but it has failed As result the group most af-

fected by the self- imposed counter- sanctions were Rus sian consumers

With a significant drop in fish imports a devaluation of the ruble and inflationary pressures on

seafood prices yearly consumption of fish in Rus sia has declined precipitously In 2015 alone

fish prices increased 20 percent and consumption dropped to 14 kilograms per person24 from

22 kilograms in 201425 In 2016 food rose to 355 percent of house hold expenditure as a result of

increases in food prices26 This has pushed vertically integrated fishing monopolies to sell even

more of their catch abroad rather than deliver to the Rus sian Federation (Figure 517) Thus we

cannot exclude the possibility of further growth in US fish and shellfish imports from Rus sia on a

marginal scale

24 Александр Савельев ldquoПотребление рыбы в России упало до 14 кг на человекаrdquo [Fish consumption in Rus sia fell to

14 kg per person] Экономика Интерфакс January 28 2015 http wwwinterfax ru business 492038

25 Илья Шестаков ldquoПотебление рыбы в России снизилось на 10 процентов из- за роста ценrdquo [Fish consumption in

Rus sia dropped by 10 percent due to price increases] RNS March 8 2017 https rnsonline consumer - market

Potreblenie - ribi - v - Rossii - snizilos - na - 10 - iz - za - rosta - tsen - 2017 - 03 - 08

26 Zoya Sheftalovich and Christian Oliver ldquoRus siarsquos Boom (Farming) Economyrdquo Politico November 8 2016 http

wwwpolitico eu article russias - boom - farming - economy

Figure 517 US Imports from Rus sia Fish and Shellfish US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

0

$50000000

$100000000

$150000000

$200000000

$250000000

$300000000

$350000000

$400000000

$450000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 39 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations40

SPACE ODYSSEY

Among high- end products beyond the top five groups of goods imported from Rus sia cheap and

efficient Rus sian engines have been used to launch US rockets into space for about 16 years

(Figure 518) There was a serious po liti cal strug gle around a 2014 ban on the purchase of Rus sian

RD-180 rocket engines revealing the conflicting business interests of power ful high- tech companies

This restrictive mea sure was temporary and was quickly lifted because of significant cost impacts

and risks of disruption to launch schedules27 For the same reason the Sanctions Act does not autho-

rize ldquothe imposition of any sanction or other condition limitation restriction or prohibition that

directly or indirectly impedes the supply by any entity of the Rus sian Federation of any product or

ser vice or the procurement of such product or ser vice by any contractor or subcontractor of the

United States or any other entity relating to or in connection with any space launch conducted for

the National Aeronautics and Space Administration or any other nonndash Department of Defense

customerrdquo28

Nevertheless many experts believe that US domestic alternatives to replace Rus sian engines will

be viable in five to eight years

27 Ken Dilanian ldquoWhy Does the US Use Rus sian Rockets to Launch Its Satellitesrdquo NBC News updated November 15

2016 http wwwnbcnews com why - does - u - s - use - russian - rockets - launch - its - satellites - n588526

28 Countering Amer i carsquos Adversaries through Sanctions Act HR 3364

Figure 518 Spacecraft Excluding Military US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

0

$20000000

$40000000

$60000000

$80000000

$100000000

$120000000

$140000000

$160000000

$180000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 40 102017 404 PM

41

Diversity and technological complexity are the most vis i ble advantages supporting US exports to

Rus sia Three major groups of export goods include civilian aircraft engines and parts (Figure 61)

drilling and oil field equipment (Figure 62) and industrial machines and engines (Figure 63)

Despite sanctions against the transfer of advanced oil producing and pro cessing technologies the

realization of US drilling and oil field equipment in Rus sia is sustainable although some bilateral

proj ects have been frozen

Another category of goods that has demonstrated resilience is the phar ma ceu ti cal industry (Fig-

ure 64) because most drugs in Rus sia are imported (about 70 percent of the Rus sian phar ma ceu-

ti cal market in value) Import substitution policies have had only modest results in this industry

As confirmed by American Chamber of Commerce surveys US exports to Rus sia are closely

connected to US FDI 30 percent of total imports of US companies working in the Rus sian

market come from the United States (more than $2 billion in 2016) In other words about

40 percent of all US exports to Rus sia are related to a US corporate- sector business pro cess in

the country The major sectors of activity of these companies are energy and natu ral resources

(52 percent) manufacturing (17 percent) information and communications technology or ICT

(13 percent) retail (7 percent) automotive industry (6 percent) phar ma ceu ti cal production

(1 percent) professional ser vices (05 percent) and other (2 percent)1

Some obvious constraints on US exports to Rus sia have resulted from a reduction in demand A

deterioration of bilateral relations and implementation of sanctions and counter- sanctions have

directly or indirectly afected all businesses Figures 65 and 66 provide data regarding a dramatic

drop in the sale of US agricultural production in Rus sia with all other categories of exports in

goods showing big cuts as well (see Figures 67ndash69)

Exports of civilian aircraft engines and parts put the state of Washington in first place among

other states as a leading exporter to the Rus sian market (Figure 610)

1 American Chamber of Commerce in Rus sia ldquoInvestment and Import to Rus sia 2nd Surveyrdquo 13

Diversity and Constraints

06

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 41 102017 404 PM

Figure 61 US Exports of Civilian Aircraft Engines Equipment and Parts to Rus sia US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

$2500000000

$2000000000

$1500000000

$1000000000

$500000000

$-

Figure 62 US Exports of Drilling and Oil Field Equipment US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

0

$5000000

$10000000

$15000000

$20000000

$25000000

$30000000

$35000000

$40000000

$45000000

$50000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 42 102017 404 PM

Figure 63 US Exports of Industrial Engines to Rus sia US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

0

$5000000

$10000000

$15000000

$20000000

$25000000

$30000000

$35000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Figure 64 US Exports of Phar ma ceu ti cal Preparations to Rus sia US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

0

$5000000

$10000000

$15000000

$20000000

$25000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 43 102017 404 PM

Figure 65 US Exports of Meat and Poultry to Rus sia US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Meat poultry etc

$1000000000

$800000000

$600000000

$400000000

$200000000

$-

$1200000000

$1400000000

$1600000000

Figure 66 US Exports of Soybeans to Rus sia US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

0

$20000000

$40000000

$60000000

$80000000

$100000000

$120000000

$140000000

$160000000

$180000000

$200000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 44 102017 404 PM

Figure 67 US Exports of Vehicles Engines and Parts to Rus sia US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Other parts and accessories of vehicles

Automotive tires and tubes

Bodies and chassis for passenger cars

Engines and engine parts (carburetors pistonsrings and valves)

Trucks buses and special purpose vehicles

Passenger cars new and used

$2500000000

$2000000000

$1500000000

$500000000

$-

$1000000000

Figure 68 US Exports of Medicinal Equipment to Rus sia US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

$10000000

$15000000

$20000000

$25000000

$30000000

$35000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 45 102017 404 PM

Figure 610 US Exports to Rus sia by States (2016 US$ Value) Million US$ 2013ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoState and Metropolitan Area Trade Datardquo

Iowa Kentucky

North Dakota

Oklahoma

South Carolina

Washington

0

$500

$1000

$1500

$2000

2013 2014 2015 2016

District of Columbia

Iowa

Kentucky

North Dakota

Oklahoma

South Carolina

Washington

Figure 69 US Exports of Excavating Machinery to Rus sia US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

0

$5000000

$10000000

$15000000

$20000000

$25000000

$30000000

$35000000

$40000000

$45000000

$50000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 46 102017 404 PM

47

Upon reviewing the current trend in US- Russia economic relations we must acknowledge that

the existing trade model is obsolete and exhausted Imports are resource- oriented and reflect

constraints of the Rus sian economic structure while five groups of goodsmdash oil metals nuclear

fuels fertilizers and fishmdash make up more than 90 percent of total imports from Rus sia (Figure 71)

Each of these industries has a limited capacity for growth in the foreseeable future

Rus siarsquos core export to the United Statesmdash oilmdash will inevitably decrease in the mid- term under any

scenario The value and volume of Rus sian exports to the United States are open to global market

volatility and po liti cal pressures with limited hedging mechanisms

Overall US exports to Rus sia are unsustainable due to bilateral po liti cal tensions the whims of

commodity markets and changing domestic policies Sanctions and counter- sanctions have

created additional barriers particularly in finance banking high- tech energy and agro- business

According to the American Chamber of Commerce 69 percent of US companies working in the

country consider the impact of US sanctions against Rus sia on their business as negative At the

same time 60 percent of companies do not expect big changes in business relations between

Rus sia and the United States under Trump1 as the new law codifies existing sanctions fortifies

them and extends them to new sectors

Current US investments are low due to the weak rule of law in Rus sia a lack of property right

protections and proper contract enforcement high levels of statization and monopolization in the

economy a poor business climate outdated capital stock dependence on natural- resource

sectors and of course sanction and counter- sanction mea sures Bloated administrative compo-

nents created as risk mitigation instruments have also served as impediments The countryrsquos

institutional weakness low level of productivity bud get constraints and a declining inflexible

workforce will restrain future economic growth even if commodity prices recover Rus sian eco-

nomic policy will likely continue to be statist and protectionist relying mostly on import

substitutions

1 Ibid 11

Existing Trends and Future Scenarios

07

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 47 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations48

What scenarios can be expected in such a challenging environment

One probability (no peace no war) is based on the assumption that matters will not deteriorate

further and implementation of the Sanctions Act will be cursory This will cause relatively slow

degradation in the economic field with occasional flashes of activity in selected areas (eg closer

cooperation against Islamist terrorist groups in Syria)

A second worse case or critical scenario is the intensive and full- scale execution of current sanc-

tion legislation and even the imposition of new economic punitive and restrictive mea sures which

could incite asymmetric retaliatory actions and lead to the introduction of additional protectionist

policies This in turn could trigger a further escalation of mutual confrontation and could eventu-

ally destroy the fundamentals of the current bilateral trade system Rus sian leadership has charac-

terized the Sanctions Act as a declaration of a trade war that ends all hope for improving bilateral

relations2

2 Дмитрий Медведев ldquoПодписание президентом США нового санкционного закона против России создает несколько

последствийrdquo [The US Presidentrsquos signing of the package of new sanctions against Rus sia will have a few conse-

quences] Facebook August 2 2017 https wwwfacebook com Dmitry Medvedev posts 10154587161801851

Figure 71 US Imports from Rus sia Share of Oil Metals Nuclear Fuel Fertilizers and Fish Million US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

93

94

93

94

95

96

93

92

87

89

0

$5000

$10000

$15000

$20000

$25000

$30000

$35000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

US Imports from Russia

Share of Oil Metals Nuclear FuelFertilizers and Fish

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 48 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 49

The best case and most favorable scenario looks less probable now It assumes the realization of

structural reforms in Rus sia in such a way that would adapt Rus siarsquos foreign policy to national

economic needs reduce confrontations with the West and make a concerted efort to integrate

Rus sian businesses into global supply and value chains A revitalization of the structural reform

agendamdash including eforts to diversify economic activities through de- monopolization and support

for SMEs a restructuring of the banking sector the creation of a vibrant business climate to foster

entrepreneurships and innovation the implementation of administrative and judicial reforms to

tackle red tape and endemic corruption and the reduction of state control over key sectors of the

economy via wide- spread privatization could kick- start the development of a nonoil economy and

improve long- term growth prospects Despite ongoing discussion of reform strategies deep

economic and po liti cal changes are extremely complicated over the next po liti calelectoral cycle

(2018ndash2024) particularly because of re sis tance of vested interests and growing commodity prices

The urgency to tackle structural shortcomings in natu ral resource- dependent economies usually

correlates with the price of those resources and the degree to which resource rents drive eco-

nomic activity However there may be marginal improvements in the efficiency of the current

economic system

Future US- Russia relations can be thought of through three pillars one pillar focuses on areas

where both countries maintain a competitive rivalry another looks at potential areas of interaction

under pres ent conditions a third pillar and one that has evaporated from the current bilateral

agenda concentrates on future cooperation Stronger economic ties could not only be a kind of

po liti cal shock absorber but contribute to the building of this future (particularly business contacts

aim to support future structural reforms) although po liti cal factors are depressing the prospects

for cooperation To escape deadlock it will be impor tant to establish the right balance between

politics and economics and create a model of collaboration within the framework of contention

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 49 102017 404 PM

About the Author

Vadim Grishin PhD MBA has been involved in the reform pro cess in Rus sia as adviser to the

deputy prime minister of Rus sia in 1992ndash1993 and 2006ndash2010 He has extensive experience

working with the Bretton Woods Institutions He was the board member of the World Bank Group

and served as se nior adviser at the International Monetary Fund Currently he is a con sul tant to the

chief economistrsquos office of the International Finance Corporation and teaches the economics of

transition at Georgetown University in Washington DC

50

594-71613_ch99_4Pindd 50 102017 403 PM

Blank

COVER PHOTO ADOBE STOCK

1616 Rhode Island Avenue NW

Washington DC 20036

202 887 0200 | wwwcsisorg

v++ISBN 978-1-4422-8035-9

Lanham bull Boulder bull New York bull London

4501 Forbes Boulevard

Lanham MD 20706

301 459 3366 | wwwrowmancom

A U T H O R

Vadim Grishin

Myths and Realities

A Report of the

CSIS RUSSIA AND EURASIA PROGRAM

US-RussiaEconomicRelations

O C T O B E R 2 0 1 7

Euml|xHSLEOCy280359z

The Man Pupu Nyor Rock Formations at the Northern Urals also known as Seven

Strong Man or Little Mountain of the God in the local tribe (Mansi) language

Page 8: U.S.-Russia Economic Relations: Myths and Realities · 2020-04-17 · OCTOBER 2017 U.S.- Russia Economic Relations Myths and Realities AUTHOR Vadim Grishin A REPORT OF THE CSIS RUSSIA

US-Russia Economic Relations2

Escalating geopo liti cal tensions have continued to significantly define Rus siarsquos economic prospects

however the countryrsquos economic model exhausted itself long before the dramatic deterioration of

relations with the West Structural bottlenecks have seriously limited Rus siarsquos growth capacity even

during the previous period of high oil prices4

The purpose of this report is to assess what has gone wrong with the US- Russia equation by

analyzing it through the prism of a bilateral economic and po liti cal trajectory while keeping in

mind the structural constraints of the Rus sian economy It will attempt to answer the following

questions

bull Do bilateral economic relations matter

bull Are the United States and Rus sia ldquonatu ralrdquo or ldquounnaturalrdquo trading partners

bull What future scenarios can we expect

In the vast lit er a ture on US- Russia economic relations analy sis of developing trends in bilateral

commerce has always been accompanied by discussions around impor tant po liti cal and eco-

nomic matters particularly regarding US legislation and regulation5 Over several de cades the

most controversial issues concerned the granting of permanent normal trading status to Rus sia

through legislation that eliminated the Jackson- Vanik Amendment and Rus siarsquos accession to

the World Trade Organ ization (WTO) The Magnitsky Act signed into law in 2012 repealed the

Jackson- Vanik provisions but added legislation providing authority for the US government to

withhold visas and freeze assets of Rus sians thought to have been involved with human rights

violations and later imposed sanctions on Rus sia because of its involvement in the Ukrainian and

Syrian crises and its cyber- enabled activities6

Some have observed deficiencies in Rus siarsquos participation in the international division of labor

(reliance on the export of energy and metals) which ldquo canrsquot serve any more as a basis for further

expansion of the countryrsquos position in world markets including the US marketrdquo7 Unfortunately

such observations have not been accompanied by quantitative and qualitative analy sis of structural

constraints in the Rus sian foreign trade model Many authors limit their policy recommendations

for fostering bilateral economic relations to a requirement for a strong initial push from respective

governments the creation of business working groups and the extension of bilateral and multilat-

eral legal grounds for economic cooperation Such instruments proved to be useful in facilitating

4 International Monetary Fund (IMF) Rus sian Federation Selected Issues (Washington DC IMF 2016)

5 ldquoAmer i carsquos New Economic Sanctions May Hurt Rus siarsquos Recoveryrdquo Economist August 5 2017 Andrey Kortunov and

Olga Oliker eds A Roadmap for US- Russia Relations (Washington DC CSISRIAC 2017) https csis - prods3

amazonaws com s3fs - public publication 170815 _ KortunovOliker _ USRussiaRelations _ Web pdf E0bdGVHlxxYRAxhO

w8zJ9tbRGwdWjEgV Самуйлов CM Братерский MB ldquoКонгресс и торговые отношения США с Россиейrdquo [US

Congressrsquos role in the US- RF trade relations] США и Канада экономика политика культура 5 no 533 (May 2014)

6 Andrew Weiss and Richard Nephew ldquoThe Role of Sanctions in US- Russian Relationsrdquo (Task Force White Paper

Car ne gie Endowment for International Peace Washington DC July 11 2016)

7 Глущенко ЮН ldquoСостояние проблемы и перспективы сотрудничества России и США в экономической сфереrdquo

[Status prob lems and prospects of Russia- US economic cooperation] Проблемы Национальной Стратегии 21 no 6

(2013) 148ndash164

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 2 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 3

trade and investment during several reset cycles in bilateral relations starting in the 1990s but

they were only partially successful

Several papers and books although focused primarily on bilateral po liti cal agendas or sectorial

analy sis underline the importance of Rus sian domestic realities Dr Angela Stent in her ldquoLimits of

Partnershiprdquo notes that state control of the commanding heights in the Rus sian economy creates

significant deterrents for US private- sector entrance into the market8 Thane Gustafson in the

ldquoWheel of Fortunerdquo asserts that Rus siarsquos growing dependence on revenue from oil exports along

with its inefficient and often- corrupt management of industry is unsustainable9 Andrew Kuchins

in his ldquoElevation and Calibration A New Rus sia Policy for Amer i cardquo has quoted some experts who

believe that the weakened Rus sian economic position may over time contribute to some rap-

prochement with the West and emphasized lack of reforms as ldquoa key obstacle not only for Rus sian

economic recovery but also for improving ties with the Westrdquo10

In a recent joint task force report Eugene Rumer Andrew S Weiss and Richard Sokolsky argue

that the concept of developing stronger economic ties with Rus sia as a foundation for improved

diplomatic relations has not worked ldquoClinton Bush and Obama all placed high hope on trade as

an engine of better relations with Rus sia All were frustrated by the fact that the two countries are

for the most part not natu ral trading partnersrdquo11 On a dif er ent note the former US envoy to

Rus sia Michael McFaul has defended the achievements of a reset policy under the Barack Obama

administration emphasizing that bilateral trade reached a rec ord level in 2011 Nevertheless he

also stresses that it was a one- time accomplishment unlikely to be repeated12

Voices of those who believe that extensive economic ties can provide stability to broader po liti cal

interaction are weaker than ever in an environment of growing protectionism and adversarial rivalry

8 Angela Stent The Limits of Partnerships US- Russian Relations in the XXI Century (Prince ton NJ Prince ton

University Press 2014) 98

9 Thane Gustafson Wheel of Fortune The Battle for Oil and Power in Rus sia (London Harvard University Press 2012)

10 Andrew Kuchins Elevation and Calibration A New Rus sia Policy for Amer i ca (Washington DC Center on Global

Interests 2016)

11 Eugene Rumer Richard Sokolsky and Andrew S Weiss ldquoTrump and Rus sia The Right Way to Manage Relationsrdquo

Foreign Affairs 96 no 2 (MarchApril 2017)

12 Michael McFaul ldquoUS- Russia Relationsrdquo (lecture Institute for Public Diplomacy and Global Communications

George Washington University Washington DC March 3 2017) https wwwc - span org video 424811 - 1 former

- ambassador - michael - mcfaul - discusses - state - usrussia - relations

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 3 102017 404 PM

4

02

Does Bilateral Economic Interaction Matter

Economic relations do not emerge out of a vacuum There are many variables that define the final

configuration of economic interactions such as a par tic u lar countryrsquos level of economic develop-

ment its business environment legal framework po liti cal climate (regime) culture and religion

history and tradition demography and geography as well as global and national economic cycles

An impor tant driver of trade relations for many economies has become participation in global and

regional trade agreements

As many studies and anecdotal evidence show bilateral economic cooperation should be sizable

and should relate to the economic growth of two countries in a way that afects their policy

interests Let us take as a reference point the BRICS countries1 a community of large emerging

economies which Rus sia belongs to Table 21 pres ents official data on US trade and investments

with BRICS states US- Russia trade in goods is disproportionally lowmdash235 times less than US

trade with China 33 times smaller than US trade with India and 28 times less than US trade

with Brazil The size of the US- Russia trade balance is comparable to the size of the US trade

balance with South Africa whose economy is almost four times smaller than Rus siarsquos If we add

trade in ser vices to the trade of goods the gaps increase significantly (Figures 21 and 22) The

diference is not only quantitative but also qualitative

The quality of trade relations can be mea sured by its diversity its share of high- tech components

resilience to economic shocks and its contribution to GDP growth On average a 10 percent

increase in a nationrsquos two- way trade relative to GDP increases GDP through a variety of channels

by at least 16 percent2

Bilateral trade and real GDP growth in the United States and Rus sia are practically uncorrelated

as shown in the summary output of multifactorial regression The coefficient of multiple determi-

nation (R Square) is close to 0 ( Table 22) At the same time the correlation of US exports to India

1 BRICS is the acronym for a select group of five developing economies Brazil Rus sia India China and South Africa

2 World Economic Forum Foreign Direct Investment as a Key Driver for Trade Growth and Prosperity The Case for a

Multilateral Agreement on Investment (Geneva World Economic Forum 2013) 11

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 4 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 5

Table 21 US Trade and Foreign Direct Investments (FDI) with China India Brazil South Africa and Rus sia 2016

China India Brazil South Africa Rus sia

Total Goods Trade 5786 677 565 13 203

Imports 4628 460 262 73 145

Exports 1158 217 303 55 58

Trade in Ser vices 696 472 317 47 na

Imports 161 268 68 17 na

Exports 535 203 249 30 na

US FDI 746 283 653 62 141

BRICS FDI in the United States

148 93 043 076 63

Supported Jobs in the United States (thousand)

911 197 308 50 84

Source United States Trade Representative (USTR) ldquoCountries amp Regionsrdquo accessed September 27 2017

https ustrgov countries - regions See US- China Trade Facts US- India Trade Facts US- Brazil Trade

Facts US- South Africa Trade Facts and US- Russia Trade Facts

201520142013

and China with the real GDP growth of these big Asian economies is significant (05) In the case of

Brazil the correlation is even higher (07) By contrast South Africarsquos small open economy is quite

sensitive to US imports from South Africa (043)3

In marked contrast to other BRICS countries Rus sia is a poor choice for export- oriented opera-

tions As a recent International Monetary Fund (IMF) study highlights Rus sia is an outlier a rare

exception among emerging market (EM) economies with virtually no preferential access to major

markets and little meaningful change over three de cades4 This complicates Rus siarsquos integration

into the global value chain (GVC) which became a significant driving force toward economic

development and trade for certain BRICS economies

3 IMF statistics authorrsquos computation

4 IMF Rus sian Federation Selected Issues IMF Country Report N17198 (Washington DC IMF July 2017)

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 5 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations6

Trade is closely connected with foreign direct investment (FDI) and both are parts of a complex

interaction known as international production sharing According to publicly available official data

US FDI in Rus sia was about $131 billion for 2013 and $295 billion for 2016 with the top industrial

sectors being software and IT ser vices financial ser vices chemicals metals coal oil and gas

and business ser vices5 If we take into account US investments made through Eu ro pean branches

of US companies and ofshore firms this number would easily triple Another component

that usually is not tracked by official statistics is reinvestments The American Chamber of

Commerce surveys in 2016 and 2017 which include this component draw a completely dif er ent

picture accumulated US corporate FDI in 90 large US companies working in Rus sia reached

5 US Department of Commerce International Trade Administration ldquoRussiamdash94- Foreign Direct Investment and

Portfolio Investment Statisticsrdquo Rus sia Country Commercial Guide July 7 2017 https wwwexport gov article

id=shyRussia - foreign - direct - investment - statistics

Figure 21 US Trade in Goods with China India Brazil Rus sia and South Africa Billion US$ 2016

Source USTR ldquoCountries amp Regionsrdquo See US- China Trade Facts US- India Trade Facts US- Brazil Trade

Facts US- South Africa Trade Facts and US- Russia Trade Facts

0

$50

$100

$150

$200

$250

$300

$350

$400

$450

$500

$550

$600

China India Brazil Russia South Africa

Exports

Imports

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 6 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 7

$8244 billion in 20176 The real level from our perspective is usually between official and private

estimations around $40 billon But even this cumulative figure is less than the US FDI in Brazil

and China

The American Chamber of Commerce surveys have also revealed other impor tant data Eighty-

five percent of US companies doing business in Rus sia entered its market 10 or more years ago

while 60 percent of them ldquolandedrdquo there 20 years ago or earlier Only one percent have started

operations over the last five years confirming an obvious fact entry into the Rus sian market is

challenging because of growing monopolism risks associated with the business climate and a

stagnating economy7

6 American Chamber of Commerce in Rus sia ldquoInvestment and Import to Rus sia 2nd Surveyrdquo (Prepared by GfK for the

American Chamber of Commerce in Rus sia Moscow May 2017) 12

7 Ibid 4

Figure 22 US Trade in Goods and in Ser vices with China India Brazil Rus sia and South Africa Billion US$ 2016

Source USTR ldquoCountries amp Regionsrdquo See US- China Trade Facts US- India Trade Facts US- Brazil Trade

Facts US- South Africa Trade Facts and US- Russia Trade Facts

0

$100

$200

$300

$400

$500

$600

$700

China India Brazil Russia South Africa

Trade in Services

Total Goods Trade

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 7 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations8

Rus sian direct investment position toward the United States declined from $215 billion in 2013 to

$83 billion in 2015 (Figure 23) Taking into account dif er ent channels and instruments the actual

volume of Rus sian investments in the United States made through ofshore Eu ro pean Canadian

and US companies may be several times greater than the available official data

Foreign investment in financial assets or foreign portfolio investment (FPI) should be included

even though Central Bank of Rus sia statistics indicate they were also quite low US investments in

equity were $345 million and in debt instruments were about $65 million in the fourth quarter of

20168 However these numbers do not reflect the real level of FPI Rus siarsquos stocks are incredibly

inexpensive while there has been impressive growth of US investments in short- term securities

and in foreign exchange (FX) operations (cash- and- carry trade) Rus sia was among the top per-

forming emerging markets in 2016 gaining 4744 percent in US dollars9 Nevertheless the gen-

eral capitalization of the stock exchange is tiny (less than 20 percent of GDP) comparable to the

capitalization of just one large US com pany such as Coca- Cola Many private sources believe that

the US FPI in Rus sia could be as high as several billion US dollars but a new set of sanctions

approved by President Trump on August 2 2017 if implemented could reverse those flows It is

still not clear whether the secretary of trea sury will prohibit participation in the oferings of Rus siarsquos

sovereign debt and the full range of derivative products A report on this subject should be sub-

mitted no later than 180 days after enactment of the law which means no later than Febru-

ary 2018 New legislation tightens prohibition on Rus sian financial companies already under

sanctions by limiting any new equity or debt with a maturity greater than 14 days (a provision that

8 Central Bank of Rus sia ldquoForeign Direct Investments in the Rus sian Federationrdquo accessed September 27 2017 www

cbr ru localization switchlanguage urlshy=shy news ampfromshy=shyru - ruamptoshy=shyen - gb

9 VanEck ldquoRus sian Stock Market Soars in 2016rdquo Seeking Alpha February 14 2017 https seekingalphacom article

4045602 - russian - stock - market - soars - 2016

Table 22 Summary Output of Regression Statistics (US Real GDP Rus sia Real GDP US- Russia Exports Imports and Total Trade)

Regression Statistics

Multiple R 0056445768

R Square 0003186125

Adjusted R Square minus0042123597

Standard Error 2616043923

Observations 24

Sources IMF statistics authorrsquos computation

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 8 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 9

previously allowed for 30 days) Similarly US persons are prohibited from taking on any new debt

that has a maturity greater than 60 days (previously it was 90 days) with Rus sian energy compa-

nies currently under sanctions10

According to the Trea sury Department Rus sia held $1029 billion in US Trea sury securities in

June 201711 Could Rus sia withdraw all its reserves from the United States and use this action as a

retaliatory mea sure Such a scenario is unlikely since there is no comparable safe- haven alterna-

tive to US dollars When Rus siarsquos US Trea sury holdings dropped 50 percent from $176 billion

(October 2010) to $90 billion (November 2011) the market did not notice12 Nevertheless Rus sian

authorities have announced they will decrease dependence on assets and payments in US dollars13

10 Countering Amer i carsquos Adversaries through Sanctions Act HR 3364

11 US Department of Trea sury Major Foreign Holders of Trea sury Securities September 18 2017 http ticdata

treasury gov Publish mfh txt

12 Ibid

13 ldquoНовый виток санкций Россия откажется от доллараrdquo [A new round of sanctions Rus sia will abandon the dollar]

Газетару August 7 2017 https wwwgazeta ru business 2017 08 07 10821937 shtml

Figure 23 Rus sia Outward FDI Position United States Equities and Debt Million US$ 2009ndash2016

Source Central Bank of the Rus sian Federation External Sector Statistics Rus sian Direct Investments

Abroad accessed September 27 2017 https wwwcbr ru localization switchlanguage urlshy=shy news

ampfromshy=shyru - ruamptoshy=shyen - gb

$6000

$8000

$10000

$12000

$14000

$16000

$18000

$20000

$22000

2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 9 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations10

Officially the country does not invest in the US stock exchange although some Rus sian oligarchs

have bought US corporate bonds and equities in large amounts The new sanctions law requires

the secretary of trea sury in consultation with the director of national intelligence and the secretary

of state to issue reports on Rus sian se nior po liti cal figures and oligarchs based on their closeness

to the Rus sian regime and their net worth as well as the exposure of key economic sectors of the

United States to Rus sian po liti cally exposed persons and parastatal entities including at a mini-

mum the banking securities insurance and real estate sectors14

Only three Rus sian companies are listed in the US exchanges

Overall the scale and scope of US- Russia economic interaction and business activity is much greater

than officially appreciated but not significant enough to be taken into consideration by policymakers

14 Countering Amer i carsquos Adversaries through Sanctions Act HR 3364

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 10 102017 404 PM

11

03

Politics in the Driverrsquos Seat

Bilateral economic relations depend to a great extent on global and national economic cycles

After the recent global financial crisis the US economy has shown surprisingly sustainable GDP

growth while the Rus sian economy was the most afected among BRICS countries by the turbu-

lence of a worldwide economic downturn in 2008ndash2009 and after a short- term rebound slipped

into stagnation (2012ndash2013) and then into full- scale recession (2014ndash2016) The countryrsquos eco-

nomic cycle however appears to be changing once again with the economy returning to a

pattern of growth albeit uneven and gradual (Figures 31 and 32) Even with sanctions still in place

conditions have improved as a result of the stabilization of Urals oil to an average annual price of

$419 per barrel in 2016 The gains were sparked in part by major crude producers agreeing to cut

production after hefty price drops in 2014 and 2015 Supported by easier financial conditions

higher oil prices and growing macro- stability Rus sia is heading toward a moderate growth rate

that is expected to reach 14 percent this year according to forecasts of the World Bank Group

(WBG) and the IMF1

Because of the significant role that politics plays in any bilateral interaction it is impor tant to

combine economic and po liti cal cycles applying a ldquoresetrdquo to bilateral economic cooperation in

addition to the po liti cal relationship I have compared po liti cal cycles and trade dynamics using the

following graphs ( Table 31 and Figure 33) These charts do not pretend to reflect with mathemati-

cal precision all shifts in the bilateral po liti cal relationship but rather attempt to visually align

impor tant economic and po liti cal moments to detect the efects of po liti cal events on the size of

bilateral trade

Figure 33 shows all pos si ble combinations economic trends at the intersection of po liti cal devel-

opments oppose or support each other in synchronization It is evident that po liti cal interference

1 International Monetary Fund Rus sian Federation Staff Concluding Statement of the 2017 Article IV Mission (Wash-

ington DC IMF 2017) World Bank Group From Recession to Recovery Rus sia Economic Report no 37 (Washington

DC World Bank 2017) http pubdocsworldbank org en 383241495487103815 RER - 37 - May26 - FINAL - with - summary

pdf

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 11 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations12

in bilateral business afairs in the early 2000s was less significant than in later years As result

growing po liti cal tensions from 2003 to 2008 did not dramatically afect bilateral economic inter-

action It is also easier to explain why 2011ndash2012 resulted in rec ord trade and investmentmdash a con-

sequence of very high oil prices GDP growth in both countries improved legislation after Rus siarsquos

accession to the WTO and the Obamandash Medvedev po liti cal reset From 2014 to 2016 a perfect

storm of developments added efficiency to Western sanctions and augmented the damaging

consequences of counter- sanction mea sures

Figure 33 also confirms that in times of reduced economic cooperation po liti cal pressures can

easily change bilateral economic trends Moreover business interests along with economic inter-

actions have a limited capacity to reverse the po liti cal mainstream

Figure 31 Economic Cycle 2014ndash2016

Source Authorrsquos evaluation of international financial institutions (IFI) data and sources from respective

countries

Sustainable Growth

Brazil

Negative Growth

Unstable Growth

Mexico

Descending Growth

Argentina

EU

US

Russia

Vietnam

China

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 12 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 13

Table 31 Po liti cal Cycles in Bilateral US- Russia Relations 1999ndash2016

2001ndash2002 The George W Bushndash Vladimir Putin Reset Rus sia supported ldquoglobal war on terrorismrdquo launched by the United States after 911 the SORT nuclear arms reduction treaty was signed by the United States and Rus sia and a successful business dialogue was developed that created the current structure of economic relations

2003ndash2008 Deterioration in bilateral relations brought on by the Iraq War Georgiarsquos ldquoRose Revolutionrdquo Mikhail Khodorkovskyrsquos arrest Ukrainersquos ldquoOrange Revolutionrdquo Kosovorsquos in de pen dence and the Georgian War

2009ndash2010 The Barack Obamandash Dmitry Medvedev Reset Rus sia served as a logistical hub for transportation and supply of US forces in Af ghan i stan United States and Rus sia signed the new START nuclear arms reduction treaty Rus sia backed tighter economic sanctions on Iran Rus sia gained access to the WTO after 18 years of negotiations

2011ndash2016 Deterioration in bilateral relations caused by the Ukrainian crisis which were followed by sanctions and counter- sanctions along with the Syrian crises and cyber- enabled activities

Source Authorrsquos evaluation of po liti cal and economic data

Note SORTthinsp=thinspStrategic Ofensive Reductions Treaty STARTthinsp=thinspStrategic Arms Reduction Treaty

Figure 32 Economic Cycle 2017ndash2019

Source Authorrsquos evaluation of IFI data and sources from respective countries

Egypt

VenezuelaEU

South Africa

Brazil

Russia

India

US

Descending Growth

Korea

China

Negative Growth

Unstable Growth

Sustainable Growth

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 13 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations14

Figure 33 US- Russia Trade Million US$ vs Po liti cal Cycle 2000ndash2016

Sources US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo Foreign Trade last modified June 29 2017

https wwwcensus gov foreign - trade balance c4621 html (see data for 2000ndash2016) authorrsquos evaluation

of po liti cal and economic data

Orange Revolution

Khodorkovskys arrest

GeorgianWar

Bush- Putin Reset

Iraq War Global Financial Crisis

Obama-Medvedev Reset

Russias WTO accession

New START Treaty

A Pefect Storm the Ukranian Crisis Oil Prices Crashing

Sanctions and Counter-Sanctions

$3000

$8000

$13000

$18000

$23000

$28000

$33000

$38000

$43000

2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 14 102017 404 PM

15

The current structure of US- Russia economic relations emerged in the early 2000s when the

model of trade and investment interaction took on a character similar to that which existed be-

tween the United States and developing economies US imports from Rus sia centered on com-

modities while technology along with food products lead American exports The primary

exception was that Rus sia supplied nuclear fuel including highly enriched uranium extracted from

nuclear weapons for US power plants and provided ser vices to the aerospace industry primarily

in satellite launches However both these exceptions can be explained as a legacy of the Soviet

past and not a harbinger of the future economic relationship (Figure 41)

In the last 15 years this trade structure has not changed significantly The only noticeable shift in

trade was a dramatic drop (to practically nothing) in exports of US agricultural products a result

of Rus siarsquos policy of import substitution and so- called counter- sanction mea sures it took in re-

sponse to US sanctions over the Ukraine crisis (Figure 42)

Promising new directions of cooperation in the IT sector and in engineering ser vices for the

aerospace industry appeared in the early 2000s1 but did not spill into other sectors and conse-

quently did little to renew economic cooperation on the whole The integration of Rus sian high-

tech ser vices into large- scale global production and value chains was constrained by the usual

culprits a lack of financial resources managerial experience skilled labor modern infrastructure

RampD investments and an adequate business environment High commodity prices incentivized the

restoration of an economic system centered on resource rents The leading role of oil and gas

extraction and transportation discouraged the development of a nonenergy sector that might

have created advanced and complex production and ser vices An import substitution policy could

not work efficiently in an economic environment plagued by the Dutch disease where currency

1 The Boeing Design Center was created in Moscow It consists of nearly 250 Boeing employees managing

a team of 1200 contract engineers from Rus sian and Ukrainian aerospace companies ldquoBackgrounder Boeing in

Rus siardquo Boeing last modified January 2017 http wwwboeing com resources boeingdotcom company key _ orgs

boeing - international pdf russia - cisbackgrounder pdf

Are the United States and Rus sia ldquoNatu ralrdquo Trading Partners A Little Bit of History

04

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 15 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations16

inflows (oil money) lead to ruble appreciation and render a countryrsquos production less competitive

During that time Rus siarsquos industry did not receive preferential access to larger markets and could

not expand its share in the global economy particularly because of its self- isolation from the

regional trade agreements (except for its participation in the Eurasian Economic Union with some

neighboring countries of the former Soviet Union) As a result neither import substitution nor

export- led strategy promoted growth and specialization in nonoil production A long- awaited

modernization and reallocation of resources from an inefficient nontrade sector to a trade sector

did not materialize

These limits were later augmented with sanctions and an extension of domestic restrictions on

cooperation with Western partners Importantly the rapid growth of state- monopoly structures in

the Rus sian economy over the past 15 years has created additional obstacles to the development

and diversification of US- Russia economic ties

Figure 41 US Imports from Rus sia US$ 2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2016)

Fish and shellfish 3

Crude oil 5

Fuel oil 37

Petroleum products other

8

Nuclear fuel materials

7

Chemicals-fertilizers 4

Steelmaking materials 5

Iron and steel mill products 4

Bauxite and aluminum 9

Other precious metals 4

Nonferrous metals other 1

Finished metal shapes 1

Synthetic rubber--primary

1

Spacecraftexcluding military

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 16 102017 404 PM

Fig

ure

42

U

S E

xpo

rts

to R

us s

ia U

S$ 2

016

Sou

rce

US

Ce

nsu

s B

ure

au ldquo

Trad

e in

Go

od

s w

ith

Ru

s sia

rdquo (s

ee

dat

a fo

r 2

016

)

Bak

ery

pro

du

cts

Win

e b

eer

an

d r

elat

ed

pro

du

cts

New

spri

nt

Pla

stic

mat

eria

ls

Ch

emic

als-

fert

ilize

rs

Ch

emic

als-

ino

rgan

icC

hem

ical

s-o

rgan

ic

Ch

emic

als-

oth

erC

ott

on

fib

er c

loth

In

du

stri

al r

ub

ber

pro

du

cts

Min

eral

su

pp

lies-

man

ufa

ctu

red

Gen

erat

ors

acc

esso

ries

Ele

ctri

c ap

par

atu

s

Dri

llin

g amp

oilfi

eld

eq

uip

men

t Sp

ecia

lized

min

ing

Exc

avat

ing

mac

hin

ery

No

nfa

rm t

ract

ors

an

d p

arts

In

du

stri

al e

ng

ines

Fo

od

to

bac

co m

ach

iner

y M

etal

wo

rkin

g m

ach

ine

too

ls

Tex

tile

sew

ing

m

ach

ines

W

oo

d g

lass

p

last

ic

Pu

lp a

nd

pap

er

mac

hin

ery

Mea

suri

ng

tes

tin

g

con

tro

l in

stru

men

ts

Mat

eria

ls h

and

ling

equ

ipm

ent

Ind

ust

rial

mac

hin

es

oth

er

Ph

oto

ser

vice

ind

ust

ry m

ach

iner

y A

gri

cult

ura

l mac

hin

ery

eq

uip

men

t C

om

pu

ters

Co

mp

ute

r ac

cess

ori

es

Sem

ico

nd

uct

ors

Tel

eco

mm

un

icat

ion

seq

uip

men

t

Bu

sin

ess

mac

hin

es a

nd

eq

uip

men

t

Lab

ora

tory

tes

tin

g in

stru

men

ts

Med

icin

al e

qu

ipm

ent

Civ

ilian

air

craf

t e

ng

ines

eq

uip

men

t a

nd

par

ts

Rai

lway

tra

nsp

ort

atio

n

equ

ipm

ent

Ves

sels

exc

lud

ing

scr

ap

Co

mm

erci

al v

esse

ls o

ther

M

arin

e en

gin

es p

arts

Spac

ecra

ft e

xclu

din

g

mili

tary

Pas

sen

ger

car

s

new

an

d u

sed

Tru

cks

bu

ses

and

sp

ecia

l p

urp

ose

ve

hic

les

En

gin

es a

nd

en

gin

e p

arts

(c

arb

ure

tors

pis

ton

s r

ing

s

and

val

ves)

B

od

ies

and

ch

assi

s fo

r p

asse

ng

er c

ars

Au

tom

oti

ve t

ires

an

d t

ub

es

Oth

er p

arts

an

d a

cces

sori

es o

f ve

hic

les

Ap

par

el h

ou

seh

old

go

od

s -

text

ile

Ph

arm

aceu

tica

lp

rep

arat

ion

s

Furn

itu

re h

ou

seh

old

go

od

s

etc

R

ug

s

Cel

l ph

on

es a

nd

oth

er

ho

use

ho

ld g

oo

ds

ne

c

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 17 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations18

Figure 43 US Trade in Goods with Rus sia Million US$ 1992ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 1992ndash2016)

Russian Financial Crisis

Oil price Increased from$2446 USD per barrel (2001)

to $9694 USD per barrel(2008)

Global Financial Crisis

Oil price high record in2011-2012

(more that $111 USD perbarrel)

Oil price crashed

$-

$5000

$10000

$15000

$20000

$25000

$30000

$35000

$40000

$45000

$50000

1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

US Imports from Russia US Exports to Russia US-Russia Trade in Goods

No doubt po liti cal ups and downs add volatility to US- Russia trade Nevertheless Rus siarsquos eco-

nomic structure exhausted itself before the Ukrainian crisis and the recent Rus sian recession Its

limitations are not only due to some mistakes in policy or negative coincidences of circumstances

but rather to deeply rooted properties in the current bilateral trade model related to structural

issues in the Rus sian economy Structural constraints such as the weak enforcement of property

rights poor business regulation and nondiversified exports weighed on Rus sian trade with the

United States From this perspective the term ldquonaturalunnatural trading partnersrdquo does not ad-

dress the unused capacity of bilateral interaction or the real challenges that kind of interaction

faces It just adds metaphysical flavor to the very specific economic and po liti cal factors that

determine the US- Russia trajectory

Overall the outlines of bilateral trade (Figure 43) resemble the famous ldquoRus sian Mountainsrdquo that

were a pre de ces sor of the modern roller coaster icy hills supported by wooden constructionsmdash a

rigid and immobile structure that sooner or later would melt This unfortunately is what is hap-

pening to US- Russia trade cooperation now

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 18 102017 404 PM

19

ARE LITTLE FISH REALLY SWEET

Low US- Russia economic interaction has at least two consequences First it limits the capacity of

policymakers to exploit trade as an instrument for geopo liti cal combat Even the question of a US

trade deficit which used to be a headache for many US trading partners has become so insig-

nificant in absolute terms (about $87 billion in 2016) that it seems hardly worth caring about

When the volume of trade between two countries becomes very small in absolute terms whether

a country is running a surplus or deficit is no longer relevant But it also renders another type of

confrontations (sometimes more dangerous) more likely since the two traders have little to lose

Second in an environment marked by low levels of bilateral trade both sides could incentivize (if

and when a desire for po liti cal rapprochement exists) the signing of new trade deals which are

elevated symbolically as a turning point in bilateral po liti cal relations (ie the sale of Boeings to

Rus sia or the delivery via tankers of Rus sian oil to US refineries) Sometimes markets themselves

pres ent ldquogiftsrdquo that can be capitalized on po liti cally US- USSR grain trade in the 1970s was one

such ldquogiftrdquo large sales of American grain to the Soviet Union helped US policymakers win favor

with the po liti cally impor tant American farming sector and permitted Soviet leaders to maintain

access to a dietary staple for the Soviet population

The strong 32 percent growth in value of US imports from Rus sia from January to May 2017

versus January to May 2016 ( Table 51) is an example of a development that has tempted officials

to pres ent it as a sign of positive change due to ldquogrowing business activitiesrdquo (this kind of statement

was heard before the bilateral summit in Germany in July 2017) although the reason for that leap

was evidently an increase in commodity prices (mainly of oilmdash see Table 52) and not a rise in

entrepreneurial interactions The primary beneficiaries of that upside rally have been two other

petro- economies Saudi Arabia and Venezuela ( Tables 53 and 54)

Sector Analyses

05

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 19 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations20

Table 51 US Imports from Rus sia Million US$ Januaryndash May 2016 vs Januaryndash May 2017

Year January February March April May Total

2016 9603 6871 11097 12257 10977 50805

2017 12215 10220 16979 13471 14147 67032

Change 271 487 530 99 289 319

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 1992ndash2016)

Table 52 Change in Urals Crude Oil Prices US$ per Barrel Januaryndash May 2016 vs Januaryndash May 2017

Januaryndash May 2016 Januaryndash May 2017 Change ($) Change ()

3601 5129 1528 424

Source Ministry of Finance of the Rus sian Federation https wwwminfin ru ru ixzz4mMIZ7XtC

Table 53 US Imports from Saudi Arabia Million US$ Januaryndash May 2016 vs Januaryndash May 2017

Year January February March April May Total

2016 15114 9036 13555 10844 14679 63228

2017 19802 20298 21650 16211 19542 97503

Change 3101 12463 5972 495 331 542

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Saudi Arabiardquo Foreign Trade last modified June 29 2017

https wwwcensus gov foreign - trade balance c5170 html (see data for 2016ndash2017)

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 20 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 21

Table 54 US Imports from Venezuela Million US$ Januaryndash May 2016 vs Januaryndash May 2017

Year January February March April May Total

2016 6657 5560 7140 8007 7922 35286

2017 13041 10864 123500 11148 12243 59646

Change 9590 9540 7297 3923 5454 6903

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Venezuelardquo Foreign Trade last modified June 29 2017

https wwwcensus gov foreign - trade balance c3070 html (see data for 2016ndash2017)

Table 55 US Exports to Rus sia Million US$ Januaryndash May 2016 vs Januaryndash May 2017

Year January February March April May Total

2016 3628 3577 7298 4657 4947 24107

2017 3144 4277 5386 6670 4806 24283

Change minus133 196 minus262 432 minus29 minus07

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2016ndash2017)

At the same time US exports to Rus sia continue to stagnate ( Table 55) due to low levels of

consumption during a two-and- a- half-year economic crisis a deep ruble devaluation sanctions

and counter- sanctions

Given the very dif er ent economic structures and resource endowments of Rus sia and the United

States it is not surprising that US- Russia trade is asymmetric and oil driven (Figure 51) A

3 percent increase in Urals oil prices translates into a one percent increase in US import growth

from Rus sia Thus in 2016 every $10 increase in Urals crude oil added $15 billion to the value of

US imports or 11 percent to the total value of imports from Rus sia

OIL ADDICTION

Oil is a core pillar of US- Russia bilateral trade A bumpy ride in oil markets afects commerce

Nevertheless Rus sian oil exports to the United States in physical terms have been rather

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 21 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations22

sustainable Starting from 2005 average annual deliveries have been above 150 million barrels

(Figure 52) Crude and heating oil have dominated while petroleum products and liquefied petro-

leum gases have not (Figure 53) In 2011 oil exports peaked at 228 million barrels but declined to

159 million barrels in 2016mdash a drop of 30 percent Rec ord high shipments of Rus sian oil to the United

States coincided with an elevation in oil prices which made the subsequent decline in oil shipment

value between 2011 and 2016 (by about 72 percent as shown in Figure 54) seem more stark The

increase in price also raised the share of oil in Rus sian exports by 74 percent in 2011 (Figure 55)

The Rus sian share in total US oil imports was around 55 percent in 2011 and 43 percent in 2016

( Table 56) In the last five years the United States has relied exclusively on consumption of Rus sian

oil for the rough equivalent of one week out of the year (Figure 56)

It is unlikely that Rus sia can significantly increase its share of the US oil market and there is a real

possibility for a downward trend There are several reasons the historically high Rus sian hydrocar-

bon export threshold of 2011 will not soon if ever be surpassed

First US energy consumption will likely be flat According to the US Energy Information Adminis-

tration (EIA) demand for petroleum and other liquids in the United States will be about 35ndash36

quadrillion British thermal units (BTUs) with minimal variation over the next 25 years1

1 US EIA ldquoAnnual Energy Outlook 2017 with Projections to 2050rdquo January 5 2017 7ndash8

Figure 51 US- Russia Trade Growth () vs US and Rus sia Real GDP Growth () 1993ndash2016

Source IMF ldquoIMF Datardquo accessed September 27 2017 http wwwimf org en Data US Census Bureau

ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo

Note rGDPthinsp=thinspreal gross domestic product

Trade

USA rGDP growth

Russia rGDP growth

-60

-40

-20

0

20

40

60

80

100

1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Gro

wth

All spikes in US-Russia trade have been connected with two main

variables volume and price of crude oil

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 22 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 23

Second the United States will become a net energy exporter between 2020 and 2030 in most

cases under dif er ent combinations of oil and natu ral gas prices GDP growth technological

breakthroughs and the availability of energy resources The role of oil imports will dramatically

fall2

Third oil price scenarios as described by the International Energy Agency (IEA) international

financial organ izations (IFIs) and many national agencies are very cautious and assume that even

by 2035 to 2040 oil prices will not to recover to the levels of 2011ndash20123

Fourth Rus sian oil production and export growth will be modest and driven by Asian economic

expansion and will comprise a decreasing share of Western markets4 According to forecasts from

2 Ibid 15ndash18

3 Ibid table 3 ldquoEnergy Prices by Sector and Sourcesrdquo World Bank World Bank Commodity Markets Price Forecasts

(Washington DC World Bank 2017) httpswwwworldbank org en research commodity - markets Organ ization of the

Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) World Oil Outlook 2016 (Vienna OPEC 2016)

4 E D Belotskaia et al Global and Rus sian Energy Outlook 2016 (Moscow Energy Research Institute of the Rus sian

Acad emy of Science Analytical Center for the Government of the Rus sian Federation 2016) http acgov ru files

publication a 12767 pdf

Figure 52 US Imports from Rus sia Crude Oil and Petroleum Products Thousands of Barrels 1995ndash2016

Source US EIA ldquoUS Imports by Country of Origin Rus siardquo Petroleum amp Other Liquids September 13

2017 http wwweia gov dnav pet PET _ MOVE _ IMPCUS _ D _ NUS _ NRS _ MBBL _ M htm

0

50000

100000

150000

200000

250000

Date 1995 1996 1997 1998 199920002001200220032004200520062007200820092010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 23 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations24

the Organ ization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) crude oil exports from Rus sia and

the Caspian region to the United States will dis appear by 20255

So why does the Rus sian Urals blend continue to be attractive for oil traders and US refineries

which could pro cess greater volumes of domestically produced lighter crude There are two main

reasons One is related to the preference of US high conversion refineries (the most sophisticated

in the world) to work with heavy oil blends produced by Canada Mexico Iraq Venezuela and

Rus sia Pro cessing heavy crude now is as profitable as pro cessing lighter crude The so- called

crack spreadmdash the diference between the cost of relatively cheap heavy crude oil and the final

price of value- added consumer products (diesel gasoline jet fuel and heating oil)mdash has become

the same as the refinery margins of light sweet crude6 This has primarily afected light oil produc-

ing countries such as Angola Algeria and Nigeria

5 OPEC World Oil Outlook 2016 306ndash309

6 ldquoHow Much for That Heavy Oilrdquo Oil Sands Magazine December 26 2015 https wwwoilsandsmagazine com

news 2015 12 26 how - much - for - that - heavy - oil

Figure 53 US Imports from Rus sia Oil and Petroleum Products US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

$-

$25000000000

$20000000000

$15000000000

$10000000000

$5000000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Liquefied petroleum gases

Petroleum products other

Fuel oil

Crude oil

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 24 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 25

Another factor afecting purchase of Rus sian oil is a new trend among oil companies for further

consolidation of scale and for integrating operations of upstream and downstream business7

There have been several waves of separation and unification of production transportation and

pro cessing in the last 50 years The current business cycle can be seen as an adaptation to a

period of low prices and oversupply Companies that buy andor produce oil in Rus sia most likely

prefer to transport and pro cess this oil in their own modern refineries in the United States At the

same time some of the newest refinery designs specifically for pro cessing heavy oils have been

built in Asia thus extending the choices of heavy oil producing countries

We should also consider that leading US and international oil traders along with oil producing

companies working with or owning US refineries frequently buy Rus sian oil on the open market

and have long- term contracts on Rus sian crude oil delivery Many Rus sian oil companies prefer to

pay for purchases or ser vices with their future production instead of cash creating situations of

ldquostickyrdquo oil imports that are difficult to replace The best- known example is an interaction between

7 ldquoEnergy and Utilities Sectorrdquo Roundtable Financier Worldwide December 2015 https wwwfinancierworldwide

com roundtable - energy - utilities - sector - dec15

Figure 54 US Imports of Oil and Petroleum Products from Rus sia vs Oil Prices Eu rope Brent Spot Price Free on Board (FOB) 1996ndash2017

Source US EIA ldquoUS Imports by Country of Origin Rus siardquo

0

20

40

60

80

100

120

140

0

5000

10000

15000

20000

25000

30000

Jan

-19

96

Jun

-19

96

No

v-19

96

Ap

r-19

97

Sep

-19

97

Feb

-19

98

Jul-

199

8D

ec-1

99

8M

ay-1

99

9O

ct-1

99

9M

ar-2

00

0A

ug

-20

00

Jan

-20

01

Jun

-20

01

No

v-2

00

1A

pr-

20

02

Sep

-20

02

Feb

-20

03

Jul-

20

03

Dec

-20

03

May

-20

04

Oct

-20

04

Mar

-20

05

Au

g-2

00

5Ja

n-2

00

6Ju

n-2

00

6N

ov-

20

06

Ap

r-2

00

7Se

p-2

00

7Fe

b-2

00

8Ju

l-2

00

8D

ec-2

00

8M

ay-2

00

9O

ct-2

00

9M

ar-2

010

Au

g-2

010

Jan

-20

11Ju

n-2

011

No

v-2

011

Ap

r-2

012

Sep

-20

12Fe

b-2

013

Jul-

20

13D

ec-2

013

May

-20

14O

ct-2

014

Mar

-20

15A

ug

-20

15Ja

n-2

016

Jun

-20

16N

ov-

20

16

USD

per

Bar

rel

Th

ou

san

d B

arr

els

US Imports from Russia of Crude Oil and Petroleum Products (Thousand Barrels)

Europe Brent Spot Price FOB (Dollars per Barrel)

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 25 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations26

Table 56 US Oil Imports All Countries vs Rus sia Thousand Barrels per Day 2011ndash2016

Years 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

All Countries 11436 10598 9859 9241 9449 10058

Rus sia 624 477 460 330 371 433

Share 546 450 467 357 393 431

Sources US EIA ldquoUS Imports by Country of Origin Total Crude Oil and Productsrdquo Petroleum amp Other

Liquids September 13 2017 wwweia gov dnav pet pet_move_impcus_a2_nus_ep00_im0_mbbl_m htm

authorrsquos computation

Figure 55 US Imports from Rus sia Share of Crude Oil and Petroleum Products Million US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

57

64

73

72

74

73

72

59

52 50

0

$5000

$10000

$15000

$20000

$25000

$30000

$35000

$40000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

US Imports from Russia

Share of Oil and Petroleum Products

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 26 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 27

the Rus sian state mono poly Rosneft and commodity trading and mining giant Glencore which

along with energy and commodities com pany Vitol participated in a $10 billion prepayment

deal with Rosneft for crude supplies in 2013

There have been a number of ongoing transactions between the Rus sian oil industry and interna-

tional oil companies including several that top the list of importers of Rus sian oil to the United

States ( Table 57) In December 2016 Glencore participated in a controversial privatization opera-

tion purchasing in tandem with the Qatar sovereign wealth fund a 195 percent stake in Rosneft

which was on the US and EU list of sanctioned firms8 Glencore has also taken a blocking stake in

midsize oil producer RussNeft BP owns a 1975 percent stake in Rosneft Chevron holds a

15 percent interest in the 935- mile- long CPC9 pipeline which transports an average of 959000

barrels of crude oil per day including 76000 barrels daily from Rus sia10 ExxonMobil has formed

8 E Mazneva and I Arkhipov ldquoRus sia Sells $11 Billion Stake in Rosneft to Glencore Qatarrdquo Bloomberg December 7

2016

9 CPCthinsp=thinspCaspian Pipeline Consortium

10 ldquoRus sia Highlights of Operations and Business Portfoliordquo Chevron accessed October 3 2017 https wwwchevron

com worldwide russia

Figure 56 Share of Rus sian Oil in Total US Oil Imports Thousands of Barrels per Day 1972ndash2016

Source US EIA ldquoUS Imports by Country of Origin Total Crude Oil and Productsrdquo

2000

4000

6000

8000

10000

12000

14000

16000

US Imports of Crude Oil and Petroleum Products (Thousand Barrels per Day)

US Imports from Russia of Crude Oil and Petroleum Products (Thousand Barrels per Day)19

7319

7419

7519

7619

7719

7819

7919

80

198

119

82

198

319

84

198

519

86

198

719

88

198

919

90

199

119

92

199

319

94

199

519

96

199

719

98

199

92

00

02

00

12

00

22

00

32

00

42

00

52

00

62

00

72

00

82

00

92

010

20

112

012

20

132

014

20

152

016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 27 102017 404 PM

Table 57 Top Importers of Rus sian Oil to the United States Thousands of Barrels 2016

VALERO MARKETING amp SUPPLY CO 54590 3616

EXXONMOBIL OIL CORP 17087 1130

CHEVRON USA INC 15217 1008

BP WEST COAST PRODUCTS LLC 10130 671

GEORGE E WARREN CORP 7272 48

PAULSBORO REFINING CO LLC 6838 453

TESORO CORP 5097 338

VITOL INC 5084 337

PHILLIPS 66 CO 4726 313

TRAFIGURA AG 4360 289

PAR HAWAII REFINING LLC 3893 258

MOTIVA ENTERPRISES LLC 3041 205

SHELL US TRADING CO 2863 19

MARATHON PETROLEUM CO LLC 2475 16

ATLANTIC TRADING amp MARKETING 2099 14

FREEPOINT COMMODITIES LLC 1439 1

GLENCORE LTD 1284 85

BEST PETROLEUM CORP 967 64

ROLYMPUS US COMMODITIES GROUP LLC 822 6

HUNT CRUDE OIL SUPPLY CO 666 4

GULF OIL LP 658 4

Source US EIA ldquoUS Imports by Country of Origin Crude Oilrdquo Petroleum amp Other Liquids September 13

2017 httpswwweiagovdnavpetpet_move_impcus_a2_nus_epc0_im0_mbblpd_ahtm authorrsquos

computation

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 28 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 29

several joint ventures with Rosneft to undertake ofshore exploration in the Black Sea and the Kara

Sea in Siberia11

According to the Sanctions Act US persons are prohibited from exporting or reexporting goods

ser vices (except financial ser vices) and technology in support of exploration or production of new

deep- water Arctic ofshore or shale oil proj ects that involve designated Rus sian entities or other

entities in which such sanctioned persons have a controlling interest or a substantial noncontrol-

ling owner ship interest defined as not less than 33 percent (previously it was 50 percent) The new

law also authorizesmdash but does not requiremdash the imposition of so- called secondary sanctions

against non- US entities that engage in activities involving the construction maintenance or

expansion of Rus sian energy export pipelines with a fair market value of $1 million or more or an

aggregate fair market value during a 12- month period of $5 million12 This provision has raised the

concerns of some Eu ro pean countries particularly Germany As result the final language of the

law included wording about coordination of this issue with allies of the United States

Shipments of Rus sian oil to the United States could be afected by activity in the US refinery

industry In early 2017 Saudi Aramco bought the United Statesrsquo largest oil refinery in Port Arthur

(Texas) and it announced plans to send more of its own crude to that refinery13 Serious concerns

exist however regarding the future of three refineries and nine pipelines owned by Citgo a US

branch of the Venezuelan state com pany PdVSA which is balancing precariously on the edge of

default Under certain conditions in the event of PdVSA bankruptcy Rosneft could claim a stake of

up to 499 percent in Citgo Such a possibility has raised concerns among politicians and US

government officials with Trea sury Secretary Steven Mnuchin calling it a ldquonational security issuerdquo14

Tables 58 59 and 510 show allocations of Rus sian oil imports to major US refineries some of

which work exclusively on Rus sian crude a total of two to three months per year In total 150940

thousand barrels of Rus sian oil were refined in 2016

Figure 57 confirms a leading position of Texas and Louisiana among the US states receiving

Rus sian crude followed by New Jersey California Mississippi Washington Hawaii and Delaware

In a paradoxical way Texas has dis appeared from the list of states as a main destination of US

imports from Rus sia (Figure 58) because Rus sian crude is mostly delivered to Louisiana ports and

registered there by US Customs as an import from Rus sia After that it transports to refineries in

Louisiana and Texas

Overall the short- term business rationale behind the sustainability of US oil imports from Rus sia

cannot overcome strong headwinds in the US energy sector facing all oil importers which will

inevitably lead to a contraction of Rus sian oil exports to the United States in the foreseeable future

11 Exxon eforts to receive a special US Trea sury waiver to drill in sanctioned Rus sia failed in 2017

12 Countering Amer i carsquos Adversaries through Sanctions Act HR 3364

13 Sarp Ozkan ldquoSaudi Aramcorsquos Port Arthur Refinery and the US Refinery Fleetrdquo Drilling Info May 11 2017

https infodrillinginfo com saudi - aramcos - port - arthur - refinery - us - refinery - fleet

14 Graham Kates ldquoTrea sury Secretary Rus siarsquos Citgo Deal a National Security Issuerdquo CBS News May 1 2017

http wwwcbsnews com news rosneft - citgo - steven - mnuchin - national - security

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 29 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations30

Table 58 Valerorsquos Refineries Pro cessing Rus sian Oil Thousands of Barrels 2016

Saint Charles Louisiana 29206 535

Corpus Christi Texas 20626 378

Wilmington California 4250 78

Total USA 54590 100

Source US EIA ldquoRefinery Capacity Reportrdquo January 1 2017

table 5 wwweia gov petroleum refinerycapacity table5 pdf

authorrsquos computation

Table 59 ExxonMobil Refineries Pro cessing Rus sian Oil Thousands of Barrels 2016

Baytown Texas 15037 88

Baton Rouge Louisiana 2046 12

Total USA 17083 100

Source US EIA ldquoRefinery Capacity Reportrdquo authorrsquos computation

Table 510 Chevronrsquos Refineries Pro cessing Rus sian Oil Thousands of Barrels 2016

Pascagoula Mississippi 12767 840

El Segundo California 2372 155

Saint Rose Louisiana 78 05

Total USA 15217 100

Source US EIA ldquoRefinery Capacity Reportrdquo authorrsquos computation

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 30 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 31

HEAVY METAL

Taken together US imports of metals and US imports of oil compose about 80 percent of US

total imports from Rus sia (Figure 59) Trade of metals like other commodities is strongly afected

by market price fluctuations Nevertheless metal imports from Rus sia have been fairly resilient to

market volatility and their average annual value has hovered at about $4 billion in the last five years

(Figure 510) This market resilience was forged at the end of the 1990searly 2000s when Rus sian

metal producers gradually modernized their plants adjusting quality of production to Western

standards and enhancing integration into global value and supply chains Some of them conquered

their share of the highly competitive US market struggling with peers from Canada and certain

BRICS countries (China India and Brazil) To attract additional resources all Rus sian large metal-

producing companies became public and were listed on stock exchanges chiefly the London Stock

Exchange (Severstalrsquo PAO Evraz MMK OAO Novolipetsk Steel Norilsk Nikel and TMK PAO) one

on the New York Stock Exchange (Mechel) and one on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange (Rusal)

Business logic pushed some of them to invest in the US metal- making industry which was hit

hard by crisis Later on some of those assets were sold (eg two US steel mills acquired by

Severstal in 2004 were purchased 10 years later by Steel Dynamics Inc and AK Steel Corp)

Figure 57 Share of US States Rus sian Oil Imports 2016

Source US EIA ldquoUS Imports from Rus sia of Crude Oil and Petroleum Productsrdquo Petroleum amp Other

Liquids September 29 2017 https www eia gov dnav pet hist LeafHandler ashx nshy=shyPETampsshy=shyMTTIM _ NUS

- NRS _ 1ampfshy=shyM authorrsquos computation

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

100

Maine

Massachusetts

Maryland

Connecticut

Georgia

Rhode Island

Virginia

Florida

New York

Alabama

Puerto Rico

Pennsylvania

Delaware

Hawaii

Washington

Mississippi

California

New Jersey

Louisiana

Texas

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 31 102017 404 PM

Figure 58 US Imports from Rus sia by State Million US$ 2013ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoState and Metropolitan Area Trade Datardquo Foreign Trade last modified

October 2 2017 https wwwcensus gov foreign - trade statistics state

Alaska

Connecticut

Delaware

Hawaii

Louisiana

Maryland

North Dakota 0

$1000

$2000

$3000

$4000

$5000

$6000

2013 2014 2015 2016

Alabama

Alaska

Connecticut

Delaware

Hawaii

Louisiana

Maryland

Maine

Mississippi

Montana

North Dakota

Mississippi

Figure 59 US Imports from Rus sia Share of Oil and Metals Million US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 1992ndash2016)

83

82

85

86

87

88

85

82

7375

0

$5000

$10000

$15000

$20000

$25000

$30000

$35000

$40000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

US Imports from Russia

Share of Oil and Metals

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 32 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 33

Obviously the market dynamic of dif er ent metals varies (eg iron steel aluminum platinum and

nickel) Caps to increase their trade and production in a ldquored oceanrdquo global environment with

anemic demand is rather limited despite Figure 510 showing a spike of iron and steel imports

from Rus sia in 2014 and aluminum in 2016 Some opportunities may exist for Russian- owned steel

plants in the United States (such as NLMK) to participate in energy proj ects resumed under Presi-

dent Trump who has required that new pipelines use only American- made steel15

Rus sia occupies a special niche in the US market for titanium products a high- end metal indus-

try Twenty years ago a long- term contract was signed between Rus sian titanium producer

VSMPO- AVISMA and Boeing The Rus sian com pany entered the selective club of Boeing suppliers

for the manufacture of components and semi- finished products Since the signing of this contract

VSMPO has delivered more than 35 percent of all titanium placed on Boeing civil aircraft16 They

are hidden in the trade data in an import category for Civilian Aircrafts and Parts (Figure 511) At

the end of 2016 Boeing announced an extension of its framework agreement with AVISMA

15 E Scheyder C Ngai and T Sylvester ldquoAmerican Steel Unlikely to Get Keystone Boost Despite Trump Orderrdquo

Reuters January 27 2017 http wwwreuters com article usa - trump - pipeline - transcanada - idUSL1N1FH1ZD

16 A Kramer ldquoTitanium Fills Vital Role for Boeing and Rus siardquo New York Times July 5 2013 http wwwnytimes com

2013 07 06 business global titanium - fills - vital - role - for - boeing - and - russia html mcubzshy=shy3

Figure 510 US Imports from Rus sia Iron Steel Bauxite Aluminum Nickel Nonferrous Metals and Other Precious Metals and Materials US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 1992ndash2016)

0

$6000000000

$5000000000

$4000000000

$3000000000

$2000000000

$1000000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 20122013

20142015

2016

Finished metal shapes

Iron and steel advanced

Iron and steel products nec

Nonferrous metals other

Other precious metals

Nickel

Bauxite and aluminum

Iron and steel mill products

Steelmaking materials

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 33 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations34

through 2022 and additional investments in the construction of a new robotic plant in Titanium

Valley a special economic zone located in the Sverdlovsk region that will open in 2018 The pro-

cessing of titanium forgings in all Boeing civil aircraft will be performed there including 787s 737

MAXs and 777Xs17 The contract extension with AVISMA may add several hundred million dollars

in value to annual US imports from Rus sia

How can such heavy reliance on imports of Rus sian titanium exist during a period of rising geopo-

liti cal tensions The answer is straightforward VSMPO- AVISMA is a highly specialized natu ral

mono poly producing 45 percent of the worldrsquos aerospace titanium Only four other countries

smelt high- grade titanium in industrial quantities the United States Germany Japan and China

Overall global production capacity is limited while demand is growing The United States cur-

rently imports around 79 percent of all the titanium it consumes each year18

17 ldquoBoeing and VSMPO Avisma to Launch Second Joint Production Siterdquo Rus sian Aviation Insider December 22 2016

http wwwrusaviainsider com boeing - and - vsmpo - avisma - to - launch - second - joint - production - site

18 Jon Ostrower and Andy Pasztor ldquoBoeing United Technologies Stockpile Titanium Partsrdquo Wall Street Journal

August 7 2014 https wwwwsj com articles boeing - united - technologies - stockpiling - titanium - parts - 1407441886

Figure 511 US Imports from Rus sia Civilian Aircrafts and Parts US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 1992ndash2016)

0

$20000000

$40000000

$60000000

$80000000

$100000000

$120000000

$140000000

$160000000

$180000000

$200000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Parts-civilian aircraft

Civilian aircraft

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 34 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 35

The Sanctions Act authorizes the secretary of the trea sury (in a nonmandatory way) to impose

restrictions (without specifying them) against Rus sian state- owned entities operating in the railway

metals and mining sectors of the Rus sian economy Despite the commanding heights of Rus siarsquos

state sector owner ship in its economy (70 percent of GDP) the metal- producing companies have

remained mostly in private hands

NUCLEAR AFFAIRS

Historically owners and operators of the 104 commercial nuclear power reactors in the United

States have purchased more than 80 percent of their uranium from foreign countries Uranium

shipping from Rus sia accounted for about 13 percent of the 58 million pounds of uranium pur-

chased overseas in 201219 At the same time the Rus sian state- owned mono poly Rosatom ac-

counts for 20 percent of Kazakhstanrsquos uranium production (which in turn comprises 11 percent of

all US uranium imports) and 20 percent of US domestic uranium production capacity (with

owner ship of exploration tracts in Wyoming)20

Nuclear fuel and nuclear power continue to be po liti cally sensitive topics both in the United

States and Rus sia Bilateral cooperation in this sector (being surprisingly stable with imports of

nuclear fuel from Rus sia at a level of $1 billion annually in the last five years [Figure 512 and 513])

is under constant po liti cal and lobbying pressure and has been a source of several po liti cal scan-

dals21 Consequently upside risks in this area of interaction are minimal and downside risks are

much higher especially when we are seeing more decommissioning of nuclear plants in the

United States than new constructions The US EIArsquos 2017 Annual Energy Outlook assumes

that about 25 percent of the nuclear capacity now operating will be removed from ser vice

by 205022

WHY IS THE GRASS GREENER ON THE OTHER SIDE

The United States continues to significantly reduce imports of chemical fertilizers as domestic pro-

duction increases In 2016 the United States imported 13 percent less ammonia and 11 percent

less urea and UAN which is a liquid urea and ammonium nitrate fertilizer Rus sia accounts for

around 40 percent of UAN imported by the United States The United States canceled antidumping

duties on imports of ammonium nitrate and urea from Rus sia in 2016 but it did not prevent import

19 US EIA ldquoThe US Relies on Foreign Uranium Enrichment Ser vices to Fuel Its Nuclear Power Plantsrdquo Today in

Energy August 28 2013 https wwweia gov todayinenergy detail php idshy=shy1273

20 Colin Chilcoat ldquoDoes Rus sia Really Own 20 Percent of the USrsquo Uranium Reservesrdquo OilPricecom May 6 2015

http oilpricecom Alternative - Energy Nuclear - Power Does - Russia - Really - Own - 20 - Of - The - US - Uranium - Reserves

html

21 Michelle Ye Hee Lee ldquoThe Facts behind Trumprsquos Repeated Claim about Hillary Clintonrsquos Role in the Rus sian Ura-

nium Dealrdquo Washington Post October 26 2016

22 US EIA ldquoAnnual Energy Outlook 2017 with Projections to 2050rdquo 81ndash82

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 35 102017 404 PM

Figure 512 US Imports from Rus sia Share of Oil Metals and Nuclear Fuel Million US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 1992ndash2016)

87

86

90

90

90

91

88

86

7882

0

$5000

$10000

$15000

$20000

$25000

$30000

$35000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

US Imports from Russia

Share of Oil Metals and Nuclear Fuel

Figure 513 US Imports from Rus sia Nuclear Fuel Materials US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

$-

$200000000

$400000000

$600000000

$800000000

$1200000000

$1000000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 36 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 37

drops twice last year (Figures 514 and 515) According to forecasts UAN imports are expected to

decline further to 15 million tons this year down over 46 percent from 28 million tons imported

last year23 The downside trend in imports of fertilizers will likely continue because of oversupply

BIG FISH

US imports of fish and shellfish from Rus sia are best understood in comparison with US fish

exports to the Rus sian market which slipped to zero in August 2014 after Rus sia issued an order

banning certain agricultural imports from the United States (Figure 516) While the volume of US

supply was not very large it was impor tant because it broke up the monopolistic dominance of a

few vertically integrated Rus sian companies that have kept prices high by restricting the entry of

new producers Seeking to implement import substitution policies Rus sia has tried to reduce

exports as well as imports of fish and seafood products in the last couple of years This symmetri-

cal approach was intended to ldquocompensaterdquo for a decrease of fish products in the domestic

23 Deepika Thapliyal ldquoPotashCorp Forecasts Sharp Drop in US Nitrogen Imports in 2017rdquo ICIS News February 7

2017 https wwwicis com resources news 2017 02 07 10076734 potashcorp - forecasts - sharp - drop - in - us - nitrogen

- imports - in - 2017

Figure 514 US Imports from Rus sia Share of Oil Metals Nuclear Fuel and Fertilizers Million US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

90

93

92

93

94

95

92

91

85

86

0

$5000

$10000

$15000

$20000

$25000

$30000

$35000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

US Imports from Russia

Share of Oil Metals Nuclear Fuel and Fertilizers

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 37 102017 404 PM

Figure 515 US Imports from Rus sia Chemical- Fertilizers US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

S-

$200000000

$400000000

$600000000

$800000000

$1000000000

$1200000000

$1400000000

$1600000000

$1800000000

$2000000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Figure 516 US Exports to Rus sia Fish and Shellfish US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

0

$10000000

$20000000

$30000000

$40000000

$50000000

$60000000

$70000000

$80000000

$90000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Fish and shellfish

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 38 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 39

consumer market caused by Rus siarsquos import ban but it has failed As result the group most af-

fected by the self- imposed counter- sanctions were Rus sian consumers

With a significant drop in fish imports a devaluation of the ruble and inflationary pressures on

seafood prices yearly consumption of fish in Rus sia has declined precipitously In 2015 alone

fish prices increased 20 percent and consumption dropped to 14 kilograms per person24 from

22 kilograms in 201425 In 2016 food rose to 355 percent of house hold expenditure as a result of

increases in food prices26 This has pushed vertically integrated fishing monopolies to sell even

more of their catch abroad rather than deliver to the Rus sian Federation (Figure 517) Thus we

cannot exclude the possibility of further growth in US fish and shellfish imports from Rus sia on a

marginal scale

24 Александр Савельев ldquoПотребление рыбы в России упало до 14 кг на человекаrdquo [Fish consumption in Rus sia fell to

14 kg per person] Экономика Интерфакс January 28 2015 http wwwinterfax ru business 492038

25 Илья Шестаков ldquoПотебление рыбы в России снизилось на 10 процентов из- за роста ценrdquo [Fish consumption in

Rus sia dropped by 10 percent due to price increases] RNS March 8 2017 https rnsonline consumer - market

Potreblenie - ribi - v - Rossii - snizilos - na - 10 - iz - za - rosta - tsen - 2017 - 03 - 08

26 Zoya Sheftalovich and Christian Oliver ldquoRus siarsquos Boom (Farming) Economyrdquo Politico November 8 2016 http

wwwpolitico eu article russias - boom - farming - economy

Figure 517 US Imports from Rus sia Fish and Shellfish US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

0

$50000000

$100000000

$150000000

$200000000

$250000000

$300000000

$350000000

$400000000

$450000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 39 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations40

SPACE ODYSSEY

Among high- end products beyond the top five groups of goods imported from Rus sia cheap and

efficient Rus sian engines have been used to launch US rockets into space for about 16 years

(Figure 518) There was a serious po liti cal strug gle around a 2014 ban on the purchase of Rus sian

RD-180 rocket engines revealing the conflicting business interests of power ful high- tech companies

This restrictive mea sure was temporary and was quickly lifted because of significant cost impacts

and risks of disruption to launch schedules27 For the same reason the Sanctions Act does not autho-

rize ldquothe imposition of any sanction or other condition limitation restriction or prohibition that

directly or indirectly impedes the supply by any entity of the Rus sian Federation of any product or

ser vice or the procurement of such product or ser vice by any contractor or subcontractor of the

United States or any other entity relating to or in connection with any space launch conducted for

the National Aeronautics and Space Administration or any other nonndash Department of Defense

customerrdquo28

Nevertheless many experts believe that US domestic alternatives to replace Rus sian engines will

be viable in five to eight years

27 Ken Dilanian ldquoWhy Does the US Use Rus sian Rockets to Launch Its Satellitesrdquo NBC News updated November 15

2016 http wwwnbcnews com why - does - u - s - use - russian - rockets - launch - its - satellites - n588526

28 Countering Amer i carsquos Adversaries through Sanctions Act HR 3364

Figure 518 Spacecraft Excluding Military US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

0

$20000000

$40000000

$60000000

$80000000

$100000000

$120000000

$140000000

$160000000

$180000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 40 102017 404 PM

41

Diversity and technological complexity are the most vis i ble advantages supporting US exports to

Rus sia Three major groups of export goods include civilian aircraft engines and parts (Figure 61)

drilling and oil field equipment (Figure 62) and industrial machines and engines (Figure 63)

Despite sanctions against the transfer of advanced oil producing and pro cessing technologies the

realization of US drilling and oil field equipment in Rus sia is sustainable although some bilateral

proj ects have been frozen

Another category of goods that has demonstrated resilience is the phar ma ceu ti cal industry (Fig-

ure 64) because most drugs in Rus sia are imported (about 70 percent of the Rus sian phar ma ceu-

ti cal market in value) Import substitution policies have had only modest results in this industry

As confirmed by American Chamber of Commerce surveys US exports to Rus sia are closely

connected to US FDI 30 percent of total imports of US companies working in the Rus sian

market come from the United States (more than $2 billion in 2016) In other words about

40 percent of all US exports to Rus sia are related to a US corporate- sector business pro cess in

the country The major sectors of activity of these companies are energy and natu ral resources

(52 percent) manufacturing (17 percent) information and communications technology or ICT

(13 percent) retail (7 percent) automotive industry (6 percent) phar ma ceu ti cal production

(1 percent) professional ser vices (05 percent) and other (2 percent)1

Some obvious constraints on US exports to Rus sia have resulted from a reduction in demand A

deterioration of bilateral relations and implementation of sanctions and counter- sanctions have

directly or indirectly afected all businesses Figures 65 and 66 provide data regarding a dramatic

drop in the sale of US agricultural production in Rus sia with all other categories of exports in

goods showing big cuts as well (see Figures 67ndash69)

Exports of civilian aircraft engines and parts put the state of Washington in first place among

other states as a leading exporter to the Rus sian market (Figure 610)

1 American Chamber of Commerce in Rus sia ldquoInvestment and Import to Rus sia 2nd Surveyrdquo 13

Diversity and Constraints

06

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 41 102017 404 PM

Figure 61 US Exports of Civilian Aircraft Engines Equipment and Parts to Rus sia US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

$2500000000

$2000000000

$1500000000

$1000000000

$500000000

$-

Figure 62 US Exports of Drilling and Oil Field Equipment US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

0

$5000000

$10000000

$15000000

$20000000

$25000000

$30000000

$35000000

$40000000

$45000000

$50000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 42 102017 404 PM

Figure 63 US Exports of Industrial Engines to Rus sia US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

0

$5000000

$10000000

$15000000

$20000000

$25000000

$30000000

$35000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Figure 64 US Exports of Phar ma ceu ti cal Preparations to Rus sia US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

0

$5000000

$10000000

$15000000

$20000000

$25000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 43 102017 404 PM

Figure 65 US Exports of Meat and Poultry to Rus sia US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Meat poultry etc

$1000000000

$800000000

$600000000

$400000000

$200000000

$-

$1200000000

$1400000000

$1600000000

Figure 66 US Exports of Soybeans to Rus sia US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

0

$20000000

$40000000

$60000000

$80000000

$100000000

$120000000

$140000000

$160000000

$180000000

$200000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 44 102017 404 PM

Figure 67 US Exports of Vehicles Engines and Parts to Rus sia US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Other parts and accessories of vehicles

Automotive tires and tubes

Bodies and chassis for passenger cars

Engines and engine parts (carburetors pistonsrings and valves)

Trucks buses and special purpose vehicles

Passenger cars new and used

$2500000000

$2000000000

$1500000000

$500000000

$-

$1000000000

Figure 68 US Exports of Medicinal Equipment to Rus sia US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

$10000000

$15000000

$20000000

$25000000

$30000000

$35000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 45 102017 404 PM

Figure 610 US Exports to Rus sia by States (2016 US$ Value) Million US$ 2013ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoState and Metropolitan Area Trade Datardquo

Iowa Kentucky

North Dakota

Oklahoma

South Carolina

Washington

0

$500

$1000

$1500

$2000

2013 2014 2015 2016

District of Columbia

Iowa

Kentucky

North Dakota

Oklahoma

South Carolina

Washington

Figure 69 US Exports of Excavating Machinery to Rus sia US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

0

$5000000

$10000000

$15000000

$20000000

$25000000

$30000000

$35000000

$40000000

$45000000

$50000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 46 102017 404 PM

47

Upon reviewing the current trend in US- Russia economic relations we must acknowledge that

the existing trade model is obsolete and exhausted Imports are resource- oriented and reflect

constraints of the Rus sian economic structure while five groups of goodsmdash oil metals nuclear

fuels fertilizers and fishmdash make up more than 90 percent of total imports from Rus sia (Figure 71)

Each of these industries has a limited capacity for growth in the foreseeable future

Rus siarsquos core export to the United Statesmdash oilmdash will inevitably decrease in the mid- term under any

scenario The value and volume of Rus sian exports to the United States are open to global market

volatility and po liti cal pressures with limited hedging mechanisms

Overall US exports to Rus sia are unsustainable due to bilateral po liti cal tensions the whims of

commodity markets and changing domestic policies Sanctions and counter- sanctions have

created additional barriers particularly in finance banking high- tech energy and agro- business

According to the American Chamber of Commerce 69 percent of US companies working in the

country consider the impact of US sanctions against Rus sia on their business as negative At the

same time 60 percent of companies do not expect big changes in business relations between

Rus sia and the United States under Trump1 as the new law codifies existing sanctions fortifies

them and extends them to new sectors

Current US investments are low due to the weak rule of law in Rus sia a lack of property right

protections and proper contract enforcement high levels of statization and monopolization in the

economy a poor business climate outdated capital stock dependence on natural- resource

sectors and of course sanction and counter- sanction mea sures Bloated administrative compo-

nents created as risk mitigation instruments have also served as impediments The countryrsquos

institutional weakness low level of productivity bud get constraints and a declining inflexible

workforce will restrain future economic growth even if commodity prices recover Rus sian eco-

nomic policy will likely continue to be statist and protectionist relying mostly on import

substitutions

1 Ibid 11

Existing Trends and Future Scenarios

07

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 47 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations48

What scenarios can be expected in such a challenging environment

One probability (no peace no war) is based on the assumption that matters will not deteriorate

further and implementation of the Sanctions Act will be cursory This will cause relatively slow

degradation in the economic field with occasional flashes of activity in selected areas (eg closer

cooperation against Islamist terrorist groups in Syria)

A second worse case or critical scenario is the intensive and full- scale execution of current sanc-

tion legislation and even the imposition of new economic punitive and restrictive mea sures which

could incite asymmetric retaliatory actions and lead to the introduction of additional protectionist

policies This in turn could trigger a further escalation of mutual confrontation and could eventu-

ally destroy the fundamentals of the current bilateral trade system Rus sian leadership has charac-

terized the Sanctions Act as a declaration of a trade war that ends all hope for improving bilateral

relations2

2 Дмитрий Медведев ldquoПодписание президентом США нового санкционного закона против России создает несколько

последствийrdquo [The US Presidentrsquos signing of the package of new sanctions against Rus sia will have a few conse-

quences] Facebook August 2 2017 https wwwfacebook com Dmitry Medvedev posts 10154587161801851

Figure 71 US Imports from Rus sia Share of Oil Metals Nuclear Fuel Fertilizers and Fish Million US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

93

94

93

94

95

96

93

92

87

89

0

$5000

$10000

$15000

$20000

$25000

$30000

$35000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

US Imports from Russia

Share of Oil Metals Nuclear FuelFertilizers and Fish

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 48 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 49

The best case and most favorable scenario looks less probable now It assumes the realization of

structural reforms in Rus sia in such a way that would adapt Rus siarsquos foreign policy to national

economic needs reduce confrontations with the West and make a concerted efort to integrate

Rus sian businesses into global supply and value chains A revitalization of the structural reform

agendamdash including eforts to diversify economic activities through de- monopolization and support

for SMEs a restructuring of the banking sector the creation of a vibrant business climate to foster

entrepreneurships and innovation the implementation of administrative and judicial reforms to

tackle red tape and endemic corruption and the reduction of state control over key sectors of the

economy via wide- spread privatization could kick- start the development of a nonoil economy and

improve long- term growth prospects Despite ongoing discussion of reform strategies deep

economic and po liti cal changes are extremely complicated over the next po liti calelectoral cycle

(2018ndash2024) particularly because of re sis tance of vested interests and growing commodity prices

The urgency to tackle structural shortcomings in natu ral resource- dependent economies usually

correlates with the price of those resources and the degree to which resource rents drive eco-

nomic activity However there may be marginal improvements in the efficiency of the current

economic system

Future US- Russia relations can be thought of through three pillars one pillar focuses on areas

where both countries maintain a competitive rivalry another looks at potential areas of interaction

under pres ent conditions a third pillar and one that has evaporated from the current bilateral

agenda concentrates on future cooperation Stronger economic ties could not only be a kind of

po liti cal shock absorber but contribute to the building of this future (particularly business contacts

aim to support future structural reforms) although po liti cal factors are depressing the prospects

for cooperation To escape deadlock it will be impor tant to establish the right balance between

politics and economics and create a model of collaboration within the framework of contention

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 49 102017 404 PM

About the Author

Vadim Grishin PhD MBA has been involved in the reform pro cess in Rus sia as adviser to the

deputy prime minister of Rus sia in 1992ndash1993 and 2006ndash2010 He has extensive experience

working with the Bretton Woods Institutions He was the board member of the World Bank Group

and served as se nior adviser at the International Monetary Fund Currently he is a con sul tant to the

chief economistrsquos office of the International Finance Corporation and teaches the economics of

transition at Georgetown University in Washington DC

50

594-71613_ch99_4Pindd 50 102017 403 PM

Blank

COVER PHOTO ADOBE STOCK

1616 Rhode Island Avenue NW

Washington DC 20036

202 887 0200 | wwwcsisorg

v++ISBN 978-1-4422-8035-9

Lanham bull Boulder bull New York bull London

4501 Forbes Boulevard

Lanham MD 20706

301 459 3366 | wwwrowmancom

A U T H O R

Vadim Grishin

Myths and Realities

A Report of the

CSIS RUSSIA AND EURASIA PROGRAM

US-RussiaEconomicRelations

O C T O B E R 2 0 1 7

Euml|xHSLEOCy280359z

The Man Pupu Nyor Rock Formations at the Northern Urals also known as Seven

Strong Man or Little Mountain of the God in the local tribe (Mansi) language

Page 9: U.S.-Russia Economic Relations: Myths and Realities · 2020-04-17 · OCTOBER 2017 U.S.- Russia Economic Relations Myths and Realities AUTHOR Vadim Grishin A REPORT OF THE CSIS RUSSIA

Vadim Grishin 3

trade and investment during several reset cycles in bilateral relations starting in the 1990s but

they were only partially successful

Several papers and books although focused primarily on bilateral po liti cal agendas or sectorial

analy sis underline the importance of Rus sian domestic realities Dr Angela Stent in her ldquoLimits of

Partnershiprdquo notes that state control of the commanding heights in the Rus sian economy creates

significant deterrents for US private- sector entrance into the market8 Thane Gustafson in the

ldquoWheel of Fortunerdquo asserts that Rus siarsquos growing dependence on revenue from oil exports along

with its inefficient and often- corrupt management of industry is unsustainable9 Andrew Kuchins

in his ldquoElevation and Calibration A New Rus sia Policy for Amer i cardquo has quoted some experts who

believe that the weakened Rus sian economic position may over time contribute to some rap-

prochement with the West and emphasized lack of reforms as ldquoa key obstacle not only for Rus sian

economic recovery but also for improving ties with the Westrdquo10

In a recent joint task force report Eugene Rumer Andrew S Weiss and Richard Sokolsky argue

that the concept of developing stronger economic ties with Rus sia as a foundation for improved

diplomatic relations has not worked ldquoClinton Bush and Obama all placed high hope on trade as

an engine of better relations with Rus sia All were frustrated by the fact that the two countries are

for the most part not natu ral trading partnersrdquo11 On a dif er ent note the former US envoy to

Rus sia Michael McFaul has defended the achievements of a reset policy under the Barack Obama

administration emphasizing that bilateral trade reached a rec ord level in 2011 Nevertheless he

also stresses that it was a one- time accomplishment unlikely to be repeated12

Voices of those who believe that extensive economic ties can provide stability to broader po liti cal

interaction are weaker than ever in an environment of growing protectionism and adversarial rivalry

8 Angela Stent The Limits of Partnerships US- Russian Relations in the XXI Century (Prince ton NJ Prince ton

University Press 2014) 98

9 Thane Gustafson Wheel of Fortune The Battle for Oil and Power in Rus sia (London Harvard University Press 2012)

10 Andrew Kuchins Elevation and Calibration A New Rus sia Policy for Amer i ca (Washington DC Center on Global

Interests 2016)

11 Eugene Rumer Richard Sokolsky and Andrew S Weiss ldquoTrump and Rus sia The Right Way to Manage Relationsrdquo

Foreign Affairs 96 no 2 (MarchApril 2017)

12 Michael McFaul ldquoUS- Russia Relationsrdquo (lecture Institute for Public Diplomacy and Global Communications

George Washington University Washington DC March 3 2017) https wwwc - span org video 424811 - 1 former

- ambassador - michael - mcfaul - discusses - state - usrussia - relations

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 3 102017 404 PM

4

02

Does Bilateral Economic Interaction Matter

Economic relations do not emerge out of a vacuum There are many variables that define the final

configuration of economic interactions such as a par tic u lar countryrsquos level of economic develop-

ment its business environment legal framework po liti cal climate (regime) culture and religion

history and tradition demography and geography as well as global and national economic cycles

An impor tant driver of trade relations for many economies has become participation in global and

regional trade agreements

As many studies and anecdotal evidence show bilateral economic cooperation should be sizable

and should relate to the economic growth of two countries in a way that afects their policy

interests Let us take as a reference point the BRICS countries1 a community of large emerging

economies which Rus sia belongs to Table 21 pres ents official data on US trade and investments

with BRICS states US- Russia trade in goods is disproportionally lowmdash235 times less than US

trade with China 33 times smaller than US trade with India and 28 times less than US trade

with Brazil The size of the US- Russia trade balance is comparable to the size of the US trade

balance with South Africa whose economy is almost four times smaller than Rus siarsquos If we add

trade in ser vices to the trade of goods the gaps increase significantly (Figures 21 and 22) The

diference is not only quantitative but also qualitative

The quality of trade relations can be mea sured by its diversity its share of high- tech components

resilience to economic shocks and its contribution to GDP growth On average a 10 percent

increase in a nationrsquos two- way trade relative to GDP increases GDP through a variety of channels

by at least 16 percent2

Bilateral trade and real GDP growth in the United States and Rus sia are practically uncorrelated

as shown in the summary output of multifactorial regression The coefficient of multiple determi-

nation (R Square) is close to 0 ( Table 22) At the same time the correlation of US exports to India

1 BRICS is the acronym for a select group of five developing economies Brazil Rus sia India China and South Africa

2 World Economic Forum Foreign Direct Investment as a Key Driver for Trade Growth and Prosperity The Case for a

Multilateral Agreement on Investment (Geneva World Economic Forum 2013) 11

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 4 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 5

Table 21 US Trade and Foreign Direct Investments (FDI) with China India Brazil South Africa and Rus sia 2016

China India Brazil South Africa Rus sia

Total Goods Trade 5786 677 565 13 203

Imports 4628 460 262 73 145

Exports 1158 217 303 55 58

Trade in Ser vices 696 472 317 47 na

Imports 161 268 68 17 na

Exports 535 203 249 30 na

US FDI 746 283 653 62 141

BRICS FDI in the United States

148 93 043 076 63

Supported Jobs in the United States (thousand)

911 197 308 50 84

Source United States Trade Representative (USTR) ldquoCountries amp Regionsrdquo accessed September 27 2017

https ustrgov countries - regions See US- China Trade Facts US- India Trade Facts US- Brazil Trade

Facts US- South Africa Trade Facts and US- Russia Trade Facts

201520142013

and China with the real GDP growth of these big Asian economies is significant (05) In the case of

Brazil the correlation is even higher (07) By contrast South Africarsquos small open economy is quite

sensitive to US imports from South Africa (043)3

In marked contrast to other BRICS countries Rus sia is a poor choice for export- oriented opera-

tions As a recent International Monetary Fund (IMF) study highlights Rus sia is an outlier a rare

exception among emerging market (EM) economies with virtually no preferential access to major

markets and little meaningful change over three de cades4 This complicates Rus siarsquos integration

into the global value chain (GVC) which became a significant driving force toward economic

development and trade for certain BRICS economies

3 IMF statistics authorrsquos computation

4 IMF Rus sian Federation Selected Issues IMF Country Report N17198 (Washington DC IMF July 2017)

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 5 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations6

Trade is closely connected with foreign direct investment (FDI) and both are parts of a complex

interaction known as international production sharing According to publicly available official data

US FDI in Rus sia was about $131 billion for 2013 and $295 billion for 2016 with the top industrial

sectors being software and IT ser vices financial ser vices chemicals metals coal oil and gas

and business ser vices5 If we take into account US investments made through Eu ro pean branches

of US companies and ofshore firms this number would easily triple Another component

that usually is not tracked by official statistics is reinvestments The American Chamber of

Commerce surveys in 2016 and 2017 which include this component draw a completely dif er ent

picture accumulated US corporate FDI in 90 large US companies working in Rus sia reached

5 US Department of Commerce International Trade Administration ldquoRussiamdash94- Foreign Direct Investment and

Portfolio Investment Statisticsrdquo Rus sia Country Commercial Guide July 7 2017 https wwwexport gov article

id=shyRussia - foreign - direct - investment - statistics

Figure 21 US Trade in Goods with China India Brazil Rus sia and South Africa Billion US$ 2016

Source USTR ldquoCountries amp Regionsrdquo See US- China Trade Facts US- India Trade Facts US- Brazil Trade

Facts US- South Africa Trade Facts and US- Russia Trade Facts

0

$50

$100

$150

$200

$250

$300

$350

$400

$450

$500

$550

$600

China India Brazil Russia South Africa

Exports

Imports

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 6 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 7

$8244 billion in 20176 The real level from our perspective is usually between official and private

estimations around $40 billon But even this cumulative figure is less than the US FDI in Brazil

and China

The American Chamber of Commerce surveys have also revealed other impor tant data Eighty-

five percent of US companies doing business in Rus sia entered its market 10 or more years ago

while 60 percent of them ldquolandedrdquo there 20 years ago or earlier Only one percent have started

operations over the last five years confirming an obvious fact entry into the Rus sian market is

challenging because of growing monopolism risks associated with the business climate and a

stagnating economy7

6 American Chamber of Commerce in Rus sia ldquoInvestment and Import to Rus sia 2nd Surveyrdquo (Prepared by GfK for the

American Chamber of Commerce in Rus sia Moscow May 2017) 12

7 Ibid 4

Figure 22 US Trade in Goods and in Ser vices with China India Brazil Rus sia and South Africa Billion US$ 2016

Source USTR ldquoCountries amp Regionsrdquo See US- China Trade Facts US- India Trade Facts US- Brazil Trade

Facts US- South Africa Trade Facts and US- Russia Trade Facts

0

$100

$200

$300

$400

$500

$600

$700

China India Brazil Russia South Africa

Trade in Services

Total Goods Trade

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 7 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations8

Rus sian direct investment position toward the United States declined from $215 billion in 2013 to

$83 billion in 2015 (Figure 23) Taking into account dif er ent channels and instruments the actual

volume of Rus sian investments in the United States made through ofshore Eu ro pean Canadian

and US companies may be several times greater than the available official data

Foreign investment in financial assets or foreign portfolio investment (FPI) should be included

even though Central Bank of Rus sia statistics indicate they were also quite low US investments in

equity were $345 million and in debt instruments were about $65 million in the fourth quarter of

20168 However these numbers do not reflect the real level of FPI Rus siarsquos stocks are incredibly

inexpensive while there has been impressive growth of US investments in short- term securities

and in foreign exchange (FX) operations (cash- and- carry trade) Rus sia was among the top per-

forming emerging markets in 2016 gaining 4744 percent in US dollars9 Nevertheless the gen-

eral capitalization of the stock exchange is tiny (less than 20 percent of GDP) comparable to the

capitalization of just one large US com pany such as Coca- Cola Many private sources believe that

the US FPI in Rus sia could be as high as several billion US dollars but a new set of sanctions

approved by President Trump on August 2 2017 if implemented could reverse those flows It is

still not clear whether the secretary of trea sury will prohibit participation in the oferings of Rus siarsquos

sovereign debt and the full range of derivative products A report on this subject should be sub-

mitted no later than 180 days after enactment of the law which means no later than Febru-

ary 2018 New legislation tightens prohibition on Rus sian financial companies already under

sanctions by limiting any new equity or debt with a maturity greater than 14 days (a provision that

8 Central Bank of Rus sia ldquoForeign Direct Investments in the Rus sian Federationrdquo accessed September 27 2017 www

cbr ru localization switchlanguage urlshy=shy news ampfromshy=shyru - ruamptoshy=shyen - gb

9 VanEck ldquoRus sian Stock Market Soars in 2016rdquo Seeking Alpha February 14 2017 https seekingalphacom article

4045602 - russian - stock - market - soars - 2016

Table 22 Summary Output of Regression Statistics (US Real GDP Rus sia Real GDP US- Russia Exports Imports and Total Trade)

Regression Statistics

Multiple R 0056445768

R Square 0003186125

Adjusted R Square minus0042123597

Standard Error 2616043923

Observations 24

Sources IMF statistics authorrsquos computation

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 8 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 9

previously allowed for 30 days) Similarly US persons are prohibited from taking on any new debt

that has a maturity greater than 60 days (previously it was 90 days) with Rus sian energy compa-

nies currently under sanctions10

According to the Trea sury Department Rus sia held $1029 billion in US Trea sury securities in

June 201711 Could Rus sia withdraw all its reserves from the United States and use this action as a

retaliatory mea sure Such a scenario is unlikely since there is no comparable safe- haven alterna-

tive to US dollars When Rus siarsquos US Trea sury holdings dropped 50 percent from $176 billion

(October 2010) to $90 billion (November 2011) the market did not notice12 Nevertheless Rus sian

authorities have announced they will decrease dependence on assets and payments in US dollars13

10 Countering Amer i carsquos Adversaries through Sanctions Act HR 3364

11 US Department of Trea sury Major Foreign Holders of Trea sury Securities September 18 2017 http ticdata

treasury gov Publish mfh txt

12 Ibid

13 ldquoНовый виток санкций Россия откажется от доллараrdquo [A new round of sanctions Rus sia will abandon the dollar]

Газетару August 7 2017 https wwwgazeta ru business 2017 08 07 10821937 shtml

Figure 23 Rus sia Outward FDI Position United States Equities and Debt Million US$ 2009ndash2016

Source Central Bank of the Rus sian Federation External Sector Statistics Rus sian Direct Investments

Abroad accessed September 27 2017 https wwwcbr ru localization switchlanguage urlshy=shy news

ampfromshy=shyru - ruamptoshy=shyen - gb

$6000

$8000

$10000

$12000

$14000

$16000

$18000

$20000

$22000

2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 9 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations10

Officially the country does not invest in the US stock exchange although some Rus sian oligarchs

have bought US corporate bonds and equities in large amounts The new sanctions law requires

the secretary of trea sury in consultation with the director of national intelligence and the secretary

of state to issue reports on Rus sian se nior po liti cal figures and oligarchs based on their closeness

to the Rus sian regime and their net worth as well as the exposure of key economic sectors of the

United States to Rus sian po liti cally exposed persons and parastatal entities including at a mini-

mum the banking securities insurance and real estate sectors14

Only three Rus sian companies are listed in the US exchanges

Overall the scale and scope of US- Russia economic interaction and business activity is much greater

than officially appreciated but not significant enough to be taken into consideration by policymakers

14 Countering Amer i carsquos Adversaries through Sanctions Act HR 3364

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 10 102017 404 PM

11

03

Politics in the Driverrsquos Seat

Bilateral economic relations depend to a great extent on global and national economic cycles

After the recent global financial crisis the US economy has shown surprisingly sustainable GDP

growth while the Rus sian economy was the most afected among BRICS countries by the turbu-

lence of a worldwide economic downturn in 2008ndash2009 and after a short- term rebound slipped

into stagnation (2012ndash2013) and then into full- scale recession (2014ndash2016) The countryrsquos eco-

nomic cycle however appears to be changing once again with the economy returning to a

pattern of growth albeit uneven and gradual (Figures 31 and 32) Even with sanctions still in place

conditions have improved as a result of the stabilization of Urals oil to an average annual price of

$419 per barrel in 2016 The gains were sparked in part by major crude producers agreeing to cut

production after hefty price drops in 2014 and 2015 Supported by easier financial conditions

higher oil prices and growing macro- stability Rus sia is heading toward a moderate growth rate

that is expected to reach 14 percent this year according to forecasts of the World Bank Group

(WBG) and the IMF1

Because of the significant role that politics plays in any bilateral interaction it is impor tant to

combine economic and po liti cal cycles applying a ldquoresetrdquo to bilateral economic cooperation in

addition to the po liti cal relationship I have compared po liti cal cycles and trade dynamics using the

following graphs ( Table 31 and Figure 33) These charts do not pretend to reflect with mathemati-

cal precision all shifts in the bilateral po liti cal relationship but rather attempt to visually align

impor tant economic and po liti cal moments to detect the efects of po liti cal events on the size of

bilateral trade

Figure 33 shows all pos si ble combinations economic trends at the intersection of po liti cal devel-

opments oppose or support each other in synchronization It is evident that po liti cal interference

1 International Monetary Fund Rus sian Federation Staff Concluding Statement of the 2017 Article IV Mission (Wash-

ington DC IMF 2017) World Bank Group From Recession to Recovery Rus sia Economic Report no 37 (Washington

DC World Bank 2017) http pubdocsworldbank org en 383241495487103815 RER - 37 - May26 - FINAL - with - summary

pdf

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 11 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations12

in bilateral business afairs in the early 2000s was less significant than in later years As result

growing po liti cal tensions from 2003 to 2008 did not dramatically afect bilateral economic inter-

action It is also easier to explain why 2011ndash2012 resulted in rec ord trade and investmentmdash a con-

sequence of very high oil prices GDP growth in both countries improved legislation after Rus siarsquos

accession to the WTO and the Obamandash Medvedev po liti cal reset From 2014 to 2016 a perfect

storm of developments added efficiency to Western sanctions and augmented the damaging

consequences of counter- sanction mea sures

Figure 33 also confirms that in times of reduced economic cooperation po liti cal pressures can

easily change bilateral economic trends Moreover business interests along with economic inter-

actions have a limited capacity to reverse the po liti cal mainstream

Figure 31 Economic Cycle 2014ndash2016

Source Authorrsquos evaluation of international financial institutions (IFI) data and sources from respective

countries

Sustainable Growth

Brazil

Negative Growth

Unstable Growth

Mexico

Descending Growth

Argentina

EU

US

Russia

Vietnam

China

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 12 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 13

Table 31 Po liti cal Cycles in Bilateral US- Russia Relations 1999ndash2016

2001ndash2002 The George W Bushndash Vladimir Putin Reset Rus sia supported ldquoglobal war on terrorismrdquo launched by the United States after 911 the SORT nuclear arms reduction treaty was signed by the United States and Rus sia and a successful business dialogue was developed that created the current structure of economic relations

2003ndash2008 Deterioration in bilateral relations brought on by the Iraq War Georgiarsquos ldquoRose Revolutionrdquo Mikhail Khodorkovskyrsquos arrest Ukrainersquos ldquoOrange Revolutionrdquo Kosovorsquos in de pen dence and the Georgian War

2009ndash2010 The Barack Obamandash Dmitry Medvedev Reset Rus sia served as a logistical hub for transportation and supply of US forces in Af ghan i stan United States and Rus sia signed the new START nuclear arms reduction treaty Rus sia backed tighter economic sanctions on Iran Rus sia gained access to the WTO after 18 years of negotiations

2011ndash2016 Deterioration in bilateral relations caused by the Ukrainian crisis which were followed by sanctions and counter- sanctions along with the Syrian crises and cyber- enabled activities

Source Authorrsquos evaluation of po liti cal and economic data

Note SORTthinsp=thinspStrategic Ofensive Reductions Treaty STARTthinsp=thinspStrategic Arms Reduction Treaty

Figure 32 Economic Cycle 2017ndash2019

Source Authorrsquos evaluation of IFI data and sources from respective countries

Egypt

VenezuelaEU

South Africa

Brazil

Russia

India

US

Descending Growth

Korea

China

Negative Growth

Unstable Growth

Sustainable Growth

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 13 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations14

Figure 33 US- Russia Trade Million US$ vs Po liti cal Cycle 2000ndash2016

Sources US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo Foreign Trade last modified June 29 2017

https wwwcensus gov foreign - trade balance c4621 html (see data for 2000ndash2016) authorrsquos evaluation

of po liti cal and economic data

Orange Revolution

Khodorkovskys arrest

GeorgianWar

Bush- Putin Reset

Iraq War Global Financial Crisis

Obama-Medvedev Reset

Russias WTO accession

New START Treaty

A Pefect Storm the Ukranian Crisis Oil Prices Crashing

Sanctions and Counter-Sanctions

$3000

$8000

$13000

$18000

$23000

$28000

$33000

$38000

$43000

2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 14 102017 404 PM

15

The current structure of US- Russia economic relations emerged in the early 2000s when the

model of trade and investment interaction took on a character similar to that which existed be-

tween the United States and developing economies US imports from Rus sia centered on com-

modities while technology along with food products lead American exports The primary

exception was that Rus sia supplied nuclear fuel including highly enriched uranium extracted from

nuclear weapons for US power plants and provided ser vices to the aerospace industry primarily

in satellite launches However both these exceptions can be explained as a legacy of the Soviet

past and not a harbinger of the future economic relationship (Figure 41)

In the last 15 years this trade structure has not changed significantly The only noticeable shift in

trade was a dramatic drop (to practically nothing) in exports of US agricultural products a result

of Rus siarsquos policy of import substitution and so- called counter- sanction mea sures it took in re-

sponse to US sanctions over the Ukraine crisis (Figure 42)

Promising new directions of cooperation in the IT sector and in engineering ser vices for the

aerospace industry appeared in the early 2000s1 but did not spill into other sectors and conse-

quently did little to renew economic cooperation on the whole The integration of Rus sian high-

tech ser vices into large- scale global production and value chains was constrained by the usual

culprits a lack of financial resources managerial experience skilled labor modern infrastructure

RampD investments and an adequate business environment High commodity prices incentivized the

restoration of an economic system centered on resource rents The leading role of oil and gas

extraction and transportation discouraged the development of a nonenergy sector that might

have created advanced and complex production and ser vices An import substitution policy could

not work efficiently in an economic environment plagued by the Dutch disease where currency

1 The Boeing Design Center was created in Moscow It consists of nearly 250 Boeing employees managing

a team of 1200 contract engineers from Rus sian and Ukrainian aerospace companies ldquoBackgrounder Boeing in

Rus siardquo Boeing last modified January 2017 http wwwboeing com resources boeingdotcom company key _ orgs

boeing - international pdf russia - cisbackgrounder pdf

Are the United States and Rus sia ldquoNatu ralrdquo Trading Partners A Little Bit of History

04

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 15 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations16

inflows (oil money) lead to ruble appreciation and render a countryrsquos production less competitive

During that time Rus siarsquos industry did not receive preferential access to larger markets and could

not expand its share in the global economy particularly because of its self- isolation from the

regional trade agreements (except for its participation in the Eurasian Economic Union with some

neighboring countries of the former Soviet Union) As a result neither import substitution nor

export- led strategy promoted growth and specialization in nonoil production A long- awaited

modernization and reallocation of resources from an inefficient nontrade sector to a trade sector

did not materialize

These limits were later augmented with sanctions and an extension of domestic restrictions on

cooperation with Western partners Importantly the rapid growth of state- monopoly structures in

the Rus sian economy over the past 15 years has created additional obstacles to the development

and diversification of US- Russia economic ties

Figure 41 US Imports from Rus sia US$ 2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2016)

Fish and shellfish 3

Crude oil 5

Fuel oil 37

Petroleum products other

8

Nuclear fuel materials

7

Chemicals-fertilizers 4

Steelmaking materials 5

Iron and steel mill products 4

Bauxite and aluminum 9

Other precious metals 4

Nonferrous metals other 1

Finished metal shapes 1

Synthetic rubber--primary

1

Spacecraftexcluding military

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 16 102017 404 PM

Fig

ure

42

U

S E

xpo

rts

to R

us s

ia U

S$ 2

016

Sou

rce

US

Ce

nsu

s B

ure

au ldquo

Trad

e in

Go

od

s w

ith

Ru

s sia

rdquo (s

ee

dat

a fo

r 2

016

)

Bak

ery

pro

du

cts

Win

e b

eer

an

d r

elat

ed

pro

du

cts

New

spri

nt

Pla

stic

mat

eria

ls

Ch

emic

als-

fert

ilize

rs

Ch

emic

als-

ino

rgan

icC

hem

ical

s-o

rgan

ic

Ch

emic

als-

oth

erC

ott

on

fib

er c

loth

In

du

stri

al r

ub

ber

pro

du

cts

Min

eral

su

pp

lies-

man

ufa

ctu

red

Gen

erat

ors

acc

esso

ries

Ele

ctri

c ap

par

atu

s

Dri

llin

g amp

oilfi

eld

eq

uip

men

t Sp

ecia

lized

min

ing

Exc

avat

ing

mac

hin

ery

No

nfa

rm t

ract

ors

an

d p

arts

In

du

stri

al e

ng

ines

Fo

od

to

bac

co m

ach

iner

y M

etal

wo

rkin

g m

ach

ine

too

ls

Tex

tile

sew

ing

m

ach

ines

W

oo

d g

lass

p

last

ic

Pu

lp a

nd

pap

er

mac

hin

ery

Mea

suri

ng

tes

tin

g

con

tro

l in

stru

men

ts

Mat

eria

ls h

and

ling

equ

ipm

ent

Ind

ust

rial

mac

hin

es

oth

er

Ph

oto

ser

vice

ind

ust

ry m

ach

iner

y A

gri

cult

ura

l mac

hin

ery

eq

uip

men

t C

om

pu

ters

Co

mp

ute

r ac

cess

ori

es

Sem

ico

nd

uct

ors

Tel

eco

mm

un

icat

ion

seq

uip

men

t

Bu

sin

ess

mac

hin

es a

nd

eq

uip

men

t

Lab

ora

tory

tes

tin

g in

stru

men

ts

Med

icin

al e

qu

ipm

ent

Civ

ilian

air

craf

t e

ng

ines

eq

uip

men

t a

nd

par

ts

Rai

lway

tra

nsp

ort

atio

n

equ

ipm

ent

Ves

sels

exc

lud

ing

scr

ap

Co

mm

erci

al v

esse

ls o

ther

M

arin

e en

gin

es p

arts

Spac

ecra

ft e

xclu

din

g

mili

tary

Pas

sen

ger

car

s

new

an

d u

sed

Tru

cks

bu

ses

and

sp

ecia

l p

urp

ose

ve

hic

les

En

gin

es a

nd

en

gin

e p

arts

(c

arb

ure

tors

pis

ton

s r

ing

s

and

val

ves)

B

od

ies

and

ch

assi

s fo

r p

asse

ng

er c

ars

Au

tom

oti

ve t

ires

an

d t

ub

es

Oth

er p

arts

an

d a

cces

sori

es o

f ve

hic

les

Ap

par

el h

ou

seh

old

go

od

s -

text

ile

Ph

arm

aceu

tica

lp

rep

arat

ion

s

Furn

itu

re h

ou

seh

old

go

od

s

etc

R

ug

s

Cel

l ph

on

es a

nd

oth

er

ho

use

ho

ld g

oo

ds

ne

c

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 17 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations18

Figure 43 US Trade in Goods with Rus sia Million US$ 1992ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 1992ndash2016)

Russian Financial Crisis

Oil price Increased from$2446 USD per barrel (2001)

to $9694 USD per barrel(2008)

Global Financial Crisis

Oil price high record in2011-2012

(more that $111 USD perbarrel)

Oil price crashed

$-

$5000

$10000

$15000

$20000

$25000

$30000

$35000

$40000

$45000

$50000

1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

US Imports from Russia US Exports to Russia US-Russia Trade in Goods

No doubt po liti cal ups and downs add volatility to US- Russia trade Nevertheless Rus siarsquos eco-

nomic structure exhausted itself before the Ukrainian crisis and the recent Rus sian recession Its

limitations are not only due to some mistakes in policy or negative coincidences of circumstances

but rather to deeply rooted properties in the current bilateral trade model related to structural

issues in the Rus sian economy Structural constraints such as the weak enforcement of property

rights poor business regulation and nondiversified exports weighed on Rus sian trade with the

United States From this perspective the term ldquonaturalunnatural trading partnersrdquo does not ad-

dress the unused capacity of bilateral interaction or the real challenges that kind of interaction

faces It just adds metaphysical flavor to the very specific economic and po liti cal factors that

determine the US- Russia trajectory

Overall the outlines of bilateral trade (Figure 43) resemble the famous ldquoRus sian Mountainsrdquo that

were a pre de ces sor of the modern roller coaster icy hills supported by wooden constructionsmdash a

rigid and immobile structure that sooner or later would melt This unfortunately is what is hap-

pening to US- Russia trade cooperation now

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 18 102017 404 PM

19

ARE LITTLE FISH REALLY SWEET

Low US- Russia economic interaction has at least two consequences First it limits the capacity of

policymakers to exploit trade as an instrument for geopo liti cal combat Even the question of a US

trade deficit which used to be a headache for many US trading partners has become so insig-

nificant in absolute terms (about $87 billion in 2016) that it seems hardly worth caring about

When the volume of trade between two countries becomes very small in absolute terms whether

a country is running a surplus or deficit is no longer relevant But it also renders another type of

confrontations (sometimes more dangerous) more likely since the two traders have little to lose

Second in an environment marked by low levels of bilateral trade both sides could incentivize (if

and when a desire for po liti cal rapprochement exists) the signing of new trade deals which are

elevated symbolically as a turning point in bilateral po liti cal relations (ie the sale of Boeings to

Rus sia or the delivery via tankers of Rus sian oil to US refineries) Sometimes markets themselves

pres ent ldquogiftsrdquo that can be capitalized on po liti cally US- USSR grain trade in the 1970s was one

such ldquogiftrdquo large sales of American grain to the Soviet Union helped US policymakers win favor

with the po liti cally impor tant American farming sector and permitted Soviet leaders to maintain

access to a dietary staple for the Soviet population

The strong 32 percent growth in value of US imports from Rus sia from January to May 2017

versus January to May 2016 ( Table 51) is an example of a development that has tempted officials

to pres ent it as a sign of positive change due to ldquogrowing business activitiesrdquo (this kind of statement

was heard before the bilateral summit in Germany in July 2017) although the reason for that leap

was evidently an increase in commodity prices (mainly of oilmdash see Table 52) and not a rise in

entrepreneurial interactions The primary beneficiaries of that upside rally have been two other

petro- economies Saudi Arabia and Venezuela ( Tables 53 and 54)

Sector Analyses

05

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 19 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations20

Table 51 US Imports from Rus sia Million US$ Januaryndash May 2016 vs Januaryndash May 2017

Year January February March April May Total

2016 9603 6871 11097 12257 10977 50805

2017 12215 10220 16979 13471 14147 67032

Change 271 487 530 99 289 319

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 1992ndash2016)

Table 52 Change in Urals Crude Oil Prices US$ per Barrel Januaryndash May 2016 vs Januaryndash May 2017

Januaryndash May 2016 Januaryndash May 2017 Change ($) Change ()

3601 5129 1528 424

Source Ministry of Finance of the Rus sian Federation https wwwminfin ru ru ixzz4mMIZ7XtC

Table 53 US Imports from Saudi Arabia Million US$ Januaryndash May 2016 vs Januaryndash May 2017

Year January February March April May Total

2016 15114 9036 13555 10844 14679 63228

2017 19802 20298 21650 16211 19542 97503

Change 3101 12463 5972 495 331 542

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Saudi Arabiardquo Foreign Trade last modified June 29 2017

https wwwcensus gov foreign - trade balance c5170 html (see data for 2016ndash2017)

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 20 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 21

Table 54 US Imports from Venezuela Million US$ Januaryndash May 2016 vs Januaryndash May 2017

Year January February March April May Total

2016 6657 5560 7140 8007 7922 35286

2017 13041 10864 123500 11148 12243 59646

Change 9590 9540 7297 3923 5454 6903

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Venezuelardquo Foreign Trade last modified June 29 2017

https wwwcensus gov foreign - trade balance c3070 html (see data for 2016ndash2017)

Table 55 US Exports to Rus sia Million US$ Januaryndash May 2016 vs Januaryndash May 2017

Year January February March April May Total

2016 3628 3577 7298 4657 4947 24107

2017 3144 4277 5386 6670 4806 24283

Change minus133 196 minus262 432 minus29 minus07

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2016ndash2017)

At the same time US exports to Rus sia continue to stagnate ( Table 55) due to low levels of

consumption during a two-and- a- half-year economic crisis a deep ruble devaluation sanctions

and counter- sanctions

Given the very dif er ent economic structures and resource endowments of Rus sia and the United

States it is not surprising that US- Russia trade is asymmetric and oil driven (Figure 51) A

3 percent increase in Urals oil prices translates into a one percent increase in US import growth

from Rus sia Thus in 2016 every $10 increase in Urals crude oil added $15 billion to the value of

US imports or 11 percent to the total value of imports from Rus sia

OIL ADDICTION

Oil is a core pillar of US- Russia bilateral trade A bumpy ride in oil markets afects commerce

Nevertheless Rus sian oil exports to the United States in physical terms have been rather

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 21 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations22

sustainable Starting from 2005 average annual deliveries have been above 150 million barrels

(Figure 52) Crude and heating oil have dominated while petroleum products and liquefied petro-

leum gases have not (Figure 53) In 2011 oil exports peaked at 228 million barrels but declined to

159 million barrels in 2016mdash a drop of 30 percent Rec ord high shipments of Rus sian oil to the United

States coincided with an elevation in oil prices which made the subsequent decline in oil shipment

value between 2011 and 2016 (by about 72 percent as shown in Figure 54) seem more stark The

increase in price also raised the share of oil in Rus sian exports by 74 percent in 2011 (Figure 55)

The Rus sian share in total US oil imports was around 55 percent in 2011 and 43 percent in 2016

( Table 56) In the last five years the United States has relied exclusively on consumption of Rus sian

oil for the rough equivalent of one week out of the year (Figure 56)

It is unlikely that Rus sia can significantly increase its share of the US oil market and there is a real

possibility for a downward trend There are several reasons the historically high Rus sian hydrocar-

bon export threshold of 2011 will not soon if ever be surpassed

First US energy consumption will likely be flat According to the US Energy Information Adminis-

tration (EIA) demand for petroleum and other liquids in the United States will be about 35ndash36

quadrillion British thermal units (BTUs) with minimal variation over the next 25 years1

1 US EIA ldquoAnnual Energy Outlook 2017 with Projections to 2050rdquo January 5 2017 7ndash8

Figure 51 US- Russia Trade Growth () vs US and Rus sia Real GDP Growth () 1993ndash2016

Source IMF ldquoIMF Datardquo accessed September 27 2017 http wwwimf org en Data US Census Bureau

ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo

Note rGDPthinsp=thinspreal gross domestic product

Trade

USA rGDP growth

Russia rGDP growth

-60

-40

-20

0

20

40

60

80

100

1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Gro

wth

All spikes in US-Russia trade have been connected with two main

variables volume and price of crude oil

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 22 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 23

Second the United States will become a net energy exporter between 2020 and 2030 in most

cases under dif er ent combinations of oil and natu ral gas prices GDP growth technological

breakthroughs and the availability of energy resources The role of oil imports will dramatically

fall2

Third oil price scenarios as described by the International Energy Agency (IEA) international

financial organ izations (IFIs) and many national agencies are very cautious and assume that even

by 2035 to 2040 oil prices will not to recover to the levels of 2011ndash20123

Fourth Rus sian oil production and export growth will be modest and driven by Asian economic

expansion and will comprise a decreasing share of Western markets4 According to forecasts from

2 Ibid 15ndash18

3 Ibid table 3 ldquoEnergy Prices by Sector and Sourcesrdquo World Bank World Bank Commodity Markets Price Forecasts

(Washington DC World Bank 2017) httpswwwworldbank org en research commodity - markets Organ ization of the

Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) World Oil Outlook 2016 (Vienna OPEC 2016)

4 E D Belotskaia et al Global and Rus sian Energy Outlook 2016 (Moscow Energy Research Institute of the Rus sian

Acad emy of Science Analytical Center for the Government of the Rus sian Federation 2016) http acgov ru files

publication a 12767 pdf

Figure 52 US Imports from Rus sia Crude Oil and Petroleum Products Thousands of Barrels 1995ndash2016

Source US EIA ldquoUS Imports by Country of Origin Rus siardquo Petroleum amp Other Liquids September 13

2017 http wwweia gov dnav pet PET _ MOVE _ IMPCUS _ D _ NUS _ NRS _ MBBL _ M htm

0

50000

100000

150000

200000

250000

Date 1995 1996 1997 1998 199920002001200220032004200520062007200820092010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 23 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations24

the Organ ization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) crude oil exports from Rus sia and

the Caspian region to the United States will dis appear by 20255

So why does the Rus sian Urals blend continue to be attractive for oil traders and US refineries

which could pro cess greater volumes of domestically produced lighter crude There are two main

reasons One is related to the preference of US high conversion refineries (the most sophisticated

in the world) to work with heavy oil blends produced by Canada Mexico Iraq Venezuela and

Rus sia Pro cessing heavy crude now is as profitable as pro cessing lighter crude The so- called

crack spreadmdash the diference between the cost of relatively cheap heavy crude oil and the final

price of value- added consumer products (diesel gasoline jet fuel and heating oil)mdash has become

the same as the refinery margins of light sweet crude6 This has primarily afected light oil produc-

ing countries such as Angola Algeria and Nigeria

5 OPEC World Oil Outlook 2016 306ndash309

6 ldquoHow Much for That Heavy Oilrdquo Oil Sands Magazine December 26 2015 https wwwoilsandsmagazine com

news 2015 12 26 how - much - for - that - heavy - oil

Figure 53 US Imports from Rus sia Oil and Petroleum Products US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

$-

$25000000000

$20000000000

$15000000000

$10000000000

$5000000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Liquefied petroleum gases

Petroleum products other

Fuel oil

Crude oil

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 24 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 25

Another factor afecting purchase of Rus sian oil is a new trend among oil companies for further

consolidation of scale and for integrating operations of upstream and downstream business7

There have been several waves of separation and unification of production transportation and

pro cessing in the last 50 years The current business cycle can be seen as an adaptation to a

period of low prices and oversupply Companies that buy andor produce oil in Rus sia most likely

prefer to transport and pro cess this oil in their own modern refineries in the United States At the

same time some of the newest refinery designs specifically for pro cessing heavy oils have been

built in Asia thus extending the choices of heavy oil producing countries

We should also consider that leading US and international oil traders along with oil producing

companies working with or owning US refineries frequently buy Rus sian oil on the open market

and have long- term contracts on Rus sian crude oil delivery Many Rus sian oil companies prefer to

pay for purchases or ser vices with their future production instead of cash creating situations of

ldquostickyrdquo oil imports that are difficult to replace The best- known example is an interaction between

7 ldquoEnergy and Utilities Sectorrdquo Roundtable Financier Worldwide December 2015 https wwwfinancierworldwide

com roundtable - energy - utilities - sector - dec15

Figure 54 US Imports of Oil and Petroleum Products from Rus sia vs Oil Prices Eu rope Brent Spot Price Free on Board (FOB) 1996ndash2017

Source US EIA ldquoUS Imports by Country of Origin Rus siardquo

0

20

40

60

80

100

120

140

0

5000

10000

15000

20000

25000

30000

Jan

-19

96

Jun

-19

96

No

v-19

96

Ap

r-19

97

Sep

-19

97

Feb

-19

98

Jul-

199

8D

ec-1

99

8M

ay-1

99

9O

ct-1

99

9M

ar-2

00

0A

ug

-20

00

Jan

-20

01

Jun

-20

01

No

v-2

00

1A

pr-

20

02

Sep

-20

02

Feb

-20

03

Jul-

20

03

Dec

-20

03

May

-20

04

Oct

-20

04

Mar

-20

05

Au

g-2

00

5Ja

n-2

00

6Ju

n-2

00

6N

ov-

20

06

Ap

r-2

00

7Se

p-2

00

7Fe

b-2

00

8Ju

l-2

00

8D

ec-2

00

8M

ay-2

00

9O

ct-2

00

9M

ar-2

010

Au

g-2

010

Jan

-20

11Ju

n-2

011

No

v-2

011

Ap

r-2

012

Sep

-20

12Fe

b-2

013

Jul-

20

13D

ec-2

013

May

-20

14O

ct-2

014

Mar

-20

15A

ug

-20

15Ja

n-2

016

Jun

-20

16N

ov-

20

16

USD

per

Bar

rel

Th

ou

san

d B

arr

els

US Imports from Russia of Crude Oil and Petroleum Products (Thousand Barrels)

Europe Brent Spot Price FOB (Dollars per Barrel)

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 25 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations26

Table 56 US Oil Imports All Countries vs Rus sia Thousand Barrels per Day 2011ndash2016

Years 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

All Countries 11436 10598 9859 9241 9449 10058

Rus sia 624 477 460 330 371 433

Share 546 450 467 357 393 431

Sources US EIA ldquoUS Imports by Country of Origin Total Crude Oil and Productsrdquo Petroleum amp Other

Liquids September 13 2017 wwweia gov dnav pet pet_move_impcus_a2_nus_ep00_im0_mbbl_m htm

authorrsquos computation

Figure 55 US Imports from Rus sia Share of Crude Oil and Petroleum Products Million US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

57

64

73

72

74

73

72

59

52 50

0

$5000

$10000

$15000

$20000

$25000

$30000

$35000

$40000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

US Imports from Russia

Share of Oil and Petroleum Products

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 26 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 27

the Rus sian state mono poly Rosneft and commodity trading and mining giant Glencore which

along with energy and commodities com pany Vitol participated in a $10 billion prepayment

deal with Rosneft for crude supplies in 2013

There have been a number of ongoing transactions between the Rus sian oil industry and interna-

tional oil companies including several that top the list of importers of Rus sian oil to the United

States ( Table 57) In December 2016 Glencore participated in a controversial privatization opera-

tion purchasing in tandem with the Qatar sovereign wealth fund a 195 percent stake in Rosneft

which was on the US and EU list of sanctioned firms8 Glencore has also taken a blocking stake in

midsize oil producer RussNeft BP owns a 1975 percent stake in Rosneft Chevron holds a

15 percent interest in the 935- mile- long CPC9 pipeline which transports an average of 959000

barrels of crude oil per day including 76000 barrels daily from Rus sia10 ExxonMobil has formed

8 E Mazneva and I Arkhipov ldquoRus sia Sells $11 Billion Stake in Rosneft to Glencore Qatarrdquo Bloomberg December 7

2016

9 CPCthinsp=thinspCaspian Pipeline Consortium

10 ldquoRus sia Highlights of Operations and Business Portfoliordquo Chevron accessed October 3 2017 https wwwchevron

com worldwide russia

Figure 56 Share of Rus sian Oil in Total US Oil Imports Thousands of Barrels per Day 1972ndash2016

Source US EIA ldquoUS Imports by Country of Origin Total Crude Oil and Productsrdquo

2000

4000

6000

8000

10000

12000

14000

16000

US Imports of Crude Oil and Petroleum Products (Thousand Barrels per Day)

US Imports from Russia of Crude Oil and Petroleum Products (Thousand Barrels per Day)19

7319

7419

7519

7619

7719

7819

7919

80

198

119

82

198

319

84

198

519

86

198

719

88

198

919

90

199

119

92

199

319

94

199

519

96

199

719

98

199

92

00

02

00

12

00

22

00

32

00

42

00

52

00

62

00

72

00

82

00

92

010

20

112

012

20

132

014

20

152

016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 27 102017 404 PM

Table 57 Top Importers of Rus sian Oil to the United States Thousands of Barrels 2016

VALERO MARKETING amp SUPPLY CO 54590 3616

EXXONMOBIL OIL CORP 17087 1130

CHEVRON USA INC 15217 1008

BP WEST COAST PRODUCTS LLC 10130 671

GEORGE E WARREN CORP 7272 48

PAULSBORO REFINING CO LLC 6838 453

TESORO CORP 5097 338

VITOL INC 5084 337

PHILLIPS 66 CO 4726 313

TRAFIGURA AG 4360 289

PAR HAWAII REFINING LLC 3893 258

MOTIVA ENTERPRISES LLC 3041 205

SHELL US TRADING CO 2863 19

MARATHON PETROLEUM CO LLC 2475 16

ATLANTIC TRADING amp MARKETING 2099 14

FREEPOINT COMMODITIES LLC 1439 1

GLENCORE LTD 1284 85

BEST PETROLEUM CORP 967 64

ROLYMPUS US COMMODITIES GROUP LLC 822 6

HUNT CRUDE OIL SUPPLY CO 666 4

GULF OIL LP 658 4

Source US EIA ldquoUS Imports by Country of Origin Crude Oilrdquo Petroleum amp Other Liquids September 13

2017 httpswwweiagovdnavpetpet_move_impcus_a2_nus_epc0_im0_mbblpd_ahtm authorrsquos

computation

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 28 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 29

several joint ventures with Rosneft to undertake ofshore exploration in the Black Sea and the Kara

Sea in Siberia11

According to the Sanctions Act US persons are prohibited from exporting or reexporting goods

ser vices (except financial ser vices) and technology in support of exploration or production of new

deep- water Arctic ofshore or shale oil proj ects that involve designated Rus sian entities or other

entities in which such sanctioned persons have a controlling interest or a substantial noncontrol-

ling owner ship interest defined as not less than 33 percent (previously it was 50 percent) The new

law also authorizesmdash but does not requiremdash the imposition of so- called secondary sanctions

against non- US entities that engage in activities involving the construction maintenance or

expansion of Rus sian energy export pipelines with a fair market value of $1 million or more or an

aggregate fair market value during a 12- month period of $5 million12 This provision has raised the

concerns of some Eu ro pean countries particularly Germany As result the final language of the

law included wording about coordination of this issue with allies of the United States

Shipments of Rus sian oil to the United States could be afected by activity in the US refinery

industry In early 2017 Saudi Aramco bought the United Statesrsquo largest oil refinery in Port Arthur

(Texas) and it announced plans to send more of its own crude to that refinery13 Serious concerns

exist however regarding the future of three refineries and nine pipelines owned by Citgo a US

branch of the Venezuelan state com pany PdVSA which is balancing precariously on the edge of

default Under certain conditions in the event of PdVSA bankruptcy Rosneft could claim a stake of

up to 499 percent in Citgo Such a possibility has raised concerns among politicians and US

government officials with Trea sury Secretary Steven Mnuchin calling it a ldquonational security issuerdquo14

Tables 58 59 and 510 show allocations of Rus sian oil imports to major US refineries some of

which work exclusively on Rus sian crude a total of two to three months per year In total 150940

thousand barrels of Rus sian oil were refined in 2016

Figure 57 confirms a leading position of Texas and Louisiana among the US states receiving

Rus sian crude followed by New Jersey California Mississippi Washington Hawaii and Delaware

In a paradoxical way Texas has dis appeared from the list of states as a main destination of US

imports from Rus sia (Figure 58) because Rus sian crude is mostly delivered to Louisiana ports and

registered there by US Customs as an import from Rus sia After that it transports to refineries in

Louisiana and Texas

Overall the short- term business rationale behind the sustainability of US oil imports from Rus sia

cannot overcome strong headwinds in the US energy sector facing all oil importers which will

inevitably lead to a contraction of Rus sian oil exports to the United States in the foreseeable future

11 Exxon eforts to receive a special US Trea sury waiver to drill in sanctioned Rus sia failed in 2017

12 Countering Amer i carsquos Adversaries through Sanctions Act HR 3364

13 Sarp Ozkan ldquoSaudi Aramcorsquos Port Arthur Refinery and the US Refinery Fleetrdquo Drilling Info May 11 2017

https infodrillinginfo com saudi - aramcos - port - arthur - refinery - us - refinery - fleet

14 Graham Kates ldquoTrea sury Secretary Rus siarsquos Citgo Deal a National Security Issuerdquo CBS News May 1 2017

http wwwcbsnews com news rosneft - citgo - steven - mnuchin - national - security

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 29 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations30

Table 58 Valerorsquos Refineries Pro cessing Rus sian Oil Thousands of Barrels 2016

Saint Charles Louisiana 29206 535

Corpus Christi Texas 20626 378

Wilmington California 4250 78

Total USA 54590 100

Source US EIA ldquoRefinery Capacity Reportrdquo January 1 2017

table 5 wwweia gov petroleum refinerycapacity table5 pdf

authorrsquos computation

Table 59 ExxonMobil Refineries Pro cessing Rus sian Oil Thousands of Barrels 2016

Baytown Texas 15037 88

Baton Rouge Louisiana 2046 12

Total USA 17083 100

Source US EIA ldquoRefinery Capacity Reportrdquo authorrsquos computation

Table 510 Chevronrsquos Refineries Pro cessing Rus sian Oil Thousands of Barrels 2016

Pascagoula Mississippi 12767 840

El Segundo California 2372 155

Saint Rose Louisiana 78 05

Total USA 15217 100

Source US EIA ldquoRefinery Capacity Reportrdquo authorrsquos computation

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 30 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 31

HEAVY METAL

Taken together US imports of metals and US imports of oil compose about 80 percent of US

total imports from Rus sia (Figure 59) Trade of metals like other commodities is strongly afected

by market price fluctuations Nevertheless metal imports from Rus sia have been fairly resilient to

market volatility and their average annual value has hovered at about $4 billion in the last five years

(Figure 510) This market resilience was forged at the end of the 1990searly 2000s when Rus sian

metal producers gradually modernized their plants adjusting quality of production to Western

standards and enhancing integration into global value and supply chains Some of them conquered

their share of the highly competitive US market struggling with peers from Canada and certain

BRICS countries (China India and Brazil) To attract additional resources all Rus sian large metal-

producing companies became public and were listed on stock exchanges chiefly the London Stock

Exchange (Severstalrsquo PAO Evraz MMK OAO Novolipetsk Steel Norilsk Nikel and TMK PAO) one

on the New York Stock Exchange (Mechel) and one on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange (Rusal)

Business logic pushed some of them to invest in the US metal- making industry which was hit

hard by crisis Later on some of those assets were sold (eg two US steel mills acquired by

Severstal in 2004 were purchased 10 years later by Steel Dynamics Inc and AK Steel Corp)

Figure 57 Share of US States Rus sian Oil Imports 2016

Source US EIA ldquoUS Imports from Rus sia of Crude Oil and Petroleum Productsrdquo Petroleum amp Other

Liquids September 29 2017 https www eia gov dnav pet hist LeafHandler ashx nshy=shyPETampsshy=shyMTTIM _ NUS

- NRS _ 1ampfshy=shyM authorrsquos computation

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

100

Maine

Massachusetts

Maryland

Connecticut

Georgia

Rhode Island

Virginia

Florida

New York

Alabama

Puerto Rico

Pennsylvania

Delaware

Hawaii

Washington

Mississippi

California

New Jersey

Louisiana

Texas

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 31 102017 404 PM

Figure 58 US Imports from Rus sia by State Million US$ 2013ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoState and Metropolitan Area Trade Datardquo Foreign Trade last modified

October 2 2017 https wwwcensus gov foreign - trade statistics state

Alaska

Connecticut

Delaware

Hawaii

Louisiana

Maryland

North Dakota 0

$1000

$2000

$3000

$4000

$5000

$6000

2013 2014 2015 2016

Alabama

Alaska

Connecticut

Delaware

Hawaii

Louisiana

Maryland

Maine

Mississippi

Montana

North Dakota

Mississippi

Figure 59 US Imports from Rus sia Share of Oil and Metals Million US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 1992ndash2016)

83

82

85

86

87

88

85

82

7375

0

$5000

$10000

$15000

$20000

$25000

$30000

$35000

$40000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

US Imports from Russia

Share of Oil and Metals

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 32 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 33

Obviously the market dynamic of dif er ent metals varies (eg iron steel aluminum platinum and

nickel) Caps to increase their trade and production in a ldquored oceanrdquo global environment with

anemic demand is rather limited despite Figure 510 showing a spike of iron and steel imports

from Rus sia in 2014 and aluminum in 2016 Some opportunities may exist for Russian- owned steel

plants in the United States (such as NLMK) to participate in energy proj ects resumed under Presi-

dent Trump who has required that new pipelines use only American- made steel15

Rus sia occupies a special niche in the US market for titanium products a high- end metal indus-

try Twenty years ago a long- term contract was signed between Rus sian titanium producer

VSMPO- AVISMA and Boeing The Rus sian com pany entered the selective club of Boeing suppliers

for the manufacture of components and semi- finished products Since the signing of this contract

VSMPO has delivered more than 35 percent of all titanium placed on Boeing civil aircraft16 They

are hidden in the trade data in an import category for Civilian Aircrafts and Parts (Figure 511) At

the end of 2016 Boeing announced an extension of its framework agreement with AVISMA

15 E Scheyder C Ngai and T Sylvester ldquoAmerican Steel Unlikely to Get Keystone Boost Despite Trump Orderrdquo

Reuters January 27 2017 http wwwreuters com article usa - trump - pipeline - transcanada - idUSL1N1FH1ZD

16 A Kramer ldquoTitanium Fills Vital Role for Boeing and Rus siardquo New York Times July 5 2013 http wwwnytimes com

2013 07 06 business global titanium - fills - vital - role - for - boeing - and - russia html mcubzshy=shy3

Figure 510 US Imports from Rus sia Iron Steel Bauxite Aluminum Nickel Nonferrous Metals and Other Precious Metals and Materials US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 1992ndash2016)

0

$6000000000

$5000000000

$4000000000

$3000000000

$2000000000

$1000000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 20122013

20142015

2016

Finished metal shapes

Iron and steel advanced

Iron and steel products nec

Nonferrous metals other

Other precious metals

Nickel

Bauxite and aluminum

Iron and steel mill products

Steelmaking materials

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 33 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations34

through 2022 and additional investments in the construction of a new robotic plant in Titanium

Valley a special economic zone located in the Sverdlovsk region that will open in 2018 The pro-

cessing of titanium forgings in all Boeing civil aircraft will be performed there including 787s 737

MAXs and 777Xs17 The contract extension with AVISMA may add several hundred million dollars

in value to annual US imports from Rus sia

How can such heavy reliance on imports of Rus sian titanium exist during a period of rising geopo-

liti cal tensions The answer is straightforward VSMPO- AVISMA is a highly specialized natu ral

mono poly producing 45 percent of the worldrsquos aerospace titanium Only four other countries

smelt high- grade titanium in industrial quantities the United States Germany Japan and China

Overall global production capacity is limited while demand is growing The United States cur-

rently imports around 79 percent of all the titanium it consumes each year18

17 ldquoBoeing and VSMPO Avisma to Launch Second Joint Production Siterdquo Rus sian Aviation Insider December 22 2016

http wwwrusaviainsider com boeing - and - vsmpo - avisma - to - launch - second - joint - production - site

18 Jon Ostrower and Andy Pasztor ldquoBoeing United Technologies Stockpile Titanium Partsrdquo Wall Street Journal

August 7 2014 https wwwwsj com articles boeing - united - technologies - stockpiling - titanium - parts - 1407441886

Figure 511 US Imports from Rus sia Civilian Aircrafts and Parts US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 1992ndash2016)

0

$20000000

$40000000

$60000000

$80000000

$100000000

$120000000

$140000000

$160000000

$180000000

$200000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Parts-civilian aircraft

Civilian aircraft

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 34 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 35

The Sanctions Act authorizes the secretary of the trea sury (in a nonmandatory way) to impose

restrictions (without specifying them) against Rus sian state- owned entities operating in the railway

metals and mining sectors of the Rus sian economy Despite the commanding heights of Rus siarsquos

state sector owner ship in its economy (70 percent of GDP) the metal- producing companies have

remained mostly in private hands

NUCLEAR AFFAIRS

Historically owners and operators of the 104 commercial nuclear power reactors in the United

States have purchased more than 80 percent of their uranium from foreign countries Uranium

shipping from Rus sia accounted for about 13 percent of the 58 million pounds of uranium pur-

chased overseas in 201219 At the same time the Rus sian state- owned mono poly Rosatom ac-

counts for 20 percent of Kazakhstanrsquos uranium production (which in turn comprises 11 percent of

all US uranium imports) and 20 percent of US domestic uranium production capacity (with

owner ship of exploration tracts in Wyoming)20

Nuclear fuel and nuclear power continue to be po liti cally sensitive topics both in the United

States and Rus sia Bilateral cooperation in this sector (being surprisingly stable with imports of

nuclear fuel from Rus sia at a level of $1 billion annually in the last five years [Figure 512 and 513])

is under constant po liti cal and lobbying pressure and has been a source of several po liti cal scan-

dals21 Consequently upside risks in this area of interaction are minimal and downside risks are

much higher especially when we are seeing more decommissioning of nuclear plants in the

United States than new constructions The US EIArsquos 2017 Annual Energy Outlook assumes

that about 25 percent of the nuclear capacity now operating will be removed from ser vice

by 205022

WHY IS THE GRASS GREENER ON THE OTHER SIDE

The United States continues to significantly reduce imports of chemical fertilizers as domestic pro-

duction increases In 2016 the United States imported 13 percent less ammonia and 11 percent

less urea and UAN which is a liquid urea and ammonium nitrate fertilizer Rus sia accounts for

around 40 percent of UAN imported by the United States The United States canceled antidumping

duties on imports of ammonium nitrate and urea from Rus sia in 2016 but it did not prevent import

19 US EIA ldquoThe US Relies on Foreign Uranium Enrichment Ser vices to Fuel Its Nuclear Power Plantsrdquo Today in

Energy August 28 2013 https wwweia gov todayinenergy detail php idshy=shy1273

20 Colin Chilcoat ldquoDoes Rus sia Really Own 20 Percent of the USrsquo Uranium Reservesrdquo OilPricecom May 6 2015

http oilpricecom Alternative - Energy Nuclear - Power Does - Russia - Really - Own - 20 - Of - The - US - Uranium - Reserves

html

21 Michelle Ye Hee Lee ldquoThe Facts behind Trumprsquos Repeated Claim about Hillary Clintonrsquos Role in the Rus sian Ura-

nium Dealrdquo Washington Post October 26 2016

22 US EIA ldquoAnnual Energy Outlook 2017 with Projections to 2050rdquo 81ndash82

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 35 102017 404 PM

Figure 512 US Imports from Rus sia Share of Oil Metals and Nuclear Fuel Million US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 1992ndash2016)

87

86

90

90

90

91

88

86

7882

0

$5000

$10000

$15000

$20000

$25000

$30000

$35000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

US Imports from Russia

Share of Oil Metals and Nuclear Fuel

Figure 513 US Imports from Rus sia Nuclear Fuel Materials US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

$-

$200000000

$400000000

$600000000

$800000000

$1200000000

$1000000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 36 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 37

drops twice last year (Figures 514 and 515) According to forecasts UAN imports are expected to

decline further to 15 million tons this year down over 46 percent from 28 million tons imported

last year23 The downside trend in imports of fertilizers will likely continue because of oversupply

BIG FISH

US imports of fish and shellfish from Rus sia are best understood in comparison with US fish

exports to the Rus sian market which slipped to zero in August 2014 after Rus sia issued an order

banning certain agricultural imports from the United States (Figure 516) While the volume of US

supply was not very large it was impor tant because it broke up the monopolistic dominance of a

few vertically integrated Rus sian companies that have kept prices high by restricting the entry of

new producers Seeking to implement import substitution policies Rus sia has tried to reduce

exports as well as imports of fish and seafood products in the last couple of years This symmetri-

cal approach was intended to ldquocompensaterdquo for a decrease of fish products in the domestic

23 Deepika Thapliyal ldquoPotashCorp Forecasts Sharp Drop in US Nitrogen Imports in 2017rdquo ICIS News February 7

2017 https wwwicis com resources news 2017 02 07 10076734 potashcorp - forecasts - sharp - drop - in - us - nitrogen

- imports - in - 2017

Figure 514 US Imports from Rus sia Share of Oil Metals Nuclear Fuel and Fertilizers Million US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

90

93

92

93

94

95

92

91

85

86

0

$5000

$10000

$15000

$20000

$25000

$30000

$35000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

US Imports from Russia

Share of Oil Metals Nuclear Fuel and Fertilizers

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 37 102017 404 PM

Figure 515 US Imports from Rus sia Chemical- Fertilizers US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

S-

$200000000

$400000000

$600000000

$800000000

$1000000000

$1200000000

$1400000000

$1600000000

$1800000000

$2000000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Figure 516 US Exports to Rus sia Fish and Shellfish US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

0

$10000000

$20000000

$30000000

$40000000

$50000000

$60000000

$70000000

$80000000

$90000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Fish and shellfish

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 38 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 39

consumer market caused by Rus siarsquos import ban but it has failed As result the group most af-

fected by the self- imposed counter- sanctions were Rus sian consumers

With a significant drop in fish imports a devaluation of the ruble and inflationary pressures on

seafood prices yearly consumption of fish in Rus sia has declined precipitously In 2015 alone

fish prices increased 20 percent and consumption dropped to 14 kilograms per person24 from

22 kilograms in 201425 In 2016 food rose to 355 percent of house hold expenditure as a result of

increases in food prices26 This has pushed vertically integrated fishing monopolies to sell even

more of their catch abroad rather than deliver to the Rus sian Federation (Figure 517) Thus we

cannot exclude the possibility of further growth in US fish and shellfish imports from Rus sia on a

marginal scale

24 Александр Савельев ldquoПотребление рыбы в России упало до 14 кг на человекаrdquo [Fish consumption in Rus sia fell to

14 kg per person] Экономика Интерфакс January 28 2015 http wwwinterfax ru business 492038

25 Илья Шестаков ldquoПотебление рыбы в России снизилось на 10 процентов из- за роста ценrdquo [Fish consumption in

Rus sia dropped by 10 percent due to price increases] RNS March 8 2017 https rnsonline consumer - market

Potreblenie - ribi - v - Rossii - snizilos - na - 10 - iz - za - rosta - tsen - 2017 - 03 - 08

26 Zoya Sheftalovich and Christian Oliver ldquoRus siarsquos Boom (Farming) Economyrdquo Politico November 8 2016 http

wwwpolitico eu article russias - boom - farming - economy

Figure 517 US Imports from Rus sia Fish and Shellfish US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

0

$50000000

$100000000

$150000000

$200000000

$250000000

$300000000

$350000000

$400000000

$450000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 39 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations40

SPACE ODYSSEY

Among high- end products beyond the top five groups of goods imported from Rus sia cheap and

efficient Rus sian engines have been used to launch US rockets into space for about 16 years

(Figure 518) There was a serious po liti cal strug gle around a 2014 ban on the purchase of Rus sian

RD-180 rocket engines revealing the conflicting business interests of power ful high- tech companies

This restrictive mea sure was temporary and was quickly lifted because of significant cost impacts

and risks of disruption to launch schedules27 For the same reason the Sanctions Act does not autho-

rize ldquothe imposition of any sanction or other condition limitation restriction or prohibition that

directly or indirectly impedes the supply by any entity of the Rus sian Federation of any product or

ser vice or the procurement of such product or ser vice by any contractor or subcontractor of the

United States or any other entity relating to or in connection with any space launch conducted for

the National Aeronautics and Space Administration or any other nonndash Department of Defense

customerrdquo28

Nevertheless many experts believe that US domestic alternatives to replace Rus sian engines will

be viable in five to eight years

27 Ken Dilanian ldquoWhy Does the US Use Rus sian Rockets to Launch Its Satellitesrdquo NBC News updated November 15

2016 http wwwnbcnews com why - does - u - s - use - russian - rockets - launch - its - satellites - n588526

28 Countering Amer i carsquos Adversaries through Sanctions Act HR 3364

Figure 518 Spacecraft Excluding Military US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

0

$20000000

$40000000

$60000000

$80000000

$100000000

$120000000

$140000000

$160000000

$180000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 40 102017 404 PM

41

Diversity and technological complexity are the most vis i ble advantages supporting US exports to

Rus sia Three major groups of export goods include civilian aircraft engines and parts (Figure 61)

drilling and oil field equipment (Figure 62) and industrial machines and engines (Figure 63)

Despite sanctions against the transfer of advanced oil producing and pro cessing technologies the

realization of US drilling and oil field equipment in Rus sia is sustainable although some bilateral

proj ects have been frozen

Another category of goods that has demonstrated resilience is the phar ma ceu ti cal industry (Fig-

ure 64) because most drugs in Rus sia are imported (about 70 percent of the Rus sian phar ma ceu-

ti cal market in value) Import substitution policies have had only modest results in this industry

As confirmed by American Chamber of Commerce surveys US exports to Rus sia are closely

connected to US FDI 30 percent of total imports of US companies working in the Rus sian

market come from the United States (more than $2 billion in 2016) In other words about

40 percent of all US exports to Rus sia are related to a US corporate- sector business pro cess in

the country The major sectors of activity of these companies are energy and natu ral resources

(52 percent) manufacturing (17 percent) information and communications technology or ICT

(13 percent) retail (7 percent) automotive industry (6 percent) phar ma ceu ti cal production

(1 percent) professional ser vices (05 percent) and other (2 percent)1

Some obvious constraints on US exports to Rus sia have resulted from a reduction in demand A

deterioration of bilateral relations and implementation of sanctions and counter- sanctions have

directly or indirectly afected all businesses Figures 65 and 66 provide data regarding a dramatic

drop in the sale of US agricultural production in Rus sia with all other categories of exports in

goods showing big cuts as well (see Figures 67ndash69)

Exports of civilian aircraft engines and parts put the state of Washington in first place among

other states as a leading exporter to the Rus sian market (Figure 610)

1 American Chamber of Commerce in Rus sia ldquoInvestment and Import to Rus sia 2nd Surveyrdquo 13

Diversity and Constraints

06

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 41 102017 404 PM

Figure 61 US Exports of Civilian Aircraft Engines Equipment and Parts to Rus sia US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

$2500000000

$2000000000

$1500000000

$1000000000

$500000000

$-

Figure 62 US Exports of Drilling and Oil Field Equipment US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

0

$5000000

$10000000

$15000000

$20000000

$25000000

$30000000

$35000000

$40000000

$45000000

$50000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 42 102017 404 PM

Figure 63 US Exports of Industrial Engines to Rus sia US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

0

$5000000

$10000000

$15000000

$20000000

$25000000

$30000000

$35000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Figure 64 US Exports of Phar ma ceu ti cal Preparations to Rus sia US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

0

$5000000

$10000000

$15000000

$20000000

$25000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 43 102017 404 PM

Figure 65 US Exports of Meat and Poultry to Rus sia US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Meat poultry etc

$1000000000

$800000000

$600000000

$400000000

$200000000

$-

$1200000000

$1400000000

$1600000000

Figure 66 US Exports of Soybeans to Rus sia US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

0

$20000000

$40000000

$60000000

$80000000

$100000000

$120000000

$140000000

$160000000

$180000000

$200000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 44 102017 404 PM

Figure 67 US Exports of Vehicles Engines and Parts to Rus sia US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Other parts and accessories of vehicles

Automotive tires and tubes

Bodies and chassis for passenger cars

Engines and engine parts (carburetors pistonsrings and valves)

Trucks buses and special purpose vehicles

Passenger cars new and used

$2500000000

$2000000000

$1500000000

$500000000

$-

$1000000000

Figure 68 US Exports of Medicinal Equipment to Rus sia US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

$10000000

$15000000

$20000000

$25000000

$30000000

$35000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 45 102017 404 PM

Figure 610 US Exports to Rus sia by States (2016 US$ Value) Million US$ 2013ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoState and Metropolitan Area Trade Datardquo

Iowa Kentucky

North Dakota

Oklahoma

South Carolina

Washington

0

$500

$1000

$1500

$2000

2013 2014 2015 2016

District of Columbia

Iowa

Kentucky

North Dakota

Oklahoma

South Carolina

Washington

Figure 69 US Exports of Excavating Machinery to Rus sia US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

0

$5000000

$10000000

$15000000

$20000000

$25000000

$30000000

$35000000

$40000000

$45000000

$50000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 46 102017 404 PM

47

Upon reviewing the current trend in US- Russia economic relations we must acknowledge that

the existing trade model is obsolete and exhausted Imports are resource- oriented and reflect

constraints of the Rus sian economic structure while five groups of goodsmdash oil metals nuclear

fuels fertilizers and fishmdash make up more than 90 percent of total imports from Rus sia (Figure 71)

Each of these industries has a limited capacity for growth in the foreseeable future

Rus siarsquos core export to the United Statesmdash oilmdash will inevitably decrease in the mid- term under any

scenario The value and volume of Rus sian exports to the United States are open to global market

volatility and po liti cal pressures with limited hedging mechanisms

Overall US exports to Rus sia are unsustainable due to bilateral po liti cal tensions the whims of

commodity markets and changing domestic policies Sanctions and counter- sanctions have

created additional barriers particularly in finance banking high- tech energy and agro- business

According to the American Chamber of Commerce 69 percent of US companies working in the

country consider the impact of US sanctions against Rus sia on their business as negative At the

same time 60 percent of companies do not expect big changes in business relations between

Rus sia and the United States under Trump1 as the new law codifies existing sanctions fortifies

them and extends them to new sectors

Current US investments are low due to the weak rule of law in Rus sia a lack of property right

protections and proper contract enforcement high levels of statization and monopolization in the

economy a poor business climate outdated capital stock dependence on natural- resource

sectors and of course sanction and counter- sanction mea sures Bloated administrative compo-

nents created as risk mitigation instruments have also served as impediments The countryrsquos

institutional weakness low level of productivity bud get constraints and a declining inflexible

workforce will restrain future economic growth even if commodity prices recover Rus sian eco-

nomic policy will likely continue to be statist and protectionist relying mostly on import

substitutions

1 Ibid 11

Existing Trends and Future Scenarios

07

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 47 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations48

What scenarios can be expected in such a challenging environment

One probability (no peace no war) is based on the assumption that matters will not deteriorate

further and implementation of the Sanctions Act will be cursory This will cause relatively slow

degradation in the economic field with occasional flashes of activity in selected areas (eg closer

cooperation against Islamist terrorist groups in Syria)

A second worse case or critical scenario is the intensive and full- scale execution of current sanc-

tion legislation and even the imposition of new economic punitive and restrictive mea sures which

could incite asymmetric retaliatory actions and lead to the introduction of additional protectionist

policies This in turn could trigger a further escalation of mutual confrontation and could eventu-

ally destroy the fundamentals of the current bilateral trade system Rus sian leadership has charac-

terized the Sanctions Act as a declaration of a trade war that ends all hope for improving bilateral

relations2

2 Дмитрий Медведев ldquoПодписание президентом США нового санкционного закона против России создает несколько

последствийrdquo [The US Presidentrsquos signing of the package of new sanctions against Rus sia will have a few conse-

quences] Facebook August 2 2017 https wwwfacebook com Dmitry Medvedev posts 10154587161801851

Figure 71 US Imports from Rus sia Share of Oil Metals Nuclear Fuel Fertilizers and Fish Million US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

93

94

93

94

95

96

93

92

87

89

0

$5000

$10000

$15000

$20000

$25000

$30000

$35000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

US Imports from Russia

Share of Oil Metals Nuclear FuelFertilizers and Fish

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 48 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 49

The best case and most favorable scenario looks less probable now It assumes the realization of

structural reforms in Rus sia in such a way that would adapt Rus siarsquos foreign policy to national

economic needs reduce confrontations with the West and make a concerted efort to integrate

Rus sian businesses into global supply and value chains A revitalization of the structural reform

agendamdash including eforts to diversify economic activities through de- monopolization and support

for SMEs a restructuring of the banking sector the creation of a vibrant business climate to foster

entrepreneurships and innovation the implementation of administrative and judicial reforms to

tackle red tape and endemic corruption and the reduction of state control over key sectors of the

economy via wide- spread privatization could kick- start the development of a nonoil economy and

improve long- term growth prospects Despite ongoing discussion of reform strategies deep

economic and po liti cal changes are extremely complicated over the next po liti calelectoral cycle

(2018ndash2024) particularly because of re sis tance of vested interests and growing commodity prices

The urgency to tackle structural shortcomings in natu ral resource- dependent economies usually

correlates with the price of those resources and the degree to which resource rents drive eco-

nomic activity However there may be marginal improvements in the efficiency of the current

economic system

Future US- Russia relations can be thought of through three pillars one pillar focuses on areas

where both countries maintain a competitive rivalry another looks at potential areas of interaction

under pres ent conditions a third pillar and one that has evaporated from the current bilateral

agenda concentrates on future cooperation Stronger economic ties could not only be a kind of

po liti cal shock absorber but contribute to the building of this future (particularly business contacts

aim to support future structural reforms) although po liti cal factors are depressing the prospects

for cooperation To escape deadlock it will be impor tant to establish the right balance between

politics and economics and create a model of collaboration within the framework of contention

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 49 102017 404 PM

About the Author

Vadim Grishin PhD MBA has been involved in the reform pro cess in Rus sia as adviser to the

deputy prime minister of Rus sia in 1992ndash1993 and 2006ndash2010 He has extensive experience

working with the Bretton Woods Institutions He was the board member of the World Bank Group

and served as se nior adviser at the International Monetary Fund Currently he is a con sul tant to the

chief economistrsquos office of the International Finance Corporation and teaches the economics of

transition at Georgetown University in Washington DC

50

594-71613_ch99_4Pindd 50 102017 403 PM

Blank

COVER PHOTO ADOBE STOCK

1616 Rhode Island Avenue NW

Washington DC 20036

202 887 0200 | wwwcsisorg

v++ISBN 978-1-4422-8035-9

Lanham bull Boulder bull New York bull London

4501 Forbes Boulevard

Lanham MD 20706

301 459 3366 | wwwrowmancom

A U T H O R

Vadim Grishin

Myths and Realities

A Report of the

CSIS RUSSIA AND EURASIA PROGRAM

US-RussiaEconomicRelations

O C T O B E R 2 0 1 7

Euml|xHSLEOCy280359z

The Man Pupu Nyor Rock Formations at the Northern Urals also known as Seven

Strong Man or Little Mountain of the God in the local tribe (Mansi) language

Page 10: U.S.-Russia Economic Relations: Myths and Realities · 2020-04-17 · OCTOBER 2017 U.S.- Russia Economic Relations Myths and Realities AUTHOR Vadim Grishin A REPORT OF THE CSIS RUSSIA

4

02

Does Bilateral Economic Interaction Matter

Economic relations do not emerge out of a vacuum There are many variables that define the final

configuration of economic interactions such as a par tic u lar countryrsquos level of economic develop-

ment its business environment legal framework po liti cal climate (regime) culture and religion

history and tradition demography and geography as well as global and national economic cycles

An impor tant driver of trade relations for many economies has become participation in global and

regional trade agreements

As many studies and anecdotal evidence show bilateral economic cooperation should be sizable

and should relate to the economic growth of two countries in a way that afects their policy

interests Let us take as a reference point the BRICS countries1 a community of large emerging

economies which Rus sia belongs to Table 21 pres ents official data on US trade and investments

with BRICS states US- Russia trade in goods is disproportionally lowmdash235 times less than US

trade with China 33 times smaller than US trade with India and 28 times less than US trade

with Brazil The size of the US- Russia trade balance is comparable to the size of the US trade

balance with South Africa whose economy is almost four times smaller than Rus siarsquos If we add

trade in ser vices to the trade of goods the gaps increase significantly (Figures 21 and 22) The

diference is not only quantitative but also qualitative

The quality of trade relations can be mea sured by its diversity its share of high- tech components

resilience to economic shocks and its contribution to GDP growth On average a 10 percent

increase in a nationrsquos two- way trade relative to GDP increases GDP through a variety of channels

by at least 16 percent2

Bilateral trade and real GDP growth in the United States and Rus sia are practically uncorrelated

as shown in the summary output of multifactorial regression The coefficient of multiple determi-

nation (R Square) is close to 0 ( Table 22) At the same time the correlation of US exports to India

1 BRICS is the acronym for a select group of five developing economies Brazil Rus sia India China and South Africa

2 World Economic Forum Foreign Direct Investment as a Key Driver for Trade Growth and Prosperity The Case for a

Multilateral Agreement on Investment (Geneva World Economic Forum 2013) 11

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 4 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 5

Table 21 US Trade and Foreign Direct Investments (FDI) with China India Brazil South Africa and Rus sia 2016

China India Brazil South Africa Rus sia

Total Goods Trade 5786 677 565 13 203

Imports 4628 460 262 73 145

Exports 1158 217 303 55 58

Trade in Ser vices 696 472 317 47 na

Imports 161 268 68 17 na

Exports 535 203 249 30 na

US FDI 746 283 653 62 141

BRICS FDI in the United States

148 93 043 076 63

Supported Jobs in the United States (thousand)

911 197 308 50 84

Source United States Trade Representative (USTR) ldquoCountries amp Regionsrdquo accessed September 27 2017

https ustrgov countries - regions See US- China Trade Facts US- India Trade Facts US- Brazil Trade

Facts US- South Africa Trade Facts and US- Russia Trade Facts

201520142013

and China with the real GDP growth of these big Asian economies is significant (05) In the case of

Brazil the correlation is even higher (07) By contrast South Africarsquos small open economy is quite

sensitive to US imports from South Africa (043)3

In marked contrast to other BRICS countries Rus sia is a poor choice for export- oriented opera-

tions As a recent International Monetary Fund (IMF) study highlights Rus sia is an outlier a rare

exception among emerging market (EM) economies with virtually no preferential access to major

markets and little meaningful change over three de cades4 This complicates Rus siarsquos integration

into the global value chain (GVC) which became a significant driving force toward economic

development and trade for certain BRICS economies

3 IMF statistics authorrsquos computation

4 IMF Rus sian Federation Selected Issues IMF Country Report N17198 (Washington DC IMF July 2017)

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 5 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations6

Trade is closely connected with foreign direct investment (FDI) and both are parts of a complex

interaction known as international production sharing According to publicly available official data

US FDI in Rus sia was about $131 billion for 2013 and $295 billion for 2016 with the top industrial

sectors being software and IT ser vices financial ser vices chemicals metals coal oil and gas

and business ser vices5 If we take into account US investments made through Eu ro pean branches

of US companies and ofshore firms this number would easily triple Another component

that usually is not tracked by official statistics is reinvestments The American Chamber of

Commerce surveys in 2016 and 2017 which include this component draw a completely dif er ent

picture accumulated US corporate FDI in 90 large US companies working in Rus sia reached

5 US Department of Commerce International Trade Administration ldquoRussiamdash94- Foreign Direct Investment and

Portfolio Investment Statisticsrdquo Rus sia Country Commercial Guide July 7 2017 https wwwexport gov article

id=shyRussia - foreign - direct - investment - statistics

Figure 21 US Trade in Goods with China India Brazil Rus sia and South Africa Billion US$ 2016

Source USTR ldquoCountries amp Regionsrdquo See US- China Trade Facts US- India Trade Facts US- Brazil Trade

Facts US- South Africa Trade Facts and US- Russia Trade Facts

0

$50

$100

$150

$200

$250

$300

$350

$400

$450

$500

$550

$600

China India Brazil Russia South Africa

Exports

Imports

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 6 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 7

$8244 billion in 20176 The real level from our perspective is usually between official and private

estimations around $40 billon But even this cumulative figure is less than the US FDI in Brazil

and China

The American Chamber of Commerce surveys have also revealed other impor tant data Eighty-

five percent of US companies doing business in Rus sia entered its market 10 or more years ago

while 60 percent of them ldquolandedrdquo there 20 years ago or earlier Only one percent have started

operations over the last five years confirming an obvious fact entry into the Rus sian market is

challenging because of growing monopolism risks associated with the business climate and a

stagnating economy7

6 American Chamber of Commerce in Rus sia ldquoInvestment and Import to Rus sia 2nd Surveyrdquo (Prepared by GfK for the

American Chamber of Commerce in Rus sia Moscow May 2017) 12

7 Ibid 4

Figure 22 US Trade in Goods and in Ser vices with China India Brazil Rus sia and South Africa Billion US$ 2016

Source USTR ldquoCountries amp Regionsrdquo See US- China Trade Facts US- India Trade Facts US- Brazil Trade

Facts US- South Africa Trade Facts and US- Russia Trade Facts

0

$100

$200

$300

$400

$500

$600

$700

China India Brazil Russia South Africa

Trade in Services

Total Goods Trade

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 7 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations8

Rus sian direct investment position toward the United States declined from $215 billion in 2013 to

$83 billion in 2015 (Figure 23) Taking into account dif er ent channels and instruments the actual

volume of Rus sian investments in the United States made through ofshore Eu ro pean Canadian

and US companies may be several times greater than the available official data

Foreign investment in financial assets or foreign portfolio investment (FPI) should be included

even though Central Bank of Rus sia statistics indicate they were also quite low US investments in

equity were $345 million and in debt instruments were about $65 million in the fourth quarter of

20168 However these numbers do not reflect the real level of FPI Rus siarsquos stocks are incredibly

inexpensive while there has been impressive growth of US investments in short- term securities

and in foreign exchange (FX) operations (cash- and- carry trade) Rus sia was among the top per-

forming emerging markets in 2016 gaining 4744 percent in US dollars9 Nevertheless the gen-

eral capitalization of the stock exchange is tiny (less than 20 percent of GDP) comparable to the

capitalization of just one large US com pany such as Coca- Cola Many private sources believe that

the US FPI in Rus sia could be as high as several billion US dollars but a new set of sanctions

approved by President Trump on August 2 2017 if implemented could reverse those flows It is

still not clear whether the secretary of trea sury will prohibit participation in the oferings of Rus siarsquos

sovereign debt and the full range of derivative products A report on this subject should be sub-

mitted no later than 180 days after enactment of the law which means no later than Febru-

ary 2018 New legislation tightens prohibition on Rus sian financial companies already under

sanctions by limiting any new equity or debt with a maturity greater than 14 days (a provision that

8 Central Bank of Rus sia ldquoForeign Direct Investments in the Rus sian Federationrdquo accessed September 27 2017 www

cbr ru localization switchlanguage urlshy=shy news ampfromshy=shyru - ruamptoshy=shyen - gb

9 VanEck ldquoRus sian Stock Market Soars in 2016rdquo Seeking Alpha February 14 2017 https seekingalphacom article

4045602 - russian - stock - market - soars - 2016

Table 22 Summary Output of Regression Statistics (US Real GDP Rus sia Real GDP US- Russia Exports Imports and Total Trade)

Regression Statistics

Multiple R 0056445768

R Square 0003186125

Adjusted R Square minus0042123597

Standard Error 2616043923

Observations 24

Sources IMF statistics authorrsquos computation

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 8 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 9

previously allowed for 30 days) Similarly US persons are prohibited from taking on any new debt

that has a maturity greater than 60 days (previously it was 90 days) with Rus sian energy compa-

nies currently under sanctions10

According to the Trea sury Department Rus sia held $1029 billion in US Trea sury securities in

June 201711 Could Rus sia withdraw all its reserves from the United States and use this action as a

retaliatory mea sure Such a scenario is unlikely since there is no comparable safe- haven alterna-

tive to US dollars When Rus siarsquos US Trea sury holdings dropped 50 percent from $176 billion

(October 2010) to $90 billion (November 2011) the market did not notice12 Nevertheless Rus sian

authorities have announced they will decrease dependence on assets and payments in US dollars13

10 Countering Amer i carsquos Adversaries through Sanctions Act HR 3364

11 US Department of Trea sury Major Foreign Holders of Trea sury Securities September 18 2017 http ticdata

treasury gov Publish mfh txt

12 Ibid

13 ldquoНовый виток санкций Россия откажется от доллараrdquo [A new round of sanctions Rus sia will abandon the dollar]

Газетару August 7 2017 https wwwgazeta ru business 2017 08 07 10821937 shtml

Figure 23 Rus sia Outward FDI Position United States Equities and Debt Million US$ 2009ndash2016

Source Central Bank of the Rus sian Federation External Sector Statistics Rus sian Direct Investments

Abroad accessed September 27 2017 https wwwcbr ru localization switchlanguage urlshy=shy news

ampfromshy=shyru - ruamptoshy=shyen - gb

$6000

$8000

$10000

$12000

$14000

$16000

$18000

$20000

$22000

2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 9 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations10

Officially the country does not invest in the US stock exchange although some Rus sian oligarchs

have bought US corporate bonds and equities in large amounts The new sanctions law requires

the secretary of trea sury in consultation with the director of national intelligence and the secretary

of state to issue reports on Rus sian se nior po liti cal figures and oligarchs based on their closeness

to the Rus sian regime and their net worth as well as the exposure of key economic sectors of the

United States to Rus sian po liti cally exposed persons and parastatal entities including at a mini-

mum the banking securities insurance and real estate sectors14

Only three Rus sian companies are listed in the US exchanges

Overall the scale and scope of US- Russia economic interaction and business activity is much greater

than officially appreciated but not significant enough to be taken into consideration by policymakers

14 Countering Amer i carsquos Adversaries through Sanctions Act HR 3364

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 10 102017 404 PM

11

03

Politics in the Driverrsquos Seat

Bilateral economic relations depend to a great extent on global and national economic cycles

After the recent global financial crisis the US economy has shown surprisingly sustainable GDP

growth while the Rus sian economy was the most afected among BRICS countries by the turbu-

lence of a worldwide economic downturn in 2008ndash2009 and after a short- term rebound slipped

into stagnation (2012ndash2013) and then into full- scale recession (2014ndash2016) The countryrsquos eco-

nomic cycle however appears to be changing once again with the economy returning to a

pattern of growth albeit uneven and gradual (Figures 31 and 32) Even with sanctions still in place

conditions have improved as a result of the stabilization of Urals oil to an average annual price of

$419 per barrel in 2016 The gains were sparked in part by major crude producers agreeing to cut

production after hefty price drops in 2014 and 2015 Supported by easier financial conditions

higher oil prices and growing macro- stability Rus sia is heading toward a moderate growth rate

that is expected to reach 14 percent this year according to forecasts of the World Bank Group

(WBG) and the IMF1

Because of the significant role that politics plays in any bilateral interaction it is impor tant to

combine economic and po liti cal cycles applying a ldquoresetrdquo to bilateral economic cooperation in

addition to the po liti cal relationship I have compared po liti cal cycles and trade dynamics using the

following graphs ( Table 31 and Figure 33) These charts do not pretend to reflect with mathemati-

cal precision all shifts in the bilateral po liti cal relationship but rather attempt to visually align

impor tant economic and po liti cal moments to detect the efects of po liti cal events on the size of

bilateral trade

Figure 33 shows all pos si ble combinations economic trends at the intersection of po liti cal devel-

opments oppose or support each other in synchronization It is evident that po liti cal interference

1 International Monetary Fund Rus sian Federation Staff Concluding Statement of the 2017 Article IV Mission (Wash-

ington DC IMF 2017) World Bank Group From Recession to Recovery Rus sia Economic Report no 37 (Washington

DC World Bank 2017) http pubdocsworldbank org en 383241495487103815 RER - 37 - May26 - FINAL - with - summary

pdf

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 11 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations12

in bilateral business afairs in the early 2000s was less significant than in later years As result

growing po liti cal tensions from 2003 to 2008 did not dramatically afect bilateral economic inter-

action It is also easier to explain why 2011ndash2012 resulted in rec ord trade and investmentmdash a con-

sequence of very high oil prices GDP growth in both countries improved legislation after Rus siarsquos

accession to the WTO and the Obamandash Medvedev po liti cal reset From 2014 to 2016 a perfect

storm of developments added efficiency to Western sanctions and augmented the damaging

consequences of counter- sanction mea sures

Figure 33 also confirms that in times of reduced economic cooperation po liti cal pressures can

easily change bilateral economic trends Moreover business interests along with economic inter-

actions have a limited capacity to reverse the po liti cal mainstream

Figure 31 Economic Cycle 2014ndash2016

Source Authorrsquos evaluation of international financial institutions (IFI) data and sources from respective

countries

Sustainable Growth

Brazil

Negative Growth

Unstable Growth

Mexico

Descending Growth

Argentina

EU

US

Russia

Vietnam

China

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 12 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 13

Table 31 Po liti cal Cycles in Bilateral US- Russia Relations 1999ndash2016

2001ndash2002 The George W Bushndash Vladimir Putin Reset Rus sia supported ldquoglobal war on terrorismrdquo launched by the United States after 911 the SORT nuclear arms reduction treaty was signed by the United States and Rus sia and a successful business dialogue was developed that created the current structure of economic relations

2003ndash2008 Deterioration in bilateral relations brought on by the Iraq War Georgiarsquos ldquoRose Revolutionrdquo Mikhail Khodorkovskyrsquos arrest Ukrainersquos ldquoOrange Revolutionrdquo Kosovorsquos in de pen dence and the Georgian War

2009ndash2010 The Barack Obamandash Dmitry Medvedev Reset Rus sia served as a logistical hub for transportation and supply of US forces in Af ghan i stan United States and Rus sia signed the new START nuclear arms reduction treaty Rus sia backed tighter economic sanctions on Iran Rus sia gained access to the WTO after 18 years of negotiations

2011ndash2016 Deterioration in bilateral relations caused by the Ukrainian crisis which were followed by sanctions and counter- sanctions along with the Syrian crises and cyber- enabled activities

Source Authorrsquos evaluation of po liti cal and economic data

Note SORTthinsp=thinspStrategic Ofensive Reductions Treaty STARTthinsp=thinspStrategic Arms Reduction Treaty

Figure 32 Economic Cycle 2017ndash2019

Source Authorrsquos evaluation of IFI data and sources from respective countries

Egypt

VenezuelaEU

South Africa

Brazil

Russia

India

US

Descending Growth

Korea

China

Negative Growth

Unstable Growth

Sustainable Growth

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 13 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations14

Figure 33 US- Russia Trade Million US$ vs Po liti cal Cycle 2000ndash2016

Sources US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo Foreign Trade last modified June 29 2017

https wwwcensus gov foreign - trade balance c4621 html (see data for 2000ndash2016) authorrsquos evaluation

of po liti cal and economic data

Orange Revolution

Khodorkovskys arrest

GeorgianWar

Bush- Putin Reset

Iraq War Global Financial Crisis

Obama-Medvedev Reset

Russias WTO accession

New START Treaty

A Pefect Storm the Ukranian Crisis Oil Prices Crashing

Sanctions and Counter-Sanctions

$3000

$8000

$13000

$18000

$23000

$28000

$33000

$38000

$43000

2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 14 102017 404 PM

15

The current structure of US- Russia economic relations emerged in the early 2000s when the

model of trade and investment interaction took on a character similar to that which existed be-

tween the United States and developing economies US imports from Rus sia centered on com-

modities while technology along with food products lead American exports The primary

exception was that Rus sia supplied nuclear fuel including highly enriched uranium extracted from

nuclear weapons for US power plants and provided ser vices to the aerospace industry primarily

in satellite launches However both these exceptions can be explained as a legacy of the Soviet

past and not a harbinger of the future economic relationship (Figure 41)

In the last 15 years this trade structure has not changed significantly The only noticeable shift in

trade was a dramatic drop (to practically nothing) in exports of US agricultural products a result

of Rus siarsquos policy of import substitution and so- called counter- sanction mea sures it took in re-

sponse to US sanctions over the Ukraine crisis (Figure 42)

Promising new directions of cooperation in the IT sector and in engineering ser vices for the

aerospace industry appeared in the early 2000s1 but did not spill into other sectors and conse-

quently did little to renew economic cooperation on the whole The integration of Rus sian high-

tech ser vices into large- scale global production and value chains was constrained by the usual

culprits a lack of financial resources managerial experience skilled labor modern infrastructure

RampD investments and an adequate business environment High commodity prices incentivized the

restoration of an economic system centered on resource rents The leading role of oil and gas

extraction and transportation discouraged the development of a nonenergy sector that might

have created advanced and complex production and ser vices An import substitution policy could

not work efficiently in an economic environment plagued by the Dutch disease where currency

1 The Boeing Design Center was created in Moscow It consists of nearly 250 Boeing employees managing

a team of 1200 contract engineers from Rus sian and Ukrainian aerospace companies ldquoBackgrounder Boeing in

Rus siardquo Boeing last modified January 2017 http wwwboeing com resources boeingdotcom company key _ orgs

boeing - international pdf russia - cisbackgrounder pdf

Are the United States and Rus sia ldquoNatu ralrdquo Trading Partners A Little Bit of History

04

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 15 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations16

inflows (oil money) lead to ruble appreciation and render a countryrsquos production less competitive

During that time Rus siarsquos industry did not receive preferential access to larger markets and could

not expand its share in the global economy particularly because of its self- isolation from the

regional trade agreements (except for its participation in the Eurasian Economic Union with some

neighboring countries of the former Soviet Union) As a result neither import substitution nor

export- led strategy promoted growth and specialization in nonoil production A long- awaited

modernization and reallocation of resources from an inefficient nontrade sector to a trade sector

did not materialize

These limits were later augmented with sanctions and an extension of domestic restrictions on

cooperation with Western partners Importantly the rapid growth of state- monopoly structures in

the Rus sian economy over the past 15 years has created additional obstacles to the development

and diversification of US- Russia economic ties

Figure 41 US Imports from Rus sia US$ 2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2016)

Fish and shellfish 3

Crude oil 5

Fuel oil 37

Petroleum products other

8

Nuclear fuel materials

7

Chemicals-fertilizers 4

Steelmaking materials 5

Iron and steel mill products 4

Bauxite and aluminum 9

Other precious metals 4

Nonferrous metals other 1

Finished metal shapes 1

Synthetic rubber--primary

1

Spacecraftexcluding military

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 16 102017 404 PM

Fig

ure

42

U

S E

xpo

rts

to R

us s

ia U

S$ 2

016

Sou

rce

US

Ce

nsu

s B

ure

au ldquo

Trad

e in

Go

od

s w

ith

Ru

s sia

rdquo (s

ee

dat

a fo

r 2

016

)

Bak

ery

pro

du

cts

Win

e b

eer

an

d r

elat

ed

pro

du

cts

New

spri

nt

Pla

stic

mat

eria

ls

Ch

emic

als-

fert

ilize

rs

Ch

emic

als-

ino

rgan

icC

hem

ical

s-o

rgan

ic

Ch

emic

als-

oth

erC

ott

on

fib

er c

loth

In

du

stri

al r

ub

ber

pro

du

cts

Min

eral

su

pp

lies-

man

ufa

ctu

red

Gen

erat

ors

acc

esso

ries

Ele

ctri

c ap

par

atu

s

Dri

llin

g amp

oilfi

eld

eq

uip

men

t Sp

ecia

lized

min

ing

Exc

avat

ing

mac

hin

ery

No

nfa

rm t

ract

ors

an

d p

arts

In

du

stri

al e

ng

ines

Fo

od

to

bac

co m

ach

iner

y M

etal

wo

rkin

g m

ach

ine

too

ls

Tex

tile

sew

ing

m

ach

ines

W

oo

d g

lass

p

last

ic

Pu

lp a

nd

pap

er

mac

hin

ery

Mea

suri

ng

tes

tin

g

con

tro

l in

stru

men

ts

Mat

eria

ls h

and

ling

equ

ipm

ent

Ind

ust

rial

mac

hin

es

oth

er

Ph

oto

ser

vice

ind

ust

ry m

ach

iner

y A

gri

cult

ura

l mac

hin

ery

eq

uip

men

t C

om

pu

ters

Co

mp

ute

r ac

cess

ori

es

Sem

ico

nd

uct

ors

Tel

eco

mm

un

icat

ion

seq

uip

men

t

Bu

sin

ess

mac

hin

es a

nd

eq

uip

men

t

Lab

ora

tory

tes

tin

g in

stru

men

ts

Med

icin

al e

qu

ipm

ent

Civ

ilian

air

craf

t e

ng

ines

eq

uip

men

t a

nd

par

ts

Rai

lway

tra

nsp

ort

atio

n

equ

ipm

ent

Ves

sels

exc

lud

ing

scr

ap

Co

mm

erci

al v

esse

ls o

ther

M

arin

e en

gin

es p

arts

Spac

ecra

ft e

xclu

din

g

mili

tary

Pas

sen

ger

car

s

new

an

d u

sed

Tru

cks

bu

ses

and

sp

ecia

l p

urp

ose

ve

hic

les

En

gin

es a

nd

en

gin

e p

arts

(c

arb

ure

tors

pis

ton

s r

ing

s

and

val

ves)

B

od

ies

and

ch

assi

s fo

r p

asse

ng

er c

ars

Au

tom

oti

ve t

ires

an

d t

ub

es

Oth

er p

arts

an

d a

cces

sori

es o

f ve

hic

les

Ap

par

el h

ou

seh

old

go

od

s -

text

ile

Ph

arm

aceu

tica

lp

rep

arat

ion

s

Furn

itu

re h

ou

seh

old

go

od

s

etc

R

ug

s

Cel

l ph

on

es a

nd

oth

er

ho

use

ho

ld g

oo

ds

ne

c

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 17 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations18

Figure 43 US Trade in Goods with Rus sia Million US$ 1992ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 1992ndash2016)

Russian Financial Crisis

Oil price Increased from$2446 USD per barrel (2001)

to $9694 USD per barrel(2008)

Global Financial Crisis

Oil price high record in2011-2012

(more that $111 USD perbarrel)

Oil price crashed

$-

$5000

$10000

$15000

$20000

$25000

$30000

$35000

$40000

$45000

$50000

1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

US Imports from Russia US Exports to Russia US-Russia Trade in Goods

No doubt po liti cal ups and downs add volatility to US- Russia trade Nevertheless Rus siarsquos eco-

nomic structure exhausted itself before the Ukrainian crisis and the recent Rus sian recession Its

limitations are not only due to some mistakes in policy or negative coincidences of circumstances

but rather to deeply rooted properties in the current bilateral trade model related to structural

issues in the Rus sian economy Structural constraints such as the weak enforcement of property

rights poor business regulation and nondiversified exports weighed on Rus sian trade with the

United States From this perspective the term ldquonaturalunnatural trading partnersrdquo does not ad-

dress the unused capacity of bilateral interaction or the real challenges that kind of interaction

faces It just adds metaphysical flavor to the very specific economic and po liti cal factors that

determine the US- Russia trajectory

Overall the outlines of bilateral trade (Figure 43) resemble the famous ldquoRus sian Mountainsrdquo that

were a pre de ces sor of the modern roller coaster icy hills supported by wooden constructionsmdash a

rigid and immobile structure that sooner or later would melt This unfortunately is what is hap-

pening to US- Russia trade cooperation now

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 18 102017 404 PM

19

ARE LITTLE FISH REALLY SWEET

Low US- Russia economic interaction has at least two consequences First it limits the capacity of

policymakers to exploit trade as an instrument for geopo liti cal combat Even the question of a US

trade deficit which used to be a headache for many US trading partners has become so insig-

nificant in absolute terms (about $87 billion in 2016) that it seems hardly worth caring about

When the volume of trade between two countries becomes very small in absolute terms whether

a country is running a surplus or deficit is no longer relevant But it also renders another type of

confrontations (sometimes more dangerous) more likely since the two traders have little to lose

Second in an environment marked by low levels of bilateral trade both sides could incentivize (if

and when a desire for po liti cal rapprochement exists) the signing of new trade deals which are

elevated symbolically as a turning point in bilateral po liti cal relations (ie the sale of Boeings to

Rus sia or the delivery via tankers of Rus sian oil to US refineries) Sometimes markets themselves

pres ent ldquogiftsrdquo that can be capitalized on po liti cally US- USSR grain trade in the 1970s was one

such ldquogiftrdquo large sales of American grain to the Soviet Union helped US policymakers win favor

with the po liti cally impor tant American farming sector and permitted Soviet leaders to maintain

access to a dietary staple for the Soviet population

The strong 32 percent growth in value of US imports from Rus sia from January to May 2017

versus January to May 2016 ( Table 51) is an example of a development that has tempted officials

to pres ent it as a sign of positive change due to ldquogrowing business activitiesrdquo (this kind of statement

was heard before the bilateral summit in Germany in July 2017) although the reason for that leap

was evidently an increase in commodity prices (mainly of oilmdash see Table 52) and not a rise in

entrepreneurial interactions The primary beneficiaries of that upside rally have been two other

petro- economies Saudi Arabia and Venezuela ( Tables 53 and 54)

Sector Analyses

05

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 19 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations20

Table 51 US Imports from Rus sia Million US$ Januaryndash May 2016 vs Januaryndash May 2017

Year January February March April May Total

2016 9603 6871 11097 12257 10977 50805

2017 12215 10220 16979 13471 14147 67032

Change 271 487 530 99 289 319

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 1992ndash2016)

Table 52 Change in Urals Crude Oil Prices US$ per Barrel Januaryndash May 2016 vs Januaryndash May 2017

Januaryndash May 2016 Januaryndash May 2017 Change ($) Change ()

3601 5129 1528 424

Source Ministry of Finance of the Rus sian Federation https wwwminfin ru ru ixzz4mMIZ7XtC

Table 53 US Imports from Saudi Arabia Million US$ Januaryndash May 2016 vs Januaryndash May 2017

Year January February March April May Total

2016 15114 9036 13555 10844 14679 63228

2017 19802 20298 21650 16211 19542 97503

Change 3101 12463 5972 495 331 542

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Saudi Arabiardquo Foreign Trade last modified June 29 2017

https wwwcensus gov foreign - trade balance c5170 html (see data for 2016ndash2017)

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 20 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 21

Table 54 US Imports from Venezuela Million US$ Januaryndash May 2016 vs Januaryndash May 2017

Year January February March April May Total

2016 6657 5560 7140 8007 7922 35286

2017 13041 10864 123500 11148 12243 59646

Change 9590 9540 7297 3923 5454 6903

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Venezuelardquo Foreign Trade last modified June 29 2017

https wwwcensus gov foreign - trade balance c3070 html (see data for 2016ndash2017)

Table 55 US Exports to Rus sia Million US$ Januaryndash May 2016 vs Januaryndash May 2017

Year January February March April May Total

2016 3628 3577 7298 4657 4947 24107

2017 3144 4277 5386 6670 4806 24283

Change minus133 196 minus262 432 minus29 minus07

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2016ndash2017)

At the same time US exports to Rus sia continue to stagnate ( Table 55) due to low levels of

consumption during a two-and- a- half-year economic crisis a deep ruble devaluation sanctions

and counter- sanctions

Given the very dif er ent economic structures and resource endowments of Rus sia and the United

States it is not surprising that US- Russia trade is asymmetric and oil driven (Figure 51) A

3 percent increase in Urals oil prices translates into a one percent increase in US import growth

from Rus sia Thus in 2016 every $10 increase in Urals crude oil added $15 billion to the value of

US imports or 11 percent to the total value of imports from Rus sia

OIL ADDICTION

Oil is a core pillar of US- Russia bilateral trade A bumpy ride in oil markets afects commerce

Nevertheless Rus sian oil exports to the United States in physical terms have been rather

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 21 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations22

sustainable Starting from 2005 average annual deliveries have been above 150 million barrels

(Figure 52) Crude and heating oil have dominated while petroleum products and liquefied petro-

leum gases have not (Figure 53) In 2011 oil exports peaked at 228 million barrels but declined to

159 million barrels in 2016mdash a drop of 30 percent Rec ord high shipments of Rus sian oil to the United

States coincided with an elevation in oil prices which made the subsequent decline in oil shipment

value between 2011 and 2016 (by about 72 percent as shown in Figure 54) seem more stark The

increase in price also raised the share of oil in Rus sian exports by 74 percent in 2011 (Figure 55)

The Rus sian share in total US oil imports was around 55 percent in 2011 and 43 percent in 2016

( Table 56) In the last five years the United States has relied exclusively on consumption of Rus sian

oil for the rough equivalent of one week out of the year (Figure 56)

It is unlikely that Rus sia can significantly increase its share of the US oil market and there is a real

possibility for a downward trend There are several reasons the historically high Rus sian hydrocar-

bon export threshold of 2011 will not soon if ever be surpassed

First US energy consumption will likely be flat According to the US Energy Information Adminis-

tration (EIA) demand for petroleum and other liquids in the United States will be about 35ndash36

quadrillion British thermal units (BTUs) with minimal variation over the next 25 years1

1 US EIA ldquoAnnual Energy Outlook 2017 with Projections to 2050rdquo January 5 2017 7ndash8

Figure 51 US- Russia Trade Growth () vs US and Rus sia Real GDP Growth () 1993ndash2016

Source IMF ldquoIMF Datardquo accessed September 27 2017 http wwwimf org en Data US Census Bureau

ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo

Note rGDPthinsp=thinspreal gross domestic product

Trade

USA rGDP growth

Russia rGDP growth

-60

-40

-20

0

20

40

60

80

100

1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Gro

wth

All spikes in US-Russia trade have been connected with two main

variables volume and price of crude oil

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 22 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 23

Second the United States will become a net energy exporter between 2020 and 2030 in most

cases under dif er ent combinations of oil and natu ral gas prices GDP growth technological

breakthroughs and the availability of energy resources The role of oil imports will dramatically

fall2

Third oil price scenarios as described by the International Energy Agency (IEA) international

financial organ izations (IFIs) and many national agencies are very cautious and assume that even

by 2035 to 2040 oil prices will not to recover to the levels of 2011ndash20123

Fourth Rus sian oil production and export growth will be modest and driven by Asian economic

expansion and will comprise a decreasing share of Western markets4 According to forecasts from

2 Ibid 15ndash18

3 Ibid table 3 ldquoEnergy Prices by Sector and Sourcesrdquo World Bank World Bank Commodity Markets Price Forecasts

(Washington DC World Bank 2017) httpswwwworldbank org en research commodity - markets Organ ization of the

Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) World Oil Outlook 2016 (Vienna OPEC 2016)

4 E D Belotskaia et al Global and Rus sian Energy Outlook 2016 (Moscow Energy Research Institute of the Rus sian

Acad emy of Science Analytical Center for the Government of the Rus sian Federation 2016) http acgov ru files

publication a 12767 pdf

Figure 52 US Imports from Rus sia Crude Oil and Petroleum Products Thousands of Barrels 1995ndash2016

Source US EIA ldquoUS Imports by Country of Origin Rus siardquo Petroleum amp Other Liquids September 13

2017 http wwweia gov dnav pet PET _ MOVE _ IMPCUS _ D _ NUS _ NRS _ MBBL _ M htm

0

50000

100000

150000

200000

250000

Date 1995 1996 1997 1998 199920002001200220032004200520062007200820092010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 23 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations24

the Organ ization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) crude oil exports from Rus sia and

the Caspian region to the United States will dis appear by 20255

So why does the Rus sian Urals blend continue to be attractive for oil traders and US refineries

which could pro cess greater volumes of domestically produced lighter crude There are two main

reasons One is related to the preference of US high conversion refineries (the most sophisticated

in the world) to work with heavy oil blends produced by Canada Mexico Iraq Venezuela and

Rus sia Pro cessing heavy crude now is as profitable as pro cessing lighter crude The so- called

crack spreadmdash the diference between the cost of relatively cheap heavy crude oil and the final

price of value- added consumer products (diesel gasoline jet fuel and heating oil)mdash has become

the same as the refinery margins of light sweet crude6 This has primarily afected light oil produc-

ing countries such as Angola Algeria and Nigeria

5 OPEC World Oil Outlook 2016 306ndash309

6 ldquoHow Much for That Heavy Oilrdquo Oil Sands Magazine December 26 2015 https wwwoilsandsmagazine com

news 2015 12 26 how - much - for - that - heavy - oil

Figure 53 US Imports from Rus sia Oil and Petroleum Products US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

$-

$25000000000

$20000000000

$15000000000

$10000000000

$5000000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Liquefied petroleum gases

Petroleum products other

Fuel oil

Crude oil

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 24 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 25

Another factor afecting purchase of Rus sian oil is a new trend among oil companies for further

consolidation of scale and for integrating operations of upstream and downstream business7

There have been several waves of separation and unification of production transportation and

pro cessing in the last 50 years The current business cycle can be seen as an adaptation to a

period of low prices and oversupply Companies that buy andor produce oil in Rus sia most likely

prefer to transport and pro cess this oil in their own modern refineries in the United States At the

same time some of the newest refinery designs specifically for pro cessing heavy oils have been

built in Asia thus extending the choices of heavy oil producing countries

We should also consider that leading US and international oil traders along with oil producing

companies working with or owning US refineries frequently buy Rus sian oil on the open market

and have long- term contracts on Rus sian crude oil delivery Many Rus sian oil companies prefer to

pay for purchases or ser vices with their future production instead of cash creating situations of

ldquostickyrdquo oil imports that are difficult to replace The best- known example is an interaction between

7 ldquoEnergy and Utilities Sectorrdquo Roundtable Financier Worldwide December 2015 https wwwfinancierworldwide

com roundtable - energy - utilities - sector - dec15

Figure 54 US Imports of Oil and Petroleum Products from Rus sia vs Oil Prices Eu rope Brent Spot Price Free on Board (FOB) 1996ndash2017

Source US EIA ldquoUS Imports by Country of Origin Rus siardquo

0

20

40

60

80

100

120

140

0

5000

10000

15000

20000

25000

30000

Jan

-19

96

Jun

-19

96

No

v-19

96

Ap

r-19

97

Sep

-19

97

Feb

-19

98

Jul-

199

8D

ec-1

99

8M

ay-1

99

9O

ct-1

99

9M

ar-2

00

0A

ug

-20

00

Jan

-20

01

Jun

-20

01

No

v-2

00

1A

pr-

20

02

Sep

-20

02

Feb

-20

03

Jul-

20

03

Dec

-20

03

May

-20

04

Oct

-20

04

Mar

-20

05

Au

g-2

00

5Ja

n-2

00

6Ju

n-2

00

6N

ov-

20

06

Ap

r-2

00

7Se

p-2

00

7Fe

b-2

00

8Ju

l-2

00

8D

ec-2

00

8M

ay-2

00

9O

ct-2

00

9M

ar-2

010

Au

g-2

010

Jan

-20

11Ju

n-2

011

No

v-2

011

Ap

r-2

012

Sep

-20

12Fe

b-2

013

Jul-

20

13D

ec-2

013

May

-20

14O

ct-2

014

Mar

-20

15A

ug

-20

15Ja

n-2

016

Jun

-20

16N

ov-

20

16

USD

per

Bar

rel

Th

ou

san

d B

arr

els

US Imports from Russia of Crude Oil and Petroleum Products (Thousand Barrels)

Europe Brent Spot Price FOB (Dollars per Barrel)

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 25 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations26

Table 56 US Oil Imports All Countries vs Rus sia Thousand Barrels per Day 2011ndash2016

Years 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

All Countries 11436 10598 9859 9241 9449 10058

Rus sia 624 477 460 330 371 433

Share 546 450 467 357 393 431

Sources US EIA ldquoUS Imports by Country of Origin Total Crude Oil and Productsrdquo Petroleum amp Other

Liquids September 13 2017 wwweia gov dnav pet pet_move_impcus_a2_nus_ep00_im0_mbbl_m htm

authorrsquos computation

Figure 55 US Imports from Rus sia Share of Crude Oil and Petroleum Products Million US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

57

64

73

72

74

73

72

59

52 50

0

$5000

$10000

$15000

$20000

$25000

$30000

$35000

$40000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

US Imports from Russia

Share of Oil and Petroleum Products

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 26 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 27

the Rus sian state mono poly Rosneft and commodity trading and mining giant Glencore which

along with energy and commodities com pany Vitol participated in a $10 billion prepayment

deal with Rosneft for crude supplies in 2013

There have been a number of ongoing transactions between the Rus sian oil industry and interna-

tional oil companies including several that top the list of importers of Rus sian oil to the United

States ( Table 57) In December 2016 Glencore participated in a controversial privatization opera-

tion purchasing in tandem with the Qatar sovereign wealth fund a 195 percent stake in Rosneft

which was on the US and EU list of sanctioned firms8 Glencore has also taken a blocking stake in

midsize oil producer RussNeft BP owns a 1975 percent stake in Rosneft Chevron holds a

15 percent interest in the 935- mile- long CPC9 pipeline which transports an average of 959000

barrels of crude oil per day including 76000 barrels daily from Rus sia10 ExxonMobil has formed

8 E Mazneva and I Arkhipov ldquoRus sia Sells $11 Billion Stake in Rosneft to Glencore Qatarrdquo Bloomberg December 7

2016

9 CPCthinsp=thinspCaspian Pipeline Consortium

10 ldquoRus sia Highlights of Operations and Business Portfoliordquo Chevron accessed October 3 2017 https wwwchevron

com worldwide russia

Figure 56 Share of Rus sian Oil in Total US Oil Imports Thousands of Barrels per Day 1972ndash2016

Source US EIA ldquoUS Imports by Country of Origin Total Crude Oil and Productsrdquo

2000

4000

6000

8000

10000

12000

14000

16000

US Imports of Crude Oil and Petroleum Products (Thousand Barrels per Day)

US Imports from Russia of Crude Oil and Petroleum Products (Thousand Barrels per Day)19

7319

7419

7519

7619

7719

7819

7919

80

198

119

82

198

319

84

198

519

86

198

719

88

198

919

90

199

119

92

199

319

94

199

519

96

199

719

98

199

92

00

02

00

12

00

22

00

32

00

42

00

52

00

62

00

72

00

82

00

92

010

20

112

012

20

132

014

20

152

016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 27 102017 404 PM

Table 57 Top Importers of Rus sian Oil to the United States Thousands of Barrels 2016

VALERO MARKETING amp SUPPLY CO 54590 3616

EXXONMOBIL OIL CORP 17087 1130

CHEVRON USA INC 15217 1008

BP WEST COAST PRODUCTS LLC 10130 671

GEORGE E WARREN CORP 7272 48

PAULSBORO REFINING CO LLC 6838 453

TESORO CORP 5097 338

VITOL INC 5084 337

PHILLIPS 66 CO 4726 313

TRAFIGURA AG 4360 289

PAR HAWAII REFINING LLC 3893 258

MOTIVA ENTERPRISES LLC 3041 205

SHELL US TRADING CO 2863 19

MARATHON PETROLEUM CO LLC 2475 16

ATLANTIC TRADING amp MARKETING 2099 14

FREEPOINT COMMODITIES LLC 1439 1

GLENCORE LTD 1284 85

BEST PETROLEUM CORP 967 64

ROLYMPUS US COMMODITIES GROUP LLC 822 6

HUNT CRUDE OIL SUPPLY CO 666 4

GULF OIL LP 658 4

Source US EIA ldquoUS Imports by Country of Origin Crude Oilrdquo Petroleum amp Other Liquids September 13

2017 httpswwweiagovdnavpetpet_move_impcus_a2_nus_epc0_im0_mbblpd_ahtm authorrsquos

computation

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 28 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 29

several joint ventures with Rosneft to undertake ofshore exploration in the Black Sea and the Kara

Sea in Siberia11

According to the Sanctions Act US persons are prohibited from exporting or reexporting goods

ser vices (except financial ser vices) and technology in support of exploration or production of new

deep- water Arctic ofshore or shale oil proj ects that involve designated Rus sian entities or other

entities in which such sanctioned persons have a controlling interest or a substantial noncontrol-

ling owner ship interest defined as not less than 33 percent (previously it was 50 percent) The new

law also authorizesmdash but does not requiremdash the imposition of so- called secondary sanctions

against non- US entities that engage in activities involving the construction maintenance or

expansion of Rus sian energy export pipelines with a fair market value of $1 million or more or an

aggregate fair market value during a 12- month period of $5 million12 This provision has raised the

concerns of some Eu ro pean countries particularly Germany As result the final language of the

law included wording about coordination of this issue with allies of the United States

Shipments of Rus sian oil to the United States could be afected by activity in the US refinery

industry In early 2017 Saudi Aramco bought the United Statesrsquo largest oil refinery in Port Arthur

(Texas) and it announced plans to send more of its own crude to that refinery13 Serious concerns

exist however regarding the future of three refineries and nine pipelines owned by Citgo a US

branch of the Venezuelan state com pany PdVSA which is balancing precariously on the edge of

default Under certain conditions in the event of PdVSA bankruptcy Rosneft could claim a stake of

up to 499 percent in Citgo Such a possibility has raised concerns among politicians and US

government officials with Trea sury Secretary Steven Mnuchin calling it a ldquonational security issuerdquo14

Tables 58 59 and 510 show allocations of Rus sian oil imports to major US refineries some of

which work exclusively on Rus sian crude a total of two to three months per year In total 150940

thousand barrels of Rus sian oil were refined in 2016

Figure 57 confirms a leading position of Texas and Louisiana among the US states receiving

Rus sian crude followed by New Jersey California Mississippi Washington Hawaii and Delaware

In a paradoxical way Texas has dis appeared from the list of states as a main destination of US

imports from Rus sia (Figure 58) because Rus sian crude is mostly delivered to Louisiana ports and

registered there by US Customs as an import from Rus sia After that it transports to refineries in

Louisiana and Texas

Overall the short- term business rationale behind the sustainability of US oil imports from Rus sia

cannot overcome strong headwinds in the US energy sector facing all oil importers which will

inevitably lead to a contraction of Rus sian oil exports to the United States in the foreseeable future

11 Exxon eforts to receive a special US Trea sury waiver to drill in sanctioned Rus sia failed in 2017

12 Countering Amer i carsquos Adversaries through Sanctions Act HR 3364

13 Sarp Ozkan ldquoSaudi Aramcorsquos Port Arthur Refinery and the US Refinery Fleetrdquo Drilling Info May 11 2017

https infodrillinginfo com saudi - aramcos - port - arthur - refinery - us - refinery - fleet

14 Graham Kates ldquoTrea sury Secretary Rus siarsquos Citgo Deal a National Security Issuerdquo CBS News May 1 2017

http wwwcbsnews com news rosneft - citgo - steven - mnuchin - national - security

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 29 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations30

Table 58 Valerorsquos Refineries Pro cessing Rus sian Oil Thousands of Barrels 2016

Saint Charles Louisiana 29206 535

Corpus Christi Texas 20626 378

Wilmington California 4250 78

Total USA 54590 100

Source US EIA ldquoRefinery Capacity Reportrdquo January 1 2017

table 5 wwweia gov petroleum refinerycapacity table5 pdf

authorrsquos computation

Table 59 ExxonMobil Refineries Pro cessing Rus sian Oil Thousands of Barrels 2016

Baytown Texas 15037 88

Baton Rouge Louisiana 2046 12

Total USA 17083 100

Source US EIA ldquoRefinery Capacity Reportrdquo authorrsquos computation

Table 510 Chevronrsquos Refineries Pro cessing Rus sian Oil Thousands of Barrels 2016

Pascagoula Mississippi 12767 840

El Segundo California 2372 155

Saint Rose Louisiana 78 05

Total USA 15217 100

Source US EIA ldquoRefinery Capacity Reportrdquo authorrsquos computation

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 30 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 31

HEAVY METAL

Taken together US imports of metals and US imports of oil compose about 80 percent of US

total imports from Rus sia (Figure 59) Trade of metals like other commodities is strongly afected

by market price fluctuations Nevertheless metal imports from Rus sia have been fairly resilient to

market volatility and their average annual value has hovered at about $4 billion in the last five years

(Figure 510) This market resilience was forged at the end of the 1990searly 2000s when Rus sian

metal producers gradually modernized their plants adjusting quality of production to Western

standards and enhancing integration into global value and supply chains Some of them conquered

their share of the highly competitive US market struggling with peers from Canada and certain

BRICS countries (China India and Brazil) To attract additional resources all Rus sian large metal-

producing companies became public and were listed on stock exchanges chiefly the London Stock

Exchange (Severstalrsquo PAO Evraz MMK OAO Novolipetsk Steel Norilsk Nikel and TMK PAO) one

on the New York Stock Exchange (Mechel) and one on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange (Rusal)

Business logic pushed some of them to invest in the US metal- making industry which was hit

hard by crisis Later on some of those assets were sold (eg two US steel mills acquired by

Severstal in 2004 were purchased 10 years later by Steel Dynamics Inc and AK Steel Corp)

Figure 57 Share of US States Rus sian Oil Imports 2016

Source US EIA ldquoUS Imports from Rus sia of Crude Oil and Petroleum Productsrdquo Petroleum amp Other

Liquids September 29 2017 https www eia gov dnav pet hist LeafHandler ashx nshy=shyPETampsshy=shyMTTIM _ NUS

- NRS _ 1ampfshy=shyM authorrsquos computation

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

100

Maine

Massachusetts

Maryland

Connecticut

Georgia

Rhode Island

Virginia

Florida

New York

Alabama

Puerto Rico

Pennsylvania

Delaware

Hawaii

Washington

Mississippi

California

New Jersey

Louisiana

Texas

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 31 102017 404 PM

Figure 58 US Imports from Rus sia by State Million US$ 2013ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoState and Metropolitan Area Trade Datardquo Foreign Trade last modified

October 2 2017 https wwwcensus gov foreign - trade statistics state

Alaska

Connecticut

Delaware

Hawaii

Louisiana

Maryland

North Dakota 0

$1000

$2000

$3000

$4000

$5000

$6000

2013 2014 2015 2016

Alabama

Alaska

Connecticut

Delaware

Hawaii

Louisiana

Maryland

Maine

Mississippi

Montana

North Dakota

Mississippi

Figure 59 US Imports from Rus sia Share of Oil and Metals Million US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 1992ndash2016)

83

82

85

86

87

88

85

82

7375

0

$5000

$10000

$15000

$20000

$25000

$30000

$35000

$40000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

US Imports from Russia

Share of Oil and Metals

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 32 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 33

Obviously the market dynamic of dif er ent metals varies (eg iron steel aluminum platinum and

nickel) Caps to increase their trade and production in a ldquored oceanrdquo global environment with

anemic demand is rather limited despite Figure 510 showing a spike of iron and steel imports

from Rus sia in 2014 and aluminum in 2016 Some opportunities may exist for Russian- owned steel

plants in the United States (such as NLMK) to participate in energy proj ects resumed under Presi-

dent Trump who has required that new pipelines use only American- made steel15

Rus sia occupies a special niche in the US market for titanium products a high- end metal indus-

try Twenty years ago a long- term contract was signed between Rus sian titanium producer

VSMPO- AVISMA and Boeing The Rus sian com pany entered the selective club of Boeing suppliers

for the manufacture of components and semi- finished products Since the signing of this contract

VSMPO has delivered more than 35 percent of all titanium placed on Boeing civil aircraft16 They

are hidden in the trade data in an import category for Civilian Aircrafts and Parts (Figure 511) At

the end of 2016 Boeing announced an extension of its framework agreement with AVISMA

15 E Scheyder C Ngai and T Sylvester ldquoAmerican Steel Unlikely to Get Keystone Boost Despite Trump Orderrdquo

Reuters January 27 2017 http wwwreuters com article usa - trump - pipeline - transcanada - idUSL1N1FH1ZD

16 A Kramer ldquoTitanium Fills Vital Role for Boeing and Rus siardquo New York Times July 5 2013 http wwwnytimes com

2013 07 06 business global titanium - fills - vital - role - for - boeing - and - russia html mcubzshy=shy3

Figure 510 US Imports from Rus sia Iron Steel Bauxite Aluminum Nickel Nonferrous Metals and Other Precious Metals and Materials US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 1992ndash2016)

0

$6000000000

$5000000000

$4000000000

$3000000000

$2000000000

$1000000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 20122013

20142015

2016

Finished metal shapes

Iron and steel advanced

Iron and steel products nec

Nonferrous metals other

Other precious metals

Nickel

Bauxite and aluminum

Iron and steel mill products

Steelmaking materials

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 33 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations34

through 2022 and additional investments in the construction of a new robotic plant in Titanium

Valley a special economic zone located in the Sverdlovsk region that will open in 2018 The pro-

cessing of titanium forgings in all Boeing civil aircraft will be performed there including 787s 737

MAXs and 777Xs17 The contract extension with AVISMA may add several hundred million dollars

in value to annual US imports from Rus sia

How can such heavy reliance on imports of Rus sian titanium exist during a period of rising geopo-

liti cal tensions The answer is straightforward VSMPO- AVISMA is a highly specialized natu ral

mono poly producing 45 percent of the worldrsquos aerospace titanium Only four other countries

smelt high- grade titanium in industrial quantities the United States Germany Japan and China

Overall global production capacity is limited while demand is growing The United States cur-

rently imports around 79 percent of all the titanium it consumes each year18

17 ldquoBoeing and VSMPO Avisma to Launch Second Joint Production Siterdquo Rus sian Aviation Insider December 22 2016

http wwwrusaviainsider com boeing - and - vsmpo - avisma - to - launch - second - joint - production - site

18 Jon Ostrower and Andy Pasztor ldquoBoeing United Technologies Stockpile Titanium Partsrdquo Wall Street Journal

August 7 2014 https wwwwsj com articles boeing - united - technologies - stockpiling - titanium - parts - 1407441886

Figure 511 US Imports from Rus sia Civilian Aircrafts and Parts US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 1992ndash2016)

0

$20000000

$40000000

$60000000

$80000000

$100000000

$120000000

$140000000

$160000000

$180000000

$200000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Parts-civilian aircraft

Civilian aircraft

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 34 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 35

The Sanctions Act authorizes the secretary of the trea sury (in a nonmandatory way) to impose

restrictions (without specifying them) against Rus sian state- owned entities operating in the railway

metals and mining sectors of the Rus sian economy Despite the commanding heights of Rus siarsquos

state sector owner ship in its economy (70 percent of GDP) the metal- producing companies have

remained mostly in private hands

NUCLEAR AFFAIRS

Historically owners and operators of the 104 commercial nuclear power reactors in the United

States have purchased more than 80 percent of their uranium from foreign countries Uranium

shipping from Rus sia accounted for about 13 percent of the 58 million pounds of uranium pur-

chased overseas in 201219 At the same time the Rus sian state- owned mono poly Rosatom ac-

counts for 20 percent of Kazakhstanrsquos uranium production (which in turn comprises 11 percent of

all US uranium imports) and 20 percent of US domestic uranium production capacity (with

owner ship of exploration tracts in Wyoming)20

Nuclear fuel and nuclear power continue to be po liti cally sensitive topics both in the United

States and Rus sia Bilateral cooperation in this sector (being surprisingly stable with imports of

nuclear fuel from Rus sia at a level of $1 billion annually in the last five years [Figure 512 and 513])

is under constant po liti cal and lobbying pressure and has been a source of several po liti cal scan-

dals21 Consequently upside risks in this area of interaction are minimal and downside risks are

much higher especially when we are seeing more decommissioning of nuclear plants in the

United States than new constructions The US EIArsquos 2017 Annual Energy Outlook assumes

that about 25 percent of the nuclear capacity now operating will be removed from ser vice

by 205022

WHY IS THE GRASS GREENER ON THE OTHER SIDE

The United States continues to significantly reduce imports of chemical fertilizers as domestic pro-

duction increases In 2016 the United States imported 13 percent less ammonia and 11 percent

less urea and UAN which is a liquid urea and ammonium nitrate fertilizer Rus sia accounts for

around 40 percent of UAN imported by the United States The United States canceled antidumping

duties on imports of ammonium nitrate and urea from Rus sia in 2016 but it did not prevent import

19 US EIA ldquoThe US Relies on Foreign Uranium Enrichment Ser vices to Fuel Its Nuclear Power Plantsrdquo Today in

Energy August 28 2013 https wwweia gov todayinenergy detail php idshy=shy1273

20 Colin Chilcoat ldquoDoes Rus sia Really Own 20 Percent of the USrsquo Uranium Reservesrdquo OilPricecom May 6 2015

http oilpricecom Alternative - Energy Nuclear - Power Does - Russia - Really - Own - 20 - Of - The - US - Uranium - Reserves

html

21 Michelle Ye Hee Lee ldquoThe Facts behind Trumprsquos Repeated Claim about Hillary Clintonrsquos Role in the Rus sian Ura-

nium Dealrdquo Washington Post October 26 2016

22 US EIA ldquoAnnual Energy Outlook 2017 with Projections to 2050rdquo 81ndash82

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 35 102017 404 PM

Figure 512 US Imports from Rus sia Share of Oil Metals and Nuclear Fuel Million US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 1992ndash2016)

87

86

90

90

90

91

88

86

7882

0

$5000

$10000

$15000

$20000

$25000

$30000

$35000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

US Imports from Russia

Share of Oil Metals and Nuclear Fuel

Figure 513 US Imports from Rus sia Nuclear Fuel Materials US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

$-

$200000000

$400000000

$600000000

$800000000

$1200000000

$1000000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 36 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 37

drops twice last year (Figures 514 and 515) According to forecasts UAN imports are expected to

decline further to 15 million tons this year down over 46 percent from 28 million tons imported

last year23 The downside trend in imports of fertilizers will likely continue because of oversupply

BIG FISH

US imports of fish and shellfish from Rus sia are best understood in comparison with US fish

exports to the Rus sian market which slipped to zero in August 2014 after Rus sia issued an order

banning certain agricultural imports from the United States (Figure 516) While the volume of US

supply was not very large it was impor tant because it broke up the monopolistic dominance of a

few vertically integrated Rus sian companies that have kept prices high by restricting the entry of

new producers Seeking to implement import substitution policies Rus sia has tried to reduce

exports as well as imports of fish and seafood products in the last couple of years This symmetri-

cal approach was intended to ldquocompensaterdquo for a decrease of fish products in the domestic

23 Deepika Thapliyal ldquoPotashCorp Forecasts Sharp Drop in US Nitrogen Imports in 2017rdquo ICIS News February 7

2017 https wwwicis com resources news 2017 02 07 10076734 potashcorp - forecasts - sharp - drop - in - us - nitrogen

- imports - in - 2017

Figure 514 US Imports from Rus sia Share of Oil Metals Nuclear Fuel and Fertilizers Million US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

90

93

92

93

94

95

92

91

85

86

0

$5000

$10000

$15000

$20000

$25000

$30000

$35000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

US Imports from Russia

Share of Oil Metals Nuclear Fuel and Fertilizers

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 37 102017 404 PM

Figure 515 US Imports from Rus sia Chemical- Fertilizers US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

S-

$200000000

$400000000

$600000000

$800000000

$1000000000

$1200000000

$1400000000

$1600000000

$1800000000

$2000000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Figure 516 US Exports to Rus sia Fish and Shellfish US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

0

$10000000

$20000000

$30000000

$40000000

$50000000

$60000000

$70000000

$80000000

$90000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Fish and shellfish

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 38 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 39

consumer market caused by Rus siarsquos import ban but it has failed As result the group most af-

fected by the self- imposed counter- sanctions were Rus sian consumers

With a significant drop in fish imports a devaluation of the ruble and inflationary pressures on

seafood prices yearly consumption of fish in Rus sia has declined precipitously In 2015 alone

fish prices increased 20 percent and consumption dropped to 14 kilograms per person24 from

22 kilograms in 201425 In 2016 food rose to 355 percent of house hold expenditure as a result of

increases in food prices26 This has pushed vertically integrated fishing monopolies to sell even

more of their catch abroad rather than deliver to the Rus sian Federation (Figure 517) Thus we

cannot exclude the possibility of further growth in US fish and shellfish imports from Rus sia on a

marginal scale

24 Александр Савельев ldquoПотребление рыбы в России упало до 14 кг на человекаrdquo [Fish consumption in Rus sia fell to

14 kg per person] Экономика Интерфакс January 28 2015 http wwwinterfax ru business 492038

25 Илья Шестаков ldquoПотебление рыбы в России снизилось на 10 процентов из- за роста ценrdquo [Fish consumption in

Rus sia dropped by 10 percent due to price increases] RNS March 8 2017 https rnsonline consumer - market

Potreblenie - ribi - v - Rossii - snizilos - na - 10 - iz - za - rosta - tsen - 2017 - 03 - 08

26 Zoya Sheftalovich and Christian Oliver ldquoRus siarsquos Boom (Farming) Economyrdquo Politico November 8 2016 http

wwwpolitico eu article russias - boom - farming - economy

Figure 517 US Imports from Rus sia Fish and Shellfish US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

0

$50000000

$100000000

$150000000

$200000000

$250000000

$300000000

$350000000

$400000000

$450000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 39 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations40

SPACE ODYSSEY

Among high- end products beyond the top five groups of goods imported from Rus sia cheap and

efficient Rus sian engines have been used to launch US rockets into space for about 16 years

(Figure 518) There was a serious po liti cal strug gle around a 2014 ban on the purchase of Rus sian

RD-180 rocket engines revealing the conflicting business interests of power ful high- tech companies

This restrictive mea sure was temporary and was quickly lifted because of significant cost impacts

and risks of disruption to launch schedules27 For the same reason the Sanctions Act does not autho-

rize ldquothe imposition of any sanction or other condition limitation restriction or prohibition that

directly or indirectly impedes the supply by any entity of the Rus sian Federation of any product or

ser vice or the procurement of such product or ser vice by any contractor or subcontractor of the

United States or any other entity relating to or in connection with any space launch conducted for

the National Aeronautics and Space Administration or any other nonndash Department of Defense

customerrdquo28

Nevertheless many experts believe that US domestic alternatives to replace Rus sian engines will

be viable in five to eight years

27 Ken Dilanian ldquoWhy Does the US Use Rus sian Rockets to Launch Its Satellitesrdquo NBC News updated November 15

2016 http wwwnbcnews com why - does - u - s - use - russian - rockets - launch - its - satellites - n588526

28 Countering Amer i carsquos Adversaries through Sanctions Act HR 3364

Figure 518 Spacecraft Excluding Military US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

0

$20000000

$40000000

$60000000

$80000000

$100000000

$120000000

$140000000

$160000000

$180000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 40 102017 404 PM

41

Diversity and technological complexity are the most vis i ble advantages supporting US exports to

Rus sia Three major groups of export goods include civilian aircraft engines and parts (Figure 61)

drilling and oil field equipment (Figure 62) and industrial machines and engines (Figure 63)

Despite sanctions against the transfer of advanced oil producing and pro cessing technologies the

realization of US drilling and oil field equipment in Rus sia is sustainable although some bilateral

proj ects have been frozen

Another category of goods that has demonstrated resilience is the phar ma ceu ti cal industry (Fig-

ure 64) because most drugs in Rus sia are imported (about 70 percent of the Rus sian phar ma ceu-

ti cal market in value) Import substitution policies have had only modest results in this industry

As confirmed by American Chamber of Commerce surveys US exports to Rus sia are closely

connected to US FDI 30 percent of total imports of US companies working in the Rus sian

market come from the United States (more than $2 billion in 2016) In other words about

40 percent of all US exports to Rus sia are related to a US corporate- sector business pro cess in

the country The major sectors of activity of these companies are energy and natu ral resources

(52 percent) manufacturing (17 percent) information and communications technology or ICT

(13 percent) retail (7 percent) automotive industry (6 percent) phar ma ceu ti cal production

(1 percent) professional ser vices (05 percent) and other (2 percent)1

Some obvious constraints on US exports to Rus sia have resulted from a reduction in demand A

deterioration of bilateral relations and implementation of sanctions and counter- sanctions have

directly or indirectly afected all businesses Figures 65 and 66 provide data regarding a dramatic

drop in the sale of US agricultural production in Rus sia with all other categories of exports in

goods showing big cuts as well (see Figures 67ndash69)

Exports of civilian aircraft engines and parts put the state of Washington in first place among

other states as a leading exporter to the Rus sian market (Figure 610)

1 American Chamber of Commerce in Rus sia ldquoInvestment and Import to Rus sia 2nd Surveyrdquo 13

Diversity and Constraints

06

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 41 102017 404 PM

Figure 61 US Exports of Civilian Aircraft Engines Equipment and Parts to Rus sia US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

$2500000000

$2000000000

$1500000000

$1000000000

$500000000

$-

Figure 62 US Exports of Drilling and Oil Field Equipment US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

0

$5000000

$10000000

$15000000

$20000000

$25000000

$30000000

$35000000

$40000000

$45000000

$50000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 42 102017 404 PM

Figure 63 US Exports of Industrial Engines to Rus sia US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

0

$5000000

$10000000

$15000000

$20000000

$25000000

$30000000

$35000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Figure 64 US Exports of Phar ma ceu ti cal Preparations to Rus sia US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

0

$5000000

$10000000

$15000000

$20000000

$25000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 43 102017 404 PM

Figure 65 US Exports of Meat and Poultry to Rus sia US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Meat poultry etc

$1000000000

$800000000

$600000000

$400000000

$200000000

$-

$1200000000

$1400000000

$1600000000

Figure 66 US Exports of Soybeans to Rus sia US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

0

$20000000

$40000000

$60000000

$80000000

$100000000

$120000000

$140000000

$160000000

$180000000

$200000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 44 102017 404 PM

Figure 67 US Exports of Vehicles Engines and Parts to Rus sia US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Other parts and accessories of vehicles

Automotive tires and tubes

Bodies and chassis for passenger cars

Engines and engine parts (carburetors pistonsrings and valves)

Trucks buses and special purpose vehicles

Passenger cars new and used

$2500000000

$2000000000

$1500000000

$500000000

$-

$1000000000

Figure 68 US Exports of Medicinal Equipment to Rus sia US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

$10000000

$15000000

$20000000

$25000000

$30000000

$35000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 45 102017 404 PM

Figure 610 US Exports to Rus sia by States (2016 US$ Value) Million US$ 2013ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoState and Metropolitan Area Trade Datardquo

Iowa Kentucky

North Dakota

Oklahoma

South Carolina

Washington

0

$500

$1000

$1500

$2000

2013 2014 2015 2016

District of Columbia

Iowa

Kentucky

North Dakota

Oklahoma

South Carolina

Washington

Figure 69 US Exports of Excavating Machinery to Rus sia US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

0

$5000000

$10000000

$15000000

$20000000

$25000000

$30000000

$35000000

$40000000

$45000000

$50000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 46 102017 404 PM

47

Upon reviewing the current trend in US- Russia economic relations we must acknowledge that

the existing trade model is obsolete and exhausted Imports are resource- oriented and reflect

constraints of the Rus sian economic structure while five groups of goodsmdash oil metals nuclear

fuels fertilizers and fishmdash make up more than 90 percent of total imports from Rus sia (Figure 71)

Each of these industries has a limited capacity for growth in the foreseeable future

Rus siarsquos core export to the United Statesmdash oilmdash will inevitably decrease in the mid- term under any

scenario The value and volume of Rus sian exports to the United States are open to global market

volatility and po liti cal pressures with limited hedging mechanisms

Overall US exports to Rus sia are unsustainable due to bilateral po liti cal tensions the whims of

commodity markets and changing domestic policies Sanctions and counter- sanctions have

created additional barriers particularly in finance banking high- tech energy and agro- business

According to the American Chamber of Commerce 69 percent of US companies working in the

country consider the impact of US sanctions against Rus sia on their business as negative At the

same time 60 percent of companies do not expect big changes in business relations between

Rus sia and the United States under Trump1 as the new law codifies existing sanctions fortifies

them and extends them to new sectors

Current US investments are low due to the weak rule of law in Rus sia a lack of property right

protections and proper contract enforcement high levels of statization and monopolization in the

economy a poor business climate outdated capital stock dependence on natural- resource

sectors and of course sanction and counter- sanction mea sures Bloated administrative compo-

nents created as risk mitigation instruments have also served as impediments The countryrsquos

institutional weakness low level of productivity bud get constraints and a declining inflexible

workforce will restrain future economic growth even if commodity prices recover Rus sian eco-

nomic policy will likely continue to be statist and protectionist relying mostly on import

substitutions

1 Ibid 11

Existing Trends and Future Scenarios

07

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 47 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations48

What scenarios can be expected in such a challenging environment

One probability (no peace no war) is based on the assumption that matters will not deteriorate

further and implementation of the Sanctions Act will be cursory This will cause relatively slow

degradation in the economic field with occasional flashes of activity in selected areas (eg closer

cooperation against Islamist terrorist groups in Syria)

A second worse case or critical scenario is the intensive and full- scale execution of current sanc-

tion legislation and even the imposition of new economic punitive and restrictive mea sures which

could incite asymmetric retaliatory actions and lead to the introduction of additional protectionist

policies This in turn could trigger a further escalation of mutual confrontation and could eventu-

ally destroy the fundamentals of the current bilateral trade system Rus sian leadership has charac-

terized the Sanctions Act as a declaration of a trade war that ends all hope for improving bilateral

relations2

2 Дмитрий Медведев ldquoПодписание президентом США нового санкционного закона против России создает несколько

последствийrdquo [The US Presidentrsquos signing of the package of new sanctions against Rus sia will have a few conse-

quences] Facebook August 2 2017 https wwwfacebook com Dmitry Medvedev posts 10154587161801851

Figure 71 US Imports from Rus sia Share of Oil Metals Nuclear Fuel Fertilizers and Fish Million US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

93

94

93

94

95

96

93

92

87

89

0

$5000

$10000

$15000

$20000

$25000

$30000

$35000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

US Imports from Russia

Share of Oil Metals Nuclear FuelFertilizers and Fish

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 48 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 49

The best case and most favorable scenario looks less probable now It assumes the realization of

structural reforms in Rus sia in such a way that would adapt Rus siarsquos foreign policy to national

economic needs reduce confrontations with the West and make a concerted efort to integrate

Rus sian businesses into global supply and value chains A revitalization of the structural reform

agendamdash including eforts to diversify economic activities through de- monopolization and support

for SMEs a restructuring of the banking sector the creation of a vibrant business climate to foster

entrepreneurships and innovation the implementation of administrative and judicial reforms to

tackle red tape and endemic corruption and the reduction of state control over key sectors of the

economy via wide- spread privatization could kick- start the development of a nonoil economy and

improve long- term growth prospects Despite ongoing discussion of reform strategies deep

economic and po liti cal changes are extremely complicated over the next po liti calelectoral cycle

(2018ndash2024) particularly because of re sis tance of vested interests and growing commodity prices

The urgency to tackle structural shortcomings in natu ral resource- dependent economies usually

correlates with the price of those resources and the degree to which resource rents drive eco-

nomic activity However there may be marginal improvements in the efficiency of the current

economic system

Future US- Russia relations can be thought of through three pillars one pillar focuses on areas

where both countries maintain a competitive rivalry another looks at potential areas of interaction

under pres ent conditions a third pillar and one that has evaporated from the current bilateral

agenda concentrates on future cooperation Stronger economic ties could not only be a kind of

po liti cal shock absorber but contribute to the building of this future (particularly business contacts

aim to support future structural reforms) although po liti cal factors are depressing the prospects

for cooperation To escape deadlock it will be impor tant to establish the right balance between

politics and economics and create a model of collaboration within the framework of contention

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 49 102017 404 PM

About the Author

Vadim Grishin PhD MBA has been involved in the reform pro cess in Rus sia as adviser to the

deputy prime minister of Rus sia in 1992ndash1993 and 2006ndash2010 He has extensive experience

working with the Bretton Woods Institutions He was the board member of the World Bank Group

and served as se nior adviser at the International Monetary Fund Currently he is a con sul tant to the

chief economistrsquos office of the International Finance Corporation and teaches the economics of

transition at Georgetown University in Washington DC

50

594-71613_ch99_4Pindd 50 102017 403 PM

Blank

COVER PHOTO ADOBE STOCK

1616 Rhode Island Avenue NW

Washington DC 20036

202 887 0200 | wwwcsisorg

v++ISBN 978-1-4422-8035-9

Lanham bull Boulder bull New York bull London

4501 Forbes Boulevard

Lanham MD 20706

301 459 3366 | wwwrowmancom

A U T H O R

Vadim Grishin

Myths and Realities

A Report of the

CSIS RUSSIA AND EURASIA PROGRAM

US-RussiaEconomicRelations

O C T O B E R 2 0 1 7

Euml|xHSLEOCy280359z

The Man Pupu Nyor Rock Formations at the Northern Urals also known as Seven

Strong Man or Little Mountain of the God in the local tribe (Mansi) language

Page 11: U.S.-Russia Economic Relations: Myths and Realities · 2020-04-17 · OCTOBER 2017 U.S.- Russia Economic Relations Myths and Realities AUTHOR Vadim Grishin A REPORT OF THE CSIS RUSSIA

Vadim Grishin 5

Table 21 US Trade and Foreign Direct Investments (FDI) with China India Brazil South Africa and Rus sia 2016

China India Brazil South Africa Rus sia

Total Goods Trade 5786 677 565 13 203

Imports 4628 460 262 73 145

Exports 1158 217 303 55 58

Trade in Ser vices 696 472 317 47 na

Imports 161 268 68 17 na

Exports 535 203 249 30 na

US FDI 746 283 653 62 141

BRICS FDI in the United States

148 93 043 076 63

Supported Jobs in the United States (thousand)

911 197 308 50 84

Source United States Trade Representative (USTR) ldquoCountries amp Regionsrdquo accessed September 27 2017

https ustrgov countries - regions See US- China Trade Facts US- India Trade Facts US- Brazil Trade

Facts US- South Africa Trade Facts and US- Russia Trade Facts

201520142013

and China with the real GDP growth of these big Asian economies is significant (05) In the case of

Brazil the correlation is even higher (07) By contrast South Africarsquos small open economy is quite

sensitive to US imports from South Africa (043)3

In marked contrast to other BRICS countries Rus sia is a poor choice for export- oriented opera-

tions As a recent International Monetary Fund (IMF) study highlights Rus sia is an outlier a rare

exception among emerging market (EM) economies with virtually no preferential access to major

markets and little meaningful change over three de cades4 This complicates Rus siarsquos integration

into the global value chain (GVC) which became a significant driving force toward economic

development and trade for certain BRICS economies

3 IMF statistics authorrsquos computation

4 IMF Rus sian Federation Selected Issues IMF Country Report N17198 (Washington DC IMF July 2017)

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 5 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations6

Trade is closely connected with foreign direct investment (FDI) and both are parts of a complex

interaction known as international production sharing According to publicly available official data

US FDI in Rus sia was about $131 billion for 2013 and $295 billion for 2016 with the top industrial

sectors being software and IT ser vices financial ser vices chemicals metals coal oil and gas

and business ser vices5 If we take into account US investments made through Eu ro pean branches

of US companies and ofshore firms this number would easily triple Another component

that usually is not tracked by official statistics is reinvestments The American Chamber of

Commerce surveys in 2016 and 2017 which include this component draw a completely dif er ent

picture accumulated US corporate FDI in 90 large US companies working in Rus sia reached

5 US Department of Commerce International Trade Administration ldquoRussiamdash94- Foreign Direct Investment and

Portfolio Investment Statisticsrdquo Rus sia Country Commercial Guide July 7 2017 https wwwexport gov article

id=shyRussia - foreign - direct - investment - statistics

Figure 21 US Trade in Goods with China India Brazil Rus sia and South Africa Billion US$ 2016

Source USTR ldquoCountries amp Regionsrdquo See US- China Trade Facts US- India Trade Facts US- Brazil Trade

Facts US- South Africa Trade Facts and US- Russia Trade Facts

0

$50

$100

$150

$200

$250

$300

$350

$400

$450

$500

$550

$600

China India Brazil Russia South Africa

Exports

Imports

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 6 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 7

$8244 billion in 20176 The real level from our perspective is usually between official and private

estimations around $40 billon But even this cumulative figure is less than the US FDI in Brazil

and China

The American Chamber of Commerce surveys have also revealed other impor tant data Eighty-

five percent of US companies doing business in Rus sia entered its market 10 or more years ago

while 60 percent of them ldquolandedrdquo there 20 years ago or earlier Only one percent have started

operations over the last five years confirming an obvious fact entry into the Rus sian market is

challenging because of growing monopolism risks associated with the business climate and a

stagnating economy7

6 American Chamber of Commerce in Rus sia ldquoInvestment and Import to Rus sia 2nd Surveyrdquo (Prepared by GfK for the

American Chamber of Commerce in Rus sia Moscow May 2017) 12

7 Ibid 4

Figure 22 US Trade in Goods and in Ser vices with China India Brazil Rus sia and South Africa Billion US$ 2016

Source USTR ldquoCountries amp Regionsrdquo See US- China Trade Facts US- India Trade Facts US- Brazil Trade

Facts US- South Africa Trade Facts and US- Russia Trade Facts

0

$100

$200

$300

$400

$500

$600

$700

China India Brazil Russia South Africa

Trade in Services

Total Goods Trade

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 7 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations8

Rus sian direct investment position toward the United States declined from $215 billion in 2013 to

$83 billion in 2015 (Figure 23) Taking into account dif er ent channels and instruments the actual

volume of Rus sian investments in the United States made through ofshore Eu ro pean Canadian

and US companies may be several times greater than the available official data

Foreign investment in financial assets or foreign portfolio investment (FPI) should be included

even though Central Bank of Rus sia statistics indicate they were also quite low US investments in

equity were $345 million and in debt instruments were about $65 million in the fourth quarter of

20168 However these numbers do not reflect the real level of FPI Rus siarsquos stocks are incredibly

inexpensive while there has been impressive growth of US investments in short- term securities

and in foreign exchange (FX) operations (cash- and- carry trade) Rus sia was among the top per-

forming emerging markets in 2016 gaining 4744 percent in US dollars9 Nevertheless the gen-

eral capitalization of the stock exchange is tiny (less than 20 percent of GDP) comparable to the

capitalization of just one large US com pany such as Coca- Cola Many private sources believe that

the US FPI in Rus sia could be as high as several billion US dollars but a new set of sanctions

approved by President Trump on August 2 2017 if implemented could reverse those flows It is

still not clear whether the secretary of trea sury will prohibit participation in the oferings of Rus siarsquos

sovereign debt and the full range of derivative products A report on this subject should be sub-

mitted no later than 180 days after enactment of the law which means no later than Febru-

ary 2018 New legislation tightens prohibition on Rus sian financial companies already under

sanctions by limiting any new equity or debt with a maturity greater than 14 days (a provision that

8 Central Bank of Rus sia ldquoForeign Direct Investments in the Rus sian Federationrdquo accessed September 27 2017 www

cbr ru localization switchlanguage urlshy=shy news ampfromshy=shyru - ruamptoshy=shyen - gb

9 VanEck ldquoRus sian Stock Market Soars in 2016rdquo Seeking Alpha February 14 2017 https seekingalphacom article

4045602 - russian - stock - market - soars - 2016

Table 22 Summary Output of Regression Statistics (US Real GDP Rus sia Real GDP US- Russia Exports Imports and Total Trade)

Regression Statistics

Multiple R 0056445768

R Square 0003186125

Adjusted R Square minus0042123597

Standard Error 2616043923

Observations 24

Sources IMF statistics authorrsquos computation

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 8 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 9

previously allowed for 30 days) Similarly US persons are prohibited from taking on any new debt

that has a maturity greater than 60 days (previously it was 90 days) with Rus sian energy compa-

nies currently under sanctions10

According to the Trea sury Department Rus sia held $1029 billion in US Trea sury securities in

June 201711 Could Rus sia withdraw all its reserves from the United States and use this action as a

retaliatory mea sure Such a scenario is unlikely since there is no comparable safe- haven alterna-

tive to US dollars When Rus siarsquos US Trea sury holdings dropped 50 percent from $176 billion

(October 2010) to $90 billion (November 2011) the market did not notice12 Nevertheless Rus sian

authorities have announced they will decrease dependence on assets and payments in US dollars13

10 Countering Amer i carsquos Adversaries through Sanctions Act HR 3364

11 US Department of Trea sury Major Foreign Holders of Trea sury Securities September 18 2017 http ticdata

treasury gov Publish mfh txt

12 Ibid

13 ldquoНовый виток санкций Россия откажется от доллараrdquo [A new round of sanctions Rus sia will abandon the dollar]

Газетару August 7 2017 https wwwgazeta ru business 2017 08 07 10821937 shtml

Figure 23 Rus sia Outward FDI Position United States Equities and Debt Million US$ 2009ndash2016

Source Central Bank of the Rus sian Federation External Sector Statistics Rus sian Direct Investments

Abroad accessed September 27 2017 https wwwcbr ru localization switchlanguage urlshy=shy news

ampfromshy=shyru - ruamptoshy=shyen - gb

$6000

$8000

$10000

$12000

$14000

$16000

$18000

$20000

$22000

2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 9 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations10

Officially the country does not invest in the US stock exchange although some Rus sian oligarchs

have bought US corporate bonds and equities in large amounts The new sanctions law requires

the secretary of trea sury in consultation with the director of national intelligence and the secretary

of state to issue reports on Rus sian se nior po liti cal figures and oligarchs based on their closeness

to the Rus sian regime and their net worth as well as the exposure of key economic sectors of the

United States to Rus sian po liti cally exposed persons and parastatal entities including at a mini-

mum the banking securities insurance and real estate sectors14

Only three Rus sian companies are listed in the US exchanges

Overall the scale and scope of US- Russia economic interaction and business activity is much greater

than officially appreciated but not significant enough to be taken into consideration by policymakers

14 Countering Amer i carsquos Adversaries through Sanctions Act HR 3364

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 10 102017 404 PM

11

03

Politics in the Driverrsquos Seat

Bilateral economic relations depend to a great extent on global and national economic cycles

After the recent global financial crisis the US economy has shown surprisingly sustainable GDP

growth while the Rus sian economy was the most afected among BRICS countries by the turbu-

lence of a worldwide economic downturn in 2008ndash2009 and after a short- term rebound slipped

into stagnation (2012ndash2013) and then into full- scale recession (2014ndash2016) The countryrsquos eco-

nomic cycle however appears to be changing once again with the economy returning to a

pattern of growth albeit uneven and gradual (Figures 31 and 32) Even with sanctions still in place

conditions have improved as a result of the stabilization of Urals oil to an average annual price of

$419 per barrel in 2016 The gains were sparked in part by major crude producers agreeing to cut

production after hefty price drops in 2014 and 2015 Supported by easier financial conditions

higher oil prices and growing macro- stability Rus sia is heading toward a moderate growth rate

that is expected to reach 14 percent this year according to forecasts of the World Bank Group

(WBG) and the IMF1

Because of the significant role that politics plays in any bilateral interaction it is impor tant to

combine economic and po liti cal cycles applying a ldquoresetrdquo to bilateral economic cooperation in

addition to the po liti cal relationship I have compared po liti cal cycles and trade dynamics using the

following graphs ( Table 31 and Figure 33) These charts do not pretend to reflect with mathemati-

cal precision all shifts in the bilateral po liti cal relationship but rather attempt to visually align

impor tant economic and po liti cal moments to detect the efects of po liti cal events on the size of

bilateral trade

Figure 33 shows all pos si ble combinations economic trends at the intersection of po liti cal devel-

opments oppose or support each other in synchronization It is evident that po liti cal interference

1 International Monetary Fund Rus sian Federation Staff Concluding Statement of the 2017 Article IV Mission (Wash-

ington DC IMF 2017) World Bank Group From Recession to Recovery Rus sia Economic Report no 37 (Washington

DC World Bank 2017) http pubdocsworldbank org en 383241495487103815 RER - 37 - May26 - FINAL - with - summary

pdf

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 11 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations12

in bilateral business afairs in the early 2000s was less significant than in later years As result

growing po liti cal tensions from 2003 to 2008 did not dramatically afect bilateral economic inter-

action It is also easier to explain why 2011ndash2012 resulted in rec ord trade and investmentmdash a con-

sequence of very high oil prices GDP growth in both countries improved legislation after Rus siarsquos

accession to the WTO and the Obamandash Medvedev po liti cal reset From 2014 to 2016 a perfect

storm of developments added efficiency to Western sanctions and augmented the damaging

consequences of counter- sanction mea sures

Figure 33 also confirms that in times of reduced economic cooperation po liti cal pressures can

easily change bilateral economic trends Moreover business interests along with economic inter-

actions have a limited capacity to reverse the po liti cal mainstream

Figure 31 Economic Cycle 2014ndash2016

Source Authorrsquos evaluation of international financial institutions (IFI) data and sources from respective

countries

Sustainable Growth

Brazil

Negative Growth

Unstable Growth

Mexico

Descending Growth

Argentina

EU

US

Russia

Vietnam

China

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 12 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 13

Table 31 Po liti cal Cycles in Bilateral US- Russia Relations 1999ndash2016

2001ndash2002 The George W Bushndash Vladimir Putin Reset Rus sia supported ldquoglobal war on terrorismrdquo launched by the United States after 911 the SORT nuclear arms reduction treaty was signed by the United States and Rus sia and a successful business dialogue was developed that created the current structure of economic relations

2003ndash2008 Deterioration in bilateral relations brought on by the Iraq War Georgiarsquos ldquoRose Revolutionrdquo Mikhail Khodorkovskyrsquos arrest Ukrainersquos ldquoOrange Revolutionrdquo Kosovorsquos in de pen dence and the Georgian War

2009ndash2010 The Barack Obamandash Dmitry Medvedev Reset Rus sia served as a logistical hub for transportation and supply of US forces in Af ghan i stan United States and Rus sia signed the new START nuclear arms reduction treaty Rus sia backed tighter economic sanctions on Iran Rus sia gained access to the WTO after 18 years of negotiations

2011ndash2016 Deterioration in bilateral relations caused by the Ukrainian crisis which were followed by sanctions and counter- sanctions along with the Syrian crises and cyber- enabled activities

Source Authorrsquos evaluation of po liti cal and economic data

Note SORTthinsp=thinspStrategic Ofensive Reductions Treaty STARTthinsp=thinspStrategic Arms Reduction Treaty

Figure 32 Economic Cycle 2017ndash2019

Source Authorrsquos evaluation of IFI data and sources from respective countries

Egypt

VenezuelaEU

South Africa

Brazil

Russia

India

US

Descending Growth

Korea

China

Negative Growth

Unstable Growth

Sustainable Growth

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 13 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations14

Figure 33 US- Russia Trade Million US$ vs Po liti cal Cycle 2000ndash2016

Sources US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo Foreign Trade last modified June 29 2017

https wwwcensus gov foreign - trade balance c4621 html (see data for 2000ndash2016) authorrsquos evaluation

of po liti cal and economic data

Orange Revolution

Khodorkovskys arrest

GeorgianWar

Bush- Putin Reset

Iraq War Global Financial Crisis

Obama-Medvedev Reset

Russias WTO accession

New START Treaty

A Pefect Storm the Ukranian Crisis Oil Prices Crashing

Sanctions and Counter-Sanctions

$3000

$8000

$13000

$18000

$23000

$28000

$33000

$38000

$43000

2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 14 102017 404 PM

15

The current structure of US- Russia economic relations emerged in the early 2000s when the

model of trade and investment interaction took on a character similar to that which existed be-

tween the United States and developing economies US imports from Rus sia centered on com-

modities while technology along with food products lead American exports The primary

exception was that Rus sia supplied nuclear fuel including highly enriched uranium extracted from

nuclear weapons for US power plants and provided ser vices to the aerospace industry primarily

in satellite launches However both these exceptions can be explained as a legacy of the Soviet

past and not a harbinger of the future economic relationship (Figure 41)

In the last 15 years this trade structure has not changed significantly The only noticeable shift in

trade was a dramatic drop (to practically nothing) in exports of US agricultural products a result

of Rus siarsquos policy of import substitution and so- called counter- sanction mea sures it took in re-

sponse to US sanctions over the Ukraine crisis (Figure 42)

Promising new directions of cooperation in the IT sector and in engineering ser vices for the

aerospace industry appeared in the early 2000s1 but did not spill into other sectors and conse-

quently did little to renew economic cooperation on the whole The integration of Rus sian high-

tech ser vices into large- scale global production and value chains was constrained by the usual

culprits a lack of financial resources managerial experience skilled labor modern infrastructure

RampD investments and an adequate business environment High commodity prices incentivized the

restoration of an economic system centered on resource rents The leading role of oil and gas

extraction and transportation discouraged the development of a nonenergy sector that might

have created advanced and complex production and ser vices An import substitution policy could

not work efficiently in an economic environment plagued by the Dutch disease where currency

1 The Boeing Design Center was created in Moscow It consists of nearly 250 Boeing employees managing

a team of 1200 contract engineers from Rus sian and Ukrainian aerospace companies ldquoBackgrounder Boeing in

Rus siardquo Boeing last modified January 2017 http wwwboeing com resources boeingdotcom company key _ orgs

boeing - international pdf russia - cisbackgrounder pdf

Are the United States and Rus sia ldquoNatu ralrdquo Trading Partners A Little Bit of History

04

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 15 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations16

inflows (oil money) lead to ruble appreciation and render a countryrsquos production less competitive

During that time Rus siarsquos industry did not receive preferential access to larger markets and could

not expand its share in the global economy particularly because of its self- isolation from the

regional trade agreements (except for its participation in the Eurasian Economic Union with some

neighboring countries of the former Soviet Union) As a result neither import substitution nor

export- led strategy promoted growth and specialization in nonoil production A long- awaited

modernization and reallocation of resources from an inefficient nontrade sector to a trade sector

did not materialize

These limits were later augmented with sanctions and an extension of domestic restrictions on

cooperation with Western partners Importantly the rapid growth of state- monopoly structures in

the Rus sian economy over the past 15 years has created additional obstacles to the development

and diversification of US- Russia economic ties

Figure 41 US Imports from Rus sia US$ 2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2016)

Fish and shellfish 3

Crude oil 5

Fuel oil 37

Petroleum products other

8

Nuclear fuel materials

7

Chemicals-fertilizers 4

Steelmaking materials 5

Iron and steel mill products 4

Bauxite and aluminum 9

Other precious metals 4

Nonferrous metals other 1

Finished metal shapes 1

Synthetic rubber--primary

1

Spacecraftexcluding military

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 16 102017 404 PM

Fig

ure

42

U

S E

xpo

rts

to R

us s

ia U

S$ 2

016

Sou

rce

US

Ce

nsu

s B

ure

au ldquo

Trad

e in

Go

od

s w

ith

Ru

s sia

rdquo (s

ee

dat

a fo

r 2

016

)

Bak

ery

pro

du

cts

Win

e b

eer

an

d r

elat

ed

pro

du

cts

New

spri

nt

Pla

stic

mat

eria

ls

Ch

emic

als-

fert

ilize

rs

Ch

emic

als-

ino

rgan

icC

hem

ical

s-o

rgan

ic

Ch

emic

als-

oth

erC

ott

on

fib

er c

loth

In

du

stri

al r

ub

ber

pro

du

cts

Min

eral

su

pp

lies-

man

ufa

ctu

red

Gen

erat

ors

acc

esso

ries

Ele

ctri

c ap

par

atu

s

Dri

llin

g amp

oilfi

eld

eq

uip

men

t Sp

ecia

lized

min

ing

Exc

avat

ing

mac

hin

ery

No

nfa

rm t

ract

ors

an

d p

arts

In

du

stri

al e

ng

ines

Fo

od

to

bac

co m

ach

iner

y M

etal

wo

rkin

g m

ach

ine

too

ls

Tex

tile

sew

ing

m

ach

ines

W

oo

d g

lass

p

last

ic

Pu

lp a

nd

pap

er

mac

hin

ery

Mea

suri

ng

tes

tin

g

con

tro

l in

stru

men

ts

Mat

eria

ls h

and

ling

equ

ipm

ent

Ind

ust

rial

mac

hin

es

oth

er

Ph

oto

ser

vice

ind

ust

ry m

ach

iner

y A

gri

cult

ura

l mac

hin

ery

eq

uip

men

t C

om

pu

ters

Co

mp

ute

r ac

cess

ori

es

Sem

ico

nd

uct

ors

Tel

eco

mm

un

icat

ion

seq

uip

men

t

Bu

sin

ess

mac

hin

es a

nd

eq

uip

men

t

Lab

ora

tory

tes

tin

g in

stru

men

ts

Med

icin

al e

qu

ipm

ent

Civ

ilian

air

craf

t e

ng

ines

eq

uip

men

t a

nd

par

ts

Rai

lway

tra

nsp

ort

atio

n

equ

ipm

ent

Ves

sels

exc

lud

ing

scr

ap

Co

mm

erci

al v

esse

ls o

ther

M

arin

e en

gin

es p

arts

Spac

ecra

ft e

xclu

din

g

mili

tary

Pas

sen

ger

car

s

new

an

d u

sed

Tru

cks

bu

ses

and

sp

ecia

l p

urp

ose

ve

hic

les

En

gin

es a

nd

en

gin

e p

arts

(c

arb

ure

tors

pis

ton

s r

ing

s

and

val

ves)

B

od

ies

and

ch

assi

s fo

r p

asse

ng

er c

ars

Au

tom

oti

ve t

ires

an

d t

ub

es

Oth

er p

arts

an

d a

cces

sori

es o

f ve

hic

les

Ap

par

el h

ou

seh

old

go

od

s -

text

ile

Ph

arm

aceu

tica

lp

rep

arat

ion

s

Furn

itu

re h

ou

seh

old

go

od

s

etc

R

ug

s

Cel

l ph

on

es a

nd

oth

er

ho

use

ho

ld g

oo

ds

ne

c

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 17 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations18

Figure 43 US Trade in Goods with Rus sia Million US$ 1992ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 1992ndash2016)

Russian Financial Crisis

Oil price Increased from$2446 USD per barrel (2001)

to $9694 USD per barrel(2008)

Global Financial Crisis

Oil price high record in2011-2012

(more that $111 USD perbarrel)

Oil price crashed

$-

$5000

$10000

$15000

$20000

$25000

$30000

$35000

$40000

$45000

$50000

1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

US Imports from Russia US Exports to Russia US-Russia Trade in Goods

No doubt po liti cal ups and downs add volatility to US- Russia trade Nevertheless Rus siarsquos eco-

nomic structure exhausted itself before the Ukrainian crisis and the recent Rus sian recession Its

limitations are not only due to some mistakes in policy or negative coincidences of circumstances

but rather to deeply rooted properties in the current bilateral trade model related to structural

issues in the Rus sian economy Structural constraints such as the weak enforcement of property

rights poor business regulation and nondiversified exports weighed on Rus sian trade with the

United States From this perspective the term ldquonaturalunnatural trading partnersrdquo does not ad-

dress the unused capacity of bilateral interaction or the real challenges that kind of interaction

faces It just adds metaphysical flavor to the very specific economic and po liti cal factors that

determine the US- Russia trajectory

Overall the outlines of bilateral trade (Figure 43) resemble the famous ldquoRus sian Mountainsrdquo that

were a pre de ces sor of the modern roller coaster icy hills supported by wooden constructionsmdash a

rigid and immobile structure that sooner or later would melt This unfortunately is what is hap-

pening to US- Russia trade cooperation now

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 18 102017 404 PM

19

ARE LITTLE FISH REALLY SWEET

Low US- Russia economic interaction has at least two consequences First it limits the capacity of

policymakers to exploit trade as an instrument for geopo liti cal combat Even the question of a US

trade deficit which used to be a headache for many US trading partners has become so insig-

nificant in absolute terms (about $87 billion in 2016) that it seems hardly worth caring about

When the volume of trade between two countries becomes very small in absolute terms whether

a country is running a surplus or deficit is no longer relevant But it also renders another type of

confrontations (sometimes more dangerous) more likely since the two traders have little to lose

Second in an environment marked by low levels of bilateral trade both sides could incentivize (if

and when a desire for po liti cal rapprochement exists) the signing of new trade deals which are

elevated symbolically as a turning point in bilateral po liti cal relations (ie the sale of Boeings to

Rus sia or the delivery via tankers of Rus sian oil to US refineries) Sometimes markets themselves

pres ent ldquogiftsrdquo that can be capitalized on po liti cally US- USSR grain trade in the 1970s was one

such ldquogiftrdquo large sales of American grain to the Soviet Union helped US policymakers win favor

with the po liti cally impor tant American farming sector and permitted Soviet leaders to maintain

access to a dietary staple for the Soviet population

The strong 32 percent growth in value of US imports from Rus sia from January to May 2017

versus January to May 2016 ( Table 51) is an example of a development that has tempted officials

to pres ent it as a sign of positive change due to ldquogrowing business activitiesrdquo (this kind of statement

was heard before the bilateral summit in Germany in July 2017) although the reason for that leap

was evidently an increase in commodity prices (mainly of oilmdash see Table 52) and not a rise in

entrepreneurial interactions The primary beneficiaries of that upside rally have been two other

petro- economies Saudi Arabia and Venezuela ( Tables 53 and 54)

Sector Analyses

05

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 19 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations20

Table 51 US Imports from Rus sia Million US$ Januaryndash May 2016 vs Januaryndash May 2017

Year January February March April May Total

2016 9603 6871 11097 12257 10977 50805

2017 12215 10220 16979 13471 14147 67032

Change 271 487 530 99 289 319

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 1992ndash2016)

Table 52 Change in Urals Crude Oil Prices US$ per Barrel Januaryndash May 2016 vs Januaryndash May 2017

Januaryndash May 2016 Januaryndash May 2017 Change ($) Change ()

3601 5129 1528 424

Source Ministry of Finance of the Rus sian Federation https wwwminfin ru ru ixzz4mMIZ7XtC

Table 53 US Imports from Saudi Arabia Million US$ Januaryndash May 2016 vs Januaryndash May 2017

Year January February March April May Total

2016 15114 9036 13555 10844 14679 63228

2017 19802 20298 21650 16211 19542 97503

Change 3101 12463 5972 495 331 542

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Saudi Arabiardquo Foreign Trade last modified June 29 2017

https wwwcensus gov foreign - trade balance c5170 html (see data for 2016ndash2017)

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 20 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 21

Table 54 US Imports from Venezuela Million US$ Januaryndash May 2016 vs Januaryndash May 2017

Year January February March April May Total

2016 6657 5560 7140 8007 7922 35286

2017 13041 10864 123500 11148 12243 59646

Change 9590 9540 7297 3923 5454 6903

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Venezuelardquo Foreign Trade last modified June 29 2017

https wwwcensus gov foreign - trade balance c3070 html (see data for 2016ndash2017)

Table 55 US Exports to Rus sia Million US$ Januaryndash May 2016 vs Januaryndash May 2017

Year January February March April May Total

2016 3628 3577 7298 4657 4947 24107

2017 3144 4277 5386 6670 4806 24283

Change minus133 196 minus262 432 minus29 minus07

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2016ndash2017)

At the same time US exports to Rus sia continue to stagnate ( Table 55) due to low levels of

consumption during a two-and- a- half-year economic crisis a deep ruble devaluation sanctions

and counter- sanctions

Given the very dif er ent economic structures and resource endowments of Rus sia and the United

States it is not surprising that US- Russia trade is asymmetric and oil driven (Figure 51) A

3 percent increase in Urals oil prices translates into a one percent increase in US import growth

from Rus sia Thus in 2016 every $10 increase in Urals crude oil added $15 billion to the value of

US imports or 11 percent to the total value of imports from Rus sia

OIL ADDICTION

Oil is a core pillar of US- Russia bilateral trade A bumpy ride in oil markets afects commerce

Nevertheless Rus sian oil exports to the United States in physical terms have been rather

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 21 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations22

sustainable Starting from 2005 average annual deliveries have been above 150 million barrels

(Figure 52) Crude and heating oil have dominated while petroleum products and liquefied petro-

leum gases have not (Figure 53) In 2011 oil exports peaked at 228 million barrels but declined to

159 million barrels in 2016mdash a drop of 30 percent Rec ord high shipments of Rus sian oil to the United

States coincided with an elevation in oil prices which made the subsequent decline in oil shipment

value between 2011 and 2016 (by about 72 percent as shown in Figure 54) seem more stark The

increase in price also raised the share of oil in Rus sian exports by 74 percent in 2011 (Figure 55)

The Rus sian share in total US oil imports was around 55 percent in 2011 and 43 percent in 2016

( Table 56) In the last five years the United States has relied exclusively on consumption of Rus sian

oil for the rough equivalent of one week out of the year (Figure 56)

It is unlikely that Rus sia can significantly increase its share of the US oil market and there is a real

possibility for a downward trend There are several reasons the historically high Rus sian hydrocar-

bon export threshold of 2011 will not soon if ever be surpassed

First US energy consumption will likely be flat According to the US Energy Information Adminis-

tration (EIA) demand for petroleum and other liquids in the United States will be about 35ndash36

quadrillion British thermal units (BTUs) with minimal variation over the next 25 years1

1 US EIA ldquoAnnual Energy Outlook 2017 with Projections to 2050rdquo January 5 2017 7ndash8

Figure 51 US- Russia Trade Growth () vs US and Rus sia Real GDP Growth () 1993ndash2016

Source IMF ldquoIMF Datardquo accessed September 27 2017 http wwwimf org en Data US Census Bureau

ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo

Note rGDPthinsp=thinspreal gross domestic product

Trade

USA rGDP growth

Russia rGDP growth

-60

-40

-20

0

20

40

60

80

100

1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Gro

wth

All spikes in US-Russia trade have been connected with two main

variables volume and price of crude oil

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 22 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 23

Second the United States will become a net energy exporter between 2020 and 2030 in most

cases under dif er ent combinations of oil and natu ral gas prices GDP growth technological

breakthroughs and the availability of energy resources The role of oil imports will dramatically

fall2

Third oil price scenarios as described by the International Energy Agency (IEA) international

financial organ izations (IFIs) and many national agencies are very cautious and assume that even

by 2035 to 2040 oil prices will not to recover to the levels of 2011ndash20123

Fourth Rus sian oil production and export growth will be modest and driven by Asian economic

expansion and will comprise a decreasing share of Western markets4 According to forecasts from

2 Ibid 15ndash18

3 Ibid table 3 ldquoEnergy Prices by Sector and Sourcesrdquo World Bank World Bank Commodity Markets Price Forecasts

(Washington DC World Bank 2017) httpswwwworldbank org en research commodity - markets Organ ization of the

Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) World Oil Outlook 2016 (Vienna OPEC 2016)

4 E D Belotskaia et al Global and Rus sian Energy Outlook 2016 (Moscow Energy Research Institute of the Rus sian

Acad emy of Science Analytical Center for the Government of the Rus sian Federation 2016) http acgov ru files

publication a 12767 pdf

Figure 52 US Imports from Rus sia Crude Oil and Petroleum Products Thousands of Barrels 1995ndash2016

Source US EIA ldquoUS Imports by Country of Origin Rus siardquo Petroleum amp Other Liquids September 13

2017 http wwweia gov dnav pet PET _ MOVE _ IMPCUS _ D _ NUS _ NRS _ MBBL _ M htm

0

50000

100000

150000

200000

250000

Date 1995 1996 1997 1998 199920002001200220032004200520062007200820092010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 23 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations24

the Organ ization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) crude oil exports from Rus sia and

the Caspian region to the United States will dis appear by 20255

So why does the Rus sian Urals blend continue to be attractive for oil traders and US refineries

which could pro cess greater volumes of domestically produced lighter crude There are two main

reasons One is related to the preference of US high conversion refineries (the most sophisticated

in the world) to work with heavy oil blends produced by Canada Mexico Iraq Venezuela and

Rus sia Pro cessing heavy crude now is as profitable as pro cessing lighter crude The so- called

crack spreadmdash the diference between the cost of relatively cheap heavy crude oil and the final

price of value- added consumer products (diesel gasoline jet fuel and heating oil)mdash has become

the same as the refinery margins of light sweet crude6 This has primarily afected light oil produc-

ing countries such as Angola Algeria and Nigeria

5 OPEC World Oil Outlook 2016 306ndash309

6 ldquoHow Much for That Heavy Oilrdquo Oil Sands Magazine December 26 2015 https wwwoilsandsmagazine com

news 2015 12 26 how - much - for - that - heavy - oil

Figure 53 US Imports from Rus sia Oil and Petroleum Products US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

$-

$25000000000

$20000000000

$15000000000

$10000000000

$5000000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Liquefied petroleum gases

Petroleum products other

Fuel oil

Crude oil

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 24 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 25

Another factor afecting purchase of Rus sian oil is a new trend among oil companies for further

consolidation of scale and for integrating operations of upstream and downstream business7

There have been several waves of separation and unification of production transportation and

pro cessing in the last 50 years The current business cycle can be seen as an adaptation to a

period of low prices and oversupply Companies that buy andor produce oil in Rus sia most likely

prefer to transport and pro cess this oil in their own modern refineries in the United States At the

same time some of the newest refinery designs specifically for pro cessing heavy oils have been

built in Asia thus extending the choices of heavy oil producing countries

We should also consider that leading US and international oil traders along with oil producing

companies working with or owning US refineries frequently buy Rus sian oil on the open market

and have long- term contracts on Rus sian crude oil delivery Many Rus sian oil companies prefer to

pay for purchases or ser vices with their future production instead of cash creating situations of

ldquostickyrdquo oil imports that are difficult to replace The best- known example is an interaction between

7 ldquoEnergy and Utilities Sectorrdquo Roundtable Financier Worldwide December 2015 https wwwfinancierworldwide

com roundtable - energy - utilities - sector - dec15

Figure 54 US Imports of Oil and Petroleum Products from Rus sia vs Oil Prices Eu rope Brent Spot Price Free on Board (FOB) 1996ndash2017

Source US EIA ldquoUS Imports by Country of Origin Rus siardquo

0

20

40

60

80

100

120

140

0

5000

10000

15000

20000

25000

30000

Jan

-19

96

Jun

-19

96

No

v-19

96

Ap

r-19

97

Sep

-19

97

Feb

-19

98

Jul-

199

8D

ec-1

99

8M

ay-1

99

9O

ct-1

99

9M

ar-2

00

0A

ug

-20

00

Jan

-20

01

Jun

-20

01

No

v-2

00

1A

pr-

20

02

Sep

-20

02

Feb

-20

03

Jul-

20

03

Dec

-20

03

May

-20

04

Oct

-20

04

Mar

-20

05

Au

g-2

00

5Ja

n-2

00

6Ju

n-2

00

6N

ov-

20

06

Ap

r-2

00

7Se

p-2

00

7Fe

b-2

00

8Ju

l-2

00

8D

ec-2

00

8M

ay-2

00

9O

ct-2

00

9M

ar-2

010

Au

g-2

010

Jan

-20

11Ju

n-2

011

No

v-2

011

Ap

r-2

012

Sep

-20

12Fe

b-2

013

Jul-

20

13D

ec-2

013

May

-20

14O

ct-2

014

Mar

-20

15A

ug

-20

15Ja

n-2

016

Jun

-20

16N

ov-

20

16

USD

per

Bar

rel

Th

ou

san

d B

arr

els

US Imports from Russia of Crude Oil and Petroleum Products (Thousand Barrels)

Europe Brent Spot Price FOB (Dollars per Barrel)

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 25 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations26

Table 56 US Oil Imports All Countries vs Rus sia Thousand Barrels per Day 2011ndash2016

Years 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

All Countries 11436 10598 9859 9241 9449 10058

Rus sia 624 477 460 330 371 433

Share 546 450 467 357 393 431

Sources US EIA ldquoUS Imports by Country of Origin Total Crude Oil and Productsrdquo Petroleum amp Other

Liquids September 13 2017 wwweia gov dnav pet pet_move_impcus_a2_nus_ep00_im0_mbbl_m htm

authorrsquos computation

Figure 55 US Imports from Rus sia Share of Crude Oil and Petroleum Products Million US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

57

64

73

72

74

73

72

59

52 50

0

$5000

$10000

$15000

$20000

$25000

$30000

$35000

$40000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

US Imports from Russia

Share of Oil and Petroleum Products

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 26 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 27

the Rus sian state mono poly Rosneft and commodity trading and mining giant Glencore which

along with energy and commodities com pany Vitol participated in a $10 billion prepayment

deal with Rosneft for crude supplies in 2013

There have been a number of ongoing transactions between the Rus sian oil industry and interna-

tional oil companies including several that top the list of importers of Rus sian oil to the United

States ( Table 57) In December 2016 Glencore participated in a controversial privatization opera-

tion purchasing in tandem with the Qatar sovereign wealth fund a 195 percent stake in Rosneft

which was on the US and EU list of sanctioned firms8 Glencore has also taken a blocking stake in

midsize oil producer RussNeft BP owns a 1975 percent stake in Rosneft Chevron holds a

15 percent interest in the 935- mile- long CPC9 pipeline which transports an average of 959000

barrels of crude oil per day including 76000 barrels daily from Rus sia10 ExxonMobil has formed

8 E Mazneva and I Arkhipov ldquoRus sia Sells $11 Billion Stake in Rosneft to Glencore Qatarrdquo Bloomberg December 7

2016

9 CPCthinsp=thinspCaspian Pipeline Consortium

10 ldquoRus sia Highlights of Operations and Business Portfoliordquo Chevron accessed October 3 2017 https wwwchevron

com worldwide russia

Figure 56 Share of Rus sian Oil in Total US Oil Imports Thousands of Barrels per Day 1972ndash2016

Source US EIA ldquoUS Imports by Country of Origin Total Crude Oil and Productsrdquo

2000

4000

6000

8000

10000

12000

14000

16000

US Imports of Crude Oil and Petroleum Products (Thousand Barrels per Day)

US Imports from Russia of Crude Oil and Petroleum Products (Thousand Barrels per Day)19

7319

7419

7519

7619

7719

7819

7919

80

198

119

82

198

319

84

198

519

86

198

719

88

198

919

90

199

119

92

199

319

94

199

519

96

199

719

98

199

92

00

02

00

12

00

22

00

32

00

42

00

52

00

62

00

72

00

82

00

92

010

20

112

012

20

132

014

20

152

016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 27 102017 404 PM

Table 57 Top Importers of Rus sian Oil to the United States Thousands of Barrels 2016

VALERO MARKETING amp SUPPLY CO 54590 3616

EXXONMOBIL OIL CORP 17087 1130

CHEVRON USA INC 15217 1008

BP WEST COAST PRODUCTS LLC 10130 671

GEORGE E WARREN CORP 7272 48

PAULSBORO REFINING CO LLC 6838 453

TESORO CORP 5097 338

VITOL INC 5084 337

PHILLIPS 66 CO 4726 313

TRAFIGURA AG 4360 289

PAR HAWAII REFINING LLC 3893 258

MOTIVA ENTERPRISES LLC 3041 205

SHELL US TRADING CO 2863 19

MARATHON PETROLEUM CO LLC 2475 16

ATLANTIC TRADING amp MARKETING 2099 14

FREEPOINT COMMODITIES LLC 1439 1

GLENCORE LTD 1284 85

BEST PETROLEUM CORP 967 64

ROLYMPUS US COMMODITIES GROUP LLC 822 6

HUNT CRUDE OIL SUPPLY CO 666 4

GULF OIL LP 658 4

Source US EIA ldquoUS Imports by Country of Origin Crude Oilrdquo Petroleum amp Other Liquids September 13

2017 httpswwweiagovdnavpetpet_move_impcus_a2_nus_epc0_im0_mbblpd_ahtm authorrsquos

computation

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 28 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 29

several joint ventures with Rosneft to undertake ofshore exploration in the Black Sea and the Kara

Sea in Siberia11

According to the Sanctions Act US persons are prohibited from exporting or reexporting goods

ser vices (except financial ser vices) and technology in support of exploration or production of new

deep- water Arctic ofshore or shale oil proj ects that involve designated Rus sian entities or other

entities in which such sanctioned persons have a controlling interest or a substantial noncontrol-

ling owner ship interest defined as not less than 33 percent (previously it was 50 percent) The new

law also authorizesmdash but does not requiremdash the imposition of so- called secondary sanctions

against non- US entities that engage in activities involving the construction maintenance or

expansion of Rus sian energy export pipelines with a fair market value of $1 million or more or an

aggregate fair market value during a 12- month period of $5 million12 This provision has raised the

concerns of some Eu ro pean countries particularly Germany As result the final language of the

law included wording about coordination of this issue with allies of the United States

Shipments of Rus sian oil to the United States could be afected by activity in the US refinery

industry In early 2017 Saudi Aramco bought the United Statesrsquo largest oil refinery in Port Arthur

(Texas) and it announced plans to send more of its own crude to that refinery13 Serious concerns

exist however regarding the future of three refineries and nine pipelines owned by Citgo a US

branch of the Venezuelan state com pany PdVSA which is balancing precariously on the edge of

default Under certain conditions in the event of PdVSA bankruptcy Rosneft could claim a stake of

up to 499 percent in Citgo Such a possibility has raised concerns among politicians and US

government officials with Trea sury Secretary Steven Mnuchin calling it a ldquonational security issuerdquo14

Tables 58 59 and 510 show allocations of Rus sian oil imports to major US refineries some of

which work exclusively on Rus sian crude a total of two to three months per year In total 150940

thousand barrels of Rus sian oil were refined in 2016

Figure 57 confirms a leading position of Texas and Louisiana among the US states receiving

Rus sian crude followed by New Jersey California Mississippi Washington Hawaii and Delaware

In a paradoxical way Texas has dis appeared from the list of states as a main destination of US

imports from Rus sia (Figure 58) because Rus sian crude is mostly delivered to Louisiana ports and

registered there by US Customs as an import from Rus sia After that it transports to refineries in

Louisiana and Texas

Overall the short- term business rationale behind the sustainability of US oil imports from Rus sia

cannot overcome strong headwinds in the US energy sector facing all oil importers which will

inevitably lead to a contraction of Rus sian oil exports to the United States in the foreseeable future

11 Exxon eforts to receive a special US Trea sury waiver to drill in sanctioned Rus sia failed in 2017

12 Countering Amer i carsquos Adversaries through Sanctions Act HR 3364

13 Sarp Ozkan ldquoSaudi Aramcorsquos Port Arthur Refinery and the US Refinery Fleetrdquo Drilling Info May 11 2017

https infodrillinginfo com saudi - aramcos - port - arthur - refinery - us - refinery - fleet

14 Graham Kates ldquoTrea sury Secretary Rus siarsquos Citgo Deal a National Security Issuerdquo CBS News May 1 2017

http wwwcbsnews com news rosneft - citgo - steven - mnuchin - national - security

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 29 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations30

Table 58 Valerorsquos Refineries Pro cessing Rus sian Oil Thousands of Barrels 2016

Saint Charles Louisiana 29206 535

Corpus Christi Texas 20626 378

Wilmington California 4250 78

Total USA 54590 100

Source US EIA ldquoRefinery Capacity Reportrdquo January 1 2017

table 5 wwweia gov petroleum refinerycapacity table5 pdf

authorrsquos computation

Table 59 ExxonMobil Refineries Pro cessing Rus sian Oil Thousands of Barrels 2016

Baytown Texas 15037 88

Baton Rouge Louisiana 2046 12

Total USA 17083 100

Source US EIA ldquoRefinery Capacity Reportrdquo authorrsquos computation

Table 510 Chevronrsquos Refineries Pro cessing Rus sian Oil Thousands of Barrels 2016

Pascagoula Mississippi 12767 840

El Segundo California 2372 155

Saint Rose Louisiana 78 05

Total USA 15217 100

Source US EIA ldquoRefinery Capacity Reportrdquo authorrsquos computation

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 30 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 31

HEAVY METAL

Taken together US imports of metals and US imports of oil compose about 80 percent of US

total imports from Rus sia (Figure 59) Trade of metals like other commodities is strongly afected

by market price fluctuations Nevertheless metal imports from Rus sia have been fairly resilient to

market volatility and their average annual value has hovered at about $4 billion in the last five years

(Figure 510) This market resilience was forged at the end of the 1990searly 2000s when Rus sian

metal producers gradually modernized their plants adjusting quality of production to Western

standards and enhancing integration into global value and supply chains Some of them conquered

their share of the highly competitive US market struggling with peers from Canada and certain

BRICS countries (China India and Brazil) To attract additional resources all Rus sian large metal-

producing companies became public and were listed on stock exchanges chiefly the London Stock

Exchange (Severstalrsquo PAO Evraz MMK OAO Novolipetsk Steel Norilsk Nikel and TMK PAO) one

on the New York Stock Exchange (Mechel) and one on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange (Rusal)

Business logic pushed some of them to invest in the US metal- making industry which was hit

hard by crisis Later on some of those assets were sold (eg two US steel mills acquired by

Severstal in 2004 were purchased 10 years later by Steel Dynamics Inc and AK Steel Corp)

Figure 57 Share of US States Rus sian Oil Imports 2016

Source US EIA ldquoUS Imports from Rus sia of Crude Oil and Petroleum Productsrdquo Petroleum amp Other

Liquids September 29 2017 https www eia gov dnav pet hist LeafHandler ashx nshy=shyPETampsshy=shyMTTIM _ NUS

- NRS _ 1ampfshy=shyM authorrsquos computation

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

100

Maine

Massachusetts

Maryland

Connecticut

Georgia

Rhode Island

Virginia

Florida

New York

Alabama

Puerto Rico

Pennsylvania

Delaware

Hawaii

Washington

Mississippi

California

New Jersey

Louisiana

Texas

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 31 102017 404 PM

Figure 58 US Imports from Rus sia by State Million US$ 2013ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoState and Metropolitan Area Trade Datardquo Foreign Trade last modified

October 2 2017 https wwwcensus gov foreign - trade statistics state

Alaska

Connecticut

Delaware

Hawaii

Louisiana

Maryland

North Dakota 0

$1000

$2000

$3000

$4000

$5000

$6000

2013 2014 2015 2016

Alabama

Alaska

Connecticut

Delaware

Hawaii

Louisiana

Maryland

Maine

Mississippi

Montana

North Dakota

Mississippi

Figure 59 US Imports from Rus sia Share of Oil and Metals Million US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 1992ndash2016)

83

82

85

86

87

88

85

82

7375

0

$5000

$10000

$15000

$20000

$25000

$30000

$35000

$40000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

US Imports from Russia

Share of Oil and Metals

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 32 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 33

Obviously the market dynamic of dif er ent metals varies (eg iron steel aluminum platinum and

nickel) Caps to increase their trade and production in a ldquored oceanrdquo global environment with

anemic demand is rather limited despite Figure 510 showing a spike of iron and steel imports

from Rus sia in 2014 and aluminum in 2016 Some opportunities may exist for Russian- owned steel

plants in the United States (such as NLMK) to participate in energy proj ects resumed under Presi-

dent Trump who has required that new pipelines use only American- made steel15

Rus sia occupies a special niche in the US market for titanium products a high- end metal indus-

try Twenty years ago a long- term contract was signed between Rus sian titanium producer

VSMPO- AVISMA and Boeing The Rus sian com pany entered the selective club of Boeing suppliers

for the manufacture of components and semi- finished products Since the signing of this contract

VSMPO has delivered more than 35 percent of all titanium placed on Boeing civil aircraft16 They

are hidden in the trade data in an import category for Civilian Aircrafts and Parts (Figure 511) At

the end of 2016 Boeing announced an extension of its framework agreement with AVISMA

15 E Scheyder C Ngai and T Sylvester ldquoAmerican Steel Unlikely to Get Keystone Boost Despite Trump Orderrdquo

Reuters January 27 2017 http wwwreuters com article usa - trump - pipeline - transcanada - idUSL1N1FH1ZD

16 A Kramer ldquoTitanium Fills Vital Role for Boeing and Rus siardquo New York Times July 5 2013 http wwwnytimes com

2013 07 06 business global titanium - fills - vital - role - for - boeing - and - russia html mcubzshy=shy3

Figure 510 US Imports from Rus sia Iron Steel Bauxite Aluminum Nickel Nonferrous Metals and Other Precious Metals and Materials US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 1992ndash2016)

0

$6000000000

$5000000000

$4000000000

$3000000000

$2000000000

$1000000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 20122013

20142015

2016

Finished metal shapes

Iron and steel advanced

Iron and steel products nec

Nonferrous metals other

Other precious metals

Nickel

Bauxite and aluminum

Iron and steel mill products

Steelmaking materials

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 33 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations34

through 2022 and additional investments in the construction of a new robotic plant in Titanium

Valley a special economic zone located in the Sverdlovsk region that will open in 2018 The pro-

cessing of titanium forgings in all Boeing civil aircraft will be performed there including 787s 737

MAXs and 777Xs17 The contract extension with AVISMA may add several hundred million dollars

in value to annual US imports from Rus sia

How can such heavy reliance on imports of Rus sian titanium exist during a period of rising geopo-

liti cal tensions The answer is straightforward VSMPO- AVISMA is a highly specialized natu ral

mono poly producing 45 percent of the worldrsquos aerospace titanium Only four other countries

smelt high- grade titanium in industrial quantities the United States Germany Japan and China

Overall global production capacity is limited while demand is growing The United States cur-

rently imports around 79 percent of all the titanium it consumes each year18

17 ldquoBoeing and VSMPO Avisma to Launch Second Joint Production Siterdquo Rus sian Aviation Insider December 22 2016

http wwwrusaviainsider com boeing - and - vsmpo - avisma - to - launch - second - joint - production - site

18 Jon Ostrower and Andy Pasztor ldquoBoeing United Technologies Stockpile Titanium Partsrdquo Wall Street Journal

August 7 2014 https wwwwsj com articles boeing - united - technologies - stockpiling - titanium - parts - 1407441886

Figure 511 US Imports from Rus sia Civilian Aircrafts and Parts US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 1992ndash2016)

0

$20000000

$40000000

$60000000

$80000000

$100000000

$120000000

$140000000

$160000000

$180000000

$200000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Parts-civilian aircraft

Civilian aircraft

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 34 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 35

The Sanctions Act authorizes the secretary of the trea sury (in a nonmandatory way) to impose

restrictions (without specifying them) against Rus sian state- owned entities operating in the railway

metals and mining sectors of the Rus sian economy Despite the commanding heights of Rus siarsquos

state sector owner ship in its economy (70 percent of GDP) the metal- producing companies have

remained mostly in private hands

NUCLEAR AFFAIRS

Historically owners and operators of the 104 commercial nuclear power reactors in the United

States have purchased more than 80 percent of their uranium from foreign countries Uranium

shipping from Rus sia accounted for about 13 percent of the 58 million pounds of uranium pur-

chased overseas in 201219 At the same time the Rus sian state- owned mono poly Rosatom ac-

counts for 20 percent of Kazakhstanrsquos uranium production (which in turn comprises 11 percent of

all US uranium imports) and 20 percent of US domestic uranium production capacity (with

owner ship of exploration tracts in Wyoming)20

Nuclear fuel and nuclear power continue to be po liti cally sensitive topics both in the United

States and Rus sia Bilateral cooperation in this sector (being surprisingly stable with imports of

nuclear fuel from Rus sia at a level of $1 billion annually in the last five years [Figure 512 and 513])

is under constant po liti cal and lobbying pressure and has been a source of several po liti cal scan-

dals21 Consequently upside risks in this area of interaction are minimal and downside risks are

much higher especially when we are seeing more decommissioning of nuclear plants in the

United States than new constructions The US EIArsquos 2017 Annual Energy Outlook assumes

that about 25 percent of the nuclear capacity now operating will be removed from ser vice

by 205022

WHY IS THE GRASS GREENER ON THE OTHER SIDE

The United States continues to significantly reduce imports of chemical fertilizers as domestic pro-

duction increases In 2016 the United States imported 13 percent less ammonia and 11 percent

less urea and UAN which is a liquid urea and ammonium nitrate fertilizer Rus sia accounts for

around 40 percent of UAN imported by the United States The United States canceled antidumping

duties on imports of ammonium nitrate and urea from Rus sia in 2016 but it did not prevent import

19 US EIA ldquoThe US Relies on Foreign Uranium Enrichment Ser vices to Fuel Its Nuclear Power Plantsrdquo Today in

Energy August 28 2013 https wwweia gov todayinenergy detail php idshy=shy1273

20 Colin Chilcoat ldquoDoes Rus sia Really Own 20 Percent of the USrsquo Uranium Reservesrdquo OilPricecom May 6 2015

http oilpricecom Alternative - Energy Nuclear - Power Does - Russia - Really - Own - 20 - Of - The - US - Uranium - Reserves

html

21 Michelle Ye Hee Lee ldquoThe Facts behind Trumprsquos Repeated Claim about Hillary Clintonrsquos Role in the Rus sian Ura-

nium Dealrdquo Washington Post October 26 2016

22 US EIA ldquoAnnual Energy Outlook 2017 with Projections to 2050rdquo 81ndash82

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 35 102017 404 PM

Figure 512 US Imports from Rus sia Share of Oil Metals and Nuclear Fuel Million US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 1992ndash2016)

87

86

90

90

90

91

88

86

7882

0

$5000

$10000

$15000

$20000

$25000

$30000

$35000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

US Imports from Russia

Share of Oil Metals and Nuclear Fuel

Figure 513 US Imports from Rus sia Nuclear Fuel Materials US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

$-

$200000000

$400000000

$600000000

$800000000

$1200000000

$1000000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 36 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 37

drops twice last year (Figures 514 and 515) According to forecasts UAN imports are expected to

decline further to 15 million tons this year down over 46 percent from 28 million tons imported

last year23 The downside trend in imports of fertilizers will likely continue because of oversupply

BIG FISH

US imports of fish and shellfish from Rus sia are best understood in comparison with US fish

exports to the Rus sian market which slipped to zero in August 2014 after Rus sia issued an order

banning certain agricultural imports from the United States (Figure 516) While the volume of US

supply was not very large it was impor tant because it broke up the monopolistic dominance of a

few vertically integrated Rus sian companies that have kept prices high by restricting the entry of

new producers Seeking to implement import substitution policies Rus sia has tried to reduce

exports as well as imports of fish and seafood products in the last couple of years This symmetri-

cal approach was intended to ldquocompensaterdquo for a decrease of fish products in the domestic

23 Deepika Thapliyal ldquoPotashCorp Forecasts Sharp Drop in US Nitrogen Imports in 2017rdquo ICIS News February 7

2017 https wwwicis com resources news 2017 02 07 10076734 potashcorp - forecasts - sharp - drop - in - us - nitrogen

- imports - in - 2017

Figure 514 US Imports from Rus sia Share of Oil Metals Nuclear Fuel and Fertilizers Million US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

90

93

92

93

94

95

92

91

85

86

0

$5000

$10000

$15000

$20000

$25000

$30000

$35000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

US Imports from Russia

Share of Oil Metals Nuclear Fuel and Fertilizers

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 37 102017 404 PM

Figure 515 US Imports from Rus sia Chemical- Fertilizers US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

S-

$200000000

$400000000

$600000000

$800000000

$1000000000

$1200000000

$1400000000

$1600000000

$1800000000

$2000000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Figure 516 US Exports to Rus sia Fish and Shellfish US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

0

$10000000

$20000000

$30000000

$40000000

$50000000

$60000000

$70000000

$80000000

$90000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Fish and shellfish

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 38 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 39

consumer market caused by Rus siarsquos import ban but it has failed As result the group most af-

fected by the self- imposed counter- sanctions were Rus sian consumers

With a significant drop in fish imports a devaluation of the ruble and inflationary pressures on

seafood prices yearly consumption of fish in Rus sia has declined precipitously In 2015 alone

fish prices increased 20 percent and consumption dropped to 14 kilograms per person24 from

22 kilograms in 201425 In 2016 food rose to 355 percent of house hold expenditure as a result of

increases in food prices26 This has pushed vertically integrated fishing monopolies to sell even

more of their catch abroad rather than deliver to the Rus sian Federation (Figure 517) Thus we

cannot exclude the possibility of further growth in US fish and shellfish imports from Rus sia on a

marginal scale

24 Александр Савельев ldquoПотребление рыбы в России упало до 14 кг на человекаrdquo [Fish consumption in Rus sia fell to

14 kg per person] Экономика Интерфакс January 28 2015 http wwwinterfax ru business 492038

25 Илья Шестаков ldquoПотебление рыбы в России снизилось на 10 процентов из- за роста ценrdquo [Fish consumption in

Rus sia dropped by 10 percent due to price increases] RNS March 8 2017 https rnsonline consumer - market

Potreblenie - ribi - v - Rossii - snizilos - na - 10 - iz - za - rosta - tsen - 2017 - 03 - 08

26 Zoya Sheftalovich and Christian Oliver ldquoRus siarsquos Boom (Farming) Economyrdquo Politico November 8 2016 http

wwwpolitico eu article russias - boom - farming - economy

Figure 517 US Imports from Rus sia Fish and Shellfish US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

0

$50000000

$100000000

$150000000

$200000000

$250000000

$300000000

$350000000

$400000000

$450000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 39 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations40

SPACE ODYSSEY

Among high- end products beyond the top five groups of goods imported from Rus sia cheap and

efficient Rus sian engines have been used to launch US rockets into space for about 16 years

(Figure 518) There was a serious po liti cal strug gle around a 2014 ban on the purchase of Rus sian

RD-180 rocket engines revealing the conflicting business interests of power ful high- tech companies

This restrictive mea sure was temporary and was quickly lifted because of significant cost impacts

and risks of disruption to launch schedules27 For the same reason the Sanctions Act does not autho-

rize ldquothe imposition of any sanction or other condition limitation restriction or prohibition that

directly or indirectly impedes the supply by any entity of the Rus sian Federation of any product or

ser vice or the procurement of such product or ser vice by any contractor or subcontractor of the

United States or any other entity relating to or in connection with any space launch conducted for

the National Aeronautics and Space Administration or any other nonndash Department of Defense

customerrdquo28

Nevertheless many experts believe that US domestic alternatives to replace Rus sian engines will

be viable in five to eight years

27 Ken Dilanian ldquoWhy Does the US Use Rus sian Rockets to Launch Its Satellitesrdquo NBC News updated November 15

2016 http wwwnbcnews com why - does - u - s - use - russian - rockets - launch - its - satellites - n588526

28 Countering Amer i carsquos Adversaries through Sanctions Act HR 3364

Figure 518 Spacecraft Excluding Military US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

0

$20000000

$40000000

$60000000

$80000000

$100000000

$120000000

$140000000

$160000000

$180000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 40 102017 404 PM

41

Diversity and technological complexity are the most vis i ble advantages supporting US exports to

Rus sia Three major groups of export goods include civilian aircraft engines and parts (Figure 61)

drilling and oil field equipment (Figure 62) and industrial machines and engines (Figure 63)

Despite sanctions against the transfer of advanced oil producing and pro cessing technologies the

realization of US drilling and oil field equipment in Rus sia is sustainable although some bilateral

proj ects have been frozen

Another category of goods that has demonstrated resilience is the phar ma ceu ti cal industry (Fig-

ure 64) because most drugs in Rus sia are imported (about 70 percent of the Rus sian phar ma ceu-

ti cal market in value) Import substitution policies have had only modest results in this industry

As confirmed by American Chamber of Commerce surveys US exports to Rus sia are closely

connected to US FDI 30 percent of total imports of US companies working in the Rus sian

market come from the United States (more than $2 billion in 2016) In other words about

40 percent of all US exports to Rus sia are related to a US corporate- sector business pro cess in

the country The major sectors of activity of these companies are energy and natu ral resources

(52 percent) manufacturing (17 percent) information and communications technology or ICT

(13 percent) retail (7 percent) automotive industry (6 percent) phar ma ceu ti cal production

(1 percent) professional ser vices (05 percent) and other (2 percent)1

Some obvious constraints on US exports to Rus sia have resulted from a reduction in demand A

deterioration of bilateral relations and implementation of sanctions and counter- sanctions have

directly or indirectly afected all businesses Figures 65 and 66 provide data regarding a dramatic

drop in the sale of US agricultural production in Rus sia with all other categories of exports in

goods showing big cuts as well (see Figures 67ndash69)

Exports of civilian aircraft engines and parts put the state of Washington in first place among

other states as a leading exporter to the Rus sian market (Figure 610)

1 American Chamber of Commerce in Rus sia ldquoInvestment and Import to Rus sia 2nd Surveyrdquo 13

Diversity and Constraints

06

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 41 102017 404 PM

Figure 61 US Exports of Civilian Aircraft Engines Equipment and Parts to Rus sia US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

$2500000000

$2000000000

$1500000000

$1000000000

$500000000

$-

Figure 62 US Exports of Drilling and Oil Field Equipment US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

0

$5000000

$10000000

$15000000

$20000000

$25000000

$30000000

$35000000

$40000000

$45000000

$50000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 42 102017 404 PM

Figure 63 US Exports of Industrial Engines to Rus sia US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

0

$5000000

$10000000

$15000000

$20000000

$25000000

$30000000

$35000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Figure 64 US Exports of Phar ma ceu ti cal Preparations to Rus sia US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

0

$5000000

$10000000

$15000000

$20000000

$25000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 43 102017 404 PM

Figure 65 US Exports of Meat and Poultry to Rus sia US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Meat poultry etc

$1000000000

$800000000

$600000000

$400000000

$200000000

$-

$1200000000

$1400000000

$1600000000

Figure 66 US Exports of Soybeans to Rus sia US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

0

$20000000

$40000000

$60000000

$80000000

$100000000

$120000000

$140000000

$160000000

$180000000

$200000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 44 102017 404 PM

Figure 67 US Exports of Vehicles Engines and Parts to Rus sia US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Other parts and accessories of vehicles

Automotive tires and tubes

Bodies and chassis for passenger cars

Engines and engine parts (carburetors pistonsrings and valves)

Trucks buses and special purpose vehicles

Passenger cars new and used

$2500000000

$2000000000

$1500000000

$500000000

$-

$1000000000

Figure 68 US Exports of Medicinal Equipment to Rus sia US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

$10000000

$15000000

$20000000

$25000000

$30000000

$35000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 45 102017 404 PM

Figure 610 US Exports to Rus sia by States (2016 US$ Value) Million US$ 2013ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoState and Metropolitan Area Trade Datardquo

Iowa Kentucky

North Dakota

Oklahoma

South Carolina

Washington

0

$500

$1000

$1500

$2000

2013 2014 2015 2016

District of Columbia

Iowa

Kentucky

North Dakota

Oklahoma

South Carolina

Washington

Figure 69 US Exports of Excavating Machinery to Rus sia US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

0

$5000000

$10000000

$15000000

$20000000

$25000000

$30000000

$35000000

$40000000

$45000000

$50000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 46 102017 404 PM

47

Upon reviewing the current trend in US- Russia economic relations we must acknowledge that

the existing trade model is obsolete and exhausted Imports are resource- oriented and reflect

constraints of the Rus sian economic structure while five groups of goodsmdash oil metals nuclear

fuels fertilizers and fishmdash make up more than 90 percent of total imports from Rus sia (Figure 71)

Each of these industries has a limited capacity for growth in the foreseeable future

Rus siarsquos core export to the United Statesmdash oilmdash will inevitably decrease in the mid- term under any

scenario The value and volume of Rus sian exports to the United States are open to global market

volatility and po liti cal pressures with limited hedging mechanisms

Overall US exports to Rus sia are unsustainable due to bilateral po liti cal tensions the whims of

commodity markets and changing domestic policies Sanctions and counter- sanctions have

created additional barriers particularly in finance banking high- tech energy and agro- business

According to the American Chamber of Commerce 69 percent of US companies working in the

country consider the impact of US sanctions against Rus sia on their business as negative At the

same time 60 percent of companies do not expect big changes in business relations between

Rus sia and the United States under Trump1 as the new law codifies existing sanctions fortifies

them and extends them to new sectors

Current US investments are low due to the weak rule of law in Rus sia a lack of property right

protections and proper contract enforcement high levels of statization and monopolization in the

economy a poor business climate outdated capital stock dependence on natural- resource

sectors and of course sanction and counter- sanction mea sures Bloated administrative compo-

nents created as risk mitigation instruments have also served as impediments The countryrsquos

institutional weakness low level of productivity bud get constraints and a declining inflexible

workforce will restrain future economic growth even if commodity prices recover Rus sian eco-

nomic policy will likely continue to be statist and protectionist relying mostly on import

substitutions

1 Ibid 11

Existing Trends and Future Scenarios

07

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 47 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations48

What scenarios can be expected in such a challenging environment

One probability (no peace no war) is based on the assumption that matters will not deteriorate

further and implementation of the Sanctions Act will be cursory This will cause relatively slow

degradation in the economic field with occasional flashes of activity in selected areas (eg closer

cooperation against Islamist terrorist groups in Syria)

A second worse case or critical scenario is the intensive and full- scale execution of current sanc-

tion legislation and even the imposition of new economic punitive and restrictive mea sures which

could incite asymmetric retaliatory actions and lead to the introduction of additional protectionist

policies This in turn could trigger a further escalation of mutual confrontation and could eventu-

ally destroy the fundamentals of the current bilateral trade system Rus sian leadership has charac-

terized the Sanctions Act as a declaration of a trade war that ends all hope for improving bilateral

relations2

2 Дмитрий Медведев ldquoПодписание президентом США нового санкционного закона против России создает несколько

последствийrdquo [The US Presidentrsquos signing of the package of new sanctions against Rus sia will have a few conse-

quences] Facebook August 2 2017 https wwwfacebook com Dmitry Medvedev posts 10154587161801851

Figure 71 US Imports from Rus sia Share of Oil Metals Nuclear Fuel Fertilizers and Fish Million US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

93

94

93

94

95

96

93

92

87

89

0

$5000

$10000

$15000

$20000

$25000

$30000

$35000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

US Imports from Russia

Share of Oil Metals Nuclear FuelFertilizers and Fish

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 48 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 49

The best case and most favorable scenario looks less probable now It assumes the realization of

structural reforms in Rus sia in such a way that would adapt Rus siarsquos foreign policy to national

economic needs reduce confrontations with the West and make a concerted efort to integrate

Rus sian businesses into global supply and value chains A revitalization of the structural reform

agendamdash including eforts to diversify economic activities through de- monopolization and support

for SMEs a restructuring of the banking sector the creation of a vibrant business climate to foster

entrepreneurships and innovation the implementation of administrative and judicial reforms to

tackle red tape and endemic corruption and the reduction of state control over key sectors of the

economy via wide- spread privatization could kick- start the development of a nonoil economy and

improve long- term growth prospects Despite ongoing discussion of reform strategies deep

economic and po liti cal changes are extremely complicated over the next po liti calelectoral cycle

(2018ndash2024) particularly because of re sis tance of vested interests and growing commodity prices

The urgency to tackle structural shortcomings in natu ral resource- dependent economies usually

correlates with the price of those resources and the degree to which resource rents drive eco-

nomic activity However there may be marginal improvements in the efficiency of the current

economic system

Future US- Russia relations can be thought of through three pillars one pillar focuses on areas

where both countries maintain a competitive rivalry another looks at potential areas of interaction

under pres ent conditions a third pillar and one that has evaporated from the current bilateral

agenda concentrates on future cooperation Stronger economic ties could not only be a kind of

po liti cal shock absorber but contribute to the building of this future (particularly business contacts

aim to support future structural reforms) although po liti cal factors are depressing the prospects

for cooperation To escape deadlock it will be impor tant to establish the right balance between

politics and economics and create a model of collaboration within the framework of contention

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 49 102017 404 PM

About the Author

Vadim Grishin PhD MBA has been involved in the reform pro cess in Rus sia as adviser to the

deputy prime minister of Rus sia in 1992ndash1993 and 2006ndash2010 He has extensive experience

working with the Bretton Woods Institutions He was the board member of the World Bank Group

and served as se nior adviser at the International Monetary Fund Currently he is a con sul tant to the

chief economistrsquos office of the International Finance Corporation and teaches the economics of

transition at Georgetown University in Washington DC

50

594-71613_ch99_4Pindd 50 102017 403 PM

Blank

COVER PHOTO ADOBE STOCK

1616 Rhode Island Avenue NW

Washington DC 20036

202 887 0200 | wwwcsisorg

v++ISBN 978-1-4422-8035-9

Lanham bull Boulder bull New York bull London

4501 Forbes Boulevard

Lanham MD 20706

301 459 3366 | wwwrowmancom

A U T H O R

Vadim Grishin

Myths and Realities

A Report of the

CSIS RUSSIA AND EURASIA PROGRAM

US-RussiaEconomicRelations

O C T O B E R 2 0 1 7

Euml|xHSLEOCy280359z

The Man Pupu Nyor Rock Formations at the Northern Urals also known as Seven

Strong Man or Little Mountain of the God in the local tribe (Mansi) language

Page 12: U.S.-Russia Economic Relations: Myths and Realities · 2020-04-17 · OCTOBER 2017 U.S.- Russia Economic Relations Myths and Realities AUTHOR Vadim Grishin A REPORT OF THE CSIS RUSSIA

US-Russia Economic Relations6

Trade is closely connected with foreign direct investment (FDI) and both are parts of a complex

interaction known as international production sharing According to publicly available official data

US FDI in Rus sia was about $131 billion for 2013 and $295 billion for 2016 with the top industrial

sectors being software and IT ser vices financial ser vices chemicals metals coal oil and gas

and business ser vices5 If we take into account US investments made through Eu ro pean branches

of US companies and ofshore firms this number would easily triple Another component

that usually is not tracked by official statistics is reinvestments The American Chamber of

Commerce surveys in 2016 and 2017 which include this component draw a completely dif er ent

picture accumulated US corporate FDI in 90 large US companies working in Rus sia reached

5 US Department of Commerce International Trade Administration ldquoRussiamdash94- Foreign Direct Investment and

Portfolio Investment Statisticsrdquo Rus sia Country Commercial Guide July 7 2017 https wwwexport gov article

id=shyRussia - foreign - direct - investment - statistics

Figure 21 US Trade in Goods with China India Brazil Rus sia and South Africa Billion US$ 2016

Source USTR ldquoCountries amp Regionsrdquo See US- China Trade Facts US- India Trade Facts US- Brazil Trade

Facts US- South Africa Trade Facts and US- Russia Trade Facts

0

$50

$100

$150

$200

$250

$300

$350

$400

$450

$500

$550

$600

China India Brazil Russia South Africa

Exports

Imports

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 6 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 7

$8244 billion in 20176 The real level from our perspective is usually between official and private

estimations around $40 billon But even this cumulative figure is less than the US FDI in Brazil

and China

The American Chamber of Commerce surveys have also revealed other impor tant data Eighty-

five percent of US companies doing business in Rus sia entered its market 10 or more years ago

while 60 percent of them ldquolandedrdquo there 20 years ago or earlier Only one percent have started

operations over the last five years confirming an obvious fact entry into the Rus sian market is

challenging because of growing monopolism risks associated with the business climate and a

stagnating economy7

6 American Chamber of Commerce in Rus sia ldquoInvestment and Import to Rus sia 2nd Surveyrdquo (Prepared by GfK for the

American Chamber of Commerce in Rus sia Moscow May 2017) 12

7 Ibid 4

Figure 22 US Trade in Goods and in Ser vices with China India Brazil Rus sia and South Africa Billion US$ 2016

Source USTR ldquoCountries amp Regionsrdquo See US- China Trade Facts US- India Trade Facts US- Brazil Trade

Facts US- South Africa Trade Facts and US- Russia Trade Facts

0

$100

$200

$300

$400

$500

$600

$700

China India Brazil Russia South Africa

Trade in Services

Total Goods Trade

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 7 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations8

Rus sian direct investment position toward the United States declined from $215 billion in 2013 to

$83 billion in 2015 (Figure 23) Taking into account dif er ent channels and instruments the actual

volume of Rus sian investments in the United States made through ofshore Eu ro pean Canadian

and US companies may be several times greater than the available official data

Foreign investment in financial assets or foreign portfolio investment (FPI) should be included

even though Central Bank of Rus sia statistics indicate they were also quite low US investments in

equity were $345 million and in debt instruments were about $65 million in the fourth quarter of

20168 However these numbers do not reflect the real level of FPI Rus siarsquos stocks are incredibly

inexpensive while there has been impressive growth of US investments in short- term securities

and in foreign exchange (FX) operations (cash- and- carry trade) Rus sia was among the top per-

forming emerging markets in 2016 gaining 4744 percent in US dollars9 Nevertheless the gen-

eral capitalization of the stock exchange is tiny (less than 20 percent of GDP) comparable to the

capitalization of just one large US com pany such as Coca- Cola Many private sources believe that

the US FPI in Rus sia could be as high as several billion US dollars but a new set of sanctions

approved by President Trump on August 2 2017 if implemented could reverse those flows It is

still not clear whether the secretary of trea sury will prohibit participation in the oferings of Rus siarsquos

sovereign debt and the full range of derivative products A report on this subject should be sub-

mitted no later than 180 days after enactment of the law which means no later than Febru-

ary 2018 New legislation tightens prohibition on Rus sian financial companies already under

sanctions by limiting any new equity or debt with a maturity greater than 14 days (a provision that

8 Central Bank of Rus sia ldquoForeign Direct Investments in the Rus sian Federationrdquo accessed September 27 2017 www

cbr ru localization switchlanguage urlshy=shy news ampfromshy=shyru - ruamptoshy=shyen - gb

9 VanEck ldquoRus sian Stock Market Soars in 2016rdquo Seeking Alpha February 14 2017 https seekingalphacom article

4045602 - russian - stock - market - soars - 2016

Table 22 Summary Output of Regression Statistics (US Real GDP Rus sia Real GDP US- Russia Exports Imports and Total Trade)

Regression Statistics

Multiple R 0056445768

R Square 0003186125

Adjusted R Square minus0042123597

Standard Error 2616043923

Observations 24

Sources IMF statistics authorrsquos computation

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 8 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 9

previously allowed for 30 days) Similarly US persons are prohibited from taking on any new debt

that has a maturity greater than 60 days (previously it was 90 days) with Rus sian energy compa-

nies currently under sanctions10

According to the Trea sury Department Rus sia held $1029 billion in US Trea sury securities in

June 201711 Could Rus sia withdraw all its reserves from the United States and use this action as a

retaliatory mea sure Such a scenario is unlikely since there is no comparable safe- haven alterna-

tive to US dollars When Rus siarsquos US Trea sury holdings dropped 50 percent from $176 billion

(October 2010) to $90 billion (November 2011) the market did not notice12 Nevertheless Rus sian

authorities have announced they will decrease dependence on assets and payments in US dollars13

10 Countering Amer i carsquos Adversaries through Sanctions Act HR 3364

11 US Department of Trea sury Major Foreign Holders of Trea sury Securities September 18 2017 http ticdata

treasury gov Publish mfh txt

12 Ibid

13 ldquoНовый виток санкций Россия откажется от доллараrdquo [A new round of sanctions Rus sia will abandon the dollar]

Газетару August 7 2017 https wwwgazeta ru business 2017 08 07 10821937 shtml

Figure 23 Rus sia Outward FDI Position United States Equities and Debt Million US$ 2009ndash2016

Source Central Bank of the Rus sian Federation External Sector Statistics Rus sian Direct Investments

Abroad accessed September 27 2017 https wwwcbr ru localization switchlanguage urlshy=shy news

ampfromshy=shyru - ruamptoshy=shyen - gb

$6000

$8000

$10000

$12000

$14000

$16000

$18000

$20000

$22000

2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 9 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations10

Officially the country does not invest in the US stock exchange although some Rus sian oligarchs

have bought US corporate bonds and equities in large amounts The new sanctions law requires

the secretary of trea sury in consultation with the director of national intelligence and the secretary

of state to issue reports on Rus sian se nior po liti cal figures and oligarchs based on their closeness

to the Rus sian regime and their net worth as well as the exposure of key economic sectors of the

United States to Rus sian po liti cally exposed persons and parastatal entities including at a mini-

mum the banking securities insurance and real estate sectors14

Only three Rus sian companies are listed in the US exchanges

Overall the scale and scope of US- Russia economic interaction and business activity is much greater

than officially appreciated but not significant enough to be taken into consideration by policymakers

14 Countering Amer i carsquos Adversaries through Sanctions Act HR 3364

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 10 102017 404 PM

11

03

Politics in the Driverrsquos Seat

Bilateral economic relations depend to a great extent on global and national economic cycles

After the recent global financial crisis the US economy has shown surprisingly sustainable GDP

growth while the Rus sian economy was the most afected among BRICS countries by the turbu-

lence of a worldwide economic downturn in 2008ndash2009 and after a short- term rebound slipped

into stagnation (2012ndash2013) and then into full- scale recession (2014ndash2016) The countryrsquos eco-

nomic cycle however appears to be changing once again with the economy returning to a

pattern of growth albeit uneven and gradual (Figures 31 and 32) Even with sanctions still in place

conditions have improved as a result of the stabilization of Urals oil to an average annual price of

$419 per barrel in 2016 The gains were sparked in part by major crude producers agreeing to cut

production after hefty price drops in 2014 and 2015 Supported by easier financial conditions

higher oil prices and growing macro- stability Rus sia is heading toward a moderate growth rate

that is expected to reach 14 percent this year according to forecasts of the World Bank Group

(WBG) and the IMF1

Because of the significant role that politics plays in any bilateral interaction it is impor tant to

combine economic and po liti cal cycles applying a ldquoresetrdquo to bilateral economic cooperation in

addition to the po liti cal relationship I have compared po liti cal cycles and trade dynamics using the

following graphs ( Table 31 and Figure 33) These charts do not pretend to reflect with mathemati-

cal precision all shifts in the bilateral po liti cal relationship but rather attempt to visually align

impor tant economic and po liti cal moments to detect the efects of po liti cal events on the size of

bilateral trade

Figure 33 shows all pos si ble combinations economic trends at the intersection of po liti cal devel-

opments oppose or support each other in synchronization It is evident that po liti cal interference

1 International Monetary Fund Rus sian Federation Staff Concluding Statement of the 2017 Article IV Mission (Wash-

ington DC IMF 2017) World Bank Group From Recession to Recovery Rus sia Economic Report no 37 (Washington

DC World Bank 2017) http pubdocsworldbank org en 383241495487103815 RER - 37 - May26 - FINAL - with - summary

pdf

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 11 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations12

in bilateral business afairs in the early 2000s was less significant than in later years As result

growing po liti cal tensions from 2003 to 2008 did not dramatically afect bilateral economic inter-

action It is also easier to explain why 2011ndash2012 resulted in rec ord trade and investmentmdash a con-

sequence of very high oil prices GDP growth in both countries improved legislation after Rus siarsquos

accession to the WTO and the Obamandash Medvedev po liti cal reset From 2014 to 2016 a perfect

storm of developments added efficiency to Western sanctions and augmented the damaging

consequences of counter- sanction mea sures

Figure 33 also confirms that in times of reduced economic cooperation po liti cal pressures can

easily change bilateral economic trends Moreover business interests along with economic inter-

actions have a limited capacity to reverse the po liti cal mainstream

Figure 31 Economic Cycle 2014ndash2016

Source Authorrsquos evaluation of international financial institutions (IFI) data and sources from respective

countries

Sustainable Growth

Brazil

Negative Growth

Unstable Growth

Mexico

Descending Growth

Argentina

EU

US

Russia

Vietnam

China

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 12 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 13

Table 31 Po liti cal Cycles in Bilateral US- Russia Relations 1999ndash2016

2001ndash2002 The George W Bushndash Vladimir Putin Reset Rus sia supported ldquoglobal war on terrorismrdquo launched by the United States after 911 the SORT nuclear arms reduction treaty was signed by the United States and Rus sia and a successful business dialogue was developed that created the current structure of economic relations

2003ndash2008 Deterioration in bilateral relations brought on by the Iraq War Georgiarsquos ldquoRose Revolutionrdquo Mikhail Khodorkovskyrsquos arrest Ukrainersquos ldquoOrange Revolutionrdquo Kosovorsquos in de pen dence and the Georgian War

2009ndash2010 The Barack Obamandash Dmitry Medvedev Reset Rus sia served as a logistical hub for transportation and supply of US forces in Af ghan i stan United States and Rus sia signed the new START nuclear arms reduction treaty Rus sia backed tighter economic sanctions on Iran Rus sia gained access to the WTO after 18 years of negotiations

2011ndash2016 Deterioration in bilateral relations caused by the Ukrainian crisis which were followed by sanctions and counter- sanctions along with the Syrian crises and cyber- enabled activities

Source Authorrsquos evaluation of po liti cal and economic data

Note SORTthinsp=thinspStrategic Ofensive Reductions Treaty STARTthinsp=thinspStrategic Arms Reduction Treaty

Figure 32 Economic Cycle 2017ndash2019

Source Authorrsquos evaluation of IFI data and sources from respective countries

Egypt

VenezuelaEU

South Africa

Brazil

Russia

India

US

Descending Growth

Korea

China

Negative Growth

Unstable Growth

Sustainable Growth

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 13 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations14

Figure 33 US- Russia Trade Million US$ vs Po liti cal Cycle 2000ndash2016

Sources US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo Foreign Trade last modified June 29 2017

https wwwcensus gov foreign - trade balance c4621 html (see data for 2000ndash2016) authorrsquos evaluation

of po liti cal and economic data

Orange Revolution

Khodorkovskys arrest

GeorgianWar

Bush- Putin Reset

Iraq War Global Financial Crisis

Obama-Medvedev Reset

Russias WTO accession

New START Treaty

A Pefect Storm the Ukranian Crisis Oil Prices Crashing

Sanctions and Counter-Sanctions

$3000

$8000

$13000

$18000

$23000

$28000

$33000

$38000

$43000

2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 14 102017 404 PM

15

The current structure of US- Russia economic relations emerged in the early 2000s when the

model of trade and investment interaction took on a character similar to that which existed be-

tween the United States and developing economies US imports from Rus sia centered on com-

modities while technology along with food products lead American exports The primary

exception was that Rus sia supplied nuclear fuel including highly enriched uranium extracted from

nuclear weapons for US power plants and provided ser vices to the aerospace industry primarily

in satellite launches However both these exceptions can be explained as a legacy of the Soviet

past and not a harbinger of the future economic relationship (Figure 41)

In the last 15 years this trade structure has not changed significantly The only noticeable shift in

trade was a dramatic drop (to practically nothing) in exports of US agricultural products a result

of Rus siarsquos policy of import substitution and so- called counter- sanction mea sures it took in re-

sponse to US sanctions over the Ukraine crisis (Figure 42)

Promising new directions of cooperation in the IT sector and in engineering ser vices for the

aerospace industry appeared in the early 2000s1 but did not spill into other sectors and conse-

quently did little to renew economic cooperation on the whole The integration of Rus sian high-

tech ser vices into large- scale global production and value chains was constrained by the usual

culprits a lack of financial resources managerial experience skilled labor modern infrastructure

RampD investments and an adequate business environment High commodity prices incentivized the

restoration of an economic system centered on resource rents The leading role of oil and gas

extraction and transportation discouraged the development of a nonenergy sector that might

have created advanced and complex production and ser vices An import substitution policy could

not work efficiently in an economic environment plagued by the Dutch disease where currency

1 The Boeing Design Center was created in Moscow It consists of nearly 250 Boeing employees managing

a team of 1200 contract engineers from Rus sian and Ukrainian aerospace companies ldquoBackgrounder Boeing in

Rus siardquo Boeing last modified January 2017 http wwwboeing com resources boeingdotcom company key _ orgs

boeing - international pdf russia - cisbackgrounder pdf

Are the United States and Rus sia ldquoNatu ralrdquo Trading Partners A Little Bit of History

04

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 15 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations16

inflows (oil money) lead to ruble appreciation and render a countryrsquos production less competitive

During that time Rus siarsquos industry did not receive preferential access to larger markets and could

not expand its share in the global economy particularly because of its self- isolation from the

regional trade agreements (except for its participation in the Eurasian Economic Union with some

neighboring countries of the former Soviet Union) As a result neither import substitution nor

export- led strategy promoted growth and specialization in nonoil production A long- awaited

modernization and reallocation of resources from an inefficient nontrade sector to a trade sector

did not materialize

These limits were later augmented with sanctions and an extension of domestic restrictions on

cooperation with Western partners Importantly the rapid growth of state- monopoly structures in

the Rus sian economy over the past 15 years has created additional obstacles to the development

and diversification of US- Russia economic ties

Figure 41 US Imports from Rus sia US$ 2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2016)

Fish and shellfish 3

Crude oil 5

Fuel oil 37

Petroleum products other

8

Nuclear fuel materials

7

Chemicals-fertilizers 4

Steelmaking materials 5

Iron and steel mill products 4

Bauxite and aluminum 9

Other precious metals 4

Nonferrous metals other 1

Finished metal shapes 1

Synthetic rubber--primary

1

Spacecraftexcluding military

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 16 102017 404 PM

Fig

ure

42

U

S E

xpo

rts

to R

us s

ia U

S$ 2

016

Sou

rce

US

Ce

nsu

s B

ure

au ldquo

Trad

e in

Go

od

s w

ith

Ru

s sia

rdquo (s

ee

dat

a fo

r 2

016

)

Bak

ery

pro

du

cts

Win

e b

eer

an

d r

elat

ed

pro

du

cts

New

spri

nt

Pla

stic

mat

eria

ls

Ch

emic

als-

fert

ilize

rs

Ch

emic

als-

ino

rgan

icC

hem

ical

s-o

rgan

ic

Ch

emic

als-

oth

erC

ott

on

fib

er c

loth

In

du

stri

al r

ub

ber

pro

du

cts

Min

eral

su

pp

lies-

man

ufa

ctu

red

Gen

erat

ors

acc

esso

ries

Ele

ctri

c ap

par

atu

s

Dri

llin

g amp

oilfi

eld

eq

uip

men

t Sp

ecia

lized

min

ing

Exc

avat

ing

mac

hin

ery

No

nfa

rm t

ract

ors

an

d p

arts

In

du

stri

al e

ng

ines

Fo

od

to

bac

co m

ach

iner

y M

etal

wo

rkin

g m

ach

ine

too

ls

Tex

tile

sew

ing

m

ach

ines

W

oo

d g

lass

p

last

ic

Pu

lp a

nd

pap

er

mac

hin

ery

Mea

suri

ng

tes

tin

g

con

tro

l in

stru

men

ts

Mat

eria

ls h

and

ling

equ

ipm

ent

Ind

ust

rial

mac

hin

es

oth

er

Ph

oto

ser

vice

ind

ust

ry m

ach

iner

y A

gri

cult

ura

l mac

hin

ery

eq

uip

men

t C

om

pu

ters

Co

mp

ute

r ac

cess

ori

es

Sem

ico

nd

uct

ors

Tel

eco

mm

un

icat

ion

seq

uip

men

t

Bu

sin

ess

mac

hin

es a

nd

eq

uip

men

t

Lab

ora

tory

tes

tin

g in

stru

men

ts

Med

icin

al e

qu

ipm

ent

Civ

ilian

air

craf

t e

ng

ines

eq

uip

men

t a

nd

par

ts

Rai

lway

tra

nsp

ort

atio

n

equ

ipm

ent

Ves

sels

exc

lud

ing

scr

ap

Co

mm

erci

al v

esse

ls o

ther

M

arin

e en

gin

es p

arts

Spac

ecra

ft e

xclu

din

g

mili

tary

Pas

sen

ger

car

s

new

an

d u

sed

Tru

cks

bu

ses

and

sp

ecia

l p

urp

ose

ve

hic

les

En

gin

es a

nd

en

gin

e p

arts

(c

arb

ure

tors

pis

ton

s r

ing

s

and

val

ves)

B

od

ies

and

ch

assi

s fo

r p

asse

ng

er c

ars

Au

tom

oti

ve t

ires

an

d t

ub

es

Oth

er p

arts

an

d a

cces

sori

es o

f ve

hic

les

Ap

par

el h

ou

seh

old

go

od

s -

text

ile

Ph

arm

aceu

tica

lp

rep

arat

ion

s

Furn

itu

re h

ou

seh

old

go

od

s

etc

R

ug

s

Cel

l ph

on

es a

nd

oth

er

ho

use

ho

ld g

oo

ds

ne

c

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 17 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations18

Figure 43 US Trade in Goods with Rus sia Million US$ 1992ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 1992ndash2016)

Russian Financial Crisis

Oil price Increased from$2446 USD per barrel (2001)

to $9694 USD per barrel(2008)

Global Financial Crisis

Oil price high record in2011-2012

(more that $111 USD perbarrel)

Oil price crashed

$-

$5000

$10000

$15000

$20000

$25000

$30000

$35000

$40000

$45000

$50000

1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

US Imports from Russia US Exports to Russia US-Russia Trade in Goods

No doubt po liti cal ups and downs add volatility to US- Russia trade Nevertheless Rus siarsquos eco-

nomic structure exhausted itself before the Ukrainian crisis and the recent Rus sian recession Its

limitations are not only due to some mistakes in policy or negative coincidences of circumstances

but rather to deeply rooted properties in the current bilateral trade model related to structural

issues in the Rus sian economy Structural constraints such as the weak enforcement of property

rights poor business regulation and nondiversified exports weighed on Rus sian trade with the

United States From this perspective the term ldquonaturalunnatural trading partnersrdquo does not ad-

dress the unused capacity of bilateral interaction or the real challenges that kind of interaction

faces It just adds metaphysical flavor to the very specific economic and po liti cal factors that

determine the US- Russia trajectory

Overall the outlines of bilateral trade (Figure 43) resemble the famous ldquoRus sian Mountainsrdquo that

were a pre de ces sor of the modern roller coaster icy hills supported by wooden constructionsmdash a

rigid and immobile structure that sooner or later would melt This unfortunately is what is hap-

pening to US- Russia trade cooperation now

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 18 102017 404 PM

19

ARE LITTLE FISH REALLY SWEET

Low US- Russia economic interaction has at least two consequences First it limits the capacity of

policymakers to exploit trade as an instrument for geopo liti cal combat Even the question of a US

trade deficit which used to be a headache for many US trading partners has become so insig-

nificant in absolute terms (about $87 billion in 2016) that it seems hardly worth caring about

When the volume of trade between two countries becomes very small in absolute terms whether

a country is running a surplus or deficit is no longer relevant But it also renders another type of

confrontations (sometimes more dangerous) more likely since the two traders have little to lose

Second in an environment marked by low levels of bilateral trade both sides could incentivize (if

and when a desire for po liti cal rapprochement exists) the signing of new trade deals which are

elevated symbolically as a turning point in bilateral po liti cal relations (ie the sale of Boeings to

Rus sia or the delivery via tankers of Rus sian oil to US refineries) Sometimes markets themselves

pres ent ldquogiftsrdquo that can be capitalized on po liti cally US- USSR grain trade in the 1970s was one

such ldquogiftrdquo large sales of American grain to the Soviet Union helped US policymakers win favor

with the po liti cally impor tant American farming sector and permitted Soviet leaders to maintain

access to a dietary staple for the Soviet population

The strong 32 percent growth in value of US imports from Rus sia from January to May 2017

versus January to May 2016 ( Table 51) is an example of a development that has tempted officials

to pres ent it as a sign of positive change due to ldquogrowing business activitiesrdquo (this kind of statement

was heard before the bilateral summit in Germany in July 2017) although the reason for that leap

was evidently an increase in commodity prices (mainly of oilmdash see Table 52) and not a rise in

entrepreneurial interactions The primary beneficiaries of that upside rally have been two other

petro- economies Saudi Arabia and Venezuela ( Tables 53 and 54)

Sector Analyses

05

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 19 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations20

Table 51 US Imports from Rus sia Million US$ Januaryndash May 2016 vs Januaryndash May 2017

Year January February March April May Total

2016 9603 6871 11097 12257 10977 50805

2017 12215 10220 16979 13471 14147 67032

Change 271 487 530 99 289 319

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 1992ndash2016)

Table 52 Change in Urals Crude Oil Prices US$ per Barrel Januaryndash May 2016 vs Januaryndash May 2017

Januaryndash May 2016 Januaryndash May 2017 Change ($) Change ()

3601 5129 1528 424

Source Ministry of Finance of the Rus sian Federation https wwwminfin ru ru ixzz4mMIZ7XtC

Table 53 US Imports from Saudi Arabia Million US$ Januaryndash May 2016 vs Januaryndash May 2017

Year January February March April May Total

2016 15114 9036 13555 10844 14679 63228

2017 19802 20298 21650 16211 19542 97503

Change 3101 12463 5972 495 331 542

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Saudi Arabiardquo Foreign Trade last modified June 29 2017

https wwwcensus gov foreign - trade balance c5170 html (see data for 2016ndash2017)

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 20 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 21

Table 54 US Imports from Venezuela Million US$ Januaryndash May 2016 vs Januaryndash May 2017

Year January February March April May Total

2016 6657 5560 7140 8007 7922 35286

2017 13041 10864 123500 11148 12243 59646

Change 9590 9540 7297 3923 5454 6903

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Venezuelardquo Foreign Trade last modified June 29 2017

https wwwcensus gov foreign - trade balance c3070 html (see data for 2016ndash2017)

Table 55 US Exports to Rus sia Million US$ Januaryndash May 2016 vs Januaryndash May 2017

Year January February March April May Total

2016 3628 3577 7298 4657 4947 24107

2017 3144 4277 5386 6670 4806 24283

Change minus133 196 minus262 432 minus29 minus07

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2016ndash2017)

At the same time US exports to Rus sia continue to stagnate ( Table 55) due to low levels of

consumption during a two-and- a- half-year economic crisis a deep ruble devaluation sanctions

and counter- sanctions

Given the very dif er ent economic structures and resource endowments of Rus sia and the United

States it is not surprising that US- Russia trade is asymmetric and oil driven (Figure 51) A

3 percent increase in Urals oil prices translates into a one percent increase in US import growth

from Rus sia Thus in 2016 every $10 increase in Urals crude oil added $15 billion to the value of

US imports or 11 percent to the total value of imports from Rus sia

OIL ADDICTION

Oil is a core pillar of US- Russia bilateral trade A bumpy ride in oil markets afects commerce

Nevertheless Rus sian oil exports to the United States in physical terms have been rather

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 21 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations22

sustainable Starting from 2005 average annual deliveries have been above 150 million barrels

(Figure 52) Crude and heating oil have dominated while petroleum products and liquefied petro-

leum gases have not (Figure 53) In 2011 oil exports peaked at 228 million barrels but declined to

159 million barrels in 2016mdash a drop of 30 percent Rec ord high shipments of Rus sian oil to the United

States coincided with an elevation in oil prices which made the subsequent decline in oil shipment

value between 2011 and 2016 (by about 72 percent as shown in Figure 54) seem more stark The

increase in price also raised the share of oil in Rus sian exports by 74 percent in 2011 (Figure 55)

The Rus sian share in total US oil imports was around 55 percent in 2011 and 43 percent in 2016

( Table 56) In the last five years the United States has relied exclusively on consumption of Rus sian

oil for the rough equivalent of one week out of the year (Figure 56)

It is unlikely that Rus sia can significantly increase its share of the US oil market and there is a real

possibility for a downward trend There are several reasons the historically high Rus sian hydrocar-

bon export threshold of 2011 will not soon if ever be surpassed

First US energy consumption will likely be flat According to the US Energy Information Adminis-

tration (EIA) demand for petroleum and other liquids in the United States will be about 35ndash36

quadrillion British thermal units (BTUs) with minimal variation over the next 25 years1

1 US EIA ldquoAnnual Energy Outlook 2017 with Projections to 2050rdquo January 5 2017 7ndash8

Figure 51 US- Russia Trade Growth () vs US and Rus sia Real GDP Growth () 1993ndash2016

Source IMF ldquoIMF Datardquo accessed September 27 2017 http wwwimf org en Data US Census Bureau

ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo

Note rGDPthinsp=thinspreal gross domestic product

Trade

USA rGDP growth

Russia rGDP growth

-60

-40

-20

0

20

40

60

80

100

1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Gro

wth

All spikes in US-Russia trade have been connected with two main

variables volume and price of crude oil

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 22 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 23

Second the United States will become a net energy exporter between 2020 and 2030 in most

cases under dif er ent combinations of oil and natu ral gas prices GDP growth technological

breakthroughs and the availability of energy resources The role of oil imports will dramatically

fall2

Third oil price scenarios as described by the International Energy Agency (IEA) international

financial organ izations (IFIs) and many national agencies are very cautious and assume that even

by 2035 to 2040 oil prices will not to recover to the levels of 2011ndash20123

Fourth Rus sian oil production and export growth will be modest and driven by Asian economic

expansion and will comprise a decreasing share of Western markets4 According to forecasts from

2 Ibid 15ndash18

3 Ibid table 3 ldquoEnergy Prices by Sector and Sourcesrdquo World Bank World Bank Commodity Markets Price Forecasts

(Washington DC World Bank 2017) httpswwwworldbank org en research commodity - markets Organ ization of the

Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) World Oil Outlook 2016 (Vienna OPEC 2016)

4 E D Belotskaia et al Global and Rus sian Energy Outlook 2016 (Moscow Energy Research Institute of the Rus sian

Acad emy of Science Analytical Center for the Government of the Rus sian Federation 2016) http acgov ru files

publication a 12767 pdf

Figure 52 US Imports from Rus sia Crude Oil and Petroleum Products Thousands of Barrels 1995ndash2016

Source US EIA ldquoUS Imports by Country of Origin Rus siardquo Petroleum amp Other Liquids September 13

2017 http wwweia gov dnav pet PET _ MOVE _ IMPCUS _ D _ NUS _ NRS _ MBBL _ M htm

0

50000

100000

150000

200000

250000

Date 1995 1996 1997 1998 199920002001200220032004200520062007200820092010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 23 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations24

the Organ ization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) crude oil exports from Rus sia and

the Caspian region to the United States will dis appear by 20255

So why does the Rus sian Urals blend continue to be attractive for oil traders and US refineries

which could pro cess greater volumes of domestically produced lighter crude There are two main

reasons One is related to the preference of US high conversion refineries (the most sophisticated

in the world) to work with heavy oil blends produced by Canada Mexico Iraq Venezuela and

Rus sia Pro cessing heavy crude now is as profitable as pro cessing lighter crude The so- called

crack spreadmdash the diference between the cost of relatively cheap heavy crude oil and the final

price of value- added consumer products (diesel gasoline jet fuel and heating oil)mdash has become

the same as the refinery margins of light sweet crude6 This has primarily afected light oil produc-

ing countries such as Angola Algeria and Nigeria

5 OPEC World Oil Outlook 2016 306ndash309

6 ldquoHow Much for That Heavy Oilrdquo Oil Sands Magazine December 26 2015 https wwwoilsandsmagazine com

news 2015 12 26 how - much - for - that - heavy - oil

Figure 53 US Imports from Rus sia Oil and Petroleum Products US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

$-

$25000000000

$20000000000

$15000000000

$10000000000

$5000000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Liquefied petroleum gases

Petroleum products other

Fuel oil

Crude oil

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 24 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 25

Another factor afecting purchase of Rus sian oil is a new trend among oil companies for further

consolidation of scale and for integrating operations of upstream and downstream business7

There have been several waves of separation and unification of production transportation and

pro cessing in the last 50 years The current business cycle can be seen as an adaptation to a

period of low prices and oversupply Companies that buy andor produce oil in Rus sia most likely

prefer to transport and pro cess this oil in their own modern refineries in the United States At the

same time some of the newest refinery designs specifically for pro cessing heavy oils have been

built in Asia thus extending the choices of heavy oil producing countries

We should also consider that leading US and international oil traders along with oil producing

companies working with or owning US refineries frequently buy Rus sian oil on the open market

and have long- term contracts on Rus sian crude oil delivery Many Rus sian oil companies prefer to

pay for purchases or ser vices with their future production instead of cash creating situations of

ldquostickyrdquo oil imports that are difficult to replace The best- known example is an interaction between

7 ldquoEnergy and Utilities Sectorrdquo Roundtable Financier Worldwide December 2015 https wwwfinancierworldwide

com roundtable - energy - utilities - sector - dec15

Figure 54 US Imports of Oil and Petroleum Products from Rus sia vs Oil Prices Eu rope Brent Spot Price Free on Board (FOB) 1996ndash2017

Source US EIA ldquoUS Imports by Country of Origin Rus siardquo

0

20

40

60

80

100

120

140

0

5000

10000

15000

20000

25000

30000

Jan

-19

96

Jun

-19

96

No

v-19

96

Ap

r-19

97

Sep

-19

97

Feb

-19

98

Jul-

199

8D

ec-1

99

8M

ay-1

99

9O

ct-1

99

9M

ar-2

00

0A

ug

-20

00

Jan

-20

01

Jun

-20

01

No

v-2

00

1A

pr-

20

02

Sep

-20

02

Feb

-20

03

Jul-

20

03

Dec

-20

03

May

-20

04

Oct

-20

04

Mar

-20

05

Au

g-2

00

5Ja

n-2

00

6Ju

n-2

00

6N

ov-

20

06

Ap

r-2

00

7Se

p-2

00

7Fe

b-2

00

8Ju

l-2

00

8D

ec-2

00

8M

ay-2

00

9O

ct-2

00

9M

ar-2

010

Au

g-2

010

Jan

-20

11Ju

n-2

011

No

v-2

011

Ap

r-2

012

Sep

-20

12Fe

b-2

013

Jul-

20

13D

ec-2

013

May

-20

14O

ct-2

014

Mar

-20

15A

ug

-20

15Ja

n-2

016

Jun

-20

16N

ov-

20

16

USD

per

Bar

rel

Th

ou

san

d B

arr

els

US Imports from Russia of Crude Oil and Petroleum Products (Thousand Barrels)

Europe Brent Spot Price FOB (Dollars per Barrel)

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 25 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations26

Table 56 US Oil Imports All Countries vs Rus sia Thousand Barrels per Day 2011ndash2016

Years 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

All Countries 11436 10598 9859 9241 9449 10058

Rus sia 624 477 460 330 371 433

Share 546 450 467 357 393 431

Sources US EIA ldquoUS Imports by Country of Origin Total Crude Oil and Productsrdquo Petroleum amp Other

Liquids September 13 2017 wwweia gov dnav pet pet_move_impcus_a2_nus_ep00_im0_mbbl_m htm

authorrsquos computation

Figure 55 US Imports from Rus sia Share of Crude Oil and Petroleum Products Million US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

57

64

73

72

74

73

72

59

52 50

0

$5000

$10000

$15000

$20000

$25000

$30000

$35000

$40000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

US Imports from Russia

Share of Oil and Petroleum Products

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 26 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 27

the Rus sian state mono poly Rosneft and commodity trading and mining giant Glencore which

along with energy and commodities com pany Vitol participated in a $10 billion prepayment

deal with Rosneft for crude supplies in 2013

There have been a number of ongoing transactions between the Rus sian oil industry and interna-

tional oil companies including several that top the list of importers of Rus sian oil to the United

States ( Table 57) In December 2016 Glencore participated in a controversial privatization opera-

tion purchasing in tandem with the Qatar sovereign wealth fund a 195 percent stake in Rosneft

which was on the US and EU list of sanctioned firms8 Glencore has also taken a blocking stake in

midsize oil producer RussNeft BP owns a 1975 percent stake in Rosneft Chevron holds a

15 percent interest in the 935- mile- long CPC9 pipeline which transports an average of 959000

barrels of crude oil per day including 76000 barrels daily from Rus sia10 ExxonMobil has formed

8 E Mazneva and I Arkhipov ldquoRus sia Sells $11 Billion Stake in Rosneft to Glencore Qatarrdquo Bloomberg December 7

2016

9 CPCthinsp=thinspCaspian Pipeline Consortium

10 ldquoRus sia Highlights of Operations and Business Portfoliordquo Chevron accessed October 3 2017 https wwwchevron

com worldwide russia

Figure 56 Share of Rus sian Oil in Total US Oil Imports Thousands of Barrels per Day 1972ndash2016

Source US EIA ldquoUS Imports by Country of Origin Total Crude Oil and Productsrdquo

2000

4000

6000

8000

10000

12000

14000

16000

US Imports of Crude Oil and Petroleum Products (Thousand Barrels per Day)

US Imports from Russia of Crude Oil and Petroleum Products (Thousand Barrels per Day)19

7319

7419

7519

7619

7719

7819

7919

80

198

119

82

198

319

84

198

519

86

198

719

88

198

919

90

199

119

92

199

319

94

199

519

96

199

719

98

199

92

00

02

00

12

00

22

00

32

00

42

00

52

00

62

00

72

00

82

00

92

010

20

112

012

20

132

014

20

152

016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 27 102017 404 PM

Table 57 Top Importers of Rus sian Oil to the United States Thousands of Barrels 2016

VALERO MARKETING amp SUPPLY CO 54590 3616

EXXONMOBIL OIL CORP 17087 1130

CHEVRON USA INC 15217 1008

BP WEST COAST PRODUCTS LLC 10130 671

GEORGE E WARREN CORP 7272 48

PAULSBORO REFINING CO LLC 6838 453

TESORO CORP 5097 338

VITOL INC 5084 337

PHILLIPS 66 CO 4726 313

TRAFIGURA AG 4360 289

PAR HAWAII REFINING LLC 3893 258

MOTIVA ENTERPRISES LLC 3041 205

SHELL US TRADING CO 2863 19

MARATHON PETROLEUM CO LLC 2475 16

ATLANTIC TRADING amp MARKETING 2099 14

FREEPOINT COMMODITIES LLC 1439 1

GLENCORE LTD 1284 85

BEST PETROLEUM CORP 967 64

ROLYMPUS US COMMODITIES GROUP LLC 822 6

HUNT CRUDE OIL SUPPLY CO 666 4

GULF OIL LP 658 4

Source US EIA ldquoUS Imports by Country of Origin Crude Oilrdquo Petroleum amp Other Liquids September 13

2017 httpswwweiagovdnavpetpet_move_impcus_a2_nus_epc0_im0_mbblpd_ahtm authorrsquos

computation

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 28 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 29

several joint ventures with Rosneft to undertake ofshore exploration in the Black Sea and the Kara

Sea in Siberia11

According to the Sanctions Act US persons are prohibited from exporting or reexporting goods

ser vices (except financial ser vices) and technology in support of exploration or production of new

deep- water Arctic ofshore or shale oil proj ects that involve designated Rus sian entities or other

entities in which such sanctioned persons have a controlling interest or a substantial noncontrol-

ling owner ship interest defined as not less than 33 percent (previously it was 50 percent) The new

law also authorizesmdash but does not requiremdash the imposition of so- called secondary sanctions

against non- US entities that engage in activities involving the construction maintenance or

expansion of Rus sian energy export pipelines with a fair market value of $1 million or more or an

aggregate fair market value during a 12- month period of $5 million12 This provision has raised the

concerns of some Eu ro pean countries particularly Germany As result the final language of the

law included wording about coordination of this issue with allies of the United States

Shipments of Rus sian oil to the United States could be afected by activity in the US refinery

industry In early 2017 Saudi Aramco bought the United Statesrsquo largest oil refinery in Port Arthur

(Texas) and it announced plans to send more of its own crude to that refinery13 Serious concerns

exist however regarding the future of three refineries and nine pipelines owned by Citgo a US

branch of the Venezuelan state com pany PdVSA which is balancing precariously on the edge of

default Under certain conditions in the event of PdVSA bankruptcy Rosneft could claim a stake of

up to 499 percent in Citgo Such a possibility has raised concerns among politicians and US

government officials with Trea sury Secretary Steven Mnuchin calling it a ldquonational security issuerdquo14

Tables 58 59 and 510 show allocations of Rus sian oil imports to major US refineries some of

which work exclusively on Rus sian crude a total of two to three months per year In total 150940

thousand barrels of Rus sian oil were refined in 2016

Figure 57 confirms a leading position of Texas and Louisiana among the US states receiving

Rus sian crude followed by New Jersey California Mississippi Washington Hawaii and Delaware

In a paradoxical way Texas has dis appeared from the list of states as a main destination of US

imports from Rus sia (Figure 58) because Rus sian crude is mostly delivered to Louisiana ports and

registered there by US Customs as an import from Rus sia After that it transports to refineries in

Louisiana and Texas

Overall the short- term business rationale behind the sustainability of US oil imports from Rus sia

cannot overcome strong headwinds in the US energy sector facing all oil importers which will

inevitably lead to a contraction of Rus sian oil exports to the United States in the foreseeable future

11 Exxon eforts to receive a special US Trea sury waiver to drill in sanctioned Rus sia failed in 2017

12 Countering Amer i carsquos Adversaries through Sanctions Act HR 3364

13 Sarp Ozkan ldquoSaudi Aramcorsquos Port Arthur Refinery and the US Refinery Fleetrdquo Drilling Info May 11 2017

https infodrillinginfo com saudi - aramcos - port - arthur - refinery - us - refinery - fleet

14 Graham Kates ldquoTrea sury Secretary Rus siarsquos Citgo Deal a National Security Issuerdquo CBS News May 1 2017

http wwwcbsnews com news rosneft - citgo - steven - mnuchin - national - security

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 29 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations30

Table 58 Valerorsquos Refineries Pro cessing Rus sian Oil Thousands of Barrels 2016

Saint Charles Louisiana 29206 535

Corpus Christi Texas 20626 378

Wilmington California 4250 78

Total USA 54590 100

Source US EIA ldquoRefinery Capacity Reportrdquo January 1 2017

table 5 wwweia gov petroleum refinerycapacity table5 pdf

authorrsquos computation

Table 59 ExxonMobil Refineries Pro cessing Rus sian Oil Thousands of Barrels 2016

Baytown Texas 15037 88

Baton Rouge Louisiana 2046 12

Total USA 17083 100

Source US EIA ldquoRefinery Capacity Reportrdquo authorrsquos computation

Table 510 Chevronrsquos Refineries Pro cessing Rus sian Oil Thousands of Barrels 2016

Pascagoula Mississippi 12767 840

El Segundo California 2372 155

Saint Rose Louisiana 78 05

Total USA 15217 100

Source US EIA ldquoRefinery Capacity Reportrdquo authorrsquos computation

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 30 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 31

HEAVY METAL

Taken together US imports of metals and US imports of oil compose about 80 percent of US

total imports from Rus sia (Figure 59) Trade of metals like other commodities is strongly afected

by market price fluctuations Nevertheless metal imports from Rus sia have been fairly resilient to

market volatility and their average annual value has hovered at about $4 billion in the last five years

(Figure 510) This market resilience was forged at the end of the 1990searly 2000s when Rus sian

metal producers gradually modernized their plants adjusting quality of production to Western

standards and enhancing integration into global value and supply chains Some of them conquered

their share of the highly competitive US market struggling with peers from Canada and certain

BRICS countries (China India and Brazil) To attract additional resources all Rus sian large metal-

producing companies became public and were listed on stock exchanges chiefly the London Stock

Exchange (Severstalrsquo PAO Evraz MMK OAO Novolipetsk Steel Norilsk Nikel and TMK PAO) one

on the New York Stock Exchange (Mechel) and one on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange (Rusal)

Business logic pushed some of them to invest in the US metal- making industry which was hit

hard by crisis Later on some of those assets were sold (eg two US steel mills acquired by

Severstal in 2004 were purchased 10 years later by Steel Dynamics Inc and AK Steel Corp)

Figure 57 Share of US States Rus sian Oil Imports 2016

Source US EIA ldquoUS Imports from Rus sia of Crude Oil and Petroleum Productsrdquo Petroleum amp Other

Liquids September 29 2017 https www eia gov dnav pet hist LeafHandler ashx nshy=shyPETampsshy=shyMTTIM _ NUS

- NRS _ 1ampfshy=shyM authorrsquos computation

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

100

Maine

Massachusetts

Maryland

Connecticut

Georgia

Rhode Island

Virginia

Florida

New York

Alabama

Puerto Rico

Pennsylvania

Delaware

Hawaii

Washington

Mississippi

California

New Jersey

Louisiana

Texas

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 31 102017 404 PM

Figure 58 US Imports from Rus sia by State Million US$ 2013ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoState and Metropolitan Area Trade Datardquo Foreign Trade last modified

October 2 2017 https wwwcensus gov foreign - trade statistics state

Alaska

Connecticut

Delaware

Hawaii

Louisiana

Maryland

North Dakota 0

$1000

$2000

$3000

$4000

$5000

$6000

2013 2014 2015 2016

Alabama

Alaska

Connecticut

Delaware

Hawaii

Louisiana

Maryland

Maine

Mississippi

Montana

North Dakota

Mississippi

Figure 59 US Imports from Rus sia Share of Oil and Metals Million US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 1992ndash2016)

83

82

85

86

87

88

85

82

7375

0

$5000

$10000

$15000

$20000

$25000

$30000

$35000

$40000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

US Imports from Russia

Share of Oil and Metals

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 32 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 33

Obviously the market dynamic of dif er ent metals varies (eg iron steel aluminum platinum and

nickel) Caps to increase their trade and production in a ldquored oceanrdquo global environment with

anemic demand is rather limited despite Figure 510 showing a spike of iron and steel imports

from Rus sia in 2014 and aluminum in 2016 Some opportunities may exist for Russian- owned steel

plants in the United States (such as NLMK) to participate in energy proj ects resumed under Presi-

dent Trump who has required that new pipelines use only American- made steel15

Rus sia occupies a special niche in the US market for titanium products a high- end metal indus-

try Twenty years ago a long- term contract was signed between Rus sian titanium producer

VSMPO- AVISMA and Boeing The Rus sian com pany entered the selective club of Boeing suppliers

for the manufacture of components and semi- finished products Since the signing of this contract

VSMPO has delivered more than 35 percent of all titanium placed on Boeing civil aircraft16 They

are hidden in the trade data in an import category for Civilian Aircrafts and Parts (Figure 511) At

the end of 2016 Boeing announced an extension of its framework agreement with AVISMA

15 E Scheyder C Ngai and T Sylvester ldquoAmerican Steel Unlikely to Get Keystone Boost Despite Trump Orderrdquo

Reuters January 27 2017 http wwwreuters com article usa - trump - pipeline - transcanada - idUSL1N1FH1ZD

16 A Kramer ldquoTitanium Fills Vital Role for Boeing and Rus siardquo New York Times July 5 2013 http wwwnytimes com

2013 07 06 business global titanium - fills - vital - role - for - boeing - and - russia html mcubzshy=shy3

Figure 510 US Imports from Rus sia Iron Steel Bauxite Aluminum Nickel Nonferrous Metals and Other Precious Metals and Materials US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 1992ndash2016)

0

$6000000000

$5000000000

$4000000000

$3000000000

$2000000000

$1000000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 20122013

20142015

2016

Finished metal shapes

Iron and steel advanced

Iron and steel products nec

Nonferrous metals other

Other precious metals

Nickel

Bauxite and aluminum

Iron and steel mill products

Steelmaking materials

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 33 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations34

through 2022 and additional investments in the construction of a new robotic plant in Titanium

Valley a special economic zone located in the Sverdlovsk region that will open in 2018 The pro-

cessing of titanium forgings in all Boeing civil aircraft will be performed there including 787s 737

MAXs and 777Xs17 The contract extension with AVISMA may add several hundred million dollars

in value to annual US imports from Rus sia

How can such heavy reliance on imports of Rus sian titanium exist during a period of rising geopo-

liti cal tensions The answer is straightforward VSMPO- AVISMA is a highly specialized natu ral

mono poly producing 45 percent of the worldrsquos aerospace titanium Only four other countries

smelt high- grade titanium in industrial quantities the United States Germany Japan and China

Overall global production capacity is limited while demand is growing The United States cur-

rently imports around 79 percent of all the titanium it consumes each year18

17 ldquoBoeing and VSMPO Avisma to Launch Second Joint Production Siterdquo Rus sian Aviation Insider December 22 2016

http wwwrusaviainsider com boeing - and - vsmpo - avisma - to - launch - second - joint - production - site

18 Jon Ostrower and Andy Pasztor ldquoBoeing United Technologies Stockpile Titanium Partsrdquo Wall Street Journal

August 7 2014 https wwwwsj com articles boeing - united - technologies - stockpiling - titanium - parts - 1407441886

Figure 511 US Imports from Rus sia Civilian Aircrafts and Parts US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 1992ndash2016)

0

$20000000

$40000000

$60000000

$80000000

$100000000

$120000000

$140000000

$160000000

$180000000

$200000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Parts-civilian aircraft

Civilian aircraft

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 34 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 35

The Sanctions Act authorizes the secretary of the trea sury (in a nonmandatory way) to impose

restrictions (without specifying them) against Rus sian state- owned entities operating in the railway

metals and mining sectors of the Rus sian economy Despite the commanding heights of Rus siarsquos

state sector owner ship in its economy (70 percent of GDP) the metal- producing companies have

remained mostly in private hands

NUCLEAR AFFAIRS

Historically owners and operators of the 104 commercial nuclear power reactors in the United

States have purchased more than 80 percent of their uranium from foreign countries Uranium

shipping from Rus sia accounted for about 13 percent of the 58 million pounds of uranium pur-

chased overseas in 201219 At the same time the Rus sian state- owned mono poly Rosatom ac-

counts for 20 percent of Kazakhstanrsquos uranium production (which in turn comprises 11 percent of

all US uranium imports) and 20 percent of US domestic uranium production capacity (with

owner ship of exploration tracts in Wyoming)20

Nuclear fuel and nuclear power continue to be po liti cally sensitive topics both in the United

States and Rus sia Bilateral cooperation in this sector (being surprisingly stable with imports of

nuclear fuel from Rus sia at a level of $1 billion annually in the last five years [Figure 512 and 513])

is under constant po liti cal and lobbying pressure and has been a source of several po liti cal scan-

dals21 Consequently upside risks in this area of interaction are minimal and downside risks are

much higher especially when we are seeing more decommissioning of nuclear plants in the

United States than new constructions The US EIArsquos 2017 Annual Energy Outlook assumes

that about 25 percent of the nuclear capacity now operating will be removed from ser vice

by 205022

WHY IS THE GRASS GREENER ON THE OTHER SIDE

The United States continues to significantly reduce imports of chemical fertilizers as domestic pro-

duction increases In 2016 the United States imported 13 percent less ammonia and 11 percent

less urea and UAN which is a liquid urea and ammonium nitrate fertilizer Rus sia accounts for

around 40 percent of UAN imported by the United States The United States canceled antidumping

duties on imports of ammonium nitrate and urea from Rus sia in 2016 but it did not prevent import

19 US EIA ldquoThe US Relies on Foreign Uranium Enrichment Ser vices to Fuel Its Nuclear Power Plantsrdquo Today in

Energy August 28 2013 https wwweia gov todayinenergy detail php idshy=shy1273

20 Colin Chilcoat ldquoDoes Rus sia Really Own 20 Percent of the USrsquo Uranium Reservesrdquo OilPricecom May 6 2015

http oilpricecom Alternative - Energy Nuclear - Power Does - Russia - Really - Own - 20 - Of - The - US - Uranium - Reserves

html

21 Michelle Ye Hee Lee ldquoThe Facts behind Trumprsquos Repeated Claim about Hillary Clintonrsquos Role in the Rus sian Ura-

nium Dealrdquo Washington Post October 26 2016

22 US EIA ldquoAnnual Energy Outlook 2017 with Projections to 2050rdquo 81ndash82

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 35 102017 404 PM

Figure 512 US Imports from Rus sia Share of Oil Metals and Nuclear Fuel Million US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 1992ndash2016)

87

86

90

90

90

91

88

86

7882

0

$5000

$10000

$15000

$20000

$25000

$30000

$35000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

US Imports from Russia

Share of Oil Metals and Nuclear Fuel

Figure 513 US Imports from Rus sia Nuclear Fuel Materials US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

$-

$200000000

$400000000

$600000000

$800000000

$1200000000

$1000000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 36 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 37

drops twice last year (Figures 514 and 515) According to forecasts UAN imports are expected to

decline further to 15 million tons this year down over 46 percent from 28 million tons imported

last year23 The downside trend in imports of fertilizers will likely continue because of oversupply

BIG FISH

US imports of fish and shellfish from Rus sia are best understood in comparison with US fish

exports to the Rus sian market which slipped to zero in August 2014 after Rus sia issued an order

banning certain agricultural imports from the United States (Figure 516) While the volume of US

supply was not very large it was impor tant because it broke up the monopolistic dominance of a

few vertically integrated Rus sian companies that have kept prices high by restricting the entry of

new producers Seeking to implement import substitution policies Rus sia has tried to reduce

exports as well as imports of fish and seafood products in the last couple of years This symmetri-

cal approach was intended to ldquocompensaterdquo for a decrease of fish products in the domestic

23 Deepika Thapliyal ldquoPotashCorp Forecasts Sharp Drop in US Nitrogen Imports in 2017rdquo ICIS News February 7

2017 https wwwicis com resources news 2017 02 07 10076734 potashcorp - forecasts - sharp - drop - in - us - nitrogen

- imports - in - 2017

Figure 514 US Imports from Rus sia Share of Oil Metals Nuclear Fuel and Fertilizers Million US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

90

93

92

93

94

95

92

91

85

86

0

$5000

$10000

$15000

$20000

$25000

$30000

$35000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

US Imports from Russia

Share of Oil Metals Nuclear Fuel and Fertilizers

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 37 102017 404 PM

Figure 515 US Imports from Rus sia Chemical- Fertilizers US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

S-

$200000000

$400000000

$600000000

$800000000

$1000000000

$1200000000

$1400000000

$1600000000

$1800000000

$2000000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Figure 516 US Exports to Rus sia Fish and Shellfish US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

0

$10000000

$20000000

$30000000

$40000000

$50000000

$60000000

$70000000

$80000000

$90000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Fish and shellfish

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 38 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 39

consumer market caused by Rus siarsquos import ban but it has failed As result the group most af-

fected by the self- imposed counter- sanctions were Rus sian consumers

With a significant drop in fish imports a devaluation of the ruble and inflationary pressures on

seafood prices yearly consumption of fish in Rus sia has declined precipitously In 2015 alone

fish prices increased 20 percent and consumption dropped to 14 kilograms per person24 from

22 kilograms in 201425 In 2016 food rose to 355 percent of house hold expenditure as a result of

increases in food prices26 This has pushed vertically integrated fishing monopolies to sell even

more of their catch abroad rather than deliver to the Rus sian Federation (Figure 517) Thus we

cannot exclude the possibility of further growth in US fish and shellfish imports from Rus sia on a

marginal scale

24 Александр Савельев ldquoПотребление рыбы в России упало до 14 кг на человекаrdquo [Fish consumption in Rus sia fell to

14 kg per person] Экономика Интерфакс January 28 2015 http wwwinterfax ru business 492038

25 Илья Шестаков ldquoПотебление рыбы в России снизилось на 10 процентов из- за роста ценrdquo [Fish consumption in

Rus sia dropped by 10 percent due to price increases] RNS March 8 2017 https rnsonline consumer - market

Potreblenie - ribi - v - Rossii - snizilos - na - 10 - iz - za - rosta - tsen - 2017 - 03 - 08

26 Zoya Sheftalovich and Christian Oliver ldquoRus siarsquos Boom (Farming) Economyrdquo Politico November 8 2016 http

wwwpolitico eu article russias - boom - farming - economy

Figure 517 US Imports from Rus sia Fish and Shellfish US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

0

$50000000

$100000000

$150000000

$200000000

$250000000

$300000000

$350000000

$400000000

$450000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 39 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations40

SPACE ODYSSEY

Among high- end products beyond the top five groups of goods imported from Rus sia cheap and

efficient Rus sian engines have been used to launch US rockets into space for about 16 years

(Figure 518) There was a serious po liti cal strug gle around a 2014 ban on the purchase of Rus sian

RD-180 rocket engines revealing the conflicting business interests of power ful high- tech companies

This restrictive mea sure was temporary and was quickly lifted because of significant cost impacts

and risks of disruption to launch schedules27 For the same reason the Sanctions Act does not autho-

rize ldquothe imposition of any sanction or other condition limitation restriction or prohibition that

directly or indirectly impedes the supply by any entity of the Rus sian Federation of any product or

ser vice or the procurement of such product or ser vice by any contractor or subcontractor of the

United States or any other entity relating to or in connection with any space launch conducted for

the National Aeronautics and Space Administration or any other nonndash Department of Defense

customerrdquo28

Nevertheless many experts believe that US domestic alternatives to replace Rus sian engines will

be viable in five to eight years

27 Ken Dilanian ldquoWhy Does the US Use Rus sian Rockets to Launch Its Satellitesrdquo NBC News updated November 15

2016 http wwwnbcnews com why - does - u - s - use - russian - rockets - launch - its - satellites - n588526

28 Countering Amer i carsquos Adversaries through Sanctions Act HR 3364

Figure 518 Spacecraft Excluding Military US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

0

$20000000

$40000000

$60000000

$80000000

$100000000

$120000000

$140000000

$160000000

$180000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 40 102017 404 PM

41

Diversity and technological complexity are the most vis i ble advantages supporting US exports to

Rus sia Three major groups of export goods include civilian aircraft engines and parts (Figure 61)

drilling and oil field equipment (Figure 62) and industrial machines and engines (Figure 63)

Despite sanctions against the transfer of advanced oil producing and pro cessing technologies the

realization of US drilling and oil field equipment in Rus sia is sustainable although some bilateral

proj ects have been frozen

Another category of goods that has demonstrated resilience is the phar ma ceu ti cal industry (Fig-

ure 64) because most drugs in Rus sia are imported (about 70 percent of the Rus sian phar ma ceu-

ti cal market in value) Import substitution policies have had only modest results in this industry

As confirmed by American Chamber of Commerce surveys US exports to Rus sia are closely

connected to US FDI 30 percent of total imports of US companies working in the Rus sian

market come from the United States (more than $2 billion in 2016) In other words about

40 percent of all US exports to Rus sia are related to a US corporate- sector business pro cess in

the country The major sectors of activity of these companies are energy and natu ral resources

(52 percent) manufacturing (17 percent) information and communications technology or ICT

(13 percent) retail (7 percent) automotive industry (6 percent) phar ma ceu ti cal production

(1 percent) professional ser vices (05 percent) and other (2 percent)1

Some obvious constraints on US exports to Rus sia have resulted from a reduction in demand A

deterioration of bilateral relations and implementation of sanctions and counter- sanctions have

directly or indirectly afected all businesses Figures 65 and 66 provide data regarding a dramatic

drop in the sale of US agricultural production in Rus sia with all other categories of exports in

goods showing big cuts as well (see Figures 67ndash69)

Exports of civilian aircraft engines and parts put the state of Washington in first place among

other states as a leading exporter to the Rus sian market (Figure 610)

1 American Chamber of Commerce in Rus sia ldquoInvestment and Import to Rus sia 2nd Surveyrdquo 13

Diversity and Constraints

06

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 41 102017 404 PM

Figure 61 US Exports of Civilian Aircraft Engines Equipment and Parts to Rus sia US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

$2500000000

$2000000000

$1500000000

$1000000000

$500000000

$-

Figure 62 US Exports of Drilling and Oil Field Equipment US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

0

$5000000

$10000000

$15000000

$20000000

$25000000

$30000000

$35000000

$40000000

$45000000

$50000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 42 102017 404 PM

Figure 63 US Exports of Industrial Engines to Rus sia US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

0

$5000000

$10000000

$15000000

$20000000

$25000000

$30000000

$35000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Figure 64 US Exports of Phar ma ceu ti cal Preparations to Rus sia US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

0

$5000000

$10000000

$15000000

$20000000

$25000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 43 102017 404 PM

Figure 65 US Exports of Meat and Poultry to Rus sia US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Meat poultry etc

$1000000000

$800000000

$600000000

$400000000

$200000000

$-

$1200000000

$1400000000

$1600000000

Figure 66 US Exports of Soybeans to Rus sia US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

0

$20000000

$40000000

$60000000

$80000000

$100000000

$120000000

$140000000

$160000000

$180000000

$200000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 44 102017 404 PM

Figure 67 US Exports of Vehicles Engines and Parts to Rus sia US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Other parts and accessories of vehicles

Automotive tires and tubes

Bodies and chassis for passenger cars

Engines and engine parts (carburetors pistonsrings and valves)

Trucks buses and special purpose vehicles

Passenger cars new and used

$2500000000

$2000000000

$1500000000

$500000000

$-

$1000000000

Figure 68 US Exports of Medicinal Equipment to Rus sia US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

$10000000

$15000000

$20000000

$25000000

$30000000

$35000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 45 102017 404 PM

Figure 610 US Exports to Rus sia by States (2016 US$ Value) Million US$ 2013ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoState and Metropolitan Area Trade Datardquo

Iowa Kentucky

North Dakota

Oklahoma

South Carolina

Washington

0

$500

$1000

$1500

$2000

2013 2014 2015 2016

District of Columbia

Iowa

Kentucky

North Dakota

Oklahoma

South Carolina

Washington

Figure 69 US Exports of Excavating Machinery to Rus sia US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

0

$5000000

$10000000

$15000000

$20000000

$25000000

$30000000

$35000000

$40000000

$45000000

$50000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 46 102017 404 PM

47

Upon reviewing the current trend in US- Russia economic relations we must acknowledge that

the existing trade model is obsolete and exhausted Imports are resource- oriented and reflect

constraints of the Rus sian economic structure while five groups of goodsmdash oil metals nuclear

fuels fertilizers and fishmdash make up more than 90 percent of total imports from Rus sia (Figure 71)

Each of these industries has a limited capacity for growth in the foreseeable future

Rus siarsquos core export to the United Statesmdash oilmdash will inevitably decrease in the mid- term under any

scenario The value and volume of Rus sian exports to the United States are open to global market

volatility and po liti cal pressures with limited hedging mechanisms

Overall US exports to Rus sia are unsustainable due to bilateral po liti cal tensions the whims of

commodity markets and changing domestic policies Sanctions and counter- sanctions have

created additional barriers particularly in finance banking high- tech energy and agro- business

According to the American Chamber of Commerce 69 percent of US companies working in the

country consider the impact of US sanctions against Rus sia on their business as negative At the

same time 60 percent of companies do not expect big changes in business relations between

Rus sia and the United States under Trump1 as the new law codifies existing sanctions fortifies

them and extends them to new sectors

Current US investments are low due to the weak rule of law in Rus sia a lack of property right

protections and proper contract enforcement high levels of statization and monopolization in the

economy a poor business climate outdated capital stock dependence on natural- resource

sectors and of course sanction and counter- sanction mea sures Bloated administrative compo-

nents created as risk mitigation instruments have also served as impediments The countryrsquos

institutional weakness low level of productivity bud get constraints and a declining inflexible

workforce will restrain future economic growth even if commodity prices recover Rus sian eco-

nomic policy will likely continue to be statist and protectionist relying mostly on import

substitutions

1 Ibid 11

Existing Trends and Future Scenarios

07

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 47 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations48

What scenarios can be expected in such a challenging environment

One probability (no peace no war) is based on the assumption that matters will not deteriorate

further and implementation of the Sanctions Act will be cursory This will cause relatively slow

degradation in the economic field with occasional flashes of activity in selected areas (eg closer

cooperation against Islamist terrorist groups in Syria)

A second worse case or critical scenario is the intensive and full- scale execution of current sanc-

tion legislation and even the imposition of new economic punitive and restrictive mea sures which

could incite asymmetric retaliatory actions and lead to the introduction of additional protectionist

policies This in turn could trigger a further escalation of mutual confrontation and could eventu-

ally destroy the fundamentals of the current bilateral trade system Rus sian leadership has charac-

terized the Sanctions Act as a declaration of a trade war that ends all hope for improving bilateral

relations2

2 Дмитрий Медведев ldquoПодписание президентом США нового санкционного закона против России создает несколько

последствийrdquo [The US Presidentrsquos signing of the package of new sanctions against Rus sia will have a few conse-

quences] Facebook August 2 2017 https wwwfacebook com Dmitry Medvedev posts 10154587161801851

Figure 71 US Imports from Rus sia Share of Oil Metals Nuclear Fuel Fertilizers and Fish Million US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

93

94

93

94

95

96

93

92

87

89

0

$5000

$10000

$15000

$20000

$25000

$30000

$35000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

US Imports from Russia

Share of Oil Metals Nuclear FuelFertilizers and Fish

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 48 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 49

The best case and most favorable scenario looks less probable now It assumes the realization of

structural reforms in Rus sia in such a way that would adapt Rus siarsquos foreign policy to national

economic needs reduce confrontations with the West and make a concerted efort to integrate

Rus sian businesses into global supply and value chains A revitalization of the structural reform

agendamdash including eforts to diversify economic activities through de- monopolization and support

for SMEs a restructuring of the banking sector the creation of a vibrant business climate to foster

entrepreneurships and innovation the implementation of administrative and judicial reforms to

tackle red tape and endemic corruption and the reduction of state control over key sectors of the

economy via wide- spread privatization could kick- start the development of a nonoil economy and

improve long- term growth prospects Despite ongoing discussion of reform strategies deep

economic and po liti cal changes are extremely complicated over the next po liti calelectoral cycle

(2018ndash2024) particularly because of re sis tance of vested interests and growing commodity prices

The urgency to tackle structural shortcomings in natu ral resource- dependent economies usually

correlates with the price of those resources and the degree to which resource rents drive eco-

nomic activity However there may be marginal improvements in the efficiency of the current

economic system

Future US- Russia relations can be thought of through three pillars one pillar focuses on areas

where both countries maintain a competitive rivalry another looks at potential areas of interaction

under pres ent conditions a third pillar and one that has evaporated from the current bilateral

agenda concentrates on future cooperation Stronger economic ties could not only be a kind of

po liti cal shock absorber but contribute to the building of this future (particularly business contacts

aim to support future structural reforms) although po liti cal factors are depressing the prospects

for cooperation To escape deadlock it will be impor tant to establish the right balance between

politics and economics and create a model of collaboration within the framework of contention

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 49 102017 404 PM

About the Author

Vadim Grishin PhD MBA has been involved in the reform pro cess in Rus sia as adviser to the

deputy prime minister of Rus sia in 1992ndash1993 and 2006ndash2010 He has extensive experience

working with the Bretton Woods Institutions He was the board member of the World Bank Group

and served as se nior adviser at the International Monetary Fund Currently he is a con sul tant to the

chief economistrsquos office of the International Finance Corporation and teaches the economics of

transition at Georgetown University in Washington DC

50

594-71613_ch99_4Pindd 50 102017 403 PM

Blank

COVER PHOTO ADOBE STOCK

1616 Rhode Island Avenue NW

Washington DC 20036

202 887 0200 | wwwcsisorg

v++ISBN 978-1-4422-8035-9

Lanham bull Boulder bull New York bull London

4501 Forbes Boulevard

Lanham MD 20706

301 459 3366 | wwwrowmancom

A U T H O R

Vadim Grishin

Myths and Realities

A Report of the

CSIS RUSSIA AND EURASIA PROGRAM

US-RussiaEconomicRelations

O C T O B E R 2 0 1 7

Euml|xHSLEOCy280359z

The Man Pupu Nyor Rock Formations at the Northern Urals also known as Seven

Strong Man or Little Mountain of the God in the local tribe (Mansi) language

Page 13: U.S.-Russia Economic Relations: Myths and Realities · 2020-04-17 · OCTOBER 2017 U.S.- Russia Economic Relations Myths and Realities AUTHOR Vadim Grishin A REPORT OF THE CSIS RUSSIA

Vadim Grishin 7

$8244 billion in 20176 The real level from our perspective is usually between official and private

estimations around $40 billon But even this cumulative figure is less than the US FDI in Brazil

and China

The American Chamber of Commerce surveys have also revealed other impor tant data Eighty-

five percent of US companies doing business in Rus sia entered its market 10 or more years ago

while 60 percent of them ldquolandedrdquo there 20 years ago or earlier Only one percent have started

operations over the last five years confirming an obvious fact entry into the Rus sian market is

challenging because of growing monopolism risks associated with the business climate and a

stagnating economy7

6 American Chamber of Commerce in Rus sia ldquoInvestment and Import to Rus sia 2nd Surveyrdquo (Prepared by GfK for the

American Chamber of Commerce in Rus sia Moscow May 2017) 12

7 Ibid 4

Figure 22 US Trade in Goods and in Ser vices with China India Brazil Rus sia and South Africa Billion US$ 2016

Source USTR ldquoCountries amp Regionsrdquo See US- China Trade Facts US- India Trade Facts US- Brazil Trade

Facts US- South Africa Trade Facts and US- Russia Trade Facts

0

$100

$200

$300

$400

$500

$600

$700

China India Brazil Russia South Africa

Trade in Services

Total Goods Trade

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 7 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations8

Rus sian direct investment position toward the United States declined from $215 billion in 2013 to

$83 billion in 2015 (Figure 23) Taking into account dif er ent channels and instruments the actual

volume of Rus sian investments in the United States made through ofshore Eu ro pean Canadian

and US companies may be several times greater than the available official data

Foreign investment in financial assets or foreign portfolio investment (FPI) should be included

even though Central Bank of Rus sia statistics indicate they were also quite low US investments in

equity were $345 million and in debt instruments were about $65 million in the fourth quarter of

20168 However these numbers do not reflect the real level of FPI Rus siarsquos stocks are incredibly

inexpensive while there has been impressive growth of US investments in short- term securities

and in foreign exchange (FX) operations (cash- and- carry trade) Rus sia was among the top per-

forming emerging markets in 2016 gaining 4744 percent in US dollars9 Nevertheless the gen-

eral capitalization of the stock exchange is tiny (less than 20 percent of GDP) comparable to the

capitalization of just one large US com pany such as Coca- Cola Many private sources believe that

the US FPI in Rus sia could be as high as several billion US dollars but a new set of sanctions

approved by President Trump on August 2 2017 if implemented could reverse those flows It is

still not clear whether the secretary of trea sury will prohibit participation in the oferings of Rus siarsquos

sovereign debt and the full range of derivative products A report on this subject should be sub-

mitted no later than 180 days after enactment of the law which means no later than Febru-

ary 2018 New legislation tightens prohibition on Rus sian financial companies already under

sanctions by limiting any new equity or debt with a maturity greater than 14 days (a provision that

8 Central Bank of Rus sia ldquoForeign Direct Investments in the Rus sian Federationrdquo accessed September 27 2017 www

cbr ru localization switchlanguage urlshy=shy news ampfromshy=shyru - ruamptoshy=shyen - gb

9 VanEck ldquoRus sian Stock Market Soars in 2016rdquo Seeking Alpha February 14 2017 https seekingalphacom article

4045602 - russian - stock - market - soars - 2016

Table 22 Summary Output of Regression Statistics (US Real GDP Rus sia Real GDP US- Russia Exports Imports and Total Trade)

Regression Statistics

Multiple R 0056445768

R Square 0003186125

Adjusted R Square minus0042123597

Standard Error 2616043923

Observations 24

Sources IMF statistics authorrsquos computation

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 8 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 9

previously allowed for 30 days) Similarly US persons are prohibited from taking on any new debt

that has a maturity greater than 60 days (previously it was 90 days) with Rus sian energy compa-

nies currently under sanctions10

According to the Trea sury Department Rus sia held $1029 billion in US Trea sury securities in

June 201711 Could Rus sia withdraw all its reserves from the United States and use this action as a

retaliatory mea sure Such a scenario is unlikely since there is no comparable safe- haven alterna-

tive to US dollars When Rus siarsquos US Trea sury holdings dropped 50 percent from $176 billion

(October 2010) to $90 billion (November 2011) the market did not notice12 Nevertheless Rus sian

authorities have announced they will decrease dependence on assets and payments in US dollars13

10 Countering Amer i carsquos Adversaries through Sanctions Act HR 3364

11 US Department of Trea sury Major Foreign Holders of Trea sury Securities September 18 2017 http ticdata

treasury gov Publish mfh txt

12 Ibid

13 ldquoНовый виток санкций Россия откажется от доллараrdquo [A new round of sanctions Rus sia will abandon the dollar]

Газетару August 7 2017 https wwwgazeta ru business 2017 08 07 10821937 shtml

Figure 23 Rus sia Outward FDI Position United States Equities and Debt Million US$ 2009ndash2016

Source Central Bank of the Rus sian Federation External Sector Statistics Rus sian Direct Investments

Abroad accessed September 27 2017 https wwwcbr ru localization switchlanguage urlshy=shy news

ampfromshy=shyru - ruamptoshy=shyen - gb

$6000

$8000

$10000

$12000

$14000

$16000

$18000

$20000

$22000

2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 9 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations10

Officially the country does not invest in the US stock exchange although some Rus sian oligarchs

have bought US corporate bonds and equities in large amounts The new sanctions law requires

the secretary of trea sury in consultation with the director of national intelligence and the secretary

of state to issue reports on Rus sian se nior po liti cal figures and oligarchs based on their closeness

to the Rus sian regime and their net worth as well as the exposure of key economic sectors of the

United States to Rus sian po liti cally exposed persons and parastatal entities including at a mini-

mum the banking securities insurance and real estate sectors14

Only three Rus sian companies are listed in the US exchanges

Overall the scale and scope of US- Russia economic interaction and business activity is much greater

than officially appreciated but not significant enough to be taken into consideration by policymakers

14 Countering Amer i carsquos Adversaries through Sanctions Act HR 3364

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 10 102017 404 PM

11

03

Politics in the Driverrsquos Seat

Bilateral economic relations depend to a great extent on global and national economic cycles

After the recent global financial crisis the US economy has shown surprisingly sustainable GDP

growth while the Rus sian economy was the most afected among BRICS countries by the turbu-

lence of a worldwide economic downturn in 2008ndash2009 and after a short- term rebound slipped

into stagnation (2012ndash2013) and then into full- scale recession (2014ndash2016) The countryrsquos eco-

nomic cycle however appears to be changing once again with the economy returning to a

pattern of growth albeit uneven and gradual (Figures 31 and 32) Even with sanctions still in place

conditions have improved as a result of the stabilization of Urals oil to an average annual price of

$419 per barrel in 2016 The gains were sparked in part by major crude producers agreeing to cut

production after hefty price drops in 2014 and 2015 Supported by easier financial conditions

higher oil prices and growing macro- stability Rus sia is heading toward a moderate growth rate

that is expected to reach 14 percent this year according to forecasts of the World Bank Group

(WBG) and the IMF1

Because of the significant role that politics plays in any bilateral interaction it is impor tant to

combine economic and po liti cal cycles applying a ldquoresetrdquo to bilateral economic cooperation in

addition to the po liti cal relationship I have compared po liti cal cycles and trade dynamics using the

following graphs ( Table 31 and Figure 33) These charts do not pretend to reflect with mathemati-

cal precision all shifts in the bilateral po liti cal relationship but rather attempt to visually align

impor tant economic and po liti cal moments to detect the efects of po liti cal events on the size of

bilateral trade

Figure 33 shows all pos si ble combinations economic trends at the intersection of po liti cal devel-

opments oppose or support each other in synchronization It is evident that po liti cal interference

1 International Monetary Fund Rus sian Federation Staff Concluding Statement of the 2017 Article IV Mission (Wash-

ington DC IMF 2017) World Bank Group From Recession to Recovery Rus sia Economic Report no 37 (Washington

DC World Bank 2017) http pubdocsworldbank org en 383241495487103815 RER - 37 - May26 - FINAL - with - summary

pdf

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 11 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations12

in bilateral business afairs in the early 2000s was less significant than in later years As result

growing po liti cal tensions from 2003 to 2008 did not dramatically afect bilateral economic inter-

action It is also easier to explain why 2011ndash2012 resulted in rec ord trade and investmentmdash a con-

sequence of very high oil prices GDP growth in both countries improved legislation after Rus siarsquos

accession to the WTO and the Obamandash Medvedev po liti cal reset From 2014 to 2016 a perfect

storm of developments added efficiency to Western sanctions and augmented the damaging

consequences of counter- sanction mea sures

Figure 33 also confirms that in times of reduced economic cooperation po liti cal pressures can

easily change bilateral economic trends Moreover business interests along with economic inter-

actions have a limited capacity to reverse the po liti cal mainstream

Figure 31 Economic Cycle 2014ndash2016

Source Authorrsquos evaluation of international financial institutions (IFI) data and sources from respective

countries

Sustainable Growth

Brazil

Negative Growth

Unstable Growth

Mexico

Descending Growth

Argentina

EU

US

Russia

Vietnam

China

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 12 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 13

Table 31 Po liti cal Cycles in Bilateral US- Russia Relations 1999ndash2016

2001ndash2002 The George W Bushndash Vladimir Putin Reset Rus sia supported ldquoglobal war on terrorismrdquo launched by the United States after 911 the SORT nuclear arms reduction treaty was signed by the United States and Rus sia and a successful business dialogue was developed that created the current structure of economic relations

2003ndash2008 Deterioration in bilateral relations brought on by the Iraq War Georgiarsquos ldquoRose Revolutionrdquo Mikhail Khodorkovskyrsquos arrest Ukrainersquos ldquoOrange Revolutionrdquo Kosovorsquos in de pen dence and the Georgian War

2009ndash2010 The Barack Obamandash Dmitry Medvedev Reset Rus sia served as a logistical hub for transportation and supply of US forces in Af ghan i stan United States and Rus sia signed the new START nuclear arms reduction treaty Rus sia backed tighter economic sanctions on Iran Rus sia gained access to the WTO after 18 years of negotiations

2011ndash2016 Deterioration in bilateral relations caused by the Ukrainian crisis which were followed by sanctions and counter- sanctions along with the Syrian crises and cyber- enabled activities

Source Authorrsquos evaluation of po liti cal and economic data

Note SORTthinsp=thinspStrategic Ofensive Reductions Treaty STARTthinsp=thinspStrategic Arms Reduction Treaty

Figure 32 Economic Cycle 2017ndash2019

Source Authorrsquos evaluation of IFI data and sources from respective countries

Egypt

VenezuelaEU

South Africa

Brazil

Russia

India

US

Descending Growth

Korea

China

Negative Growth

Unstable Growth

Sustainable Growth

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 13 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations14

Figure 33 US- Russia Trade Million US$ vs Po liti cal Cycle 2000ndash2016

Sources US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo Foreign Trade last modified June 29 2017

https wwwcensus gov foreign - trade balance c4621 html (see data for 2000ndash2016) authorrsquos evaluation

of po liti cal and economic data

Orange Revolution

Khodorkovskys arrest

GeorgianWar

Bush- Putin Reset

Iraq War Global Financial Crisis

Obama-Medvedev Reset

Russias WTO accession

New START Treaty

A Pefect Storm the Ukranian Crisis Oil Prices Crashing

Sanctions and Counter-Sanctions

$3000

$8000

$13000

$18000

$23000

$28000

$33000

$38000

$43000

2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 14 102017 404 PM

15

The current structure of US- Russia economic relations emerged in the early 2000s when the

model of trade and investment interaction took on a character similar to that which existed be-

tween the United States and developing economies US imports from Rus sia centered on com-

modities while technology along with food products lead American exports The primary

exception was that Rus sia supplied nuclear fuel including highly enriched uranium extracted from

nuclear weapons for US power plants and provided ser vices to the aerospace industry primarily

in satellite launches However both these exceptions can be explained as a legacy of the Soviet

past and not a harbinger of the future economic relationship (Figure 41)

In the last 15 years this trade structure has not changed significantly The only noticeable shift in

trade was a dramatic drop (to practically nothing) in exports of US agricultural products a result

of Rus siarsquos policy of import substitution and so- called counter- sanction mea sures it took in re-

sponse to US sanctions over the Ukraine crisis (Figure 42)

Promising new directions of cooperation in the IT sector and in engineering ser vices for the

aerospace industry appeared in the early 2000s1 but did not spill into other sectors and conse-

quently did little to renew economic cooperation on the whole The integration of Rus sian high-

tech ser vices into large- scale global production and value chains was constrained by the usual

culprits a lack of financial resources managerial experience skilled labor modern infrastructure

RampD investments and an adequate business environment High commodity prices incentivized the

restoration of an economic system centered on resource rents The leading role of oil and gas

extraction and transportation discouraged the development of a nonenergy sector that might

have created advanced and complex production and ser vices An import substitution policy could

not work efficiently in an economic environment plagued by the Dutch disease where currency

1 The Boeing Design Center was created in Moscow It consists of nearly 250 Boeing employees managing

a team of 1200 contract engineers from Rus sian and Ukrainian aerospace companies ldquoBackgrounder Boeing in

Rus siardquo Boeing last modified January 2017 http wwwboeing com resources boeingdotcom company key _ orgs

boeing - international pdf russia - cisbackgrounder pdf

Are the United States and Rus sia ldquoNatu ralrdquo Trading Partners A Little Bit of History

04

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 15 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations16

inflows (oil money) lead to ruble appreciation and render a countryrsquos production less competitive

During that time Rus siarsquos industry did not receive preferential access to larger markets and could

not expand its share in the global economy particularly because of its self- isolation from the

regional trade agreements (except for its participation in the Eurasian Economic Union with some

neighboring countries of the former Soviet Union) As a result neither import substitution nor

export- led strategy promoted growth and specialization in nonoil production A long- awaited

modernization and reallocation of resources from an inefficient nontrade sector to a trade sector

did not materialize

These limits were later augmented with sanctions and an extension of domestic restrictions on

cooperation with Western partners Importantly the rapid growth of state- monopoly structures in

the Rus sian economy over the past 15 years has created additional obstacles to the development

and diversification of US- Russia economic ties

Figure 41 US Imports from Rus sia US$ 2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2016)

Fish and shellfish 3

Crude oil 5

Fuel oil 37

Petroleum products other

8

Nuclear fuel materials

7

Chemicals-fertilizers 4

Steelmaking materials 5

Iron and steel mill products 4

Bauxite and aluminum 9

Other precious metals 4

Nonferrous metals other 1

Finished metal shapes 1

Synthetic rubber--primary

1

Spacecraftexcluding military

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 16 102017 404 PM

Fig

ure

42

U

S E

xpo

rts

to R

us s

ia U

S$ 2

016

Sou

rce

US

Ce

nsu

s B

ure

au ldquo

Trad

e in

Go

od

s w

ith

Ru

s sia

rdquo (s

ee

dat

a fo

r 2

016

)

Bak

ery

pro

du

cts

Win

e b

eer

an

d r

elat

ed

pro

du

cts

New

spri

nt

Pla

stic

mat

eria

ls

Ch

emic

als-

fert

ilize

rs

Ch

emic

als-

ino

rgan

icC

hem

ical

s-o

rgan

ic

Ch

emic

als-

oth

erC

ott

on

fib

er c

loth

In

du

stri

al r

ub

ber

pro

du

cts

Min

eral

su

pp

lies-

man

ufa

ctu

red

Gen

erat

ors

acc

esso

ries

Ele

ctri

c ap

par

atu

s

Dri

llin

g amp

oilfi

eld

eq

uip

men

t Sp

ecia

lized

min

ing

Exc

avat

ing

mac

hin

ery

No

nfa

rm t

ract

ors

an

d p

arts

In

du

stri

al e

ng

ines

Fo

od

to

bac

co m

ach

iner

y M

etal

wo

rkin

g m

ach

ine

too

ls

Tex

tile

sew

ing

m

ach

ines

W

oo

d g

lass

p

last

ic

Pu

lp a

nd

pap

er

mac

hin

ery

Mea

suri

ng

tes

tin

g

con

tro

l in

stru

men

ts

Mat

eria

ls h

and

ling

equ

ipm

ent

Ind

ust

rial

mac

hin

es

oth

er

Ph

oto

ser

vice

ind

ust

ry m

ach

iner

y A

gri

cult

ura

l mac

hin

ery

eq

uip

men

t C

om

pu

ters

Co

mp

ute

r ac

cess

ori

es

Sem

ico

nd

uct

ors

Tel

eco

mm

un

icat

ion

seq

uip

men

t

Bu

sin

ess

mac

hin

es a

nd

eq

uip

men

t

Lab

ora

tory

tes

tin

g in

stru

men

ts

Med

icin

al e

qu

ipm

ent

Civ

ilian

air

craf

t e

ng

ines

eq

uip

men

t a

nd

par

ts

Rai

lway

tra

nsp

ort

atio

n

equ

ipm

ent

Ves

sels

exc

lud

ing

scr

ap

Co

mm

erci

al v

esse

ls o

ther

M

arin

e en

gin

es p

arts

Spac

ecra

ft e

xclu

din

g

mili

tary

Pas

sen

ger

car

s

new

an

d u

sed

Tru

cks

bu

ses

and

sp

ecia

l p

urp

ose

ve

hic

les

En

gin

es a

nd

en

gin

e p

arts

(c

arb

ure

tors

pis

ton

s r

ing

s

and

val

ves)

B

od

ies

and

ch

assi

s fo

r p

asse

ng

er c

ars

Au

tom

oti

ve t

ires

an

d t

ub

es

Oth

er p

arts

an

d a

cces

sori

es o

f ve

hic

les

Ap

par

el h

ou

seh

old

go

od

s -

text

ile

Ph

arm

aceu

tica

lp

rep

arat

ion

s

Furn

itu

re h

ou

seh

old

go

od

s

etc

R

ug

s

Cel

l ph

on

es a

nd

oth

er

ho

use

ho

ld g

oo

ds

ne

c

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 17 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations18

Figure 43 US Trade in Goods with Rus sia Million US$ 1992ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 1992ndash2016)

Russian Financial Crisis

Oil price Increased from$2446 USD per barrel (2001)

to $9694 USD per barrel(2008)

Global Financial Crisis

Oil price high record in2011-2012

(more that $111 USD perbarrel)

Oil price crashed

$-

$5000

$10000

$15000

$20000

$25000

$30000

$35000

$40000

$45000

$50000

1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

US Imports from Russia US Exports to Russia US-Russia Trade in Goods

No doubt po liti cal ups and downs add volatility to US- Russia trade Nevertheless Rus siarsquos eco-

nomic structure exhausted itself before the Ukrainian crisis and the recent Rus sian recession Its

limitations are not only due to some mistakes in policy or negative coincidences of circumstances

but rather to deeply rooted properties in the current bilateral trade model related to structural

issues in the Rus sian economy Structural constraints such as the weak enforcement of property

rights poor business regulation and nondiversified exports weighed on Rus sian trade with the

United States From this perspective the term ldquonaturalunnatural trading partnersrdquo does not ad-

dress the unused capacity of bilateral interaction or the real challenges that kind of interaction

faces It just adds metaphysical flavor to the very specific economic and po liti cal factors that

determine the US- Russia trajectory

Overall the outlines of bilateral trade (Figure 43) resemble the famous ldquoRus sian Mountainsrdquo that

were a pre de ces sor of the modern roller coaster icy hills supported by wooden constructionsmdash a

rigid and immobile structure that sooner or later would melt This unfortunately is what is hap-

pening to US- Russia trade cooperation now

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 18 102017 404 PM

19

ARE LITTLE FISH REALLY SWEET

Low US- Russia economic interaction has at least two consequences First it limits the capacity of

policymakers to exploit trade as an instrument for geopo liti cal combat Even the question of a US

trade deficit which used to be a headache for many US trading partners has become so insig-

nificant in absolute terms (about $87 billion in 2016) that it seems hardly worth caring about

When the volume of trade between two countries becomes very small in absolute terms whether

a country is running a surplus or deficit is no longer relevant But it also renders another type of

confrontations (sometimes more dangerous) more likely since the two traders have little to lose

Second in an environment marked by low levels of bilateral trade both sides could incentivize (if

and when a desire for po liti cal rapprochement exists) the signing of new trade deals which are

elevated symbolically as a turning point in bilateral po liti cal relations (ie the sale of Boeings to

Rus sia or the delivery via tankers of Rus sian oil to US refineries) Sometimes markets themselves

pres ent ldquogiftsrdquo that can be capitalized on po liti cally US- USSR grain trade in the 1970s was one

such ldquogiftrdquo large sales of American grain to the Soviet Union helped US policymakers win favor

with the po liti cally impor tant American farming sector and permitted Soviet leaders to maintain

access to a dietary staple for the Soviet population

The strong 32 percent growth in value of US imports from Rus sia from January to May 2017

versus January to May 2016 ( Table 51) is an example of a development that has tempted officials

to pres ent it as a sign of positive change due to ldquogrowing business activitiesrdquo (this kind of statement

was heard before the bilateral summit in Germany in July 2017) although the reason for that leap

was evidently an increase in commodity prices (mainly of oilmdash see Table 52) and not a rise in

entrepreneurial interactions The primary beneficiaries of that upside rally have been two other

petro- economies Saudi Arabia and Venezuela ( Tables 53 and 54)

Sector Analyses

05

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 19 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations20

Table 51 US Imports from Rus sia Million US$ Januaryndash May 2016 vs Januaryndash May 2017

Year January February March April May Total

2016 9603 6871 11097 12257 10977 50805

2017 12215 10220 16979 13471 14147 67032

Change 271 487 530 99 289 319

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 1992ndash2016)

Table 52 Change in Urals Crude Oil Prices US$ per Barrel Januaryndash May 2016 vs Januaryndash May 2017

Januaryndash May 2016 Januaryndash May 2017 Change ($) Change ()

3601 5129 1528 424

Source Ministry of Finance of the Rus sian Federation https wwwminfin ru ru ixzz4mMIZ7XtC

Table 53 US Imports from Saudi Arabia Million US$ Januaryndash May 2016 vs Januaryndash May 2017

Year January February March April May Total

2016 15114 9036 13555 10844 14679 63228

2017 19802 20298 21650 16211 19542 97503

Change 3101 12463 5972 495 331 542

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Saudi Arabiardquo Foreign Trade last modified June 29 2017

https wwwcensus gov foreign - trade balance c5170 html (see data for 2016ndash2017)

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 20 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 21

Table 54 US Imports from Venezuela Million US$ Januaryndash May 2016 vs Januaryndash May 2017

Year January February March April May Total

2016 6657 5560 7140 8007 7922 35286

2017 13041 10864 123500 11148 12243 59646

Change 9590 9540 7297 3923 5454 6903

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Venezuelardquo Foreign Trade last modified June 29 2017

https wwwcensus gov foreign - trade balance c3070 html (see data for 2016ndash2017)

Table 55 US Exports to Rus sia Million US$ Januaryndash May 2016 vs Januaryndash May 2017

Year January February March April May Total

2016 3628 3577 7298 4657 4947 24107

2017 3144 4277 5386 6670 4806 24283

Change minus133 196 minus262 432 minus29 minus07

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2016ndash2017)

At the same time US exports to Rus sia continue to stagnate ( Table 55) due to low levels of

consumption during a two-and- a- half-year economic crisis a deep ruble devaluation sanctions

and counter- sanctions

Given the very dif er ent economic structures and resource endowments of Rus sia and the United

States it is not surprising that US- Russia trade is asymmetric and oil driven (Figure 51) A

3 percent increase in Urals oil prices translates into a one percent increase in US import growth

from Rus sia Thus in 2016 every $10 increase in Urals crude oil added $15 billion to the value of

US imports or 11 percent to the total value of imports from Rus sia

OIL ADDICTION

Oil is a core pillar of US- Russia bilateral trade A bumpy ride in oil markets afects commerce

Nevertheless Rus sian oil exports to the United States in physical terms have been rather

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 21 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations22

sustainable Starting from 2005 average annual deliveries have been above 150 million barrels

(Figure 52) Crude and heating oil have dominated while petroleum products and liquefied petro-

leum gases have not (Figure 53) In 2011 oil exports peaked at 228 million barrels but declined to

159 million barrels in 2016mdash a drop of 30 percent Rec ord high shipments of Rus sian oil to the United

States coincided with an elevation in oil prices which made the subsequent decline in oil shipment

value between 2011 and 2016 (by about 72 percent as shown in Figure 54) seem more stark The

increase in price also raised the share of oil in Rus sian exports by 74 percent in 2011 (Figure 55)

The Rus sian share in total US oil imports was around 55 percent in 2011 and 43 percent in 2016

( Table 56) In the last five years the United States has relied exclusively on consumption of Rus sian

oil for the rough equivalent of one week out of the year (Figure 56)

It is unlikely that Rus sia can significantly increase its share of the US oil market and there is a real

possibility for a downward trend There are several reasons the historically high Rus sian hydrocar-

bon export threshold of 2011 will not soon if ever be surpassed

First US energy consumption will likely be flat According to the US Energy Information Adminis-

tration (EIA) demand for petroleum and other liquids in the United States will be about 35ndash36

quadrillion British thermal units (BTUs) with minimal variation over the next 25 years1

1 US EIA ldquoAnnual Energy Outlook 2017 with Projections to 2050rdquo January 5 2017 7ndash8

Figure 51 US- Russia Trade Growth () vs US and Rus sia Real GDP Growth () 1993ndash2016

Source IMF ldquoIMF Datardquo accessed September 27 2017 http wwwimf org en Data US Census Bureau

ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo

Note rGDPthinsp=thinspreal gross domestic product

Trade

USA rGDP growth

Russia rGDP growth

-60

-40

-20

0

20

40

60

80

100

1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Gro

wth

All spikes in US-Russia trade have been connected with two main

variables volume and price of crude oil

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 22 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 23

Second the United States will become a net energy exporter between 2020 and 2030 in most

cases under dif er ent combinations of oil and natu ral gas prices GDP growth technological

breakthroughs and the availability of energy resources The role of oil imports will dramatically

fall2

Third oil price scenarios as described by the International Energy Agency (IEA) international

financial organ izations (IFIs) and many national agencies are very cautious and assume that even

by 2035 to 2040 oil prices will not to recover to the levels of 2011ndash20123

Fourth Rus sian oil production and export growth will be modest and driven by Asian economic

expansion and will comprise a decreasing share of Western markets4 According to forecasts from

2 Ibid 15ndash18

3 Ibid table 3 ldquoEnergy Prices by Sector and Sourcesrdquo World Bank World Bank Commodity Markets Price Forecasts

(Washington DC World Bank 2017) httpswwwworldbank org en research commodity - markets Organ ization of the

Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) World Oil Outlook 2016 (Vienna OPEC 2016)

4 E D Belotskaia et al Global and Rus sian Energy Outlook 2016 (Moscow Energy Research Institute of the Rus sian

Acad emy of Science Analytical Center for the Government of the Rus sian Federation 2016) http acgov ru files

publication a 12767 pdf

Figure 52 US Imports from Rus sia Crude Oil and Petroleum Products Thousands of Barrels 1995ndash2016

Source US EIA ldquoUS Imports by Country of Origin Rus siardquo Petroleum amp Other Liquids September 13

2017 http wwweia gov dnav pet PET _ MOVE _ IMPCUS _ D _ NUS _ NRS _ MBBL _ M htm

0

50000

100000

150000

200000

250000

Date 1995 1996 1997 1998 199920002001200220032004200520062007200820092010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 23 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations24

the Organ ization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) crude oil exports from Rus sia and

the Caspian region to the United States will dis appear by 20255

So why does the Rus sian Urals blend continue to be attractive for oil traders and US refineries

which could pro cess greater volumes of domestically produced lighter crude There are two main

reasons One is related to the preference of US high conversion refineries (the most sophisticated

in the world) to work with heavy oil blends produced by Canada Mexico Iraq Venezuela and

Rus sia Pro cessing heavy crude now is as profitable as pro cessing lighter crude The so- called

crack spreadmdash the diference between the cost of relatively cheap heavy crude oil and the final

price of value- added consumer products (diesel gasoline jet fuel and heating oil)mdash has become

the same as the refinery margins of light sweet crude6 This has primarily afected light oil produc-

ing countries such as Angola Algeria and Nigeria

5 OPEC World Oil Outlook 2016 306ndash309

6 ldquoHow Much for That Heavy Oilrdquo Oil Sands Magazine December 26 2015 https wwwoilsandsmagazine com

news 2015 12 26 how - much - for - that - heavy - oil

Figure 53 US Imports from Rus sia Oil and Petroleum Products US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

$-

$25000000000

$20000000000

$15000000000

$10000000000

$5000000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Liquefied petroleum gases

Petroleum products other

Fuel oil

Crude oil

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 24 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 25

Another factor afecting purchase of Rus sian oil is a new trend among oil companies for further

consolidation of scale and for integrating operations of upstream and downstream business7

There have been several waves of separation and unification of production transportation and

pro cessing in the last 50 years The current business cycle can be seen as an adaptation to a

period of low prices and oversupply Companies that buy andor produce oil in Rus sia most likely

prefer to transport and pro cess this oil in their own modern refineries in the United States At the

same time some of the newest refinery designs specifically for pro cessing heavy oils have been

built in Asia thus extending the choices of heavy oil producing countries

We should also consider that leading US and international oil traders along with oil producing

companies working with or owning US refineries frequently buy Rus sian oil on the open market

and have long- term contracts on Rus sian crude oil delivery Many Rus sian oil companies prefer to

pay for purchases or ser vices with their future production instead of cash creating situations of

ldquostickyrdquo oil imports that are difficult to replace The best- known example is an interaction between

7 ldquoEnergy and Utilities Sectorrdquo Roundtable Financier Worldwide December 2015 https wwwfinancierworldwide

com roundtable - energy - utilities - sector - dec15

Figure 54 US Imports of Oil and Petroleum Products from Rus sia vs Oil Prices Eu rope Brent Spot Price Free on Board (FOB) 1996ndash2017

Source US EIA ldquoUS Imports by Country of Origin Rus siardquo

0

20

40

60

80

100

120

140

0

5000

10000

15000

20000

25000

30000

Jan

-19

96

Jun

-19

96

No

v-19

96

Ap

r-19

97

Sep

-19

97

Feb

-19

98

Jul-

199

8D

ec-1

99

8M

ay-1

99

9O

ct-1

99

9M

ar-2

00

0A

ug

-20

00

Jan

-20

01

Jun

-20

01

No

v-2

00

1A

pr-

20

02

Sep

-20

02

Feb

-20

03

Jul-

20

03

Dec

-20

03

May

-20

04

Oct

-20

04

Mar

-20

05

Au

g-2

00

5Ja

n-2

00

6Ju

n-2

00

6N

ov-

20

06

Ap

r-2

00

7Se

p-2

00

7Fe

b-2

00

8Ju

l-2

00

8D

ec-2

00

8M

ay-2

00

9O

ct-2

00

9M

ar-2

010

Au

g-2

010

Jan

-20

11Ju

n-2

011

No

v-2

011

Ap

r-2

012

Sep

-20

12Fe

b-2

013

Jul-

20

13D

ec-2

013

May

-20

14O

ct-2

014

Mar

-20

15A

ug

-20

15Ja

n-2

016

Jun

-20

16N

ov-

20

16

USD

per

Bar

rel

Th

ou

san

d B

arr

els

US Imports from Russia of Crude Oil and Petroleum Products (Thousand Barrels)

Europe Brent Spot Price FOB (Dollars per Barrel)

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 25 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations26

Table 56 US Oil Imports All Countries vs Rus sia Thousand Barrels per Day 2011ndash2016

Years 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

All Countries 11436 10598 9859 9241 9449 10058

Rus sia 624 477 460 330 371 433

Share 546 450 467 357 393 431

Sources US EIA ldquoUS Imports by Country of Origin Total Crude Oil and Productsrdquo Petroleum amp Other

Liquids September 13 2017 wwweia gov dnav pet pet_move_impcus_a2_nus_ep00_im0_mbbl_m htm

authorrsquos computation

Figure 55 US Imports from Rus sia Share of Crude Oil and Petroleum Products Million US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

57

64

73

72

74

73

72

59

52 50

0

$5000

$10000

$15000

$20000

$25000

$30000

$35000

$40000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

US Imports from Russia

Share of Oil and Petroleum Products

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 26 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 27

the Rus sian state mono poly Rosneft and commodity trading and mining giant Glencore which

along with energy and commodities com pany Vitol participated in a $10 billion prepayment

deal with Rosneft for crude supplies in 2013

There have been a number of ongoing transactions between the Rus sian oil industry and interna-

tional oil companies including several that top the list of importers of Rus sian oil to the United

States ( Table 57) In December 2016 Glencore participated in a controversial privatization opera-

tion purchasing in tandem with the Qatar sovereign wealth fund a 195 percent stake in Rosneft

which was on the US and EU list of sanctioned firms8 Glencore has also taken a blocking stake in

midsize oil producer RussNeft BP owns a 1975 percent stake in Rosneft Chevron holds a

15 percent interest in the 935- mile- long CPC9 pipeline which transports an average of 959000

barrels of crude oil per day including 76000 barrels daily from Rus sia10 ExxonMobil has formed

8 E Mazneva and I Arkhipov ldquoRus sia Sells $11 Billion Stake in Rosneft to Glencore Qatarrdquo Bloomberg December 7

2016

9 CPCthinsp=thinspCaspian Pipeline Consortium

10 ldquoRus sia Highlights of Operations and Business Portfoliordquo Chevron accessed October 3 2017 https wwwchevron

com worldwide russia

Figure 56 Share of Rus sian Oil in Total US Oil Imports Thousands of Barrels per Day 1972ndash2016

Source US EIA ldquoUS Imports by Country of Origin Total Crude Oil and Productsrdquo

2000

4000

6000

8000

10000

12000

14000

16000

US Imports of Crude Oil and Petroleum Products (Thousand Barrels per Day)

US Imports from Russia of Crude Oil and Petroleum Products (Thousand Barrels per Day)19

7319

7419

7519

7619

7719

7819

7919

80

198

119

82

198

319

84

198

519

86

198

719

88

198

919

90

199

119

92

199

319

94

199

519

96

199

719

98

199

92

00

02

00

12

00

22

00

32

00

42

00

52

00

62

00

72

00

82

00

92

010

20

112

012

20

132

014

20

152

016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 27 102017 404 PM

Table 57 Top Importers of Rus sian Oil to the United States Thousands of Barrels 2016

VALERO MARKETING amp SUPPLY CO 54590 3616

EXXONMOBIL OIL CORP 17087 1130

CHEVRON USA INC 15217 1008

BP WEST COAST PRODUCTS LLC 10130 671

GEORGE E WARREN CORP 7272 48

PAULSBORO REFINING CO LLC 6838 453

TESORO CORP 5097 338

VITOL INC 5084 337

PHILLIPS 66 CO 4726 313

TRAFIGURA AG 4360 289

PAR HAWAII REFINING LLC 3893 258

MOTIVA ENTERPRISES LLC 3041 205

SHELL US TRADING CO 2863 19

MARATHON PETROLEUM CO LLC 2475 16

ATLANTIC TRADING amp MARKETING 2099 14

FREEPOINT COMMODITIES LLC 1439 1

GLENCORE LTD 1284 85

BEST PETROLEUM CORP 967 64

ROLYMPUS US COMMODITIES GROUP LLC 822 6

HUNT CRUDE OIL SUPPLY CO 666 4

GULF OIL LP 658 4

Source US EIA ldquoUS Imports by Country of Origin Crude Oilrdquo Petroleum amp Other Liquids September 13

2017 httpswwweiagovdnavpetpet_move_impcus_a2_nus_epc0_im0_mbblpd_ahtm authorrsquos

computation

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 28 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 29

several joint ventures with Rosneft to undertake ofshore exploration in the Black Sea and the Kara

Sea in Siberia11

According to the Sanctions Act US persons are prohibited from exporting or reexporting goods

ser vices (except financial ser vices) and technology in support of exploration or production of new

deep- water Arctic ofshore or shale oil proj ects that involve designated Rus sian entities or other

entities in which such sanctioned persons have a controlling interest or a substantial noncontrol-

ling owner ship interest defined as not less than 33 percent (previously it was 50 percent) The new

law also authorizesmdash but does not requiremdash the imposition of so- called secondary sanctions

against non- US entities that engage in activities involving the construction maintenance or

expansion of Rus sian energy export pipelines with a fair market value of $1 million or more or an

aggregate fair market value during a 12- month period of $5 million12 This provision has raised the

concerns of some Eu ro pean countries particularly Germany As result the final language of the

law included wording about coordination of this issue with allies of the United States

Shipments of Rus sian oil to the United States could be afected by activity in the US refinery

industry In early 2017 Saudi Aramco bought the United Statesrsquo largest oil refinery in Port Arthur

(Texas) and it announced plans to send more of its own crude to that refinery13 Serious concerns

exist however regarding the future of three refineries and nine pipelines owned by Citgo a US

branch of the Venezuelan state com pany PdVSA which is balancing precariously on the edge of

default Under certain conditions in the event of PdVSA bankruptcy Rosneft could claim a stake of

up to 499 percent in Citgo Such a possibility has raised concerns among politicians and US

government officials with Trea sury Secretary Steven Mnuchin calling it a ldquonational security issuerdquo14

Tables 58 59 and 510 show allocations of Rus sian oil imports to major US refineries some of

which work exclusively on Rus sian crude a total of two to three months per year In total 150940

thousand barrels of Rus sian oil were refined in 2016

Figure 57 confirms a leading position of Texas and Louisiana among the US states receiving

Rus sian crude followed by New Jersey California Mississippi Washington Hawaii and Delaware

In a paradoxical way Texas has dis appeared from the list of states as a main destination of US

imports from Rus sia (Figure 58) because Rus sian crude is mostly delivered to Louisiana ports and

registered there by US Customs as an import from Rus sia After that it transports to refineries in

Louisiana and Texas

Overall the short- term business rationale behind the sustainability of US oil imports from Rus sia

cannot overcome strong headwinds in the US energy sector facing all oil importers which will

inevitably lead to a contraction of Rus sian oil exports to the United States in the foreseeable future

11 Exxon eforts to receive a special US Trea sury waiver to drill in sanctioned Rus sia failed in 2017

12 Countering Amer i carsquos Adversaries through Sanctions Act HR 3364

13 Sarp Ozkan ldquoSaudi Aramcorsquos Port Arthur Refinery and the US Refinery Fleetrdquo Drilling Info May 11 2017

https infodrillinginfo com saudi - aramcos - port - arthur - refinery - us - refinery - fleet

14 Graham Kates ldquoTrea sury Secretary Rus siarsquos Citgo Deal a National Security Issuerdquo CBS News May 1 2017

http wwwcbsnews com news rosneft - citgo - steven - mnuchin - national - security

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 29 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations30

Table 58 Valerorsquos Refineries Pro cessing Rus sian Oil Thousands of Barrels 2016

Saint Charles Louisiana 29206 535

Corpus Christi Texas 20626 378

Wilmington California 4250 78

Total USA 54590 100

Source US EIA ldquoRefinery Capacity Reportrdquo January 1 2017

table 5 wwweia gov petroleum refinerycapacity table5 pdf

authorrsquos computation

Table 59 ExxonMobil Refineries Pro cessing Rus sian Oil Thousands of Barrels 2016

Baytown Texas 15037 88

Baton Rouge Louisiana 2046 12

Total USA 17083 100

Source US EIA ldquoRefinery Capacity Reportrdquo authorrsquos computation

Table 510 Chevronrsquos Refineries Pro cessing Rus sian Oil Thousands of Barrels 2016

Pascagoula Mississippi 12767 840

El Segundo California 2372 155

Saint Rose Louisiana 78 05

Total USA 15217 100

Source US EIA ldquoRefinery Capacity Reportrdquo authorrsquos computation

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 30 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 31

HEAVY METAL

Taken together US imports of metals and US imports of oil compose about 80 percent of US

total imports from Rus sia (Figure 59) Trade of metals like other commodities is strongly afected

by market price fluctuations Nevertheless metal imports from Rus sia have been fairly resilient to

market volatility and their average annual value has hovered at about $4 billion in the last five years

(Figure 510) This market resilience was forged at the end of the 1990searly 2000s when Rus sian

metal producers gradually modernized their plants adjusting quality of production to Western

standards and enhancing integration into global value and supply chains Some of them conquered

their share of the highly competitive US market struggling with peers from Canada and certain

BRICS countries (China India and Brazil) To attract additional resources all Rus sian large metal-

producing companies became public and were listed on stock exchanges chiefly the London Stock

Exchange (Severstalrsquo PAO Evraz MMK OAO Novolipetsk Steel Norilsk Nikel and TMK PAO) one

on the New York Stock Exchange (Mechel) and one on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange (Rusal)

Business logic pushed some of them to invest in the US metal- making industry which was hit

hard by crisis Later on some of those assets were sold (eg two US steel mills acquired by

Severstal in 2004 were purchased 10 years later by Steel Dynamics Inc and AK Steel Corp)

Figure 57 Share of US States Rus sian Oil Imports 2016

Source US EIA ldquoUS Imports from Rus sia of Crude Oil and Petroleum Productsrdquo Petroleum amp Other

Liquids September 29 2017 https www eia gov dnav pet hist LeafHandler ashx nshy=shyPETampsshy=shyMTTIM _ NUS

- NRS _ 1ampfshy=shyM authorrsquos computation

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

100

Maine

Massachusetts

Maryland

Connecticut

Georgia

Rhode Island

Virginia

Florida

New York

Alabama

Puerto Rico

Pennsylvania

Delaware

Hawaii

Washington

Mississippi

California

New Jersey

Louisiana

Texas

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 31 102017 404 PM

Figure 58 US Imports from Rus sia by State Million US$ 2013ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoState and Metropolitan Area Trade Datardquo Foreign Trade last modified

October 2 2017 https wwwcensus gov foreign - trade statistics state

Alaska

Connecticut

Delaware

Hawaii

Louisiana

Maryland

North Dakota 0

$1000

$2000

$3000

$4000

$5000

$6000

2013 2014 2015 2016

Alabama

Alaska

Connecticut

Delaware

Hawaii

Louisiana

Maryland

Maine

Mississippi

Montana

North Dakota

Mississippi

Figure 59 US Imports from Rus sia Share of Oil and Metals Million US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 1992ndash2016)

83

82

85

86

87

88

85

82

7375

0

$5000

$10000

$15000

$20000

$25000

$30000

$35000

$40000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

US Imports from Russia

Share of Oil and Metals

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 32 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 33

Obviously the market dynamic of dif er ent metals varies (eg iron steel aluminum platinum and

nickel) Caps to increase their trade and production in a ldquored oceanrdquo global environment with

anemic demand is rather limited despite Figure 510 showing a spike of iron and steel imports

from Rus sia in 2014 and aluminum in 2016 Some opportunities may exist for Russian- owned steel

plants in the United States (such as NLMK) to participate in energy proj ects resumed under Presi-

dent Trump who has required that new pipelines use only American- made steel15

Rus sia occupies a special niche in the US market for titanium products a high- end metal indus-

try Twenty years ago a long- term contract was signed between Rus sian titanium producer

VSMPO- AVISMA and Boeing The Rus sian com pany entered the selective club of Boeing suppliers

for the manufacture of components and semi- finished products Since the signing of this contract

VSMPO has delivered more than 35 percent of all titanium placed on Boeing civil aircraft16 They

are hidden in the trade data in an import category for Civilian Aircrafts and Parts (Figure 511) At

the end of 2016 Boeing announced an extension of its framework agreement with AVISMA

15 E Scheyder C Ngai and T Sylvester ldquoAmerican Steel Unlikely to Get Keystone Boost Despite Trump Orderrdquo

Reuters January 27 2017 http wwwreuters com article usa - trump - pipeline - transcanada - idUSL1N1FH1ZD

16 A Kramer ldquoTitanium Fills Vital Role for Boeing and Rus siardquo New York Times July 5 2013 http wwwnytimes com

2013 07 06 business global titanium - fills - vital - role - for - boeing - and - russia html mcubzshy=shy3

Figure 510 US Imports from Rus sia Iron Steel Bauxite Aluminum Nickel Nonferrous Metals and Other Precious Metals and Materials US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 1992ndash2016)

0

$6000000000

$5000000000

$4000000000

$3000000000

$2000000000

$1000000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 20122013

20142015

2016

Finished metal shapes

Iron and steel advanced

Iron and steel products nec

Nonferrous metals other

Other precious metals

Nickel

Bauxite and aluminum

Iron and steel mill products

Steelmaking materials

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 33 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations34

through 2022 and additional investments in the construction of a new robotic plant in Titanium

Valley a special economic zone located in the Sverdlovsk region that will open in 2018 The pro-

cessing of titanium forgings in all Boeing civil aircraft will be performed there including 787s 737

MAXs and 777Xs17 The contract extension with AVISMA may add several hundred million dollars

in value to annual US imports from Rus sia

How can such heavy reliance on imports of Rus sian titanium exist during a period of rising geopo-

liti cal tensions The answer is straightforward VSMPO- AVISMA is a highly specialized natu ral

mono poly producing 45 percent of the worldrsquos aerospace titanium Only four other countries

smelt high- grade titanium in industrial quantities the United States Germany Japan and China

Overall global production capacity is limited while demand is growing The United States cur-

rently imports around 79 percent of all the titanium it consumes each year18

17 ldquoBoeing and VSMPO Avisma to Launch Second Joint Production Siterdquo Rus sian Aviation Insider December 22 2016

http wwwrusaviainsider com boeing - and - vsmpo - avisma - to - launch - second - joint - production - site

18 Jon Ostrower and Andy Pasztor ldquoBoeing United Technologies Stockpile Titanium Partsrdquo Wall Street Journal

August 7 2014 https wwwwsj com articles boeing - united - technologies - stockpiling - titanium - parts - 1407441886

Figure 511 US Imports from Rus sia Civilian Aircrafts and Parts US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 1992ndash2016)

0

$20000000

$40000000

$60000000

$80000000

$100000000

$120000000

$140000000

$160000000

$180000000

$200000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Parts-civilian aircraft

Civilian aircraft

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 34 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 35

The Sanctions Act authorizes the secretary of the trea sury (in a nonmandatory way) to impose

restrictions (without specifying them) against Rus sian state- owned entities operating in the railway

metals and mining sectors of the Rus sian economy Despite the commanding heights of Rus siarsquos

state sector owner ship in its economy (70 percent of GDP) the metal- producing companies have

remained mostly in private hands

NUCLEAR AFFAIRS

Historically owners and operators of the 104 commercial nuclear power reactors in the United

States have purchased more than 80 percent of their uranium from foreign countries Uranium

shipping from Rus sia accounted for about 13 percent of the 58 million pounds of uranium pur-

chased overseas in 201219 At the same time the Rus sian state- owned mono poly Rosatom ac-

counts for 20 percent of Kazakhstanrsquos uranium production (which in turn comprises 11 percent of

all US uranium imports) and 20 percent of US domestic uranium production capacity (with

owner ship of exploration tracts in Wyoming)20

Nuclear fuel and nuclear power continue to be po liti cally sensitive topics both in the United

States and Rus sia Bilateral cooperation in this sector (being surprisingly stable with imports of

nuclear fuel from Rus sia at a level of $1 billion annually in the last five years [Figure 512 and 513])

is under constant po liti cal and lobbying pressure and has been a source of several po liti cal scan-

dals21 Consequently upside risks in this area of interaction are minimal and downside risks are

much higher especially when we are seeing more decommissioning of nuclear plants in the

United States than new constructions The US EIArsquos 2017 Annual Energy Outlook assumes

that about 25 percent of the nuclear capacity now operating will be removed from ser vice

by 205022

WHY IS THE GRASS GREENER ON THE OTHER SIDE

The United States continues to significantly reduce imports of chemical fertilizers as domestic pro-

duction increases In 2016 the United States imported 13 percent less ammonia and 11 percent

less urea and UAN which is a liquid urea and ammonium nitrate fertilizer Rus sia accounts for

around 40 percent of UAN imported by the United States The United States canceled antidumping

duties on imports of ammonium nitrate and urea from Rus sia in 2016 but it did not prevent import

19 US EIA ldquoThe US Relies on Foreign Uranium Enrichment Ser vices to Fuel Its Nuclear Power Plantsrdquo Today in

Energy August 28 2013 https wwweia gov todayinenergy detail php idshy=shy1273

20 Colin Chilcoat ldquoDoes Rus sia Really Own 20 Percent of the USrsquo Uranium Reservesrdquo OilPricecom May 6 2015

http oilpricecom Alternative - Energy Nuclear - Power Does - Russia - Really - Own - 20 - Of - The - US - Uranium - Reserves

html

21 Michelle Ye Hee Lee ldquoThe Facts behind Trumprsquos Repeated Claim about Hillary Clintonrsquos Role in the Rus sian Ura-

nium Dealrdquo Washington Post October 26 2016

22 US EIA ldquoAnnual Energy Outlook 2017 with Projections to 2050rdquo 81ndash82

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 35 102017 404 PM

Figure 512 US Imports from Rus sia Share of Oil Metals and Nuclear Fuel Million US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 1992ndash2016)

87

86

90

90

90

91

88

86

7882

0

$5000

$10000

$15000

$20000

$25000

$30000

$35000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

US Imports from Russia

Share of Oil Metals and Nuclear Fuel

Figure 513 US Imports from Rus sia Nuclear Fuel Materials US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

$-

$200000000

$400000000

$600000000

$800000000

$1200000000

$1000000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 36 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 37

drops twice last year (Figures 514 and 515) According to forecasts UAN imports are expected to

decline further to 15 million tons this year down over 46 percent from 28 million tons imported

last year23 The downside trend in imports of fertilizers will likely continue because of oversupply

BIG FISH

US imports of fish and shellfish from Rus sia are best understood in comparison with US fish

exports to the Rus sian market which slipped to zero in August 2014 after Rus sia issued an order

banning certain agricultural imports from the United States (Figure 516) While the volume of US

supply was not very large it was impor tant because it broke up the monopolistic dominance of a

few vertically integrated Rus sian companies that have kept prices high by restricting the entry of

new producers Seeking to implement import substitution policies Rus sia has tried to reduce

exports as well as imports of fish and seafood products in the last couple of years This symmetri-

cal approach was intended to ldquocompensaterdquo for a decrease of fish products in the domestic

23 Deepika Thapliyal ldquoPotashCorp Forecasts Sharp Drop in US Nitrogen Imports in 2017rdquo ICIS News February 7

2017 https wwwicis com resources news 2017 02 07 10076734 potashcorp - forecasts - sharp - drop - in - us - nitrogen

- imports - in - 2017

Figure 514 US Imports from Rus sia Share of Oil Metals Nuclear Fuel and Fertilizers Million US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

90

93

92

93

94

95

92

91

85

86

0

$5000

$10000

$15000

$20000

$25000

$30000

$35000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

US Imports from Russia

Share of Oil Metals Nuclear Fuel and Fertilizers

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 37 102017 404 PM

Figure 515 US Imports from Rus sia Chemical- Fertilizers US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

S-

$200000000

$400000000

$600000000

$800000000

$1000000000

$1200000000

$1400000000

$1600000000

$1800000000

$2000000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Figure 516 US Exports to Rus sia Fish and Shellfish US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

0

$10000000

$20000000

$30000000

$40000000

$50000000

$60000000

$70000000

$80000000

$90000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Fish and shellfish

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 38 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 39

consumer market caused by Rus siarsquos import ban but it has failed As result the group most af-

fected by the self- imposed counter- sanctions were Rus sian consumers

With a significant drop in fish imports a devaluation of the ruble and inflationary pressures on

seafood prices yearly consumption of fish in Rus sia has declined precipitously In 2015 alone

fish prices increased 20 percent and consumption dropped to 14 kilograms per person24 from

22 kilograms in 201425 In 2016 food rose to 355 percent of house hold expenditure as a result of

increases in food prices26 This has pushed vertically integrated fishing monopolies to sell even

more of their catch abroad rather than deliver to the Rus sian Federation (Figure 517) Thus we

cannot exclude the possibility of further growth in US fish and shellfish imports from Rus sia on a

marginal scale

24 Александр Савельев ldquoПотребление рыбы в России упало до 14 кг на человекаrdquo [Fish consumption in Rus sia fell to

14 kg per person] Экономика Интерфакс January 28 2015 http wwwinterfax ru business 492038

25 Илья Шестаков ldquoПотебление рыбы в России снизилось на 10 процентов из- за роста ценrdquo [Fish consumption in

Rus sia dropped by 10 percent due to price increases] RNS March 8 2017 https rnsonline consumer - market

Potreblenie - ribi - v - Rossii - snizilos - na - 10 - iz - za - rosta - tsen - 2017 - 03 - 08

26 Zoya Sheftalovich and Christian Oliver ldquoRus siarsquos Boom (Farming) Economyrdquo Politico November 8 2016 http

wwwpolitico eu article russias - boom - farming - economy

Figure 517 US Imports from Rus sia Fish and Shellfish US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

0

$50000000

$100000000

$150000000

$200000000

$250000000

$300000000

$350000000

$400000000

$450000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 39 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations40

SPACE ODYSSEY

Among high- end products beyond the top five groups of goods imported from Rus sia cheap and

efficient Rus sian engines have been used to launch US rockets into space for about 16 years

(Figure 518) There was a serious po liti cal strug gle around a 2014 ban on the purchase of Rus sian

RD-180 rocket engines revealing the conflicting business interests of power ful high- tech companies

This restrictive mea sure was temporary and was quickly lifted because of significant cost impacts

and risks of disruption to launch schedules27 For the same reason the Sanctions Act does not autho-

rize ldquothe imposition of any sanction or other condition limitation restriction or prohibition that

directly or indirectly impedes the supply by any entity of the Rus sian Federation of any product or

ser vice or the procurement of such product or ser vice by any contractor or subcontractor of the

United States or any other entity relating to or in connection with any space launch conducted for

the National Aeronautics and Space Administration or any other nonndash Department of Defense

customerrdquo28

Nevertheless many experts believe that US domestic alternatives to replace Rus sian engines will

be viable in five to eight years

27 Ken Dilanian ldquoWhy Does the US Use Rus sian Rockets to Launch Its Satellitesrdquo NBC News updated November 15

2016 http wwwnbcnews com why - does - u - s - use - russian - rockets - launch - its - satellites - n588526

28 Countering Amer i carsquos Adversaries through Sanctions Act HR 3364

Figure 518 Spacecraft Excluding Military US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

0

$20000000

$40000000

$60000000

$80000000

$100000000

$120000000

$140000000

$160000000

$180000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 40 102017 404 PM

41

Diversity and technological complexity are the most vis i ble advantages supporting US exports to

Rus sia Three major groups of export goods include civilian aircraft engines and parts (Figure 61)

drilling and oil field equipment (Figure 62) and industrial machines and engines (Figure 63)

Despite sanctions against the transfer of advanced oil producing and pro cessing technologies the

realization of US drilling and oil field equipment in Rus sia is sustainable although some bilateral

proj ects have been frozen

Another category of goods that has demonstrated resilience is the phar ma ceu ti cal industry (Fig-

ure 64) because most drugs in Rus sia are imported (about 70 percent of the Rus sian phar ma ceu-

ti cal market in value) Import substitution policies have had only modest results in this industry

As confirmed by American Chamber of Commerce surveys US exports to Rus sia are closely

connected to US FDI 30 percent of total imports of US companies working in the Rus sian

market come from the United States (more than $2 billion in 2016) In other words about

40 percent of all US exports to Rus sia are related to a US corporate- sector business pro cess in

the country The major sectors of activity of these companies are energy and natu ral resources

(52 percent) manufacturing (17 percent) information and communications technology or ICT

(13 percent) retail (7 percent) automotive industry (6 percent) phar ma ceu ti cal production

(1 percent) professional ser vices (05 percent) and other (2 percent)1

Some obvious constraints on US exports to Rus sia have resulted from a reduction in demand A

deterioration of bilateral relations and implementation of sanctions and counter- sanctions have

directly or indirectly afected all businesses Figures 65 and 66 provide data regarding a dramatic

drop in the sale of US agricultural production in Rus sia with all other categories of exports in

goods showing big cuts as well (see Figures 67ndash69)

Exports of civilian aircraft engines and parts put the state of Washington in first place among

other states as a leading exporter to the Rus sian market (Figure 610)

1 American Chamber of Commerce in Rus sia ldquoInvestment and Import to Rus sia 2nd Surveyrdquo 13

Diversity and Constraints

06

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 41 102017 404 PM

Figure 61 US Exports of Civilian Aircraft Engines Equipment and Parts to Rus sia US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

$2500000000

$2000000000

$1500000000

$1000000000

$500000000

$-

Figure 62 US Exports of Drilling and Oil Field Equipment US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

0

$5000000

$10000000

$15000000

$20000000

$25000000

$30000000

$35000000

$40000000

$45000000

$50000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 42 102017 404 PM

Figure 63 US Exports of Industrial Engines to Rus sia US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

0

$5000000

$10000000

$15000000

$20000000

$25000000

$30000000

$35000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Figure 64 US Exports of Phar ma ceu ti cal Preparations to Rus sia US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

0

$5000000

$10000000

$15000000

$20000000

$25000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 43 102017 404 PM

Figure 65 US Exports of Meat and Poultry to Rus sia US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Meat poultry etc

$1000000000

$800000000

$600000000

$400000000

$200000000

$-

$1200000000

$1400000000

$1600000000

Figure 66 US Exports of Soybeans to Rus sia US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

0

$20000000

$40000000

$60000000

$80000000

$100000000

$120000000

$140000000

$160000000

$180000000

$200000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 44 102017 404 PM

Figure 67 US Exports of Vehicles Engines and Parts to Rus sia US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Other parts and accessories of vehicles

Automotive tires and tubes

Bodies and chassis for passenger cars

Engines and engine parts (carburetors pistonsrings and valves)

Trucks buses and special purpose vehicles

Passenger cars new and used

$2500000000

$2000000000

$1500000000

$500000000

$-

$1000000000

Figure 68 US Exports of Medicinal Equipment to Rus sia US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

$10000000

$15000000

$20000000

$25000000

$30000000

$35000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 45 102017 404 PM

Figure 610 US Exports to Rus sia by States (2016 US$ Value) Million US$ 2013ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoState and Metropolitan Area Trade Datardquo

Iowa Kentucky

North Dakota

Oklahoma

South Carolina

Washington

0

$500

$1000

$1500

$2000

2013 2014 2015 2016

District of Columbia

Iowa

Kentucky

North Dakota

Oklahoma

South Carolina

Washington

Figure 69 US Exports of Excavating Machinery to Rus sia US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

0

$5000000

$10000000

$15000000

$20000000

$25000000

$30000000

$35000000

$40000000

$45000000

$50000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 46 102017 404 PM

47

Upon reviewing the current trend in US- Russia economic relations we must acknowledge that

the existing trade model is obsolete and exhausted Imports are resource- oriented and reflect

constraints of the Rus sian economic structure while five groups of goodsmdash oil metals nuclear

fuels fertilizers and fishmdash make up more than 90 percent of total imports from Rus sia (Figure 71)

Each of these industries has a limited capacity for growth in the foreseeable future

Rus siarsquos core export to the United Statesmdash oilmdash will inevitably decrease in the mid- term under any

scenario The value and volume of Rus sian exports to the United States are open to global market

volatility and po liti cal pressures with limited hedging mechanisms

Overall US exports to Rus sia are unsustainable due to bilateral po liti cal tensions the whims of

commodity markets and changing domestic policies Sanctions and counter- sanctions have

created additional barriers particularly in finance banking high- tech energy and agro- business

According to the American Chamber of Commerce 69 percent of US companies working in the

country consider the impact of US sanctions against Rus sia on their business as negative At the

same time 60 percent of companies do not expect big changes in business relations between

Rus sia and the United States under Trump1 as the new law codifies existing sanctions fortifies

them and extends them to new sectors

Current US investments are low due to the weak rule of law in Rus sia a lack of property right

protections and proper contract enforcement high levels of statization and monopolization in the

economy a poor business climate outdated capital stock dependence on natural- resource

sectors and of course sanction and counter- sanction mea sures Bloated administrative compo-

nents created as risk mitigation instruments have also served as impediments The countryrsquos

institutional weakness low level of productivity bud get constraints and a declining inflexible

workforce will restrain future economic growth even if commodity prices recover Rus sian eco-

nomic policy will likely continue to be statist and protectionist relying mostly on import

substitutions

1 Ibid 11

Existing Trends and Future Scenarios

07

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 47 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations48

What scenarios can be expected in such a challenging environment

One probability (no peace no war) is based on the assumption that matters will not deteriorate

further and implementation of the Sanctions Act will be cursory This will cause relatively slow

degradation in the economic field with occasional flashes of activity in selected areas (eg closer

cooperation against Islamist terrorist groups in Syria)

A second worse case or critical scenario is the intensive and full- scale execution of current sanc-

tion legislation and even the imposition of new economic punitive and restrictive mea sures which

could incite asymmetric retaliatory actions and lead to the introduction of additional protectionist

policies This in turn could trigger a further escalation of mutual confrontation and could eventu-

ally destroy the fundamentals of the current bilateral trade system Rus sian leadership has charac-

terized the Sanctions Act as a declaration of a trade war that ends all hope for improving bilateral

relations2

2 Дмитрий Медведев ldquoПодписание президентом США нового санкционного закона против России создает несколько

последствийrdquo [The US Presidentrsquos signing of the package of new sanctions against Rus sia will have a few conse-

quences] Facebook August 2 2017 https wwwfacebook com Dmitry Medvedev posts 10154587161801851

Figure 71 US Imports from Rus sia Share of Oil Metals Nuclear Fuel Fertilizers and Fish Million US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

93

94

93

94

95

96

93

92

87

89

0

$5000

$10000

$15000

$20000

$25000

$30000

$35000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

US Imports from Russia

Share of Oil Metals Nuclear FuelFertilizers and Fish

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 48 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 49

The best case and most favorable scenario looks less probable now It assumes the realization of

structural reforms in Rus sia in such a way that would adapt Rus siarsquos foreign policy to national

economic needs reduce confrontations with the West and make a concerted efort to integrate

Rus sian businesses into global supply and value chains A revitalization of the structural reform

agendamdash including eforts to diversify economic activities through de- monopolization and support

for SMEs a restructuring of the banking sector the creation of a vibrant business climate to foster

entrepreneurships and innovation the implementation of administrative and judicial reforms to

tackle red tape and endemic corruption and the reduction of state control over key sectors of the

economy via wide- spread privatization could kick- start the development of a nonoil economy and

improve long- term growth prospects Despite ongoing discussion of reform strategies deep

economic and po liti cal changes are extremely complicated over the next po liti calelectoral cycle

(2018ndash2024) particularly because of re sis tance of vested interests and growing commodity prices

The urgency to tackle structural shortcomings in natu ral resource- dependent economies usually

correlates with the price of those resources and the degree to which resource rents drive eco-

nomic activity However there may be marginal improvements in the efficiency of the current

economic system

Future US- Russia relations can be thought of through three pillars one pillar focuses on areas

where both countries maintain a competitive rivalry another looks at potential areas of interaction

under pres ent conditions a third pillar and one that has evaporated from the current bilateral

agenda concentrates on future cooperation Stronger economic ties could not only be a kind of

po liti cal shock absorber but contribute to the building of this future (particularly business contacts

aim to support future structural reforms) although po liti cal factors are depressing the prospects

for cooperation To escape deadlock it will be impor tant to establish the right balance between

politics and economics and create a model of collaboration within the framework of contention

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 49 102017 404 PM

About the Author

Vadim Grishin PhD MBA has been involved in the reform pro cess in Rus sia as adviser to the

deputy prime minister of Rus sia in 1992ndash1993 and 2006ndash2010 He has extensive experience

working with the Bretton Woods Institutions He was the board member of the World Bank Group

and served as se nior adviser at the International Monetary Fund Currently he is a con sul tant to the

chief economistrsquos office of the International Finance Corporation and teaches the economics of

transition at Georgetown University in Washington DC

50

594-71613_ch99_4Pindd 50 102017 403 PM

Blank

COVER PHOTO ADOBE STOCK

1616 Rhode Island Avenue NW

Washington DC 20036

202 887 0200 | wwwcsisorg

v++ISBN 978-1-4422-8035-9

Lanham bull Boulder bull New York bull London

4501 Forbes Boulevard

Lanham MD 20706

301 459 3366 | wwwrowmancom

A U T H O R

Vadim Grishin

Myths and Realities

A Report of the

CSIS RUSSIA AND EURASIA PROGRAM

US-RussiaEconomicRelations

O C T O B E R 2 0 1 7

Euml|xHSLEOCy280359z

The Man Pupu Nyor Rock Formations at the Northern Urals also known as Seven

Strong Man or Little Mountain of the God in the local tribe (Mansi) language

Page 14: U.S.-Russia Economic Relations: Myths and Realities · 2020-04-17 · OCTOBER 2017 U.S.- Russia Economic Relations Myths and Realities AUTHOR Vadim Grishin A REPORT OF THE CSIS RUSSIA

US-Russia Economic Relations8

Rus sian direct investment position toward the United States declined from $215 billion in 2013 to

$83 billion in 2015 (Figure 23) Taking into account dif er ent channels and instruments the actual

volume of Rus sian investments in the United States made through ofshore Eu ro pean Canadian

and US companies may be several times greater than the available official data

Foreign investment in financial assets or foreign portfolio investment (FPI) should be included

even though Central Bank of Rus sia statistics indicate they were also quite low US investments in

equity were $345 million and in debt instruments were about $65 million in the fourth quarter of

20168 However these numbers do not reflect the real level of FPI Rus siarsquos stocks are incredibly

inexpensive while there has been impressive growth of US investments in short- term securities

and in foreign exchange (FX) operations (cash- and- carry trade) Rus sia was among the top per-

forming emerging markets in 2016 gaining 4744 percent in US dollars9 Nevertheless the gen-

eral capitalization of the stock exchange is tiny (less than 20 percent of GDP) comparable to the

capitalization of just one large US com pany such as Coca- Cola Many private sources believe that

the US FPI in Rus sia could be as high as several billion US dollars but a new set of sanctions

approved by President Trump on August 2 2017 if implemented could reverse those flows It is

still not clear whether the secretary of trea sury will prohibit participation in the oferings of Rus siarsquos

sovereign debt and the full range of derivative products A report on this subject should be sub-

mitted no later than 180 days after enactment of the law which means no later than Febru-

ary 2018 New legislation tightens prohibition on Rus sian financial companies already under

sanctions by limiting any new equity or debt with a maturity greater than 14 days (a provision that

8 Central Bank of Rus sia ldquoForeign Direct Investments in the Rus sian Federationrdquo accessed September 27 2017 www

cbr ru localization switchlanguage urlshy=shy news ampfromshy=shyru - ruamptoshy=shyen - gb

9 VanEck ldquoRus sian Stock Market Soars in 2016rdquo Seeking Alpha February 14 2017 https seekingalphacom article

4045602 - russian - stock - market - soars - 2016

Table 22 Summary Output of Regression Statistics (US Real GDP Rus sia Real GDP US- Russia Exports Imports and Total Trade)

Regression Statistics

Multiple R 0056445768

R Square 0003186125

Adjusted R Square minus0042123597

Standard Error 2616043923

Observations 24

Sources IMF statistics authorrsquos computation

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 8 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 9

previously allowed for 30 days) Similarly US persons are prohibited from taking on any new debt

that has a maturity greater than 60 days (previously it was 90 days) with Rus sian energy compa-

nies currently under sanctions10

According to the Trea sury Department Rus sia held $1029 billion in US Trea sury securities in

June 201711 Could Rus sia withdraw all its reserves from the United States and use this action as a

retaliatory mea sure Such a scenario is unlikely since there is no comparable safe- haven alterna-

tive to US dollars When Rus siarsquos US Trea sury holdings dropped 50 percent from $176 billion

(October 2010) to $90 billion (November 2011) the market did not notice12 Nevertheless Rus sian

authorities have announced they will decrease dependence on assets and payments in US dollars13

10 Countering Amer i carsquos Adversaries through Sanctions Act HR 3364

11 US Department of Trea sury Major Foreign Holders of Trea sury Securities September 18 2017 http ticdata

treasury gov Publish mfh txt

12 Ibid

13 ldquoНовый виток санкций Россия откажется от доллараrdquo [A new round of sanctions Rus sia will abandon the dollar]

Газетару August 7 2017 https wwwgazeta ru business 2017 08 07 10821937 shtml

Figure 23 Rus sia Outward FDI Position United States Equities and Debt Million US$ 2009ndash2016

Source Central Bank of the Rus sian Federation External Sector Statistics Rus sian Direct Investments

Abroad accessed September 27 2017 https wwwcbr ru localization switchlanguage urlshy=shy news

ampfromshy=shyru - ruamptoshy=shyen - gb

$6000

$8000

$10000

$12000

$14000

$16000

$18000

$20000

$22000

2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 9 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations10

Officially the country does not invest in the US stock exchange although some Rus sian oligarchs

have bought US corporate bonds and equities in large amounts The new sanctions law requires

the secretary of trea sury in consultation with the director of national intelligence and the secretary

of state to issue reports on Rus sian se nior po liti cal figures and oligarchs based on their closeness

to the Rus sian regime and their net worth as well as the exposure of key economic sectors of the

United States to Rus sian po liti cally exposed persons and parastatal entities including at a mini-

mum the banking securities insurance and real estate sectors14

Only three Rus sian companies are listed in the US exchanges

Overall the scale and scope of US- Russia economic interaction and business activity is much greater

than officially appreciated but not significant enough to be taken into consideration by policymakers

14 Countering Amer i carsquos Adversaries through Sanctions Act HR 3364

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 10 102017 404 PM

11

03

Politics in the Driverrsquos Seat

Bilateral economic relations depend to a great extent on global and national economic cycles

After the recent global financial crisis the US economy has shown surprisingly sustainable GDP

growth while the Rus sian economy was the most afected among BRICS countries by the turbu-

lence of a worldwide economic downturn in 2008ndash2009 and after a short- term rebound slipped

into stagnation (2012ndash2013) and then into full- scale recession (2014ndash2016) The countryrsquos eco-

nomic cycle however appears to be changing once again with the economy returning to a

pattern of growth albeit uneven and gradual (Figures 31 and 32) Even with sanctions still in place

conditions have improved as a result of the stabilization of Urals oil to an average annual price of

$419 per barrel in 2016 The gains were sparked in part by major crude producers agreeing to cut

production after hefty price drops in 2014 and 2015 Supported by easier financial conditions

higher oil prices and growing macro- stability Rus sia is heading toward a moderate growth rate

that is expected to reach 14 percent this year according to forecasts of the World Bank Group

(WBG) and the IMF1

Because of the significant role that politics plays in any bilateral interaction it is impor tant to

combine economic and po liti cal cycles applying a ldquoresetrdquo to bilateral economic cooperation in

addition to the po liti cal relationship I have compared po liti cal cycles and trade dynamics using the

following graphs ( Table 31 and Figure 33) These charts do not pretend to reflect with mathemati-

cal precision all shifts in the bilateral po liti cal relationship but rather attempt to visually align

impor tant economic and po liti cal moments to detect the efects of po liti cal events on the size of

bilateral trade

Figure 33 shows all pos si ble combinations economic trends at the intersection of po liti cal devel-

opments oppose or support each other in synchronization It is evident that po liti cal interference

1 International Monetary Fund Rus sian Federation Staff Concluding Statement of the 2017 Article IV Mission (Wash-

ington DC IMF 2017) World Bank Group From Recession to Recovery Rus sia Economic Report no 37 (Washington

DC World Bank 2017) http pubdocsworldbank org en 383241495487103815 RER - 37 - May26 - FINAL - with - summary

pdf

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 11 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations12

in bilateral business afairs in the early 2000s was less significant than in later years As result

growing po liti cal tensions from 2003 to 2008 did not dramatically afect bilateral economic inter-

action It is also easier to explain why 2011ndash2012 resulted in rec ord trade and investmentmdash a con-

sequence of very high oil prices GDP growth in both countries improved legislation after Rus siarsquos

accession to the WTO and the Obamandash Medvedev po liti cal reset From 2014 to 2016 a perfect

storm of developments added efficiency to Western sanctions and augmented the damaging

consequences of counter- sanction mea sures

Figure 33 also confirms that in times of reduced economic cooperation po liti cal pressures can

easily change bilateral economic trends Moreover business interests along with economic inter-

actions have a limited capacity to reverse the po liti cal mainstream

Figure 31 Economic Cycle 2014ndash2016

Source Authorrsquos evaluation of international financial institutions (IFI) data and sources from respective

countries

Sustainable Growth

Brazil

Negative Growth

Unstable Growth

Mexico

Descending Growth

Argentina

EU

US

Russia

Vietnam

China

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 12 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 13

Table 31 Po liti cal Cycles in Bilateral US- Russia Relations 1999ndash2016

2001ndash2002 The George W Bushndash Vladimir Putin Reset Rus sia supported ldquoglobal war on terrorismrdquo launched by the United States after 911 the SORT nuclear arms reduction treaty was signed by the United States and Rus sia and a successful business dialogue was developed that created the current structure of economic relations

2003ndash2008 Deterioration in bilateral relations brought on by the Iraq War Georgiarsquos ldquoRose Revolutionrdquo Mikhail Khodorkovskyrsquos arrest Ukrainersquos ldquoOrange Revolutionrdquo Kosovorsquos in de pen dence and the Georgian War

2009ndash2010 The Barack Obamandash Dmitry Medvedev Reset Rus sia served as a logistical hub for transportation and supply of US forces in Af ghan i stan United States and Rus sia signed the new START nuclear arms reduction treaty Rus sia backed tighter economic sanctions on Iran Rus sia gained access to the WTO after 18 years of negotiations

2011ndash2016 Deterioration in bilateral relations caused by the Ukrainian crisis which were followed by sanctions and counter- sanctions along with the Syrian crises and cyber- enabled activities

Source Authorrsquos evaluation of po liti cal and economic data

Note SORTthinsp=thinspStrategic Ofensive Reductions Treaty STARTthinsp=thinspStrategic Arms Reduction Treaty

Figure 32 Economic Cycle 2017ndash2019

Source Authorrsquos evaluation of IFI data and sources from respective countries

Egypt

VenezuelaEU

South Africa

Brazil

Russia

India

US

Descending Growth

Korea

China

Negative Growth

Unstable Growth

Sustainable Growth

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 13 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations14

Figure 33 US- Russia Trade Million US$ vs Po liti cal Cycle 2000ndash2016

Sources US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo Foreign Trade last modified June 29 2017

https wwwcensus gov foreign - trade balance c4621 html (see data for 2000ndash2016) authorrsquos evaluation

of po liti cal and economic data

Orange Revolution

Khodorkovskys arrest

GeorgianWar

Bush- Putin Reset

Iraq War Global Financial Crisis

Obama-Medvedev Reset

Russias WTO accession

New START Treaty

A Pefect Storm the Ukranian Crisis Oil Prices Crashing

Sanctions and Counter-Sanctions

$3000

$8000

$13000

$18000

$23000

$28000

$33000

$38000

$43000

2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 14 102017 404 PM

15

The current structure of US- Russia economic relations emerged in the early 2000s when the

model of trade and investment interaction took on a character similar to that which existed be-

tween the United States and developing economies US imports from Rus sia centered on com-

modities while technology along with food products lead American exports The primary

exception was that Rus sia supplied nuclear fuel including highly enriched uranium extracted from

nuclear weapons for US power plants and provided ser vices to the aerospace industry primarily

in satellite launches However both these exceptions can be explained as a legacy of the Soviet

past and not a harbinger of the future economic relationship (Figure 41)

In the last 15 years this trade structure has not changed significantly The only noticeable shift in

trade was a dramatic drop (to practically nothing) in exports of US agricultural products a result

of Rus siarsquos policy of import substitution and so- called counter- sanction mea sures it took in re-

sponse to US sanctions over the Ukraine crisis (Figure 42)

Promising new directions of cooperation in the IT sector and in engineering ser vices for the

aerospace industry appeared in the early 2000s1 but did not spill into other sectors and conse-

quently did little to renew economic cooperation on the whole The integration of Rus sian high-

tech ser vices into large- scale global production and value chains was constrained by the usual

culprits a lack of financial resources managerial experience skilled labor modern infrastructure

RampD investments and an adequate business environment High commodity prices incentivized the

restoration of an economic system centered on resource rents The leading role of oil and gas

extraction and transportation discouraged the development of a nonenergy sector that might

have created advanced and complex production and ser vices An import substitution policy could

not work efficiently in an economic environment plagued by the Dutch disease where currency

1 The Boeing Design Center was created in Moscow It consists of nearly 250 Boeing employees managing

a team of 1200 contract engineers from Rus sian and Ukrainian aerospace companies ldquoBackgrounder Boeing in

Rus siardquo Boeing last modified January 2017 http wwwboeing com resources boeingdotcom company key _ orgs

boeing - international pdf russia - cisbackgrounder pdf

Are the United States and Rus sia ldquoNatu ralrdquo Trading Partners A Little Bit of History

04

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 15 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations16

inflows (oil money) lead to ruble appreciation and render a countryrsquos production less competitive

During that time Rus siarsquos industry did not receive preferential access to larger markets and could

not expand its share in the global economy particularly because of its self- isolation from the

regional trade agreements (except for its participation in the Eurasian Economic Union with some

neighboring countries of the former Soviet Union) As a result neither import substitution nor

export- led strategy promoted growth and specialization in nonoil production A long- awaited

modernization and reallocation of resources from an inefficient nontrade sector to a trade sector

did not materialize

These limits were later augmented with sanctions and an extension of domestic restrictions on

cooperation with Western partners Importantly the rapid growth of state- monopoly structures in

the Rus sian economy over the past 15 years has created additional obstacles to the development

and diversification of US- Russia economic ties

Figure 41 US Imports from Rus sia US$ 2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2016)

Fish and shellfish 3

Crude oil 5

Fuel oil 37

Petroleum products other

8

Nuclear fuel materials

7

Chemicals-fertilizers 4

Steelmaking materials 5

Iron and steel mill products 4

Bauxite and aluminum 9

Other precious metals 4

Nonferrous metals other 1

Finished metal shapes 1

Synthetic rubber--primary

1

Spacecraftexcluding military

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 16 102017 404 PM

Fig

ure

42

U

S E

xpo

rts

to R

us s

ia U

S$ 2

016

Sou

rce

US

Ce

nsu

s B

ure

au ldquo

Trad

e in

Go

od

s w

ith

Ru

s sia

rdquo (s

ee

dat

a fo

r 2

016

)

Bak

ery

pro

du

cts

Win

e b

eer

an

d r

elat

ed

pro

du

cts

New

spri

nt

Pla

stic

mat

eria

ls

Ch

emic

als-

fert

ilize

rs

Ch

emic

als-

ino

rgan

icC

hem

ical

s-o

rgan

ic

Ch

emic

als-

oth

erC

ott

on

fib

er c

loth

In

du

stri

al r

ub

ber

pro

du

cts

Min

eral

su

pp

lies-

man

ufa

ctu

red

Gen

erat

ors

acc

esso

ries

Ele

ctri

c ap

par

atu

s

Dri

llin

g amp

oilfi

eld

eq

uip

men

t Sp

ecia

lized

min

ing

Exc

avat

ing

mac

hin

ery

No

nfa

rm t

ract

ors

an

d p

arts

In

du

stri

al e

ng

ines

Fo

od

to

bac

co m

ach

iner

y M

etal

wo

rkin

g m

ach

ine

too

ls

Tex

tile

sew

ing

m

ach

ines

W

oo

d g

lass

p

last

ic

Pu

lp a

nd

pap

er

mac

hin

ery

Mea

suri

ng

tes

tin

g

con

tro

l in

stru

men

ts

Mat

eria

ls h

and

ling

equ

ipm

ent

Ind

ust

rial

mac

hin

es

oth

er

Ph

oto

ser

vice

ind

ust

ry m

ach

iner

y A

gri

cult

ura

l mac

hin

ery

eq

uip

men

t C

om

pu

ters

Co

mp

ute

r ac

cess

ori

es

Sem

ico

nd

uct

ors

Tel

eco

mm

un

icat

ion

seq

uip

men

t

Bu

sin

ess

mac

hin

es a

nd

eq

uip

men

t

Lab

ora

tory

tes

tin

g in

stru

men

ts

Med

icin

al e

qu

ipm

ent

Civ

ilian

air

craf

t e

ng

ines

eq

uip

men

t a

nd

par

ts

Rai

lway

tra

nsp

ort

atio

n

equ

ipm

ent

Ves

sels

exc

lud

ing

scr

ap

Co

mm

erci

al v

esse

ls o

ther

M

arin

e en

gin

es p

arts

Spac

ecra

ft e

xclu

din

g

mili

tary

Pas

sen

ger

car

s

new

an

d u

sed

Tru

cks

bu

ses

and

sp

ecia

l p

urp

ose

ve

hic

les

En

gin

es a

nd

en

gin

e p

arts

(c

arb

ure

tors

pis

ton

s r

ing

s

and

val

ves)

B

od

ies

and

ch

assi

s fo

r p

asse

ng

er c

ars

Au

tom

oti

ve t

ires

an

d t

ub

es

Oth

er p

arts

an

d a

cces

sori

es o

f ve

hic

les

Ap

par

el h

ou

seh

old

go

od

s -

text

ile

Ph

arm

aceu

tica

lp

rep

arat

ion

s

Furn

itu

re h

ou

seh

old

go

od

s

etc

R

ug

s

Cel

l ph

on

es a

nd

oth

er

ho

use

ho

ld g

oo

ds

ne

c

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 17 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations18

Figure 43 US Trade in Goods with Rus sia Million US$ 1992ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 1992ndash2016)

Russian Financial Crisis

Oil price Increased from$2446 USD per barrel (2001)

to $9694 USD per barrel(2008)

Global Financial Crisis

Oil price high record in2011-2012

(more that $111 USD perbarrel)

Oil price crashed

$-

$5000

$10000

$15000

$20000

$25000

$30000

$35000

$40000

$45000

$50000

1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

US Imports from Russia US Exports to Russia US-Russia Trade in Goods

No doubt po liti cal ups and downs add volatility to US- Russia trade Nevertheless Rus siarsquos eco-

nomic structure exhausted itself before the Ukrainian crisis and the recent Rus sian recession Its

limitations are not only due to some mistakes in policy or negative coincidences of circumstances

but rather to deeply rooted properties in the current bilateral trade model related to structural

issues in the Rus sian economy Structural constraints such as the weak enforcement of property

rights poor business regulation and nondiversified exports weighed on Rus sian trade with the

United States From this perspective the term ldquonaturalunnatural trading partnersrdquo does not ad-

dress the unused capacity of bilateral interaction or the real challenges that kind of interaction

faces It just adds metaphysical flavor to the very specific economic and po liti cal factors that

determine the US- Russia trajectory

Overall the outlines of bilateral trade (Figure 43) resemble the famous ldquoRus sian Mountainsrdquo that

were a pre de ces sor of the modern roller coaster icy hills supported by wooden constructionsmdash a

rigid and immobile structure that sooner or later would melt This unfortunately is what is hap-

pening to US- Russia trade cooperation now

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 18 102017 404 PM

19

ARE LITTLE FISH REALLY SWEET

Low US- Russia economic interaction has at least two consequences First it limits the capacity of

policymakers to exploit trade as an instrument for geopo liti cal combat Even the question of a US

trade deficit which used to be a headache for many US trading partners has become so insig-

nificant in absolute terms (about $87 billion in 2016) that it seems hardly worth caring about

When the volume of trade between two countries becomes very small in absolute terms whether

a country is running a surplus or deficit is no longer relevant But it also renders another type of

confrontations (sometimes more dangerous) more likely since the two traders have little to lose

Second in an environment marked by low levels of bilateral trade both sides could incentivize (if

and when a desire for po liti cal rapprochement exists) the signing of new trade deals which are

elevated symbolically as a turning point in bilateral po liti cal relations (ie the sale of Boeings to

Rus sia or the delivery via tankers of Rus sian oil to US refineries) Sometimes markets themselves

pres ent ldquogiftsrdquo that can be capitalized on po liti cally US- USSR grain trade in the 1970s was one

such ldquogiftrdquo large sales of American grain to the Soviet Union helped US policymakers win favor

with the po liti cally impor tant American farming sector and permitted Soviet leaders to maintain

access to a dietary staple for the Soviet population

The strong 32 percent growth in value of US imports from Rus sia from January to May 2017

versus January to May 2016 ( Table 51) is an example of a development that has tempted officials

to pres ent it as a sign of positive change due to ldquogrowing business activitiesrdquo (this kind of statement

was heard before the bilateral summit in Germany in July 2017) although the reason for that leap

was evidently an increase in commodity prices (mainly of oilmdash see Table 52) and not a rise in

entrepreneurial interactions The primary beneficiaries of that upside rally have been two other

petro- economies Saudi Arabia and Venezuela ( Tables 53 and 54)

Sector Analyses

05

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 19 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations20

Table 51 US Imports from Rus sia Million US$ Januaryndash May 2016 vs Januaryndash May 2017

Year January February March April May Total

2016 9603 6871 11097 12257 10977 50805

2017 12215 10220 16979 13471 14147 67032

Change 271 487 530 99 289 319

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 1992ndash2016)

Table 52 Change in Urals Crude Oil Prices US$ per Barrel Januaryndash May 2016 vs Januaryndash May 2017

Januaryndash May 2016 Januaryndash May 2017 Change ($) Change ()

3601 5129 1528 424

Source Ministry of Finance of the Rus sian Federation https wwwminfin ru ru ixzz4mMIZ7XtC

Table 53 US Imports from Saudi Arabia Million US$ Januaryndash May 2016 vs Januaryndash May 2017

Year January February March April May Total

2016 15114 9036 13555 10844 14679 63228

2017 19802 20298 21650 16211 19542 97503

Change 3101 12463 5972 495 331 542

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Saudi Arabiardquo Foreign Trade last modified June 29 2017

https wwwcensus gov foreign - trade balance c5170 html (see data for 2016ndash2017)

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 20 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 21

Table 54 US Imports from Venezuela Million US$ Januaryndash May 2016 vs Januaryndash May 2017

Year January February March April May Total

2016 6657 5560 7140 8007 7922 35286

2017 13041 10864 123500 11148 12243 59646

Change 9590 9540 7297 3923 5454 6903

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Venezuelardquo Foreign Trade last modified June 29 2017

https wwwcensus gov foreign - trade balance c3070 html (see data for 2016ndash2017)

Table 55 US Exports to Rus sia Million US$ Januaryndash May 2016 vs Januaryndash May 2017

Year January February March April May Total

2016 3628 3577 7298 4657 4947 24107

2017 3144 4277 5386 6670 4806 24283

Change minus133 196 minus262 432 minus29 minus07

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2016ndash2017)

At the same time US exports to Rus sia continue to stagnate ( Table 55) due to low levels of

consumption during a two-and- a- half-year economic crisis a deep ruble devaluation sanctions

and counter- sanctions

Given the very dif er ent economic structures and resource endowments of Rus sia and the United

States it is not surprising that US- Russia trade is asymmetric and oil driven (Figure 51) A

3 percent increase in Urals oil prices translates into a one percent increase in US import growth

from Rus sia Thus in 2016 every $10 increase in Urals crude oil added $15 billion to the value of

US imports or 11 percent to the total value of imports from Rus sia

OIL ADDICTION

Oil is a core pillar of US- Russia bilateral trade A bumpy ride in oil markets afects commerce

Nevertheless Rus sian oil exports to the United States in physical terms have been rather

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 21 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations22

sustainable Starting from 2005 average annual deliveries have been above 150 million barrels

(Figure 52) Crude and heating oil have dominated while petroleum products and liquefied petro-

leum gases have not (Figure 53) In 2011 oil exports peaked at 228 million barrels but declined to

159 million barrels in 2016mdash a drop of 30 percent Rec ord high shipments of Rus sian oil to the United

States coincided with an elevation in oil prices which made the subsequent decline in oil shipment

value between 2011 and 2016 (by about 72 percent as shown in Figure 54) seem more stark The

increase in price also raised the share of oil in Rus sian exports by 74 percent in 2011 (Figure 55)

The Rus sian share in total US oil imports was around 55 percent in 2011 and 43 percent in 2016

( Table 56) In the last five years the United States has relied exclusively on consumption of Rus sian

oil for the rough equivalent of one week out of the year (Figure 56)

It is unlikely that Rus sia can significantly increase its share of the US oil market and there is a real

possibility for a downward trend There are several reasons the historically high Rus sian hydrocar-

bon export threshold of 2011 will not soon if ever be surpassed

First US energy consumption will likely be flat According to the US Energy Information Adminis-

tration (EIA) demand for petroleum and other liquids in the United States will be about 35ndash36

quadrillion British thermal units (BTUs) with minimal variation over the next 25 years1

1 US EIA ldquoAnnual Energy Outlook 2017 with Projections to 2050rdquo January 5 2017 7ndash8

Figure 51 US- Russia Trade Growth () vs US and Rus sia Real GDP Growth () 1993ndash2016

Source IMF ldquoIMF Datardquo accessed September 27 2017 http wwwimf org en Data US Census Bureau

ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo

Note rGDPthinsp=thinspreal gross domestic product

Trade

USA rGDP growth

Russia rGDP growth

-60

-40

-20

0

20

40

60

80

100

1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Gro

wth

All spikes in US-Russia trade have been connected with two main

variables volume and price of crude oil

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 22 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 23

Second the United States will become a net energy exporter between 2020 and 2030 in most

cases under dif er ent combinations of oil and natu ral gas prices GDP growth technological

breakthroughs and the availability of energy resources The role of oil imports will dramatically

fall2

Third oil price scenarios as described by the International Energy Agency (IEA) international

financial organ izations (IFIs) and many national agencies are very cautious and assume that even

by 2035 to 2040 oil prices will not to recover to the levels of 2011ndash20123

Fourth Rus sian oil production and export growth will be modest and driven by Asian economic

expansion and will comprise a decreasing share of Western markets4 According to forecasts from

2 Ibid 15ndash18

3 Ibid table 3 ldquoEnergy Prices by Sector and Sourcesrdquo World Bank World Bank Commodity Markets Price Forecasts

(Washington DC World Bank 2017) httpswwwworldbank org en research commodity - markets Organ ization of the

Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) World Oil Outlook 2016 (Vienna OPEC 2016)

4 E D Belotskaia et al Global and Rus sian Energy Outlook 2016 (Moscow Energy Research Institute of the Rus sian

Acad emy of Science Analytical Center for the Government of the Rus sian Federation 2016) http acgov ru files

publication a 12767 pdf

Figure 52 US Imports from Rus sia Crude Oil and Petroleum Products Thousands of Barrels 1995ndash2016

Source US EIA ldquoUS Imports by Country of Origin Rus siardquo Petroleum amp Other Liquids September 13

2017 http wwweia gov dnav pet PET _ MOVE _ IMPCUS _ D _ NUS _ NRS _ MBBL _ M htm

0

50000

100000

150000

200000

250000

Date 1995 1996 1997 1998 199920002001200220032004200520062007200820092010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 23 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations24

the Organ ization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) crude oil exports from Rus sia and

the Caspian region to the United States will dis appear by 20255

So why does the Rus sian Urals blend continue to be attractive for oil traders and US refineries

which could pro cess greater volumes of domestically produced lighter crude There are two main

reasons One is related to the preference of US high conversion refineries (the most sophisticated

in the world) to work with heavy oil blends produced by Canada Mexico Iraq Venezuela and

Rus sia Pro cessing heavy crude now is as profitable as pro cessing lighter crude The so- called

crack spreadmdash the diference between the cost of relatively cheap heavy crude oil and the final

price of value- added consumer products (diesel gasoline jet fuel and heating oil)mdash has become

the same as the refinery margins of light sweet crude6 This has primarily afected light oil produc-

ing countries such as Angola Algeria and Nigeria

5 OPEC World Oil Outlook 2016 306ndash309

6 ldquoHow Much for That Heavy Oilrdquo Oil Sands Magazine December 26 2015 https wwwoilsandsmagazine com

news 2015 12 26 how - much - for - that - heavy - oil

Figure 53 US Imports from Rus sia Oil and Petroleum Products US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

$-

$25000000000

$20000000000

$15000000000

$10000000000

$5000000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Liquefied petroleum gases

Petroleum products other

Fuel oil

Crude oil

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 24 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 25

Another factor afecting purchase of Rus sian oil is a new trend among oil companies for further

consolidation of scale and for integrating operations of upstream and downstream business7

There have been several waves of separation and unification of production transportation and

pro cessing in the last 50 years The current business cycle can be seen as an adaptation to a

period of low prices and oversupply Companies that buy andor produce oil in Rus sia most likely

prefer to transport and pro cess this oil in their own modern refineries in the United States At the

same time some of the newest refinery designs specifically for pro cessing heavy oils have been

built in Asia thus extending the choices of heavy oil producing countries

We should also consider that leading US and international oil traders along with oil producing

companies working with or owning US refineries frequently buy Rus sian oil on the open market

and have long- term contracts on Rus sian crude oil delivery Many Rus sian oil companies prefer to

pay for purchases or ser vices with their future production instead of cash creating situations of

ldquostickyrdquo oil imports that are difficult to replace The best- known example is an interaction between

7 ldquoEnergy and Utilities Sectorrdquo Roundtable Financier Worldwide December 2015 https wwwfinancierworldwide

com roundtable - energy - utilities - sector - dec15

Figure 54 US Imports of Oil and Petroleum Products from Rus sia vs Oil Prices Eu rope Brent Spot Price Free on Board (FOB) 1996ndash2017

Source US EIA ldquoUS Imports by Country of Origin Rus siardquo

0

20

40

60

80

100

120

140

0

5000

10000

15000

20000

25000

30000

Jan

-19

96

Jun

-19

96

No

v-19

96

Ap

r-19

97

Sep

-19

97

Feb

-19

98

Jul-

199

8D

ec-1

99

8M

ay-1

99

9O

ct-1

99

9M

ar-2

00

0A

ug

-20

00

Jan

-20

01

Jun

-20

01

No

v-2

00

1A

pr-

20

02

Sep

-20

02

Feb

-20

03

Jul-

20

03

Dec

-20

03

May

-20

04

Oct

-20

04

Mar

-20

05

Au

g-2

00

5Ja

n-2

00

6Ju

n-2

00

6N

ov-

20

06

Ap

r-2

00

7Se

p-2

00

7Fe

b-2

00

8Ju

l-2

00

8D

ec-2

00

8M

ay-2

00

9O

ct-2

00

9M

ar-2

010

Au

g-2

010

Jan

-20

11Ju

n-2

011

No

v-2

011

Ap

r-2

012

Sep

-20

12Fe

b-2

013

Jul-

20

13D

ec-2

013

May

-20

14O

ct-2

014

Mar

-20

15A

ug

-20

15Ja

n-2

016

Jun

-20

16N

ov-

20

16

USD

per

Bar

rel

Th

ou

san

d B

arr

els

US Imports from Russia of Crude Oil and Petroleum Products (Thousand Barrels)

Europe Brent Spot Price FOB (Dollars per Barrel)

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 25 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations26

Table 56 US Oil Imports All Countries vs Rus sia Thousand Barrels per Day 2011ndash2016

Years 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

All Countries 11436 10598 9859 9241 9449 10058

Rus sia 624 477 460 330 371 433

Share 546 450 467 357 393 431

Sources US EIA ldquoUS Imports by Country of Origin Total Crude Oil and Productsrdquo Petroleum amp Other

Liquids September 13 2017 wwweia gov dnav pet pet_move_impcus_a2_nus_ep00_im0_mbbl_m htm

authorrsquos computation

Figure 55 US Imports from Rus sia Share of Crude Oil and Petroleum Products Million US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

57

64

73

72

74

73

72

59

52 50

0

$5000

$10000

$15000

$20000

$25000

$30000

$35000

$40000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

US Imports from Russia

Share of Oil and Petroleum Products

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 26 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 27

the Rus sian state mono poly Rosneft and commodity trading and mining giant Glencore which

along with energy and commodities com pany Vitol participated in a $10 billion prepayment

deal with Rosneft for crude supplies in 2013

There have been a number of ongoing transactions between the Rus sian oil industry and interna-

tional oil companies including several that top the list of importers of Rus sian oil to the United

States ( Table 57) In December 2016 Glencore participated in a controversial privatization opera-

tion purchasing in tandem with the Qatar sovereign wealth fund a 195 percent stake in Rosneft

which was on the US and EU list of sanctioned firms8 Glencore has also taken a blocking stake in

midsize oil producer RussNeft BP owns a 1975 percent stake in Rosneft Chevron holds a

15 percent interest in the 935- mile- long CPC9 pipeline which transports an average of 959000

barrels of crude oil per day including 76000 barrels daily from Rus sia10 ExxonMobil has formed

8 E Mazneva and I Arkhipov ldquoRus sia Sells $11 Billion Stake in Rosneft to Glencore Qatarrdquo Bloomberg December 7

2016

9 CPCthinsp=thinspCaspian Pipeline Consortium

10 ldquoRus sia Highlights of Operations and Business Portfoliordquo Chevron accessed October 3 2017 https wwwchevron

com worldwide russia

Figure 56 Share of Rus sian Oil in Total US Oil Imports Thousands of Barrels per Day 1972ndash2016

Source US EIA ldquoUS Imports by Country of Origin Total Crude Oil and Productsrdquo

2000

4000

6000

8000

10000

12000

14000

16000

US Imports of Crude Oil and Petroleum Products (Thousand Barrels per Day)

US Imports from Russia of Crude Oil and Petroleum Products (Thousand Barrels per Day)19

7319

7419

7519

7619

7719

7819

7919

80

198

119

82

198

319

84

198

519

86

198

719

88

198

919

90

199

119

92

199

319

94

199

519

96

199

719

98

199

92

00

02

00

12

00

22

00

32

00

42

00

52

00

62

00

72

00

82

00

92

010

20

112

012

20

132

014

20

152

016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 27 102017 404 PM

Table 57 Top Importers of Rus sian Oil to the United States Thousands of Barrels 2016

VALERO MARKETING amp SUPPLY CO 54590 3616

EXXONMOBIL OIL CORP 17087 1130

CHEVRON USA INC 15217 1008

BP WEST COAST PRODUCTS LLC 10130 671

GEORGE E WARREN CORP 7272 48

PAULSBORO REFINING CO LLC 6838 453

TESORO CORP 5097 338

VITOL INC 5084 337

PHILLIPS 66 CO 4726 313

TRAFIGURA AG 4360 289

PAR HAWAII REFINING LLC 3893 258

MOTIVA ENTERPRISES LLC 3041 205

SHELL US TRADING CO 2863 19

MARATHON PETROLEUM CO LLC 2475 16

ATLANTIC TRADING amp MARKETING 2099 14

FREEPOINT COMMODITIES LLC 1439 1

GLENCORE LTD 1284 85

BEST PETROLEUM CORP 967 64

ROLYMPUS US COMMODITIES GROUP LLC 822 6

HUNT CRUDE OIL SUPPLY CO 666 4

GULF OIL LP 658 4

Source US EIA ldquoUS Imports by Country of Origin Crude Oilrdquo Petroleum amp Other Liquids September 13

2017 httpswwweiagovdnavpetpet_move_impcus_a2_nus_epc0_im0_mbblpd_ahtm authorrsquos

computation

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 28 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 29

several joint ventures with Rosneft to undertake ofshore exploration in the Black Sea and the Kara

Sea in Siberia11

According to the Sanctions Act US persons are prohibited from exporting or reexporting goods

ser vices (except financial ser vices) and technology in support of exploration or production of new

deep- water Arctic ofshore or shale oil proj ects that involve designated Rus sian entities or other

entities in which such sanctioned persons have a controlling interest or a substantial noncontrol-

ling owner ship interest defined as not less than 33 percent (previously it was 50 percent) The new

law also authorizesmdash but does not requiremdash the imposition of so- called secondary sanctions

against non- US entities that engage in activities involving the construction maintenance or

expansion of Rus sian energy export pipelines with a fair market value of $1 million or more or an

aggregate fair market value during a 12- month period of $5 million12 This provision has raised the

concerns of some Eu ro pean countries particularly Germany As result the final language of the

law included wording about coordination of this issue with allies of the United States

Shipments of Rus sian oil to the United States could be afected by activity in the US refinery

industry In early 2017 Saudi Aramco bought the United Statesrsquo largest oil refinery in Port Arthur

(Texas) and it announced plans to send more of its own crude to that refinery13 Serious concerns

exist however regarding the future of three refineries and nine pipelines owned by Citgo a US

branch of the Venezuelan state com pany PdVSA which is balancing precariously on the edge of

default Under certain conditions in the event of PdVSA bankruptcy Rosneft could claim a stake of

up to 499 percent in Citgo Such a possibility has raised concerns among politicians and US

government officials with Trea sury Secretary Steven Mnuchin calling it a ldquonational security issuerdquo14

Tables 58 59 and 510 show allocations of Rus sian oil imports to major US refineries some of

which work exclusively on Rus sian crude a total of two to three months per year In total 150940

thousand barrels of Rus sian oil were refined in 2016

Figure 57 confirms a leading position of Texas and Louisiana among the US states receiving

Rus sian crude followed by New Jersey California Mississippi Washington Hawaii and Delaware

In a paradoxical way Texas has dis appeared from the list of states as a main destination of US

imports from Rus sia (Figure 58) because Rus sian crude is mostly delivered to Louisiana ports and

registered there by US Customs as an import from Rus sia After that it transports to refineries in

Louisiana and Texas

Overall the short- term business rationale behind the sustainability of US oil imports from Rus sia

cannot overcome strong headwinds in the US energy sector facing all oil importers which will

inevitably lead to a contraction of Rus sian oil exports to the United States in the foreseeable future

11 Exxon eforts to receive a special US Trea sury waiver to drill in sanctioned Rus sia failed in 2017

12 Countering Amer i carsquos Adversaries through Sanctions Act HR 3364

13 Sarp Ozkan ldquoSaudi Aramcorsquos Port Arthur Refinery and the US Refinery Fleetrdquo Drilling Info May 11 2017

https infodrillinginfo com saudi - aramcos - port - arthur - refinery - us - refinery - fleet

14 Graham Kates ldquoTrea sury Secretary Rus siarsquos Citgo Deal a National Security Issuerdquo CBS News May 1 2017

http wwwcbsnews com news rosneft - citgo - steven - mnuchin - national - security

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 29 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations30

Table 58 Valerorsquos Refineries Pro cessing Rus sian Oil Thousands of Barrels 2016

Saint Charles Louisiana 29206 535

Corpus Christi Texas 20626 378

Wilmington California 4250 78

Total USA 54590 100

Source US EIA ldquoRefinery Capacity Reportrdquo January 1 2017

table 5 wwweia gov petroleum refinerycapacity table5 pdf

authorrsquos computation

Table 59 ExxonMobil Refineries Pro cessing Rus sian Oil Thousands of Barrels 2016

Baytown Texas 15037 88

Baton Rouge Louisiana 2046 12

Total USA 17083 100

Source US EIA ldquoRefinery Capacity Reportrdquo authorrsquos computation

Table 510 Chevronrsquos Refineries Pro cessing Rus sian Oil Thousands of Barrels 2016

Pascagoula Mississippi 12767 840

El Segundo California 2372 155

Saint Rose Louisiana 78 05

Total USA 15217 100

Source US EIA ldquoRefinery Capacity Reportrdquo authorrsquos computation

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 30 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 31

HEAVY METAL

Taken together US imports of metals and US imports of oil compose about 80 percent of US

total imports from Rus sia (Figure 59) Trade of metals like other commodities is strongly afected

by market price fluctuations Nevertheless metal imports from Rus sia have been fairly resilient to

market volatility and their average annual value has hovered at about $4 billion in the last five years

(Figure 510) This market resilience was forged at the end of the 1990searly 2000s when Rus sian

metal producers gradually modernized their plants adjusting quality of production to Western

standards and enhancing integration into global value and supply chains Some of them conquered

their share of the highly competitive US market struggling with peers from Canada and certain

BRICS countries (China India and Brazil) To attract additional resources all Rus sian large metal-

producing companies became public and were listed on stock exchanges chiefly the London Stock

Exchange (Severstalrsquo PAO Evraz MMK OAO Novolipetsk Steel Norilsk Nikel and TMK PAO) one

on the New York Stock Exchange (Mechel) and one on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange (Rusal)

Business logic pushed some of them to invest in the US metal- making industry which was hit

hard by crisis Later on some of those assets were sold (eg two US steel mills acquired by

Severstal in 2004 were purchased 10 years later by Steel Dynamics Inc and AK Steel Corp)

Figure 57 Share of US States Rus sian Oil Imports 2016

Source US EIA ldquoUS Imports from Rus sia of Crude Oil and Petroleum Productsrdquo Petroleum amp Other

Liquids September 29 2017 https www eia gov dnav pet hist LeafHandler ashx nshy=shyPETampsshy=shyMTTIM _ NUS

- NRS _ 1ampfshy=shyM authorrsquos computation

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

100

Maine

Massachusetts

Maryland

Connecticut

Georgia

Rhode Island

Virginia

Florida

New York

Alabama

Puerto Rico

Pennsylvania

Delaware

Hawaii

Washington

Mississippi

California

New Jersey

Louisiana

Texas

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 31 102017 404 PM

Figure 58 US Imports from Rus sia by State Million US$ 2013ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoState and Metropolitan Area Trade Datardquo Foreign Trade last modified

October 2 2017 https wwwcensus gov foreign - trade statistics state

Alaska

Connecticut

Delaware

Hawaii

Louisiana

Maryland

North Dakota 0

$1000

$2000

$3000

$4000

$5000

$6000

2013 2014 2015 2016

Alabama

Alaska

Connecticut

Delaware

Hawaii

Louisiana

Maryland

Maine

Mississippi

Montana

North Dakota

Mississippi

Figure 59 US Imports from Rus sia Share of Oil and Metals Million US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 1992ndash2016)

83

82

85

86

87

88

85

82

7375

0

$5000

$10000

$15000

$20000

$25000

$30000

$35000

$40000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

US Imports from Russia

Share of Oil and Metals

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 32 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 33

Obviously the market dynamic of dif er ent metals varies (eg iron steel aluminum platinum and

nickel) Caps to increase their trade and production in a ldquored oceanrdquo global environment with

anemic demand is rather limited despite Figure 510 showing a spike of iron and steel imports

from Rus sia in 2014 and aluminum in 2016 Some opportunities may exist for Russian- owned steel

plants in the United States (such as NLMK) to participate in energy proj ects resumed under Presi-

dent Trump who has required that new pipelines use only American- made steel15

Rus sia occupies a special niche in the US market for titanium products a high- end metal indus-

try Twenty years ago a long- term contract was signed between Rus sian titanium producer

VSMPO- AVISMA and Boeing The Rus sian com pany entered the selective club of Boeing suppliers

for the manufacture of components and semi- finished products Since the signing of this contract

VSMPO has delivered more than 35 percent of all titanium placed on Boeing civil aircraft16 They

are hidden in the trade data in an import category for Civilian Aircrafts and Parts (Figure 511) At

the end of 2016 Boeing announced an extension of its framework agreement with AVISMA

15 E Scheyder C Ngai and T Sylvester ldquoAmerican Steel Unlikely to Get Keystone Boost Despite Trump Orderrdquo

Reuters January 27 2017 http wwwreuters com article usa - trump - pipeline - transcanada - idUSL1N1FH1ZD

16 A Kramer ldquoTitanium Fills Vital Role for Boeing and Rus siardquo New York Times July 5 2013 http wwwnytimes com

2013 07 06 business global titanium - fills - vital - role - for - boeing - and - russia html mcubzshy=shy3

Figure 510 US Imports from Rus sia Iron Steel Bauxite Aluminum Nickel Nonferrous Metals and Other Precious Metals and Materials US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 1992ndash2016)

0

$6000000000

$5000000000

$4000000000

$3000000000

$2000000000

$1000000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 20122013

20142015

2016

Finished metal shapes

Iron and steel advanced

Iron and steel products nec

Nonferrous metals other

Other precious metals

Nickel

Bauxite and aluminum

Iron and steel mill products

Steelmaking materials

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 33 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations34

through 2022 and additional investments in the construction of a new robotic plant in Titanium

Valley a special economic zone located in the Sverdlovsk region that will open in 2018 The pro-

cessing of titanium forgings in all Boeing civil aircraft will be performed there including 787s 737

MAXs and 777Xs17 The contract extension with AVISMA may add several hundred million dollars

in value to annual US imports from Rus sia

How can such heavy reliance on imports of Rus sian titanium exist during a period of rising geopo-

liti cal tensions The answer is straightforward VSMPO- AVISMA is a highly specialized natu ral

mono poly producing 45 percent of the worldrsquos aerospace titanium Only four other countries

smelt high- grade titanium in industrial quantities the United States Germany Japan and China

Overall global production capacity is limited while demand is growing The United States cur-

rently imports around 79 percent of all the titanium it consumes each year18

17 ldquoBoeing and VSMPO Avisma to Launch Second Joint Production Siterdquo Rus sian Aviation Insider December 22 2016

http wwwrusaviainsider com boeing - and - vsmpo - avisma - to - launch - second - joint - production - site

18 Jon Ostrower and Andy Pasztor ldquoBoeing United Technologies Stockpile Titanium Partsrdquo Wall Street Journal

August 7 2014 https wwwwsj com articles boeing - united - technologies - stockpiling - titanium - parts - 1407441886

Figure 511 US Imports from Rus sia Civilian Aircrafts and Parts US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 1992ndash2016)

0

$20000000

$40000000

$60000000

$80000000

$100000000

$120000000

$140000000

$160000000

$180000000

$200000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Parts-civilian aircraft

Civilian aircraft

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 34 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 35

The Sanctions Act authorizes the secretary of the trea sury (in a nonmandatory way) to impose

restrictions (without specifying them) against Rus sian state- owned entities operating in the railway

metals and mining sectors of the Rus sian economy Despite the commanding heights of Rus siarsquos

state sector owner ship in its economy (70 percent of GDP) the metal- producing companies have

remained mostly in private hands

NUCLEAR AFFAIRS

Historically owners and operators of the 104 commercial nuclear power reactors in the United

States have purchased more than 80 percent of their uranium from foreign countries Uranium

shipping from Rus sia accounted for about 13 percent of the 58 million pounds of uranium pur-

chased overseas in 201219 At the same time the Rus sian state- owned mono poly Rosatom ac-

counts for 20 percent of Kazakhstanrsquos uranium production (which in turn comprises 11 percent of

all US uranium imports) and 20 percent of US domestic uranium production capacity (with

owner ship of exploration tracts in Wyoming)20

Nuclear fuel and nuclear power continue to be po liti cally sensitive topics both in the United

States and Rus sia Bilateral cooperation in this sector (being surprisingly stable with imports of

nuclear fuel from Rus sia at a level of $1 billion annually in the last five years [Figure 512 and 513])

is under constant po liti cal and lobbying pressure and has been a source of several po liti cal scan-

dals21 Consequently upside risks in this area of interaction are minimal and downside risks are

much higher especially when we are seeing more decommissioning of nuclear plants in the

United States than new constructions The US EIArsquos 2017 Annual Energy Outlook assumes

that about 25 percent of the nuclear capacity now operating will be removed from ser vice

by 205022

WHY IS THE GRASS GREENER ON THE OTHER SIDE

The United States continues to significantly reduce imports of chemical fertilizers as domestic pro-

duction increases In 2016 the United States imported 13 percent less ammonia and 11 percent

less urea and UAN which is a liquid urea and ammonium nitrate fertilizer Rus sia accounts for

around 40 percent of UAN imported by the United States The United States canceled antidumping

duties on imports of ammonium nitrate and urea from Rus sia in 2016 but it did not prevent import

19 US EIA ldquoThe US Relies on Foreign Uranium Enrichment Ser vices to Fuel Its Nuclear Power Plantsrdquo Today in

Energy August 28 2013 https wwweia gov todayinenergy detail php idshy=shy1273

20 Colin Chilcoat ldquoDoes Rus sia Really Own 20 Percent of the USrsquo Uranium Reservesrdquo OilPricecom May 6 2015

http oilpricecom Alternative - Energy Nuclear - Power Does - Russia - Really - Own - 20 - Of - The - US - Uranium - Reserves

html

21 Michelle Ye Hee Lee ldquoThe Facts behind Trumprsquos Repeated Claim about Hillary Clintonrsquos Role in the Rus sian Ura-

nium Dealrdquo Washington Post October 26 2016

22 US EIA ldquoAnnual Energy Outlook 2017 with Projections to 2050rdquo 81ndash82

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 35 102017 404 PM

Figure 512 US Imports from Rus sia Share of Oil Metals and Nuclear Fuel Million US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 1992ndash2016)

87

86

90

90

90

91

88

86

7882

0

$5000

$10000

$15000

$20000

$25000

$30000

$35000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

US Imports from Russia

Share of Oil Metals and Nuclear Fuel

Figure 513 US Imports from Rus sia Nuclear Fuel Materials US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

$-

$200000000

$400000000

$600000000

$800000000

$1200000000

$1000000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 36 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 37

drops twice last year (Figures 514 and 515) According to forecasts UAN imports are expected to

decline further to 15 million tons this year down over 46 percent from 28 million tons imported

last year23 The downside trend in imports of fertilizers will likely continue because of oversupply

BIG FISH

US imports of fish and shellfish from Rus sia are best understood in comparison with US fish

exports to the Rus sian market which slipped to zero in August 2014 after Rus sia issued an order

banning certain agricultural imports from the United States (Figure 516) While the volume of US

supply was not very large it was impor tant because it broke up the monopolistic dominance of a

few vertically integrated Rus sian companies that have kept prices high by restricting the entry of

new producers Seeking to implement import substitution policies Rus sia has tried to reduce

exports as well as imports of fish and seafood products in the last couple of years This symmetri-

cal approach was intended to ldquocompensaterdquo for a decrease of fish products in the domestic

23 Deepika Thapliyal ldquoPotashCorp Forecasts Sharp Drop in US Nitrogen Imports in 2017rdquo ICIS News February 7

2017 https wwwicis com resources news 2017 02 07 10076734 potashcorp - forecasts - sharp - drop - in - us - nitrogen

- imports - in - 2017

Figure 514 US Imports from Rus sia Share of Oil Metals Nuclear Fuel and Fertilizers Million US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

90

93

92

93

94

95

92

91

85

86

0

$5000

$10000

$15000

$20000

$25000

$30000

$35000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

US Imports from Russia

Share of Oil Metals Nuclear Fuel and Fertilizers

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 37 102017 404 PM

Figure 515 US Imports from Rus sia Chemical- Fertilizers US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

S-

$200000000

$400000000

$600000000

$800000000

$1000000000

$1200000000

$1400000000

$1600000000

$1800000000

$2000000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Figure 516 US Exports to Rus sia Fish and Shellfish US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

0

$10000000

$20000000

$30000000

$40000000

$50000000

$60000000

$70000000

$80000000

$90000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Fish and shellfish

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 38 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 39

consumer market caused by Rus siarsquos import ban but it has failed As result the group most af-

fected by the self- imposed counter- sanctions were Rus sian consumers

With a significant drop in fish imports a devaluation of the ruble and inflationary pressures on

seafood prices yearly consumption of fish in Rus sia has declined precipitously In 2015 alone

fish prices increased 20 percent and consumption dropped to 14 kilograms per person24 from

22 kilograms in 201425 In 2016 food rose to 355 percent of house hold expenditure as a result of

increases in food prices26 This has pushed vertically integrated fishing monopolies to sell even

more of their catch abroad rather than deliver to the Rus sian Federation (Figure 517) Thus we

cannot exclude the possibility of further growth in US fish and shellfish imports from Rus sia on a

marginal scale

24 Александр Савельев ldquoПотребление рыбы в России упало до 14 кг на человекаrdquo [Fish consumption in Rus sia fell to

14 kg per person] Экономика Интерфакс January 28 2015 http wwwinterfax ru business 492038

25 Илья Шестаков ldquoПотебление рыбы в России снизилось на 10 процентов из- за роста ценrdquo [Fish consumption in

Rus sia dropped by 10 percent due to price increases] RNS March 8 2017 https rnsonline consumer - market

Potreblenie - ribi - v - Rossii - snizilos - na - 10 - iz - za - rosta - tsen - 2017 - 03 - 08

26 Zoya Sheftalovich and Christian Oliver ldquoRus siarsquos Boom (Farming) Economyrdquo Politico November 8 2016 http

wwwpolitico eu article russias - boom - farming - economy

Figure 517 US Imports from Rus sia Fish and Shellfish US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

0

$50000000

$100000000

$150000000

$200000000

$250000000

$300000000

$350000000

$400000000

$450000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 39 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations40

SPACE ODYSSEY

Among high- end products beyond the top five groups of goods imported from Rus sia cheap and

efficient Rus sian engines have been used to launch US rockets into space for about 16 years

(Figure 518) There was a serious po liti cal strug gle around a 2014 ban on the purchase of Rus sian

RD-180 rocket engines revealing the conflicting business interests of power ful high- tech companies

This restrictive mea sure was temporary and was quickly lifted because of significant cost impacts

and risks of disruption to launch schedules27 For the same reason the Sanctions Act does not autho-

rize ldquothe imposition of any sanction or other condition limitation restriction or prohibition that

directly or indirectly impedes the supply by any entity of the Rus sian Federation of any product or

ser vice or the procurement of such product or ser vice by any contractor or subcontractor of the

United States or any other entity relating to or in connection with any space launch conducted for

the National Aeronautics and Space Administration or any other nonndash Department of Defense

customerrdquo28

Nevertheless many experts believe that US domestic alternatives to replace Rus sian engines will

be viable in five to eight years

27 Ken Dilanian ldquoWhy Does the US Use Rus sian Rockets to Launch Its Satellitesrdquo NBC News updated November 15

2016 http wwwnbcnews com why - does - u - s - use - russian - rockets - launch - its - satellites - n588526

28 Countering Amer i carsquos Adversaries through Sanctions Act HR 3364

Figure 518 Spacecraft Excluding Military US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

0

$20000000

$40000000

$60000000

$80000000

$100000000

$120000000

$140000000

$160000000

$180000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 40 102017 404 PM

41

Diversity and technological complexity are the most vis i ble advantages supporting US exports to

Rus sia Three major groups of export goods include civilian aircraft engines and parts (Figure 61)

drilling and oil field equipment (Figure 62) and industrial machines and engines (Figure 63)

Despite sanctions against the transfer of advanced oil producing and pro cessing technologies the

realization of US drilling and oil field equipment in Rus sia is sustainable although some bilateral

proj ects have been frozen

Another category of goods that has demonstrated resilience is the phar ma ceu ti cal industry (Fig-

ure 64) because most drugs in Rus sia are imported (about 70 percent of the Rus sian phar ma ceu-

ti cal market in value) Import substitution policies have had only modest results in this industry

As confirmed by American Chamber of Commerce surveys US exports to Rus sia are closely

connected to US FDI 30 percent of total imports of US companies working in the Rus sian

market come from the United States (more than $2 billion in 2016) In other words about

40 percent of all US exports to Rus sia are related to a US corporate- sector business pro cess in

the country The major sectors of activity of these companies are energy and natu ral resources

(52 percent) manufacturing (17 percent) information and communications technology or ICT

(13 percent) retail (7 percent) automotive industry (6 percent) phar ma ceu ti cal production

(1 percent) professional ser vices (05 percent) and other (2 percent)1

Some obvious constraints on US exports to Rus sia have resulted from a reduction in demand A

deterioration of bilateral relations and implementation of sanctions and counter- sanctions have

directly or indirectly afected all businesses Figures 65 and 66 provide data regarding a dramatic

drop in the sale of US agricultural production in Rus sia with all other categories of exports in

goods showing big cuts as well (see Figures 67ndash69)

Exports of civilian aircraft engines and parts put the state of Washington in first place among

other states as a leading exporter to the Rus sian market (Figure 610)

1 American Chamber of Commerce in Rus sia ldquoInvestment and Import to Rus sia 2nd Surveyrdquo 13

Diversity and Constraints

06

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 41 102017 404 PM

Figure 61 US Exports of Civilian Aircraft Engines Equipment and Parts to Rus sia US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

$2500000000

$2000000000

$1500000000

$1000000000

$500000000

$-

Figure 62 US Exports of Drilling and Oil Field Equipment US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

0

$5000000

$10000000

$15000000

$20000000

$25000000

$30000000

$35000000

$40000000

$45000000

$50000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 42 102017 404 PM

Figure 63 US Exports of Industrial Engines to Rus sia US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

0

$5000000

$10000000

$15000000

$20000000

$25000000

$30000000

$35000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Figure 64 US Exports of Phar ma ceu ti cal Preparations to Rus sia US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

0

$5000000

$10000000

$15000000

$20000000

$25000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 43 102017 404 PM

Figure 65 US Exports of Meat and Poultry to Rus sia US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Meat poultry etc

$1000000000

$800000000

$600000000

$400000000

$200000000

$-

$1200000000

$1400000000

$1600000000

Figure 66 US Exports of Soybeans to Rus sia US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

0

$20000000

$40000000

$60000000

$80000000

$100000000

$120000000

$140000000

$160000000

$180000000

$200000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 44 102017 404 PM

Figure 67 US Exports of Vehicles Engines and Parts to Rus sia US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Other parts and accessories of vehicles

Automotive tires and tubes

Bodies and chassis for passenger cars

Engines and engine parts (carburetors pistonsrings and valves)

Trucks buses and special purpose vehicles

Passenger cars new and used

$2500000000

$2000000000

$1500000000

$500000000

$-

$1000000000

Figure 68 US Exports of Medicinal Equipment to Rus sia US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

$10000000

$15000000

$20000000

$25000000

$30000000

$35000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 45 102017 404 PM

Figure 610 US Exports to Rus sia by States (2016 US$ Value) Million US$ 2013ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoState and Metropolitan Area Trade Datardquo

Iowa Kentucky

North Dakota

Oklahoma

South Carolina

Washington

0

$500

$1000

$1500

$2000

2013 2014 2015 2016

District of Columbia

Iowa

Kentucky

North Dakota

Oklahoma

South Carolina

Washington

Figure 69 US Exports of Excavating Machinery to Rus sia US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

0

$5000000

$10000000

$15000000

$20000000

$25000000

$30000000

$35000000

$40000000

$45000000

$50000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 46 102017 404 PM

47

Upon reviewing the current trend in US- Russia economic relations we must acknowledge that

the existing trade model is obsolete and exhausted Imports are resource- oriented and reflect

constraints of the Rus sian economic structure while five groups of goodsmdash oil metals nuclear

fuels fertilizers and fishmdash make up more than 90 percent of total imports from Rus sia (Figure 71)

Each of these industries has a limited capacity for growth in the foreseeable future

Rus siarsquos core export to the United Statesmdash oilmdash will inevitably decrease in the mid- term under any

scenario The value and volume of Rus sian exports to the United States are open to global market

volatility and po liti cal pressures with limited hedging mechanisms

Overall US exports to Rus sia are unsustainable due to bilateral po liti cal tensions the whims of

commodity markets and changing domestic policies Sanctions and counter- sanctions have

created additional barriers particularly in finance banking high- tech energy and agro- business

According to the American Chamber of Commerce 69 percent of US companies working in the

country consider the impact of US sanctions against Rus sia on their business as negative At the

same time 60 percent of companies do not expect big changes in business relations between

Rus sia and the United States under Trump1 as the new law codifies existing sanctions fortifies

them and extends them to new sectors

Current US investments are low due to the weak rule of law in Rus sia a lack of property right

protections and proper contract enforcement high levels of statization and monopolization in the

economy a poor business climate outdated capital stock dependence on natural- resource

sectors and of course sanction and counter- sanction mea sures Bloated administrative compo-

nents created as risk mitigation instruments have also served as impediments The countryrsquos

institutional weakness low level of productivity bud get constraints and a declining inflexible

workforce will restrain future economic growth even if commodity prices recover Rus sian eco-

nomic policy will likely continue to be statist and protectionist relying mostly on import

substitutions

1 Ibid 11

Existing Trends and Future Scenarios

07

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 47 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations48

What scenarios can be expected in such a challenging environment

One probability (no peace no war) is based on the assumption that matters will not deteriorate

further and implementation of the Sanctions Act will be cursory This will cause relatively slow

degradation in the economic field with occasional flashes of activity in selected areas (eg closer

cooperation against Islamist terrorist groups in Syria)

A second worse case or critical scenario is the intensive and full- scale execution of current sanc-

tion legislation and even the imposition of new economic punitive and restrictive mea sures which

could incite asymmetric retaliatory actions and lead to the introduction of additional protectionist

policies This in turn could trigger a further escalation of mutual confrontation and could eventu-

ally destroy the fundamentals of the current bilateral trade system Rus sian leadership has charac-

terized the Sanctions Act as a declaration of a trade war that ends all hope for improving bilateral

relations2

2 Дмитрий Медведев ldquoПодписание президентом США нового санкционного закона против России создает несколько

последствийrdquo [The US Presidentrsquos signing of the package of new sanctions against Rus sia will have a few conse-

quences] Facebook August 2 2017 https wwwfacebook com Dmitry Medvedev posts 10154587161801851

Figure 71 US Imports from Rus sia Share of Oil Metals Nuclear Fuel Fertilizers and Fish Million US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

93

94

93

94

95

96

93

92

87

89

0

$5000

$10000

$15000

$20000

$25000

$30000

$35000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

US Imports from Russia

Share of Oil Metals Nuclear FuelFertilizers and Fish

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 48 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 49

The best case and most favorable scenario looks less probable now It assumes the realization of

structural reforms in Rus sia in such a way that would adapt Rus siarsquos foreign policy to national

economic needs reduce confrontations with the West and make a concerted efort to integrate

Rus sian businesses into global supply and value chains A revitalization of the structural reform

agendamdash including eforts to diversify economic activities through de- monopolization and support

for SMEs a restructuring of the banking sector the creation of a vibrant business climate to foster

entrepreneurships and innovation the implementation of administrative and judicial reforms to

tackle red tape and endemic corruption and the reduction of state control over key sectors of the

economy via wide- spread privatization could kick- start the development of a nonoil economy and

improve long- term growth prospects Despite ongoing discussion of reform strategies deep

economic and po liti cal changes are extremely complicated over the next po liti calelectoral cycle

(2018ndash2024) particularly because of re sis tance of vested interests and growing commodity prices

The urgency to tackle structural shortcomings in natu ral resource- dependent economies usually

correlates with the price of those resources and the degree to which resource rents drive eco-

nomic activity However there may be marginal improvements in the efficiency of the current

economic system

Future US- Russia relations can be thought of through three pillars one pillar focuses on areas

where both countries maintain a competitive rivalry another looks at potential areas of interaction

under pres ent conditions a third pillar and one that has evaporated from the current bilateral

agenda concentrates on future cooperation Stronger economic ties could not only be a kind of

po liti cal shock absorber but contribute to the building of this future (particularly business contacts

aim to support future structural reforms) although po liti cal factors are depressing the prospects

for cooperation To escape deadlock it will be impor tant to establish the right balance between

politics and economics and create a model of collaboration within the framework of contention

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 49 102017 404 PM

About the Author

Vadim Grishin PhD MBA has been involved in the reform pro cess in Rus sia as adviser to the

deputy prime minister of Rus sia in 1992ndash1993 and 2006ndash2010 He has extensive experience

working with the Bretton Woods Institutions He was the board member of the World Bank Group

and served as se nior adviser at the International Monetary Fund Currently he is a con sul tant to the

chief economistrsquos office of the International Finance Corporation and teaches the economics of

transition at Georgetown University in Washington DC

50

594-71613_ch99_4Pindd 50 102017 403 PM

Blank

COVER PHOTO ADOBE STOCK

1616 Rhode Island Avenue NW

Washington DC 20036

202 887 0200 | wwwcsisorg

v++ISBN 978-1-4422-8035-9

Lanham bull Boulder bull New York bull London

4501 Forbes Boulevard

Lanham MD 20706

301 459 3366 | wwwrowmancom

A U T H O R

Vadim Grishin

Myths and Realities

A Report of the

CSIS RUSSIA AND EURASIA PROGRAM

US-RussiaEconomicRelations

O C T O B E R 2 0 1 7

Euml|xHSLEOCy280359z

The Man Pupu Nyor Rock Formations at the Northern Urals also known as Seven

Strong Man or Little Mountain of the God in the local tribe (Mansi) language

Page 15: U.S.-Russia Economic Relations: Myths and Realities · 2020-04-17 · OCTOBER 2017 U.S.- Russia Economic Relations Myths and Realities AUTHOR Vadim Grishin A REPORT OF THE CSIS RUSSIA

Vadim Grishin 9

previously allowed for 30 days) Similarly US persons are prohibited from taking on any new debt

that has a maturity greater than 60 days (previously it was 90 days) with Rus sian energy compa-

nies currently under sanctions10

According to the Trea sury Department Rus sia held $1029 billion in US Trea sury securities in

June 201711 Could Rus sia withdraw all its reserves from the United States and use this action as a

retaliatory mea sure Such a scenario is unlikely since there is no comparable safe- haven alterna-

tive to US dollars When Rus siarsquos US Trea sury holdings dropped 50 percent from $176 billion

(October 2010) to $90 billion (November 2011) the market did not notice12 Nevertheless Rus sian

authorities have announced they will decrease dependence on assets and payments in US dollars13

10 Countering Amer i carsquos Adversaries through Sanctions Act HR 3364

11 US Department of Trea sury Major Foreign Holders of Trea sury Securities September 18 2017 http ticdata

treasury gov Publish mfh txt

12 Ibid

13 ldquoНовый виток санкций Россия откажется от доллараrdquo [A new round of sanctions Rus sia will abandon the dollar]

Газетару August 7 2017 https wwwgazeta ru business 2017 08 07 10821937 shtml

Figure 23 Rus sia Outward FDI Position United States Equities and Debt Million US$ 2009ndash2016

Source Central Bank of the Rus sian Federation External Sector Statistics Rus sian Direct Investments

Abroad accessed September 27 2017 https wwwcbr ru localization switchlanguage urlshy=shy news

ampfromshy=shyru - ruamptoshy=shyen - gb

$6000

$8000

$10000

$12000

$14000

$16000

$18000

$20000

$22000

2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 9 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations10

Officially the country does not invest in the US stock exchange although some Rus sian oligarchs

have bought US corporate bonds and equities in large amounts The new sanctions law requires

the secretary of trea sury in consultation with the director of national intelligence and the secretary

of state to issue reports on Rus sian se nior po liti cal figures and oligarchs based on their closeness

to the Rus sian regime and their net worth as well as the exposure of key economic sectors of the

United States to Rus sian po liti cally exposed persons and parastatal entities including at a mini-

mum the banking securities insurance and real estate sectors14

Only three Rus sian companies are listed in the US exchanges

Overall the scale and scope of US- Russia economic interaction and business activity is much greater

than officially appreciated but not significant enough to be taken into consideration by policymakers

14 Countering Amer i carsquos Adversaries through Sanctions Act HR 3364

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 10 102017 404 PM

11

03

Politics in the Driverrsquos Seat

Bilateral economic relations depend to a great extent on global and national economic cycles

After the recent global financial crisis the US economy has shown surprisingly sustainable GDP

growth while the Rus sian economy was the most afected among BRICS countries by the turbu-

lence of a worldwide economic downturn in 2008ndash2009 and after a short- term rebound slipped

into stagnation (2012ndash2013) and then into full- scale recession (2014ndash2016) The countryrsquos eco-

nomic cycle however appears to be changing once again with the economy returning to a

pattern of growth albeit uneven and gradual (Figures 31 and 32) Even with sanctions still in place

conditions have improved as a result of the stabilization of Urals oil to an average annual price of

$419 per barrel in 2016 The gains were sparked in part by major crude producers agreeing to cut

production after hefty price drops in 2014 and 2015 Supported by easier financial conditions

higher oil prices and growing macro- stability Rus sia is heading toward a moderate growth rate

that is expected to reach 14 percent this year according to forecasts of the World Bank Group

(WBG) and the IMF1

Because of the significant role that politics plays in any bilateral interaction it is impor tant to

combine economic and po liti cal cycles applying a ldquoresetrdquo to bilateral economic cooperation in

addition to the po liti cal relationship I have compared po liti cal cycles and trade dynamics using the

following graphs ( Table 31 and Figure 33) These charts do not pretend to reflect with mathemati-

cal precision all shifts in the bilateral po liti cal relationship but rather attempt to visually align

impor tant economic and po liti cal moments to detect the efects of po liti cal events on the size of

bilateral trade

Figure 33 shows all pos si ble combinations economic trends at the intersection of po liti cal devel-

opments oppose or support each other in synchronization It is evident that po liti cal interference

1 International Monetary Fund Rus sian Federation Staff Concluding Statement of the 2017 Article IV Mission (Wash-

ington DC IMF 2017) World Bank Group From Recession to Recovery Rus sia Economic Report no 37 (Washington

DC World Bank 2017) http pubdocsworldbank org en 383241495487103815 RER - 37 - May26 - FINAL - with - summary

pdf

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 11 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations12

in bilateral business afairs in the early 2000s was less significant than in later years As result

growing po liti cal tensions from 2003 to 2008 did not dramatically afect bilateral economic inter-

action It is also easier to explain why 2011ndash2012 resulted in rec ord trade and investmentmdash a con-

sequence of very high oil prices GDP growth in both countries improved legislation after Rus siarsquos

accession to the WTO and the Obamandash Medvedev po liti cal reset From 2014 to 2016 a perfect

storm of developments added efficiency to Western sanctions and augmented the damaging

consequences of counter- sanction mea sures

Figure 33 also confirms that in times of reduced economic cooperation po liti cal pressures can

easily change bilateral economic trends Moreover business interests along with economic inter-

actions have a limited capacity to reverse the po liti cal mainstream

Figure 31 Economic Cycle 2014ndash2016

Source Authorrsquos evaluation of international financial institutions (IFI) data and sources from respective

countries

Sustainable Growth

Brazil

Negative Growth

Unstable Growth

Mexico

Descending Growth

Argentina

EU

US

Russia

Vietnam

China

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 12 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 13

Table 31 Po liti cal Cycles in Bilateral US- Russia Relations 1999ndash2016

2001ndash2002 The George W Bushndash Vladimir Putin Reset Rus sia supported ldquoglobal war on terrorismrdquo launched by the United States after 911 the SORT nuclear arms reduction treaty was signed by the United States and Rus sia and a successful business dialogue was developed that created the current structure of economic relations

2003ndash2008 Deterioration in bilateral relations brought on by the Iraq War Georgiarsquos ldquoRose Revolutionrdquo Mikhail Khodorkovskyrsquos arrest Ukrainersquos ldquoOrange Revolutionrdquo Kosovorsquos in de pen dence and the Georgian War

2009ndash2010 The Barack Obamandash Dmitry Medvedev Reset Rus sia served as a logistical hub for transportation and supply of US forces in Af ghan i stan United States and Rus sia signed the new START nuclear arms reduction treaty Rus sia backed tighter economic sanctions on Iran Rus sia gained access to the WTO after 18 years of negotiations

2011ndash2016 Deterioration in bilateral relations caused by the Ukrainian crisis which were followed by sanctions and counter- sanctions along with the Syrian crises and cyber- enabled activities

Source Authorrsquos evaluation of po liti cal and economic data

Note SORTthinsp=thinspStrategic Ofensive Reductions Treaty STARTthinsp=thinspStrategic Arms Reduction Treaty

Figure 32 Economic Cycle 2017ndash2019

Source Authorrsquos evaluation of IFI data and sources from respective countries

Egypt

VenezuelaEU

South Africa

Brazil

Russia

India

US

Descending Growth

Korea

China

Negative Growth

Unstable Growth

Sustainable Growth

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 13 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations14

Figure 33 US- Russia Trade Million US$ vs Po liti cal Cycle 2000ndash2016

Sources US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo Foreign Trade last modified June 29 2017

https wwwcensus gov foreign - trade balance c4621 html (see data for 2000ndash2016) authorrsquos evaluation

of po liti cal and economic data

Orange Revolution

Khodorkovskys arrest

GeorgianWar

Bush- Putin Reset

Iraq War Global Financial Crisis

Obama-Medvedev Reset

Russias WTO accession

New START Treaty

A Pefect Storm the Ukranian Crisis Oil Prices Crashing

Sanctions and Counter-Sanctions

$3000

$8000

$13000

$18000

$23000

$28000

$33000

$38000

$43000

2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 14 102017 404 PM

15

The current structure of US- Russia economic relations emerged in the early 2000s when the

model of trade and investment interaction took on a character similar to that which existed be-

tween the United States and developing economies US imports from Rus sia centered on com-

modities while technology along with food products lead American exports The primary

exception was that Rus sia supplied nuclear fuel including highly enriched uranium extracted from

nuclear weapons for US power plants and provided ser vices to the aerospace industry primarily

in satellite launches However both these exceptions can be explained as a legacy of the Soviet

past and not a harbinger of the future economic relationship (Figure 41)

In the last 15 years this trade structure has not changed significantly The only noticeable shift in

trade was a dramatic drop (to practically nothing) in exports of US agricultural products a result

of Rus siarsquos policy of import substitution and so- called counter- sanction mea sures it took in re-

sponse to US sanctions over the Ukraine crisis (Figure 42)

Promising new directions of cooperation in the IT sector and in engineering ser vices for the

aerospace industry appeared in the early 2000s1 but did not spill into other sectors and conse-

quently did little to renew economic cooperation on the whole The integration of Rus sian high-

tech ser vices into large- scale global production and value chains was constrained by the usual

culprits a lack of financial resources managerial experience skilled labor modern infrastructure

RampD investments and an adequate business environment High commodity prices incentivized the

restoration of an economic system centered on resource rents The leading role of oil and gas

extraction and transportation discouraged the development of a nonenergy sector that might

have created advanced and complex production and ser vices An import substitution policy could

not work efficiently in an economic environment plagued by the Dutch disease where currency

1 The Boeing Design Center was created in Moscow It consists of nearly 250 Boeing employees managing

a team of 1200 contract engineers from Rus sian and Ukrainian aerospace companies ldquoBackgrounder Boeing in

Rus siardquo Boeing last modified January 2017 http wwwboeing com resources boeingdotcom company key _ orgs

boeing - international pdf russia - cisbackgrounder pdf

Are the United States and Rus sia ldquoNatu ralrdquo Trading Partners A Little Bit of History

04

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 15 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations16

inflows (oil money) lead to ruble appreciation and render a countryrsquos production less competitive

During that time Rus siarsquos industry did not receive preferential access to larger markets and could

not expand its share in the global economy particularly because of its self- isolation from the

regional trade agreements (except for its participation in the Eurasian Economic Union with some

neighboring countries of the former Soviet Union) As a result neither import substitution nor

export- led strategy promoted growth and specialization in nonoil production A long- awaited

modernization and reallocation of resources from an inefficient nontrade sector to a trade sector

did not materialize

These limits were later augmented with sanctions and an extension of domestic restrictions on

cooperation with Western partners Importantly the rapid growth of state- monopoly structures in

the Rus sian economy over the past 15 years has created additional obstacles to the development

and diversification of US- Russia economic ties

Figure 41 US Imports from Rus sia US$ 2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2016)

Fish and shellfish 3

Crude oil 5

Fuel oil 37

Petroleum products other

8

Nuclear fuel materials

7

Chemicals-fertilizers 4

Steelmaking materials 5

Iron and steel mill products 4

Bauxite and aluminum 9

Other precious metals 4

Nonferrous metals other 1

Finished metal shapes 1

Synthetic rubber--primary

1

Spacecraftexcluding military

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 16 102017 404 PM

Fig

ure

42

U

S E

xpo

rts

to R

us s

ia U

S$ 2

016

Sou

rce

US

Ce

nsu

s B

ure

au ldquo

Trad

e in

Go

od

s w

ith

Ru

s sia

rdquo (s

ee

dat

a fo

r 2

016

)

Bak

ery

pro

du

cts

Win

e b

eer

an

d r

elat

ed

pro

du

cts

New

spri

nt

Pla

stic

mat

eria

ls

Ch

emic

als-

fert

ilize

rs

Ch

emic

als-

ino

rgan

icC

hem

ical

s-o

rgan

ic

Ch

emic

als-

oth

erC

ott

on

fib

er c

loth

In

du

stri

al r

ub

ber

pro

du

cts

Min

eral

su

pp

lies-

man

ufa

ctu

red

Gen

erat

ors

acc

esso

ries

Ele

ctri

c ap

par

atu

s

Dri

llin

g amp

oilfi

eld

eq

uip

men

t Sp

ecia

lized

min

ing

Exc

avat

ing

mac

hin

ery

No

nfa

rm t

ract

ors

an

d p

arts

In

du

stri

al e

ng

ines

Fo

od

to

bac

co m

ach

iner

y M

etal

wo

rkin

g m

ach

ine

too

ls

Tex

tile

sew

ing

m

ach

ines

W

oo

d g

lass

p

last

ic

Pu

lp a

nd

pap

er

mac

hin

ery

Mea

suri

ng

tes

tin

g

con

tro

l in

stru

men

ts

Mat

eria

ls h

and

ling

equ

ipm

ent

Ind

ust

rial

mac

hin

es

oth

er

Ph

oto

ser

vice

ind

ust

ry m

ach

iner

y A

gri

cult

ura

l mac

hin

ery

eq

uip

men

t C

om

pu

ters

Co

mp

ute

r ac

cess

ori

es

Sem

ico

nd

uct

ors

Tel

eco

mm

un

icat

ion

seq

uip

men

t

Bu

sin

ess

mac

hin

es a

nd

eq

uip

men

t

Lab

ora

tory

tes

tin

g in

stru

men

ts

Med

icin

al e

qu

ipm

ent

Civ

ilian

air

craf

t e

ng

ines

eq

uip

men

t a

nd

par

ts

Rai

lway

tra

nsp

ort

atio

n

equ

ipm

ent

Ves

sels

exc

lud

ing

scr

ap

Co

mm

erci

al v

esse

ls o

ther

M

arin

e en

gin

es p

arts

Spac

ecra

ft e

xclu

din

g

mili

tary

Pas

sen

ger

car

s

new

an

d u

sed

Tru

cks

bu

ses

and

sp

ecia

l p

urp

ose

ve

hic

les

En

gin

es a

nd

en

gin

e p

arts

(c

arb

ure

tors

pis

ton

s r

ing

s

and

val

ves)

B

od

ies

and

ch

assi

s fo

r p

asse

ng

er c

ars

Au

tom

oti

ve t

ires

an

d t

ub

es

Oth

er p

arts

an

d a

cces

sori

es o

f ve

hic

les

Ap

par

el h

ou

seh

old

go

od

s -

text

ile

Ph

arm

aceu

tica

lp

rep

arat

ion

s

Furn

itu

re h

ou

seh

old

go

od

s

etc

R

ug

s

Cel

l ph

on

es a

nd

oth

er

ho

use

ho

ld g

oo

ds

ne

c

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 17 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations18

Figure 43 US Trade in Goods with Rus sia Million US$ 1992ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 1992ndash2016)

Russian Financial Crisis

Oil price Increased from$2446 USD per barrel (2001)

to $9694 USD per barrel(2008)

Global Financial Crisis

Oil price high record in2011-2012

(more that $111 USD perbarrel)

Oil price crashed

$-

$5000

$10000

$15000

$20000

$25000

$30000

$35000

$40000

$45000

$50000

1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

US Imports from Russia US Exports to Russia US-Russia Trade in Goods

No doubt po liti cal ups and downs add volatility to US- Russia trade Nevertheless Rus siarsquos eco-

nomic structure exhausted itself before the Ukrainian crisis and the recent Rus sian recession Its

limitations are not only due to some mistakes in policy or negative coincidences of circumstances

but rather to deeply rooted properties in the current bilateral trade model related to structural

issues in the Rus sian economy Structural constraints such as the weak enforcement of property

rights poor business regulation and nondiversified exports weighed on Rus sian trade with the

United States From this perspective the term ldquonaturalunnatural trading partnersrdquo does not ad-

dress the unused capacity of bilateral interaction or the real challenges that kind of interaction

faces It just adds metaphysical flavor to the very specific economic and po liti cal factors that

determine the US- Russia trajectory

Overall the outlines of bilateral trade (Figure 43) resemble the famous ldquoRus sian Mountainsrdquo that

were a pre de ces sor of the modern roller coaster icy hills supported by wooden constructionsmdash a

rigid and immobile structure that sooner or later would melt This unfortunately is what is hap-

pening to US- Russia trade cooperation now

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 18 102017 404 PM

19

ARE LITTLE FISH REALLY SWEET

Low US- Russia economic interaction has at least two consequences First it limits the capacity of

policymakers to exploit trade as an instrument for geopo liti cal combat Even the question of a US

trade deficit which used to be a headache for many US trading partners has become so insig-

nificant in absolute terms (about $87 billion in 2016) that it seems hardly worth caring about

When the volume of trade between two countries becomes very small in absolute terms whether

a country is running a surplus or deficit is no longer relevant But it also renders another type of

confrontations (sometimes more dangerous) more likely since the two traders have little to lose

Second in an environment marked by low levels of bilateral trade both sides could incentivize (if

and when a desire for po liti cal rapprochement exists) the signing of new trade deals which are

elevated symbolically as a turning point in bilateral po liti cal relations (ie the sale of Boeings to

Rus sia or the delivery via tankers of Rus sian oil to US refineries) Sometimes markets themselves

pres ent ldquogiftsrdquo that can be capitalized on po liti cally US- USSR grain trade in the 1970s was one

such ldquogiftrdquo large sales of American grain to the Soviet Union helped US policymakers win favor

with the po liti cally impor tant American farming sector and permitted Soviet leaders to maintain

access to a dietary staple for the Soviet population

The strong 32 percent growth in value of US imports from Rus sia from January to May 2017

versus January to May 2016 ( Table 51) is an example of a development that has tempted officials

to pres ent it as a sign of positive change due to ldquogrowing business activitiesrdquo (this kind of statement

was heard before the bilateral summit in Germany in July 2017) although the reason for that leap

was evidently an increase in commodity prices (mainly of oilmdash see Table 52) and not a rise in

entrepreneurial interactions The primary beneficiaries of that upside rally have been two other

petro- economies Saudi Arabia and Venezuela ( Tables 53 and 54)

Sector Analyses

05

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 19 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations20

Table 51 US Imports from Rus sia Million US$ Januaryndash May 2016 vs Januaryndash May 2017

Year January February March April May Total

2016 9603 6871 11097 12257 10977 50805

2017 12215 10220 16979 13471 14147 67032

Change 271 487 530 99 289 319

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 1992ndash2016)

Table 52 Change in Urals Crude Oil Prices US$ per Barrel Januaryndash May 2016 vs Januaryndash May 2017

Januaryndash May 2016 Januaryndash May 2017 Change ($) Change ()

3601 5129 1528 424

Source Ministry of Finance of the Rus sian Federation https wwwminfin ru ru ixzz4mMIZ7XtC

Table 53 US Imports from Saudi Arabia Million US$ Januaryndash May 2016 vs Januaryndash May 2017

Year January February March April May Total

2016 15114 9036 13555 10844 14679 63228

2017 19802 20298 21650 16211 19542 97503

Change 3101 12463 5972 495 331 542

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Saudi Arabiardquo Foreign Trade last modified June 29 2017

https wwwcensus gov foreign - trade balance c5170 html (see data for 2016ndash2017)

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 20 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 21

Table 54 US Imports from Venezuela Million US$ Januaryndash May 2016 vs Januaryndash May 2017

Year January February March April May Total

2016 6657 5560 7140 8007 7922 35286

2017 13041 10864 123500 11148 12243 59646

Change 9590 9540 7297 3923 5454 6903

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Venezuelardquo Foreign Trade last modified June 29 2017

https wwwcensus gov foreign - trade balance c3070 html (see data for 2016ndash2017)

Table 55 US Exports to Rus sia Million US$ Januaryndash May 2016 vs Januaryndash May 2017

Year January February March April May Total

2016 3628 3577 7298 4657 4947 24107

2017 3144 4277 5386 6670 4806 24283

Change minus133 196 minus262 432 minus29 minus07

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2016ndash2017)

At the same time US exports to Rus sia continue to stagnate ( Table 55) due to low levels of

consumption during a two-and- a- half-year economic crisis a deep ruble devaluation sanctions

and counter- sanctions

Given the very dif er ent economic structures and resource endowments of Rus sia and the United

States it is not surprising that US- Russia trade is asymmetric and oil driven (Figure 51) A

3 percent increase in Urals oil prices translates into a one percent increase in US import growth

from Rus sia Thus in 2016 every $10 increase in Urals crude oil added $15 billion to the value of

US imports or 11 percent to the total value of imports from Rus sia

OIL ADDICTION

Oil is a core pillar of US- Russia bilateral trade A bumpy ride in oil markets afects commerce

Nevertheless Rus sian oil exports to the United States in physical terms have been rather

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 21 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations22

sustainable Starting from 2005 average annual deliveries have been above 150 million barrels

(Figure 52) Crude and heating oil have dominated while petroleum products and liquefied petro-

leum gases have not (Figure 53) In 2011 oil exports peaked at 228 million barrels but declined to

159 million barrels in 2016mdash a drop of 30 percent Rec ord high shipments of Rus sian oil to the United

States coincided with an elevation in oil prices which made the subsequent decline in oil shipment

value between 2011 and 2016 (by about 72 percent as shown in Figure 54) seem more stark The

increase in price also raised the share of oil in Rus sian exports by 74 percent in 2011 (Figure 55)

The Rus sian share in total US oil imports was around 55 percent in 2011 and 43 percent in 2016

( Table 56) In the last five years the United States has relied exclusively on consumption of Rus sian

oil for the rough equivalent of one week out of the year (Figure 56)

It is unlikely that Rus sia can significantly increase its share of the US oil market and there is a real

possibility for a downward trend There are several reasons the historically high Rus sian hydrocar-

bon export threshold of 2011 will not soon if ever be surpassed

First US energy consumption will likely be flat According to the US Energy Information Adminis-

tration (EIA) demand for petroleum and other liquids in the United States will be about 35ndash36

quadrillion British thermal units (BTUs) with minimal variation over the next 25 years1

1 US EIA ldquoAnnual Energy Outlook 2017 with Projections to 2050rdquo January 5 2017 7ndash8

Figure 51 US- Russia Trade Growth () vs US and Rus sia Real GDP Growth () 1993ndash2016

Source IMF ldquoIMF Datardquo accessed September 27 2017 http wwwimf org en Data US Census Bureau

ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo

Note rGDPthinsp=thinspreal gross domestic product

Trade

USA rGDP growth

Russia rGDP growth

-60

-40

-20

0

20

40

60

80

100

1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Gro

wth

All spikes in US-Russia trade have been connected with two main

variables volume and price of crude oil

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 22 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 23

Second the United States will become a net energy exporter between 2020 and 2030 in most

cases under dif er ent combinations of oil and natu ral gas prices GDP growth technological

breakthroughs and the availability of energy resources The role of oil imports will dramatically

fall2

Third oil price scenarios as described by the International Energy Agency (IEA) international

financial organ izations (IFIs) and many national agencies are very cautious and assume that even

by 2035 to 2040 oil prices will not to recover to the levels of 2011ndash20123

Fourth Rus sian oil production and export growth will be modest and driven by Asian economic

expansion and will comprise a decreasing share of Western markets4 According to forecasts from

2 Ibid 15ndash18

3 Ibid table 3 ldquoEnergy Prices by Sector and Sourcesrdquo World Bank World Bank Commodity Markets Price Forecasts

(Washington DC World Bank 2017) httpswwwworldbank org en research commodity - markets Organ ization of the

Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) World Oil Outlook 2016 (Vienna OPEC 2016)

4 E D Belotskaia et al Global and Rus sian Energy Outlook 2016 (Moscow Energy Research Institute of the Rus sian

Acad emy of Science Analytical Center for the Government of the Rus sian Federation 2016) http acgov ru files

publication a 12767 pdf

Figure 52 US Imports from Rus sia Crude Oil and Petroleum Products Thousands of Barrels 1995ndash2016

Source US EIA ldquoUS Imports by Country of Origin Rus siardquo Petroleum amp Other Liquids September 13

2017 http wwweia gov dnav pet PET _ MOVE _ IMPCUS _ D _ NUS _ NRS _ MBBL _ M htm

0

50000

100000

150000

200000

250000

Date 1995 1996 1997 1998 199920002001200220032004200520062007200820092010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 23 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations24

the Organ ization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) crude oil exports from Rus sia and

the Caspian region to the United States will dis appear by 20255

So why does the Rus sian Urals blend continue to be attractive for oil traders and US refineries

which could pro cess greater volumes of domestically produced lighter crude There are two main

reasons One is related to the preference of US high conversion refineries (the most sophisticated

in the world) to work with heavy oil blends produced by Canada Mexico Iraq Venezuela and

Rus sia Pro cessing heavy crude now is as profitable as pro cessing lighter crude The so- called

crack spreadmdash the diference between the cost of relatively cheap heavy crude oil and the final

price of value- added consumer products (diesel gasoline jet fuel and heating oil)mdash has become

the same as the refinery margins of light sweet crude6 This has primarily afected light oil produc-

ing countries such as Angola Algeria and Nigeria

5 OPEC World Oil Outlook 2016 306ndash309

6 ldquoHow Much for That Heavy Oilrdquo Oil Sands Magazine December 26 2015 https wwwoilsandsmagazine com

news 2015 12 26 how - much - for - that - heavy - oil

Figure 53 US Imports from Rus sia Oil and Petroleum Products US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

$-

$25000000000

$20000000000

$15000000000

$10000000000

$5000000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Liquefied petroleum gases

Petroleum products other

Fuel oil

Crude oil

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 24 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 25

Another factor afecting purchase of Rus sian oil is a new trend among oil companies for further

consolidation of scale and for integrating operations of upstream and downstream business7

There have been several waves of separation and unification of production transportation and

pro cessing in the last 50 years The current business cycle can be seen as an adaptation to a

period of low prices and oversupply Companies that buy andor produce oil in Rus sia most likely

prefer to transport and pro cess this oil in their own modern refineries in the United States At the

same time some of the newest refinery designs specifically for pro cessing heavy oils have been

built in Asia thus extending the choices of heavy oil producing countries

We should also consider that leading US and international oil traders along with oil producing

companies working with or owning US refineries frequently buy Rus sian oil on the open market

and have long- term contracts on Rus sian crude oil delivery Many Rus sian oil companies prefer to

pay for purchases or ser vices with their future production instead of cash creating situations of

ldquostickyrdquo oil imports that are difficult to replace The best- known example is an interaction between

7 ldquoEnergy and Utilities Sectorrdquo Roundtable Financier Worldwide December 2015 https wwwfinancierworldwide

com roundtable - energy - utilities - sector - dec15

Figure 54 US Imports of Oil and Petroleum Products from Rus sia vs Oil Prices Eu rope Brent Spot Price Free on Board (FOB) 1996ndash2017

Source US EIA ldquoUS Imports by Country of Origin Rus siardquo

0

20

40

60

80

100

120

140

0

5000

10000

15000

20000

25000

30000

Jan

-19

96

Jun

-19

96

No

v-19

96

Ap

r-19

97

Sep

-19

97

Feb

-19

98

Jul-

199

8D

ec-1

99

8M

ay-1

99

9O

ct-1

99

9M

ar-2

00

0A

ug

-20

00

Jan

-20

01

Jun

-20

01

No

v-2

00

1A

pr-

20

02

Sep

-20

02

Feb

-20

03

Jul-

20

03

Dec

-20

03

May

-20

04

Oct

-20

04

Mar

-20

05

Au

g-2

00

5Ja

n-2

00

6Ju

n-2

00

6N

ov-

20

06

Ap

r-2

00

7Se

p-2

00

7Fe

b-2

00

8Ju

l-2

00

8D

ec-2

00

8M

ay-2

00

9O

ct-2

00

9M

ar-2

010

Au

g-2

010

Jan

-20

11Ju

n-2

011

No

v-2

011

Ap

r-2

012

Sep

-20

12Fe

b-2

013

Jul-

20

13D

ec-2

013

May

-20

14O

ct-2

014

Mar

-20

15A

ug

-20

15Ja

n-2

016

Jun

-20

16N

ov-

20

16

USD

per

Bar

rel

Th

ou

san

d B

arr

els

US Imports from Russia of Crude Oil and Petroleum Products (Thousand Barrels)

Europe Brent Spot Price FOB (Dollars per Barrel)

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 25 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations26

Table 56 US Oil Imports All Countries vs Rus sia Thousand Barrels per Day 2011ndash2016

Years 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

All Countries 11436 10598 9859 9241 9449 10058

Rus sia 624 477 460 330 371 433

Share 546 450 467 357 393 431

Sources US EIA ldquoUS Imports by Country of Origin Total Crude Oil and Productsrdquo Petroleum amp Other

Liquids September 13 2017 wwweia gov dnav pet pet_move_impcus_a2_nus_ep00_im0_mbbl_m htm

authorrsquos computation

Figure 55 US Imports from Rus sia Share of Crude Oil and Petroleum Products Million US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

57

64

73

72

74

73

72

59

52 50

0

$5000

$10000

$15000

$20000

$25000

$30000

$35000

$40000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

US Imports from Russia

Share of Oil and Petroleum Products

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 26 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 27

the Rus sian state mono poly Rosneft and commodity trading and mining giant Glencore which

along with energy and commodities com pany Vitol participated in a $10 billion prepayment

deal with Rosneft for crude supplies in 2013

There have been a number of ongoing transactions between the Rus sian oil industry and interna-

tional oil companies including several that top the list of importers of Rus sian oil to the United

States ( Table 57) In December 2016 Glencore participated in a controversial privatization opera-

tion purchasing in tandem with the Qatar sovereign wealth fund a 195 percent stake in Rosneft

which was on the US and EU list of sanctioned firms8 Glencore has also taken a blocking stake in

midsize oil producer RussNeft BP owns a 1975 percent stake in Rosneft Chevron holds a

15 percent interest in the 935- mile- long CPC9 pipeline which transports an average of 959000

barrels of crude oil per day including 76000 barrels daily from Rus sia10 ExxonMobil has formed

8 E Mazneva and I Arkhipov ldquoRus sia Sells $11 Billion Stake in Rosneft to Glencore Qatarrdquo Bloomberg December 7

2016

9 CPCthinsp=thinspCaspian Pipeline Consortium

10 ldquoRus sia Highlights of Operations and Business Portfoliordquo Chevron accessed October 3 2017 https wwwchevron

com worldwide russia

Figure 56 Share of Rus sian Oil in Total US Oil Imports Thousands of Barrels per Day 1972ndash2016

Source US EIA ldquoUS Imports by Country of Origin Total Crude Oil and Productsrdquo

2000

4000

6000

8000

10000

12000

14000

16000

US Imports of Crude Oil and Petroleum Products (Thousand Barrels per Day)

US Imports from Russia of Crude Oil and Petroleum Products (Thousand Barrels per Day)19

7319

7419

7519

7619

7719

7819

7919

80

198

119

82

198

319

84

198

519

86

198

719

88

198

919

90

199

119

92

199

319

94

199

519

96

199

719

98

199

92

00

02

00

12

00

22

00

32

00

42

00

52

00

62

00

72

00

82

00

92

010

20

112

012

20

132

014

20

152

016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 27 102017 404 PM

Table 57 Top Importers of Rus sian Oil to the United States Thousands of Barrels 2016

VALERO MARKETING amp SUPPLY CO 54590 3616

EXXONMOBIL OIL CORP 17087 1130

CHEVRON USA INC 15217 1008

BP WEST COAST PRODUCTS LLC 10130 671

GEORGE E WARREN CORP 7272 48

PAULSBORO REFINING CO LLC 6838 453

TESORO CORP 5097 338

VITOL INC 5084 337

PHILLIPS 66 CO 4726 313

TRAFIGURA AG 4360 289

PAR HAWAII REFINING LLC 3893 258

MOTIVA ENTERPRISES LLC 3041 205

SHELL US TRADING CO 2863 19

MARATHON PETROLEUM CO LLC 2475 16

ATLANTIC TRADING amp MARKETING 2099 14

FREEPOINT COMMODITIES LLC 1439 1

GLENCORE LTD 1284 85

BEST PETROLEUM CORP 967 64

ROLYMPUS US COMMODITIES GROUP LLC 822 6

HUNT CRUDE OIL SUPPLY CO 666 4

GULF OIL LP 658 4

Source US EIA ldquoUS Imports by Country of Origin Crude Oilrdquo Petroleum amp Other Liquids September 13

2017 httpswwweiagovdnavpetpet_move_impcus_a2_nus_epc0_im0_mbblpd_ahtm authorrsquos

computation

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 28 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 29

several joint ventures with Rosneft to undertake ofshore exploration in the Black Sea and the Kara

Sea in Siberia11

According to the Sanctions Act US persons are prohibited from exporting or reexporting goods

ser vices (except financial ser vices) and technology in support of exploration or production of new

deep- water Arctic ofshore or shale oil proj ects that involve designated Rus sian entities or other

entities in which such sanctioned persons have a controlling interest or a substantial noncontrol-

ling owner ship interest defined as not less than 33 percent (previously it was 50 percent) The new

law also authorizesmdash but does not requiremdash the imposition of so- called secondary sanctions

against non- US entities that engage in activities involving the construction maintenance or

expansion of Rus sian energy export pipelines with a fair market value of $1 million or more or an

aggregate fair market value during a 12- month period of $5 million12 This provision has raised the

concerns of some Eu ro pean countries particularly Germany As result the final language of the

law included wording about coordination of this issue with allies of the United States

Shipments of Rus sian oil to the United States could be afected by activity in the US refinery

industry In early 2017 Saudi Aramco bought the United Statesrsquo largest oil refinery in Port Arthur

(Texas) and it announced plans to send more of its own crude to that refinery13 Serious concerns

exist however regarding the future of three refineries and nine pipelines owned by Citgo a US

branch of the Venezuelan state com pany PdVSA which is balancing precariously on the edge of

default Under certain conditions in the event of PdVSA bankruptcy Rosneft could claim a stake of

up to 499 percent in Citgo Such a possibility has raised concerns among politicians and US

government officials with Trea sury Secretary Steven Mnuchin calling it a ldquonational security issuerdquo14

Tables 58 59 and 510 show allocations of Rus sian oil imports to major US refineries some of

which work exclusively on Rus sian crude a total of two to three months per year In total 150940

thousand barrels of Rus sian oil were refined in 2016

Figure 57 confirms a leading position of Texas and Louisiana among the US states receiving

Rus sian crude followed by New Jersey California Mississippi Washington Hawaii and Delaware

In a paradoxical way Texas has dis appeared from the list of states as a main destination of US

imports from Rus sia (Figure 58) because Rus sian crude is mostly delivered to Louisiana ports and

registered there by US Customs as an import from Rus sia After that it transports to refineries in

Louisiana and Texas

Overall the short- term business rationale behind the sustainability of US oil imports from Rus sia

cannot overcome strong headwinds in the US energy sector facing all oil importers which will

inevitably lead to a contraction of Rus sian oil exports to the United States in the foreseeable future

11 Exxon eforts to receive a special US Trea sury waiver to drill in sanctioned Rus sia failed in 2017

12 Countering Amer i carsquos Adversaries through Sanctions Act HR 3364

13 Sarp Ozkan ldquoSaudi Aramcorsquos Port Arthur Refinery and the US Refinery Fleetrdquo Drilling Info May 11 2017

https infodrillinginfo com saudi - aramcos - port - arthur - refinery - us - refinery - fleet

14 Graham Kates ldquoTrea sury Secretary Rus siarsquos Citgo Deal a National Security Issuerdquo CBS News May 1 2017

http wwwcbsnews com news rosneft - citgo - steven - mnuchin - national - security

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 29 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations30

Table 58 Valerorsquos Refineries Pro cessing Rus sian Oil Thousands of Barrels 2016

Saint Charles Louisiana 29206 535

Corpus Christi Texas 20626 378

Wilmington California 4250 78

Total USA 54590 100

Source US EIA ldquoRefinery Capacity Reportrdquo January 1 2017

table 5 wwweia gov petroleum refinerycapacity table5 pdf

authorrsquos computation

Table 59 ExxonMobil Refineries Pro cessing Rus sian Oil Thousands of Barrels 2016

Baytown Texas 15037 88

Baton Rouge Louisiana 2046 12

Total USA 17083 100

Source US EIA ldquoRefinery Capacity Reportrdquo authorrsquos computation

Table 510 Chevronrsquos Refineries Pro cessing Rus sian Oil Thousands of Barrels 2016

Pascagoula Mississippi 12767 840

El Segundo California 2372 155

Saint Rose Louisiana 78 05

Total USA 15217 100

Source US EIA ldquoRefinery Capacity Reportrdquo authorrsquos computation

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 30 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 31

HEAVY METAL

Taken together US imports of metals and US imports of oil compose about 80 percent of US

total imports from Rus sia (Figure 59) Trade of metals like other commodities is strongly afected

by market price fluctuations Nevertheless metal imports from Rus sia have been fairly resilient to

market volatility and their average annual value has hovered at about $4 billion in the last five years

(Figure 510) This market resilience was forged at the end of the 1990searly 2000s when Rus sian

metal producers gradually modernized their plants adjusting quality of production to Western

standards and enhancing integration into global value and supply chains Some of them conquered

their share of the highly competitive US market struggling with peers from Canada and certain

BRICS countries (China India and Brazil) To attract additional resources all Rus sian large metal-

producing companies became public and were listed on stock exchanges chiefly the London Stock

Exchange (Severstalrsquo PAO Evraz MMK OAO Novolipetsk Steel Norilsk Nikel and TMK PAO) one

on the New York Stock Exchange (Mechel) and one on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange (Rusal)

Business logic pushed some of them to invest in the US metal- making industry which was hit

hard by crisis Later on some of those assets were sold (eg two US steel mills acquired by

Severstal in 2004 were purchased 10 years later by Steel Dynamics Inc and AK Steel Corp)

Figure 57 Share of US States Rus sian Oil Imports 2016

Source US EIA ldquoUS Imports from Rus sia of Crude Oil and Petroleum Productsrdquo Petroleum amp Other

Liquids September 29 2017 https www eia gov dnav pet hist LeafHandler ashx nshy=shyPETampsshy=shyMTTIM _ NUS

- NRS _ 1ampfshy=shyM authorrsquos computation

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

100

Maine

Massachusetts

Maryland

Connecticut

Georgia

Rhode Island

Virginia

Florida

New York

Alabama

Puerto Rico

Pennsylvania

Delaware

Hawaii

Washington

Mississippi

California

New Jersey

Louisiana

Texas

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 31 102017 404 PM

Figure 58 US Imports from Rus sia by State Million US$ 2013ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoState and Metropolitan Area Trade Datardquo Foreign Trade last modified

October 2 2017 https wwwcensus gov foreign - trade statistics state

Alaska

Connecticut

Delaware

Hawaii

Louisiana

Maryland

North Dakota 0

$1000

$2000

$3000

$4000

$5000

$6000

2013 2014 2015 2016

Alabama

Alaska

Connecticut

Delaware

Hawaii

Louisiana

Maryland

Maine

Mississippi

Montana

North Dakota

Mississippi

Figure 59 US Imports from Rus sia Share of Oil and Metals Million US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 1992ndash2016)

83

82

85

86

87

88

85

82

7375

0

$5000

$10000

$15000

$20000

$25000

$30000

$35000

$40000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

US Imports from Russia

Share of Oil and Metals

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 32 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 33

Obviously the market dynamic of dif er ent metals varies (eg iron steel aluminum platinum and

nickel) Caps to increase their trade and production in a ldquored oceanrdquo global environment with

anemic demand is rather limited despite Figure 510 showing a spike of iron and steel imports

from Rus sia in 2014 and aluminum in 2016 Some opportunities may exist for Russian- owned steel

plants in the United States (such as NLMK) to participate in energy proj ects resumed under Presi-

dent Trump who has required that new pipelines use only American- made steel15

Rus sia occupies a special niche in the US market for titanium products a high- end metal indus-

try Twenty years ago a long- term contract was signed between Rus sian titanium producer

VSMPO- AVISMA and Boeing The Rus sian com pany entered the selective club of Boeing suppliers

for the manufacture of components and semi- finished products Since the signing of this contract

VSMPO has delivered more than 35 percent of all titanium placed on Boeing civil aircraft16 They

are hidden in the trade data in an import category for Civilian Aircrafts and Parts (Figure 511) At

the end of 2016 Boeing announced an extension of its framework agreement with AVISMA

15 E Scheyder C Ngai and T Sylvester ldquoAmerican Steel Unlikely to Get Keystone Boost Despite Trump Orderrdquo

Reuters January 27 2017 http wwwreuters com article usa - trump - pipeline - transcanada - idUSL1N1FH1ZD

16 A Kramer ldquoTitanium Fills Vital Role for Boeing and Rus siardquo New York Times July 5 2013 http wwwnytimes com

2013 07 06 business global titanium - fills - vital - role - for - boeing - and - russia html mcubzshy=shy3

Figure 510 US Imports from Rus sia Iron Steel Bauxite Aluminum Nickel Nonferrous Metals and Other Precious Metals and Materials US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 1992ndash2016)

0

$6000000000

$5000000000

$4000000000

$3000000000

$2000000000

$1000000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 20122013

20142015

2016

Finished metal shapes

Iron and steel advanced

Iron and steel products nec

Nonferrous metals other

Other precious metals

Nickel

Bauxite and aluminum

Iron and steel mill products

Steelmaking materials

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 33 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations34

through 2022 and additional investments in the construction of a new robotic plant in Titanium

Valley a special economic zone located in the Sverdlovsk region that will open in 2018 The pro-

cessing of titanium forgings in all Boeing civil aircraft will be performed there including 787s 737

MAXs and 777Xs17 The contract extension with AVISMA may add several hundred million dollars

in value to annual US imports from Rus sia

How can such heavy reliance on imports of Rus sian titanium exist during a period of rising geopo-

liti cal tensions The answer is straightforward VSMPO- AVISMA is a highly specialized natu ral

mono poly producing 45 percent of the worldrsquos aerospace titanium Only four other countries

smelt high- grade titanium in industrial quantities the United States Germany Japan and China

Overall global production capacity is limited while demand is growing The United States cur-

rently imports around 79 percent of all the titanium it consumes each year18

17 ldquoBoeing and VSMPO Avisma to Launch Second Joint Production Siterdquo Rus sian Aviation Insider December 22 2016

http wwwrusaviainsider com boeing - and - vsmpo - avisma - to - launch - second - joint - production - site

18 Jon Ostrower and Andy Pasztor ldquoBoeing United Technologies Stockpile Titanium Partsrdquo Wall Street Journal

August 7 2014 https wwwwsj com articles boeing - united - technologies - stockpiling - titanium - parts - 1407441886

Figure 511 US Imports from Rus sia Civilian Aircrafts and Parts US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 1992ndash2016)

0

$20000000

$40000000

$60000000

$80000000

$100000000

$120000000

$140000000

$160000000

$180000000

$200000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Parts-civilian aircraft

Civilian aircraft

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 34 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 35

The Sanctions Act authorizes the secretary of the trea sury (in a nonmandatory way) to impose

restrictions (without specifying them) against Rus sian state- owned entities operating in the railway

metals and mining sectors of the Rus sian economy Despite the commanding heights of Rus siarsquos

state sector owner ship in its economy (70 percent of GDP) the metal- producing companies have

remained mostly in private hands

NUCLEAR AFFAIRS

Historically owners and operators of the 104 commercial nuclear power reactors in the United

States have purchased more than 80 percent of their uranium from foreign countries Uranium

shipping from Rus sia accounted for about 13 percent of the 58 million pounds of uranium pur-

chased overseas in 201219 At the same time the Rus sian state- owned mono poly Rosatom ac-

counts for 20 percent of Kazakhstanrsquos uranium production (which in turn comprises 11 percent of

all US uranium imports) and 20 percent of US domestic uranium production capacity (with

owner ship of exploration tracts in Wyoming)20

Nuclear fuel and nuclear power continue to be po liti cally sensitive topics both in the United

States and Rus sia Bilateral cooperation in this sector (being surprisingly stable with imports of

nuclear fuel from Rus sia at a level of $1 billion annually in the last five years [Figure 512 and 513])

is under constant po liti cal and lobbying pressure and has been a source of several po liti cal scan-

dals21 Consequently upside risks in this area of interaction are minimal and downside risks are

much higher especially when we are seeing more decommissioning of nuclear plants in the

United States than new constructions The US EIArsquos 2017 Annual Energy Outlook assumes

that about 25 percent of the nuclear capacity now operating will be removed from ser vice

by 205022

WHY IS THE GRASS GREENER ON THE OTHER SIDE

The United States continues to significantly reduce imports of chemical fertilizers as domestic pro-

duction increases In 2016 the United States imported 13 percent less ammonia and 11 percent

less urea and UAN which is a liquid urea and ammonium nitrate fertilizer Rus sia accounts for

around 40 percent of UAN imported by the United States The United States canceled antidumping

duties on imports of ammonium nitrate and urea from Rus sia in 2016 but it did not prevent import

19 US EIA ldquoThe US Relies on Foreign Uranium Enrichment Ser vices to Fuel Its Nuclear Power Plantsrdquo Today in

Energy August 28 2013 https wwweia gov todayinenergy detail php idshy=shy1273

20 Colin Chilcoat ldquoDoes Rus sia Really Own 20 Percent of the USrsquo Uranium Reservesrdquo OilPricecom May 6 2015

http oilpricecom Alternative - Energy Nuclear - Power Does - Russia - Really - Own - 20 - Of - The - US - Uranium - Reserves

html

21 Michelle Ye Hee Lee ldquoThe Facts behind Trumprsquos Repeated Claim about Hillary Clintonrsquos Role in the Rus sian Ura-

nium Dealrdquo Washington Post October 26 2016

22 US EIA ldquoAnnual Energy Outlook 2017 with Projections to 2050rdquo 81ndash82

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 35 102017 404 PM

Figure 512 US Imports from Rus sia Share of Oil Metals and Nuclear Fuel Million US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 1992ndash2016)

87

86

90

90

90

91

88

86

7882

0

$5000

$10000

$15000

$20000

$25000

$30000

$35000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

US Imports from Russia

Share of Oil Metals and Nuclear Fuel

Figure 513 US Imports from Rus sia Nuclear Fuel Materials US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

$-

$200000000

$400000000

$600000000

$800000000

$1200000000

$1000000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 36 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 37

drops twice last year (Figures 514 and 515) According to forecasts UAN imports are expected to

decline further to 15 million tons this year down over 46 percent from 28 million tons imported

last year23 The downside trend in imports of fertilizers will likely continue because of oversupply

BIG FISH

US imports of fish and shellfish from Rus sia are best understood in comparison with US fish

exports to the Rus sian market which slipped to zero in August 2014 after Rus sia issued an order

banning certain agricultural imports from the United States (Figure 516) While the volume of US

supply was not very large it was impor tant because it broke up the monopolistic dominance of a

few vertically integrated Rus sian companies that have kept prices high by restricting the entry of

new producers Seeking to implement import substitution policies Rus sia has tried to reduce

exports as well as imports of fish and seafood products in the last couple of years This symmetri-

cal approach was intended to ldquocompensaterdquo for a decrease of fish products in the domestic

23 Deepika Thapliyal ldquoPotashCorp Forecasts Sharp Drop in US Nitrogen Imports in 2017rdquo ICIS News February 7

2017 https wwwicis com resources news 2017 02 07 10076734 potashcorp - forecasts - sharp - drop - in - us - nitrogen

- imports - in - 2017

Figure 514 US Imports from Rus sia Share of Oil Metals Nuclear Fuel and Fertilizers Million US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

90

93

92

93

94

95

92

91

85

86

0

$5000

$10000

$15000

$20000

$25000

$30000

$35000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

US Imports from Russia

Share of Oil Metals Nuclear Fuel and Fertilizers

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 37 102017 404 PM

Figure 515 US Imports from Rus sia Chemical- Fertilizers US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

S-

$200000000

$400000000

$600000000

$800000000

$1000000000

$1200000000

$1400000000

$1600000000

$1800000000

$2000000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Figure 516 US Exports to Rus sia Fish and Shellfish US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

0

$10000000

$20000000

$30000000

$40000000

$50000000

$60000000

$70000000

$80000000

$90000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Fish and shellfish

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 38 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 39

consumer market caused by Rus siarsquos import ban but it has failed As result the group most af-

fected by the self- imposed counter- sanctions were Rus sian consumers

With a significant drop in fish imports a devaluation of the ruble and inflationary pressures on

seafood prices yearly consumption of fish in Rus sia has declined precipitously In 2015 alone

fish prices increased 20 percent and consumption dropped to 14 kilograms per person24 from

22 kilograms in 201425 In 2016 food rose to 355 percent of house hold expenditure as a result of

increases in food prices26 This has pushed vertically integrated fishing monopolies to sell even

more of their catch abroad rather than deliver to the Rus sian Federation (Figure 517) Thus we

cannot exclude the possibility of further growth in US fish and shellfish imports from Rus sia on a

marginal scale

24 Александр Савельев ldquoПотребление рыбы в России упало до 14 кг на человекаrdquo [Fish consumption in Rus sia fell to

14 kg per person] Экономика Интерфакс January 28 2015 http wwwinterfax ru business 492038

25 Илья Шестаков ldquoПотебление рыбы в России снизилось на 10 процентов из- за роста ценrdquo [Fish consumption in

Rus sia dropped by 10 percent due to price increases] RNS March 8 2017 https rnsonline consumer - market

Potreblenie - ribi - v - Rossii - snizilos - na - 10 - iz - za - rosta - tsen - 2017 - 03 - 08

26 Zoya Sheftalovich and Christian Oliver ldquoRus siarsquos Boom (Farming) Economyrdquo Politico November 8 2016 http

wwwpolitico eu article russias - boom - farming - economy

Figure 517 US Imports from Rus sia Fish and Shellfish US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

0

$50000000

$100000000

$150000000

$200000000

$250000000

$300000000

$350000000

$400000000

$450000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 39 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations40

SPACE ODYSSEY

Among high- end products beyond the top five groups of goods imported from Rus sia cheap and

efficient Rus sian engines have been used to launch US rockets into space for about 16 years

(Figure 518) There was a serious po liti cal strug gle around a 2014 ban on the purchase of Rus sian

RD-180 rocket engines revealing the conflicting business interests of power ful high- tech companies

This restrictive mea sure was temporary and was quickly lifted because of significant cost impacts

and risks of disruption to launch schedules27 For the same reason the Sanctions Act does not autho-

rize ldquothe imposition of any sanction or other condition limitation restriction or prohibition that

directly or indirectly impedes the supply by any entity of the Rus sian Federation of any product or

ser vice or the procurement of such product or ser vice by any contractor or subcontractor of the

United States or any other entity relating to or in connection with any space launch conducted for

the National Aeronautics and Space Administration or any other nonndash Department of Defense

customerrdquo28

Nevertheless many experts believe that US domestic alternatives to replace Rus sian engines will

be viable in five to eight years

27 Ken Dilanian ldquoWhy Does the US Use Rus sian Rockets to Launch Its Satellitesrdquo NBC News updated November 15

2016 http wwwnbcnews com why - does - u - s - use - russian - rockets - launch - its - satellites - n588526

28 Countering Amer i carsquos Adversaries through Sanctions Act HR 3364

Figure 518 Spacecraft Excluding Military US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

0

$20000000

$40000000

$60000000

$80000000

$100000000

$120000000

$140000000

$160000000

$180000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 40 102017 404 PM

41

Diversity and technological complexity are the most vis i ble advantages supporting US exports to

Rus sia Three major groups of export goods include civilian aircraft engines and parts (Figure 61)

drilling and oil field equipment (Figure 62) and industrial machines and engines (Figure 63)

Despite sanctions against the transfer of advanced oil producing and pro cessing technologies the

realization of US drilling and oil field equipment in Rus sia is sustainable although some bilateral

proj ects have been frozen

Another category of goods that has demonstrated resilience is the phar ma ceu ti cal industry (Fig-

ure 64) because most drugs in Rus sia are imported (about 70 percent of the Rus sian phar ma ceu-

ti cal market in value) Import substitution policies have had only modest results in this industry

As confirmed by American Chamber of Commerce surveys US exports to Rus sia are closely

connected to US FDI 30 percent of total imports of US companies working in the Rus sian

market come from the United States (more than $2 billion in 2016) In other words about

40 percent of all US exports to Rus sia are related to a US corporate- sector business pro cess in

the country The major sectors of activity of these companies are energy and natu ral resources

(52 percent) manufacturing (17 percent) information and communications technology or ICT

(13 percent) retail (7 percent) automotive industry (6 percent) phar ma ceu ti cal production

(1 percent) professional ser vices (05 percent) and other (2 percent)1

Some obvious constraints on US exports to Rus sia have resulted from a reduction in demand A

deterioration of bilateral relations and implementation of sanctions and counter- sanctions have

directly or indirectly afected all businesses Figures 65 and 66 provide data regarding a dramatic

drop in the sale of US agricultural production in Rus sia with all other categories of exports in

goods showing big cuts as well (see Figures 67ndash69)

Exports of civilian aircraft engines and parts put the state of Washington in first place among

other states as a leading exporter to the Rus sian market (Figure 610)

1 American Chamber of Commerce in Rus sia ldquoInvestment and Import to Rus sia 2nd Surveyrdquo 13

Diversity and Constraints

06

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 41 102017 404 PM

Figure 61 US Exports of Civilian Aircraft Engines Equipment and Parts to Rus sia US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

$2500000000

$2000000000

$1500000000

$1000000000

$500000000

$-

Figure 62 US Exports of Drilling and Oil Field Equipment US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

0

$5000000

$10000000

$15000000

$20000000

$25000000

$30000000

$35000000

$40000000

$45000000

$50000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 42 102017 404 PM

Figure 63 US Exports of Industrial Engines to Rus sia US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

0

$5000000

$10000000

$15000000

$20000000

$25000000

$30000000

$35000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Figure 64 US Exports of Phar ma ceu ti cal Preparations to Rus sia US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

0

$5000000

$10000000

$15000000

$20000000

$25000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 43 102017 404 PM

Figure 65 US Exports of Meat and Poultry to Rus sia US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Meat poultry etc

$1000000000

$800000000

$600000000

$400000000

$200000000

$-

$1200000000

$1400000000

$1600000000

Figure 66 US Exports of Soybeans to Rus sia US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

0

$20000000

$40000000

$60000000

$80000000

$100000000

$120000000

$140000000

$160000000

$180000000

$200000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 44 102017 404 PM

Figure 67 US Exports of Vehicles Engines and Parts to Rus sia US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Other parts and accessories of vehicles

Automotive tires and tubes

Bodies and chassis for passenger cars

Engines and engine parts (carburetors pistonsrings and valves)

Trucks buses and special purpose vehicles

Passenger cars new and used

$2500000000

$2000000000

$1500000000

$500000000

$-

$1000000000

Figure 68 US Exports of Medicinal Equipment to Rus sia US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

$10000000

$15000000

$20000000

$25000000

$30000000

$35000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 45 102017 404 PM

Figure 610 US Exports to Rus sia by States (2016 US$ Value) Million US$ 2013ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoState and Metropolitan Area Trade Datardquo

Iowa Kentucky

North Dakota

Oklahoma

South Carolina

Washington

0

$500

$1000

$1500

$2000

2013 2014 2015 2016

District of Columbia

Iowa

Kentucky

North Dakota

Oklahoma

South Carolina

Washington

Figure 69 US Exports of Excavating Machinery to Rus sia US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

0

$5000000

$10000000

$15000000

$20000000

$25000000

$30000000

$35000000

$40000000

$45000000

$50000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 46 102017 404 PM

47

Upon reviewing the current trend in US- Russia economic relations we must acknowledge that

the existing trade model is obsolete and exhausted Imports are resource- oriented and reflect

constraints of the Rus sian economic structure while five groups of goodsmdash oil metals nuclear

fuels fertilizers and fishmdash make up more than 90 percent of total imports from Rus sia (Figure 71)

Each of these industries has a limited capacity for growth in the foreseeable future

Rus siarsquos core export to the United Statesmdash oilmdash will inevitably decrease in the mid- term under any

scenario The value and volume of Rus sian exports to the United States are open to global market

volatility and po liti cal pressures with limited hedging mechanisms

Overall US exports to Rus sia are unsustainable due to bilateral po liti cal tensions the whims of

commodity markets and changing domestic policies Sanctions and counter- sanctions have

created additional barriers particularly in finance banking high- tech energy and agro- business

According to the American Chamber of Commerce 69 percent of US companies working in the

country consider the impact of US sanctions against Rus sia on their business as negative At the

same time 60 percent of companies do not expect big changes in business relations between

Rus sia and the United States under Trump1 as the new law codifies existing sanctions fortifies

them and extends them to new sectors

Current US investments are low due to the weak rule of law in Rus sia a lack of property right

protections and proper contract enforcement high levels of statization and monopolization in the

economy a poor business climate outdated capital stock dependence on natural- resource

sectors and of course sanction and counter- sanction mea sures Bloated administrative compo-

nents created as risk mitigation instruments have also served as impediments The countryrsquos

institutional weakness low level of productivity bud get constraints and a declining inflexible

workforce will restrain future economic growth even if commodity prices recover Rus sian eco-

nomic policy will likely continue to be statist and protectionist relying mostly on import

substitutions

1 Ibid 11

Existing Trends and Future Scenarios

07

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 47 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations48

What scenarios can be expected in such a challenging environment

One probability (no peace no war) is based on the assumption that matters will not deteriorate

further and implementation of the Sanctions Act will be cursory This will cause relatively slow

degradation in the economic field with occasional flashes of activity in selected areas (eg closer

cooperation against Islamist terrorist groups in Syria)

A second worse case or critical scenario is the intensive and full- scale execution of current sanc-

tion legislation and even the imposition of new economic punitive and restrictive mea sures which

could incite asymmetric retaliatory actions and lead to the introduction of additional protectionist

policies This in turn could trigger a further escalation of mutual confrontation and could eventu-

ally destroy the fundamentals of the current bilateral trade system Rus sian leadership has charac-

terized the Sanctions Act as a declaration of a trade war that ends all hope for improving bilateral

relations2

2 Дмитрий Медведев ldquoПодписание президентом США нового санкционного закона против России создает несколько

последствийrdquo [The US Presidentrsquos signing of the package of new sanctions against Rus sia will have a few conse-

quences] Facebook August 2 2017 https wwwfacebook com Dmitry Medvedev posts 10154587161801851

Figure 71 US Imports from Rus sia Share of Oil Metals Nuclear Fuel Fertilizers and Fish Million US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

93

94

93

94

95

96

93

92

87

89

0

$5000

$10000

$15000

$20000

$25000

$30000

$35000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

US Imports from Russia

Share of Oil Metals Nuclear FuelFertilizers and Fish

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 48 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 49

The best case and most favorable scenario looks less probable now It assumes the realization of

structural reforms in Rus sia in such a way that would adapt Rus siarsquos foreign policy to national

economic needs reduce confrontations with the West and make a concerted efort to integrate

Rus sian businesses into global supply and value chains A revitalization of the structural reform

agendamdash including eforts to diversify economic activities through de- monopolization and support

for SMEs a restructuring of the banking sector the creation of a vibrant business climate to foster

entrepreneurships and innovation the implementation of administrative and judicial reforms to

tackle red tape and endemic corruption and the reduction of state control over key sectors of the

economy via wide- spread privatization could kick- start the development of a nonoil economy and

improve long- term growth prospects Despite ongoing discussion of reform strategies deep

economic and po liti cal changes are extremely complicated over the next po liti calelectoral cycle

(2018ndash2024) particularly because of re sis tance of vested interests and growing commodity prices

The urgency to tackle structural shortcomings in natu ral resource- dependent economies usually

correlates with the price of those resources and the degree to which resource rents drive eco-

nomic activity However there may be marginal improvements in the efficiency of the current

economic system

Future US- Russia relations can be thought of through three pillars one pillar focuses on areas

where both countries maintain a competitive rivalry another looks at potential areas of interaction

under pres ent conditions a third pillar and one that has evaporated from the current bilateral

agenda concentrates on future cooperation Stronger economic ties could not only be a kind of

po liti cal shock absorber but contribute to the building of this future (particularly business contacts

aim to support future structural reforms) although po liti cal factors are depressing the prospects

for cooperation To escape deadlock it will be impor tant to establish the right balance between

politics and economics and create a model of collaboration within the framework of contention

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 49 102017 404 PM

About the Author

Vadim Grishin PhD MBA has been involved in the reform pro cess in Rus sia as adviser to the

deputy prime minister of Rus sia in 1992ndash1993 and 2006ndash2010 He has extensive experience

working with the Bretton Woods Institutions He was the board member of the World Bank Group

and served as se nior adviser at the International Monetary Fund Currently he is a con sul tant to the

chief economistrsquos office of the International Finance Corporation and teaches the economics of

transition at Georgetown University in Washington DC

50

594-71613_ch99_4Pindd 50 102017 403 PM

Blank

COVER PHOTO ADOBE STOCK

1616 Rhode Island Avenue NW

Washington DC 20036

202 887 0200 | wwwcsisorg

v++ISBN 978-1-4422-8035-9

Lanham bull Boulder bull New York bull London

4501 Forbes Boulevard

Lanham MD 20706

301 459 3366 | wwwrowmancom

A U T H O R

Vadim Grishin

Myths and Realities

A Report of the

CSIS RUSSIA AND EURASIA PROGRAM

US-RussiaEconomicRelations

O C T O B E R 2 0 1 7

Euml|xHSLEOCy280359z

The Man Pupu Nyor Rock Formations at the Northern Urals also known as Seven

Strong Man or Little Mountain of the God in the local tribe (Mansi) language

Page 16: U.S.-Russia Economic Relations: Myths and Realities · 2020-04-17 · OCTOBER 2017 U.S.- Russia Economic Relations Myths and Realities AUTHOR Vadim Grishin A REPORT OF THE CSIS RUSSIA

US-Russia Economic Relations10

Officially the country does not invest in the US stock exchange although some Rus sian oligarchs

have bought US corporate bonds and equities in large amounts The new sanctions law requires

the secretary of trea sury in consultation with the director of national intelligence and the secretary

of state to issue reports on Rus sian se nior po liti cal figures and oligarchs based on their closeness

to the Rus sian regime and their net worth as well as the exposure of key economic sectors of the

United States to Rus sian po liti cally exposed persons and parastatal entities including at a mini-

mum the banking securities insurance and real estate sectors14

Only three Rus sian companies are listed in the US exchanges

Overall the scale and scope of US- Russia economic interaction and business activity is much greater

than officially appreciated but not significant enough to be taken into consideration by policymakers

14 Countering Amer i carsquos Adversaries through Sanctions Act HR 3364

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 10 102017 404 PM

11

03

Politics in the Driverrsquos Seat

Bilateral economic relations depend to a great extent on global and national economic cycles

After the recent global financial crisis the US economy has shown surprisingly sustainable GDP

growth while the Rus sian economy was the most afected among BRICS countries by the turbu-

lence of a worldwide economic downturn in 2008ndash2009 and after a short- term rebound slipped

into stagnation (2012ndash2013) and then into full- scale recession (2014ndash2016) The countryrsquos eco-

nomic cycle however appears to be changing once again with the economy returning to a

pattern of growth albeit uneven and gradual (Figures 31 and 32) Even with sanctions still in place

conditions have improved as a result of the stabilization of Urals oil to an average annual price of

$419 per barrel in 2016 The gains were sparked in part by major crude producers agreeing to cut

production after hefty price drops in 2014 and 2015 Supported by easier financial conditions

higher oil prices and growing macro- stability Rus sia is heading toward a moderate growth rate

that is expected to reach 14 percent this year according to forecasts of the World Bank Group

(WBG) and the IMF1

Because of the significant role that politics plays in any bilateral interaction it is impor tant to

combine economic and po liti cal cycles applying a ldquoresetrdquo to bilateral economic cooperation in

addition to the po liti cal relationship I have compared po liti cal cycles and trade dynamics using the

following graphs ( Table 31 and Figure 33) These charts do not pretend to reflect with mathemati-

cal precision all shifts in the bilateral po liti cal relationship but rather attempt to visually align

impor tant economic and po liti cal moments to detect the efects of po liti cal events on the size of

bilateral trade

Figure 33 shows all pos si ble combinations economic trends at the intersection of po liti cal devel-

opments oppose or support each other in synchronization It is evident that po liti cal interference

1 International Monetary Fund Rus sian Federation Staff Concluding Statement of the 2017 Article IV Mission (Wash-

ington DC IMF 2017) World Bank Group From Recession to Recovery Rus sia Economic Report no 37 (Washington

DC World Bank 2017) http pubdocsworldbank org en 383241495487103815 RER - 37 - May26 - FINAL - with - summary

pdf

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 11 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations12

in bilateral business afairs in the early 2000s was less significant than in later years As result

growing po liti cal tensions from 2003 to 2008 did not dramatically afect bilateral economic inter-

action It is also easier to explain why 2011ndash2012 resulted in rec ord trade and investmentmdash a con-

sequence of very high oil prices GDP growth in both countries improved legislation after Rus siarsquos

accession to the WTO and the Obamandash Medvedev po liti cal reset From 2014 to 2016 a perfect

storm of developments added efficiency to Western sanctions and augmented the damaging

consequences of counter- sanction mea sures

Figure 33 also confirms that in times of reduced economic cooperation po liti cal pressures can

easily change bilateral economic trends Moreover business interests along with economic inter-

actions have a limited capacity to reverse the po liti cal mainstream

Figure 31 Economic Cycle 2014ndash2016

Source Authorrsquos evaluation of international financial institutions (IFI) data and sources from respective

countries

Sustainable Growth

Brazil

Negative Growth

Unstable Growth

Mexico

Descending Growth

Argentina

EU

US

Russia

Vietnam

China

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 12 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 13

Table 31 Po liti cal Cycles in Bilateral US- Russia Relations 1999ndash2016

2001ndash2002 The George W Bushndash Vladimir Putin Reset Rus sia supported ldquoglobal war on terrorismrdquo launched by the United States after 911 the SORT nuclear arms reduction treaty was signed by the United States and Rus sia and a successful business dialogue was developed that created the current structure of economic relations

2003ndash2008 Deterioration in bilateral relations brought on by the Iraq War Georgiarsquos ldquoRose Revolutionrdquo Mikhail Khodorkovskyrsquos arrest Ukrainersquos ldquoOrange Revolutionrdquo Kosovorsquos in de pen dence and the Georgian War

2009ndash2010 The Barack Obamandash Dmitry Medvedev Reset Rus sia served as a logistical hub for transportation and supply of US forces in Af ghan i stan United States and Rus sia signed the new START nuclear arms reduction treaty Rus sia backed tighter economic sanctions on Iran Rus sia gained access to the WTO after 18 years of negotiations

2011ndash2016 Deterioration in bilateral relations caused by the Ukrainian crisis which were followed by sanctions and counter- sanctions along with the Syrian crises and cyber- enabled activities

Source Authorrsquos evaluation of po liti cal and economic data

Note SORTthinsp=thinspStrategic Ofensive Reductions Treaty STARTthinsp=thinspStrategic Arms Reduction Treaty

Figure 32 Economic Cycle 2017ndash2019

Source Authorrsquos evaluation of IFI data and sources from respective countries

Egypt

VenezuelaEU

South Africa

Brazil

Russia

India

US

Descending Growth

Korea

China

Negative Growth

Unstable Growth

Sustainable Growth

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 13 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations14

Figure 33 US- Russia Trade Million US$ vs Po liti cal Cycle 2000ndash2016

Sources US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo Foreign Trade last modified June 29 2017

https wwwcensus gov foreign - trade balance c4621 html (see data for 2000ndash2016) authorrsquos evaluation

of po liti cal and economic data

Orange Revolution

Khodorkovskys arrest

GeorgianWar

Bush- Putin Reset

Iraq War Global Financial Crisis

Obama-Medvedev Reset

Russias WTO accession

New START Treaty

A Pefect Storm the Ukranian Crisis Oil Prices Crashing

Sanctions and Counter-Sanctions

$3000

$8000

$13000

$18000

$23000

$28000

$33000

$38000

$43000

2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 14 102017 404 PM

15

The current structure of US- Russia economic relations emerged in the early 2000s when the

model of trade and investment interaction took on a character similar to that which existed be-

tween the United States and developing economies US imports from Rus sia centered on com-

modities while technology along with food products lead American exports The primary

exception was that Rus sia supplied nuclear fuel including highly enriched uranium extracted from

nuclear weapons for US power plants and provided ser vices to the aerospace industry primarily

in satellite launches However both these exceptions can be explained as a legacy of the Soviet

past and not a harbinger of the future economic relationship (Figure 41)

In the last 15 years this trade structure has not changed significantly The only noticeable shift in

trade was a dramatic drop (to practically nothing) in exports of US agricultural products a result

of Rus siarsquos policy of import substitution and so- called counter- sanction mea sures it took in re-

sponse to US sanctions over the Ukraine crisis (Figure 42)

Promising new directions of cooperation in the IT sector and in engineering ser vices for the

aerospace industry appeared in the early 2000s1 but did not spill into other sectors and conse-

quently did little to renew economic cooperation on the whole The integration of Rus sian high-

tech ser vices into large- scale global production and value chains was constrained by the usual

culprits a lack of financial resources managerial experience skilled labor modern infrastructure

RampD investments and an adequate business environment High commodity prices incentivized the

restoration of an economic system centered on resource rents The leading role of oil and gas

extraction and transportation discouraged the development of a nonenergy sector that might

have created advanced and complex production and ser vices An import substitution policy could

not work efficiently in an economic environment plagued by the Dutch disease where currency

1 The Boeing Design Center was created in Moscow It consists of nearly 250 Boeing employees managing

a team of 1200 contract engineers from Rus sian and Ukrainian aerospace companies ldquoBackgrounder Boeing in

Rus siardquo Boeing last modified January 2017 http wwwboeing com resources boeingdotcom company key _ orgs

boeing - international pdf russia - cisbackgrounder pdf

Are the United States and Rus sia ldquoNatu ralrdquo Trading Partners A Little Bit of History

04

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 15 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations16

inflows (oil money) lead to ruble appreciation and render a countryrsquos production less competitive

During that time Rus siarsquos industry did not receive preferential access to larger markets and could

not expand its share in the global economy particularly because of its self- isolation from the

regional trade agreements (except for its participation in the Eurasian Economic Union with some

neighboring countries of the former Soviet Union) As a result neither import substitution nor

export- led strategy promoted growth and specialization in nonoil production A long- awaited

modernization and reallocation of resources from an inefficient nontrade sector to a trade sector

did not materialize

These limits were later augmented with sanctions and an extension of domestic restrictions on

cooperation with Western partners Importantly the rapid growth of state- monopoly structures in

the Rus sian economy over the past 15 years has created additional obstacles to the development

and diversification of US- Russia economic ties

Figure 41 US Imports from Rus sia US$ 2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2016)

Fish and shellfish 3

Crude oil 5

Fuel oil 37

Petroleum products other

8

Nuclear fuel materials

7

Chemicals-fertilizers 4

Steelmaking materials 5

Iron and steel mill products 4

Bauxite and aluminum 9

Other precious metals 4

Nonferrous metals other 1

Finished metal shapes 1

Synthetic rubber--primary

1

Spacecraftexcluding military

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 16 102017 404 PM

Fig

ure

42

U

S E

xpo

rts

to R

us s

ia U

S$ 2

016

Sou

rce

US

Ce

nsu

s B

ure

au ldquo

Trad

e in

Go

od

s w

ith

Ru

s sia

rdquo (s

ee

dat

a fo

r 2

016

)

Bak

ery

pro

du

cts

Win

e b

eer

an

d r

elat

ed

pro

du

cts

New

spri

nt

Pla

stic

mat

eria

ls

Ch

emic

als-

fert

ilize

rs

Ch

emic

als-

ino

rgan

icC

hem

ical

s-o

rgan

ic

Ch

emic

als-

oth

erC

ott

on

fib

er c

loth

In

du

stri

al r

ub

ber

pro

du

cts

Min

eral

su

pp

lies-

man

ufa

ctu

red

Gen

erat

ors

acc

esso

ries

Ele

ctri

c ap

par

atu

s

Dri

llin

g amp

oilfi

eld

eq

uip

men

t Sp

ecia

lized

min

ing

Exc

avat

ing

mac

hin

ery

No

nfa

rm t

ract

ors

an

d p

arts

In

du

stri

al e

ng

ines

Fo

od

to

bac

co m

ach

iner

y M

etal

wo

rkin

g m

ach

ine

too

ls

Tex

tile

sew

ing

m

ach

ines

W

oo

d g

lass

p

last

ic

Pu

lp a

nd

pap

er

mac

hin

ery

Mea

suri

ng

tes

tin

g

con

tro

l in

stru

men

ts

Mat

eria

ls h

and

ling

equ

ipm

ent

Ind

ust

rial

mac

hin

es

oth

er

Ph

oto

ser

vice

ind

ust

ry m

ach

iner

y A

gri

cult

ura

l mac

hin

ery

eq

uip

men

t C

om

pu

ters

Co

mp

ute

r ac

cess

ori

es

Sem

ico

nd

uct

ors

Tel

eco

mm

un

icat

ion

seq

uip

men

t

Bu

sin

ess

mac

hin

es a

nd

eq

uip

men

t

Lab

ora

tory

tes

tin

g in

stru

men

ts

Med

icin

al e

qu

ipm

ent

Civ

ilian

air

craf

t e

ng

ines

eq

uip

men

t a

nd

par

ts

Rai

lway

tra

nsp

ort

atio

n

equ

ipm

ent

Ves

sels

exc

lud

ing

scr

ap

Co

mm

erci

al v

esse

ls o

ther

M

arin

e en

gin

es p

arts

Spac

ecra

ft e

xclu

din

g

mili

tary

Pas

sen

ger

car

s

new

an

d u

sed

Tru

cks

bu

ses

and

sp

ecia

l p

urp

ose

ve

hic

les

En

gin

es a

nd

en

gin

e p

arts

(c

arb

ure

tors

pis

ton

s r

ing

s

and

val

ves)

B

od

ies

and

ch

assi

s fo

r p

asse

ng

er c

ars

Au

tom

oti

ve t

ires

an

d t

ub

es

Oth

er p

arts

an

d a

cces

sori

es o

f ve

hic

les

Ap

par

el h

ou

seh

old

go

od

s -

text

ile

Ph

arm

aceu

tica

lp

rep

arat

ion

s

Furn

itu

re h

ou

seh

old

go

od

s

etc

R

ug

s

Cel

l ph

on

es a

nd

oth

er

ho

use

ho

ld g

oo

ds

ne

c

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 17 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations18

Figure 43 US Trade in Goods with Rus sia Million US$ 1992ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 1992ndash2016)

Russian Financial Crisis

Oil price Increased from$2446 USD per barrel (2001)

to $9694 USD per barrel(2008)

Global Financial Crisis

Oil price high record in2011-2012

(more that $111 USD perbarrel)

Oil price crashed

$-

$5000

$10000

$15000

$20000

$25000

$30000

$35000

$40000

$45000

$50000

1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

US Imports from Russia US Exports to Russia US-Russia Trade in Goods

No doubt po liti cal ups and downs add volatility to US- Russia trade Nevertheless Rus siarsquos eco-

nomic structure exhausted itself before the Ukrainian crisis and the recent Rus sian recession Its

limitations are not only due to some mistakes in policy or negative coincidences of circumstances

but rather to deeply rooted properties in the current bilateral trade model related to structural

issues in the Rus sian economy Structural constraints such as the weak enforcement of property

rights poor business regulation and nondiversified exports weighed on Rus sian trade with the

United States From this perspective the term ldquonaturalunnatural trading partnersrdquo does not ad-

dress the unused capacity of bilateral interaction or the real challenges that kind of interaction

faces It just adds metaphysical flavor to the very specific economic and po liti cal factors that

determine the US- Russia trajectory

Overall the outlines of bilateral trade (Figure 43) resemble the famous ldquoRus sian Mountainsrdquo that

were a pre de ces sor of the modern roller coaster icy hills supported by wooden constructionsmdash a

rigid and immobile structure that sooner or later would melt This unfortunately is what is hap-

pening to US- Russia trade cooperation now

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 18 102017 404 PM

19

ARE LITTLE FISH REALLY SWEET

Low US- Russia economic interaction has at least two consequences First it limits the capacity of

policymakers to exploit trade as an instrument for geopo liti cal combat Even the question of a US

trade deficit which used to be a headache for many US trading partners has become so insig-

nificant in absolute terms (about $87 billion in 2016) that it seems hardly worth caring about

When the volume of trade between two countries becomes very small in absolute terms whether

a country is running a surplus or deficit is no longer relevant But it also renders another type of

confrontations (sometimes more dangerous) more likely since the two traders have little to lose

Second in an environment marked by low levels of bilateral trade both sides could incentivize (if

and when a desire for po liti cal rapprochement exists) the signing of new trade deals which are

elevated symbolically as a turning point in bilateral po liti cal relations (ie the sale of Boeings to

Rus sia or the delivery via tankers of Rus sian oil to US refineries) Sometimes markets themselves

pres ent ldquogiftsrdquo that can be capitalized on po liti cally US- USSR grain trade in the 1970s was one

such ldquogiftrdquo large sales of American grain to the Soviet Union helped US policymakers win favor

with the po liti cally impor tant American farming sector and permitted Soviet leaders to maintain

access to a dietary staple for the Soviet population

The strong 32 percent growth in value of US imports from Rus sia from January to May 2017

versus January to May 2016 ( Table 51) is an example of a development that has tempted officials

to pres ent it as a sign of positive change due to ldquogrowing business activitiesrdquo (this kind of statement

was heard before the bilateral summit in Germany in July 2017) although the reason for that leap

was evidently an increase in commodity prices (mainly of oilmdash see Table 52) and not a rise in

entrepreneurial interactions The primary beneficiaries of that upside rally have been two other

petro- economies Saudi Arabia and Venezuela ( Tables 53 and 54)

Sector Analyses

05

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 19 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations20

Table 51 US Imports from Rus sia Million US$ Januaryndash May 2016 vs Januaryndash May 2017

Year January February March April May Total

2016 9603 6871 11097 12257 10977 50805

2017 12215 10220 16979 13471 14147 67032

Change 271 487 530 99 289 319

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 1992ndash2016)

Table 52 Change in Urals Crude Oil Prices US$ per Barrel Januaryndash May 2016 vs Januaryndash May 2017

Januaryndash May 2016 Januaryndash May 2017 Change ($) Change ()

3601 5129 1528 424

Source Ministry of Finance of the Rus sian Federation https wwwminfin ru ru ixzz4mMIZ7XtC

Table 53 US Imports from Saudi Arabia Million US$ Januaryndash May 2016 vs Januaryndash May 2017

Year January February March April May Total

2016 15114 9036 13555 10844 14679 63228

2017 19802 20298 21650 16211 19542 97503

Change 3101 12463 5972 495 331 542

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Saudi Arabiardquo Foreign Trade last modified June 29 2017

https wwwcensus gov foreign - trade balance c5170 html (see data for 2016ndash2017)

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 20 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 21

Table 54 US Imports from Venezuela Million US$ Januaryndash May 2016 vs Januaryndash May 2017

Year January February March April May Total

2016 6657 5560 7140 8007 7922 35286

2017 13041 10864 123500 11148 12243 59646

Change 9590 9540 7297 3923 5454 6903

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Venezuelardquo Foreign Trade last modified June 29 2017

https wwwcensus gov foreign - trade balance c3070 html (see data for 2016ndash2017)

Table 55 US Exports to Rus sia Million US$ Januaryndash May 2016 vs Januaryndash May 2017

Year January February March April May Total

2016 3628 3577 7298 4657 4947 24107

2017 3144 4277 5386 6670 4806 24283

Change minus133 196 minus262 432 minus29 minus07

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2016ndash2017)

At the same time US exports to Rus sia continue to stagnate ( Table 55) due to low levels of

consumption during a two-and- a- half-year economic crisis a deep ruble devaluation sanctions

and counter- sanctions

Given the very dif er ent economic structures and resource endowments of Rus sia and the United

States it is not surprising that US- Russia trade is asymmetric and oil driven (Figure 51) A

3 percent increase in Urals oil prices translates into a one percent increase in US import growth

from Rus sia Thus in 2016 every $10 increase in Urals crude oil added $15 billion to the value of

US imports or 11 percent to the total value of imports from Rus sia

OIL ADDICTION

Oil is a core pillar of US- Russia bilateral trade A bumpy ride in oil markets afects commerce

Nevertheless Rus sian oil exports to the United States in physical terms have been rather

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 21 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations22

sustainable Starting from 2005 average annual deliveries have been above 150 million barrels

(Figure 52) Crude and heating oil have dominated while petroleum products and liquefied petro-

leum gases have not (Figure 53) In 2011 oil exports peaked at 228 million barrels but declined to

159 million barrels in 2016mdash a drop of 30 percent Rec ord high shipments of Rus sian oil to the United

States coincided with an elevation in oil prices which made the subsequent decline in oil shipment

value between 2011 and 2016 (by about 72 percent as shown in Figure 54) seem more stark The

increase in price also raised the share of oil in Rus sian exports by 74 percent in 2011 (Figure 55)

The Rus sian share in total US oil imports was around 55 percent in 2011 and 43 percent in 2016

( Table 56) In the last five years the United States has relied exclusively on consumption of Rus sian

oil for the rough equivalent of one week out of the year (Figure 56)

It is unlikely that Rus sia can significantly increase its share of the US oil market and there is a real

possibility for a downward trend There are several reasons the historically high Rus sian hydrocar-

bon export threshold of 2011 will not soon if ever be surpassed

First US energy consumption will likely be flat According to the US Energy Information Adminis-

tration (EIA) demand for petroleum and other liquids in the United States will be about 35ndash36

quadrillion British thermal units (BTUs) with minimal variation over the next 25 years1

1 US EIA ldquoAnnual Energy Outlook 2017 with Projections to 2050rdquo January 5 2017 7ndash8

Figure 51 US- Russia Trade Growth () vs US and Rus sia Real GDP Growth () 1993ndash2016

Source IMF ldquoIMF Datardquo accessed September 27 2017 http wwwimf org en Data US Census Bureau

ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo

Note rGDPthinsp=thinspreal gross domestic product

Trade

USA rGDP growth

Russia rGDP growth

-60

-40

-20

0

20

40

60

80

100

1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Gro

wth

All spikes in US-Russia trade have been connected with two main

variables volume and price of crude oil

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 22 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 23

Second the United States will become a net energy exporter between 2020 and 2030 in most

cases under dif er ent combinations of oil and natu ral gas prices GDP growth technological

breakthroughs and the availability of energy resources The role of oil imports will dramatically

fall2

Third oil price scenarios as described by the International Energy Agency (IEA) international

financial organ izations (IFIs) and many national agencies are very cautious and assume that even

by 2035 to 2040 oil prices will not to recover to the levels of 2011ndash20123

Fourth Rus sian oil production and export growth will be modest and driven by Asian economic

expansion and will comprise a decreasing share of Western markets4 According to forecasts from

2 Ibid 15ndash18

3 Ibid table 3 ldquoEnergy Prices by Sector and Sourcesrdquo World Bank World Bank Commodity Markets Price Forecasts

(Washington DC World Bank 2017) httpswwwworldbank org en research commodity - markets Organ ization of the

Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) World Oil Outlook 2016 (Vienna OPEC 2016)

4 E D Belotskaia et al Global and Rus sian Energy Outlook 2016 (Moscow Energy Research Institute of the Rus sian

Acad emy of Science Analytical Center for the Government of the Rus sian Federation 2016) http acgov ru files

publication a 12767 pdf

Figure 52 US Imports from Rus sia Crude Oil and Petroleum Products Thousands of Barrels 1995ndash2016

Source US EIA ldquoUS Imports by Country of Origin Rus siardquo Petroleum amp Other Liquids September 13

2017 http wwweia gov dnav pet PET _ MOVE _ IMPCUS _ D _ NUS _ NRS _ MBBL _ M htm

0

50000

100000

150000

200000

250000

Date 1995 1996 1997 1998 199920002001200220032004200520062007200820092010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 23 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations24

the Organ ization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) crude oil exports from Rus sia and

the Caspian region to the United States will dis appear by 20255

So why does the Rus sian Urals blend continue to be attractive for oil traders and US refineries

which could pro cess greater volumes of domestically produced lighter crude There are two main

reasons One is related to the preference of US high conversion refineries (the most sophisticated

in the world) to work with heavy oil blends produced by Canada Mexico Iraq Venezuela and

Rus sia Pro cessing heavy crude now is as profitable as pro cessing lighter crude The so- called

crack spreadmdash the diference between the cost of relatively cheap heavy crude oil and the final

price of value- added consumer products (diesel gasoline jet fuel and heating oil)mdash has become

the same as the refinery margins of light sweet crude6 This has primarily afected light oil produc-

ing countries such as Angola Algeria and Nigeria

5 OPEC World Oil Outlook 2016 306ndash309

6 ldquoHow Much for That Heavy Oilrdquo Oil Sands Magazine December 26 2015 https wwwoilsandsmagazine com

news 2015 12 26 how - much - for - that - heavy - oil

Figure 53 US Imports from Rus sia Oil and Petroleum Products US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

$-

$25000000000

$20000000000

$15000000000

$10000000000

$5000000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Liquefied petroleum gases

Petroleum products other

Fuel oil

Crude oil

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 24 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 25

Another factor afecting purchase of Rus sian oil is a new trend among oil companies for further

consolidation of scale and for integrating operations of upstream and downstream business7

There have been several waves of separation and unification of production transportation and

pro cessing in the last 50 years The current business cycle can be seen as an adaptation to a

period of low prices and oversupply Companies that buy andor produce oil in Rus sia most likely

prefer to transport and pro cess this oil in their own modern refineries in the United States At the

same time some of the newest refinery designs specifically for pro cessing heavy oils have been

built in Asia thus extending the choices of heavy oil producing countries

We should also consider that leading US and international oil traders along with oil producing

companies working with or owning US refineries frequently buy Rus sian oil on the open market

and have long- term contracts on Rus sian crude oil delivery Many Rus sian oil companies prefer to

pay for purchases or ser vices with their future production instead of cash creating situations of

ldquostickyrdquo oil imports that are difficult to replace The best- known example is an interaction between

7 ldquoEnergy and Utilities Sectorrdquo Roundtable Financier Worldwide December 2015 https wwwfinancierworldwide

com roundtable - energy - utilities - sector - dec15

Figure 54 US Imports of Oil and Petroleum Products from Rus sia vs Oil Prices Eu rope Brent Spot Price Free on Board (FOB) 1996ndash2017

Source US EIA ldquoUS Imports by Country of Origin Rus siardquo

0

20

40

60

80

100

120

140

0

5000

10000

15000

20000

25000

30000

Jan

-19

96

Jun

-19

96

No

v-19

96

Ap

r-19

97

Sep

-19

97

Feb

-19

98

Jul-

199

8D

ec-1

99

8M

ay-1

99

9O

ct-1

99

9M

ar-2

00

0A

ug

-20

00

Jan

-20

01

Jun

-20

01

No

v-2

00

1A

pr-

20

02

Sep

-20

02

Feb

-20

03

Jul-

20

03

Dec

-20

03

May

-20

04

Oct

-20

04

Mar

-20

05

Au

g-2

00

5Ja

n-2

00

6Ju

n-2

00

6N

ov-

20

06

Ap

r-2

00

7Se

p-2

00

7Fe

b-2

00

8Ju

l-2

00

8D

ec-2

00

8M

ay-2

00

9O

ct-2

00

9M

ar-2

010

Au

g-2

010

Jan

-20

11Ju

n-2

011

No

v-2

011

Ap

r-2

012

Sep

-20

12Fe

b-2

013

Jul-

20

13D

ec-2

013

May

-20

14O

ct-2

014

Mar

-20

15A

ug

-20

15Ja

n-2

016

Jun

-20

16N

ov-

20

16

USD

per

Bar

rel

Th

ou

san

d B

arr

els

US Imports from Russia of Crude Oil and Petroleum Products (Thousand Barrels)

Europe Brent Spot Price FOB (Dollars per Barrel)

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 25 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations26

Table 56 US Oil Imports All Countries vs Rus sia Thousand Barrels per Day 2011ndash2016

Years 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

All Countries 11436 10598 9859 9241 9449 10058

Rus sia 624 477 460 330 371 433

Share 546 450 467 357 393 431

Sources US EIA ldquoUS Imports by Country of Origin Total Crude Oil and Productsrdquo Petroleum amp Other

Liquids September 13 2017 wwweia gov dnav pet pet_move_impcus_a2_nus_ep00_im0_mbbl_m htm

authorrsquos computation

Figure 55 US Imports from Rus sia Share of Crude Oil and Petroleum Products Million US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

57

64

73

72

74

73

72

59

52 50

0

$5000

$10000

$15000

$20000

$25000

$30000

$35000

$40000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

US Imports from Russia

Share of Oil and Petroleum Products

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 26 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 27

the Rus sian state mono poly Rosneft and commodity trading and mining giant Glencore which

along with energy and commodities com pany Vitol participated in a $10 billion prepayment

deal with Rosneft for crude supplies in 2013

There have been a number of ongoing transactions between the Rus sian oil industry and interna-

tional oil companies including several that top the list of importers of Rus sian oil to the United

States ( Table 57) In December 2016 Glencore participated in a controversial privatization opera-

tion purchasing in tandem with the Qatar sovereign wealth fund a 195 percent stake in Rosneft

which was on the US and EU list of sanctioned firms8 Glencore has also taken a blocking stake in

midsize oil producer RussNeft BP owns a 1975 percent stake in Rosneft Chevron holds a

15 percent interest in the 935- mile- long CPC9 pipeline which transports an average of 959000

barrels of crude oil per day including 76000 barrels daily from Rus sia10 ExxonMobil has formed

8 E Mazneva and I Arkhipov ldquoRus sia Sells $11 Billion Stake in Rosneft to Glencore Qatarrdquo Bloomberg December 7

2016

9 CPCthinsp=thinspCaspian Pipeline Consortium

10 ldquoRus sia Highlights of Operations and Business Portfoliordquo Chevron accessed October 3 2017 https wwwchevron

com worldwide russia

Figure 56 Share of Rus sian Oil in Total US Oil Imports Thousands of Barrels per Day 1972ndash2016

Source US EIA ldquoUS Imports by Country of Origin Total Crude Oil and Productsrdquo

2000

4000

6000

8000

10000

12000

14000

16000

US Imports of Crude Oil and Petroleum Products (Thousand Barrels per Day)

US Imports from Russia of Crude Oil and Petroleum Products (Thousand Barrels per Day)19

7319

7419

7519

7619

7719

7819

7919

80

198

119

82

198

319

84

198

519

86

198

719

88

198

919

90

199

119

92

199

319

94

199

519

96

199

719

98

199

92

00

02

00

12

00

22

00

32

00

42

00

52

00

62

00

72

00

82

00

92

010

20

112

012

20

132

014

20

152

016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 27 102017 404 PM

Table 57 Top Importers of Rus sian Oil to the United States Thousands of Barrels 2016

VALERO MARKETING amp SUPPLY CO 54590 3616

EXXONMOBIL OIL CORP 17087 1130

CHEVRON USA INC 15217 1008

BP WEST COAST PRODUCTS LLC 10130 671

GEORGE E WARREN CORP 7272 48

PAULSBORO REFINING CO LLC 6838 453

TESORO CORP 5097 338

VITOL INC 5084 337

PHILLIPS 66 CO 4726 313

TRAFIGURA AG 4360 289

PAR HAWAII REFINING LLC 3893 258

MOTIVA ENTERPRISES LLC 3041 205

SHELL US TRADING CO 2863 19

MARATHON PETROLEUM CO LLC 2475 16

ATLANTIC TRADING amp MARKETING 2099 14

FREEPOINT COMMODITIES LLC 1439 1

GLENCORE LTD 1284 85

BEST PETROLEUM CORP 967 64

ROLYMPUS US COMMODITIES GROUP LLC 822 6

HUNT CRUDE OIL SUPPLY CO 666 4

GULF OIL LP 658 4

Source US EIA ldquoUS Imports by Country of Origin Crude Oilrdquo Petroleum amp Other Liquids September 13

2017 httpswwweiagovdnavpetpet_move_impcus_a2_nus_epc0_im0_mbblpd_ahtm authorrsquos

computation

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 28 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 29

several joint ventures with Rosneft to undertake ofshore exploration in the Black Sea and the Kara

Sea in Siberia11

According to the Sanctions Act US persons are prohibited from exporting or reexporting goods

ser vices (except financial ser vices) and technology in support of exploration or production of new

deep- water Arctic ofshore or shale oil proj ects that involve designated Rus sian entities or other

entities in which such sanctioned persons have a controlling interest or a substantial noncontrol-

ling owner ship interest defined as not less than 33 percent (previously it was 50 percent) The new

law also authorizesmdash but does not requiremdash the imposition of so- called secondary sanctions

against non- US entities that engage in activities involving the construction maintenance or

expansion of Rus sian energy export pipelines with a fair market value of $1 million or more or an

aggregate fair market value during a 12- month period of $5 million12 This provision has raised the

concerns of some Eu ro pean countries particularly Germany As result the final language of the

law included wording about coordination of this issue with allies of the United States

Shipments of Rus sian oil to the United States could be afected by activity in the US refinery

industry In early 2017 Saudi Aramco bought the United Statesrsquo largest oil refinery in Port Arthur

(Texas) and it announced plans to send more of its own crude to that refinery13 Serious concerns

exist however regarding the future of three refineries and nine pipelines owned by Citgo a US

branch of the Venezuelan state com pany PdVSA which is balancing precariously on the edge of

default Under certain conditions in the event of PdVSA bankruptcy Rosneft could claim a stake of

up to 499 percent in Citgo Such a possibility has raised concerns among politicians and US

government officials with Trea sury Secretary Steven Mnuchin calling it a ldquonational security issuerdquo14

Tables 58 59 and 510 show allocations of Rus sian oil imports to major US refineries some of

which work exclusively on Rus sian crude a total of two to three months per year In total 150940

thousand barrels of Rus sian oil were refined in 2016

Figure 57 confirms a leading position of Texas and Louisiana among the US states receiving

Rus sian crude followed by New Jersey California Mississippi Washington Hawaii and Delaware

In a paradoxical way Texas has dis appeared from the list of states as a main destination of US

imports from Rus sia (Figure 58) because Rus sian crude is mostly delivered to Louisiana ports and

registered there by US Customs as an import from Rus sia After that it transports to refineries in

Louisiana and Texas

Overall the short- term business rationale behind the sustainability of US oil imports from Rus sia

cannot overcome strong headwinds in the US energy sector facing all oil importers which will

inevitably lead to a contraction of Rus sian oil exports to the United States in the foreseeable future

11 Exxon eforts to receive a special US Trea sury waiver to drill in sanctioned Rus sia failed in 2017

12 Countering Amer i carsquos Adversaries through Sanctions Act HR 3364

13 Sarp Ozkan ldquoSaudi Aramcorsquos Port Arthur Refinery and the US Refinery Fleetrdquo Drilling Info May 11 2017

https infodrillinginfo com saudi - aramcos - port - arthur - refinery - us - refinery - fleet

14 Graham Kates ldquoTrea sury Secretary Rus siarsquos Citgo Deal a National Security Issuerdquo CBS News May 1 2017

http wwwcbsnews com news rosneft - citgo - steven - mnuchin - national - security

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 29 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations30

Table 58 Valerorsquos Refineries Pro cessing Rus sian Oil Thousands of Barrels 2016

Saint Charles Louisiana 29206 535

Corpus Christi Texas 20626 378

Wilmington California 4250 78

Total USA 54590 100

Source US EIA ldquoRefinery Capacity Reportrdquo January 1 2017

table 5 wwweia gov petroleum refinerycapacity table5 pdf

authorrsquos computation

Table 59 ExxonMobil Refineries Pro cessing Rus sian Oil Thousands of Barrels 2016

Baytown Texas 15037 88

Baton Rouge Louisiana 2046 12

Total USA 17083 100

Source US EIA ldquoRefinery Capacity Reportrdquo authorrsquos computation

Table 510 Chevronrsquos Refineries Pro cessing Rus sian Oil Thousands of Barrels 2016

Pascagoula Mississippi 12767 840

El Segundo California 2372 155

Saint Rose Louisiana 78 05

Total USA 15217 100

Source US EIA ldquoRefinery Capacity Reportrdquo authorrsquos computation

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 30 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 31

HEAVY METAL

Taken together US imports of metals and US imports of oil compose about 80 percent of US

total imports from Rus sia (Figure 59) Trade of metals like other commodities is strongly afected

by market price fluctuations Nevertheless metal imports from Rus sia have been fairly resilient to

market volatility and their average annual value has hovered at about $4 billion in the last five years

(Figure 510) This market resilience was forged at the end of the 1990searly 2000s when Rus sian

metal producers gradually modernized their plants adjusting quality of production to Western

standards and enhancing integration into global value and supply chains Some of them conquered

their share of the highly competitive US market struggling with peers from Canada and certain

BRICS countries (China India and Brazil) To attract additional resources all Rus sian large metal-

producing companies became public and were listed on stock exchanges chiefly the London Stock

Exchange (Severstalrsquo PAO Evraz MMK OAO Novolipetsk Steel Norilsk Nikel and TMK PAO) one

on the New York Stock Exchange (Mechel) and one on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange (Rusal)

Business logic pushed some of them to invest in the US metal- making industry which was hit

hard by crisis Later on some of those assets were sold (eg two US steel mills acquired by

Severstal in 2004 were purchased 10 years later by Steel Dynamics Inc and AK Steel Corp)

Figure 57 Share of US States Rus sian Oil Imports 2016

Source US EIA ldquoUS Imports from Rus sia of Crude Oil and Petroleum Productsrdquo Petroleum amp Other

Liquids September 29 2017 https www eia gov dnav pet hist LeafHandler ashx nshy=shyPETampsshy=shyMTTIM _ NUS

- NRS _ 1ampfshy=shyM authorrsquos computation

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

100

Maine

Massachusetts

Maryland

Connecticut

Georgia

Rhode Island

Virginia

Florida

New York

Alabama

Puerto Rico

Pennsylvania

Delaware

Hawaii

Washington

Mississippi

California

New Jersey

Louisiana

Texas

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 31 102017 404 PM

Figure 58 US Imports from Rus sia by State Million US$ 2013ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoState and Metropolitan Area Trade Datardquo Foreign Trade last modified

October 2 2017 https wwwcensus gov foreign - trade statistics state

Alaska

Connecticut

Delaware

Hawaii

Louisiana

Maryland

North Dakota 0

$1000

$2000

$3000

$4000

$5000

$6000

2013 2014 2015 2016

Alabama

Alaska

Connecticut

Delaware

Hawaii

Louisiana

Maryland

Maine

Mississippi

Montana

North Dakota

Mississippi

Figure 59 US Imports from Rus sia Share of Oil and Metals Million US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 1992ndash2016)

83

82

85

86

87

88

85

82

7375

0

$5000

$10000

$15000

$20000

$25000

$30000

$35000

$40000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

US Imports from Russia

Share of Oil and Metals

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 32 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 33

Obviously the market dynamic of dif er ent metals varies (eg iron steel aluminum platinum and

nickel) Caps to increase their trade and production in a ldquored oceanrdquo global environment with

anemic demand is rather limited despite Figure 510 showing a spike of iron and steel imports

from Rus sia in 2014 and aluminum in 2016 Some opportunities may exist for Russian- owned steel

plants in the United States (such as NLMK) to participate in energy proj ects resumed under Presi-

dent Trump who has required that new pipelines use only American- made steel15

Rus sia occupies a special niche in the US market for titanium products a high- end metal indus-

try Twenty years ago a long- term contract was signed between Rus sian titanium producer

VSMPO- AVISMA and Boeing The Rus sian com pany entered the selective club of Boeing suppliers

for the manufacture of components and semi- finished products Since the signing of this contract

VSMPO has delivered more than 35 percent of all titanium placed on Boeing civil aircraft16 They

are hidden in the trade data in an import category for Civilian Aircrafts and Parts (Figure 511) At

the end of 2016 Boeing announced an extension of its framework agreement with AVISMA

15 E Scheyder C Ngai and T Sylvester ldquoAmerican Steel Unlikely to Get Keystone Boost Despite Trump Orderrdquo

Reuters January 27 2017 http wwwreuters com article usa - trump - pipeline - transcanada - idUSL1N1FH1ZD

16 A Kramer ldquoTitanium Fills Vital Role for Boeing and Rus siardquo New York Times July 5 2013 http wwwnytimes com

2013 07 06 business global titanium - fills - vital - role - for - boeing - and - russia html mcubzshy=shy3

Figure 510 US Imports from Rus sia Iron Steel Bauxite Aluminum Nickel Nonferrous Metals and Other Precious Metals and Materials US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 1992ndash2016)

0

$6000000000

$5000000000

$4000000000

$3000000000

$2000000000

$1000000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 20122013

20142015

2016

Finished metal shapes

Iron and steel advanced

Iron and steel products nec

Nonferrous metals other

Other precious metals

Nickel

Bauxite and aluminum

Iron and steel mill products

Steelmaking materials

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 33 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations34

through 2022 and additional investments in the construction of a new robotic plant in Titanium

Valley a special economic zone located in the Sverdlovsk region that will open in 2018 The pro-

cessing of titanium forgings in all Boeing civil aircraft will be performed there including 787s 737

MAXs and 777Xs17 The contract extension with AVISMA may add several hundred million dollars

in value to annual US imports from Rus sia

How can such heavy reliance on imports of Rus sian titanium exist during a period of rising geopo-

liti cal tensions The answer is straightforward VSMPO- AVISMA is a highly specialized natu ral

mono poly producing 45 percent of the worldrsquos aerospace titanium Only four other countries

smelt high- grade titanium in industrial quantities the United States Germany Japan and China

Overall global production capacity is limited while demand is growing The United States cur-

rently imports around 79 percent of all the titanium it consumes each year18

17 ldquoBoeing and VSMPO Avisma to Launch Second Joint Production Siterdquo Rus sian Aviation Insider December 22 2016

http wwwrusaviainsider com boeing - and - vsmpo - avisma - to - launch - second - joint - production - site

18 Jon Ostrower and Andy Pasztor ldquoBoeing United Technologies Stockpile Titanium Partsrdquo Wall Street Journal

August 7 2014 https wwwwsj com articles boeing - united - technologies - stockpiling - titanium - parts - 1407441886

Figure 511 US Imports from Rus sia Civilian Aircrafts and Parts US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 1992ndash2016)

0

$20000000

$40000000

$60000000

$80000000

$100000000

$120000000

$140000000

$160000000

$180000000

$200000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Parts-civilian aircraft

Civilian aircraft

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 34 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 35

The Sanctions Act authorizes the secretary of the trea sury (in a nonmandatory way) to impose

restrictions (without specifying them) against Rus sian state- owned entities operating in the railway

metals and mining sectors of the Rus sian economy Despite the commanding heights of Rus siarsquos

state sector owner ship in its economy (70 percent of GDP) the metal- producing companies have

remained mostly in private hands

NUCLEAR AFFAIRS

Historically owners and operators of the 104 commercial nuclear power reactors in the United

States have purchased more than 80 percent of their uranium from foreign countries Uranium

shipping from Rus sia accounted for about 13 percent of the 58 million pounds of uranium pur-

chased overseas in 201219 At the same time the Rus sian state- owned mono poly Rosatom ac-

counts for 20 percent of Kazakhstanrsquos uranium production (which in turn comprises 11 percent of

all US uranium imports) and 20 percent of US domestic uranium production capacity (with

owner ship of exploration tracts in Wyoming)20

Nuclear fuel and nuclear power continue to be po liti cally sensitive topics both in the United

States and Rus sia Bilateral cooperation in this sector (being surprisingly stable with imports of

nuclear fuel from Rus sia at a level of $1 billion annually in the last five years [Figure 512 and 513])

is under constant po liti cal and lobbying pressure and has been a source of several po liti cal scan-

dals21 Consequently upside risks in this area of interaction are minimal and downside risks are

much higher especially when we are seeing more decommissioning of nuclear plants in the

United States than new constructions The US EIArsquos 2017 Annual Energy Outlook assumes

that about 25 percent of the nuclear capacity now operating will be removed from ser vice

by 205022

WHY IS THE GRASS GREENER ON THE OTHER SIDE

The United States continues to significantly reduce imports of chemical fertilizers as domestic pro-

duction increases In 2016 the United States imported 13 percent less ammonia and 11 percent

less urea and UAN which is a liquid urea and ammonium nitrate fertilizer Rus sia accounts for

around 40 percent of UAN imported by the United States The United States canceled antidumping

duties on imports of ammonium nitrate and urea from Rus sia in 2016 but it did not prevent import

19 US EIA ldquoThe US Relies on Foreign Uranium Enrichment Ser vices to Fuel Its Nuclear Power Plantsrdquo Today in

Energy August 28 2013 https wwweia gov todayinenergy detail php idshy=shy1273

20 Colin Chilcoat ldquoDoes Rus sia Really Own 20 Percent of the USrsquo Uranium Reservesrdquo OilPricecom May 6 2015

http oilpricecom Alternative - Energy Nuclear - Power Does - Russia - Really - Own - 20 - Of - The - US - Uranium - Reserves

html

21 Michelle Ye Hee Lee ldquoThe Facts behind Trumprsquos Repeated Claim about Hillary Clintonrsquos Role in the Rus sian Ura-

nium Dealrdquo Washington Post October 26 2016

22 US EIA ldquoAnnual Energy Outlook 2017 with Projections to 2050rdquo 81ndash82

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 35 102017 404 PM

Figure 512 US Imports from Rus sia Share of Oil Metals and Nuclear Fuel Million US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 1992ndash2016)

87

86

90

90

90

91

88

86

7882

0

$5000

$10000

$15000

$20000

$25000

$30000

$35000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

US Imports from Russia

Share of Oil Metals and Nuclear Fuel

Figure 513 US Imports from Rus sia Nuclear Fuel Materials US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

$-

$200000000

$400000000

$600000000

$800000000

$1200000000

$1000000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 36 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 37

drops twice last year (Figures 514 and 515) According to forecasts UAN imports are expected to

decline further to 15 million tons this year down over 46 percent from 28 million tons imported

last year23 The downside trend in imports of fertilizers will likely continue because of oversupply

BIG FISH

US imports of fish and shellfish from Rus sia are best understood in comparison with US fish

exports to the Rus sian market which slipped to zero in August 2014 after Rus sia issued an order

banning certain agricultural imports from the United States (Figure 516) While the volume of US

supply was not very large it was impor tant because it broke up the monopolistic dominance of a

few vertically integrated Rus sian companies that have kept prices high by restricting the entry of

new producers Seeking to implement import substitution policies Rus sia has tried to reduce

exports as well as imports of fish and seafood products in the last couple of years This symmetri-

cal approach was intended to ldquocompensaterdquo for a decrease of fish products in the domestic

23 Deepika Thapliyal ldquoPotashCorp Forecasts Sharp Drop in US Nitrogen Imports in 2017rdquo ICIS News February 7

2017 https wwwicis com resources news 2017 02 07 10076734 potashcorp - forecasts - sharp - drop - in - us - nitrogen

- imports - in - 2017

Figure 514 US Imports from Rus sia Share of Oil Metals Nuclear Fuel and Fertilizers Million US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

90

93

92

93

94

95

92

91

85

86

0

$5000

$10000

$15000

$20000

$25000

$30000

$35000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

US Imports from Russia

Share of Oil Metals Nuclear Fuel and Fertilizers

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 37 102017 404 PM

Figure 515 US Imports from Rus sia Chemical- Fertilizers US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

S-

$200000000

$400000000

$600000000

$800000000

$1000000000

$1200000000

$1400000000

$1600000000

$1800000000

$2000000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Figure 516 US Exports to Rus sia Fish and Shellfish US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

0

$10000000

$20000000

$30000000

$40000000

$50000000

$60000000

$70000000

$80000000

$90000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Fish and shellfish

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 38 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 39

consumer market caused by Rus siarsquos import ban but it has failed As result the group most af-

fected by the self- imposed counter- sanctions were Rus sian consumers

With a significant drop in fish imports a devaluation of the ruble and inflationary pressures on

seafood prices yearly consumption of fish in Rus sia has declined precipitously In 2015 alone

fish prices increased 20 percent and consumption dropped to 14 kilograms per person24 from

22 kilograms in 201425 In 2016 food rose to 355 percent of house hold expenditure as a result of

increases in food prices26 This has pushed vertically integrated fishing monopolies to sell even

more of their catch abroad rather than deliver to the Rus sian Federation (Figure 517) Thus we

cannot exclude the possibility of further growth in US fish and shellfish imports from Rus sia on a

marginal scale

24 Александр Савельев ldquoПотребление рыбы в России упало до 14 кг на человекаrdquo [Fish consumption in Rus sia fell to

14 kg per person] Экономика Интерфакс January 28 2015 http wwwinterfax ru business 492038

25 Илья Шестаков ldquoПотебление рыбы в России снизилось на 10 процентов из- за роста ценrdquo [Fish consumption in

Rus sia dropped by 10 percent due to price increases] RNS March 8 2017 https rnsonline consumer - market

Potreblenie - ribi - v - Rossii - snizilos - na - 10 - iz - za - rosta - tsen - 2017 - 03 - 08

26 Zoya Sheftalovich and Christian Oliver ldquoRus siarsquos Boom (Farming) Economyrdquo Politico November 8 2016 http

wwwpolitico eu article russias - boom - farming - economy

Figure 517 US Imports from Rus sia Fish and Shellfish US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

0

$50000000

$100000000

$150000000

$200000000

$250000000

$300000000

$350000000

$400000000

$450000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 39 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations40

SPACE ODYSSEY

Among high- end products beyond the top five groups of goods imported from Rus sia cheap and

efficient Rus sian engines have been used to launch US rockets into space for about 16 years

(Figure 518) There was a serious po liti cal strug gle around a 2014 ban on the purchase of Rus sian

RD-180 rocket engines revealing the conflicting business interests of power ful high- tech companies

This restrictive mea sure was temporary and was quickly lifted because of significant cost impacts

and risks of disruption to launch schedules27 For the same reason the Sanctions Act does not autho-

rize ldquothe imposition of any sanction or other condition limitation restriction or prohibition that

directly or indirectly impedes the supply by any entity of the Rus sian Federation of any product or

ser vice or the procurement of such product or ser vice by any contractor or subcontractor of the

United States or any other entity relating to or in connection with any space launch conducted for

the National Aeronautics and Space Administration or any other nonndash Department of Defense

customerrdquo28

Nevertheless many experts believe that US domestic alternatives to replace Rus sian engines will

be viable in five to eight years

27 Ken Dilanian ldquoWhy Does the US Use Rus sian Rockets to Launch Its Satellitesrdquo NBC News updated November 15

2016 http wwwnbcnews com why - does - u - s - use - russian - rockets - launch - its - satellites - n588526

28 Countering Amer i carsquos Adversaries through Sanctions Act HR 3364

Figure 518 Spacecraft Excluding Military US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

0

$20000000

$40000000

$60000000

$80000000

$100000000

$120000000

$140000000

$160000000

$180000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 40 102017 404 PM

41

Diversity and technological complexity are the most vis i ble advantages supporting US exports to

Rus sia Three major groups of export goods include civilian aircraft engines and parts (Figure 61)

drilling and oil field equipment (Figure 62) and industrial machines and engines (Figure 63)

Despite sanctions against the transfer of advanced oil producing and pro cessing technologies the

realization of US drilling and oil field equipment in Rus sia is sustainable although some bilateral

proj ects have been frozen

Another category of goods that has demonstrated resilience is the phar ma ceu ti cal industry (Fig-

ure 64) because most drugs in Rus sia are imported (about 70 percent of the Rus sian phar ma ceu-

ti cal market in value) Import substitution policies have had only modest results in this industry

As confirmed by American Chamber of Commerce surveys US exports to Rus sia are closely

connected to US FDI 30 percent of total imports of US companies working in the Rus sian

market come from the United States (more than $2 billion in 2016) In other words about

40 percent of all US exports to Rus sia are related to a US corporate- sector business pro cess in

the country The major sectors of activity of these companies are energy and natu ral resources

(52 percent) manufacturing (17 percent) information and communications technology or ICT

(13 percent) retail (7 percent) automotive industry (6 percent) phar ma ceu ti cal production

(1 percent) professional ser vices (05 percent) and other (2 percent)1

Some obvious constraints on US exports to Rus sia have resulted from a reduction in demand A

deterioration of bilateral relations and implementation of sanctions and counter- sanctions have

directly or indirectly afected all businesses Figures 65 and 66 provide data regarding a dramatic

drop in the sale of US agricultural production in Rus sia with all other categories of exports in

goods showing big cuts as well (see Figures 67ndash69)

Exports of civilian aircraft engines and parts put the state of Washington in first place among

other states as a leading exporter to the Rus sian market (Figure 610)

1 American Chamber of Commerce in Rus sia ldquoInvestment and Import to Rus sia 2nd Surveyrdquo 13

Diversity and Constraints

06

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 41 102017 404 PM

Figure 61 US Exports of Civilian Aircraft Engines Equipment and Parts to Rus sia US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

$2500000000

$2000000000

$1500000000

$1000000000

$500000000

$-

Figure 62 US Exports of Drilling and Oil Field Equipment US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

0

$5000000

$10000000

$15000000

$20000000

$25000000

$30000000

$35000000

$40000000

$45000000

$50000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 42 102017 404 PM

Figure 63 US Exports of Industrial Engines to Rus sia US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

0

$5000000

$10000000

$15000000

$20000000

$25000000

$30000000

$35000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Figure 64 US Exports of Phar ma ceu ti cal Preparations to Rus sia US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

0

$5000000

$10000000

$15000000

$20000000

$25000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 43 102017 404 PM

Figure 65 US Exports of Meat and Poultry to Rus sia US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Meat poultry etc

$1000000000

$800000000

$600000000

$400000000

$200000000

$-

$1200000000

$1400000000

$1600000000

Figure 66 US Exports of Soybeans to Rus sia US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

0

$20000000

$40000000

$60000000

$80000000

$100000000

$120000000

$140000000

$160000000

$180000000

$200000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 44 102017 404 PM

Figure 67 US Exports of Vehicles Engines and Parts to Rus sia US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Other parts and accessories of vehicles

Automotive tires and tubes

Bodies and chassis for passenger cars

Engines and engine parts (carburetors pistonsrings and valves)

Trucks buses and special purpose vehicles

Passenger cars new and used

$2500000000

$2000000000

$1500000000

$500000000

$-

$1000000000

Figure 68 US Exports of Medicinal Equipment to Rus sia US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

$10000000

$15000000

$20000000

$25000000

$30000000

$35000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 45 102017 404 PM

Figure 610 US Exports to Rus sia by States (2016 US$ Value) Million US$ 2013ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoState and Metropolitan Area Trade Datardquo

Iowa Kentucky

North Dakota

Oklahoma

South Carolina

Washington

0

$500

$1000

$1500

$2000

2013 2014 2015 2016

District of Columbia

Iowa

Kentucky

North Dakota

Oklahoma

South Carolina

Washington

Figure 69 US Exports of Excavating Machinery to Rus sia US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

0

$5000000

$10000000

$15000000

$20000000

$25000000

$30000000

$35000000

$40000000

$45000000

$50000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 46 102017 404 PM

47

Upon reviewing the current trend in US- Russia economic relations we must acknowledge that

the existing trade model is obsolete and exhausted Imports are resource- oriented and reflect

constraints of the Rus sian economic structure while five groups of goodsmdash oil metals nuclear

fuels fertilizers and fishmdash make up more than 90 percent of total imports from Rus sia (Figure 71)

Each of these industries has a limited capacity for growth in the foreseeable future

Rus siarsquos core export to the United Statesmdash oilmdash will inevitably decrease in the mid- term under any

scenario The value and volume of Rus sian exports to the United States are open to global market

volatility and po liti cal pressures with limited hedging mechanisms

Overall US exports to Rus sia are unsustainable due to bilateral po liti cal tensions the whims of

commodity markets and changing domestic policies Sanctions and counter- sanctions have

created additional barriers particularly in finance banking high- tech energy and agro- business

According to the American Chamber of Commerce 69 percent of US companies working in the

country consider the impact of US sanctions against Rus sia on their business as negative At the

same time 60 percent of companies do not expect big changes in business relations between

Rus sia and the United States under Trump1 as the new law codifies existing sanctions fortifies

them and extends them to new sectors

Current US investments are low due to the weak rule of law in Rus sia a lack of property right

protections and proper contract enforcement high levels of statization and monopolization in the

economy a poor business climate outdated capital stock dependence on natural- resource

sectors and of course sanction and counter- sanction mea sures Bloated administrative compo-

nents created as risk mitigation instruments have also served as impediments The countryrsquos

institutional weakness low level of productivity bud get constraints and a declining inflexible

workforce will restrain future economic growth even if commodity prices recover Rus sian eco-

nomic policy will likely continue to be statist and protectionist relying mostly on import

substitutions

1 Ibid 11

Existing Trends and Future Scenarios

07

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 47 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations48

What scenarios can be expected in such a challenging environment

One probability (no peace no war) is based on the assumption that matters will not deteriorate

further and implementation of the Sanctions Act will be cursory This will cause relatively slow

degradation in the economic field with occasional flashes of activity in selected areas (eg closer

cooperation against Islamist terrorist groups in Syria)

A second worse case or critical scenario is the intensive and full- scale execution of current sanc-

tion legislation and even the imposition of new economic punitive and restrictive mea sures which

could incite asymmetric retaliatory actions and lead to the introduction of additional protectionist

policies This in turn could trigger a further escalation of mutual confrontation and could eventu-

ally destroy the fundamentals of the current bilateral trade system Rus sian leadership has charac-

terized the Sanctions Act as a declaration of a trade war that ends all hope for improving bilateral

relations2

2 Дмитрий Медведев ldquoПодписание президентом США нового санкционного закона против России создает несколько

последствийrdquo [The US Presidentrsquos signing of the package of new sanctions against Rus sia will have a few conse-

quences] Facebook August 2 2017 https wwwfacebook com Dmitry Medvedev posts 10154587161801851

Figure 71 US Imports from Rus sia Share of Oil Metals Nuclear Fuel Fertilizers and Fish Million US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

93

94

93

94

95

96

93

92

87

89

0

$5000

$10000

$15000

$20000

$25000

$30000

$35000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

US Imports from Russia

Share of Oil Metals Nuclear FuelFertilizers and Fish

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 48 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 49

The best case and most favorable scenario looks less probable now It assumes the realization of

structural reforms in Rus sia in such a way that would adapt Rus siarsquos foreign policy to national

economic needs reduce confrontations with the West and make a concerted efort to integrate

Rus sian businesses into global supply and value chains A revitalization of the structural reform

agendamdash including eforts to diversify economic activities through de- monopolization and support

for SMEs a restructuring of the banking sector the creation of a vibrant business climate to foster

entrepreneurships and innovation the implementation of administrative and judicial reforms to

tackle red tape and endemic corruption and the reduction of state control over key sectors of the

economy via wide- spread privatization could kick- start the development of a nonoil economy and

improve long- term growth prospects Despite ongoing discussion of reform strategies deep

economic and po liti cal changes are extremely complicated over the next po liti calelectoral cycle

(2018ndash2024) particularly because of re sis tance of vested interests and growing commodity prices

The urgency to tackle structural shortcomings in natu ral resource- dependent economies usually

correlates with the price of those resources and the degree to which resource rents drive eco-

nomic activity However there may be marginal improvements in the efficiency of the current

economic system

Future US- Russia relations can be thought of through three pillars one pillar focuses on areas

where both countries maintain a competitive rivalry another looks at potential areas of interaction

under pres ent conditions a third pillar and one that has evaporated from the current bilateral

agenda concentrates on future cooperation Stronger economic ties could not only be a kind of

po liti cal shock absorber but contribute to the building of this future (particularly business contacts

aim to support future structural reforms) although po liti cal factors are depressing the prospects

for cooperation To escape deadlock it will be impor tant to establish the right balance between

politics and economics and create a model of collaboration within the framework of contention

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 49 102017 404 PM

About the Author

Vadim Grishin PhD MBA has been involved in the reform pro cess in Rus sia as adviser to the

deputy prime minister of Rus sia in 1992ndash1993 and 2006ndash2010 He has extensive experience

working with the Bretton Woods Institutions He was the board member of the World Bank Group

and served as se nior adviser at the International Monetary Fund Currently he is a con sul tant to the

chief economistrsquos office of the International Finance Corporation and teaches the economics of

transition at Georgetown University in Washington DC

50

594-71613_ch99_4Pindd 50 102017 403 PM

Blank

COVER PHOTO ADOBE STOCK

1616 Rhode Island Avenue NW

Washington DC 20036

202 887 0200 | wwwcsisorg

v++ISBN 978-1-4422-8035-9

Lanham bull Boulder bull New York bull London

4501 Forbes Boulevard

Lanham MD 20706

301 459 3366 | wwwrowmancom

A U T H O R

Vadim Grishin

Myths and Realities

A Report of the

CSIS RUSSIA AND EURASIA PROGRAM

US-RussiaEconomicRelations

O C T O B E R 2 0 1 7

Euml|xHSLEOCy280359z

The Man Pupu Nyor Rock Formations at the Northern Urals also known as Seven

Strong Man or Little Mountain of the God in the local tribe (Mansi) language

Page 17: U.S.-Russia Economic Relations: Myths and Realities · 2020-04-17 · OCTOBER 2017 U.S.- Russia Economic Relations Myths and Realities AUTHOR Vadim Grishin A REPORT OF THE CSIS RUSSIA

11

03

Politics in the Driverrsquos Seat

Bilateral economic relations depend to a great extent on global and national economic cycles

After the recent global financial crisis the US economy has shown surprisingly sustainable GDP

growth while the Rus sian economy was the most afected among BRICS countries by the turbu-

lence of a worldwide economic downturn in 2008ndash2009 and after a short- term rebound slipped

into stagnation (2012ndash2013) and then into full- scale recession (2014ndash2016) The countryrsquos eco-

nomic cycle however appears to be changing once again with the economy returning to a

pattern of growth albeit uneven and gradual (Figures 31 and 32) Even with sanctions still in place

conditions have improved as a result of the stabilization of Urals oil to an average annual price of

$419 per barrel in 2016 The gains were sparked in part by major crude producers agreeing to cut

production after hefty price drops in 2014 and 2015 Supported by easier financial conditions

higher oil prices and growing macro- stability Rus sia is heading toward a moderate growth rate

that is expected to reach 14 percent this year according to forecasts of the World Bank Group

(WBG) and the IMF1

Because of the significant role that politics plays in any bilateral interaction it is impor tant to

combine economic and po liti cal cycles applying a ldquoresetrdquo to bilateral economic cooperation in

addition to the po liti cal relationship I have compared po liti cal cycles and trade dynamics using the

following graphs ( Table 31 and Figure 33) These charts do not pretend to reflect with mathemati-

cal precision all shifts in the bilateral po liti cal relationship but rather attempt to visually align

impor tant economic and po liti cal moments to detect the efects of po liti cal events on the size of

bilateral trade

Figure 33 shows all pos si ble combinations economic trends at the intersection of po liti cal devel-

opments oppose or support each other in synchronization It is evident that po liti cal interference

1 International Monetary Fund Rus sian Federation Staff Concluding Statement of the 2017 Article IV Mission (Wash-

ington DC IMF 2017) World Bank Group From Recession to Recovery Rus sia Economic Report no 37 (Washington

DC World Bank 2017) http pubdocsworldbank org en 383241495487103815 RER - 37 - May26 - FINAL - with - summary

pdf

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 11 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations12

in bilateral business afairs in the early 2000s was less significant than in later years As result

growing po liti cal tensions from 2003 to 2008 did not dramatically afect bilateral economic inter-

action It is also easier to explain why 2011ndash2012 resulted in rec ord trade and investmentmdash a con-

sequence of very high oil prices GDP growth in both countries improved legislation after Rus siarsquos

accession to the WTO and the Obamandash Medvedev po liti cal reset From 2014 to 2016 a perfect

storm of developments added efficiency to Western sanctions and augmented the damaging

consequences of counter- sanction mea sures

Figure 33 also confirms that in times of reduced economic cooperation po liti cal pressures can

easily change bilateral economic trends Moreover business interests along with economic inter-

actions have a limited capacity to reverse the po liti cal mainstream

Figure 31 Economic Cycle 2014ndash2016

Source Authorrsquos evaluation of international financial institutions (IFI) data and sources from respective

countries

Sustainable Growth

Brazil

Negative Growth

Unstable Growth

Mexico

Descending Growth

Argentina

EU

US

Russia

Vietnam

China

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 12 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 13

Table 31 Po liti cal Cycles in Bilateral US- Russia Relations 1999ndash2016

2001ndash2002 The George W Bushndash Vladimir Putin Reset Rus sia supported ldquoglobal war on terrorismrdquo launched by the United States after 911 the SORT nuclear arms reduction treaty was signed by the United States and Rus sia and a successful business dialogue was developed that created the current structure of economic relations

2003ndash2008 Deterioration in bilateral relations brought on by the Iraq War Georgiarsquos ldquoRose Revolutionrdquo Mikhail Khodorkovskyrsquos arrest Ukrainersquos ldquoOrange Revolutionrdquo Kosovorsquos in de pen dence and the Georgian War

2009ndash2010 The Barack Obamandash Dmitry Medvedev Reset Rus sia served as a logistical hub for transportation and supply of US forces in Af ghan i stan United States and Rus sia signed the new START nuclear arms reduction treaty Rus sia backed tighter economic sanctions on Iran Rus sia gained access to the WTO after 18 years of negotiations

2011ndash2016 Deterioration in bilateral relations caused by the Ukrainian crisis which were followed by sanctions and counter- sanctions along with the Syrian crises and cyber- enabled activities

Source Authorrsquos evaluation of po liti cal and economic data

Note SORTthinsp=thinspStrategic Ofensive Reductions Treaty STARTthinsp=thinspStrategic Arms Reduction Treaty

Figure 32 Economic Cycle 2017ndash2019

Source Authorrsquos evaluation of IFI data and sources from respective countries

Egypt

VenezuelaEU

South Africa

Brazil

Russia

India

US

Descending Growth

Korea

China

Negative Growth

Unstable Growth

Sustainable Growth

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 13 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations14

Figure 33 US- Russia Trade Million US$ vs Po liti cal Cycle 2000ndash2016

Sources US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo Foreign Trade last modified June 29 2017

https wwwcensus gov foreign - trade balance c4621 html (see data for 2000ndash2016) authorrsquos evaluation

of po liti cal and economic data

Orange Revolution

Khodorkovskys arrest

GeorgianWar

Bush- Putin Reset

Iraq War Global Financial Crisis

Obama-Medvedev Reset

Russias WTO accession

New START Treaty

A Pefect Storm the Ukranian Crisis Oil Prices Crashing

Sanctions and Counter-Sanctions

$3000

$8000

$13000

$18000

$23000

$28000

$33000

$38000

$43000

2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 14 102017 404 PM

15

The current structure of US- Russia economic relations emerged in the early 2000s when the

model of trade and investment interaction took on a character similar to that which existed be-

tween the United States and developing economies US imports from Rus sia centered on com-

modities while technology along with food products lead American exports The primary

exception was that Rus sia supplied nuclear fuel including highly enriched uranium extracted from

nuclear weapons for US power plants and provided ser vices to the aerospace industry primarily

in satellite launches However both these exceptions can be explained as a legacy of the Soviet

past and not a harbinger of the future economic relationship (Figure 41)

In the last 15 years this trade structure has not changed significantly The only noticeable shift in

trade was a dramatic drop (to practically nothing) in exports of US agricultural products a result

of Rus siarsquos policy of import substitution and so- called counter- sanction mea sures it took in re-

sponse to US sanctions over the Ukraine crisis (Figure 42)

Promising new directions of cooperation in the IT sector and in engineering ser vices for the

aerospace industry appeared in the early 2000s1 but did not spill into other sectors and conse-

quently did little to renew economic cooperation on the whole The integration of Rus sian high-

tech ser vices into large- scale global production and value chains was constrained by the usual

culprits a lack of financial resources managerial experience skilled labor modern infrastructure

RampD investments and an adequate business environment High commodity prices incentivized the

restoration of an economic system centered on resource rents The leading role of oil and gas

extraction and transportation discouraged the development of a nonenergy sector that might

have created advanced and complex production and ser vices An import substitution policy could

not work efficiently in an economic environment plagued by the Dutch disease where currency

1 The Boeing Design Center was created in Moscow It consists of nearly 250 Boeing employees managing

a team of 1200 contract engineers from Rus sian and Ukrainian aerospace companies ldquoBackgrounder Boeing in

Rus siardquo Boeing last modified January 2017 http wwwboeing com resources boeingdotcom company key _ orgs

boeing - international pdf russia - cisbackgrounder pdf

Are the United States and Rus sia ldquoNatu ralrdquo Trading Partners A Little Bit of History

04

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 15 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations16

inflows (oil money) lead to ruble appreciation and render a countryrsquos production less competitive

During that time Rus siarsquos industry did not receive preferential access to larger markets and could

not expand its share in the global economy particularly because of its self- isolation from the

regional trade agreements (except for its participation in the Eurasian Economic Union with some

neighboring countries of the former Soviet Union) As a result neither import substitution nor

export- led strategy promoted growth and specialization in nonoil production A long- awaited

modernization and reallocation of resources from an inefficient nontrade sector to a trade sector

did not materialize

These limits were later augmented with sanctions and an extension of domestic restrictions on

cooperation with Western partners Importantly the rapid growth of state- monopoly structures in

the Rus sian economy over the past 15 years has created additional obstacles to the development

and diversification of US- Russia economic ties

Figure 41 US Imports from Rus sia US$ 2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2016)

Fish and shellfish 3

Crude oil 5

Fuel oil 37

Petroleum products other

8

Nuclear fuel materials

7

Chemicals-fertilizers 4

Steelmaking materials 5

Iron and steel mill products 4

Bauxite and aluminum 9

Other precious metals 4

Nonferrous metals other 1

Finished metal shapes 1

Synthetic rubber--primary

1

Spacecraftexcluding military

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 16 102017 404 PM

Fig

ure

42

U

S E

xpo

rts

to R

us s

ia U

S$ 2

016

Sou

rce

US

Ce

nsu

s B

ure

au ldquo

Trad

e in

Go

od

s w

ith

Ru

s sia

rdquo (s

ee

dat

a fo

r 2

016

)

Bak

ery

pro

du

cts

Win

e b

eer

an

d r

elat

ed

pro

du

cts

New

spri

nt

Pla

stic

mat

eria

ls

Ch

emic

als-

fert

ilize

rs

Ch

emic

als-

ino

rgan

icC

hem

ical

s-o

rgan

ic

Ch

emic

als-

oth

erC

ott

on

fib

er c

loth

In

du

stri

al r

ub

ber

pro

du

cts

Min

eral

su

pp

lies-

man

ufa

ctu

red

Gen

erat

ors

acc

esso

ries

Ele

ctri

c ap

par

atu

s

Dri

llin

g amp

oilfi

eld

eq

uip

men

t Sp

ecia

lized

min

ing

Exc

avat

ing

mac

hin

ery

No

nfa

rm t

ract

ors

an

d p

arts

In

du

stri

al e

ng

ines

Fo

od

to

bac

co m

ach

iner

y M

etal

wo

rkin

g m

ach

ine

too

ls

Tex

tile

sew

ing

m

ach

ines

W

oo

d g

lass

p

last

ic

Pu

lp a

nd

pap

er

mac

hin

ery

Mea

suri

ng

tes

tin

g

con

tro

l in

stru

men

ts

Mat

eria

ls h

and

ling

equ

ipm

ent

Ind

ust

rial

mac

hin

es

oth

er

Ph

oto

ser

vice

ind

ust

ry m

ach

iner

y A

gri

cult

ura

l mac

hin

ery

eq

uip

men

t C

om

pu

ters

Co

mp

ute

r ac

cess

ori

es

Sem

ico

nd

uct

ors

Tel

eco

mm

un

icat

ion

seq

uip

men

t

Bu

sin

ess

mac

hin

es a

nd

eq

uip

men

t

Lab

ora

tory

tes

tin

g in

stru

men

ts

Med

icin

al e

qu

ipm

ent

Civ

ilian

air

craf

t e

ng

ines

eq

uip

men

t a

nd

par

ts

Rai

lway

tra

nsp

ort

atio

n

equ

ipm

ent

Ves

sels

exc

lud

ing

scr

ap

Co

mm

erci

al v

esse

ls o

ther

M

arin

e en

gin

es p

arts

Spac

ecra

ft e

xclu

din

g

mili

tary

Pas

sen

ger

car

s

new

an

d u

sed

Tru

cks

bu

ses

and

sp

ecia

l p

urp

ose

ve

hic

les

En

gin

es a

nd

en

gin

e p

arts

(c

arb

ure

tors

pis

ton

s r

ing

s

and

val

ves)

B

od

ies

and

ch

assi

s fo

r p

asse

ng

er c

ars

Au

tom

oti

ve t

ires

an

d t

ub

es

Oth

er p

arts

an

d a

cces

sori

es o

f ve

hic

les

Ap

par

el h

ou

seh

old

go

od

s -

text

ile

Ph

arm

aceu

tica

lp

rep

arat

ion

s

Furn

itu

re h

ou

seh

old

go

od

s

etc

R

ug

s

Cel

l ph

on

es a

nd

oth

er

ho

use

ho

ld g

oo

ds

ne

c

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 17 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations18

Figure 43 US Trade in Goods with Rus sia Million US$ 1992ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 1992ndash2016)

Russian Financial Crisis

Oil price Increased from$2446 USD per barrel (2001)

to $9694 USD per barrel(2008)

Global Financial Crisis

Oil price high record in2011-2012

(more that $111 USD perbarrel)

Oil price crashed

$-

$5000

$10000

$15000

$20000

$25000

$30000

$35000

$40000

$45000

$50000

1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

US Imports from Russia US Exports to Russia US-Russia Trade in Goods

No doubt po liti cal ups and downs add volatility to US- Russia trade Nevertheless Rus siarsquos eco-

nomic structure exhausted itself before the Ukrainian crisis and the recent Rus sian recession Its

limitations are not only due to some mistakes in policy or negative coincidences of circumstances

but rather to deeply rooted properties in the current bilateral trade model related to structural

issues in the Rus sian economy Structural constraints such as the weak enforcement of property

rights poor business regulation and nondiversified exports weighed on Rus sian trade with the

United States From this perspective the term ldquonaturalunnatural trading partnersrdquo does not ad-

dress the unused capacity of bilateral interaction or the real challenges that kind of interaction

faces It just adds metaphysical flavor to the very specific economic and po liti cal factors that

determine the US- Russia trajectory

Overall the outlines of bilateral trade (Figure 43) resemble the famous ldquoRus sian Mountainsrdquo that

were a pre de ces sor of the modern roller coaster icy hills supported by wooden constructionsmdash a

rigid and immobile structure that sooner or later would melt This unfortunately is what is hap-

pening to US- Russia trade cooperation now

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 18 102017 404 PM

19

ARE LITTLE FISH REALLY SWEET

Low US- Russia economic interaction has at least two consequences First it limits the capacity of

policymakers to exploit trade as an instrument for geopo liti cal combat Even the question of a US

trade deficit which used to be a headache for many US trading partners has become so insig-

nificant in absolute terms (about $87 billion in 2016) that it seems hardly worth caring about

When the volume of trade between two countries becomes very small in absolute terms whether

a country is running a surplus or deficit is no longer relevant But it also renders another type of

confrontations (sometimes more dangerous) more likely since the two traders have little to lose

Second in an environment marked by low levels of bilateral trade both sides could incentivize (if

and when a desire for po liti cal rapprochement exists) the signing of new trade deals which are

elevated symbolically as a turning point in bilateral po liti cal relations (ie the sale of Boeings to

Rus sia or the delivery via tankers of Rus sian oil to US refineries) Sometimes markets themselves

pres ent ldquogiftsrdquo that can be capitalized on po liti cally US- USSR grain trade in the 1970s was one

such ldquogiftrdquo large sales of American grain to the Soviet Union helped US policymakers win favor

with the po liti cally impor tant American farming sector and permitted Soviet leaders to maintain

access to a dietary staple for the Soviet population

The strong 32 percent growth in value of US imports from Rus sia from January to May 2017

versus January to May 2016 ( Table 51) is an example of a development that has tempted officials

to pres ent it as a sign of positive change due to ldquogrowing business activitiesrdquo (this kind of statement

was heard before the bilateral summit in Germany in July 2017) although the reason for that leap

was evidently an increase in commodity prices (mainly of oilmdash see Table 52) and not a rise in

entrepreneurial interactions The primary beneficiaries of that upside rally have been two other

petro- economies Saudi Arabia and Venezuela ( Tables 53 and 54)

Sector Analyses

05

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 19 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations20

Table 51 US Imports from Rus sia Million US$ Januaryndash May 2016 vs Januaryndash May 2017

Year January February March April May Total

2016 9603 6871 11097 12257 10977 50805

2017 12215 10220 16979 13471 14147 67032

Change 271 487 530 99 289 319

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 1992ndash2016)

Table 52 Change in Urals Crude Oil Prices US$ per Barrel Januaryndash May 2016 vs Januaryndash May 2017

Januaryndash May 2016 Januaryndash May 2017 Change ($) Change ()

3601 5129 1528 424

Source Ministry of Finance of the Rus sian Federation https wwwminfin ru ru ixzz4mMIZ7XtC

Table 53 US Imports from Saudi Arabia Million US$ Januaryndash May 2016 vs Januaryndash May 2017

Year January February March April May Total

2016 15114 9036 13555 10844 14679 63228

2017 19802 20298 21650 16211 19542 97503

Change 3101 12463 5972 495 331 542

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Saudi Arabiardquo Foreign Trade last modified June 29 2017

https wwwcensus gov foreign - trade balance c5170 html (see data for 2016ndash2017)

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 20 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 21

Table 54 US Imports from Venezuela Million US$ Januaryndash May 2016 vs Januaryndash May 2017

Year January February March April May Total

2016 6657 5560 7140 8007 7922 35286

2017 13041 10864 123500 11148 12243 59646

Change 9590 9540 7297 3923 5454 6903

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Venezuelardquo Foreign Trade last modified June 29 2017

https wwwcensus gov foreign - trade balance c3070 html (see data for 2016ndash2017)

Table 55 US Exports to Rus sia Million US$ Januaryndash May 2016 vs Januaryndash May 2017

Year January February March April May Total

2016 3628 3577 7298 4657 4947 24107

2017 3144 4277 5386 6670 4806 24283

Change minus133 196 minus262 432 minus29 minus07

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2016ndash2017)

At the same time US exports to Rus sia continue to stagnate ( Table 55) due to low levels of

consumption during a two-and- a- half-year economic crisis a deep ruble devaluation sanctions

and counter- sanctions

Given the very dif er ent economic structures and resource endowments of Rus sia and the United

States it is not surprising that US- Russia trade is asymmetric and oil driven (Figure 51) A

3 percent increase in Urals oil prices translates into a one percent increase in US import growth

from Rus sia Thus in 2016 every $10 increase in Urals crude oil added $15 billion to the value of

US imports or 11 percent to the total value of imports from Rus sia

OIL ADDICTION

Oil is a core pillar of US- Russia bilateral trade A bumpy ride in oil markets afects commerce

Nevertheless Rus sian oil exports to the United States in physical terms have been rather

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 21 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations22

sustainable Starting from 2005 average annual deliveries have been above 150 million barrels

(Figure 52) Crude and heating oil have dominated while petroleum products and liquefied petro-

leum gases have not (Figure 53) In 2011 oil exports peaked at 228 million barrels but declined to

159 million barrels in 2016mdash a drop of 30 percent Rec ord high shipments of Rus sian oil to the United

States coincided with an elevation in oil prices which made the subsequent decline in oil shipment

value between 2011 and 2016 (by about 72 percent as shown in Figure 54) seem more stark The

increase in price also raised the share of oil in Rus sian exports by 74 percent in 2011 (Figure 55)

The Rus sian share in total US oil imports was around 55 percent in 2011 and 43 percent in 2016

( Table 56) In the last five years the United States has relied exclusively on consumption of Rus sian

oil for the rough equivalent of one week out of the year (Figure 56)

It is unlikely that Rus sia can significantly increase its share of the US oil market and there is a real

possibility for a downward trend There are several reasons the historically high Rus sian hydrocar-

bon export threshold of 2011 will not soon if ever be surpassed

First US energy consumption will likely be flat According to the US Energy Information Adminis-

tration (EIA) demand for petroleum and other liquids in the United States will be about 35ndash36

quadrillion British thermal units (BTUs) with minimal variation over the next 25 years1

1 US EIA ldquoAnnual Energy Outlook 2017 with Projections to 2050rdquo January 5 2017 7ndash8

Figure 51 US- Russia Trade Growth () vs US and Rus sia Real GDP Growth () 1993ndash2016

Source IMF ldquoIMF Datardquo accessed September 27 2017 http wwwimf org en Data US Census Bureau

ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo

Note rGDPthinsp=thinspreal gross domestic product

Trade

USA rGDP growth

Russia rGDP growth

-60

-40

-20

0

20

40

60

80

100

1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Gro

wth

All spikes in US-Russia trade have been connected with two main

variables volume and price of crude oil

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 22 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 23

Second the United States will become a net energy exporter between 2020 and 2030 in most

cases under dif er ent combinations of oil and natu ral gas prices GDP growth technological

breakthroughs and the availability of energy resources The role of oil imports will dramatically

fall2

Third oil price scenarios as described by the International Energy Agency (IEA) international

financial organ izations (IFIs) and many national agencies are very cautious and assume that even

by 2035 to 2040 oil prices will not to recover to the levels of 2011ndash20123

Fourth Rus sian oil production and export growth will be modest and driven by Asian economic

expansion and will comprise a decreasing share of Western markets4 According to forecasts from

2 Ibid 15ndash18

3 Ibid table 3 ldquoEnergy Prices by Sector and Sourcesrdquo World Bank World Bank Commodity Markets Price Forecasts

(Washington DC World Bank 2017) httpswwwworldbank org en research commodity - markets Organ ization of the

Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) World Oil Outlook 2016 (Vienna OPEC 2016)

4 E D Belotskaia et al Global and Rus sian Energy Outlook 2016 (Moscow Energy Research Institute of the Rus sian

Acad emy of Science Analytical Center for the Government of the Rus sian Federation 2016) http acgov ru files

publication a 12767 pdf

Figure 52 US Imports from Rus sia Crude Oil and Petroleum Products Thousands of Barrels 1995ndash2016

Source US EIA ldquoUS Imports by Country of Origin Rus siardquo Petroleum amp Other Liquids September 13

2017 http wwweia gov dnav pet PET _ MOVE _ IMPCUS _ D _ NUS _ NRS _ MBBL _ M htm

0

50000

100000

150000

200000

250000

Date 1995 1996 1997 1998 199920002001200220032004200520062007200820092010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 23 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations24

the Organ ization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) crude oil exports from Rus sia and

the Caspian region to the United States will dis appear by 20255

So why does the Rus sian Urals blend continue to be attractive for oil traders and US refineries

which could pro cess greater volumes of domestically produced lighter crude There are two main

reasons One is related to the preference of US high conversion refineries (the most sophisticated

in the world) to work with heavy oil blends produced by Canada Mexico Iraq Venezuela and

Rus sia Pro cessing heavy crude now is as profitable as pro cessing lighter crude The so- called

crack spreadmdash the diference between the cost of relatively cheap heavy crude oil and the final

price of value- added consumer products (diesel gasoline jet fuel and heating oil)mdash has become

the same as the refinery margins of light sweet crude6 This has primarily afected light oil produc-

ing countries such as Angola Algeria and Nigeria

5 OPEC World Oil Outlook 2016 306ndash309

6 ldquoHow Much for That Heavy Oilrdquo Oil Sands Magazine December 26 2015 https wwwoilsandsmagazine com

news 2015 12 26 how - much - for - that - heavy - oil

Figure 53 US Imports from Rus sia Oil and Petroleum Products US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

$-

$25000000000

$20000000000

$15000000000

$10000000000

$5000000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Liquefied petroleum gases

Petroleum products other

Fuel oil

Crude oil

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 24 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 25

Another factor afecting purchase of Rus sian oil is a new trend among oil companies for further

consolidation of scale and for integrating operations of upstream and downstream business7

There have been several waves of separation and unification of production transportation and

pro cessing in the last 50 years The current business cycle can be seen as an adaptation to a

period of low prices and oversupply Companies that buy andor produce oil in Rus sia most likely

prefer to transport and pro cess this oil in their own modern refineries in the United States At the

same time some of the newest refinery designs specifically for pro cessing heavy oils have been

built in Asia thus extending the choices of heavy oil producing countries

We should also consider that leading US and international oil traders along with oil producing

companies working with or owning US refineries frequently buy Rus sian oil on the open market

and have long- term contracts on Rus sian crude oil delivery Many Rus sian oil companies prefer to

pay for purchases or ser vices with their future production instead of cash creating situations of

ldquostickyrdquo oil imports that are difficult to replace The best- known example is an interaction between

7 ldquoEnergy and Utilities Sectorrdquo Roundtable Financier Worldwide December 2015 https wwwfinancierworldwide

com roundtable - energy - utilities - sector - dec15

Figure 54 US Imports of Oil and Petroleum Products from Rus sia vs Oil Prices Eu rope Brent Spot Price Free on Board (FOB) 1996ndash2017

Source US EIA ldquoUS Imports by Country of Origin Rus siardquo

0

20

40

60

80

100

120

140

0

5000

10000

15000

20000

25000

30000

Jan

-19

96

Jun

-19

96

No

v-19

96

Ap

r-19

97

Sep

-19

97

Feb

-19

98

Jul-

199

8D

ec-1

99

8M

ay-1

99

9O

ct-1

99

9M

ar-2

00

0A

ug

-20

00

Jan

-20

01

Jun

-20

01

No

v-2

00

1A

pr-

20

02

Sep

-20

02

Feb

-20

03

Jul-

20

03

Dec

-20

03

May

-20

04

Oct

-20

04

Mar

-20

05

Au

g-2

00

5Ja

n-2

00

6Ju

n-2

00

6N

ov-

20

06

Ap

r-2

00

7Se

p-2

00

7Fe

b-2

00

8Ju

l-2

00

8D

ec-2

00

8M

ay-2

00

9O

ct-2

00

9M

ar-2

010

Au

g-2

010

Jan

-20

11Ju

n-2

011

No

v-2

011

Ap

r-2

012

Sep

-20

12Fe

b-2

013

Jul-

20

13D

ec-2

013

May

-20

14O

ct-2

014

Mar

-20

15A

ug

-20

15Ja

n-2

016

Jun

-20

16N

ov-

20

16

USD

per

Bar

rel

Th

ou

san

d B

arr

els

US Imports from Russia of Crude Oil and Petroleum Products (Thousand Barrels)

Europe Brent Spot Price FOB (Dollars per Barrel)

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 25 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations26

Table 56 US Oil Imports All Countries vs Rus sia Thousand Barrels per Day 2011ndash2016

Years 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

All Countries 11436 10598 9859 9241 9449 10058

Rus sia 624 477 460 330 371 433

Share 546 450 467 357 393 431

Sources US EIA ldquoUS Imports by Country of Origin Total Crude Oil and Productsrdquo Petroleum amp Other

Liquids September 13 2017 wwweia gov dnav pet pet_move_impcus_a2_nus_ep00_im0_mbbl_m htm

authorrsquos computation

Figure 55 US Imports from Rus sia Share of Crude Oil and Petroleum Products Million US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

57

64

73

72

74

73

72

59

52 50

0

$5000

$10000

$15000

$20000

$25000

$30000

$35000

$40000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

US Imports from Russia

Share of Oil and Petroleum Products

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 26 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 27

the Rus sian state mono poly Rosneft and commodity trading and mining giant Glencore which

along with energy and commodities com pany Vitol participated in a $10 billion prepayment

deal with Rosneft for crude supplies in 2013

There have been a number of ongoing transactions between the Rus sian oil industry and interna-

tional oil companies including several that top the list of importers of Rus sian oil to the United

States ( Table 57) In December 2016 Glencore participated in a controversial privatization opera-

tion purchasing in tandem with the Qatar sovereign wealth fund a 195 percent stake in Rosneft

which was on the US and EU list of sanctioned firms8 Glencore has also taken a blocking stake in

midsize oil producer RussNeft BP owns a 1975 percent stake in Rosneft Chevron holds a

15 percent interest in the 935- mile- long CPC9 pipeline which transports an average of 959000

barrels of crude oil per day including 76000 barrels daily from Rus sia10 ExxonMobil has formed

8 E Mazneva and I Arkhipov ldquoRus sia Sells $11 Billion Stake in Rosneft to Glencore Qatarrdquo Bloomberg December 7

2016

9 CPCthinsp=thinspCaspian Pipeline Consortium

10 ldquoRus sia Highlights of Operations and Business Portfoliordquo Chevron accessed October 3 2017 https wwwchevron

com worldwide russia

Figure 56 Share of Rus sian Oil in Total US Oil Imports Thousands of Barrels per Day 1972ndash2016

Source US EIA ldquoUS Imports by Country of Origin Total Crude Oil and Productsrdquo

2000

4000

6000

8000

10000

12000

14000

16000

US Imports of Crude Oil and Petroleum Products (Thousand Barrels per Day)

US Imports from Russia of Crude Oil and Petroleum Products (Thousand Barrels per Day)19

7319

7419

7519

7619

7719

7819

7919

80

198

119

82

198

319

84

198

519

86

198

719

88

198

919

90

199

119

92

199

319

94

199

519

96

199

719

98

199

92

00

02

00

12

00

22

00

32

00

42

00

52

00

62

00

72

00

82

00

92

010

20

112

012

20

132

014

20

152

016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 27 102017 404 PM

Table 57 Top Importers of Rus sian Oil to the United States Thousands of Barrels 2016

VALERO MARKETING amp SUPPLY CO 54590 3616

EXXONMOBIL OIL CORP 17087 1130

CHEVRON USA INC 15217 1008

BP WEST COAST PRODUCTS LLC 10130 671

GEORGE E WARREN CORP 7272 48

PAULSBORO REFINING CO LLC 6838 453

TESORO CORP 5097 338

VITOL INC 5084 337

PHILLIPS 66 CO 4726 313

TRAFIGURA AG 4360 289

PAR HAWAII REFINING LLC 3893 258

MOTIVA ENTERPRISES LLC 3041 205

SHELL US TRADING CO 2863 19

MARATHON PETROLEUM CO LLC 2475 16

ATLANTIC TRADING amp MARKETING 2099 14

FREEPOINT COMMODITIES LLC 1439 1

GLENCORE LTD 1284 85

BEST PETROLEUM CORP 967 64

ROLYMPUS US COMMODITIES GROUP LLC 822 6

HUNT CRUDE OIL SUPPLY CO 666 4

GULF OIL LP 658 4

Source US EIA ldquoUS Imports by Country of Origin Crude Oilrdquo Petroleum amp Other Liquids September 13

2017 httpswwweiagovdnavpetpet_move_impcus_a2_nus_epc0_im0_mbblpd_ahtm authorrsquos

computation

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 28 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 29

several joint ventures with Rosneft to undertake ofshore exploration in the Black Sea and the Kara

Sea in Siberia11

According to the Sanctions Act US persons are prohibited from exporting or reexporting goods

ser vices (except financial ser vices) and technology in support of exploration or production of new

deep- water Arctic ofshore or shale oil proj ects that involve designated Rus sian entities or other

entities in which such sanctioned persons have a controlling interest or a substantial noncontrol-

ling owner ship interest defined as not less than 33 percent (previously it was 50 percent) The new

law also authorizesmdash but does not requiremdash the imposition of so- called secondary sanctions

against non- US entities that engage in activities involving the construction maintenance or

expansion of Rus sian energy export pipelines with a fair market value of $1 million or more or an

aggregate fair market value during a 12- month period of $5 million12 This provision has raised the

concerns of some Eu ro pean countries particularly Germany As result the final language of the

law included wording about coordination of this issue with allies of the United States

Shipments of Rus sian oil to the United States could be afected by activity in the US refinery

industry In early 2017 Saudi Aramco bought the United Statesrsquo largest oil refinery in Port Arthur

(Texas) and it announced plans to send more of its own crude to that refinery13 Serious concerns

exist however regarding the future of three refineries and nine pipelines owned by Citgo a US

branch of the Venezuelan state com pany PdVSA which is balancing precariously on the edge of

default Under certain conditions in the event of PdVSA bankruptcy Rosneft could claim a stake of

up to 499 percent in Citgo Such a possibility has raised concerns among politicians and US

government officials with Trea sury Secretary Steven Mnuchin calling it a ldquonational security issuerdquo14

Tables 58 59 and 510 show allocations of Rus sian oil imports to major US refineries some of

which work exclusively on Rus sian crude a total of two to three months per year In total 150940

thousand barrels of Rus sian oil were refined in 2016

Figure 57 confirms a leading position of Texas and Louisiana among the US states receiving

Rus sian crude followed by New Jersey California Mississippi Washington Hawaii and Delaware

In a paradoxical way Texas has dis appeared from the list of states as a main destination of US

imports from Rus sia (Figure 58) because Rus sian crude is mostly delivered to Louisiana ports and

registered there by US Customs as an import from Rus sia After that it transports to refineries in

Louisiana and Texas

Overall the short- term business rationale behind the sustainability of US oil imports from Rus sia

cannot overcome strong headwinds in the US energy sector facing all oil importers which will

inevitably lead to a contraction of Rus sian oil exports to the United States in the foreseeable future

11 Exxon eforts to receive a special US Trea sury waiver to drill in sanctioned Rus sia failed in 2017

12 Countering Amer i carsquos Adversaries through Sanctions Act HR 3364

13 Sarp Ozkan ldquoSaudi Aramcorsquos Port Arthur Refinery and the US Refinery Fleetrdquo Drilling Info May 11 2017

https infodrillinginfo com saudi - aramcos - port - arthur - refinery - us - refinery - fleet

14 Graham Kates ldquoTrea sury Secretary Rus siarsquos Citgo Deal a National Security Issuerdquo CBS News May 1 2017

http wwwcbsnews com news rosneft - citgo - steven - mnuchin - national - security

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 29 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations30

Table 58 Valerorsquos Refineries Pro cessing Rus sian Oil Thousands of Barrels 2016

Saint Charles Louisiana 29206 535

Corpus Christi Texas 20626 378

Wilmington California 4250 78

Total USA 54590 100

Source US EIA ldquoRefinery Capacity Reportrdquo January 1 2017

table 5 wwweia gov petroleum refinerycapacity table5 pdf

authorrsquos computation

Table 59 ExxonMobil Refineries Pro cessing Rus sian Oil Thousands of Barrels 2016

Baytown Texas 15037 88

Baton Rouge Louisiana 2046 12

Total USA 17083 100

Source US EIA ldquoRefinery Capacity Reportrdquo authorrsquos computation

Table 510 Chevronrsquos Refineries Pro cessing Rus sian Oil Thousands of Barrels 2016

Pascagoula Mississippi 12767 840

El Segundo California 2372 155

Saint Rose Louisiana 78 05

Total USA 15217 100

Source US EIA ldquoRefinery Capacity Reportrdquo authorrsquos computation

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 30 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 31

HEAVY METAL

Taken together US imports of metals and US imports of oil compose about 80 percent of US

total imports from Rus sia (Figure 59) Trade of metals like other commodities is strongly afected

by market price fluctuations Nevertheless metal imports from Rus sia have been fairly resilient to

market volatility and their average annual value has hovered at about $4 billion in the last five years

(Figure 510) This market resilience was forged at the end of the 1990searly 2000s when Rus sian

metal producers gradually modernized their plants adjusting quality of production to Western

standards and enhancing integration into global value and supply chains Some of them conquered

their share of the highly competitive US market struggling with peers from Canada and certain

BRICS countries (China India and Brazil) To attract additional resources all Rus sian large metal-

producing companies became public and were listed on stock exchanges chiefly the London Stock

Exchange (Severstalrsquo PAO Evraz MMK OAO Novolipetsk Steel Norilsk Nikel and TMK PAO) one

on the New York Stock Exchange (Mechel) and one on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange (Rusal)

Business logic pushed some of them to invest in the US metal- making industry which was hit

hard by crisis Later on some of those assets were sold (eg two US steel mills acquired by

Severstal in 2004 were purchased 10 years later by Steel Dynamics Inc and AK Steel Corp)

Figure 57 Share of US States Rus sian Oil Imports 2016

Source US EIA ldquoUS Imports from Rus sia of Crude Oil and Petroleum Productsrdquo Petroleum amp Other

Liquids September 29 2017 https www eia gov dnav pet hist LeafHandler ashx nshy=shyPETampsshy=shyMTTIM _ NUS

- NRS _ 1ampfshy=shyM authorrsquos computation

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

100

Maine

Massachusetts

Maryland

Connecticut

Georgia

Rhode Island

Virginia

Florida

New York

Alabama

Puerto Rico

Pennsylvania

Delaware

Hawaii

Washington

Mississippi

California

New Jersey

Louisiana

Texas

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 31 102017 404 PM

Figure 58 US Imports from Rus sia by State Million US$ 2013ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoState and Metropolitan Area Trade Datardquo Foreign Trade last modified

October 2 2017 https wwwcensus gov foreign - trade statistics state

Alaska

Connecticut

Delaware

Hawaii

Louisiana

Maryland

North Dakota 0

$1000

$2000

$3000

$4000

$5000

$6000

2013 2014 2015 2016

Alabama

Alaska

Connecticut

Delaware

Hawaii

Louisiana

Maryland

Maine

Mississippi

Montana

North Dakota

Mississippi

Figure 59 US Imports from Rus sia Share of Oil and Metals Million US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 1992ndash2016)

83

82

85

86

87

88

85

82

7375

0

$5000

$10000

$15000

$20000

$25000

$30000

$35000

$40000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

US Imports from Russia

Share of Oil and Metals

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 32 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 33

Obviously the market dynamic of dif er ent metals varies (eg iron steel aluminum platinum and

nickel) Caps to increase their trade and production in a ldquored oceanrdquo global environment with

anemic demand is rather limited despite Figure 510 showing a spike of iron and steel imports

from Rus sia in 2014 and aluminum in 2016 Some opportunities may exist for Russian- owned steel

plants in the United States (such as NLMK) to participate in energy proj ects resumed under Presi-

dent Trump who has required that new pipelines use only American- made steel15

Rus sia occupies a special niche in the US market for titanium products a high- end metal indus-

try Twenty years ago a long- term contract was signed between Rus sian titanium producer

VSMPO- AVISMA and Boeing The Rus sian com pany entered the selective club of Boeing suppliers

for the manufacture of components and semi- finished products Since the signing of this contract

VSMPO has delivered more than 35 percent of all titanium placed on Boeing civil aircraft16 They

are hidden in the trade data in an import category for Civilian Aircrafts and Parts (Figure 511) At

the end of 2016 Boeing announced an extension of its framework agreement with AVISMA

15 E Scheyder C Ngai and T Sylvester ldquoAmerican Steel Unlikely to Get Keystone Boost Despite Trump Orderrdquo

Reuters January 27 2017 http wwwreuters com article usa - trump - pipeline - transcanada - idUSL1N1FH1ZD

16 A Kramer ldquoTitanium Fills Vital Role for Boeing and Rus siardquo New York Times July 5 2013 http wwwnytimes com

2013 07 06 business global titanium - fills - vital - role - for - boeing - and - russia html mcubzshy=shy3

Figure 510 US Imports from Rus sia Iron Steel Bauxite Aluminum Nickel Nonferrous Metals and Other Precious Metals and Materials US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 1992ndash2016)

0

$6000000000

$5000000000

$4000000000

$3000000000

$2000000000

$1000000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 20122013

20142015

2016

Finished metal shapes

Iron and steel advanced

Iron and steel products nec

Nonferrous metals other

Other precious metals

Nickel

Bauxite and aluminum

Iron and steel mill products

Steelmaking materials

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 33 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations34

through 2022 and additional investments in the construction of a new robotic plant in Titanium

Valley a special economic zone located in the Sverdlovsk region that will open in 2018 The pro-

cessing of titanium forgings in all Boeing civil aircraft will be performed there including 787s 737

MAXs and 777Xs17 The contract extension with AVISMA may add several hundred million dollars

in value to annual US imports from Rus sia

How can such heavy reliance on imports of Rus sian titanium exist during a period of rising geopo-

liti cal tensions The answer is straightforward VSMPO- AVISMA is a highly specialized natu ral

mono poly producing 45 percent of the worldrsquos aerospace titanium Only four other countries

smelt high- grade titanium in industrial quantities the United States Germany Japan and China

Overall global production capacity is limited while demand is growing The United States cur-

rently imports around 79 percent of all the titanium it consumes each year18

17 ldquoBoeing and VSMPO Avisma to Launch Second Joint Production Siterdquo Rus sian Aviation Insider December 22 2016

http wwwrusaviainsider com boeing - and - vsmpo - avisma - to - launch - second - joint - production - site

18 Jon Ostrower and Andy Pasztor ldquoBoeing United Technologies Stockpile Titanium Partsrdquo Wall Street Journal

August 7 2014 https wwwwsj com articles boeing - united - technologies - stockpiling - titanium - parts - 1407441886

Figure 511 US Imports from Rus sia Civilian Aircrafts and Parts US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 1992ndash2016)

0

$20000000

$40000000

$60000000

$80000000

$100000000

$120000000

$140000000

$160000000

$180000000

$200000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Parts-civilian aircraft

Civilian aircraft

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 34 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 35

The Sanctions Act authorizes the secretary of the trea sury (in a nonmandatory way) to impose

restrictions (without specifying them) against Rus sian state- owned entities operating in the railway

metals and mining sectors of the Rus sian economy Despite the commanding heights of Rus siarsquos

state sector owner ship in its economy (70 percent of GDP) the metal- producing companies have

remained mostly in private hands

NUCLEAR AFFAIRS

Historically owners and operators of the 104 commercial nuclear power reactors in the United

States have purchased more than 80 percent of their uranium from foreign countries Uranium

shipping from Rus sia accounted for about 13 percent of the 58 million pounds of uranium pur-

chased overseas in 201219 At the same time the Rus sian state- owned mono poly Rosatom ac-

counts for 20 percent of Kazakhstanrsquos uranium production (which in turn comprises 11 percent of

all US uranium imports) and 20 percent of US domestic uranium production capacity (with

owner ship of exploration tracts in Wyoming)20

Nuclear fuel and nuclear power continue to be po liti cally sensitive topics both in the United

States and Rus sia Bilateral cooperation in this sector (being surprisingly stable with imports of

nuclear fuel from Rus sia at a level of $1 billion annually in the last five years [Figure 512 and 513])

is under constant po liti cal and lobbying pressure and has been a source of several po liti cal scan-

dals21 Consequently upside risks in this area of interaction are minimal and downside risks are

much higher especially when we are seeing more decommissioning of nuclear plants in the

United States than new constructions The US EIArsquos 2017 Annual Energy Outlook assumes

that about 25 percent of the nuclear capacity now operating will be removed from ser vice

by 205022

WHY IS THE GRASS GREENER ON THE OTHER SIDE

The United States continues to significantly reduce imports of chemical fertilizers as domestic pro-

duction increases In 2016 the United States imported 13 percent less ammonia and 11 percent

less urea and UAN which is a liquid urea and ammonium nitrate fertilizer Rus sia accounts for

around 40 percent of UAN imported by the United States The United States canceled antidumping

duties on imports of ammonium nitrate and urea from Rus sia in 2016 but it did not prevent import

19 US EIA ldquoThe US Relies on Foreign Uranium Enrichment Ser vices to Fuel Its Nuclear Power Plantsrdquo Today in

Energy August 28 2013 https wwweia gov todayinenergy detail php idshy=shy1273

20 Colin Chilcoat ldquoDoes Rus sia Really Own 20 Percent of the USrsquo Uranium Reservesrdquo OilPricecom May 6 2015

http oilpricecom Alternative - Energy Nuclear - Power Does - Russia - Really - Own - 20 - Of - The - US - Uranium - Reserves

html

21 Michelle Ye Hee Lee ldquoThe Facts behind Trumprsquos Repeated Claim about Hillary Clintonrsquos Role in the Rus sian Ura-

nium Dealrdquo Washington Post October 26 2016

22 US EIA ldquoAnnual Energy Outlook 2017 with Projections to 2050rdquo 81ndash82

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 35 102017 404 PM

Figure 512 US Imports from Rus sia Share of Oil Metals and Nuclear Fuel Million US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 1992ndash2016)

87

86

90

90

90

91

88

86

7882

0

$5000

$10000

$15000

$20000

$25000

$30000

$35000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

US Imports from Russia

Share of Oil Metals and Nuclear Fuel

Figure 513 US Imports from Rus sia Nuclear Fuel Materials US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

$-

$200000000

$400000000

$600000000

$800000000

$1200000000

$1000000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 36 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 37

drops twice last year (Figures 514 and 515) According to forecasts UAN imports are expected to

decline further to 15 million tons this year down over 46 percent from 28 million tons imported

last year23 The downside trend in imports of fertilizers will likely continue because of oversupply

BIG FISH

US imports of fish and shellfish from Rus sia are best understood in comparison with US fish

exports to the Rus sian market which slipped to zero in August 2014 after Rus sia issued an order

banning certain agricultural imports from the United States (Figure 516) While the volume of US

supply was not very large it was impor tant because it broke up the monopolistic dominance of a

few vertically integrated Rus sian companies that have kept prices high by restricting the entry of

new producers Seeking to implement import substitution policies Rus sia has tried to reduce

exports as well as imports of fish and seafood products in the last couple of years This symmetri-

cal approach was intended to ldquocompensaterdquo for a decrease of fish products in the domestic

23 Deepika Thapliyal ldquoPotashCorp Forecasts Sharp Drop in US Nitrogen Imports in 2017rdquo ICIS News February 7

2017 https wwwicis com resources news 2017 02 07 10076734 potashcorp - forecasts - sharp - drop - in - us - nitrogen

- imports - in - 2017

Figure 514 US Imports from Rus sia Share of Oil Metals Nuclear Fuel and Fertilizers Million US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

90

93

92

93

94

95

92

91

85

86

0

$5000

$10000

$15000

$20000

$25000

$30000

$35000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

US Imports from Russia

Share of Oil Metals Nuclear Fuel and Fertilizers

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 37 102017 404 PM

Figure 515 US Imports from Rus sia Chemical- Fertilizers US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

S-

$200000000

$400000000

$600000000

$800000000

$1000000000

$1200000000

$1400000000

$1600000000

$1800000000

$2000000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Figure 516 US Exports to Rus sia Fish and Shellfish US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

0

$10000000

$20000000

$30000000

$40000000

$50000000

$60000000

$70000000

$80000000

$90000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Fish and shellfish

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 38 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 39

consumer market caused by Rus siarsquos import ban but it has failed As result the group most af-

fected by the self- imposed counter- sanctions were Rus sian consumers

With a significant drop in fish imports a devaluation of the ruble and inflationary pressures on

seafood prices yearly consumption of fish in Rus sia has declined precipitously In 2015 alone

fish prices increased 20 percent and consumption dropped to 14 kilograms per person24 from

22 kilograms in 201425 In 2016 food rose to 355 percent of house hold expenditure as a result of

increases in food prices26 This has pushed vertically integrated fishing monopolies to sell even

more of their catch abroad rather than deliver to the Rus sian Federation (Figure 517) Thus we

cannot exclude the possibility of further growth in US fish and shellfish imports from Rus sia on a

marginal scale

24 Александр Савельев ldquoПотребление рыбы в России упало до 14 кг на человекаrdquo [Fish consumption in Rus sia fell to

14 kg per person] Экономика Интерфакс January 28 2015 http wwwinterfax ru business 492038

25 Илья Шестаков ldquoПотебление рыбы в России снизилось на 10 процентов из- за роста ценrdquo [Fish consumption in

Rus sia dropped by 10 percent due to price increases] RNS March 8 2017 https rnsonline consumer - market

Potreblenie - ribi - v - Rossii - snizilos - na - 10 - iz - za - rosta - tsen - 2017 - 03 - 08

26 Zoya Sheftalovich and Christian Oliver ldquoRus siarsquos Boom (Farming) Economyrdquo Politico November 8 2016 http

wwwpolitico eu article russias - boom - farming - economy

Figure 517 US Imports from Rus sia Fish and Shellfish US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

0

$50000000

$100000000

$150000000

$200000000

$250000000

$300000000

$350000000

$400000000

$450000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 39 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations40

SPACE ODYSSEY

Among high- end products beyond the top five groups of goods imported from Rus sia cheap and

efficient Rus sian engines have been used to launch US rockets into space for about 16 years

(Figure 518) There was a serious po liti cal strug gle around a 2014 ban on the purchase of Rus sian

RD-180 rocket engines revealing the conflicting business interests of power ful high- tech companies

This restrictive mea sure was temporary and was quickly lifted because of significant cost impacts

and risks of disruption to launch schedules27 For the same reason the Sanctions Act does not autho-

rize ldquothe imposition of any sanction or other condition limitation restriction or prohibition that

directly or indirectly impedes the supply by any entity of the Rus sian Federation of any product or

ser vice or the procurement of such product or ser vice by any contractor or subcontractor of the

United States or any other entity relating to or in connection with any space launch conducted for

the National Aeronautics and Space Administration or any other nonndash Department of Defense

customerrdquo28

Nevertheless many experts believe that US domestic alternatives to replace Rus sian engines will

be viable in five to eight years

27 Ken Dilanian ldquoWhy Does the US Use Rus sian Rockets to Launch Its Satellitesrdquo NBC News updated November 15

2016 http wwwnbcnews com why - does - u - s - use - russian - rockets - launch - its - satellites - n588526

28 Countering Amer i carsquos Adversaries through Sanctions Act HR 3364

Figure 518 Spacecraft Excluding Military US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

0

$20000000

$40000000

$60000000

$80000000

$100000000

$120000000

$140000000

$160000000

$180000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 40 102017 404 PM

41

Diversity and technological complexity are the most vis i ble advantages supporting US exports to

Rus sia Three major groups of export goods include civilian aircraft engines and parts (Figure 61)

drilling and oil field equipment (Figure 62) and industrial machines and engines (Figure 63)

Despite sanctions against the transfer of advanced oil producing and pro cessing technologies the

realization of US drilling and oil field equipment in Rus sia is sustainable although some bilateral

proj ects have been frozen

Another category of goods that has demonstrated resilience is the phar ma ceu ti cal industry (Fig-

ure 64) because most drugs in Rus sia are imported (about 70 percent of the Rus sian phar ma ceu-

ti cal market in value) Import substitution policies have had only modest results in this industry

As confirmed by American Chamber of Commerce surveys US exports to Rus sia are closely

connected to US FDI 30 percent of total imports of US companies working in the Rus sian

market come from the United States (more than $2 billion in 2016) In other words about

40 percent of all US exports to Rus sia are related to a US corporate- sector business pro cess in

the country The major sectors of activity of these companies are energy and natu ral resources

(52 percent) manufacturing (17 percent) information and communications technology or ICT

(13 percent) retail (7 percent) automotive industry (6 percent) phar ma ceu ti cal production

(1 percent) professional ser vices (05 percent) and other (2 percent)1

Some obvious constraints on US exports to Rus sia have resulted from a reduction in demand A

deterioration of bilateral relations and implementation of sanctions and counter- sanctions have

directly or indirectly afected all businesses Figures 65 and 66 provide data regarding a dramatic

drop in the sale of US agricultural production in Rus sia with all other categories of exports in

goods showing big cuts as well (see Figures 67ndash69)

Exports of civilian aircraft engines and parts put the state of Washington in first place among

other states as a leading exporter to the Rus sian market (Figure 610)

1 American Chamber of Commerce in Rus sia ldquoInvestment and Import to Rus sia 2nd Surveyrdquo 13

Diversity and Constraints

06

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 41 102017 404 PM

Figure 61 US Exports of Civilian Aircraft Engines Equipment and Parts to Rus sia US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

$2500000000

$2000000000

$1500000000

$1000000000

$500000000

$-

Figure 62 US Exports of Drilling and Oil Field Equipment US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

0

$5000000

$10000000

$15000000

$20000000

$25000000

$30000000

$35000000

$40000000

$45000000

$50000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 42 102017 404 PM

Figure 63 US Exports of Industrial Engines to Rus sia US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

0

$5000000

$10000000

$15000000

$20000000

$25000000

$30000000

$35000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Figure 64 US Exports of Phar ma ceu ti cal Preparations to Rus sia US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

0

$5000000

$10000000

$15000000

$20000000

$25000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 43 102017 404 PM

Figure 65 US Exports of Meat and Poultry to Rus sia US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Meat poultry etc

$1000000000

$800000000

$600000000

$400000000

$200000000

$-

$1200000000

$1400000000

$1600000000

Figure 66 US Exports of Soybeans to Rus sia US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

0

$20000000

$40000000

$60000000

$80000000

$100000000

$120000000

$140000000

$160000000

$180000000

$200000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 44 102017 404 PM

Figure 67 US Exports of Vehicles Engines and Parts to Rus sia US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Other parts and accessories of vehicles

Automotive tires and tubes

Bodies and chassis for passenger cars

Engines and engine parts (carburetors pistonsrings and valves)

Trucks buses and special purpose vehicles

Passenger cars new and used

$2500000000

$2000000000

$1500000000

$500000000

$-

$1000000000

Figure 68 US Exports of Medicinal Equipment to Rus sia US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

$10000000

$15000000

$20000000

$25000000

$30000000

$35000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 45 102017 404 PM

Figure 610 US Exports to Rus sia by States (2016 US$ Value) Million US$ 2013ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoState and Metropolitan Area Trade Datardquo

Iowa Kentucky

North Dakota

Oklahoma

South Carolina

Washington

0

$500

$1000

$1500

$2000

2013 2014 2015 2016

District of Columbia

Iowa

Kentucky

North Dakota

Oklahoma

South Carolina

Washington

Figure 69 US Exports of Excavating Machinery to Rus sia US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

0

$5000000

$10000000

$15000000

$20000000

$25000000

$30000000

$35000000

$40000000

$45000000

$50000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 46 102017 404 PM

47

Upon reviewing the current trend in US- Russia economic relations we must acknowledge that

the existing trade model is obsolete and exhausted Imports are resource- oriented and reflect

constraints of the Rus sian economic structure while five groups of goodsmdash oil metals nuclear

fuels fertilizers and fishmdash make up more than 90 percent of total imports from Rus sia (Figure 71)

Each of these industries has a limited capacity for growth in the foreseeable future

Rus siarsquos core export to the United Statesmdash oilmdash will inevitably decrease in the mid- term under any

scenario The value and volume of Rus sian exports to the United States are open to global market

volatility and po liti cal pressures with limited hedging mechanisms

Overall US exports to Rus sia are unsustainable due to bilateral po liti cal tensions the whims of

commodity markets and changing domestic policies Sanctions and counter- sanctions have

created additional barriers particularly in finance banking high- tech energy and agro- business

According to the American Chamber of Commerce 69 percent of US companies working in the

country consider the impact of US sanctions against Rus sia on their business as negative At the

same time 60 percent of companies do not expect big changes in business relations between

Rus sia and the United States under Trump1 as the new law codifies existing sanctions fortifies

them and extends them to new sectors

Current US investments are low due to the weak rule of law in Rus sia a lack of property right

protections and proper contract enforcement high levels of statization and monopolization in the

economy a poor business climate outdated capital stock dependence on natural- resource

sectors and of course sanction and counter- sanction mea sures Bloated administrative compo-

nents created as risk mitigation instruments have also served as impediments The countryrsquos

institutional weakness low level of productivity bud get constraints and a declining inflexible

workforce will restrain future economic growth even if commodity prices recover Rus sian eco-

nomic policy will likely continue to be statist and protectionist relying mostly on import

substitutions

1 Ibid 11

Existing Trends and Future Scenarios

07

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 47 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations48

What scenarios can be expected in such a challenging environment

One probability (no peace no war) is based on the assumption that matters will not deteriorate

further and implementation of the Sanctions Act will be cursory This will cause relatively slow

degradation in the economic field with occasional flashes of activity in selected areas (eg closer

cooperation against Islamist terrorist groups in Syria)

A second worse case or critical scenario is the intensive and full- scale execution of current sanc-

tion legislation and even the imposition of new economic punitive and restrictive mea sures which

could incite asymmetric retaliatory actions and lead to the introduction of additional protectionist

policies This in turn could trigger a further escalation of mutual confrontation and could eventu-

ally destroy the fundamentals of the current bilateral trade system Rus sian leadership has charac-

terized the Sanctions Act as a declaration of a trade war that ends all hope for improving bilateral

relations2

2 Дмитрий Медведев ldquoПодписание президентом США нового санкционного закона против России создает несколько

последствийrdquo [The US Presidentrsquos signing of the package of new sanctions against Rus sia will have a few conse-

quences] Facebook August 2 2017 https wwwfacebook com Dmitry Medvedev posts 10154587161801851

Figure 71 US Imports from Rus sia Share of Oil Metals Nuclear Fuel Fertilizers and Fish Million US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

93

94

93

94

95

96

93

92

87

89

0

$5000

$10000

$15000

$20000

$25000

$30000

$35000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

US Imports from Russia

Share of Oil Metals Nuclear FuelFertilizers and Fish

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 48 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 49

The best case and most favorable scenario looks less probable now It assumes the realization of

structural reforms in Rus sia in such a way that would adapt Rus siarsquos foreign policy to national

economic needs reduce confrontations with the West and make a concerted efort to integrate

Rus sian businesses into global supply and value chains A revitalization of the structural reform

agendamdash including eforts to diversify economic activities through de- monopolization and support

for SMEs a restructuring of the banking sector the creation of a vibrant business climate to foster

entrepreneurships and innovation the implementation of administrative and judicial reforms to

tackle red tape and endemic corruption and the reduction of state control over key sectors of the

economy via wide- spread privatization could kick- start the development of a nonoil economy and

improve long- term growth prospects Despite ongoing discussion of reform strategies deep

economic and po liti cal changes are extremely complicated over the next po liti calelectoral cycle

(2018ndash2024) particularly because of re sis tance of vested interests and growing commodity prices

The urgency to tackle structural shortcomings in natu ral resource- dependent economies usually

correlates with the price of those resources and the degree to which resource rents drive eco-

nomic activity However there may be marginal improvements in the efficiency of the current

economic system

Future US- Russia relations can be thought of through three pillars one pillar focuses on areas

where both countries maintain a competitive rivalry another looks at potential areas of interaction

under pres ent conditions a third pillar and one that has evaporated from the current bilateral

agenda concentrates on future cooperation Stronger economic ties could not only be a kind of

po liti cal shock absorber but contribute to the building of this future (particularly business contacts

aim to support future structural reforms) although po liti cal factors are depressing the prospects

for cooperation To escape deadlock it will be impor tant to establish the right balance between

politics and economics and create a model of collaboration within the framework of contention

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 49 102017 404 PM

About the Author

Vadim Grishin PhD MBA has been involved in the reform pro cess in Rus sia as adviser to the

deputy prime minister of Rus sia in 1992ndash1993 and 2006ndash2010 He has extensive experience

working with the Bretton Woods Institutions He was the board member of the World Bank Group

and served as se nior adviser at the International Monetary Fund Currently he is a con sul tant to the

chief economistrsquos office of the International Finance Corporation and teaches the economics of

transition at Georgetown University in Washington DC

50

594-71613_ch99_4Pindd 50 102017 403 PM

Blank

COVER PHOTO ADOBE STOCK

1616 Rhode Island Avenue NW

Washington DC 20036

202 887 0200 | wwwcsisorg

v++ISBN 978-1-4422-8035-9

Lanham bull Boulder bull New York bull London

4501 Forbes Boulevard

Lanham MD 20706

301 459 3366 | wwwrowmancom

A U T H O R

Vadim Grishin

Myths and Realities

A Report of the

CSIS RUSSIA AND EURASIA PROGRAM

US-RussiaEconomicRelations

O C T O B E R 2 0 1 7

Euml|xHSLEOCy280359z

The Man Pupu Nyor Rock Formations at the Northern Urals also known as Seven

Strong Man or Little Mountain of the God in the local tribe (Mansi) language

Page 18: U.S.-Russia Economic Relations: Myths and Realities · 2020-04-17 · OCTOBER 2017 U.S.- Russia Economic Relations Myths and Realities AUTHOR Vadim Grishin A REPORT OF THE CSIS RUSSIA

US-Russia Economic Relations12

in bilateral business afairs in the early 2000s was less significant than in later years As result

growing po liti cal tensions from 2003 to 2008 did not dramatically afect bilateral economic inter-

action It is also easier to explain why 2011ndash2012 resulted in rec ord trade and investmentmdash a con-

sequence of very high oil prices GDP growth in both countries improved legislation after Rus siarsquos

accession to the WTO and the Obamandash Medvedev po liti cal reset From 2014 to 2016 a perfect

storm of developments added efficiency to Western sanctions and augmented the damaging

consequences of counter- sanction mea sures

Figure 33 also confirms that in times of reduced economic cooperation po liti cal pressures can

easily change bilateral economic trends Moreover business interests along with economic inter-

actions have a limited capacity to reverse the po liti cal mainstream

Figure 31 Economic Cycle 2014ndash2016

Source Authorrsquos evaluation of international financial institutions (IFI) data and sources from respective

countries

Sustainable Growth

Brazil

Negative Growth

Unstable Growth

Mexico

Descending Growth

Argentina

EU

US

Russia

Vietnam

China

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 12 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 13

Table 31 Po liti cal Cycles in Bilateral US- Russia Relations 1999ndash2016

2001ndash2002 The George W Bushndash Vladimir Putin Reset Rus sia supported ldquoglobal war on terrorismrdquo launched by the United States after 911 the SORT nuclear arms reduction treaty was signed by the United States and Rus sia and a successful business dialogue was developed that created the current structure of economic relations

2003ndash2008 Deterioration in bilateral relations brought on by the Iraq War Georgiarsquos ldquoRose Revolutionrdquo Mikhail Khodorkovskyrsquos arrest Ukrainersquos ldquoOrange Revolutionrdquo Kosovorsquos in de pen dence and the Georgian War

2009ndash2010 The Barack Obamandash Dmitry Medvedev Reset Rus sia served as a logistical hub for transportation and supply of US forces in Af ghan i stan United States and Rus sia signed the new START nuclear arms reduction treaty Rus sia backed tighter economic sanctions on Iran Rus sia gained access to the WTO after 18 years of negotiations

2011ndash2016 Deterioration in bilateral relations caused by the Ukrainian crisis which were followed by sanctions and counter- sanctions along with the Syrian crises and cyber- enabled activities

Source Authorrsquos evaluation of po liti cal and economic data

Note SORTthinsp=thinspStrategic Ofensive Reductions Treaty STARTthinsp=thinspStrategic Arms Reduction Treaty

Figure 32 Economic Cycle 2017ndash2019

Source Authorrsquos evaluation of IFI data and sources from respective countries

Egypt

VenezuelaEU

South Africa

Brazil

Russia

India

US

Descending Growth

Korea

China

Negative Growth

Unstable Growth

Sustainable Growth

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 13 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations14

Figure 33 US- Russia Trade Million US$ vs Po liti cal Cycle 2000ndash2016

Sources US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo Foreign Trade last modified June 29 2017

https wwwcensus gov foreign - trade balance c4621 html (see data for 2000ndash2016) authorrsquos evaluation

of po liti cal and economic data

Orange Revolution

Khodorkovskys arrest

GeorgianWar

Bush- Putin Reset

Iraq War Global Financial Crisis

Obama-Medvedev Reset

Russias WTO accession

New START Treaty

A Pefect Storm the Ukranian Crisis Oil Prices Crashing

Sanctions and Counter-Sanctions

$3000

$8000

$13000

$18000

$23000

$28000

$33000

$38000

$43000

2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 14 102017 404 PM

15

The current structure of US- Russia economic relations emerged in the early 2000s when the

model of trade and investment interaction took on a character similar to that which existed be-

tween the United States and developing economies US imports from Rus sia centered on com-

modities while technology along with food products lead American exports The primary

exception was that Rus sia supplied nuclear fuel including highly enriched uranium extracted from

nuclear weapons for US power plants and provided ser vices to the aerospace industry primarily

in satellite launches However both these exceptions can be explained as a legacy of the Soviet

past and not a harbinger of the future economic relationship (Figure 41)

In the last 15 years this trade structure has not changed significantly The only noticeable shift in

trade was a dramatic drop (to practically nothing) in exports of US agricultural products a result

of Rus siarsquos policy of import substitution and so- called counter- sanction mea sures it took in re-

sponse to US sanctions over the Ukraine crisis (Figure 42)

Promising new directions of cooperation in the IT sector and in engineering ser vices for the

aerospace industry appeared in the early 2000s1 but did not spill into other sectors and conse-

quently did little to renew economic cooperation on the whole The integration of Rus sian high-

tech ser vices into large- scale global production and value chains was constrained by the usual

culprits a lack of financial resources managerial experience skilled labor modern infrastructure

RampD investments and an adequate business environment High commodity prices incentivized the

restoration of an economic system centered on resource rents The leading role of oil and gas

extraction and transportation discouraged the development of a nonenergy sector that might

have created advanced and complex production and ser vices An import substitution policy could

not work efficiently in an economic environment plagued by the Dutch disease where currency

1 The Boeing Design Center was created in Moscow It consists of nearly 250 Boeing employees managing

a team of 1200 contract engineers from Rus sian and Ukrainian aerospace companies ldquoBackgrounder Boeing in

Rus siardquo Boeing last modified January 2017 http wwwboeing com resources boeingdotcom company key _ orgs

boeing - international pdf russia - cisbackgrounder pdf

Are the United States and Rus sia ldquoNatu ralrdquo Trading Partners A Little Bit of History

04

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 15 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations16

inflows (oil money) lead to ruble appreciation and render a countryrsquos production less competitive

During that time Rus siarsquos industry did not receive preferential access to larger markets and could

not expand its share in the global economy particularly because of its self- isolation from the

regional trade agreements (except for its participation in the Eurasian Economic Union with some

neighboring countries of the former Soviet Union) As a result neither import substitution nor

export- led strategy promoted growth and specialization in nonoil production A long- awaited

modernization and reallocation of resources from an inefficient nontrade sector to a trade sector

did not materialize

These limits were later augmented with sanctions and an extension of domestic restrictions on

cooperation with Western partners Importantly the rapid growth of state- monopoly structures in

the Rus sian economy over the past 15 years has created additional obstacles to the development

and diversification of US- Russia economic ties

Figure 41 US Imports from Rus sia US$ 2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2016)

Fish and shellfish 3

Crude oil 5

Fuel oil 37

Petroleum products other

8

Nuclear fuel materials

7

Chemicals-fertilizers 4

Steelmaking materials 5

Iron and steel mill products 4

Bauxite and aluminum 9

Other precious metals 4

Nonferrous metals other 1

Finished metal shapes 1

Synthetic rubber--primary

1

Spacecraftexcluding military

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 16 102017 404 PM

Fig

ure

42

U

S E

xpo

rts

to R

us s

ia U

S$ 2

016

Sou

rce

US

Ce

nsu

s B

ure

au ldquo

Trad

e in

Go

od

s w

ith

Ru

s sia

rdquo (s

ee

dat

a fo

r 2

016

)

Bak

ery

pro

du

cts

Win

e b

eer

an

d r

elat

ed

pro

du

cts

New

spri

nt

Pla

stic

mat

eria

ls

Ch

emic

als-

fert

ilize

rs

Ch

emic

als-

ino

rgan

icC

hem

ical

s-o

rgan

ic

Ch

emic

als-

oth

erC

ott

on

fib

er c

loth

In

du

stri

al r

ub

ber

pro

du

cts

Min

eral

su

pp

lies-

man

ufa

ctu

red

Gen

erat

ors

acc

esso

ries

Ele

ctri

c ap

par

atu

s

Dri

llin

g amp

oilfi

eld

eq

uip

men

t Sp

ecia

lized

min

ing

Exc

avat

ing

mac

hin

ery

No

nfa

rm t

ract

ors

an

d p

arts

In

du

stri

al e

ng

ines

Fo

od

to

bac

co m

ach

iner

y M

etal

wo

rkin

g m

ach

ine

too

ls

Tex

tile

sew

ing

m

ach

ines

W

oo

d g

lass

p

last

ic

Pu

lp a

nd

pap

er

mac

hin

ery

Mea

suri

ng

tes

tin

g

con

tro

l in

stru

men

ts

Mat

eria

ls h

and

ling

equ

ipm

ent

Ind

ust

rial

mac

hin

es

oth

er

Ph

oto

ser

vice

ind

ust

ry m

ach

iner

y A

gri

cult

ura

l mac

hin

ery

eq

uip

men

t C

om

pu

ters

Co

mp

ute

r ac

cess

ori

es

Sem

ico

nd

uct

ors

Tel

eco

mm

un

icat

ion

seq

uip

men

t

Bu

sin

ess

mac

hin

es a

nd

eq

uip

men

t

Lab

ora

tory

tes

tin

g in

stru

men

ts

Med

icin

al e

qu

ipm

ent

Civ

ilian

air

craf

t e

ng

ines

eq

uip

men

t a

nd

par

ts

Rai

lway

tra

nsp

ort

atio

n

equ

ipm

ent

Ves

sels

exc

lud

ing

scr

ap

Co

mm

erci

al v

esse

ls o

ther

M

arin

e en

gin

es p

arts

Spac

ecra

ft e

xclu

din

g

mili

tary

Pas

sen

ger

car

s

new

an

d u

sed

Tru

cks

bu

ses

and

sp

ecia

l p

urp

ose

ve

hic

les

En

gin

es a

nd

en

gin

e p

arts

(c

arb

ure

tors

pis

ton

s r

ing

s

and

val

ves)

B

od

ies

and

ch

assi

s fo

r p

asse

ng

er c

ars

Au

tom

oti

ve t

ires

an

d t

ub

es

Oth

er p

arts

an

d a

cces

sori

es o

f ve

hic

les

Ap

par

el h

ou

seh

old

go

od

s -

text

ile

Ph

arm

aceu

tica

lp

rep

arat

ion

s

Furn

itu

re h

ou

seh

old

go

od

s

etc

R

ug

s

Cel

l ph

on

es a

nd

oth

er

ho

use

ho

ld g

oo

ds

ne

c

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 17 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations18

Figure 43 US Trade in Goods with Rus sia Million US$ 1992ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 1992ndash2016)

Russian Financial Crisis

Oil price Increased from$2446 USD per barrel (2001)

to $9694 USD per barrel(2008)

Global Financial Crisis

Oil price high record in2011-2012

(more that $111 USD perbarrel)

Oil price crashed

$-

$5000

$10000

$15000

$20000

$25000

$30000

$35000

$40000

$45000

$50000

1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

US Imports from Russia US Exports to Russia US-Russia Trade in Goods

No doubt po liti cal ups and downs add volatility to US- Russia trade Nevertheless Rus siarsquos eco-

nomic structure exhausted itself before the Ukrainian crisis and the recent Rus sian recession Its

limitations are not only due to some mistakes in policy or negative coincidences of circumstances

but rather to deeply rooted properties in the current bilateral trade model related to structural

issues in the Rus sian economy Structural constraints such as the weak enforcement of property

rights poor business regulation and nondiversified exports weighed on Rus sian trade with the

United States From this perspective the term ldquonaturalunnatural trading partnersrdquo does not ad-

dress the unused capacity of bilateral interaction or the real challenges that kind of interaction

faces It just adds metaphysical flavor to the very specific economic and po liti cal factors that

determine the US- Russia trajectory

Overall the outlines of bilateral trade (Figure 43) resemble the famous ldquoRus sian Mountainsrdquo that

were a pre de ces sor of the modern roller coaster icy hills supported by wooden constructionsmdash a

rigid and immobile structure that sooner or later would melt This unfortunately is what is hap-

pening to US- Russia trade cooperation now

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 18 102017 404 PM

19

ARE LITTLE FISH REALLY SWEET

Low US- Russia economic interaction has at least two consequences First it limits the capacity of

policymakers to exploit trade as an instrument for geopo liti cal combat Even the question of a US

trade deficit which used to be a headache for many US trading partners has become so insig-

nificant in absolute terms (about $87 billion in 2016) that it seems hardly worth caring about

When the volume of trade between two countries becomes very small in absolute terms whether

a country is running a surplus or deficit is no longer relevant But it also renders another type of

confrontations (sometimes more dangerous) more likely since the two traders have little to lose

Second in an environment marked by low levels of bilateral trade both sides could incentivize (if

and when a desire for po liti cal rapprochement exists) the signing of new trade deals which are

elevated symbolically as a turning point in bilateral po liti cal relations (ie the sale of Boeings to

Rus sia or the delivery via tankers of Rus sian oil to US refineries) Sometimes markets themselves

pres ent ldquogiftsrdquo that can be capitalized on po liti cally US- USSR grain trade in the 1970s was one

such ldquogiftrdquo large sales of American grain to the Soviet Union helped US policymakers win favor

with the po liti cally impor tant American farming sector and permitted Soviet leaders to maintain

access to a dietary staple for the Soviet population

The strong 32 percent growth in value of US imports from Rus sia from January to May 2017

versus January to May 2016 ( Table 51) is an example of a development that has tempted officials

to pres ent it as a sign of positive change due to ldquogrowing business activitiesrdquo (this kind of statement

was heard before the bilateral summit in Germany in July 2017) although the reason for that leap

was evidently an increase in commodity prices (mainly of oilmdash see Table 52) and not a rise in

entrepreneurial interactions The primary beneficiaries of that upside rally have been two other

petro- economies Saudi Arabia and Venezuela ( Tables 53 and 54)

Sector Analyses

05

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 19 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations20

Table 51 US Imports from Rus sia Million US$ Januaryndash May 2016 vs Januaryndash May 2017

Year January February March April May Total

2016 9603 6871 11097 12257 10977 50805

2017 12215 10220 16979 13471 14147 67032

Change 271 487 530 99 289 319

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 1992ndash2016)

Table 52 Change in Urals Crude Oil Prices US$ per Barrel Januaryndash May 2016 vs Januaryndash May 2017

Januaryndash May 2016 Januaryndash May 2017 Change ($) Change ()

3601 5129 1528 424

Source Ministry of Finance of the Rus sian Federation https wwwminfin ru ru ixzz4mMIZ7XtC

Table 53 US Imports from Saudi Arabia Million US$ Januaryndash May 2016 vs Januaryndash May 2017

Year January February March April May Total

2016 15114 9036 13555 10844 14679 63228

2017 19802 20298 21650 16211 19542 97503

Change 3101 12463 5972 495 331 542

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Saudi Arabiardquo Foreign Trade last modified June 29 2017

https wwwcensus gov foreign - trade balance c5170 html (see data for 2016ndash2017)

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 20 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 21

Table 54 US Imports from Venezuela Million US$ Januaryndash May 2016 vs Januaryndash May 2017

Year January February March April May Total

2016 6657 5560 7140 8007 7922 35286

2017 13041 10864 123500 11148 12243 59646

Change 9590 9540 7297 3923 5454 6903

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Venezuelardquo Foreign Trade last modified June 29 2017

https wwwcensus gov foreign - trade balance c3070 html (see data for 2016ndash2017)

Table 55 US Exports to Rus sia Million US$ Januaryndash May 2016 vs Januaryndash May 2017

Year January February March April May Total

2016 3628 3577 7298 4657 4947 24107

2017 3144 4277 5386 6670 4806 24283

Change minus133 196 minus262 432 minus29 minus07

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2016ndash2017)

At the same time US exports to Rus sia continue to stagnate ( Table 55) due to low levels of

consumption during a two-and- a- half-year economic crisis a deep ruble devaluation sanctions

and counter- sanctions

Given the very dif er ent economic structures and resource endowments of Rus sia and the United

States it is not surprising that US- Russia trade is asymmetric and oil driven (Figure 51) A

3 percent increase in Urals oil prices translates into a one percent increase in US import growth

from Rus sia Thus in 2016 every $10 increase in Urals crude oil added $15 billion to the value of

US imports or 11 percent to the total value of imports from Rus sia

OIL ADDICTION

Oil is a core pillar of US- Russia bilateral trade A bumpy ride in oil markets afects commerce

Nevertheless Rus sian oil exports to the United States in physical terms have been rather

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 21 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations22

sustainable Starting from 2005 average annual deliveries have been above 150 million barrels

(Figure 52) Crude and heating oil have dominated while petroleum products and liquefied petro-

leum gases have not (Figure 53) In 2011 oil exports peaked at 228 million barrels but declined to

159 million barrels in 2016mdash a drop of 30 percent Rec ord high shipments of Rus sian oil to the United

States coincided with an elevation in oil prices which made the subsequent decline in oil shipment

value between 2011 and 2016 (by about 72 percent as shown in Figure 54) seem more stark The

increase in price also raised the share of oil in Rus sian exports by 74 percent in 2011 (Figure 55)

The Rus sian share in total US oil imports was around 55 percent in 2011 and 43 percent in 2016

( Table 56) In the last five years the United States has relied exclusively on consumption of Rus sian

oil for the rough equivalent of one week out of the year (Figure 56)

It is unlikely that Rus sia can significantly increase its share of the US oil market and there is a real

possibility for a downward trend There are several reasons the historically high Rus sian hydrocar-

bon export threshold of 2011 will not soon if ever be surpassed

First US energy consumption will likely be flat According to the US Energy Information Adminis-

tration (EIA) demand for petroleum and other liquids in the United States will be about 35ndash36

quadrillion British thermal units (BTUs) with minimal variation over the next 25 years1

1 US EIA ldquoAnnual Energy Outlook 2017 with Projections to 2050rdquo January 5 2017 7ndash8

Figure 51 US- Russia Trade Growth () vs US and Rus sia Real GDP Growth () 1993ndash2016

Source IMF ldquoIMF Datardquo accessed September 27 2017 http wwwimf org en Data US Census Bureau

ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo

Note rGDPthinsp=thinspreal gross domestic product

Trade

USA rGDP growth

Russia rGDP growth

-60

-40

-20

0

20

40

60

80

100

1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Gro

wth

All spikes in US-Russia trade have been connected with two main

variables volume and price of crude oil

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 22 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 23

Second the United States will become a net energy exporter between 2020 and 2030 in most

cases under dif er ent combinations of oil and natu ral gas prices GDP growth technological

breakthroughs and the availability of energy resources The role of oil imports will dramatically

fall2

Third oil price scenarios as described by the International Energy Agency (IEA) international

financial organ izations (IFIs) and many national agencies are very cautious and assume that even

by 2035 to 2040 oil prices will not to recover to the levels of 2011ndash20123

Fourth Rus sian oil production and export growth will be modest and driven by Asian economic

expansion and will comprise a decreasing share of Western markets4 According to forecasts from

2 Ibid 15ndash18

3 Ibid table 3 ldquoEnergy Prices by Sector and Sourcesrdquo World Bank World Bank Commodity Markets Price Forecasts

(Washington DC World Bank 2017) httpswwwworldbank org en research commodity - markets Organ ization of the

Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) World Oil Outlook 2016 (Vienna OPEC 2016)

4 E D Belotskaia et al Global and Rus sian Energy Outlook 2016 (Moscow Energy Research Institute of the Rus sian

Acad emy of Science Analytical Center for the Government of the Rus sian Federation 2016) http acgov ru files

publication a 12767 pdf

Figure 52 US Imports from Rus sia Crude Oil and Petroleum Products Thousands of Barrels 1995ndash2016

Source US EIA ldquoUS Imports by Country of Origin Rus siardquo Petroleum amp Other Liquids September 13

2017 http wwweia gov dnav pet PET _ MOVE _ IMPCUS _ D _ NUS _ NRS _ MBBL _ M htm

0

50000

100000

150000

200000

250000

Date 1995 1996 1997 1998 199920002001200220032004200520062007200820092010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 23 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations24

the Organ ization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) crude oil exports from Rus sia and

the Caspian region to the United States will dis appear by 20255

So why does the Rus sian Urals blend continue to be attractive for oil traders and US refineries

which could pro cess greater volumes of domestically produced lighter crude There are two main

reasons One is related to the preference of US high conversion refineries (the most sophisticated

in the world) to work with heavy oil blends produced by Canada Mexico Iraq Venezuela and

Rus sia Pro cessing heavy crude now is as profitable as pro cessing lighter crude The so- called

crack spreadmdash the diference between the cost of relatively cheap heavy crude oil and the final

price of value- added consumer products (diesel gasoline jet fuel and heating oil)mdash has become

the same as the refinery margins of light sweet crude6 This has primarily afected light oil produc-

ing countries such as Angola Algeria and Nigeria

5 OPEC World Oil Outlook 2016 306ndash309

6 ldquoHow Much for That Heavy Oilrdquo Oil Sands Magazine December 26 2015 https wwwoilsandsmagazine com

news 2015 12 26 how - much - for - that - heavy - oil

Figure 53 US Imports from Rus sia Oil and Petroleum Products US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

$-

$25000000000

$20000000000

$15000000000

$10000000000

$5000000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Liquefied petroleum gases

Petroleum products other

Fuel oil

Crude oil

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 24 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 25

Another factor afecting purchase of Rus sian oil is a new trend among oil companies for further

consolidation of scale and for integrating operations of upstream and downstream business7

There have been several waves of separation and unification of production transportation and

pro cessing in the last 50 years The current business cycle can be seen as an adaptation to a

period of low prices and oversupply Companies that buy andor produce oil in Rus sia most likely

prefer to transport and pro cess this oil in their own modern refineries in the United States At the

same time some of the newest refinery designs specifically for pro cessing heavy oils have been

built in Asia thus extending the choices of heavy oil producing countries

We should also consider that leading US and international oil traders along with oil producing

companies working with or owning US refineries frequently buy Rus sian oil on the open market

and have long- term contracts on Rus sian crude oil delivery Many Rus sian oil companies prefer to

pay for purchases or ser vices with their future production instead of cash creating situations of

ldquostickyrdquo oil imports that are difficult to replace The best- known example is an interaction between

7 ldquoEnergy and Utilities Sectorrdquo Roundtable Financier Worldwide December 2015 https wwwfinancierworldwide

com roundtable - energy - utilities - sector - dec15

Figure 54 US Imports of Oil and Petroleum Products from Rus sia vs Oil Prices Eu rope Brent Spot Price Free on Board (FOB) 1996ndash2017

Source US EIA ldquoUS Imports by Country of Origin Rus siardquo

0

20

40

60

80

100

120

140

0

5000

10000

15000

20000

25000

30000

Jan

-19

96

Jun

-19

96

No

v-19

96

Ap

r-19

97

Sep

-19

97

Feb

-19

98

Jul-

199

8D

ec-1

99

8M

ay-1

99

9O

ct-1

99

9M

ar-2

00

0A

ug

-20

00

Jan

-20

01

Jun

-20

01

No

v-2

00

1A

pr-

20

02

Sep

-20

02

Feb

-20

03

Jul-

20

03

Dec

-20

03

May

-20

04

Oct

-20

04

Mar

-20

05

Au

g-2

00

5Ja

n-2

00

6Ju

n-2

00

6N

ov-

20

06

Ap

r-2

00

7Se

p-2

00

7Fe

b-2

00

8Ju

l-2

00

8D

ec-2

00

8M

ay-2

00

9O

ct-2

00

9M

ar-2

010

Au

g-2

010

Jan

-20

11Ju

n-2

011

No

v-2

011

Ap

r-2

012

Sep

-20

12Fe

b-2

013

Jul-

20

13D

ec-2

013

May

-20

14O

ct-2

014

Mar

-20

15A

ug

-20

15Ja

n-2

016

Jun

-20

16N

ov-

20

16

USD

per

Bar

rel

Th

ou

san

d B

arr

els

US Imports from Russia of Crude Oil and Petroleum Products (Thousand Barrels)

Europe Brent Spot Price FOB (Dollars per Barrel)

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 25 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations26

Table 56 US Oil Imports All Countries vs Rus sia Thousand Barrels per Day 2011ndash2016

Years 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

All Countries 11436 10598 9859 9241 9449 10058

Rus sia 624 477 460 330 371 433

Share 546 450 467 357 393 431

Sources US EIA ldquoUS Imports by Country of Origin Total Crude Oil and Productsrdquo Petroleum amp Other

Liquids September 13 2017 wwweia gov dnav pet pet_move_impcus_a2_nus_ep00_im0_mbbl_m htm

authorrsquos computation

Figure 55 US Imports from Rus sia Share of Crude Oil and Petroleum Products Million US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

57

64

73

72

74

73

72

59

52 50

0

$5000

$10000

$15000

$20000

$25000

$30000

$35000

$40000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

US Imports from Russia

Share of Oil and Petroleum Products

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 26 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 27

the Rus sian state mono poly Rosneft and commodity trading and mining giant Glencore which

along with energy and commodities com pany Vitol participated in a $10 billion prepayment

deal with Rosneft for crude supplies in 2013

There have been a number of ongoing transactions between the Rus sian oil industry and interna-

tional oil companies including several that top the list of importers of Rus sian oil to the United

States ( Table 57) In December 2016 Glencore participated in a controversial privatization opera-

tion purchasing in tandem with the Qatar sovereign wealth fund a 195 percent stake in Rosneft

which was on the US and EU list of sanctioned firms8 Glencore has also taken a blocking stake in

midsize oil producer RussNeft BP owns a 1975 percent stake in Rosneft Chevron holds a

15 percent interest in the 935- mile- long CPC9 pipeline which transports an average of 959000

barrels of crude oil per day including 76000 barrels daily from Rus sia10 ExxonMobil has formed

8 E Mazneva and I Arkhipov ldquoRus sia Sells $11 Billion Stake in Rosneft to Glencore Qatarrdquo Bloomberg December 7

2016

9 CPCthinsp=thinspCaspian Pipeline Consortium

10 ldquoRus sia Highlights of Operations and Business Portfoliordquo Chevron accessed October 3 2017 https wwwchevron

com worldwide russia

Figure 56 Share of Rus sian Oil in Total US Oil Imports Thousands of Barrels per Day 1972ndash2016

Source US EIA ldquoUS Imports by Country of Origin Total Crude Oil and Productsrdquo

2000

4000

6000

8000

10000

12000

14000

16000

US Imports of Crude Oil and Petroleum Products (Thousand Barrels per Day)

US Imports from Russia of Crude Oil and Petroleum Products (Thousand Barrels per Day)19

7319

7419

7519

7619

7719

7819

7919

80

198

119

82

198

319

84

198

519

86

198

719

88

198

919

90

199

119

92

199

319

94

199

519

96

199

719

98

199

92

00

02

00

12

00

22

00

32

00

42

00

52

00

62

00

72

00

82

00

92

010

20

112

012

20

132

014

20

152

016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 27 102017 404 PM

Table 57 Top Importers of Rus sian Oil to the United States Thousands of Barrels 2016

VALERO MARKETING amp SUPPLY CO 54590 3616

EXXONMOBIL OIL CORP 17087 1130

CHEVRON USA INC 15217 1008

BP WEST COAST PRODUCTS LLC 10130 671

GEORGE E WARREN CORP 7272 48

PAULSBORO REFINING CO LLC 6838 453

TESORO CORP 5097 338

VITOL INC 5084 337

PHILLIPS 66 CO 4726 313

TRAFIGURA AG 4360 289

PAR HAWAII REFINING LLC 3893 258

MOTIVA ENTERPRISES LLC 3041 205

SHELL US TRADING CO 2863 19

MARATHON PETROLEUM CO LLC 2475 16

ATLANTIC TRADING amp MARKETING 2099 14

FREEPOINT COMMODITIES LLC 1439 1

GLENCORE LTD 1284 85

BEST PETROLEUM CORP 967 64

ROLYMPUS US COMMODITIES GROUP LLC 822 6

HUNT CRUDE OIL SUPPLY CO 666 4

GULF OIL LP 658 4

Source US EIA ldquoUS Imports by Country of Origin Crude Oilrdquo Petroleum amp Other Liquids September 13

2017 httpswwweiagovdnavpetpet_move_impcus_a2_nus_epc0_im0_mbblpd_ahtm authorrsquos

computation

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 28 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 29

several joint ventures with Rosneft to undertake ofshore exploration in the Black Sea and the Kara

Sea in Siberia11

According to the Sanctions Act US persons are prohibited from exporting or reexporting goods

ser vices (except financial ser vices) and technology in support of exploration or production of new

deep- water Arctic ofshore or shale oil proj ects that involve designated Rus sian entities or other

entities in which such sanctioned persons have a controlling interest or a substantial noncontrol-

ling owner ship interest defined as not less than 33 percent (previously it was 50 percent) The new

law also authorizesmdash but does not requiremdash the imposition of so- called secondary sanctions

against non- US entities that engage in activities involving the construction maintenance or

expansion of Rus sian energy export pipelines with a fair market value of $1 million or more or an

aggregate fair market value during a 12- month period of $5 million12 This provision has raised the

concerns of some Eu ro pean countries particularly Germany As result the final language of the

law included wording about coordination of this issue with allies of the United States

Shipments of Rus sian oil to the United States could be afected by activity in the US refinery

industry In early 2017 Saudi Aramco bought the United Statesrsquo largest oil refinery in Port Arthur

(Texas) and it announced plans to send more of its own crude to that refinery13 Serious concerns

exist however regarding the future of three refineries and nine pipelines owned by Citgo a US

branch of the Venezuelan state com pany PdVSA which is balancing precariously on the edge of

default Under certain conditions in the event of PdVSA bankruptcy Rosneft could claim a stake of

up to 499 percent in Citgo Such a possibility has raised concerns among politicians and US

government officials with Trea sury Secretary Steven Mnuchin calling it a ldquonational security issuerdquo14

Tables 58 59 and 510 show allocations of Rus sian oil imports to major US refineries some of

which work exclusively on Rus sian crude a total of two to three months per year In total 150940

thousand barrels of Rus sian oil were refined in 2016

Figure 57 confirms a leading position of Texas and Louisiana among the US states receiving

Rus sian crude followed by New Jersey California Mississippi Washington Hawaii and Delaware

In a paradoxical way Texas has dis appeared from the list of states as a main destination of US

imports from Rus sia (Figure 58) because Rus sian crude is mostly delivered to Louisiana ports and

registered there by US Customs as an import from Rus sia After that it transports to refineries in

Louisiana and Texas

Overall the short- term business rationale behind the sustainability of US oil imports from Rus sia

cannot overcome strong headwinds in the US energy sector facing all oil importers which will

inevitably lead to a contraction of Rus sian oil exports to the United States in the foreseeable future

11 Exxon eforts to receive a special US Trea sury waiver to drill in sanctioned Rus sia failed in 2017

12 Countering Amer i carsquos Adversaries through Sanctions Act HR 3364

13 Sarp Ozkan ldquoSaudi Aramcorsquos Port Arthur Refinery and the US Refinery Fleetrdquo Drilling Info May 11 2017

https infodrillinginfo com saudi - aramcos - port - arthur - refinery - us - refinery - fleet

14 Graham Kates ldquoTrea sury Secretary Rus siarsquos Citgo Deal a National Security Issuerdquo CBS News May 1 2017

http wwwcbsnews com news rosneft - citgo - steven - mnuchin - national - security

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 29 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations30

Table 58 Valerorsquos Refineries Pro cessing Rus sian Oil Thousands of Barrels 2016

Saint Charles Louisiana 29206 535

Corpus Christi Texas 20626 378

Wilmington California 4250 78

Total USA 54590 100

Source US EIA ldquoRefinery Capacity Reportrdquo January 1 2017

table 5 wwweia gov petroleum refinerycapacity table5 pdf

authorrsquos computation

Table 59 ExxonMobil Refineries Pro cessing Rus sian Oil Thousands of Barrels 2016

Baytown Texas 15037 88

Baton Rouge Louisiana 2046 12

Total USA 17083 100

Source US EIA ldquoRefinery Capacity Reportrdquo authorrsquos computation

Table 510 Chevronrsquos Refineries Pro cessing Rus sian Oil Thousands of Barrels 2016

Pascagoula Mississippi 12767 840

El Segundo California 2372 155

Saint Rose Louisiana 78 05

Total USA 15217 100

Source US EIA ldquoRefinery Capacity Reportrdquo authorrsquos computation

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 30 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 31

HEAVY METAL

Taken together US imports of metals and US imports of oil compose about 80 percent of US

total imports from Rus sia (Figure 59) Trade of metals like other commodities is strongly afected

by market price fluctuations Nevertheless metal imports from Rus sia have been fairly resilient to

market volatility and their average annual value has hovered at about $4 billion in the last five years

(Figure 510) This market resilience was forged at the end of the 1990searly 2000s when Rus sian

metal producers gradually modernized their plants adjusting quality of production to Western

standards and enhancing integration into global value and supply chains Some of them conquered

their share of the highly competitive US market struggling with peers from Canada and certain

BRICS countries (China India and Brazil) To attract additional resources all Rus sian large metal-

producing companies became public and were listed on stock exchanges chiefly the London Stock

Exchange (Severstalrsquo PAO Evraz MMK OAO Novolipetsk Steel Norilsk Nikel and TMK PAO) one

on the New York Stock Exchange (Mechel) and one on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange (Rusal)

Business logic pushed some of them to invest in the US metal- making industry which was hit

hard by crisis Later on some of those assets were sold (eg two US steel mills acquired by

Severstal in 2004 were purchased 10 years later by Steel Dynamics Inc and AK Steel Corp)

Figure 57 Share of US States Rus sian Oil Imports 2016

Source US EIA ldquoUS Imports from Rus sia of Crude Oil and Petroleum Productsrdquo Petroleum amp Other

Liquids September 29 2017 https www eia gov dnav pet hist LeafHandler ashx nshy=shyPETampsshy=shyMTTIM _ NUS

- NRS _ 1ampfshy=shyM authorrsquos computation

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

100

Maine

Massachusetts

Maryland

Connecticut

Georgia

Rhode Island

Virginia

Florida

New York

Alabama

Puerto Rico

Pennsylvania

Delaware

Hawaii

Washington

Mississippi

California

New Jersey

Louisiana

Texas

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 31 102017 404 PM

Figure 58 US Imports from Rus sia by State Million US$ 2013ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoState and Metropolitan Area Trade Datardquo Foreign Trade last modified

October 2 2017 https wwwcensus gov foreign - trade statistics state

Alaska

Connecticut

Delaware

Hawaii

Louisiana

Maryland

North Dakota 0

$1000

$2000

$3000

$4000

$5000

$6000

2013 2014 2015 2016

Alabama

Alaska

Connecticut

Delaware

Hawaii

Louisiana

Maryland

Maine

Mississippi

Montana

North Dakota

Mississippi

Figure 59 US Imports from Rus sia Share of Oil and Metals Million US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 1992ndash2016)

83

82

85

86

87

88

85

82

7375

0

$5000

$10000

$15000

$20000

$25000

$30000

$35000

$40000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

US Imports from Russia

Share of Oil and Metals

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 32 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 33

Obviously the market dynamic of dif er ent metals varies (eg iron steel aluminum platinum and

nickel) Caps to increase their trade and production in a ldquored oceanrdquo global environment with

anemic demand is rather limited despite Figure 510 showing a spike of iron and steel imports

from Rus sia in 2014 and aluminum in 2016 Some opportunities may exist for Russian- owned steel

plants in the United States (such as NLMK) to participate in energy proj ects resumed under Presi-

dent Trump who has required that new pipelines use only American- made steel15

Rus sia occupies a special niche in the US market for titanium products a high- end metal indus-

try Twenty years ago a long- term contract was signed between Rus sian titanium producer

VSMPO- AVISMA and Boeing The Rus sian com pany entered the selective club of Boeing suppliers

for the manufacture of components and semi- finished products Since the signing of this contract

VSMPO has delivered more than 35 percent of all titanium placed on Boeing civil aircraft16 They

are hidden in the trade data in an import category for Civilian Aircrafts and Parts (Figure 511) At

the end of 2016 Boeing announced an extension of its framework agreement with AVISMA

15 E Scheyder C Ngai and T Sylvester ldquoAmerican Steel Unlikely to Get Keystone Boost Despite Trump Orderrdquo

Reuters January 27 2017 http wwwreuters com article usa - trump - pipeline - transcanada - idUSL1N1FH1ZD

16 A Kramer ldquoTitanium Fills Vital Role for Boeing and Rus siardquo New York Times July 5 2013 http wwwnytimes com

2013 07 06 business global titanium - fills - vital - role - for - boeing - and - russia html mcubzshy=shy3

Figure 510 US Imports from Rus sia Iron Steel Bauxite Aluminum Nickel Nonferrous Metals and Other Precious Metals and Materials US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 1992ndash2016)

0

$6000000000

$5000000000

$4000000000

$3000000000

$2000000000

$1000000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 20122013

20142015

2016

Finished metal shapes

Iron and steel advanced

Iron and steel products nec

Nonferrous metals other

Other precious metals

Nickel

Bauxite and aluminum

Iron and steel mill products

Steelmaking materials

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 33 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations34

through 2022 and additional investments in the construction of a new robotic plant in Titanium

Valley a special economic zone located in the Sverdlovsk region that will open in 2018 The pro-

cessing of titanium forgings in all Boeing civil aircraft will be performed there including 787s 737

MAXs and 777Xs17 The contract extension with AVISMA may add several hundred million dollars

in value to annual US imports from Rus sia

How can such heavy reliance on imports of Rus sian titanium exist during a period of rising geopo-

liti cal tensions The answer is straightforward VSMPO- AVISMA is a highly specialized natu ral

mono poly producing 45 percent of the worldrsquos aerospace titanium Only four other countries

smelt high- grade titanium in industrial quantities the United States Germany Japan and China

Overall global production capacity is limited while demand is growing The United States cur-

rently imports around 79 percent of all the titanium it consumes each year18

17 ldquoBoeing and VSMPO Avisma to Launch Second Joint Production Siterdquo Rus sian Aviation Insider December 22 2016

http wwwrusaviainsider com boeing - and - vsmpo - avisma - to - launch - second - joint - production - site

18 Jon Ostrower and Andy Pasztor ldquoBoeing United Technologies Stockpile Titanium Partsrdquo Wall Street Journal

August 7 2014 https wwwwsj com articles boeing - united - technologies - stockpiling - titanium - parts - 1407441886

Figure 511 US Imports from Rus sia Civilian Aircrafts and Parts US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 1992ndash2016)

0

$20000000

$40000000

$60000000

$80000000

$100000000

$120000000

$140000000

$160000000

$180000000

$200000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Parts-civilian aircraft

Civilian aircraft

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 34 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 35

The Sanctions Act authorizes the secretary of the trea sury (in a nonmandatory way) to impose

restrictions (without specifying them) against Rus sian state- owned entities operating in the railway

metals and mining sectors of the Rus sian economy Despite the commanding heights of Rus siarsquos

state sector owner ship in its economy (70 percent of GDP) the metal- producing companies have

remained mostly in private hands

NUCLEAR AFFAIRS

Historically owners and operators of the 104 commercial nuclear power reactors in the United

States have purchased more than 80 percent of their uranium from foreign countries Uranium

shipping from Rus sia accounted for about 13 percent of the 58 million pounds of uranium pur-

chased overseas in 201219 At the same time the Rus sian state- owned mono poly Rosatom ac-

counts for 20 percent of Kazakhstanrsquos uranium production (which in turn comprises 11 percent of

all US uranium imports) and 20 percent of US domestic uranium production capacity (with

owner ship of exploration tracts in Wyoming)20

Nuclear fuel and nuclear power continue to be po liti cally sensitive topics both in the United

States and Rus sia Bilateral cooperation in this sector (being surprisingly stable with imports of

nuclear fuel from Rus sia at a level of $1 billion annually in the last five years [Figure 512 and 513])

is under constant po liti cal and lobbying pressure and has been a source of several po liti cal scan-

dals21 Consequently upside risks in this area of interaction are minimal and downside risks are

much higher especially when we are seeing more decommissioning of nuclear plants in the

United States than new constructions The US EIArsquos 2017 Annual Energy Outlook assumes

that about 25 percent of the nuclear capacity now operating will be removed from ser vice

by 205022

WHY IS THE GRASS GREENER ON THE OTHER SIDE

The United States continues to significantly reduce imports of chemical fertilizers as domestic pro-

duction increases In 2016 the United States imported 13 percent less ammonia and 11 percent

less urea and UAN which is a liquid urea and ammonium nitrate fertilizer Rus sia accounts for

around 40 percent of UAN imported by the United States The United States canceled antidumping

duties on imports of ammonium nitrate and urea from Rus sia in 2016 but it did not prevent import

19 US EIA ldquoThe US Relies on Foreign Uranium Enrichment Ser vices to Fuel Its Nuclear Power Plantsrdquo Today in

Energy August 28 2013 https wwweia gov todayinenergy detail php idshy=shy1273

20 Colin Chilcoat ldquoDoes Rus sia Really Own 20 Percent of the USrsquo Uranium Reservesrdquo OilPricecom May 6 2015

http oilpricecom Alternative - Energy Nuclear - Power Does - Russia - Really - Own - 20 - Of - The - US - Uranium - Reserves

html

21 Michelle Ye Hee Lee ldquoThe Facts behind Trumprsquos Repeated Claim about Hillary Clintonrsquos Role in the Rus sian Ura-

nium Dealrdquo Washington Post October 26 2016

22 US EIA ldquoAnnual Energy Outlook 2017 with Projections to 2050rdquo 81ndash82

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 35 102017 404 PM

Figure 512 US Imports from Rus sia Share of Oil Metals and Nuclear Fuel Million US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 1992ndash2016)

87

86

90

90

90

91

88

86

7882

0

$5000

$10000

$15000

$20000

$25000

$30000

$35000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

US Imports from Russia

Share of Oil Metals and Nuclear Fuel

Figure 513 US Imports from Rus sia Nuclear Fuel Materials US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

$-

$200000000

$400000000

$600000000

$800000000

$1200000000

$1000000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 36 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 37

drops twice last year (Figures 514 and 515) According to forecasts UAN imports are expected to

decline further to 15 million tons this year down over 46 percent from 28 million tons imported

last year23 The downside trend in imports of fertilizers will likely continue because of oversupply

BIG FISH

US imports of fish and shellfish from Rus sia are best understood in comparison with US fish

exports to the Rus sian market which slipped to zero in August 2014 after Rus sia issued an order

banning certain agricultural imports from the United States (Figure 516) While the volume of US

supply was not very large it was impor tant because it broke up the monopolistic dominance of a

few vertically integrated Rus sian companies that have kept prices high by restricting the entry of

new producers Seeking to implement import substitution policies Rus sia has tried to reduce

exports as well as imports of fish and seafood products in the last couple of years This symmetri-

cal approach was intended to ldquocompensaterdquo for a decrease of fish products in the domestic

23 Deepika Thapliyal ldquoPotashCorp Forecasts Sharp Drop in US Nitrogen Imports in 2017rdquo ICIS News February 7

2017 https wwwicis com resources news 2017 02 07 10076734 potashcorp - forecasts - sharp - drop - in - us - nitrogen

- imports - in - 2017

Figure 514 US Imports from Rus sia Share of Oil Metals Nuclear Fuel and Fertilizers Million US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

90

93

92

93

94

95

92

91

85

86

0

$5000

$10000

$15000

$20000

$25000

$30000

$35000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

US Imports from Russia

Share of Oil Metals Nuclear Fuel and Fertilizers

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 37 102017 404 PM

Figure 515 US Imports from Rus sia Chemical- Fertilizers US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

S-

$200000000

$400000000

$600000000

$800000000

$1000000000

$1200000000

$1400000000

$1600000000

$1800000000

$2000000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Figure 516 US Exports to Rus sia Fish and Shellfish US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

0

$10000000

$20000000

$30000000

$40000000

$50000000

$60000000

$70000000

$80000000

$90000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Fish and shellfish

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 38 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 39

consumer market caused by Rus siarsquos import ban but it has failed As result the group most af-

fected by the self- imposed counter- sanctions were Rus sian consumers

With a significant drop in fish imports a devaluation of the ruble and inflationary pressures on

seafood prices yearly consumption of fish in Rus sia has declined precipitously In 2015 alone

fish prices increased 20 percent and consumption dropped to 14 kilograms per person24 from

22 kilograms in 201425 In 2016 food rose to 355 percent of house hold expenditure as a result of

increases in food prices26 This has pushed vertically integrated fishing monopolies to sell even

more of their catch abroad rather than deliver to the Rus sian Federation (Figure 517) Thus we

cannot exclude the possibility of further growth in US fish and shellfish imports from Rus sia on a

marginal scale

24 Александр Савельев ldquoПотребление рыбы в России упало до 14 кг на человекаrdquo [Fish consumption in Rus sia fell to

14 kg per person] Экономика Интерфакс January 28 2015 http wwwinterfax ru business 492038

25 Илья Шестаков ldquoПотебление рыбы в России снизилось на 10 процентов из- за роста ценrdquo [Fish consumption in

Rus sia dropped by 10 percent due to price increases] RNS March 8 2017 https rnsonline consumer - market

Potreblenie - ribi - v - Rossii - snizilos - na - 10 - iz - za - rosta - tsen - 2017 - 03 - 08

26 Zoya Sheftalovich and Christian Oliver ldquoRus siarsquos Boom (Farming) Economyrdquo Politico November 8 2016 http

wwwpolitico eu article russias - boom - farming - economy

Figure 517 US Imports from Rus sia Fish and Shellfish US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

0

$50000000

$100000000

$150000000

$200000000

$250000000

$300000000

$350000000

$400000000

$450000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 39 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations40

SPACE ODYSSEY

Among high- end products beyond the top five groups of goods imported from Rus sia cheap and

efficient Rus sian engines have been used to launch US rockets into space for about 16 years

(Figure 518) There was a serious po liti cal strug gle around a 2014 ban on the purchase of Rus sian

RD-180 rocket engines revealing the conflicting business interests of power ful high- tech companies

This restrictive mea sure was temporary and was quickly lifted because of significant cost impacts

and risks of disruption to launch schedules27 For the same reason the Sanctions Act does not autho-

rize ldquothe imposition of any sanction or other condition limitation restriction or prohibition that

directly or indirectly impedes the supply by any entity of the Rus sian Federation of any product or

ser vice or the procurement of such product or ser vice by any contractor or subcontractor of the

United States or any other entity relating to or in connection with any space launch conducted for

the National Aeronautics and Space Administration or any other nonndash Department of Defense

customerrdquo28

Nevertheless many experts believe that US domestic alternatives to replace Rus sian engines will

be viable in five to eight years

27 Ken Dilanian ldquoWhy Does the US Use Rus sian Rockets to Launch Its Satellitesrdquo NBC News updated November 15

2016 http wwwnbcnews com why - does - u - s - use - russian - rockets - launch - its - satellites - n588526

28 Countering Amer i carsquos Adversaries through Sanctions Act HR 3364

Figure 518 Spacecraft Excluding Military US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

0

$20000000

$40000000

$60000000

$80000000

$100000000

$120000000

$140000000

$160000000

$180000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 40 102017 404 PM

41

Diversity and technological complexity are the most vis i ble advantages supporting US exports to

Rus sia Three major groups of export goods include civilian aircraft engines and parts (Figure 61)

drilling and oil field equipment (Figure 62) and industrial machines and engines (Figure 63)

Despite sanctions against the transfer of advanced oil producing and pro cessing technologies the

realization of US drilling and oil field equipment in Rus sia is sustainable although some bilateral

proj ects have been frozen

Another category of goods that has demonstrated resilience is the phar ma ceu ti cal industry (Fig-

ure 64) because most drugs in Rus sia are imported (about 70 percent of the Rus sian phar ma ceu-

ti cal market in value) Import substitution policies have had only modest results in this industry

As confirmed by American Chamber of Commerce surveys US exports to Rus sia are closely

connected to US FDI 30 percent of total imports of US companies working in the Rus sian

market come from the United States (more than $2 billion in 2016) In other words about

40 percent of all US exports to Rus sia are related to a US corporate- sector business pro cess in

the country The major sectors of activity of these companies are energy and natu ral resources

(52 percent) manufacturing (17 percent) information and communications technology or ICT

(13 percent) retail (7 percent) automotive industry (6 percent) phar ma ceu ti cal production

(1 percent) professional ser vices (05 percent) and other (2 percent)1

Some obvious constraints on US exports to Rus sia have resulted from a reduction in demand A

deterioration of bilateral relations and implementation of sanctions and counter- sanctions have

directly or indirectly afected all businesses Figures 65 and 66 provide data regarding a dramatic

drop in the sale of US agricultural production in Rus sia with all other categories of exports in

goods showing big cuts as well (see Figures 67ndash69)

Exports of civilian aircraft engines and parts put the state of Washington in first place among

other states as a leading exporter to the Rus sian market (Figure 610)

1 American Chamber of Commerce in Rus sia ldquoInvestment and Import to Rus sia 2nd Surveyrdquo 13

Diversity and Constraints

06

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 41 102017 404 PM

Figure 61 US Exports of Civilian Aircraft Engines Equipment and Parts to Rus sia US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

$2500000000

$2000000000

$1500000000

$1000000000

$500000000

$-

Figure 62 US Exports of Drilling and Oil Field Equipment US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

0

$5000000

$10000000

$15000000

$20000000

$25000000

$30000000

$35000000

$40000000

$45000000

$50000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 42 102017 404 PM

Figure 63 US Exports of Industrial Engines to Rus sia US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

0

$5000000

$10000000

$15000000

$20000000

$25000000

$30000000

$35000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Figure 64 US Exports of Phar ma ceu ti cal Preparations to Rus sia US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

0

$5000000

$10000000

$15000000

$20000000

$25000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 43 102017 404 PM

Figure 65 US Exports of Meat and Poultry to Rus sia US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Meat poultry etc

$1000000000

$800000000

$600000000

$400000000

$200000000

$-

$1200000000

$1400000000

$1600000000

Figure 66 US Exports of Soybeans to Rus sia US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

0

$20000000

$40000000

$60000000

$80000000

$100000000

$120000000

$140000000

$160000000

$180000000

$200000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 44 102017 404 PM

Figure 67 US Exports of Vehicles Engines and Parts to Rus sia US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Other parts and accessories of vehicles

Automotive tires and tubes

Bodies and chassis for passenger cars

Engines and engine parts (carburetors pistonsrings and valves)

Trucks buses and special purpose vehicles

Passenger cars new and used

$2500000000

$2000000000

$1500000000

$500000000

$-

$1000000000

Figure 68 US Exports of Medicinal Equipment to Rus sia US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

$10000000

$15000000

$20000000

$25000000

$30000000

$35000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 45 102017 404 PM

Figure 610 US Exports to Rus sia by States (2016 US$ Value) Million US$ 2013ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoState and Metropolitan Area Trade Datardquo

Iowa Kentucky

North Dakota

Oklahoma

South Carolina

Washington

0

$500

$1000

$1500

$2000

2013 2014 2015 2016

District of Columbia

Iowa

Kentucky

North Dakota

Oklahoma

South Carolina

Washington

Figure 69 US Exports of Excavating Machinery to Rus sia US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

0

$5000000

$10000000

$15000000

$20000000

$25000000

$30000000

$35000000

$40000000

$45000000

$50000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 46 102017 404 PM

47

Upon reviewing the current trend in US- Russia economic relations we must acknowledge that

the existing trade model is obsolete and exhausted Imports are resource- oriented and reflect

constraints of the Rus sian economic structure while five groups of goodsmdash oil metals nuclear

fuels fertilizers and fishmdash make up more than 90 percent of total imports from Rus sia (Figure 71)

Each of these industries has a limited capacity for growth in the foreseeable future

Rus siarsquos core export to the United Statesmdash oilmdash will inevitably decrease in the mid- term under any

scenario The value and volume of Rus sian exports to the United States are open to global market

volatility and po liti cal pressures with limited hedging mechanisms

Overall US exports to Rus sia are unsustainable due to bilateral po liti cal tensions the whims of

commodity markets and changing domestic policies Sanctions and counter- sanctions have

created additional barriers particularly in finance banking high- tech energy and agro- business

According to the American Chamber of Commerce 69 percent of US companies working in the

country consider the impact of US sanctions against Rus sia on their business as negative At the

same time 60 percent of companies do not expect big changes in business relations between

Rus sia and the United States under Trump1 as the new law codifies existing sanctions fortifies

them and extends them to new sectors

Current US investments are low due to the weak rule of law in Rus sia a lack of property right

protections and proper contract enforcement high levels of statization and monopolization in the

economy a poor business climate outdated capital stock dependence on natural- resource

sectors and of course sanction and counter- sanction mea sures Bloated administrative compo-

nents created as risk mitigation instruments have also served as impediments The countryrsquos

institutional weakness low level of productivity bud get constraints and a declining inflexible

workforce will restrain future economic growth even if commodity prices recover Rus sian eco-

nomic policy will likely continue to be statist and protectionist relying mostly on import

substitutions

1 Ibid 11

Existing Trends and Future Scenarios

07

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 47 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations48

What scenarios can be expected in such a challenging environment

One probability (no peace no war) is based on the assumption that matters will not deteriorate

further and implementation of the Sanctions Act will be cursory This will cause relatively slow

degradation in the economic field with occasional flashes of activity in selected areas (eg closer

cooperation against Islamist terrorist groups in Syria)

A second worse case or critical scenario is the intensive and full- scale execution of current sanc-

tion legislation and even the imposition of new economic punitive and restrictive mea sures which

could incite asymmetric retaliatory actions and lead to the introduction of additional protectionist

policies This in turn could trigger a further escalation of mutual confrontation and could eventu-

ally destroy the fundamentals of the current bilateral trade system Rus sian leadership has charac-

terized the Sanctions Act as a declaration of a trade war that ends all hope for improving bilateral

relations2

2 Дмитрий Медведев ldquoПодписание президентом США нового санкционного закона против России создает несколько

последствийrdquo [The US Presidentrsquos signing of the package of new sanctions against Rus sia will have a few conse-

quences] Facebook August 2 2017 https wwwfacebook com Dmitry Medvedev posts 10154587161801851

Figure 71 US Imports from Rus sia Share of Oil Metals Nuclear Fuel Fertilizers and Fish Million US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

93

94

93

94

95

96

93

92

87

89

0

$5000

$10000

$15000

$20000

$25000

$30000

$35000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

US Imports from Russia

Share of Oil Metals Nuclear FuelFertilizers and Fish

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 48 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 49

The best case and most favorable scenario looks less probable now It assumes the realization of

structural reforms in Rus sia in such a way that would adapt Rus siarsquos foreign policy to national

economic needs reduce confrontations with the West and make a concerted efort to integrate

Rus sian businesses into global supply and value chains A revitalization of the structural reform

agendamdash including eforts to diversify economic activities through de- monopolization and support

for SMEs a restructuring of the banking sector the creation of a vibrant business climate to foster

entrepreneurships and innovation the implementation of administrative and judicial reforms to

tackle red tape and endemic corruption and the reduction of state control over key sectors of the

economy via wide- spread privatization could kick- start the development of a nonoil economy and

improve long- term growth prospects Despite ongoing discussion of reform strategies deep

economic and po liti cal changes are extremely complicated over the next po liti calelectoral cycle

(2018ndash2024) particularly because of re sis tance of vested interests and growing commodity prices

The urgency to tackle structural shortcomings in natu ral resource- dependent economies usually

correlates with the price of those resources and the degree to which resource rents drive eco-

nomic activity However there may be marginal improvements in the efficiency of the current

economic system

Future US- Russia relations can be thought of through three pillars one pillar focuses on areas

where both countries maintain a competitive rivalry another looks at potential areas of interaction

under pres ent conditions a third pillar and one that has evaporated from the current bilateral

agenda concentrates on future cooperation Stronger economic ties could not only be a kind of

po liti cal shock absorber but contribute to the building of this future (particularly business contacts

aim to support future structural reforms) although po liti cal factors are depressing the prospects

for cooperation To escape deadlock it will be impor tant to establish the right balance between

politics and economics and create a model of collaboration within the framework of contention

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 49 102017 404 PM

About the Author

Vadim Grishin PhD MBA has been involved in the reform pro cess in Rus sia as adviser to the

deputy prime minister of Rus sia in 1992ndash1993 and 2006ndash2010 He has extensive experience

working with the Bretton Woods Institutions He was the board member of the World Bank Group

and served as se nior adviser at the International Monetary Fund Currently he is a con sul tant to the

chief economistrsquos office of the International Finance Corporation and teaches the economics of

transition at Georgetown University in Washington DC

50

594-71613_ch99_4Pindd 50 102017 403 PM

Blank

COVER PHOTO ADOBE STOCK

1616 Rhode Island Avenue NW

Washington DC 20036

202 887 0200 | wwwcsisorg

v++ISBN 978-1-4422-8035-9

Lanham bull Boulder bull New York bull London

4501 Forbes Boulevard

Lanham MD 20706

301 459 3366 | wwwrowmancom

A U T H O R

Vadim Grishin

Myths and Realities

A Report of the

CSIS RUSSIA AND EURASIA PROGRAM

US-RussiaEconomicRelations

O C T O B E R 2 0 1 7

Euml|xHSLEOCy280359z

The Man Pupu Nyor Rock Formations at the Northern Urals also known as Seven

Strong Man or Little Mountain of the God in the local tribe (Mansi) language

Page 19: U.S.-Russia Economic Relations: Myths and Realities · 2020-04-17 · OCTOBER 2017 U.S.- Russia Economic Relations Myths and Realities AUTHOR Vadim Grishin A REPORT OF THE CSIS RUSSIA

Vadim Grishin 13

Table 31 Po liti cal Cycles in Bilateral US- Russia Relations 1999ndash2016

2001ndash2002 The George W Bushndash Vladimir Putin Reset Rus sia supported ldquoglobal war on terrorismrdquo launched by the United States after 911 the SORT nuclear arms reduction treaty was signed by the United States and Rus sia and a successful business dialogue was developed that created the current structure of economic relations

2003ndash2008 Deterioration in bilateral relations brought on by the Iraq War Georgiarsquos ldquoRose Revolutionrdquo Mikhail Khodorkovskyrsquos arrest Ukrainersquos ldquoOrange Revolutionrdquo Kosovorsquos in de pen dence and the Georgian War

2009ndash2010 The Barack Obamandash Dmitry Medvedev Reset Rus sia served as a logistical hub for transportation and supply of US forces in Af ghan i stan United States and Rus sia signed the new START nuclear arms reduction treaty Rus sia backed tighter economic sanctions on Iran Rus sia gained access to the WTO after 18 years of negotiations

2011ndash2016 Deterioration in bilateral relations caused by the Ukrainian crisis which were followed by sanctions and counter- sanctions along with the Syrian crises and cyber- enabled activities

Source Authorrsquos evaluation of po liti cal and economic data

Note SORTthinsp=thinspStrategic Ofensive Reductions Treaty STARTthinsp=thinspStrategic Arms Reduction Treaty

Figure 32 Economic Cycle 2017ndash2019

Source Authorrsquos evaluation of IFI data and sources from respective countries

Egypt

VenezuelaEU

South Africa

Brazil

Russia

India

US

Descending Growth

Korea

China

Negative Growth

Unstable Growth

Sustainable Growth

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 13 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations14

Figure 33 US- Russia Trade Million US$ vs Po liti cal Cycle 2000ndash2016

Sources US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo Foreign Trade last modified June 29 2017

https wwwcensus gov foreign - trade balance c4621 html (see data for 2000ndash2016) authorrsquos evaluation

of po liti cal and economic data

Orange Revolution

Khodorkovskys arrest

GeorgianWar

Bush- Putin Reset

Iraq War Global Financial Crisis

Obama-Medvedev Reset

Russias WTO accession

New START Treaty

A Pefect Storm the Ukranian Crisis Oil Prices Crashing

Sanctions and Counter-Sanctions

$3000

$8000

$13000

$18000

$23000

$28000

$33000

$38000

$43000

2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 14 102017 404 PM

15

The current structure of US- Russia economic relations emerged in the early 2000s when the

model of trade and investment interaction took on a character similar to that which existed be-

tween the United States and developing economies US imports from Rus sia centered on com-

modities while technology along with food products lead American exports The primary

exception was that Rus sia supplied nuclear fuel including highly enriched uranium extracted from

nuclear weapons for US power plants and provided ser vices to the aerospace industry primarily

in satellite launches However both these exceptions can be explained as a legacy of the Soviet

past and not a harbinger of the future economic relationship (Figure 41)

In the last 15 years this trade structure has not changed significantly The only noticeable shift in

trade was a dramatic drop (to practically nothing) in exports of US agricultural products a result

of Rus siarsquos policy of import substitution and so- called counter- sanction mea sures it took in re-

sponse to US sanctions over the Ukraine crisis (Figure 42)

Promising new directions of cooperation in the IT sector and in engineering ser vices for the

aerospace industry appeared in the early 2000s1 but did not spill into other sectors and conse-

quently did little to renew economic cooperation on the whole The integration of Rus sian high-

tech ser vices into large- scale global production and value chains was constrained by the usual

culprits a lack of financial resources managerial experience skilled labor modern infrastructure

RampD investments and an adequate business environment High commodity prices incentivized the

restoration of an economic system centered on resource rents The leading role of oil and gas

extraction and transportation discouraged the development of a nonenergy sector that might

have created advanced and complex production and ser vices An import substitution policy could

not work efficiently in an economic environment plagued by the Dutch disease where currency

1 The Boeing Design Center was created in Moscow It consists of nearly 250 Boeing employees managing

a team of 1200 contract engineers from Rus sian and Ukrainian aerospace companies ldquoBackgrounder Boeing in

Rus siardquo Boeing last modified January 2017 http wwwboeing com resources boeingdotcom company key _ orgs

boeing - international pdf russia - cisbackgrounder pdf

Are the United States and Rus sia ldquoNatu ralrdquo Trading Partners A Little Bit of History

04

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 15 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations16

inflows (oil money) lead to ruble appreciation and render a countryrsquos production less competitive

During that time Rus siarsquos industry did not receive preferential access to larger markets and could

not expand its share in the global economy particularly because of its self- isolation from the

regional trade agreements (except for its participation in the Eurasian Economic Union with some

neighboring countries of the former Soviet Union) As a result neither import substitution nor

export- led strategy promoted growth and specialization in nonoil production A long- awaited

modernization and reallocation of resources from an inefficient nontrade sector to a trade sector

did not materialize

These limits were later augmented with sanctions and an extension of domestic restrictions on

cooperation with Western partners Importantly the rapid growth of state- monopoly structures in

the Rus sian economy over the past 15 years has created additional obstacles to the development

and diversification of US- Russia economic ties

Figure 41 US Imports from Rus sia US$ 2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2016)

Fish and shellfish 3

Crude oil 5

Fuel oil 37

Petroleum products other

8

Nuclear fuel materials

7

Chemicals-fertilizers 4

Steelmaking materials 5

Iron and steel mill products 4

Bauxite and aluminum 9

Other precious metals 4

Nonferrous metals other 1

Finished metal shapes 1

Synthetic rubber--primary

1

Spacecraftexcluding military

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 16 102017 404 PM

Fig

ure

42

U

S E

xpo

rts

to R

us s

ia U

S$ 2

016

Sou

rce

US

Ce

nsu

s B

ure

au ldquo

Trad

e in

Go

od

s w

ith

Ru

s sia

rdquo (s

ee

dat

a fo

r 2

016

)

Bak

ery

pro

du

cts

Win

e b

eer

an

d r

elat

ed

pro

du

cts

New

spri

nt

Pla

stic

mat

eria

ls

Ch

emic

als-

fert

ilize

rs

Ch

emic

als-

ino

rgan

icC

hem

ical

s-o

rgan

ic

Ch

emic

als-

oth

erC

ott

on

fib

er c

loth

In

du

stri

al r

ub

ber

pro

du

cts

Min

eral

su

pp

lies-

man

ufa

ctu

red

Gen

erat

ors

acc

esso

ries

Ele

ctri

c ap

par

atu

s

Dri

llin

g amp

oilfi

eld

eq

uip

men

t Sp

ecia

lized

min

ing

Exc

avat

ing

mac

hin

ery

No

nfa

rm t

ract

ors

an

d p

arts

In

du

stri

al e

ng

ines

Fo

od

to

bac

co m

ach

iner

y M

etal

wo

rkin

g m

ach

ine

too

ls

Tex

tile

sew

ing

m

ach

ines

W

oo

d g

lass

p

last

ic

Pu

lp a

nd

pap

er

mac

hin

ery

Mea

suri

ng

tes

tin

g

con

tro

l in

stru

men

ts

Mat

eria

ls h

and

ling

equ

ipm

ent

Ind

ust

rial

mac

hin

es

oth

er

Ph

oto

ser

vice

ind

ust

ry m

ach

iner

y A

gri

cult

ura

l mac

hin

ery

eq

uip

men

t C

om

pu

ters

Co

mp

ute

r ac

cess

ori

es

Sem

ico

nd

uct

ors

Tel

eco

mm

un

icat

ion

seq

uip

men

t

Bu

sin

ess

mac

hin

es a

nd

eq

uip

men

t

Lab

ora

tory

tes

tin

g in

stru

men

ts

Med

icin

al e

qu

ipm

ent

Civ

ilian

air

craf

t e

ng

ines

eq

uip

men

t a

nd

par

ts

Rai

lway

tra

nsp

ort

atio

n

equ

ipm

ent

Ves

sels

exc

lud

ing

scr

ap

Co

mm

erci

al v

esse

ls o

ther

M

arin

e en

gin

es p

arts

Spac

ecra

ft e

xclu

din

g

mili

tary

Pas

sen

ger

car

s

new

an

d u

sed

Tru

cks

bu

ses

and

sp

ecia

l p

urp

ose

ve

hic

les

En

gin

es a

nd

en

gin

e p

arts

(c

arb

ure

tors

pis

ton

s r

ing

s

and

val

ves)

B

od

ies

and

ch

assi

s fo

r p

asse

ng

er c

ars

Au

tom

oti

ve t

ires

an

d t

ub

es

Oth

er p

arts

an

d a

cces

sori

es o

f ve

hic

les

Ap

par

el h

ou

seh

old

go

od

s -

text

ile

Ph

arm

aceu

tica

lp

rep

arat

ion

s

Furn

itu

re h

ou

seh

old

go

od

s

etc

R

ug

s

Cel

l ph

on

es a

nd

oth

er

ho

use

ho

ld g

oo

ds

ne

c

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 17 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations18

Figure 43 US Trade in Goods with Rus sia Million US$ 1992ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 1992ndash2016)

Russian Financial Crisis

Oil price Increased from$2446 USD per barrel (2001)

to $9694 USD per barrel(2008)

Global Financial Crisis

Oil price high record in2011-2012

(more that $111 USD perbarrel)

Oil price crashed

$-

$5000

$10000

$15000

$20000

$25000

$30000

$35000

$40000

$45000

$50000

1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

US Imports from Russia US Exports to Russia US-Russia Trade in Goods

No doubt po liti cal ups and downs add volatility to US- Russia trade Nevertheless Rus siarsquos eco-

nomic structure exhausted itself before the Ukrainian crisis and the recent Rus sian recession Its

limitations are not only due to some mistakes in policy or negative coincidences of circumstances

but rather to deeply rooted properties in the current bilateral trade model related to structural

issues in the Rus sian economy Structural constraints such as the weak enforcement of property

rights poor business regulation and nondiversified exports weighed on Rus sian trade with the

United States From this perspective the term ldquonaturalunnatural trading partnersrdquo does not ad-

dress the unused capacity of bilateral interaction or the real challenges that kind of interaction

faces It just adds metaphysical flavor to the very specific economic and po liti cal factors that

determine the US- Russia trajectory

Overall the outlines of bilateral trade (Figure 43) resemble the famous ldquoRus sian Mountainsrdquo that

were a pre de ces sor of the modern roller coaster icy hills supported by wooden constructionsmdash a

rigid and immobile structure that sooner or later would melt This unfortunately is what is hap-

pening to US- Russia trade cooperation now

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 18 102017 404 PM

19

ARE LITTLE FISH REALLY SWEET

Low US- Russia economic interaction has at least two consequences First it limits the capacity of

policymakers to exploit trade as an instrument for geopo liti cal combat Even the question of a US

trade deficit which used to be a headache for many US trading partners has become so insig-

nificant in absolute terms (about $87 billion in 2016) that it seems hardly worth caring about

When the volume of trade between two countries becomes very small in absolute terms whether

a country is running a surplus or deficit is no longer relevant But it also renders another type of

confrontations (sometimes more dangerous) more likely since the two traders have little to lose

Second in an environment marked by low levels of bilateral trade both sides could incentivize (if

and when a desire for po liti cal rapprochement exists) the signing of new trade deals which are

elevated symbolically as a turning point in bilateral po liti cal relations (ie the sale of Boeings to

Rus sia or the delivery via tankers of Rus sian oil to US refineries) Sometimes markets themselves

pres ent ldquogiftsrdquo that can be capitalized on po liti cally US- USSR grain trade in the 1970s was one

such ldquogiftrdquo large sales of American grain to the Soviet Union helped US policymakers win favor

with the po liti cally impor tant American farming sector and permitted Soviet leaders to maintain

access to a dietary staple for the Soviet population

The strong 32 percent growth in value of US imports from Rus sia from January to May 2017

versus January to May 2016 ( Table 51) is an example of a development that has tempted officials

to pres ent it as a sign of positive change due to ldquogrowing business activitiesrdquo (this kind of statement

was heard before the bilateral summit in Germany in July 2017) although the reason for that leap

was evidently an increase in commodity prices (mainly of oilmdash see Table 52) and not a rise in

entrepreneurial interactions The primary beneficiaries of that upside rally have been two other

petro- economies Saudi Arabia and Venezuela ( Tables 53 and 54)

Sector Analyses

05

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 19 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations20

Table 51 US Imports from Rus sia Million US$ Januaryndash May 2016 vs Januaryndash May 2017

Year January February March April May Total

2016 9603 6871 11097 12257 10977 50805

2017 12215 10220 16979 13471 14147 67032

Change 271 487 530 99 289 319

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 1992ndash2016)

Table 52 Change in Urals Crude Oil Prices US$ per Barrel Januaryndash May 2016 vs Januaryndash May 2017

Januaryndash May 2016 Januaryndash May 2017 Change ($) Change ()

3601 5129 1528 424

Source Ministry of Finance of the Rus sian Federation https wwwminfin ru ru ixzz4mMIZ7XtC

Table 53 US Imports from Saudi Arabia Million US$ Januaryndash May 2016 vs Januaryndash May 2017

Year January February March April May Total

2016 15114 9036 13555 10844 14679 63228

2017 19802 20298 21650 16211 19542 97503

Change 3101 12463 5972 495 331 542

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Saudi Arabiardquo Foreign Trade last modified June 29 2017

https wwwcensus gov foreign - trade balance c5170 html (see data for 2016ndash2017)

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 20 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 21

Table 54 US Imports from Venezuela Million US$ Januaryndash May 2016 vs Januaryndash May 2017

Year January February March April May Total

2016 6657 5560 7140 8007 7922 35286

2017 13041 10864 123500 11148 12243 59646

Change 9590 9540 7297 3923 5454 6903

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Venezuelardquo Foreign Trade last modified June 29 2017

https wwwcensus gov foreign - trade balance c3070 html (see data for 2016ndash2017)

Table 55 US Exports to Rus sia Million US$ Januaryndash May 2016 vs Januaryndash May 2017

Year January February March April May Total

2016 3628 3577 7298 4657 4947 24107

2017 3144 4277 5386 6670 4806 24283

Change minus133 196 minus262 432 minus29 minus07

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2016ndash2017)

At the same time US exports to Rus sia continue to stagnate ( Table 55) due to low levels of

consumption during a two-and- a- half-year economic crisis a deep ruble devaluation sanctions

and counter- sanctions

Given the very dif er ent economic structures and resource endowments of Rus sia and the United

States it is not surprising that US- Russia trade is asymmetric and oil driven (Figure 51) A

3 percent increase in Urals oil prices translates into a one percent increase in US import growth

from Rus sia Thus in 2016 every $10 increase in Urals crude oil added $15 billion to the value of

US imports or 11 percent to the total value of imports from Rus sia

OIL ADDICTION

Oil is a core pillar of US- Russia bilateral trade A bumpy ride in oil markets afects commerce

Nevertheless Rus sian oil exports to the United States in physical terms have been rather

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 21 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations22

sustainable Starting from 2005 average annual deliveries have been above 150 million barrels

(Figure 52) Crude and heating oil have dominated while petroleum products and liquefied petro-

leum gases have not (Figure 53) In 2011 oil exports peaked at 228 million barrels but declined to

159 million barrels in 2016mdash a drop of 30 percent Rec ord high shipments of Rus sian oil to the United

States coincided with an elevation in oil prices which made the subsequent decline in oil shipment

value between 2011 and 2016 (by about 72 percent as shown in Figure 54) seem more stark The

increase in price also raised the share of oil in Rus sian exports by 74 percent in 2011 (Figure 55)

The Rus sian share in total US oil imports was around 55 percent in 2011 and 43 percent in 2016

( Table 56) In the last five years the United States has relied exclusively on consumption of Rus sian

oil for the rough equivalent of one week out of the year (Figure 56)

It is unlikely that Rus sia can significantly increase its share of the US oil market and there is a real

possibility for a downward trend There are several reasons the historically high Rus sian hydrocar-

bon export threshold of 2011 will not soon if ever be surpassed

First US energy consumption will likely be flat According to the US Energy Information Adminis-

tration (EIA) demand for petroleum and other liquids in the United States will be about 35ndash36

quadrillion British thermal units (BTUs) with minimal variation over the next 25 years1

1 US EIA ldquoAnnual Energy Outlook 2017 with Projections to 2050rdquo January 5 2017 7ndash8

Figure 51 US- Russia Trade Growth () vs US and Rus sia Real GDP Growth () 1993ndash2016

Source IMF ldquoIMF Datardquo accessed September 27 2017 http wwwimf org en Data US Census Bureau

ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo

Note rGDPthinsp=thinspreal gross domestic product

Trade

USA rGDP growth

Russia rGDP growth

-60

-40

-20

0

20

40

60

80

100

1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Gro

wth

All spikes in US-Russia trade have been connected with two main

variables volume and price of crude oil

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 22 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 23

Second the United States will become a net energy exporter between 2020 and 2030 in most

cases under dif er ent combinations of oil and natu ral gas prices GDP growth technological

breakthroughs and the availability of energy resources The role of oil imports will dramatically

fall2

Third oil price scenarios as described by the International Energy Agency (IEA) international

financial organ izations (IFIs) and many national agencies are very cautious and assume that even

by 2035 to 2040 oil prices will not to recover to the levels of 2011ndash20123

Fourth Rus sian oil production and export growth will be modest and driven by Asian economic

expansion and will comprise a decreasing share of Western markets4 According to forecasts from

2 Ibid 15ndash18

3 Ibid table 3 ldquoEnergy Prices by Sector and Sourcesrdquo World Bank World Bank Commodity Markets Price Forecasts

(Washington DC World Bank 2017) httpswwwworldbank org en research commodity - markets Organ ization of the

Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) World Oil Outlook 2016 (Vienna OPEC 2016)

4 E D Belotskaia et al Global and Rus sian Energy Outlook 2016 (Moscow Energy Research Institute of the Rus sian

Acad emy of Science Analytical Center for the Government of the Rus sian Federation 2016) http acgov ru files

publication a 12767 pdf

Figure 52 US Imports from Rus sia Crude Oil and Petroleum Products Thousands of Barrels 1995ndash2016

Source US EIA ldquoUS Imports by Country of Origin Rus siardquo Petroleum amp Other Liquids September 13

2017 http wwweia gov dnav pet PET _ MOVE _ IMPCUS _ D _ NUS _ NRS _ MBBL _ M htm

0

50000

100000

150000

200000

250000

Date 1995 1996 1997 1998 199920002001200220032004200520062007200820092010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 23 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations24

the Organ ization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) crude oil exports from Rus sia and

the Caspian region to the United States will dis appear by 20255

So why does the Rus sian Urals blend continue to be attractive for oil traders and US refineries

which could pro cess greater volumes of domestically produced lighter crude There are two main

reasons One is related to the preference of US high conversion refineries (the most sophisticated

in the world) to work with heavy oil blends produced by Canada Mexico Iraq Venezuela and

Rus sia Pro cessing heavy crude now is as profitable as pro cessing lighter crude The so- called

crack spreadmdash the diference between the cost of relatively cheap heavy crude oil and the final

price of value- added consumer products (diesel gasoline jet fuel and heating oil)mdash has become

the same as the refinery margins of light sweet crude6 This has primarily afected light oil produc-

ing countries such as Angola Algeria and Nigeria

5 OPEC World Oil Outlook 2016 306ndash309

6 ldquoHow Much for That Heavy Oilrdquo Oil Sands Magazine December 26 2015 https wwwoilsandsmagazine com

news 2015 12 26 how - much - for - that - heavy - oil

Figure 53 US Imports from Rus sia Oil and Petroleum Products US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

$-

$25000000000

$20000000000

$15000000000

$10000000000

$5000000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Liquefied petroleum gases

Petroleum products other

Fuel oil

Crude oil

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 24 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 25

Another factor afecting purchase of Rus sian oil is a new trend among oil companies for further

consolidation of scale and for integrating operations of upstream and downstream business7

There have been several waves of separation and unification of production transportation and

pro cessing in the last 50 years The current business cycle can be seen as an adaptation to a

period of low prices and oversupply Companies that buy andor produce oil in Rus sia most likely

prefer to transport and pro cess this oil in their own modern refineries in the United States At the

same time some of the newest refinery designs specifically for pro cessing heavy oils have been

built in Asia thus extending the choices of heavy oil producing countries

We should also consider that leading US and international oil traders along with oil producing

companies working with or owning US refineries frequently buy Rus sian oil on the open market

and have long- term contracts on Rus sian crude oil delivery Many Rus sian oil companies prefer to

pay for purchases or ser vices with their future production instead of cash creating situations of

ldquostickyrdquo oil imports that are difficult to replace The best- known example is an interaction between

7 ldquoEnergy and Utilities Sectorrdquo Roundtable Financier Worldwide December 2015 https wwwfinancierworldwide

com roundtable - energy - utilities - sector - dec15

Figure 54 US Imports of Oil and Petroleum Products from Rus sia vs Oil Prices Eu rope Brent Spot Price Free on Board (FOB) 1996ndash2017

Source US EIA ldquoUS Imports by Country of Origin Rus siardquo

0

20

40

60

80

100

120

140

0

5000

10000

15000

20000

25000

30000

Jan

-19

96

Jun

-19

96

No

v-19

96

Ap

r-19

97

Sep

-19

97

Feb

-19

98

Jul-

199

8D

ec-1

99

8M

ay-1

99

9O

ct-1

99

9M

ar-2

00

0A

ug

-20

00

Jan

-20

01

Jun

-20

01

No

v-2

00

1A

pr-

20

02

Sep

-20

02

Feb

-20

03

Jul-

20

03

Dec

-20

03

May

-20

04

Oct

-20

04

Mar

-20

05

Au

g-2

00

5Ja

n-2

00

6Ju

n-2

00

6N

ov-

20

06

Ap

r-2

00

7Se

p-2

00

7Fe

b-2

00

8Ju

l-2

00

8D

ec-2

00

8M

ay-2

00

9O

ct-2

00

9M

ar-2

010

Au

g-2

010

Jan

-20

11Ju

n-2

011

No

v-2

011

Ap

r-2

012

Sep

-20

12Fe

b-2

013

Jul-

20

13D

ec-2

013

May

-20

14O

ct-2

014

Mar

-20

15A

ug

-20

15Ja

n-2

016

Jun

-20

16N

ov-

20

16

USD

per

Bar

rel

Th

ou

san

d B

arr

els

US Imports from Russia of Crude Oil and Petroleum Products (Thousand Barrels)

Europe Brent Spot Price FOB (Dollars per Barrel)

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 25 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations26

Table 56 US Oil Imports All Countries vs Rus sia Thousand Barrels per Day 2011ndash2016

Years 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

All Countries 11436 10598 9859 9241 9449 10058

Rus sia 624 477 460 330 371 433

Share 546 450 467 357 393 431

Sources US EIA ldquoUS Imports by Country of Origin Total Crude Oil and Productsrdquo Petroleum amp Other

Liquids September 13 2017 wwweia gov dnav pet pet_move_impcus_a2_nus_ep00_im0_mbbl_m htm

authorrsquos computation

Figure 55 US Imports from Rus sia Share of Crude Oil and Petroleum Products Million US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

57

64

73

72

74

73

72

59

52 50

0

$5000

$10000

$15000

$20000

$25000

$30000

$35000

$40000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

US Imports from Russia

Share of Oil and Petroleum Products

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 26 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 27

the Rus sian state mono poly Rosneft and commodity trading and mining giant Glencore which

along with energy and commodities com pany Vitol participated in a $10 billion prepayment

deal with Rosneft for crude supplies in 2013

There have been a number of ongoing transactions between the Rus sian oil industry and interna-

tional oil companies including several that top the list of importers of Rus sian oil to the United

States ( Table 57) In December 2016 Glencore participated in a controversial privatization opera-

tion purchasing in tandem with the Qatar sovereign wealth fund a 195 percent stake in Rosneft

which was on the US and EU list of sanctioned firms8 Glencore has also taken a blocking stake in

midsize oil producer RussNeft BP owns a 1975 percent stake in Rosneft Chevron holds a

15 percent interest in the 935- mile- long CPC9 pipeline which transports an average of 959000

barrels of crude oil per day including 76000 barrels daily from Rus sia10 ExxonMobil has formed

8 E Mazneva and I Arkhipov ldquoRus sia Sells $11 Billion Stake in Rosneft to Glencore Qatarrdquo Bloomberg December 7

2016

9 CPCthinsp=thinspCaspian Pipeline Consortium

10 ldquoRus sia Highlights of Operations and Business Portfoliordquo Chevron accessed October 3 2017 https wwwchevron

com worldwide russia

Figure 56 Share of Rus sian Oil in Total US Oil Imports Thousands of Barrels per Day 1972ndash2016

Source US EIA ldquoUS Imports by Country of Origin Total Crude Oil and Productsrdquo

2000

4000

6000

8000

10000

12000

14000

16000

US Imports of Crude Oil and Petroleum Products (Thousand Barrels per Day)

US Imports from Russia of Crude Oil and Petroleum Products (Thousand Barrels per Day)19

7319

7419

7519

7619

7719

7819

7919

80

198

119

82

198

319

84

198

519

86

198

719

88

198

919

90

199

119

92

199

319

94

199

519

96

199

719

98

199

92

00

02

00

12

00

22

00

32

00

42

00

52

00

62

00

72

00

82

00

92

010

20

112

012

20

132

014

20

152

016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 27 102017 404 PM

Table 57 Top Importers of Rus sian Oil to the United States Thousands of Barrels 2016

VALERO MARKETING amp SUPPLY CO 54590 3616

EXXONMOBIL OIL CORP 17087 1130

CHEVRON USA INC 15217 1008

BP WEST COAST PRODUCTS LLC 10130 671

GEORGE E WARREN CORP 7272 48

PAULSBORO REFINING CO LLC 6838 453

TESORO CORP 5097 338

VITOL INC 5084 337

PHILLIPS 66 CO 4726 313

TRAFIGURA AG 4360 289

PAR HAWAII REFINING LLC 3893 258

MOTIVA ENTERPRISES LLC 3041 205

SHELL US TRADING CO 2863 19

MARATHON PETROLEUM CO LLC 2475 16

ATLANTIC TRADING amp MARKETING 2099 14

FREEPOINT COMMODITIES LLC 1439 1

GLENCORE LTD 1284 85

BEST PETROLEUM CORP 967 64

ROLYMPUS US COMMODITIES GROUP LLC 822 6

HUNT CRUDE OIL SUPPLY CO 666 4

GULF OIL LP 658 4

Source US EIA ldquoUS Imports by Country of Origin Crude Oilrdquo Petroleum amp Other Liquids September 13

2017 httpswwweiagovdnavpetpet_move_impcus_a2_nus_epc0_im0_mbblpd_ahtm authorrsquos

computation

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 28 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 29

several joint ventures with Rosneft to undertake ofshore exploration in the Black Sea and the Kara

Sea in Siberia11

According to the Sanctions Act US persons are prohibited from exporting or reexporting goods

ser vices (except financial ser vices) and technology in support of exploration or production of new

deep- water Arctic ofshore or shale oil proj ects that involve designated Rus sian entities or other

entities in which such sanctioned persons have a controlling interest or a substantial noncontrol-

ling owner ship interest defined as not less than 33 percent (previously it was 50 percent) The new

law also authorizesmdash but does not requiremdash the imposition of so- called secondary sanctions

against non- US entities that engage in activities involving the construction maintenance or

expansion of Rus sian energy export pipelines with a fair market value of $1 million or more or an

aggregate fair market value during a 12- month period of $5 million12 This provision has raised the

concerns of some Eu ro pean countries particularly Germany As result the final language of the

law included wording about coordination of this issue with allies of the United States

Shipments of Rus sian oil to the United States could be afected by activity in the US refinery

industry In early 2017 Saudi Aramco bought the United Statesrsquo largest oil refinery in Port Arthur

(Texas) and it announced plans to send more of its own crude to that refinery13 Serious concerns

exist however regarding the future of three refineries and nine pipelines owned by Citgo a US

branch of the Venezuelan state com pany PdVSA which is balancing precariously on the edge of

default Under certain conditions in the event of PdVSA bankruptcy Rosneft could claim a stake of

up to 499 percent in Citgo Such a possibility has raised concerns among politicians and US

government officials with Trea sury Secretary Steven Mnuchin calling it a ldquonational security issuerdquo14

Tables 58 59 and 510 show allocations of Rus sian oil imports to major US refineries some of

which work exclusively on Rus sian crude a total of two to three months per year In total 150940

thousand barrels of Rus sian oil were refined in 2016

Figure 57 confirms a leading position of Texas and Louisiana among the US states receiving

Rus sian crude followed by New Jersey California Mississippi Washington Hawaii and Delaware

In a paradoxical way Texas has dis appeared from the list of states as a main destination of US

imports from Rus sia (Figure 58) because Rus sian crude is mostly delivered to Louisiana ports and

registered there by US Customs as an import from Rus sia After that it transports to refineries in

Louisiana and Texas

Overall the short- term business rationale behind the sustainability of US oil imports from Rus sia

cannot overcome strong headwinds in the US energy sector facing all oil importers which will

inevitably lead to a contraction of Rus sian oil exports to the United States in the foreseeable future

11 Exxon eforts to receive a special US Trea sury waiver to drill in sanctioned Rus sia failed in 2017

12 Countering Amer i carsquos Adversaries through Sanctions Act HR 3364

13 Sarp Ozkan ldquoSaudi Aramcorsquos Port Arthur Refinery and the US Refinery Fleetrdquo Drilling Info May 11 2017

https infodrillinginfo com saudi - aramcos - port - arthur - refinery - us - refinery - fleet

14 Graham Kates ldquoTrea sury Secretary Rus siarsquos Citgo Deal a National Security Issuerdquo CBS News May 1 2017

http wwwcbsnews com news rosneft - citgo - steven - mnuchin - national - security

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 29 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations30

Table 58 Valerorsquos Refineries Pro cessing Rus sian Oil Thousands of Barrels 2016

Saint Charles Louisiana 29206 535

Corpus Christi Texas 20626 378

Wilmington California 4250 78

Total USA 54590 100

Source US EIA ldquoRefinery Capacity Reportrdquo January 1 2017

table 5 wwweia gov petroleum refinerycapacity table5 pdf

authorrsquos computation

Table 59 ExxonMobil Refineries Pro cessing Rus sian Oil Thousands of Barrels 2016

Baytown Texas 15037 88

Baton Rouge Louisiana 2046 12

Total USA 17083 100

Source US EIA ldquoRefinery Capacity Reportrdquo authorrsquos computation

Table 510 Chevronrsquos Refineries Pro cessing Rus sian Oil Thousands of Barrels 2016

Pascagoula Mississippi 12767 840

El Segundo California 2372 155

Saint Rose Louisiana 78 05

Total USA 15217 100

Source US EIA ldquoRefinery Capacity Reportrdquo authorrsquos computation

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 30 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 31

HEAVY METAL

Taken together US imports of metals and US imports of oil compose about 80 percent of US

total imports from Rus sia (Figure 59) Trade of metals like other commodities is strongly afected

by market price fluctuations Nevertheless metal imports from Rus sia have been fairly resilient to

market volatility and their average annual value has hovered at about $4 billion in the last five years

(Figure 510) This market resilience was forged at the end of the 1990searly 2000s when Rus sian

metal producers gradually modernized their plants adjusting quality of production to Western

standards and enhancing integration into global value and supply chains Some of them conquered

their share of the highly competitive US market struggling with peers from Canada and certain

BRICS countries (China India and Brazil) To attract additional resources all Rus sian large metal-

producing companies became public and were listed on stock exchanges chiefly the London Stock

Exchange (Severstalrsquo PAO Evraz MMK OAO Novolipetsk Steel Norilsk Nikel and TMK PAO) one

on the New York Stock Exchange (Mechel) and one on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange (Rusal)

Business logic pushed some of them to invest in the US metal- making industry which was hit

hard by crisis Later on some of those assets were sold (eg two US steel mills acquired by

Severstal in 2004 were purchased 10 years later by Steel Dynamics Inc and AK Steel Corp)

Figure 57 Share of US States Rus sian Oil Imports 2016

Source US EIA ldquoUS Imports from Rus sia of Crude Oil and Petroleum Productsrdquo Petroleum amp Other

Liquids September 29 2017 https www eia gov dnav pet hist LeafHandler ashx nshy=shyPETampsshy=shyMTTIM _ NUS

- NRS _ 1ampfshy=shyM authorrsquos computation

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

100

Maine

Massachusetts

Maryland

Connecticut

Georgia

Rhode Island

Virginia

Florida

New York

Alabama

Puerto Rico

Pennsylvania

Delaware

Hawaii

Washington

Mississippi

California

New Jersey

Louisiana

Texas

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 31 102017 404 PM

Figure 58 US Imports from Rus sia by State Million US$ 2013ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoState and Metropolitan Area Trade Datardquo Foreign Trade last modified

October 2 2017 https wwwcensus gov foreign - trade statistics state

Alaska

Connecticut

Delaware

Hawaii

Louisiana

Maryland

North Dakota 0

$1000

$2000

$3000

$4000

$5000

$6000

2013 2014 2015 2016

Alabama

Alaska

Connecticut

Delaware

Hawaii

Louisiana

Maryland

Maine

Mississippi

Montana

North Dakota

Mississippi

Figure 59 US Imports from Rus sia Share of Oil and Metals Million US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 1992ndash2016)

83

82

85

86

87

88

85

82

7375

0

$5000

$10000

$15000

$20000

$25000

$30000

$35000

$40000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

US Imports from Russia

Share of Oil and Metals

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 32 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 33

Obviously the market dynamic of dif er ent metals varies (eg iron steel aluminum platinum and

nickel) Caps to increase their trade and production in a ldquored oceanrdquo global environment with

anemic demand is rather limited despite Figure 510 showing a spike of iron and steel imports

from Rus sia in 2014 and aluminum in 2016 Some opportunities may exist for Russian- owned steel

plants in the United States (such as NLMK) to participate in energy proj ects resumed under Presi-

dent Trump who has required that new pipelines use only American- made steel15

Rus sia occupies a special niche in the US market for titanium products a high- end metal indus-

try Twenty years ago a long- term contract was signed between Rus sian titanium producer

VSMPO- AVISMA and Boeing The Rus sian com pany entered the selective club of Boeing suppliers

for the manufacture of components and semi- finished products Since the signing of this contract

VSMPO has delivered more than 35 percent of all titanium placed on Boeing civil aircraft16 They

are hidden in the trade data in an import category for Civilian Aircrafts and Parts (Figure 511) At

the end of 2016 Boeing announced an extension of its framework agreement with AVISMA

15 E Scheyder C Ngai and T Sylvester ldquoAmerican Steel Unlikely to Get Keystone Boost Despite Trump Orderrdquo

Reuters January 27 2017 http wwwreuters com article usa - trump - pipeline - transcanada - idUSL1N1FH1ZD

16 A Kramer ldquoTitanium Fills Vital Role for Boeing and Rus siardquo New York Times July 5 2013 http wwwnytimes com

2013 07 06 business global titanium - fills - vital - role - for - boeing - and - russia html mcubzshy=shy3

Figure 510 US Imports from Rus sia Iron Steel Bauxite Aluminum Nickel Nonferrous Metals and Other Precious Metals and Materials US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 1992ndash2016)

0

$6000000000

$5000000000

$4000000000

$3000000000

$2000000000

$1000000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 20122013

20142015

2016

Finished metal shapes

Iron and steel advanced

Iron and steel products nec

Nonferrous metals other

Other precious metals

Nickel

Bauxite and aluminum

Iron and steel mill products

Steelmaking materials

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 33 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations34

through 2022 and additional investments in the construction of a new robotic plant in Titanium

Valley a special economic zone located in the Sverdlovsk region that will open in 2018 The pro-

cessing of titanium forgings in all Boeing civil aircraft will be performed there including 787s 737

MAXs and 777Xs17 The contract extension with AVISMA may add several hundred million dollars

in value to annual US imports from Rus sia

How can such heavy reliance on imports of Rus sian titanium exist during a period of rising geopo-

liti cal tensions The answer is straightforward VSMPO- AVISMA is a highly specialized natu ral

mono poly producing 45 percent of the worldrsquos aerospace titanium Only four other countries

smelt high- grade titanium in industrial quantities the United States Germany Japan and China

Overall global production capacity is limited while demand is growing The United States cur-

rently imports around 79 percent of all the titanium it consumes each year18

17 ldquoBoeing and VSMPO Avisma to Launch Second Joint Production Siterdquo Rus sian Aviation Insider December 22 2016

http wwwrusaviainsider com boeing - and - vsmpo - avisma - to - launch - second - joint - production - site

18 Jon Ostrower and Andy Pasztor ldquoBoeing United Technologies Stockpile Titanium Partsrdquo Wall Street Journal

August 7 2014 https wwwwsj com articles boeing - united - technologies - stockpiling - titanium - parts - 1407441886

Figure 511 US Imports from Rus sia Civilian Aircrafts and Parts US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 1992ndash2016)

0

$20000000

$40000000

$60000000

$80000000

$100000000

$120000000

$140000000

$160000000

$180000000

$200000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Parts-civilian aircraft

Civilian aircraft

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 34 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 35

The Sanctions Act authorizes the secretary of the trea sury (in a nonmandatory way) to impose

restrictions (without specifying them) against Rus sian state- owned entities operating in the railway

metals and mining sectors of the Rus sian economy Despite the commanding heights of Rus siarsquos

state sector owner ship in its economy (70 percent of GDP) the metal- producing companies have

remained mostly in private hands

NUCLEAR AFFAIRS

Historically owners and operators of the 104 commercial nuclear power reactors in the United

States have purchased more than 80 percent of their uranium from foreign countries Uranium

shipping from Rus sia accounted for about 13 percent of the 58 million pounds of uranium pur-

chased overseas in 201219 At the same time the Rus sian state- owned mono poly Rosatom ac-

counts for 20 percent of Kazakhstanrsquos uranium production (which in turn comprises 11 percent of

all US uranium imports) and 20 percent of US domestic uranium production capacity (with

owner ship of exploration tracts in Wyoming)20

Nuclear fuel and nuclear power continue to be po liti cally sensitive topics both in the United

States and Rus sia Bilateral cooperation in this sector (being surprisingly stable with imports of

nuclear fuel from Rus sia at a level of $1 billion annually in the last five years [Figure 512 and 513])

is under constant po liti cal and lobbying pressure and has been a source of several po liti cal scan-

dals21 Consequently upside risks in this area of interaction are minimal and downside risks are

much higher especially when we are seeing more decommissioning of nuclear plants in the

United States than new constructions The US EIArsquos 2017 Annual Energy Outlook assumes

that about 25 percent of the nuclear capacity now operating will be removed from ser vice

by 205022

WHY IS THE GRASS GREENER ON THE OTHER SIDE

The United States continues to significantly reduce imports of chemical fertilizers as domestic pro-

duction increases In 2016 the United States imported 13 percent less ammonia and 11 percent

less urea and UAN which is a liquid urea and ammonium nitrate fertilizer Rus sia accounts for

around 40 percent of UAN imported by the United States The United States canceled antidumping

duties on imports of ammonium nitrate and urea from Rus sia in 2016 but it did not prevent import

19 US EIA ldquoThe US Relies on Foreign Uranium Enrichment Ser vices to Fuel Its Nuclear Power Plantsrdquo Today in

Energy August 28 2013 https wwweia gov todayinenergy detail php idshy=shy1273

20 Colin Chilcoat ldquoDoes Rus sia Really Own 20 Percent of the USrsquo Uranium Reservesrdquo OilPricecom May 6 2015

http oilpricecom Alternative - Energy Nuclear - Power Does - Russia - Really - Own - 20 - Of - The - US - Uranium - Reserves

html

21 Michelle Ye Hee Lee ldquoThe Facts behind Trumprsquos Repeated Claim about Hillary Clintonrsquos Role in the Rus sian Ura-

nium Dealrdquo Washington Post October 26 2016

22 US EIA ldquoAnnual Energy Outlook 2017 with Projections to 2050rdquo 81ndash82

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 35 102017 404 PM

Figure 512 US Imports from Rus sia Share of Oil Metals and Nuclear Fuel Million US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 1992ndash2016)

87

86

90

90

90

91

88

86

7882

0

$5000

$10000

$15000

$20000

$25000

$30000

$35000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

US Imports from Russia

Share of Oil Metals and Nuclear Fuel

Figure 513 US Imports from Rus sia Nuclear Fuel Materials US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

$-

$200000000

$400000000

$600000000

$800000000

$1200000000

$1000000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 36 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 37

drops twice last year (Figures 514 and 515) According to forecasts UAN imports are expected to

decline further to 15 million tons this year down over 46 percent from 28 million tons imported

last year23 The downside trend in imports of fertilizers will likely continue because of oversupply

BIG FISH

US imports of fish and shellfish from Rus sia are best understood in comparison with US fish

exports to the Rus sian market which slipped to zero in August 2014 after Rus sia issued an order

banning certain agricultural imports from the United States (Figure 516) While the volume of US

supply was not very large it was impor tant because it broke up the monopolistic dominance of a

few vertically integrated Rus sian companies that have kept prices high by restricting the entry of

new producers Seeking to implement import substitution policies Rus sia has tried to reduce

exports as well as imports of fish and seafood products in the last couple of years This symmetri-

cal approach was intended to ldquocompensaterdquo for a decrease of fish products in the domestic

23 Deepika Thapliyal ldquoPotashCorp Forecasts Sharp Drop in US Nitrogen Imports in 2017rdquo ICIS News February 7

2017 https wwwicis com resources news 2017 02 07 10076734 potashcorp - forecasts - sharp - drop - in - us - nitrogen

- imports - in - 2017

Figure 514 US Imports from Rus sia Share of Oil Metals Nuclear Fuel and Fertilizers Million US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

90

93

92

93

94

95

92

91

85

86

0

$5000

$10000

$15000

$20000

$25000

$30000

$35000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

US Imports from Russia

Share of Oil Metals Nuclear Fuel and Fertilizers

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 37 102017 404 PM

Figure 515 US Imports from Rus sia Chemical- Fertilizers US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

S-

$200000000

$400000000

$600000000

$800000000

$1000000000

$1200000000

$1400000000

$1600000000

$1800000000

$2000000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Figure 516 US Exports to Rus sia Fish and Shellfish US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

0

$10000000

$20000000

$30000000

$40000000

$50000000

$60000000

$70000000

$80000000

$90000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Fish and shellfish

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 38 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 39

consumer market caused by Rus siarsquos import ban but it has failed As result the group most af-

fected by the self- imposed counter- sanctions were Rus sian consumers

With a significant drop in fish imports a devaluation of the ruble and inflationary pressures on

seafood prices yearly consumption of fish in Rus sia has declined precipitously In 2015 alone

fish prices increased 20 percent and consumption dropped to 14 kilograms per person24 from

22 kilograms in 201425 In 2016 food rose to 355 percent of house hold expenditure as a result of

increases in food prices26 This has pushed vertically integrated fishing monopolies to sell even

more of their catch abroad rather than deliver to the Rus sian Federation (Figure 517) Thus we

cannot exclude the possibility of further growth in US fish and shellfish imports from Rus sia on a

marginal scale

24 Александр Савельев ldquoПотребление рыбы в России упало до 14 кг на человекаrdquo [Fish consumption in Rus sia fell to

14 kg per person] Экономика Интерфакс January 28 2015 http wwwinterfax ru business 492038

25 Илья Шестаков ldquoПотебление рыбы в России снизилось на 10 процентов из- за роста ценrdquo [Fish consumption in

Rus sia dropped by 10 percent due to price increases] RNS March 8 2017 https rnsonline consumer - market

Potreblenie - ribi - v - Rossii - snizilos - na - 10 - iz - za - rosta - tsen - 2017 - 03 - 08

26 Zoya Sheftalovich and Christian Oliver ldquoRus siarsquos Boom (Farming) Economyrdquo Politico November 8 2016 http

wwwpolitico eu article russias - boom - farming - economy

Figure 517 US Imports from Rus sia Fish and Shellfish US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

0

$50000000

$100000000

$150000000

$200000000

$250000000

$300000000

$350000000

$400000000

$450000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 39 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations40

SPACE ODYSSEY

Among high- end products beyond the top five groups of goods imported from Rus sia cheap and

efficient Rus sian engines have been used to launch US rockets into space for about 16 years

(Figure 518) There was a serious po liti cal strug gle around a 2014 ban on the purchase of Rus sian

RD-180 rocket engines revealing the conflicting business interests of power ful high- tech companies

This restrictive mea sure was temporary and was quickly lifted because of significant cost impacts

and risks of disruption to launch schedules27 For the same reason the Sanctions Act does not autho-

rize ldquothe imposition of any sanction or other condition limitation restriction or prohibition that

directly or indirectly impedes the supply by any entity of the Rus sian Federation of any product or

ser vice or the procurement of such product or ser vice by any contractor or subcontractor of the

United States or any other entity relating to or in connection with any space launch conducted for

the National Aeronautics and Space Administration or any other nonndash Department of Defense

customerrdquo28

Nevertheless many experts believe that US domestic alternatives to replace Rus sian engines will

be viable in five to eight years

27 Ken Dilanian ldquoWhy Does the US Use Rus sian Rockets to Launch Its Satellitesrdquo NBC News updated November 15

2016 http wwwnbcnews com why - does - u - s - use - russian - rockets - launch - its - satellites - n588526

28 Countering Amer i carsquos Adversaries through Sanctions Act HR 3364

Figure 518 Spacecraft Excluding Military US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

0

$20000000

$40000000

$60000000

$80000000

$100000000

$120000000

$140000000

$160000000

$180000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 40 102017 404 PM

41

Diversity and technological complexity are the most vis i ble advantages supporting US exports to

Rus sia Three major groups of export goods include civilian aircraft engines and parts (Figure 61)

drilling and oil field equipment (Figure 62) and industrial machines and engines (Figure 63)

Despite sanctions against the transfer of advanced oil producing and pro cessing technologies the

realization of US drilling and oil field equipment in Rus sia is sustainable although some bilateral

proj ects have been frozen

Another category of goods that has demonstrated resilience is the phar ma ceu ti cal industry (Fig-

ure 64) because most drugs in Rus sia are imported (about 70 percent of the Rus sian phar ma ceu-

ti cal market in value) Import substitution policies have had only modest results in this industry

As confirmed by American Chamber of Commerce surveys US exports to Rus sia are closely

connected to US FDI 30 percent of total imports of US companies working in the Rus sian

market come from the United States (more than $2 billion in 2016) In other words about

40 percent of all US exports to Rus sia are related to a US corporate- sector business pro cess in

the country The major sectors of activity of these companies are energy and natu ral resources

(52 percent) manufacturing (17 percent) information and communications technology or ICT

(13 percent) retail (7 percent) automotive industry (6 percent) phar ma ceu ti cal production

(1 percent) professional ser vices (05 percent) and other (2 percent)1

Some obvious constraints on US exports to Rus sia have resulted from a reduction in demand A

deterioration of bilateral relations and implementation of sanctions and counter- sanctions have

directly or indirectly afected all businesses Figures 65 and 66 provide data regarding a dramatic

drop in the sale of US agricultural production in Rus sia with all other categories of exports in

goods showing big cuts as well (see Figures 67ndash69)

Exports of civilian aircraft engines and parts put the state of Washington in first place among

other states as a leading exporter to the Rus sian market (Figure 610)

1 American Chamber of Commerce in Rus sia ldquoInvestment and Import to Rus sia 2nd Surveyrdquo 13

Diversity and Constraints

06

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 41 102017 404 PM

Figure 61 US Exports of Civilian Aircraft Engines Equipment and Parts to Rus sia US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

$2500000000

$2000000000

$1500000000

$1000000000

$500000000

$-

Figure 62 US Exports of Drilling and Oil Field Equipment US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

0

$5000000

$10000000

$15000000

$20000000

$25000000

$30000000

$35000000

$40000000

$45000000

$50000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 42 102017 404 PM

Figure 63 US Exports of Industrial Engines to Rus sia US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

0

$5000000

$10000000

$15000000

$20000000

$25000000

$30000000

$35000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Figure 64 US Exports of Phar ma ceu ti cal Preparations to Rus sia US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

0

$5000000

$10000000

$15000000

$20000000

$25000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 43 102017 404 PM

Figure 65 US Exports of Meat and Poultry to Rus sia US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Meat poultry etc

$1000000000

$800000000

$600000000

$400000000

$200000000

$-

$1200000000

$1400000000

$1600000000

Figure 66 US Exports of Soybeans to Rus sia US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

0

$20000000

$40000000

$60000000

$80000000

$100000000

$120000000

$140000000

$160000000

$180000000

$200000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 44 102017 404 PM

Figure 67 US Exports of Vehicles Engines and Parts to Rus sia US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Other parts and accessories of vehicles

Automotive tires and tubes

Bodies and chassis for passenger cars

Engines and engine parts (carburetors pistonsrings and valves)

Trucks buses and special purpose vehicles

Passenger cars new and used

$2500000000

$2000000000

$1500000000

$500000000

$-

$1000000000

Figure 68 US Exports of Medicinal Equipment to Rus sia US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

$10000000

$15000000

$20000000

$25000000

$30000000

$35000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 45 102017 404 PM

Figure 610 US Exports to Rus sia by States (2016 US$ Value) Million US$ 2013ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoState and Metropolitan Area Trade Datardquo

Iowa Kentucky

North Dakota

Oklahoma

South Carolina

Washington

0

$500

$1000

$1500

$2000

2013 2014 2015 2016

District of Columbia

Iowa

Kentucky

North Dakota

Oklahoma

South Carolina

Washington

Figure 69 US Exports of Excavating Machinery to Rus sia US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

0

$5000000

$10000000

$15000000

$20000000

$25000000

$30000000

$35000000

$40000000

$45000000

$50000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 46 102017 404 PM

47

Upon reviewing the current trend in US- Russia economic relations we must acknowledge that

the existing trade model is obsolete and exhausted Imports are resource- oriented and reflect

constraints of the Rus sian economic structure while five groups of goodsmdash oil metals nuclear

fuels fertilizers and fishmdash make up more than 90 percent of total imports from Rus sia (Figure 71)

Each of these industries has a limited capacity for growth in the foreseeable future

Rus siarsquos core export to the United Statesmdash oilmdash will inevitably decrease in the mid- term under any

scenario The value and volume of Rus sian exports to the United States are open to global market

volatility and po liti cal pressures with limited hedging mechanisms

Overall US exports to Rus sia are unsustainable due to bilateral po liti cal tensions the whims of

commodity markets and changing domestic policies Sanctions and counter- sanctions have

created additional barriers particularly in finance banking high- tech energy and agro- business

According to the American Chamber of Commerce 69 percent of US companies working in the

country consider the impact of US sanctions against Rus sia on their business as negative At the

same time 60 percent of companies do not expect big changes in business relations between

Rus sia and the United States under Trump1 as the new law codifies existing sanctions fortifies

them and extends them to new sectors

Current US investments are low due to the weak rule of law in Rus sia a lack of property right

protections and proper contract enforcement high levels of statization and monopolization in the

economy a poor business climate outdated capital stock dependence on natural- resource

sectors and of course sanction and counter- sanction mea sures Bloated administrative compo-

nents created as risk mitigation instruments have also served as impediments The countryrsquos

institutional weakness low level of productivity bud get constraints and a declining inflexible

workforce will restrain future economic growth even if commodity prices recover Rus sian eco-

nomic policy will likely continue to be statist and protectionist relying mostly on import

substitutions

1 Ibid 11

Existing Trends and Future Scenarios

07

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 47 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations48

What scenarios can be expected in such a challenging environment

One probability (no peace no war) is based on the assumption that matters will not deteriorate

further and implementation of the Sanctions Act will be cursory This will cause relatively slow

degradation in the economic field with occasional flashes of activity in selected areas (eg closer

cooperation against Islamist terrorist groups in Syria)

A second worse case or critical scenario is the intensive and full- scale execution of current sanc-

tion legislation and even the imposition of new economic punitive and restrictive mea sures which

could incite asymmetric retaliatory actions and lead to the introduction of additional protectionist

policies This in turn could trigger a further escalation of mutual confrontation and could eventu-

ally destroy the fundamentals of the current bilateral trade system Rus sian leadership has charac-

terized the Sanctions Act as a declaration of a trade war that ends all hope for improving bilateral

relations2

2 Дмитрий Медведев ldquoПодписание президентом США нового санкционного закона против России создает несколько

последствийrdquo [The US Presidentrsquos signing of the package of new sanctions against Rus sia will have a few conse-

quences] Facebook August 2 2017 https wwwfacebook com Dmitry Medvedev posts 10154587161801851

Figure 71 US Imports from Rus sia Share of Oil Metals Nuclear Fuel Fertilizers and Fish Million US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

93

94

93

94

95

96

93

92

87

89

0

$5000

$10000

$15000

$20000

$25000

$30000

$35000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

US Imports from Russia

Share of Oil Metals Nuclear FuelFertilizers and Fish

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 48 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 49

The best case and most favorable scenario looks less probable now It assumes the realization of

structural reforms in Rus sia in such a way that would adapt Rus siarsquos foreign policy to national

economic needs reduce confrontations with the West and make a concerted efort to integrate

Rus sian businesses into global supply and value chains A revitalization of the structural reform

agendamdash including eforts to diversify economic activities through de- monopolization and support

for SMEs a restructuring of the banking sector the creation of a vibrant business climate to foster

entrepreneurships and innovation the implementation of administrative and judicial reforms to

tackle red tape and endemic corruption and the reduction of state control over key sectors of the

economy via wide- spread privatization could kick- start the development of a nonoil economy and

improve long- term growth prospects Despite ongoing discussion of reform strategies deep

economic and po liti cal changes are extremely complicated over the next po liti calelectoral cycle

(2018ndash2024) particularly because of re sis tance of vested interests and growing commodity prices

The urgency to tackle structural shortcomings in natu ral resource- dependent economies usually

correlates with the price of those resources and the degree to which resource rents drive eco-

nomic activity However there may be marginal improvements in the efficiency of the current

economic system

Future US- Russia relations can be thought of through three pillars one pillar focuses on areas

where both countries maintain a competitive rivalry another looks at potential areas of interaction

under pres ent conditions a third pillar and one that has evaporated from the current bilateral

agenda concentrates on future cooperation Stronger economic ties could not only be a kind of

po liti cal shock absorber but contribute to the building of this future (particularly business contacts

aim to support future structural reforms) although po liti cal factors are depressing the prospects

for cooperation To escape deadlock it will be impor tant to establish the right balance between

politics and economics and create a model of collaboration within the framework of contention

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 49 102017 404 PM

About the Author

Vadim Grishin PhD MBA has been involved in the reform pro cess in Rus sia as adviser to the

deputy prime minister of Rus sia in 1992ndash1993 and 2006ndash2010 He has extensive experience

working with the Bretton Woods Institutions He was the board member of the World Bank Group

and served as se nior adviser at the International Monetary Fund Currently he is a con sul tant to the

chief economistrsquos office of the International Finance Corporation and teaches the economics of

transition at Georgetown University in Washington DC

50

594-71613_ch99_4Pindd 50 102017 403 PM

Blank

COVER PHOTO ADOBE STOCK

1616 Rhode Island Avenue NW

Washington DC 20036

202 887 0200 | wwwcsisorg

v++ISBN 978-1-4422-8035-9

Lanham bull Boulder bull New York bull London

4501 Forbes Boulevard

Lanham MD 20706

301 459 3366 | wwwrowmancom

A U T H O R

Vadim Grishin

Myths and Realities

A Report of the

CSIS RUSSIA AND EURASIA PROGRAM

US-RussiaEconomicRelations

O C T O B E R 2 0 1 7

Euml|xHSLEOCy280359z

The Man Pupu Nyor Rock Formations at the Northern Urals also known as Seven

Strong Man or Little Mountain of the God in the local tribe (Mansi) language

Page 20: U.S.-Russia Economic Relations: Myths and Realities · 2020-04-17 · OCTOBER 2017 U.S.- Russia Economic Relations Myths and Realities AUTHOR Vadim Grishin A REPORT OF THE CSIS RUSSIA

US-Russia Economic Relations14

Figure 33 US- Russia Trade Million US$ vs Po liti cal Cycle 2000ndash2016

Sources US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo Foreign Trade last modified June 29 2017

https wwwcensus gov foreign - trade balance c4621 html (see data for 2000ndash2016) authorrsquos evaluation

of po liti cal and economic data

Orange Revolution

Khodorkovskys arrest

GeorgianWar

Bush- Putin Reset

Iraq War Global Financial Crisis

Obama-Medvedev Reset

Russias WTO accession

New START Treaty

A Pefect Storm the Ukranian Crisis Oil Prices Crashing

Sanctions and Counter-Sanctions

$3000

$8000

$13000

$18000

$23000

$28000

$33000

$38000

$43000

2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 14 102017 404 PM

15

The current structure of US- Russia economic relations emerged in the early 2000s when the

model of trade and investment interaction took on a character similar to that which existed be-

tween the United States and developing economies US imports from Rus sia centered on com-

modities while technology along with food products lead American exports The primary

exception was that Rus sia supplied nuclear fuel including highly enriched uranium extracted from

nuclear weapons for US power plants and provided ser vices to the aerospace industry primarily

in satellite launches However both these exceptions can be explained as a legacy of the Soviet

past and not a harbinger of the future economic relationship (Figure 41)

In the last 15 years this trade structure has not changed significantly The only noticeable shift in

trade was a dramatic drop (to practically nothing) in exports of US agricultural products a result

of Rus siarsquos policy of import substitution and so- called counter- sanction mea sures it took in re-

sponse to US sanctions over the Ukraine crisis (Figure 42)

Promising new directions of cooperation in the IT sector and in engineering ser vices for the

aerospace industry appeared in the early 2000s1 but did not spill into other sectors and conse-

quently did little to renew economic cooperation on the whole The integration of Rus sian high-

tech ser vices into large- scale global production and value chains was constrained by the usual

culprits a lack of financial resources managerial experience skilled labor modern infrastructure

RampD investments and an adequate business environment High commodity prices incentivized the

restoration of an economic system centered on resource rents The leading role of oil and gas

extraction and transportation discouraged the development of a nonenergy sector that might

have created advanced and complex production and ser vices An import substitution policy could

not work efficiently in an economic environment plagued by the Dutch disease where currency

1 The Boeing Design Center was created in Moscow It consists of nearly 250 Boeing employees managing

a team of 1200 contract engineers from Rus sian and Ukrainian aerospace companies ldquoBackgrounder Boeing in

Rus siardquo Boeing last modified January 2017 http wwwboeing com resources boeingdotcom company key _ orgs

boeing - international pdf russia - cisbackgrounder pdf

Are the United States and Rus sia ldquoNatu ralrdquo Trading Partners A Little Bit of History

04

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 15 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations16

inflows (oil money) lead to ruble appreciation and render a countryrsquos production less competitive

During that time Rus siarsquos industry did not receive preferential access to larger markets and could

not expand its share in the global economy particularly because of its self- isolation from the

regional trade agreements (except for its participation in the Eurasian Economic Union with some

neighboring countries of the former Soviet Union) As a result neither import substitution nor

export- led strategy promoted growth and specialization in nonoil production A long- awaited

modernization and reallocation of resources from an inefficient nontrade sector to a trade sector

did not materialize

These limits were later augmented with sanctions and an extension of domestic restrictions on

cooperation with Western partners Importantly the rapid growth of state- monopoly structures in

the Rus sian economy over the past 15 years has created additional obstacles to the development

and diversification of US- Russia economic ties

Figure 41 US Imports from Rus sia US$ 2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2016)

Fish and shellfish 3

Crude oil 5

Fuel oil 37

Petroleum products other

8

Nuclear fuel materials

7

Chemicals-fertilizers 4

Steelmaking materials 5

Iron and steel mill products 4

Bauxite and aluminum 9

Other precious metals 4

Nonferrous metals other 1

Finished metal shapes 1

Synthetic rubber--primary

1

Spacecraftexcluding military

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 16 102017 404 PM

Fig

ure

42

U

S E

xpo

rts

to R

us s

ia U

S$ 2

016

Sou

rce

US

Ce

nsu

s B

ure

au ldquo

Trad

e in

Go

od

s w

ith

Ru

s sia

rdquo (s

ee

dat

a fo

r 2

016

)

Bak

ery

pro

du

cts

Win

e b

eer

an

d r

elat

ed

pro

du

cts

New

spri

nt

Pla

stic

mat

eria

ls

Ch

emic

als-

fert

ilize

rs

Ch

emic

als-

ino

rgan

icC

hem

ical

s-o

rgan

ic

Ch

emic

als-

oth

erC

ott

on

fib

er c

loth

In

du

stri

al r

ub

ber

pro

du

cts

Min

eral

su

pp

lies-

man

ufa

ctu

red

Gen

erat

ors

acc

esso

ries

Ele

ctri

c ap

par

atu

s

Dri

llin

g amp

oilfi

eld

eq

uip

men

t Sp

ecia

lized

min

ing

Exc

avat

ing

mac

hin

ery

No

nfa

rm t

ract

ors

an

d p

arts

In

du

stri

al e

ng

ines

Fo

od

to

bac

co m

ach

iner

y M

etal

wo

rkin

g m

ach

ine

too

ls

Tex

tile

sew

ing

m

ach

ines

W

oo

d g

lass

p

last

ic

Pu

lp a

nd

pap

er

mac

hin

ery

Mea

suri

ng

tes

tin

g

con

tro

l in

stru

men

ts

Mat

eria

ls h

and

ling

equ

ipm

ent

Ind

ust

rial

mac

hin

es

oth

er

Ph

oto

ser

vice

ind

ust

ry m

ach

iner

y A

gri

cult

ura

l mac

hin

ery

eq

uip

men

t C

om

pu

ters

Co

mp

ute

r ac

cess

ori

es

Sem

ico

nd

uct

ors

Tel

eco

mm

un

icat

ion

seq

uip

men

t

Bu

sin

ess

mac

hin

es a

nd

eq

uip

men

t

Lab

ora

tory

tes

tin

g in

stru

men

ts

Med

icin

al e

qu

ipm

ent

Civ

ilian

air

craf

t e

ng

ines

eq

uip

men

t a

nd

par

ts

Rai

lway

tra

nsp

ort

atio

n

equ

ipm

ent

Ves

sels

exc

lud

ing

scr

ap

Co

mm

erci

al v

esse

ls o

ther

M

arin

e en

gin

es p

arts

Spac

ecra

ft e

xclu

din

g

mili

tary

Pas

sen

ger

car

s

new

an

d u

sed

Tru

cks

bu

ses

and

sp

ecia

l p

urp

ose

ve

hic

les

En

gin

es a

nd

en

gin

e p

arts

(c

arb

ure

tors

pis

ton

s r

ing

s

and

val

ves)

B

od

ies

and

ch

assi

s fo

r p

asse

ng

er c

ars

Au

tom

oti

ve t

ires

an

d t

ub

es

Oth

er p

arts

an

d a

cces

sori

es o

f ve

hic

les

Ap

par

el h

ou

seh

old

go

od

s -

text

ile

Ph

arm

aceu

tica

lp

rep

arat

ion

s

Furn

itu

re h

ou

seh

old

go

od

s

etc

R

ug

s

Cel

l ph

on

es a

nd

oth

er

ho

use

ho

ld g

oo

ds

ne

c

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 17 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations18

Figure 43 US Trade in Goods with Rus sia Million US$ 1992ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 1992ndash2016)

Russian Financial Crisis

Oil price Increased from$2446 USD per barrel (2001)

to $9694 USD per barrel(2008)

Global Financial Crisis

Oil price high record in2011-2012

(more that $111 USD perbarrel)

Oil price crashed

$-

$5000

$10000

$15000

$20000

$25000

$30000

$35000

$40000

$45000

$50000

1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

US Imports from Russia US Exports to Russia US-Russia Trade in Goods

No doubt po liti cal ups and downs add volatility to US- Russia trade Nevertheless Rus siarsquos eco-

nomic structure exhausted itself before the Ukrainian crisis and the recent Rus sian recession Its

limitations are not only due to some mistakes in policy or negative coincidences of circumstances

but rather to deeply rooted properties in the current bilateral trade model related to structural

issues in the Rus sian economy Structural constraints such as the weak enforcement of property

rights poor business regulation and nondiversified exports weighed on Rus sian trade with the

United States From this perspective the term ldquonaturalunnatural trading partnersrdquo does not ad-

dress the unused capacity of bilateral interaction or the real challenges that kind of interaction

faces It just adds metaphysical flavor to the very specific economic and po liti cal factors that

determine the US- Russia trajectory

Overall the outlines of bilateral trade (Figure 43) resemble the famous ldquoRus sian Mountainsrdquo that

were a pre de ces sor of the modern roller coaster icy hills supported by wooden constructionsmdash a

rigid and immobile structure that sooner or later would melt This unfortunately is what is hap-

pening to US- Russia trade cooperation now

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 18 102017 404 PM

19

ARE LITTLE FISH REALLY SWEET

Low US- Russia economic interaction has at least two consequences First it limits the capacity of

policymakers to exploit trade as an instrument for geopo liti cal combat Even the question of a US

trade deficit which used to be a headache for many US trading partners has become so insig-

nificant in absolute terms (about $87 billion in 2016) that it seems hardly worth caring about

When the volume of trade between two countries becomes very small in absolute terms whether

a country is running a surplus or deficit is no longer relevant But it also renders another type of

confrontations (sometimes more dangerous) more likely since the two traders have little to lose

Second in an environment marked by low levels of bilateral trade both sides could incentivize (if

and when a desire for po liti cal rapprochement exists) the signing of new trade deals which are

elevated symbolically as a turning point in bilateral po liti cal relations (ie the sale of Boeings to

Rus sia or the delivery via tankers of Rus sian oil to US refineries) Sometimes markets themselves

pres ent ldquogiftsrdquo that can be capitalized on po liti cally US- USSR grain trade in the 1970s was one

such ldquogiftrdquo large sales of American grain to the Soviet Union helped US policymakers win favor

with the po liti cally impor tant American farming sector and permitted Soviet leaders to maintain

access to a dietary staple for the Soviet population

The strong 32 percent growth in value of US imports from Rus sia from January to May 2017

versus January to May 2016 ( Table 51) is an example of a development that has tempted officials

to pres ent it as a sign of positive change due to ldquogrowing business activitiesrdquo (this kind of statement

was heard before the bilateral summit in Germany in July 2017) although the reason for that leap

was evidently an increase in commodity prices (mainly of oilmdash see Table 52) and not a rise in

entrepreneurial interactions The primary beneficiaries of that upside rally have been two other

petro- economies Saudi Arabia and Venezuela ( Tables 53 and 54)

Sector Analyses

05

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 19 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations20

Table 51 US Imports from Rus sia Million US$ Januaryndash May 2016 vs Januaryndash May 2017

Year January February March April May Total

2016 9603 6871 11097 12257 10977 50805

2017 12215 10220 16979 13471 14147 67032

Change 271 487 530 99 289 319

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 1992ndash2016)

Table 52 Change in Urals Crude Oil Prices US$ per Barrel Januaryndash May 2016 vs Januaryndash May 2017

Januaryndash May 2016 Januaryndash May 2017 Change ($) Change ()

3601 5129 1528 424

Source Ministry of Finance of the Rus sian Federation https wwwminfin ru ru ixzz4mMIZ7XtC

Table 53 US Imports from Saudi Arabia Million US$ Januaryndash May 2016 vs Januaryndash May 2017

Year January February March April May Total

2016 15114 9036 13555 10844 14679 63228

2017 19802 20298 21650 16211 19542 97503

Change 3101 12463 5972 495 331 542

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Saudi Arabiardquo Foreign Trade last modified June 29 2017

https wwwcensus gov foreign - trade balance c5170 html (see data for 2016ndash2017)

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 20 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 21

Table 54 US Imports from Venezuela Million US$ Januaryndash May 2016 vs Januaryndash May 2017

Year January February March April May Total

2016 6657 5560 7140 8007 7922 35286

2017 13041 10864 123500 11148 12243 59646

Change 9590 9540 7297 3923 5454 6903

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Venezuelardquo Foreign Trade last modified June 29 2017

https wwwcensus gov foreign - trade balance c3070 html (see data for 2016ndash2017)

Table 55 US Exports to Rus sia Million US$ Januaryndash May 2016 vs Januaryndash May 2017

Year January February March April May Total

2016 3628 3577 7298 4657 4947 24107

2017 3144 4277 5386 6670 4806 24283

Change minus133 196 minus262 432 minus29 minus07

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2016ndash2017)

At the same time US exports to Rus sia continue to stagnate ( Table 55) due to low levels of

consumption during a two-and- a- half-year economic crisis a deep ruble devaluation sanctions

and counter- sanctions

Given the very dif er ent economic structures and resource endowments of Rus sia and the United

States it is not surprising that US- Russia trade is asymmetric and oil driven (Figure 51) A

3 percent increase in Urals oil prices translates into a one percent increase in US import growth

from Rus sia Thus in 2016 every $10 increase in Urals crude oil added $15 billion to the value of

US imports or 11 percent to the total value of imports from Rus sia

OIL ADDICTION

Oil is a core pillar of US- Russia bilateral trade A bumpy ride in oil markets afects commerce

Nevertheless Rus sian oil exports to the United States in physical terms have been rather

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 21 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations22

sustainable Starting from 2005 average annual deliveries have been above 150 million barrels

(Figure 52) Crude and heating oil have dominated while petroleum products and liquefied petro-

leum gases have not (Figure 53) In 2011 oil exports peaked at 228 million barrels but declined to

159 million barrels in 2016mdash a drop of 30 percent Rec ord high shipments of Rus sian oil to the United

States coincided with an elevation in oil prices which made the subsequent decline in oil shipment

value between 2011 and 2016 (by about 72 percent as shown in Figure 54) seem more stark The

increase in price also raised the share of oil in Rus sian exports by 74 percent in 2011 (Figure 55)

The Rus sian share in total US oil imports was around 55 percent in 2011 and 43 percent in 2016

( Table 56) In the last five years the United States has relied exclusively on consumption of Rus sian

oil for the rough equivalent of one week out of the year (Figure 56)

It is unlikely that Rus sia can significantly increase its share of the US oil market and there is a real

possibility for a downward trend There are several reasons the historically high Rus sian hydrocar-

bon export threshold of 2011 will not soon if ever be surpassed

First US energy consumption will likely be flat According to the US Energy Information Adminis-

tration (EIA) demand for petroleum and other liquids in the United States will be about 35ndash36

quadrillion British thermal units (BTUs) with minimal variation over the next 25 years1

1 US EIA ldquoAnnual Energy Outlook 2017 with Projections to 2050rdquo January 5 2017 7ndash8

Figure 51 US- Russia Trade Growth () vs US and Rus sia Real GDP Growth () 1993ndash2016

Source IMF ldquoIMF Datardquo accessed September 27 2017 http wwwimf org en Data US Census Bureau

ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo

Note rGDPthinsp=thinspreal gross domestic product

Trade

USA rGDP growth

Russia rGDP growth

-60

-40

-20

0

20

40

60

80

100

1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Gro

wth

All spikes in US-Russia trade have been connected with two main

variables volume and price of crude oil

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 22 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 23

Second the United States will become a net energy exporter between 2020 and 2030 in most

cases under dif er ent combinations of oil and natu ral gas prices GDP growth technological

breakthroughs and the availability of energy resources The role of oil imports will dramatically

fall2

Third oil price scenarios as described by the International Energy Agency (IEA) international

financial organ izations (IFIs) and many national agencies are very cautious and assume that even

by 2035 to 2040 oil prices will not to recover to the levels of 2011ndash20123

Fourth Rus sian oil production and export growth will be modest and driven by Asian economic

expansion and will comprise a decreasing share of Western markets4 According to forecasts from

2 Ibid 15ndash18

3 Ibid table 3 ldquoEnergy Prices by Sector and Sourcesrdquo World Bank World Bank Commodity Markets Price Forecasts

(Washington DC World Bank 2017) httpswwwworldbank org en research commodity - markets Organ ization of the

Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) World Oil Outlook 2016 (Vienna OPEC 2016)

4 E D Belotskaia et al Global and Rus sian Energy Outlook 2016 (Moscow Energy Research Institute of the Rus sian

Acad emy of Science Analytical Center for the Government of the Rus sian Federation 2016) http acgov ru files

publication a 12767 pdf

Figure 52 US Imports from Rus sia Crude Oil and Petroleum Products Thousands of Barrels 1995ndash2016

Source US EIA ldquoUS Imports by Country of Origin Rus siardquo Petroleum amp Other Liquids September 13

2017 http wwweia gov dnav pet PET _ MOVE _ IMPCUS _ D _ NUS _ NRS _ MBBL _ M htm

0

50000

100000

150000

200000

250000

Date 1995 1996 1997 1998 199920002001200220032004200520062007200820092010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 23 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations24

the Organ ization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) crude oil exports from Rus sia and

the Caspian region to the United States will dis appear by 20255

So why does the Rus sian Urals blend continue to be attractive for oil traders and US refineries

which could pro cess greater volumes of domestically produced lighter crude There are two main

reasons One is related to the preference of US high conversion refineries (the most sophisticated

in the world) to work with heavy oil blends produced by Canada Mexico Iraq Venezuela and

Rus sia Pro cessing heavy crude now is as profitable as pro cessing lighter crude The so- called

crack spreadmdash the diference between the cost of relatively cheap heavy crude oil and the final

price of value- added consumer products (diesel gasoline jet fuel and heating oil)mdash has become

the same as the refinery margins of light sweet crude6 This has primarily afected light oil produc-

ing countries such as Angola Algeria and Nigeria

5 OPEC World Oil Outlook 2016 306ndash309

6 ldquoHow Much for That Heavy Oilrdquo Oil Sands Magazine December 26 2015 https wwwoilsandsmagazine com

news 2015 12 26 how - much - for - that - heavy - oil

Figure 53 US Imports from Rus sia Oil and Petroleum Products US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

$-

$25000000000

$20000000000

$15000000000

$10000000000

$5000000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Liquefied petroleum gases

Petroleum products other

Fuel oil

Crude oil

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 24 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 25

Another factor afecting purchase of Rus sian oil is a new trend among oil companies for further

consolidation of scale and for integrating operations of upstream and downstream business7

There have been several waves of separation and unification of production transportation and

pro cessing in the last 50 years The current business cycle can be seen as an adaptation to a

period of low prices and oversupply Companies that buy andor produce oil in Rus sia most likely

prefer to transport and pro cess this oil in their own modern refineries in the United States At the

same time some of the newest refinery designs specifically for pro cessing heavy oils have been

built in Asia thus extending the choices of heavy oil producing countries

We should also consider that leading US and international oil traders along with oil producing

companies working with or owning US refineries frequently buy Rus sian oil on the open market

and have long- term contracts on Rus sian crude oil delivery Many Rus sian oil companies prefer to

pay for purchases or ser vices with their future production instead of cash creating situations of

ldquostickyrdquo oil imports that are difficult to replace The best- known example is an interaction between

7 ldquoEnergy and Utilities Sectorrdquo Roundtable Financier Worldwide December 2015 https wwwfinancierworldwide

com roundtable - energy - utilities - sector - dec15

Figure 54 US Imports of Oil and Petroleum Products from Rus sia vs Oil Prices Eu rope Brent Spot Price Free on Board (FOB) 1996ndash2017

Source US EIA ldquoUS Imports by Country of Origin Rus siardquo

0

20

40

60

80

100

120

140

0

5000

10000

15000

20000

25000

30000

Jan

-19

96

Jun

-19

96

No

v-19

96

Ap

r-19

97

Sep

-19

97

Feb

-19

98

Jul-

199

8D

ec-1

99

8M

ay-1

99

9O

ct-1

99

9M

ar-2

00

0A

ug

-20

00

Jan

-20

01

Jun

-20

01

No

v-2

00

1A

pr-

20

02

Sep

-20

02

Feb

-20

03

Jul-

20

03

Dec

-20

03

May

-20

04

Oct

-20

04

Mar

-20

05

Au

g-2

00

5Ja

n-2

00

6Ju

n-2

00

6N

ov-

20

06

Ap

r-2

00

7Se

p-2

00

7Fe

b-2

00

8Ju

l-2

00

8D

ec-2

00

8M

ay-2

00

9O

ct-2

00

9M

ar-2

010

Au

g-2

010

Jan

-20

11Ju

n-2

011

No

v-2

011

Ap

r-2

012

Sep

-20

12Fe

b-2

013

Jul-

20

13D

ec-2

013

May

-20

14O

ct-2

014

Mar

-20

15A

ug

-20

15Ja

n-2

016

Jun

-20

16N

ov-

20

16

USD

per

Bar

rel

Th

ou

san

d B

arr

els

US Imports from Russia of Crude Oil and Petroleum Products (Thousand Barrels)

Europe Brent Spot Price FOB (Dollars per Barrel)

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 25 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations26

Table 56 US Oil Imports All Countries vs Rus sia Thousand Barrels per Day 2011ndash2016

Years 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

All Countries 11436 10598 9859 9241 9449 10058

Rus sia 624 477 460 330 371 433

Share 546 450 467 357 393 431

Sources US EIA ldquoUS Imports by Country of Origin Total Crude Oil and Productsrdquo Petroleum amp Other

Liquids September 13 2017 wwweia gov dnav pet pet_move_impcus_a2_nus_ep00_im0_mbbl_m htm

authorrsquos computation

Figure 55 US Imports from Rus sia Share of Crude Oil and Petroleum Products Million US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

57

64

73

72

74

73

72

59

52 50

0

$5000

$10000

$15000

$20000

$25000

$30000

$35000

$40000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

US Imports from Russia

Share of Oil and Petroleum Products

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 26 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 27

the Rus sian state mono poly Rosneft and commodity trading and mining giant Glencore which

along with energy and commodities com pany Vitol participated in a $10 billion prepayment

deal with Rosneft for crude supplies in 2013

There have been a number of ongoing transactions between the Rus sian oil industry and interna-

tional oil companies including several that top the list of importers of Rus sian oil to the United

States ( Table 57) In December 2016 Glencore participated in a controversial privatization opera-

tion purchasing in tandem with the Qatar sovereign wealth fund a 195 percent stake in Rosneft

which was on the US and EU list of sanctioned firms8 Glencore has also taken a blocking stake in

midsize oil producer RussNeft BP owns a 1975 percent stake in Rosneft Chevron holds a

15 percent interest in the 935- mile- long CPC9 pipeline which transports an average of 959000

barrels of crude oil per day including 76000 barrels daily from Rus sia10 ExxonMobil has formed

8 E Mazneva and I Arkhipov ldquoRus sia Sells $11 Billion Stake in Rosneft to Glencore Qatarrdquo Bloomberg December 7

2016

9 CPCthinsp=thinspCaspian Pipeline Consortium

10 ldquoRus sia Highlights of Operations and Business Portfoliordquo Chevron accessed October 3 2017 https wwwchevron

com worldwide russia

Figure 56 Share of Rus sian Oil in Total US Oil Imports Thousands of Barrels per Day 1972ndash2016

Source US EIA ldquoUS Imports by Country of Origin Total Crude Oil and Productsrdquo

2000

4000

6000

8000

10000

12000

14000

16000

US Imports of Crude Oil and Petroleum Products (Thousand Barrels per Day)

US Imports from Russia of Crude Oil and Petroleum Products (Thousand Barrels per Day)19

7319

7419

7519

7619

7719

7819

7919

80

198

119

82

198

319

84

198

519

86

198

719

88

198

919

90

199

119

92

199

319

94

199

519

96

199

719

98

199

92

00

02

00

12

00

22

00

32

00

42

00

52

00

62

00

72

00

82

00

92

010

20

112

012

20

132

014

20

152

016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 27 102017 404 PM

Table 57 Top Importers of Rus sian Oil to the United States Thousands of Barrels 2016

VALERO MARKETING amp SUPPLY CO 54590 3616

EXXONMOBIL OIL CORP 17087 1130

CHEVRON USA INC 15217 1008

BP WEST COAST PRODUCTS LLC 10130 671

GEORGE E WARREN CORP 7272 48

PAULSBORO REFINING CO LLC 6838 453

TESORO CORP 5097 338

VITOL INC 5084 337

PHILLIPS 66 CO 4726 313

TRAFIGURA AG 4360 289

PAR HAWAII REFINING LLC 3893 258

MOTIVA ENTERPRISES LLC 3041 205

SHELL US TRADING CO 2863 19

MARATHON PETROLEUM CO LLC 2475 16

ATLANTIC TRADING amp MARKETING 2099 14

FREEPOINT COMMODITIES LLC 1439 1

GLENCORE LTD 1284 85

BEST PETROLEUM CORP 967 64

ROLYMPUS US COMMODITIES GROUP LLC 822 6

HUNT CRUDE OIL SUPPLY CO 666 4

GULF OIL LP 658 4

Source US EIA ldquoUS Imports by Country of Origin Crude Oilrdquo Petroleum amp Other Liquids September 13

2017 httpswwweiagovdnavpetpet_move_impcus_a2_nus_epc0_im0_mbblpd_ahtm authorrsquos

computation

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 28 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 29

several joint ventures with Rosneft to undertake ofshore exploration in the Black Sea and the Kara

Sea in Siberia11

According to the Sanctions Act US persons are prohibited from exporting or reexporting goods

ser vices (except financial ser vices) and technology in support of exploration or production of new

deep- water Arctic ofshore or shale oil proj ects that involve designated Rus sian entities or other

entities in which such sanctioned persons have a controlling interest or a substantial noncontrol-

ling owner ship interest defined as not less than 33 percent (previously it was 50 percent) The new

law also authorizesmdash but does not requiremdash the imposition of so- called secondary sanctions

against non- US entities that engage in activities involving the construction maintenance or

expansion of Rus sian energy export pipelines with a fair market value of $1 million or more or an

aggregate fair market value during a 12- month period of $5 million12 This provision has raised the

concerns of some Eu ro pean countries particularly Germany As result the final language of the

law included wording about coordination of this issue with allies of the United States

Shipments of Rus sian oil to the United States could be afected by activity in the US refinery

industry In early 2017 Saudi Aramco bought the United Statesrsquo largest oil refinery in Port Arthur

(Texas) and it announced plans to send more of its own crude to that refinery13 Serious concerns

exist however regarding the future of three refineries and nine pipelines owned by Citgo a US

branch of the Venezuelan state com pany PdVSA which is balancing precariously on the edge of

default Under certain conditions in the event of PdVSA bankruptcy Rosneft could claim a stake of

up to 499 percent in Citgo Such a possibility has raised concerns among politicians and US

government officials with Trea sury Secretary Steven Mnuchin calling it a ldquonational security issuerdquo14

Tables 58 59 and 510 show allocations of Rus sian oil imports to major US refineries some of

which work exclusively on Rus sian crude a total of two to three months per year In total 150940

thousand barrels of Rus sian oil were refined in 2016

Figure 57 confirms a leading position of Texas and Louisiana among the US states receiving

Rus sian crude followed by New Jersey California Mississippi Washington Hawaii and Delaware

In a paradoxical way Texas has dis appeared from the list of states as a main destination of US

imports from Rus sia (Figure 58) because Rus sian crude is mostly delivered to Louisiana ports and

registered there by US Customs as an import from Rus sia After that it transports to refineries in

Louisiana and Texas

Overall the short- term business rationale behind the sustainability of US oil imports from Rus sia

cannot overcome strong headwinds in the US energy sector facing all oil importers which will

inevitably lead to a contraction of Rus sian oil exports to the United States in the foreseeable future

11 Exxon eforts to receive a special US Trea sury waiver to drill in sanctioned Rus sia failed in 2017

12 Countering Amer i carsquos Adversaries through Sanctions Act HR 3364

13 Sarp Ozkan ldquoSaudi Aramcorsquos Port Arthur Refinery and the US Refinery Fleetrdquo Drilling Info May 11 2017

https infodrillinginfo com saudi - aramcos - port - arthur - refinery - us - refinery - fleet

14 Graham Kates ldquoTrea sury Secretary Rus siarsquos Citgo Deal a National Security Issuerdquo CBS News May 1 2017

http wwwcbsnews com news rosneft - citgo - steven - mnuchin - national - security

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 29 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations30

Table 58 Valerorsquos Refineries Pro cessing Rus sian Oil Thousands of Barrels 2016

Saint Charles Louisiana 29206 535

Corpus Christi Texas 20626 378

Wilmington California 4250 78

Total USA 54590 100

Source US EIA ldquoRefinery Capacity Reportrdquo January 1 2017

table 5 wwweia gov petroleum refinerycapacity table5 pdf

authorrsquos computation

Table 59 ExxonMobil Refineries Pro cessing Rus sian Oil Thousands of Barrels 2016

Baytown Texas 15037 88

Baton Rouge Louisiana 2046 12

Total USA 17083 100

Source US EIA ldquoRefinery Capacity Reportrdquo authorrsquos computation

Table 510 Chevronrsquos Refineries Pro cessing Rus sian Oil Thousands of Barrels 2016

Pascagoula Mississippi 12767 840

El Segundo California 2372 155

Saint Rose Louisiana 78 05

Total USA 15217 100

Source US EIA ldquoRefinery Capacity Reportrdquo authorrsquos computation

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 30 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 31

HEAVY METAL

Taken together US imports of metals and US imports of oil compose about 80 percent of US

total imports from Rus sia (Figure 59) Trade of metals like other commodities is strongly afected

by market price fluctuations Nevertheless metal imports from Rus sia have been fairly resilient to

market volatility and their average annual value has hovered at about $4 billion in the last five years

(Figure 510) This market resilience was forged at the end of the 1990searly 2000s when Rus sian

metal producers gradually modernized their plants adjusting quality of production to Western

standards and enhancing integration into global value and supply chains Some of them conquered

their share of the highly competitive US market struggling with peers from Canada and certain

BRICS countries (China India and Brazil) To attract additional resources all Rus sian large metal-

producing companies became public and were listed on stock exchanges chiefly the London Stock

Exchange (Severstalrsquo PAO Evraz MMK OAO Novolipetsk Steel Norilsk Nikel and TMK PAO) one

on the New York Stock Exchange (Mechel) and one on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange (Rusal)

Business logic pushed some of them to invest in the US metal- making industry which was hit

hard by crisis Later on some of those assets were sold (eg two US steel mills acquired by

Severstal in 2004 were purchased 10 years later by Steel Dynamics Inc and AK Steel Corp)

Figure 57 Share of US States Rus sian Oil Imports 2016

Source US EIA ldquoUS Imports from Rus sia of Crude Oil and Petroleum Productsrdquo Petroleum amp Other

Liquids September 29 2017 https www eia gov dnav pet hist LeafHandler ashx nshy=shyPETampsshy=shyMTTIM _ NUS

- NRS _ 1ampfshy=shyM authorrsquos computation

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

100

Maine

Massachusetts

Maryland

Connecticut

Georgia

Rhode Island

Virginia

Florida

New York

Alabama

Puerto Rico

Pennsylvania

Delaware

Hawaii

Washington

Mississippi

California

New Jersey

Louisiana

Texas

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 31 102017 404 PM

Figure 58 US Imports from Rus sia by State Million US$ 2013ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoState and Metropolitan Area Trade Datardquo Foreign Trade last modified

October 2 2017 https wwwcensus gov foreign - trade statistics state

Alaska

Connecticut

Delaware

Hawaii

Louisiana

Maryland

North Dakota 0

$1000

$2000

$3000

$4000

$5000

$6000

2013 2014 2015 2016

Alabama

Alaska

Connecticut

Delaware

Hawaii

Louisiana

Maryland

Maine

Mississippi

Montana

North Dakota

Mississippi

Figure 59 US Imports from Rus sia Share of Oil and Metals Million US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 1992ndash2016)

83

82

85

86

87

88

85

82

7375

0

$5000

$10000

$15000

$20000

$25000

$30000

$35000

$40000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

US Imports from Russia

Share of Oil and Metals

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 32 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 33

Obviously the market dynamic of dif er ent metals varies (eg iron steel aluminum platinum and

nickel) Caps to increase their trade and production in a ldquored oceanrdquo global environment with

anemic demand is rather limited despite Figure 510 showing a spike of iron and steel imports

from Rus sia in 2014 and aluminum in 2016 Some opportunities may exist for Russian- owned steel

plants in the United States (such as NLMK) to participate in energy proj ects resumed under Presi-

dent Trump who has required that new pipelines use only American- made steel15

Rus sia occupies a special niche in the US market for titanium products a high- end metal indus-

try Twenty years ago a long- term contract was signed between Rus sian titanium producer

VSMPO- AVISMA and Boeing The Rus sian com pany entered the selective club of Boeing suppliers

for the manufacture of components and semi- finished products Since the signing of this contract

VSMPO has delivered more than 35 percent of all titanium placed on Boeing civil aircraft16 They

are hidden in the trade data in an import category for Civilian Aircrafts and Parts (Figure 511) At

the end of 2016 Boeing announced an extension of its framework agreement with AVISMA

15 E Scheyder C Ngai and T Sylvester ldquoAmerican Steel Unlikely to Get Keystone Boost Despite Trump Orderrdquo

Reuters January 27 2017 http wwwreuters com article usa - trump - pipeline - transcanada - idUSL1N1FH1ZD

16 A Kramer ldquoTitanium Fills Vital Role for Boeing and Rus siardquo New York Times July 5 2013 http wwwnytimes com

2013 07 06 business global titanium - fills - vital - role - for - boeing - and - russia html mcubzshy=shy3

Figure 510 US Imports from Rus sia Iron Steel Bauxite Aluminum Nickel Nonferrous Metals and Other Precious Metals and Materials US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 1992ndash2016)

0

$6000000000

$5000000000

$4000000000

$3000000000

$2000000000

$1000000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 20122013

20142015

2016

Finished metal shapes

Iron and steel advanced

Iron and steel products nec

Nonferrous metals other

Other precious metals

Nickel

Bauxite and aluminum

Iron and steel mill products

Steelmaking materials

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 33 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations34

through 2022 and additional investments in the construction of a new robotic plant in Titanium

Valley a special economic zone located in the Sverdlovsk region that will open in 2018 The pro-

cessing of titanium forgings in all Boeing civil aircraft will be performed there including 787s 737

MAXs and 777Xs17 The contract extension with AVISMA may add several hundred million dollars

in value to annual US imports from Rus sia

How can such heavy reliance on imports of Rus sian titanium exist during a period of rising geopo-

liti cal tensions The answer is straightforward VSMPO- AVISMA is a highly specialized natu ral

mono poly producing 45 percent of the worldrsquos aerospace titanium Only four other countries

smelt high- grade titanium in industrial quantities the United States Germany Japan and China

Overall global production capacity is limited while demand is growing The United States cur-

rently imports around 79 percent of all the titanium it consumes each year18

17 ldquoBoeing and VSMPO Avisma to Launch Second Joint Production Siterdquo Rus sian Aviation Insider December 22 2016

http wwwrusaviainsider com boeing - and - vsmpo - avisma - to - launch - second - joint - production - site

18 Jon Ostrower and Andy Pasztor ldquoBoeing United Technologies Stockpile Titanium Partsrdquo Wall Street Journal

August 7 2014 https wwwwsj com articles boeing - united - technologies - stockpiling - titanium - parts - 1407441886

Figure 511 US Imports from Rus sia Civilian Aircrafts and Parts US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 1992ndash2016)

0

$20000000

$40000000

$60000000

$80000000

$100000000

$120000000

$140000000

$160000000

$180000000

$200000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Parts-civilian aircraft

Civilian aircraft

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 34 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 35

The Sanctions Act authorizes the secretary of the trea sury (in a nonmandatory way) to impose

restrictions (without specifying them) against Rus sian state- owned entities operating in the railway

metals and mining sectors of the Rus sian economy Despite the commanding heights of Rus siarsquos

state sector owner ship in its economy (70 percent of GDP) the metal- producing companies have

remained mostly in private hands

NUCLEAR AFFAIRS

Historically owners and operators of the 104 commercial nuclear power reactors in the United

States have purchased more than 80 percent of their uranium from foreign countries Uranium

shipping from Rus sia accounted for about 13 percent of the 58 million pounds of uranium pur-

chased overseas in 201219 At the same time the Rus sian state- owned mono poly Rosatom ac-

counts for 20 percent of Kazakhstanrsquos uranium production (which in turn comprises 11 percent of

all US uranium imports) and 20 percent of US domestic uranium production capacity (with

owner ship of exploration tracts in Wyoming)20

Nuclear fuel and nuclear power continue to be po liti cally sensitive topics both in the United

States and Rus sia Bilateral cooperation in this sector (being surprisingly stable with imports of

nuclear fuel from Rus sia at a level of $1 billion annually in the last five years [Figure 512 and 513])

is under constant po liti cal and lobbying pressure and has been a source of several po liti cal scan-

dals21 Consequently upside risks in this area of interaction are minimal and downside risks are

much higher especially when we are seeing more decommissioning of nuclear plants in the

United States than new constructions The US EIArsquos 2017 Annual Energy Outlook assumes

that about 25 percent of the nuclear capacity now operating will be removed from ser vice

by 205022

WHY IS THE GRASS GREENER ON THE OTHER SIDE

The United States continues to significantly reduce imports of chemical fertilizers as domestic pro-

duction increases In 2016 the United States imported 13 percent less ammonia and 11 percent

less urea and UAN which is a liquid urea and ammonium nitrate fertilizer Rus sia accounts for

around 40 percent of UAN imported by the United States The United States canceled antidumping

duties on imports of ammonium nitrate and urea from Rus sia in 2016 but it did not prevent import

19 US EIA ldquoThe US Relies on Foreign Uranium Enrichment Ser vices to Fuel Its Nuclear Power Plantsrdquo Today in

Energy August 28 2013 https wwweia gov todayinenergy detail php idshy=shy1273

20 Colin Chilcoat ldquoDoes Rus sia Really Own 20 Percent of the USrsquo Uranium Reservesrdquo OilPricecom May 6 2015

http oilpricecom Alternative - Energy Nuclear - Power Does - Russia - Really - Own - 20 - Of - The - US - Uranium - Reserves

html

21 Michelle Ye Hee Lee ldquoThe Facts behind Trumprsquos Repeated Claim about Hillary Clintonrsquos Role in the Rus sian Ura-

nium Dealrdquo Washington Post October 26 2016

22 US EIA ldquoAnnual Energy Outlook 2017 with Projections to 2050rdquo 81ndash82

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 35 102017 404 PM

Figure 512 US Imports from Rus sia Share of Oil Metals and Nuclear Fuel Million US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 1992ndash2016)

87

86

90

90

90

91

88

86

7882

0

$5000

$10000

$15000

$20000

$25000

$30000

$35000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

US Imports from Russia

Share of Oil Metals and Nuclear Fuel

Figure 513 US Imports from Rus sia Nuclear Fuel Materials US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

$-

$200000000

$400000000

$600000000

$800000000

$1200000000

$1000000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 36 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 37

drops twice last year (Figures 514 and 515) According to forecasts UAN imports are expected to

decline further to 15 million tons this year down over 46 percent from 28 million tons imported

last year23 The downside trend in imports of fertilizers will likely continue because of oversupply

BIG FISH

US imports of fish and shellfish from Rus sia are best understood in comparison with US fish

exports to the Rus sian market which slipped to zero in August 2014 after Rus sia issued an order

banning certain agricultural imports from the United States (Figure 516) While the volume of US

supply was not very large it was impor tant because it broke up the monopolistic dominance of a

few vertically integrated Rus sian companies that have kept prices high by restricting the entry of

new producers Seeking to implement import substitution policies Rus sia has tried to reduce

exports as well as imports of fish and seafood products in the last couple of years This symmetri-

cal approach was intended to ldquocompensaterdquo for a decrease of fish products in the domestic

23 Deepika Thapliyal ldquoPotashCorp Forecasts Sharp Drop in US Nitrogen Imports in 2017rdquo ICIS News February 7

2017 https wwwicis com resources news 2017 02 07 10076734 potashcorp - forecasts - sharp - drop - in - us - nitrogen

- imports - in - 2017

Figure 514 US Imports from Rus sia Share of Oil Metals Nuclear Fuel and Fertilizers Million US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

90

93

92

93

94

95

92

91

85

86

0

$5000

$10000

$15000

$20000

$25000

$30000

$35000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

US Imports from Russia

Share of Oil Metals Nuclear Fuel and Fertilizers

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 37 102017 404 PM

Figure 515 US Imports from Rus sia Chemical- Fertilizers US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

S-

$200000000

$400000000

$600000000

$800000000

$1000000000

$1200000000

$1400000000

$1600000000

$1800000000

$2000000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Figure 516 US Exports to Rus sia Fish and Shellfish US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

0

$10000000

$20000000

$30000000

$40000000

$50000000

$60000000

$70000000

$80000000

$90000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Fish and shellfish

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 38 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 39

consumer market caused by Rus siarsquos import ban but it has failed As result the group most af-

fected by the self- imposed counter- sanctions were Rus sian consumers

With a significant drop in fish imports a devaluation of the ruble and inflationary pressures on

seafood prices yearly consumption of fish in Rus sia has declined precipitously In 2015 alone

fish prices increased 20 percent and consumption dropped to 14 kilograms per person24 from

22 kilograms in 201425 In 2016 food rose to 355 percent of house hold expenditure as a result of

increases in food prices26 This has pushed vertically integrated fishing monopolies to sell even

more of their catch abroad rather than deliver to the Rus sian Federation (Figure 517) Thus we

cannot exclude the possibility of further growth in US fish and shellfish imports from Rus sia on a

marginal scale

24 Александр Савельев ldquoПотребление рыбы в России упало до 14 кг на человекаrdquo [Fish consumption in Rus sia fell to

14 kg per person] Экономика Интерфакс January 28 2015 http wwwinterfax ru business 492038

25 Илья Шестаков ldquoПотебление рыбы в России снизилось на 10 процентов из- за роста ценrdquo [Fish consumption in

Rus sia dropped by 10 percent due to price increases] RNS March 8 2017 https rnsonline consumer - market

Potreblenie - ribi - v - Rossii - snizilos - na - 10 - iz - za - rosta - tsen - 2017 - 03 - 08

26 Zoya Sheftalovich and Christian Oliver ldquoRus siarsquos Boom (Farming) Economyrdquo Politico November 8 2016 http

wwwpolitico eu article russias - boom - farming - economy

Figure 517 US Imports from Rus sia Fish and Shellfish US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

0

$50000000

$100000000

$150000000

$200000000

$250000000

$300000000

$350000000

$400000000

$450000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 39 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations40

SPACE ODYSSEY

Among high- end products beyond the top five groups of goods imported from Rus sia cheap and

efficient Rus sian engines have been used to launch US rockets into space for about 16 years

(Figure 518) There was a serious po liti cal strug gle around a 2014 ban on the purchase of Rus sian

RD-180 rocket engines revealing the conflicting business interests of power ful high- tech companies

This restrictive mea sure was temporary and was quickly lifted because of significant cost impacts

and risks of disruption to launch schedules27 For the same reason the Sanctions Act does not autho-

rize ldquothe imposition of any sanction or other condition limitation restriction or prohibition that

directly or indirectly impedes the supply by any entity of the Rus sian Federation of any product or

ser vice or the procurement of such product or ser vice by any contractor or subcontractor of the

United States or any other entity relating to or in connection with any space launch conducted for

the National Aeronautics and Space Administration or any other nonndash Department of Defense

customerrdquo28

Nevertheless many experts believe that US domestic alternatives to replace Rus sian engines will

be viable in five to eight years

27 Ken Dilanian ldquoWhy Does the US Use Rus sian Rockets to Launch Its Satellitesrdquo NBC News updated November 15

2016 http wwwnbcnews com why - does - u - s - use - russian - rockets - launch - its - satellites - n588526

28 Countering Amer i carsquos Adversaries through Sanctions Act HR 3364

Figure 518 Spacecraft Excluding Military US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

0

$20000000

$40000000

$60000000

$80000000

$100000000

$120000000

$140000000

$160000000

$180000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 40 102017 404 PM

41

Diversity and technological complexity are the most vis i ble advantages supporting US exports to

Rus sia Three major groups of export goods include civilian aircraft engines and parts (Figure 61)

drilling and oil field equipment (Figure 62) and industrial machines and engines (Figure 63)

Despite sanctions against the transfer of advanced oil producing and pro cessing technologies the

realization of US drilling and oil field equipment in Rus sia is sustainable although some bilateral

proj ects have been frozen

Another category of goods that has demonstrated resilience is the phar ma ceu ti cal industry (Fig-

ure 64) because most drugs in Rus sia are imported (about 70 percent of the Rus sian phar ma ceu-

ti cal market in value) Import substitution policies have had only modest results in this industry

As confirmed by American Chamber of Commerce surveys US exports to Rus sia are closely

connected to US FDI 30 percent of total imports of US companies working in the Rus sian

market come from the United States (more than $2 billion in 2016) In other words about

40 percent of all US exports to Rus sia are related to a US corporate- sector business pro cess in

the country The major sectors of activity of these companies are energy and natu ral resources

(52 percent) manufacturing (17 percent) information and communications technology or ICT

(13 percent) retail (7 percent) automotive industry (6 percent) phar ma ceu ti cal production

(1 percent) professional ser vices (05 percent) and other (2 percent)1

Some obvious constraints on US exports to Rus sia have resulted from a reduction in demand A

deterioration of bilateral relations and implementation of sanctions and counter- sanctions have

directly or indirectly afected all businesses Figures 65 and 66 provide data regarding a dramatic

drop in the sale of US agricultural production in Rus sia with all other categories of exports in

goods showing big cuts as well (see Figures 67ndash69)

Exports of civilian aircraft engines and parts put the state of Washington in first place among

other states as a leading exporter to the Rus sian market (Figure 610)

1 American Chamber of Commerce in Rus sia ldquoInvestment and Import to Rus sia 2nd Surveyrdquo 13

Diversity and Constraints

06

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 41 102017 404 PM

Figure 61 US Exports of Civilian Aircraft Engines Equipment and Parts to Rus sia US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

$2500000000

$2000000000

$1500000000

$1000000000

$500000000

$-

Figure 62 US Exports of Drilling and Oil Field Equipment US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

0

$5000000

$10000000

$15000000

$20000000

$25000000

$30000000

$35000000

$40000000

$45000000

$50000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 42 102017 404 PM

Figure 63 US Exports of Industrial Engines to Rus sia US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

0

$5000000

$10000000

$15000000

$20000000

$25000000

$30000000

$35000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Figure 64 US Exports of Phar ma ceu ti cal Preparations to Rus sia US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

0

$5000000

$10000000

$15000000

$20000000

$25000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 43 102017 404 PM

Figure 65 US Exports of Meat and Poultry to Rus sia US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Meat poultry etc

$1000000000

$800000000

$600000000

$400000000

$200000000

$-

$1200000000

$1400000000

$1600000000

Figure 66 US Exports of Soybeans to Rus sia US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

0

$20000000

$40000000

$60000000

$80000000

$100000000

$120000000

$140000000

$160000000

$180000000

$200000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 44 102017 404 PM

Figure 67 US Exports of Vehicles Engines and Parts to Rus sia US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Other parts and accessories of vehicles

Automotive tires and tubes

Bodies and chassis for passenger cars

Engines and engine parts (carburetors pistonsrings and valves)

Trucks buses and special purpose vehicles

Passenger cars new and used

$2500000000

$2000000000

$1500000000

$500000000

$-

$1000000000

Figure 68 US Exports of Medicinal Equipment to Rus sia US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

$10000000

$15000000

$20000000

$25000000

$30000000

$35000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 45 102017 404 PM

Figure 610 US Exports to Rus sia by States (2016 US$ Value) Million US$ 2013ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoState and Metropolitan Area Trade Datardquo

Iowa Kentucky

North Dakota

Oklahoma

South Carolina

Washington

0

$500

$1000

$1500

$2000

2013 2014 2015 2016

District of Columbia

Iowa

Kentucky

North Dakota

Oklahoma

South Carolina

Washington

Figure 69 US Exports of Excavating Machinery to Rus sia US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

0

$5000000

$10000000

$15000000

$20000000

$25000000

$30000000

$35000000

$40000000

$45000000

$50000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 46 102017 404 PM

47

Upon reviewing the current trend in US- Russia economic relations we must acknowledge that

the existing trade model is obsolete and exhausted Imports are resource- oriented and reflect

constraints of the Rus sian economic structure while five groups of goodsmdash oil metals nuclear

fuels fertilizers and fishmdash make up more than 90 percent of total imports from Rus sia (Figure 71)

Each of these industries has a limited capacity for growth in the foreseeable future

Rus siarsquos core export to the United Statesmdash oilmdash will inevitably decrease in the mid- term under any

scenario The value and volume of Rus sian exports to the United States are open to global market

volatility and po liti cal pressures with limited hedging mechanisms

Overall US exports to Rus sia are unsustainable due to bilateral po liti cal tensions the whims of

commodity markets and changing domestic policies Sanctions and counter- sanctions have

created additional barriers particularly in finance banking high- tech energy and agro- business

According to the American Chamber of Commerce 69 percent of US companies working in the

country consider the impact of US sanctions against Rus sia on their business as negative At the

same time 60 percent of companies do not expect big changes in business relations between

Rus sia and the United States under Trump1 as the new law codifies existing sanctions fortifies

them and extends them to new sectors

Current US investments are low due to the weak rule of law in Rus sia a lack of property right

protections and proper contract enforcement high levels of statization and monopolization in the

economy a poor business climate outdated capital stock dependence on natural- resource

sectors and of course sanction and counter- sanction mea sures Bloated administrative compo-

nents created as risk mitigation instruments have also served as impediments The countryrsquos

institutional weakness low level of productivity bud get constraints and a declining inflexible

workforce will restrain future economic growth even if commodity prices recover Rus sian eco-

nomic policy will likely continue to be statist and protectionist relying mostly on import

substitutions

1 Ibid 11

Existing Trends and Future Scenarios

07

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 47 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations48

What scenarios can be expected in such a challenging environment

One probability (no peace no war) is based on the assumption that matters will not deteriorate

further and implementation of the Sanctions Act will be cursory This will cause relatively slow

degradation in the economic field with occasional flashes of activity in selected areas (eg closer

cooperation against Islamist terrorist groups in Syria)

A second worse case or critical scenario is the intensive and full- scale execution of current sanc-

tion legislation and even the imposition of new economic punitive and restrictive mea sures which

could incite asymmetric retaliatory actions and lead to the introduction of additional protectionist

policies This in turn could trigger a further escalation of mutual confrontation and could eventu-

ally destroy the fundamentals of the current bilateral trade system Rus sian leadership has charac-

terized the Sanctions Act as a declaration of a trade war that ends all hope for improving bilateral

relations2

2 Дмитрий Медведев ldquoПодписание президентом США нового санкционного закона против России создает несколько

последствийrdquo [The US Presidentrsquos signing of the package of new sanctions against Rus sia will have a few conse-

quences] Facebook August 2 2017 https wwwfacebook com Dmitry Medvedev posts 10154587161801851

Figure 71 US Imports from Rus sia Share of Oil Metals Nuclear Fuel Fertilizers and Fish Million US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

93

94

93

94

95

96

93

92

87

89

0

$5000

$10000

$15000

$20000

$25000

$30000

$35000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

US Imports from Russia

Share of Oil Metals Nuclear FuelFertilizers and Fish

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 48 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 49

The best case and most favorable scenario looks less probable now It assumes the realization of

structural reforms in Rus sia in such a way that would adapt Rus siarsquos foreign policy to national

economic needs reduce confrontations with the West and make a concerted efort to integrate

Rus sian businesses into global supply and value chains A revitalization of the structural reform

agendamdash including eforts to diversify economic activities through de- monopolization and support

for SMEs a restructuring of the banking sector the creation of a vibrant business climate to foster

entrepreneurships and innovation the implementation of administrative and judicial reforms to

tackle red tape and endemic corruption and the reduction of state control over key sectors of the

economy via wide- spread privatization could kick- start the development of a nonoil economy and

improve long- term growth prospects Despite ongoing discussion of reform strategies deep

economic and po liti cal changes are extremely complicated over the next po liti calelectoral cycle

(2018ndash2024) particularly because of re sis tance of vested interests and growing commodity prices

The urgency to tackle structural shortcomings in natu ral resource- dependent economies usually

correlates with the price of those resources and the degree to which resource rents drive eco-

nomic activity However there may be marginal improvements in the efficiency of the current

economic system

Future US- Russia relations can be thought of through three pillars one pillar focuses on areas

where both countries maintain a competitive rivalry another looks at potential areas of interaction

under pres ent conditions a third pillar and one that has evaporated from the current bilateral

agenda concentrates on future cooperation Stronger economic ties could not only be a kind of

po liti cal shock absorber but contribute to the building of this future (particularly business contacts

aim to support future structural reforms) although po liti cal factors are depressing the prospects

for cooperation To escape deadlock it will be impor tant to establish the right balance between

politics and economics and create a model of collaboration within the framework of contention

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 49 102017 404 PM

About the Author

Vadim Grishin PhD MBA has been involved in the reform pro cess in Rus sia as adviser to the

deputy prime minister of Rus sia in 1992ndash1993 and 2006ndash2010 He has extensive experience

working with the Bretton Woods Institutions He was the board member of the World Bank Group

and served as se nior adviser at the International Monetary Fund Currently he is a con sul tant to the

chief economistrsquos office of the International Finance Corporation and teaches the economics of

transition at Georgetown University in Washington DC

50

594-71613_ch99_4Pindd 50 102017 403 PM

Blank

COVER PHOTO ADOBE STOCK

1616 Rhode Island Avenue NW

Washington DC 20036

202 887 0200 | wwwcsisorg

v++ISBN 978-1-4422-8035-9

Lanham bull Boulder bull New York bull London

4501 Forbes Boulevard

Lanham MD 20706

301 459 3366 | wwwrowmancom

A U T H O R

Vadim Grishin

Myths and Realities

A Report of the

CSIS RUSSIA AND EURASIA PROGRAM

US-RussiaEconomicRelations

O C T O B E R 2 0 1 7

Euml|xHSLEOCy280359z

The Man Pupu Nyor Rock Formations at the Northern Urals also known as Seven

Strong Man or Little Mountain of the God in the local tribe (Mansi) language

Page 21: U.S.-Russia Economic Relations: Myths and Realities · 2020-04-17 · OCTOBER 2017 U.S.- Russia Economic Relations Myths and Realities AUTHOR Vadim Grishin A REPORT OF THE CSIS RUSSIA

15

The current structure of US- Russia economic relations emerged in the early 2000s when the

model of trade and investment interaction took on a character similar to that which existed be-

tween the United States and developing economies US imports from Rus sia centered on com-

modities while technology along with food products lead American exports The primary

exception was that Rus sia supplied nuclear fuel including highly enriched uranium extracted from

nuclear weapons for US power plants and provided ser vices to the aerospace industry primarily

in satellite launches However both these exceptions can be explained as a legacy of the Soviet

past and not a harbinger of the future economic relationship (Figure 41)

In the last 15 years this trade structure has not changed significantly The only noticeable shift in

trade was a dramatic drop (to practically nothing) in exports of US agricultural products a result

of Rus siarsquos policy of import substitution and so- called counter- sanction mea sures it took in re-

sponse to US sanctions over the Ukraine crisis (Figure 42)

Promising new directions of cooperation in the IT sector and in engineering ser vices for the

aerospace industry appeared in the early 2000s1 but did not spill into other sectors and conse-

quently did little to renew economic cooperation on the whole The integration of Rus sian high-

tech ser vices into large- scale global production and value chains was constrained by the usual

culprits a lack of financial resources managerial experience skilled labor modern infrastructure

RampD investments and an adequate business environment High commodity prices incentivized the

restoration of an economic system centered on resource rents The leading role of oil and gas

extraction and transportation discouraged the development of a nonenergy sector that might

have created advanced and complex production and ser vices An import substitution policy could

not work efficiently in an economic environment plagued by the Dutch disease where currency

1 The Boeing Design Center was created in Moscow It consists of nearly 250 Boeing employees managing

a team of 1200 contract engineers from Rus sian and Ukrainian aerospace companies ldquoBackgrounder Boeing in

Rus siardquo Boeing last modified January 2017 http wwwboeing com resources boeingdotcom company key _ orgs

boeing - international pdf russia - cisbackgrounder pdf

Are the United States and Rus sia ldquoNatu ralrdquo Trading Partners A Little Bit of History

04

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 15 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations16

inflows (oil money) lead to ruble appreciation and render a countryrsquos production less competitive

During that time Rus siarsquos industry did not receive preferential access to larger markets and could

not expand its share in the global economy particularly because of its self- isolation from the

regional trade agreements (except for its participation in the Eurasian Economic Union with some

neighboring countries of the former Soviet Union) As a result neither import substitution nor

export- led strategy promoted growth and specialization in nonoil production A long- awaited

modernization and reallocation of resources from an inefficient nontrade sector to a trade sector

did not materialize

These limits were later augmented with sanctions and an extension of domestic restrictions on

cooperation with Western partners Importantly the rapid growth of state- monopoly structures in

the Rus sian economy over the past 15 years has created additional obstacles to the development

and diversification of US- Russia economic ties

Figure 41 US Imports from Rus sia US$ 2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2016)

Fish and shellfish 3

Crude oil 5

Fuel oil 37

Petroleum products other

8

Nuclear fuel materials

7

Chemicals-fertilizers 4

Steelmaking materials 5

Iron and steel mill products 4

Bauxite and aluminum 9

Other precious metals 4

Nonferrous metals other 1

Finished metal shapes 1

Synthetic rubber--primary

1

Spacecraftexcluding military

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 16 102017 404 PM

Fig

ure

42

U

S E

xpo

rts

to R

us s

ia U

S$ 2

016

Sou

rce

US

Ce

nsu

s B

ure

au ldquo

Trad

e in

Go

od

s w

ith

Ru

s sia

rdquo (s

ee

dat

a fo

r 2

016

)

Bak

ery

pro

du

cts

Win

e b

eer

an

d r

elat

ed

pro

du

cts

New

spri

nt

Pla

stic

mat

eria

ls

Ch

emic

als-

fert

ilize

rs

Ch

emic

als-

ino

rgan

icC

hem

ical

s-o

rgan

ic

Ch

emic

als-

oth

erC

ott

on

fib

er c

loth

In

du

stri

al r

ub

ber

pro

du

cts

Min

eral

su

pp

lies-

man

ufa

ctu

red

Gen

erat

ors

acc

esso

ries

Ele

ctri

c ap

par

atu

s

Dri

llin

g amp

oilfi

eld

eq

uip

men

t Sp

ecia

lized

min

ing

Exc

avat

ing

mac

hin

ery

No

nfa

rm t

ract

ors

an

d p

arts

In

du

stri

al e

ng

ines

Fo

od

to

bac

co m

ach

iner

y M

etal

wo

rkin

g m

ach

ine

too

ls

Tex

tile

sew

ing

m

ach

ines

W

oo

d g

lass

p

last

ic

Pu

lp a

nd

pap

er

mac

hin

ery

Mea

suri

ng

tes

tin

g

con

tro

l in

stru

men

ts

Mat

eria

ls h

and

ling

equ

ipm

ent

Ind

ust

rial

mac

hin

es

oth

er

Ph

oto

ser

vice

ind

ust

ry m

ach

iner

y A

gri

cult

ura

l mac

hin

ery

eq

uip

men

t C

om

pu

ters

Co

mp

ute

r ac

cess

ori

es

Sem

ico

nd

uct

ors

Tel

eco

mm

un

icat

ion

seq

uip

men

t

Bu

sin

ess

mac

hin

es a

nd

eq

uip

men

t

Lab

ora

tory

tes

tin

g in

stru

men

ts

Med

icin

al e

qu

ipm

ent

Civ

ilian

air

craf

t e

ng

ines

eq

uip

men

t a

nd

par

ts

Rai

lway

tra

nsp

ort

atio

n

equ

ipm

ent

Ves

sels

exc

lud

ing

scr

ap

Co

mm

erci

al v

esse

ls o

ther

M

arin

e en

gin

es p

arts

Spac

ecra

ft e

xclu

din

g

mili

tary

Pas

sen

ger

car

s

new

an

d u

sed

Tru

cks

bu

ses

and

sp

ecia

l p

urp

ose

ve

hic

les

En

gin

es a

nd

en

gin

e p

arts

(c

arb

ure

tors

pis

ton

s r

ing

s

and

val

ves)

B

od

ies

and

ch

assi

s fo

r p

asse

ng

er c

ars

Au

tom

oti

ve t

ires

an

d t

ub

es

Oth

er p

arts

an

d a

cces

sori

es o

f ve

hic

les

Ap

par

el h

ou

seh

old

go

od

s -

text

ile

Ph

arm

aceu

tica

lp

rep

arat

ion

s

Furn

itu

re h

ou

seh

old

go

od

s

etc

R

ug

s

Cel

l ph

on

es a

nd

oth

er

ho

use

ho

ld g

oo

ds

ne

c

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 17 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations18

Figure 43 US Trade in Goods with Rus sia Million US$ 1992ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 1992ndash2016)

Russian Financial Crisis

Oil price Increased from$2446 USD per barrel (2001)

to $9694 USD per barrel(2008)

Global Financial Crisis

Oil price high record in2011-2012

(more that $111 USD perbarrel)

Oil price crashed

$-

$5000

$10000

$15000

$20000

$25000

$30000

$35000

$40000

$45000

$50000

1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

US Imports from Russia US Exports to Russia US-Russia Trade in Goods

No doubt po liti cal ups and downs add volatility to US- Russia trade Nevertheless Rus siarsquos eco-

nomic structure exhausted itself before the Ukrainian crisis and the recent Rus sian recession Its

limitations are not only due to some mistakes in policy or negative coincidences of circumstances

but rather to deeply rooted properties in the current bilateral trade model related to structural

issues in the Rus sian economy Structural constraints such as the weak enforcement of property

rights poor business regulation and nondiversified exports weighed on Rus sian trade with the

United States From this perspective the term ldquonaturalunnatural trading partnersrdquo does not ad-

dress the unused capacity of bilateral interaction or the real challenges that kind of interaction

faces It just adds metaphysical flavor to the very specific economic and po liti cal factors that

determine the US- Russia trajectory

Overall the outlines of bilateral trade (Figure 43) resemble the famous ldquoRus sian Mountainsrdquo that

were a pre de ces sor of the modern roller coaster icy hills supported by wooden constructionsmdash a

rigid and immobile structure that sooner or later would melt This unfortunately is what is hap-

pening to US- Russia trade cooperation now

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 18 102017 404 PM

19

ARE LITTLE FISH REALLY SWEET

Low US- Russia economic interaction has at least two consequences First it limits the capacity of

policymakers to exploit trade as an instrument for geopo liti cal combat Even the question of a US

trade deficit which used to be a headache for many US trading partners has become so insig-

nificant in absolute terms (about $87 billion in 2016) that it seems hardly worth caring about

When the volume of trade between two countries becomes very small in absolute terms whether

a country is running a surplus or deficit is no longer relevant But it also renders another type of

confrontations (sometimes more dangerous) more likely since the two traders have little to lose

Second in an environment marked by low levels of bilateral trade both sides could incentivize (if

and when a desire for po liti cal rapprochement exists) the signing of new trade deals which are

elevated symbolically as a turning point in bilateral po liti cal relations (ie the sale of Boeings to

Rus sia or the delivery via tankers of Rus sian oil to US refineries) Sometimes markets themselves

pres ent ldquogiftsrdquo that can be capitalized on po liti cally US- USSR grain trade in the 1970s was one

such ldquogiftrdquo large sales of American grain to the Soviet Union helped US policymakers win favor

with the po liti cally impor tant American farming sector and permitted Soviet leaders to maintain

access to a dietary staple for the Soviet population

The strong 32 percent growth in value of US imports from Rus sia from January to May 2017

versus January to May 2016 ( Table 51) is an example of a development that has tempted officials

to pres ent it as a sign of positive change due to ldquogrowing business activitiesrdquo (this kind of statement

was heard before the bilateral summit in Germany in July 2017) although the reason for that leap

was evidently an increase in commodity prices (mainly of oilmdash see Table 52) and not a rise in

entrepreneurial interactions The primary beneficiaries of that upside rally have been two other

petro- economies Saudi Arabia and Venezuela ( Tables 53 and 54)

Sector Analyses

05

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 19 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations20

Table 51 US Imports from Rus sia Million US$ Januaryndash May 2016 vs Januaryndash May 2017

Year January February March April May Total

2016 9603 6871 11097 12257 10977 50805

2017 12215 10220 16979 13471 14147 67032

Change 271 487 530 99 289 319

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 1992ndash2016)

Table 52 Change in Urals Crude Oil Prices US$ per Barrel Januaryndash May 2016 vs Januaryndash May 2017

Januaryndash May 2016 Januaryndash May 2017 Change ($) Change ()

3601 5129 1528 424

Source Ministry of Finance of the Rus sian Federation https wwwminfin ru ru ixzz4mMIZ7XtC

Table 53 US Imports from Saudi Arabia Million US$ Januaryndash May 2016 vs Januaryndash May 2017

Year January February March April May Total

2016 15114 9036 13555 10844 14679 63228

2017 19802 20298 21650 16211 19542 97503

Change 3101 12463 5972 495 331 542

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Saudi Arabiardquo Foreign Trade last modified June 29 2017

https wwwcensus gov foreign - trade balance c5170 html (see data for 2016ndash2017)

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 20 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 21

Table 54 US Imports from Venezuela Million US$ Januaryndash May 2016 vs Januaryndash May 2017

Year January February March April May Total

2016 6657 5560 7140 8007 7922 35286

2017 13041 10864 123500 11148 12243 59646

Change 9590 9540 7297 3923 5454 6903

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Venezuelardquo Foreign Trade last modified June 29 2017

https wwwcensus gov foreign - trade balance c3070 html (see data for 2016ndash2017)

Table 55 US Exports to Rus sia Million US$ Januaryndash May 2016 vs Januaryndash May 2017

Year January February March April May Total

2016 3628 3577 7298 4657 4947 24107

2017 3144 4277 5386 6670 4806 24283

Change minus133 196 minus262 432 minus29 minus07

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2016ndash2017)

At the same time US exports to Rus sia continue to stagnate ( Table 55) due to low levels of

consumption during a two-and- a- half-year economic crisis a deep ruble devaluation sanctions

and counter- sanctions

Given the very dif er ent economic structures and resource endowments of Rus sia and the United

States it is not surprising that US- Russia trade is asymmetric and oil driven (Figure 51) A

3 percent increase in Urals oil prices translates into a one percent increase in US import growth

from Rus sia Thus in 2016 every $10 increase in Urals crude oil added $15 billion to the value of

US imports or 11 percent to the total value of imports from Rus sia

OIL ADDICTION

Oil is a core pillar of US- Russia bilateral trade A bumpy ride in oil markets afects commerce

Nevertheless Rus sian oil exports to the United States in physical terms have been rather

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 21 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations22

sustainable Starting from 2005 average annual deliveries have been above 150 million barrels

(Figure 52) Crude and heating oil have dominated while petroleum products and liquefied petro-

leum gases have not (Figure 53) In 2011 oil exports peaked at 228 million barrels but declined to

159 million barrels in 2016mdash a drop of 30 percent Rec ord high shipments of Rus sian oil to the United

States coincided with an elevation in oil prices which made the subsequent decline in oil shipment

value between 2011 and 2016 (by about 72 percent as shown in Figure 54) seem more stark The

increase in price also raised the share of oil in Rus sian exports by 74 percent in 2011 (Figure 55)

The Rus sian share in total US oil imports was around 55 percent in 2011 and 43 percent in 2016

( Table 56) In the last five years the United States has relied exclusively on consumption of Rus sian

oil for the rough equivalent of one week out of the year (Figure 56)

It is unlikely that Rus sia can significantly increase its share of the US oil market and there is a real

possibility for a downward trend There are several reasons the historically high Rus sian hydrocar-

bon export threshold of 2011 will not soon if ever be surpassed

First US energy consumption will likely be flat According to the US Energy Information Adminis-

tration (EIA) demand for petroleum and other liquids in the United States will be about 35ndash36

quadrillion British thermal units (BTUs) with minimal variation over the next 25 years1

1 US EIA ldquoAnnual Energy Outlook 2017 with Projections to 2050rdquo January 5 2017 7ndash8

Figure 51 US- Russia Trade Growth () vs US and Rus sia Real GDP Growth () 1993ndash2016

Source IMF ldquoIMF Datardquo accessed September 27 2017 http wwwimf org en Data US Census Bureau

ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo

Note rGDPthinsp=thinspreal gross domestic product

Trade

USA rGDP growth

Russia rGDP growth

-60

-40

-20

0

20

40

60

80

100

1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Gro

wth

All spikes in US-Russia trade have been connected with two main

variables volume and price of crude oil

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 22 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 23

Second the United States will become a net energy exporter between 2020 and 2030 in most

cases under dif er ent combinations of oil and natu ral gas prices GDP growth technological

breakthroughs and the availability of energy resources The role of oil imports will dramatically

fall2

Third oil price scenarios as described by the International Energy Agency (IEA) international

financial organ izations (IFIs) and many national agencies are very cautious and assume that even

by 2035 to 2040 oil prices will not to recover to the levels of 2011ndash20123

Fourth Rus sian oil production and export growth will be modest and driven by Asian economic

expansion and will comprise a decreasing share of Western markets4 According to forecasts from

2 Ibid 15ndash18

3 Ibid table 3 ldquoEnergy Prices by Sector and Sourcesrdquo World Bank World Bank Commodity Markets Price Forecasts

(Washington DC World Bank 2017) httpswwwworldbank org en research commodity - markets Organ ization of the

Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) World Oil Outlook 2016 (Vienna OPEC 2016)

4 E D Belotskaia et al Global and Rus sian Energy Outlook 2016 (Moscow Energy Research Institute of the Rus sian

Acad emy of Science Analytical Center for the Government of the Rus sian Federation 2016) http acgov ru files

publication a 12767 pdf

Figure 52 US Imports from Rus sia Crude Oil and Petroleum Products Thousands of Barrels 1995ndash2016

Source US EIA ldquoUS Imports by Country of Origin Rus siardquo Petroleum amp Other Liquids September 13

2017 http wwweia gov dnav pet PET _ MOVE _ IMPCUS _ D _ NUS _ NRS _ MBBL _ M htm

0

50000

100000

150000

200000

250000

Date 1995 1996 1997 1998 199920002001200220032004200520062007200820092010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 23 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations24

the Organ ization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) crude oil exports from Rus sia and

the Caspian region to the United States will dis appear by 20255

So why does the Rus sian Urals blend continue to be attractive for oil traders and US refineries

which could pro cess greater volumes of domestically produced lighter crude There are two main

reasons One is related to the preference of US high conversion refineries (the most sophisticated

in the world) to work with heavy oil blends produced by Canada Mexico Iraq Venezuela and

Rus sia Pro cessing heavy crude now is as profitable as pro cessing lighter crude The so- called

crack spreadmdash the diference between the cost of relatively cheap heavy crude oil and the final

price of value- added consumer products (diesel gasoline jet fuel and heating oil)mdash has become

the same as the refinery margins of light sweet crude6 This has primarily afected light oil produc-

ing countries such as Angola Algeria and Nigeria

5 OPEC World Oil Outlook 2016 306ndash309

6 ldquoHow Much for That Heavy Oilrdquo Oil Sands Magazine December 26 2015 https wwwoilsandsmagazine com

news 2015 12 26 how - much - for - that - heavy - oil

Figure 53 US Imports from Rus sia Oil and Petroleum Products US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

$-

$25000000000

$20000000000

$15000000000

$10000000000

$5000000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Liquefied petroleum gases

Petroleum products other

Fuel oil

Crude oil

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 24 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 25

Another factor afecting purchase of Rus sian oil is a new trend among oil companies for further

consolidation of scale and for integrating operations of upstream and downstream business7

There have been several waves of separation and unification of production transportation and

pro cessing in the last 50 years The current business cycle can be seen as an adaptation to a

period of low prices and oversupply Companies that buy andor produce oil in Rus sia most likely

prefer to transport and pro cess this oil in their own modern refineries in the United States At the

same time some of the newest refinery designs specifically for pro cessing heavy oils have been

built in Asia thus extending the choices of heavy oil producing countries

We should also consider that leading US and international oil traders along with oil producing

companies working with or owning US refineries frequently buy Rus sian oil on the open market

and have long- term contracts on Rus sian crude oil delivery Many Rus sian oil companies prefer to

pay for purchases or ser vices with their future production instead of cash creating situations of

ldquostickyrdquo oil imports that are difficult to replace The best- known example is an interaction between

7 ldquoEnergy and Utilities Sectorrdquo Roundtable Financier Worldwide December 2015 https wwwfinancierworldwide

com roundtable - energy - utilities - sector - dec15

Figure 54 US Imports of Oil and Petroleum Products from Rus sia vs Oil Prices Eu rope Brent Spot Price Free on Board (FOB) 1996ndash2017

Source US EIA ldquoUS Imports by Country of Origin Rus siardquo

0

20

40

60

80

100

120

140

0

5000

10000

15000

20000

25000

30000

Jan

-19

96

Jun

-19

96

No

v-19

96

Ap

r-19

97

Sep

-19

97

Feb

-19

98

Jul-

199

8D

ec-1

99

8M

ay-1

99

9O

ct-1

99

9M

ar-2

00

0A

ug

-20

00

Jan

-20

01

Jun

-20

01

No

v-2

00

1A

pr-

20

02

Sep

-20

02

Feb

-20

03

Jul-

20

03

Dec

-20

03

May

-20

04

Oct

-20

04

Mar

-20

05

Au

g-2

00

5Ja

n-2

00

6Ju

n-2

00

6N

ov-

20

06

Ap

r-2

00

7Se

p-2

00

7Fe

b-2

00

8Ju

l-2

00

8D

ec-2

00

8M

ay-2

00

9O

ct-2

00

9M

ar-2

010

Au

g-2

010

Jan

-20

11Ju

n-2

011

No

v-2

011

Ap

r-2

012

Sep

-20

12Fe

b-2

013

Jul-

20

13D

ec-2

013

May

-20

14O

ct-2

014

Mar

-20

15A

ug

-20

15Ja

n-2

016

Jun

-20

16N

ov-

20

16

USD

per

Bar

rel

Th

ou

san

d B

arr

els

US Imports from Russia of Crude Oil and Petroleum Products (Thousand Barrels)

Europe Brent Spot Price FOB (Dollars per Barrel)

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 25 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations26

Table 56 US Oil Imports All Countries vs Rus sia Thousand Barrels per Day 2011ndash2016

Years 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

All Countries 11436 10598 9859 9241 9449 10058

Rus sia 624 477 460 330 371 433

Share 546 450 467 357 393 431

Sources US EIA ldquoUS Imports by Country of Origin Total Crude Oil and Productsrdquo Petroleum amp Other

Liquids September 13 2017 wwweia gov dnav pet pet_move_impcus_a2_nus_ep00_im0_mbbl_m htm

authorrsquos computation

Figure 55 US Imports from Rus sia Share of Crude Oil and Petroleum Products Million US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

57

64

73

72

74

73

72

59

52 50

0

$5000

$10000

$15000

$20000

$25000

$30000

$35000

$40000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

US Imports from Russia

Share of Oil and Petroleum Products

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 26 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 27

the Rus sian state mono poly Rosneft and commodity trading and mining giant Glencore which

along with energy and commodities com pany Vitol participated in a $10 billion prepayment

deal with Rosneft for crude supplies in 2013

There have been a number of ongoing transactions between the Rus sian oil industry and interna-

tional oil companies including several that top the list of importers of Rus sian oil to the United

States ( Table 57) In December 2016 Glencore participated in a controversial privatization opera-

tion purchasing in tandem with the Qatar sovereign wealth fund a 195 percent stake in Rosneft

which was on the US and EU list of sanctioned firms8 Glencore has also taken a blocking stake in

midsize oil producer RussNeft BP owns a 1975 percent stake in Rosneft Chevron holds a

15 percent interest in the 935- mile- long CPC9 pipeline which transports an average of 959000

barrels of crude oil per day including 76000 barrels daily from Rus sia10 ExxonMobil has formed

8 E Mazneva and I Arkhipov ldquoRus sia Sells $11 Billion Stake in Rosneft to Glencore Qatarrdquo Bloomberg December 7

2016

9 CPCthinsp=thinspCaspian Pipeline Consortium

10 ldquoRus sia Highlights of Operations and Business Portfoliordquo Chevron accessed October 3 2017 https wwwchevron

com worldwide russia

Figure 56 Share of Rus sian Oil in Total US Oil Imports Thousands of Barrels per Day 1972ndash2016

Source US EIA ldquoUS Imports by Country of Origin Total Crude Oil and Productsrdquo

2000

4000

6000

8000

10000

12000

14000

16000

US Imports of Crude Oil and Petroleum Products (Thousand Barrels per Day)

US Imports from Russia of Crude Oil and Petroleum Products (Thousand Barrels per Day)19

7319

7419

7519

7619

7719

7819

7919

80

198

119

82

198

319

84

198

519

86

198

719

88

198

919

90

199

119

92

199

319

94

199

519

96

199

719

98

199

92

00

02

00

12

00

22

00

32

00

42

00

52

00

62

00

72

00

82

00

92

010

20

112

012

20

132

014

20

152

016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 27 102017 404 PM

Table 57 Top Importers of Rus sian Oil to the United States Thousands of Barrels 2016

VALERO MARKETING amp SUPPLY CO 54590 3616

EXXONMOBIL OIL CORP 17087 1130

CHEVRON USA INC 15217 1008

BP WEST COAST PRODUCTS LLC 10130 671

GEORGE E WARREN CORP 7272 48

PAULSBORO REFINING CO LLC 6838 453

TESORO CORP 5097 338

VITOL INC 5084 337

PHILLIPS 66 CO 4726 313

TRAFIGURA AG 4360 289

PAR HAWAII REFINING LLC 3893 258

MOTIVA ENTERPRISES LLC 3041 205

SHELL US TRADING CO 2863 19

MARATHON PETROLEUM CO LLC 2475 16

ATLANTIC TRADING amp MARKETING 2099 14

FREEPOINT COMMODITIES LLC 1439 1

GLENCORE LTD 1284 85

BEST PETROLEUM CORP 967 64

ROLYMPUS US COMMODITIES GROUP LLC 822 6

HUNT CRUDE OIL SUPPLY CO 666 4

GULF OIL LP 658 4

Source US EIA ldquoUS Imports by Country of Origin Crude Oilrdquo Petroleum amp Other Liquids September 13

2017 httpswwweiagovdnavpetpet_move_impcus_a2_nus_epc0_im0_mbblpd_ahtm authorrsquos

computation

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 28 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 29

several joint ventures with Rosneft to undertake ofshore exploration in the Black Sea and the Kara

Sea in Siberia11

According to the Sanctions Act US persons are prohibited from exporting or reexporting goods

ser vices (except financial ser vices) and technology in support of exploration or production of new

deep- water Arctic ofshore or shale oil proj ects that involve designated Rus sian entities or other

entities in which such sanctioned persons have a controlling interest or a substantial noncontrol-

ling owner ship interest defined as not less than 33 percent (previously it was 50 percent) The new

law also authorizesmdash but does not requiremdash the imposition of so- called secondary sanctions

against non- US entities that engage in activities involving the construction maintenance or

expansion of Rus sian energy export pipelines with a fair market value of $1 million or more or an

aggregate fair market value during a 12- month period of $5 million12 This provision has raised the

concerns of some Eu ro pean countries particularly Germany As result the final language of the

law included wording about coordination of this issue with allies of the United States

Shipments of Rus sian oil to the United States could be afected by activity in the US refinery

industry In early 2017 Saudi Aramco bought the United Statesrsquo largest oil refinery in Port Arthur

(Texas) and it announced plans to send more of its own crude to that refinery13 Serious concerns

exist however regarding the future of three refineries and nine pipelines owned by Citgo a US

branch of the Venezuelan state com pany PdVSA which is balancing precariously on the edge of

default Under certain conditions in the event of PdVSA bankruptcy Rosneft could claim a stake of

up to 499 percent in Citgo Such a possibility has raised concerns among politicians and US

government officials with Trea sury Secretary Steven Mnuchin calling it a ldquonational security issuerdquo14

Tables 58 59 and 510 show allocations of Rus sian oil imports to major US refineries some of

which work exclusively on Rus sian crude a total of two to three months per year In total 150940

thousand barrels of Rus sian oil were refined in 2016

Figure 57 confirms a leading position of Texas and Louisiana among the US states receiving

Rus sian crude followed by New Jersey California Mississippi Washington Hawaii and Delaware

In a paradoxical way Texas has dis appeared from the list of states as a main destination of US

imports from Rus sia (Figure 58) because Rus sian crude is mostly delivered to Louisiana ports and

registered there by US Customs as an import from Rus sia After that it transports to refineries in

Louisiana and Texas

Overall the short- term business rationale behind the sustainability of US oil imports from Rus sia

cannot overcome strong headwinds in the US energy sector facing all oil importers which will

inevitably lead to a contraction of Rus sian oil exports to the United States in the foreseeable future

11 Exxon eforts to receive a special US Trea sury waiver to drill in sanctioned Rus sia failed in 2017

12 Countering Amer i carsquos Adversaries through Sanctions Act HR 3364

13 Sarp Ozkan ldquoSaudi Aramcorsquos Port Arthur Refinery and the US Refinery Fleetrdquo Drilling Info May 11 2017

https infodrillinginfo com saudi - aramcos - port - arthur - refinery - us - refinery - fleet

14 Graham Kates ldquoTrea sury Secretary Rus siarsquos Citgo Deal a National Security Issuerdquo CBS News May 1 2017

http wwwcbsnews com news rosneft - citgo - steven - mnuchin - national - security

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 29 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations30

Table 58 Valerorsquos Refineries Pro cessing Rus sian Oil Thousands of Barrels 2016

Saint Charles Louisiana 29206 535

Corpus Christi Texas 20626 378

Wilmington California 4250 78

Total USA 54590 100

Source US EIA ldquoRefinery Capacity Reportrdquo January 1 2017

table 5 wwweia gov petroleum refinerycapacity table5 pdf

authorrsquos computation

Table 59 ExxonMobil Refineries Pro cessing Rus sian Oil Thousands of Barrels 2016

Baytown Texas 15037 88

Baton Rouge Louisiana 2046 12

Total USA 17083 100

Source US EIA ldquoRefinery Capacity Reportrdquo authorrsquos computation

Table 510 Chevronrsquos Refineries Pro cessing Rus sian Oil Thousands of Barrels 2016

Pascagoula Mississippi 12767 840

El Segundo California 2372 155

Saint Rose Louisiana 78 05

Total USA 15217 100

Source US EIA ldquoRefinery Capacity Reportrdquo authorrsquos computation

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 30 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 31

HEAVY METAL

Taken together US imports of metals and US imports of oil compose about 80 percent of US

total imports from Rus sia (Figure 59) Trade of metals like other commodities is strongly afected

by market price fluctuations Nevertheless metal imports from Rus sia have been fairly resilient to

market volatility and their average annual value has hovered at about $4 billion in the last five years

(Figure 510) This market resilience was forged at the end of the 1990searly 2000s when Rus sian

metal producers gradually modernized their plants adjusting quality of production to Western

standards and enhancing integration into global value and supply chains Some of them conquered

their share of the highly competitive US market struggling with peers from Canada and certain

BRICS countries (China India and Brazil) To attract additional resources all Rus sian large metal-

producing companies became public and were listed on stock exchanges chiefly the London Stock

Exchange (Severstalrsquo PAO Evraz MMK OAO Novolipetsk Steel Norilsk Nikel and TMK PAO) one

on the New York Stock Exchange (Mechel) and one on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange (Rusal)

Business logic pushed some of them to invest in the US metal- making industry which was hit

hard by crisis Later on some of those assets were sold (eg two US steel mills acquired by

Severstal in 2004 were purchased 10 years later by Steel Dynamics Inc and AK Steel Corp)

Figure 57 Share of US States Rus sian Oil Imports 2016

Source US EIA ldquoUS Imports from Rus sia of Crude Oil and Petroleum Productsrdquo Petroleum amp Other

Liquids September 29 2017 https www eia gov dnav pet hist LeafHandler ashx nshy=shyPETampsshy=shyMTTIM _ NUS

- NRS _ 1ampfshy=shyM authorrsquos computation

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

100

Maine

Massachusetts

Maryland

Connecticut

Georgia

Rhode Island

Virginia

Florida

New York

Alabama

Puerto Rico

Pennsylvania

Delaware

Hawaii

Washington

Mississippi

California

New Jersey

Louisiana

Texas

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 31 102017 404 PM

Figure 58 US Imports from Rus sia by State Million US$ 2013ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoState and Metropolitan Area Trade Datardquo Foreign Trade last modified

October 2 2017 https wwwcensus gov foreign - trade statistics state

Alaska

Connecticut

Delaware

Hawaii

Louisiana

Maryland

North Dakota 0

$1000

$2000

$3000

$4000

$5000

$6000

2013 2014 2015 2016

Alabama

Alaska

Connecticut

Delaware

Hawaii

Louisiana

Maryland

Maine

Mississippi

Montana

North Dakota

Mississippi

Figure 59 US Imports from Rus sia Share of Oil and Metals Million US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 1992ndash2016)

83

82

85

86

87

88

85

82

7375

0

$5000

$10000

$15000

$20000

$25000

$30000

$35000

$40000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

US Imports from Russia

Share of Oil and Metals

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 32 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 33

Obviously the market dynamic of dif er ent metals varies (eg iron steel aluminum platinum and

nickel) Caps to increase their trade and production in a ldquored oceanrdquo global environment with

anemic demand is rather limited despite Figure 510 showing a spike of iron and steel imports

from Rus sia in 2014 and aluminum in 2016 Some opportunities may exist for Russian- owned steel

plants in the United States (such as NLMK) to participate in energy proj ects resumed under Presi-

dent Trump who has required that new pipelines use only American- made steel15

Rus sia occupies a special niche in the US market for titanium products a high- end metal indus-

try Twenty years ago a long- term contract was signed between Rus sian titanium producer

VSMPO- AVISMA and Boeing The Rus sian com pany entered the selective club of Boeing suppliers

for the manufacture of components and semi- finished products Since the signing of this contract

VSMPO has delivered more than 35 percent of all titanium placed on Boeing civil aircraft16 They

are hidden in the trade data in an import category for Civilian Aircrafts and Parts (Figure 511) At

the end of 2016 Boeing announced an extension of its framework agreement with AVISMA

15 E Scheyder C Ngai and T Sylvester ldquoAmerican Steel Unlikely to Get Keystone Boost Despite Trump Orderrdquo

Reuters January 27 2017 http wwwreuters com article usa - trump - pipeline - transcanada - idUSL1N1FH1ZD

16 A Kramer ldquoTitanium Fills Vital Role for Boeing and Rus siardquo New York Times July 5 2013 http wwwnytimes com

2013 07 06 business global titanium - fills - vital - role - for - boeing - and - russia html mcubzshy=shy3

Figure 510 US Imports from Rus sia Iron Steel Bauxite Aluminum Nickel Nonferrous Metals and Other Precious Metals and Materials US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 1992ndash2016)

0

$6000000000

$5000000000

$4000000000

$3000000000

$2000000000

$1000000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 20122013

20142015

2016

Finished metal shapes

Iron and steel advanced

Iron and steel products nec

Nonferrous metals other

Other precious metals

Nickel

Bauxite and aluminum

Iron and steel mill products

Steelmaking materials

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 33 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations34

through 2022 and additional investments in the construction of a new robotic plant in Titanium

Valley a special economic zone located in the Sverdlovsk region that will open in 2018 The pro-

cessing of titanium forgings in all Boeing civil aircraft will be performed there including 787s 737

MAXs and 777Xs17 The contract extension with AVISMA may add several hundred million dollars

in value to annual US imports from Rus sia

How can such heavy reliance on imports of Rus sian titanium exist during a period of rising geopo-

liti cal tensions The answer is straightforward VSMPO- AVISMA is a highly specialized natu ral

mono poly producing 45 percent of the worldrsquos aerospace titanium Only four other countries

smelt high- grade titanium in industrial quantities the United States Germany Japan and China

Overall global production capacity is limited while demand is growing The United States cur-

rently imports around 79 percent of all the titanium it consumes each year18

17 ldquoBoeing and VSMPO Avisma to Launch Second Joint Production Siterdquo Rus sian Aviation Insider December 22 2016

http wwwrusaviainsider com boeing - and - vsmpo - avisma - to - launch - second - joint - production - site

18 Jon Ostrower and Andy Pasztor ldquoBoeing United Technologies Stockpile Titanium Partsrdquo Wall Street Journal

August 7 2014 https wwwwsj com articles boeing - united - technologies - stockpiling - titanium - parts - 1407441886

Figure 511 US Imports from Rus sia Civilian Aircrafts and Parts US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 1992ndash2016)

0

$20000000

$40000000

$60000000

$80000000

$100000000

$120000000

$140000000

$160000000

$180000000

$200000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Parts-civilian aircraft

Civilian aircraft

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 34 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 35

The Sanctions Act authorizes the secretary of the trea sury (in a nonmandatory way) to impose

restrictions (without specifying them) against Rus sian state- owned entities operating in the railway

metals and mining sectors of the Rus sian economy Despite the commanding heights of Rus siarsquos

state sector owner ship in its economy (70 percent of GDP) the metal- producing companies have

remained mostly in private hands

NUCLEAR AFFAIRS

Historically owners and operators of the 104 commercial nuclear power reactors in the United

States have purchased more than 80 percent of their uranium from foreign countries Uranium

shipping from Rus sia accounted for about 13 percent of the 58 million pounds of uranium pur-

chased overseas in 201219 At the same time the Rus sian state- owned mono poly Rosatom ac-

counts for 20 percent of Kazakhstanrsquos uranium production (which in turn comprises 11 percent of

all US uranium imports) and 20 percent of US domestic uranium production capacity (with

owner ship of exploration tracts in Wyoming)20

Nuclear fuel and nuclear power continue to be po liti cally sensitive topics both in the United

States and Rus sia Bilateral cooperation in this sector (being surprisingly stable with imports of

nuclear fuel from Rus sia at a level of $1 billion annually in the last five years [Figure 512 and 513])

is under constant po liti cal and lobbying pressure and has been a source of several po liti cal scan-

dals21 Consequently upside risks in this area of interaction are minimal and downside risks are

much higher especially when we are seeing more decommissioning of nuclear plants in the

United States than new constructions The US EIArsquos 2017 Annual Energy Outlook assumes

that about 25 percent of the nuclear capacity now operating will be removed from ser vice

by 205022

WHY IS THE GRASS GREENER ON THE OTHER SIDE

The United States continues to significantly reduce imports of chemical fertilizers as domestic pro-

duction increases In 2016 the United States imported 13 percent less ammonia and 11 percent

less urea and UAN which is a liquid urea and ammonium nitrate fertilizer Rus sia accounts for

around 40 percent of UAN imported by the United States The United States canceled antidumping

duties on imports of ammonium nitrate and urea from Rus sia in 2016 but it did not prevent import

19 US EIA ldquoThe US Relies on Foreign Uranium Enrichment Ser vices to Fuel Its Nuclear Power Plantsrdquo Today in

Energy August 28 2013 https wwweia gov todayinenergy detail php idshy=shy1273

20 Colin Chilcoat ldquoDoes Rus sia Really Own 20 Percent of the USrsquo Uranium Reservesrdquo OilPricecom May 6 2015

http oilpricecom Alternative - Energy Nuclear - Power Does - Russia - Really - Own - 20 - Of - The - US - Uranium - Reserves

html

21 Michelle Ye Hee Lee ldquoThe Facts behind Trumprsquos Repeated Claim about Hillary Clintonrsquos Role in the Rus sian Ura-

nium Dealrdquo Washington Post October 26 2016

22 US EIA ldquoAnnual Energy Outlook 2017 with Projections to 2050rdquo 81ndash82

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 35 102017 404 PM

Figure 512 US Imports from Rus sia Share of Oil Metals and Nuclear Fuel Million US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 1992ndash2016)

87

86

90

90

90

91

88

86

7882

0

$5000

$10000

$15000

$20000

$25000

$30000

$35000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

US Imports from Russia

Share of Oil Metals and Nuclear Fuel

Figure 513 US Imports from Rus sia Nuclear Fuel Materials US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

$-

$200000000

$400000000

$600000000

$800000000

$1200000000

$1000000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 36 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 37

drops twice last year (Figures 514 and 515) According to forecasts UAN imports are expected to

decline further to 15 million tons this year down over 46 percent from 28 million tons imported

last year23 The downside trend in imports of fertilizers will likely continue because of oversupply

BIG FISH

US imports of fish and shellfish from Rus sia are best understood in comparison with US fish

exports to the Rus sian market which slipped to zero in August 2014 after Rus sia issued an order

banning certain agricultural imports from the United States (Figure 516) While the volume of US

supply was not very large it was impor tant because it broke up the monopolistic dominance of a

few vertically integrated Rus sian companies that have kept prices high by restricting the entry of

new producers Seeking to implement import substitution policies Rus sia has tried to reduce

exports as well as imports of fish and seafood products in the last couple of years This symmetri-

cal approach was intended to ldquocompensaterdquo for a decrease of fish products in the domestic

23 Deepika Thapliyal ldquoPotashCorp Forecasts Sharp Drop in US Nitrogen Imports in 2017rdquo ICIS News February 7

2017 https wwwicis com resources news 2017 02 07 10076734 potashcorp - forecasts - sharp - drop - in - us - nitrogen

- imports - in - 2017

Figure 514 US Imports from Rus sia Share of Oil Metals Nuclear Fuel and Fertilizers Million US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

90

93

92

93

94

95

92

91

85

86

0

$5000

$10000

$15000

$20000

$25000

$30000

$35000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

US Imports from Russia

Share of Oil Metals Nuclear Fuel and Fertilizers

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 37 102017 404 PM

Figure 515 US Imports from Rus sia Chemical- Fertilizers US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

S-

$200000000

$400000000

$600000000

$800000000

$1000000000

$1200000000

$1400000000

$1600000000

$1800000000

$2000000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Figure 516 US Exports to Rus sia Fish and Shellfish US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

0

$10000000

$20000000

$30000000

$40000000

$50000000

$60000000

$70000000

$80000000

$90000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Fish and shellfish

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 38 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 39

consumer market caused by Rus siarsquos import ban but it has failed As result the group most af-

fected by the self- imposed counter- sanctions were Rus sian consumers

With a significant drop in fish imports a devaluation of the ruble and inflationary pressures on

seafood prices yearly consumption of fish in Rus sia has declined precipitously In 2015 alone

fish prices increased 20 percent and consumption dropped to 14 kilograms per person24 from

22 kilograms in 201425 In 2016 food rose to 355 percent of house hold expenditure as a result of

increases in food prices26 This has pushed vertically integrated fishing monopolies to sell even

more of their catch abroad rather than deliver to the Rus sian Federation (Figure 517) Thus we

cannot exclude the possibility of further growth in US fish and shellfish imports from Rus sia on a

marginal scale

24 Александр Савельев ldquoПотребление рыбы в России упало до 14 кг на человекаrdquo [Fish consumption in Rus sia fell to

14 kg per person] Экономика Интерфакс January 28 2015 http wwwinterfax ru business 492038

25 Илья Шестаков ldquoПотебление рыбы в России снизилось на 10 процентов из- за роста ценrdquo [Fish consumption in

Rus sia dropped by 10 percent due to price increases] RNS March 8 2017 https rnsonline consumer - market

Potreblenie - ribi - v - Rossii - snizilos - na - 10 - iz - za - rosta - tsen - 2017 - 03 - 08

26 Zoya Sheftalovich and Christian Oliver ldquoRus siarsquos Boom (Farming) Economyrdquo Politico November 8 2016 http

wwwpolitico eu article russias - boom - farming - economy

Figure 517 US Imports from Rus sia Fish and Shellfish US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

0

$50000000

$100000000

$150000000

$200000000

$250000000

$300000000

$350000000

$400000000

$450000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 39 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations40

SPACE ODYSSEY

Among high- end products beyond the top five groups of goods imported from Rus sia cheap and

efficient Rus sian engines have been used to launch US rockets into space for about 16 years

(Figure 518) There was a serious po liti cal strug gle around a 2014 ban on the purchase of Rus sian

RD-180 rocket engines revealing the conflicting business interests of power ful high- tech companies

This restrictive mea sure was temporary and was quickly lifted because of significant cost impacts

and risks of disruption to launch schedules27 For the same reason the Sanctions Act does not autho-

rize ldquothe imposition of any sanction or other condition limitation restriction or prohibition that

directly or indirectly impedes the supply by any entity of the Rus sian Federation of any product or

ser vice or the procurement of such product or ser vice by any contractor or subcontractor of the

United States or any other entity relating to or in connection with any space launch conducted for

the National Aeronautics and Space Administration or any other nonndash Department of Defense

customerrdquo28

Nevertheless many experts believe that US domestic alternatives to replace Rus sian engines will

be viable in five to eight years

27 Ken Dilanian ldquoWhy Does the US Use Rus sian Rockets to Launch Its Satellitesrdquo NBC News updated November 15

2016 http wwwnbcnews com why - does - u - s - use - russian - rockets - launch - its - satellites - n588526

28 Countering Amer i carsquos Adversaries through Sanctions Act HR 3364

Figure 518 Spacecraft Excluding Military US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

0

$20000000

$40000000

$60000000

$80000000

$100000000

$120000000

$140000000

$160000000

$180000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 40 102017 404 PM

41

Diversity and technological complexity are the most vis i ble advantages supporting US exports to

Rus sia Three major groups of export goods include civilian aircraft engines and parts (Figure 61)

drilling and oil field equipment (Figure 62) and industrial machines and engines (Figure 63)

Despite sanctions against the transfer of advanced oil producing and pro cessing technologies the

realization of US drilling and oil field equipment in Rus sia is sustainable although some bilateral

proj ects have been frozen

Another category of goods that has demonstrated resilience is the phar ma ceu ti cal industry (Fig-

ure 64) because most drugs in Rus sia are imported (about 70 percent of the Rus sian phar ma ceu-

ti cal market in value) Import substitution policies have had only modest results in this industry

As confirmed by American Chamber of Commerce surveys US exports to Rus sia are closely

connected to US FDI 30 percent of total imports of US companies working in the Rus sian

market come from the United States (more than $2 billion in 2016) In other words about

40 percent of all US exports to Rus sia are related to a US corporate- sector business pro cess in

the country The major sectors of activity of these companies are energy and natu ral resources

(52 percent) manufacturing (17 percent) information and communications technology or ICT

(13 percent) retail (7 percent) automotive industry (6 percent) phar ma ceu ti cal production

(1 percent) professional ser vices (05 percent) and other (2 percent)1

Some obvious constraints on US exports to Rus sia have resulted from a reduction in demand A

deterioration of bilateral relations and implementation of sanctions and counter- sanctions have

directly or indirectly afected all businesses Figures 65 and 66 provide data regarding a dramatic

drop in the sale of US agricultural production in Rus sia with all other categories of exports in

goods showing big cuts as well (see Figures 67ndash69)

Exports of civilian aircraft engines and parts put the state of Washington in first place among

other states as a leading exporter to the Rus sian market (Figure 610)

1 American Chamber of Commerce in Rus sia ldquoInvestment and Import to Rus sia 2nd Surveyrdquo 13

Diversity and Constraints

06

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 41 102017 404 PM

Figure 61 US Exports of Civilian Aircraft Engines Equipment and Parts to Rus sia US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

$2500000000

$2000000000

$1500000000

$1000000000

$500000000

$-

Figure 62 US Exports of Drilling and Oil Field Equipment US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

0

$5000000

$10000000

$15000000

$20000000

$25000000

$30000000

$35000000

$40000000

$45000000

$50000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 42 102017 404 PM

Figure 63 US Exports of Industrial Engines to Rus sia US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

0

$5000000

$10000000

$15000000

$20000000

$25000000

$30000000

$35000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Figure 64 US Exports of Phar ma ceu ti cal Preparations to Rus sia US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

0

$5000000

$10000000

$15000000

$20000000

$25000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 43 102017 404 PM

Figure 65 US Exports of Meat and Poultry to Rus sia US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Meat poultry etc

$1000000000

$800000000

$600000000

$400000000

$200000000

$-

$1200000000

$1400000000

$1600000000

Figure 66 US Exports of Soybeans to Rus sia US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

0

$20000000

$40000000

$60000000

$80000000

$100000000

$120000000

$140000000

$160000000

$180000000

$200000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 44 102017 404 PM

Figure 67 US Exports of Vehicles Engines and Parts to Rus sia US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Other parts and accessories of vehicles

Automotive tires and tubes

Bodies and chassis for passenger cars

Engines and engine parts (carburetors pistonsrings and valves)

Trucks buses and special purpose vehicles

Passenger cars new and used

$2500000000

$2000000000

$1500000000

$500000000

$-

$1000000000

Figure 68 US Exports of Medicinal Equipment to Rus sia US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

$10000000

$15000000

$20000000

$25000000

$30000000

$35000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 45 102017 404 PM

Figure 610 US Exports to Rus sia by States (2016 US$ Value) Million US$ 2013ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoState and Metropolitan Area Trade Datardquo

Iowa Kentucky

North Dakota

Oklahoma

South Carolina

Washington

0

$500

$1000

$1500

$2000

2013 2014 2015 2016

District of Columbia

Iowa

Kentucky

North Dakota

Oklahoma

South Carolina

Washington

Figure 69 US Exports of Excavating Machinery to Rus sia US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

0

$5000000

$10000000

$15000000

$20000000

$25000000

$30000000

$35000000

$40000000

$45000000

$50000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 46 102017 404 PM

47

Upon reviewing the current trend in US- Russia economic relations we must acknowledge that

the existing trade model is obsolete and exhausted Imports are resource- oriented and reflect

constraints of the Rus sian economic structure while five groups of goodsmdash oil metals nuclear

fuels fertilizers and fishmdash make up more than 90 percent of total imports from Rus sia (Figure 71)

Each of these industries has a limited capacity for growth in the foreseeable future

Rus siarsquos core export to the United Statesmdash oilmdash will inevitably decrease in the mid- term under any

scenario The value and volume of Rus sian exports to the United States are open to global market

volatility and po liti cal pressures with limited hedging mechanisms

Overall US exports to Rus sia are unsustainable due to bilateral po liti cal tensions the whims of

commodity markets and changing domestic policies Sanctions and counter- sanctions have

created additional barriers particularly in finance banking high- tech energy and agro- business

According to the American Chamber of Commerce 69 percent of US companies working in the

country consider the impact of US sanctions against Rus sia on their business as negative At the

same time 60 percent of companies do not expect big changes in business relations between

Rus sia and the United States under Trump1 as the new law codifies existing sanctions fortifies

them and extends them to new sectors

Current US investments are low due to the weak rule of law in Rus sia a lack of property right

protections and proper contract enforcement high levels of statization and monopolization in the

economy a poor business climate outdated capital stock dependence on natural- resource

sectors and of course sanction and counter- sanction mea sures Bloated administrative compo-

nents created as risk mitigation instruments have also served as impediments The countryrsquos

institutional weakness low level of productivity bud get constraints and a declining inflexible

workforce will restrain future economic growth even if commodity prices recover Rus sian eco-

nomic policy will likely continue to be statist and protectionist relying mostly on import

substitutions

1 Ibid 11

Existing Trends and Future Scenarios

07

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 47 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations48

What scenarios can be expected in such a challenging environment

One probability (no peace no war) is based on the assumption that matters will not deteriorate

further and implementation of the Sanctions Act will be cursory This will cause relatively slow

degradation in the economic field with occasional flashes of activity in selected areas (eg closer

cooperation against Islamist terrorist groups in Syria)

A second worse case or critical scenario is the intensive and full- scale execution of current sanc-

tion legislation and even the imposition of new economic punitive and restrictive mea sures which

could incite asymmetric retaliatory actions and lead to the introduction of additional protectionist

policies This in turn could trigger a further escalation of mutual confrontation and could eventu-

ally destroy the fundamentals of the current bilateral trade system Rus sian leadership has charac-

terized the Sanctions Act as a declaration of a trade war that ends all hope for improving bilateral

relations2

2 Дмитрий Медведев ldquoПодписание президентом США нового санкционного закона против России создает несколько

последствийrdquo [The US Presidentrsquos signing of the package of new sanctions against Rus sia will have a few conse-

quences] Facebook August 2 2017 https wwwfacebook com Dmitry Medvedev posts 10154587161801851

Figure 71 US Imports from Rus sia Share of Oil Metals Nuclear Fuel Fertilizers and Fish Million US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

93

94

93

94

95

96

93

92

87

89

0

$5000

$10000

$15000

$20000

$25000

$30000

$35000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

US Imports from Russia

Share of Oil Metals Nuclear FuelFertilizers and Fish

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 48 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 49

The best case and most favorable scenario looks less probable now It assumes the realization of

structural reforms in Rus sia in such a way that would adapt Rus siarsquos foreign policy to national

economic needs reduce confrontations with the West and make a concerted efort to integrate

Rus sian businesses into global supply and value chains A revitalization of the structural reform

agendamdash including eforts to diversify economic activities through de- monopolization and support

for SMEs a restructuring of the banking sector the creation of a vibrant business climate to foster

entrepreneurships and innovation the implementation of administrative and judicial reforms to

tackle red tape and endemic corruption and the reduction of state control over key sectors of the

economy via wide- spread privatization could kick- start the development of a nonoil economy and

improve long- term growth prospects Despite ongoing discussion of reform strategies deep

economic and po liti cal changes are extremely complicated over the next po liti calelectoral cycle

(2018ndash2024) particularly because of re sis tance of vested interests and growing commodity prices

The urgency to tackle structural shortcomings in natu ral resource- dependent economies usually

correlates with the price of those resources and the degree to which resource rents drive eco-

nomic activity However there may be marginal improvements in the efficiency of the current

economic system

Future US- Russia relations can be thought of through three pillars one pillar focuses on areas

where both countries maintain a competitive rivalry another looks at potential areas of interaction

under pres ent conditions a third pillar and one that has evaporated from the current bilateral

agenda concentrates on future cooperation Stronger economic ties could not only be a kind of

po liti cal shock absorber but contribute to the building of this future (particularly business contacts

aim to support future structural reforms) although po liti cal factors are depressing the prospects

for cooperation To escape deadlock it will be impor tant to establish the right balance between

politics and economics and create a model of collaboration within the framework of contention

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 49 102017 404 PM

About the Author

Vadim Grishin PhD MBA has been involved in the reform pro cess in Rus sia as adviser to the

deputy prime minister of Rus sia in 1992ndash1993 and 2006ndash2010 He has extensive experience

working with the Bretton Woods Institutions He was the board member of the World Bank Group

and served as se nior adviser at the International Monetary Fund Currently he is a con sul tant to the

chief economistrsquos office of the International Finance Corporation and teaches the economics of

transition at Georgetown University in Washington DC

50

594-71613_ch99_4Pindd 50 102017 403 PM

Blank

COVER PHOTO ADOBE STOCK

1616 Rhode Island Avenue NW

Washington DC 20036

202 887 0200 | wwwcsisorg

v++ISBN 978-1-4422-8035-9

Lanham bull Boulder bull New York bull London

4501 Forbes Boulevard

Lanham MD 20706

301 459 3366 | wwwrowmancom

A U T H O R

Vadim Grishin

Myths and Realities

A Report of the

CSIS RUSSIA AND EURASIA PROGRAM

US-RussiaEconomicRelations

O C T O B E R 2 0 1 7

Euml|xHSLEOCy280359z

The Man Pupu Nyor Rock Formations at the Northern Urals also known as Seven

Strong Man or Little Mountain of the God in the local tribe (Mansi) language

Page 22: U.S.-Russia Economic Relations: Myths and Realities · 2020-04-17 · OCTOBER 2017 U.S.- Russia Economic Relations Myths and Realities AUTHOR Vadim Grishin A REPORT OF THE CSIS RUSSIA

US-Russia Economic Relations16

inflows (oil money) lead to ruble appreciation and render a countryrsquos production less competitive

During that time Rus siarsquos industry did not receive preferential access to larger markets and could

not expand its share in the global economy particularly because of its self- isolation from the

regional trade agreements (except for its participation in the Eurasian Economic Union with some

neighboring countries of the former Soviet Union) As a result neither import substitution nor

export- led strategy promoted growth and specialization in nonoil production A long- awaited

modernization and reallocation of resources from an inefficient nontrade sector to a trade sector

did not materialize

These limits were later augmented with sanctions and an extension of domestic restrictions on

cooperation with Western partners Importantly the rapid growth of state- monopoly structures in

the Rus sian economy over the past 15 years has created additional obstacles to the development

and diversification of US- Russia economic ties

Figure 41 US Imports from Rus sia US$ 2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2016)

Fish and shellfish 3

Crude oil 5

Fuel oil 37

Petroleum products other

8

Nuclear fuel materials

7

Chemicals-fertilizers 4

Steelmaking materials 5

Iron and steel mill products 4

Bauxite and aluminum 9

Other precious metals 4

Nonferrous metals other 1

Finished metal shapes 1

Synthetic rubber--primary

1

Spacecraftexcluding military

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 16 102017 404 PM

Fig

ure

42

U

S E

xpo

rts

to R

us s

ia U

S$ 2

016

Sou

rce

US

Ce

nsu

s B

ure

au ldquo

Trad

e in

Go

od

s w

ith

Ru

s sia

rdquo (s

ee

dat

a fo

r 2

016

)

Bak

ery

pro

du

cts

Win

e b

eer

an

d r

elat

ed

pro

du

cts

New

spri

nt

Pla

stic

mat

eria

ls

Ch

emic

als-

fert

ilize

rs

Ch

emic

als-

ino

rgan

icC

hem

ical

s-o

rgan

ic

Ch

emic

als-

oth

erC

ott

on

fib

er c

loth

In

du

stri

al r

ub

ber

pro

du

cts

Min

eral

su

pp

lies-

man

ufa

ctu

red

Gen

erat

ors

acc

esso

ries

Ele

ctri

c ap

par

atu

s

Dri

llin

g amp

oilfi

eld

eq

uip

men

t Sp

ecia

lized

min

ing

Exc

avat

ing

mac

hin

ery

No

nfa

rm t

ract

ors

an

d p

arts

In

du

stri

al e

ng

ines

Fo

od

to

bac

co m

ach

iner

y M

etal

wo

rkin

g m

ach

ine

too

ls

Tex

tile

sew

ing

m

ach

ines

W

oo

d g

lass

p

last

ic

Pu

lp a

nd

pap

er

mac

hin

ery

Mea

suri

ng

tes

tin

g

con

tro

l in

stru

men

ts

Mat

eria

ls h

and

ling

equ

ipm

ent

Ind

ust

rial

mac

hin

es

oth

er

Ph

oto

ser

vice

ind

ust

ry m

ach

iner

y A

gri

cult

ura

l mac

hin

ery

eq

uip

men

t C

om

pu

ters

Co

mp

ute

r ac

cess

ori

es

Sem

ico

nd

uct

ors

Tel

eco

mm

un

icat

ion

seq

uip

men

t

Bu

sin

ess

mac

hin

es a

nd

eq

uip

men

t

Lab

ora

tory

tes

tin

g in

stru

men

ts

Med

icin

al e

qu

ipm

ent

Civ

ilian

air

craf

t e

ng

ines

eq

uip

men

t a

nd

par

ts

Rai

lway

tra

nsp

ort

atio

n

equ

ipm

ent

Ves

sels

exc

lud

ing

scr

ap

Co

mm

erci

al v

esse

ls o

ther

M

arin

e en

gin

es p

arts

Spac

ecra

ft e

xclu

din

g

mili

tary

Pas

sen

ger

car

s

new

an

d u

sed

Tru

cks

bu

ses

and

sp

ecia

l p

urp

ose

ve

hic

les

En

gin

es a

nd

en

gin

e p

arts

(c

arb

ure

tors

pis

ton

s r

ing

s

and

val

ves)

B

od

ies

and

ch

assi

s fo

r p

asse

ng

er c

ars

Au

tom

oti

ve t

ires

an

d t

ub

es

Oth

er p

arts

an

d a

cces

sori

es o

f ve

hic

les

Ap

par

el h

ou

seh

old

go

od

s -

text

ile

Ph

arm

aceu

tica

lp

rep

arat

ion

s

Furn

itu

re h

ou

seh

old

go

od

s

etc

R

ug

s

Cel

l ph

on

es a

nd

oth

er

ho

use

ho

ld g

oo

ds

ne

c

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 17 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations18

Figure 43 US Trade in Goods with Rus sia Million US$ 1992ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 1992ndash2016)

Russian Financial Crisis

Oil price Increased from$2446 USD per barrel (2001)

to $9694 USD per barrel(2008)

Global Financial Crisis

Oil price high record in2011-2012

(more that $111 USD perbarrel)

Oil price crashed

$-

$5000

$10000

$15000

$20000

$25000

$30000

$35000

$40000

$45000

$50000

1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

US Imports from Russia US Exports to Russia US-Russia Trade in Goods

No doubt po liti cal ups and downs add volatility to US- Russia trade Nevertheless Rus siarsquos eco-

nomic structure exhausted itself before the Ukrainian crisis and the recent Rus sian recession Its

limitations are not only due to some mistakes in policy or negative coincidences of circumstances

but rather to deeply rooted properties in the current bilateral trade model related to structural

issues in the Rus sian economy Structural constraints such as the weak enforcement of property

rights poor business regulation and nondiversified exports weighed on Rus sian trade with the

United States From this perspective the term ldquonaturalunnatural trading partnersrdquo does not ad-

dress the unused capacity of bilateral interaction or the real challenges that kind of interaction

faces It just adds metaphysical flavor to the very specific economic and po liti cal factors that

determine the US- Russia trajectory

Overall the outlines of bilateral trade (Figure 43) resemble the famous ldquoRus sian Mountainsrdquo that

were a pre de ces sor of the modern roller coaster icy hills supported by wooden constructionsmdash a

rigid and immobile structure that sooner or later would melt This unfortunately is what is hap-

pening to US- Russia trade cooperation now

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 18 102017 404 PM

19

ARE LITTLE FISH REALLY SWEET

Low US- Russia economic interaction has at least two consequences First it limits the capacity of

policymakers to exploit trade as an instrument for geopo liti cal combat Even the question of a US

trade deficit which used to be a headache for many US trading partners has become so insig-

nificant in absolute terms (about $87 billion in 2016) that it seems hardly worth caring about

When the volume of trade between two countries becomes very small in absolute terms whether

a country is running a surplus or deficit is no longer relevant But it also renders another type of

confrontations (sometimes more dangerous) more likely since the two traders have little to lose

Second in an environment marked by low levels of bilateral trade both sides could incentivize (if

and when a desire for po liti cal rapprochement exists) the signing of new trade deals which are

elevated symbolically as a turning point in bilateral po liti cal relations (ie the sale of Boeings to

Rus sia or the delivery via tankers of Rus sian oil to US refineries) Sometimes markets themselves

pres ent ldquogiftsrdquo that can be capitalized on po liti cally US- USSR grain trade in the 1970s was one

such ldquogiftrdquo large sales of American grain to the Soviet Union helped US policymakers win favor

with the po liti cally impor tant American farming sector and permitted Soviet leaders to maintain

access to a dietary staple for the Soviet population

The strong 32 percent growth in value of US imports from Rus sia from January to May 2017

versus January to May 2016 ( Table 51) is an example of a development that has tempted officials

to pres ent it as a sign of positive change due to ldquogrowing business activitiesrdquo (this kind of statement

was heard before the bilateral summit in Germany in July 2017) although the reason for that leap

was evidently an increase in commodity prices (mainly of oilmdash see Table 52) and not a rise in

entrepreneurial interactions The primary beneficiaries of that upside rally have been two other

petro- economies Saudi Arabia and Venezuela ( Tables 53 and 54)

Sector Analyses

05

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 19 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations20

Table 51 US Imports from Rus sia Million US$ Januaryndash May 2016 vs Januaryndash May 2017

Year January February March April May Total

2016 9603 6871 11097 12257 10977 50805

2017 12215 10220 16979 13471 14147 67032

Change 271 487 530 99 289 319

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 1992ndash2016)

Table 52 Change in Urals Crude Oil Prices US$ per Barrel Januaryndash May 2016 vs Januaryndash May 2017

Januaryndash May 2016 Januaryndash May 2017 Change ($) Change ()

3601 5129 1528 424

Source Ministry of Finance of the Rus sian Federation https wwwminfin ru ru ixzz4mMIZ7XtC

Table 53 US Imports from Saudi Arabia Million US$ Januaryndash May 2016 vs Januaryndash May 2017

Year January February March April May Total

2016 15114 9036 13555 10844 14679 63228

2017 19802 20298 21650 16211 19542 97503

Change 3101 12463 5972 495 331 542

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Saudi Arabiardquo Foreign Trade last modified June 29 2017

https wwwcensus gov foreign - trade balance c5170 html (see data for 2016ndash2017)

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 20 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 21

Table 54 US Imports from Venezuela Million US$ Januaryndash May 2016 vs Januaryndash May 2017

Year January February March April May Total

2016 6657 5560 7140 8007 7922 35286

2017 13041 10864 123500 11148 12243 59646

Change 9590 9540 7297 3923 5454 6903

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Venezuelardquo Foreign Trade last modified June 29 2017

https wwwcensus gov foreign - trade balance c3070 html (see data for 2016ndash2017)

Table 55 US Exports to Rus sia Million US$ Januaryndash May 2016 vs Januaryndash May 2017

Year January February March April May Total

2016 3628 3577 7298 4657 4947 24107

2017 3144 4277 5386 6670 4806 24283

Change minus133 196 minus262 432 minus29 minus07

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2016ndash2017)

At the same time US exports to Rus sia continue to stagnate ( Table 55) due to low levels of

consumption during a two-and- a- half-year economic crisis a deep ruble devaluation sanctions

and counter- sanctions

Given the very dif er ent economic structures and resource endowments of Rus sia and the United

States it is not surprising that US- Russia trade is asymmetric and oil driven (Figure 51) A

3 percent increase in Urals oil prices translates into a one percent increase in US import growth

from Rus sia Thus in 2016 every $10 increase in Urals crude oil added $15 billion to the value of

US imports or 11 percent to the total value of imports from Rus sia

OIL ADDICTION

Oil is a core pillar of US- Russia bilateral trade A bumpy ride in oil markets afects commerce

Nevertheless Rus sian oil exports to the United States in physical terms have been rather

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 21 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations22

sustainable Starting from 2005 average annual deliveries have been above 150 million barrels

(Figure 52) Crude and heating oil have dominated while petroleum products and liquefied petro-

leum gases have not (Figure 53) In 2011 oil exports peaked at 228 million barrels but declined to

159 million barrels in 2016mdash a drop of 30 percent Rec ord high shipments of Rus sian oil to the United

States coincided with an elevation in oil prices which made the subsequent decline in oil shipment

value between 2011 and 2016 (by about 72 percent as shown in Figure 54) seem more stark The

increase in price also raised the share of oil in Rus sian exports by 74 percent in 2011 (Figure 55)

The Rus sian share in total US oil imports was around 55 percent in 2011 and 43 percent in 2016

( Table 56) In the last five years the United States has relied exclusively on consumption of Rus sian

oil for the rough equivalent of one week out of the year (Figure 56)

It is unlikely that Rus sia can significantly increase its share of the US oil market and there is a real

possibility for a downward trend There are several reasons the historically high Rus sian hydrocar-

bon export threshold of 2011 will not soon if ever be surpassed

First US energy consumption will likely be flat According to the US Energy Information Adminis-

tration (EIA) demand for petroleum and other liquids in the United States will be about 35ndash36

quadrillion British thermal units (BTUs) with minimal variation over the next 25 years1

1 US EIA ldquoAnnual Energy Outlook 2017 with Projections to 2050rdquo January 5 2017 7ndash8

Figure 51 US- Russia Trade Growth () vs US and Rus sia Real GDP Growth () 1993ndash2016

Source IMF ldquoIMF Datardquo accessed September 27 2017 http wwwimf org en Data US Census Bureau

ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo

Note rGDPthinsp=thinspreal gross domestic product

Trade

USA rGDP growth

Russia rGDP growth

-60

-40

-20

0

20

40

60

80

100

1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Gro

wth

All spikes in US-Russia trade have been connected with two main

variables volume and price of crude oil

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 22 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 23

Second the United States will become a net energy exporter between 2020 and 2030 in most

cases under dif er ent combinations of oil and natu ral gas prices GDP growth technological

breakthroughs and the availability of energy resources The role of oil imports will dramatically

fall2

Third oil price scenarios as described by the International Energy Agency (IEA) international

financial organ izations (IFIs) and many national agencies are very cautious and assume that even

by 2035 to 2040 oil prices will not to recover to the levels of 2011ndash20123

Fourth Rus sian oil production and export growth will be modest and driven by Asian economic

expansion and will comprise a decreasing share of Western markets4 According to forecasts from

2 Ibid 15ndash18

3 Ibid table 3 ldquoEnergy Prices by Sector and Sourcesrdquo World Bank World Bank Commodity Markets Price Forecasts

(Washington DC World Bank 2017) httpswwwworldbank org en research commodity - markets Organ ization of the

Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) World Oil Outlook 2016 (Vienna OPEC 2016)

4 E D Belotskaia et al Global and Rus sian Energy Outlook 2016 (Moscow Energy Research Institute of the Rus sian

Acad emy of Science Analytical Center for the Government of the Rus sian Federation 2016) http acgov ru files

publication a 12767 pdf

Figure 52 US Imports from Rus sia Crude Oil and Petroleum Products Thousands of Barrels 1995ndash2016

Source US EIA ldquoUS Imports by Country of Origin Rus siardquo Petroleum amp Other Liquids September 13

2017 http wwweia gov dnav pet PET _ MOVE _ IMPCUS _ D _ NUS _ NRS _ MBBL _ M htm

0

50000

100000

150000

200000

250000

Date 1995 1996 1997 1998 199920002001200220032004200520062007200820092010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 23 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations24

the Organ ization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) crude oil exports from Rus sia and

the Caspian region to the United States will dis appear by 20255

So why does the Rus sian Urals blend continue to be attractive for oil traders and US refineries

which could pro cess greater volumes of domestically produced lighter crude There are two main

reasons One is related to the preference of US high conversion refineries (the most sophisticated

in the world) to work with heavy oil blends produced by Canada Mexico Iraq Venezuela and

Rus sia Pro cessing heavy crude now is as profitable as pro cessing lighter crude The so- called

crack spreadmdash the diference between the cost of relatively cheap heavy crude oil and the final

price of value- added consumer products (diesel gasoline jet fuel and heating oil)mdash has become

the same as the refinery margins of light sweet crude6 This has primarily afected light oil produc-

ing countries such as Angola Algeria and Nigeria

5 OPEC World Oil Outlook 2016 306ndash309

6 ldquoHow Much for That Heavy Oilrdquo Oil Sands Magazine December 26 2015 https wwwoilsandsmagazine com

news 2015 12 26 how - much - for - that - heavy - oil

Figure 53 US Imports from Rus sia Oil and Petroleum Products US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

$-

$25000000000

$20000000000

$15000000000

$10000000000

$5000000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Liquefied petroleum gases

Petroleum products other

Fuel oil

Crude oil

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 24 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 25

Another factor afecting purchase of Rus sian oil is a new trend among oil companies for further

consolidation of scale and for integrating operations of upstream and downstream business7

There have been several waves of separation and unification of production transportation and

pro cessing in the last 50 years The current business cycle can be seen as an adaptation to a

period of low prices and oversupply Companies that buy andor produce oil in Rus sia most likely

prefer to transport and pro cess this oil in their own modern refineries in the United States At the

same time some of the newest refinery designs specifically for pro cessing heavy oils have been

built in Asia thus extending the choices of heavy oil producing countries

We should also consider that leading US and international oil traders along with oil producing

companies working with or owning US refineries frequently buy Rus sian oil on the open market

and have long- term contracts on Rus sian crude oil delivery Many Rus sian oil companies prefer to

pay for purchases or ser vices with their future production instead of cash creating situations of

ldquostickyrdquo oil imports that are difficult to replace The best- known example is an interaction between

7 ldquoEnergy and Utilities Sectorrdquo Roundtable Financier Worldwide December 2015 https wwwfinancierworldwide

com roundtable - energy - utilities - sector - dec15

Figure 54 US Imports of Oil and Petroleum Products from Rus sia vs Oil Prices Eu rope Brent Spot Price Free on Board (FOB) 1996ndash2017

Source US EIA ldquoUS Imports by Country of Origin Rus siardquo

0

20

40

60

80

100

120

140

0

5000

10000

15000

20000

25000

30000

Jan

-19

96

Jun

-19

96

No

v-19

96

Ap

r-19

97

Sep

-19

97

Feb

-19

98

Jul-

199

8D

ec-1

99

8M

ay-1

99

9O

ct-1

99

9M

ar-2

00

0A

ug

-20

00

Jan

-20

01

Jun

-20

01

No

v-2

00

1A

pr-

20

02

Sep

-20

02

Feb

-20

03

Jul-

20

03

Dec

-20

03

May

-20

04

Oct

-20

04

Mar

-20

05

Au

g-2

00

5Ja

n-2

00

6Ju

n-2

00

6N

ov-

20

06

Ap

r-2

00

7Se

p-2

00

7Fe

b-2

00

8Ju

l-2

00

8D

ec-2

00

8M

ay-2

00

9O

ct-2

00

9M

ar-2

010

Au

g-2

010

Jan

-20

11Ju

n-2

011

No

v-2

011

Ap

r-2

012

Sep

-20

12Fe

b-2

013

Jul-

20

13D

ec-2

013

May

-20

14O

ct-2

014

Mar

-20

15A

ug

-20

15Ja

n-2

016

Jun

-20

16N

ov-

20

16

USD

per

Bar

rel

Th

ou

san

d B

arr

els

US Imports from Russia of Crude Oil and Petroleum Products (Thousand Barrels)

Europe Brent Spot Price FOB (Dollars per Barrel)

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 25 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations26

Table 56 US Oil Imports All Countries vs Rus sia Thousand Barrels per Day 2011ndash2016

Years 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

All Countries 11436 10598 9859 9241 9449 10058

Rus sia 624 477 460 330 371 433

Share 546 450 467 357 393 431

Sources US EIA ldquoUS Imports by Country of Origin Total Crude Oil and Productsrdquo Petroleum amp Other

Liquids September 13 2017 wwweia gov dnav pet pet_move_impcus_a2_nus_ep00_im0_mbbl_m htm

authorrsquos computation

Figure 55 US Imports from Rus sia Share of Crude Oil and Petroleum Products Million US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

57

64

73

72

74

73

72

59

52 50

0

$5000

$10000

$15000

$20000

$25000

$30000

$35000

$40000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

US Imports from Russia

Share of Oil and Petroleum Products

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 26 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 27

the Rus sian state mono poly Rosneft and commodity trading and mining giant Glencore which

along with energy and commodities com pany Vitol participated in a $10 billion prepayment

deal with Rosneft for crude supplies in 2013

There have been a number of ongoing transactions between the Rus sian oil industry and interna-

tional oil companies including several that top the list of importers of Rus sian oil to the United

States ( Table 57) In December 2016 Glencore participated in a controversial privatization opera-

tion purchasing in tandem with the Qatar sovereign wealth fund a 195 percent stake in Rosneft

which was on the US and EU list of sanctioned firms8 Glencore has also taken a blocking stake in

midsize oil producer RussNeft BP owns a 1975 percent stake in Rosneft Chevron holds a

15 percent interest in the 935- mile- long CPC9 pipeline which transports an average of 959000

barrels of crude oil per day including 76000 barrels daily from Rus sia10 ExxonMobil has formed

8 E Mazneva and I Arkhipov ldquoRus sia Sells $11 Billion Stake in Rosneft to Glencore Qatarrdquo Bloomberg December 7

2016

9 CPCthinsp=thinspCaspian Pipeline Consortium

10 ldquoRus sia Highlights of Operations and Business Portfoliordquo Chevron accessed October 3 2017 https wwwchevron

com worldwide russia

Figure 56 Share of Rus sian Oil in Total US Oil Imports Thousands of Barrels per Day 1972ndash2016

Source US EIA ldquoUS Imports by Country of Origin Total Crude Oil and Productsrdquo

2000

4000

6000

8000

10000

12000

14000

16000

US Imports of Crude Oil and Petroleum Products (Thousand Barrels per Day)

US Imports from Russia of Crude Oil and Petroleum Products (Thousand Barrels per Day)19

7319

7419

7519

7619

7719

7819

7919

80

198

119

82

198

319

84

198

519

86

198

719

88

198

919

90

199

119

92

199

319

94

199

519

96

199

719

98

199

92

00

02

00

12

00

22

00

32

00

42

00

52

00

62

00

72

00

82

00

92

010

20

112

012

20

132

014

20

152

016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 27 102017 404 PM

Table 57 Top Importers of Rus sian Oil to the United States Thousands of Barrels 2016

VALERO MARKETING amp SUPPLY CO 54590 3616

EXXONMOBIL OIL CORP 17087 1130

CHEVRON USA INC 15217 1008

BP WEST COAST PRODUCTS LLC 10130 671

GEORGE E WARREN CORP 7272 48

PAULSBORO REFINING CO LLC 6838 453

TESORO CORP 5097 338

VITOL INC 5084 337

PHILLIPS 66 CO 4726 313

TRAFIGURA AG 4360 289

PAR HAWAII REFINING LLC 3893 258

MOTIVA ENTERPRISES LLC 3041 205

SHELL US TRADING CO 2863 19

MARATHON PETROLEUM CO LLC 2475 16

ATLANTIC TRADING amp MARKETING 2099 14

FREEPOINT COMMODITIES LLC 1439 1

GLENCORE LTD 1284 85

BEST PETROLEUM CORP 967 64

ROLYMPUS US COMMODITIES GROUP LLC 822 6

HUNT CRUDE OIL SUPPLY CO 666 4

GULF OIL LP 658 4

Source US EIA ldquoUS Imports by Country of Origin Crude Oilrdquo Petroleum amp Other Liquids September 13

2017 httpswwweiagovdnavpetpet_move_impcus_a2_nus_epc0_im0_mbblpd_ahtm authorrsquos

computation

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 28 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 29

several joint ventures with Rosneft to undertake ofshore exploration in the Black Sea and the Kara

Sea in Siberia11

According to the Sanctions Act US persons are prohibited from exporting or reexporting goods

ser vices (except financial ser vices) and technology in support of exploration or production of new

deep- water Arctic ofshore or shale oil proj ects that involve designated Rus sian entities or other

entities in which such sanctioned persons have a controlling interest or a substantial noncontrol-

ling owner ship interest defined as not less than 33 percent (previously it was 50 percent) The new

law also authorizesmdash but does not requiremdash the imposition of so- called secondary sanctions

against non- US entities that engage in activities involving the construction maintenance or

expansion of Rus sian energy export pipelines with a fair market value of $1 million or more or an

aggregate fair market value during a 12- month period of $5 million12 This provision has raised the

concerns of some Eu ro pean countries particularly Germany As result the final language of the

law included wording about coordination of this issue with allies of the United States

Shipments of Rus sian oil to the United States could be afected by activity in the US refinery

industry In early 2017 Saudi Aramco bought the United Statesrsquo largest oil refinery in Port Arthur

(Texas) and it announced plans to send more of its own crude to that refinery13 Serious concerns

exist however regarding the future of three refineries and nine pipelines owned by Citgo a US

branch of the Venezuelan state com pany PdVSA which is balancing precariously on the edge of

default Under certain conditions in the event of PdVSA bankruptcy Rosneft could claim a stake of

up to 499 percent in Citgo Such a possibility has raised concerns among politicians and US

government officials with Trea sury Secretary Steven Mnuchin calling it a ldquonational security issuerdquo14

Tables 58 59 and 510 show allocations of Rus sian oil imports to major US refineries some of

which work exclusively on Rus sian crude a total of two to three months per year In total 150940

thousand barrels of Rus sian oil were refined in 2016

Figure 57 confirms a leading position of Texas and Louisiana among the US states receiving

Rus sian crude followed by New Jersey California Mississippi Washington Hawaii and Delaware

In a paradoxical way Texas has dis appeared from the list of states as a main destination of US

imports from Rus sia (Figure 58) because Rus sian crude is mostly delivered to Louisiana ports and

registered there by US Customs as an import from Rus sia After that it transports to refineries in

Louisiana and Texas

Overall the short- term business rationale behind the sustainability of US oil imports from Rus sia

cannot overcome strong headwinds in the US energy sector facing all oil importers which will

inevitably lead to a contraction of Rus sian oil exports to the United States in the foreseeable future

11 Exxon eforts to receive a special US Trea sury waiver to drill in sanctioned Rus sia failed in 2017

12 Countering Amer i carsquos Adversaries through Sanctions Act HR 3364

13 Sarp Ozkan ldquoSaudi Aramcorsquos Port Arthur Refinery and the US Refinery Fleetrdquo Drilling Info May 11 2017

https infodrillinginfo com saudi - aramcos - port - arthur - refinery - us - refinery - fleet

14 Graham Kates ldquoTrea sury Secretary Rus siarsquos Citgo Deal a National Security Issuerdquo CBS News May 1 2017

http wwwcbsnews com news rosneft - citgo - steven - mnuchin - national - security

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 29 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations30

Table 58 Valerorsquos Refineries Pro cessing Rus sian Oil Thousands of Barrels 2016

Saint Charles Louisiana 29206 535

Corpus Christi Texas 20626 378

Wilmington California 4250 78

Total USA 54590 100

Source US EIA ldquoRefinery Capacity Reportrdquo January 1 2017

table 5 wwweia gov petroleum refinerycapacity table5 pdf

authorrsquos computation

Table 59 ExxonMobil Refineries Pro cessing Rus sian Oil Thousands of Barrels 2016

Baytown Texas 15037 88

Baton Rouge Louisiana 2046 12

Total USA 17083 100

Source US EIA ldquoRefinery Capacity Reportrdquo authorrsquos computation

Table 510 Chevronrsquos Refineries Pro cessing Rus sian Oil Thousands of Barrels 2016

Pascagoula Mississippi 12767 840

El Segundo California 2372 155

Saint Rose Louisiana 78 05

Total USA 15217 100

Source US EIA ldquoRefinery Capacity Reportrdquo authorrsquos computation

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 30 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 31

HEAVY METAL

Taken together US imports of metals and US imports of oil compose about 80 percent of US

total imports from Rus sia (Figure 59) Trade of metals like other commodities is strongly afected

by market price fluctuations Nevertheless metal imports from Rus sia have been fairly resilient to

market volatility and their average annual value has hovered at about $4 billion in the last five years

(Figure 510) This market resilience was forged at the end of the 1990searly 2000s when Rus sian

metal producers gradually modernized their plants adjusting quality of production to Western

standards and enhancing integration into global value and supply chains Some of them conquered

their share of the highly competitive US market struggling with peers from Canada and certain

BRICS countries (China India and Brazil) To attract additional resources all Rus sian large metal-

producing companies became public and were listed on stock exchanges chiefly the London Stock

Exchange (Severstalrsquo PAO Evraz MMK OAO Novolipetsk Steel Norilsk Nikel and TMK PAO) one

on the New York Stock Exchange (Mechel) and one on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange (Rusal)

Business logic pushed some of them to invest in the US metal- making industry which was hit

hard by crisis Later on some of those assets were sold (eg two US steel mills acquired by

Severstal in 2004 were purchased 10 years later by Steel Dynamics Inc and AK Steel Corp)

Figure 57 Share of US States Rus sian Oil Imports 2016

Source US EIA ldquoUS Imports from Rus sia of Crude Oil and Petroleum Productsrdquo Petroleum amp Other

Liquids September 29 2017 https www eia gov dnav pet hist LeafHandler ashx nshy=shyPETampsshy=shyMTTIM _ NUS

- NRS _ 1ampfshy=shyM authorrsquos computation

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

100

Maine

Massachusetts

Maryland

Connecticut

Georgia

Rhode Island

Virginia

Florida

New York

Alabama

Puerto Rico

Pennsylvania

Delaware

Hawaii

Washington

Mississippi

California

New Jersey

Louisiana

Texas

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 31 102017 404 PM

Figure 58 US Imports from Rus sia by State Million US$ 2013ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoState and Metropolitan Area Trade Datardquo Foreign Trade last modified

October 2 2017 https wwwcensus gov foreign - trade statistics state

Alaska

Connecticut

Delaware

Hawaii

Louisiana

Maryland

North Dakota 0

$1000

$2000

$3000

$4000

$5000

$6000

2013 2014 2015 2016

Alabama

Alaska

Connecticut

Delaware

Hawaii

Louisiana

Maryland

Maine

Mississippi

Montana

North Dakota

Mississippi

Figure 59 US Imports from Rus sia Share of Oil and Metals Million US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 1992ndash2016)

83

82

85

86

87

88

85

82

7375

0

$5000

$10000

$15000

$20000

$25000

$30000

$35000

$40000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

US Imports from Russia

Share of Oil and Metals

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 32 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 33

Obviously the market dynamic of dif er ent metals varies (eg iron steel aluminum platinum and

nickel) Caps to increase their trade and production in a ldquored oceanrdquo global environment with

anemic demand is rather limited despite Figure 510 showing a spike of iron and steel imports

from Rus sia in 2014 and aluminum in 2016 Some opportunities may exist for Russian- owned steel

plants in the United States (such as NLMK) to participate in energy proj ects resumed under Presi-

dent Trump who has required that new pipelines use only American- made steel15

Rus sia occupies a special niche in the US market for titanium products a high- end metal indus-

try Twenty years ago a long- term contract was signed between Rus sian titanium producer

VSMPO- AVISMA and Boeing The Rus sian com pany entered the selective club of Boeing suppliers

for the manufacture of components and semi- finished products Since the signing of this contract

VSMPO has delivered more than 35 percent of all titanium placed on Boeing civil aircraft16 They

are hidden in the trade data in an import category for Civilian Aircrafts and Parts (Figure 511) At

the end of 2016 Boeing announced an extension of its framework agreement with AVISMA

15 E Scheyder C Ngai and T Sylvester ldquoAmerican Steel Unlikely to Get Keystone Boost Despite Trump Orderrdquo

Reuters January 27 2017 http wwwreuters com article usa - trump - pipeline - transcanada - idUSL1N1FH1ZD

16 A Kramer ldquoTitanium Fills Vital Role for Boeing and Rus siardquo New York Times July 5 2013 http wwwnytimes com

2013 07 06 business global titanium - fills - vital - role - for - boeing - and - russia html mcubzshy=shy3

Figure 510 US Imports from Rus sia Iron Steel Bauxite Aluminum Nickel Nonferrous Metals and Other Precious Metals and Materials US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 1992ndash2016)

0

$6000000000

$5000000000

$4000000000

$3000000000

$2000000000

$1000000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 20122013

20142015

2016

Finished metal shapes

Iron and steel advanced

Iron and steel products nec

Nonferrous metals other

Other precious metals

Nickel

Bauxite and aluminum

Iron and steel mill products

Steelmaking materials

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 33 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations34

through 2022 and additional investments in the construction of a new robotic plant in Titanium

Valley a special economic zone located in the Sverdlovsk region that will open in 2018 The pro-

cessing of titanium forgings in all Boeing civil aircraft will be performed there including 787s 737

MAXs and 777Xs17 The contract extension with AVISMA may add several hundred million dollars

in value to annual US imports from Rus sia

How can such heavy reliance on imports of Rus sian titanium exist during a period of rising geopo-

liti cal tensions The answer is straightforward VSMPO- AVISMA is a highly specialized natu ral

mono poly producing 45 percent of the worldrsquos aerospace titanium Only four other countries

smelt high- grade titanium in industrial quantities the United States Germany Japan and China

Overall global production capacity is limited while demand is growing The United States cur-

rently imports around 79 percent of all the titanium it consumes each year18

17 ldquoBoeing and VSMPO Avisma to Launch Second Joint Production Siterdquo Rus sian Aviation Insider December 22 2016

http wwwrusaviainsider com boeing - and - vsmpo - avisma - to - launch - second - joint - production - site

18 Jon Ostrower and Andy Pasztor ldquoBoeing United Technologies Stockpile Titanium Partsrdquo Wall Street Journal

August 7 2014 https wwwwsj com articles boeing - united - technologies - stockpiling - titanium - parts - 1407441886

Figure 511 US Imports from Rus sia Civilian Aircrafts and Parts US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 1992ndash2016)

0

$20000000

$40000000

$60000000

$80000000

$100000000

$120000000

$140000000

$160000000

$180000000

$200000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Parts-civilian aircraft

Civilian aircraft

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 34 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 35

The Sanctions Act authorizes the secretary of the trea sury (in a nonmandatory way) to impose

restrictions (without specifying them) against Rus sian state- owned entities operating in the railway

metals and mining sectors of the Rus sian economy Despite the commanding heights of Rus siarsquos

state sector owner ship in its economy (70 percent of GDP) the metal- producing companies have

remained mostly in private hands

NUCLEAR AFFAIRS

Historically owners and operators of the 104 commercial nuclear power reactors in the United

States have purchased more than 80 percent of their uranium from foreign countries Uranium

shipping from Rus sia accounted for about 13 percent of the 58 million pounds of uranium pur-

chased overseas in 201219 At the same time the Rus sian state- owned mono poly Rosatom ac-

counts for 20 percent of Kazakhstanrsquos uranium production (which in turn comprises 11 percent of

all US uranium imports) and 20 percent of US domestic uranium production capacity (with

owner ship of exploration tracts in Wyoming)20

Nuclear fuel and nuclear power continue to be po liti cally sensitive topics both in the United

States and Rus sia Bilateral cooperation in this sector (being surprisingly stable with imports of

nuclear fuel from Rus sia at a level of $1 billion annually in the last five years [Figure 512 and 513])

is under constant po liti cal and lobbying pressure and has been a source of several po liti cal scan-

dals21 Consequently upside risks in this area of interaction are minimal and downside risks are

much higher especially when we are seeing more decommissioning of nuclear plants in the

United States than new constructions The US EIArsquos 2017 Annual Energy Outlook assumes

that about 25 percent of the nuclear capacity now operating will be removed from ser vice

by 205022

WHY IS THE GRASS GREENER ON THE OTHER SIDE

The United States continues to significantly reduce imports of chemical fertilizers as domestic pro-

duction increases In 2016 the United States imported 13 percent less ammonia and 11 percent

less urea and UAN which is a liquid urea and ammonium nitrate fertilizer Rus sia accounts for

around 40 percent of UAN imported by the United States The United States canceled antidumping

duties on imports of ammonium nitrate and urea from Rus sia in 2016 but it did not prevent import

19 US EIA ldquoThe US Relies on Foreign Uranium Enrichment Ser vices to Fuel Its Nuclear Power Plantsrdquo Today in

Energy August 28 2013 https wwweia gov todayinenergy detail php idshy=shy1273

20 Colin Chilcoat ldquoDoes Rus sia Really Own 20 Percent of the USrsquo Uranium Reservesrdquo OilPricecom May 6 2015

http oilpricecom Alternative - Energy Nuclear - Power Does - Russia - Really - Own - 20 - Of - The - US - Uranium - Reserves

html

21 Michelle Ye Hee Lee ldquoThe Facts behind Trumprsquos Repeated Claim about Hillary Clintonrsquos Role in the Rus sian Ura-

nium Dealrdquo Washington Post October 26 2016

22 US EIA ldquoAnnual Energy Outlook 2017 with Projections to 2050rdquo 81ndash82

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 35 102017 404 PM

Figure 512 US Imports from Rus sia Share of Oil Metals and Nuclear Fuel Million US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 1992ndash2016)

87

86

90

90

90

91

88

86

7882

0

$5000

$10000

$15000

$20000

$25000

$30000

$35000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

US Imports from Russia

Share of Oil Metals and Nuclear Fuel

Figure 513 US Imports from Rus sia Nuclear Fuel Materials US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

$-

$200000000

$400000000

$600000000

$800000000

$1200000000

$1000000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 36 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 37

drops twice last year (Figures 514 and 515) According to forecasts UAN imports are expected to

decline further to 15 million tons this year down over 46 percent from 28 million tons imported

last year23 The downside trend in imports of fertilizers will likely continue because of oversupply

BIG FISH

US imports of fish and shellfish from Rus sia are best understood in comparison with US fish

exports to the Rus sian market which slipped to zero in August 2014 after Rus sia issued an order

banning certain agricultural imports from the United States (Figure 516) While the volume of US

supply was not very large it was impor tant because it broke up the monopolistic dominance of a

few vertically integrated Rus sian companies that have kept prices high by restricting the entry of

new producers Seeking to implement import substitution policies Rus sia has tried to reduce

exports as well as imports of fish and seafood products in the last couple of years This symmetri-

cal approach was intended to ldquocompensaterdquo for a decrease of fish products in the domestic

23 Deepika Thapliyal ldquoPotashCorp Forecasts Sharp Drop in US Nitrogen Imports in 2017rdquo ICIS News February 7

2017 https wwwicis com resources news 2017 02 07 10076734 potashcorp - forecasts - sharp - drop - in - us - nitrogen

- imports - in - 2017

Figure 514 US Imports from Rus sia Share of Oil Metals Nuclear Fuel and Fertilizers Million US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

90

93

92

93

94

95

92

91

85

86

0

$5000

$10000

$15000

$20000

$25000

$30000

$35000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

US Imports from Russia

Share of Oil Metals Nuclear Fuel and Fertilizers

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 37 102017 404 PM

Figure 515 US Imports from Rus sia Chemical- Fertilizers US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

S-

$200000000

$400000000

$600000000

$800000000

$1000000000

$1200000000

$1400000000

$1600000000

$1800000000

$2000000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Figure 516 US Exports to Rus sia Fish and Shellfish US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

0

$10000000

$20000000

$30000000

$40000000

$50000000

$60000000

$70000000

$80000000

$90000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Fish and shellfish

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 38 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 39

consumer market caused by Rus siarsquos import ban but it has failed As result the group most af-

fected by the self- imposed counter- sanctions were Rus sian consumers

With a significant drop in fish imports a devaluation of the ruble and inflationary pressures on

seafood prices yearly consumption of fish in Rus sia has declined precipitously In 2015 alone

fish prices increased 20 percent and consumption dropped to 14 kilograms per person24 from

22 kilograms in 201425 In 2016 food rose to 355 percent of house hold expenditure as a result of

increases in food prices26 This has pushed vertically integrated fishing monopolies to sell even

more of their catch abroad rather than deliver to the Rus sian Federation (Figure 517) Thus we

cannot exclude the possibility of further growth in US fish and shellfish imports from Rus sia on a

marginal scale

24 Александр Савельев ldquoПотребление рыбы в России упало до 14 кг на человекаrdquo [Fish consumption in Rus sia fell to

14 kg per person] Экономика Интерфакс January 28 2015 http wwwinterfax ru business 492038

25 Илья Шестаков ldquoПотебление рыбы в России снизилось на 10 процентов из- за роста ценrdquo [Fish consumption in

Rus sia dropped by 10 percent due to price increases] RNS March 8 2017 https rnsonline consumer - market

Potreblenie - ribi - v - Rossii - snizilos - na - 10 - iz - za - rosta - tsen - 2017 - 03 - 08

26 Zoya Sheftalovich and Christian Oliver ldquoRus siarsquos Boom (Farming) Economyrdquo Politico November 8 2016 http

wwwpolitico eu article russias - boom - farming - economy

Figure 517 US Imports from Rus sia Fish and Shellfish US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

0

$50000000

$100000000

$150000000

$200000000

$250000000

$300000000

$350000000

$400000000

$450000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 39 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations40

SPACE ODYSSEY

Among high- end products beyond the top five groups of goods imported from Rus sia cheap and

efficient Rus sian engines have been used to launch US rockets into space for about 16 years

(Figure 518) There was a serious po liti cal strug gle around a 2014 ban on the purchase of Rus sian

RD-180 rocket engines revealing the conflicting business interests of power ful high- tech companies

This restrictive mea sure was temporary and was quickly lifted because of significant cost impacts

and risks of disruption to launch schedules27 For the same reason the Sanctions Act does not autho-

rize ldquothe imposition of any sanction or other condition limitation restriction or prohibition that

directly or indirectly impedes the supply by any entity of the Rus sian Federation of any product or

ser vice or the procurement of such product or ser vice by any contractor or subcontractor of the

United States or any other entity relating to or in connection with any space launch conducted for

the National Aeronautics and Space Administration or any other nonndash Department of Defense

customerrdquo28

Nevertheless many experts believe that US domestic alternatives to replace Rus sian engines will

be viable in five to eight years

27 Ken Dilanian ldquoWhy Does the US Use Rus sian Rockets to Launch Its Satellitesrdquo NBC News updated November 15

2016 http wwwnbcnews com why - does - u - s - use - russian - rockets - launch - its - satellites - n588526

28 Countering Amer i carsquos Adversaries through Sanctions Act HR 3364

Figure 518 Spacecraft Excluding Military US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

0

$20000000

$40000000

$60000000

$80000000

$100000000

$120000000

$140000000

$160000000

$180000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 40 102017 404 PM

41

Diversity and technological complexity are the most vis i ble advantages supporting US exports to

Rus sia Three major groups of export goods include civilian aircraft engines and parts (Figure 61)

drilling and oil field equipment (Figure 62) and industrial machines and engines (Figure 63)

Despite sanctions against the transfer of advanced oil producing and pro cessing technologies the

realization of US drilling and oil field equipment in Rus sia is sustainable although some bilateral

proj ects have been frozen

Another category of goods that has demonstrated resilience is the phar ma ceu ti cal industry (Fig-

ure 64) because most drugs in Rus sia are imported (about 70 percent of the Rus sian phar ma ceu-

ti cal market in value) Import substitution policies have had only modest results in this industry

As confirmed by American Chamber of Commerce surveys US exports to Rus sia are closely

connected to US FDI 30 percent of total imports of US companies working in the Rus sian

market come from the United States (more than $2 billion in 2016) In other words about

40 percent of all US exports to Rus sia are related to a US corporate- sector business pro cess in

the country The major sectors of activity of these companies are energy and natu ral resources

(52 percent) manufacturing (17 percent) information and communications technology or ICT

(13 percent) retail (7 percent) automotive industry (6 percent) phar ma ceu ti cal production

(1 percent) professional ser vices (05 percent) and other (2 percent)1

Some obvious constraints on US exports to Rus sia have resulted from a reduction in demand A

deterioration of bilateral relations and implementation of sanctions and counter- sanctions have

directly or indirectly afected all businesses Figures 65 and 66 provide data regarding a dramatic

drop in the sale of US agricultural production in Rus sia with all other categories of exports in

goods showing big cuts as well (see Figures 67ndash69)

Exports of civilian aircraft engines and parts put the state of Washington in first place among

other states as a leading exporter to the Rus sian market (Figure 610)

1 American Chamber of Commerce in Rus sia ldquoInvestment and Import to Rus sia 2nd Surveyrdquo 13

Diversity and Constraints

06

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 41 102017 404 PM

Figure 61 US Exports of Civilian Aircraft Engines Equipment and Parts to Rus sia US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

$2500000000

$2000000000

$1500000000

$1000000000

$500000000

$-

Figure 62 US Exports of Drilling and Oil Field Equipment US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

0

$5000000

$10000000

$15000000

$20000000

$25000000

$30000000

$35000000

$40000000

$45000000

$50000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 42 102017 404 PM

Figure 63 US Exports of Industrial Engines to Rus sia US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

0

$5000000

$10000000

$15000000

$20000000

$25000000

$30000000

$35000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Figure 64 US Exports of Phar ma ceu ti cal Preparations to Rus sia US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

0

$5000000

$10000000

$15000000

$20000000

$25000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 43 102017 404 PM

Figure 65 US Exports of Meat and Poultry to Rus sia US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Meat poultry etc

$1000000000

$800000000

$600000000

$400000000

$200000000

$-

$1200000000

$1400000000

$1600000000

Figure 66 US Exports of Soybeans to Rus sia US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

0

$20000000

$40000000

$60000000

$80000000

$100000000

$120000000

$140000000

$160000000

$180000000

$200000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 44 102017 404 PM

Figure 67 US Exports of Vehicles Engines and Parts to Rus sia US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Other parts and accessories of vehicles

Automotive tires and tubes

Bodies and chassis for passenger cars

Engines and engine parts (carburetors pistonsrings and valves)

Trucks buses and special purpose vehicles

Passenger cars new and used

$2500000000

$2000000000

$1500000000

$500000000

$-

$1000000000

Figure 68 US Exports of Medicinal Equipment to Rus sia US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

$10000000

$15000000

$20000000

$25000000

$30000000

$35000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 45 102017 404 PM

Figure 610 US Exports to Rus sia by States (2016 US$ Value) Million US$ 2013ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoState and Metropolitan Area Trade Datardquo

Iowa Kentucky

North Dakota

Oklahoma

South Carolina

Washington

0

$500

$1000

$1500

$2000

2013 2014 2015 2016

District of Columbia

Iowa

Kentucky

North Dakota

Oklahoma

South Carolina

Washington

Figure 69 US Exports of Excavating Machinery to Rus sia US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

0

$5000000

$10000000

$15000000

$20000000

$25000000

$30000000

$35000000

$40000000

$45000000

$50000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 46 102017 404 PM

47

Upon reviewing the current trend in US- Russia economic relations we must acknowledge that

the existing trade model is obsolete and exhausted Imports are resource- oriented and reflect

constraints of the Rus sian economic structure while five groups of goodsmdash oil metals nuclear

fuels fertilizers and fishmdash make up more than 90 percent of total imports from Rus sia (Figure 71)

Each of these industries has a limited capacity for growth in the foreseeable future

Rus siarsquos core export to the United Statesmdash oilmdash will inevitably decrease in the mid- term under any

scenario The value and volume of Rus sian exports to the United States are open to global market

volatility and po liti cal pressures with limited hedging mechanisms

Overall US exports to Rus sia are unsustainable due to bilateral po liti cal tensions the whims of

commodity markets and changing domestic policies Sanctions and counter- sanctions have

created additional barriers particularly in finance banking high- tech energy and agro- business

According to the American Chamber of Commerce 69 percent of US companies working in the

country consider the impact of US sanctions against Rus sia on their business as negative At the

same time 60 percent of companies do not expect big changes in business relations between

Rus sia and the United States under Trump1 as the new law codifies existing sanctions fortifies

them and extends them to new sectors

Current US investments are low due to the weak rule of law in Rus sia a lack of property right

protections and proper contract enforcement high levels of statization and monopolization in the

economy a poor business climate outdated capital stock dependence on natural- resource

sectors and of course sanction and counter- sanction mea sures Bloated administrative compo-

nents created as risk mitigation instruments have also served as impediments The countryrsquos

institutional weakness low level of productivity bud get constraints and a declining inflexible

workforce will restrain future economic growth even if commodity prices recover Rus sian eco-

nomic policy will likely continue to be statist and protectionist relying mostly on import

substitutions

1 Ibid 11

Existing Trends and Future Scenarios

07

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 47 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations48

What scenarios can be expected in such a challenging environment

One probability (no peace no war) is based on the assumption that matters will not deteriorate

further and implementation of the Sanctions Act will be cursory This will cause relatively slow

degradation in the economic field with occasional flashes of activity in selected areas (eg closer

cooperation against Islamist terrorist groups in Syria)

A second worse case or critical scenario is the intensive and full- scale execution of current sanc-

tion legislation and even the imposition of new economic punitive and restrictive mea sures which

could incite asymmetric retaliatory actions and lead to the introduction of additional protectionist

policies This in turn could trigger a further escalation of mutual confrontation and could eventu-

ally destroy the fundamentals of the current bilateral trade system Rus sian leadership has charac-

terized the Sanctions Act as a declaration of a trade war that ends all hope for improving bilateral

relations2

2 Дмитрий Медведев ldquoПодписание президентом США нового санкционного закона против России создает несколько

последствийrdquo [The US Presidentrsquos signing of the package of new sanctions against Rus sia will have a few conse-

quences] Facebook August 2 2017 https wwwfacebook com Dmitry Medvedev posts 10154587161801851

Figure 71 US Imports from Rus sia Share of Oil Metals Nuclear Fuel Fertilizers and Fish Million US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

93

94

93

94

95

96

93

92

87

89

0

$5000

$10000

$15000

$20000

$25000

$30000

$35000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

US Imports from Russia

Share of Oil Metals Nuclear FuelFertilizers and Fish

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 48 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 49

The best case and most favorable scenario looks less probable now It assumes the realization of

structural reforms in Rus sia in such a way that would adapt Rus siarsquos foreign policy to national

economic needs reduce confrontations with the West and make a concerted efort to integrate

Rus sian businesses into global supply and value chains A revitalization of the structural reform

agendamdash including eforts to diversify economic activities through de- monopolization and support

for SMEs a restructuring of the banking sector the creation of a vibrant business climate to foster

entrepreneurships and innovation the implementation of administrative and judicial reforms to

tackle red tape and endemic corruption and the reduction of state control over key sectors of the

economy via wide- spread privatization could kick- start the development of a nonoil economy and

improve long- term growth prospects Despite ongoing discussion of reform strategies deep

economic and po liti cal changes are extremely complicated over the next po liti calelectoral cycle

(2018ndash2024) particularly because of re sis tance of vested interests and growing commodity prices

The urgency to tackle structural shortcomings in natu ral resource- dependent economies usually

correlates with the price of those resources and the degree to which resource rents drive eco-

nomic activity However there may be marginal improvements in the efficiency of the current

economic system

Future US- Russia relations can be thought of through three pillars one pillar focuses on areas

where both countries maintain a competitive rivalry another looks at potential areas of interaction

under pres ent conditions a third pillar and one that has evaporated from the current bilateral

agenda concentrates on future cooperation Stronger economic ties could not only be a kind of

po liti cal shock absorber but contribute to the building of this future (particularly business contacts

aim to support future structural reforms) although po liti cal factors are depressing the prospects

for cooperation To escape deadlock it will be impor tant to establish the right balance between

politics and economics and create a model of collaboration within the framework of contention

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 49 102017 404 PM

About the Author

Vadim Grishin PhD MBA has been involved in the reform pro cess in Rus sia as adviser to the

deputy prime minister of Rus sia in 1992ndash1993 and 2006ndash2010 He has extensive experience

working with the Bretton Woods Institutions He was the board member of the World Bank Group

and served as se nior adviser at the International Monetary Fund Currently he is a con sul tant to the

chief economistrsquos office of the International Finance Corporation and teaches the economics of

transition at Georgetown University in Washington DC

50

594-71613_ch99_4Pindd 50 102017 403 PM

Blank

COVER PHOTO ADOBE STOCK

1616 Rhode Island Avenue NW

Washington DC 20036

202 887 0200 | wwwcsisorg

v++ISBN 978-1-4422-8035-9

Lanham bull Boulder bull New York bull London

4501 Forbes Boulevard

Lanham MD 20706

301 459 3366 | wwwrowmancom

A U T H O R

Vadim Grishin

Myths and Realities

A Report of the

CSIS RUSSIA AND EURASIA PROGRAM

US-RussiaEconomicRelations

O C T O B E R 2 0 1 7

Euml|xHSLEOCy280359z

The Man Pupu Nyor Rock Formations at the Northern Urals also known as Seven

Strong Man or Little Mountain of the God in the local tribe (Mansi) language

Page 23: U.S.-Russia Economic Relations: Myths and Realities · 2020-04-17 · OCTOBER 2017 U.S.- Russia Economic Relations Myths and Realities AUTHOR Vadim Grishin A REPORT OF THE CSIS RUSSIA

Fig

ure

42

U

S E

xpo

rts

to R

us s

ia U

S$ 2

016

Sou

rce

US

Ce

nsu

s B

ure

au ldquo

Trad

e in

Go

od

s w

ith

Ru

s sia

rdquo (s

ee

dat

a fo

r 2

016

)

Bak

ery

pro

du

cts

Win

e b

eer

an

d r

elat

ed

pro

du

cts

New

spri

nt

Pla

stic

mat

eria

ls

Ch

emic

als-

fert

ilize

rs

Ch

emic

als-

ino

rgan

icC

hem

ical

s-o

rgan

ic

Ch

emic

als-

oth

erC

ott

on

fib

er c

loth

In

du

stri

al r

ub

ber

pro

du

cts

Min

eral

su

pp

lies-

man

ufa

ctu

red

Gen

erat

ors

acc

esso

ries

Ele

ctri

c ap

par

atu

s

Dri

llin

g amp

oilfi

eld

eq

uip

men

t Sp

ecia

lized

min

ing

Exc

avat

ing

mac

hin

ery

No

nfa

rm t

ract

ors

an

d p

arts

In

du

stri

al e

ng

ines

Fo

od

to

bac

co m

ach

iner

y M

etal

wo

rkin

g m

ach

ine

too

ls

Tex

tile

sew

ing

m

ach

ines

W

oo

d g

lass

p

last

ic

Pu

lp a

nd

pap

er

mac

hin

ery

Mea

suri

ng

tes

tin

g

con

tro

l in

stru

men

ts

Mat

eria

ls h

and

ling

equ

ipm

ent

Ind

ust

rial

mac

hin

es

oth

er

Ph

oto

ser

vice

ind

ust

ry m

ach

iner

y A

gri

cult

ura

l mac

hin

ery

eq

uip

men

t C

om

pu

ters

Co

mp

ute

r ac

cess

ori

es

Sem

ico

nd

uct

ors

Tel

eco

mm

un

icat

ion

seq

uip

men

t

Bu

sin

ess

mac

hin

es a

nd

eq

uip

men

t

Lab

ora

tory

tes

tin

g in

stru

men

ts

Med

icin

al e

qu

ipm

ent

Civ

ilian

air

craf

t e

ng

ines

eq

uip

men

t a

nd

par

ts

Rai

lway

tra

nsp

ort

atio

n

equ

ipm

ent

Ves

sels

exc

lud

ing

scr

ap

Co

mm

erci

al v

esse

ls o

ther

M

arin

e en

gin

es p

arts

Spac

ecra

ft e

xclu

din

g

mili

tary

Pas

sen

ger

car

s

new

an

d u

sed

Tru

cks

bu

ses

and

sp

ecia

l p

urp

ose

ve

hic

les

En

gin

es a

nd

en

gin

e p

arts

(c

arb

ure

tors

pis

ton

s r

ing

s

and

val

ves)

B

od

ies

and

ch

assi

s fo

r p

asse

ng

er c

ars

Au

tom

oti

ve t

ires

an

d t

ub

es

Oth

er p

arts

an

d a

cces

sori

es o

f ve

hic

les

Ap

par

el h

ou

seh

old

go

od

s -

text

ile

Ph

arm

aceu

tica

lp

rep

arat

ion

s

Furn

itu

re h

ou

seh

old

go

od

s

etc

R

ug

s

Cel

l ph

on

es a

nd

oth

er

ho

use

ho

ld g

oo

ds

ne

c

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 17 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations18

Figure 43 US Trade in Goods with Rus sia Million US$ 1992ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 1992ndash2016)

Russian Financial Crisis

Oil price Increased from$2446 USD per barrel (2001)

to $9694 USD per barrel(2008)

Global Financial Crisis

Oil price high record in2011-2012

(more that $111 USD perbarrel)

Oil price crashed

$-

$5000

$10000

$15000

$20000

$25000

$30000

$35000

$40000

$45000

$50000

1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

US Imports from Russia US Exports to Russia US-Russia Trade in Goods

No doubt po liti cal ups and downs add volatility to US- Russia trade Nevertheless Rus siarsquos eco-

nomic structure exhausted itself before the Ukrainian crisis and the recent Rus sian recession Its

limitations are not only due to some mistakes in policy or negative coincidences of circumstances

but rather to deeply rooted properties in the current bilateral trade model related to structural

issues in the Rus sian economy Structural constraints such as the weak enforcement of property

rights poor business regulation and nondiversified exports weighed on Rus sian trade with the

United States From this perspective the term ldquonaturalunnatural trading partnersrdquo does not ad-

dress the unused capacity of bilateral interaction or the real challenges that kind of interaction

faces It just adds metaphysical flavor to the very specific economic and po liti cal factors that

determine the US- Russia trajectory

Overall the outlines of bilateral trade (Figure 43) resemble the famous ldquoRus sian Mountainsrdquo that

were a pre de ces sor of the modern roller coaster icy hills supported by wooden constructionsmdash a

rigid and immobile structure that sooner or later would melt This unfortunately is what is hap-

pening to US- Russia trade cooperation now

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 18 102017 404 PM

19

ARE LITTLE FISH REALLY SWEET

Low US- Russia economic interaction has at least two consequences First it limits the capacity of

policymakers to exploit trade as an instrument for geopo liti cal combat Even the question of a US

trade deficit which used to be a headache for many US trading partners has become so insig-

nificant in absolute terms (about $87 billion in 2016) that it seems hardly worth caring about

When the volume of trade between two countries becomes very small in absolute terms whether

a country is running a surplus or deficit is no longer relevant But it also renders another type of

confrontations (sometimes more dangerous) more likely since the two traders have little to lose

Second in an environment marked by low levels of bilateral trade both sides could incentivize (if

and when a desire for po liti cal rapprochement exists) the signing of new trade deals which are

elevated symbolically as a turning point in bilateral po liti cal relations (ie the sale of Boeings to

Rus sia or the delivery via tankers of Rus sian oil to US refineries) Sometimes markets themselves

pres ent ldquogiftsrdquo that can be capitalized on po liti cally US- USSR grain trade in the 1970s was one

such ldquogiftrdquo large sales of American grain to the Soviet Union helped US policymakers win favor

with the po liti cally impor tant American farming sector and permitted Soviet leaders to maintain

access to a dietary staple for the Soviet population

The strong 32 percent growth in value of US imports from Rus sia from January to May 2017

versus January to May 2016 ( Table 51) is an example of a development that has tempted officials

to pres ent it as a sign of positive change due to ldquogrowing business activitiesrdquo (this kind of statement

was heard before the bilateral summit in Germany in July 2017) although the reason for that leap

was evidently an increase in commodity prices (mainly of oilmdash see Table 52) and not a rise in

entrepreneurial interactions The primary beneficiaries of that upside rally have been two other

petro- economies Saudi Arabia and Venezuela ( Tables 53 and 54)

Sector Analyses

05

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 19 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations20

Table 51 US Imports from Rus sia Million US$ Januaryndash May 2016 vs Januaryndash May 2017

Year January February March April May Total

2016 9603 6871 11097 12257 10977 50805

2017 12215 10220 16979 13471 14147 67032

Change 271 487 530 99 289 319

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 1992ndash2016)

Table 52 Change in Urals Crude Oil Prices US$ per Barrel Januaryndash May 2016 vs Januaryndash May 2017

Januaryndash May 2016 Januaryndash May 2017 Change ($) Change ()

3601 5129 1528 424

Source Ministry of Finance of the Rus sian Federation https wwwminfin ru ru ixzz4mMIZ7XtC

Table 53 US Imports from Saudi Arabia Million US$ Januaryndash May 2016 vs Januaryndash May 2017

Year January February March April May Total

2016 15114 9036 13555 10844 14679 63228

2017 19802 20298 21650 16211 19542 97503

Change 3101 12463 5972 495 331 542

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Saudi Arabiardquo Foreign Trade last modified June 29 2017

https wwwcensus gov foreign - trade balance c5170 html (see data for 2016ndash2017)

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 20 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 21

Table 54 US Imports from Venezuela Million US$ Januaryndash May 2016 vs Januaryndash May 2017

Year January February March April May Total

2016 6657 5560 7140 8007 7922 35286

2017 13041 10864 123500 11148 12243 59646

Change 9590 9540 7297 3923 5454 6903

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Venezuelardquo Foreign Trade last modified June 29 2017

https wwwcensus gov foreign - trade balance c3070 html (see data for 2016ndash2017)

Table 55 US Exports to Rus sia Million US$ Januaryndash May 2016 vs Januaryndash May 2017

Year January February March April May Total

2016 3628 3577 7298 4657 4947 24107

2017 3144 4277 5386 6670 4806 24283

Change minus133 196 minus262 432 minus29 minus07

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2016ndash2017)

At the same time US exports to Rus sia continue to stagnate ( Table 55) due to low levels of

consumption during a two-and- a- half-year economic crisis a deep ruble devaluation sanctions

and counter- sanctions

Given the very dif er ent economic structures and resource endowments of Rus sia and the United

States it is not surprising that US- Russia trade is asymmetric and oil driven (Figure 51) A

3 percent increase in Urals oil prices translates into a one percent increase in US import growth

from Rus sia Thus in 2016 every $10 increase in Urals crude oil added $15 billion to the value of

US imports or 11 percent to the total value of imports from Rus sia

OIL ADDICTION

Oil is a core pillar of US- Russia bilateral trade A bumpy ride in oil markets afects commerce

Nevertheless Rus sian oil exports to the United States in physical terms have been rather

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 21 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations22

sustainable Starting from 2005 average annual deliveries have been above 150 million barrels

(Figure 52) Crude and heating oil have dominated while petroleum products and liquefied petro-

leum gases have not (Figure 53) In 2011 oil exports peaked at 228 million barrels but declined to

159 million barrels in 2016mdash a drop of 30 percent Rec ord high shipments of Rus sian oil to the United

States coincided with an elevation in oil prices which made the subsequent decline in oil shipment

value between 2011 and 2016 (by about 72 percent as shown in Figure 54) seem more stark The

increase in price also raised the share of oil in Rus sian exports by 74 percent in 2011 (Figure 55)

The Rus sian share in total US oil imports was around 55 percent in 2011 and 43 percent in 2016

( Table 56) In the last five years the United States has relied exclusively on consumption of Rus sian

oil for the rough equivalent of one week out of the year (Figure 56)

It is unlikely that Rus sia can significantly increase its share of the US oil market and there is a real

possibility for a downward trend There are several reasons the historically high Rus sian hydrocar-

bon export threshold of 2011 will not soon if ever be surpassed

First US energy consumption will likely be flat According to the US Energy Information Adminis-

tration (EIA) demand for petroleum and other liquids in the United States will be about 35ndash36

quadrillion British thermal units (BTUs) with minimal variation over the next 25 years1

1 US EIA ldquoAnnual Energy Outlook 2017 with Projections to 2050rdquo January 5 2017 7ndash8

Figure 51 US- Russia Trade Growth () vs US and Rus sia Real GDP Growth () 1993ndash2016

Source IMF ldquoIMF Datardquo accessed September 27 2017 http wwwimf org en Data US Census Bureau

ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo

Note rGDPthinsp=thinspreal gross domestic product

Trade

USA rGDP growth

Russia rGDP growth

-60

-40

-20

0

20

40

60

80

100

1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Gro

wth

All spikes in US-Russia trade have been connected with two main

variables volume and price of crude oil

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 22 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 23

Second the United States will become a net energy exporter between 2020 and 2030 in most

cases under dif er ent combinations of oil and natu ral gas prices GDP growth technological

breakthroughs and the availability of energy resources The role of oil imports will dramatically

fall2

Third oil price scenarios as described by the International Energy Agency (IEA) international

financial organ izations (IFIs) and many national agencies are very cautious and assume that even

by 2035 to 2040 oil prices will not to recover to the levels of 2011ndash20123

Fourth Rus sian oil production and export growth will be modest and driven by Asian economic

expansion and will comprise a decreasing share of Western markets4 According to forecasts from

2 Ibid 15ndash18

3 Ibid table 3 ldquoEnergy Prices by Sector and Sourcesrdquo World Bank World Bank Commodity Markets Price Forecasts

(Washington DC World Bank 2017) httpswwwworldbank org en research commodity - markets Organ ization of the

Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) World Oil Outlook 2016 (Vienna OPEC 2016)

4 E D Belotskaia et al Global and Rus sian Energy Outlook 2016 (Moscow Energy Research Institute of the Rus sian

Acad emy of Science Analytical Center for the Government of the Rus sian Federation 2016) http acgov ru files

publication a 12767 pdf

Figure 52 US Imports from Rus sia Crude Oil and Petroleum Products Thousands of Barrels 1995ndash2016

Source US EIA ldquoUS Imports by Country of Origin Rus siardquo Petroleum amp Other Liquids September 13

2017 http wwweia gov dnav pet PET _ MOVE _ IMPCUS _ D _ NUS _ NRS _ MBBL _ M htm

0

50000

100000

150000

200000

250000

Date 1995 1996 1997 1998 199920002001200220032004200520062007200820092010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 23 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations24

the Organ ization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) crude oil exports from Rus sia and

the Caspian region to the United States will dis appear by 20255

So why does the Rus sian Urals blend continue to be attractive for oil traders and US refineries

which could pro cess greater volumes of domestically produced lighter crude There are two main

reasons One is related to the preference of US high conversion refineries (the most sophisticated

in the world) to work with heavy oil blends produced by Canada Mexico Iraq Venezuela and

Rus sia Pro cessing heavy crude now is as profitable as pro cessing lighter crude The so- called

crack spreadmdash the diference between the cost of relatively cheap heavy crude oil and the final

price of value- added consumer products (diesel gasoline jet fuel and heating oil)mdash has become

the same as the refinery margins of light sweet crude6 This has primarily afected light oil produc-

ing countries such as Angola Algeria and Nigeria

5 OPEC World Oil Outlook 2016 306ndash309

6 ldquoHow Much for That Heavy Oilrdquo Oil Sands Magazine December 26 2015 https wwwoilsandsmagazine com

news 2015 12 26 how - much - for - that - heavy - oil

Figure 53 US Imports from Rus sia Oil and Petroleum Products US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

$-

$25000000000

$20000000000

$15000000000

$10000000000

$5000000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Liquefied petroleum gases

Petroleum products other

Fuel oil

Crude oil

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 24 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 25

Another factor afecting purchase of Rus sian oil is a new trend among oil companies for further

consolidation of scale and for integrating operations of upstream and downstream business7

There have been several waves of separation and unification of production transportation and

pro cessing in the last 50 years The current business cycle can be seen as an adaptation to a

period of low prices and oversupply Companies that buy andor produce oil in Rus sia most likely

prefer to transport and pro cess this oil in their own modern refineries in the United States At the

same time some of the newest refinery designs specifically for pro cessing heavy oils have been

built in Asia thus extending the choices of heavy oil producing countries

We should also consider that leading US and international oil traders along with oil producing

companies working with or owning US refineries frequently buy Rus sian oil on the open market

and have long- term contracts on Rus sian crude oil delivery Many Rus sian oil companies prefer to

pay for purchases or ser vices with their future production instead of cash creating situations of

ldquostickyrdquo oil imports that are difficult to replace The best- known example is an interaction between

7 ldquoEnergy and Utilities Sectorrdquo Roundtable Financier Worldwide December 2015 https wwwfinancierworldwide

com roundtable - energy - utilities - sector - dec15

Figure 54 US Imports of Oil and Petroleum Products from Rus sia vs Oil Prices Eu rope Brent Spot Price Free on Board (FOB) 1996ndash2017

Source US EIA ldquoUS Imports by Country of Origin Rus siardquo

0

20

40

60

80

100

120

140

0

5000

10000

15000

20000

25000

30000

Jan

-19

96

Jun

-19

96

No

v-19

96

Ap

r-19

97

Sep

-19

97

Feb

-19

98

Jul-

199

8D

ec-1

99

8M

ay-1

99

9O

ct-1

99

9M

ar-2

00

0A

ug

-20

00

Jan

-20

01

Jun

-20

01

No

v-2

00

1A

pr-

20

02

Sep

-20

02

Feb

-20

03

Jul-

20

03

Dec

-20

03

May

-20

04

Oct

-20

04

Mar

-20

05

Au

g-2

00

5Ja

n-2

00

6Ju

n-2

00

6N

ov-

20

06

Ap

r-2

00

7Se

p-2

00

7Fe

b-2

00

8Ju

l-2

00

8D

ec-2

00

8M

ay-2

00

9O

ct-2

00

9M

ar-2

010

Au

g-2

010

Jan

-20

11Ju

n-2

011

No

v-2

011

Ap

r-2

012

Sep

-20

12Fe

b-2

013

Jul-

20

13D

ec-2

013

May

-20

14O

ct-2

014

Mar

-20

15A

ug

-20

15Ja

n-2

016

Jun

-20

16N

ov-

20

16

USD

per

Bar

rel

Th

ou

san

d B

arr

els

US Imports from Russia of Crude Oil and Petroleum Products (Thousand Barrels)

Europe Brent Spot Price FOB (Dollars per Barrel)

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 25 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations26

Table 56 US Oil Imports All Countries vs Rus sia Thousand Barrels per Day 2011ndash2016

Years 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

All Countries 11436 10598 9859 9241 9449 10058

Rus sia 624 477 460 330 371 433

Share 546 450 467 357 393 431

Sources US EIA ldquoUS Imports by Country of Origin Total Crude Oil and Productsrdquo Petroleum amp Other

Liquids September 13 2017 wwweia gov dnav pet pet_move_impcus_a2_nus_ep00_im0_mbbl_m htm

authorrsquos computation

Figure 55 US Imports from Rus sia Share of Crude Oil and Petroleum Products Million US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

57

64

73

72

74

73

72

59

52 50

0

$5000

$10000

$15000

$20000

$25000

$30000

$35000

$40000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

US Imports from Russia

Share of Oil and Petroleum Products

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 26 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 27

the Rus sian state mono poly Rosneft and commodity trading and mining giant Glencore which

along with energy and commodities com pany Vitol participated in a $10 billion prepayment

deal with Rosneft for crude supplies in 2013

There have been a number of ongoing transactions between the Rus sian oil industry and interna-

tional oil companies including several that top the list of importers of Rus sian oil to the United

States ( Table 57) In December 2016 Glencore participated in a controversial privatization opera-

tion purchasing in tandem with the Qatar sovereign wealth fund a 195 percent stake in Rosneft

which was on the US and EU list of sanctioned firms8 Glencore has also taken a blocking stake in

midsize oil producer RussNeft BP owns a 1975 percent stake in Rosneft Chevron holds a

15 percent interest in the 935- mile- long CPC9 pipeline which transports an average of 959000

barrels of crude oil per day including 76000 barrels daily from Rus sia10 ExxonMobil has formed

8 E Mazneva and I Arkhipov ldquoRus sia Sells $11 Billion Stake in Rosneft to Glencore Qatarrdquo Bloomberg December 7

2016

9 CPCthinsp=thinspCaspian Pipeline Consortium

10 ldquoRus sia Highlights of Operations and Business Portfoliordquo Chevron accessed October 3 2017 https wwwchevron

com worldwide russia

Figure 56 Share of Rus sian Oil in Total US Oil Imports Thousands of Barrels per Day 1972ndash2016

Source US EIA ldquoUS Imports by Country of Origin Total Crude Oil and Productsrdquo

2000

4000

6000

8000

10000

12000

14000

16000

US Imports of Crude Oil and Petroleum Products (Thousand Barrels per Day)

US Imports from Russia of Crude Oil and Petroleum Products (Thousand Barrels per Day)19

7319

7419

7519

7619

7719

7819

7919

80

198

119

82

198

319

84

198

519

86

198

719

88

198

919

90

199

119

92

199

319

94

199

519

96

199

719

98

199

92

00

02

00

12

00

22

00

32

00

42

00

52

00

62

00

72

00

82

00

92

010

20

112

012

20

132

014

20

152

016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 27 102017 404 PM

Table 57 Top Importers of Rus sian Oil to the United States Thousands of Barrels 2016

VALERO MARKETING amp SUPPLY CO 54590 3616

EXXONMOBIL OIL CORP 17087 1130

CHEVRON USA INC 15217 1008

BP WEST COAST PRODUCTS LLC 10130 671

GEORGE E WARREN CORP 7272 48

PAULSBORO REFINING CO LLC 6838 453

TESORO CORP 5097 338

VITOL INC 5084 337

PHILLIPS 66 CO 4726 313

TRAFIGURA AG 4360 289

PAR HAWAII REFINING LLC 3893 258

MOTIVA ENTERPRISES LLC 3041 205

SHELL US TRADING CO 2863 19

MARATHON PETROLEUM CO LLC 2475 16

ATLANTIC TRADING amp MARKETING 2099 14

FREEPOINT COMMODITIES LLC 1439 1

GLENCORE LTD 1284 85

BEST PETROLEUM CORP 967 64

ROLYMPUS US COMMODITIES GROUP LLC 822 6

HUNT CRUDE OIL SUPPLY CO 666 4

GULF OIL LP 658 4

Source US EIA ldquoUS Imports by Country of Origin Crude Oilrdquo Petroleum amp Other Liquids September 13

2017 httpswwweiagovdnavpetpet_move_impcus_a2_nus_epc0_im0_mbblpd_ahtm authorrsquos

computation

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 28 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 29

several joint ventures with Rosneft to undertake ofshore exploration in the Black Sea and the Kara

Sea in Siberia11

According to the Sanctions Act US persons are prohibited from exporting or reexporting goods

ser vices (except financial ser vices) and technology in support of exploration or production of new

deep- water Arctic ofshore or shale oil proj ects that involve designated Rus sian entities or other

entities in which such sanctioned persons have a controlling interest or a substantial noncontrol-

ling owner ship interest defined as not less than 33 percent (previously it was 50 percent) The new

law also authorizesmdash but does not requiremdash the imposition of so- called secondary sanctions

against non- US entities that engage in activities involving the construction maintenance or

expansion of Rus sian energy export pipelines with a fair market value of $1 million or more or an

aggregate fair market value during a 12- month period of $5 million12 This provision has raised the

concerns of some Eu ro pean countries particularly Germany As result the final language of the

law included wording about coordination of this issue with allies of the United States

Shipments of Rus sian oil to the United States could be afected by activity in the US refinery

industry In early 2017 Saudi Aramco bought the United Statesrsquo largest oil refinery in Port Arthur

(Texas) and it announced plans to send more of its own crude to that refinery13 Serious concerns

exist however regarding the future of three refineries and nine pipelines owned by Citgo a US

branch of the Venezuelan state com pany PdVSA which is balancing precariously on the edge of

default Under certain conditions in the event of PdVSA bankruptcy Rosneft could claim a stake of

up to 499 percent in Citgo Such a possibility has raised concerns among politicians and US

government officials with Trea sury Secretary Steven Mnuchin calling it a ldquonational security issuerdquo14

Tables 58 59 and 510 show allocations of Rus sian oil imports to major US refineries some of

which work exclusively on Rus sian crude a total of two to three months per year In total 150940

thousand barrels of Rus sian oil were refined in 2016

Figure 57 confirms a leading position of Texas and Louisiana among the US states receiving

Rus sian crude followed by New Jersey California Mississippi Washington Hawaii and Delaware

In a paradoxical way Texas has dis appeared from the list of states as a main destination of US

imports from Rus sia (Figure 58) because Rus sian crude is mostly delivered to Louisiana ports and

registered there by US Customs as an import from Rus sia After that it transports to refineries in

Louisiana and Texas

Overall the short- term business rationale behind the sustainability of US oil imports from Rus sia

cannot overcome strong headwinds in the US energy sector facing all oil importers which will

inevitably lead to a contraction of Rus sian oil exports to the United States in the foreseeable future

11 Exxon eforts to receive a special US Trea sury waiver to drill in sanctioned Rus sia failed in 2017

12 Countering Amer i carsquos Adversaries through Sanctions Act HR 3364

13 Sarp Ozkan ldquoSaudi Aramcorsquos Port Arthur Refinery and the US Refinery Fleetrdquo Drilling Info May 11 2017

https infodrillinginfo com saudi - aramcos - port - arthur - refinery - us - refinery - fleet

14 Graham Kates ldquoTrea sury Secretary Rus siarsquos Citgo Deal a National Security Issuerdquo CBS News May 1 2017

http wwwcbsnews com news rosneft - citgo - steven - mnuchin - national - security

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 29 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations30

Table 58 Valerorsquos Refineries Pro cessing Rus sian Oil Thousands of Barrels 2016

Saint Charles Louisiana 29206 535

Corpus Christi Texas 20626 378

Wilmington California 4250 78

Total USA 54590 100

Source US EIA ldquoRefinery Capacity Reportrdquo January 1 2017

table 5 wwweia gov petroleum refinerycapacity table5 pdf

authorrsquos computation

Table 59 ExxonMobil Refineries Pro cessing Rus sian Oil Thousands of Barrels 2016

Baytown Texas 15037 88

Baton Rouge Louisiana 2046 12

Total USA 17083 100

Source US EIA ldquoRefinery Capacity Reportrdquo authorrsquos computation

Table 510 Chevronrsquos Refineries Pro cessing Rus sian Oil Thousands of Barrels 2016

Pascagoula Mississippi 12767 840

El Segundo California 2372 155

Saint Rose Louisiana 78 05

Total USA 15217 100

Source US EIA ldquoRefinery Capacity Reportrdquo authorrsquos computation

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 30 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 31

HEAVY METAL

Taken together US imports of metals and US imports of oil compose about 80 percent of US

total imports from Rus sia (Figure 59) Trade of metals like other commodities is strongly afected

by market price fluctuations Nevertheless metal imports from Rus sia have been fairly resilient to

market volatility and their average annual value has hovered at about $4 billion in the last five years

(Figure 510) This market resilience was forged at the end of the 1990searly 2000s when Rus sian

metal producers gradually modernized their plants adjusting quality of production to Western

standards and enhancing integration into global value and supply chains Some of them conquered

their share of the highly competitive US market struggling with peers from Canada and certain

BRICS countries (China India and Brazil) To attract additional resources all Rus sian large metal-

producing companies became public and were listed on stock exchanges chiefly the London Stock

Exchange (Severstalrsquo PAO Evraz MMK OAO Novolipetsk Steel Norilsk Nikel and TMK PAO) one

on the New York Stock Exchange (Mechel) and one on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange (Rusal)

Business logic pushed some of them to invest in the US metal- making industry which was hit

hard by crisis Later on some of those assets were sold (eg two US steel mills acquired by

Severstal in 2004 were purchased 10 years later by Steel Dynamics Inc and AK Steel Corp)

Figure 57 Share of US States Rus sian Oil Imports 2016

Source US EIA ldquoUS Imports from Rus sia of Crude Oil and Petroleum Productsrdquo Petroleum amp Other

Liquids September 29 2017 https www eia gov dnav pet hist LeafHandler ashx nshy=shyPETampsshy=shyMTTIM _ NUS

- NRS _ 1ampfshy=shyM authorrsquos computation

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

100

Maine

Massachusetts

Maryland

Connecticut

Georgia

Rhode Island

Virginia

Florida

New York

Alabama

Puerto Rico

Pennsylvania

Delaware

Hawaii

Washington

Mississippi

California

New Jersey

Louisiana

Texas

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 31 102017 404 PM

Figure 58 US Imports from Rus sia by State Million US$ 2013ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoState and Metropolitan Area Trade Datardquo Foreign Trade last modified

October 2 2017 https wwwcensus gov foreign - trade statistics state

Alaska

Connecticut

Delaware

Hawaii

Louisiana

Maryland

North Dakota 0

$1000

$2000

$3000

$4000

$5000

$6000

2013 2014 2015 2016

Alabama

Alaska

Connecticut

Delaware

Hawaii

Louisiana

Maryland

Maine

Mississippi

Montana

North Dakota

Mississippi

Figure 59 US Imports from Rus sia Share of Oil and Metals Million US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 1992ndash2016)

83

82

85

86

87

88

85

82

7375

0

$5000

$10000

$15000

$20000

$25000

$30000

$35000

$40000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

US Imports from Russia

Share of Oil and Metals

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 32 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 33

Obviously the market dynamic of dif er ent metals varies (eg iron steel aluminum platinum and

nickel) Caps to increase their trade and production in a ldquored oceanrdquo global environment with

anemic demand is rather limited despite Figure 510 showing a spike of iron and steel imports

from Rus sia in 2014 and aluminum in 2016 Some opportunities may exist for Russian- owned steel

plants in the United States (such as NLMK) to participate in energy proj ects resumed under Presi-

dent Trump who has required that new pipelines use only American- made steel15

Rus sia occupies a special niche in the US market for titanium products a high- end metal indus-

try Twenty years ago a long- term contract was signed between Rus sian titanium producer

VSMPO- AVISMA and Boeing The Rus sian com pany entered the selective club of Boeing suppliers

for the manufacture of components and semi- finished products Since the signing of this contract

VSMPO has delivered more than 35 percent of all titanium placed on Boeing civil aircraft16 They

are hidden in the trade data in an import category for Civilian Aircrafts and Parts (Figure 511) At

the end of 2016 Boeing announced an extension of its framework agreement with AVISMA

15 E Scheyder C Ngai and T Sylvester ldquoAmerican Steel Unlikely to Get Keystone Boost Despite Trump Orderrdquo

Reuters January 27 2017 http wwwreuters com article usa - trump - pipeline - transcanada - idUSL1N1FH1ZD

16 A Kramer ldquoTitanium Fills Vital Role for Boeing and Rus siardquo New York Times July 5 2013 http wwwnytimes com

2013 07 06 business global titanium - fills - vital - role - for - boeing - and - russia html mcubzshy=shy3

Figure 510 US Imports from Rus sia Iron Steel Bauxite Aluminum Nickel Nonferrous Metals and Other Precious Metals and Materials US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 1992ndash2016)

0

$6000000000

$5000000000

$4000000000

$3000000000

$2000000000

$1000000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 20122013

20142015

2016

Finished metal shapes

Iron and steel advanced

Iron and steel products nec

Nonferrous metals other

Other precious metals

Nickel

Bauxite and aluminum

Iron and steel mill products

Steelmaking materials

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 33 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations34

through 2022 and additional investments in the construction of a new robotic plant in Titanium

Valley a special economic zone located in the Sverdlovsk region that will open in 2018 The pro-

cessing of titanium forgings in all Boeing civil aircraft will be performed there including 787s 737

MAXs and 777Xs17 The contract extension with AVISMA may add several hundred million dollars

in value to annual US imports from Rus sia

How can such heavy reliance on imports of Rus sian titanium exist during a period of rising geopo-

liti cal tensions The answer is straightforward VSMPO- AVISMA is a highly specialized natu ral

mono poly producing 45 percent of the worldrsquos aerospace titanium Only four other countries

smelt high- grade titanium in industrial quantities the United States Germany Japan and China

Overall global production capacity is limited while demand is growing The United States cur-

rently imports around 79 percent of all the titanium it consumes each year18

17 ldquoBoeing and VSMPO Avisma to Launch Second Joint Production Siterdquo Rus sian Aviation Insider December 22 2016

http wwwrusaviainsider com boeing - and - vsmpo - avisma - to - launch - second - joint - production - site

18 Jon Ostrower and Andy Pasztor ldquoBoeing United Technologies Stockpile Titanium Partsrdquo Wall Street Journal

August 7 2014 https wwwwsj com articles boeing - united - technologies - stockpiling - titanium - parts - 1407441886

Figure 511 US Imports from Rus sia Civilian Aircrafts and Parts US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 1992ndash2016)

0

$20000000

$40000000

$60000000

$80000000

$100000000

$120000000

$140000000

$160000000

$180000000

$200000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Parts-civilian aircraft

Civilian aircraft

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 34 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 35

The Sanctions Act authorizes the secretary of the trea sury (in a nonmandatory way) to impose

restrictions (without specifying them) against Rus sian state- owned entities operating in the railway

metals and mining sectors of the Rus sian economy Despite the commanding heights of Rus siarsquos

state sector owner ship in its economy (70 percent of GDP) the metal- producing companies have

remained mostly in private hands

NUCLEAR AFFAIRS

Historically owners and operators of the 104 commercial nuclear power reactors in the United

States have purchased more than 80 percent of their uranium from foreign countries Uranium

shipping from Rus sia accounted for about 13 percent of the 58 million pounds of uranium pur-

chased overseas in 201219 At the same time the Rus sian state- owned mono poly Rosatom ac-

counts for 20 percent of Kazakhstanrsquos uranium production (which in turn comprises 11 percent of

all US uranium imports) and 20 percent of US domestic uranium production capacity (with

owner ship of exploration tracts in Wyoming)20

Nuclear fuel and nuclear power continue to be po liti cally sensitive topics both in the United

States and Rus sia Bilateral cooperation in this sector (being surprisingly stable with imports of

nuclear fuel from Rus sia at a level of $1 billion annually in the last five years [Figure 512 and 513])

is under constant po liti cal and lobbying pressure and has been a source of several po liti cal scan-

dals21 Consequently upside risks in this area of interaction are minimal and downside risks are

much higher especially when we are seeing more decommissioning of nuclear plants in the

United States than new constructions The US EIArsquos 2017 Annual Energy Outlook assumes

that about 25 percent of the nuclear capacity now operating will be removed from ser vice

by 205022

WHY IS THE GRASS GREENER ON THE OTHER SIDE

The United States continues to significantly reduce imports of chemical fertilizers as domestic pro-

duction increases In 2016 the United States imported 13 percent less ammonia and 11 percent

less urea and UAN which is a liquid urea and ammonium nitrate fertilizer Rus sia accounts for

around 40 percent of UAN imported by the United States The United States canceled antidumping

duties on imports of ammonium nitrate and urea from Rus sia in 2016 but it did not prevent import

19 US EIA ldquoThe US Relies on Foreign Uranium Enrichment Ser vices to Fuel Its Nuclear Power Plantsrdquo Today in

Energy August 28 2013 https wwweia gov todayinenergy detail php idshy=shy1273

20 Colin Chilcoat ldquoDoes Rus sia Really Own 20 Percent of the USrsquo Uranium Reservesrdquo OilPricecom May 6 2015

http oilpricecom Alternative - Energy Nuclear - Power Does - Russia - Really - Own - 20 - Of - The - US - Uranium - Reserves

html

21 Michelle Ye Hee Lee ldquoThe Facts behind Trumprsquos Repeated Claim about Hillary Clintonrsquos Role in the Rus sian Ura-

nium Dealrdquo Washington Post October 26 2016

22 US EIA ldquoAnnual Energy Outlook 2017 with Projections to 2050rdquo 81ndash82

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 35 102017 404 PM

Figure 512 US Imports from Rus sia Share of Oil Metals and Nuclear Fuel Million US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 1992ndash2016)

87

86

90

90

90

91

88

86

7882

0

$5000

$10000

$15000

$20000

$25000

$30000

$35000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

US Imports from Russia

Share of Oil Metals and Nuclear Fuel

Figure 513 US Imports from Rus sia Nuclear Fuel Materials US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

$-

$200000000

$400000000

$600000000

$800000000

$1200000000

$1000000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 36 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 37

drops twice last year (Figures 514 and 515) According to forecasts UAN imports are expected to

decline further to 15 million tons this year down over 46 percent from 28 million tons imported

last year23 The downside trend in imports of fertilizers will likely continue because of oversupply

BIG FISH

US imports of fish and shellfish from Rus sia are best understood in comparison with US fish

exports to the Rus sian market which slipped to zero in August 2014 after Rus sia issued an order

banning certain agricultural imports from the United States (Figure 516) While the volume of US

supply was not very large it was impor tant because it broke up the monopolistic dominance of a

few vertically integrated Rus sian companies that have kept prices high by restricting the entry of

new producers Seeking to implement import substitution policies Rus sia has tried to reduce

exports as well as imports of fish and seafood products in the last couple of years This symmetri-

cal approach was intended to ldquocompensaterdquo for a decrease of fish products in the domestic

23 Deepika Thapliyal ldquoPotashCorp Forecasts Sharp Drop in US Nitrogen Imports in 2017rdquo ICIS News February 7

2017 https wwwicis com resources news 2017 02 07 10076734 potashcorp - forecasts - sharp - drop - in - us - nitrogen

- imports - in - 2017

Figure 514 US Imports from Rus sia Share of Oil Metals Nuclear Fuel and Fertilizers Million US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

90

93

92

93

94

95

92

91

85

86

0

$5000

$10000

$15000

$20000

$25000

$30000

$35000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

US Imports from Russia

Share of Oil Metals Nuclear Fuel and Fertilizers

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 37 102017 404 PM

Figure 515 US Imports from Rus sia Chemical- Fertilizers US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

S-

$200000000

$400000000

$600000000

$800000000

$1000000000

$1200000000

$1400000000

$1600000000

$1800000000

$2000000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Figure 516 US Exports to Rus sia Fish and Shellfish US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

0

$10000000

$20000000

$30000000

$40000000

$50000000

$60000000

$70000000

$80000000

$90000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Fish and shellfish

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 38 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 39

consumer market caused by Rus siarsquos import ban but it has failed As result the group most af-

fected by the self- imposed counter- sanctions were Rus sian consumers

With a significant drop in fish imports a devaluation of the ruble and inflationary pressures on

seafood prices yearly consumption of fish in Rus sia has declined precipitously In 2015 alone

fish prices increased 20 percent and consumption dropped to 14 kilograms per person24 from

22 kilograms in 201425 In 2016 food rose to 355 percent of house hold expenditure as a result of

increases in food prices26 This has pushed vertically integrated fishing monopolies to sell even

more of their catch abroad rather than deliver to the Rus sian Federation (Figure 517) Thus we

cannot exclude the possibility of further growth in US fish and shellfish imports from Rus sia on a

marginal scale

24 Александр Савельев ldquoПотребление рыбы в России упало до 14 кг на человекаrdquo [Fish consumption in Rus sia fell to

14 kg per person] Экономика Интерфакс January 28 2015 http wwwinterfax ru business 492038

25 Илья Шестаков ldquoПотебление рыбы в России снизилось на 10 процентов из- за роста ценrdquo [Fish consumption in

Rus sia dropped by 10 percent due to price increases] RNS March 8 2017 https rnsonline consumer - market

Potreblenie - ribi - v - Rossii - snizilos - na - 10 - iz - za - rosta - tsen - 2017 - 03 - 08

26 Zoya Sheftalovich and Christian Oliver ldquoRus siarsquos Boom (Farming) Economyrdquo Politico November 8 2016 http

wwwpolitico eu article russias - boom - farming - economy

Figure 517 US Imports from Rus sia Fish and Shellfish US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

0

$50000000

$100000000

$150000000

$200000000

$250000000

$300000000

$350000000

$400000000

$450000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 39 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations40

SPACE ODYSSEY

Among high- end products beyond the top five groups of goods imported from Rus sia cheap and

efficient Rus sian engines have been used to launch US rockets into space for about 16 years

(Figure 518) There was a serious po liti cal strug gle around a 2014 ban on the purchase of Rus sian

RD-180 rocket engines revealing the conflicting business interests of power ful high- tech companies

This restrictive mea sure was temporary and was quickly lifted because of significant cost impacts

and risks of disruption to launch schedules27 For the same reason the Sanctions Act does not autho-

rize ldquothe imposition of any sanction or other condition limitation restriction or prohibition that

directly or indirectly impedes the supply by any entity of the Rus sian Federation of any product or

ser vice or the procurement of such product or ser vice by any contractor or subcontractor of the

United States or any other entity relating to or in connection with any space launch conducted for

the National Aeronautics and Space Administration or any other nonndash Department of Defense

customerrdquo28

Nevertheless many experts believe that US domestic alternatives to replace Rus sian engines will

be viable in five to eight years

27 Ken Dilanian ldquoWhy Does the US Use Rus sian Rockets to Launch Its Satellitesrdquo NBC News updated November 15

2016 http wwwnbcnews com why - does - u - s - use - russian - rockets - launch - its - satellites - n588526

28 Countering Amer i carsquos Adversaries through Sanctions Act HR 3364

Figure 518 Spacecraft Excluding Military US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

0

$20000000

$40000000

$60000000

$80000000

$100000000

$120000000

$140000000

$160000000

$180000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 40 102017 404 PM

41

Diversity and technological complexity are the most vis i ble advantages supporting US exports to

Rus sia Three major groups of export goods include civilian aircraft engines and parts (Figure 61)

drilling and oil field equipment (Figure 62) and industrial machines and engines (Figure 63)

Despite sanctions against the transfer of advanced oil producing and pro cessing technologies the

realization of US drilling and oil field equipment in Rus sia is sustainable although some bilateral

proj ects have been frozen

Another category of goods that has demonstrated resilience is the phar ma ceu ti cal industry (Fig-

ure 64) because most drugs in Rus sia are imported (about 70 percent of the Rus sian phar ma ceu-

ti cal market in value) Import substitution policies have had only modest results in this industry

As confirmed by American Chamber of Commerce surveys US exports to Rus sia are closely

connected to US FDI 30 percent of total imports of US companies working in the Rus sian

market come from the United States (more than $2 billion in 2016) In other words about

40 percent of all US exports to Rus sia are related to a US corporate- sector business pro cess in

the country The major sectors of activity of these companies are energy and natu ral resources

(52 percent) manufacturing (17 percent) information and communications technology or ICT

(13 percent) retail (7 percent) automotive industry (6 percent) phar ma ceu ti cal production

(1 percent) professional ser vices (05 percent) and other (2 percent)1

Some obvious constraints on US exports to Rus sia have resulted from a reduction in demand A

deterioration of bilateral relations and implementation of sanctions and counter- sanctions have

directly or indirectly afected all businesses Figures 65 and 66 provide data regarding a dramatic

drop in the sale of US agricultural production in Rus sia with all other categories of exports in

goods showing big cuts as well (see Figures 67ndash69)

Exports of civilian aircraft engines and parts put the state of Washington in first place among

other states as a leading exporter to the Rus sian market (Figure 610)

1 American Chamber of Commerce in Rus sia ldquoInvestment and Import to Rus sia 2nd Surveyrdquo 13

Diversity and Constraints

06

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 41 102017 404 PM

Figure 61 US Exports of Civilian Aircraft Engines Equipment and Parts to Rus sia US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

$2500000000

$2000000000

$1500000000

$1000000000

$500000000

$-

Figure 62 US Exports of Drilling and Oil Field Equipment US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

0

$5000000

$10000000

$15000000

$20000000

$25000000

$30000000

$35000000

$40000000

$45000000

$50000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 42 102017 404 PM

Figure 63 US Exports of Industrial Engines to Rus sia US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

0

$5000000

$10000000

$15000000

$20000000

$25000000

$30000000

$35000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Figure 64 US Exports of Phar ma ceu ti cal Preparations to Rus sia US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

0

$5000000

$10000000

$15000000

$20000000

$25000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 43 102017 404 PM

Figure 65 US Exports of Meat and Poultry to Rus sia US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Meat poultry etc

$1000000000

$800000000

$600000000

$400000000

$200000000

$-

$1200000000

$1400000000

$1600000000

Figure 66 US Exports of Soybeans to Rus sia US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

0

$20000000

$40000000

$60000000

$80000000

$100000000

$120000000

$140000000

$160000000

$180000000

$200000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 44 102017 404 PM

Figure 67 US Exports of Vehicles Engines and Parts to Rus sia US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Other parts and accessories of vehicles

Automotive tires and tubes

Bodies and chassis for passenger cars

Engines and engine parts (carburetors pistonsrings and valves)

Trucks buses and special purpose vehicles

Passenger cars new and used

$2500000000

$2000000000

$1500000000

$500000000

$-

$1000000000

Figure 68 US Exports of Medicinal Equipment to Rus sia US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

$10000000

$15000000

$20000000

$25000000

$30000000

$35000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 45 102017 404 PM

Figure 610 US Exports to Rus sia by States (2016 US$ Value) Million US$ 2013ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoState and Metropolitan Area Trade Datardquo

Iowa Kentucky

North Dakota

Oklahoma

South Carolina

Washington

0

$500

$1000

$1500

$2000

2013 2014 2015 2016

District of Columbia

Iowa

Kentucky

North Dakota

Oklahoma

South Carolina

Washington

Figure 69 US Exports of Excavating Machinery to Rus sia US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

0

$5000000

$10000000

$15000000

$20000000

$25000000

$30000000

$35000000

$40000000

$45000000

$50000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 46 102017 404 PM

47

Upon reviewing the current trend in US- Russia economic relations we must acknowledge that

the existing trade model is obsolete and exhausted Imports are resource- oriented and reflect

constraints of the Rus sian economic structure while five groups of goodsmdash oil metals nuclear

fuels fertilizers and fishmdash make up more than 90 percent of total imports from Rus sia (Figure 71)

Each of these industries has a limited capacity for growth in the foreseeable future

Rus siarsquos core export to the United Statesmdash oilmdash will inevitably decrease in the mid- term under any

scenario The value and volume of Rus sian exports to the United States are open to global market

volatility and po liti cal pressures with limited hedging mechanisms

Overall US exports to Rus sia are unsustainable due to bilateral po liti cal tensions the whims of

commodity markets and changing domestic policies Sanctions and counter- sanctions have

created additional barriers particularly in finance banking high- tech energy and agro- business

According to the American Chamber of Commerce 69 percent of US companies working in the

country consider the impact of US sanctions against Rus sia on their business as negative At the

same time 60 percent of companies do not expect big changes in business relations between

Rus sia and the United States under Trump1 as the new law codifies existing sanctions fortifies

them and extends them to new sectors

Current US investments are low due to the weak rule of law in Rus sia a lack of property right

protections and proper contract enforcement high levels of statization and monopolization in the

economy a poor business climate outdated capital stock dependence on natural- resource

sectors and of course sanction and counter- sanction mea sures Bloated administrative compo-

nents created as risk mitigation instruments have also served as impediments The countryrsquos

institutional weakness low level of productivity bud get constraints and a declining inflexible

workforce will restrain future economic growth even if commodity prices recover Rus sian eco-

nomic policy will likely continue to be statist and protectionist relying mostly on import

substitutions

1 Ibid 11

Existing Trends and Future Scenarios

07

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 47 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations48

What scenarios can be expected in such a challenging environment

One probability (no peace no war) is based on the assumption that matters will not deteriorate

further and implementation of the Sanctions Act will be cursory This will cause relatively slow

degradation in the economic field with occasional flashes of activity in selected areas (eg closer

cooperation against Islamist terrorist groups in Syria)

A second worse case or critical scenario is the intensive and full- scale execution of current sanc-

tion legislation and even the imposition of new economic punitive and restrictive mea sures which

could incite asymmetric retaliatory actions and lead to the introduction of additional protectionist

policies This in turn could trigger a further escalation of mutual confrontation and could eventu-

ally destroy the fundamentals of the current bilateral trade system Rus sian leadership has charac-

terized the Sanctions Act as a declaration of a trade war that ends all hope for improving bilateral

relations2

2 Дмитрий Медведев ldquoПодписание президентом США нового санкционного закона против России создает несколько

последствийrdquo [The US Presidentrsquos signing of the package of new sanctions against Rus sia will have a few conse-

quences] Facebook August 2 2017 https wwwfacebook com Dmitry Medvedev posts 10154587161801851

Figure 71 US Imports from Rus sia Share of Oil Metals Nuclear Fuel Fertilizers and Fish Million US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

93

94

93

94

95

96

93

92

87

89

0

$5000

$10000

$15000

$20000

$25000

$30000

$35000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

US Imports from Russia

Share of Oil Metals Nuclear FuelFertilizers and Fish

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 48 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 49

The best case and most favorable scenario looks less probable now It assumes the realization of

structural reforms in Rus sia in such a way that would adapt Rus siarsquos foreign policy to national

economic needs reduce confrontations with the West and make a concerted efort to integrate

Rus sian businesses into global supply and value chains A revitalization of the structural reform

agendamdash including eforts to diversify economic activities through de- monopolization and support

for SMEs a restructuring of the banking sector the creation of a vibrant business climate to foster

entrepreneurships and innovation the implementation of administrative and judicial reforms to

tackle red tape and endemic corruption and the reduction of state control over key sectors of the

economy via wide- spread privatization could kick- start the development of a nonoil economy and

improve long- term growth prospects Despite ongoing discussion of reform strategies deep

economic and po liti cal changes are extremely complicated over the next po liti calelectoral cycle

(2018ndash2024) particularly because of re sis tance of vested interests and growing commodity prices

The urgency to tackle structural shortcomings in natu ral resource- dependent economies usually

correlates with the price of those resources and the degree to which resource rents drive eco-

nomic activity However there may be marginal improvements in the efficiency of the current

economic system

Future US- Russia relations can be thought of through three pillars one pillar focuses on areas

where both countries maintain a competitive rivalry another looks at potential areas of interaction

under pres ent conditions a third pillar and one that has evaporated from the current bilateral

agenda concentrates on future cooperation Stronger economic ties could not only be a kind of

po liti cal shock absorber but contribute to the building of this future (particularly business contacts

aim to support future structural reforms) although po liti cal factors are depressing the prospects

for cooperation To escape deadlock it will be impor tant to establish the right balance between

politics and economics and create a model of collaboration within the framework of contention

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 49 102017 404 PM

About the Author

Vadim Grishin PhD MBA has been involved in the reform pro cess in Rus sia as adviser to the

deputy prime minister of Rus sia in 1992ndash1993 and 2006ndash2010 He has extensive experience

working with the Bretton Woods Institutions He was the board member of the World Bank Group

and served as se nior adviser at the International Monetary Fund Currently he is a con sul tant to the

chief economistrsquos office of the International Finance Corporation and teaches the economics of

transition at Georgetown University in Washington DC

50

594-71613_ch99_4Pindd 50 102017 403 PM

Blank

COVER PHOTO ADOBE STOCK

1616 Rhode Island Avenue NW

Washington DC 20036

202 887 0200 | wwwcsisorg

v++ISBN 978-1-4422-8035-9

Lanham bull Boulder bull New York bull London

4501 Forbes Boulevard

Lanham MD 20706

301 459 3366 | wwwrowmancom

A U T H O R

Vadim Grishin

Myths and Realities

A Report of the

CSIS RUSSIA AND EURASIA PROGRAM

US-RussiaEconomicRelations

O C T O B E R 2 0 1 7

Euml|xHSLEOCy280359z

The Man Pupu Nyor Rock Formations at the Northern Urals also known as Seven

Strong Man or Little Mountain of the God in the local tribe (Mansi) language

Page 24: U.S.-Russia Economic Relations: Myths and Realities · 2020-04-17 · OCTOBER 2017 U.S.- Russia Economic Relations Myths and Realities AUTHOR Vadim Grishin A REPORT OF THE CSIS RUSSIA

US-Russia Economic Relations18

Figure 43 US Trade in Goods with Rus sia Million US$ 1992ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 1992ndash2016)

Russian Financial Crisis

Oil price Increased from$2446 USD per barrel (2001)

to $9694 USD per barrel(2008)

Global Financial Crisis

Oil price high record in2011-2012

(more that $111 USD perbarrel)

Oil price crashed

$-

$5000

$10000

$15000

$20000

$25000

$30000

$35000

$40000

$45000

$50000

1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

US Imports from Russia US Exports to Russia US-Russia Trade in Goods

No doubt po liti cal ups and downs add volatility to US- Russia trade Nevertheless Rus siarsquos eco-

nomic structure exhausted itself before the Ukrainian crisis and the recent Rus sian recession Its

limitations are not only due to some mistakes in policy or negative coincidences of circumstances

but rather to deeply rooted properties in the current bilateral trade model related to structural

issues in the Rus sian economy Structural constraints such as the weak enforcement of property

rights poor business regulation and nondiversified exports weighed on Rus sian trade with the

United States From this perspective the term ldquonaturalunnatural trading partnersrdquo does not ad-

dress the unused capacity of bilateral interaction or the real challenges that kind of interaction

faces It just adds metaphysical flavor to the very specific economic and po liti cal factors that

determine the US- Russia trajectory

Overall the outlines of bilateral trade (Figure 43) resemble the famous ldquoRus sian Mountainsrdquo that

were a pre de ces sor of the modern roller coaster icy hills supported by wooden constructionsmdash a

rigid and immobile structure that sooner or later would melt This unfortunately is what is hap-

pening to US- Russia trade cooperation now

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 18 102017 404 PM

19

ARE LITTLE FISH REALLY SWEET

Low US- Russia economic interaction has at least two consequences First it limits the capacity of

policymakers to exploit trade as an instrument for geopo liti cal combat Even the question of a US

trade deficit which used to be a headache for many US trading partners has become so insig-

nificant in absolute terms (about $87 billion in 2016) that it seems hardly worth caring about

When the volume of trade between two countries becomes very small in absolute terms whether

a country is running a surplus or deficit is no longer relevant But it also renders another type of

confrontations (sometimes more dangerous) more likely since the two traders have little to lose

Second in an environment marked by low levels of bilateral trade both sides could incentivize (if

and when a desire for po liti cal rapprochement exists) the signing of new trade deals which are

elevated symbolically as a turning point in bilateral po liti cal relations (ie the sale of Boeings to

Rus sia or the delivery via tankers of Rus sian oil to US refineries) Sometimes markets themselves

pres ent ldquogiftsrdquo that can be capitalized on po liti cally US- USSR grain trade in the 1970s was one

such ldquogiftrdquo large sales of American grain to the Soviet Union helped US policymakers win favor

with the po liti cally impor tant American farming sector and permitted Soviet leaders to maintain

access to a dietary staple for the Soviet population

The strong 32 percent growth in value of US imports from Rus sia from January to May 2017

versus January to May 2016 ( Table 51) is an example of a development that has tempted officials

to pres ent it as a sign of positive change due to ldquogrowing business activitiesrdquo (this kind of statement

was heard before the bilateral summit in Germany in July 2017) although the reason for that leap

was evidently an increase in commodity prices (mainly of oilmdash see Table 52) and not a rise in

entrepreneurial interactions The primary beneficiaries of that upside rally have been two other

petro- economies Saudi Arabia and Venezuela ( Tables 53 and 54)

Sector Analyses

05

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 19 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations20

Table 51 US Imports from Rus sia Million US$ Januaryndash May 2016 vs Januaryndash May 2017

Year January February March April May Total

2016 9603 6871 11097 12257 10977 50805

2017 12215 10220 16979 13471 14147 67032

Change 271 487 530 99 289 319

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 1992ndash2016)

Table 52 Change in Urals Crude Oil Prices US$ per Barrel Januaryndash May 2016 vs Januaryndash May 2017

Januaryndash May 2016 Januaryndash May 2017 Change ($) Change ()

3601 5129 1528 424

Source Ministry of Finance of the Rus sian Federation https wwwminfin ru ru ixzz4mMIZ7XtC

Table 53 US Imports from Saudi Arabia Million US$ Januaryndash May 2016 vs Januaryndash May 2017

Year January February March April May Total

2016 15114 9036 13555 10844 14679 63228

2017 19802 20298 21650 16211 19542 97503

Change 3101 12463 5972 495 331 542

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Saudi Arabiardquo Foreign Trade last modified June 29 2017

https wwwcensus gov foreign - trade balance c5170 html (see data for 2016ndash2017)

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 20 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 21

Table 54 US Imports from Venezuela Million US$ Januaryndash May 2016 vs Januaryndash May 2017

Year January February March April May Total

2016 6657 5560 7140 8007 7922 35286

2017 13041 10864 123500 11148 12243 59646

Change 9590 9540 7297 3923 5454 6903

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Venezuelardquo Foreign Trade last modified June 29 2017

https wwwcensus gov foreign - trade balance c3070 html (see data for 2016ndash2017)

Table 55 US Exports to Rus sia Million US$ Januaryndash May 2016 vs Januaryndash May 2017

Year January February March April May Total

2016 3628 3577 7298 4657 4947 24107

2017 3144 4277 5386 6670 4806 24283

Change minus133 196 minus262 432 minus29 minus07

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2016ndash2017)

At the same time US exports to Rus sia continue to stagnate ( Table 55) due to low levels of

consumption during a two-and- a- half-year economic crisis a deep ruble devaluation sanctions

and counter- sanctions

Given the very dif er ent economic structures and resource endowments of Rus sia and the United

States it is not surprising that US- Russia trade is asymmetric and oil driven (Figure 51) A

3 percent increase in Urals oil prices translates into a one percent increase in US import growth

from Rus sia Thus in 2016 every $10 increase in Urals crude oil added $15 billion to the value of

US imports or 11 percent to the total value of imports from Rus sia

OIL ADDICTION

Oil is a core pillar of US- Russia bilateral trade A bumpy ride in oil markets afects commerce

Nevertheless Rus sian oil exports to the United States in physical terms have been rather

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 21 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations22

sustainable Starting from 2005 average annual deliveries have been above 150 million barrels

(Figure 52) Crude and heating oil have dominated while petroleum products and liquefied petro-

leum gases have not (Figure 53) In 2011 oil exports peaked at 228 million barrels but declined to

159 million barrels in 2016mdash a drop of 30 percent Rec ord high shipments of Rus sian oil to the United

States coincided with an elevation in oil prices which made the subsequent decline in oil shipment

value between 2011 and 2016 (by about 72 percent as shown in Figure 54) seem more stark The

increase in price also raised the share of oil in Rus sian exports by 74 percent in 2011 (Figure 55)

The Rus sian share in total US oil imports was around 55 percent in 2011 and 43 percent in 2016

( Table 56) In the last five years the United States has relied exclusively on consumption of Rus sian

oil for the rough equivalent of one week out of the year (Figure 56)

It is unlikely that Rus sia can significantly increase its share of the US oil market and there is a real

possibility for a downward trend There are several reasons the historically high Rus sian hydrocar-

bon export threshold of 2011 will not soon if ever be surpassed

First US energy consumption will likely be flat According to the US Energy Information Adminis-

tration (EIA) demand for petroleum and other liquids in the United States will be about 35ndash36

quadrillion British thermal units (BTUs) with minimal variation over the next 25 years1

1 US EIA ldquoAnnual Energy Outlook 2017 with Projections to 2050rdquo January 5 2017 7ndash8

Figure 51 US- Russia Trade Growth () vs US and Rus sia Real GDP Growth () 1993ndash2016

Source IMF ldquoIMF Datardquo accessed September 27 2017 http wwwimf org en Data US Census Bureau

ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo

Note rGDPthinsp=thinspreal gross domestic product

Trade

USA rGDP growth

Russia rGDP growth

-60

-40

-20

0

20

40

60

80

100

1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Gro

wth

All spikes in US-Russia trade have been connected with two main

variables volume and price of crude oil

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 22 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 23

Second the United States will become a net energy exporter between 2020 and 2030 in most

cases under dif er ent combinations of oil and natu ral gas prices GDP growth technological

breakthroughs and the availability of energy resources The role of oil imports will dramatically

fall2

Third oil price scenarios as described by the International Energy Agency (IEA) international

financial organ izations (IFIs) and many national agencies are very cautious and assume that even

by 2035 to 2040 oil prices will not to recover to the levels of 2011ndash20123

Fourth Rus sian oil production and export growth will be modest and driven by Asian economic

expansion and will comprise a decreasing share of Western markets4 According to forecasts from

2 Ibid 15ndash18

3 Ibid table 3 ldquoEnergy Prices by Sector and Sourcesrdquo World Bank World Bank Commodity Markets Price Forecasts

(Washington DC World Bank 2017) httpswwwworldbank org en research commodity - markets Organ ization of the

Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) World Oil Outlook 2016 (Vienna OPEC 2016)

4 E D Belotskaia et al Global and Rus sian Energy Outlook 2016 (Moscow Energy Research Institute of the Rus sian

Acad emy of Science Analytical Center for the Government of the Rus sian Federation 2016) http acgov ru files

publication a 12767 pdf

Figure 52 US Imports from Rus sia Crude Oil and Petroleum Products Thousands of Barrels 1995ndash2016

Source US EIA ldquoUS Imports by Country of Origin Rus siardquo Petroleum amp Other Liquids September 13

2017 http wwweia gov dnav pet PET _ MOVE _ IMPCUS _ D _ NUS _ NRS _ MBBL _ M htm

0

50000

100000

150000

200000

250000

Date 1995 1996 1997 1998 199920002001200220032004200520062007200820092010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 23 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations24

the Organ ization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) crude oil exports from Rus sia and

the Caspian region to the United States will dis appear by 20255

So why does the Rus sian Urals blend continue to be attractive for oil traders and US refineries

which could pro cess greater volumes of domestically produced lighter crude There are two main

reasons One is related to the preference of US high conversion refineries (the most sophisticated

in the world) to work with heavy oil blends produced by Canada Mexico Iraq Venezuela and

Rus sia Pro cessing heavy crude now is as profitable as pro cessing lighter crude The so- called

crack spreadmdash the diference between the cost of relatively cheap heavy crude oil and the final

price of value- added consumer products (diesel gasoline jet fuel and heating oil)mdash has become

the same as the refinery margins of light sweet crude6 This has primarily afected light oil produc-

ing countries such as Angola Algeria and Nigeria

5 OPEC World Oil Outlook 2016 306ndash309

6 ldquoHow Much for That Heavy Oilrdquo Oil Sands Magazine December 26 2015 https wwwoilsandsmagazine com

news 2015 12 26 how - much - for - that - heavy - oil

Figure 53 US Imports from Rus sia Oil and Petroleum Products US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

$-

$25000000000

$20000000000

$15000000000

$10000000000

$5000000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Liquefied petroleum gases

Petroleum products other

Fuel oil

Crude oil

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 24 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 25

Another factor afecting purchase of Rus sian oil is a new trend among oil companies for further

consolidation of scale and for integrating operations of upstream and downstream business7

There have been several waves of separation and unification of production transportation and

pro cessing in the last 50 years The current business cycle can be seen as an adaptation to a

period of low prices and oversupply Companies that buy andor produce oil in Rus sia most likely

prefer to transport and pro cess this oil in their own modern refineries in the United States At the

same time some of the newest refinery designs specifically for pro cessing heavy oils have been

built in Asia thus extending the choices of heavy oil producing countries

We should also consider that leading US and international oil traders along with oil producing

companies working with or owning US refineries frequently buy Rus sian oil on the open market

and have long- term contracts on Rus sian crude oil delivery Many Rus sian oil companies prefer to

pay for purchases or ser vices with their future production instead of cash creating situations of

ldquostickyrdquo oil imports that are difficult to replace The best- known example is an interaction between

7 ldquoEnergy and Utilities Sectorrdquo Roundtable Financier Worldwide December 2015 https wwwfinancierworldwide

com roundtable - energy - utilities - sector - dec15

Figure 54 US Imports of Oil and Petroleum Products from Rus sia vs Oil Prices Eu rope Brent Spot Price Free on Board (FOB) 1996ndash2017

Source US EIA ldquoUS Imports by Country of Origin Rus siardquo

0

20

40

60

80

100

120

140

0

5000

10000

15000

20000

25000

30000

Jan

-19

96

Jun

-19

96

No

v-19

96

Ap

r-19

97

Sep

-19

97

Feb

-19

98

Jul-

199

8D

ec-1

99

8M

ay-1

99

9O

ct-1

99

9M

ar-2

00

0A

ug

-20

00

Jan

-20

01

Jun

-20

01

No

v-2

00

1A

pr-

20

02

Sep

-20

02

Feb

-20

03

Jul-

20

03

Dec

-20

03

May

-20

04

Oct

-20

04

Mar

-20

05

Au

g-2

00

5Ja

n-2

00

6Ju

n-2

00

6N

ov-

20

06

Ap

r-2

00

7Se

p-2

00

7Fe

b-2

00

8Ju

l-2

00

8D

ec-2

00

8M

ay-2

00

9O

ct-2

00

9M

ar-2

010

Au

g-2

010

Jan

-20

11Ju

n-2

011

No

v-2

011

Ap

r-2

012

Sep

-20

12Fe

b-2

013

Jul-

20

13D

ec-2

013

May

-20

14O

ct-2

014

Mar

-20

15A

ug

-20

15Ja

n-2

016

Jun

-20

16N

ov-

20

16

USD

per

Bar

rel

Th

ou

san

d B

arr

els

US Imports from Russia of Crude Oil and Petroleum Products (Thousand Barrels)

Europe Brent Spot Price FOB (Dollars per Barrel)

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 25 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations26

Table 56 US Oil Imports All Countries vs Rus sia Thousand Barrels per Day 2011ndash2016

Years 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

All Countries 11436 10598 9859 9241 9449 10058

Rus sia 624 477 460 330 371 433

Share 546 450 467 357 393 431

Sources US EIA ldquoUS Imports by Country of Origin Total Crude Oil and Productsrdquo Petroleum amp Other

Liquids September 13 2017 wwweia gov dnav pet pet_move_impcus_a2_nus_ep00_im0_mbbl_m htm

authorrsquos computation

Figure 55 US Imports from Rus sia Share of Crude Oil and Petroleum Products Million US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

57

64

73

72

74

73

72

59

52 50

0

$5000

$10000

$15000

$20000

$25000

$30000

$35000

$40000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

US Imports from Russia

Share of Oil and Petroleum Products

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 26 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 27

the Rus sian state mono poly Rosneft and commodity trading and mining giant Glencore which

along with energy and commodities com pany Vitol participated in a $10 billion prepayment

deal with Rosneft for crude supplies in 2013

There have been a number of ongoing transactions between the Rus sian oil industry and interna-

tional oil companies including several that top the list of importers of Rus sian oil to the United

States ( Table 57) In December 2016 Glencore participated in a controversial privatization opera-

tion purchasing in tandem with the Qatar sovereign wealth fund a 195 percent stake in Rosneft

which was on the US and EU list of sanctioned firms8 Glencore has also taken a blocking stake in

midsize oil producer RussNeft BP owns a 1975 percent stake in Rosneft Chevron holds a

15 percent interest in the 935- mile- long CPC9 pipeline which transports an average of 959000

barrels of crude oil per day including 76000 barrels daily from Rus sia10 ExxonMobil has formed

8 E Mazneva and I Arkhipov ldquoRus sia Sells $11 Billion Stake in Rosneft to Glencore Qatarrdquo Bloomberg December 7

2016

9 CPCthinsp=thinspCaspian Pipeline Consortium

10 ldquoRus sia Highlights of Operations and Business Portfoliordquo Chevron accessed October 3 2017 https wwwchevron

com worldwide russia

Figure 56 Share of Rus sian Oil in Total US Oil Imports Thousands of Barrels per Day 1972ndash2016

Source US EIA ldquoUS Imports by Country of Origin Total Crude Oil and Productsrdquo

2000

4000

6000

8000

10000

12000

14000

16000

US Imports of Crude Oil and Petroleum Products (Thousand Barrels per Day)

US Imports from Russia of Crude Oil and Petroleum Products (Thousand Barrels per Day)19

7319

7419

7519

7619

7719

7819

7919

80

198

119

82

198

319

84

198

519

86

198

719

88

198

919

90

199

119

92

199

319

94

199

519

96

199

719

98

199

92

00

02

00

12

00

22

00

32

00

42

00

52

00

62

00

72

00

82

00

92

010

20

112

012

20

132

014

20

152

016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 27 102017 404 PM

Table 57 Top Importers of Rus sian Oil to the United States Thousands of Barrels 2016

VALERO MARKETING amp SUPPLY CO 54590 3616

EXXONMOBIL OIL CORP 17087 1130

CHEVRON USA INC 15217 1008

BP WEST COAST PRODUCTS LLC 10130 671

GEORGE E WARREN CORP 7272 48

PAULSBORO REFINING CO LLC 6838 453

TESORO CORP 5097 338

VITOL INC 5084 337

PHILLIPS 66 CO 4726 313

TRAFIGURA AG 4360 289

PAR HAWAII REFINING LLC 3893 258

MOTIVA ENTERPRISES LLC 3041 205

SHELL US TRADING CO 2863 19

MARATHON PETROLEUM CO LLC 2475 16

ATLANTIC TRADING amp MARKETING 2099 14

FREEPOINT COMMODITIES LLC 1439 1

GLENCORE LTD 1284 85

BEST PETROLEUM CORP 967 64

ROLYMPUS US COMMODITIES GROUP LLC 822 6

HUNT CRUDE OIL SUPPLY CO 666 4

GULF OIL LP 658 4

Source US EIA ldquoUS Imports by Country of Origin Crude Oilrdquo Petroleum amp Other Liquids September 13

2017 httpswwweiagovdnavpetpet_move_impcus_a2_nus_epc0_im0_mbblpd_ahtm authorrsquos

computation

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 28 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 29

several joint ventures with Rosneft to undertake ofshore exploration in the Black Sea and the Kara

Sea in Siberia11

According to the Sanctions Act US persons are prohibited from exporting or reexporting goods

ser vices (except financial ser vices) and technology in support of exploration or production of new

deep- water Arctic ofshore or shale oil proj ects that involve designated Rus sian entities or other

entities in which such sanctioned persons have a controlling interest or a substantial noncontrol-

ling owner ship interest defined as not less than 33 percent (previously it was 50 percent) The new

law also authorizesmdash but does not requiremdash the imposition of so- called secondary sanctions

against non- US entities that engage in activities involving the construction maintenance or

expansion of Rus sian energy export pipelines with a fair market value of $1 million or more or an

aggregate fair market value during a 12- month period of $5 million12 This provision has raised the

concerns of some Eu ro pean countries particularly Germany As result the final language of the

law included wording about coordination of this issue with allies of the United States

Shipments of Rus sian oil to the United States could be afected by activity in the US refinery

industry In early 2017 Saudi Aramco bought the United Statesrsquo largest oil refinery in Port Arthur

(Texas) and it announced plans to send more of its own crude to that refinery13 Serious concerns

exist however regarding the future of three refineries and nine pipelines owned by Citgo a US

branch of the Venezuelan state com pany PdVSA which is balancing precariously on the edge of

default Under certain conditions in the event of PdVSA bankruptcy Rosneft could claim a stake of

up to 499 percent in Citgo Such a possibility has raised concerns among politicians and US

government officials with Trea sury Secretary Steven Mnuchin calling it a ldquonational security issuerdquo14

Tables 58 59 and 510 show allocations of Rus sian oil imports to major US refineries some of

which work exclusively on Rus sian crude a total of two to three months per year In total 150940

thousand barrels of Rus sian oil were refined in 2016

Figure 57 confirms a leading position of Texas and Louisiana among the US states receiving

Rus sian crude followed by New Jersey California Mississippi Washington Hawaii and Delaware

In a paradoxical way Texas has dis appeared from the list of states as a main destination of US

imports from Rus sia (Figure 58) because Rus sian crude is mostly delivered to Louisiana ports and

registered there by US Customs as an import from Rus sia After that it transports to refineries in

Louisiana and Texas

Overall the short- term business rationale behind the sustainability of US oil imports from Rus sia

cannot overcome strong headwinds in the US energy sector facing all oil importers which will

inevitably lead to a contraction of Rus sian oil exports to the United States in the foreseeable future

11 Exxon eforts to receive a special US Trea sury waiver to drill in sanctioned Rus sia failed in 2017

12 Countering Amer i carsquos Adversaries through Sanctions Act HR 3364

13 Sarp Ozkan ldquoSaudi Aramcorsquos Port Arthur Refinery and the US Refinery Fleetrdquo Drilling Info May 11 2017

https infodrillinginfo com saudi - aramcos - port - arthur - refinery - us - refinery - fleet

14 Graham Kates ldquoTrea sury Secretary Rus siarsquos Citgo Deal a National Security Issuerdquo CBS News May 1 2017

http wwwcbsnews com news rosneft - citgo - steven - mnuchin - national - security

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 29 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations30

Table 58 Valerorsquos Refineries Pro cessing Rus sian Oil Thousands of Barrels 2016

Saint Charles Louisiana 29206 535

Corpus Christi Texas 20626 378

Wilmington California 4250 78

Total USA 54590 100

Source US EIA ldquoRefinery Capacity Reportrdquo January 1 2017

table 5 wwweia gov petroleum refinerycapacity table5 pdf

authorrsquos computation

Table 59 ExxonMobil Refineries Pro cessing Rus sian Oil Thousands of Barrels 2016

Baytown Texas 15037 88

Baton Rouge Louisiana 2046 12

Total USA 17083 100

Source US EIA ldquoRefinery Capacity Reportrdquo authorrsquos computation

Table 510 Chevronrsquos Refineries Pro cessing Rus sian Oil Thousands of Barrels 2016

Pascagoula Mississippi 12767 840

El Segundo California 2372 155

Saint Rose Louisiana 78 05

Total USA 15217 100

Source US EIA ldquoRefinery Capacity Reportrdquo authorrsquos computation

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 30 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 31

HEAVY METAL

Taken together US imports of metals and US imports of oil compose about 80 percent of US

total imports from Rus sia (Figure 59) Trade of metals like other commodities is strongly afected

by market price fluctuations Nevertheless metal imports from Rus sia have been fairly resilient to

market volatility and their average annual value has hovered at about $4 billion in the last five years

(Figure 510) This market resilience was forged at the end of the 1990searly 2000s when Rus sian

metal producers gradually modernized their plants adjusting quality of production to Western

standards and enhancing integration into global value and supply chains Some of them conquered

their share of the highly competitive US market struggling with peers from Canada and certain

BRICS countries (China India and Brazil) To attract additional resources all Rus sian large metal-

producing companies became public and were listed on stock exchanges chiefly the London Stock

Exchange (Severstalrsquo PAO Evraz MMK OAO Novolipetsk Steel Norilsk Nikel and TMK PAO) one

on the New York Stock Exchange (Mechel) and one on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange (Rusal)

Business logic pushed some of them to invest in the US metal- making industry which was hit

hard by crisis Later on some of those assets were sold (eg two US steel mills acquired by

Severstal in 2004 were purchased 10 years later by Steel Dynamics Inc and AK Steel Corp)

Figure 57 Share of US States Rus sian Oil Imports 2016

Source US EIA ldquoUS Imports from Rus sia of Crude Oil and Petroleum Productsrdquo Petroleum amp Other

Liquids September 29 2017 https www eia gov dnav pet hist LeafHandler ashx nshy=shyPETampsshy=shyMTTIM _ NUS

- NRS _ 1ampfshy=shyM authorrsquos computation

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

100

Maine

Massachusetts

Maryland

Connecticut

Georgia

Rhode Island

Virginia

Florida

New York

Alabama

Puerto Rico

Pennsylvania

Delaware

Hawaii

Washington

Mississippi

California

New Jersey

Louisiana

Texas

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 31 102017 404 PM

Figure 58 US Imports from Rus sia by State Million US$ 2013ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoState and Metropolitan Area Trade Datardquo Foreign Trade last modified

October 2 2017 https wwwcensus gov foreign - trade statistics state

Alaska

Connecticut

Delaware

Hawaii

Louisiana

Maryland

North Dakota 0

$1000

$2000

$3000

$4000

$5000

$6000

2013 2014 2015 2016

Alabama

Alaska

Connecticut

Delaware

Hawaii

Louisiana

Maryland

Maine

Mississippi

Montana

North Dakota

Mississippi

Figure 59 US Imports from Rus sia Share of Oil and Metals Million US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 1992ndash2016)

83

82

85

86

87

88

85

82

7375

0

$5000

$10000

$15000

$20000

$25000

$30000

$35000

$40000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

US Imports from Russia

Share of Oil and Metals

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 32 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 33

Obviously the market dynamic of dif er ent metals varies (eg iron steel aluminum platinum and

nickel) Caps to increase their trade and production in a ldquored oceanrdquo global environment with

anemic demand is rather limited despite Figure 510 showing a spike of iron and steel imports

from Rus sia in 2014 and aluminum in 2016 Some opportunities may exist for Russian- owned steel

plants in the United States (such as NLMK) to participate in energy proj ects resumed under Presi-

dent Trump who has required that new pipelines use only American- made steel15

Rus sia occupies a special niche in the US market for titanium products a high- end metal indus-

try Twenty years ago a long- term contract was signed between Rus sian titanium producer

VSMPO- AVISMA and Boeing The Rus sian com pany entered the selective club of Boeing suppliers

for the manufacture of components and semi- finished products Since the signing of this contract

VSMPO has delivered more than 35 percent of all titanium placed on Boeing civil aircraft16 They

are hidden in the trade data in an import category for Civilian Aircrafts and Parts (Figure 511) At

the end of 2016 Boeing announced an extension of its framework agreement with AVISMA

15 E Scheyder C Ngai and T Sylvester ldquoAmerican Steel Unlikely to Get Keystone Boost Despite Trump Orderrdquo

Reuters January 27 2017 http wwwreuters com article usa - trump - pipeline - transcanada - idUSL1N1FH1ZD

16 A Kramer ldquoTitanium Fills Vital Role for Boeing and Rus siardquo New York Times July 5 2013 http wwwnytimes com

2013 07 06 business global titanium - fills - vital - role - for - boeing - and - russia html mcubzshy=shy3

Figure 510 US Imports from Rus sia Iron Steel Bauxite Aluminum Nickel Nonferrous Metals and Other Precious Metals and Materials US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 1992ndash2016)

0

$6000000000

$5000000000

$4000000000

$3000000000

$2000000000

$1000000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 20122013

20142015

2016

Finished metal shapes

Iron and steel advanced

Iron and steel products nec

Nonferrous metals other

Other precious metals

Nickel

Bauxite and aluminum

Iron and steel mill products

Steelmaking materials

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 33 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations34

through 2022 and additional investments in the construction of a new robotic plant in Titanium

Valley a special economic zone located in the Sverdlovsk region that will open in 2018 The pro-

cessing of titanium forgings in all Boeing civil aircraft will be performed there including 787s 737

MAXs and 777Xs17 The contract extension with AVISMA may add several hundred million dollars

in value to annual US imports from Rus sia

How can such heavy reliance on imports of Rus sian titanium exist during a period of rising geopo-

liti cal tensions The answer is straightforward VSMPO- AVISMA is a highly specialized natu ral

mono poly producing 45 percent of the worldrsquos aerospace titanium Only four other countries

smelt high- grade titanium in industrial quantities the United States Germany Japan and China

Overall global production capacity is limited while demand is growing The United States cur-

rently imports around 79 percent of all the titanium it consumes each year18

17 ldquoBoeing and VSMPO Avisma to Launch Second Joint Production Siterdquo Rus sian Aviation Insider December 22 2016

http wwwrusaviainsider com boeing - and - vsmpo - avisma - to - launch - second - joint - production - site

18 Jon Ostrower and Andy Pasztor ldquoBoeing United Technologies Stockpile Titanium Partsrdquo Wall Street Journal

August 7 2014 https wwwwsj com articles boeing - united - technologies - stockpiling - titanium - parts - 1407441886

Figure 511 US Imports from Rus sia Civilian Aircrafts and Parts US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 1992ndash2016)

0

$20000000

$40000000

$60000000

$80000000

$100000000

$120000000

$140000000

$160000000

$180000000

$200000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Parts-civilian aircraft

Civilian aircraft

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 34 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 35

The Sanctions Act authorizes the secretary of the trea sury (in a nonmandatory way) to impose

restrictions (without specifying them) against Rus sian state- owned entities operating in the railway

metals and mining sectors of the Rus sian economy Despite the commanding heights of Rus siarsquos

state sector owner ship in its economy (70 percent of GDP) the metal- producing companies have

remained mostly in private hands

NUCLEAR AFFAIRS

Historically owners and operators of the 104 commercial nuclear power reactors in the United

States have purchased more than 80 percent of their uranium from foreign countries Uranium

shipping from Rus sia accounted for about 13 percent of the 58 million pounds of uranium pur-

chased overseas in 201219 At the same time the Rus sian state- owned mono poly Rosatom ac-

counts for 20 percent of Kazakhstanrsquos uranium production (which in turn comprises 11 percent of

all US uranium imports) and 20 percent of US domestic uranium production capacity (with

owner ship of exploration tracts in Wyoming)20

Nuclear fuel and nuclear power continue to be po liti cally sensitive topics both in the United

States and Rus sia Bilateral cooperation in this sector (being surprisingly stable with imports of

nuclear fuel from Rus sia at a level of $1 billion annually in the last five years [Figure 512 and 513])

is under constant po liti cal and lobbying pressure and has been a source of several po liti cal scan-

dals21 Consequently upside risks in this area of interaction are minimal and downside risks are

much higher especially when we are seeing more decommissioning of nuclear plants in the

United States than new constructions The US EIArsquos 2017 Annual Energy Outlook assumes

that about 25 percent of the nuclear capacity now operating will be removed from ser vice

by 205022

WHY IS THE GRASS GREENER ON THE OTHER SIDE

The United States continues to significantly reduce imports of chemical fertilizers as domestic pro-

duction increases In 2016 the United States imported 13 percent less ammonia and 11 percent

less urea and UAN which is a liquid urea and ammonium nitrate fertilizer Rus sia accounts for

around 40 percent of UAN imported by the United States The United States canceled antidumping

duties on imports of ammonium nitrate and urea from Rus sia in 2016 but it did not prevent import

19 US EIA ldquoThe US Relies on Foreign Uranium Enrichment Ser vices to Fuel Its Nuclear Power Plantsrdquo Today in

Energy August 28 2013 https wwweia gov todayinenergy detail php idshy=shy1273

20 Colin Chilcoat ldquoDoes Rus sia Really Own 20 Percent of the USrsquo Uranium Reservesrdquo OilPricecom May 6 2015

http oilpricecom Alternative - Energy Nuclear - Power Does - Russia - Really - Own - 20 - Of - The - US - Uranium - Reserves

html

21 Michelle Ye Hee Lee ldquoThe Facts behind Trumprsquos Repeated Claim about Hillary Clintonrsquos Role in the Rus sian Ura-

nium Dealrdquo Washington Post October 26 2016

22 US EIA ldquoAnnual Energy Outlook 2017 with Projections to 2050rdquo 81ndash82

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 35 102017 404 PM

Figure 512 US Imports from Rus sia Share of Oil Metals and Nuclear Fuel Million US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 1992ndash2016)

87

86

90

90

90

91

88

86

7882

0

$5000

$10000

$15000

$20000

$25000

$30000

$35000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

US Imports from Russia

Share of Oil Metals and Nuclear Fuel

Figure 513 US Imports from Rus sia Nuclear Fuel Materials US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

$-

$200000000

$400000000

$600000000

$800000000

$1200000000

$1000000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 36 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 37

drops twice last year (Figures 514 and 515) According to forecasts UAN imports are expected to

decline further to 15 million tons this year down over 46 percent from 28 million tons imported

last year23 The downside trend in imports of fertilizers will likely continue because of oversupply

BIG FISH

US imports of fish and shellfish from Rus sia are best understood in comparison with US fish

exports to the Rus sian market which slipped to zero in August 2014 after Rus sia issued an order

banning certain agricultural imports from the United States (Figure 516) While the volume of US

supply was not very large it was impor tant because it broke up the monopolistic dominance of a

few vertically integrated Rus sian companies that have kept prices high by restricting the entry of

new producers Seeking to implement import substitution policies Rus sia has tried to reduce

exports as well as imports of fish and seafood products in the last couple of years This symmetri-

cal approach was intended to ldquocompensaterdquo for a decrease of fish products in the domestic

23 Deepika Thapliyal ldquoPotashCorp Forecasts Sharp Drop in US Nitrogen Imports in 2017rdquo ICIS News February 7

2017 https wwwicis com resources news 2017 02 07 10076734 potashcorp - forecasts - sharp - drop - in - us - nitrogen

- imports - in - 2017

Figure 514 US Imports from Rus sia Share of Oil Metals Nuclear Fuel and Fertilizers Million US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

90

93

92

93

94

95

92

91

85

86

0

$5000

$10000

$15000

$20000

$25000

$30000

$35000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

US Imports from Russia

Share of Oil Metals Nuclear Fuel and Fertilizers

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 37 102017 404 PM

Figure 515 US Imports from Rus sia Chemical- Fertilizers US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

S-

$200000000

$400000000

$600000000

$800000000

$1000000000

$1200000000

$1400000000

$1600000000

$1800000000

$2000000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Figure 516 US Exports to Rus sia Fish and Shellfish US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

0

$10000000

$20000000

$30000000

$40000000

$50000000

$60000000

$70000000

$80000000

$90000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Fish and shellfish

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 38 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 39

consumer market caused by Rus siarsquos import ban but it has failed As result the group most af-

fected by the self- imposed counter- sanctions were Rus sian consumers

With a significant drop in fish imports a devaluation of the ruble and inflationary pressures on

seafood prices yearly consumption of fish in Rus sia has declined precipitously In 2015 alone

fish prices increased 20 percent and consumption dropped to 14 kilograms per person24 from

22 kilograms in 201425 In 2016 food rose to 355 percent of house hold expenditure as a result of

increases in food prices26 This has pushed vertically integrated fishing monopolies to sell even

more of their catch abroad rather than deliver to the Rus sian Federation (Figure 517) Thus we

cannot exclude the possibility of further growth in US fish and shellfish imports from Rus sia on a

marginal scale

24 Александр Савельев ldquoПотребление рыбы в России упало до 14 кг на человекаrdquo [Fish consumption in Rus sia fell to

14 kg per person] Экономика Интерфакс January 28 2015 http wwwinterfax ru business 492038

25 Илья Шестаков ldquoПотебление рыбы в России снизилось на 10 процентов из- за роста ценrdquo [Fish consumption in

Rus sia dropped by 10 percent due to price increases] RNS March 8 2017 https rnsonline consumer - market

Potreblenie - ribi - v - Rossii - snizilos - na - 10 - iz - za - rosta - tsen - 2017 - 03 - 08

26 Zoya Sheftalovich and Christian Oliver ldquoRus siarsquos Boom (Farming) Economyrdquo Politico November 8 2016 http

wwwpolitico eu article russias - boom - farming - economy

Figure 517 US Imports from Rus sia Fish and Shellfish US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

0

$50000000

$100000000

$150000000

$200000000

$250000000

$300000000

$350000000

$400000000

$450000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 39 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations40

SPACE ODYSSEY

Among high- end products beyond the top five groups of goods imported from Rus sia cheap and

efficient Rus sian engines have been used to launch US rockets into space for about 16 years

(Figure 518) There was a serious po liti cal strug gle around a 2014 ban on the purchase of Rus sian

RD-180 rocket engines revealing the conflicting business interests of power ful high- tech companies

This restrictive mea sure was temporary and was quickly lifted because of significant cost impacts

and risks of disruption to launch schedules27 For the same reason the Sanctions Act does not autho-

rize ldquothe imposition of any sanction or other condition limitation restriction or prohibition that

directly or indirectly impedes the supply by any entity of the Rus sian Federation of any product or

ser vice or the procurement of such product or ser vice by any contractor or subcontractor of the

United States or any other entity relating to or in connection with any space launch conducted for

the National Aeronautics and Space Administration or any other nonndash Department of Defense

customerrdquo28

Nevertheless many experts believe that US domestic alternatives to replace Rus sian engines will

be viable in five to eight years

27 Ken Dilanian ldquoWhy Does the US Use Rus sian Rockets to Launch Its Satellitesrdquo NBC News updated November 15

2016 http wwwnbcnews com why - does - u - s - use - russian - rockets - launch - its - satellites - n588526

28 Countering Amer i carsquos Adversaries through Sanctions Act HR 3364

Figure 518 Spacecraft Excluding Military US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

0

$20000000

$40000000

$60000000

$80000000

$100000000

$120000000

$140000000

$160000000

$180000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 40 102017 404 PM

41

Diversity and technological complexity are the most vis i ble advantages supporting US exports to

Rus sia Three major groups of export goods include civilian aircraft engines and parts (Figure 61)

drilling and oil field equipment (Figure 62) and industrial machines and engines (Figure 63)

Despite sanctions against the transfer of advanced oil producing and pro cessing technologies the

realization of US drilling and oil field equipment in Rus sia is sustainable although some bilateral

proj ects have been frozen

Another category of goods that has demonstrated resilience is the phar ma ceu ti cal industry (Fig-

ure 64) because most drugs in Rus sia are imported (about 70 percent of the Rus sian phar ma ceu-

ti cal market in value) Import substitution policies have had only modest results in this industry

As confirmed by American Chamber of Commerce surveys US exports to Rus sia are closely

connected to US FDI 30 percent of total imports of US companies working in the Rus sian

market come from the United States (more than $2 billion in 2016) In other words about

40 percent of all US exports to Rus sia are related to a US corporate- sector business pro cess in

the country The major sectors of activity of these companies are energy and natu ral resources

(52 percent) manufacturing (17 percent) information and communications technology or ICT

(13 percent) retail (7 percent) automotive industry (6 percent) phar ma ceu ti cal production

(1 percent) professional ser vices (05 percent) and other (2 percent)1

Some obvious constraints on US exports to Rus sia have resulted from a reduction in demand A

deterioration of bilateral relations and implementation of sanctions and counter- sanctions have

directly or indirectly afected all businesses Figures 65 and 66 provide data regarding a dramatic

drop in the sale of US agricultural production in Rus sia with all other categories of exports in

goods showing big cuts as well (see Figures 67ndash69)

Exports of civilian aircraft engines and parts put the state of Washington in first place among

other states as a leading exporter to the Rus sian market (Figure 610)

1 American Chamber of Commerce in Rus sia ldquoInvestment and Import to Rus sia 2nd Surveyrdquo 13

Diversity and Constraints

06

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 41 102017 404 PM

Figure 61 US Exports of Civilian Aircraft Engines Equipment and Parts to Rus sia US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

$2500000000

$2000000000

$1500000000

$1000000000

$500000000

$-

Figure 62 US Exports of Drilling and Oil Field Equipment US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

0

$5000000

$10000000

$15000000

$20000000

$25000000

$30000000

$35000000

$40000000

$45000000

$50000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 42 102017 404 PM

Figure 63 US Exports of Industrial Engines to Rus sia US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

0

$5000000

$10000000

$15000000

$20000000

$25000000

$30000000

$35000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Figure 64 US Exports of Phar ma ceu ti cal Preparations to Rus sia US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

0

$5000000

$10000000

$15000000

$20000000

$25000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 43 102017 404 PM

Figure 65 US Exports of Meat and Poultry to Rus sia US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Meat poultry etc

$1000000000

$800000000

$600000000

$400000000

$200000000

$-

$1200000000

$1400000000

$1600000000

Figure 66 US Exports of Soybeans to Rus sia US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

0

$20000000

$40000000

$60000000

$80000000

$100000000

$120000000

$140000000

$160000000

$180000000

$200000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 44 102017 404 PM

Figure 67 US Exports of Vehicles Engines and Parts to Rus sia US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Other parts and accessories of vehicles

Automotive tires and tubes

Bodies and chassis for passenger cars

Engines and engine parts (carburetors pistonsrings and valves)

Trucks buses and special purpose vehicles

Passenger cars new and used

$2500000000

$2000000000

$1500000000

$500000000

$-

$1000000000

Figure 68 US Exports of Medicinal Equipment to Rus sia US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

$10000000

$15000000

$20000000

$25000000

$30000000

$35000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 45 102017 404 PM

Figure 610 US Exports to Rus sia by States (2016 US$ Value) Million US$ 2013ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoState and Metropolitan Area Trade Datardquo

Iowa Kentucky

North Dakota

Oklahoma

South Carolina

Washington

0

$500

$1000

$1500

$2000

2013 2014 2015 2016

District of Columbia

Iowa

Kentucky

North Dakota

Oklahoma

South Carolina

Washington

Figure 69 US Exports of Excavating Machinery to Rus sia US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

0

$5000000

$10000000

$15000000

$20000000

$25000000

$30000000

$35000000

$40000000

$45000000

$50000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 46 102017 404 PM

47

Upon reviewing the current trend in US- Russia economic relations we must acknowledge that

the existing trade model is obsolete and exhausted Imports are resource- oriented and reflect

constraints of the Rus sian economic structure while five groups of goodsmdash oil metals nuclear

fuels fertilizers and fishmdash make up more than 90 percent of total imports from Rus sia (Figure 71)

Each of these industries has a limited capacity for growth in the foreseeable future

Rus siarsquos core export to the United Statesmdash oilmdash will inevitably decrease in the mid- term under any

scenario The value and volume of Rus sian exports to the United States are open to global market

volatility and po liti cal pressures with limited hedging mechanisms

Overall US exports to Rus sia are unsustainable due to bilateral po liti cal tensions the whims of

commodity markets and changing domestic policies Sanctions and counter- sanctions have

created additional barriers particularly in finance banking high- tech energy and agro- business

According to the American Chamber of Commerce 69 percent of US companies working in the

country consider the impact of US sanctions against Rus sia on their business as negative At the

same time 60 percent of companies do not expect big changes in business relations between

Rus sia and the United States under Trump1 as the new law codifies existing sanctions fortifies

them and extends them to new sectors

Current US investments are low due to the weak rule of law in Rus sia a lack of property right

protections and proper contract enforcement high levels of statization and monopolization in the

economy a poor business climate outdated capital stock dependence on natural- resource

sectors and of course sanction and counter- sanction mea sures Bloated administrative compo-

nents created as risk mitigation instruments have also served as impediments The countryrsquos

institutional weakness low level of productivity bud get constraints and a declining inflexible

workforce will restrain future economic growth even if commodity prices recover Rus sian eco-

nomic policy will likely continue to be statist and protectionist relying mostly on import

substitutions

1 Ibid 11

Existing Trends and Future Scenarios

07

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 47 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations48

What scenarios can be expected in such a challenging environment

One probability (no peace no war) is based on the assumption that matters will not deteriorate

further and implementation of the Sanctions Act will be cursory This will cause relatively slow

degradation in the economic field with occasional flashes of activity in selected areas (eg closer

cooperation against Islamist terrorist groups in Syria)

A second worse case or critical scenario is the intensive and full- scale execution of current sanc-

tion legislation and even the imposition of new economic punitive and restrictive mea sures which

could incite asymmetric retaliatory actions and lead to the introduction of additional protectionist

policies This in turn could trigger a further escalation of mutual confrontation and could eventu-

ally destroy the fundamentals of the current bilateral trade system Rus sian leadership has charac-

terized the Sanctions Act as a declaration of a trade war that ends all hope for improving bilateral

relations2

2 Дмитрий Медведев ldquoПодписание президентом США нового санкционного закона против России создает несколько

последствийrdquo [The US Presidentrsquos signing of the package of new sanctions against Rus sia will have a few conse-

quences] Facebook August 2 2017 https wwwfacebook com Dmitry Medvedev posts 10154587161801851

Figure 71 US Imports from Rus sia Share of Oil Metals Nuclear Fuel Fertilizers and Fish Million US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

93

94

93

94

95

96

93

92

87

89

0

$5000

$10000

$15000

$20000

$25000

$30000

$35000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

US Imports from Russia

Share of Oil Metals Nuclear FuelFertilizers and Fish

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 48 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 49

The best case and most favorable scenario looks less probable now It assumes the realization of

structural reforms in Rus sia in such a way that would adapt Rus siarsquos foreign policy to national

economic needs reduce confrontations with the West and make a concerted efort to integrate

Rus sian businesses into global supply and value chains A revitalization of the structural reform

agendamdash including eforts to diversify economic activities through de- monopolization and support

for SMEs a restructuring of the banking sector the creation of a vibrant business climate to foster

entrepreneurships and innovation the implementation of administrative and judicial reforms to

tackle red tape and endemic corruption and the reduction of state control over key sectors of the

economy via wide- spread privatization could kick- start the development of a nonoil economy and

improve long- term growth prospects Despite ongoing discussion of reform strategies deep

economic and po liti cal changes are extremely complicated over the next po liti calelectoral cycle

(2018ndash2024) particularly because of re sis tance of vested interests and growing commodity prices

The urgency to tackle structural shortcomings in natu ral resource- dependent economies usually

correlates with the price of those resources and the degree to which resource rents drive eco-

nomic activity However there may be marginal improvements in the efficiency of the current

economic system

Future US- Russia relations can be thought of through three pillars one pillar focuses on areas

where both countries maintain a competitive rivalry another looks at potential areas of interaction

under pres ent conditions a third pillar and one that has evaporated from the current bilateral

agenda concentrates on future cooperation Stronger economic ties could not only be a kind of

po liti cal shock absorber but contribute to the building of this future (particularly business contacts

aim to support future structural reforms) although po liti cal factors are depressing the prospects

for cooperation To escape deadlock it will be impor tant to establish the right balance between

politics and economics and create a model of collaboration within the framework of contention

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 49 102017 404 PM

About the Author

Vadim Grishin PhD MBA has been involved in the reform pro cess in Rus sia as adviser to the

deputy prime minister of Rus sia in 1992ndash1993 and 2006ndash2010 He has extensive experience

working with the Bretton Woods Institutions He was the board member of the World Bank Group

and served as se nior adviser at the International Monetary Fund Currently he is a con sul tant to the

chief economistrsquos office of the International Finance Corporation and teaches the economics of

transition at Georgetown University in Washington DC

50

594-71613_ch99_4Pindd 50 102017 403 PM

Blank

COVER PHOTO ADOBE STOCK

1616 Rhode Island Avenue NW

Washington DC 20036

202 887 0200 | wwwcsisorg

v++ISBN 978-1-4422-8035-9

Lanham bull Boulder bull New York bull London

4501 Forbes Boulevard

Lanham MD 20706

301 459 3366 | wwwrowmancom

A U T H O R

Vadim Grishin

Myths and Realities

A Report of the

CSIS RUSSIA AND EURASIA PROGRAM

US-RussiaEconomicRelations

O C T O B E R 2 0 1 7

Euml|xHSLEOCy280359z

The Man Pupu Nyor Rock Formations at the Northern Urals also known as Seven

Strong Man or Little Mountain of the God in the local tribe (Mansi) language

Page 25: U.S.-Russia Economic Relations: Myths and Realities · 2020-04-17 · OCTOBER 2017 U.S.- Russia Economic Relations Myths and Realities AUTHOR Vadim Grishin A REPORT OF THE CSIS RUSSIA

19

ARE LITTLE FISH REALLY SWEET

Low US- Russia economic interaction has at least two consequences First it limits the capacity of

policymakers to exploit trade as an instrument for geopo liti cal combat Even the question of a US

trade deficit which used to be a headache for many US trading partners has become so insig-

nificant in absolute terms (about $87 billion in 2016) that it seems hardly worth caring about

When the volume of trade between two countries becomes very small in absolute terms whether

a country is running a surplus or deficit is no longer relevant But it also renders another type of

confrontations (sometimes more dangerous) more likely since the two traders have little to lose

Second in an environment marked by low levels of bilateral trade both sides could incentivize (if

and when a desire for po liti cal rapprochement exists) the signing of new trade deals which are

elevated symbolically as a turning point in bilateral po liti cal relations (ie the sale of Boeings to

Rus sia or the delivery via tankers of Rus sian oil to US refineries) Sometimes markets themselves

pres ent ldquogiftsrdquo that can be capitalized on po liti cally US- USSR grain trade in the 1970s was one

such ldquogiftrdquo large sales of American grain to the Soviet Union helped US policymakers win favor

with the po liti cally impor tant American farming sector and permitted Soviet leaders to maintain

access to a dietary staple for the Soviet population

The strong 32 percent growth in value of US imports from Rus sia from January to May 2017

versus January to May 2016 ( Table 51) is an example of a development that has tempted officials

to pres ent it as a sign of positive change due to ldquogrowing business activitiesrdquo (this kind of statement

was heard before the bilateral summit in Germany in July 2017) although the reason for that leap

was evidently an increase in commodity prices (mainly of oilmdash see Table 52) and not a rise in

entrepreneurial interactions The primary beneficiaries of that upside rally have been two other

petro- economies Saudi Arabia and Venezuela ( Tables 53 and 54)

Sector Analyses

05

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 19 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations20

Table 51 US Imports from Rus sia Million US$ Januaryndash May 2016 vs Januaryndash May 2017

Year January February March April May Total

2016 9603 6871 11097 12257 10977 50805

2017 12215 10220 16979 13471 14147 67032

Change 271 487 530 99 289 319

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 1992ndash2016)

Table 52 Change in Urals Crude Oil Prices US$ per Barrel Januaryndash May 2016 vs Januaryndash May 2017

Januaryndash May 2016 Januaryndash May 2017 Change ($) Change ()

3601 5129 1528 424

Source Ministry of Finance of the Rus sian Federation https wwwminfin ru ru ixzz4mMIZ7XtC

Table 53 US Imports from Saudi Arabia Million US$ Januaryndash May 2016 vs Januaryndash May 2017

Year January February March April May Total

2016 15114 9036 13555 10844 14679 63228

2017 19802 20298 21650 16211 19542 97503

Change 3101 12463 5972 495 331 542

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Saudi Arabiardquo Foreign Trade last modified June 29 2017

https wwwcensus gov foreign - trade balance c5170 html (see data for 2016ndash2017)

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 20 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 21

Table 54 US Imports from Venezuela Million US$ Januaryndash May 2016 vs Januaryndash May 2017

Year January February March April May Total

2016 6657 5560 7140 8007 7922 35286

2017 13041 10864 123500 11148 12243 59646

Change 9590 9540 7297 3923 5454 6903

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Venezuelardquo Foreign Trade last modified June 29 2017

https wwwcensus gov foreign - trade balance c3070 html (see data for 2016ndash2017)

Table 55 US Exports to Rus sia Million US$ Januaryndash May 2016 vs Januaryndash May 2017

Year January February March April May Total

2016 3628 3577 7298 4657 4947 24107

2017 3144 4277 5386 6670 4806 24283

Change minus133 196 minus262 432 minus29 minus07

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2016ndash2017)

At the same time US exports to Rus sia continue to stagnate ( Table 55) due to low levels of

consumption during a two-and- a- half-year economic crisis a deep ruble devaluation sanctions

and counter- sanctions

Given the very dif er ent economic structures and resource endowments of Rus sia and the United

States it is not surprising that US- Russia trade is asymmetric and oil driven (Figure 51) A

3 percent increase in Urals oil prices translates into a one percent increase in US import growth

from Rus sia Thus in 2016 every $10 increase in Urals crude oil added $15 billion to the value of

US imports or 11 percent to the total value of imports from Rus sia

OIL ADDICTION

Oil is a core pillar of US- Russia bilateral trade A bumpy ride in oil markets afects commerce

Nevertheless Rus sian oil exports to the United States in physical terms have been rather

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 21 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations22

sustainable Starting from 2005 average annual deliveries have been above 150 million barrels

(Figure 52) Crude and heating oil have dominated while petroleum products and liquefied petro-

leum gases have not (Figure 53) In 2011 oil exports peaked at 228 million barrels but declined to

159 million barrels in 2016mdash a drop of 30 percent Rec ord high shipments of Rus sian oil to the United

States coincided with an elevation in oil prices which made the subsequent decline in oil shipment

value between 2011 and 2016 (by about 72 percent as shown in Figure 54) seem more stark The

increase in price also raised the share of oil in Rus sian exports by 74 percent in 2011 (Figure 55)

The Rus sian share in total US oil imports was around 55 percent in 2011 and 43 percent in 2016

( Table 56) In the last five years the United States has relied exclusively on consumption of Rus sian

oil for the rough equivalent of one week out of the year (Figure 56)

It is unlikely that Rus sia can significantly increase its share of the US oil market and there is a real

possibility for a downward trend There are several reasons the historically high Rus sian hydrocar-

bon export threshold of 2011 will not soon if ever be surpassed

First US energy consumption will likely be flat According to the US Energy Information Adminis-

tration (EIA) demand for petroleum and other liquids in the United States will be about 35ndash36

quadrillion British thermal units (BTUs) with minimal variation over the next 25 years1

1 US EIA ldquoAnnual Energy Outlook 2017 with Projections to 2050rdquo January 5 2017 7ndash8

Figure 51 US- Russia Trade Growth () vs US and Rus sia Real GDP Growth () 1993ndash2016

Source IMF ldquoIMF Datardquo accessed September 27 2017 http wwwimf org en Data US Census Bureau

ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo

Note rGDPthinsp=thinspreal gross domestic product

Trade

USA rGDP growth

Russia rGDP growth

-60

-40

-20

0

20

40

60

80

100

1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Gro

wth

All spikes in US-Russia trade have been connected with two main

variables volume and price of crude oil

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 22 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 23

Second the United States will become a net energy exporter between 2020 and 2030 in most

cases under dif er ent combinations of oil and natu ral gas prices GDP growth technological

breakthroughs and the availability of energy resources The role of oil imports will dramatically

fall2

Third oil price scenarios as described by the International Energy Agency (IEA) international

financial organ izations (IFIs) and many national agencies are very cautious and assume that even

by 2035 to 2040 oil prices will not to recover to the levels of 2011ndash20123

Fourth Rus sian oil production and export growth will be modest and driven by Asian economic

expansion and will comprise a decreasing share of Western markets4 According to forecasts from

2 Ibid 15ndash18

3 Ibid table 3 ldquoEnergy Prices by Sector and Sourcesrdquo World Bank World Bank Commodity Markets Price Forecasts

(Washington DC World Bank 2017) httpswwwworldbank org en research commodity - markets Organ ization of the

Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) World Oil Outlook 2016 (Vienna OPEC 2016)

4 E D Belotskaia et al Global and Rus sian Energy Outlook 2016 (Moscow Energy Research Institute of the Rus sian

Acad emy of Science Analytical Center for the Government of the Rus sian Federation 2016) http acgov ru files

publication a 12767 pdf

Figure 52 US Imports from Rus sia Crude Oil and Petroleum Products Thousands of Barrels 1995ndash2016

Source US EIA ldquoUS Imports by Country of Origin Rus siardquo Petroleum amp Other Liquids September 13

2017 http wwweia gov dnav pet PET _ MOVE _ IMPCUS _ D _ NUS _ NRS _ MBBL _ M htm

0

50000

100000

150000

200000

250000

Date 1995 1996 1997 1998 199920002001200220032004200520062007200820092010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 23 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations24

the Organ ization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) crude oil exports from Rus sia and

the Caspian region to the United States will dis appear by 20255

So why does the Rus sian Urals blend continue to be attractive for oil traders and US refineries

which could pro cess greater volumes of domestically produced lighter crude There are two main

reasons One is related to the preference of US high conversion refineries (the most sophisticated

in the world) to work with heavy oil blends produced by Canada Mexico Iraq Venezuela and

Rus sia Pro cessing heavy crude now is as profitable as pro cessing lighter crude The so- called

crack spreadmdash the diference between the cost of relatively cheap heavy crude oil and the final

price of value- added consumer products (diesel gasoline jet fuel and heating oil)mdash has become

the same as the refinery margins of light sweet crude6 This has primarily afected light oil produc-

ing countries such as Angola Algeria and Nigeria

5 OPEC World Oil Outlook 2016 306ndash309

6 ldquoHow Much for That Heavy Oilrdquo Oil Sands Magazine December 26 2015 https wwwoilsandsmagazine com

news 2015 12 26 how - much - for - that - heavy - oil

Figure 53 US Imports from Rus sia Oil and Petroleum Products US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

$-

$25000000000

$20000000000

$15000000000

$10000000000

$5000000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Liquefied petroleum gases

Petroleum products other

Fuel oil

Crude oil

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 24 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 25

Another factor afecting purchase of Rus sian oil is a new trend among oil companies for further

consolidation of scale and for integrating operations of upstream and downstream business7

There have been several waves of separation and unification of production transportation and

pro cessing in the last 50 years The current business cycle can be seen as an adaptation to a

period of low prices and oversupply Companies that buy andor produce oil in Rus sia most likely

prefer to transport and pro cess this oil in their own modern refineries in the United States At the

same time some of the newest refinery designs specifically for pro cessing heavy oils have been

built in Asia thus extending the choices of heavy oil producing countries

We should also consider that leading US and international oil traders along with oil producing

companies working with or owning US refineries frequently buy Rus sian oil on the open market

and have long- term contracts on Rus sian crude oil delivery Many Rus sian oil companies prefer to

pay for purchases or ser vices with their future production instead of cash creating situations of

ldquostickyrdquo oil imports that are difficult to replace The best- known example is an interaction between

7 ldquoEnergy and Utilities Sectorrdquo Roundtable Financier Worldwide December 2015 https wwwfinancierworldwide

com roundtable - energy - utilities - sector - dec15

Figure 54 US Imports of Oil and Petroleum Products from Rus sia vs Oil Prices Eu rope Brent Spot Price Free on Board (FOB) 1996ndash2017

Source US EIA ldquoUS Imports by Country of Origin Rus siardquo

0

20

40

60

80

100

120

140

0

5000

10000

15000

20000

25000

30000

Jan

-19

96

Jun

-19

96

No

v-19

96

Ap

r-19

97

Sep

-19

97

Feb

-19

98

Jul-

199

8D

ec-1

99

8M

ay-1

99

9O

ct-1

99

9M

ar-2

00

0A

ug

-20

00

Jan

-20

01

Jun

-20

01

No

v-2

00

1A

pr-

20

02

Sep

-20

02

Feb

-20

03

Jul-

20

03

Dec

-20

03

May

-20

04

Oct

-20

04

Mar

-20

05

Au

g-2

00

5Ja

n-2

00

6Ju

n-2

00

6N

ov-

20

06

Ap

r-2

00

7Se

p-2

00

7Fe

b-2

00

8Ju

l-2

00

8D

ec-2

00

8M

ay-2

00

9O

ct-2

00

9M

ar-2

010

Au

g-2

010

Jan

-20

11Ju

n-2

011

No

v-2

011

Ap

r-2

012

Sep

-20

12Fe

b-2

013

Jul-

20

13D

ec-2

013

May

-20

14O

ct-2

014

Mar

-20

15A

ug

-20

15Ja

n-2

016

Jun

-20

16N

ov-

20

16

USD

per

Bar

rel

Th

ou

san

d B

arr

els

US Imports from Russia of Crude Oil and Petroleum Products (Thousand Barrels)

Europe Brent Spot Price FOB (Dollars per Barrel)

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 25 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations26

Table 56 US Oil Imports All Countries vs Rus sia Thousand Barrels per Day 2011ndash2016

Years 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

All Countries 11436 10598 9859 9241 9449 10058

Rus sia 624 477 460 330 371 433

Share 546 450 467 357 393 431

Sources US EIA ldquoUS Imports by Country of Origin Total Crude Oil and Productsrdquo Petroleum amp Other

Liquids September 13 2017 wwweia gov dnav pet pet_move_impcus_a2_nus_ep00_im0_mbbl_m htm

authorrsquos computation

Figure 55 US Imports from Rus sia Share of Crude Oil and Petroleum Products Million US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

57

64

73

72

74

73

72

59

52 50

0

$5000

$10000

$15000

$20000

$25000

$30000

$35000

$40000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

US Imports from Russia

Share of Oil and Petroleum Products

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 26 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 27

the Rus sian state mono poly Rosneft and commodity trading and mining giant Glencore which

along with energy and commodities com pany Vitol participated in a $10 billion prepayment

deal with Rosneft for crude supplies in 2013

There have been a number of ongoing transactions between the Rus sian oil industry and interna-

tional oil companies including several that top the list of importers of Rus sian oil to the United

States ( Table 57) In December 2016 Glencore participated in a controversial privatization opera-

tion purchasing in tandem with the Qatar sovereign wealth fund a 195 percent stake in Rosneft

which was on the US and EU list of sanctioned firms8 Glencore has also taken a blocking stake in

midsize oil producer RussNeft BP owns a 1975 percent stake in Rosneft Chevron holds a

15 percent interest in the 935- mile- long CPC9 pipeline which transports an average of 959000

barrels of crude oil per day including 76000 barrels daily from Rus sia10 ExxonMobil has formed

8 E Mazneva and I Arkhipov ldquoRus sia Sells $11 Billion Stake in Rosneft to Glencore Qatarrdquo Bloomberg December 7

2016

9 CPCthinsp=thinspCaspian Pipeline Consortium

10 ldquoRus sia Highlights of Operations and Business Portfoliordquo Chevron accessed October 3 2017 https wwwchevron

com worldwide russia

Figure 56 Share of Rus sian Oil in Total US Oil Imports Thousands of Barrels per Day 1972ndash2016

Source US EIA ldquoUS Imports by Country of Origin Total Crude Oil and Productsrdquo

2000

4000

6000

8000

10000

12000

14000

16000

US Imports of Crude Oil and Petroleum Products (Thousand Barrels per Day)

US Imports from Russia of Crude Oil and Petroleum Products (Thousand Barrels per Day)19

7319

7419

7519

7619

7719

7819

7919

80

198

119

82

198

319

84

198

519

86

198

719

88

198

919

90

199

119

92

199

319

94

199

519

96

199

719

98

199

92

00

02

00

12

00

22

00

32

00

42

00

52

00

62

00

72

00

82

00

92

010

20

112

012

20

132

014

20

152

016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 27 102017 404 PM

Table 57 Top Importers of Rus sian Oil to the United States Thousands of Barrels 2016

VALERO MARKETING amp SUPPLY CO 54590 3616

EXXONMOBIL OIL CORP 17087 1130

CHEVRON USA INC 15217 1008

BP WEST COAST PRODUCTS LLC 10130 671

GEORGE E WARREN CORP 7272 48

PAULSBORO REFINING CO LLC 6838 453

TESORO CORP 5097 338

VITOL INC 5084 337

PHILLIPS 66 CO 4726 313

TRAFIGURA AG 4360 289

PAR HAWAII REFINING LLC 3893 258

MOTIVA ENTERPRISES LLC 3041 205

SHELL US TRADING CO 2863 19

MARATHON PETROLEUM CO LLC 2475 16

ATLANTIC TRADING amp MARKETING 2099 14

FREEPOINT COMMODITIES LLC 1439 1

GLENCORE LTD 1284 85

BEST PETROLEUM CORP 967 64

ROLYMPUS US COMMODITIES GROUP LLC 822 6

HUNT CRUDE OIL SUPPLY CO 666 4

GULF OIL LP 658 4

Source US EIA ldquoUS Imports by Country of Origin Crude Oilrdquo Petroleum amp Other Liquids September 13

2017 httpswwweiagovdnavpetpet_move_impcus_a2_nus_epc0_im0_mbblpd_ahtm authorrsquos

computation

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 28 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 29

several joint ventures with Rosneft to undertake ofshore exploration in the Black Sea and the Kara

Sea in Siberia11

According to the Sanctions Act US persons are prohibited from exporting or reexporting goods

ser vices (except financial ser vices) and technology in support of exploration or production of new

deep- water Arctic ofshore or shale oil proj ects that involve designated Rus sian entities or other

entities in which such sanctioned persons have a controlling interest or a substantial noncontrol-

ling owner ship interest defined as not less than 33 percent (previously it was 50 percent) The new

law also authorizesmdash but does not requiremdash the imposition of so- called secondary sanctions

against non- US entities that engage in activities involving the construction maintenance or

expansion of Rus sian energy export pipelines with a fair market value of $1 million or more or an

aggregate fair market value during a 12- month period of $5 million12 This provision has raised the

concerns of some Eu ro pean countries particularly Germany As result the final language of the

law included wording about coordination of this issue with allies of the United States

Shipments of Rus sian oil to the United States could be afected by activity in the US refinery

industry In early 2017 Saudi Aramco bought the United Statesrsquo largest oil refinery in Port Arthur

(Texas) and it announced plans to send more of its own crude to that refinery13 Serious concerns

exist however regarding the future of three refineries and nine pipelines owned by Citgo a US

branch of the Venezuelan state com pany PdVSA which is balancing precariously on the edge of

default Under certain conditions in the event of PdVSA bankruptcy Rosneft could claim a stake of

up to 499 percent in Citgo Such a possibility has raised concerns among politicians and US

government officials with Trea sury Secretary Steven Mnuchin calling it a ldquonational security issuerdquo14

Tables 58 59 and 510 show allocations of Rus sian oil imports to major US refineries some of

which work exclusively on Rus sian crude a total of two to three months per year In total 150940

thousand barrels of Rus sian oil were refined in 2016

Figure 57 confirms a leading position of Texas and Louisiana among the US states receiving

Rus sian crude followed by New Jersey California Mississippi Washington Hawaii and Delaware

In a paradoxical way Texas has dis appeared from the list of states as a main destination of US

imports from Rus sia (Figure 58) because Rus sian crude is mostly delivered to Louisiana ports and

registered there by US Customs as an import from Rus sia After that it transports to refineries in

Louisiana and Texas

Overall the short- term business rationale behind the sustainability of US oil imports from Rus sia

cannot overcome strong headwinds in the US energy sector facing all oil importers which will

inevitably lead to a contraction of Rus sian oil exports to the United States in the foreseeable future

11 Exxon eforts to receive a special US Trea sury waiver to drill in sanctioned Rus sia failed in 2017

12 Countering Amer i carsquos Adversaries through Sanctions Act HR 3364

13 Sarp Ozkan ldquoSaudi Aramcorsquos Port Arthur Refinery and the US Refinery Fleetrdquo Drilling Info May 11 2017

https infodrillinginfo com saudi - aramcos - port - arthur - refinery - us - refinery - fleet

14 Graham Kates ldquoTrea sury Secretary Rus siarsquos Citgo Deal a National Security Issuerdquo CBS News May 1 2017

http wwwcbsnews com news rosneft - citgo - steven - mnuchin - national - security

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 29 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations30

Table 58 Valerorsquos Refineries Pro cessing Rus sian Oil Thousands of Barrels 2016

Saint Charles Louisiana 29206 535

Corpus Christi Texas 20626 378

Wilmington California 4250 78

Total USA 54590 100

Source US EIA ldquoRefinery Capacity Reportrdquo January 1 2017

table 5 wwweia gov petroleum refinerycapacity table5 pdf

authorrsquos computation

Table 59 ExxonMobil Refineries Pro cessing Rus sian Oil Thousands of Barrels 2016

Baytown Texas 15037 88

Baton Rouge Louisiana 2046 12

Total USA 17083 100

Source US EIA ldquoRefinery Capacity Reportrdquo authorrsquos computation

Table 510 Chevronrsquos Refineries Pro cessing Rus sian Oil Thousands of Barrels 2016

Pascagoula Mississippi 12767 840

El Segundo California 2372 155

Saint Rose Louisiana 78 05

Total USA 15217 100

Source US EIA ldquoRefinery Capacity Reportrdquo authorrsquos computation

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 30 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 31

HEAVY METAL

Taken together US imports of metals and US imports of oil compose about 80 percent of US

total imports from Rus sia (Figure 59) Trade of metals like other commodities is strongly afected

by market price fluctuations Nevertheless metal imports from Rus sia have been fairly resilient to

market volatility and their average annual value has hovered at about $4 billion in the last five years

(Figure 510) This market resilience was forged at the end of the 1990searly 2000s when Rus sian

metal producers gradually modernized their plants adjusting quality of production to Western

standards and enhancing integration into global value and supply chains Some of them conquered

their share of the highly competitive US market struggling with peers from Canada and certain

BRICS countries (China India and Brazil) To attract additional resources all Rus sian large metal-

producing companies became public and were listed on stock exchanges chiefly the London Stock

Exchange (Severstalrsquo PAO Evraz MMK OAO Novolipetsk Steel Norilsk Nikel and TMK PAO) one

on the New York Stock Exchange (Mechel) and one on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange (Rusal)

Business logic pushed some of them to invest in the US metal- making industry which was hit

hard by crisis Later on some of those assets were sold (eg two US steel mills acquired by

Severstal in 2004 were purchased 10 years later by Steel Dynamics Inc and AK Steel Corp)

Figure 57 Share of US States Rus sian Oil Imports 2016

Source US EIA ldquoUS Imports from Rus sia of Crude Oil and Petroleum Productsrdquo Petroleum amp Other

Liquids September 29 2017 https www eia gov dnav pet hist LeafHandler ashx nshy=shyPETampsshy=shyMTTIM _ NUS

- NRS _ 1ampfshy=shyM authorrsquos computation

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

100

Maine

Massachusetts

Maryland

Connecticut

Georgia

Rhode Island

Virginia

Florida

New York

Alabama

Puerto Rico

Pennsylvania

Delaware

Hawaii

Washington

Mississippi

California

New Jersey

Louisiana

Texas

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 31 102017 404 PM

Figure 58 US Imports from Rus sia by State Million US$ 2013ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoState and Metropolitan Area Trade Datardquo Foreign Trade last modified

October 2 2017 https wwwcensus gov foreign - trade statistics state

Alaska

Connecticut

Delaware

Hawaii

Louisiana

Maryland

North Dakota 0

$1000

$2000

$3000

$4000

$5000

$6000

2013 2014 2015 2016

Alabama

Alaska

Connecticut

Delaware

Hawaii

Louisiana

Maryland

Maine

Mississippi

Montana

North Dakota

Mississippi

Figure 59 US Imports from Rus sia Share of Oil and Metals Million US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 1992ndash2016)

83

82

85

86

87

88

85

82

7375

0

$5000

$10000

$15000

$20000

$25000

$30000

$35000

$40000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

US Imports from Russia

Share of Oil and Metals

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 32 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 33

Obviously the market dynamic of dif er ent metals varies (eg iron steel aluminum platinum and

nickel) Caps to increase their trade and production in a ldquored oceanrdquo global environment with

anemic demand is rather limited despite Figure 510 showing a spike of iron and steel imports

from Rus sia in 2014 and aluminum in 2016 Some opportunities may exist for Russian- owned steel

plants in the United States (such as NLMK) to participate in energy proj ects resumed under Presi-

dent Trump who has required that new pipelines use only American- made steel15

Rus sia occupies a special niche in the US market for titanium products a high- end metal indus-

try Twenty years ago a long- term contract was signed between Rus sian titanium producer

VSMPO- AVISMA and Boeing The Rus sian com pany entered the selective club of Boeing suppliers

for the manufacture of components and semi- finished products Since the signing of this contract

VSMPO has delivered more than 35 percent of all titanium placed on Boeing civil aircraft16 They

are hidden in the trade data in an import category for Civilian Aircrafts and Parts (Figure 511) At

the end of 2016 Boeing announced an extension of its framework agreement with AVISMA

15 E Scheyder C Ngai and T Sylvester ldquoAmerican Steel Unlikely to Get Keystone Boost Despite Trump Orderrdquo

Reuters January 27 2017 http wwwreuters com article usa - trump - pipeline - transcanada - idUSL1N1FH1ZD

16 A Kramer ldquoTitanium Fills Vital Role for Boeing and Rus siardquo New York Times July 5 2013 http wwwnytimes com

2013 07 06 business global titanium - fills - vital - role - for - boeing - and - russia html mcubzshy=shy3

Figure 510 US Imports from Rus sia Iron Steel Bauxite Aluminum Nickel Nonferrous Metals and Other Precious Metals and Materials US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 1992ndash2016)

0

$6000000000

$5000000000

$4000000000

$3000000000

$2000000000

$1000000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 20122013

20142015

2016

Finished metal shapes

Iron and steel advanced

Iron and steel products nec

Nonferrous metals other

Other precious metals

Nickel

Bauxite and aluminum

Iron and steel mill products

Steelmaking materials

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 33 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations34

through 2022 and additional investments in the construction of a new robotic plant in Titanium

Valley a special economic zone located in the Sverdlovsk region that will open in 2018 The pro-

cessing of titanium forgings in all Boeing civil aircraft will be performed there including 787s 737

MAXs and 777Xs17 The contract extension with AVISMA may add several hundred million dollars

in value to annual US imports from Rus sia

How can such heavy reliance on imports of Rus sian titanium exist during a period of rising geopo-

liti cal tensions The answer is straightforward VSMPO- AVISMA is a highly specialized natu ral

mono poly producing 45 percent of the worldrsquos aerospace titanium Only four other countries

smelt high- grade titanium in industrial quantities the United States Germany Japan and China

Overall global production capacity is limited while demand is growing The United States cur-

rently imports around 79 percent of all the titanium it consumes each year18

17 ldquoBoeing and VSMPO Avisma to Launch Second Joint Production Siterdquo Rus sian Aviation Insider December 22 2016

http wwwrusaviainsider com boeing - and - vsmpo - avisma - to - launch - second - joint - production - site

18 Jon Ostrower and Andy Pasztor ldquoBoeing United Technologies Stockpile Titanium Partsrdquo Wall Street Journal

August 7 2014 https wwwwsj com articles boeing - united - technologies - stockpiling - titanium - parts - 1407441886

Figure 511 US Imports from Rus sia Civilian Aircrafts and Parts US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 1992ndash2016)

0

$20000000

$40000000

$60000000

$80000000

$100000000

$120000000

$140000000

$160000000

$180000000

$200000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Parts-civilian aircraft

Civilian aircraft

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 34 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 35

The Sanctions Act authorizes the secretary of the trea sury (in a nonmandatory way) to impose

restrictions (without specifying them) against Rus sian state- owned entities operating in the railway

metals and mining sectors of the Rus sian economy Despite the commanding heights of Rus siarsquos

state sector owner ship in its economy (70 percent of GDP) the metal- producing companies have

remained mostly in private hands

NUCLEAR AFFAIRS

Historically owners and operators of the 104 commercial nuclear power reactors in the United

States have purchased more than 80 percent of their uranium from foreign countries Uranium

shipping from Rus sia accounted for about 13 percent of the 58 million pounds of uranium pur-

chased overseas in 201219 At the same time the Rus sian state- owned mono poly Rosatom ac-

counts for 20 percent of Kazakhstanrsquos uranium production (which in turn comprises 11 percent of

all US uranium imports) and 20 percent of US domestic uranium production capacity (with

owner ship of exploration tracts in Wyoming)20

Nuclear fuel and nuclear power continue to be po liti cally sensitive topics both in the United

States and Rus sia Bilateral cooperation in this sector (being surprisingly stable with imports of

nuclear fuel from Rus sia at a level of $1 billion annually in the last five years [Figure 512 and 513])

is under constant po liti cal and lobbying pressure and has been a source of several po liti cal scan-

dals21 Consequently upside risks in this area of interaction are minimal and downside risks are

much higher especially when we are seeing more decommissioning of nuclear plants in the

United States than new constructions The US EIArsquos 2017 Annual Energy Outlook assumes

that about 25 percent of the nuclear capacity now operating will be removed from ser vice

by 205022

WHY IS THE GRASS GREENER ON THE OTHER SIDE

The United States continues to significantly reduce imports of chemical fertilizers as domestic pro-

duction increases In 2016 the United States imported 13 percent less ammonia and 11 percent

less urea and UAN which is a liquid urea and ammonium nitrate fertilizer Rus sia accounts for

around 40 percent of UAN imported by the United States The United States canceled antidumping

duties on imports of ammonium nitrate and urea from Rus sia in 2016 but it did not prevent import

19 US EIA ldquoThe US Relies on Foreign Uranium Enrichment Ser vices to Fuel Its Nuclear Power Plantsrdquo Today in

Energy August 28 2013 https wwweia gov todayinenergy detail php idshy=shy1273

20 Colin Chilcoat ldquoDoes Rus sia Really Own 20 Percent of the USrsquo Uranium Reservesrdquo OilPricecom May 6 2015

http oilpricecom Alternative - Energy Nuclear - Power Does - Russia - Really - Own - 20 - Of - The - US - Uranium - Reserves

html

21 Michelle Ye Hee Lee ldquoThe Facts behind Trumprsquos Repeated Claim about Hillary Clintonrsquos Role in the Rus sian Ura-

nium Dealrdquo Washington Post October 26 2016

22 US EIA ldquoAnnual Energy Outlook 2017 with Projections to 2050rdquo 81ndash82

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 35 102017 404 PM

Figure 512 US Imports from Rus sia Share of Oil Metals and Nuclear Fuel Million US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 1992ndash2016)

87

86

90

90

90

91

88

86

7882

0

$5000

$10000

$15000

$20000

$25000

$30000

$35000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

US Imports from Russia

Share of Oil Metals and Nuclear Fuel

Figure 513 US Imports from Rus sia Nuclear Fuel Materials US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

$-

$200000000

$400000000

$600000000

$800000000

$1200000000

$1000000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 36 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 37

drops twice last year (Figures 514 and 515) According to forecasts UAN imports are expected to

decline further to 15 million tons this year down over 46 percent from 28 million tons imported

last year23 The downside trend in imports of fertilizers will likely continue because of oversupply

BIG FISH

US imports of fish and shellfish from Rus sia are best understood in comparison with US fish

exports to the Rus sian market which slipped to zero in August 2014 after Rus sia issued an order

banning certain agricultural imports from the United States (Figure 516) While the volume of US

supply was not very large it was impor tant because it broke up the monopolistic dominance of a

few vertically integrated Rus sian companies that have kept prices high by restricting the entry of

new producers Seeking to implement import substitution policies Rus sia has tried to reduce

exports as well as imports of fish and seafood products in the last couple of years This symmetri-

cal approach was intended to ldquocompensaterdquo for a decrease of fish products in the domestic

23 Deepika Thapliyal ldquoPotashCorp Forecasts Sharp Drop in US Nitrogen Imports in 2017rdquo ICIS News February 7

2017 https wwwicis com resources news 2017 02 07 10076734 potashcorp - forecasts - sharp - drop - in - us - nitrogen

- imports - in - 2017

Figure 514 US Imports from Rus sia Share of Oil Metals Nuclear Fuel and Fertilizers Million US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

90

93

92

93

94

95

92

91

85

86

0

$5000

$10000

$15000

$20000

$25000

$30000

$35000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

US Imports from Russia

Share of Oil Metals Nuclear Fuel and Fertilizers

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 37 102017 404 PM

Figure 515 US Imports from Rus sia Chemical- Fertilizers US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

S-

$200000000

$400000000

$600000000

$800000000

$1000000000

$1200000000

$1400000000

$1600000000

$1800000000

$2000000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Figure 516 US Exports to Rus sia Fish and Shellfish US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

0

$10000000

$20000000

$30000000

$40000000

$50000000

$60000000

$70000000

$80000000

$90000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Fish and shellfish

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 38 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 39

consumer market caused by Rus siarsquos import ban but it has failed As result the group most af-

fected by the self- imposed counter- sanctions were Rus sian consumers

With a significant drop in fish imports a devaluation of the ruble and inflationary pressures on

seafood prices yearly consumption of fish in Rus sia has declined precipitously In 2015 alone

fish prices increased 20 percent and consumption dropped to 14 kilograms per person24 from

22 kilograms in 201425 In 2016 food rose to 355 percent of house hold expenditure as a result of

increases in food prices26 This has pushed vertically integrated fishing monopolies to sell even

more of their catch abroad rather than deliver to the Rus sian Federation (Figure 517) Thus we

cannot exclude the possibility of further growth in US fish and shellfish imports from Rus sia on a

marginal scale

24 Александр Савельев ldquoПотребление рыбы в России упало до 14 кг на человекаrdquo [Fish consumption in Rus sia fell to

14 kg per person] Экономика Интерфакс January 28 2015 http wwwinterfax ru business 492038

25 Илья Шестаков ldquoПотебление рыбы в России снизилось на 10 процентов из- за роста ценrdquo [Fish consumption in

Rus sia dropped by 10 percent due to price increases] RNS March 8 2017 https rnsonline consumer - market

Potreblenie - ribi - v - Rossii - snizilos - na - 10 - iz - za - rosta - tsen - 2017 - 03 - 08

26 Zoya Sheftalovich and Christian Oliver ldquoRus siarsquos Boom (Farming) Economyrdquo Politico November 8 2016 http

wwwpolitico eu article russias - boom - farming - economy

Figure 517 US Imports from Rus sia Fish and Shellfish US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

0

$50000000

$100000000

$150000000

$200000000

$250000000

$300000000

$350000000

$400000000

$450000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 39 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations40

SPACE ODYSSEY

Among high- end products beyond the top five groups of goods imported from Rus sia cheap and

efficient Rus sian engines have been used to launch US rockets into space for about 16 years

(Figure 518) There was a serious po liti cal strug gle around a 2014 ban on the purchase of Rus sian

RD-180 rocket engines revealing the conflicting business interests of power ful high- tech companies

This restrictive mea sure was temporary and was quickly lifted because of significant cost impacts

and risks of disruption to launch schedules27 For the same reason the Sanctions Act does not autho-

rize ldquothe imposition of any sanction or other condition limitation restriction or prohibition that

directly or indirectly impedes the supply by any entity of the Rus sian Federation of any product or

ser vice or the procurement of such product or ser vice by any contractor or subcontractor of the

United States or any other entity relating to or in connection with any space launch conducted for

the National Aeronautics and Space Administration or any other nonndash Department of Defense

customerrdquo28

Nevertheless many experts believe that US domestic alternatives to replace Rus sian engines will

be viable in five to eight years

27 Ken Dilanian ldquoWhy Does the US Use Rus sian Rockets to Launch Its Satellitesrdquo NBC News updated November 15

2016 http wwwnbcnews com why - does - u - s - use - russian - rockets - launch - its - satellites - n588526

28 Countering Amer i carsquos Adversaries through Sanctions Act HR 3364

Figure 518 Spacecraft Excluding Military US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

0

$20000000

$40000000

$60000000

$80000000

$100000000

$120000000

$140000000

$160000000

$180000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 40 102017 404 PM

41

Diversity and technological complexity are the most vis i ble advantages supporting US exports to

Rus sia Three major groups of export goods include civilian aircraft engines and parts (Figure 61)

drilling and oil field equipment (Figure 62) and industrial machines and engines (Figure 63)

Despite sanctions against the transfer of advanced oil producing and pro cessing technologies the

realization of US drilling and oil field equipment in Rus sia is sustainable although some bilateral

proj ects have been frozen

Another category of goods that has demonstrated resilience is the phar ma ceu ti cal industry (Fig-

ure 64) because most drugs in Rus sia are imported (about 70 percent of the Rus sian phar ma ceu-

ti cal market in value) Import substitution policies have had only modest results in this industry

As confirmed by American Chamber of Commerce surveys US exports to Rus sia are closely

connected to US FDI 30 percent of total imports of US companies working in the Rus sian

market come from the United States (more than $2 billion in 2016) In other words about

40 percent of all US exports to Rus sia are related to a US corporate- sector business pro cess in

the country The major sectors of activity of these companies are energy and natu ral resources

(52 percent) manufacturing (17 percent) information and communications technology or ICT

(13 percent) retail (7 percent) automotive industry (6 percent) phar ma ceu ti cal production

(1 percent) professional ser vices (05 percent) and other (2 percent)1

Some obvious constraints on US exports to Rus sia have resulted from a reduction in demand A

deterioration of bilateral relations and implementation of sanctions and counter- sanctions have

directly or indirectly afected all businesses Figures 65 and 66 provide data regarding a dramatic

drop in the sale of US agricultural production in Rus sia with all other categories of exports in

goods showing big cuts as well (see Figures 67ndash69)

Exports of civilian aircraft engines and parts put the state of Washington in first place among

other states as a leading exporter to the Rus sian market (Figure 610)

1 American Chamber of Commerce in Rus sia ldquoInvestment and Import to Rus sia 2nd Surveyrdquo 13

Diversity and Constraints

06

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 41 102017 404 PM

Figure 61 US Exports of Civilian Aircraft Engines Equipment and Parts to Rus sia US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

$2500000000

$2000000000

$1500000000

$1000000000

$500000000

$-

Figure 62 US Exports of Drilling and Oil Field Equipment US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

0

$5000000

$10000000

$15000000

$20000000

$25000000

$30000000

$35000000

$40000000

$45000000

$50000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 42 102017 404 PM

Figure 63 US Exports of Industrial Engines to Rus sia US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

0

$5000000

$10000000

$15000000

$20000000

$25000000

$30000000

$35000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Figure 64 US Exports of Phar ma ceu ti cal Preparations to Rus sia US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

0

$5000000

$10000000

$15000000

$20000000

$25000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 43 102017 404 PM

Figure 65 US Exports of Meat and Poultry to Rus sia US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Meat poultry etc

$1000000000

$800000000

$600000000

$400000000

$200000000

$-

$1200000000

$1400000000

$1600000000

Figure 66 US Exports of Soybeans to Rus sia US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

0

$20000000

$40000000

$60000000

$80000000

$100000000

$120000000

$140000000

$160000000

$180000000

$200000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 44 102017 404 PM

Figure 67 US Exports of Vehicles Engines and Parts to Rus sia US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Other parts and accessories of vehicles

Automotive tires and tubes

Bodies and chassis for passenger cars

Engines and engine parts (carburetors pistonsrings and valves)

Trucks buses and special purpose vehicles

Passenger cars new and used

$2500000000

$2000000000

$1500000000

$500000000

$-

$1000000000

Figure 68 US Exports of Medicinal Equipment to Rus sia US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

$10000000

$15000000

$20000000

$25000000

$30000000

$35000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 45 102017 404 PM

Figure 610 US Exports to Rus sia by States (2016 US$ Value) Million US$ 2013ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoState and Metropolitan Area Trade Datardquo

Iowa Kentucky

North Dakota

Oklahoma

South Carolina

Washington

0

$500

$1000

$1500

$2000

2013 2014 2015 2016

District of Columbia

Iowa

Kentucky

North Dakota

Oklahoma

South Carolina

Washington

Figure 69 US Exports of Excavating Machinery to Rus sia US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

0

$5000000

$10000000

$15000000

$20000000

$25000000

$30000000

$35000000

$40000000

$45000000

$50000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 46 102017 404 PM

47

Upon reviewing the current trend in US- Russia economic relations we must acknowledge that

the existing trade model is obsolete and exhausted Imports are resource- oriented and reflect

constraints of the Rus sian economic structure while five groups of goodsmdash oil metals nuclear

fuels fertilizers and fishmdash make up more than 90 percent of total imports from Rus sia (Figure 71)

Each of these industries has a limited capacity for growth in the foreseeable future

Rus siarsquos core export to the United Statesmdash oilmdash will inevitably decrease in the mid- term under any

scenario The value and volume of Rus sian exports to the United States are open to global market

volatility and po liti cal pressures with limited hedging mechanisms

Overall US exports to Rus sia are unsustainable due to bilateral po liti cal tensions the whims of

commodity markets and changing domestic policies Sanctions and counter- sanctions have

created additional barriers particularly in finance banking high- tech energy and agro- business

According to the American Chamber of Commerce 69 percent of US companies working in the

country consider the impact of US sanctions against Rus sia on their business as negative At the

same time 60 percent of companies do not expect big changes in business relations between

Rus sia and the United States under Trump1 as the new law codifies existing sanctions fortifies

them and extends them to new sectors

Current US investments are low due to the weak rule of law in Rus sia a lack of property right

protections and proper contract enforcement high levels of statization and monopolization in the

economy a poor business climate outdated capital stock dependence on natural- resource

sectors and of course sanction and counter- sanction mea sures Bloated administrative compo-

nents created as risk mitigation instruments have also served as impediments The countryrsquos

institutional weakness low level of productivity bud get constraints and a declining inflexible

workforce will restrain future economic growth even if commodity prices recover Rus sian eco-

nomic policy will likely continue to be statist and protectionist relying mostly on import

substitutions

1 Ibid 11

Existing Trends and Future Scenarios

07

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 47 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations48

What scenarios can be expected in such a challenging environment

One probability (no peace no war) is based on the assumption that matters will not deteriorate

further and implementation of the Sanctions Act will be cursory This will cause relatively slow

degradation in the economic field with occasional flashes of activity in selected areas (eg closer

cooperation against Islamist terrorist groups in Syria)

A second worse case or critical scenario is the intensive and full- scale execution of current sanc-

tion legislation and even the imposition of new economic punitive and restrictive mea sures which

could incite asymmetric retaliatory actions and lead to the introduction of additional protectionist

policies This in turn could trigger a further escalation of mutual confrontation and could eventu-

ally destroy the fundamentals of the current bilateral trade system Rus sian leadership has charac-

terized the Sanctions Act as a declaration of a trade war that ends all hope for improving bilateral

relations2

2 Дмитрий Медведев ldquoПодписание президентом США нового санкционного закона против России создает несколько

последствийrdquo [The US Presidentrsquos signing of the package of new sanctions against Rus sia will have a few conse-

quences] Facebook August 2 2017 https wwwfacebook com Dmitry Medvedev posts 10154587161801851

Figure 71 US Imports from Rus sia Share of Oil Metals Nuclear Fuel Fertilizers and Fish Million US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

93

94

93

94

95

96

93

92

87

89

0

$5000

$10000

$15000

$20000

$25000

$30000

$35000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

US Imports from Russia

Share of Oil Metals Nuclear FuelFertilizers and Fish

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 48 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 49

The best case and most favorable scenario looks less probable now It assumes the realization of

structural reforms in Rus sia in such a way that would adapt Rus siarsquos foreign policy to national

economic needs reduce confrontations with the West and make a concerted efort to integrate

Rus sian businesses into global supply and value chains A revitalization of the structural reform

agendamdash including eforts to diversify economic activities through de- monopolization and support

for SMEs a restructuring of the banking sector the creation of a vibrant business climate to foster

entrepreneurships and innovation the implementation of administrative and judicial reforms to

tackle red tape and endemic corruption and the reduction of state control over key sectors of the

economy via wide- spread privatization could kick- start the development of a nonoil economy and

improve long- term growth prospects Despite ongoing discussion of reform strategies deep

economic and po liti cal changes are extremely complicated over the next po liti calelectoral cycle

(2018ndash2024) particularly because of re sis tance of vested interests and growing commodity prices

The urgency to tackle structural shortcomings in natu ral resource- dependent economies usually

correlates with the price of those resources and the degree to which resource rents drive eco-

nomic activity However there may be marginal improvements in the efficiency of the current

economic system

Future US- Russia relations can be thought of through three pillars one pillar focuses on areas

where both countries maintain a competitive rivalry another looks at potential areas of interaction

under pres ent conditions a third pillar and one that has evaporated from the current bilateral

agenda concentrates on future cooperation Stronger economic ties could not only be a kind of

po liti cal shock absorber but contribute to the building of this future (particularly business contacts

aim to support future structural reforms) although po liti cal factors are depressing the prospects

for cooperation To escape deadlock it will be impor tant to establish the right balance between

politics and economics and create a model of collaboration within the framework of contention

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 49 102017 404 PM

About the Author

Vadim Grishin PhD MBA has been involved in the reform pro cess in Rus sia as adviser to the

deputy prime minister of Rus sia in 1992ndash1993 and 2006ndash2010 He has extensive experience

working with the Bretton Woods Institutions He was the board member of the World Bank Group

and served as se nior adviser at the International Monetary Fund Currently he is a con sul tant to the

chief economistrsquos office of the International Finance Corporation and teaches the economics of

transition at Georgetown University in Washington DC

50

594-71613_ch99_4Pindd 50 102017 403 PM

Blank

COVER PHOTO ADOBE STOCK

1616 Rhode Island Avenue NW

Washington DC 20036

202 887 0200 | wwwcsisorg

v++ISBN 978-1-4422-8035-9

Lanham bull Boulder bull New York bull London

4501 Forbes Boulevard

Lanham MD 20706

301 459 3366 | wwwrowmancom

A U T H O R

Vadim Grishin

Myths and Realities

A Report of the

CSIS RUSSIA AND EURASIA PROGRAM

US-RussiaEconomicRelations

O C T O B E R 2 0 1 7

Euml|xHSLEOCy280359z

The Man Pupu Nyor Rock Formations at the Northern Urals also known as Seven

Strong Man or Little Mountain of the God in the local tribe (Mansi) language

Page 26: U.S.-Russia Economic Relations: Myths and Realities · 2020-04-17 · OCTOBER 2017 U.S.- Russia Economic Relations Myths and Realities AUTHOR Vadim Grishin A REPORT OF THE CSIS RUSSIA

US-Russia Economic Relations20

Table 51 US Imports from Rus sia Million US$ Januaryndash May 2016 vs Januaryndash May 2017

Year January February March April May Total

2016 9603 6871 11097 12257 10977 50805

2017 12215 10220 16979 13471 14147 67032

Change 271 487 530 99 289 319

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 1992ndash2016)

Table 52 Change in Urals Crude Oil Prices US$ per Barrel Januaryndash May 2016 vs Januaryndash May 2017

Januaryndash May 2016 Januaryndash May 2017 Change ($) Change ()

3601 5129 1528 424

Source Ministry of Finance of the Rus sian Federation https wwwminfin ru ru ixzz4mMIZ7XtC

Table 53 US Imports from Saudi Arabia Million US$ Januaryndash May 2016 vs Januaryndash May 2017

Year January February March April May Total

2016 15114 9036 13555 10844 14679 63228

2017 19802 20298 21650 16211 19542 97503

Change 3101 12463 5972 495 331 542

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Saudi Arabiardquo Foreign Trade last modified June 29 2017

https wwwcensus gov foreign - trade balance c5170 html (see data for 2016ndash2017)

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 20 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 21

Table 54 US Imports from Venezuela Million US$ Januaryndash May 2016 vs Januaryndash May 2017

Year January February March April May Total

2016 6657 5560 7140 8007 7922 35286

2017 13041 10864 123500 11148 12243 59646

Change 9590 9540 7297 3923 5454 6903

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Venezuelardquo Foreign Trade last modified June 29 2017

https wwwcensus gov foreign - trade balance c3070 html (see data for 2016ndash2017)

Table 55 US Exports to Rus sia Million US$ Januaryndash May 2016 vs Januaryndash May 2017

Year January February March April May Total

2016 3628 3577 7298 4657 4947 24107

2017 3144 4277 5386 6670 4806 24283

Change minus133 196 minus262 432 minus29 minus07

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2016ndash2017)

At the same time US exports to Rus sia continue to stagnate ( Table 55) due to low levels of

consumption during a two-and- a- half-year economic crisis a deep ruble devaluation sanctions

and counter- sanctions

Given the very dif er ent economic structures and resource endowments of Rus sia and the United

States it is not surprising that US- Russia trade is asymmetric and oil driven (Figure 51) A

3 percent increase in Urals oil prices translates into a one percent increase in US import growth

from Rus sia Thus in 2016 every $10 increase in Urals crude oil added $15 billion to the value of

US imports or 11 percent to the total value of imports from Rus sia

OIL ADDICTION

Oil is a core pillar of US- Russia bilateral trade A bumpy ride in oil markets afects commerce

Nevertheless Rus sian oil exports to the United States in physical terms have been rather

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 21 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations22

sustainable Starting from 2005 average annual deliveries have been above 150 million barrels

(Figure 52) Crude and heating oil have dominated while petroleum products and liquefied petro-

leum gases have not (Figure 53) In 2011 oil exports peaked at 228 million barrels but declined to

159 million barrels in 2016mdash a drop of 30 percent Rec ord high shipments of Rus sian oil to the United

States coincided with an elevation in oil prices which made the subsequent decline in oil shipment

value between 2011 and 2016 (by about 72 percent as shown in Figure 54) seem more stark The

increase in price also raised the share of oil in Rus sian exports by 74 percent in 2011 (Figure 55)

The Rus sian share in total US oil imports was around 55 percent in 2011 and 43 percent in 2016

( Table 56) In the last five years the United States has relied exclusively on consumption of Rus sian

oil for the rough equivalent of one week out of the year (Figure 56)

It is unlikely that Rus sia can significantly increase its share of the US oil market and there is a real

possibility for a downward trend There are several reasons the historically high Rus sian hydrocar-

bon export threshold of 2011 will not soon if ever be surpassed

First US energy consumption will likely be flat According to the US Energy Information Adminis-

tration (EIA) demand for petroleum and other liquids in the United States will be about 35ndash36

quadrillion British thermal units (BTUs) with minimal variation over the next 25 years1

1 US EIA ldquoAnnual Energy Outlook 2017 with Projections to 2050rdquo January 5 2017 7ndash8

Figure 51 US- Russia Trade Growth () vs US and Rus sia Real GDP Growth () 1993ndash2016

Source IMF ldquoIMF Datardquo accessed September 27 2017 http wwwimf org en Data US Census Bureau

ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo

Note rGDPthinsp=thinspreal gross domestic product

Trade

USA rGDP growth

Russia rGDP growth

-60

-40

-20

0

20

40

60

80

100

1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Gro

wth

All spikes in US-Russia trade have been connected with two main

variables volume and price of crude oil

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 22 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 23

Second the United States will become a net energy exporter between 2020 and 2030 in most

cases under dif er ent combinations of oil and natu ral gas prices GDP growth technological

breakthroughs and the availability of energy resources The role of oil imports will dramatically

fall2

Third oil price scenarios as described by the International Energy Agency (IEA) international

financial organ izations (IFIs) and many national agencies are very cautious and assume that even

by 2035 to 2040 oil prices will not to recover to the levels of 2011ndash20123

Fourth Rus sian oil production and export growth will be modest and driven by Asian economic

expansion and will comprise a decreasing share of Western markets4 According to forecasts from

2 Ibid 15ndash18

3 Ibid table 3 ldquoEnergy Prices by Sector and Sourcesrdquo World Bank World Bank Commodity Markets Price Forecasts

(Washington DC World Bank 2017) httpswwwworldbank org en research commodity - markets Organ ization of the

Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) World Oil Outlook 2016 (Vienna OPEC 2016)

4 E D Belotskaia et al Global and Rus sian Energy Outlook 2016 (Moscow Energy Research Institute of the Rus sian

Acad emy of Science Analytical Center for the Government of the Rus sian Federation 2016) http acgov ru files

publication a 12767 pdf

Figure 52 US Imports from Rus sia Crude Oil and Petroleum Products Thousands of Barrels 1995ndash2016

Source US EIA ldquoUS Imports by Country of Origin Rus siardquo Petroleum amp Other Liquids September 13

2017 http wwweia gov dnav pet PET _ MOVE _ IMPCUS _ D _ NUS _ NRS _ MBBL _ M htm

0

50000

100000

150000

200000

250000

Date 1995 1996 1997 1998 199920002001200220032004200520062007200820092010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 23 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations24

the Organ ization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) crude oil exports from Rus sia and

the Caspian region to the United States will dis appear by 20255

So why does the Rus sian Urals blend continue to be attractive for oil traders and US refineries

which could pro cess greater volumes of domestically produced lighter crude There are two main

reasons One is related to the preference of US high conversion refineries (the most sophisticated

in the world) to work with heavy oil blends produced by Canada Mexico Iraq Venezuela and

Rus sia Pro cessing heavy crude now is as profitable as pro cessing lighter crude The so- called

crack spreadmdash the diference between the cost of relatively cheap heavy crude oil and the final

price of value- added consumer products (diesel gasoline jet fuel and heating oil)mdash has become

the same as the refinery margins of light sweet crude6 This has primarily afected light oil produc-

ing countries such as Angola Algeria and Nigeria

5 OPEC World Oil Outlook 2016 306ndash309

6 ldquoHow Much for That Heavy Oilrdquo Oil Sands Magazine December 26 2015 https wwwoilsandsmagazine com

news 2015 12 26 how - much - for - that - heavy - oil

Figure 53 US Imports from Rus sia Oil and Petroleum Products US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

$-

$25000000000

$20000000000

$15000000000

$10000000000

$5000000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Liquefied petroleum gases

Petroleum products other

Fuel oil

Crude oil

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 24 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 25

Another factor afecting purchase of Rus sian oil is a new trend among oil companies for further

consolidation of scale and for integrating operations of upstream and downstream business7

There have been several waves of separation and unification of production transportation and

pro cessing in the last 50 years The current business cycle can be seen as an adaptation to a

period of low prices and oversupply Companies that buy andor produce oil in Rus sia most likely

prefer to transport and pro cess this oil in their own modern refineries in the United States At the

same time some of the newest refinery designs specifically for pro cessing heavy oils have been

built in Asia thus extending the choices of heavy oil producing countries

We should also consider that leading US and international oil traders along with oil producing

companies working with or owning US refineries frequently buy Rus sian oil on the open market

and have long- term contracts on Rus sian crude oil delivery Many Rus sian oil companies prefer to

pay for purchases or ser vices with their future production instead of cash creating situations of

ldquostickyrdquo oil imports that are difficult to replace The best- known example is an interaction between

7 ldquoEnergy and Utilities Sectorrdquo Roundtable Financier Worldwide December 2015 https wwwfinancierworldwide

com roundtable - energy - utilities - sector - dec15

Figure 54 US Imports of Oil and Petroleum Products from Rus sia vs Oil Prices Eu rope Brent Spot Price Free on Board (FOB) 1996ndash2017

Source US EIA ldquoUS Imports by Country of Origin Rus siardquo

0

20

40

60

80

100

120

140

0

5000

10000

15000

20000

25000

30000

Jan

-19

96

Jun

-19

96

No

v-19

96

Ap

r-19

97

Sep

-19

97

Feb

-19

98

Jul-

199

8D

ec-1

99

8M

ay-1

99

9O

ct-1

99

9M

ar-2

00

0A

ug

-20

00

Jan

-20

01

Jun

-20

01

No

v-2

00

1A

pr-

20

02

Sep

-20

02

Feb

-20

03

Jul-

20

03

Dec

-20

03

May

-20

04

Oct

-20

04

Mar

-20

05

Au

g-2

00

5Ja

n-2

00

6Ju

n-2

00

6N

ov-

20

06

Ap

r-2

00

7Se

p-2

00

7Fe

b-2

00

8Ju

l-2

00

8D

ec-2

00

8M

ay-2

00

9O

ct-2

00

9M

ar-2

010

Au

g-2

010

Jan

-20

11Ju

n-2

011

No

v-2

011

Ap

r-2

012

Sep

-20

12Fe

b-2

013

Jul-

20

13D

ec-2

013

May

-20

14O

ct-2

014

Mar

-20

15A

ug

-20

15Ja

n-2

016

Jun

-20

16N

ov-

20

16

USD

per

Bar

rel

Th

ou

san

d B

arr

els

US Imports from Russia of Crude Oil and Petroleum Products (Thousand Barrels)

Europe Brent Spot Price FOB (Dollars per Barrel)

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 25 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations26

Table 56 US Oil Imports All Countries vs Rus sia Thousand Barrels per Day 2011ndash2016

Years 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

All Countries 11436 10598 9859 9241 9449 10058

Rus sia 624 477 460 330 371 433

Share 546 450 467 357 393 431

Sources US EIA ldquoUS Imports by Country of Origin Total Crude Oil and Productsrdquo Petroleum amp Other

Liquids September 13 2017 wwweia gov dnav pet pet_move_impcus_a2_nus_ep00_im0_mbbl_m htm

authorrsquos computation

Figure 55 US Imports from Rus sia Share of Crude Oil and Petroleum Products Million US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

57

64

73

72

74

73

72

59

52 50

0

$5000

$10000

$15000

$20000

$25000

$30000

$35000

$40000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

US Imports from Russia

Share of Oil and Petroleum Products

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 26 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 27

the Rus sian state mono poly Rosneft and commodity trading and mining giant Glencore which

along with energy and commodities com pany Vitol participated in a $10 billion prepayment

deal with Rosneft for crude supplies in 2013

There have been a number of ongoing transactions between the Rus sian oil industry and interna-

tional oil companies including several that top the list of importers of Rus sian oil to the United

States ( Table 57) In December 2016 Glencore participated in a controversial privatization opera-

tion purchasing in tandem with the Qatar sovereign wealth fund a 195 percent stake in Rosneft

which was on the US and EU list of sanctioned firms8 Glencore has also taken a blocking stake in

midsize oil producer RussNeft BP owns a 1975 percent stake in Rosneft Chevron holds a

15 percent interest in the 935- mile- long CPC9 pipeline which transports an average of 959000

barrels of crude oil per day including 76000 barrels daily from Rus sia10 ExxonMobil has formed

8 E Mazneva and I Arkhipov ldquoRus sia Sells $11 Billion Stake in Rosneft to Glencore Qatarrdquo Bloomberg December 7

2016

9 CPCthinsp=thinspCaspian Pipeline Consortium

10 ldquoRus sia Highlights of Operations and Business Portfoliordquo Chevron accessed October 3 2017 https wwwchevron

com worldwide russia

Figure 56 Share of Rus sian Oil in Total US Oil Imports Thousands of Barrels per Day 1972ndash2016

Source US EIA ldquoUS Imports by Country of Origin Total Crude Oil and Productsrdquo

2000

4000

6000

8000

10000

12000

14000

16000

US Imports of Crude Oil and Petroleum Products (Thousand Barrels per Day)

US Imports from Russia of Crude Oil and Petroleum Products (Thousand Barrels per Day)19

7319

7419

7519

7619

7719

7819

7919

80

198

119

82

198

319

84

198

519

86

198

719

88

198

919

90

199

119

92

199

319

94

199

519

96

199

719

98

199

92

00

02

00

12

00

22

00

32

00

42

00

52

00

62

00

72

00

82

00

92

010

20

112

012

20

132

014

20

152

016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 27 102017 404 PM

Table 57 Top Importers of Rus sian Oil to the United States Thousands of Barrels 2016

VALERO MARKETING amp SUPPLY CO 54590 3616

EXXONMOBIL OIL CORP 17087 1130

CHEVRON USA INC 15217 1008

BP WEST COAST PRODUCTS LLC 10130 671

GEORGE E WARREN CORP 7272 48

PAULSBORO REFINING CO LLC 6838 453

TESORO CORP 5097 338

VITOL INC 5084 337

PHILLIPS 66 CO 4726 313

TRAFIGURA AG 4360 289

PAR HAWAII REFINING LLC 3893 258

MOTIVA ENTERPRISES LLC 3041 205

SHELL US TRADING CO 2863 19

MARATHON PETROLEUM CO LLC 2475 16

ATLANTIC TRADING amp MARKETING 2099 14

FREEPOINT COMMODITIES LLC 1439 1

GLENCORE LTD 1284 85

BEST PETROLEUM CORP 967 64

ROLYMPUS US COMMODITIES GROUP LLC 822 6

HUNT CRUDE OIL SUPPLY CO 666 4

GULF OIL LP 658 4

Source US EIA ldquoUS Imports by Country of Origin Crude Oilrdquo Petroleum amp Other Liquids September 13

2017 httpswwweiagovdnavpetpet_move_impcus_a2_nus_epc0_im0_mbblpd_ahtm authorrsquos

computation

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 28 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 29

several joint ventures with Rosneft to undertake ofshore exploration in the Black Sea and the Kara

Sea in Siberia11

According to the Sanctions Act US persons are prohibited from exporting or reexporting goods

ser vices (except financial ser vices) and technology in support of exploration or production of new

deep- water Arctic ofshore or shale oil proj ects that involve designated Rus sian entities or other

entities in which such sanctioned persons have a controlling interest or a substantial noncontrol-

ling owner ship interest defined as not less than 33 percent (previously it was 50 percent) The new

law also authorizesmdash but does not requiremdash the imposition of so- called secondary sanctions

against non- US entities that engage in activities involving the construction maintenance or

expansion of Rus sian energy export pipelines with a fair market value of $1 million or more or an

aggregate fair market value during a 12- month period of $5 million12 This provision has raised the

concerns of some Eu ro pean countries particularly Germany As result the final language of the

law included wording about coordination of this issue with allies of the United States

Shipments of Rus sian oil to the United States could be afected by activity in the US refinery

industry In early 2017 Saudi Aramco bought the United Statesrsquo largest oil refinery in Port Arthur

(Texas) and it announced plans to send more of its own crude to that refinery13 Serious concerns

exist however regarding the future of three refineries and nine pipelines owned by Citgo a US

branch of the Venezuelan state com pany PdVSA which is balancing precariously on the edge of

default Under certain conditions in the event of PdVSA bankruptcy Rosneft could claim a stake of

up to 499 percent in Citgo Such a possibility has raised concerns among politicians and US

government officials with Trea sury Secretary Steven Mnuchin calling it a ldquonational security issuerdquo14

Tables 58 59 and 510 show allocations of Rus sian oil imports to major US refineries some of

which work exclusively on Rus sian crude a total of two to three months per year In total 150940

thousand barrels of Rus sian oil were refined in 2016

Figure 57 confirms a leading position of Texas and Louisiana among the US states receiving

Rus sian crude followed by New Jersey California Mississippi Washington Hawaii and Delaware

In a paradoxical way Texas has dis appeared from the list of states as a main destination of US

imports from Rus sia (Figure 58) because Rus sian crude is mostly delivered to Louisiana ports and

registered there by US Customs as an import from Rus sia After that it transports to refineries in

Louisiana and Texas

Overall the short- term business rationale behind the sustainability of US oil imports from Rus sia

cannot overcome strong headwinds in the US energy sector facing all oil importers which will

inevitably lead to a contraction of Rus sian oil exports to the United States in the foreseeable future

11 Exxon eforts to receive a special US Trea sury waiver to drill in sanctioned Rus sia failed in 2017

12 Countering Amer i carsquos Adversaries through Sanctions Act HR 3364

13 Sarp Ozkan ldquoSaudi Aramcorsquos Port Arthur Refinery and the US Refinery Fleetrdquo Drilling Info May 11 2017

https infodrillinginfo com saudi - aramcos - port - arthur - refinery - us - refinery - fleet

14 Graham Kates ldquoTrea sury Secretary Rus siarsquos Citgo Deal a National Security Issuerdquo CBS News May 1 2017

http wwwcbsnews com news rosneft - citgo - steven - mnuchin - national - security

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 29 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations30

Table 58 Valerorsquos Refineries Pro cessing Rus sian Oil Thousands of Barrels 2016

Saint Charles Louisiana 29206 535

Corpus Christi Texas 20626 378

Wilmington California 4250 78

Total USA 54590 100

Source US EIA ldquoRefinery Capacity Reportrdquo January 1 2017

table 5 wwweia gov petroleum refinerycapacity table5 pdf

authorrsquos computation

Table 59 ExxonMobil Refineries Pro cessing Rus sian Oil Thousands of Barrels 2016

Baytown Texas 15037 88

Baton Rouge Louisiana 2046 12

Total USA 17083 100

Source US EIA ldquoRefinery Capacity Reportrdquo authorrsquos computation

Table 510 Chevronrsquos Refineries Pro cessing Rus sian Oil Thousands of Barrels 2016

Pascagoula Mississippi 12767 840

El Segundo California 2372 155

Saint Rose Louisiana 78 05

Total USA 15217 100

Source US EIA ldquoRefinery Capacity Reportrdquo authorrsquos computation

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 30 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 31

HEAVY METAL

Taken together US imports of metals and US imports of oil compose about 80 percent of US

total imports from Rus sia (Figure 59) Trade of metals like other commodities is strongly afected

by market price fluctuations Nevertheless metal imports from Rus sia have been fairly resilient to

market volatility and their average annual value has hovered at about $4 billion in the last five years

(Figure 510) This market resilience was forged at the end of the 1990searly 2000s when Rus sian

metal producers gradually modernized their plants adjusting quality of production to Western

standards and enhancing integration into global value and supply chains Some of them conquered

their share of the highly competitive US market struggling with peers from Canada and certain

BRICS countries (China India and Brazil) To attract additional resources all Rus sian large metal-

producing companies became public and were listed on stock exchanges chiefly the London Stock

Exchange (Severstalrsquo PAO Evraz MMK OAO Novolipetsk Steel Norilsk Nikel and TMK PAO) one

on the New York Stock Exchange (Mechel) and one on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange (Rusal)

Business logic pushed some of them to invest in the US metal- making industry which was hit

hard by crisis Later on some of those assets were sold (eg two US steel mills acquired by

Severstal in 2004 were purchased 10 years later by Steel Dynamics Inc and AK Steel Corp)

Figure 57 Share of US States Rus sian Oil Imports 2016

Source US EIA ldquoUS Imports from Rus sia of Crude Oil and Petroleum Productsrdquo Petroleum amp Other

Liquids September 29 2017 https www eia gov dnav pet hist LeafHandler ashx nshy=shyPETampsshy=shyMTTIM _ NUS

- NRS _ 1ampfshy=shyM authorrsquos computation

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

100

Maine

Massachusetts

Maryland

Connecticut

Georgia

Rhode Island

Virginia

Florida

New York

Alabama

Puerto Rico

Pennsylvania

Delaware

Hawaii

Washington

Mississippi

California

New Jersey

Louisiana

Texas

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 31 102017 404 PM

Figure 58 US Imports from Rus sia by State Million US$ 2013ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoState and Metropolitan Area Trade Datardquo Foreign Trade last modified

October 2 2017 https wwwcensus gov foreign - trade statistics state

Alaska

Connecticut

Delaware

Hawaii

Louisiana

Maryland

North Dakota 0

$1000

$2000

$3000

$4000

$5000

$6000

2013 2014 2015 2016

Alabama

Alaska

Connecticut

Delaware

Hawaii

Louisiana

Maryland

Maine

Mississippi

Montana

North Dakota

Mississippi

Figure 59 US Imports from Rus sia Share of Oil and Metals Million US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 1992ndash2016)

83

82

85

86

87

88

85

82

7375

0

$5000

$10000

$15000

$20000

$25000

$30000

$35000

$40000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

US Imports from Russia

Share of Oil and Metals

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 32 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 33

Obviously the market dynamic of dif er ent metals varies (eg iron steel aluminum platinum and

nickel) Caps to increase their trade and production in a ldquored oceanrdquo global environment with

anemic demand is rather limited despite Figure 510 showing a spike of iron and steel imports

from Rus sia in 2014 and aluminum in 2016 Some opportunities may exist for Russian- owned steel

plants in the United States (such as NLMK) to participate in energy proj ects resumed under Presi-

dent Trump who has required that new pipelines use only American- made steel15

Rus sia occupies a special niche in the US market for titanium products a high- end metal indus-

try Twenty years ago a long- term contract was signed between Rus sian titanium producer

VSMPO- AVISMA and Boeing The Rus sian com pany entered the selective club of Boeing suppliers

for the manufacture of components and semi- finished products Since the signing of this contract

VSMPO has delivered more than 35 percent of all titanium placed on Boeing civil aircraft16 They

are hidden in the trade data in an import category for Civilian Aircrafts and Parts (Figure 511) At

the end of 2016 Boeing announced an extension of its framework agreement with AVISMA

15 E Scheyder C Ngai and T Sylvester ldquoAmerican Steel Unlikely to Get Keystone Boost Despite Trump Orderrdquo

Reuters January 27 2017 http wwwreuters com article usa - trump - pipeline - transcanada - idUSL1N1FH1ZD

16 A Kramer ldquoTitanium Fills Vital Role for Boeing and Rus siardquo New York Times July 5 2013 http wwwnytimes com

2013 07 06 business global titanium - fills - vital - role - for - boeing - and - russia html mcubzshy=shy3

Figure 510 US Imports from Rus sia Iron Steel Bauxite Aluminum Nickel Nonferrous Metals and Other Precious Metals and Materials US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 1992ndash2016)

0

$6000000000

$5000000000

$4000000000

$3000000000

$2000000000

$1000000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 20122013

20142015

2016

Finished metal shapes

Iron and steel advanced

Iron and steel products nec

Nonferrous metals other

Other precious metals

Nickel

Bauxite and aluminum

Iron and steel mill products

Steelmaking materials

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 33 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations34

through 2022 and additional investments in the construction of a new robotic plant in Titanium

Valley a special economic zone located in the Sverdlovsk region that will open in 2018 The pro-

cessing of titanium forgings in all Boeing civil aircraft will be performed there including 787s 737

MAXs and 777Xs17 The contract extension with AVISMA may add several hundred million dollars

in value to annual US imports from Rus sia

How can such heavy reliance on imports of Rus sian titanium exist during a period of rising geopo-

liti cal tensions The answer is straightforward VSMPO- AVISMA is a highly specialized natu ral

mono poly producing 45 percent of the worldrsquos aerospace titanium Only four other countries

smelt high- grade titanium in industrial quantities the United States Germany Japan and China

Overall global production capacity is limited while demand is growing The United States cur-

rently imports around 79 percent of all the titanium it consumes each year18

17 ldquoBoeing and VSMPO Avisma to Launch Second Joint Production Siterdquo Rus sian Aviation Insider December 22 2016

http wwwrusaviainsider com boeing - and - vsmpo - avisma - to - launch - second - joint - production - site

18 Jon Ostrower and Andy Pasztor ldquoBoeing United Technologies Stockpile Titanium Partsrdquo Wall Street Journal

August 7 2014 https wwwwsj com articles boeing - united - technologies - stockpiling - titanium - parts - 1407441886

Figure 511 US Imports from Rus sia Civilian Aircrafts and Parts US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 1992ndash2016)

0

$20000000

$40000000

$60000000

$80000000

$100000000

$120000000

$140000000

$160000000

$180000000

$200000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Parts-civilian aircraft

Civilian aircraft

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 34 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 35

The Sanctions Act authorizes the secretary of the trea sury (in a nonmandatory way) to impose

restrictions (without specifying them) against Rus sian state- owned entities operating in the railway

metals and mining sectors of the Rus sian economy Despite the commanding heights of Rus siarsquos

state sector owner ship in its economy (70 percent of GDP) the metal- producing companies have

remained mostly in private hands

NUCLEAR AFFAIRS

Historically owners and operators of the 104 commercial nuclear power reactors in the United

States have purchased more than 80 percent of their uranium from foreign countries Uranium

shipping from Rus sia accounted for about 13 percent of the 58 million pounds of uranium pur-

chased overseas in 201219 At the same time the Rus sian state- owned mono poly Rosatom ac-

counts for 20 percent of Kazakhstanrsquos uranium production (which in turn comprises 11 percent of

all US uranium imports) and 20 percent of US domestic uranium production capacity (with

owner ship of exploration tracts in Wyoming)20

Nuclear fuel and nuclear power continue to be po liti cally sensitive topics both in the United

States and Rus sia Bilateral cooperation in this sector (being surprisingly stable with imports of

nuclear fuel from Rus sia at a level of $1 billion annually in the last five years [Figure 512 and 513])

is under constant po liti cal and lobbying pressure and has been a source of several po liti cal scan-

dals21 Consequently upside risks in this area of interaction are minimal and downside risks are

much higher especially when we are seeing more decommissioning of nuclear plants in the

United States than new constructions The US EIArsquos 2017 Annual Energy Outlook assumes

that about 25 percent of the nuclear capacity now operating will be removed from ser vice

by 205022

WHY IS THE GRASS GREENER ON THE OTHER SIDE

The United States continues to significantly reduce imports of chemical fertilizers as domestic pro-

duction increases In 2016 the United States imported 13 percent less ammonia and 11 percent

less urea and UAN which is a liquid urea and ammonium nitrate fertilizer Rus sia accounts for

around 40 percent of UAN imported by the United States The United States canceled antidumping

duties on imports of ammonium nitrate and urea from Rus sia in 2016 but it did not prevent import

19 US EIA ldquoThe US Relies on Foreign Uranium Enrichment Ser vices to Fuel Its Nuclear Power Plantsrdquo Today in

Energy August 28 2013 https wwweia gov todayinenergy detail php idshy=shy1273

20 Colin Chilcoat ldquoDoes Rus sia Really Own 20 Percent of the USrsquo Uranium Reservesrdquo OilPricecom May 6 2015

http oilpricecom Alternative - Energy Nuclear - Power Does - Russia - Really - Own - 20 - Of - The - US - Uranium - Reserves

html

21 Michelle Ye Hee Lee ldquoThe Facts behind Trumprsquos Repeated Claim about Hillary Clintonrsquos Role in the Rus sian Ura-

nium Dealrdquo Washington Post October 26 2016

22 US EIA ldquoAnnual Energy Outlook 2017 with Projections to 2050rdquo 81ndash82

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 35 102017 404 PM

Figure 512 US Imports from Rus sia Share of Oil Metals and Nuclear Fuel Million US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 1992ndash2016)

87

86

90

90

90

91

88

86

7882

0

$5000

$10000

$15000

$20000

$25000

$30000

$35000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

US Imports from Russia

Share of Oil Metals and Nuclear Fuel

Figure 513 US Imports from Rus sia Nuclear Fuel Materials US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

$-

$200000000

$400000000

$600000000

$800000000

$1200000000

$1000000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 36 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 37

drops twice last year (Figures 514 and 515) According to forecasts UAN imports are expected to

decline further to 15 million tons this year down over 46 percent from 28 million tons imported

last year23 The downside trend in imports of fertilizers will likely continue because of oversupply

BIG FISH

US imports of fish and shellfish from Rus sia are best understood in comparison with US fish

exports to the Rus sian market which slipped to zero in August 2014 after Rus sia issued an order

banning certain agricultural imports from the United States (Figure 516) While the volume of US

supply was not very large it was impor tant because it broke up the monopolistic dominance of a

few vertically integrated Rus sian companies that have kept prices high by restricting the entry of

new producers Seeking to implement import substitution policies Rus sia has tried to reduce

exports as well as imports of fish and seafood products in the last couple of years This symmetri-

cal approach was intended to ldquocompensaterdquo for a decrease of fish products in the domestic

23 Deepika Thapliyal ldquoPotashCorp Forecasts Sharp Drop in US Nitrogen Imports in 2017rdquo ICIS News February 7

2017 https wwwicis com resources news 2017 02 07 10076734 potashcorp - forecasts - sharp - drop - in - us - nitrogen

- imports - in - 2017

Figure 514 US Imports from Rus sia Share of Oil Metals Nuclear Fuel and Fertilizers Million US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

90

93

92

93

94

95

92

91

85

86

0

$5000

$10000

$15000

$20000

$25000

$30000

$35000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

US Imports from Russia

Share of Oil Metals Nuclear Fuel and Fertilizers

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 37 102017 404 PM

Figure 515 US Imports from Rus sia Chemical- Fertilizers US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

S-

$200000000

$400000000

$600000000

$800000000

$1000000000

$1200000000

$1400000000

$1600000000

$1800000000

$2000000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Figure 516 US Exports to Rus sia Fish and Shellfish US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

0

$10000000

$20000000

$30000000

$40000000

$50000000

$60000000

$70000000

$80000000

$90000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Fish and shellfish

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 38 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 39

consumer market caused by Rus siarsquos import ban but it has failed As result the group most af-

fected by the self- imposed counter- sanctions were Rus sian consumers

With a significant drop in fish imports a devaluation of the ruble and inflationary pressures on

seafood prices yearly consumption of fish in Rus sia has declined precipitously In 2015 alone

fish prices increased 20 percent and consumption dropped to 14 kilograms per person24 from

22 kilograms in 201425 In 2016 food rose to 355 percent of house hold expenditure as a result of

increases in food prices26 This has pushed vertically integrated fishing monopolies to sell even

more of their catch abroad rather than deliver to the Rus sian Federation (Figure 517) Thus we

cannot exclude the possibility of further growth in US fish and shellfish imports from Rus sia on a

marginal scale

24 Александр Савельев ldquoПотребление рыбы в России упало до 14 кг на человекаrdquo [Fish consumption in Rus sia fell to

14 kg per person] Экономика Интерфакс January 28 2015 http wwwinterfax ru business 492038

25 Илья Шестаков ldquoПотебление рыбы в России снизилось на 10 процентов из- за роста ценrdquo [Fish consumption in

Rus sia dropped by 10 percent due to price increases] RNS March 8 2017 https rnsonline consumer - market

Potreblenie - ribi - v - Rossii - snizilos - na - 10 - iz - za - rosta - tsen - 2017 - 03 - 08

26 Zoya Sheftalovich and Christian Oliver ldquoRus siarsquos Boom (Farming) Economyrdquo Politico November 8 2016 http

wwwpolitico eu article russias - boom - farming - economy

Figure 517 US Imports from Rus sia Fish and Shellfish US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

0

$50000000

$100000000

$150000000

$200000000

$250000000

$300000000

$350000000

$400000000

$450000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 39 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations40

SPACE ODYSSEY

Among high- end products beyond the top five groups of goods imported from Rus sia cheap and

efficient Rus sian engines have been used to launch US rockets into space for about 16 years

(Figure 518) There was a serious po liti cal strug gle around a 2014 ban on the purchase of Rus sian

RD-180 rocket engines revealing the conflicting business interests of power ful high- tech companies

This restrictive mea sure was temporary and was quickly lifted because of significant cost impacts

and risks of disruption to launch schedules27 For the same reason the Sanctions Act does not autho-

rize ldquothe imposition of any sanction or other condition limitation restriction or prohibition that

directly or indirectly impedes the supply by any entity of the Rus sian Federation of any product or

ser vice or the procurement of such product or ser vice by any contractor or subcontractor of the

United States or any other entity relating to or in connection with any space launch conducted for

the National Aeronautics and Space Administration or any other nonndash Department of Defense

customerrdquo28

Nevertheless many experts believe that US domestic alternatives to replace Rus sian engines will

be viable in five to eight years

27 Ken Dilanian ldquoWhy Does the US Use Rus sian Rockets to Launch Its Satellitesrdquo NBC News updated November 15

2016 http wwwnbcnews com why - does - u - s - use - russian - rockets - launch - its - satellites - n588526

28 Countering Amer i carsquos Adversaries through Sanctions Act HR 3364

Figure 518 Spacecraft Excluding Military US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

0

$20000000

$40000000

$60000000

$80000000

$100000000

$120000000

$140000000

$160000000

$180000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 40 102017 404 PM

41

Diversity and technological complexity are the most vis i ble advantages supporting US exports to

Rus sia Three major groups of export goods include civilian aircraft engines and parts (Figure 61)

drilling and oil field equipment (Figure 62) and industrial machines and engines (Figure 63)

Despite sanctions against the transfer of advanced oil producing and pro cessing technologies the

realization of US drilling and oil field equipment in Rus sia is sustainable although some bilateral

proj ects have been frozen

Another category of goods that has demonstrated resilience is the phar ma ceu ti cal industry (Fig-

ure 64) because most drugs in Rus sia are imported (about 70 percent of the Rus sian phar ma ceu-

ti cal market in value) Import substitution policies have had only modest results in this industry

As confirmed by American Chamber of Commerce surveys US exports to Rus sia are closely

connected to US FDI 30 percent of total imports of US companies working in the Rus sian

market come from the United States (more than $2 billion in 2016) In other words about

40 percent of all US exports to Rus sia are related to a US corporate- sector business pro cess in

the country The major sectors of activity of these companies are energy and natu ral resources

(52 percent) manufacturing (17 percent) information and communications technology or ICT

(13 percent) retail (7 percent) automotive industry (6 percent) phar ma ceu ti cal production

(1 percent) professional ser vices (05 percent) and other (2 percent)1

Some obvious constraints on US exports to Rus sia have resulted from a reduction in demand A

deterioration of bilateral relations and implementation of sanctions and counter- sanctions have

directly or indirectly afected all businesses Figures 65 and 66 provide data regarding a dramatic

drop in the sale of US agricultural production in Rus sia with all other categories of exports in

goods showing big cuts as well (see Figures 67ndash69)

Exports of civilian aircraft engines and parts put the state of Washington in first place among

other states as a leading exporter to the Rus sian market (Figure 610)

1 American Chamber of Commerce in Rus sia ldquoInvestment and Import to Rus sia 2nd Surveyrdquo 13

Diversity and Constraints

06

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 41 102017 404 PM

Figure 61 US Exports of Civilian Aircraft Engines Equipment and Parts to Rus sia US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

$2500000000

$2000000000

$1500000000

$1000000000

$500000000

$-

Figure 62 US Exports of Drilling and Oil Field Equipment US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

0

$5000000

$10000000

$15000000

$20000000

$25000000

$30000000

$35000000

$40000000

$45000000

$50000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 42 102017 404 PM

Figure 63 US Exports of Industrial Engines to Rus sia US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

0

$5000000

$10000000

$15000000

$20000000

$25000000

$30000000

$35000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Figure 64 US Exports of Phar ma ceu ti cal Preparations to Rus sia US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

0

$5000000

$10000000

$15000000

$20000000

$25000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 43 102017 404 PM

Figure 65 US Exports of Meat and Poultry to Rus sia US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Meat poultry etc

$1000000000

$800000000

$600000000

$400000000

$200000000

$-

$1200000000

$1400000000

$1600000000

Figure 66 US Exports of Soybeans to Rus sia US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

0

$20000000

$40000000

$60000000

$80000000

$100000000

$120000000

$140000000

$160000000

$180000000

$200000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 44 102017 404 PM

Figure 67 US Exports of Vehicles Engines and Parts to Rus sia US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Other parts and accessories of vehicles

Automotive tires and tubes

Bodies and chassis for passenger cars

Engines and engine parts (carburetors pistonsrings and valves)

Trucks buses and special purpose vehicles

Passenger cars new and used

$2500000000

$2000000000

$1500000000

$500000000

$-

$1000000000

Figure 68 US Exports of Medicinal Equipment to Rus sia US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

$10000000

$15000000

$20000000

$25000000

$30000000

$35000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 45 102017 404 PM

Figure 610 US Exports to Rus sia by States (2016 US$ Value) Million US$ 2013ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoState and Metropolitan Area Trade Datardquo

Iowa Kentucky

North Dakota

Oklahoma

South Carolina

Washington

0

$500

$1000

$1500

$2000

2013 2014 2015 2016

District of Columbia

Iowa

Kentucky

North Dakota

Oklahoma

South Carolina

Washington

Figure 69 US Exports of Excavating Machinery to Rus sia US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

0

$5000000

$10000000

$15000000

$20000000

$25000000

$30000000

$35000000

$40000000

$45000000

$50000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 46 102017 404 PM

47

Upon reviewing the current trend in US- Russia economic relations we must acknowledge that

the existing trade model is obsolete and exhausted Imports are resource- oriented and reflect

constraints of the Rus sian economic structure while five groups of goodsmdash oil metals nuclear

fuels fertilizers and fishmdash make up more than 90 percent of total imports from Rus sia (Figure 71)

Each of these industries has a limited capacity for growth in the foreseeable future

Rus siarsquos core export to the United Statesmdash oilmdash will inevitably decrease in the mid- term under any

scenario The value and volume of Rus sian exports to the United States are open to global market

volatility and po liti cal pressures with limited hedging mechanisms

Overall US exports to Rus sia are unsustainable due to bilateral po liti cal tensions the whims of

commodity markets and changing domestic policies Sanctions and counter- sanctions have

created additional barriers particularly in finance banking high- tech energy and agro- business

According to the American Chamber of Commerce 69 percent of US companies working in the

country consider the impact of US sanctions against Rus sia on their business as negative At the

same time 60 percent of companies do not expect big changes in business relations between

Rus sia and the United States under Trump1 as the new law codifies existing sanctions fortifies

them and extends them to new sectors

Current US investments are low due to the weak rule of law in Rus sia a lack of property right

protections and proper contract enforcement high levels of statization and monopolization in the

economy a poor business climate outdated capital stock dependence on natural- resource

sectors and of course sanction and counter- sanction mea sures Bloated administrative compo-

nents created as risk mitigation instruments have also served as impediments The countryrsquos

institutional weakness low level of productivity bud get constraints and a declining inflexible

workforce will restrain future economic growth even if commodity prices recover Rus sian eco-

nomic policy will likely continue to be statist and protectionist relying mostly on import

substitutions

1 Ibid 11

Existing Trends and Future Scenarios

07

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 47 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations48

What scenarios can be expected in such a challenging environment

One probability (no peace no war) is based on the assumption that matters will not deteriorate

further and implementation of the Sanctions Act will be cursory This will cause relatively slow

degradation in the economic field with occasional flashes of activity in selected areas (eg closer

cooperation against Islamist terrorist groups in Syria)

A second worse case or critical scenario is the intensive and full- scale execution of current sanc-

tion legislation and even the imposition of new economic punitive and restrictive mea sures which

could incite asymmetric retaliatory actions and lead to the introduction of additional protectionist

policies This in turn could trigger a further escalation of mutual confrontation and could eventu-

ally destroy the fundamentals of the current bilateral trade system Rus sian leadership has charac-

terized the Sanctions Act as a declaration of a trade war that ends all hope for improving bilateral

relations2

2 Дмитрий Медведев ldquoПодписание президентом США нового санкционного закона против России создает несколько

последствийrdquo [The US Presidentrsquos signing of the package of new sanctions against Rus sia will have a few conse-

quences] Facebook August 2 2017 https wwwfacebook com Dmitry Medvedev posts 10154587161801851

Figure 71 US Imports from Rus sia Share of Oil Metals Nuclear Fuel Fertilizers and Fish Million US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

93

94

93

94

95

96

93

92

87

89

0

$5000

$10000

$15000

$20000

$25000

$30000

$35000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

US Imports from Russia

Share of Oil Metals Nuclear FuelFertilizers and Fish

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 48 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 49

The best case and most favorable scenario looks less probable now It assumes the realization of

structural reforms in Rus sia in such a way that would adapt Rus siarsquos foreign policy to national

economic needs reduce confrontations with the West and make a concerted efort to integrate

Rus sian businesses into global supply and value chains A revitalization of the structural reform

agendamdash including eforts to diversify economic activities through de- monopolization and support

for SMEs a restructuring of the banking sector the creation of a vibrant business climate to foster

entrepreneurships and innovation the implementation of administrative and judicial reforms to

tackle red tape and endemic corruption and the reduction of state control over key sectors of the

economy via wide- spread privatization could kick- start the development of a nonoil economy and

improve long- term growth prospects Despite ongoing discussion of reform strategies deep

economic and po liti cal changes are extremely complicated over the next po liti calelectoral cycle

(2018ndash2024) particularly because of re sis tance of vested interests and growing commodity prices

The urgency to tackle structural shortcomings in natu ral resource- dependent economies usually

correlates with the price of those resources and the degree to which resource rents drive eco-

nomic activity However there may be marginal improvements in the efficiency of the current

economic system

Future US- Russia relations can be thought of through three pillars one pillar focuses on areas

where both countries maintain a competitive rivalry another looks at potential areas of interaction

under pres ent conditions a third pillar and one that has evaporated from the current bilateral

agenda concentrates on future cooperation Stronger economic ties could not only be a kind of

po liti cal shock absorber but contribute to the building of this future (particularly business contacts

aim to support future structural reforms) although po liti cal factors are depressing the prospects

for cooperation To escape deadlock it will be impor tant to establish the right balance between

politics and economics and create a model of collaboration within the framework of contention

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 49 102017 404 PM

About the Author

Vadim Grishin PhD MBA has been involved in the reform pro cess in Rus sia as adviser to the

deputy prime minister of Rus sia in 1992ndash1993 and 2006ndash2010 He has extensive experience

working with the Bretton Woods Institutions He was the board member of the World Bank Group

and served as se nior adviser at the International Monetary Fund Currently he is a con sul tant to the

chief economistrsquos office of the International Finance Corporation and teaches the economics of

transition at Georgetown University in Washington DC

50

594-71613_ch99_4Pindd 50 102017 403 PM

Blank

COVER PHOTO ADOBE STOCK

1616 Rhode Island Avenue NW

Washington DC 20036

202 887 0200 | wwwcsisorg

v++ISBN 978-1-4422-8035-9

Lanham bull Boulder bull New York bull London

4501 Forbes Boulevard

Lanham MD 20706

301 459 3366 | wwwrowmancom

A U T H O R

Vadim Grishin

Myths and Realities

A Report of the

CSIS RUSSIA AND EURASIA PROGRAM

US-RussiaEconomicRelations

O C T O B E R 2 0 1 7

Euml|xHSLEOCy280359z

The Man Pupu Nyor Rock Formations at the Northern Urals also known as Seven

Strong Man or Little Mountain of the God in the local tribe (Mansi) language

Page 27: U.S.-Russia Economic Relations: Myths and Realities · 2020-04-17 · OCTOBER 2017 U.S.- Russia Economic Relations Myths and Realities AUTHOR Vadim Grishin A REPORT OF THE CSIS RUSSIA

Vadim Grishin 21

Table 54 US Imports from Venezuela Million US$ Januaryndash May 2016 vs Januaryndash May 2017

Year January February March April May Total

2016 6657 5560 7140 8007 7922 35286

2017 13041 10864 123500 11148 12243 59646

Change 9590 9540 7297 3923 5454 6903

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Venezuelardquo Foreign Trade last modified June 29 2017

https wwwcensus gov foreign - trade balance c3070 html (see data for 2016ndash2017)

Table 55 US Exports to Rus sia Million US$ Januaryndash May 2016 vs Januaryndash May 2017

Year January February March April May Total

2016 3628 3577 7298 4657 4947 24107

2017 3144 4277 5386 6670 4806 24283

Change minus133 196 minus262 432 minus29 minus07

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2016ndash2017)

At the same time US exports to Rus sia continue to stagnate ( Table 55) due to low levels of

consumption during a two-and- a- half-year economic crisis a deep ruble devaluation sanctions

and counter- sanctions

Given the very dif er ent economic structures and resource endowments of Rus sia and the United

States it is not surprising that US- Russia trade is asymmetric and oil driven (Figure 51) A

3 percent increase in Urals oil prices translates into a one percent increase in US import growth

from Rus sia Thus in 2016 every $10 increase in Urals crude oil added $15 billion to the value of

US imports or 11 percent to the total value of imports from Rus sia

OIL ADDICTION

Oil is a core pillar of US- Russia bilateral trade A bumpy ride in oil markets afects commerce

Nevertheless Rus sian oil exports to the United States in physical terms have been rather

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 21 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations22

sustainable Starting from 2005 average annual deliveries have been above 150 million barrels

(Figure 52) Crude and heating oil have dominated while petroleum products and liquefied petro-

leum gases have not (Figure 53) In 2011 oil exports peaked at 228 million barrels but declined to

159 million barrels in 2016mdash a drop of 30 percent Rec ord high shipments of Rus sian oil to the United

States coincided with an elevation in oil prices which made the subsequent decline in oil shipment

value between 2011 and 2016 (by about 72 percent as shown in Figure 54) seem more stark The

increase in price also raised the share of oil in Rus sian exports by 74 percent in 2011 (Figure 55)

The Rus sian share in total US oil imports was around 55 percent in 2011 and 43 percent in 2016

( Table 56) In the last five years the United States has relied exclusively on consumption of Rus sian

oil for the rough equivalent of one week out of the year (Figure 56)

It is unlikely that Rus sia can significantly increase its share of the US oil market and there is a real

possibility for a downward trend There are several reasons the historically high Rus sian hydrocar-

bon export threshold of 2011 will not soon if ever be surpassed

First US energy consumption will likely be flat According to the US Energy Information Adminis-

tration (EIA) demand for petroleum and other liquids in the United States will be about 35ndash36

quadrillion British thermal units (BTUs) with minimal variation over the next 25 years1

1 US EIA ldquoAnnual Energy Outlook 2017 with Projections to 2050rdquo January 5 2017 7ndash8

Figure 51 US- Russia Trade Growth () vs US and Rus sia Real GDP Growth () 1993ndash2016

Source IMF ldquoIMF Datardquo accessed September 27 2017 http wwwimf org en Data US Census Bureau

ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo

Note rGDPthinsp=thinspreal gross domestic product

Trade

USA rGDP growth

Russia rGDP growth

-60

-40

-20

0

20

40

60

80

100

1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Gro

wth

All spikes in US-Russia trade have been connected with two main

variables volume and price of crude oil

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 22 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 23

Second the United States will become a net energy exporter between 2020 and 2030 in most

cases under dif er ent combinations of oil and natu ral gas prices GDP growth technological

breakthroughs and the availability of energy resources The role of oil imports will dramatically

fall2

Third oil price scenarios as described by the International Energy Agency (IEA) international

financial organ izations (IFIs) and many national agencies are very cautious and assume that even

by 2035 to 2040 oil prices will not to recover to the levels of 2011ndash20123

Fourth Rus sian oil production and export growth will be modest and driven by Asian economic

expansion and will comprise a decreasing share of Western markets4 According to forecasts from

2 Ibid 15ndash18

3 Ibid table 3 ldquoEnergy Prices by Sector and Sourcesrdquo World Bank World Bank Commodity Markets Price Forecasts

(Washington DC World Bank 2017) httpswwwworldbank org en research commodity - markets Organ ization of the

Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) World Oil Outlook 2016 (Vienna OPEC 2016)

4 E D Belotskaia et al Global and Rus sian Energy Outlook 2016 (Moscow Energy Research Institute of the Rus sian

Acad emy of Science Analytical Center for the Government of the Rus sian Federation 2016) http acgov ru files

publication a 12767 pdf

Figure 52 US Imports from Rus sia Crude Oil and Petroleum Products Thousands of Barrels 1995ndash2016

Source US EIA ldquoUS Imports by Country of Origin Rus siardquo Petroleum amp Other Liquids September 13

2017 http wwweia gov dnav pet PET _ MOVE _ IMPCUS _ D _ NUS _ NRS _ MBBL _ M htm

0

50000

100000

150000

200000

250000

Date 1995 1996 1997 1998 199920002001200220032004200520062007200820092010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 23 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations24

the Organ ization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) crude oil exports from Rus sia and

the Caspian region to the United States will dis appear by 20255

So why does the Rus sian Urals blend continue to be attractive for oil traders and US refineries

which could pro cess greater volumes of domestically produced lighter crude There are two main

reasons One is related to the preference of US high conversion refineries (the most sophisticated

in the world) to work with heavy oil blends produced by Canada Mexico Iraq Venezuela and

Rus sia Pro cessing heavy crude now is as profitable as pro cessing lighter crude The so- called

crack spreadmdash the diference between the cost of relatively cheap heavy crude oil and the final

price of value- added consumer products (diesel gasoline jet fuel and heating oil)mdash has become

the same as the refinery margins of light sweet crude6 This has primarily afected light oil produc-

ing countries such as Angola Algeria and Nigeria

5 OPEC World Oil Outlook 2016 306ndash309

6 ldquoHow Much for That Heavy Oilrdquo Oil Sands Magazine December 26 2015 https wwwoilsandsmagazine com

news 2015 12 26 how - much - for - that - heavy - oil

Figure 53 US Imports from Rus sia Oil and Petroleum Products US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

$-

$25000000000

$20000000000

$15000000000

$10000000000

$5000000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Liquefied petroleum gases

Petroleum products other

Fuel oil

Crude oil

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 24 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 25

Another factor afecting purchase of Rus sian oil is a new trend among oil companies for further

consolidation of scale and for integrating operations of upstream and downstream business7

There have been several waves of separation and unification of production transportation and

pro cessing in the last 50 years The current business cycle can be seen as an adaptation to a

period of low prices and oversupply Companies that buy andor produce oil in Rus sia most likely

prefer to transport and pro cess this oil in their own modern refineries in the United States At the

same time some of the newest refinery designs specifically for pro cessing heavy oils have been

built in Asia thus extending the choices of heavy oil producing countries

We should also consider that leading US and international oil traders along with oil producing

companies working with or owning US refineries frequently buy Rus sian oil on the open market

and have long- term contracts on Rus sian crude oil delivery Many Rus sian oil companies prefer to

pay for purchases or ser vices with their future production instead of cash creating situations of

ldquostickyrdquo oil imports that are difficult to replace The best- known example is an interaction between

7 ldquoEnergy and Utilities Sectorrdquo Roundtable Financier Worldwide December 2015 https wwwfinancierworldwide

com roundtable - energy - utilities - sector - dec15

Figure 54 US Imports of Oil and Petroleum Products from Rus sia vs Oil Prices Eu rope Brent Spot Price Free on Board (FOB) 1996ndash2017

Source US EIA ldquoUS Imports by Country of Origin Rus siardquo

0

20

40

60

80

100

120

140

0

5000

10000

15000

20000

25000

30000

Jan

-19

96

Jun

-19

96

No

v-19

96

Ap

r-19

97

Sep

-19

97

Feb

-19

98

Jul-

199

8D

ec-1

99

8M

ay-1

99

9O

ct-1

99

9M

ar-2

00

0A

ug

-20

00

Jan

-20

01

Jun

-20

01

No

v-2

00

1A

pr-

20

02

Sep

-20

02

Feb

-20

03

Jul-

20

03

Dec

-20

03

May

-20

04

Oct

-20

04

Mar

-20

05

Au

g-2

00

5Ja

n-2

00

6Ju

n-2

00

6N

ov-

20

06

Ap

r-2

00

7Se

p-2

00

7Fe

b-2

00

8Ju

l-2

00

8D

ec-2

00

8M

ay-2

00

9O

ct-2

00

9M

ar-2

010

Au

g-2

010

Jan

-20

11Ju

n-2

011

No

v-2

011

Ap

r-2

012

Sep

-20

12Fe

b-2

013

Jul-

20

13D

ec-2

013

May

-20

14O

ct-2

014

Mar

-20

15A

ug

-20

15Ja

n-2

016

Jun

-20

16N

ov-

20

16

USD

per

Bar

rel

Th

ou

san

d B

arr

els

US Imports from Russia of Crude Oil and Petroleum Products (Thousand Barrels)

Europe Brent Spot Price FOB (Dollars per Barrel)

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 25 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations26

Table 56 US Oil Imports All Countries vs Rus sia Thousand Barrels per Day 2011ndash2016

Years 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

All Countries 11436 10598 9859 9241 9449 10058

Rus sia 624 477 460 330 371 433

Share 546 450 467 357 393 431

Sources US EIA ldquoUS Imports by Country of Origin Total Crude Oil and Productsrdquo Petroleum amp Other

Liquids September 13 2017 wwweia gov dnav pet pet_move_impcus_a2_nus_ep00_im0_mbbl_m htm

authorrsquos computation

Figure 55 US Imports from Rus sia Share of Crude Oil and Petroleum Products Million US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

57

64

73

72

74

73

72

59

52 50

0

$5000

$10000

$15000

$20000

$25000

$30000

$35000

$40000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

US Imports from Russia

Share of Oil and Petroleum Products

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 26 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 27

the Rus sian state mono poly Rosneft and commodity trading and mining giant Glencore which

along with energy and commodities com pany Vitol participated in a $10 billion prepayment

deal with Rosneft for crude supplies in 2013

There have been a number of ongoing transactions between the Rus sian oil industry and interna-

tional oil companies including several that top the list of importers of Rus sian oil to the United

States ( Table 57) In December 2016 Glencore participated in a controversial privatization opera-

tion purchasing in tandem with the Qatar sovereign wealth fund a 195 percent stake in Rosneft

which was on the US and EU list of sanctioned firms8 Glencore has also taken a blocking stake in

midsize oil producer RussNeft BP owns a 1975 percent stake in Rosneft Chevron holds a

15 percent interest in the 935- mile- long CPC9 pipeline which transports an average of 959000

barrels of crude oil per day including 76000 barrels daily from Rus sia10 ExxonMobil has formed

8 E Mazneva and I Arkhipov ldquoRus sia Sells $11 Billion Stake in Rosneft to Glencore Qatarrdquo Bloomberg December 7

2016

9 CPCthinsp=thinspCaspian Pipeline Consortium

10 ldquoRus sia Highlights of Operations and Business Portfoliordquo Chevron accessed October 3 2017 https wwwchevron

com worldwide russia

Figure 56 Share of Rus sian Oil in Total US Oil Imports Thousands of Barrels per Day 1972ndash2016

Source US EIA ldquoUS Imports by Country of Origin Total Crude Oil and Productsrdquo

2000

4000

6000

8000

10000

12000

14000

16000

US Imports of Crude Oil and Petroleum Products (Thousand Barrels per Day)

US Imports from Russia of Crude Oil and Petroleum Products (Thousand Barrels per Day)19

7319

7419

7519

7619

7719

7819

7919

80

198

119

82

198

319

84

198

519

86

198

719

88

198

919

90

199

119

92

199

319

94

199

519

96

199

719

98

199

92

00

02

00

12

00

22

00

32

00

42

00

52

00

62

00

72

00

82

00

92

010

20

112

012

20

132

014

20

152

016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 27 102017 404 PM

Table 57 Top Importers of Rus sian Oil to the United States Thousands of Barrels 2016

VALERO MARKETING amp SUPPLY CO 54590 3616

EXXONMOBIL OIL CORP 17087 1130

CHEVRON USA INC 15217 1008

BP WEST COAST PRODUCTS LLC 10130 671

GEORGE E WARREN CORP 7272 48

PAULSBORO REFINING CO LLC 6838 453

TESORO CORP 5097 338

VITOL INC 5084 337

PHILLIPS 66 CO 4726 313

TRAFIGURA AG 4360 289

PAR HAWAII REFINING LLC 3893 258

MOTIVA ENTERPRISES LLC 3041 205

SHELL US TRADING CO 2863 19

MARATHON PETROLEUM CO LLC 2475 16

ATLANTIC TRADING amp MARKETING 2099 14

FREEPOINT COMMODITIES LLC 1439 1

GLENCORE LTD 1284 85

BEST PETROLEUM CORP 967 64

ROLYMPUS US COMMODITIES GROUP LLC 822 6

HUNT CRUDE OIL SUPPLY CO 666 4

GULF OIL LP 658 4

Source US EIA ldquoUS Imports by Country of Origin Crude Oilrdquo Petroleum amp Other Liquids September 13

2017 httpswwweiagovdnavpetpet_move_impcus_a2_nus_epc0_im0_mbblpd_ahtm authorrsquos

computation

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 28 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 29

several joint ventures with Rosneft to undertake ofshore exploration in the Black Sea and the Kara

Sea in Siberia11

According to the Sanctions Act US persons are prohibited from exporting or reexporting goods

ser vices (except financial ser vices) and technology in support of exploration or production of new

deep- water Arctic ofshore or shale oil proj ects that involve designated Rus sian entities or other

entities in which such sanctioned persons have a controlling interest or a substantial noncontrol-

ling owner ship interest defined as not less than 33 percent (previously it was 50 percent) The new

law also authorizesmdash but does not requiremdash the imposition of so- called secondary sanctions

against non- US entities that engage in activities involving the construction maintenance or

expansion of Rus sian energy export pipelines with a fair market value of $1 million or more or an

aggregate fair market value during a 12- month period of $5 million12 This provision has raised the

concerns of some Eu ro pean countries particularly Germany As result the final language of the

law included wording about coordination of this issue with allies of the United States

Shipments of Rus sian oil to the United States could be afected by activity in the US refinery

industry In early 2017 Saudi Aramco bought the United Statesrsquo largest oil refinery in Port Arthur

(Texas) and it announced plans to send more of its own crude to that refinery13 Serious concerns

exist however regarding the future of three refineries and nine pipelines owned by Citgo a US

branch of the Venezuelan state com pany PdVSA which is balancing precariously on the edge of

default Under certain conditions in the event of PdVSA bankruptcy Rosneft could claim a stake of

up to 499 percent in Citgo Such a possibility has raised concerns among politicians and US

government officials with Trea sury Secretary Steven Mnuchin calling it a ldquonational security issuerdquo14

Tables 58 59 and 510 show allocations of Rus sian oil imports to major US refineries some of

which work exclusively on Rus sian crude a total of two to three months per year In total 150940

thousand barrels of Rus sian oil were refined in 2016

Figure 57 confirms a leading position of Texas and Louisiana among the US states receiving

Rus sian crude followed by New Jersey California Mississippi Washington Hawaii and Delaware

In a paradoxical way Texas has dis appeared from the list of states as a main destination of US

imports from Rus sia (Figure 58) because Rus sian crude is mostly delivered to Louisiana ports and

registered there by US Customs as an import from Rus sia After that it transports to refineries in

Louisiana and Texas

Overall the short- term business rationale behind the sustainability of US oil imports from Rus sia

cannot overcome strong headwinds in the US energy sector facing all oil importers which will

inevitably lead to a contraction of Rus sian oil exports to the United States in the foreseeable future

11 Exxon eforts to receive a special US Trea sury waiver to drill in sanctioned Rus sia failed in 2017

12 Countering Amer i carsquos Adversaries through Sanctions Act HR 3364

13 Sarp Ozkan ldquoSaudi Aramcorsquos Port Arthur Refinery and the US Refinery Fleetrdquo Drilling Info May 11 2017

https infodrillinginfo com saudi - aramcos - port - arthur - refinery - us - refinery - fleet

14 Graham Kates ldquoTrea sury Secretary Rus siarsquos Citgo Deal a National Security Issuerdquo CBS News May 1 2017

http wwwcbsnews com news rosneft - citgo - steven - mnuchin - national - security

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 29 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations30

Table 58 Valerorsquos Refineries Pro cessing Rus sian Oil Thousands of Barrels 2016

Saint Charles Louisiana 29206 535

Corpus Christi Texas 20626 378

Wilmington California 4250 78

Total USA 54590 100

Source US EIA ldquoRefinery Capacity Reportrdquo January 1 2017

table 5 wwweia gov petroleum refinerycapacity table5 pdf

authorrsquos computation

Table 59 ExxonMobil Refineries Pro cessing Rus sian Oil Thousands of Barrels 2016

Baytown Texas 15037 88

Baton Rouge Louisiana 2046 12

Total USA 17083 100

Source US EIA ldquoRefinery Capacity Reportrdquo authorrsquos computation

Table 510 Chevronrsquos Refineries Pro cessing Rus sian Oil Thousands of Barrels 2016

Pascagoula Mississippi 12767 840

El Segundo California 2372 155

Saint Rose Louisiana 78 05

Total USA 15217 100

Source US EIA ldquoRefinery Capacity Reportrdquo authorrsquos computation

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 30 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 31

HEAVY METAL

Taken together US imports of metals and US imports of oil compose about 80 percent of US

total imports from Rus sia (Figure 59) Trade of metals like other commodities is strongly afected

by market price fluctuations Nevertheless metal imports from Rus sia have been fairly resilient to

market volatility and their average annual value has hovered at about $4 billion in the last five years

(Figure 510) This market resilience was forged at the end of the 1990searly 2000s when Rus sian

metal producers gradually modernized their plants adjusting quality of production to Western

standards and enhancing integration into global value and supply chains Some of them conquered

their share of the highly competitive US market struggling with peers from Canada and certain

BRICS countries (China India and Brazil) To attract additional resources all Rus sian large metal-

producing companies became public and were listed on stock exchanges chiefly the London Stock

Exchange (Severstalrsquo PAO Evraz MMK OAO Novolipetsk Steel Norilsk Nikel and TMK PAO) one

on the New York Stock Exchange (Mechel) and one on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange (Rusal)

Business logic pushed some of them to invest in the US metal- making industry which was hit

hard by crisis Later on some of those assets were sold (eg two US steel mills acquired by

Severstal in 2004 were purchased 10 years later by Steel Dynamics Inc and AK Steel Corp)

Figure 57 Share of US States Rus sian Oil Imports 2016

Source US EIA ldquoUS Imports from Rus sia of Crude Oil and Petroleum Productsrdquo Petroleum amp Other

Liquids September 29 2017 https www eia gov dnav pet hist LeafHandler ashx nshy=shyPETampsshy=shyMTTIM _ NUS

- NRS _ 1ampfshy=shyM authorrsquos computation

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

100

Maine

Massachusetts

Maryland

Connecticut

Georgia

Rhode Island

Virginia

Florida

New York

Alabama

Puerto Rico

Pennsylvania

Delaware

Hawaii

Washington

Mississippi

California

New Jersey

Louisiana

Texas

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 31 102017 404 PM

Figure 58 US Imports from Rus sia by State Million US$ 2013ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoState and Metropolitan Area Trade Datardquo Foreign Trade last modified

October 2 2017 https wwwcensus gov foreign - trade statistics state

Alaska

Connecticut

Delaware

Hawaii

Louisiana

Maryland

North Dakota 0

$1000

$2000

$3000

$4000

$5000

$6000

2013 2014 2015 2016

Alabama

Alaska

Connecticut

Delaware

Hawaii

Louisiana

Maryland

Maine

Mississippi

Montana

North Dakota

Mississippi

Figure 59 US Imports from Rus sia Share of Oil and Metals Million US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 1992ndash2016)

83

82

85

86

87

88

85

82

7375

0

$5000

$10000

$15000

$20000

$25000

$30000

$35000

$40000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

US Imports from Russia

Share of Oil and Metals

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 32 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 33

Obviously the market dynamic of dif er ent metals varies (eg iron steel aluminum platinum and

nickel) Caps to increase their trade and production in a ldquored oceanrdquo global environment with

anemic demand is rather limited despite Figure 510 showing a spike of iron and steel imports

from Rus sia in 2014 and aluminum in 2016 Some opportunities may exist for Russian- owned steel

plants in the United States (such as NLMK) to participate in energy proj ects resumed under Presi-

dent Trump who has required that new pipelines use only American- made steel15

Rus sia occupies a special niche in the US market for titanium products a high- end metal indus-

try Twenty years ago a long- term contract was signed between Rus sian titanium producer

VSMPO- AVISMA and Boeing The Rus sian com pany entered the selective club of Boeing suppliers

for the manufacture of components and semi- finished products Since the signing of this contract

VSMPO has delivered more than 35 percent of all titanium placed on Boeing civil aircraft16 They

are hidden in the trade data in an import category for Civilian Aircrafts and Parts (Figure 511) At

the end of 2016 Boeing announced an extension of its framework agreement with AVISMA

15 E Scheyder C Ngai and T Sylvester ldquoAmerican Steel Unlikely to Get Keystone Boost Despite Trump Orderrdquo

Reuters January 27 2017 http wwwreuters com article usa - trump - pipeline - transcanada - idUSL1N1FH1ZD

16 A Kramer ldquoTitanium Fills Vital Role for Boeing and Rus siardquo New York Times July 5 2013 http wwwnytimes com

2013 07 06 business global titanium - fills - vital - role - for - boeing - and - russia html mcubzshy=shy3

Figure 510 US Imports from Rus sia Iron Steel Bauxite Aluminum Nickel Nonferrous Metals and Other Precious Metals and Materials US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 1992ndash2016)

0

$6000000000

$5000000000

$4000000000

$3000000000

$2000000000

$1000000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 20122013

20142015

2016

Finished metal shapes

Iron and steel advanced

Iron and steel products nec

Nonferrous metals other

Other precious metals

Nickel

Bauxite and aluminum

Iron and steel mill products

Steelmaking materials

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 33 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations34

through 2022 and additional investments in the construction of a new robotic plant in Titanium

Valley a special economic zone located in the Sverdlovsk region that will open in 2018 The pro-

cessing of titanium forgings in all Boeing civil aircraft will be performed there including 787s 737

MAXs and 777Xs17 The contract extension with AVISMA may add several hundred million dollars

in value to annual US imports from Rus sia

How can such heavy reliance on imports of Rus sian titanium exist during a period of rising geopo-

liti cal tensions The answer is straightforward VSMPO- AVISMA is a highly specialized natu ral

mono poly producing 45 percent of the worldrsquos aerospace titanium Only four other countries

smelt high- grade titanium in industrial quantities the United States Germany Japan and China

Overall global production capacity is limited while demand is growing The United States cur-

rently imports around 79 percent of all the titanium it consumes each year18

17 ldquoBoeing and VSMPO Avisma to Launch Second Joint Production Siterdquo Rus sian Aviation Insider December 22 2016

http wwwrusaviainsider com boeing - and - vsmpo - avisma - to - launch - second - joint - production - site

18 Jon Ostrower and Andy Pasztor ldquoBoeing United Technologies Stockpile Titanium Partsrdquo Wall Street Journal

August 7 2014 https wwwwsj com articles boeing - united - technologies - stockpiling - titanium - parts - 1407441886

Figure 511 US Imports from Rus sia Civilian Aircrafts and Parts US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 1992ndash2016)

0

$20000000

$40000000

$60000000

$80000000

$100000000

$120000000

$140000000

$160000000

$180000000

$200000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Parts-civilian aircraft

Civilian aircraft

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 34 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 35

The Sanctions Act authorizes the secretary of the trea sury (in a nonmandatory way) to impose

restrictions (without specifying them) against Rus sian state- owned entities operating in the railway

metals and mining sectors of the Rus sian economy Despite the commanding heights of Rus siarsquos

state sector owner ship in its economy (70 percent of GDP) the metal- producing companies have

remained mostly in private hands

NUCLEAR AFFAIRS

Historically owners and operators of the 104 commercial nuclear power reactors in the United

States have purchased more than 80 percent of their uranium from foreign countries Uranium

shipping from Rus sia accounted for about 13 percent of the 58 million pounds of uranium pur-

chased overseas in 201219 At the same time the Rus sian state- owned mono poly Rosatom ac-

counts for 20 percent of Kazakhstanrsquos uranium production (which in turn comprises 11 percent of

all US uranium imports) and 20 percent of US domestic uranium production capacity (with

owner ship of exploration tracts in Wyoming)20

Nuclear fuel and nuclear power continue to be po liti cally sensitive topics both in the United

States and Rus sia Bilateral cooperation in this sector (being surprisingly stable with imports of

nuclear fuel from Rus sia at a level of $1 billion annually in the last five years [Figure 512 and 513])

is under constant po liti cal and lobbying pressure and has been a source of several po liti cal scan-

dals21 Consequently upside risks in this area of interaction are minimal and downside risks are

much higher especially when we are seeing more decommissioning of nuclear plants in the

United States than new constructions The US EIArsquos 2017 Annual Energy Outlook assumes

that about 25 percent of the nuclear capacity now operating will be removed from ser vice

by 205022

WHY IS THE GRASS GREENER ON THE OTHER SIDE

The United States continues to significantly reduce imports of chemical fertilizers as domestic pro-

duction increases In 2016 the United States imported 13 percent less ammonia and 11 percent

less urea and UAN which is a liquid urea and ammonium nitrate fertilizer Rus sia accounts for

around 40 percent of UAN imported by the United States The United States canceled antidumping

duties on imports of ammonium nitrate and urea from Rus sia in 2016 but it did not prevent import

19 US EIA ldquoThe US Relies on Foreign Uranium Enrichment Ser vices to Fuel Its Nuclear Power Plantsrdquo Today in

Energy August 28 2013 https wwweia gov todayinenergy detail php idshy=shy1273

20 Colin Chilcoat ldquoDoes Rus sia Really Own 20 Percent of the USrsquo Uranium Reservesrdquo OilPricecom May 6 2015

http oilpricecom Alternative - Energy Nuclear - Power Does - Russia - Really - Own - 20 - Of - The - US - Uranium - Reserves

html

21 Michelle Ye Hee Lee ldquoThe Facts behind Trumprsquos Repeated Claim about Hillary Clintonrsquos Role in the Rus sian Ura-

nium Dealrdquo Washington Post October 26 2016

22 US EIA ldquoAnnual Energy Outlook 2017 with Projections to 2050rdquo 81ndash82

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 35 102017 404 PM

Figure 512 US Imports from Rus sia Share of Oil Metals and Nuclear Fuel Million US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 1992ndash2016)

87

86

90

90

90

91

88

86

7882

0

$5000

$10000

$15000

$20000

$25000

$30000

$35000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

US Imports from Russia

Share of Oil Metals and Nuclear Fuel

Figure 513 US Imports from Rus sia Nuclear Fuel Materials US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

$-

$200000000

$400000000

$600000000

$800000000

$1200000000

$1000000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 36 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 37

drops twice last year (Figures 514 and 515) According to forecasts UAN imports are expected to

decline further to 15 million tons this year down over 46 percent from 28 million tons imported

last year23 The downside trend in imports of fertilizers will likely continue because of oversupply

BIG FISH

US imports of fish and shellfish from Rus sia are best understood in comparison with US fish

exports to the Rus sian market which slipped to zero in August 2014 after Rus sia issued an order

banning certain agricultural imports from the United States (Figure 516) While the volume of US

supply was not very large it was impor tant because it broke up the monopolistic dominance of a

few vertically integrated Rus sian companies that have kept prices high by restricting the entry of

new producers Seeking to implement import substitution policies Rus sia has tried to reduce

exports as well as imports of fish and seafood products in the last couple of years This symmetri-

cal approach was intended to ldquocompensaterdquo for a decrease of fish products in the domestic

23 Deepika Thapliyal ldquoPotashCorp Forecasts Sharp Drop in US Nitrogen Imports in 2017rdquo ICIS News February 7

2017 https wwwicis com resources news 2017 02 07 10076734 potashcorp - forecasts - sharp - drop - in - us - nitrogen

- imports - in - 2017

Figure 514 US Imports from Rus sia Share of Oil Metals Nuclear Fuel and Fertilizers Million US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

90

93

92

93

94

95

92

91

85

86

0

$5000

$10000

$15000

$20000

$25000

$30000

$35000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

US Imports from Russia

Share of Oil Metals Nuclear Fuel and Fertilizers

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 37 102017 404 PM

Figure 515 US Imports from Rus sia Chemical- Fertilizers US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

S-

$200000000

$400000000

$600000000

$800000000

$1000000000

$1200000000

$1400000000

$1600000000

$1800000000

$2000000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Figure 516 US Exports to Rus sia Fish and Shellfish US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

0

$10000000

$20000000

$30000000

$40000000

$50000000

$60000000

$70000000

$80000000

$90000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Fish and shellfish

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 38 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 39

consumer market caused by Rus siarsquos import ban but it has failed As result the group most af-

fected by the self- imposed counter- sanctions were Rus sian consumers

With a significant drop in fish imports a devaluation of the ruble and inflationary pressures on

seafood prices yearly consumption of fish in Rus sia has declined precipitously In 2015 alone

fish prices increased 20 percent and consumption dropped to 14 kilograms per person24 from

22 kilograms in 201425 In 2016 food rose to 355 percent of house hold expenditure as a result of

increases in food prices26 This has pushed vertically integrated fishing monopolies to sell even

more of their catch abroad rather than deliver to the Rus sian Federation (Figure 517) Thus we

cannot exclude the possibility of further growth in US fish and shellfish imports from Rus sia on a

marginal scale

24 Александр Савельев ldquoПотребление рыбы в России упало до 14 кг на человекаrdquo [Fish consumption in Rus sia fell to

14 kg per person] Экономика Интерфакс January 28 2015 http wwwinterfax ru business 492038

25 Илья Шестаков ldquoПотебление рыбы в России снизилось на 10 процентов из- за роста ценrdquo [Fish consumption in

Rus sia dropped by 10 percent due to price increases] RNS March 8 2017 https rnsonline consumer - market

Potreblenie - ribi - v - Rossii - snizilos - na - 10 - iz - za - rosta - tsen - 2017 - 03 - 08

26 Zoya Sheftalovich and Christian Oliver ldquoRus siarsquos Boom (Farming) Economyrdquo Politico November 8 2016 http

wwwpolitico eu article russias - boom - farming - economy

Figure 517 US Imports from Rus sia Fish and Shellfish US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

0

$50000000

$100000000

$150000000

$200000000

$250000000

$300000000

$350000000

$400000000

$450000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 39 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations40

SPACE ODYSSEY

Among high- end products beyond the top five groups of goods imported from Rus sia cheap and

efficient Rus sian engines have been used to launch US rockets into space for about 16 years

(Figure 518) There was a serious po liti cal strug gle around a 2014 ban on the purchase of Rus sian

RD-180 rocket engines revealing the conflicting business interests of power ful high- tech companies

This restrictive mea sure was temporary and was quickly lifted because of significant cost impacts

and risks of disruption to launch schedules27 For the same reason the Sanctions Act does not autho-

rize ldquothe imposition of any sanction or other condition limitation restriction or prohibition that

directly or indirectly impedes the supply by any entity of the Rus sian Federation of any product or

ser vice or the procurement of such product or ser vice by any contractor or subcontractor of the

United States or any other entity relating to or in connection with any space launch conducted for

the National Aeronautics and Space Administration or any other nonndash Department of Defense

customerrdquo28

Nevertheless many experts believe that US domestic alternatives to replace Rus sian engines will

be viable in five to eight years

27 Ken Dilanian ldquoWhy Does the US Use Rus sian Rockets to Launch Its Satellitesrdquo NBC News updated November 15

2016 http wwwnbcnews com why - does - u - s - use - russian - rockets - launch - its - satellites - n588526

28 Countering Amer i carsquos Adversaries through Sanctions Act HR 3364

Figure 518 Spacecraft Excluding Military US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

0

$20000000

$40000000

$60000000

$80000000

$100000000

$120000000

$140000000

$160000000

$180000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 40 102017 404 PM

41

Diversity and technological complexity are the most vis i ble advantages supporting US exports to

Rus sia Three major groups of export goods include civilian aircraft engines and parts (Figure 61)

drilling and oil field equipment (Figure 62) and industrial machines and engines (Figure 63)

Despite sanctions against the transfer of advanced oil producing and pro cessing technologies the

realization of US drilling and oil field equipment in Rus sia is sustainable although some bilateral

proj ects have been frozen

Another category of goods that has demonstrated resilience is the phar ma ceu ti cal industry (Fig-

ure 64) because most drugs in Rus sia are imported (about 70 percent of the Rus sian phar ma ceu-

ti cal market in value) Import substitution policies have had only modest results in this industry

As confirmed by American Chamber of Commerce surveys US exports to Rus sia are closely

connected to US FDI 30 percent of total imports of US companies working in the Rus sian

market come from the United States (more than $2 billion in 2016) In other words about

40 percent of all US exports to Rus sia are related to a US corporate- sector business pro cess in

the country The major sectors of activity of these companies are energy and natu ral resources

(52 percent) manufacturing (17 percent) information and communications technology or ICT

(13 percent) retail (7 percent) automotive industry (6 percent) phar ma ceu ti cal production

(1 percent) professional ser vices (05 percent) and other (2 percent)1

Some obvious constraints on US exports to Rus sia have resulted from a reduction in demand A

deterioration of bilateral relations and implementation of sanctions and counter- sanctions have

directly or indirectly afected all businesses Figures 65 and 66 provide data regarding a dramatic

drop in the sale of US agricultural production in Rus sia with all other categories of exports in

goods showing big cuts as well (see Figures 67ndash69)

Exports of civilian aircraft engines and parts put the state of Washington in first place among

other states as a leading exporter to the Rus sian market (Figure 610)

1 American Chamber of Commerce in Rus sia ldquoInvestment and Import to Rus sia 2nd Surveyrdquo 13

Diversity and Constraints

06

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 41 102017 404 PM

Figure 61 US Exports of Civilian Aircraft Engines Equipment and Parts to Rus sia US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

$2500000000

$2000000000

$1500000000

$1000000000

$500000000

$-

Figure 62 US Exports of Drilling and Oil Field Equipment US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

0

$5000000

$10000000

$15000000

$20000000

$25000000

$30000000

$35000000

$40000000

$45000000

$50000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 42 102017 404 PM

Figure 63 US Exports of Industrial Engines to Rus sia US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

0

$5000000

$10000000

$15000000

$20000000

$25000000

$30000000

$35000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Figure 64 US Exports of Phar ma ceu ti cal Preparations to Rus sia US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

0

$5000000

$10000000

$15000000

$20000000

$25000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 43 102017 404 PM

Figure 65 US Exports of Meat and Poultry to Rus sia US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Meat poultry etc

$1000000000

$800000000

$600000000

$400000000

$200000000

$-

$1200000000

$1400000000

$1600000000

Figure 66 US Exports of Soybeans to Rus sia US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

0

$20000000

$40000000

$60000000

$80000000

$100000000

$120000000

$140000000

$160000000

$180000000

$200000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 44 102017 404 PM

Figure 67 US Exports of Vehicles Engines and Parts to Rus sia US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Other parts and accessories of vehicles

Automotive tires and tubes

Bodies and chassis for passenger cars

Engines and engine parts (carburetors pistonsrings and valves)

Trucks buses and special purpose vehicles

Passenger cars new and used

$2500000000

$2000000000

$1500000000

$500000000

$-

$1000000000

Figure 68 US Exports of Medicinal Equipment to Rus sia US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

$10000000

$15000000

$20000000

$25000000

$30000000

$35000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 45 102017 404 PM

Figure 610 US Exports to Rus sia by States (2016 US$ Value) Million US$ 2013ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoState and Metropolitan Area Trade Datardquo

Iowa Kentucky

North Dakota

Oklahoma

South Carolina

Washington

0

$500

$1000

$1500

$2000

2013 2014 2015 2016

District of Columbia

Iowa

Kentucky

North Dakota

Oklahoma

South Carolina

Washington

Figure 69 US Exports of Excavating Machinery to Rus sia US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

0

$5000000

$10000000

$15000000

$20000000

$25000000

$30000000

$35000000

$40000000

$45000000

$50000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 46 102017 404 PM

47

Upon reviewing the current trend in US- Russia economic relations we must acknowledge that

the existing trade model is obsolete and exhausted Imports are resource- oriented and reflect

constraints of the Rus sian economic structure while five groups of goodsmdash oil metals nuclear

fuels fertilizers and fishmdash make up more than 90 percent of total imports from Rus sia (Figure 71)

Each of these industries has a limited capacity for growth in the foreseeable future

Rus siarsquos core export to the United Statesmdash oilmdash will inevitably decrease in the mid- term under any

scenario The value and volume of Rus sian exports to the United States are open to global market

volatility and po liti cal pressures with limited hedging mechanisms

Overall US exports to Rus sia are unsustainable due to bilateral po liti cal tensions the whims of

commodity markets and changing domestic policies Sanctions and counter- sanctions have

created additional barriers particularly in finance banking high- tech energy and agro- business

According to the American Chamber of Commerce 69 percent of US companies working in the

country consider the impact of US sanctions against Rus sia on their business as negative At the

same time 60 percent of companies do not expect big changes in business relations between

Rus sia and the United States under Trump1 as the new law codifies existing sanctions fortifies

them and extends them to new sectors

Current US investments are low due to the weak rule of law in Rus sia a lack of property right

protections and proper contract enforcement high levels of statization and monopolization in the

economy a poor business climate outdated capital stock dependence on natural- resource

sectors and of course sanction and counter- sanction mea sures Bloated administrative compo-

nents created as risk mitigation instruments have also served as impediments The countryrsquos

institutional weakness low level of productivity bud get constraints and a declining inflexible

workforce will restrain future economic growth even if commodity prices recover Rus sian eco-

nomic policy will likely continue to be statist and protectionist relying mostly on import

substitutions

1 Ibid 11

Existing Trends and Future Scenarios

07

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 47 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations48

What scenarios can be expected in such a challenging environment

One probability (no peace no war) is based on the assumption that matters will not deteriorate

further and implementation of the Sanctions Act will be cursory This will cause relatively slow

degradation in the economic field with occasional flashes of activity in selected areas (eg closer

cooperation against Islamist terrorist groups in Syria)

A second worse case or critical scenario is the intensive and full- scale execution of current sanc-

tion legislation and even the imposition of new economic punitive and restrictive mea sures which

could incite asymmetric retaliatory actions and lead to the introduction of additional protectionist

policies This in turn could trigger a further escalation of mutual confrontation and could eventu-

ally destroy the fundamentals of the current bilateral trade system Rus sian leadership has charac-

terized the Sanctions Act as a declaration of a trade war that ends all hope for improving bilateral

relations2

2 Дмитрий Медведев ldquoПодписание президентом США нового санкционного закона против России создает несколько

последствийrdquo [The US Presidentrsquos signing of the package of new sanctions against Rus sia will have a few conse-

quences] Facebook August 2 2017 https wwwfacebook com Dmitry Medvedev posts 10154587161801851

Figure 71 US Imports from Rus sia Share of Oil Metals Nuclear Fuel Fertilizers and Fish Million US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

93

94

93

94

95

96

93

92

87

89

0

$5000

$10000

$15000

$20000

$25000

$30000

$35000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

US Imports from Russia

Share of Oil Metals Nuclear FuelFertilizers and Fish

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 48 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 49

The best case and most favorable scenario looks less probable now It assumes the realization of

structural reforms in Rus sia in such a way that would adapt Rus siarsquos foreign policy to national

economic needs reduce confrontations with the West and make a concerted efort to integrate

Rus sian businesses into global supply and value chains A revitalization of the structural reform

agendamdash including eforts to diversify economic activities through de- monopolization and support

for SMEs a restructuring of the banking sector the creation of a vibrant business climate to foster

entrepreneurships and innovation the implementation of administrative and judicial reforms to

tackle red tape and endemic corruption and the reduction of state control over key sectors of the

economy via wide- spread privatization could kick- start the development of a nonoil economy and

improve long- term growth prospects Despite ongoing discussion of reform strategies deep

economic and po liti cal changes are extremely complicated over the next po liti calelectoral cycle

(2018ndash2024) particularly because of re sis tance of vested interests and growing commodity prices

The urgency to tackle structural shortcomings in natu ral resource- dependent economies usually

correlates with the price of those resources and the degree to which resource rents drive eco-

nomic activity However there may be marginal improvements in the efficiency of the current

economic system

Future US- Russia relations can be thought of through three pillars one pillar focuses on areas

where both countries maintain a competitive rivalry another looks at potential areas of interaction

under pres ent conditions a third pillar and one that has evaporated from the current bilateral

agenda concentrates on future cooperation Stronger economic ties could not only be a kind of

po liti cal shock absorber but contribute to the building of this future (particularly business contacts

aim to support future structural reforms) although po liti cal factors are depressing the prospects

for cooperation To escape deadlock it will be impor tant to establish the right balance between

politics and economics and create a model of collaboration within the framework of contention

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 49 102017 404 PM

About the Author

Vadim Grishin PhD MBA has been involved in the reform pro cess in Rus sia as adviser to the

deputy prime minister of Rus sia in 1992ndash1993 and 2006ndash2010 He has extensive experience

working with the Bretton Woods Institutions He was the board member of the World Bank Group

and served as se nior adviser at the International Monetary Fund Currently he is a con sul tant to the

chief economistrsquos office of the International Finance Corporation and teaches the economics of

transition at Georgetown University in Washington DC

50

594-71613_ch99_4Pindd 50 102017 403 PM

Blank

COVER PHOTO ADOBE STOCK

1616 Rhode Island Avenue NW

Washington DC 20036

202 887 0200 | wwwcsisorg

v++ISBN 978-1-4422-8035-9

Lanham bull Boulder bull New York bull London

4501 Forbes Boulevard

Lanham MD 20706

301 459 3366 | wwwrowmancom

A U T H O R

Vadim Grishin

Myths and Realities

A Report of the

CSIS RUSSIA AND EURASIA PROGRAM

US-RussiaEconomicRelations

O C T O B E R 2 0 1 7

Euml|xHSLEOCy280359z

The Man Pupu Nyor Rock Formations at the Northern Urals also known as Seven

Strong Man or Little Mountain of the God in the local tribe (Mansi) language

Page 28: U.S.-Russia Economic Relations: Myths and Realities · 2020-04-17 · OCTOBER 2017 U.S.- Russia Economic Relations Myths and Realities AUTHOR Vadim Grishin A REPORT OF THE CSIS RUSSIA

US-Russia Economic Relations22

sustainable Starting from 2005 average annual deliveries have been above 150 million barrels

(Figure 52) Crude and heating oil have dominated while petroleum products and liquefied petro-

leum gases have not (Figure 53) In 2011 oil exports peaked at 228 million barrels but declined to

159 million barrels in 2016mdash a drop of 30 percent Rec ord high shipments of Rus sian oil to the United

States coincided with an elevation in oil prices which made the subsequent decline in oil shipment

value between 2011 and 2016 (by about 72 percent as shown in Figure 54) seem more stark The

increase in price also raised the share of oil in Rus sian exports by 74 percent in 2011 (Figure 55)

The Rus sian share in total US oil imports was around 55 percent in 2011 and 43 percent in 2016

( Table 56) In the last five years the United States has relied exclusively on consumption of Rus sian

oil for the rough equivalent of one week out of the year (Figure 56)

It is unlikely that Rus sia can significantly increase its share of the US oil market and there is a real

possibility for a downward trend There are several reasons the historically high Rus sian hydrocar-

bon export threshold of 2011 will not soon if ever be surpassed

First US energy consumption will likely be flat According to the US Energy Information Adminis-

tration (EIA) demand for petroleum and other liquids in the United States will be about 35ndash36

quadrillion British thermal units (BTUs) with minimal variation over the next 25 years1

1 US EIA ldquoAnnual Energy Outlook 2017 with Projections to 2050rdquo January 5 2017 7ndash8

Figure 51 US- Russia Trade Growth () vs US and Rus sia Real GDP Growth () 1993ndash2016

Source IMF ldquoIMF Datardquo accessed September 27 2017 http wwwimf org en Data US Census Bureau

ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo

Note rGDPthinsp=thinspreal gross domestic product

Trade

USA rGDP growth

Russia rGDP growth

-60

-40

-20

0

20

40

60

80

100

1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Gro

wth

All spikes in US-Russia trade have been connected with two main

variables volume and price of crude oil

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 22 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 23

Second the United States will become a net energy exporter between 2020 and 2030 in most

cases under dif er ent combinations of oil and natu ral gas prices GDP growth technological

breakthroughs and the availability of energy resources The role of oil imports will dramatically

fall2

Third oil price scenarios as described by the International Energy Agency (IEA) international

financial organ izations (IFIs) and many national agencies are very cautious and assume that even

by 2035 to 2040 oil prices will not to recover to the levels of 2011ndash20123

Fourth Rus sian oil production and export growth will be modest and driven by Asian economic

expansion and will comprise a decreasing share of Western markets4 According to forecasts from

2 Ibid 15ndash18

3 Ibid table 3 ldquoEnergy Prices by Sector and Sourcesrdquo World Bank World Bank Commodity Markets Price Forecasts

(Washington DC World Bank 2017) httpswwwworldbank org en research commodity - markets Organ ization of the

Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) World Oil Outlook 2016 (Vienna OPEC 2016)

4 E D Belotskaia et al Global and Rus sian Energy Outlook 2016 (Moscow Energy Research Institute of the Rus sian

Acad emy of Science Analytical Center for the Government of the Rus sian Federation 2016) http acgov ru files

publication a 12767 pdf

Figure 52 US Imports from Rus sia Crude Oil and Petroleum Products Thousands of Barrels 1995ndash2016

Source US EIA ldquoUS Imports by Country of Origin Rus siardquo Petroleum amp Other Liquids September 13

2017 http wwweia gov dnav pet PET _ MOVE _ IMPCUS _ D _ NUS _ NRS _ MBBL _ M htm

0

50000

100000

150000

200000

250000

Date 1995 1996 1997 1998 199920002001200220032004200520062007200820092010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 23 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations24

the Organ ization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) crude oil exports from Rus sia and

the Caspian region to the United States will dis appear by 20255

So why does the Rus sian Urals blend continue to be attractive for oil traders and US refineries

which could pro cess greater volumes of domestically produced lighter crude There are two main

reasons One is related to the preference of US high conversion refineries (the most sophisticated

in the world) to work with heavy oil blends produced by Canada Mexico Iraq Venezuela and

Rus sia Pro cessing heavy crude now is as profitable as pro cessing lighter crude The so- called

crack spreadmdash the diference between the cost of relatively cheap heavy crude oil and the final

price of value- added consumer products (diesel gasoline jet fuel and heating oil)mdash has become

the same as the refinery margins of light sweet crude6 This has primarily afected light oil produc-

ing countries such as Angola Algeria and Nigeria

5 OPEC World Oil Outlook 2016 306ndash309

6 ldquoHow Much for That Heavy Oilrdquo Oil Sands Magazine December 26 2015 https wwwoilsandsmagazine com

news 2015 12 26 how - much - for - that - heavy - oil

Figure 53 US Imports from Rus sia Oil and Petroleum Products US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

$-

$25000000000

$20000000000

$15000000000

$10000000000

$5000000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Liquefied petroleum gases

Petroleum products other

Fuel oil

Crude oil

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 24 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 25

Another factor afecting purchase of Rus sian oil is a new trend among oil companies for further

consolidation of scale and for integrating operations of upstream and downstream business7

There have been several waves of separation and unification of production transportation and

pro cessing in the last 50 years The current business cycle can be seen as an adaptation to a

period of low prices and oversupply Companies that buy andor produce oil in Rus sia most likely

prefer to transport and pro cess this oil in their own modern refineries in the United States At the

same time some of the newest refinery designs specifically for pro cessing heavy oils have been

built in Asia thus extending the choices of heavy oil producing countries

We should also consider that leading US and international oil traders along with oil producing

companies working with or owning US refineries frequently buy Rus sian oil on the open market

and have long- term contracts on Rus sian crude oil delivery Many Rus sian oil companies prefer to

pay for purchases or ser vices with their future production instead of cash creating situations of

ldquostickyrdquo oil imports that are difficult to replace The best- known example is an interaction between

7 ldquoEnergy and Utilities Sectorrdquo Roundtable Financier Worldwide December 2015 https wwwfinancierworldwide

com roundtable - energy - utilities - sector - dec15

Figure 54 US Imports of Oil and Petroleum Products from Rus sia vs Oil Prices Eu rope Brent Spot Price Free on Board (FOB) 1996ndash2017

Source US EIA ldquoUS Imports by Country of Origin Rus siardquo

0

20

40

60

80

100

120

140

0

5000

10000

15000

20000

25000

30000

Jan

-19

96

Jun

-19

96

No

v-19

96

Ap

r-19

97

Sep

-19

97

Feb

-19

98

Jul-

199

8D

ec-1

99

8M

ay-1

99

9O

ct-1

99

9M

ar-2

00

0A

ug

-20

00

Jan

-20

01

Jun

-20

01

No

v-2

00

1A

pr-

20

02

Sep

-20

02

Feb

-20

03

Jul-

20

03

Dec

-20

03

May

-20

04

Oct

-20

04

Mar

-20

05

Au

g-2

00

5Ja

n-2

00

6Ju

n-2

00

6N

ov-

20

06

Ap

r-2

00

7Se

p-2

00

7Fe

b-2

00

8Ju

l-2

00

8D

ec-2

00

8M

ay-2

00

9O

ct-2

00

9M

ar-2

010

Au

g-2

010

Jan

-20

11Ju

n-2

011

No

v-2

011

Ap

r-2

012

Sep

-20

12Fe

b-2

013

Jul-

20

13D

ec-2

013

May

-20

14O

ct-2

014

Mar

-20

15A

ug

-20

15Ja

n-2

016

Jun

-20

16N

ov-

20

16

USD

per

Bar

rel

Th

ou

san

d B

arr

els

US Imports from Russia of Crude Oil and Petroleum Products (Thousand Barrels)

Europe Brent Spot Price FOB (Dollars per Barrel)

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 25 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations26

Table 56 US Oil Imports All Countries vs Rus sia Thousand Barrels per Day 2011ndash2016

Years 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

All Countries 11436 10598 9859 9241 9449 10058

Rus sia 624 477 460 330 371 433

Share 546 450 467 357 393 431

Sources US EIA ldquoUS Imports by Country of Origin Total Crude Oil and Productsrdquo Petroleum amp Other

Liquids September 13 2017 wwweia gov dnav pet pet_move_impcus_a2_nus_ep00_im0_mbbl_m htm

authorrsquos computation

Figure 55 US Imports from Rus sia Share of Crude Oil and Petroleum Products Million US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

57

64

73

72

74

73

72

59

52 50

0

$5000

$10000

$15000

$20000

$25000

$30000

$35000

$40000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

US Imports from Russia

Share of Oil and Petroleum Products

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 26 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 27

the Rus sian state mono poly Rosneft and commodity trading and mining giant Glencore which

along with energy and commodities com pany Vitol participated in a $10 billion prepayment

deal with Rosneft for crude supplies in 2013

There have been a number of ongoing transactions between the Rus sian oil industry and interna-

tional oil companies including several that top the list of importers of Rus sian oil to the United

States ( Table 57) In December 2016 Glencore participated in a controversial privatization opera-

tion purchasing in tandem with the Qatar sovereign wealth fund a 195 percent stake in Rosneft

which was on the US and EU list of sanctioned firms8 Glencore has also taken a blocking stake in

midsize oil producer RussNeft BP owns a 1975 percent stake in Rosneft Chevron holds a

15 percent interest in the 935- mile- long CPC9 pipeline which transports an average of 959000

barrels of crude oil per day including 76000 barrels daily from Rus sia10 ExxonMobil has formed

8 E Mazneva and I Arkhipov ldquoRus sia Sells $11 Billion Stake in Rosneft to Glencore Qatarrdquo Bloomberg December 7

2016

9 CPCthinsp=thinspCaspian Pipeline Consortium

10 ldquoRus sia Highlights of Operations and Business Portfoliordquo Chevron accessed October 3 2017 https wwwchevron

com worldwide russia

Figure 56 Share of Rus sian Oil in Total US Oil Imports Thousands of Barrels per Day 1972ndash2016

Source US EIA ldquoUS Imports by Country of Origin Total Crude Oil and Productsrdquo

2000

4000

6000

8000

10000

12000

14000

16000

US Imports of Crude Oil and Petroleum Products (Thousand Barrels per Day)

US Imports from Russia of Crude Oil and Petroleum Products (Thousand Barrels per Day)19

7319

7419

7519

7619

7719

7819

7919

80

198

119

82

198

319

84

198

519

86

198

719

88

198

919

90

199

119

92

199

319

94

199

519

96

199

719

98

199

92

00

02

00

12

00

22

00

32

00

42

00

52

00

62

00

72

00

82

00

92

010

20

112

012

20

132

014

20

152

016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 27 102017 404 PM

Table 57 Top Importers of Rus sian Oil to the United States Thousands of Barrels 2016

VALERO MARKETING amp SUPPLY CO 54590 3616

EXXONMOBIL OIL CORP 17087 1130

CHEVRON USA INC 15217 1008

BP WEST COAST PRODUCTS LLC 10130 671

GEORGE E WARREN CORP 7272 48

PAULSBORO REFINING CO LLC 6838 453

TESORO CORP 5097 338

VITOL INC 5084 337

PHILLIPS 66 CO 4726 313

TRAFIGURA AG 4360 289

PAR HAWAII REFINING LLC 3893 258

MOTIVA ENTERPRISES LLC 3041 205

SHELL US TRADING CO 2863 19

MARATHON PETROLEUM CO LLC 2475 16

ATLANTIC TRADING amp MARKETING 2099 14

FREEPOINT COMMODITIES LLC 1439 1

GLENCORE LTD 1284 85

BEST PETROLEUM CORP 967 64

ROLYMPUS US COMMODITIES GROUP LLC 822 6

HUNT CRUDE OIL SUPPLY CO 666 4

GULF OIL LP 658 4

Source US EIA ldquoUS Imports by Country of Origin Crude Oilrdquo Petroleum amp Other Liquids September 13

2017 httpswwweiagovdnavpetpet_move_impcus_a2_nus_epc0_im0_mbblpd_ahtm authorrsquos

computation

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 28 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 29

several joint ventures with Rosneft to undertake ofshore exploration in the Black Sea and the Kara

Sea in Siberia11

According to the Sanctions Act US persons are prohibited from exporting or reexporting goods

ser vices (except financial ser vices) and technology in support of exploration or production of new

deep- water Arctic ofshore or shale oil proj ects that involve designated Rus sian entities or other

entities in which such sanctioned persons have a controlling interest or a substantial noncontrol-

ling owner ship interest defined as not less than 33 percent (previously it was 50 percent) The new

law also authorizesmdash but does not requiremdash the imposition of so- called secondary sanctions

against non- US entities that engage in activities involving the construction maintenance or

expansion of Rus sian energy export pipelines with a fair market value of $1 million or more or an

aggregate fair market value during a 12- month period of $5 million12 This provision has raised the

concerns of some Eu ro pean countries particularly Germany As result the final language of the

law included wording about coordination of this issue with allies of the United States

Shipments of Rus sian oil to the United States could be afected by activity in the US refinery

industry In early 2017 Saudi Aramco bought the United Statesrsquo largest oil refinery in Port Arthur

(Texas) and it announced plans to send more of its own crude to that refinery13 Serious concerns

exist however regarding the future of three refineries and nine pipelines owned by Citgo a US

branch of the Venezuelan state com pany PdVSA which is balancing precariously on the edge of

default Under certain conditions in the event of PdVSA bankruptcy Rosneft could claim a stake of

up to 499 percent in Citgo Such a possibility has raised concerns among politicians and US

government officials with Trea sury Secretary Steven Mnuchin calling it a ldquonational security issuerdquo14

Tables 58 59 and 510 show allocations of Rus sian oil imports to major US refineries some of

which work exclusively on Rus sian crude a total of two to three months per year In total 150940

thousand barrels of Rus sian oil were refined in 2016

Figure 57 confirms a leading position of Texas and Louisiana among the US states receiving

Rus sian crude followed by New Jersey California Mississippi Washington Hawaii and Delaware

In a paradoxical way Texas has dis appeared from the list of states as a main destination of US

imports from Rus sia (Figure 58) because Rus sian crude is mostly delivered to Louisiana ports and

registered there by US Customs as an import from Rus sia After that it transports to refineries in

Louisiana and Texas

Overall the short- term business rationale behind the sustainability of US oil imports from Rus sia

cannot overcome strong headwinds in the US energy sector facing all oil importers which will

inevitably lead to a contraction of Rus sian oil exports to the United States in the foreseeable future

11 Exxon eforts to receive a special US Trea sury waiver to drill in sanctioned Rus sia failed in 2017

12 Countering Amer i carsquos Adversaries through Sanctions Act HR 3364

13 Sarp Ozkan ldquoSaudi Aramcorsquos Port Arthur Refinery and the US Refinery Fleetrdquo Drilling Info May 11 2017

https infodrillinginfo com saudi - aramcos - port - arthur - refinery - us - refinery - fleet

14 Graham Kates ldquoTrea sury Secretary Rus siarsquos Citgo Deal a National Security Issuerdquo CBS News May 1 2017

http wwwcbsnews com news rosneft - citgo - steven - mnuchin - national - security

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 29 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations30

Table 58 Valerorsquos Refineries Pro cessing Rus sian Oil Thousands of Barrels 2016

Saint Charles Louisiana 29206 535

Corpus Christi Texas 20626 378

Wilmington California 4250 78

Total USA 54590 100

Source US EIA ldquoRefinery Capacity Reportrdquo January 1 2017

table 5 wwweia gov petroleum refinerycapacity table5 pdf

authorrsquos computation

Table 59 ExxonMobil Refineries Pro cessing Rus sian Oil Thousands of Barrels 2016

Baytown Texas 15037 88

Baton Rouge Louisiana 2046 12

Total USA 17083 100

Source US EIA ldquoRefinery Capacity Reportrdquo authorrsquos computation

Table 510 Chevronrsquos Refineries Pro cessing Rus sian Oil Thousands of Barrels 2016

Pascagoula Mississippi 12767 840

El Segundo California 2372 155

Saint Rose Louisiana 78 05

Total USA 15217 100

Source US EIA ldquoRefinery Capacity Reportrdquo authorrsquos computation

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 30 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 31

HEAVY METAL

Taken together US imports of metals and US imports of oil compose about 80 percent of US

total imports from Rus sia (Figure 59) Trade of metals like other commodities is strongly afected

by market price fluctuations Nevertheless metal imports from Rus sia have been fairly resilient to

market volatility and their average annual value has hovered at about $4 billion in the last five years

(Figure 510) This market resilience was forged at the end of the 1990searly 2000s when Rus sian

metal producers gradually modernized their plants adjusting quality of production to Western

standards and enhancing integration into global value and supply chains Some of them conquered

their share of the highly competitive US market struggling with peers from Canada and certain

BRICS countries (China India and Brazil) To attract additional resources all Rus sian large metal-

producing companies became public and were listed on stock exchanges chiefly the London Stock

Exchange (Severstalrsquo PAO Evraz MMK OAO Novolipetsk Steel Norilsk Nikel and TMK PAO) one

on the New York Stock Exchange (Mechel) and one on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange (Rusal)

Business logic pushed some of them to invest in the US metal- making industry which was hit

hard by crisis Later on some of those assets were sold (eg two US steel mills acquired by

Severstal in 2004 were purchased 10 years later by Steel Dynamics Inc and AK Steel Corp)

Figure 57 Share of US States Rus sian Oil Imports 2016

Source US EIA ldquoUS Imports from Rus sia of Crude Oil and Petroleum Productsrdquo Petroleum amp Other

Liquids September 29 2017 https www eia gov dnav pet hist LeafHandler ashx nshy=shyPETampsshy=shyMTTIM _ NUS

- NRS _ 1ampfshy=shyM authorrsquos computation

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

100

Maine

Massachusetts

Maryland

Connecticut

Georgia

Rhode Island

Virginia

Florida

New York

Alabama

Puerto Rico

Pennsylvania

Delaware

Hawaii

Washington

Mississippi

California

New Jersey

Louisiana

Texas

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 31 102017 404 PM

Figure 58 US Imports from Rus sia by State Million US$ 2013ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoState and Metropolitan Area Trade Datardquo Foreign Trade last modified

October 2 2017 https wwwcensus gov foreign - trade statistics state

Alaska

Connecticut

Delaware

Hawaii

Louisiana

Maryland

North Dakota 0

$1000

$2000

$3000

$4000

$5000

$6000

2013 2014 2015 2016

Alabama

Alaska

Connecticut

Delaware

Hawaii

Louisiana

Maryland

Maine

Mississippi

Montana

North Dakota

Mississippi

Figure 59 US Imports from Rus sia Share of Oil and Metals Million US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 1992ndash2016)

83

82

85

86

87

88

85

82

7375

0

$5000

$10000

$15000

$20000

$25000

$30000

$35000

$40000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

US Imports from Russia

Share of Oil and Metals

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 32 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 33

Obviously the market dynamic of dif er ent metals varies (eg iron steel aluminum platinum and

nickel) Caps to increase their trade and production in a ldquored oceanrdquo global environment with

anemic demand is rather limited despite Figure 510 showing a spike of iron and steel imports

from Rus sia in 2014 and aluminum in 2016 Some opportunities may exist for Russian- owned steel

plants in the United States (such as NLMK) to participate in energy proj ects resumed under Presi-

dent Trump who has required that new pipelines use only American- made steel15

Rus sia occupies a special niche in the US market for titanium products a high- end metal indus-

try Twenty years ago a long- term contract was signed between Rus sian titanium producer

VSMPO- AVISMA and Boeing The Rus sian com pany entered the selective club of Boeing suppliers

for the manufacture of components and semi- finished products Since the signing of this contract

VSMPO has delivered more than 35 percent of all titanium placed on Boeing civil aircraft16 They

are hidden in the trade data in an import category for Civilian Aircrafts and Parts (Figure 511) At

the end of 2016 Boeing announced an extension of its framework agreement with AVISMA

15 E Scheyder C Ngai and T Sylvester ldquoAmerican Steel Unlikely to Get Keystone Boost Despite Trump Orderrdquo

Reuters January 27 2017 http wwwreuters com article usa - trump - pipeline - transcanada - idUSL1N1FH1ZD

16 A Kramer ldquoTitanium Fills Vital Role for Boeing and Rus siardquo New York Times July 5 2013 http wwwnytimes com

2013 07 06 business global titanium - fills - vital - role - for - boeing - and - russia html mcubzshy=shy3

Figure 510 US Imports from Rus sia Iron Steel Bauxite Aluminum Nickel Nonferrous Metals and Other Precious Metals and Materials US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 1992ndash2016)

0

$6000000000

$5000000000

$4000000000

$3000000000

$2000000000

$1000000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 20122013

20142015

2016

Finished metal shapes

Iron and steel advanced

Iron and steel products nec

Nonferrous metals other

Other precious metals

Nickel

Bauxite and aluminum

Iron and steel mill products

Steelmaking materials

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 33 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations34

through 2022 and additional investments in the construction of a new robotic plant in Titanium

Valley a special economic zone located in the Sverdlovsk region that will open in 2018 The pro-

cessing of titanium forgings in all Boeing civil aircraft will be performed there including 787s 737

MAXs and 777Xs17 The contract extension with AVISMA may add several hundred million dollars

in value to annual US imports from Rus sia

How can such heavy reliance on imports of Rus sian titanium exist during a period of rising geopo-

liti cal tensions The answer is straightforward VSMPO- AVISMA is a highly specialized natu ral

mono poly producing 45 percent of the worldrsquos aerospace titanium Only four other countries

smelt high- grade titanium in industrial quantities the United States Germany Japan and China

Overall global production capacity is limited while demand is growing The United States cur-

rently imports around 79 percent of all the titanium it consumes each year18

17 ldquoBoeing and VSMPO Avisma to Launch Second Joint Production Siterdquo Rus sian Aviation Insider December 22 2016

http wwwrusaviainsider com boeing - and - vsmpo - avisma - to - launch - second - joint - production - site

18 Jon Ostrower and Andy Pasztor ldquoBoeing United Technologies Stockpile Titanium Partsrdquo Wall Street Journal

August 7 2014 https wwwwsj com articles boeing - united - technologies - stockpiling - titanium - parts - 1407441886

Figure 511 US Imports from Rus sia Civilian Aircrafts and Parts US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 1992ndash2016)

0

$20000000

$40000000

$60000000

$80000000

$100000000

$120000000

$140000000

$160000000

$180000000

$200000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Parts-civilian aircraft

Civilian aircraft

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 34 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 35

The Sanctions Act authorizes the secretary of the trea sury (in a nonmandatory way) to impose

restrictions (without specifying them) against Rus sian state- owned entities operating in the railway

metals and mining sectors of the Rus sian economy Despite the commanding heights of Rus siarsquos

state sector owner ship in its economy (70 percent of GDP) the metal- producing companies have

remained mostly in private hands

NUCLEAR AFFAIRS

Historically owners and operators of the 104 commercial nuclear power reactors in the United

States have purchased more than 80 percent of their uranium from foreign countries Uranium

shipping from Rus sia accounted for about 13 percent of the 58 million pounds of uranium pur-

chased overseas in 201219 At the same time the Rus sian state- owned mono poly Rosatom ac-

counts for 20 percent of Kazakhstanrsquos uranium production (which in turn comprises 11 percent of

all US uranium imports) and 20 percent of US domestic uranium production capacity (with

owner ship of exploration tracts in Wyoming)20

Nuclear fuel and nuclear power continue to be po liti cally sensitive topics both in the United

States and Rus sia Bilateral cooperation in this sector (being surprisingly stable with imports of

nuclear fuel from Rus sia at a level of $1 billion annually in the last five years [Figure 512 and 513])

is under constant po liti cal and lobbying pressure and has been a source of several po liti cal scan-

dals21 Consequently upside risks in this area of interaction are minimal and downside risks are

much higher especially when we are seeing more decommissioning of nuclear plants in the

United States than new constructions The US EIArsquos 2017 Annual Energy Outlook assumes

that about 25 percent of the nuclear capacity now operating will be removed from ser vice

by 205022

WHY IS THE GRASS GREENER ON THE OTHER SIDE

The United States continues to significantly reduce imports of chemical fertilizers as domestic pro-

duction increases In 2016 the United States imported 13 percent less ammonia and 11 percent

less urea and UAN which is a liquid urea and ammonium nitrate fertilizer Rus sia accounts for

around 40 percent of UAN imported by the United States The United States canceled antidumping

duties on imports of ammonium nitrate and urea from Rus sia in 2016 but it did not prevent import

19 US EIA ldquoThe US Relies on Foreign Uranium Enrichment Ser vices to Fuel Its Nuclear Power Plantsrdquo Today in

Energy August 28 2013 https wwweia gov todayinenergy detail php idshy=shy1273

20 Colin Chilcoat ldquoDoes Rus sia Really Own 20 Percent of the USrsquo Uranium Reservesrdquo OilPricecom May 6 2015

http oilpricecom Alternative - Energy Nuclear - Power Does - Russia - Really - Own - 20 - Of - The - US - Uranium - Reserves

html

21 Michelle Ye Hee Lee ldquoThe Facts behind Trumprsquos Repeated Claim about Hillary Clintonrsquos Role in the Rus sian Ura-

nium Dealrdquo Washington Post October 26 2016

22 US EIA ldquoAnnual Energy Outlook 2017 with Projections to 2050rdquo 81ndash82

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 35 102017 404 PM

Figure 512 US Imports from Rus sia Share of Oil Metals and Nuclear Fuel Million US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 1992ndash2016)

87

86

90

90

90

91

88

86

7882

0

$5000

$10000

$15000

$20000

$25000

$30000

$35000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

US Imports from Russia

Share of Oil Metals and Nuclear Fuel

Figure 513 US Imports from Rus sia Nuclear Fuel Materials US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

$-

$200000000

$400000000

$600000000

$800000000

$1200000000

$1000000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 36 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 37

drops twice last year (Figures 514 and 515) According to forecasts UAN imports are expected to

decline further to 15 million tons this year down over 46 percent from 28 million tons imported

last year23 The downside trend in imports of fertilizers will likely continue because of oversupply

BIG FISH

US imports of fish and shellfish from Rus sia are best understood in comparison with US fish

exports to the Rus sian market which slipped to zero in August 2014 after Rus sia issued an order

banning certain agricultural imports from the United States (Figure 516) While the volume of US

supply was not very large it was impor tant because it broke up the monopolistic dominance of a

few vertically integrated Rus sian companies that have kept prices high by restricting the entry of

new producers Seeking to implement import substitution policies Rus sia has tried to reduce

exports as well as imports of fish and seafood products in the last couple of years This symmetri-

cal approach was intended to ldquocompensaterdquo for a decrease of fish products in the domestic

23 Deepika Thapliyal ldquoPotashCorp Forecasts Sharp Drop in US Nitrogen Imports in 2017rdquo ICIS News February 7

2017 https wwwicis com resources news 2017 02 07 10076734 potashcorp - forecasts - sharp - drop - in - us - nitrogen

- imports - in - 2017

Figure 514 US Imports from Rus sia Share of Oil Metals Nuclear Fuel and Fertilizers Million US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

90

93

92

93

94

95

92

91

85

86

0

$5000

$10000

$15000

$20000

$25000

$30000

$35000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

US Imports from Russia

Share of Oil Metals Nuclear Fuel and Fertilizers

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 37 102017 404 PM

Figure 515 US Imports from Rus sia Chemical- Fertilizers US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

S-

$200000000

$400000000

$600000000

$800000000

$1000000000

$1200000000

$1400000000

$1600000000

$1800000000

$2000000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Figure 516 US Exports to Rus sia Fish and Shellfish US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

0

$10000000

$20000000

$30000000

$40000000

$50000000

$60000000

$70000000

$80000000

$90000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Fish and shellfish

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 38 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 39

consumer market caused by Rus siarsquos import ban but it has failed As result the group most af-

fected by the self- imposed counter- sanctions were Rus sian consumers

With a significant drop in fish imports a devaluation of the ruble and inflationary pressures on

seafood prices yearly consumption of fish in Rus sia has declined precipitously In 2015 alone

fish prices increased 20 percent and consumption dropped to 14 kilograms per person24 from

22 kilograms in 201425 In 2016 food rose to 355 percent of house hold expenditure as a result of

increases in food prices26 This has pushed vertically integrated fishing monopolies to sell even

more of their catch abroad rather than deliver to the Rus sian Federation (Figure 517) Thus we

cannot exclude the possibility of further growth in US fish and shellfish imports from Rus sia on a

marginal scale

24 Александр Савельев ldquoПотребление рыбы в России упало до 14 кг на человекаrdquo [Fish consumption in Rus sia fell to

14 kg per person] Экономика Интерфакс January 28 2015 http wwwinterfax ru business 492038

25 Илья Шестаков ldquoПотебление рыбы в России снизилось на 10 процентов из- за роста ценrdquo [Fish consumption in

Rus sia dropped by 10 percent due to price increases] RNS March 8 2017 https rnsonline consumer - market

Potreblenie - ribi - v - Rossii - snizilos - na - 10 - iz - za - rosta - tsen - 2017 - 03 - 08

26 Zoya Sheftalovich and Christian Oliver ldquoRus siarsquos Boom (Farming) Economyrdquo Politico November 8 2016 http

wwwpolitico eu article russias - boom - farming - economy

Figure 517 US Imports from Rus sia Fish and Shellfish US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

0

$50000000

$100000000

$150000000

$200000000

$250000000

$300000000

$350000000

$400000000

$450000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 39 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations40

SPACE ODYSSEY

Among high- end products beyond the top five groups of goods imported from Rus sia cheap and

efficient Rus sian engines have been used to launch US rockets into space for about 16 years

(Figure 518) There was a serious po liti cal strug gle around a 2014 ban on the purchase of Rus sian

RD-180 rocket engines revealing the conflicting business interests of power ful high- tech companies

This restrictive mea sure was temporary and was quickly lifted because of significant cost impacts

and risks of disruption to launch schedules27 For the same reason the Sanctions Act does not autho-

rize ldquothe imposition of any sanction or other condition limitation restriction or prohibition that

directly or indirectly impedes the supply by any entity of the Rus sian Federation of any product or

ser vice or the procurement of such product or ser vice by any contractor or subcontractor of the

United States or any other entity relating to or in connection with any space launch conducted for

the National Aeronautics and Space Administration or any other nonndash Department of Defense

customerrdquo28

Nevertheless many experts believe that US domestic alternatives to replace Rus sian engines will

be viable in five to eight years

27 Ken Dilanian ldquoWhy Does the US Use Rus sian Rockets to Launch Its Satellitesrdquo NBC News updated November 15

2016 http wwwnbcnews com why - does - u - s - use - russian - rockets - launch - its - satellites - n588526

28 Countering Amer i carsquos Adversaries through Sanctions Act HR 3364

Figure 518 Spacecraft Excluding Military US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

0

$20000000

$40000000

$60000000

$80000000

$100000000

$120000000

$140000000

$160000000

$180000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 40 102017 404 PM

41

Diversity and technological complexity are the most vis i ble advantages supporting US exports to

Rus sia Three major groups of export goods include civilian aircraft engines and parts (Figure 61)

drilling and oil field equipment (Figure 62) and industrial machines and engines (Figure 63)

Despite sanctions against the transfer of advanced oil producing and pro cessing technologies the

realization of US drilling and oil field equipment in Rus sia is sustainable although some bilateral

proj ects have been frozen

Another category of goods that has demonstrated resilience is the phar ma ceu ti cal industry (Fig-

ure 64) because most drugs in Rus sia are imported (about 70 percent of the Rus sian phar ma ceu-

ti cal market in value) Import substitution policies have had only modest results in this industry

As confirmed by American Chamber of Commerce surveys US exports to Rus sia are closely

connected to US FDI 30 percent of total imports of US companies working in the Rus sian

market come from the United States (more than $2 billion in 2016) In other words about

40 percent of all US exports to Rus sia are related to a US corporate- sector business pro cess in

the country The major sectors of activity of these companies are energy and natu ral resources

(52 percent) manufacturing (17 percent) information and communications technology or ICT

(13 percent) retail (7 percent) automotive industry (6 percent) phar ma ceu ti cal production

(1 percent) professional ser vices (05 percent) and other (2 percent)1

Some obvious constraints on US exports to Rus sia have resulted from a reduction in demand A

deterioration of bilateral relations and implementation of sanctions and counter- sanctions have

directly or indirectly afected all businesses Figures 65 and 66 provide data regarding a dramatic

drop in the sale of US agricultural production in Rus sia with all other categories of exports in

goods showing big cuts as well (see Figures 67ndash69)

Exports of civilian aircraft engines and parts put the state of Washington in first place among

other states as a leading exporter to the Rus sian market (Figure 610)

1 American Chamber of Commerce in Rus sia ldquoInvestment and Import to Rus sia 2nd Surveyrdquo 13

Diversity and Constraints

06

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 41 102017 404 PM

Figure 61 US Exports of Civilian Aircraft Engines Equipment and Parts to Rus sia US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

$2500000000

$2000000000

$1500000000

$1000000000

$500000000

$-

Figure 62 US Exports of Drilling and Oil Field Equipment US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

0

$5000000

$10000000

$15000000

$20000000

$25000000

$30000000

$35000000

$40000000

$45000000

$50000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 42 102017 404 PM

Figure 63 US Exports of Industrial Engines to Rus sia US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

0

$5000000

$10000000

$15000000

$20000000

$25000000

$30000000

$35000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Figure 64 US Exports of Phar ma ceu ti cal Preparations to Rus sia US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

0

$5000000

$10000000

$15000000

$20000000

$25000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 43 102017 404 PM

Figure 65 US Exports of Meat and Poultry to Rus sia US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Meat poultry etc

$1000000000

$800000000

$600000000

$400000000

$200000000

$-

$1200000000

$1400000000

$1600000000

Figure 66 US Exports of Soybeans to Rus sia US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

0

$20000000

$40000000

$60000000

$80000000

$100000000

$120000000

$140000000

$160000000

$180000000

$200000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 44 102017 404 PM

Figure 67 US Exports of Vehicles Engines and Parts to Rus sia US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Other parts and accessories of vehicles

Automotive tires and tubes

Bodies and chassis for passenger cars

Engines and engine parts (carburetors pistonsrings and valves)

Trucks buses and special purpose vehicles

Passenger cars new and used

$2500000000

$2000000000

$1500000000

$500000000

$-

$1000000000

Figure 68 US Exports of Medicinal Equipment to Rus sia US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

$10000000

$15000000

$20000000

$25000000

$30000000

$35000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 45 102017 404 PM

Figure 610 US Exports to Rus sia by States (2016 US$ Value) Million US$ 2013ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoState and Metropolitan Area Trade Datardquo

Iowa Kentucky

North Dakota

Oklahoma

South Carolina

Washington

0

$500

$1000

$1500

$2000

2013 2014 2015 2016

District of Columbia

Iowa

Kentucky

North Dakota

Oklahoma

South Carolina

Washington

Figure 69 US Exports of Excavating Machinery to Rus sia US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

0

$5000000

$10000000

$15000000

$20000000

$25000000

$30000000

$35000000

$40000000

$45000000

$50000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 46 102017 404 PM

47

Upon reviewing the current trend in US- Russia economic relations we must acknowledge that

the existing trade model is obsolete and exhausted Imports are resource- oriented and reflect

constraints of the Rus sian economic structure while five groups of goodsmdash oil metals nuclear

fuels fertilizers and fishmdash make up more than 90 percent of total imports from Rus sia (Figure 71)

Each of these industries has a limited capacity for growth in the foreseeable future

Rus siarsquos core export to the United Statesmdash oilmdash will inevitably decrease in the mid- term under any

scenario The value and volume of Rus sian exports to the United States are open to global market

volatility and po liti cal pressures with limited hedging mechanisms

Overall US exports to Rus sia are unsustainable due to bilateral po liti cal tensions the whims of

commodity markets and changing domestic policies Sanctions and counter- sanctions have

created additional barriers particularly in finance banking high- tech energy and agro- business

According to the American Chamber of Commerce 69 percent of US companies working in the

country consider the impact of US sanctions against Rus sia on their business as negative At the

same time 60 percent of companies do not expect big changes in business relations between

Rus sia and the United States under Trump1 as the new law codifies existing sanctions fortifies

them and extends them to new sectors

Current US investments are low due to the weak rule of law in Rus sia a lack of property right

protections and proper contract enforcement high levels of statization and monopolization in the

economy a poor business climate outdated capital stock dependence on natural- resource

sectors and of course sanction and counter- sanction mea sures Bloated administrative compo-

nents created as risk mitigation instruments have also served as impediments The countryrsquos

institutional weakness low level of productivity bud get constraints and a declining inflexible

workforce will restrain future economic growth even if commodity prices recover Rus sian eco-

nomic policy will likely continue to be statist and protectionist relying mostly on import

substitutions

1 Ibid 11

Existing Trends and Future Scenarios

07

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 47 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations48

What scenarios can be expected in such a challenging environment

One probability (no peace no war) is based on the assumption that matters will not deteriorate

further and implementation of the Sanctions Act will be cursory This will cause relatively slow

degradation in the economic field with occasional flashes of activity in selected areas (eg closer

cooperation against Islamist terrorist groups in Syria)

A second worse case or critical scenario is the intensive and full- scale execution of current sanc-

tion legislation and even the imposition of new economic punitive and restrictive mea sures which

could incite asymmetric retaliatory actions and lead to the introduction of additional protectionist

policies This in turn could trigger a further escalation of mutual confrontation and could eventu-

ally destroy the fundamentals of the current bilateral trade system Rus sian leadership has charac-

terized the Sanctions Act as a declaration of a trade war that ends all hope for improving bilateral

relations2

2 Дмитрий Медведев ldquoПодписание президентом США нового санкционного закона против России создает несколько

последствийrdquo [The US Presidentrsquos signing of the package of new sanctions against Rus sia will have a few conse-

quences] Facebook August 2 2017 https wwwfacebook com Dmitry Medvedev posts 10154587161801851

Figure 71 US Imports from Rus sia Share of Oil Metals Nuclear Fuel Fertilizers and Fish Million US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

93

94

93

94

95

96

93

92

87

89

0

$5000

$10000

$15000

$20000

$25000

$30000

$35000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

US Imports from Russia

Share of Oil Metals Nuclear FuelFertilizers and Fish

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 48 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 49

The best case and most favorable scenario looks less probable now It assumes the realization of

structural reforms in Rus sia in such a way that would adapt Rus siarsquos foreign policy to national

economic needs reduce confrontations with the West and make a concerted efort to integrate

Rus sian businesses into global supply and value chains A revitalization of the structural reform

agendamdash including eforts to diversify economic activities through de- monopolization and support

for SMEs a restructuring of the banking sector the creation of a vibrant business climate to foster

entrepreneurships and innovation the implementation of administrative and judicial reforms to

tackle red tape and endemic corruption and the reduction of state control over key sectors of the

economy via wide- spread privatization could kick- start the development of a nonoil economy and

improve long- term growth prospects Despite ongoing discussion of reform strategies deep

economic and po liti cal changes are extremely complicated over the next po liti calelectoral cycle

(2018ndash2024) particularly because of re sis tance of vested interests and growing commodity prices

The urgency to tackle structural shortcomings in natu ral resource- dependent economies usually

correlates with the price of those resources and the degree to which resource rents drive eco-

nomic activity However there may be marginal improvements in the efficiency of the current

economic system

Future US- Russia relations can be thought of through three pillars one pillar focuses on areas

where both countries maintain a competitive rivalry another looks at potential areas of interaction

under pres ent conditions a third pillar and one that has evaporated from the current bilateral

agenda concentrates on future cooperation Stronger economic ties could not only be a kind of

po liti cal shock absorber but contribute to the building of this future (particularly business contacts

aim to support future structural reforms) although po liti cal factors are depressing the prospects

for cooperation To escape deadlock it will be impor tant to establish the right balance between

politics and economics and create a model of collaboration within the framework of contention

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 49 102017 404 PM

About the Author

Vadim Grishin PhD MBA has been involved in the reform pro cess in Rus sia as adviser to the

deputy prime minister of Rus sia in 1992ndash1993 and 2006ndash2010 He has extensive experience

working with the Bretton Woods Institutions He was the board member of the World Bank Group

and served as se nior adviser at the International Monetary Fund Currently he is a con sul tant to the

chief economistrsquos office of the International Finance Corporation and teaches the economics of

transition at Georgetown University in Washington DC

50

594-71613_ch99_4Pindd 50 102017 403 PM

Blank

COVER PHOTO ADOBE STOCK

1616 Rhode Island Avenue NW

Washington DC 20036

202 887 0200 | wwwcsisorg

v++ISBN 978-1-4422-8035-9

Lanham bull Boulder bull New York bull London

4501 Forbes Boulevard

Lanham MD 20706

301 459 3366 | wwwrowmancom

A U T H O R

Vadim Grishin

Myths and Realities

A Report of the

CSIS RUSSIA AND EURASIA PROGRAM

US-RussiaEconomicRelations

O C T O B E R 2 0 1 7

Euml|xHSLEOCy280359z

The Man Pupu Nyor Rock Formations at the Northern Urals also known as Seven

Strong Man or Little Mountain of the God in the local tribe (Mansi) language

Page 29: U.S.-Russia Economic Relations: Myths and Realities · 2020-04-17 · OCTOBER 2017 U.S.- Russia Economic Relations Myths and Realities AUTHOR Vadim Grishin A REPORT OF THE CSIS RUSSIA

Vadim Grishin 23

Second the United States will become a net energy exporter between 2020 and 2030 in most

cases under dif er ent combinations of oil and natu ral gas prices GDP growth technological

breakthroughs and the availability of energy resources The role of oil imports will dramatically

fall2

Third oil price scenarios as described by the International Energy Agency (IEA) international

financial organ izations (IFIs) and many national agencies are very cautious and assume that even

by 2035 to 2040 oil prices will not to recover to the levels of 2011ndash20123

Fourth Rus sian oil production and export growth will be modest and driven by Asian economic

expansion and will comprise a decreasing share of Western markets4 According to forecasts from

2 Ibid 15ndash18

3 Ibid table 3 ldquoEnergy Prices by Sector and Sourcesrdquo World Bank World Bank Commodity Markets Price Forecasts

(Washington DC World Bank 2017) httpswwwworldbank org en research commodity - markets Organ ization of the

Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) World Oil Outlook 2016 (Vienna OPEC 2016)

4 E D Belotskaia et al Global and Rus sian Energy Outlook 2016 (Moscow Energy Research Institute of the Rus sian

Acad emy of Science Analytical Center for the Government of the Rus sian Federation 2016) http acgov ru files

publication a 12767 pdf

Figure 52 US Imports from Rus sia Crude Oil and Petroleum Products Thousands of Barrels 1995ndash2016

Source US EIA ldquoUS Imports by Country of Origin Rus siardquo Petroleum amp Other Liquids September 13

2017 http wwweia gov dnav pet PET _ MOVE _ IMPCUS _ D _ NUS _ NRS _ MBBL _ M htm

0

50000

100000

150000

200000

250000

Date 1995 1996 1997 1998 199920002001200220032004200520062007200820092010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 23 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations24

the Organ ization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) crude oil exports from Rus sia and

the Caspian region to the United States will dis appear by 20255

So why does the Rus sian Urals blend continue to be attractive for oil traders and US refineries

which could pro cess greater volumes of domestically produced lighter crude There are two main

reasons One is related to the preference of US high conversion refineries (the most sophisticated

in the world) to work with heavy oil blends produced by Canada Mexico Iraq Venezuela and

Rus sia Pro cessing heavy crude now is as profitable as pro cessing lighter crude The so- called

crack spreadmdash the diference between the cost of relatively cheap heavy crude oil and the final

price of value- added consumer products (diesel gasoline jet fuel and heating oil)mdash has become

the same as the refinery margins of light sweet crude6 This has primarily afected light oil produc-

ing countries such as Angola Algeria and Nigeria

5 OPEC World Oil Outlook 2016 306ndash309

6 ldquoHow Much for That Heavy Oilrdquo Oil Sands Magazine December 26 2015 https wwwoilsandsmagazine com

news 2015 12 26 how - much - for - that - heavy - oil

Figure 53 US Imports from Rus sia Oil and Petroleum Products US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

$-

$25000000000

$20000000000

$15000000000

$10000000000

$5000000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Liquefied petroleum gases

Petroleum products other

Fuel oil

Crude oil

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 24 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 25

Another factor afecting purchase of Rus sian oil is a new trend among oil companies for further

consolidation of scale and for integrating operations of upstream and downstream business7

There have been several waves of separation and unification of production transportation and

pro cessing in the last 50 years The current business cycle can be seen as an adaptation to a

period of low prices and oversupply Companies that buy andor produce oil in Rus sia most likely

prefer to transport and pro cess this oil in their own modern refineries in the United States At the

same time some of the newest refinery designs specifically for pro cessing heavy oils have been

built in Asia thus extending the choices of heavy oil producing countries

We should also consider that leading US and international oil traders along with oil producing

companies working with or owning US refineries frequently buy Rus sian oil on the open market

and have long- term contracts on Rus sian crude oil delivery Many Rus sian oil companies prefer to

pay for purchases or ser vices with their future production instead of cash creating situations of

ldquostickyrdquo oil imports that are difficult to replace The best- known example is an interaction between

7 ldquoEnergy and Utilities Sectorrdquo Roundtable Financier Worldwide December 2015 https wwwfinancierworldwide

com roundtable - energy - utilities - sector - dec15

Figure 54 US Imports of Oil and Petroleum Products from Rus sia vs Oil Prices Eu rope Brent Spot Price Free on Board (FOB) 1996ndash2017

Source US EIA ldquoUS Imports by Country of Origin Rus siardquo

0

20

40

60

80

100

120

140

0

5000

10000

15000

20000

25000

30000

Jan

-19

96

Jun

-19

96

No

v-19

96

Ap

r-19

97

Sep

-19

97

Feb

-19

98

Jul-

199

8D

ec-1

99

8M

ay-1

99

9O

ct-1

99

9M

ar-2

00

0A

ug

-20

00

Jan

-20

01

Jun

-20

01

No

v-2

00

1A

pr-

20

02

Sep

-20

02

Feb

-20

03

Jul-

20

03

Dec

-20

03

May

-20

04

Oct

-20

04

Mar

-20

05

Au

g-2

00

5Ja

n-2

00

6Ju

n-2

00

6N

ov-

20

06

Ap

r-2

00

7Se

p-2

00

7Fe

b-2

00

8Ju

l-2

00

8D

ec-2

00

8M

ay-2

00

9O

ct-2

00

9M

ar-2

010

Au

g-2

010

Jan

-20

11Ju

n-2

011

No

v-2

011

Ap

r-2

012

Sep

-20

12Fe

b-2

013

Jul-

20

13D

ec-2

013

May

-20

14O

ct-2

014

Mar

-20

15A

ug

-20

15Ja

n-2

016

Jun

-20

16N

ov-

20

16

USD

per

Bar

rel

Th

ou

san

d B

arr

els

US Imports from Russia of Crude Oil and Petroleum Products (Thousand Barrels)

Europe Brent Spot Price FOB (Dollars per Barrel)

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 25 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations26

Table 56 US Oil Imports All Countries vs Rus sia Thousand Barrels per Day 2011ndash2016

Years 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

All Countries 11436 10598 9859 9241 9449 10058

Rus sia 624 477 460 330 371 433

Share 546 450 467 357 393 431

Sources US EIA ldquoUS Imports by Country of Origin Total Crude Oil and Productsrdquo Petroleum amp Other

Liquids September 13 2017 wwweia gov dnav pet pet_move_impcus_a2_nus_ep00_im0_mbbl_m htm

authorrsquos computation

Figure 55 US Imports from Rus sia Share of Crude Oil and Petroleum Products Million US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

57

64

73

72

74

73

72

59

52 50

0

$5000

$10000

$15000

$20000

$25000

$30000

$35000

$40000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

US Imports from Russia

Share of Oil and Petroleum Products

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 26 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 27

the Rus sian state mono poly Rosneft and commodity trading and mining giant Glencore which

along with energy and commodities com pany Vitol participated in a $10 billion prepayment

deal with Rosneft for crude supplies in 2013

There have been a number of ongoing transactions between the Rus sian oil industry and interna-

tional oil companies including several that top the list of importers of Rus sian oil to the United

States ( Table 57) In December 2016 Glencore participated in a controversial privatization opera-

tion purchasing in tandem with the Qatar sovereign wealth fund a 195 percent stake in Rosneft

which was on the US and EU list of sanctioned firms8 Glencore has also taken a blocking stake in

midsize oil producer RussNeft BP owns a 1975 percent stake in Rosneft Chevron holds a

15 percent interest in the 935- mile- long CPC9 pipeline which transports an average of 959000

barrels of crude oil per day including 76000 barrels daily from Rus sia10 ExxonMobil has formed

8 E Mazneva and I Arkhipov ldquoRus sia Sells $11 Billion Stake in Rosneft to Glencore Qatarrdquo Bloomberg December 7

2016

9 CPCthinsp=thinspCaspian Pipeline Consortium

10 ldquoRus sia Highlights of Operations and Business Portfoliordquo Chevron accessed October 3 2017 https wwwchevron

com worldwide russia

Figure 56 Share of Rus sian Oil in Total US Oil Imports Thousands of Barrels per Day 1972ndash2016

Source US EIA ldquoUS Imports by Country of Origin Total Crude Oil and Productsrdquo

2000

4000

6000

8000

10000

12000

14000

16000

US Imports of Crude Oil and Petroleum Products (Thousand Barrels per Day)

US Imports from Russia of Crude Oil and Petroleum Products (Thousand Barrels per Day)19

7319

7419

7519

7619

7719

7819

7919

80

198

119

82

198

319

84

198

519

86

198

719

88

198

919

90

199

119

92

199

319

94

199

519

96

199

719

98

199

92

00

02

00

12

00

22

00

32

00

42

00

52

00

62

00

72

00

82

00

92

010

20

112

012

20

132

014

20

152

016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 27 102017 404 PM

Table 57 Top Importers of Rus sian Oil to the United States Thousands of Barrels 2016

VALERO MARKETING amp SUPPLY CO 54590 3616

EXXONMOBIL OIL CORP 17087 1130

CHEVRON USA INC 15217 1008

BP WEST COAST PRODUCTS LLC 10130 671

GEORGE E WARREN CORP 7272 48

PAULSBORO REFINING CO LLC 6838 453

TESORO CORP 5097 338

VITOL INC 5084 337

PHILLIPS 66 CO 4726 313

TRAFIGURA AG 4360 289

PAR HAWAII REFINING LLC 3893 258

MOTIVA ENTERPRISES LLC 3041 205

SHELL US TRADING CO 2863 19

MARATHON PETROLEUM CO LLC 2475 16

ATLANTIC TRADING amp MARKETING 2099 14

FREEPOINT COMMODITIES LLC 1439 1

GLENCORE LTD 1284 85

BEST PETROLEUM CORP 967 64

ROLYMPUS US COMMODITIES GROUP LLC 822 6

HUNT CRUDE OIL SUPPLY CO 666 4

GULF OIL LP 658 4

Source US EIA ldquoUS Imports by Country of Origin Crude Oilrdquo Petroleum amp Other Liquids September 13

2017 httpswwweiagovdnavpetpet_move_impcus_a2_nus_epc0_im0_mbblpd_ahtm authorrsquos

computation

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 28 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 29

several joint ventures with Rosneft to undertake ofshore exploration in the Black Sea and the Kara

Sea in Siberia11

According to the Sanctions Act US persons are prohibited from exporting or reexporting goods

ser vices (except financial ser vices) and technology in support of exploration or production of new

deep- water Arctic ofshore or shale oil proj ects that involve designated Rus sian entities or other

entities in which such sanctioned persons have a controlling interest or a substantial noncontrol-

ling owner ship interest defined as not less than 33 percent (previously it was 50 percent) The new

law also authorizesmdash but does not requiremdash the imposition of so- called secondary sanctions

against non- US entities that engage in activities involving the construction maintenance or

expansion of Rus sian energy export pipelines with a fair market value of $1 million or more or an

aggregate fair market value during a 12- month period of $5 million12 This provision has raised the

concerns of some Eu ro pean countries particularly Germany As result the final language of the

law included wording about coordination of this issue with allies of the United States

Shipments of Rus sian oil to the United States could be afected by activity in the US refinery

industry In early 2017 Saudi Aramco bought the United Statesrsquo largest oil refinery in Port Arthur

(Texas) and it announced plans to send more of its own crude to that refinery13 Serious concerns

exist however regarding the future of three refineries and nine pipelines owned by Citgo a US

branch of the Venezuelan state com pany PdVSA which is balancing precariously on the edge of

default Under certain conditions in the event of PdVSA bankruptcy Rosneft could claim a stake of

up to 499 percent in Citgo Such a possibility has raised concerns among politicians and US

government officials with Trea sury Secretary Steven Mnuchin calling it a ldquonational security issuerdquo14

Tables 58 59 and 510 show allocations of Rus sian oil imports to major US refineries some of

which work exclusively on Rus sian crude a total of two to three months per year In total 150940

thousand barrels of Rus sian oil were refined in 2016

Figure 57 confirms a leading position of Texas and Louisiana among the US states receiving

Rus sian crude followed by New Jersey California Mississippi Washington Hawaii and Delaware

In a paradoxical way Texas has dis appeared from the list of states as a main destination of US

imports from Rus sia (Figure 58) because Rus sian crude is mostly delivered to Louisiana ports and

registered there by US Customs as an import from Rus sia After that it transports to refineries in

Louisiana and Texas

Overall the short- term business rationale behind the sustainability of US oil imports from Rus sia

cannot overcome strong headwinds in the US energy sector facing all oil importers which will

inevitably lead to a contraction of Rus sian oil exports to the United States in the foreseeable future

11 Exxon eforts to receive a special US Trea sury waiver to drill in sanctioned Rus sia failed in 2017

12 Countering Amer i carsquos Adversaries through Sanctions Act HR 3364

13 Sarp Ozkan ldquoSaudi Aramcorsquos Port Arthur Refinery and the US Refinery Fleetrdquo Drilling Info May 11 2017

https infodrillinginfo com saudi - aramcos - port - arthur - refinery - us - refinery - fleet

14 Graham Kates ldquoTrea sury Secretary Rus siarsquos Citgo Deal a National Security Issuerdquo CBS News May 1 2017

http wwwcbsnews com news rosneft - citgo - steven - mnuchin - national - security

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 29 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations30

Table 58 Valerorsquos Refineries Pro cessing Rus sian Oil Thousands of Barrels 2016

Saint Charles Louisiana 29206 535

Corpus Christi Texas 20626 378

Wilmington California 4250 78

Total USA 54590 100

Source US EIA ldquoRefinery Capacity Reportrdquo January 1 2017

table 5 wwweia gov petroleum refinerycapacity table5 pdf

authorrsquos computation

Table 59 ExxonMobil Refineries Pro cessing Rus sian Oil Thousands of Barrels 2016

Baytown Texas 15037 88

Baton Rouge Louisiana 2046 12

Total USA 17083 100

Source US EIA ldquoRefinery Capacity Reportrdquo authorrsquos computation

Table 510 Chevronrsquos Refineries Pro cessing Rus sian Oil Thousands of Barrels 2016

Pascagoula Mississippi 12767 840

El Segundo California 2372 155

Saint Rose Louisiana 78 05

Total USA 15217 100

Source US EIA ldquoRefinery Capacity Reportrdquo authorrsquos computation

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 30 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 31

HEAVY METAL

Taken together US imports of metals and US imports of oil compose about 80 percent of US

total imports from Rus sia (Figure 59) Trade of metals like other commodities is strongly afected

by market price fluctuations Nevertheless metal imports from Rus sia have been fairly resilient to

market volatility and their average annual value has hovered at about $4 billion in the last five years

(Figure 510) This market resilience was forged at the end of the 1990searly 2000s when Rus sian

metal producers gradually modernized their plants adjusting quality of production to Western

standards and enhancing integration into global value and supply chains Some of them conquered

their share of the highly competitive US market struggling with peers from Canada and certain

BRICS countries (China India and Brazil) To attract additional resources all Rus sian large metal-

producing companies became public and were listed on stock exchanges chiefly the London Stock

Exchange (Severstalrsquo PAO Evraz MMK OAO Novolipetsk Steel Norilsk Nikel and TMK PAO) one

on the New York Stock Exchange (Mechel) and one on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange (Rusal)

Business logic pushed some of them to invest in the US metal- making industry which was hit

hard by crisis Later on some of those assets were sold (eg two US steel mills acquired by

Severstal in 2004 were purchased 10 years later by Steel Dynamics Inc and AK Steel Corp)

Figure 57 Share of US States Rus sian Oil Imports 2016

Source US EIA ldquoUS Imports from Rus sia of Crude Oil and Petroleum Productsrdquo Petroleum amp Other

Liquids September 29 2017 https www eia gov dnav pet hist LeafHandler ashx nshy=shyPETampsshy=shyMTTIM _ NUS

- NRS _ 1ampfshy=shyM authorrsquos computation

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

100

Maine

Massachusetts

Maryland

Connecticut

Georgia

Rhode Island

Virginia

Florida

New York

Alabama

Puerto Rico

Pennsylvania

Delaware

Hawaii

Washington

Mississippi

California

New Jersey

Louisiana

Texas

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 31 102017 404 PM

Figure 58 US Imports from Rus sia by State Million US$ 2013ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoState and Metropolitan Area Trade Datardquo Foreign Trade last modified

October 2 2017 https wwwcensus gov foreign - trade statistics state

Alaska

Connecticut

Delaware

Hawaii

Louisiana

Maryland

North Dakota 0

$1000

$2000

$3000

$4000

$5000

$6000

2013 2014 2015 2016

Alabama

Alaska

Connecticut

Delaware

Hawaii

Louisiana

Maryland

Maine

Mississippi

Montana

North Dakota

Mississippi

Figure 59 US Imports from Rus sia Share of Oil and Metals Million US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 1992ndash2016)

83

82

85

86

87

88

85

82

7375

0

$5000

$10000

$15000

$20000

$25000

$30000

$35000

$40000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

US Imports from Russia

Share of Oil and Metals

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 32 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 33

Obviously the market dynamic of dif er ent metals varies (eg iron steel aluminum platinum and

nickel) Caps to increase their trade and production in a ldquored oceanrdquo global environment with

anemic demand is rather limited despite Figure 510 showing a spike of iron and steel imports

from Rus sia in 2014 and aluminum in 2016 Some opportunities may exist for Russian- owned steel

plants in the United States (such as NLMK) to participate in energy proj ects resumed under Presi-

dent Trump who has required that new pipelines use only American- made steel15

Rus sia occupies a special niche in the US market for titanium products a high- end metal indus-

try Twenty years ago a long- term contract was signed between Rus sian titanium producer

VSMPO- AVISMA and Boeing The Rus sian com pany entered the selective club of Boeing suppliers

for the manufacture of components and semi- finished products Since the signing of this contract

VSMPO has delivered more than 35 percent of all titanium placed on Boeing civil aircraft16 They

are hidden in the trade data in an import category for Civilian Aircrafts and Parts (Figure 511) At

the end of 2016 Boeing announced an extension of its framework agreement with AVISMA

15 E Scheyder C Ngai and T Sylvester ldquoAmerican Steel Unlikely to Get Keystone Boost Despite Trump Orderrdquo

Reuters January 27 2017 http wwwreuters com article usa - trump - pipeline - transcanada - idUSL1N1FH1ZD

16 A Kramer ldquoTitanium Fills Vital Role for Boeing and Rus siardquo New York Times July 5 2013 http wwwnytimes com

2013 07 06 business global titanium - fills - vital - role - for - boeing - and - russia html mcubzshy=shy3

Figure 510 US Imports from Rus sia Iron Steel Bauxite Aluminum Nickel Nonferrous Metals and Other Precious Metals and Materials US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 1992ndash2016)

0

$6000000000

$5000000000

$4000000000

$3000000000

$2000000000

$1000000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 20122013

20142015

2016

Finished metal shapes

Iron and steel advanced

Iron and steel products nec

Nonferrous metals other

Other precious metals

Nickel

Bauxite and aluminum

Iron and steel mill products

Steelmaking materials

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 33 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations34

through 2022 and additional investments in the construction of a new robotic plant in Titanium

Valley a special economic zone located in the Sverdlovsk region that will open in 2018 The pro-

cessing of titanium forgings in all Boeing civil aircraft will be performed there including 787s 737

MAXs and 777Xs17 The contract extension with AVISMA may add several hundred million dollars

in value to annual US imports from Rus sia

How can such heavy reliance on imports of Rus sian titanium exist during a period of rising geopo-

liti cal tensions The answer is straightforward VSMPO- AVISMA is a highly specialized natu ral

mono poly producing 45 percent of the worldrsquos aerospace titanium Only four other countries

smelt high- grade titanium in industrial quantities the United States Germany Japan and China

Overall global production capacity is limited while demand is growing The United States cur-

rently imports around 79 percent of all the titanium it consumes each year18

17 ldquoBoeing and VSMPO Avisma to Launch Second Joint Production Siterdquo Rus sian Aviation Insider December 22 2016

http wwwrusaviainsider com boeing - and - vsmpo - avisma - to - launch - second - joint - production - site

18 Jon Ostrower and Andy Pasztor ldquoBoeing United Technologies Stockpile Titanium Partsrdquo Wall Street Journal

August 7 2014 https wwwwsj com articles boeing - united - technologies - stockpiling - titanium - parts - 1407441886

Figure 511 US Imports from Rus sia Civilian Aircrafts and Parts US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 1992ndash2016)

0

$20000000

$40000000

$60000000

$80000000

$100000000

$120000000

$140000000

$160000000

$180000000

$200000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Parts-civilian aircraft

Civilian aircraft

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 34 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 35

The Sanctions Act authorizes the secretary of the trea sury (in a nonmandatory way) to impose

restrictions (without specifying them) against Rus sian state- owned entities operating in the railway

metals and mining sectors of the Rus sian economy Despite the commanding heights of Rus siarsquos

state sector owner ship in its economy (70 percent of GDP) the metal- producing companies have

remained mostly in private hands

NUCLEAR AFFAIRS

Historically owners and operators of the 104 commercial nuclear power reactors in the United

States have purchased more than 80 percent of their uranium from foreign countries Uranium

shipping from Rus sia accounted for about 13 percent of the 58 million pounds of uranium pur-

chased overseas in 201219 At the same time the Rus sian state- owned mono poly Rosatom ac-

counts for 20 percent of Kazakhstanrsquos uranium production (which in turn comprises 11 percent of

all US uranium imports) and 20 percent of US domestic uranium production capacity (with

owner ship of exploration tracts in Wyoming)20

Nuclear fuel and nuclear power continue to be po liti cally sensitive topics both in the United

States and Rus sia Bilateral cooperation in this sector (being surprisingly stable with imports of

nuclear fuel from Rus sia at a level of $1 billion annually in the last five years [Figure 512 and 513])

is under constant po liti cal and lobbying pressure and has been a source of several po liti cal scan-

dals21 Consequently upside risks in this area of interaction are minimal and downside risks are

much higher especially when we are seeing more decommissioning of nuclear plants in the

United States than new constructions The US EIArsquos 2017 Annual Energy Outlook assumes

that about 25 percent of the nuclear capacity now operating will be removed from ser vice

by 205022

WHY IS THE GRASS GREENER ON THE OTHER SIDE

The United States continues to significantly reduce imports of chemical fertilizers as domestic pro-

duction increases In 2016 the United States imported 13 percent less ammonia and 11 percent

less urea and UAN which is a liquid urea and ammonium nitrate fertilizer Rus sia accounts for

around 40 percent of UAN imported by the United States The United States canceled antidumping

duties on imports of ammonium nitrate and urea from Rus sia in 2016 but it did not prevent import

19 US EIA ldquoThe US Relies on Foreign Uranium Enrichment Ser vices to Fuel Its Nuclear Power Plantsrdquo Today in

Energy August 28 2013 https wwweia gov todayinenergy detail php idshy=shy1273

20 Colin Chilcoat ldquoDoes Rus sia Really Own 20 Percent of the USrsquo Uranium Reservesrdquo OilPricecom May 6 2015

http oilpricecom Alternative - Energy Nuclear - Power Does - Russia - Really - Own - 20 - Of - The - US - Uranium - Reserves

html

21 Michelle Ye Hee Lee ldquoThe Facts behind Trumprsquos Repeated Claim about Hillary Clintonrsquos Role in the Rus sian Ura-

nium Dealrdquo Washington Post October 26 2016

22 US EIA ldquoAnnual Energy Outlook 2017 with Projections to 2050rdquo 81ndash82

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 35 102017 404 PM

Figure 512 US Imports from Rus sia Share of Oil Metals and Nuclear Fuel Million US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 1992ndash2016)

87

86

90

90

90

91

88

86

7882

0

$5000

$10000

$15000

$20000

$25000

$30000

$35000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

US Imports from Russia

Share of Oil Metals and Nuclear Fuel

Figure 513 US Imports from Rus sia Nuclear Fuel Materials US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

$-

$200000000

$400000000

$600000000

$800000000

$1200000000

$1000000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 36 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 37

drops twice last year (Figures 514 and 515) According to forecasts UAN imports are expected to

decline further to 15 million tons this year down over 46 percent from 28 million tons imported

last year23 The downside trend in imports of fertilizers will likely continue because of oversupply

BIG FISH

US imports of fish and shellfish from Rus sia are best understood in comparison with US fish

exports to the Rus sian market which slipped to zero in August 2014 after Rus sia issued an order

banning certain agricultural imports from the United States (Figure 516) While the volume of US

supply was not very large it was impor tant because it broke up the monopolistic dominance of a

few vertically integrated Rus sian companies that have kept prices high by restricting the entry of

new producers Seeking to implement import substitution policies Rus sia has tried to reduce

exports as well as imports of fish and seafood products in the last couple of years This symmetri-

cal approach was intended to ldquocompensaterdquo for a decrease of fish products in the domestic

23 Deepika Thapliyal ldquoPotashCorp Forecasts Sharp Drop in US Nitrogen Imports in 2017rdquo ICIS News February 7

2017 https wwwicis com resources news 2017 02 07 10076734 potashcorp - forecasts - sharp - drop - in - us - nitrogen

- imports - in - 2017

Figure 514 US Imports from Rus sia Share of Oil Metals Nuclear Fuel and Fertilizers Million US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

90

93

92

93

94

95

92

91

85

86

0

$5000

$10000

$15000

$20000

$25000

$30000

$35000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

US Imports from Russia

Share of Oil Metals Nuclear Fuel and Fertilizers

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 37 102017 404 PM

Figure 515 US Imports from Rus sia Chemical- Fertilizers US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

S-

$200000000

$400000000

$600000000

$800000000

$1000000000

$1200000000

$1400000000

$1600000000

$1800000000

$2000000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Figure 516 US Exports to Rus sia Fish and Shellfish US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

0

$10000000

$20000000

$30000000

$40000000

$50000000

$60000000

$70000000

$80000000

$90000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Fish and shellfish

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 38 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 39

consumer market caused by Rus siarsquos import ban but it has failed As result the group most af-

fected by the self- imposed counter- sanctions were Rus sian consumers

With a significant drop in fish imports a devaluation of the ruble and inflationary pressures on

seafood prices yearly consumption of fish in Rus sia has declined precipitously In 2015 alone

fish prices increased 20 percent and consumption dropped to 14 kilograms per person24 from

22 kilograms in 201425 In 2016 food rose to 355 percent of house hold expenditure as a result of

increases in food prices26 This has pushed vertically integrated fishing monopolies to sell even

more of their catch abroad rather than deliver to the Rus sian Federation (Figure 517) Thus we

cannot exclude the possibility of further growth in US fish and shellfish imports from Rus sia on a

marginal scale

24 Александр Савельев ldquoПотребление рыбы в России упало до 14 кг на человекаrdquo [Fish consumption in Rus sia fell to

14 kg per person] Экономика Интерфакс January 28 2015 http wwwinterfax ru business 492038

25 Илья Шестаков ldquoПотебление рыбы в России снизилось на 10 процентов из- за роста ценrdquo [Fish consumption in

Rus sia dropped by 10 percent due to price increases] RNS March 8 2017 https rnsonline consumer - market

Potreblenie - ribi - v - Rossii - snizilos - na - 10 - iz - za - rosta - tsen - 2017 - 03 - 08

26 Zoya Sheftalovich and Christian Oliver ldquoRus siarsquos Boom (Farming) Economyrdquo Politico November 8 2016 http

wwwpolitico eu article russias - boom - farming - economy

Figure 517 US Imports from Rus sia Fish and Shellfish US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

0

$50000000

$100000000

$150000000

$200000000

$250000000

$300000000

$350000000

$400000000

$450000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 39 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations40

SPACE ODYSSEY

Among high- end products beyond the top five groups of goods imported from Rus sia cheap and

efficient Rus sian engines have been used to launch US rockets into space for about 16 years

(Figure 518) There was a serious po liti cal strug gle around a 2014 ban on the purchase of Rus sian

RD-180 rocket engines revealing the conflicting business interests of power ful high- tech companies

This restrictive mea sure was temporary and was quickly lifted because of significant cost impacts

and risks of disruption to launch schedules27 For the same reason the Sanctions Act does not autho-

rize ldquothe imposition of any sanction or other condition limitation restriction or prohibition that

directly or indirectly impedes the supply by any entity of the Rus sian Federation of any product or

ser vice or the procurement of such product or ser vice by any contractor or subcontractor of the

United States or any other entity relating to or in connection with any space launch conducted for

the National Aeronautics and Space Administration or any other nonndash Department of Defense

customerrdquo28

Nevertheless many experts believe that US domestic alternatives to replace Rus sian engines will

be viable in five to eight years

27 Ken Dilanian ldquoWhy Does the US Use Rus sian Rockets to Launch Its Satellitesrdquo NBC News updated November 15

2016 http wwwnbcnews com why - does - u - s - use - russian - rockets - launch - its - satellites - n588526

28 Countering Amer i carsquos Adversaries through Sanctions Act HR 3364

Figure 518 Spacecraft Excluding Military US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

0

$20000000

$40000000

$60000000

$80000000

$100000000

$120000000

$140000000

$160000000

$180000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 40 102017 404 PM

41

Diversity and technological complexity are the most vis i ble advantages supporting US exports to

Rus sia Three major groups of export goods include civilian aircraft engines and parts (Figure 61)

drilling and oil field equipment (Figure 62) and industrial machines and engines (Figure 63)

Despite sanctions against the transfer of advanced oil producing and pro cessing technologies the

realization of US drilling and oil field equipment in Rus sia is sustainable although some bilateral

proj ects have been frozen

Another category of goods that has demonstrated resilience is the phar ma ceu ti cal industry (Fig-

ure 64) because most drugs in Rus sia are imported (about 70 percent of the Rus sian phar ma ceu-

ti cal market in value) Import substitution policies have had only modest results in this industry

As confirmed by American Chamber of Commerce surveys US exports to Rus sia are closely

connected to US FDI 30 percent of total imports of US companies working in the Rus sian

market come from the United States (more than $2 billion in 2016) In other words about

40 percent of all US exports to Rus sia are related to a US corporate- sector business pro cess in

the country The major sectors of activity of these companies are energy and natu ral resources

(52 percent) manufacturing (17 percent) information and communications technology or ICT

(13 percent) retail (7 percent) automotive industry (6 percent) phar ma ceu ti cal production

(1 percent) professional ser vices (05 percent) and other (2 percent)1

Some obvious constraints on US exports to Rus sia have resulted from a reduction in demand A

deterioration of bilateral relations and implementation of sanctions and counter- sanctions have

directly or indirectly afected all businesses Figures 65 and 66 provide data regarding a dramatic

drop in the sale of US agricultural production in Rus sia with all other categories of exports in

goods showing big cuts as well (see Figures 67ndash69)

Exports of civilian aircraft engines and parts put the state of Washington in first place among

other states as a leading exporter to the Rus sian market (Figure 610)

1 American Chamber of Commerce in Rus sia ldquoInvestment and Import to Rus sia 2nd Surveyrdquo 13

Diversity and Constraints

06

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 41 102017 404 PM

Figure 61 US Exports of Civilian Aircraft Engines Equipment and Parts to Rus sia US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

$2500000000

$2000000000

$1500000000

$1000000000

$500000000

$-

Figure 62 US Exports of Drilling and Oil Field Equipment US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

0

$5000000

$10000000

$15000000

$20000000

$25000000

$30000000

$35000000

$40000000

$45000000

$50000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 42 102017 404 PM

Figure 63 US Exports of Industrial Engines to Rus sia US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

0

$5000000

$10000000

$15000000

$20000000

$25000000

$30000000

$35000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Figure 64 US Exports of Phar ma ceu ti cal Preparations to Rus sia US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

0

$5000000

$10000000

$15000000

$20000000

$25000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 43 102017 404 PM

Figure 65 US Exports of Meat and Poultry to Rus sia US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Meat poultry etc

$1000000000

$800000000

$600000000

$400000000

$200000000

$-

$1200000000

$1400000000

$1600000000

Figure 66 US Exports of Soybeans to Rus sia US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

0

$20000000

$40000000

$60000000

$80000000

$100000000

$120000000

$140000000

$160000000

$180000000

$200000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 44 102017 404 PM

Figure 67 US Exports of Vehicles Engines and Parts to Rus sia US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Other parts and accessories of vehicles

Automotive tires and tubes

Bodies and chassis for passenger cars

Engines and engine parts (carburetors pistonsrings and valves)

Trucks buses and special purpose vehicles

Passenger cars new and used

$2500000000

$2000000000

$1500000000

$500000000

$-

$1000000000

Figure 68 US Exports of Medicinal Equipment to Rus sia US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

$10000000

$15000000

$20000000

$25000000

$30000000

$35000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 45 102017 404 PM

Figure 610 US Exports to Rus sia by States (2016 US$ Value) Million US$ 2013ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoState and Metropolitan Area Trade Datardquo

Iowa Kentucky

North Dakota

Oklahoma

South Carolina

Washington

0

$500

$1000

$1500

$2000

2013 2014 2015 2016

District of Columbia

Iowa

Kentucky

North Dakota

Oklahoma

South Carolina

Washington

Figure 69 US Exports of Excavating Machinery to Rus sia US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

0

$5000000

$10000000

$15000000

$20000000

$25000000

$30000000

$35000000

$40000000

$45000000

$50000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 46 102017 404 PM

47

Upon reviewing the current trend in US- Russia economic relations we must acknowledge that

the existing trade model is obsolete and exhausted Imports are resource- oriented and reflect

constraints of the Rus sian economic structure while five groups of goodsmdash oil metals nuclear

fuels fertilizers and fishmdash make up more than 90 percent of total imports from Rus sia (Figure 71)

Each of these industries has a limited capacity for growth in the foreseeable future

Rus siarsquos core export to the United Statesmdash oilmdash will inevitably decrease in the mid- term under any

scenario The value and volume of Rus sian exports to the United States are open to global market

volatility and po liti cal pressures with limited hedging mechanisms

Overall US exports to Rus sia are unsustainable due to bilateral po liti cal tensions the whims of

commodity markets and changing domestic policies Sanctions and counter- sanctions have

created additional barriers particularly in finance banking high- tech energy and agro- business

According to the American Chamber of Commerce 69 percent of US companies working in the

country consider the impact of US sanctions against Rus sia on their business as negative At the

same time 60 percent of companies do not expect big changes in business relations between

Rus sia and the United States under Trump1 as the new law codifies existing sanctions fortifies

them and extends them to new sectors

Current US investments are low due to the weak rule of law in Rus sia a lack of property right

protections and proper contract enforcement high levels of statization and monopolization in the

economy a poor business climate outdated capital stock dependence on natural- resource

sectors and of course sanction and counter- sanction mea sures Bloated administrative compo-

nents created as risk mitigation instruments have also served as impediments The countryrsquos

institutional weakness low level of productivity bud get constraints and a declining inflexible

workforce will restrain future economic growth even if commodity prices recover Rus sian eco-

nomic policy will likely continue to be statist and protectionist relying mostly on import

substitutions

1 Ibid 11

Existing Trends and Future Scenarios

07

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 47 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations48

What scenarios can be expected in such a challenging environment

One probability (no peace no war) is based on the assumption that matters will not deteriorate

further and implementation of the Sanctions Act will be cursory This will cause relatively slow

degradation in the economic field with occasional flashes of activity in selected areas (eg closer

cooperation against Islamist terrorist groups in Syria)

A second worse case or critical scenario is the intensive and full- scale execution of current sanc-

tion legislation and even the imposition of new economic punitive and restrictive mea sures which

could incite asymmetric retaliatory actions and lead to the introduction of additional protectionist

policies This in turn could trigger a further escalation of mutual confrontation and could eventu-

ally destroy the fundamentals of the current bilateral trade system Rus sian leadership has charac-

terized the Sanctions Act as a declaration of a trade war that ends all hope for improving bilateral

relations2

2 Дмитрий Медведев ldquoПодписание президентом США нового санкционного закона против России создает несколько

последствийrdquo [The US Presidentrsquos signing of the package of new sanctions against Rus sia will have a few conse-

quences] Facebook August 2 2017 https wwwfacebook com Dmitry Medvedev posts 10154587161801851

Figure 71 US Imports from Rus sia Share of Oil Metals Nuclear Fuel Fertilizers and Fish Million US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

93

94

93

94

95

96

93

92

87

89

0

$5000

$10000

$15000

$20000

$25000

$30000

$35000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

US Imports from Russia

Share of Oil Metals Nuclear FuelFertilizers and Fish

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 48 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 49

The best case and most favorable scenario looks less probable now It assumes the realization of

structural reforms in Rus sia in such a way that would adapt Rus siarsquos foreign policy to national

economic needs reduce confrontations with the West and make a concerted efort to integrate

Rus sian businesses into global supply and value chains A revitalization of the structural reform

agendamdash including eforts to diversify economic activities through de- monopolization and support

for SMEs a restructuring of the banking sector the creation of a vibrant business climate to foster

entrepreneurships and innovation the implementation of administrative and judicial reforms to

tackle red tape and endemic corruption and the reduction of state control over key sectors of the

economy via wide- spread privatization could kick- start the development of a nonoil economy and

improve long- term growth prospects Despite ongoing discussion of reform strategies deep

economic and po liti cal changes are extremely complicated over the next po liti calelectoral cycle

(2018ndash2024) particularly because of re sis tance of vested interests and growing commodity prices

The urgency to tackle structural shortcomings in natu ral resource- dependent economies usually

correlates with the price of those resources and the degree to which resource rents drive eco-

nomic activity However there may be marginal improvements in the efficiency of the current

economic system

Future US- Russia relations can be thought of through three pillars one pillar focuses on areas

where both countries maintain a competitive rivalry another looks at potential areas of interaction

under pres ent conditions a third pillar and one that has evaporated from the current bilateral

agenda concentrates on future cooperation Stronger economic ties could not only be a kind of

po liti cal shock absorber but contribute to the building of this future (particularly business contacts

aim to support future structural reforms) although po liti cal factors are depressing the prospects

for cooperation To escape deadlock it will be impor tant to establish the right balance between

politics and economics and create a model of collaboration within the framework of contention

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 49 102017 404 PM

About the Author

Vadim Grishin PhD MBA has been involved in the reform pro cess in Rus sia as adviser to the

deputy prime minister of Rus sia in 1992ndash1993 and 2006ndash2010 He has extensive experience

working with the Bretton Woods Institutions He was the board member of the World Bank Group

and served as se nior adviser at the International Monetary Fund Currently he is a con sul tant to the

chief economistrsquos office of the International Finance Corporation and teaches the economics of

transition at Georgetown University in Washington DC

50

594-71613_ch99_4Pindd 50 102017 403 PM

Blank

COVER PHOTO ADOBE STOCK

1616 Rhode Island Avenue NW

Washington DC 20036

202 887 0200 | wwwcsisorg

v++ISBN 978-1-4422-8035-9

Lanham bull Boulder bull New York bull London

4501 Forbes Boulevard

Lanham MD 20706

301 459 3366 | wwwrowmancom

A U T H O R

Vadim Grishin

Myths and Realities

A Report of the

CSIS RUSSIA AND EURASIA PROGRAM

US-RussiaEconomicRelations

O C T O B E R 2 0 1 7

Euml|xHSLEOCy280359z

The Man Pupu Nyor Rock Formations at the Northern Urals also known as Seven

Strong Man or Little Mountain of the God in the local tribe (Mansi) language

Page 30: U.S.-Russia Economic Relations: Myths and Realities · 2020-04-17 · OCTOBER 2017 U.S.- Russia Economic Relations Myths and Realities AUTHOR Vadim Grishin A REPORT OF THE CSIS RUSSIA

US-Russia Economic Relations24

the Organ ization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) crude oil exports from Rus sia and

the Caspian region to the United States will dis appear by 20255

So why does the Rus sian Urals blend continue to be attractive for oil traders and US refineries

which could pro cess greater volumes of domestically produced lighter crude There are two main

reasons One is related to the preference of US high conversion refineries (the most sophisticated

in the world) to work with heavy oil blends produced by Canada Mexico Iraq Venezuela and

Rus sia Pro cessing heavy crude now is as profitable as pro cessing lighter crude The so- called

crack spreadmdash the diference between the cost of relatively cheap heavy crude oil and the final

price of value- added consumer products (diesel gasoline jet fuel and heating oil)mdash has become

the same as the refinery margins of light sweet crude6 This has primarily afected light oil produc-

ing countries such as Angola Algeria and Nigeria

5 OPEC World Oil Outlook 2016 306ndash309

6 ldquoHow Much for That Heavy Oilrdquo Oil Sands Magazine December 26 2015 https wwwoilsandsmagazine com

news 2015 12 26 how - much - for - that - heavy - oil

Figure 53 US Imports from Rus sia Oil and Petroleum Products US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

$-

$25000000000

$20000000000

$15000000000

$10000000000

$5000000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Liquefied petroleum gases

Petroleum products other

Fuel oil

Crude oil

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 24 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 25

Another factor afecting purchase of Rus sian oil is a new trend among oil companies for further

consolidation of scale and for integrating operations of upstream and downstream business7

There have been several waves of separation and unification of production transportation and

pro cessing in the last 50 years The current business cycle can be seen as an adaptation to a

period of low prices and oversupply Companies that buy andor produce oil in Rus sia most likely

prefer to transport and pro cess this oil in their own modern refineries in the United States At the

same time some of the newest refinery designs specifically for pro cessing heavy oils have been

built in Asia thus extending the choices of heavy oil producing countries

We should also consider that leading US and international oil traders along with oil producing

companies working with or owning US refineries frequently buy Rus sian oil on the open market

and have long- term contracts on Rus sian crude oil delivery Many Rus sian oil companies prefer to

pay for purchases or ser vices with their future production instead of cash creating situations of

ldquostickyrdquo oil imports that are difficult to replace The best- known example is an interaction between

7 ldquoEnergy and Utilities Sectorrdquo Roundtable Financier Worldwide December 2015 https wwwfinancierworldwide

com roundtable - energy - utilities - sector - dec15

Figure 54 US Imports of Oil and Petroleum Products from Rus sia vs Oil Prices Eu rope Brent Spot Price Free on Board (FOB) 1996ndash2017

Source US EIA ldquoUS Imports by Country of Origin Rus siardquo

0

20

40

60

80

100

120

140

0

5000

10000

15000

20000

25000

30000

Jan

-19

96

Jun

-19

96

No

v-19

96

Ap

r-19

97

Sep

-19

97

Feb

-19

98

Jul-

199

8D

ec-1

99

8M

ay-1

99

9O

ct-1

99

9M

ar-2

00

0A

ug

-20

00

Jan

-20

01

Jun

-20

01

No

v-2

00

1A

pr-

20

02

Sep

-20

02

Feb

-20

03

Jul-

20

03

Dec

-20

03

May

-20

04

Oct

-20

04

Mar

-20

05

Au

g-2

00

5Ja

n-2

00

6Ju

n-2

00

6N

ov-

20

06

Ap

r-2

00

7Se

p-2

00

7Fe

b-2

00

8Ju

l-2

00

8D

ec-2

00

8M

ay-2

00

9O

ct-2

00

9M

ar-2

010

Au

g-2

010

Jan

-20

11Ju

n-2

011

No

v-2

011

Ap

r-2

012

Sep

-20

12Fe

b-2

013

Jul-

20

13D

ec-2

013

May

-20

14O

ct-2

014

Mar

-20

15A

ug

-20

15Ja

n-2

016

Jun

-20

16N

ov-

20

16

USD

per

Bar

rel

Th

ou

san

d B

arr

els

US Imports from Russia of Crude Oil and Petroleum Products (Thousand Barrels)

Europe Brent Spot Price FOB (Dollars per Barrel)

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 25 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations26

Table 56 US Oil Imports All Countries vs Rus sia Thousand Barrels per Day 2011ndash2016

Years 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

All Countries 11436 10598 9859 9241 9449 10058

Rus sia 624 477 460 330 371 433

Share 546 450 467 357 393 431

Sources US EIA ldquoUS Imports by Country of Origin Total Crude Oil and Productsrdquo Petroleum amp Other

Liquids September 13 2017 wwweia gov dnav pet pet_move_impcus_a2_nus_ep00_im0_mbbl_m htm

authorrsquos computation

Figure 55 US Imports from Rus sia Share of Crude Oil and Petroleum Products Million US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

57

64

73

72

74

73

72

59

52 50

0

$5000

$10000

$15000

$20000

$25000

$30000

$35000

$40000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

US Imports from Russia

Share of Oil and Petroleum Products

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 26 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 27

the Rus sian state mono poly Rosneft and commodity trading and mining giant Glencore which

along with energy and commodities com pany Vitol participated in a $10 billion prepayment

deal with Rosneft for crude supplies in 2013

There have been a number of ongoing transactions between the Rus sian oil industry and interna-

tional oil companies including several that top the list of importers of Rus sian oil to the United

States ( Table 57) In December 2016 Glencore participated in a controversial privatization opera-

tion purchasing in tandem with the Qatar sovereign wealth fund a 195 percent stake in Rosneft

which was on the US and EU list of sanctioned firms8 Glencore has also taken a blocking stake in

midsize oil producer RussNeft BP owns a 1975 percent stake in Rosneft Chevron holds a

15 percent interest in the 935- mile- long CPC9 pipeline which transports an average of 959000

barrels of crude oil per day including 76000 barrels daily from Rus sia10 ExxonMobil has formed

8 E Mazneva and I Arkhipov ldquoRus sia Sells $11 Billion Stake in Rosneft to Glencore Qatarrdquo Bloomberg December 7

2016

9 CPCthinsp=thinspCaspian Pipeline Consortium

10 ldquoRus sia Highlights of Operations and Business Portfoliordquo Chevron accessed October 3 2017 https wwwchevron

com worldwide russia

Figure 56 Share of Rus sian Oil in Total US Oil Imports Thousands of Barrels per Day 1972ndash2016

Source US EIA ldquoUS Imports by Country of Origin Total Crude Oil and Productsrdquo

2000

4000

6000

8000

10000

12000

14000

16000

US Imports of Crude Oil and Petroleum Products (Thousand Barrels per Day)

US Imports from Russia of Crude Oil and Petroleum Products (Thousand Barrels per Day)19

7319

7419

7519

7619

7719

7819

7919

80

198

119

82

198

319

84

198

519

86

198

719

88

198

919

90

199

119

92

199

319

94

199

519

96

199

719

98

199

92

00

02

00

12

00

22

00

32

00

42

00

52

00

62

00

72

00

82

00

92

010

20

112

012

20

132

014

20

152

016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 27 102017 404 PM

Table 57 Top Importers of Rus sian Oil to the United States Thousands of Barrels 2016

VALERO MARKETING amp SUPPLY CO 54590 3616

EXXONMOBIL OIL CORP 17087 1130

CHEVRON USA INC 15217 1008

BP WEST COAST PRODUCTS LLC 10130 671

GEORGE E WARREN CORP 7272 48

PAULSBORO REFINING CO LLC 6838 453

TESORO CORP 5097 338

VITOL INC 5084 337

PHILLIPS 66 CO 4726 313

TRAFIGURA AG 4360 289

PAR HAWAII REFINING LLC 3893 258

MOTIVA ENTERPRISES LLC 3041 205

SHELL US TRADING CO 2863 19

MARATHON PETROLEUM CO LLC 2475 16

ATLANTIC TRADING amp MARKETING 2099 14

FREEPOINT COMMODITIES LLC 1439 1

GLENCORE LTD 1284 85

BEST PETROLEUM CORP 967 64

ROLYMPUS US COMMODITIES GROUP LLC 822 6

HUNT CRUDE OIL SUPPLY CO 666 4

GULF OIL LP 658 4

Source US EIA ldquoUS Imports by Country of Origin Crude Oilrdquo Petroleum amp Other Liquids September 13

2017 httpswwweiagovdnavpetpet_move_impcus_a2_nus_epc0_im0_mbblpd_ahtm authorrsquos

computation

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 28 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 29

several joint ventures with Rosneft to undertake ofshore exploration in the Black Sea and the Kara

Sea in Siberia11

According to the Sanctions Act US persons are prohibited from exporting or reexporting goods

ser vices (except financial ser vices) and technology in support of exploration or production of new

deep- water Arctic ofshore or shale oil proj ects that involve designated Rus sian entities or other

entities in which such sanctioned persons have a controlling interest or a substantial noncontrol-

ling owner ship interest defined as not less than 33 percent (previously it was 50 percent) The new

law also authorizesmdash but does not requiremdash the imposition of so- called secondary sanctions

against non- US entities that engage in activities involving the construction maintenance or

expansion of Rus sian energy export pipelines with a fair market value of $1 million or more or an

aggregate fair market value during a 12- month period of $5 million12 This provision has raised the

concerns of some Eu ro pean countries particularly Germany As result the final language of the

law included wording about coordination of this issue with allies of the United States

Shipments of Rus sian oil to the United States could be afected by activity in the US refinery

industry In early 2017 Saudi Aramco bought the United Statesrsquo largest oil refinery in Port Arthur

(Texas) and it announced plans to send more of its own crude to that refinery13 Serious concerns

exist however regarding the future of three refineries and nine pipelines owned by Citgo a US

branch of the Venezuelan state com pany PdVSA which is balancing precariously on the edge of

default Under certain conditions in the event of PdVSA bankruptcy Rosneft could claim a stake of

up to 499 percent in Citgo Such a possibility has raised concerns among politicians and US

government officials with Trea sury Secretary Steven Mnuchin calling it a ldquonational security issuerdquo14

Tables 58 59 and 510 show allocations of Rus sian oil imports to major US refineries some of

which work exclusively on Rus sian crude a total of two to three months per year In total 150940

thousand barrels of Rus sian oil were refined in 2016

Figure 57 confirms a leading position of Texas and Louisiana among the US states receiving

Rus sian crude followed by New Jersey California Mississippi Washington Hawaii and Delaware

In a paradoxical way Texas has dis appeared from the list of states as a main destination of US

imports from Rus sia (Figure 58) because Rus sian crude is mostly delivered to Louisiana ports and

registered there by US Customs as an import from Rus sia After that it transports to refineries in

Louisiana and Texas

Overall the short- term business rationale behind the sustainability of US oil imports from Rus sia

cannot overcome strong headwinds in the US energy sector facing all oil importers which will

inevitably lead to a contraction of Rus sian oil exports to the United States in the foreseeable future

11 Exxon eforts to receive a special US Trea sury waiver to drill in sanctioned Rus sia failed in 2017

12 Countering Amer i carsquos Adversaries through Sanctions Act HR 3364

13 Sarp Ozkan ldquoSaudi Aramcorsquos Port Arthur Refinery and the US Refinery Fleetrdquo Drilling Info May 11 2017

https infodrillinginfo com saudi - aramcos - port - arthur - refinery - us - refinery - fleet

14 Graham Kates ldquoTrea sury Secretary Rus siarsquos Citgo Deal a National Security Issuerdquo CBS News May 1 2017

http wwwcbsnews com news rosneft - citgo - steven - mnuchin - national - security

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 29 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations30

Table 58 Valerorsquos Refineries Pro cessing Rus sian Oil Thousands of Barrels 2016

Saint Charles Louisiana 29206 535

Corpus Christi Texas 20626 378

Wilmington California 4250 78

Total USA 54590 100

Source US EIA ldquoRefinery Capacity Reportrdquo January 1 2017

table 5 wwweia gov petroleum refinerycapacity table5 pdf

authorrsquos computation

Table 59 ExxonMobil Refineries Pro cessing Rus sian Oil Thousands of Barrels 2016

Baytown Texas 15037 88

Baton Rouge Louisiana 2046 12

Total USA 17083 100

Source US EIA ldquoRefinery Capacity Reportrdquo authorrsquos computation

Table 510 Chevronrsquos Refineries Pro cessing Rus sian Oil Thousands of Barrels 2016

Pascagoula Mississippi 12767 840

El Segundo California 2372 155

Saint Rose Louisiana 78 05

Total USA 15217 100

Source US EIA ldquoRefinery Capacity Reportrdquo authorrsquos computation

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 30 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 31

HEAVY METAL

Taken together US imports of metals and US imports of oil compose about 80 percent of US

total imports from Rus sia (Figure 59) Trade of metals like other commodities is strongly afected

by market price fluctuations Nevertheless metal imports from Rus sia have been fairly resilient to

market volatility and their average annual value has hovered at about $4 billion in the last five years

(Figure 510) This market resilience was forged at the end of the 1990searly 2000s when Rus sian

metal producers gradually modernized their plants adjusting quality of production to Western

standards and enhancing integration into global value and supply chains Some of them conquered

their share of the highly competitive US market struggling with peers from Canada and certain

BRICS countries (China India and Brazil) To attract additional resources all Rus sian large metal-

producing companies became public and were listed on stock exchanges chiefly the London Stock

Exchange (Severstalrsquo PAO Evraz MMK OAO Novolipetsk Steel Norilsk Nikel and TMK PAO) one

on the New York Stock Exchange (Mechel) and one on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange (Rusal)

Business logic pushed some of them to invest in the US metal- making industry which was hit

hard by crisis Later on some of those assets were sold (eg two US steel mills acquired by

Severstal in 2004 were purchased 10 years later by Steel Dynamics Inc and AK Steel Corp)

Figure 57 Share of US States Rus sian Oil Imports 2016

Source US EIA ldquoUS Imports from Rus sia of Crude Oil and Petroleum Productsrdquo Petroleum amp Other

Liquids September 29 2017 https www eia gov dnav pet hist LeafHandler ashx nshy=shyPETampsshy=shyMTTIM _ NUS

- NRS _ 1ampfshy=shyM authorrsquos computation

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

100

Maine

Massachusetts

Maryland

Connecticut

Georgia

Rhode Island

Virginia

Florida

New York

Alabama

Puerto Rico

Pennsylvania

Delaware

Hawaii

Washington

Mississippi

California

New Jersey

Louisiana

Texas

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 31 102017 404 PM

Figure 58 US Imports from Rus sia by State Million US$ 2013ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoState and Metropolitan Area Trade Datardquo Foreign Trade last modified

October 2 2017 https wwwcensus gov foreign - trade statistics state

Alaska

Connecticut

Delaware

Hawaii

Louisiana

Maryland

North Dakota 0

$1000

$2000

$3000

$4000

$5000

$6000

2013 2014 2015 2016

Alabama

Alaska

Connecticut

Delaware

Hawaii

Louisiana

Maryland

Maine

Mississippi

Montana

North Dakota

Mississippi

Figure 59 US Imports from Rus sia Share of Oil and Metals Million US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 1992ndash2016)

83

82

85

86

87

88

85

82

7375

0

$5000

$10000

$15000

$20000

$25000

$30000

$35000

$40000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

US Imports from Russia

Share of Oil and Metals

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 32 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 33

Obviously the market dynamic of dif er ent metals varies (eg iron steel aluminum platinum and

nickel) Caps to increase their trade and production in a ldquored oceanrdquo global environment with

anemic demand is rather limited despite Figure 510 showing a spike of iron and steel imports

from Rus sia in 2014 and aluminum in 2016 Some opportunities may exist for Russian- owned steel

plants in the United States (such as NLMK) to participate in energy proj ects resumed under Presi-

dent Trump who has required that new pipelines use only American- made steel15

Rus sia occupies a special niche in the US market for titanium products a high- end metal indus-

try Twenty years ago a long- term contract was signed between Rus sian titanium producer

VSMPO- AVISMA and Boeing The Rus sian com pany entered the selective club of Boeing suppliers

for the manufacture of components and semi- finished products Since the signing of this contract

VSMPO has delivered more than 35 percent of all titanium placed on Boeing civil aircraft16 They

are hidden in the trade data in an import category for Civilian Aircrafts and Parts (Figure 511) At

the end of 2016 Boeing announced an extension of its framework agreement with AVISMA

15 E Scheyder C Ngai and T Sylvester ldquoAmerican Steel Unlikely to Get Keystone Boost Despite Trump Orderrdquo

Reuters January 27 2017 http wwwreuters com article usa - trump - pipeline - transcanada - idUSL1N1FH1ZD

16 A Kramer ldquoTitanium Fills Vital Role for Boeing and Rus siardquo New York Times July 5 2013 http wwwnytimes com

2013 07 06 business global titanium - fills - vital - role - for - boeing - and - russia html mcubzshy=shy3

Figure 510 US Imports from Rus sia Iron Steel Bauxite Aluminum Nickel Nonferrous Metals and Other Precious Metals and Materials US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 1992ndash2016)

0

$6000000000

$5000000000

$4000000000

$3000000000

$2000000000

$1000000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 20122013

20142015

2016

Finished metal shapes

Iron and steel advanced

Iron and steel products nec

Nonferrous metals other

Other precious metals

Nickel

Bauxite and aluminum

Iron and steel mill products

Steelmaking materials

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 33 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations34

through 2022 and additional investments in the construction of a new robotic plant in Titanium

Valley a special economic zone located in the Sverdlovsk region that will open in 2018 The pro-

cessing of titanium forgings in all Boeing civil aircraft will be performed there including 787s 737

MAXs and 777Xs17 The contract extension with AVISMA may add several hundred million dollars

in value to annual US imports from Rus sia

How can such heavy reliance on imports of Rus sian titanium exist during a period of rising geopo-

liti cal tensions The answer is straightforward VSMPO- AVISMA is a highly specialized natu ral

mono poly producing 45 percent of the worldrsquos aerospace titanium Only four other countries

smelt high- grade titanium in industrial quantities the United States Germany Japan and China

Overall global production capacity is limited while demand is growing The United States cur-

rently imports around 79 percent of all the titanium it consumes each year18

17 ldquoBoeing and VSMPO Avisma to Launch Second Joint Production Siterdquo Rus sian Aviation Insider December 22 2016

http wwwrusaviainsider com boeing - and - vsmpo - avisma - to - launch - second - joint - production - site

18 Jon Ostrower and Andy Pasztor ldquoBoeing United Technologies Stockpile Titanium Partsrdquo Wall Street Journal

August 7 2014 https wwwwsj com articles boeing - united - technologies - stockpiling - titanium - parts - 1407441886

Figure 511 US Imports from Rus sia Civilian Aircrafts and Parts US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 1992ndash2016)

0

$20000000

$40000000

$60000000

$80000000

$100000000

$120000000

$140000000

$160000000

$180000000

$200000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Parts-civilian aircraft

Civilian aircraft

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 34 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 35

The Sanctions Act authorizes the secretary of the trea sury (in a nonmandatory way) to impose

restrictions (without specifying them) against Rus sian state- owned entities operating in the railway

metals and mining sectors of the Rus sian economy Despite the commanding heights of Rus siarsquos

state sector owner ship in its economy (70 percent of GDP) the metal- producing companies have

remained mostly in private hands

NUCLEAR AFFAIRS

Historically owners and operators of the 104 commercial nuclear power reactors in the United

States have purchased more than 80 percent of their uranium from foreign countries Uranium

shipping from Rus sia accounted for about 13 percent of the 58 million pounds of uranium pur-

chased overseas in 201219 At the same time the Rus sian state- owned mono poly Rosatom ac-

counts for 20 percent of Kazakhstanrsquos uranium production (which in turn comprises 11 percent of

all US uranium imports) and 20 percent of US domestic uranium production capacity (with

owner ship of exploration tracts in Wyoming)20

Nuclear fuel and nuclear power continue to be po liti cally sensitive topics both in the United

States and Rus sia Bilateral cooperation in this sector (being surprisingly stable with imports of

nuclear fuel from Rus sia at a level of $1 billion annually in the last five years [Figure 512 and 513])

is under constant po liti cal and lobbying pressure and has been a source of several po liti cal scan-

dals21 Consequently upside risks in this area of interaction are minimal and downside risks are

much higher especially when we are seeing more decommissioning of nuclear plants in the

United States than new constructions The US EIArsquos 2017 Annual Energy Outlook assumes

that about 25 percent of the nuclear capacity now operating will be removed from ser vice

by 205022

WHY IS THE GRASS GREENER ON THE OTHER SIDE

The United States continues to significantly reduce imports of chemical fertilizers as domestic pro-

duction increases In 2016 the United States imported 13 percent less ammonia and 11 percent

less urea and UAN which is a liquid urea and ammonium nitrate fertilizer Rus sia accounts for

around 40 percent of UAN imported by the United States The United States canceled antidumping

duties on imports of ammonium nitrate and urea from Rus sia in 2016 but it did not prevent import

19 US EIA ldquoThe US Relies on Foreign Uranium Enrichment Ser vices to Fuel Its Nuclear Power Plantsrdquo Today in

Energy August 28 2013 https wwweia gov todayinenergy detail php idshy=shy1273

20 Colin Chilcoat ldquoDoes Rus sia Really Own 20 Percent of the USrsquo Uranium Reservesrdquo OilPricecom May 6 2015

http oilpricecom Alternative - Energy Nuclear - Power Does - Russia - Really - Own - 20 - Of - The - US - Uranium - Reserves

html

21 Michelle Ye Hee Lee ldquoThe Facts behind Trumprsquos Repeated Claim about Hillary Clintonrsquos Role in the Rus sian Ura-

nium Dealrdquo Washington Post October 26 2016

22 US EIA ldquoAnnual Energy Outlook 2017 with Projections to 2050rdquo 81ndash82

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 35 102017 404 PM

Figure 512 US Imports from Rus sia Share of Oil Metals and Nuclear Fuel Million US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 1992ndash2016)

87

86

90

90

90

91

88

86

7882

0

$5000

$10000

$15000

$20000

$25000

$30000

$35000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

US Imports from Russia

Share of Oil Metals and Nuclear Fuel

Figure 513 US Imports from Rus sia Nuclear Fuel Materials US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

$-

$200000000

$400000000

$600000000

$800000000

$1200000000

$1000000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 36 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 37

drops twice last year (Figures 514 and 515) According to forecasts UAN imports are expected to

decline further to 15 million tons this year down over 46 percent from 28 million tons imported

last year23 The downside trend in imports of fertilizers will likely continue because of oversupply

BIG FISH

US imports of fish and shellfish from Rus sia are best understood in comparison with US fish

exports to the Rus sian market which slipped to zero in August 2014 after Rus sia issued an order

banning certain agricultural imports from the United States (Figure 516) While the volume of US

supply was not very large it was impor tant because it broke up the monopolistic dominance of a

few vertically integrated Rus sian companies that have kept prices high by restricting the entry of

new producers Seeking to implement import substitution policies Rus sia has tried to reduce

exports as well as imports of fish and seafood products in the last couple of years This symmetri-

cal approach was intended to ldquocompensaterdquo for a decrease of fish products in the domestic

23 Deepika Thapliyal ldquoPotashCorp Forecasts Sharp Drop in US Nitrogen Imports in 2017rdquo ICIS News February 7

2017 https wwwicis com resources news 2017 02 07 10076734 potashcorp - forecasts - sharp - drop - in - us - nitrogen

- imports - in - 2017

Figure 514 US Imports from Rus sia Share of Oil Metals Nuclear Fuel and Fertilizers Million US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

90

93

92

93

94

95

92

91

85

86

0

$5000

$10000

$15000

$20000

$25000

$30000

$35000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

US Imports from Russia

Share of Oil Metals Nuclear Fuel and Fertilizers

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 37 102017 404 PM

Figure 515 US Imports from Rus sia Chemical- Fertilizers US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

S-

$200000000

$400000000

$600000000

$800000000

$1000000000

$1200000000

$1400000000

$1600000000

$1800000000

$2000000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Figure 516 US Exports to Rus sia Fish and Shellfish US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

0

$10000000

$20000000

$30000000

$40000000

$50000000

$60000000

$70000000

$80000000

$90000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Fish and shellfish

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 38 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 39

consumer market caused by Rus siarsquos import ban but it has failed As result the group most af-

fected by the self- imposed counter- sanctions were Rus sian consumers

With a significant drop in fish imports a devaluation of the ruble and inflationary pressures on

seafood prices yearly consumption of fish in Rus sia has declined precipitously In 2015 alone

fish prices increased 20 percent and consumption dropped to 14 kilograms per person24 from

22 kilograms in 201425 In 2016 food rose to 355 percent of house hold expenditure as a result of

increases in food prices26 This has pushed vertically integrated fishing monopolies to sell even

more of their catch abroad rather than deliver to the Rus sian Federation (Figure 517) Thus we

cannot exclude the possibility of further growth in US fish and shellfish imports from Rus sia on a

marginal scale

24 Александр Савельев ldquoПотребление рыбы в России упало до 14 кг на человекаrdquo [Fish consumption in Rus sia fell to

14 kg per person] Экономика Интерфакс January 28 2015 http wwwinterfax ru business 492038

25 Илья Шестаков ldquoПотебление рыбы в России снизилось на 10 процентов из- за роста ценrdquo [Fish consumption in

Rus sia dropped by 10 percent due to price increases] RNS March 8 2017 https rnsonline consumer - market

Potreblenie - ribi - v - Rossii - snizilos - na - 10 - iz - za - rosta - tsen - 2017 - 03 - 08

26 Zoya Sheftalovich and Christian Oliver ldquoRus siarsquos Boom (Farming) Economyrdquo Politico November 8 2016 http

wwwpolitico eu article russias - boom - farming - economy

Figure 517 US Imports from Rus sia Fish and Shellfish US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

0

$50000000

$100000000

$150000000

$200000000

$250000000

$300000000

$350000000

$400000000

$450000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 39 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations40

SPACE ODYSSEY

Among high- end products beyond the top five groups of goods imported from Rus sia cheap and

efficient Rus sian engines have been used to launch US rockets into space for about 16 years

(Figure 518) There was a serious po liti cal strug gle around a 2014 ban on the purchase of Rus sian

RD-180 rocket engines revealing the conflicting business interests of power ful high- tech companies

This restrictive mea sure was temporary and was quickly lifted because of significant cost impacts

and risks of disruption to launch schedules27 For the same reason the Sanctions Act does not autho-

rize ldquothe imposition of any sanction or other condition limitation restriction or prohibition that

directly or indirectly impedes the supply by any entity of the Rus sian Federation of any product or

ser vice or the procurement of such product or ser vice by any contractor or subcontractor of the

United States or any other entity relating to or in connection with any space launch conducted for

the National Aeronautics and Space Administration or any other nonndash Department of Defense

customerrdquo28

Nevertheless many experts believe that US domestic alternatives to replace Rus sian engines will

be viable in five to eight years

27 Ken Dilanian ldquoWhy Does the US Use Rus sian Rockets to Launch Its Satellitesrdquo NBC News updated November 15

2016 http wwwnbcnews com why - does - u - s - use - russian - rockets - launch - its - satellites - n588526

28 Countering Amer i carsquos Adversaries through Sanctions Act HR 3364

Figure 518 Spacecraft Excluding Military US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

0

$20000000

$40000000

$60000000

$80000000

$100000000

$120000000

$140000000

$160000000

$180000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 40 102017 404 PM

41

Diversity and technological complexity are the most vis i ble advantages supporting US exports to

Rus sia Three major groups of export goods include civilian aircraft engines and parts (Figure 61)

drilling and oil field equipment (Figure 62) and industrial machines and engines (Figure 63)

Despite sanctions against the transfer of advanced oil producing and pro cessing technologies the

realization of US drilling and oil field equipment in Rus sia is sustainable although some bilateral

proj ects have been frozen

Another category of goods that has demonstrated resilience is the phar ma ceu ti cal industry (Fig-

ure 64) because most drugs in Rus sia are imported (about 70 percent of the Rus sian phar ma ceu-

ti cal market in value) Import substitution policies have had only modest results in this industry

As confirmed by American Chamber of Commerce surveys US exports to Rus sia are closely

connected to US FDI 30 percent of total imports of US companies working in the Rus sian

market come from the United States (more than $2 billion in 2016) In other words about

40 percent of all US exports to Rus sia are related to a US corporate- sector business pro cess in

the country The major sectors of activity of these companies are energy and natu ral resources

(52 percent) manufacturing (17 percent) information and communications technology or ICT

(13 percent) retail (7 percent) automotive industry (6 percent) phar ma ceu ti cal production

(1 percent) professional ser vices (05 percent) and other (2 percent)1

Some obvious constraints on US exports to Rus sia have resulted from a reduction in demand A

deterioration of bilateral relations and implementation of sanctions and counter- sanctions have

directly or indirectly afected all businesses Figures 65 and 66 provide data regarding a dramatic

drop in the sale of US agricultural production in Rus sia with all other categories of exports in

goods showing big cuts as well (see Figures 67ndash69)

Exports of civilian aircraft engines and parts put the state of Washington in first place among

other states as a leading exporter to the Rus sian market (Figure 610)

1 American Chamber of Commerce in Rus sia ldquoInvestment and Import to Rus sia 2nd Surveyrdquo 13

Diversity and Constraints

06

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 41 102017 404 PM

Figure 61 US Exports of Civilian Aircraft Engines Equipment and Parts to Rus sia US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

$2500000000

$2000000000

$1500000000

$1000000000

$500000000

$-

Figure 62 US Exports of Drilling and Oil Field Equipment US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

0

$5000000

$10000000

$15000000

$20000000

$25000000

$30000000

$35000000

$40000000

$45000000

$50000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 42 102017 404 PM

Figure 63 US Exports of Industrial Engines to Rus sia US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

0

$5000000

$10000000

$15000000

$20000000

$25000000

$30000000

$35000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Figure 64 US Exports of Phar ma ceu ti cal Preparations to Rus sia US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

0

$5000000

$10000000

$15000000

$20000000

$25000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 43 102017 404 PM

Figure 65 US Exports of Meat and Poultry to Rus sia US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Meat poultry etc

$1000000000

$800000000

$600000000

$400000000

$200000000

$-

$1200000000

$1400000000

$1600000000

Figure 66 US Exports of Soybeans to Rus sia US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

0

$20000000

$40000000

$60000000

$80000000

$100000000

$120000000

$140000000

$160000000

$180000000

$200000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 44 102017 404 PM

Figure 67 US Exports of Vehicles Engines and Parts to Rus sia US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Other parts and accessories of vehicles

Automotive tires and tubes

Bodies and chassis for passenger cars

Engines and engine parts (carburetors pistonsrings and valves)

Trucks buses and special purpose vehicles

Passenger cars new and used

$2500000000

$2000000000

$1500000000

$500000000

$-

$1000000000

Figure 68 US Exports of Medicinal Equipment to Rus sia US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

$10000000

$15000000

$20000000

$25000000

$30000000

$35000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 45 102017 404 PM

Figure 610 US Exports to Rus sia by States (2016 US$ Value) Million US$ 2013ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoState and Metropolitan Area Trade Datardquo

Iowa Kentucky

North Dakota

Oklahoma

South Carolina

Washington

0

$500

$1000

$1500

$2000

2013 2014 2015 2016

District of Columbia

Iowa

Kentucky

North Dakota

Oklahoma

South Carolina

Washington

Figure 69 US Exports of Excavating Machinery to Rus sia US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

0

$5000000

$10000000

$15000000

$20000000

$25000000

$30000000

$35000000

$40000000

$45000000

$50000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 46 102017 404 PM

47

Upon reviewing the current trend in US- Russia economic relations we must acknowledge that

the existing trade model is obsolete and exhausted Imports are resource- oriented and reflect

constraints of the Rus sian economic structure while five groups of goodsmdash oil metals nuclear

fuels fertilizers and fishmdash make up more than 90 percent of total imports from Rus sia (Figure 71)

Each of these industries has a limited capacity for growth in the foreseeable future

Rus siarsquos core export to the United Statesmdash oilmdash will inevitably decrease in the mid- term under any

scenario The value and volume of Rus sian exports to the United States are open to global market

volatility and po liti cal pressures with limited hedging mechanisms

Overall US exports to Rus sia are unsustainable due to bilateral po liti cal tensions the whims of

commodity markets and changing domestic policies Sanctions and counter- sanctions have

created additional barriers particularly in finance banking high- tech energy and agro- business

According to the American Chamber of Commerce 69 percent of US companies working in the

country consider the impact of US sanctions against Rus sia on their business as negative At the

same time 60 percent of companies do not expect big changes in business relations between

Rus sia and the United States under Trump1 as the new law codifies existing sanctions fortifies

them and extends them to new sectors

Current US investments are low due to the weak rule of law in Rus sia a lack of property right

protections and proper contract enforcement high levels of statization and monopolization in the

economy a poor business climate outdated capital stock dependence on natural- resource

sectors and of course sanction and counter- sanction mea sures Bloated administrative compo-

nents created as risk mitigation instruments have also served as impediments The countryrsquos

institutional weakness low level of productivity bud get constraints and a declining inflexible

workforce will restrain future economic growth even if commodity prices recover Rus sian eco-

nomic policy will likely continue to be statist and protectionist relying mostly on import

substitutions

1 Ibid 11

Existing Trends and Future Scenarios

07

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 47 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations48

What scenarios can be expected in such a challenging environment

One probability (no peace no war) is based on the assumption that matters will not deteriorate

further and implementation of the Sanctions Act will be cursory This will cause relatively slow

degradation in the economic field with occasional flashes of activity in selected areas (eg closer

cooperation against Islamist terrorist groups in Syria)

A second worse case or critical scenario is the intensive and full- scale execution of current sanc-

tion legislation and even the imposition of new economic punitive and restrictive mea sures which

could incite asymmetric retaliatory actions and lead to the introduction of additional protectionist

policies This in turn could trigger a further escalation of mutual confrontation and could eventu-

ally destroy the fundamentals of the current bilateral trade system Rus sian leadership has charac-

terized the Sanctions Act as a declaration of a trade war that ends all hope for improving bilateral

relations2

2 Дмитрий Медведев ldquoПодписание президентом США нового санкционного закона против России создает несколько

последствийrdquo [The US Presidentrsquos signing of the package of new sanctions against Rus sia will have a few conse-

quences] Facebook August 2 2017 https wwwfacebook com Dmitry Medvedev posts 10154587161801851

Figure 71 US Imports from Rus sia Share of Oil Metals Nuclear Fuel Fertilizers and Fish Million US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

93

94

93

94

95

96

93

92

87

89

0

$5000

$10000

$15000

$20000

$25000

$30000

$35000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

US Imports from Russia

Share of Oil Metals Nuclear FuelFertilizers and Fish

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 48 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 49

The best case and most favorable scenario looks less probable now It assumes the realization of

structural reforms in Rus sia in such a way that would adapt Rus siarsquos foreign policy to national

economic needs reduce confrontations with the West and make a concerted efort to integrate

Rus sian businesses into global supply and value chains A revitalization of the structural reform

agendamdash including eforts to diversify economic activities through de- monopolization and support

for SMEs a restructuring of the banking sector the creation of a vibrant business climate to foster

entrepreneurships and innovation the implementation of administrative and judicial reforms to

tackle red tape and endemic corruption and the reduction of state control over key sectors of the

economy via wide- spread privatization could kick- start the development of a nonoil economy and

improve long- term growth prospects Despite ongoing discussion of reform strategies deep

economic and po liti cal changes are extremely complicated over the next po liti calelectoral cycle

(2018ndash2024) particularly because of re sis tance of vested interests and growing commodity prices

The urgency to tackle structural shortcomings in natu ral resource- dependent economies usually

correlates with the price of those resources and the degree to which resource rents drive eco-

nomic activity However there may be marginal improvements in the efficiency of the current

economic system

Future US- Russia relations can be thought of through three pillars one pillar focuses on areas

where both countries maintain a competitive rivalry another looks at potential areas of interaction

under pres ent conditions a third pillar and one that has evaporated from the current bilateral

agenda concentrates on future cooperation Stronger economic ties could not only be a kind of

po liti cal shock absorber but contribute to the building of this future (particularly business contacts

aim to support future structural reforms) although po liti cal factors are depressing the prospects

for cooperation To escape deadlock it will be impor tant to establish the right balance between

politics and economics and create a model of collaboration within the framework of contention

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 49 102017 404 PM

About the Author

Vadim Grishin PhD MBA has been involved in the reform pro cess in Rus sia as adviser to the

deputy prime minister of Rus sia in 1992ndash1993 and 2006ndash2010 He has extensive experience

working with the Bretton Woods Institutions He was the board member of the World Bank Group

and served as se nior adviser at the International Monetary Fund Currently he is a con sul tant to the

chief economistrsquos office of the International Finance Corporation and teaches the economics of

transition at Georgetown University in Washington DC

50

594-71613_ch99_4Pindd 50 102017 403 PM

Blank

COVER PHOTO ADOBE STOCK

1616 Rhode Island Avenue NW

Washington DC 20036

202 887 0200 | wwwcsisorg

v++ISBN 978-1-4422-8035-9

Lanham bull Boulder bull New York bull London

4501 Forbes Boulevard

Lanham MD 20706

301 459 3366 | wwwrowmancom

A U T H O R

Vadim Grishin

Myths and Realities

A Report of the

CSIS RUSSIA AND EURASIA PROGRAM

US-RussiaEconomicRelations

O C T O B E R 2 0 1 7

Euml|xHSLEOCy280359z

The Man Pupu Nyor Rock Formations at the Northern Urals also known as Seven

Strong Man or Little Mountain of the God in the local tribe (Mansi) language

Page 31: U.S.-Russia Economic Relations: Myths and Realities · 2020-04-17 · OCTOBER 2017 U.S.- Russia Economic Relations Myths and Realities AUTHOR Vadim Grishin A REPORT OF THE CSIS RUSSIA

Vadim Grishin 25

Another factor afecting purchase of Rus sian oil is a new trend among oil companies for further

consolidation of scale and for integrating operations of upstream and downstream business7

There have been several waves of separation and unification of production transportation and

pro cessing in the last 50 years The current business cycle can be seen as an adaptation to a

period of low prices and oversupply Companies that buy andor produce oil in Rus sia most likely

prefer to transport and pro cess this oil in their own modern refineries in the United States At the

same time some of the newest refinery designs specifically for pro cessing heavy oils have been

built in Asia thus extending the choices of heavy oil producing countries

We should also consider that leading US and international oil traders along with oil producing

companies working with or owning US refineries frequently buy Rus sian oil on the open market

and have long- term contracts on Rus sian crude oil delivery Many Rus sian oil companies prefer to

pay for purchases or ser vices with their future production instead of cash creating situations of

ldquostickyrdquo oil imports that are difficult to replace The best- known example is an interaction between

7 ldquoEnergy and Utilities Sectorrdquo Roundtable Financier Worldwide December 2015 https wwwfinancierworldwide

com roundtable - energy - utilities - sector - dec15

Figure 54 US Imports of Oil and Petroleum Products from Rus sia vs Oil Prices Eu rope Brent Spot Price Free on Board (FOB) 1996ndash2017

Source US EIA ldquoUS Imports by Country of Origin Rus siardquo

0

20

40

60

80

100

120

140

0

5000

10000

15000

20000

25000

30000

Jan

-19

96

Jun

-19

96

No

v-19

96

Ap

r-19

97

Sep

-19

97

Feb

-19

98

Jul-

199

8D

ec-1

99

8M

ay-1

99

9O

ct-1

99

9M

ar-2

00

0A

ug

-20

00

Jan

-20

01

Jun

-20

01

No

v-2

00

1A

pr-

20

02

Sep

-20

02

Feb

-20

03

Jul-

20

03

Dec

-20

03

May

-20

04

Oct

-20

04

Mar

-20

05

Au

g-2

00

5Ja

n-2

00

6Ju

n-2

00

6N

ov-

20

06

Ap

r-2

00

7Se

p-2

00

7Fe

b-2

00

8Ju

l-2

00

8D

ec-2

00

8M

ay-2

00

9O

ct-2

00

9M

ar-2

010

Au

g-2

010

Jan

-20

11Ju

n-2

011

No

v-2

011

Ap

r-2

012

Sep

-20

12Fe

b-2

013

Jul-

20

13D

ec-2

013

May

-20

14O

ct-2

014

Mar

-20

15A

ug

-20

15Ja

n-2

016

Jun

-20

16N

ov-

20

16

USD

per

Bar

rel

Th

ou

san

d B

arr

els

US Imports from Russia of Crude Oil and Petroleum Products (Thousand Barrels)

Europe Brent Spot Price FOB (Dollars per Barrel)

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 25 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations26

Table 56 US Oil Imports All Countries vs Rus sia Thousand Barrels per Day 2011ndash2016

Years 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

All Countries 11436 10598 9859 9241 9449 10058

Rus sia 624 477 460 330 371 433

Share 546 450 467 357 393 431

Sources US EIA ldquoUS Imports by Country of Origin Total Crude Oil and Productsrdquo Petroleum amp Other

Liquids September 13 2017 wwweia gov dnav pet pet_move_impcus_a2_nus_ep00_im0_mbbl_m htm

authorrsquos computation

Figure 55 US Imports from Rus sia Share of Crude Oil and Petroleum Products Million US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

57

64

73

72

74

73

72

59

52 50

0

$5000

$10000

$15000

$20000

$25000

$30000

$35000

$40000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

US Imports from Russia

Share of Oil and Petroleum Products

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 26 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 27

the Rus sian state mono poly Rosneft and commodity trading and mining giant Glencore which

along with energy and commodities com pany Vitol participated in a $10 billion prepayment

deal with Rosneft for crude supplies in 2013

There have been a number of ongoing transactions between the Rus sian oil industry and interna-

tional oil companies including several that top the list of importers of Rus sian oil to the United

States ( Table 57) In December 2016 Glencore participated in a controversial privatization opera-

tion purchasing in tandem with the Qatar sovereign wealth fund a 195 percent stake in Rosneft

which was on the US and EU list of sanctioned firms8 Glencore has also taken a blocking stake in

midsize oil producer RussNeft BP owns a 1975 percent stake in Rosneft Chevron holds a

15 percent interest in the 935- mile- long CPC9 pipeline which transports an average of 959000

barrels of crude oil per day including 76000 barrels daily from Rus sia10 ExxonMobil has formed

8 E Mazneva and I Arkhipov ldquoRus sia Sells $11 Billion Stake in Rosneft to Glencore Qatarrdquo Bloomberg December 7

2016

9 CPCthinsp=thinspCaspian Pipeline Consortium

10 ldquoRus sia Highlights of Operations and Business Portfoliordquo Chevron accessed October 3 2017 https wwwchevron

com worldwide russia

Figure 56 Share of Rus sian Oil in Total US Oil Imports Thousands of Barrels per Day 1972ndash2016

Source US EIA ldquoUS Imports by Country of Origin Total Crude Oil and Productsrdquo

2000

4000

6000

8000

10000

12000

14000

16000

US Imports of Crude Oil and Petroleum Products (Thousand Barrels per Day)

US Imports from Russia of Crude Oil and Petroleum Products (Thousand Barrels per Day)19

7319

7419

7519

7619

7719

7819

7919

80

198

119

82

198

319

84

198

519

86

198

719

88

198

919

90

199

119

92

199

319

94

199

519

96

199

719

98

199

92

00

02

00

12

00

22

00

32

00

42

00

52

00

62

00

72

00

82

00

92

010

20

112

012

20

132

014

20

152

016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 27 102017 404 PM

Table 57 Top Importers of Rus sian Oil to the United States Thousands of Barrels 2016

VALERO MARKETING amp SUPPLY CO 54590 3616

EXXONMOBIL OIL CORP 17087 1130

CHEVRON USA INC 15217 1008

BP WEST COAST PRODUCTS LLC 10130 671

GEORGE E WARREN CORP 7272 48

PAULSBORO REFINING CO LLC 6838 453

TESORO CORP 5097 338

VITOL INC 5084 337

PHILLIPS 66 CO 4726 313

TRAFIGURA AG 4360 289

PAR HAWAII REFINING LLC 3893 258

MOTIVA ENTERPRISES LLC 3041 205

SHELL US TRADING CO 2863 19

MARATHON PETROLEUM CO LLC 2475 16

ATLANTIC TRADING amp MARKETING 2099 14

FREEPOINT COMMODITIES LLC 1439 1

GLENCORE LTD 1284 85

BEST PETROLEUM CORP 967 64

ROLYMPUS US COMMODITIES GROUP LLC 822 6

HUNT CRUDE OIL SUPPLY CO 666 4

GULF OIL LP 658 4

Source US EIA ldquoUS Imports by Country of Origin Crude Oilrdquo Petroleum amp Other Liquids September 13

2017 httpswwweiagovdnavpetpet_move_impcus_a2_nus_epc0_im0_mbblpd_ahtm authorrsquos

computation

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 28 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 29

several joint ventures with Rosneft to undertake ofshore exploration in the Black Sea and the Kara

Sea in Siberia11

According to the Sanctions Act US persons are prohibited from exporting or reexporting goods

ser vices (except financial ser vices) and technology in support of exploration or production of new

deep- water Arctic ofshore or shale oil proj ects that involve designated Rus sian entities or other

entities in which such sanctioned persons have a controlling interest or a substantial noncontrol-

ling owner ship interest defined as not less than 33 percent (previously it was 50 percent) The new

law also authorizesmdash but does not requiremdash the imposition of so- called secondary sanctions

against non- US entities that engage in activities involving the construction maintenance or

expansion of Rus sian energy export pipelines with a fair market value of $1 million or more or an

aggregate fair market value during a 12- month period of $5 million12 This provision has raised the

concerns of some Eu ro pean countries particularly Germany As result the final language of the

law included wording about coordination of this issue with allies of the United States

Shipments of Rus sian oil to the United States could be afected by activity in the US refinery

industry In early 2017 Saudi Aramco bought the United Statesrsquo largest oil refinery in Port Arthur

(Texas) and it announced plans to send more of its own crude to that refinery13 Serious concerns

exist however regarding the future of three refineries and nine pipelines owned by Citgo a US

branch of the Venezuelan state com pany PdVSA which is balancing precariously on the edge of

default Under certain conditions in the event of PdVSA bankruptcy Rosneft could claim a stake of

up to 499 percent in Citgo Such a possibility has raised concerns among politicians and US

government officials with Trea sury Secretary Steven Mnuchin calling it a ldquonational security issuerdquo14

Tables 58 59 and 510 show allocations of Rus sian oil imports to major US refineries some of

which work exclusively on Rus sian crude a total of two to three months per year In total 150940

thousand barrels of Rus sian oil were refined in 2016

Figure 57 confirms a leading position of Texas and Louisiana among the US states receiving

Rus sian crude followed by New Jersey California Mississippi Washington Hawaii and Delaware

In a paradoxical way Texas has dis appeared from the list of states as a main destination of US

imports from Rus sia (Figure 58) because Rus sian crude is mostly delivered to Louisiana ports and

registered there by US Customs as an import from Rus sia After that it transports to refineries in

Louisiana and Texas

Overall the short- term business rationale behind the sustainability of US oil imports from Rus sia

cannot overcome strong headwinds in the US energy sector facing all oil importers which will

inevitably lead to a contraction of Rus sian oil exports to the United States in the foreseeable future

11 Exxon eforts to receive a special US Trea sury waiver to drill in sanctioned Rus sia failed in 2017

12 Countering Amer i carsquos Adversaries through Sanctions Act HR 3364

13 Sarp Ozkan ldquoSaudi Aramcorsquos Port Arthur Refinery and the US Refinery Fleetrdquo Drilling Info May 11 2017

https infodrillinginfo com saudi - aramcos - port - arthur - refinery - us - refinery - fleet

14 Graham Kates ldquoTrea sury Secretary Rus siarsquos Citgo Deal a National Security Issuerdquo CBS News May 1 2017

http wwwcbsnews com news rosneft - citgo - steven - mnuchin - national - security

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 29 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations30

Table 58 Valerorsquos Refineries Pro cessing Rus sian Oil Thousands of Barrels 2016

Saint Charles Louisiana 29206 535

Corpus Christi Texas 20626 378

Wilmington California 4250 78

Total USA 54590 100

Source US EIA ldquoRefinery Capacity Reportrdquo January 1 2017

table 5 wwweia gov petroleum refinerycapacity table5 pdf

authorrsquos computation

Table 59 ExxonMobil Refineries Pro cessing Rus sian Oil Thousands of Barrels 2016

Baytown Texas 15037 88

Baton Rouge Louisiana 2046 12

Total USA 17083 100

Source US EIA ldquoRefinery Capacity Reportrdquo authorrsquos computation

Table 510 Chevronrsquos Refineries Pro cessing Rus sian Oil Thousands of Barrels 2016

Pascagoula Mississippi 12767 840

El Segundo California 2372 155

Saint Rose Louisiana 78 05

Total USA 15217 100

Source US EIA ldquoRefinery Capacity Reportrdquo authorrsquos computation

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 30 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 31

HEAVY METAL

Taken together US imports of metals and US imports of oil compose about 80 percent of US

total imports from Rus sia (Figure 59) Trade of metals like other commodities is strongly afected

by market price fluctuations Nevertheless metal imports from Rus sia have been fairly resilient to

market volatility and their average annual value has hovered at about $4 billion in the last five years

(Figure 510) This market resilience was forged at the end of the 1990searly 2000s when Rus sian

metal producers gradually modernized their plants adjusting quality of production to Western

standards and enhancing integration into global value and supply chains Some of them conquered

their share of the highly competitive US market struggling with peers from Canada and certain

BRICS countries (China India and Brazil) To attract additional resources all Rus sian large metal-

producing companies became public and were listed on stock exchanges chiefly the London Stock

Exchange (Severstalrsquo PAO Evraz MMK OAO Novolipetsk Steel Norilsk Nikel and TMK PAO) one

on the New York Stock Exchange (Mechel) and one on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange (Rusal)

Business logic pushed some of them to invest in the US metal- making industry which was hit

hard by crisis Later on some of those assets were sold (eg two US steel mills acquired by

Severstal in 2004 were purchased 10 years later by Steel Dynamics Inc and AK Steel Corp)

Figure 57 Share of US States Rus sian Oil Imports 2016

Source US EIA ldquoUS Imports from Rus sia of Crude Oil and Petroleum Productsrdquo Petroleum amp Other

Liquids September 29 2017 https www eia gov dnav pet hist LeafHandler ashx nshy=shyPETampsshy=shyMTTIM _ NUS

- NRS _ 1ampfshy=shyM authorrsquos computation

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

100

Maine

Massachusetts

Maryland

Connecticut

Georgia

Rhode Island

Virginia

Florida

New York

Alabama

Puerto Rico

Pennsylvania

Delaware

Hawaii

Washington

Mississippi

California

New Jersey

Louisiana

Texas

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 31 102017 404 PM

Figure 58 US Imports from Rus sia by State Million US$ 2013ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoState and Metropolitan Area Trade Datardquo Foreign Trade last modified

October 2 2017 https wwwcensus gov foreign - trade statistics state

Alaska

Connecticut

Delaware

Hawaii

Louisiana

Maryland

North Dakota 0

$1000

$2000

$3000

$4000

$5000

$6000

2013 2014 2015 2016

Alabama

Alaska

Connecticut

Delaware

Hawaii

Louisiana

Maryland

Maine

Mississippi

Montana

North Dakota

Mississippi

Figure 59 US Imports from Rus sia Share of Oil and Metals Million US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 1992ndash2016)

83

82

85

86

87

88

85

82

7375

0

$5000

$10000

$15000

$20000

$25000

$30000

$35000

$40000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

US Imports from Russia

Share of Oil and Metals

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 32 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 33

Obviously the market dynamic of dif er ent metals varies (eg iron steel aluminum platinum and

nickel) Caps to increase their trade and production in a ldquored oceanrdquo global environment with

anemic demand is rather limited despite Figure 510 showing a spike of iron and steel imports

from Rus sia in 2014 and aluminum in 2016 Some opportunities may exist for Russian- owned steel

plants in the United States (such as NLMK) to participate in energy proj ects resumed under Presi-

dent Trump who has required that new pipelines use only American- made steel15

Rus sia occupies a special niche in the US market for titanium products a high- end metal indus-

try Twenty years ago a long- term contract was signed between Rus sian titanium producer

VSMPO- AVISMA and Boeing The Rus sian com pany entered the selective club of Boeing suppliers

for the manufacture of components and semi- finished products Since the signing of this contract

VSMPO has delivered more than 35 percent of all titanium placed on Boeing civil aircraft16 They

are hidden in the trade data in an import category for Civilian Aircrafts and Parts (Figure 511) At

the end of 2016 Boeing announced an extension of its framework agreement with AVISMA

15 E Scheyder C Ngai and T Sylvester ldquoAmerican Steel Unlikely to Get Keystone Boost Despite Trump Orderrdquo

Reuters January 27 2017 http wwwreuters com article usa - trump - pipeline - transcanada - idUSL1N1FH1ZD

16 A Kramer ldquoTitanium Fills Vital Role for Boeing and Rus siardquo New York Times July 5 2013 http wwwnytimes com

2013 07 06 business global titanium - fills - vital - role - for - boeing - and - russia html mcubzshy=shy3

Figure 510 US Imports from Rus sia Iron Steel Bauxite Aluminum Nickel Nonferrous Metals and Other Precious Metals and Materials US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 1992ndash2016)

0

$6000000000

$5000000000

$4000000000

$3000000000

$2000000000

$1000000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 20122013

20142015

2016

Finished metal shapes

Iron and steel advanced

Iron and steel products nec

Nonferrous metals other

Other precious metals

Nickel

Bauxite and aluminum

Iron and steel mill products

Steelmaking materials

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 33 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations34

through 2022 and additional investments in the construction of a new robotic plant in Titanium

Valley a special economic zone located in the Sverdlovsk region that will open in 2018 The pro-

cessing of titanium forgings in all Boeing civil aircraft will be performed there including 787s 737

MAXs and 777Xs17 The contract extension with AVISMA may add several hundred million dollars

in value to annual US imports from Rus sia

How can such heavy reliance on imports of Rus sian titanium exist during a period of rising geopo-

liti cal tensions The answer is straightforward VSMPO- AVISMA is a highly specialized natu ral

mono poly producing 45 percent of the worldrsquos aerospace titanium Only four other countries

smelt high- grade titanium in industrial quantities the United States Germany Japan and China

Overall global production capacity is limited while demand is growing The United States cur-

rently imports around 79 percent of all the titanium it consumes each year18

17 ldquoBoeing and VSMPO Avisma to Launch Second Joint Production Siterdquo Rus sian Aviation Insider December 22 2016

http wwwrusaviainsider com boeing - and - vsmpo - avisma - to - launch - second - joint - production - site

18 Jon Ostrower and Andy Pasztor ldquoBoeing United Technologies Stockpile Titanium Partsrdquo Wall Street Journal

August 7 2014 https wwwwsj com articles boeing - united - technologies - stockpiling - titanium - parts - 1407441886

Figure 511 US Imports from Rus sia Civilian Aircrafts and Parts US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 1992ndash2016)

0

$20000000

$40000000

$60000000

$80000000

$100000000

$120000000

$140000000

$160000000

$180000000

$200000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Parts-civilian aircraft

Civilian aircraft

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 34 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 35

The Sanctions Act authorizes the secretary of the trea sury (in a nonmandatory way) to impose

restrictions (without specifying them) against Rus sian state- owned entities operating in the railway

metals and mining sectors of the Rus sian economy Despite the commanding heights of Rus siarsquos

state sector owner ship in its economy (70 percent of GDP) the metal- producing companies have

remained mostly in private hands

NUCLEAR AFFAIRS

Historically owners and operators of the 104 commercial nuclear power reactors in the United

States have purchased more than 80 percent of their uranium from foreign countries Uranium

shipping from Rus sia accounted for about 13 percent of the 58 million pounds of uranium pur-

chased overseas in 201219 At the same time the Rus sian state- owned mono poly Rosatom ac-

counts for 20 percent of Kazakhstanrsquos uranium production (which in turn comprises 11 percent of

all US uranium imports) and 20 percent of US domestic uranium production capacity (with

owner ship of exploration tracts in Wyoming)20

Nuclear fuel and nuclear power continue to be po liti cally sensitive topics both in the United

States and Rus sia Bilateral cooperation in this sector (being surprisingly stable with imports of

nuclear fuel from Rus sia at a level of $1 billion annually in the last five years [Figure 512 and 513])

is under constant po liti cal and lobbying pressure and has been a source of several po liti cal scan-

dals21 Consequently upside risks in this area of interaction are minimal and downside risks are

much higher especially when we are seeing more decommissioning of nuclear plants in the

United States than new constructions The US EIArsquos 2017 Annual Energy Outlook assumes

that about 25 percent of the nuclear capacity now operating will be removed from ser vice

by 205022

WHY IS THE GRASS GREENER ON THE OTHER SIDE

The United States continues to significantly reduce imports of chemical fertilizers as domestic pro-

duction increases In 2016 the United States imported 13 percent less ammonia and 11 percent

less urea and UAN which is a liquid urea and ammonium nitrate fertilizer Rus sia accounts for

around 40 percent of UAN imported by the United States The United States canceled antidumping

duties on imports of ammonium nitrate and urea from Rus sia in 2016 but it did not prevent import

19 US EIA ldquoThe US Relies on Foreign Uranium Enrichment Ser vices to Fuel Its Nuclear Power Plantsrdquo Today in

Energy August 28 2013 https wwweia gov todayinenergy detail php idshy=shy1273

20 Colin Chilcoat ldquoDoes Rus sia Really Own 20 Percent of the USrsquo Uranium Reservesrdquo OilPricecom May 6 2015

http oilpricecom Alternative - Energy Nuclear - Power Does - Russia - Really - Own - 20 - Of - The - US - Uranium - Reserves

html

21 Michelle Ye Hee Lee ldquoThe Facts behind Trumprsquos Repeated Claim about Hillary Clintonrsquos Role in the Rus sian Ura-

nium Dealrdquo Washington Post October 26 2016

22 US EIA ldquoAnnual Energy Outlook 2017 with Projections to 2050rdquo 81ndash82

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 35 102017 404 PM

Figure 512 US Imports from Rus sia Share of Oil Metals and Nuclear Fuel Million US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 1992ndash2016)

87

86

90

90

90

91

88

86

7882

0

$5000

$10000

$15000

$20000

$25000

$30000

$35000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

US Imports from Russia

Share of Oil Metals and Nuclear Fuel

Figure 513 US Imports from Rus sia Nuclear Fuel Materials US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

$-

$200000000

$400000000

$600000000

$800000000

$1200000000

$1000000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 36 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 37

drops twice last year (Figures 514 and 515) According to forecasts UAN imports are expected to

decline further to 15 million tons this year down over 46 percent from 28 million tons imported

last year23 The downside trend in imports of fertilizers will likely continue because of oversupply

BIG FISH

US imports of fish and shellfish from Rus sia are best understood in comparison with US fish

exports to the Rus sian market which slipped to zero in August 2014 after Rus sia issued an order

banning certain agricultural imports from the United States (Figure 516) While the volume of US

supply was not very large it was impor tant because it broke up the monopolistic dominance of a

few vertically integrated Rus sian companies that have kept prices high by restricting the entry of

new producers Seeking to implement import substitution policies Rus sia has tried to reduce

exports as well as imports of fish and seafood products in the last couple of years This symmetri-

cal approach was intended to ldquocompensaterdquo for a decrease of fish products in the domestic

23 Deepika Thapliyal ldquoPotashCorp Forecasts Sharp Drop in US Nitrogen Imports in 2017rdquo ICIS News February 7

2017 https wwwicis com resources news 2017 02 07 10076734 potashcorp - forecasts - sharp - drop - in - us - nitrogen

- imports - in - 2017

Figure 514 US Imports from Rus sia Share of Oil Metals Nuclear Fuel and Fertilizers Million US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

90

93

92

93

94

95

92

91

85

86

0

$5000

$10000

$15000

$20000

$25000

$30000

$35000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

US Imports from Russia

Share of Oil Metals Nuclear Fuel and Fertilizers

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 37 102017 404 PM

Figure 515 US Imports from Rus sia Chemical- Fertilizers US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

S-

$200000000

$400000000

$600000000

$800000000

$1000000000

$1200000000

$1400000000

$1600000000

$1800000000

$2000000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Figure 516 US Exports to Rus sia Fish and Shellfish US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

0

$10000000

$20000000

$30000000

$40000000

$50000000

$60000000

$70000000

$80000000

$90000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Fish and shellfish

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 38 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 39

consumer market caused by Rus siarsquos import ban but it has failed As result the group most af-

fected by the self- imposed counter- sanctions were Rus sian consumers

With a significant drop in fish imports a devaluation of the ruble and inflationary pressures on

seafood prices yearly consumption of fish in Rus sia has declined precipitously In 2015 alone

fish prices increased 20 percent and consumption dropped to 14 kilograms per person24 from

22 kilograms in 201425 In 2016 food rose to 355 percent of house hold expenditure as a result of

increases in food prices26 This has pushed vertically integrated fishing monopolies to sell even

more of their catch abroad rather than deliver to the Rus sian Federation (Figure 517) Thus we

cannot exclude the possibility of further growth in US fish and shellfish imports from Rus sia on a

marginal scale

24 Александр Савельев ldquoПотребление рыбы в России упало до 14 кг на человекаrdquo [Fish consumption in Rus sia fell to

14 kg per person] Экономика Интерфакс January 28 2015 http wwwinterfax ru business 492038

25 Илья Шестаков ldquoПотебление рыбы в России снизилось на 10 процентов из- за роста ценrdquo [Fish consumption in

Rus sia dropped by 10 percent due to price increases] RNS March 8 2017 https rnsonline consumer - market

Potreblenie - ribi - v - Rossii - snizilos - na - 10 - iz - za - rosta - tsen - 2017 - 03 - 08

26 Zoya Sheftalovich and Christian Oliver ldquoRus siarsquos Boom (Farming) Economyrdquo Politico November 8 2016 http

wwwpolitico eu article russias - boom - farming - economy

Figure 517 US Imports from Rus sia Fish and Shellfish US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

0

$50000000

$100000000

$150000000

$200000000

$250000000

$300000000

$350000000

$400000000

$450000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 39 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations40

SPACE ODYSSEY

Among high- end products beyond the top five groups of goods imported from Rus sia cheap and

efficient Rus sian engines have been used to launch US rockets into space for about 16 years

(Figure 518) There was a serious po liti cal strug gle around a 2014 ban on the purchase of Rus sian

RD-180 rocket engines revealing the conflicting business interests of power ful high- tech companies

This restrictive mea sure was temporary and was quickly lifted because of significant cost impacts

and risks of disruption to launch schedules27 For the same reason the Sanctions Act does not autho-

rize ldquothe imposition of any sanction or other condition limitation restriction or prohibition that

directly or indirectly impedes the supply by any entity of the Rus sian Federation of any product or

ser vice or the procurement of such product or ser vice by any contractor or subcontractor of the

United States or any other entity relating to or in connection with any space launch conducted for

the National Aeronautics and Space Administration or any other nonndash Department of Defense

customerrdquo28

Nevertheless many experts believe that US domestic alternatives to replace Rus sian engines will

be viable in five to eight years

27 Ken Dilanian ldquoWhy Does the US Use Rus sian Rockets to Launch Its Satellitesrdquo NBC News updated November 15

2016 http wwwnbcnews com why - does - u - s - use - russian - rockets - launch - its - satellites - n588526

28 Countering Amer i carsquos Adversaries through Sanctions Act HR 3364

Figure 518 Spacecraft Excluding Military US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

0

$20000000

$40000000

$60000000

$80000000

$100000000

$120000000

$140000000

$160000000

$180000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 40 102017 404 PM

41

Diversity and technological complexity are the most vis i ble advantages supporting US exports to

Rus sia Three major groups of export goods include civilian aircraft engines and parts (Figure 61)

drilling and oil field equipment (Figure 62) and industrial machines and engines (Figure 63)

Despite sanctions against the transfer of advanced oil producing and pro cessing technologies the

realization of US drilling and oil field equipment in Rus sia is sustainable although some bilateral

proj ects have been frozen

Another category of goods that has demonstrated resilience is the phar ma ceu ti cal industry (Fig-

ure 64) because most drugs in Rus sia are imported (about 70 percent of the Rus sian phar ma ceu-

ti cal market in value) Import substitution policies have had only modest results in this industry

As confirmed by American Chamber of Commerce surveys US exports to Rus sia are closely

connected to US FDI 30 percent of total imports of US companies working in the Rus sian

market come from the United States (more than $2 billion in 2016) In other words about

40 percent of all US exports to Rus sia are related to a US corporate- sector business pro cess in

the country The major sectors of activity of these companies are energy and natu ral resources

(52 percent) manufacturing (17 percent) information and communications technology or ICT

(13 percent) retail (7 percent) automotive industry (6 percent) phar ma ceu ti cal production

(1 percent) professional ser vices (05 percent) and other (2 percent)1

Some obvious constraints on US exports to Rus sia have resulted from a reduction in demand A

deterioration of bilateral relations and implementation of sanctions and counter- sanctions have

directly or indirectly afected all businesses Figures 65 and 66 provide data regarding a dramatic

drop in the sale of US agricultural production in Rus sia with all other categories of exports in

goods showing big cuts as well (see Figures 67ndash69)

Exports of civilian aircraft engines and parts put the state of Washington in first place among

other states as a leading exporter to the Rus sian market (Figure 610)

1 American Chamber of Commerce in Rus sia ldquoInvestment and Import to Rus sia 2nd Surveyrdquo 13

Diversity and Constraints

06

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 41 102017 404 PM

Figure 61 US Exports of Civilian Aircraft Engines Equipment and Parts to Rus sia US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

$2500000000

$2000000000

$1500000000

$1000000000

$500000000

$-

Figure 62 US Exports of Drilling and Oil Field Equipment US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

0

$5000000

$10000000

$15000000

$20000000

$25000000

$30000000

$35000000

$40000000

$45000000

$50000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 42 102017 404 PM

Figure 63 US Exports of Industrial Engines to Rus sia US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

0

$5000000

$10000000

$15000000

$20000000

$25000000

$30000000

$35000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Figure 64 US Exports of Phar ma ceu ti cal Preparations to Rus sia US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

0

$5000000

$10000000

$15000000

$20000000

$25000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 43 102017 404 PM

Figure 65 US Exports of Meat and Poultry to Rus sia US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Meat poultry etc

$1000000000

$800000000

$600000000

$400000000

$200000000

$-

$1200000000

$1400000000

$1600000000

Figure 66 US Exports of Soybeans to Rus sia US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

0

$20000000

$40000000

$60000000

$80000000

$100000000

$120000000

$140000000

$160000000

$180000000

$200000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 44 102017 404 PM

Figure 67 US Exports of Vehicles Engines and Parts to Rus sia US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Other parts and accessories of vehicles

Automotive tires and tubes

Bodies and chassis for passenger cars

Engines and engine parts (carburetors pistonsrings and valves)

Trucks buses and special purpose vehicles

Passenger cars new and used

$2500000000

$2000000000

$1500000000

$500000000

$-

$1000000000

Figure 68 US Exports of Medicinal Equipment to Rus sia US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

$10000000

$15000000

$20000000

$25000000

$30000000

$35000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 45 102017 404 PM

Figure 610 US Exports to Rus sia by States (2016 US$ Value) Million US$ 2013ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoState and Metropolitan Area Trade Datardquo

Iowa Kentucky

North Dakota

Oklahoma

South Carolina

Washington

0

$500

$1000

$1500

$2000

2013 2014 2015 2016

District of Columbia

Iowa

Kentucky

North Dakota

Oklahoma

South Carolina

Washington

Figure 69 US Exports of Excavating Machinery to Rus sia US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

0

$5000000

$10000000

$15000000

$20000000

$25000000

$30000000

$35000000

$40000000

$45000000

$50000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 46 102017 404 PM

47

Upon reviewing the current trend in US- Russia economic relations we must acknowledge that

the existing trade model is obsolete and exhausted Imports are resource- oriented and reflect

constraints of the Rus sian economic structure while five groups of goodsmdash oil metals nuclear

fuels fertilizers and fishmdash make up more than 90 percent of total imports from Rus sia (Figure 71)

Each of these industries has a limited capacity for growth in the foreseeable future

Rus siarsquos core export to the United Statesmdash oilmdash will inevitably decrease in the mid- term under any

scenario The value and volume of Rus sian exports to the United States are open to global market

volatility and po liti cal pressures with limited hedging mechanisms

Overall US exports to Rus sia are unsustainable due to bilateral po liti cal tensions the whims of

commodity markets and changing domestic policies Sanctions and counter- sanctions have

created additional barriers particularly in finance banking high- tech energy and agro- business

According to the American Chamber of Commerce 69 percent of US companies working in the

country consider the impact of US sanctions against Rus sia on their business as negative At the

same time 60 percent of companies do not expect big changes in business relations between

Rus sia and the United States under Trump1 as the new law codifies existing sanctions fortifies

them and extends them to new sectors

Current US investments are low due to the weak rule of law in Rus sia a lack of property right

protections and proper contract enforcement high levels of statization and monopolization in the

economy a poor business climate outdated capital stock dependence on natural- resource

sectors and of course sanction and counter- sanction mea sures Bloated administrative compo-

nents created as risk mitigation instruments have also served as impediments The countryrsquos

institutional weakness low level of productivity bud get constraints and a declining inflexible

workforce will restrain future economic growth even if commodity prices recover Rus sian eco-

nomic policy will likely continue to be statist and protectionist relying mostly on import

substitutions

1 Ibid 11

Existing Trends and Future Scenarios

07

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 47 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations48

What scenarios can be expected in such a challenging environment

One probability (no peace no war) is based on the assumption that matters will not deteriorate

further and implementation of the Sanctions Act will be cursory This will cause relatively slow

degradation in the economic field with occasional flashes of activity in selected areas (eg closer

cooperation against Islamist terrorist groups in Syria)

A second worse case or critical scenario is the intensive and full- scale execution of current sanc-

tion legislation and even the imposition of new economic punitive and restrictive mea sures which

could incite asymmetric retaliatory actions and lead to the introduction of additional protectionist

policies This in turn could trigger a further escalation of mutual confrontation and could eventu-

ally destroy the fundamentals of the current bilateral trade system Rus sian leadership has charac-

terized the Sanctions Act as a declaration of a trade war that ends all hope for improving bilateral

relations2

2 Дмитрий Медведев ldquoПодписание президентом США нового санкционного закона против России создает несколько

последствийrdquo [The US Presidentrsquos signing of the package of new sanctions against Rus sia will have a few conse-

quences] Facebook August 2 2017 https wwwfacebook com Dmitry Medvedev posts 10154587161801851

Figure 71 US Imports from Rus sia Share of Oil Metals Nuclear Fuel Fertilizers and Fish Million US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

93

94

93

94

95

96

93

92

87

89

0

$5000

$10000

$15000

$20000

$25000

$30000

$35000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

US Imports from Russia

Share of Oil Metals Nuclear FuelFertilizers and Fish

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 48 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 49

The best case and most favorable scenario looks less probable now It assumes the realization of

structural reforms in Rus sia in such a way that would adapt Rus siarsquos foreign policy to national

economic needs reduce confrontations with the West and make a concerted efort to integrate

Rus sian businesses into global supply and value chains A revitalization of the structural reform

agendamdash including eforts to diversify economic activities through de- monopolization and support

for SMEs a restructuring of the banking sector the creation of a vibrant business climate to foster

entrepreneurships and innovation the implementation of administrative and judicial reforms to

tackle red tape and endemic corruption and the reduction of state control over key sectors of the

economy via wide- spread privatization could kick- start the development of a nonoil economy and

improve long- term growth prospects Despite ongoing discussion of reform strategies deep

economic and po liti cal changes are extremely complicated over the next po liti calelectoral cycle

(2018ndash2024) particularly because of re sis tance of vested interests and growing commodity prices

The urgency to tackle structural shortcomings in natu ral resource- dependent economies usually

correlates with the price of those resources and the degree to which resource rents drive eco-

nomic activity However there may be marginal improvements in the efficiency of the current

economic system

Future US- Russia relations can be thought of through three pillars one pillar focuses on areas

where both countries maintain a competitive rivalry another looks at potential areas of interaction

under pres ent conditions a third pillar and one that has evaporated from the current bilateral

agenda concentrates on future cooperation Stronger economic ties could not only be a kind of

po liti cal shock absorber but contribute to the building of this future (particularly business contacts

aim to support future structural reforms) although po liti cal factors are depressing the prospects

for cooperation To escape deadlock it will be impor tant to establish the right balance between

politics and economics and create a model of collaboration within the framework of contention

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 49 102017 404 PM

About the Author

Vadim Grishin PhD MBA has been involved in the reform pro cess in Rus sia as adviser to the

deputy prime minister of Rus sia in 1992ndash1993 and 2006ndash2010 He has extensive experience

working with the Bretton Woods Institutions He was the board member of the World Bank Group

and served as se nior adviser at the International Monetary Fund Currently he is a con sul tant to the

chief economistrsquos office of the International Finance Corporation and teaches the economics of

transition at Georgetown University in Washington DC

50

594-71613_ch99_4Pindd 50 102017 403 PM

Blank

COVER PHOTO ADOBE STOCK

1616 Rhode Island Avenue NW

Washington DC 20036

202 887 0200 | wwwcsisorg

v++ISBN 978-1-4422-8035-9

Lanham bull Boulder bull New York bull London

4501 Forbes Boulevard

Lanham MD 20706

301 459 3366 | wwwrowmancom

A U T H O R

Vadim Grishin

Myths and Realities

A Report of the

CSIS RUSSIA AND EURASIA PROGRAM

US-RussiaEconomicRelations

O C T O B E R 2 0 1 7

Euml|xHSLEOCy280359z

The Man Pupu Nyor Rock Formations at the Northern Urals also known as Seven

Strong Man or Little Mountain of the God in the local tribe (Mansi) language

Page 32: U.S.-Russia Economic Relations: Myths and Realities · 2020-04-17 · OCTOBER 2017 U.S.- Russia Economic Relations Myths and Realities AUTHOR Vadim Grishin A REPORT OF THE CSIS RUSSIA

US-Russia Economic Relations26

Table 56 US Oil Imports All Countries vs Rus sia Thousand Barrels per Day 2011ndash2016

Years 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

All Countries 11436 10598 9859 9241 9449 10058

Rus sia 624 477 460 330 371 433

Share 546 450 467 357 393 431

Sources US EIA ldquoUS Imports by Country of Origin Total Crude Oil and Productsrdquo Petroleum amp Other

Liquids September 13 2017 wwweia gov dnav pet pet_move_impcus_a2_nus_ep00_im0_mbbl_m htm

authorrsquos computation

Figure 55 US Imports from Rus sia Share of Crude Oil and Petroleum Products Million US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

57

64

73

72

74

73

72

59

52 50

0

$5000

$10000

$15000

$20000

$25000

$30000

$35000

$40000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

US Imports from Russia

Share of Oil and Petroleum Products

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 26 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 27

the Rus sian state mono poly Rosneft and commodity trading and mining giant Glencore which

along with energy and commodities com pany Vitol participated in a $10 billion prepayment

deal with Rosneft for crude supplies in 2013

There have been a number of ongoing transactions between the Rus sian oil industry and interna-

tional oil companies including several that top the list of importers of Rus sian oil to the United

States ( Table 57) In December 2016 Glencore participated in a controversial privatization opera-

tion purchasing in tandem with the Qatar sovereign wealth fund a 195 percent stake in Rosneft

which was on the US and EU list of sanctioned firms8 Glencore has also taken a blocking stake in

midsize oil producer RussNeft BP owns a 1975 percent stake in Rosneft Chevron holds a

15 percent interest in the 935- mile- long CPC9 pipeline which transports an average of 959000

barrels of crude oil per day including 76000 barrels daily from Rus sia10 ExxonMobil has formed

8 E Mazneva and I Arkhipov ldquoRus sia Sells $11 Billion Stake in Rosneft to Glencore Qatarrdquo Bloomberg December 7

2016

9 CPCthinsp=thinspCaspian Pipeline Consortium

10 ldquoRus sia Highlights of Operations and Business Portfoliordquo Chevron accessed October 3 2017 https wwwchevron

com worldwide russia

Figure 56 Share of Rus sian Oil in Total US Oil Imports Thousands of Barrels per Day 1972ndash2016

Source US EIA ldquoUS Imports by Country of Origin Total Crude Oil and Productsrdquo

2000

4000

6000

8000

10000

12000

14000

16000

US Imports of Crude Oil and Petroleum Products (Thousand Barrels per Day)

US Imports from Russia of Crude Oil and Petroleum Products (Thousand Barrels per Day)19

7319

7419

7519

7619

7719

7819

7919

80

198

119

82

198

319

84

198

519

86

198

719

88

198

919

90

199

119

92

199

319

94

199

519

96

199

719

98

199

92

00

02

00

12

00

22

00

32

00

42

00

52

00

62

00

72

00

82

00

92

010

20

112

012

20

132

014

20

152

016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 27 102017 404 PM

Table 57 Top Importers of Rus sian Oil to the United States Thousands of Barrels 2016

VALERO MARKETING amp SUPPLY CO 54590 3616

EXXONMOBIL OIL CORP 17087 1130

CHEVRON USA INC 15217 1008

BP WEST COAST PRODUCTS LLC 10130 671

GEORGE E WARREN CORP 7272 48

PAULSBORO REFINING CO LLC 6838 453

TESORO CORP 5097 338

VITOL INC 5084 337

PHILLIPS 66 CO 4726 313

TRAFIGURA AG 4360 289

PAR HAWAII REFINING LLC 3893 258

MOTIVA ENTERPRISES LLC 3041 205

SHELL US TRADING CO 2863 19

MARATHON PETROLEUM CO LLC 2475 16

ATLANTIC TRADING amp MARKETING 2099 14

FREEPOINT COMMODITIES LLC 1439 1

GLENCORE LTD 1284 85

BEST PETROLEUM CORP 967 64

ROLYMPUS US COMMODITIES GROUP LLC 822 6

HUNT CRUDE OIL SUPPLY CO 666 4

GULF OIL LP 658 4

Source US EIA ldquoUS Imports by Country of Origin Crude Oilrdquo Petroleum amp Other Liquids September 13

2017 httpswwweiagovdnavpetpet_move_impcus_a2_nus_epc0_im0_mbblpd_ahtm authorrsquos

computation

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 28 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 29

several joint ventures with Rosneft to undertake ofshore exploration in the Black Sea and the Kara

Sea in Siberia11

According to the Sanctions Act US persons are prohibited from exporting or reexporting goods

ser vices (except financial ser vices) and technology in support of exploration or production of new

deep- water Arctic ofshore or shale oil proj ects that involve designated Rus sian entities or other

entities in which such sanctioned persons have a controlling interest or a substantial noncontrol-

ling owner ship interest defined as not less than 33 percent (previously it was 50 percent) The new

law also authorizesmdash but does not requiremdash the imposition of so- called secondary sanctions

against non- US entities that engage in activities involving the construction maintenance or

expansion of Rus sian energy export pipelines with a fair market value of $1 million or more or an

aggregate fair market value during a 12- month period of $5 million12 This provision has raised the

concerns of some Eu ro pean countries particularly Germany As result the final language of the

law included wording about coordination of this issue with allies of the United States

Shipments of Rus sian oil to the United States could be afected by activity in the US refinery

industry In early 2017 Saudi Aramco bought the United Statesrsquo largest oil refinery in Port Arthur

(Texas) and it announced plans to send more of its own crude to that refinery13 Serious concerns

exist however regarding the future of three refineries and nine pipelines owned by Citgo a US

branch of the Venezuelan state com pany PdVSA which is balancing precariously on the edge of

default Under certain conditions in the event of PdVSA bankruptcy Rosneft could claim a stake of

up to 499 percent in Citgo Such a possibility has raised concerns among politicians and US

government officials with Trea sury Secretary Steven Mnuchin calling it a ldquonational security issuerdquo14

Tables 58 59 and 510 show allocations of Rus sian oil imports to major US refineries some of

which work exclusively on Rus sian crude a total of two to three months per year In total 150940

thousand barrels of Rus sian oil were refined in 2016

Figure 57 confirms a leading position of Texas and Louisiana among the US states receiving

Rus sian crude followed by New Jersey California Mississippi Washington Hawaii and Delaware

In a paradoxical way Texas has dis appeared from the list of states as a main destination of US

imports from Rus sia (Figure 58) because Rus sian crude is mostly delivered to Louisiana ports and

registered there by US Customs as an import from Rus sia After that it transports to refineries in

Louisiana and Texas

Overall the short- term business rationale behind the sustainability of US oil imports from Rus sia

cannot overcome strong headwinds in the US energy sector facing all oil importers which will

inevitably lead to a contraction of Rus sian oil exports to the United States in the foreseeable future

11 Exxon eforts to receive a special US Trea sury waiver to drill in sanctioned Rus sia failed in 2017

12 Countering Amer i carsquos Adversaries through Sanctions Act HR 3364

13 Sarp Ozkan ldquoSaudi Aramcorsquos Port Arthur Refinery and the US Refinery Fleetrdquo Drilling Info May 11 2017

https infodrillinginfo com saudi - aramcos - port - arthur - refinery - us - refinery - fleet

14 Graham Kates ldquoTrea sury Secretary Rus siarsquos Citgo Deal a National Security Issuerdquo CBS News May 1 2017

http wwwcbsnews com news rosneft - citgo - steven - mnuchin - national - security

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 29 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations30

Table 58 Valerorsquos Refineries Pro cessing Rus sian Oil Thousands of Barrels 2016

Saint Charles Louisiana 29206 535

Corpus Christi Texas 20626 378

Wilmington California 4250 78

Total USA 54590 100

Source US EIA ldquoRefinery Capacity Reportrdquo January 1 2017

table 5 wwweia gov petroleum refinerycapacity table5 pdf

authorrsquos computation

Table 59 ExxonMobil Refineries Pro cessing Rus sian Oil Thousands of Barrels 2016

Baytown Texas 15037 88

Baton Rouge Louisiana 2046 12

Total USA 17083 100

Source US EIA ldquoRefinery Capacity Reportrdquo authorrsquos computation

Table 510 Chevronrsquos Refineries Pro cessing Rus sian Oil Thousands of Barrels 2016

Pascagoula Mississippi 12767 840

El Segundo California 2372 155

Saint Rose Louisiana 78 05

Total USA 15217 100

Source US EIA ldquoRefinery Capacity Reportrdquo authorrsquos computation

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 30 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 31

HEAVY METAL

Taken together US imports of metals and US imports of oil compose about 80 percent of US

total imports from Rus sia (Figure 59) Trade of metals like other commodities is strongly afected

by market price fluctuations Nevertheless metal imports from Rus sia have been fairly resilient to

market volatility and their average annual value has hovered at about $4 billion in the last five years

(Figure 510) This market resilience was forged at the end of the 1990searly 2000s when Rus sian

metal producers gradually modernized their plants adjusting quality of production to Western

standards and enhancing integration into global value and supply chains Some of them conquered

their share of the highly competitive US market struggling with peers from Canada and certain

BRICS countries (China India and Brazil) To attract additional resources all Rus sian large metal-

producing companies became public and were listed on stock exchanges chiefly the London Stock

Exchange (Severstalrsquo PAO Evraz MMK OAO Novolipetsk Steel Norilsk Nikel and TMK PAO) one

on the New York Stock Exchange (Mechel) and one on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange (Rusal)

Business logic pushed some of them to invest in the US metal- making industry which was hit

hard by crisis Later on some of those assets were sold (eg two US steel mills acquired by

Severstal in 2004 were purchased 10 years later by Steel Dynamics Inc and AK Steel Corp)

Figure 57 Share of US States Rus sian Oil Imports 2016

Source US EIA ldquoUS Imports from Rus sia of Crude Oil and Petroleum Productsrdquo Petroleum amp Other

Liquids September 29 2017 https www eia gov dnav pet hist LeafHandler ashx nshy=shyPETampsshy=shyMTTIM _ NUS

- NRS _ 1ampfshy=shyM authorrsquos computation

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

100

Maine

Massachusetts

Maryland

Connecticut

Georgia

Rhode Island

Virginia

Florida

New York

Alabama

Puerto Rico

Pennsylvania

Delaware

Hawaii

Washington

Mississippi

California

New Jersey

Louisiana

Texas

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 31 102017 404 PM

Figure 58 US Imports from Rus sia by State Million US$ 2013ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoState and Metropolitan Area Trade Datardquo Foreign Trade last modified

October 2 2017 https wwwcensus gov foreign - trade statistics state

Alaska

Connecticut

Delaware

Hawaii

Louisiana

Maryland

North Dakota 0

$1000

$2000

$3000

$4000

$5000

$6000

2013 2014 2015 2016

Alabama

Alaska

Connecticut

Delaware

Hawaii

Louisiana

Maryland

Maine

Mississippi

Montana

North Dakota

Mississippi

Figure 59 US Imports from Rus sia Share of Oil and Metals Million US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 1992ndash2016)

83

82

85

86

87

88

85

82

7375

0

$5000

$10000

$15000

$20000

$25000

$30000

$35000

$40000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

US Imports from Russia

Share of Oil and Metals

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 32 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 33

Obviously the market dynamic of dif er ent metals varies (eg iron steel aluminum platinum and

nickel) Caps to increase their trade and production in a ldquored oceanrdquo global environment with

anemic demand is rather limited despite Figure 510 showing a spike of iron and steel imports

from Rus sia in 2014 and aluminum in 2016 Some opportunities may exist for Russian- owned steel

plants in the United States (such as NLMK) to participate in energy proj ects resumed under Presi-

dent Trump who has required that new pipelines use only American- made steel15

Rus sia occupies a special niche in the US market for titanium products a high- end metal indus-

try Twenty years ago a long- term contract was signed between Rus sian titanium producer

VSMPO- AVISMA and Boeing The Rus sian com pany entered the selective club of Boeing suppliers

for the manufacture of components and semi- finished products Since the signing of this contract

VSMPO has delivered more than 35 percent of all titanium placed on Boeing civil aircraft16 They

are hidden in the trade data in an import category for Civilian Aircrafts and Parts (Figure 511) At

the end of 2016 Boeing announced an extension of its framework agreement with AVISMA

15 E Scheyder C Ngai and T Sylvester ldquoAmerican Steel Unlikely to Get Keystone Boost Despite Trump Orderrdquo

Reuters January 27 2017 http wwwreuters com article usa - trump - pipeline - transcanada - idUSL1N1FH1ZD

16 A Kramer ldquoTitanium Fills Vital Role for Boeing and Rus siardquo New York Times July 5 2013 http wwwnytimes com

2013 07 06 business global titanium - fills - vital - role - for - boeing - and - russia html mcubzshy=shy3

Figure 510 US Imports from Rus sia Iron Steel Bauxite Aluminum Nickel Nonferrous Metals and Other Precious Metals and Materials US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 1992ndash2016)

0

$6000000000

$5000000000

$4000000000

$3000000000

$2000000000

$1000000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 20122013

20142015

2016

Finished metal shapes

Iron and steel advanced

Iron and steel products nec

Nonferrous metals other

Other precious metals

Nickel

Bauxite and aluminum

Iron and steel mill products

Steelmaking materials

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 33 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations34

through 2022 and additional investments in the construction of a new robotic plant in Titanium

Valley a special economic zone located in the Sverdlovsk region that will open in 2018 The pro-

cessing of titanium forgings in all Boeing civil aircraft will be performed there including 787s 737

MAXs and 777Xs17 The contract extension with AVISMA may add several hundred million dollars

in value to annual US imports from Rus sia

How can such heavy reliance on imports of Rus sian titanium exist during a period of rising geopo-

liti cal tensions The answer is straightforward VSMPO- AVISMA is a highly specialized natu ral

mono poly producing 45 percent of the worldrsquos aerospace titanium Only four other countries

smelt high- grade titanium in industrial quantities the United States Germany Japan and China

Overall global production capacity is limited while demand is growing The United States cur-

rently imports around 79 percent of all the titanium it consumes each year18

17 ldquoBoeing and VSMPO Avisma to Launch Second Joint Production Siterdquo Rus sian Aviation Insider December 22 2016

http wwwrusaviainsider com boeing - and - vsmpo - avisma - to - launch - second - joint - production - site

18 Jon Ostrower and Andy Pasztor ldquoBoeing United Technologies Stockpile Titanium Partsrdquo Wall Street Journal

August 7 2014 https wwwwsj com articles boeing - united - technologies - stockpiling - titanium - parts - 1407441886

Figure 511 US Imports from Rus sia Civilian Aircrafts and Parts US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 1992ndash2016)

0

$20000000

$40000000

$60000000

$80000000

$100000000

$120000000

$140000000

$160000000

$180000000

$200000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Parts-civilian aircraft

Civilian aircraft

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 34 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 35

The Sanctions Act authorizes the secretary of the trea sury (in a nonmandatory way) to impose

restrictions (without specifying them) against Rus sian state- owned entities operating in the railway

metals and mining sectors of the Rus sian economy Despite the commanding heights of Rus siarsquos

state sector owner ship in its economy (70 percent of GDP) the metal- producing companies have

remained mostly in private hands

NUCLEAR AFFAIRS

Historically owners and operators of the 104 commercial nuclear power reactors in the United

States have purchased more than 80 percent of their uranium from foreign countries Uranium

shipping from Rus sia accounted for about 13 percent of the 58 million pounds of uranium pur-

chased overseas in 201219 At the same time the Rus sian state- owned mono poly Rosatom ac-

counts for 20 percent of Kazakhstanrsquos uranium production (which in turn comprises 11 percent of

all US uranium imports) and 20 percent of US domestic uranium production capacity (with

owner ship of exploration tracts in Wyoming)20

Nuclear fuel and nuclear power continue to be po liti cally sensitive topics both in the United

States and Rus sia Bilateral cooperation in this sector (being surprisingly stable with imports of

nuclear fuel from Rus sia at a level of $1 billion annually in the last five years [Figure 512 and 513])

is under constant po liti cal and lobbying pressure and has been a source of several po liti cal scan-

dals21 Consequently upside risks in this area of interaction are minimal and downside risks are

much higher especially when we are seeing more decommissioning of nuclear plants in the

United States than new constructions The US EIArsquos 2017 Annual Energy Outlook assumes

that about 25 percent of the nuclear capacity now operating will be removed from ser vice

by 205022

WHY IS THE GRASS GREENER ON THE OTHER SIDE

The United States continues to significantly reduce imports of chemical fertilizers as domestic pro-

duction increases In 2016 the United States imported 13 percent less ammonia and 11 percent

less urea and UAN which is a liquid urea and ammonium nitrate fertilizer Rus sia accounts for

around 40 percent of UAN imported by the United States The United States canceled antidumping

duties on imports of ammonium nitrate and urea from Rus sia in 2016 but it did not prevent import

19 US EIA ldquoThe US Relies on Foreign Uranium Enrichment Ser vices to Fuel Its Nuclear Power Plantsrdquo Today in

Energy August 28 2013 https wwweia gov todayinenergy detail php idshy=shy1273

20 Colin Chilcoat ldquoDoes Rus sia Really Own 20 Percent of the USrsquo Uranium Reservesrdquo OilPricecom May 6 2015

http oilpricecom Alternative - Energy Nuclear - Power Does - Russia - Really - Own - 20 - Of - The - US - Uranium - Reserves

html

21 Michelle Ye Hee Lee ldquoThe Facts behind Trumprsquos Repeated Claim about Hillary Clintonrsquos Role in the Rus sian Ura-

nium Dealrdquo Washington Post October 26 2016

22 US EIA ldquoAnnual Energy Outlook 2017 with Projections to 2050rdquo 81ndash82

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 35 102017 404 PM

Figure 512 US Imports from Rus sia Share of Oil Metals and Nuclear Fuel Million US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 1992ndash2016)

87

86

90

90

90

91

88

86

7882

0

$5000

$10000

$15000

$20000

$25000

$30000

$35000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

US Imports from Russia

Share of Oil Metals and Nuclear Fuel

Figure 513 US Imports from Rus sia Nuclear Fuel Materials US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

$-

$200000000

$400000000

$600000000

$800000000

$1200000000

$1000000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 36 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 37

drops twice last year (Figures 514 and 515) According to forecasts UAN imports are expected to

decline further to 15 million tons this year down over 46 percent from 28 million tons imported

last year23 The downside trend in imports of fertilizers will likely continue because of oversupply

BIG FISH

US imports of fish and shellfish from Rus sia are best understood in comparison with US fish

exports to the Rus sian market which slipped to zero in August 2014 after Rus sia issued an order

banning certain agricultural imports from the United States (Figure 516) While the volume of US

supply was not very large it was impor tant because it broke up the monopolistic dominance of a

few vertically integrated Rus sian companies that have kept prices high by restricting the entry of

new producers Seeking to implement import substitution policies Rus sia has tried to reduce

exports as well as imports of fish and seafood products in the last couple of years This symmetri-

cal approach was intended to ldquocompensaterdquo for a decrease of fish products in the domestic

23 Deepika Thapliyal ldquoPotashCorp Forecasts Sharp Drop in US Nitrogen Imports in 2017rdquo ICIS News February 7

2017 https wwwicis com resources news 2017 02 07 10076734 potashcorp - forecasts - sharp - drop - in - us - nitrogen

- imports - in - 2017

Figure 514 US Imports from Rus sia Share of Oil Metals Nuclear Fuel and Fertilizers Million US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

90

93

92

93

94

95

92

91

85

86

0

$5000

$10000

$15000

$20000

$25000

$30000

$35000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

US Imports from Russia

Share of Oil Metals Nuclear Fuel and Fertilizers

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 37 102017 404 PM

Figure 515 US Imports from Rus sia Chemical- Fertilizers US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

S-

$200000000

$400000000

$600000000

$800000000

$1000000000

$1200000000

$1400000000

$1600000000

$1800000000

$2000000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Figure 516 US Exports to Rus sia Fish and Shellfish US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

0

$10000000

$20000000

$30000000

$40000000

$50000000

$60000000

$70000000

$80000000

$90000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Fish and shellfish

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 38 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 39

consumer market caused by Rus siarsquos import ban but it has failed As result the group most af-

fected by the self- imposed counter- sanctions were Rus sian consumers

With a significant drop in fish imports a devaluation of the ruble and inflationary pressures on

seafood prices yearly consumption of fish in Rus sia has declined precipitously In 2015 alone

fish prices increased 20 percent and consumption dropped to 14 kilograms per person24 from

22 kilograms in 201425 In 2016 food rose to 355 percent of house hold expenditure as a result of

increases in food prices26 This has pushed vertically integrated fishing monopolies to sell even

more of their catch abroad rather than deliver to the Rus sian Federation (Figure 517) Thus we

cannot exclude the possibility of further growth in US fish and shellfish imports from Rus sia on a

marginal scale

24 Александр Савельев ldquoПотребление рыбы в России упало до 14 кг на человекаrdquo [Fish consumption in Rus sia fell to

14 kg per person] Экономика Интерфакс January 28 2015 http wwwinterfax ru business 492038

25 Илья Шестаков ldquoПотебление рыбы в России снизилось на 10 процентов из- за роста ценrdquo [Fish consumption in

Rus sia dropped by 10 percent due to price increases] RNS March 8 2017 https rnsonline consumer - market

Potreblenie - ribi - v - Rossii - snizilos - na - 10 - iz - za - rosta - tsen - 2017 - 03 - 08

26 Zoya Sheftalovich and Christian Oliver ldquoRus siarsquos Boom (Farming) Economyrdquo Politico November 8 2016 http

wwwpolitico eu article russias - boom - farming - economy

Figure 517 US Imports from Rus sia Fish and Shellfish US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

0

$50000000

$100000000

$150000000

$200000000

$250000000

$300000000

$350000000

$400000000

$450000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 39 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations40

SPACE ODYSSEY

Among high- end products beyond the top five groups of goods imported from Rus sia cheap and

efficient Rus sian engines have been used to launch US rockets into space for about 16 years

(Figure 518) There was a serious po liti cal strug gle around a 2014 ban on the purchase of Rus sian

RD-180 rocket engines revealing the conflicting business interests of power ful high- tech companies

This restrictive mea sure was temporary and was quickly lifted because of significant cost impacts

and risks of disruption to launch schedules27 For the same reason the Sanctions Act does not autho-

rize ldquothe imposition of any sanction or other condition limitation restriction or prohibition that

directly or indirectly impedes the supply by any entity of the Rus sian Federation of any product or

ser vice or the procurement of such product or ser vice by any contractor or subcontractor of the

United States or any other entity relating to or in connection with any space launch conducted for

the National Aeronautics and Space Administration or any other nonndash Department of Defense

customerrdquo28

Nevertheless many experts believe that US domestic alternatives to replace Rus sian engines will

be viable in five to eight years

27 Ken Dilanian ldquoWhy Does the US Use Rus sian Rockets to Launch Its Satellitesrdquo NBC News updated November 15

2016 http wwwnbcnews com why - does - u - s - use - russian - rockets - launch - its - satellites - n588526

28 Countering Amer i carsquos Adversaries through Sanctions Act HR 3364

Figure 518 Spacecraft Excluding Military US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

0

$20000000

$40000000

$60000000

$80000000

$100000000

$120000000

$140000000

$160000000

$180000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 40 102017 404 PM

41

Diversity and technological complexity are the most vis i ble advantages supporting US exports to

Rus sia Three major groups of export goods include civilian aircraft engines and parts (Figure 61)

drilling and oil field equipment (Figure 62) and industrial machines and engines (Figure 63)

Despite sanctions against the transfer of advanced oil producing and pro cessing technologies the

realization of US drilling and oil field equipment in Rus sia is sustainable although some bilateral

proj ects have been frozen

Another category of goods that has demonstrated resilience is the phar ma ceu ti cal industry (Fig-

ure 64) because most drugs in Rus sia are imported (about 70 percent of the Rus sian phar ma ceu-

ti cal market in value) Import substitution policies have had only modest results in this industry

As confirmed by American Chamber of Commerce surveys US exports to Rus sia are closely

connected to US FDI 30 percent of total imports of US companies working in the Rus sian

market come from the United States (more than $2 billion in 2016) In other words about

40 percent of all US exports to Rus sia are related to a US corporate- sector business pro cess in

the country The major sectors of activity of these companies are energy and natu ral resources

(52 percent) manufacturing (17 percent) information and communications technology or ICT

(13 percent) retail (7 percent) automotive industry (6 percent) phar ma ceu ti cal production

(1 percent) professional ser vices (05 percent) and other (2 percent)1

Some obvious constraints on US exports to Rus sia have resulted from a reduction in demand A

deterioration of bilateral relations and implementation of sanctions and counter- sanctions have

directly or indirectly afected all businesses Figures 65 and 66 provide data regarding a dramatic

drop in the sale of US agricultural production in Rus sia with all other categories of exports in

goods showing big cuts as well (see Figures 67ndash69)

Exports of civilian aircraft engines and parts put the state of Washington in first place among

other states as a leading exporter to the Rus sian market (Figure 610)

1 American Chamber of Commerce in Rus sia ldquoInvestment and Import to Rus sia 2nd Surveyrdquo 13

Diversity and Constraints

06

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 41 102017 404 PM

Figure 61 US Exports of Civilian Aircraft Engines Equipment and Parts to Rus sia US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

$2500000000

$2000000000

$1500000000

$1000000000

$500000000

$-

Figure 62 US Exports of Drilling and Oil Field Equipment US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

0

$5000000

$10000000

$15000000

$20000000

$25000000

$30000000

$35000000

$40000000

$45000000

$50000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 42 102017 404 PM

Figure 63 US Exports of Industrial Engines to Rus sia US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

0

$5000000

$10000000

$15000000

$20000000

$25000000

$30000000

$35000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Figure 64 US Exports of Phar ma ceu ti cal Preparations to Rus sia US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

0

$5000000

$10000000

$15000000

$20000000

$25000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 43 102017 404 PM

Figure 65 US Exports of Meat and Poultry to Rus sia US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Meat poultry etc

$1000000000

$800000000

$600000000

$400000000

$200000000

$-

$1200000000

$1400000000

$1600000000

Figure 66 US Exports of Soybeans to Rus sia US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

0

$20000000

$40000000

$60000000

$80000000

$100000000

$120000000

$140000000

$160000000

$180000000

$200000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 44 102017 404 PM

Figure 67 US Exports of Vehicles Engines and Parts to Rus sia US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Other parts and accessories of vehicles

Automotive tires and tubes

Bodies and chassis for passenger cars

Engines and engine parts (carburetors pistonsrings and valves)

Trucks buses and special purpose vehicles

Passenger cars new and used

$2500000000

$2000000000

$1500000000

$500000000

$-

$1000000000

Figure 68 US Exports of Medicinal Equipment to Rus sia US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

$10000000

$15000000

$20000000

$25000000

$30000000

$35000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 45 102017 404 PM

Figure 610 US Exports to Rus sia by States (2016 US$ Value) Million US$ 2013ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoState and Metropolitan Area Trade Datardquo

Iowa Kentucky

North Dakota

Oklahoma

South Carolina

Washington

0

$500

$1000

$1500

$2000

2013 2014 2015 2016

District of Columbia

Iowa

Kentucky

North Dakota

Oklahoma

South Carolina

Washington

Figure 69 US Exports of Excavating Machinery to Rus sia US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

0

$5000000

$10000000

$15000000

$20000000

$25000000

$30000000

$35000000

$40000000

$45000000

$50000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 46 102017 404 PM

47

Upon reviewing the current trend in US- Russia economic relations we must acknowledge that

the existing trade model is obsolete and exhausted Imports are resource- oriented and reflect

constraints of the Rus sian economic structure while five groups of goodsmdash oil metals nuclear

fuels fertilizers and fishmdash make up more than 90 percent of total imports from Rus sia (Figure 71)

Each of these industries has a limited capacity for growth in the foreseeable future

Rus siarsquos core export to the United Statesmdash oilmdash will inevitably decrease in the mid- term under any

scenario The value and volume of Rus sian exports to the United States are open to global market

volatility and po liti cal pressures with limited hedging mechanisms

Overall US exports to Rus sia are unsustainable due to bilateral po liti cal tensions the whims of

commodity markets and changing domestic policies Sanctions and counter- sanctions have

created additional barriers particularly in finance banking high- tech energy and agro- business

According to the American Chamber of Commerce 69 percent of US companies working in the

country consider the impact of US sanctions against Rus sia on their business as negative At the

same time 60 percent of companies do not expect big changes in business relations between

Rus sia and the United States under Trump1 as the new law codifies existing sanctions fortifies

them and extends them to new sectors

Current US investments are low due to the weak rule of law in Rus sia a lack of property right

protections and proper contract enforcement high levels of statization and monopolization in the

economy a poor business climate outdated capital stock dependence on natural- resource

sectors and of course sanction and counter- sanction mea sures Bloated administrative compo-

nents created as risk mitigation instruments have also served as impediments The countryrsquos

institutional weakness low level of productivity bud get constraints and a declining inflexible

workforce will restrain future economic growth even if commodity prices recover Rus sian eco-

nomic policy will likely continue to be statist and protectionist relying mostly on import

substitutions

1 Ibid 11

Existing Trends and Future Scenarios

07

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 47 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations48

What scenarios can be expected in such a challenging environment

One probability (no peace no war) is based on the assumption that matters will not deteriorate

further and implementation of the Sanctions Act will be cursory This will cause relatively slow

degradation in the economic field with occasional flashes of activity in selected areas (eg closer

cooperation against Islamist terrorist groups in Syria)

A second worse case or critical scenario is the intensive and full- scale execution of current sanc-

tion legislation and even the imposition of new economic punitive and restrictive mea sures which

could incite asymmetric retaliatory actions and lead to the introduction of additional protectionist

policies This in turn could trigger a further escalation of mutual confrontation and could eventu-

ally destroy the fundamentals of the current bilateral trade system Rus sian leadership has charac-

terized the Sanctions Act as a declaration of a trade war that ends all hope for improving bilateral

relations2

2 Дмитрий Медведев ldquoПодписание президентом США нового санкционного закона против России создает несколько

последствийrdquo [The US Presidentrsquos signing of the package of new sanctions against Rus sia will have a few conse-

quences] Facebook August 2 2017 https wwwfacebook com Dmitry Medvedev posts 10154587161801851

Figure 71 US Imports from Rus sia Share of Oil Metals Nuclear Fuel Fertilizers and Fish Million US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

93

94

93

94

95

96

93

92

87

89

0

$5000

$10000

$15000

$20000

$25000

$30000

$35000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

US Imports from Russia

Share of Oil Metals Nuclear FuelFertilizers and Fish

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 48 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 49

The best case and most favorable scenario looks less probable now It assumes the realization of

structural reforms in Rus sia in such a way that would adapt Rus siarsquos foreign policy to national

economic needs reduce confrontations with the West and make a concerted efort to integrate

Rus sian businesses into global supply and value chains A revitalization of the structural reform

agendamdash including eforts to diversify economic activities through de- monopolization and support

for SMEs a restructuring of the banking sector the creation of a vibrant business climate to foster

entrepreneurships and innovation the implementation of administrative and judicial reforms to

tackle red tape and endemic corruption and the reduction of state control over key sectors of the

economy via wide- spread privatization could kick- start the development of a nonoil economy and

improve long- term growth prospects Despite ongoing discussion of reform strategies deep

economic and po liti cal changes are extremely complicated over the next po liti calelectoral cycle

(2018ndash2024) particularly because of re sis tance of vested interests and growing commodity prices

The urgency to tackle structural shortcomings in natu ral resource- dependent economies usually

correlates with the price of those resources and the degree to which resource rents drive eco-

nomic activity However there may be marginal improvements in the efficiency of the current

economic system

Future US- Russia relations can be thought of through three pillars one pillar focuses on areas

where both countries maintain a competitive rivalry another looks at potential areas of interaction

under pres ent conditions a third pillar and one that has evaporated from the current bilateral

agenda concentrates on future cooperation Stronger economic ties could not only be a kind of

po liti cal shock absorber but contribute to the building of this future (particularly business contacts

aim to support future structural reforms) although po liti cal factors are depressing the prospects

for cooperation To escape deadlock it will be impor tant to establish the right balance between

politics and economics and create a model of collaboration within the framework of contention

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 49 102017 404 PM

About the Author

Vadim Grishin PhD MBA has been involved in the reform pro cess in Rus sia as adviser to the

deputy prime minister of Rus sia in 1992ndash1993 and 2006ndash2010 He has extensive experience

working with the Bretton Woods Institutions He was the board member of the World Bank Group

and served as se nior adviser at the International Monetary Fund Currently he is a con sul tant to the

chief economistrsquos office of the International Finance Corporation and teaches the economics of

transition at Georgetown University in Washington DC

50

594-71613_ch99_4Pindd 50 102017 403 PM

Blank

COVER PHOTO ADOBE STOCK

1616 Rhode Island Avenue NW

Washington DC 20036

202 887 0200 | wwwcsisorg

v++ISBN 978-1-4422-8035-9

Lanham bull Boulder bull New York bull London

4501 Forbes Boulevard

Lanham MD 20706

301 459 3366 | wwwrowmancom

A U T H O R

Vadim Grishin

Myths and Realities

A Report of the

CSIS RUSSIA AND EURASIA PROGRAM

US-RussiaEconomicRelations

O C T O B E R 2 0 1 7

Euml|xHSLEOCy280359z

The Man Pupu Nyor Rock Formations at the Northern Urals also known as Seven

Strong Man or Little Mountain of the God in the local tribe (Mansi) language

Page 33: U.S.-Russia Economic Relations: Myths and Realities · 2020-04-17 · OCTOBER 2017 U.S.- Russia Economic Relations Myths and Realities AUTHOR Vadim Grishin A REPORT OF THE CSIS RUSSIA

Vadim Grishin 27

the Rus sian state mono poly Rosneft and commodity trading and mining giant Glencore which

along with energy and commodities com pany Vitol participated in a $10 billion prepayment

deal with Rosneft for crude supplies in 2013

There have been a number of ongoing transactions between the Rus sian oil industry and interna-

tional oil companies including several that top the list of importers of Rus sian oil to the United

States ( Table 57) In December 2016 Glencore participated in a controversial privatization opera-

tion purchasing in tandem with the Qatar sovereign wealth fund a 195 percent stake in Rosneft

which was on the US and EU list of sanctioned firms8 Glencore has also taken a blocking stake in

midsize oil producer RussNeft BP owns a 1975 percent stake in Rosneft Chevron holds a

15 percent interest in the 935- mile- long CPC9 pipeline which transports an average of 959000

barrels of crude oil per day including 76000 barrels daily from Rus sia10 ExxonMobil has formed

8 E Mazneva and I Arkhipov ldquoRus sia Sells $11 Billion Stake in Rosneft to Glencore Qatarrdquo Bloomberg December 7

2016

9 CPCthinsp=thinspCaspian Pipeline Consortium

10 ldquoRus sia Highlights of Operations and Business Portfoliordquo Chevron accessed October 3 2017 https wwwchevron

com worldwide russia

Figure 56 Share of Rus sian Oil in Total US Oil Imports Thousands of Barrels per Day 1972ndash2016

Source US EIA ldquoUS Imports by Country of Origin Total Crude Oil and Productsrdquo

2000

4000

6000

8000

10000

12000

14000

16000

US Imports of Crude Oil and Petroleum Products (Thousand Barrels per Day)

US Imports from Russia of Crude Oil and Petroleum Products (Thousand Barrels per Day)19

7319

7419

7519

7619

7719

7819

7919

80

198

119

82

198

319

84

198

519

86

198

719

88

198

919

90

199

119

92

199

319

94

199

519

96

199

719

98

199

92

00

02

00

12

00

22

00

32

00

42

00

52

00

62

00

72

00

82

00

92

010

20

112

012

20

132

014

20

152

016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 27 102017 404 PM

Table 57 Top Importers of Rus sian Oil to the United States Thousands of Barrels 2016

VALERO MARKETING amp SUPPLY CO 54590 3616

EXXONMOBIL OIL CORP 17087 1130

CHEVRON USA INC 15217 1008

BP WEST COAST PRODUCTS LLC 10130 671

GEORGE E WARREN CORP 7272 48

PAULSBORO REFINING CO LLC 6838 453

TESORO CORP 5097 338

VITOL INC 5084 337

PHILLIPS 66 CO 4726 313

TRAFIGURA AG 4360 289

PAR HAWAII REFINING LLC 3893 258

MOTIVA ENTERPRISES LLC 3041 205

SHELL US TRADING CO 2863 19

MARATHON PETROLEUM CO LLC 2475 16

ATLANTIC TRADING amp MARKETING 2099 14

FREEPOINT COMMODITIES LLC 1439 1

GLENCORE LTD 1284 85

BEST PETROLEUM CORP 967 64

ROLYMPUS US COMMODITIES GROUP LLC 822 6

HUNT CRUDE OIL SUPPLY CO 666 4

GULF OIL LP 658 4

Source US EIA ldquoUS Imports by Country of Origin Crude Oilrdquo Petroleum amp Other Liquids September 13

2017 httpswwweiagovdnavpetpet_move_impcus_a2_nus_epc0_im0_mbblpd_ahtm authorrsquos

computation

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 28 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 29

several joint ventures with Rosneft to undertake ofshore exploration in the Black Sea and the Kara

Sea in Siberia11

According to the Sanctions Act US persons are prohibited from exporting or reexporting goods

ser vices (except financial ser vices) and technology in support of exploration or production of new

deep- water Arctic ofshore or shale oil proj ects that involve designated Rus sian entities or other

entities in which such sanctioned persons have a controlling interest or a substantial noncontrol-

ling owner ship interest defined as not less than 33 percent (previously it was 50 percent) The new

law also authorizesmdash but does not requiremdash the imposition of so- called secondary sanctions

against non- US entities that engage in activities involving the construction maintenance or

expansion of Rus sian energy export pipelines with a fair market value of $1 million or more or an

aggregate fair market value during a 12- month period of $5 million12 This provision has raised the

concerns of some Eu ro pean countries particularly Germany As result the final language of the

law included wording about coordination of this issue with allies of the United States

Shipments of Rus sian oil to the United States could be afected by activity in the US refinery

industry In early 2017 Saudi Aramco bought the United Statesrsquo largest oil refinery in Port Arthur

(Texas) and it announced plans to send more of its own crude to that refinery13 Serious concerns

exist however regarding the future of three refineries and nine pipelines owned by Citgo a US

branch of the Venezuelan state com pany PdVSA which is balancing precariously on the edge of

default Under certain conditions in the event of PdVSA bankruptcy Rosneft could claim a stake of

up to 499 percent in Citgo Such a possibility has raised concerns among politicians and US

government officials with Trea sury Secretary Steven Mnuchin calling it a ldquonational security issuerdquo14

Tables 58 59 and 510 show allocations of Rus sian oil imports to major US refineries some of

which work exclusively on Rus sian crude a total of two to three months per year In total 150940

thousand barrels of Rus sian oil were refined in 2016

Figure 57 confirms a leading position of Texas and Louisiana among the US states receiving

Rus sian crude followed by New Jersey California Mississippi Washington Hawaii and Delaware

In a paradoxical way Texas has dis appeared from the list of states as a main destination of US

imports from Rus sia (Figure 58) because Rus sian crude is mostly delivered to Louisiana ports and

registered there by US Customs as an import from Rus sia After that it transports to refineries in

Louisiana and Texas

Overall the short- term business rationale behind the sustainability of US oil imports from Rus sia

cannot overcome strong headwinds in the US energy sector facing all oil importers which will

inevitably lead to a contraction of Rus sian oil exports to the United States in the foreseeable future

11 Exxon eforts to receive a special US Trea sury waiver to drill in sanctioned Rus sia failed in 2017

12 Countering Amer i carsquos Adversaries through Sanctions Act HR 3364

13 Sarp Ozkan ldquoSaudi Aramcorsquos Port Arthur Refinery and the US Refinery Fleetrdquo Drilling Info May 11 2017

https infodrillinginfo com saudi - aramcos - port - arthur - refinery - us - refinery - fleet

14 Graham Kates ldquoTrea sury Secretary Rus siarsquos Citgo Deal a National Security Issuerdquo CBS News May 1 2017

http wwwcbsnews com news rosneft - citgo - steven - mnuchin - national - security

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 29 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations30

Table 58 Valerorsquos Refineries Pro cessing Rus sian Oil Thousands of Barrels 2016

Saint Charles Louisiana 29206 535

Corpus Christi Texas 20626 378

Wilmington California 4250 78

Total USA 54590 100

Source US EIA ldquoRefinery Capacity Reportrdquo January 1 2017

table 5 wwweia gov petroleum refinerycapacity table5 pdf

authorrsquos computation

Table 59 ExxonMobil Refineries Pro cessing Rus sian Oil Thousands of Barrels 2016

Baytown Texas 15037 88

Baton Rouge Louisiana 2046 12

Total USA 17083 100

Source US EIA ldquoRefinery Capacity Reportrdquo authorrsquos computation

Table 510 Chevronrsquos Refineries Pro cessing Rus sian Oil Thousands of Barrels 2016

Pascagoula Mississippi 12767 840

El Segundo California 2372 155

Saint Rose Louisiana 78 05

Total USA 15217 100

Source US EIA ldquoRefinery Capacity Reportrdquo authorrsquos computation

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 30 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 31

HEAVY METAL

Taken together US imports of metals and US imports of oil compose about 80 percent of US

total imports from Rus sia (Figure 59) Trade of metals like other commodities is strongly afected

by market price fluctuations Nevertheless metal imports from Rus sia have been fairly resilient to

market volatility and their average annual value has hovered at about $4 billion in the last five years

(Figure 510) This market resilience was forged at the end of the 1990searly 2000s when Rus sian

metal producers gradually modernized their plants adjusting quality of production to Western

standards and enhancing integration into global value and supply chains Some of them conquered

their share of the highly competitive US market struggling with peers from Canada and certain

BRICS countries (China India and Brazil) To attract additional resources all Rus sian large metal-

producing companies became public and were listed on stock exchanges chiefly the London Stock

Exchange (Severstalrsquo PAO Evraz MMK OAO Novolipetsk Steel Norilsk Nikel and TMK PAO) one

on the New York Stock Exchange (Mechel) and one on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange (Rusal)

Business logic pushed some of them to invest in the US metal- making industry which was hit

hard by crisis Later on some of those assets were sold (eg two US steel mills acquired by

Severstal in 2004 were purchased 10 years later by Steel Dynamics Inc and AK Steel Corp)

Figure 57 Share of US States Rus sian Oil Imports 2016

Source US EIA ldquoUS Imports from Rus sia of Crude Oil and Petroleum Productsrdquo Petroleum amp Other

Liquids September 29 2017 https www eia gov dnav pet hist LeafHandler ashx nshy=shyPETampsshy=shyMTTIM _ NUS

- NRS _ 1ampfshy=shyM authorrsquos computation

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

100

Maine

Massachusetts

Maryland

Connecticut

Georgia

Rhode Island

Virginia

Florida

New York

Alabama

Puerto Rico

Pennsylvania

Delaware

Hawaii

Washington

Mississippi

California

New Jersey

Louisiana

Texas

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 31 102017 404 PM

Figure 58 US Imports from Rus sia by State Million US$ 2013ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoState and Metropolitan Area Trade Datardquo Foreign Trade last modified

October 2 2017 https wwwcensus gov foreign - trade statistics state

Alaska

Connecticut

Delaware

Hawaii

Louisiana

Maryland

North Dakota 0

$1000

$2000

$3000

$4000

$5000

$6000

2013 2014 2015 2016

Alabama

Alaska

Connecticut

Delaware

Hawaii

Louisiana

Maryland

Maine

Mississippi

Montana

North Dakota

Mississippi

Figure 59 US Imports from Rus sia Share of Oil and Metals Million US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 1992ndash2016)

83

82

85

86

87

88

85

82

7375

0

$5000

$10000

$15000

$20000

$25000

$30000

$35000

$40000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

US Imports from Russia

Share of Oil and Metals

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 32 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 33

Obviously the market dynamic of dif er ent metals varies (eg iron steel aluminum platinum and

nickel) Caps to increase their trade and production in a ldquored oceanrdquo global environment with

anemic demand is rather limited despite Figure 510 showing a spike of iron and steel imports

from Rus sia in 2014 and aluminum in 2016 Some opportunities may exist for Russian- owned steel

plants in the United States (such as NLMK) to participate in energy proj ects resumed under Presi-

dent Trump who has required that new pipelines use only American- made steel15

Rus sia occupies a special niche in the US market for titanium products a high- end metal indus-

try Twenty years ago a long- term contract was signed between Rus sian titanium producer

VSMPO- AVISMA and Boeing The Rus sian com pany entered the selective club of Boeing suppliers

for the manufacture of components and semi- finished products Since the signing of this contract

VSMPO has delivered more than 35 percent of all titanium placed on Boeing civil aircraft16 They

are hidden in the trade data in an import category for Civilian Aircrafts and Parts (Figure 511) At

the end of 2016 Boeing announced an extension of its framework agreement with AVISMA

15 E Scheyder C Ngai and T Sylvester ldquoAmerican Steel Unlikely to Get Keystone Boost Despite Trump Orderrdquo

Reuters January 27 2017 http wwwreuters com article usa - trump - pipeline - transcanada - idUSL1N1FH1ZD

16 A Kramer ldquoTitanium Fills Vital Role for Boeing and Rus siardquo New York Times July 5 2013 http wwwnytimes com

2013 07 06 business global titanium - fills - vital - role - for - boeing - and - russia html mcubzshy=shy3

Figure 510 US Imports from Rus sia Iron Steel Bauxite Aluminum Nickel Nonferrous Metals and Other Precious Metals and Materials US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 1992ndash2016)

0

$6000000000

$5000000000

$4000000000

$3000000000

$2000000000

$1000000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 20122013

20142015

2016

Finished metal shapes

Iron and steel advanced

Iron and steel products nec

Nonferrous metals other

Other precious metals

Nickel

Bauxite and aluminum

Iron and steel mill products

Steelmaking materials

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 33 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations34

through 2022 and additional investments in the construction of a new robotic plant in Titanium

Valley a special economic zone located in the Sverdlovsk region that will open in 2018 The pro-

cessing of titanium forgings in all Boeing civil aircraft will be performed there including 787s 737

MAXs and 777Xs17 The contract extension with AVISMA may add several hundred million dollars

in value to annual US imports from Rus sia

How can such heavy reliance on imports of Rus sian titanium exist during a period of rising geopo-

liti cal tensions The answer is straightforward VSMPO- AVISMA is a highly specialized natu ral

mono poly producing 45 percent of the worldrsquos aerospace titanium Only four other countries

smelt high- grade titanium in industrial quantities the United States Germany Japan and China

Overall global production capacity is limited while demand is growing The United States cur-

rently imports around 79 percent of all the titanium it consumes each year18

17 ldquoBoeing and VSMPO Avisma to Launch Second Joint Production Siterdquo Rus sian Aviation Insider December 22 2016

http wwwrusaviainsider com boeing - and - vsmpo - avisma - to - launch - second - joint - production - site

18 Jon Ostrower and Andy Pasztor ldquoBoeing United Technologies Stockpile Titanium Partsrdquo Wall Street Journal

August 7 2014 https wwwwsj com articles boeing - united - technologies - stockpiling - titanium - parts - 1407441886

Figure 511 US Imports from Rus sia Civilian Aircrafts and Parts US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 1992ndash2016)

0

$20000000

$40000000

$60000000

$80000000

$100000000

$120000000

$140000000

$160000000

$180000000

$200000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Parts-civilian aircraft

Civilian aircraft

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 34 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 35

The Sanctions Act authorizes the secretary of the trea sury (in a nonmandatory way) to impose

restrictions (without specifying them) against Rus sian state- owned entities operating in the railway

metals and mining sectors of the Rus sian economy Despite the commanding heights of Rus siarsquos

state sector owner ship in its economy (70 percent of GDP) the metal- producing companies have

remained mostly in private hands

NUCLEAR AFFAIRS

Historically owners and operators of the 104 commercial nuclear power reactors in the United

States have purchased more than 80 percent of their uranium from foreign countries Uranium

shipping from Rus sia accounted for about 13 percent of the 58 million pounds of uranium pur-

chased overseas in 201219 At the same time the Rus sian state- owned mono poly Rosatom ac-

counts for 20 percent of Kazakhstanrsquos uranium production (which in turn comprises 11 percent of

all US uranium imports) and 20 percent of US domestic uranium production capacity (with

owner ship of exploration tracts in Wyoming)20

Nuclear fuel and nuclear power continue to be po liti cally sensitive topics both in the United

States and Rus sia Bilateral cooperation in this sector (being surprisingly stable with imports of

nuclear fuel from Rus sia at a level of $1 billion annually in the last five years [Figure 512 and 513])

is under constant po liti cal and lobbying pressure and has been a source of several po liti cal scan-

dals21 Consequently upside risks in this area of interaction are minimal and downside risks are

much higher especially when we are seeing more decommissioning of nuclear plants in the

United States than new constructions The US EIArsquos 2017 Annual Energy Outlook assumes

that about 25 percent of the nuclear capacity now operating will be removed from ser vice

by 205022

WHY IS THE GRASS GREENER ON THE OTHER SIDE

The United States continues to significantly reduce imports of chemical fertilizers as domestic pro-

duction increases In 2016 the United States imported 13 percent less ammonia and 11 percent

less urea and UAN which is a liquid urea and ammonium nitrate fertilizer Rus sia accounts for

around 40 percent of UAN imported by the United States The United States canceled antidumping

duties on imports of ammonium nitrate and urea from Rus sia in 2016 but it did not prevent import

19 US EIA ldquoThe US Relies on Foreign Uranium Enrichment Ser vices to Fuel Its Nuclear Power Plantsrdquo Today in

Energy August 28 2013 https wwweia gov todayinenergy detail php idshy=shy1273

20 Colin Chilcoat ldquoDoes Rus sia Really Own 20 Percent of the USrsquo Uranium Reservesrdquo OilPricecom May 6 2015

http oilpricecom Alternative - Energy Nuclear - Power Does - Russia - Really - Own - 20 - Of - The - US - Uranium - Reserves

html

21 Michelle Ye Hee Lee ldquoThe Facts behind Trumprsquos Repeated Claim about Hillary Clintonrsquos Role in the Rus sian Ura-

nium Dealrdquo Washington Post October 26 2016

22 US EIA ldquoAnnual Energy Outlook 2017 with Projections to 2050rdquo 81ndash82

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 35 102017 404 PM

Figure 512 US Imports from Rus sia Share of Oil Metals and Nuclear Fuel Million US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 1992ndash2016)

87

86

90

90

90

91

88

86

7882

0

$5000

$10000

$15000

$20000

$25000

$30000

$35000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

US Imports from Russia

Share of Oil Metals and Nuclear Fuel

Figure 513 US Imports from Rus sia Nuclear Fuel Materials US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

$-

$200000000

$400000000

$600000000

$800000000

$1200000000

$1000000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 36 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 37

drops twice last year (Figures 514 and 515) According to forecasts UAN imports are expected to

decline further to 15 million tons this year down over 46 percent from 28 million tons imported

last year23 The downside trend in imports of fertilizers will likely continue because of oversupply

BIG FISH

US imports of fish and shellfish from Rus sia are best understood in comparison with US fish

exports to the Rus sian market which slipped to zero in August 2014 after Rus sia issued an order

banning certain agricultural imports from the United States (Figure 516) While the volume of US

supply was not very large it was impor tant because it broke up the monopolistic dominance of a

few vertically integrated Rus sian companies that have kept prices high by restricting the entry of

new producers Seeking to implement import substitution policies Rus sia has tried to reduce

exports as well as imports of fish and seafood products in the last couple of years This symmetri-

cal approach was intended to ldquocompensaterdquo for a decrease of fish products in the domestic

23 Deepika Thapliyal ldquoPotashCorp Forecasts Sharp Drop in US Nitrogen Imports in 2017rdquo ICIS News February 7

2017 https wwwicis com resources news 2017 02 07 10076734 potashcorp - forecasts - sharp - drop - in - us - nitrogen

- imports - in - 2017

Figure 514 US Imports from Rus sia Share of Oil Metals Nuclear Fuel and Fertilizers Million US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

90

93

92

93

94

95

92

91

85

86

0

$5000

$10000

$15000

$20000

$25000

$30000

$35000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

US Imports from Russia

Share of Oil Metals Nuclear Fuel and Fertilizers

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 37 102017 404 PM

Figure 515 US Imports from Rus sia Chemical- Fertilizers US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

S-

$200000000

$400000000

$600000000

$800000000

$1000000000

$1200000000

$1400000000

$1600000000

$1800000000

$2000000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Figure 516 US Exports to Rus sia Fish and Shellfish US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

0

$10000000

$20000000

$30000000

$40000000

$50000000

$60000000

$70000000

$80000000

$90000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Fish and shellfish

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 38 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 39

consumer market caused by Rus siarsquos import ban but it has failed As result the group most af-

fected by the self- imposed counter- sanctions were Rus sian consumers

With a significant drop in fish imports a devaluation of the ruble and inflationary pressures on

seafood prices yearly consumption of fish in Rus sia has declined precipitously In 2015 alone

fish prices increased 20 percent and consumption dropped to 14 kilograms per person24 from

22 kilograms in 201425 In 2016 food rose to 355 percent of house hold expenditure as a result of

increases in food prices26 This has pushed vertically integrated fishing monopolies to sell even

more of their catch abroad rather than deliver to the Rus sian Federation (Figure 517) Thus we

cannot exclude the possibility of further growth in US fish and shellfish imports from Rus sia on a

marginal scale

24 Александр Савельев ldquoПотребление рыбы в России упало до 14 кг на человекаrdquo [Fish consumption in Rus sia fell to

14 kg per person] Экономика Интерфакс January 28 2015 http wwwinterfax ru business 492038

25 Илья Шестаков ldquoПотебление рыбы в России снизилось на 10 процентов из- за роста ценrdquo [Fish consumption in

Rus sia dropped by 10 percent due to price increases] RNS March 8 2017 https rnsonline consumer - market

Potreblenie - ribi - v - Rossii - snizilos - na - 10 - iz - za - rosta - tsen - 2017 - 03 - 08

26 Zoya Sheftalovich and Christian Oliver ldquoRus siarsquos Boom (Farming) Economyrdquo Politico November 8 2016 http

wwwpolitico eu article russias - boom - farming - economy

Figure 517 US Imports from Rus sia Fish and Shellfish US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

0

$50000000

$100000000

$150000000

$200000000

$250000000

$300000000

$350000000

$400000000

$450000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 39 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations40

SPACE ODYSSEY

Among high- end products beyond the top five groups of goods imported from Rus sia cheap and

efficient Rus sian engines have been used to launch US rockets into space for about 16 years

(Figure 518) There was a serious po liti cal strug gle around a 2014 ban on the purchase of Rus sian

RD-180 rocket engines revealing the conflicting business interests of power ful high- tech companies

This restrictive mea sure was temporary and was quickly lifted because of significant cost impacts

and risks of disruption to launch schedules27 For the same reason the Sanctions Act does not autho-

rize ldquothe imposition of any sanction or other condition limitation restriction or prohibition that

directly or indirectly impedes the supply by any entity of the Rus sian Federation of any product or

ser vice or the procurement of such product or ser vice by any contractor or subcontractor of the

United States or any other entity relating to or in connection with any space launch conducted for

the National Aeronautics and Space Administration or any other nonndash Department of Defense

customerrdquo28

Nevertheless many experts believe that US domestic alternatives to replace Rus sian engines will

be viable in five to eight years

27 Ken Dilanian ldquoWhy Does the US Use Rus sian Rockets to Launch Its Satellitesrdquo NBC News updated November 15

2016 http wwwnbcnews com why - does - u - s - use - russian - rockets - launch - its - satellites - n588526

28 Countering Amer i carsquos Adversaries through Sanctions Act HR 3364

Figure 518 Spacecraft Excluding Military US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

0

$20000000

$40000000

$60000000

$80000000

$100000000

$120000000

$140000000

$160000000

$180000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 40 102017 404 PM

41

Diversity and technological complexity are the most vis i ble advantages supporting US exports to

Rus sia Three major groups of export goods include civilian aircraft engines and parts (Figure 61)

drilling and oil field equipment (Figure 62) and industrial machines and engines (Figure 63)

Despite sanctions against the transfer of advanced oil producing and pro cessing technologies the

realization of US drilling and oil field equipment in Rus sia is sustainable although some bilateral

proj ects have been frozen

Another category of goods that has demonstrated resilience is the phar ma ceu ti cal industry (Fig-

ure 64) because most drugs in Rus sia are imported (about 70 percent of the Rus sian phar ma ceu-

ti cal market in value) Import substitution policies have had only modest results in this industry

As confirmed by American Chamber of Commerce surveys US exports to Rus sia are closely

connected to US FDI 30 percent of total imports of US companies working in the Rus sian

market come from the United States (more than $2 billion in 2016) In other words about

40 percent of all US exports to Rus sia are related to a US corporate- sector business pro cess in

the country The major sectors of activity of these companies are energy and natu ral resources

(52 percent) manufacturing (17 percent) information and communications technology or ICT

(13 percent) retail (7 percent) automotive industry (6 percent) phar ma ceu ti cal production

(1 percent) professional ser vices (05 percent) and other (2 percent)1

Some obvious constraints on US exports to Rus sia have resulted from a reduction in demand A

deterioration of bilateral relations and implementation of sanctions and counter- sanctions have

directly or indirectly afected all businesses Figures 65 and 66 provide data regarding a dramatic

drop in the sale of US agricultural production in Rus sia with all other categories of exports in

goods showing big cuts as well (see Figures 67ndash69)

Exports of civilian aircraft engines and parts put the state of Washington in first place among

other states as a leading exporter to the Rus sian market (Figure 610)

1 American Chamber of Commerce in Rus sia ldquoInvestment and Import to Rus sia 2nd Surveyrdquo 13

Diversity and Constraints

06

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 41 102017 404 PM

Figure 61 US Exports of Civilian Aircraft Engines Equipment and Parts to Rus sia US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

$2500000000

$2000000000

$1500000000

$1000000000

$500000000

$-

Figure 62 US Exports of Drilling and Oil Field Equipment US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

0

$5000000

$10000000

$15000000

$20000000

$25000000

$30000000

$35000000

$40000000

$45000000

$50000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 42 102017 404 PM

Figure 63 US Exports of Industrial Engines to Rus sia US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

0

$5000000

$10000000

$15000000

$20000000

$25000000

$30000000

$35000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Figure 64 US Exports of Phar ma ceu ti cal Preparations to Rus sia US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

0

$5000000

$10000000

$15000000

$20000000

$25000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 43 102017 404 PM

Figure 65 US Exports of Meat and Poultry to Rus sia US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Meat poultry etc

$1000000000

$800000000

$600000000

$400000000

$200000000

$-

$1200000000

$1400000000

$1600000000

Figure 66 US Exports of Soybeans to Rus sia US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

0

$20000000

$40000000

$60000000

$80000000

$100000000

$120000000

$140000000

$160000000

$180000000

$200000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 44 102017 404 PM

Figure 67 US Exports of Vehicles Engines and Parts to Rus sia US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Other parts and accessories of vehicles

Automotive tires and tubes

Bodies and chassis for passenger cars

Engines and engine parts (carburetors pistonsrings and valves)

Trucks buses and special purpose vehicles

Passenger cars new and used

$2500000000

$2000000000

$1500000000

$500000000

$-

$1000000000

Figure 68 US Exports of Medicinal Equipment to Rus sia US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

$10000000

$15000000

$20000000

$25000000

$30000000

$35000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 45 102017 404 PM

Figure 610 US Exports to Rus sia by States (2016 US$ Value) Million US$ 2013ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoState and Metropolitan Area Trade Datardquo

Iowa Kentucky

North Dakota

Oklahoma

South Carolina

Washington

0

$500

$1000

$1500

$2000

2013 2014 2015 2016

District of Columbia

Iowa

Kentucky

North Dakota

Oklahoma

South Carolina

Washington

Figure 69 US Exports of Excavating Machinery to Rus sia US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

0

$5000000

$10000000

$15000000

$20000000

$25000000

$30000000

$35000000

$40000000

$45000000

$50000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 46 102017 404 PM

47

Upon reviewing the current trend in US- Russia economic relations we must acknowledge that

the existing trade model is obsolete and exhausted Imports are resource- oriented and reflect

constraints of the Rus sian economic structure while five groups of goodsmdash oil metals nuclear

fuels fertilizers and fishmdash make up more than 90 percent of total imports from Rus sia (Figure 71)

Each of these industries has a limited capacity for growth in the foreseeable future

Rus siarsquos core export to the United Statesmdash oilmdash will inevitably decrease in the mid- term under any

scenario The value and volume of Rus sian exports to the United States are open to global market

volatility and po liti cal pressures with limited hedging mechanisms

Overall US exports to Rus sia are unsustainable due to bilateral po liti cal tensions the whims of

commodity markets and changing domestic policies Sanctions and counter- sanctions have

created additional barriers particularly in finance banking high- tech energy and agro- business

According to the American Chamber of Commerce 69 percent of US companies working in the

country consider the impact of US sanctions against Rus sia on their business as negative At the

same time 60 percent of companies do not expect big changes in business relations between

Rus sia and the United States under Trump1 as the new law codifies existing sanctions fortifies

them and extends them to new sectors

Current US investments are low due to the weak rule of law in Rus sia a lack of property right

protections and proper contract enforcement high levels of statization and monopolization in the

economy a poor business climate outdated capital stock dependence on natural- resource

sectors and of course sanction and counter- sanction mea sures Bloated administrative compo-

nents created as risk mitigation instruments have also served as impediments The countryrsquos

institutional weakness low level of productivity bud get constraints and a declining inflexible

workforce will restrain future economic growth even if commodity prices recover Rus sian eco-

nomic policy will likely continue to be statist and protectionist relying mostly on import

substitutions

1 Ibid 11

Existing Trends and Future Scenarios

07

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 47 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations48

What scenarios can be expected in such a challenging environment

One probability (no peace no war) is based on the assumption that matters will not deteriorate

further and implementation of the Sanctions Act will be cursory This will cause relatively slow

degradation in the economic field with occasional flashes of activity in selected areas (eg closer

cooperation against Islamist terrorist groups in Syria)

A second worse case or critical scenario is the intensive and full- scale execution of current sanc-

tion legislation and even the imposition of new economic punitive and restrictive mea sures which

could incite asymmetric retaliatory actions and lead to the introduction of additional protectionist

policies This in turn could trigger a further escalation of mutual confrontation and could eventu-

ally destroy the fundamentals of the current bilateral trade system Rus sian leadership has charac-

terized the Sanctions Act as a declaration of a trade war that ends all hope for improving bilateral

relations2

2 Дмитрий Медведев ldquoПодписание президентом США нового санкционного закона против России создает несколько

последствийrdquo [The US Presidentrsquos signing of the package of new sanctions against Rus sia will have a few conse-

quences] Facebook August 2 2017 https wwwfacebook com Dmitry Medvedev posts 10154587161801851

Figure 71 US Imports from Rus sia Share of Oil Metals Nuclear Fuel Fertilizers and Fish Million US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

93

94

93

94

95

96

93

92

87

89

0

$5000

$10000

$15000

$20000

$25000

$30000

$35000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

US Imports from Russia

Share of Oil Metals Nuclear FuelFertilizers and Fish

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 48 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 49

The best case and most favorable scenario looks less probable now It assumes the realization of

structural reforms in Rus sia in such a way that would adapt Rus siarsquos foreign policy to national

economic needs reduce confrontations with the West and make a concerted efort to integrate

Rus sian businesses into global supply and value chains A revitalization of the structural reform

agendamdash including eforts to diversify economic activities through de- monopolization and support

for SMEs a restructuring of the banking sector the creation of a vibrant business climate to foster

entrepreneurships and innovation the implementation of administrative and judicial reforms to

tackle red tape and endemic corruption and the reduction of state control over key sectors of the

economy via wide- spread privatization could kick- start the development of a nonoil economy and

improve long- term growth prospects Despite ongoing discussion of reform strategies deep

economic and po liti cal changes are extremely complicated over the next po liti calelectoral cycle

(2018ndash2024) particularly because of re sis tance of vested interests and growing commodity prices

The urgency to tackle structural shortcomings in natu ral resource- dependent economies usually

correlates with the price of those resources and the degree to which resource rents drive eco-

nomic activity However there may be marginal improvements in the efficiency of the current

economic system

Future US- Russia relations can be thought of through three pillars one pillar focuses on areas

where both countries maintain a competitive rivalry another looks at potential areas of interaction

under pres ent conditions a third pillar and one that has evaporated from the current bilateral

agenda concentrates on future cooperation Stronger economic ties could not only be a kind of

po liti cal shock absorber but contribute to the building of this future (particularly business contacts

aim to support future structural reforms) although po liti cal factors are depressing the prospects

for cooperation To escape deadlock it will be impor tant to establish the right balance between

politics and economics and create a model of collaboration within the framework of contention

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 49 102017 404 PM

About the Author

Vadim Grishin PhD MBA has been involved in the reform pro cess in Rus sia as adviser to the

deputy prime minister of Rus sia in 1992ndash1993 and 2006ndash2010 He has extensive experience

working with the Bretton Woods Institutions He was the board member of the World Bank Group

and served as se nior adviser at the International Monetary Fund Currently he is a con sul tant to the

chief economistrsquos office of the International Finance Corporation and teaches the economics of

transition at Georgetown University in Washington DC

50

594-71613_ch99_4Pindd 50 102017 403 PM

Blank

COVER PHOTO ADOBE STOCK

1616 Rhode Island Avenue NW

Washington DC 20036

202 887 0200 | wwwcsisorg

v++ISBN 978-1-4422-8035-9

Lanham bull Boulder bull New York bull London

4501 Forbes Boulevard

Lanham MD 20706

301 459 3366 | wwwrowmancom

A U T H O R

Vadim Grishin

Myths and Realities

A Report of the

CSIS RUSSIA AND EURASIA PROGRAM

US-RussiaEconomicRelations

O C T O B E R 2 0 1 7

Euml|xHSLEOCy280359z

The Man Pupu Nyor Rock Formations at the Northern Urals also known as Seven

Strong Man or Little Mountain of the God in the local tribe (Mansi) language

Page 34: U.S.-Russia Economic Relations: Myths and Realities · 2020-04-17 · OCTOBER 2017 U.S.- Russia Economic Relations Myths and Realities AUTHOR Vadim Grishin A REPORT OF THE CSIS RUSSIA

Table 57 Top Importers of Rus sian Oil to the United States Thousands of Barrels 2016

VALERO MARKETING amp SUPPLY CO 54590 3616

EXXONMOBIL OIL CORP 17087 1130

CHEVRON USA INC 15217 1008

BP WEST COAST PRODUCTS LLC 10130 671

GEORGE E WARREN CORP 7272 48

PAULSBORO REFINING CO LLC 6838 453

TESORO CORP 5097 338

VITOL INC 5084 337

PHILLIPS 66 CO 4726 313

TRAFIGURA AG 4360 289

PAR HAWAII REFINING LLC 3893 258

MOTIVA ENTERPRISES LLC 3041 205

SHELL US TRADING CO 2863 19

MARATHON PETROLEUM CO LLC 2475 16

ATLANTIC TRADING amp MARKETING 2099 14

FREEPOINT COMMODITIES LLC 1439 1

GLENCORE LTD 1284 85

BEST PETROLEUM CORP 967 64

ROLYMPUS US COMMODITIES GROUP LLC 822 6

HUNT CRUDE OIL SUPPLY CO 666 4

GULF OIL LP 658 4

Source US EIA ldquoUS Imports by Country of Origin Crude Oilrdquo Petroleum amp Other Liquids September 13

2017 httpswwweiagovdnavpetpet_move_impcus_a2_nus_epc0_im0_mbblpd_ahtm authorrsquos

computation

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 28 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 29

several joint ventures with Rosneft to undertake ofshore exploration in the Black Sea and the Kara

Sea in Siberia11

According to the Sanctions Act US persons are prohibited from exporting or reexporting goods

ser vices (except financial ser vices) and technology in support of exploration or production of new

deep- water Arctic ofshore or shale oil proj ects that involve designated Rus sian entities or other

entities in which such sanctioned persons have a controlling interest or a substantial noncontrol-

ling owner ship interest defined as not less than 33 percent (previously it was 50 percent) The new

law also authorizesmdash but does not requiremdash the imposition of so- called secondary sanctions

against non- US entities that engage in activities involving the construction maintenance or

expansion of Rus sian energy export pipelines with a fair market value of $1 million or more or an

aggregate fair market value during a 12- month period of $5 million12 This provision has raised the

concerns of some Eu ro pean countries particularly Germany As result the final language of the

law included wording about coordination of this issue with allies of the United States

Shipments of Rus sian oil to the United States could be afected by activity in the US refinery

industry In early 2017 Saudi Aramco bought the United Statesrsquo largest oil refinery in Port Arthur

(Texas) and it announced plans to send more of its own crude to that refinery13 Serious concerns

exist however regarding the future of three refineries and nine pipelines owned by Citgo a US

branch of the Venezuelan state com pany PdVSA which is balancing precariously on the edge of

default Under certain conditions in the event of PdVSA bankruptcy Rosneft could claim a stake of

up to 499 percent in Citgo Such a possibility has raised concerns among politicians and US

government officials with Trea sury Secretary Steven Mnuchin calling it a ldquonational security issuerdquo14

Tables 58 59 and 510 show allocations of Rus sian oil imports to major US refineries some of

which work exclusively on Rus sian crude a total of two to three months per year In total 150940

thousand barrels of Rus sian oil were refined in 2016

Figure 57 confirms a leading position of Texas and Louisiana among the US states receiving

Rus sian crude followed by New Jersey California Mississippi Washington Hawaii and Delaware

In a paradoxical way Texas has dis appeared from the list of states as a main destination of US

imports from Rus sia (Figure 58) because Rus sian crude is mostly delivered to Louisiana ports and

registered there by US Customs as an import from Rus sia After that it transports to refineries in

Louisiana and Texas

Overall the short- term business rationale behind the sustainability of US oil imports from Rus sia

cannot overcome strong headwinds in the US energy sector facing all oil importers which will

inevitably lead to a contraction of Rus sian oil exports to the United States in the foreseeable future

11 Exxon eforts to receive a special US Trea sury waiver to drill in sanctioned Rus sia failed in 2017

12 Countering Amer i carsquos Adversaries through Sanctions Act HR 3364

13 Sarp Ozkan ldquoSaudi Aramcorsquos Port Arthur Refinery and the US Refinery Fleetrdquo Drilling Info May 11 2017

https infodrillinginfo com saudi - aramcos - port - arthur - refinery - us - refinery - fleet

14 Graham Kates ldquoTrea sury Secretary Rus siarsquos Citgo Deal a National Security Issuerdquo CBS News May 1 2017

http wwwcbsnews com news rosneft - citgo - steven - mnuchin - national - security

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 29 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations30

Table 58 Valerorsquos Refineries Pro cessing Rus sian Oil Thousands of Barrels 2016

Saint Charles Louisiana 29206 535

Corpus Christi Texas 20626 378

Wilmington California 4250 78

Total USA 54590 100

Source US EIA ldquoRefinery Capacity Reportrdquo January 1 2017

table 5 wwweia gov petroleum refinerycapacity table5 pdf

authorrsquos computation

Table 59 ExxonMobil Refineries Pro cessing Rus sian Oil Thousands of Barrels 2016

Baytown Texas 15037 88

Baton Rouge Louisiana 2046 12

Total USA 17083 100

Source US EIA ldquoRefinery Capacity Reportrdquo authorrsquos computation

Table 510 Chevronrsquos Refineries Pro cessing Rus sian Oil Thousands of Barrels 2016

Pascagoula Mississippi 12767 840

El Segundo California 2372 155

Saint Rose Louisiana 78 05

Total USA 15217 100

Source US EIA ldquoRefinery Capacity Reportrdquo authorrsquos computation

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 30 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 31

HEAVY METAL

Taken together US imports of metals and US imports of oil compose about 80 percent of US

total imports from Rus sia (Figure 59) Trade of metals like other commodities is strongly afected

by market price fluctuations Nevertheless metal imports from Rus sia have been fairly resilient to

market volatility and their average annual value has hovered at about $4 billion in the last five years

(Figure 510) This market resilience was forged at the end of the 1990searly 2000s when Rus sian

metal producers gradually modernized their plants adjusting quality of production to Western

standards and enhancing integration into global value and supply chains Some of them conquered

their share of the highly competitive US market struggling with peers from Canada and certain

BRICS countries (China India and Brazil) To attract additional resources all Rus sian large metal-

producing companies became public and were listed on stock exchanges chiefly the London Stock

Exchange (Severstalrsquo PAO Evraz MMK OAO Novolipetsk Steel Norilsk Nikel and TMK PAO) one

on the New York Stock Exchange (Mechel) and one on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange (Rusal)

Business logic pushed some of them to invest in the US metal- making industry which was hit

hard by crisis Later on some of those assets were sold (eg two US steel mills acquired by

Severstal in 2004 were purchased 10 years later by Steel Dynamics Inc and AK Steel Corp)

Figure 57 Share of US States Rus sian Oil Imports 2016

Source US EIA ldquoUS Imports from Rus sia of Crude Oil and Petroleum Productsrdquo Petroleum amp Other

Liquids September 29 2017 https www eia gov dnav pet hist LeafHandler ashx nshy=shyPETampsshy=shyMTTIM _ NUS

- NRS _ 1ampfshy=shyM authorrsquos computation

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

100

Maine

Massachusetts

Maryland

Connecticut

Georgia

Rhode Island

Virginia

Florida

New York

Alabama

Puerto Rico

Pennsylvania

Delaware

Hawaii

Washington

Mississippi

California

New Jersey

Louisiana

Texas

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 31 102017 404 PM

Figure 58 US Imports from Rus sia by State Million US$ 2013ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoState and Metropolitan Area Trade Datardquo Foreign Trade last modified

October 2 2017 https wwwcensus gov foreign - trade statistics state

Alaska

Connecticut

Delaware

Hawaii

Louisiana

Maryland

North Dakota 0

$1000

$2000

$3000

$4000

$5000

$6000

2013 2014 2015 2016

Alabama

Alaska

Connecticut

Delaware

Hawaii

Louisiana

Maryland

Maine

Mississippi

Montana

North Dakota

Mississippi

Figure 59 US Imports from Rus sia Share of Oil and Metals Million US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 1992ndash2016)

83

82

85

86

87

88

85

82

7375

0

$5000

$10000

$15000

$20000

$25000

$30000

$35000

$40000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

US Imports from Russia

Share of Oil and Metals

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 32 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 33

Obviously the market dynamic of dif er ent metals varies (eg iron steel aluminum platinum and

nickel) Caps to increase their trade and production in a ldquored oceanrdquo global environment with

anemic demand is rather limited despite Figure 510 showing a spike of iron and steel imports

from Rus sia in 2014 and aluminum in 2016 Some opportunities may exist for Russian- owned steel

plants in the United States (such as NLMK) to participate in energy proj ects resumed under Presi-

dent Trump who has required that new pipelines use only American- made steel15

Rus sia occupies a special niche in the US market for titanium products a high- end metal indus-

try Twenty years ago a long- term contract was signed between Rus sian titanium producer

VSMPO- AVISMA and Boeing The Rus sian com pany entered the selective club of Boeing suppliers

for the manufacture of components and semi- finished products Since the signing of this contract

VSMPO has delivered more than 35 percent of all titanium placed on Boeing civil aircraft16 They

are hidden in the trade data in an import category for Civilian Aircrafts and Parts (Figure 511) At

the end of 2016 Boeing announced an extension of its framework agreement with AVISMA

15 E Scheyder C Ngai and T Sylvester ldquoAmerican Steel Unlikely to Get Keystone Boost Despite Trump Orderrdquo

Reuters January 27 2017 http wwwreuters com article usa - trump - pipeline - transcanada - idUSL1N1FH1ZD

16 A Kramer ldquoTitanium Fills Vital Role for Boeing and Rus siardquo New York Times July 5 2013 http wwwnytimes com

2013 07 06 business global titanium - fills - vital - role - for - boeing - and - russia html mcubzshy=shy3

Figure 510 US Imports from Rus sia Iron Steel Bauxite Aluminum Nickel Nonferrous Metals and Other Precious Metals and Materials US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 1992ndash2016)

0

$6000000000

$5000000000

$4000000000

$3000000000

$2000000000

$1000000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 20122013

20142015

2016

Finished metal shapes

Iron and steel advanced

Iron and steel products nec

Nonferrous metals other

Other precious metals

Nickel

Bauxite and aluminum

Iron and steel mill products

Steelmaking materials

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 33 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations34

through 2022 and additional investments in the construction of a new robotic plant in Titanium

Valley a special economic zone located in the Sverdlovsk region that will open in 2018 The pro-

cessing of titanium forgings in all Boeing civil aircraft will be performed there including 787s 737

MAXs and 777Xs17 The contract extension with AVISMA may add several hundred million dollars

in value to annual US imports from Rus sia

How can such heavy reliance on imports of Rus sian titanium exist during a period of rising geopo-

liti cal tensions The answer is straightforward VSMPO- AVISMA is a highly specialized natu ral

mono poly producing 45 percent of the worldrsquos aerospace titanium Only four other countries

smelt high- grade titanium in industrial quantities the United States Germany Japan and China

Overall global production capacity is limited while demand is growing The United States cur-

rently imports around 79 percent of all the titanium it consumes each year18

17 ldquoBoeing and VSMPO Avisma to Launch Second Joint Production Siterdquo Rus sian Aviation Insider December 22 2016

http wwwrusaviainsider com boeing - and - vsmpo - avisma - to - launch - second - joint - production - site

18 Jon Ostrower and Andy Pasztor ldquoBoeing United Technologies Stockpile Titanium Partsrdquo Wall Street Journal

August 7 2014 https wwwwsj com articles boeing - united - technologies - stockpiling - titanium - parts - 1407441886

Figure 511 US Imports from Rus sia Civilian Aircrafts and Parts US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 1992ndash2016)

0

$20000000

$40000000

$60000000

$80000000

$100000000

$120000000

$140000000

$160000000

$180000000

$200000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Parts-civilian aircraft

Civilian aircraft

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 34 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 35

The Sanctions Act authorizes the secretary of the trea sury (in a nonmandatory way) to impose

restrictions (without specifying them) against Rus sian state- owned entities operating in the railway

metals and mining sectors of the Rus sian economy Despite the commanding heights of Rus siarsquos

state sector owner ship in its economy (70 percent of GDP) the metal- producing companies have

remained mostly in private hands

NUCLEAR AFFAIRS

Historically owners and operators of the 104 commercial nuclear power reactors in the United

States have purchased more than 80 percent of their uranium from foreign countries Uranium

shipping from Rus sia accounted for about 13 percent of the 58 million pounds of uranium pur-

chased overseas in 201219 At the same time the Rus sian state- owned mono poly Rosatom ac-

counts for 20 percent of Kazakhstanrsquos uranium production (which in turn comprises 11 percent of

all US uranium imports) and 20 percent of US domestic uranium production capacity (with

owner ship of exploration tracts in Wyoming)20

Nuclear fuel and nuclear power continue to be po liti cally sensitive topics both in the United

States and Rus sia Bilateral cooperation in this sector (being surprisingly stable with imports of

nuclear fuel from Rus sia at a level of $1 billion annually in the last five years [Figure 512 and 513])

is under constant po liti cal and lobbying pressure and has been a source of several po liti cal scan-

dals21 Consequently upside risks in this area of interaction are minimal and downside risks are

much higher especially when we are seeing more decommissioning of nuclear plants in the

United States than new constructions The US EIArsquos 2017 Annual Energy Outlook assumes

that about 25 percent of the nuclear capacity now operating will be removed from ser vice

by 205022

WHY IS THE GRASS GREENER ON THE OTHER SIDE

The United States continues to significantly reduce imports of chemical fertilizers as domestic pro-

duction increases In 2016 the United States imported 13 percent less ammonia and 11 percent

less urea and UAN which is a liquid urea and ammonium nitrate fertilizer Rus sia accounts for

around 40 percent of UAN imported by the United States The United States canceled antidumping

duties on imports of ammonium nitrate and urea from Rus sia in 2016 but it did not prevent import

19 US EIA ldquoThe US Relies on Foreign Uranium Enrichment Ser vices to Fuel Its Nuclear Power Plantsrdquo Today in

Energy August 28 2013 https wwweia gov todayinenergy detail php idshy=shy1273

20 Colin Chilcoat ldquoDoes Rus sia Really Own 20 Percent of the USrsquo Uranium Reservesrdquo OilPricecom May 6 2015

http oilpricecom Alternative - Energy Nuclear - Power Does - Russia - Really - Own - 20 - Of - The - US - Uranium - Reserves

html

21 Michelle Ye Hee Lee ldquoThe Facts behind Trumprsquos Repeated Claim about Hillary Clintonrsquos Role in the Rus sian Ura-

nium Dealrdquo Washington Post October 26 2016

22 US EIA ldquoAnnual Energy Outlook 2017 with Projections to 2050rdquo 81ndash82

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 35 102017 404 PM

Figure 512 US Imports from Rus sia Share of Oil Metals and Nuclear Fuel Million US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 1992ndash2016)

87

86

90

90

90

91

88

86

7882

0

$5000

$10000

$15000

$20000

$25000

$30000

$35000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

US Imports from Russia

Share of Oil Metals and Nuclear Fuel

Figure 513 US Imports from Rus sia Nuclear Fuel Materials US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

$-

$200000000

$400000000

$600000000

$800000000

$1200000000

$1000000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 36 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 37

drops twice last year (Figures 514 and 515) According to forecasts UAN imports are expected to

decline further to 15 million tons this year down over 46 percent from 28 million tons imported

last year23 The downside trend in imports of fertilizers will likely continue because of oversupply

BIG FISH

US imports of fish and shellfish from Rus sia are best understood in comparison with US fish

exports to the Rus sian market which slipped to zero in August 2014 after Rus sia issued an order

banning certain agricultural imports from the United States (Figure 516) While the volume of US

supply was not very large it was impor tant because it broke up the monopolistic dominance of a

few vertically integrated Rus sian companies that have kept prices high by restricting the entry of

new producers Seeking to implement import substitution policies Rus sia has tried to reduce

exports as well as imports of fish and seafood products in the last couple of years This symmetri-

cal approach was intended to ldquocompensaterdquo for a decrease of fish products in the domestic

23 Deepika Thapliyal ldquoPotashCorp Forecasts Sharp Drop in US Nitrogen Imports in 2017rdquo ICIS News February 7

2017 https wwwicis com resources news 2017 02 07 10076734 potashcorp - forecasts - sharp - drop - in - us - nitrogen

- imports - in - 2017

Figure 514 US Imports from Rus sia Share of Oil Metals Nuclear Fuel and Fertilizers Million US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

90

93

92

93

94

95

92

91

85

86

0

$5000

$10000

$15000

$20000

$25000

$30000

$35000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

US Imports from Russia

Share of Oil Metals Nuclear Fuel and Fertilizers

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 37 102017 404 PM

Figure 515 US Imports from Rus sia Chemical- Fertilizers US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

S-

$200000000

$400000000

$600000000

$800000000

$1000000000

$1200000000

$1400000000

$1600000000

$1800000000

$2000000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Figure 516 US Exports to Rus sia Fish and Shellfish US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

0

$10000000

$20000000

$30000000

$40000000

$50000000

$60000000

$70000000

$80000000

$90000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Fish and shellfish

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 38 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 39

consumer market caused by Rus siarsquos import ban but it has failed As result the group most af-

fected by the self- imposed counter- sanctions were Rus sian consumers

With a significant drop in fish imports a devaluation of the ruble and inflationary pressures on

seafood prices yearly consumption of fish in Rus sia has declined precipitously In 2015 alone

fish prices increased 20 percent and consumption dropped to 14 kilograms per person24 from

22 kilograms in 201425 In 2016 food rose to 355 percent of house hold expenditure as a result of

increases in food prices26 This has pushed vertically integrated fishing monopolies to sell even

more of their catch abroad rather than deliver to the Rus sian Federation (Figure 517) Thus we

cannot exclude the possibility of further growth in US fish and shellfish imports from Rus sia on a

marginal scale

24 Александр Савельев ldquoПотребление рыбы в России упало до 14 кг на человекаrdquo [Fish consumption in Rus sia fell to

14 kg per person] Экономика Интерфакс January 28 2015 http wwwinterfax ru business 492038

25 Илья Шестаков ldquoПотебление рыбы в России снизилось на 10 процентов из- за роста ценrdquo [Fish consumption in

Rus sia dropped by 10 percent due to price increases] RNS March 8 2017 https rnsonline consumer - market

Potreblenie - ribi - v - Rossii - snizilos - na - 10 - iz - za - rosta - tsen - 2017 - 03 - 08

26 Zoya Sheftalovich and Christian Oliver ldquoRus siarsquos Boom (Farming) Economyrdquo Politico November 8 2016 http

wwwpolitico eu article russias - boom - farming - economy

Figure 517 US Imports from Rus sia Fish and Shellfish US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

0

$50000000

$100000000

$150000000

$200000000

$250000000

$300000000

$350000000

$400000000

$450000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 39 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations40

SPACE ODYSSEY

Among high- end products beyond the top five groups of goods imported from Rus sia cheap and

efficient Rus sian engines have been used to launch US rockets into space for about 16 years

(Figure 518) There was a serious po liti cal strug gle around a 2014 ban on the purchase of Rus sian

RD-180 rocket engines revealing the conflicting business interests of power ful high- tech companies

This restrictive mea sure was temporary and was quickly lifted because of significant cost impacts

and risks of disruption to launch schedules27 For the same reason the Sanctions Act does not autho-

rize ldquothe imposition of any sanction or other condition limitation restriction or prohibition that

directly or indirectly impedes the supply by any entity of the Rus sian Federation of any product or

ser vice or the procurement of such product or ser vice by any contractor or subcontractor of the

United States or any other entity relating to or in connection with any space launch conducted for

the National Aeronautics and Space Administration or any other nonndash Department of Defense

customerrdquo28

Nevertheless many experts believe that US domestic alternatives to replace Rus sian engines will

be viable in five to eight years

27 Ken Dilanian ldquoWhy Does the US Use Rus sian Rockets to Launch Its Satellitesrdquo NBC News updated November 15

2016 http wwwnbcnews com why - does - u - s - use - russian - rockets - launch - its - satellites - n588526

28 Countering Amer i carsquos Adversaries through Sanctions Act HR 3364

Figure 518 Spacecraft Excluding Military US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

0

$20000000

$40000000

$60000000

$80000000

$100000000

$120000000

$140000000

$160000000

$180000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 40 102017 404 PM

41

Diversity and technological complexity are the most vis i ble advantages supporting US exports to

Rus sia Three major groups of export goods include civilian aircraft engines and parts (Figure 61)

drilling and oil field equipment (Figure 62) and industrial machines and engines (Figure 63)

Despite sanctions against the transfer of advanced oil producing and pro cessing technologies the

realization of US drilling and oil field equipment in Rus sia is sustainable although some bilateral

proj ects have been frozen

Another category of goods that has demonstrated resilience is the phar ma ceu ti cal industry (Fig-

ure 64) because most drugs in Rus sia are imported (about 70 percent of the Rus sian phar ma ceu-

ti cal market in value) Import substitution policies have had only modest results in this industry

As confirmed by American Chamber of Commerce surveys US exports to Rus sia are closely

connected to US FDI 30 percent of total imports of US companies working in the Rus sian

market come from the United States (more than $2 billion in 2016) In other words about

40 percent of all US exports to Rus sia are related to a US corporate- sector business pro cess in

the country The major sectors of activity of these companies are energy and natu ral resources

(52 percent) manufacturing (17 percent) information and communications technology or ICT

(13 percent) retail (7 percent) automotive industry (6 percent) phar ma ceu ti cal production

(1 percent) professional ser vices (05 percent) and other (2 percent)1

Some obvious constraints on US exports to Rus sia have resulted from a reduction in demand A

deterioration of bilateral relations and implementation of sanctions and counter- sanctions have

directly or indirectly afected all businesses Figures 65 and 66 provide data regarding a dramatic

drop in the sale of US agricultural production in Rus sia with all other categories of exports in

goods showing big cuts as well (see Figures 67ndash69)

Exports of civilian aircraft engines and parts put the state of Washington in first place among

other states as a leading exporter to the Rus sian market (Figure 610)

1 American Chamber of Commerce in Rus sia ldquoInvestment and Import to Rus sia 2nd Surveyrdquo 13

Diversity and Constraints

06

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 41 102017 404 PM

Figure 61 US Exports of Civilian Aircraft Engines Equipment and Parts to Rus sia US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

$2500000000

$2000000000

$1500000000

$1000000000

$500000000

$-

Figure 62 US Exports of Drilling and Oil Field Equipment US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

0

$5000000

$10000000

$15000000

$20000000

$25000000

$30000000

$35000000

$40000000

$45000000

$50000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 42 102017 404 PM

Figure 63 US Exports of Industrial Engines to Rus sia US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

0

$5000000

$10000000

$15000000

$20000000

$25000000

$30000000

$35000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Figure 64 US Exports of Phar ma ceu ti cal Preparations to Rus sia US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

0

$5000000

$10000000

$15000000

$20000000

$25000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 43 102017 404 PM

Figure 65 US Exports of Meat and Poultry to Rus sia US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Meat poultry etc

$1000000000

$800000000

$600000000

$400000000

$200000000

$-

$1200000000

$1400000000

$1600000000

Figure 66 US Exports of Soybeans to Rus sia US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

0

$20000000

$40000000

$60000000

$80000000

$100000000

$120000000

$140000000

$160000000

$180000000

$200000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 44 102017 404 PM

Figure 67 US Exports of Vehicles Engines and Parts to Rus sia US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Other parts and accessories of vehicles

Automotive tires and tubes

Bodies and chassis for passenger cars

Engines and engine parts (carburetors pistonsrings and valves)

Trucks buses and special purpose vehicles

Passenger cars new and used

$2500000000

$2000000000

$1500000000

$500000000

$-

$1000000000

Figure 68 US Exports of Medicinal Equipment to Rus sia US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

$10000000

$15000000

$20000000

$25000000

$30000000

$35000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 45 102017 404 PM

Figure 610 US Exports to Rus sia by States (2016 US$ Value) Million US$ 2013ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoState and Metropolitan Area Trade Datardquo

Iowa Kentucky

North Dakota

Oklahoma

South Carolina

Washington

0

$500

$1000

$1500

$2000

2013 2014 2015 2016

District of Columbia

Iowa

Kentucky

North Dakota

Oklahoma

South Carolina

Washington

Figure 69 US Exports of Excavating Machinery to Rus sia US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

0

$5000000

$10000000

$15000000

$20000000

$25000000

$30000000

$35000000

$40000000

$45000000

$50000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 46 102017 404 PM

47

Upon reviewing the current trend in US- Russia economic relations we must acknowledge that

the existing trade model is obsolete and exhausted Imports are resource- oriented and reflect

constraints of the Rus sian economic structure while five groups of goodsmdash oil metals nuclear

fuels fertilizers and fishmdash make up more than 90 percent of total imports from Rus sia (Figure 71)

Each of these industries has a limited capacity for growth in the foreseeable future

Rus siarsquos core export to the United Statesmdash oilmdash will inevitably decrease in the mid- term under any

scenario The value and volume of Rus sian exports to the United States are open to global market

volatility and po liti cal pressures with limited hedging mechanisms

Overall US exports to Rus sia are unsustainable due to bilateral po liti cal tensions the whims of

commodity markets and changing domestic policies Sanctions and counter- sanctions have

created additional barriers particularly in finance banking high- tech energy and agro- business

According to the American Chamber of Commerce 69 percent of US companies working in the

country consider the impact of US sanctions against Rus sia on their business as negative At the

same time 60 percent of companies do not expect big changes in business relations between

Rus sia and the United States under Trump1 as the new law codifies existing sanctions fortifies

them and extends them to new sectors

Current US investments are low due to the weak rule of law in Rus sia a lack of property right

protections and proper contract enforcement high levels of statization and monopolization in the

economy a poor business climate outdated capital stock dependence on natural- resource

sectors and of course sanction and counter- sanction mea sures Bloated administrative compo-

nents created as risk mitigation instruments have also served as impediments The countryrsquos

institutional weakness low level of productivity bud get constraints and a declining inflexible

workforce will restrain future economic growth even if commodity prices recover Rus sian eco-

nomic policy will likely continue to be statist and protectionist relying mostly on import

substitutions

1 Ibid 11

Existing Trends and Future Scenarios

07

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 47 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations48

What scenarios can be expected in such a challenging environment

One probability (no peace no war) is based on the assumption that matters will not deteriorate

further and implementation of the Sanctions Act will be cursory This will cause relatively slow

degradation in the economic field with occasional flashes of activity in selected areas (eg closer

cooperation against Islamist terrorist groups in Syria)

A second worse case or critical scenario is the intensive and full- scale execution of current sanc-

tion legislation and even the imposition of new economic punitive and restrictive mea sures which

could incite asymmetric retaliatory actions and lead to the introduction of additional protectionist

policies This in turn could trigger a further escalation of mutual confrontation and could eventu-

ally destroy the fundamentals of the current bilateral trade system Rus sian leadership has charac-

terized the Sanctions Act as a declaration of a trade war that ends all hope for improving bilateral

relations2

2 Дмитрий Медведев ldquoПодписание президентом США нового санкционного закона против России создает несколько

последствийrdquo [The US Presidentrsquos signing of the package of new sanctions against Rus sia will have a few conse-

quences] Facebook August 2 2017 https wwwfacebook com Dmitry Medvedev posts 10154587161801851

Figure 71 US Imports from Rus sia Share of Oil Metals Nuclear Fuel Fertilizers and Fish Million US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

93

94

93

94

95

96

93

92

87

89

0

$5000

$10000

$15000

$20000

$25000

$30000

$35000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

US Imports from Russia

Share of Oil Metals Nuclear FuelFertilizers and Fish

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 48 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 49

The best case and most favorable scenario looks less probable now It assumes the realization of

structural reforms in Rus sia in such a way that would adapt Rus siarsquos foreign policy to national

economic needs reduce confrontations with the West and make a concerted efort to integrate

Rus sian businesses into global supply and value chains A revitalization of the structural reform

agendamdash including eforts to diversify economic activities through de- monopolization and support

for SMEs a restructuring of the banking sector the creation of a vibrant business climate to foster

entrepreneurships and innovation the implementation of administrative and judicial reforms to

tackle red tape and endemic corruption and the reduction of state control over key sectors of the

economy via wide- spread privatization could kick- start the development of a nonoil economy and

improve long- term growth prospects Despite ongoing discussion of reform strategies deep

economic and po liti cal changes are extremely complicated over the next po liti calelectoral cycle

(2018ndash2024) particularly because of re sis tance of vested interests and growing commodity prices

The urgency to tackle structural shortcomings in natu ral resource- dependent economies usually

correlates with the price of those resources and the degree to which resource rents drive eco-

nomic activity However there may be marginal improvements in the efficiency of the current

economic system

Future US- Russia relations can be thought of through three pillars one pillar focuses on areas

where both countries maintain a competitive rivalry another looks at potential areas of interaction

under pres ent conditions a third pillar and one that has evaporated from the current bilateral

agenda concentrates on future cooperation Stronger economic ties could not only be a kind of

po liti cal shock absorber but contribute to the building of this future (particularly business contacts

aim to support future structural reforms) although po liti cal factors are depressing the prospects

for cooperation To escape deadlock it will be impor tant to establish the right balance between

politics and economics and create a model of collaboration within the framework of contention

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 49 102017 404 PM

About the Author

Vadim Grishin PhD MBA has been involved in the reform pro cess in Rus sia as adviser to the

deputy prime minister of Rus sia in 1992ndash1993 and 2006ndash2010 He has extensive experience

working with the Bretton Woods Institutions He was the board member of the World Bank Group

and served as se nior adviser at the International Monetary Fund Currently he is a con sul tant to the

chief economistrsquos office of the International Finance Corporation and teaches the economics of

transition at Georgetown University in Washington DC

50

594-71613_ch99_4Pindd 50 102017 403 PM

Blank

COVER PHOTO ADOBE STOCK

1616 Rhode Island Avenue NW

Washington DC 20036

202 887 0200 | wwwcsisorg

v++ISBN 978-1-4422-8035-9

Lanham bull Boulder bull New York bull London

4501 Forbes Boulevard

Lanham MD 20706

301 459 3366 | wwwrowmancom

A U T H O R

Vadim Grishin

Myths and Realities

A Report of the

CSIS RUSSIA AND EURASIA PROGRAM

US-RussiaEconomicRelations

O C T O B E R 2 0 1 7

Euml|xHSLEOCy280359z

The Man Pupu Nyor Rock Formations at the Northern Urals also known as Seven

Strong Man or Little Mountain of the God in the local tribe (Mansi) language

Page 35: U.S.-Russia Economic Relations: Myths and Realities · 2020-04-17 · OCTOBER 2017 U.S.- Russia Economic Relations Myths and Realities AUTHOR Vadim Grishin A REPORT OF THE CSIS RUSSIA

Vadim Grishin 29

several joint ventures with Rosneft to undertake ofshore exploration in the Black Sea and the Kara

Sea in Siberia11

According to the Sanctions Act US persons are prohibited from exporting or reexporting goods

ser vices (except financial ser vices) and technology in support of exploration or production of new

deep- water Arctic ofshore or shale oil proj ects that involve designated Rus sian entities or other

entities in which such sanctioned persons have a controlling interest or a substantial noncontrol-

ling owner ship interest defined as not less than 33 percent (previously it was 50 percent) The new

law also authorizesmdash but does not requiremdash the imposition of so- called secondary sanctions

against non- US entities that engage in activities involving the construction maintenance or

expansion of Rus sian energy export pipelines with a fair market value of $1 million or more or an

aggregate fair market value during a 12- month period of $5 million12 This provision has raised the

concerns of some Eu ro pean countries particularly Germany As result the final language of the

law included wording about coordination of this issue with allies of the United States

Shipments of Rus sian oil to the United States could be afected by activity in the US refinery

industry In early 2017 Saudi Aramco bought the United Statesrsquo largest oil refinery in Port Arthur

(Texas) and it announced plans to send more of its own crude to that refinery13 Serious concerns

exist however regarding the future of three refineries and nine pipelines owned by Citgo a US

branch of the Venezuelan state com pany PdVSA which is balancing precariously on the edge of

default Under certain conditions in the event of PdVSA bankruptcy Rosneft could claim a stake of

up to 499 percent in Citgo Such a possibility has raised concerns among politicians and US

government officials with Trea sury Secretary Steven Mnuchin calling it a ldquonational security issuerdquo14

Tables 58 59 and 510 show allocations of Rus sian oil imports to major US refineries some of

which work exclusively on Rus sian crude a total of two to three months per year In total 150940

thousand barrels of Rus sian oil were refined in 2016

Figure 57 confirms a leading position of Texas and Louisiana among the US states receiving

Rus sian crude followed by New Jersey California Mississippi Washington Hawaii and Delaware

In a paradoxical way Texas has dis appeared from the list of states as a main destination of US

imports from Rus sia (Figure 58) because Rus sian crude is mostly delivered to Louisiana ports and

registered there by US Customs as an import from Rus sia After that it transports to refineries in

Louisiana and Texas

Overall the short- term business rationale behind the sustainability of US oil imports from Rus sia

cannot overcome strong headwinds in the US energy sector facing all oil importers which will

inevitably lead to a contraction of Rus sian oil exports to the United States in the foreseeable future

11 Exxon eforts to receive a special US Trea sury waiver to drill in sanctioned Rus sia failed in 2017

12 Countering Amer i carsquos Adversaries through Sanctions Act HR 3364

13 Sarp Ozkan ldquoSaudi Aramcorsquos Port Arthur Refinery and the US Refinery Fleetrdquo Drilling Info May 11 2017

https infodrillinginfo com saudi - aramcos - port - arthur - refinery - us - refinery - fleet

14 Graham Kates ldquoTrea sury Secretary Rus siarsquos Citgo Deal a National Security Issuerdquo CBS News May 1 2017

http wwwcbsnews com news rosneft - citgo - steven - mnuchin - national - security

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 29 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations30

Table 58 Valerorsquos Refineries Pro cessing Rus sian Oil Thousands of Barrels 2016

Saint Charles Louisiana 29206 535

Corpus Christi Texas 20626 378

Wilmington California 4250 78

Total USA 54590 100

Source US EIA ldquoRefinery Capacity Reportrdquo January 1 2017

table 5 wwweia gov petroleum refinerycapacity table5 pdf

authorrsquos computation

Table 59 ExxonMobil Refineries Pro cessing Rus sian Oil Thousands of Barrels 2016

Baytown Texas 15037 88

Baton Rouge Louisiana 2046 12

Total USA 17083 100

Source US EIA ldquoRefinery Capacity Reportrdquo authorrsquos computation

Table 510 Chevronrsquos Refineries Pro cessing Rus sian Oil Thousands of Barrels 2016

Pascagoula Mississippi 12767 840

El Segundo California 2372 155

Saint Rose Louisiana 78 05

Total USA 15217 100

Source US EIA ldquoRefinery Capacity Reportrdquo authorrsquos computation

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 30 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 31

HEAVY METAL

Taken together US imports of metals and US imports of oil compose about 80 percent of US

total imports from Rus sia (Figure 59) Trade of metals like other commodities is strongly afected

by market price fluctuations Nevertheless metal imports from Rus sia have been fairly resilient to

market volatility and their average annual value has hovered at about $4 billion in the last five years

(Figure 510) This market resilience was forged at the end of the 1990searly 2000s when Rus sian

metal producers gradually modernized their plants adjusting quality of production to Western

standards and enhancing integration into global value and supply chains Some of them conquered

their share of the highly competitive US market struggling with peers from Canada and certain

BRICS countries (China India and Brazil) To attract additional resources all Rus sian large metal-

producing companies became public and were listed on stock exchanges chiefly the London Stock

Exchange (Severstalrsquo PAO Evraz MMK OAO Novolipetsk Steel Norilsk Nikel and TMK PAO) one

on the New York Stock Exchange (Mechel) and one on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange (Rusal)

Business logic pushed some of them to invest in the US metal- making industry which was hit

hard by crisis Later on some of those assets were sold (eg two US steel mills acquired by

Severstal in 2004 were purchased 10 years later by Steel Dynamics Inc and AK Steel Corp)

Figure 57 Share of US States Rus sian Oil Imports 2016

Source US EIA ldquoUS Imports from Rus sia of Crude Oil and Petroleum Productsrdquo Petroleum amp Other

Liquids September 29 2017 https www eia gov dnav pet hist LeafHandler ashx nshy=shyPETampsshy=shyMTTIM _ NUS

- NRS _ 1ampfshy=shyM authorrsquos computation

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

100

Maine

Massachusetts

Maryland

Connecticut

Georgia

Rhode Island

Virginia

Florida

New York

Alabama

Puerto Rico

Pennsylvania

Delaware

Hawaii

Washington

Mississippi

California

New Jersey

Louisiana

Texas

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 31 102017 404 PM

Figure 58 US Imports from Rus sia by State Million US$ 2013ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoState and Metropolitan Area Trade Datardquo Foreign Trade last modified

October 2 2017 https wwwcensus gov foreign - trade statistics state

Alaska

Connecticut

Delaware

Hawaii

Louisiana

Maryland

North Dakota 0

$1000

$2000

$3000

$4000

$5000

$6000

2013 2014 2015 2016

Alabama

Alaska

Connecticut

Delaware

Hawaii

Louisiana

Maryland

Maine

Mississippi

Montana

North Dakota

Mississippi

Figure 59 US Imports from Rus sia Share of Oil and Metals Million US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 1992ndash2016)

83

82

85

86

87

88

85

82

7375

0

$5000

$10000

$15000

$20000

$25000

$30000

$35000

$40000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

US Imports from Russia

Share of Oil and Metals

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 32 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 33

Obviously the market dynamic of dif er ent metals varies (eg iron steel aluminum platinum and

nickel) Caps to increase their trade and production in a ldquored oceanrdquo global environment with

anemic demand is rather limited despite Figure 510 showing a spike of iron and steel imports

from Rus sia in 2014 and aluminum in 2016 Some opportunities may exist for Russian- owned steel

plants in the United States (such as NLMK) to participate in energy proj ects resumed under Presi-

dent Trump who has required that new pipelines use only American- made steel15

Rus sia occupies a special niche in the US market for titanium products a high- end metal indus-

try Twenty years ago a long- term contract was signed between Rus sian titanium producer

VSMPO- AVISMA and Boeing The Rus sian com pany entered the selective club of Boeing suppliers

for the manufacture of components and semi- finished products Since the signing of this contract

VSMPO has delivered more than 35 percent of all titanium placed on Boeing civil aircraft16 They

are hidden in the trade data in an import category for Civilian Aircrafts and Parts (Figure 511) At

the end of 2016 Boeing announced an extension of its framework agreement with AVISMA

15 E Scheyder C Ngai and T Sylvester ldquoAmerican Steel Unlikely to Get Keystone Boost Despite Trump Orderrdquo

Reuters January 27 2017 http wwwreuters com article usa - trump - pipeline - transcanada - idUSL1N1FH1ZD

16 A Kramer ldquoTitanium Fills Vital Role for Boeing and Rus siardquo New York Times July 5 2013 http wwwnytimes com

2013 07 06 business global titanium - fills - vital - role - for - boeing - and - russia html mcubzshy=shy3

Figure 510 US Imports from Rus sia Iron Steel Bauxite Aluminum Nickel Nonferrous Metals and Other Precious Metals and Materials US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 1992ndash2016)

0

$6000000000

$5000000000

$4000000000

$3000000000

$2000000000

$1000000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 20122013

20142015

2016

Finished metal shapes

Iron and steel advanced

Iron and steel products nec

Nonferrous metals other

Other precious metals

Nickel

Bauxite and aluminum

Iron and steel mill products

Steelmaking materials

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 33 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations34

through 2022 and additional investments in the construction of a new robotic plant in Titanium

Valley a special economic zone located in the Sverdlovsk region that will open in 2018 The pro-

cessing of titanium forgings in all Boeing civil aircraft will be performed there including 787s 737

MAXs and 777Xs17 The contract extension with AVISMA may add several hundred million dollars

in value to annual US imports from Rus sia

How can such heavy reliance on imports of Rus sian titanium exist during a period of rising geopo-

liti cal tensions The answer is straightforward VSMPO- AVISMA is a highly specialized natu ral

mono poly producing 45 percent of the worldrsquos aerospace titanium Only four other countries

smelt high- grade titanium in industrial quantities the United States Germany Japan and China

Overall global production capacity is limited while demand is growing The United States cur-

rently imports around 79 percent of all the titanium it consumes each year18

17 ldquoBoeing and VSMPO Avisma to Launch Second Joint Production Siterdquo Rus sian Aviation Insider December 22 2016

http wwwrusaviainsider com boeing - and - vsmpo - avisma - to - launch - second - joint - production - site

18 Jon Ostrower and Andy Pasztor ldquoBoeing United Technologies Stockpile Titanium Partsrdquo Wall Street Journal

August 7 2014 https wwwwsj com articles boeing - united - technologies - stockpiling - titanium - parts - 1407441886

Figure 511 US Imports from Rus sia Civilian Aircrafts and Parts US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 1992ndash2016)

0

$20000000

$40000000

$60000000

$80000000

$100000000

$120000000

$140000000

$160000000

$180000000

$200000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Parts-civilian aircraft

Civilian aircraft

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 34 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 35

The Sanctions Act authorizes the secretary of the trea sury (in a nonmandatory way) to impose

restrictions (without specifying them) against Rus sian state- owned entities operating in the railway

metals and mining sectors of the Rus sian economy Despite the commanding heights of Rus siarsquos

state sector owner ship in its economy (70 percent of GDP) the metal- producing companies have

remained mostly in private hands

NUCLEAR AFFAIRS

Historically owners and operators of the 104 commercial nuclear power reactors in the United

States have purchased more than 80 percent of their uranium from foreign countries Uranium

shipping from Rus sia accounted for about 13 percent of the 58 million pounds of uranium pur-

chased overseas in 201219 At the same time the Rus sian state- owned mono poly Rosatom ac-

counts for 20 percent of Kazakhstanrsquos uranium production (which in turn comprises 11 percent of

all US uranium imports) and 20 percent of US domestic uranium production capacity (with

owner ship of exploration tracts in Wyoming)20

Nuclear fuel and nuclear power continue to be po liti cally sensitive topics both in the United

States and Rus sia Bilateral cooperation in this sector (being surprisingly stable with imports of

nuclear fuel from Rus sia at a level of $1 billion annually in the last five years [Figure 512 and 513])

is under constant po liti cal and lobbying pressure and has been a source of several po liti cal scan-

dals21 Consequently upside risks in this area of interaction are minimal and downside risks are

much higher especially when we are seeing more decommissioning of nuclear plants in the

United States than new constructions The US EIArsquos 2017 Annual Energy Outlook assumes

that about 25 percent of the nuclear capacity now operating will be removed from ser vice

by 205022

WHY IS THE GRASS GREENER ON THE OTHER SIDE

The United States continues to significantly reduce imports of chemical fertilizers as domestic pro-

duction increases In 2016 the United States imported 13 percent less ammonia and 11 percent

less urea and UAN which is a liquid urea and ammonium nitrate fertilizer Rus sia accounts for

around 40 percent of UAN imported by the United States The United States canceled antidumping

duties on imports of ammonium nitrate and urea from Rus sia in 2016 but it did not prevent import

19 US EIA ldquoThe US Relies on Foreign Uranium Enrichment Ser vices to Fuel Its Nuclear Power Plantsrdquo Today in

Energy August 28 2013 https wwweia gov todayinenergy detail php idshy=shy1273

20 Colin Chilcoat ldquoDoes Rus sia Really Own 20 Percent of the USrsquo Uranium Reservesrdquo OilPricecom May 6 2015

http oilpricecom Alternative - Energy Nuclear - Power Does - Russia - Really - Own - 20 - Of - The - US - Uranium - Reserves

html

21 Michelle Ye Hee Lee ldquoThe Facts behind Trumprsquos Repeated Claim about Hillary Clintonrsquos Role in the Rus sian Ura-

nium Dealrdquo Washington Post October 26 2016

22 US EIA ldquoAnnual Energy Outlook 2017 with Projections to 2050rdquo 81ndash82

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 35 102017 404 PM

Figure 512 US Imports from Rus sia Share of Oil Metals and Nuclear Fuel Million US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 1992ndash2016)

87

86

90

90

90

91

88

86

7882

0

$5000

$10000

$15000

$20000

$25000

$30000

$35000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

US Imports from Russia

Share of Oil Metals and Nuclear Fuel

Figure 513 US Imports from Rus sia Nuclear Fuel Materials US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

$-

$200000000

$400000000

$600000000

$800000000

$1200000000

$1000000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 36 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 37

drops twice last year (Figures 514 and 515) According to forecasts UAN imports are expected to

decline further to 15 million tons this year down over 46 percent from 28 million tons imported

last year23 The downside trend in imports of fertilizers will likely continue because of oversupply

BIG FISH

US imports of fish and shellfish from Rus sia are best understood in comparison with US fish

exports to the Rus sian market which slipped to zero in August 2014 after Rus sia issued an order

banning certain agricultural imports from the United States (Figure 516) While the volume of US

supply was not very large it was impor tant because it broke up the monopolistic dominance of a

few vertically integrated Rus sian companies that have kept prices high by restricting the entry of

new producers Seeking to implement import substitution policies Rus sia has tried to reduce

exports as well as imports of fish and seafood products in the last couple of years This symmetri-

cal approach was intended to ldquocompensaterdquo for a decrease of fish products in the domestic

23 Deepika Thapliyal ldquoPotashCorp Forecasts Sharp Drop in US Nitrogen Imports in 2017rdquo ICIS News February 7

2017 https wwwicis com resources news 2017 02 07 10076734 potashcorp - forecasts - sharp - drop - in - us - nitrogen

- imports - in - 2017

Figure 514 US Imports from Rus sia Share of Oil Metals Nuclear Fuel and Fertilizers Million US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

90

93

92

93

94

95

92

91

85

86

0

$5000

$10000

$15000

$20000

$25000

$30000

$35000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

US Imports from Russia

Share of Oil Metals Nuclear Fuel and Fertilizers

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 37 102017 404 PM

Figure 515 US Imports from Rus sia Chemical- Fertilizers US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

S-

$200000000

$400000000

$600000000

$800000000

$1000000000

$1200000000

$1400000000

$1600000000

$1800000000

$2000000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Figure 516 US Exports to Rus sia Fish and Shellfish US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

0

$10000000

$20000000

$30000000

$40000000

$50000000

$60000000

$70000000

$80000000

$90000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Fish and shellfish

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 38 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 39

consumer market caused by Rus siarsquos import ban but it has failed As result the group most af-

fected by the self- imposed counter- sanctions were Rus sian consumers

With a significant drop in fish imports a devaluation of the ruble and inflationary pressures on

seafood prices yearly consumption of fish in Rus sia has declined precipitously In 2015 alone

fish prices increased 20 percent and consumption dropped to 14 kilograms per person24 from

22 kilograms in 201425 In 2016 food rose to 355 percent of house hold expenditure as a result of

increases in food prices26 This has pushed vertically integrated fishing monopolies to sell even

more of their catch abroad rather than deliver to the Rus sian Federation (Figure 517) Thus we

cannot exclude the possibility of further growth in US fish and shellfish imports from Rus sia on a

marginal scale

24 Александр Савельев ldquoПотребление рыбы в России упало до 14 кг на человекаrdquo [Fish consumption in Rus sia fell to

14 kg per person] Экономика Интерфакс January 28 2015 http wwwinterfax ru business 492038

25 Илья Шестаков ldquoПотебление рыбы в России снизилось на 10 процентов из- за роста ценrdquo [Fish consumption in

Rus sia dropped by 10 percent due to price increases] RNS March 8 2017 https rnsonline consumer - market

Potreblenie - ribi - v - Rossii - snizilos - na - 10 - iz - za - rosta - tsen - 2017 - 03 - 08

26 Zoya Sheftalovich and Christian Oliver ldquoRus siarsquos Boom (Farming) Economyrdquo Politico November 8 2016 http

wwwpolitico eu article russias - boom - farming - economy

Figure 517 US Imports from Rus sia Fish and Shellfish US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

0

$50000000

$100000000

$150000000

$200000000

$250000000

$300000000

$350000000

$400000000

$450000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 39 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations40

SPACE ODYSSEY

Among high- end products beyond the top five groups of goods imported from Rus sia cheap and

efficient Rus sian engines have been used to launch US rockets into space for about 16 years

(Figure 518) There was a serious po liti cal strug gle around a 2014 ban on the purchase of Rus sian

RD-180 rocket engines revealing the conflicting business interests of power ful high- tech companies

This restrictive mea sure was temporary and was quickly lifted because of significant cost impacts

and risks of disruption to launch schedules27 For the same reason the Sanctions Act does not autho-

rize ldquothe imposition of any sanction or other condition limitation restriction or prohibition that

directly or indirectly impedes the supply by any entity of the Rus sian Federation of any product or

ser vice or the procurement of such product or ser vice by any contractor or subcontractor of the

United States or any other entity relating to or in connection with any space launch conducted for

the National Aeronautics and Space Administration or any other nonndash Department of Defense

customerrdquo28

Nevertheless many experts believe that US domestic alternatives to replace Rus sian engines will

be viable in five to eight years

27 Ken Dilanian ldquoWhy Does the US Use Rus sian Rockets to Launch Its Satellitesrdquo NBC News updated November 15

2016 http wwwnbcnews com why - does - u - s - use - russian - rockets - launch - its - satellites - n588526

28 Countering Amer i carsquos Adversaries through Sanctions Act HR 3364

Figure 518 Spacecraft Excluding Military US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

0

$20000000

$40000000

$60000000

$80000000

$100000000

$120000000

$140000000

$160000000

$180000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 40 102017 404 PM

41

Diversity and technological complexity are the most vis i ble advantages supporting US exports to

Rus sia Three major groups of export goods include civilian aircraft engines and parts (Figure 61)

drilling and oil field equipment (Figure 62) and industrial machines and engines (Figure 63)

Despite sanctions against the transfer of advanced oil producing and pro cessing technologies the

realization of US drilling and oil field equipment in Rus sia is sustainable although some bilateral

proj ects have been frozen

Another category of goods that has demonstrated resilience is the phar ma ceu ti cal industry (Fig-

ure 64) because most drugs in Rus sia are imported (about 70 percent of the Rus sian phar ma ceu-

ti cal market in value) Import substitution policies have had only modest results in this industry

As confirmed by American Chamber of Commerce surveys US exports to Rus sia are closely

connected to US FDI 30 percent of total imports of US companies working in the Rus sian

market come from the United States (more than $2 billion in 2016) In other words about

40 percent of all US exports to Rus sia are related to a US corporate- sector business pro cess in

the country The major sectors of activity of these companies are energy and natu ral resources

(52 percent) manufacturing (17 percent) information and communications technology or ICT

(13 percent) retail (7 percent) automotive industry (6 percent) phar ma ceu ti cal production

(1 percent) professional ser vices (05 percent) and other (2 percent)1

Some obvious constraints on US exports to Rus sia have resulted from a reduction in demand A

deterioration of bilateral relations and implementation of sanctions and counter- sanctions have

directly or indirectly afected all businesses Figures 65 and 66 provide data regarding a dramatic

drop in the sale of US agricultural production in Rus sia with all other categories of exports in

goods showing big cuts as well (see Figures 67ndash69)

Exports of civilian aircraft engines and parts put the state of Washington in first place among

other states as a leading exporter to the Rus sian market (Figure 610)

1 American Chamber of Commerce in Rus sia ldquoInvestment and Import to Rus sia 2nd Surveyrdquo 13

Diversity and Constraints

06

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 41 102017 404 PM

Figure 61 US Exports of Civilian Aircraft Engines Equipment and Parts to Rus sia US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

$2500000000

$2000000000

$1500000000

$1000000000

$500000000

$-

Figure 62 US Exports of Drilling and Oil Field Equipment US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

0

$5000000

$10000000

$15000000

$20000000

$25000000

$30000000

$35000000

$40000000

$45000000

$50000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 42 102017 404 PM

Figure 63 US Exports of Industrial Engines to Rus sia US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

0

$5000000

$10000000

$15000000

$20000000

$25000000

$30000000

$35000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Figure 64 US Exports of Phar ma ceu ti cal Preparations to Rus sia US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

0

$5000000

$10000000

$15000000

$20000000

$25000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 43 102017 404 PM

Figure 65 US Exports of Meat and Poultry to Rus sia US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Meat poultry etc

$1000000000

$800000000

$600000000

$400000000

$200000000

$-

$1200000000

$1400000000

$1600000000

Figure 66 US Exports of Soybeans to Rus sia US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

0

$20000000

$40000000

$60000000

$80000000

$100000000

$120000000

$140000000

$160000000

$180000000

$200000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 44 102017 404 PM

Figure 67 US Exports of Vehicles Engines and Parts to Rus sia US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Other parts and accessories of vehicles

Automotive tires and tubes

Bodies and chassis for passenger cars

Engines and engine parts (carburetors pistonsrings and valves)

Trucks buses and special purpose vehicles

Passenger cars new and used

$2500000000

$2000000000

$1500000000

$500000000

$-

$1000000000

Figure 68 US Exports of Medicinal Equipment to Rus sia US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

$10000000

$15000000

$20000000

$25000000

$30000000

$35000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 45 102017 404 PM

Figure 610 US Exports to Rus sia by States (2016 US$ Value) Million US$ 2013ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoState and Metropolitan Area Trade Datardquo

Iowa Kentucky

North Dakota

Oklahoma

South Carolina

Washington

0

$500

$1000

$1500

$2000

2013 2014 2015 2016

District of Columbia

Iowa

Kentucky

North Dakota

Oklahoma

South Carolina

Washington

Figure 69 US Exports of Excavating Machinery to Rus sia US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

0

$5000000

$10000000

$15000000

$20000000

$25000000

$30000000

$35000000

$40000000

$45000000

$50000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 46 102017 404 PM

47

Upon reviewing the current trend in US- Russia economic relations we must acknowledge that

the existing trade model is obsolete and exhausted Imports are resource- oriented and reflect

constraints of the Rus sian economic structure while five groups of goodsmdash oil metals nuclear

fuels fertilizers and fishmdash make up more than 90 percent of total imports from Rus sia (Figure 71)

Each of these industries has a limited capacity for growth in the foreseeable future

Rus siarsquos core export to the United Statesmdash oilmdash will inevitably decrease in the mid- term under any

scenario The value and volume of Rus sian exports to the United States are open to global market

volatility and po liti cal pressures with limited hedging mechanisms

Overall US exports to Rus sia are unsustainable due to bilateral po liti cal tensions the whims of

commodity markets and changing domestic policies Sanctions and counter- sanctions have

created additional barriers particularly in finance banking high- tech energy and agro- business

According to the American Chamber of Commerce 69 percent of US companies working in the

country consider the impact of US sanctions against Rus sia on their business as negative At the

same time 60 percent of companies do not expect big changes in business relations between

Rus sia and the United States under Trump1 as the new law codifies existing sanctions fortifies

them and extends them to new sectors

Current US investments are low due to the weak rule of law in Rus sia a lack of property right

protections and proper contract enforcement high levels of statization and monopolization in the

economy a poor business climate outdated capital stock dependence on natural- resource

sectors and of course sanction and counter- sanction mea sures Bloated administrative compo-

nents created as risk mitigation instruments have also served as impediments The countryrsquos

institutional weakness low level of productivity bud get constraints and a declining inflexible

workforce will restrain future economic growth even if commodity prices recover Rus sian eco-

nomic policy will likely continue to be statist and protectionist relying mostly on import

substitutions

1 Ibid 11

Existing Trends and Future Scenarios

07

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 47 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations48

What scenarios can be expected in such a challenging environment

One probability (no peace no war) is based on the assumption that matters will not deteriorate

further and implementation of the Sanctions Act will be cursory This will cause relatively slow

degradation in the economic field with occasional flashes of activity in selected areas (eg closer

cooperation against Islamist terrorist groups in Syria)

A second worse case or critical scenario is the intensive and full- scale execution of current sanc-

tion legislation and even the imposition of new economic punitive and restrictive mea sures which

could incite asymmetric retaliatory actions and lead to the introduction of additional protectionist

policies This in turn could trigger a further escalation of mutual confrontation and could eventu-

ally destroy the fundamentals of the current bilateral trade system Rus sian leadership has charac-

terized the Sanctions Act as a declaration of a trade war that ends all hope for improving bilateral

relations2

2 Дмитрий Медведев ldquoПодписание президентом США нового санкционного закона против России создает несколько

последствийrdquo [The US Presidentrsquos signing of the package of new sanctions against Rus sia will have a few conse-

quences] Facebook August 2 2017 https wwwfacebook com Dmitry Medvedev posts 10154587161801851

Figure 71 US Imports from Rus sia Share of Oil Metals Nuclear Fuel Fertilizers and Fish Million US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

93

94

93

94

95

96

93

92

87

89

0

$5000

$10000

$15000

$20000

$25000

$30000

$35000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

US Imports from Russia

Share of Oil Metals Nuclear FuelFertilizers and Fish

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 48 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 49

The best case and most favorable scenario looks less probable now It assumes the realization of

structural reforms in Rus sia in such a way that would adapt Rus siarsquos foreign policy to national

economic needs reduce confrontations with the West and make a concerted efort to integrate

Rus sian businesses into global supply and value chains A revitalization of the structural reform

agendamdash including eforts to diversify economic activities through de- monopolization and support

for SMEs a restructuring of the banking sector the creation of a vibrant business climate to foster

entrepreneurships and innovation the implementation of administrative and judicial reforms to

tackle red tape and endemic corruption and the reduction of state control over key sectors of the

economy via wide- spread privatization could kick- start the development of a nonoil economy and

improve long- term growth prospects Despite ongoing discussion of reform strategies deep

economic and po liti cal changes are extremely complicated over the next po liti calelectoral cycle

(2018ndash2024) particularly because of re sis tance of vested interests and growing commodity prices

The urgency to tackle structural shortcomings in natu ral resource- dependent economies usually

correlates with the price of those resources and the degree to which resource rents drive eco-

nomic activity However there may be marginal improvements in the efficiency of the current

economic system

Future US- Russia relations can be thought of through three pillars one pillar focuses on areas

where both countries maintain a competitive rivalry another looks at potential areas of interaction

under pres ent conditions a third pillar and one that has evaporated from the current bilateral

agenda concentrates on future cooperation Stronger economic ties could not only be a kind of

po liti cal shock absorber but contribute to the building of this future (particularly business contacts

aim to support future structural reforms) although po liti cal factors are depressing the prospects

for cooperation To escape deadlock it will be impor tant to establish the right balance between

politics and economics and create a model of collaboration within the framework of contention

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 49 102017 404 PM

About the Author

Vadim Grishin PhD MBA has been involved in the reform pro cess in Rus sia as adviser to the

deputy prime minister of Rus sia in 1992ndash1993 and 2006ndash2010 He has extensive experience

working with the Bretton Woods Institutions He was the board member of the World Bank Group

and served as se nior adviser at the International Monetary Fund Currently he is a con sul tant to the

chief economistrsquos office of the International Finance Corporation and teaches the economics of

transition at Georgetown University in Washington DC

50

594-71613_ch99_4Pindd 50 102017 403 PM

Blank

COVER PHOTO ADOBE STOCK

1616 Rhode Island Avenue NW

Washington DC 20036

202 887 0200 | wwwcsisorg

v++ISBN 978-1-4422-8035-9

Lanham bull Boulder bull New York bull London

4501 Forbes Boulevard

Lanham MD 20706

301 459 3366 | wwwrowmancom

A U T H O R

Vadim Grishin

Myths and Realities

A Report of the

CSIS RUSSIA AND EURASIA PROGRAM

US-RussiaEconomicRelations

O C T O B E R 2 0 1 7

Euml|xHSLEOCy280359z

The Man Pupu Nyor Rock Formations at the Northern Urals also known as Seven

Strong Man or Little Mountain of the God in the local tribe (Mansi) language

Page 36: U.S.-Russia Economic Relations: Myths and Realities · 2020-04-17 · OCTOBER 2017 U.S.- Russia Economic Relations Myths and Realities AUTHOR Vadim Grishin A REPORT OF THE CSIS RUSSIA

US-Russia Economic Relations30

Table 58 Valerorsquos Refineries Pro cessing Rus sian Oil Thousands of Barrels 2016

Saint Charles Louisiana 29206 535

Corpus Christi Texas 20626 378

Wilmington California 4250 78

Total USA 54590 100

Source US EIA ldquoRefinery Capacity Reportrdquo January 1 2017

table 5 wwweia gov petroleum refinerycapacity table5 pdf

authorrsquos computation

Table 59 ExxonMobil Refineries Pro cessing Rus sian Oil Thousands of Barrels 2016

Baytown Texas 15037 88

Baton Rouge Louisiana 2046 12

Total USA 17083 100

Source US EIA ldquoRefinery Capacity Reportrdquo authorrsquos computation

Table 510 Chevronrsquos Refineries Pro cessing Rus sian Oil Thousands of Barrels 2016

Pascagoula Mississippi 12767 840

El Segundo California 2372 155

Saint Rose Louisiana 78 05

Total USA 15217 100

Source US EIA ldquoRefinery Capacity Reportrdquo authorrsquos computation

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 30 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 31

HEAVY METAL

Taken together US imports of metals and US imports of oil compose about 80 percent of US

total imports from Rus sia (Figure 59) Trade of metals like other commodities is strongly afected

by market price fluctuations Nevertheless metal imports from Rus sia have been fairly resilient to

market volatility and their average annual value has hovered at about $4 billion in the last five years

(Figure 510) This market resilience was forged at the end of the 1990searly 2000s when Rus sian

metal producers gradually modernized their plants adjusting quality of production to Western

standards and enhancing integration into global value and supply chains Some of them conquered

their share of the highly competitive US market struggling with peers from Canada and certain

BRICS countries (China India and Brazil) To attract additional resources all Rus sian large metal-

producing companies became public and were listed on stock exchanges chiefly the London Stock

Exchange (Severstalrsquo PAO Evraz MMK OAO Novolipetsk Steel Norilsk Nikel and TMK PAO) one

on the New York Stock Exchange (Mechel) and one on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange (Rusal)

Business logic pushed some of them to invest in the US metal- making industry which was hit

hard by crisis Later on some of those assets were sold (eg two US steel mills acquired by

Severstal in 2004 were purchased 10 years later by Steel Dynamics Inc and AK Steel Corp)

Figure 57 Share of US States Rus sian Oil Imports 2016

Source US EIA ldquoUS Imports from Rus sia of Crude Oil and Petroleum Productsrdquo Petroleum amp Other

Liquids September 29 2017 https www eia gov dnav pet hist LeafHandler ashx nshy=shyPETampsshy=shyMTTIM _ NUS

- NRS _ 1ampfshy=shyM authorrsquos computation

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

100

Maine

Massachusetts

Maryland

Connecticut

Georgia

Rhode Island

Virginia

Florida

New York

Alabama

Puerto Rico

Pennsylvania

Delaware

Hawaii

Washington

Mississippi

California

New Jersey

Louisiana

Texas

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 31 102017 404 PM

Figure 58 US Imports from Rus sia by State Million US$ 2013ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoState and Metropolitan Area Trade Datardquo Foreign Trade last modified

October 2 2017 https wwwcensus gov foreign - trade statistics state

Alaska

Connecticut

Delaware

Hawaii

Louisiana

Maryland

North Dakota 0

$1000

$2000

$3000

$4000

$5000

$6000

2013 2014 2015 2016

Alabama

Alaska

Connecticut

Delaware

Hawaii

Louisiana

Maryland

Maine

Mississippi

Montana

North Dakota

Mississippi

Figure 59 US Imports from Rus sia Share of Oil and Metals Million US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 1992ndash2016)

83

82

85

86

87

88

85

82

7375

0

$5000

$10000

$15000

$20000

$25000

$30000

$35000

$40000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

US Imports from Russia

Share of Oil and Metals

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 32 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 33

Obviously the market dynamic of dif er ent metals varies (eg iron steel aluminum platinum and

nickel) Caps to increase their trade and production in a ldquored oceanrdquo global environment with

anemic demand is rather limited despite Figure 510 showing a spike of iron and steel imports

from Rus sia in 2014 and aluminum in 2016 Some opportunities may exist for Russian- owned steel

plants in the United States (such as NLMK) to participate in energy proj ects resumed under Presi-

dent Trump who has required that new pipelines use only American- made steel15

Rus sia occupies a special niche in the US market for titanium products a high- end metal indus-

try Twenty years ago a long- term contract was signed between Rus sian titanium producer

VSMPO- AVISMA and Boeing The Rus sian com pany entered the selective club of Boeing suppliers

for the manufacture of components and semi- finished products Since the signing of this contract

VSMPO has delivered more than 35 percent of all titanium placed on Boeing civil aircraft16 They

are hidden in the trade data in an import category for Civilian Aircrafts and Parts (Figure 511) At

the end of 2016 Boeing announced an extension of its framework agreement with AVISMA

15 E Scheyder C Ngai and T Sylvester ldquoAmerican Steel Unlikely to Get Keystone Boost Despite Trump Orderrdquo

Reuters January 27 2017 http wwwreuters com article usa - trump - pipeline - transcanada - idUSL1N1FH1ZD

16 A Kramer ldquoTitanium Fills Vital Role for Boeing and Rus siardquo New York Times July 5 2013 http wwwnytimes com

2013 07 06 business global titanium - fills - vital - role - for - boeing - and - russia html mcubzshy=shy3

Figure 510 US Imports from Rus sia Iron Steel Bauxite Aluminum Nickel Nonferrous Metals and Other Precious Metals and Materials US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 1992ndash2016)

0

$6000000000

$5000000000

$4000000000

$3000000000

$2000000000

$1000000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 20122013

20142015

2016

Finished metal shapes

Iron and steel advanced

Iron and steel products nec

Nonferrous metals other

Other precious metals

Nickel

Bauxite and aluminum

Iron and steel mill products

Steelmaking materials

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 33 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations34

through 2022 and additional investments in the construction of a new robotic plant in Titanium

Valley a special economic zone located in the Sverdlovsk region that will open in 2018 The pro-

cessing of titanium forgings in all Boeing civil aircraft will be performed there including 787s 737

MAXs and 777Xs17 The contract extension with AVISMA may add several hundred million dollars

in value to annual US imports from Rus sia

How can such heavy reliance on imports of Rus sian titanium exist during a period of rising geopo-

liti cal tensions The answer is straightforward VSMPO- AVISMA is a highly specialized natu ral

mono poly producing 45 percent of the worldrsquos aerospace titanium Only four other countries

smelt high- grade titanium in industrial quantities the United States Germany Japan and China

Overall global production capacity is limited while demand is growing The United States cur-

rently imports around 79 percent of all the titanium it consumes each year18

17 ldquoBoeing and VSMPO Avisma to Launch Second Joint Production Siterdquo Rus sian Aviation Insider December 22 2016

http wwwrusaviainsider com boeing - and - vsmpo - avisma - to - launch - second - joint - production - site

18 Jon Ostrower and Andy Pasztor ldquoBoeing United Technologies Stockpile Titanium Partsrdquo Wall Street Journal

August 7 2014 https wwwwsj com articles boeing - united - technologies - stockpiling - titanium - parts - 1407441886

Figure 511 US Imports from Rus sia Civilian Aircrafts and Parts US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 1992ndash2016)

0

$20000000

$40000000

$60000000

$80000000

$100000000

$120000000

$140000000

$160000000

$180000000

$200000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Parts-civilian aircraft

Civilian aircraft

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 34 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 35

The Sanctions Act authorizes the secretary of the trea sury (in a nonmandatory way) to impose

restrictions (without specifying them) against Rus sian state- owned entities operating in the railway

metals and mining sectors of the Rus sian economy Despite the commanding heights of Rus siarsquos

state sector owner ship in its economy (70 percent of GDP) the metal- producing companies have

remained mostly in private hands

NUCLEAR AFFAIRS

Historically owners and operators of the 104 commercial nuclear power reactors in the United

States have purchased more than 80 percent of their uranium from foreign countries Uranium

shipping from Rus sia accounted for about 13 percent of the 58 million pounds of uranium pur-

chased overseas in 201219 At the same time the Rus sian state- owned mono poly Rosatom ac-

counts for 20 percent of Kazakhstanrsquos uranium production (which in turn comprises 11 percent of

all US uranium imports) and 20 percent of US domestic uranium production capacity (with

owner ship of exploration tracts in Wyoming)20

Nuclear fuel and nuclear power continue to be po liti cally sensitive topics both in the United

States and Rus sia Bilateral cooperation in this sector (being surprisingly stable with imports of

nuclear fuel from Rus sia at a level of $1 billion annually in the last five years [Figure 512 and 513])

is under constant po liti cal and lobbying pressure and has been a source of several po liti cal scan-

dals21 Consequently upside risks in this area of interaction are minimal and downside risks are

much higher especially when we are seeing more decommissioning of nuclear plants in the

United States than new constructions The US EIArsquos 2017 Annual Energy Outlook assumes

that about 25 percent of the nuclear capacity now operating will be removed from ser vice

by 205022

WHY IS THE GRASS GREENER ON THE OTHER SIDE

The United States continues to significantly reduce imports of chemical fertilizers as domestic pro-

duction increases In 2016 the United States imported 13 percent less ammonia and 11 percent

less urea and UAN which is a liquid urea and ammonium nitrate fertilizer Rus sia accounts for

around 40 percent of UAN imported by the United States The United States canceled antidumping

duties on imports of ammonium nitrate and urea from Rus sia in 2016 but it did not prevent import

19 US EIA ldquoThe US Relies on Foreign Uranium Enrichment Ser vices to Fuel Its Nuclear Power Plantsrdquo Today in

Energy August 28 2013 https wwweia gov todayinenergy detail php idshy=shy1273

20 Colin Chilcoat ldquoDoes Rus sia Really Own 20 Percent of the USrsquo Uranium Reservesrdquo OilPricecom May 6 2015

http oilpricecom Alternative - Energy Nuclear - Power Does - Russia - Really - Own - 20 - Of - The - US - Uranium - Reserves

html

21 Michelle Ye Hee Lee ldquoThe Facts behind Trumprsquos Repeated Claim about Hillary Clintonrsquos Role in the Rus sian Ura-

nium Dealrdquo Washington Post October 26 2016

22 US EIA ldquoAnnual Energy Outlook 2017 with Projections to 2050rdquo 81ndash82

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 35 102017 404 PM

Figure 512 US Imports from Rus sia Share of Oil Metals and Nuclear Fuel Million US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 1992ndash2016)

87

86

90

90

90

91

88

86

7882

0

$5000

$10000

$15000

$20000

$25000

$30000

$35000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

US Imports from Russia

Share of Oil Metals and Nuclear Fuel

Figure 513 US Imports from Rus sia Nuclear Fuel Materials US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

$-

$200000000

$400000000

$600000000

$800000000

$1200000000

$1000000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 36 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 37

drops twice last year (Figures 514 and 515) According to forecasts UAN imports are expected to

decline further to 15 million tons this year down over 46 percent from 28 million tons imported

last year23 The downside trend in imports of fertilizers will likely continue because of oversupply

BIG FISH

US imports of fish and shellfish from Rus sia are best understood in comparison with US fish

exports to the Rus sian market which slipped to zero in August 2014 after Rus sia issued an order

banning certain agricultural imports from the United States (Figure 516) While the volume of US

supply was not very large it was impor tant because it broke up the monopolistic dominance of a

few vertically integrated Rus sian companies that have kept prices high by restricting the entry of

new producers Seeking to implement import substitution policies Rus sia has tried to reduce

exports as well as imports of fish and seafood products in the last couple of years This symmetri-

cal approach was intended to ldquocompensaterdquo for a decrease of fish products in the domestic

23 Deepika Thapliyal ldquoPotashCorp Forecasts Sharp Drop in US Nitrogen Imports in 2017rdquo ICIS News February 7

2017 https wwwicis com resources news 2017 02 07 10076734 potashcorp - forecasts - sharp - drop - in - us - nitrogen

- imports - in - 2017

Figure 514 US Imports from Rus sia Share of Oil Metals Nuclear Fuel and Fertilizers Million US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

90

93

92

93

94

95

92

91

85

86

0

$5000

$10000

$15000

$20000

$25000

$30000

$35000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

US Imports from Russia

Share of Oil Metals Nuclear Fuel and Fertilizers

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 37 102017 404 PM

Figure 515 US Imports from Rus sia Chemical- Fertilizers US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

S-

$200000000

$400000000

$600000000

$800000000

$1000000000

$1200000000

$1400000000

$1600000000

$1800000000

$2000000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Figure 516 US Exports to Rus sia Fish and Shellfish US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

0

$10000000

$20000000

$30000000

$40000000

$50000000

$60000000

$70000000

$80000000

$90000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Fish and shellfish

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 38 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 39

consumer market caused by Rus siarsquos import ban but it has failed As result the group most af-

fected by the self- imposed counter- sanctions were Rus sian consumers

With a significant drop in fish imports a devaluation of the ruble and inflationary pressures on

seafood prices yearly consumption of fish in Rus sia has declined precipitously In 2015 alone

fish prices increased 20 percent and consumption dropped to 14 kilograms per person24 from

22 kilograms in 201425 In 2016 food rose to 355 percent of house hold expenditure as a result of

increases in food prices26 This has pushed vertically integrated fishing monopolies to sell even

more of their catch abroad rather than deliver to the Rus sian Federation (Figure 517) Thus we

cannot exclude the possibility of further growth in US fish and shellfish imports from Rus sia on a

marginal scale

24 Александр Савельев ldquoПотребление рыбы в России упало до 14 кг на человекаrdquo [Fish consumption in Rus sia fell to

14 kg per person] Экономика Интерфакс January 28 2015 http wwwinterfax ru business 492038

25 Илья Шестаков ldquoПотебление рыбы в России снизилось на 10 процентов из- за роста ценrdquo [Fish consumption in

Rus sia dropped by 10 percent due to price increases] RNS March 8 2017 https rnsonline consumer - market

Potreblenie - ribi - v - Rossii - snizilos - na - 10 - iz - za - rosta - tsen - 2017 - 03 - 08

26 Zoya Sheftalovich and Christian Oliver ldquoRus siarsquos Boom (Farming) Economyrdquo Politico November 8 2016 http

wwwpolitico eu article russias - boom - farming - economy

Figure 517 US Imports from Rus sia Fish and Shellfish US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

0

$50000000

$100000000

$150000000

$200000000

$250000000

$300000000

$350000000

$400000000

$450000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 39 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations40

SPACE ODYSSEY

Among high- end products beyond the top five groups of goods imported from Rus sia cheap and

efficient Rus sian engines have been used to launch US rockets into space for about 16 years

(Figure 518) There was a serious po liti cal strug gle around a 2014 ban on the purchase of Rus sian

RD-180 rocket engines revealing the conflicting business interests of power ful high- tech companies

This restrictive mea sure was temporary and was quickly lifted because of significant cost impacts

and risks of disruption to launch schedules27 For the same reason the Sanctions Act does not autho-

rize ldquothe imposition of any sanction or other condition limitation restriction or prohibition that

directly or indirectly impedes the supply by any entity of the Rus sian Federation of any product or

ser vice or the procurement of such product or ser vice by any contractor or subcontractor of the

United States or any other entity relating to or in connection with any space launch conducted for

the National Aeronautics and Space Administration or any other nonndash Department of Defense

customerrdquo28

Nevertheless many experts believe that US domestic alternatives to replace Rus sian engines will

be viable in five to eight years

27 Ken Dilanian ldquoWhy Does the US Use Rus sian Rockets to Launch Its Satellitesrdquo NBC News updated November 15

2016 http wwwnbcnews com why - does - u - s - use - russian - rockets - launch - its - satellites - n588526

28 Countering Amer i carsquos Adversaries through Sanctions Act HR 3364

Figure 518 Spacecraft Excluding Military US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

0

$20000000

$40000000

$60000000

$80000000

$100000000

$120000000

$140000000

$160000000

$180000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 40 102017 404 PM

41

Diversity and technological complexity are the most vis i ble advantages supporting US exports to

Rus sia Three major groups of export goods include civilian aircraft engines and parts (Figure 61)

drilling and oil field equipment (Figure 62) and industrial machines and engines (Figure 63)

Despite sanctions against the transfer of advanced oil producing and pro cessing technologies the

realization of US drilling and oil field equipment in Rus sia is sustainable although some bilateral

proj ects have been frozen

Another category of goods that has demonstrated resilience is the phar ma ceu ti cal industry (Fig-

ure 64) because most drugs in Rus sia are imported (about 70 percent of the Rus sian phar ma ceu-

ti cal market in value) Import substitution policies have had only modest results in this industry

As confirmed by American Chamber of Commerce surveys US exports to Rus sia are closely

connected to US FDI 30 percent of total imports of US companies working in the Rus sian

market come from the United States (more than $2 billion in 2016) In other words about

40 percent of all US exports to Rus sia are related to a US corporate- sector business pro cess in

the country The major sectors of activity of these companies are energy and natu ral resources

(52 percent) manufacturing (17 percent) information and communications technology or ICT

(13 percent) retail (7 percent) automotive industry (6 percent) phar ma ceu ti cal production

(1 percent) professional ser vices (05 percent) and other (2 percent)1

Some obvious constraints on US exports to Rus sia have resulted from a reduction in demand A

deterioration of bilateral relations and implementation of sanctions and counter- sanctions have

directly or indirectly afected all businesses Figures 65 and 66 provide data regarding a dramatic

drop in the sale of US agricultural production in Rus sia with all other categories of exports in

goods showing big cuts as well (see Figures 67ndash69)

Exports of civilian aircraft engines and parts put the state of Washington in first place among

other states as a leading exporter to the Rus sian market (Figure 610)

1 American Chamber of Commerce in Rus sia ldquoInvestment and Import to Rus sia 2nd Surveyrdquo 13

Diversity and Constraints

06

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 41 102017 404 PM

Figure 61 US Exports of Civilian Aircraft Engines Equipment and Parts to Rus sia US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

$2500000000

$2000000000

$1500000000

$1000000000

$500000000

$-

Figure 62 US Exports of Drilling and Oil Field Equipment US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

0

$5000000

$10000000

$15000000

$20000000

$25000000

$30000000

$35000000

$40000000

$45000000

$50000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 42 102017 404 PM

Figure 63 US Exports of Industrial Engines to Rus sia US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

0

$5000000

$10000000

$15000000

$20000000

$25000000

$30000000

$35000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Figure 64 US Exports of Phar ma ceu ti cal Preparations to Rus sia US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

0

$5000000

$10000000

$15000000

$20000000

$25000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 43 102017 404 PM

Figure 65 US Exports of Meat and Poultry to Rus sia US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Meat poultry etc

$1000000000

$800000000

$600000000

$400000000

$200000000

$-

$1200000000

$1400000000

$1600000000

Figure 66 US Exports of Soybeans to Rus sia US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

0

$20000000

$40000000

$60000000

$80000000

$100000000

$120000000

$140000000

$160000000

$180000000

$200000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 44 102017 404 PM

Figure 67 US Exports of Vehicles Engines and Parts to Rus sia US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Other parts and accessories of vehicles

Automotive tires and tubes

Bodies and chassis for passenger cars

Engines and engine parts (carburetors pistonsrings and valves)

Trucks buses and special purpose vehicles

Passenger cars new and used

$2500000000

$2000000000

$1500000000

$500000000

$-

$1000000000

Figure 68 US Exports of Medicinal Equipment to Rus sia US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

$10000000

$15000000

$20000000

$25000000

$30000000

$35000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 45 102017 404 PM

Figure 610 US Exports to Rus sia by States (2016 US$ Value) Million US$ 2013ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoState and Metropolitan Area Trade Datardquo

Iowa Kentucky

North Dakota

Oklahoma

South Carolina

Washington

0

$500

$1000

$1500

$2000

2013 2014 2015 2016

District of Columbia

Iowa

Kentucky

North Dakota

Oklahoma

South Carolina

Washington

Figure 69 US Exports of Excavating Machinery to Rus sia US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

0

$5000000

$10000000

$15000000

$20000000

$25000000

$30000000

$35000000

$40000000

$45000000

$50000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 46 102017 404 PM

47

Upon reviewing the current trend in US- Russia economic relations we must acknowledge that

the existing trade model is obsolete and exhausted Imports are resource- oriented and reflect

constraints of the Rus sian economic structure while five groups of goodsmdash oil metals nuclear

fuels fertilizers and fishmdash make up more than 90 percent of total imports from Rus sia (Figure 71)

Each of these industries has a limited capacity for growth in the foreseeable future

Rus siarsquos core export to the United Statesmdash oilmdash will inevitably decrease in the mid- term under any

scenario The value and volume of Rus sian exports to the United States are open to global market

volatility and po liti cal pressures with limited hedging mechanisms

Overall US exports to Rus sia are unsustainable due to bilateral po liti cal tensions the whims of

commodity markets and changing domestic policies Sanctions and counter- sanctions have

created additional barriers particularly in finance banking high- tech energy and agro- business

According to the American Chamber of Commerce 69 percent of US companies working in the

country consider the impact of US sanctions against Rus sia on their business as negative At the

same time 60 percent of companies do not expect big changes in business relations between

Rus sia and the United States under Trump1 as the new law codifies existing sanctions fortifies

them and extends them to new sectors

Current US investments are low due to the weak rule of law in Rus sia a lack of property right

protections and proper contract enforcement high levels of statization and monopolization in the

economy a poor business climate outdated capital stock dependence on natural- resource

sectors and of course sanction and counter- sanction mea sures Bloated administrative compo-

nents created as risk mitigation instruments have also served as impediments The countryrsquos

institutional weakness low level of productivity bud get constraints and a declining inflexible

workforce will restrain future economic growth even if commodity prices recover Rus sian eco-

nomic policy will likely continue to be statist and protectionist relying mostly on import

substitutions

1 Ibid 11

Existing Trends and Future Scenarios

07

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 47 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations48

What scenarios can be expected in such a challenging environment

One probability (no peace no war) is based on the assumption that matters will not deteriorate

further and implementation of the Sanctions Act will be cursory This will cause relatively slow

degradation in the economic field with occasional flashes of activity in selected areas (eg closer

cooperation against Islamist terrorist groups in Syria)

A second worse case or critical scenario is the intensive and full- scale execution of current sanc-

tion legislation and even the imposition of new economic punitive and restrictive mea sures which

could incite asymmetric retaliatory actions and lead to the introduction of additional protectionist

policies This in turn could trigger a further escalation of mutual confrontation and could eventu-

ally destroy the fundamentals of the current bilateral trade system Rus sian leadership has charac-

terized the Sanctions Act as a declaration of a trade war that ends all hope for improving bilateral

relations2

2 Дмитрий Медведев ldquoПодписание президентом США нового санкционного закона против России создает несколько

последствийrdquo [The US Presidentrsquos signing of the package of new sanctions against Rus sia will have a few conse-

quences] Facebook August 2 2017 https wwwfacebook com Dmitry Medvedev posts 10154587161801851

Figure 71 US Imports from Rus sia Share of Oil Metals Nuclear Fuel Fertilizers and Fish Million US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

93

94

93

94

95

96

93

92

87

89

0

$5000

$10000

$15000

$20000

$25000

$30000

$35000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

US Imports from Russia

Share of Oil Metals Nuclear FuelFertilizers and Fish

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 48 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 49

The best case and most favorable scenario looks less probable now It assumes the realization of

structural reforms in Rus sia in such a way that would adapt Rus siarsquos foreign policy to national

economic needs reduce confrontations with the West and make a concerted efort to integrate

Rus sian businesses into global supply and value chains A revitalization of the structural reform

agendamdash including eforts to diversify economic activities through de- monopolization and support

for SMEs a restructuring of the banking sector the creation of a vibrant business climate to foster

entrepreneurships and innovation the implementation of administrative and judicial reforms to

tackle red tape and endemic corruption and the reduction of state control over key sectors of the

economy via wide- spread privatization could kick- start the development of a nonoil economy and

improve long- term growth prospects Despite ongoing discussion of reform strategies deep

economic and po liti cal changes are extremely complicated over the next po liti calelectoral cycle

(2018ndash2024) particularly because of re sis tance of vested interests and growing commodity prices

The urgency to tackle structural shortcomings in natu ral resource- dependent economies usually

correlates with the price of those resources and the degree to which resource rents drive eco-

nomic activity However there may be marginal improvements in the efficiency of the current

economic system

Future US- Russia relations can be thought of through three pillars one pillar focuses on areas

where both countries maintain a competitive rivalry another looks at potential areas of interaction

under pres ent conditions a third pillar and one that has evaporated from the current bilateral

agenda concentrates on future cooperation Stronger economic ties could not only be a kind of

po liti cal shock absorber but contribute to the building of this future (particularly business contacts

aim to support future structural reforms) although po liti cal factors are depressing the prospects

for cooperation To escape deadlock it will be impor tant to establish the right balance between

politics and economics and create a model of collaboration within the framework of contention

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 49 102017 404 PM

About the Author

Vadim Grishin PhD MBA has been involved in the reform pro cess in Rus sia as adviser to the

deputy prime minister of Rus sia in 1992ndash1993 and 2006ndash2010 He has extensive experience

working with the Bretton Woods Institutions He was the board member of the World Bank Group

and served as se nior adviser at the International Monetary Fund Currently he is a con sul tant to the

chief economistrsquos office of the International Finance Corporation and teaches the economics of

transition at Georgetown University in Washington DC

50

594-71613_ch99_4Pindd 50 102017 403 PM

Blank

COVER PHOTO ADOBE STOCK

1616 Rhode Island Avenue NW

Washington DC 20036

202 887 0200 | wwwcsisorg

v++ISBN 978-1-4422-8035-9

Lanham bull Boulder bull New York bull London

4501 Forbes Boulevard

Lanham MD 20706

301 459 3366 | wwwrowmancom

A U T H O R

Vadim Grishin

Myths and Realities

A Report of the

CSIS RUSSIA AND EURASIA PROGRAM

US-RussiaEconomicRelations

O C T O B E R 2 0 1 7

Euml|xHSLEOCy280359z

The Man Pupu Nyor Rock Formations at the Northern Urals also known as Seven

Strong Man or Little Mountain of the God in the local tribe (Mansi) language

Page 37: U.S.-Russia Economic Relations: Myths and Realities · 2020-04-17 · OCTOBER 2017 U.S.- Russia Economic Relations Myths and Realities AUTHOR Vadim Grishin A REPORT OF THE CSIS RUSSIA

Vadim Grishin 31

HEAVY METAL

Taken together US imports of metals and US imports of oil compose about 80 percent of US

total imports from Rus sia (Figure 59) Trade of metals like other commodities is strongly afected

by market price fluctuations Nevertheless metal imports from Rus sia have been fairly resilient to

market volatility and their average annual value has hovered at about $4 billion in the last five years

(Figure 510) This market resilience was forged at the end of the 1990searly 2000s when Rus sian

metal producers gradually modernized their plants adjusting quality of production to Western

standards and enhancing integration into global value and supply chains Some of them conquered

their share of the highly competitive US market struggling with peers from Canada and certain

BRICS countries (China India and Brazil) To attract additional resources all Rus sian large metal-

producing companies became public and were listed on stock exchanges chiefly the London Stock

Exchange (Severstalrsquo PAO Evraz MMK OAO Novolipetsk Steel Norilsk Nikel and TMK PAO) one

on the New York Stock Exchange (Mechel) and one on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange (Rusal)

Business logic pushed some of them to invest in the US metal- making industry which was hit

hard by crisis Later on some of those assets were sold (eg two US steel mills acquired by

Severstal in 2004 were purchased 10 years later by Steel Dynamics Inc and AK Steel Corp)

Figure 57 Share of US States Rus sian Oil Imports 2016

Source US EIA ldquoUS Imports from Rus sia of Crude Oil and Petroleum Productsrdquo Petroleum amp Other

Liquids September 29 2017 https www eia gov dnav pet hist LeafHandler ashx nshy=shyPETampsshy=shyMTTIM _ NUS

- NRS _ 1ampfshy=shyM authorrsquos computation

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

100

Maine

Massachusetts

Maryland

Connecticut

Georgia

Rhode Island

Virginia

Florida

New York

Alabama

Puerto Rico

Pennsylvania

Delaware

Hawaii

Washington

Mississippi

California

New Jersey

Louisiana

Texas

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 31 102017 404 PM

Figure 58 US Imports from Rus sia by State Million US$ 2013ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoState and Metropolitan Area Trade Datardquo Foreign Trade last modified

October 2 2017 https wwwcensus gov foreign - trade statistics state

Alaska

Connecticut

Delaware

Hawaii

Louisiana

Maryland

North Dakota 0

$1000

$2000

$3000

$4000

$5000

$6000

2013 2014 2015 2016

Alabama

Alaska

Connecticut

Delaware

Hawaii

Louisiana

Maryland

Maine

Mississippi

Montana

North Dakota

Mississippi

Figure 59 US Imports from Rus sia Share of Oil and Metals Million US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 1992ndash2016)

83

82

85

86

87

88

85

82

7375

0

$5000

$10000

$15000

$20000

$25000

$30000

$35000

$40000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

US Imports from Russia

Share of Oil and Metals

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 32 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 33

Obviously the market dynamic of dif er ent metals varies (eg iron steel aluminum platinum and

nickel) Caps to increase their trade and production in a ldquored oceanrdquo global environment with

anemic demand is rather limited despite Figure 510 showing a spike of iron and steel imports

from Rus sia in 2014 and aluminum in 2016 Some opportunities may exist for Russian- owned steel

plants in the United States (such as NLMK) to participate in energy proj ects resumed under Presi-

dent Trump who has required that new pipelines use only American- made steel15

Rus sia occupies a special niche in the US market for titanium products a high- end metal indus-

try Twenty years ago a long- term contract was signed between Rus sian titanium producer

VSMPO- AVISMA and Boeing The Rus sian com pany entered the selective club of Boeing suppliers

for the manufacture of components and semi- finished products Since the signing of this contract

VSMPO has delivered more than 35 percent of all titanium placed on Boeing civil aircraft16 They

are hidden in the trade data in an import category for Civilian Aircrafts and Parts (Figure 511) At

the end of 2016 Boeing announced an extension of its framework agreement with AVISMA

15 E Scheyder C Ngai and T Sylvester ldquoAmerican Steel Unlikely to Get Keystone Boost Despite Trump Orderrdquo

Reuters January 27 2017 http wwwreuters com article usa - trump - pipeline - transcanada - idUSL1N1FH1ZD

16 A Kramer ldquoTitanium Fills Vital Role for Boeing and Rus siardquo New York Times July 5 2013 http wwwnytimes com

2013 07 06 business global titanium - fills - vital - role - for - boeing - and - russia html mcubzshy=shy3

Figure 510 US Imports from Rus sia Iron Steel Bauxite Aluminum Nickel Nonferrous Metals and Other Precious Metals and Materials US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 1992ndash2016)

0

$6000000000

$5000000000

$4000000000

$3000000000

$2000000000

$1000000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 20122013

20142015

2016

Finished metal shapes

Iron and steel advanced

Iron and steel products nec

Nonferrous metals other

Other precious metals

Nickel

Bauxite and aluminum

Iron and steel mill products

Steelmaking materials

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 33 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations34

through 2022 and additional investments in the construction of a new robotic plant in Titanium

Valley a special economic zone located in the Sverdlovsk region that will open in 2018 The pro-

cessing of titanium forgings in all Boeing civil aircraft will be performed there including 787s 737

MAXs and 777Xs17 The contract extension with AVISMA may add several hundred million dollars

in value to annual US imports from Rus sia

How can such heavy reliance on imports of Rus sian titanium exist during a period of rising geopo-

liti cal tensions The answer is straightforward VSMPO- AVISMA is a highly specialized natu ral

mono poly producing 45 percent of the worldrsquos aerospace titanium Only four other countries

smelt high- grade titanium in industrial quantities the United States Germany Japan and China

Overall global production capacity is limited while demand is growing The United States cur-

rently imports around 79 percent of all the titanium it consumes each year18

17 ldquoBoeing and VSMPO Avisma to Launch Second Joint Production Siterdquo Rus sian Aviation Insider December 22 2016

http wwwrusaviainsider com boeing - and - vsmpo - avisma - to - launch - second - joint - production - site

18 Jon Ostrower and Andy Pasztor ldquoBoeing United Technologies Stockpile Titanium Partsrdquo Wall Street Journal

August 7 2014 https wwwwsj com articles boeing - united - technologies - stockpiling - titanium - parts - 1407441886

Figure 511 US Imports from Rus sia Civilian Aircrafts and Parts US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 1992ndash2016)

0

$20000000

$40000000

$60000000

$80000000

$100000000

$120000000

$140000000

$160000000

$180000000

$200000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Parts-civilian aircraft

Civilian aircraft

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 34 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 35

The Sanctions Act authorizes the secretary of the trea sury (in a nonmandatory way) to impose

restrictions (without specifying them) against Rus sian state- owned entities operating in the railway

metals and mining sectors of the Rus sian economy Despite the commanding heights of Rus siarsquos

state sector owner ship in its economy (70 percent of GDP) the metal- producing companies have

remained mostly in private hands

NUCLEAR AFFAIRS

Historically owners and operators of the 104 commercial nuclear power reactors in the United

States have purchased more than 80 percent of their uranium from foreign countries Uranium

shipping from Rus sia accounted for about 13 percent of the 58 million pounds of uranium pur-

chased overseas in 201219 At the same time the Rus sian state- owned mono poly Rosatom ac-

counts for 20 percent of Kazakhstanrsquos uranium production (which in turn comprises 11 percent of

all US uranium imports) and 20 percent of US domestic uranium production capacity (with

owner ship of exploration tracts in Wyoming)20

Nuclear fuel and nuclear power continue to be po liti cally sensitive topics both in the United

States and Rus sia Bilateral cooperation in this sector (being surprisingly stable with imports of

nuclear fuel from Rus sia at a level of $1 billion annually in the last five years [Figure 512 and 513])

is under constant po liti cal and lobbying pressure and has been a source of several po liti cal scan-

dals21 Consequently upside risks in this area of interaction are minimal and downside risks are

much higher especially when we are seeing more decommissioning of nuclear plants in the

United States than new constructions The US EIArsquos 2017 Annual Energy Outlook assumes

that about 25 percent of the nuclear capacity now operating will be removed from ser vice

by 205022

WHY IS THE GRASS GREENER ON THE OTHER SIDE

The United States continues to significantly reduce imports of chemical fertilizers as domestic pro-

duction increases In 2016 the United States imported 13 percent less ammonia and 11 percent

less urea and UAN which is a liquid urea and ammonium nitrate fertilizer Rus sia accounts for

around 40 percent of UAN imported by the United States The United States canceled antidumping

duties on imports of ammonium nitrate and urea from Rus sia in 2016 but it did not prevent import

19 US EIA ldquoThe US Relies on Foreign Uranium Enrichment Ser vices to Fuel Its Nuclear Power Plantsrdquo Today in

Energy August 28 2013 https wwweia gov todayinenergy detail php idshy=shy1273

20 Colin Chilcoat ldquoDoes Rus sia Really Own 20 Percent of the USrsquo Uranium Reservesrdquo OilPricecom May 6 2015

http oilpricecom Alternative - Energy Nuclear - Power Does - Russia - Really - Own - 20 - Of - The - US - Uranium - Reserves

html

21 Michelle Ye Hee Lee ldquoThe Facts behind Trumprsquos Repeated Claim about Hillary Clintonrsquos Role in the Rus sian Ura-

nium Dealrdquo Washington Post October 26 2016

22 US EIA ldquoAnnual Energy Outlook 2017 with Projections to 2050rdquo 81ndash82

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 35 102017 404 PM

Figure 512 US Imports from Rus sia Share of Oil Metals and Nuclear Fuel Million US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 1992ndash2016)

87

86

90

90

90

91

88

86

7882

0

$5000

$10000

$15000

$20000

$25000

$30000

$35000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

US Imports from Russia

Share of Oil Metals and Nuclear Fuel

Figure 513 US Imports from Rus sia Nuclear Fuel Materials US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

$-

$200000000

$400000000

$600000000

$800000000

$1200000000

$1000000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 36 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 37

drops twice last year (Figures 514 and 515) According to forecasts UAN imports are expected to

decline further to 15 million tons this year down over 46 percent from 28 million tons imported

last year23 The downside trend in imports of fertilizers will likely continue because of oversupply

BIG FISH

US imports of fish and shellfish from Rus sia are best understood in comparison with US fish

exports to the Rus sian market which slipped to zero in August 2014 after Rus sia issued an order

banning certain agricultural imports from the United States (Figure 516) While the volume of US

supply was not very large it was impor tant because it broke up the monopolistic dominance of a

few vertically integrated Rus sian companies that have kept prices high by restricting the entry of

new producers Seeking to implement import substitution policies Rus sia has tried to reduce

exports as well as imports of fish and seafood products in the last couple of years This symmetri-

cal approach was intended to ldquocompensaterdquo for a decrease of fish products in the domestic

23 Deepika Thapliyal ldquoPotashCorp Forecasts Sharp Drop in US Nitrogen Imports in 2017rdquo ICIS News February 7

2017 https wwwicis com resources news 2017 02 07 10076734 potashcorp - forecasts - sharp - drop - in - us - nitrogen

- imports - in - 2017

Figure 514 US Imports from Rus sia Share of Oil Metals Nuclear Fuel and Fertilizers Million US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

90

93

92

93

94

95

92

91

85

86

0

$5000

$10000

$15000

$20000

$25000

$30000

$35000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

US Imports from Russia

Share of Oil Metals Nuclear Fuel and Fertilizers

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 37 102017 404 PM

Figure 515 US Imports from Rus sia Chemical- Fertilizers US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

S-

$200000000

$400000000

$600000000

$800000000

$1000000000

$1200000000

$1400000000

$1600000000

$1800000000

$2000000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Figure 516 US Exports to Rus sia Fish and Shellfish US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

0

$10000000

$20000000

$30000000

$40000000

$50000000

$60000000

$70000000

$80000000

$90000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Fish and shellfish

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 38 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 39

consumer market caused by Rus siarsquos import ban but it has failed As result the group most af-

fected by the self- imposed counter- sanctions were Rus sian consumers

With a significant drop in fish imports a devaluation of the ruble and inflationary pressures on

seafood prices yearly consumption of fish in Rus sia has declined precipitously In 2015 alone

fish prices increased 20 percent and consumption dropped to 14 kilograms per person24 from

22 kilograms in 201425 In 2016 food rose to 355 percent of house hold expenditure as a result of

increases in food prices26 This has pushed vertically integrated fishing monopolies to sell even

more of their catch abroad rather than deliver to the Rus sian Federation (Figure 517) Thus we

cannot exclude the possibility of further growth in US fish and shellfish imports from Rus sia on a

marginal scale

24 Александр Савельев ldquoПотребление рыбы в России упало до 14 кг на человекаrdquo [Fish consumption in Rus sia fell to

14 kg per person] Экономика Интерфакс January 28 2015 http wwwinterfax ru business 492038

25 Илья Шестаков ldquoПотебление рыбы в России снизилось на 10 процентов из- за роста ценrdquo [Fish consumption in

Rus sia dropped by 10 percent due to price increases] RNS March 8 2017 https rnsonline consumer - market

Potreblenie - ribi - v - Rossii - snizilos - na - 10 - iz - za - rosta - tsen - 2017 - 03 - 08

26 Zoya Sheftalovich and Christian Oliver ldquoRus siarsquos Boom (Farming) Economyrdquo Politico November 8 2016 http

wwwpolitico eu article russias - boom - farming - economy

Figure 517 US Imports from Rus sia Fish and Shellfish US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

0

$50000000

$100000000

$150000000

$200000000

$250000000

$300000000

$350000000

$400000000

$450000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 39 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations40

SPACE ODYSSEY

Among high- end products beyond the top five groups of goods imported from Rus sia cheap and

efficient Rus sian engines have been used to launch US rockets into space for about 16 years

(Figure 518) There was a serious po liti cal strug gle around a 2014 ban on the purchase of Rus sian

RD-180 rocket engines revealing the conflicting business interests of power ful high- tech companies

This restrictive mea sure was temporary and was quickly lifted because of significant cost impacts

and risks of disruption to launch schedules27 For the same reason the Sanctions Act does not autho-

rize ldquothe imposition of any sanction or other condition limitation restriction or prohibition that

directly or indirectly impedes the supply by any entity of the Rus sian Federation of any product or

ser vice or the procurement of such product or ser vice by any contractor or subcontractor of the

United States or any other entity relating to or in connection with any space launch conducted for

the National Aeronautics and Space Administration or any other nonndash Department of Defense

customerrdquo28

Nevertheless many experts believe that US domestic alternatives to replace Rus sian engines will

be viable in five to eight years

27 Ken Dilanian ldquoWhy Does the US Use Rus sian Rockets to Launch Its Satellitesrdquo NBC News updated November 15

2016 http wwwnbcnews com why - does - u - s - use - russian - rockets - launch - its - satellites - n588526

28 Countering Amer i carsquos Adversaries through Sanctions Act HR 3364

Figure 518 Spacecraft Excluding Military US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

0

$20000000

$40000000

$60000000

$80000000

$100000000

$120000000

$140000000

$160000000

$180000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 40 102017 404 PM

41

Diversity and technological complexity are the most vis i ble advantages supporting US exports to

Rus sia Three major groups of export goods include civilian aircraft engines and parts (Figure 61)

drilling and oil field equipment (Figure 62) and industrial machines and engines (Figure 63)

Despite sanctions against the transfer of advanced oil producing and pro cessing technologies the

realization of US drilling and oil field equipment in Rus sia is sustainable although some bilateral

proj ects have been frozen

Another category of goods that has demonstrated resilience is the phar ma ceu ti cal industry (Fig-

ure 64) because most drugs in Rus sia are imported (about 70 percent of the Rus sian phar ma ceu-

ti cal market in value) Import substitution policies have had only modest results in this industry

As confirmed by American Chamber of Commerce surveys US exports to Rus sia are closely

connected to US FDI 30 percent of total imports of US companies working in the Rus sian

market come from the United States (more than $2 billion in 2016) In other words about

40 percent of all US exports to Rus sia are related to a US corporate- sector business pro cess in

the country The major sectors of activity of these companies are energy and natu ral resources

(52 percent) manufacturing (17 percent) information and communications technology or ICT

(13 percent) retail (7 percent) automotive industry (6 percent) phar ma ceu ti cal production

(1 percent) professional ser vices (05 percent) and other (2 percent)1

Some obvious constraints on US exports to Rus sia have resulted from a reduction in demand A

deterioration of bilateral relations and implementation of sanctions and counter- sanctions have

directly or indirectly afected all businesses Figures 65 and 66 provide data regarding a dramatic

drop in the sale of US agricultural production in Rus sia with all other categories of exports in

goods showing big cuts as well (see Figures 67ndash69)

Exports of civilian aircraft engines and parts put the state of Washington in first place among

other states as a leading exporter to the Rus sian market (Figure 610)

1 American Chamber of Commerce in Rus sia ldquoInvestment and Import to Rus sia 2nd Surveyrdquo 13

Diversity and Constraints

06

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 41 102017 404 PM

Figure 61 US Exports of Civilian Aircraft Engines Equipment and Parts to Rus sia US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

$2500000000

$2000000000

$1500000000

$1000000000

$500000000

$-

Figure 62 US Exports of Drilling and Oil Field Equipment US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

0

$5000000

$10000000

$15000000

$20000000

$25000000

$30000000

$35000000

$40000000

$45000000

$50000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 42 102017 404 PM

Figure 63 US Exports of Industrial Engines to Rus sia US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

0

$5000000

$10000000

$15000000

$20000000

$25000000

$30000000

$35000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Figure 64 US Exports of Phar ma ceu ti cal Preparations to Rus sia US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

0

$5000000

$10000000

$15000000

$20000000

$25000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 43 102017 404 PM

Figure 65 US Exports of Meat and Poultry to Rus sia US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Meat poultry etc

$1000000000

$800000000

$600000000

$400000000

$200000000

$-

$1200000000

$1400000000

$1600000000

Figure 66 US Exports of Soybeans to Rus sia US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

0

$20000000

$40000000

$60000000

$80000000

$100000000

$120000000

$140000000

$160000000

$180000000

$200000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 44 102017 404 PM

Figure 67 US Exports of Vehicles Engines and Parts to Rus sia US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Other parts and accessories of vehicles

Automotive tires and tubes

Bodies and chassis for passenger cars

Engines and engine parts (carburetors pistonsrings and valves)

Trucks buses and special purpose vehicles

Passenger cars new and used

$2500000000

$2000000000

$1500000000

$500000000

$-

$1000000000

Figure 68 US Exports of Medicinal Equipment to Rus sia US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

$10000000

$15000000

$20000000

$25000000

$30000000

$35000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 45 102017 404 PM

Figure 610 US Exports to Rus sia by States (2016 US$ Value) Million US$ 2013ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoState and Metropolitan Area Trade Datardquo

Iowa Kentucky

North Dakota

Oklahoma

South Carolina

Washington

0

$500

$1000

$1500

$2000

2013 2014 2015 2016

District of Columbia

Iowa

Kentucky

North Dakota

Oklahoma

South Carolina

Washington

Figure 69 US Exports of Excavating Machinery to Rus sia US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

0

$5000000

$10000000

$15000000

$20000000

$25000000

$30000000

$35000000

$40000000

$45000000

$50000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 46 102017 404 PM

47

Upon reviewing the current trend in US- Russia economic relations we must acknowledge that

the existing trade model is obsolete and exhausted Imports are resource- oriented and reflect

constraints of the Rus sian economic structure while five groups of goodsmdash oil metals nuclear

fuels fertilizers and fishmdash make up more than 90 percent of total imports from Rus sia (Figure 71)

Each of these industries has a limited capacity for growth in the foreseeable future

Rus siarsquos core export to the United Statesmdash oilmdash will inevitably decrease in the mid- term under any

scenario The value and volume of Rus sian exports to the United States are open to global market

volatility and po liti cal pressures with limited hedging mechanisms

Overall US exports to Rus sia are unsustainable due to bilateral po liti cal tensions the whims of

commodity markets and changing domestic policies Sanctions and counter- sanctions have

created additional barriers particularly in finance banking high- tech energy and agro- business

According to the American Chamber of Commerce 69 percent of US companies working in the

country consider the impact of US sanctions against Rus sia on their business as negative At the

same time 60 percent of companies do not expect big changes in business relations between

Rus sia and the United States under Trump1 as the new law codifies existing sanctions fortifies

them and extends them to new sectors

Current US investments are low due to the weak rule of law in Rus sia a lack of property right

protections and proper contract enforcement high levels of statization and monopolization in the

economy a poor business climate outdated capital stock dependence on natural- resource

sectors and of course sanction and counter- sanction mea sures Bloated administrative compo-

nents created as risk mitigation instruments have also served as impediments The countryrsquos

institutional weakness low level of productivity bud get constraints and a declining inflexible

workforce will restrain future economic growth even if commodity prices recover Rus sian eco-

nomic policy will likely continue to be statist and protectionist relying mostly on import

substitutions

1 Ibid 11

Existing Trends and Future Scenarios

07

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 47 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations48

What scenarios can be expected in such a challenging environment

One probability (no peace no war) is based on the assumption that matters will not deteriorate

further and implementation of the Sanctions Act will be cursory This will cause relatively slow

degradation in the economic field with occasional flashes of activity in selected areas (eg closer

cooperation against Islamist terrorist groups in Syria)

A second worse case or critical scenario is the intensive and full- scale execution of current sanc-

tion legislation and even the imposition of new economic punitive and restrictive mea sures which

could incite asymmetric retaliatory actions and lead to the introduction of additional protectionist

policies This in turn could trigger a further escalation of mutual confrontation and could eventu-

ally destroy the fundamentals of the current bilateral trade system Rus sian leadership has charac-

terized the Sanctions Act as a declaration of a trade war that ends all hope for improving bilateral

relations2

2 Дмитрий Медведев ldquoПодписание президентом США нового санкционного закона против России создает несколько

последствийrdquo [The US Presidentrsquos signing of the package of new sanctions against Rus sia will have a few conse-

quences] Facebook August 2 2017 https wwwfacebook com Dmitry Medvedev posts 10154587161801851

Figure 71 US Imports from Rus sia Share of Oil Metals Nuclear Fuel Fertilizers and Fish Million US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

93

94

93

94

95

96

93

92

87

89

0

$5000

$10000

$15000

$20000

$25000

$30000

$35000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

US Imports from Russia

Share of Oil Metals Nuclear FuelFertilizers and Fish

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 48 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 49

The best case and most favorable scenario looks less probable now It assumes the realization of

structural reforms in Rus sia in such a way that would adapt Rus siarsquos foreign policy to national

economic needs reduce confrontations with the West and make a concerted efort to integrate

Rus sian businesses into global supply and value chains A revitalization of the structural reform

agendamdash including eforts to diversify economic activities through de- monopolization and support

for SMEs a restructuring of the banking sector the creation of a vibrant business climate to foster

entrepreneurships and innovation the implementation of administrative and judicial reforms to

tackle red tape and endemic corruption and the reduction of state control over key sectors of the

economy via wide- spread privatization could kick- start the development of a nonoil economy and

improve long- term growth prospects Despite ongoing discussion of reform strategies deep

economic and po liti cal changes are extremely complicated over the next po liti calelectoral cycle

(2018ndash2024) particularly because of re sis tance of vested interests and growing commodity prices

The urgency to tackle structural shortcomings in natu ral resource- dependent economies usually

correlates with the price of those resources and the degree to which resource rents drive eco-

nomic activity However there may be marginal improvements in the efficiency of the current

economic system

Future US- Russia relations can be thought of through three pillars one pillar focuses on areas

where both countries maintain a competitive rivalry another looks at potential areas of interaction

under pres ent conditions a third pillar and one that has evaporated from the current bilateral

agenda concentrates on future cooperation Stronger economic ties could not only be a kind of

po liti cal shock absorber but contribute to the building of this future (particularly business contacts

aim to support future structural reforms) although po liti cal factors are depressing the prospects

for cooperation To escape deadlock it will be impor tant to establish the right balance between

politics and economics and create a model of collaboration within the framework of contention

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 49 102017 404 PM

About the Author

Vadim Grishin PhD MBA has been involved in the reform pro cess in Rus sia as adviser to the

deputy prime minister of Rus sia in 1992ndash1993 and 2006ndash2010 He has extensive experience

working with the Bretton Woods Institutions He was the board member of the World Bank Group

and served as se nior adviser at the International Monetary Fund Currently he is a con sul tant to the

chief economistrsquos office of the International Finance Corporation and teaches the economics of

transition at Georgetown University in Washington DC

50

594-71613_ch99_4Pindd 50 102017 403 PM

Blank

COVER PHOTO ADOBE STOCK

1616 Rhode Island Avenue NW

Washington DC 20036

202 887 0200 | wwwcsisorg

v++ISBN 978-1-4422-8035-9

Lanham bull Boulder bull New York bull London

4501 Forbes Boulevard

Lanham MD 20706

301 459 3366 | wwwrowmancom

A U T H O R

Vadim Grishin

Myths and Realities

A Report of the

CSIS RUSSIA AND EURASIA PROGRAM

US-RussiaEconomicRelations

O C T O B E R 2 0 1 7

Euml|xHSLEOCy280359z

The Man Pupu Nyor Rock Formations at the Northern Urals also known as Seven

Strong Man or Little Mountain of the God in the local tribe (Mansi) language

Page 38: U.S.-Russia Economic Relations: Myths and Realities · 2020-04-17 · OCTOBER 2017 U.S.- Russia Economic Relations Myths and Realities AUTHOR Vadim Grishin A REPORT OF THE CSIS RUSSIA

Figure 58 US Imports from Rus sia by State Million US$ 2013ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoState and Metropolitan Area Trade Datardquo Foreign Trade last modified

October 2 2017 https wwwcensus gov foreign - trade statistics state

Alaska

Connecticut

Delaware

Hawaii

Louisiana

Maryland

North Dakota 0

$1000

$2000

$3000

$4000

$5000

$6000

2013 2014 2015 2016

Alabama

Alaska

Connecticut

Delaware

Hawaii

Louisiana

Maryland

Maine

Mississippi

Montana

North Dakota

Mississippi

Figure 59 US Imports from Rus sia Share of Oil and Metals Million US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 1992ndash2016)

83

82

85

86

87

88

85

82

7375

0

$5000

$10000

$15000

$20000

$25000

$30000

$35000

$40000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

US Imports from Russia

Share of Oil and Metals

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 32 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 33

Obviously the market dynamic of dif er ent metals varies (eg iron steel aluminum platinum and

nickel) Caps to increase their trade and production in a ldquored oceanrdquo global environment with

anemic demand is rather limited despite Figure 510 showing a spike of iron and steel imports

from Rus sia in 2014 and aluminum in 2016 Some opportunities may exist for Russian- owned steel

plants in the United States (such as NLMK) to participate in energy proj ects resumed under Presi-

dent Trump who has required that new pipelines use only American- made steel15

Rus sia occupies a special niche in the US market for titanium products a high- end metal indus-

try Twenty years ago a long- term contract was signed between Rus sian titanium producer

VSMPO- AVISMA and Boeing The Rus sian com pany entered the selective club of Boeing suppliers

for the manufacture of components and semi- finished products Since the signing of this contract

VSMPO has delivered more than 35 percent of all titanium placed on Boeing civil aircraft16 They

are hidden in the trade data in an import category for Civilian Aircrafts and Parts (Figure 511) At

the end of 2016 Boeing announced an extension of its framework agreement with AVISMA

15 E Scheyder C Ngai and T Sylvester ldquoAmerican Steel Unlikely to Get Keystone Boost Despite Trump Orderrdquo

Reuters January 27 2017 http wwwreuters com article usa - trump - pipeline - transcanada - idUSL1N1FH1ZD

16 A Kramer ldquoTitanium Fills Vital Role for Boeing and Rus siardquo New York Times July 5 2013 http wwwnytimes com

2013 07 06 business global titanium - fills - vital - role - for - boeing - and - russia html mcubzshy=shy3

Figure 510 US Imports from Rus sia Iron Steel Bauxite Aluminum Nickel Nonferrous Metals and Other Precious Metals and Materials US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 1992ndash2016)

0

$6000000000

$5000000000

$4000000000

$3000000000

$2000000000

$1000000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 20122013

20142015

2016

Finished metal shapes

Iron and steel advanced

Iron and steel products nec

Nonferrous metals other

Other precious metals

Nickel

Bauxite and aluminum

Iron and steel mill products

Steelmaking materials

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 33 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations34

through 2022 and additional investments in the construction of a new robotic plant in Titanium

Valley a special economic zone located in the Sverdlovsk region that will open in 2018 The pro-

cessing of titanium forgings in all Boeing civil aircraft will be performed there including 787s 737

MAXs and 777Xs17 The contract extension with AVISMA may add several hundred million dollars

in value to annual US imports from Rus sia

How can such heavy reliance on imports of Rus sian titanium exist during a period of rising geopo-

liti cal tensions The answer is straightforward VSMPO- AVISMA is a highly specialized natu ral

mono poly producing 45 percent of the worldrsquos aerospace titanium Only four other countries

smelt high- grade titanium in industrial quantities the United States Germany Japan and China

Overall global production capacity is limited while demand is growing The United States cur-

rently imports around 79 percent of all the titanium it consumes each year18

17 ldquoBoeing and VSMPO Avisma to Launch Second Joint Production Siterdquo Rus sian Aviation Insider December 22 2016

http wwwrusaviainsider com boeing - and - vsmpo - avisma - to - launch - second - joint - production - site

18 Jon Ostrower and Andy Pasztor ldquoBoeing United Technologies Stockpile Titanium Partsrdquo Wall Street Journal

August 7 2014 https wwwwsj com articles boeing - united - technologies - stockpiling - titanium - parts - 1407441886

Figure 511 US Imports from Rus sia Civilian Aircrafts and Parts US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 1992ndash2016)

0

$20000000

$40000000

$60000000

$80000000

$100000000

$120000000

$140000000

$160000000

$180000000

$200000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Parts-civilian aircraft

Civilian aircraft

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 34 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 35

The Sanctions Act authorizes the secretary of the trea sury (in a nonmandatory way) to impose

restrictions (without specifying them) against Rus sian state- owned entities operating in the railway

metals and mining sectors of the Rus sian economy Despite the commanding heights of Rus siarsquos

state sector owner ship in its economy (70 percent of GDP) the metal- producing companies have

remained mostly in private hands

NUCLEAR AFFAIRS

Historically owners and operators of the 104 commercial nuclear power reactors in the United

States have purchased more than 80 percent of their uranium from foreign countries Uranium

shipping from Rus sia accounted for about 13 percent of the 58 million pounds of uranium pur-

chased overseas in 201219 At the same time the Rus sian state- owned mono poly Rosatom ac-

counts for 20 percent of Kazakhstanrsquos uranium production (which in turn comprises 11 percent of

all US uranium imports) and 20 percent of US domestic uranium production capacity (with

owner ship of exploration tracts in Wyoming)20

Nuclear fuel and nuclear power continue to be po liti cally sensitive topics both in the United

States and Rus sia Bilateral cooperation in this sector (being surprisingly stable with imports of

nuclear fuel from Rus sia at a level of $1 billion annually in the last five years [Figure 512 and 513])

is under constant po liti cal and lobbying pressure and has been a source of several po liti cal scan-

dals21 Consequently upside risks in this area of interaction are minimal and downside risks are

much higher especially when we are seeing more decommissioning of nuclear plants in the

United States than new constructions The US EIArsquos 2017 Annual Energy Outlook assumes

that about 25 percent of the nuclear capacity now operating will be removed from ser vice

by 205022

WHY IS THE GRASS GREENER ON THE OTHER SIDE

The United States continues to significantly reduce imports of chemical fertilizers as domestic pro-

duction increases In 2016 the United States imported 13 percent less ammonia and 11 percent

less urea and UAN which is a liquid urea and ammonium nitrate fertilizer Rus sia accounts for

around 40 percent of UAN imported by the United States The United States canceled antidumping

duties on imports of ammonium nitrate and urea from Rus sia in 2016 but it did not prevent import

19 US EIA ldquoThe US Relies on Foreign Uranium Enrichment Ser vices to Fuel Its Nuclear Power Plantsrdquo Today in

Energy August 28 2013 https wwweia gov todayinenergy detail php idshy=shy1273

20 Colin Chilcoat ldquoDoes Rus sia Really Own 20 Percent of the USrsquo Uranium Reservesrdquo OilPricecom May 6 2015

http oilpricecom Alternative - Energy Nuclear - Power Does - Russia - Really - Own - 20 - Of - The - US - Uranium - Reserves

html

21 Michelle Ye Hee Lee ldquoThe Facts behind Trumprsquos Repeated Claim about Hillary Clintonrsquos Role in the Rus sian Ura-

nium Dealrdquo Washington Post October 26 2016

22 US EIA ldquoAnnual Energy Outlook 2017 with Projections to 2050rdquo 81ndash82

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 35 102017 404 PM

Figure 512 US Imports from Rus sia Share of Oil Metals and Nuclear Fuel Million US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 1992ndash2016)

87

86

90

90

90

91

88

86

7882

0

$5000

$10000

$15000

$20000

$25000

$30000

$35000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

US Imports from Russia

Share of Oil Metals and Nuclear Fuel

Figure 513 US Imports from Rus sia Nuclear Fuel Materials US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

$-

$200000000

$400000000

$600000000

$800000000

$1200000000

$1000000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 36 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 37

drops twice last year (Figures 514 and 515) According to forecasts UAN imports are expected to

decline further to 15 million tons this year down over 46 percent from 28 million tons imported

last year23 The downside trend in imports of fertilizers will likely continue because of oversupply

BIG FISH

US imports of fish and shellfish from Rus sia are best understood in comparison with US fish

exports to the Rus sian market which slipped to zero in August 2014 after Rus sia issued an order

banning certain agricultural imports from the United States (Figure 516) While the volume of US

supply was not very large it was impor tant because it broke up the monopolistic dominance of a

few vertically integrated Rus sian companies that have kept prices high by restricting the entry of

new producers Seeking to implement import substitution policies Rus sia has tried to reduce

exports as well as imports of fish and seafood products in the last couple of years This symmetri-

cal approach was intended to ldquocompensaterdquo for a decrease of fish products in the domestic

23 Deepika Thapliyal ldquoPotashCorp Forecasts Sharp Drop in US Nitrogen Imports in 2017rdquo ICIS News February 7

2017 https wwwicis com resources news 2017 02 07 10076734 potashcorp - forecasts - sharp - drop - in - us - nitrogen

- imports - in - 2017

Figure 514 US Imports from Rus sia Share of Oil Metals Nuclear Fuel and Fertilizers Million US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

90

93

92

93

94

95

92

91

85

86

0

$5000

$10000

$15000

$20000

$25000

$30000

$35000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

US Imports from Russia

Share of Oil Metals Nuclear Fuel and Fertilizers

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 37 102017 404 PM

Figure 515 US Imports from Rus sia Chemical- Fertilizers US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

S-

$200000000

$400000000

$600000000

$800000000

$1000000000

$1200000000

$1400000000

$1600000000

$1800000000

$2000000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Figure 516 US Exports to Rus sia Fish and Shellfish US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

0

$10000000

$20000000

$30000000

$40000000

$50000000

$60000000

$70000000

$80000000

$90000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Fish and shellfish

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 38 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 39

consumer market caused by Rus siarsquos import ban but it has failed As result the group most af-

fected by the self- imposed counter- sanctions were Rus sian consumers

With a significant drop in fish imports a devaluation of the ruble and inflationary pressures on

seafood prices yearly consumption of fish in Rus sia has declined precipitously In 2015 alone

fish prices increased 20 percent and consumption dropped to 14 kilograms per person24 from

22 kilograms in 201425 In 2016 food rose to 355 percent of house hold expenditure as a result of

increases in food prices26 This has pushed vertically integrated fishing monopolies to sell even

more of their catch abroad rather than deliver to the Rus sian Federation (Figure 517) Thus we

cannot exclude the possibility of further growth in US fish and shellfish imports from Rus sia on a

marginal scale

24 Александр Савельев ldquoПотребление рыбы в России упало до 14 кг на человекаrdquo [Fish consumption in Rus sia fell to

14 kg per person] Экономика Интерфакс January 28 2015 http wwwinterfax ru business 492038

25 Илья Шестаков ldquoПотебление рыбы в России снизилось на 10 процентов из- за роста ценrdquo [Fish consumption in

Rus sia dropped by 10 percent due to price increases] RNS March 8 2017 https rnsonline consumer - market

Potreblenie - ribi - v - Rossii - snizilos - na - 10 - iz - za - rosta - tsen - 2017 - 03 - 08

26 Zoya Sheftalovich and Christian Oliver ldquoRus siarsquos Boom (Farming) Economyrdquo Politico November 8 2016 http

wwwpolitico eu article russias - boom - farming - economy

Figure 517 US Imports from Rus sia Fish and Shellfish US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

0

$50000000

$100000000

$150000000

$200000000

$250000000

$300000000

$350000000

$400000000

$450000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 39 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations40

SPACE ODYSSEY

Among high- end products beyond the top five groups of goods imported from Rus sia cheap and

efficient Rus sian engines have been used to launch US rockets into space for about 16 years

(Figure 518) There was a serious po liti cal strug gle around a 2014 ban on the purchase of Rus sian

RD-180 rocket engines revealing the conflicting business interests of power ful high- tech companies

This restrictive mea sure was temporary and was quickly lifted because of significant cost impacts

and risks of disruption to launch schedules27 For the same reason the Sanctions Act does not autho-

rize ldquothe imposition of any sanction or other condition limitation restriction or prohibition that

directly or indirectly impedes the supply by any entity of the Rus sian Federation of any product or

ser vice or the procurement of such product or ser vice by any contractor or subcontractor of the

United States or any other entity relating to or in connection with any space launch conducted for

the National Aeronautics and Space Administration or any other nonndash Department of Defense

customerrdquo28

Nevertheless many experts believe that US domestic alternatives to replace Rus sian engines will

be viable in five to eight years

27 Ken Dilanian ldquoWhy Does the US Use Rus sian Rockets to Launch Its Satellitesrdquo NBC News updated November 15

2016 http wwwnbcnews com why - does - u - s - use - russian - rockets - launch - its - satellites - n588526

28 Countering Amer i carsquos Adversaries through Sanctions Act HR 3364

Figure 518 Spacecraft Excluding Military US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

0

$20000000

$40000000

$60000000

$80000000

$100000000

$120000000

$140000000

$160000000

$180000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 40 102017 404 PM

41

Diversity and technological complexity are the most vis i ble advantages supporting US exports to

Rus sia Three major groups of export goods include civilian aircraft engines and parts (Figure 61)

drilling and oil field equipment (Figure 62) and industrial machines and engines (Figure 63)

Despite sanctions against the transfer of advanced oil producing and pro cessing technologies the

realization of US drilling and oil field equipment in Rus sia is sustainable although some bilateral

proj ects have been frozen

Another category of goods that has demonstrated resilience is the phar ma ceu ti cal industry (Fig-

ure 64) because most drugs in Rus sia are imported (about 70 percent of the Rus sian phar ma ceu-

ti cal market in value) Import substitution policies have had only modest results in this industry

As confirmed by American Chamber of Commerce surveys US exports to Rus sia are closely

connected to US FDI 30 percent of total imports of US companies working in the Rus sian

market come from the United States (more than $2 billion in 2016) In other words about

40 percent of all US exports to Rus sia are related to a US corporate- sector business pro cess in

the country The major sectors of activity of these companies are energy and natu ral resources

(52 percent) manufacturing (17 percent) information and communications technology or ICT

(13 percent) retail (7 percent) automotive industry (6 percent) phar ma ceu ti cal production

(1 percent) professional ser vices (05 percent) and other (2 percent)1

Some obvious constraints on US exports to Rus sia have resulted from a reduction in demand A

deterioration of bilateral relations and implementation of sanctions and counter- sanctions have

directly or indirectly afected all businesses Figures 65 and 66 provide data regarding a dramatic

drop in the sale of US agricultural production in Rus sia with all other categories of exports in

goods showing big cuts as well (see Figures 67ndash69)

Exports of civilian aircraft engines and parts put the state of Washington in first place among

other states as a leading exporter to the Rus sian market (Figure 610)

1 American Chamber of Commerce in Rus sia ldquoInvestment and Import to Rus sia 2nd Surveyrdquo 13

Diversity and Constraints

06

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 41 102017 404 PM

Figure 61 US Exports of Civilian Aircraft Engines Equipment and Parts to Rus sia US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

$2500000000

$2000000000

$1500000000

$1000000000

$500000000

$-

Figure 62 US Exports of Drilling and Oil Field Equipment US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

0

$5000000

$10000000

$15000000

$20000000

$25000000

$30000000

$35000000

$40000000

$45000000

$50000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 42 102017 404 PM

Figure 63 US Exports of Industrial Engines to Rus sia US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

0

$5000000

$10000000

$15000000

$20000000

$25000000

$30000000

$35000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Figure 64 US Exports of Phar ma ceu ti cal Preparations to Rus sia US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

0

$5000000

$10000000

$15000000

$20000000

$25000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 43 102017 404 PM

Figure 65 US Exports of Meat and Poultry to Rus sia US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Meat poultry etc

$1000000000

$800000000

$600000000

$400000000

$200000000

$-

$1200000000

$1400000000

$1600000000

Figure 66 US Exports of Soybeans to Rus sia US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

0

$20000000

$40000000

$60000000

$80000000

$100000000

$120000000

$140000000

$160000000

$180000000

$200000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 44 102017 404 PM

Figure 67 US Exports of Vehicles Engines and Parts to Rus sia US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Other parts and accessories of vehicles

Automotive tires and tubes

Bodies and chassis for passenger cars

Engines and engine parts (carburetors pistonsrings and valves)

Trucks buses and special purpose vehicles

Passenger cars new and used

$2500000000

$2000000000

$1500000000

$500000000

$-

$1000000000

Figure 68 US Exports of Medicinal Equipment to Rus sia US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

$10000000

$15000000

$20000000

$25000000

$30000000

$35000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 45 102017 404 PM

Figure 610 US Exports to Rus sia by States (2016 US$ Value) Million US$ 2013ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoState and Metropolitan Area Trade Datardquo

Iowa Kentucky

North Dakota

Oklahoma

South Carolina

Washington

0

$500

$1000

$1500

$2000

2013 2014 2015 2016

District of Columbia

Iowa

Kentucky

North Dakota

Oklahoma

South Carolina

Washington

Figure 69 US Exports of Excavating Machinery to Rus sia US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

0

$5000000

$10000000

$15000000

$20000000

$25000000

$30000000

$35000000

$40000000

$45000000

$50000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 46 102017 404 PM

47

Upon reviewing the current trend in US- Russia economic relations we must acknowledge that

the existing trade model is obsolete and exhausted Imports are resource- oriented and reflect

constraints of the Rus sian economic structure while five groups of goodsmdash oil metals nuclear

fuels fertilizers and fishmdash make up more than 90 percent of total imports from Rus sia (Figure 71)

Each of these industries has a limited capacity for growth in the foreseeable future

Rus siarsquos core export to the United Statesmdash oilmdash will inevitably decrease in the mid- term under any

scenario The value and volume of Rus sian exports to the United States are open to global market

volatility and po liti cal pressures with limited hedging mechanisms

Overall US exports to Rus sia are unsustainable due to bilateral po liti cal tensions the whims of

commodity markets and changing domestic policies Sanctions and counter- sanctions have

created additional barriers particularly in finance banking high- tech energy and agro- business

According to the American Chamber of Commerce 69 percent of US companies working in the

country consider the impact of US sanctions against Rus sia on their business as negative At the

same time 60 percent of companies do not expect big changes in business relations between

Rus sia and the United States under Trump1 as the new law codifies existing sanctions fortifies

them and extends them to new sectors

Current US investments are low due to the weak rule of law in Rus sia a lack of property right

protections and proper contract enforcement high levels of statization and monopolization in the

economy a poor business climate outdated capital stock dependence on natural- resource

sectors and of course sanction and counter- sanction mea sures Bloated administrative compo-

nents created as risk mitigation instruments have also served as impediments The countryrsquos

institutional weakness low level of productivity bud get constraints and a declining inflexible

workforce will restrain future economic growth even if commodity prices recover Rus sian eco-

nomic policy will likely continue to be statist and protectionist relying mostly on import

substitutions

1 Ibid 11

Existing Trends and Future Scenarios

07

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 47 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations48

What scenarios can be expected in such a challenging environment

One probability (no peace no war) is based on the assumption that matters will not deteriorate

further and implementation of the Sanctions Act will be cursory This will cause relatively slow

degradation in the economic field with occasional flashes of activity in selected areas (eg closer

cooperation against Islamist terrorist groups in Syria)

A second worse case or critical scenario is the intensive and full- scale execution of current sanc-

tion legislation and even the imposition of new economic punitive and restrictive mea sures which

could incite asymmetric retaliatory actions and lead to the introduction of additional protectionist

policies This in turn could trigger a further escalation of mutual confrontation and could eventu-

ally destroy the fundamentals of the current bilateral trade system Rus sian leadership has charac-

terized the Sanctions Act as a declaration of a trade war that ends all hope for improving bilateral

relations2

2 Дмитрий Медведев ldquoПодписание президентом США нового санкционного закона против России создает несколько

последствийrdquo [The US Presidentrsquos signing of the package of new sanctions against Rus sia will have a few conse-

quences] Facebook August 2 2017 https wwwfacebook com Dmitry Medvedev posts 10154587161801851

Figure 71 US Imports from Rus sia Share of Oil Metals Nuclear Fuel Fertilizers and Fish Million US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

93

94

93

94

95

96

93

92

87

89

0

$5000

$10000

$15000

$20000

$25000

$30000

$35000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

US Imports from Russia

Share of Oil Metals Nuclear FuelFertilizers and Fish

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 48 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 49

The best case and most favorable scenario looks less probable now It assumes the realization of

structural reforms in Rus sia in such a way that would adapt Rus siarsquos foreign policy to national

economic needs reduce confrontations with the West and make a concerted efort to integrate

Rus sian businesses into global supply and value chains A revitalization of the structural reform

agendamdash including eforts to diversify economic activities through de- monopolization and support

for SMEs a restructuring of the banking sector the creation of a vibrant business climate to foster

entrepreneurships and innovation the implementation of administrative and judicial reforms to

tackle red tape and endemic corruption and the reduction of state control over key sectors of the

economy via wide- spread privatization could kick- start the development of a nonoil economy and

improve long- term growth prospects Despite ongoing discussion of reform strategies deep

economic and po liti cal changes are extremely complicated over the next po liti calelectoral cycle

(2018ndash2024) particularly because of re sis tance of vested interests and growing commodity prices

The urgency to tackle structural shortcomings in natu ral resource- dependent economies usually

correlates with the price of those resources and the degree to which resource rents drive eco-

nomic activity However there may be marginal improvements in the efficiency of the current

economic system

Future US- Russia relations can be thought of through three pillars one pillar focuses on areas

where both countries maintain a competitive rivalry another looks at potential areas of interaction

under pres ent conditions a third pillar and one that has evaporated from the current bilateral

agenda concentrates on future cooperation Stronger economic ties could not only be a kind of

po liti cal shock absorber but contribute to the building of this future (particularly business contacts

aim to support future structural reforms) although po liti cal factors are depressing the prospects

for cooperation To escape deadlock it will be impor tant to establish the right balance between

politics and economics and create a model of collaboration within the framework of contention

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 49 102017 404 PM

About the Author

Vadim Grishin PhD MBA has been involved in the reform pro cess in Rus sia as adviser to the

deputy prime minister of Rus sia in 1992ndash1993 and 2006ndash2010 He has extensive experience

working with the Bretton Woods Institutions He was the board member of the World Bank Group

and served as se nior adviser at the International Monetary Fund Currently he is a con sul tant to the

chief economistrsquos office of the International Finance Corporation and teaches the economics of

transition at Georgetown University in Washington DC

50

594-71613_ch99_4Pindd 50 102017 403 PM

Blank

COVER PHOTO ADOBE STOCK

1616 Rhode Island Avenue NW

Washington DC 20036

202 887 0200 | wwwcsisorg

v++ISBN 978-1-4422-8035-9

Lanham bull Boulder bull New York bull London

4501 Forbes Boulevard

Lanham MD 20706

301 459 3366 | wwwrowmancom

A U T H O R

Vadim Grishin

Myths and Realities

A Report of the

CSIS RUSSIA AND EURASIA PROGRAM

US-RussiaEconomicRelations

O C T O B E R 2 0 1 7

Euml|xHSLEOCy280359z

The Man Pupu Nyor Rock Formations at the Northern Urals also known as Seven

Strong Man or Little Mountain of the God in the local tribe (Mansi) language

Page 39: U.S.-Russia Economic Relations: Myths and Realities · 2020-04-17 · OCTOBER 2017 U.S.- Russia Economic Relations Myths and Realities AUTHOR Vadim Grishin A REPORT OF THE CSIS RUSSIA

Vadim Grishin 33

Obviously the market dynamic of dif er ent metals varies (eg iron steel aluminum platinum and

nickel) Caps to increase their trade and production in a ldquored oceanrdquo global environment with

anemic demand is rather limited despite Figure 510 showing a spike of iron and steel imports

from Rus sia in 2014 and aluminum in 2016 Some opportunities may exist for Russian- owned steel

plants in the United States (such as NLMK) to participate in energy proj ects resumed under Presi-

dent Trump who has required that new pipelines use only American- made steel15

Rus sia occupies a special niche in the US market for titanium products a high- end metal indus-

try Twenty years ago a long- term contract was signed between Rus sian titanium producer

VSMPO- AVISMA and Boeing The Rus sian com pany entered the selective club of Boeing suppliers

for the manufacture of components and semi- finished products Since the signing of this contract

VSMPO has delivered more than 35 percent of all titanium placed on Boeing civil aircraft16 They

are hidden in the trade data in an import category for Civilian Aircrafts and Parts (Figure 511) At

the end of 2016 Boeing announced an extension of its framework agreement with AVISMA

15 E Scheyder C Ngai and T Sylvester ldquoAmerican Steel Unlikely to Get Keystone Boost Despite Trump Orderrdquo

Reuters January 27 2017 http wwwreuters com article usa - trump - pipeline - transcanada - idUSL1N1FH1ZD

16 A Kramer ldquoTitanium Fills Vital Role for Boeing and Rus siardquo New York Times July 5 2013 http wwwnytimes com

2013 07 06 business global titanium - fills - vital - role - for - boeing - and - russia html mcubzshy=shy3

Figure 510 US Imports from Rus sia Iron Steel Bauxite Aluminum Nickel Nonferrous Metals and Other Precious Metals and Materials US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 1992ndash2016)

0

$6000000000

$5000000000

$4000000000

$3000000000

$2000000000

$1000000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 20122013

20142015

2016

Finished metal shapes

Iron and steel advanced

Iron and steel products nec

Nonferrous metals other

Other precious metals

Nickel

Bauxite and aluminum

Iron and steel mill products

Steelmaking materials

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 33 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations34

through 2022 and additional investments in the construction of a new robotic plant in Titanium

Valley a special economic zone located in the Sverdlovsk region that will open in 2018 The pro-

cessing of titanium forgings in all Boeing civil aircraft will be performed there including 787s 737

MAXs and 777Xs17 The contract extension with AVISMA may add several hundred million dollars

in value to annual US imports from Rus sia

How can such heavy reliance on imports of Rus sian titanium exist during a period of rising geopo-

liti cal tensions The answer is straightforward VSMPO- AVISMA is a highly specialized natu ral

mono poly producing 45 percent of the worldrsquos aerospace titanium Only four other countries

smelt high- grade titanium in industrial quantities the United States Germany Japan and China

Overall global production capacity is limited while demand is growing The United States cur-

rently imports around 79 percent of all the titanium it consumes each year18

17 ldquoBoeing and VSMPO Avisma to Launch Second Joint Production Siterdquo Rus sian Aviation Insider December 22 2016

http wwwrusaviainsider com boeing - and - vsmpo - avisma - to - launch - second - joint - production - site

18 Jon Ostrower and Andy Pasztor ldquoBoeing United Technologies Stockpile Titanium Partsrdquo Wall Street Journal

August 7 2014 https wwwwsj com articles boeing - united - technologies - stockpiling - titanium - parts - 1407441886

Figure 511 US Imports from Rus sia Civilian Aircrafts and Parts US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 1992ndash2016)

0

$20000000

$40000000

$60000000

$80000000

$100000000

$120000000

$140000000

$160000000

$180000000

$200000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Parts-civilian aircraft

Civilian aircraft

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 34 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 35

The Sanctions Act authorizes the secretary of the trea sury (in a nonmandatory way) to impose

restrictions (without specifying them) against Rus sian state- owned entities operating in the railway

metals and mining sectors of the Rus sian economy Despite the commanding heights of Rus siarsquos

state sector owner ship in its economy (70 percent of GDP) the metal- producing companies have

remained mostly in private hands

NUCLEAR AFFAIRS

Historically owners and operators of the 104 commercial nuclear power reactors in the United

States have purchased more than 80 percent of their uranium from foreign countries Uranium

shipping from Rus sia accounted for about 13 percent of the 58 million pounds of uranium pur-

chased overseas in 201219 At the same time the Rus sian state- owned mono poly Rosatom ac-

counts for 20 percent of Kazakhstanrsquos uranium production (which in turn comprises 11 percent of

all US uranium imports) and 20 percent of US domestic uranium production capacity (with

owner ship of exploration tracts in Wyoming)20

Nuclear fuel and nuclear power continue to be po liti cally sensitive topics both in the United

States and Rus sia Bilateral cooperation in this sector (being surprisingly stable with imports of

nuclear fuel from Rus sia at a level of $1 billion annually in the last five years [Figure 512 and 513])

is under constant po liti cal and lobbying pressure and has been a source of several po liti cal scan-

dals21 Consequently upside risks in this area of interaction are minimal and downside risks are

much higher especially when we are seeing more decommissioning of nuclear plants in the

United States than new constructions The US EIArsquos 2017 Annual Energy Outlook assumes

that about 25 percent of the nuclear capacity now operating will be removed from ser vice

by 205022

WHY IS THE GRASS GREENER ON THE OTHER SIDE

The United States continues to significantly reduce imports of chemical fertilizers as domestic pro-

duction increases In 2016 the United States imported 13 percent less ammonia and 11 percent

less urea and UAN which is a liquid urea and ammonium nitrate fertilizer Rus sia accounts for

around 40 percent of UAN imported by the United States The United States canceled antidumping

duties on imports of ammonium nitrate and urea from Rus sia in 2016 but it did not prevent import

19 US EIA ldquoThe US Relies on Foreign Uranium Enrichment Ser vices to Fuel Its Nuclear Power Plantsrdquo Today in

Energy August 28 2013 https wwweia gov todayinenergy detail php idshy=shy1273

20 Colin Chilcoat ldquoDoes Rus sia Really Own 20 Percent of the USrsquo Uranium Reservesrdquo OilPricecom May 6 2015

http oilpricecom Alternative - Energy Nuclear - Power Does - Russia - Really - Own - 20 - Of - The - US - Uranium - Reserves

html

21 Michelle Ye Hee Lee ldquoThe Facts behind Trumprsquos Repeated Claim about Hillary Clintonrsquos Role in the Rus sian Ura-

nium Dealrdquo Washington Post October 26 2016

22 US EIA ldquoAnnual Energy Outlook 2017 with Projections to 2050rdquo 81ndash82

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 35 102017 404 PM

Figure 512 US Imports from Rus sia Share of Oil Metals and Nuclear Fuel Million US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 1992ndash2016)

87

86

90

90

90

91

88

86

7882

0

$5000

$10000

$15000

$20000

$25000

$30000

$35000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

US Imports from Russia

Share of Oil Metals and Nuclear Fuel

Figure 513 US Imports from Rus sia Nuclear Fuel Materials US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

$-

$200000000

$400000000

$600000000

$800000000

$1200000000

$1000000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 36 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 37

drops twice last year (Figures 514 and 515) According to forecasts UAN imports are expected to

decline further to 15 million tons this year down over 46 percent from 28 million tons imported

last year23 The downside trend in imports of fertilizers will likely continue because of oversupply

BIG FISH

US imports of fish and shellfish from Rus sia are best understood in comparison with US fish

exports to the Rus sian market which slipped to zero in August 2014 after Rus sia issued an order

banning certain agricultural imports from the United States (Figure 516) While the volume of US

supply was not very large it was impor tant because it broke up the monopolistic dominance of a

few vertically integrated Rus sian companies that have kept prices high by restricting the entry of

new producers Seeking to implement import substitution policies Rus sia has tried to reduce

exports as well as imports of fish and seafood products in the last couple of years This symmetri-

cal approach was intended to ldquocompensaterdquo for a decrease of fish products in the domestic

23 Deepika Thapliyal ldquoPotashCorp Forecasts Sharp Drop in US Nitrogen Imports in 2017rdquo ICIS News February 7

2017 https wwwicis com resources news 2017 02 07 10076734 potashcorp - forecasts - sharp - drop - in - us - nitrogen

- imports - in - 2017

Figure 514 US Imports from Rus sia Share of Oil Metals Nuclear Fuel and Fertilizers Million US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

90

93

92

93

94

95

92

91

85

86

0

$5000

$10000

$15000

$20000

$25000

$30000

$35000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

US Imports from Russia

Share of Oil Metals Nuclear Fuel and Fertilizers

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 37 102017 404 PM

Figure 515 US Imports from Rus sia Chemical- Fertilizers US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

S-

$200000000

$400000000

$600000000

$800000000

$1000000000

$1200000000

$1400000000

$1600000000

$1800000000

$2000000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Figure 516 US Exports to Rus sia Fish and Shellfish US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

0

$10000000

$20000000

$30000000

$40000000

$50000000

$60000000

$70000000

$80000000

$90000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Fish and shellfish

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 38 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 39

consumer market caused by Rus siarsquos import ban but it has failed As result the group most af-

fected by the self- imposed counter- sanctions were Rus sian consumers

With a significant drop in fish imports a devaluation of the ruble and inflationary pressures on

seafood prices yearly consumption of fish in Rus sia has declined precipitously In 2015 alone

fish prices increased 20 percent and consumption dropped to 14 kilograms per person24 from

22 kilograms in 201425 In 2016 food rose to 355 percent of house hold expenditure as a result of

increases in food prices26 This has pushed vertically integrated fishing monopolies to sell even

more of their catch abroad rather than deliver to the Rus sian Federation (Figure 517) Thus we

cannot exclude the possibility of further growth in US fish and shellfish imports from Rus sia on a

marginal scale

24 Александр Савельев ldquoПотребление рыбы в России упало до 14 кг на человекаrdquo [Fish consumption in Rus sia fell to

14 kg per person] Экономика Интерфакс January 28 2015 http wwwinterfax ru business 492038

25 Илья Шестаков ldquoПотебление рыбы в России снизилось на 10 процентов из- за роста ценrdquo [Fish consumption in

Rus sia dropped by 10 percent due to price increases] RNS March 8 2017 https rnsonline consumer - market

Potreblenie - ribi - v - Rossii - snizilos - na - 10 - iz - za - rosta - tsen - 2017 - 03 - 08

26 Zoya Sheftalovich and Christian Oliver ldquoRus siarsquos Boom (Farming) Economyrdquo Politico November 8 2016 http

wwwpolitico eu article russias - boom - farming - economy

Figure 517 US Imports from Rus sia Fish and Shellfish US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

0

$50000000

$100000000

$150000000

$200000000

$250000000

$300000000

$350000000

$400000000

$450000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 39 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations40

SPACE ODYSSEY

Among high- end products beyond the top five groups of goods imported from Rus sia cheap and

efficient Rus sian engines have been used to launch US rockets into space for about 16 years

(Figure 518) There was a serious po liti cal strug gle around a 2014 ban on the purchase of Rus sian

RD-180 rocket engines revealing the conflicting business interests of power ful high- tech companies

This restrictive mea sure was temporary and was quickly lifted because of significant cost impacts

and risks of disruption to launch schedules27 For the same reason the Sanctions Act does not autho-

rize ldquothe imposition of any sanction or other condition limitation restriction or prohibition that

directly or indirectly impedes the supply by any entity of the Rus sian Federation of any product or

ser vice or the procurement of such product or ser vice by any contractor or subcontractor of the

United States or any other entity relating to or in connection with any space launch conducted for

the National Aeronautics and Space Administration or any other nonndash Department of Defense

customerrdquo28

Nevertheless many experts believe that US domestic alternatives to replace Rus sian engines will

be viable in five to eight years

27 Ken Dilanian ldquoWhy Does the US Use Rus sian Rockets to Launch Its Satellitesrdquo NBC News updated November 15

2016 http wwwnbcnews com why - does - u - s - use - russian - rockets - launch - its - satellites - n588526

28 Countering Amer i carsquos Adversaries through Sanctions Act HR 3364

Figure 518 Spacecraft Excluding Military US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

0

$20000000

$40000000

$60000000

$80000000

$100000000

$120000000

$140000000

$160000000

$180000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 40 102017 404 PM

41

Diversity and technological complexity are the most vis i ble advantages supporting US exports to

Rus sia Three major groups of export goods include civilian aircraft engines and parts (Figure 61)

drilling and oil field equipment (Figure 62) and industrial machines and engines (Figure 63)

Despite sanctions against the transfer of advanced oil producing and pro cessing technologies the

realization of US drilling and oil field equipment in Rus sia is sustainable although some bilateral

proj ects have been frozen

Another category of goods that has demonstrated resilience is the phar ma ceu ti cal industry (Fig-

ure 64) because most drugs in Rus sia are imported (about 70 percent of the Rus sian phar ma ceu-

ti cal market in value) Import substitution policies have had only modest results in this industry

As confirmed by American Chamber of Commerce surveys US exports to Rus sia are closely

connected to US FDI 30 percent of total imports of US companies working in the Rus sian

market come from the United States (more than $2 billion in 2016) In other words about

40 percent of all US exports to Rus sia are related to a US corporate- sector business pro cess in

the country The major sectors of activity of these companies are energy and natu ral resources

(52 percent) manufacturing (17 percent) information and communications technology or ICT

(13 percent) retail (7 percent) automotive industry (6 percent) phar ma ceu ti cal production

(1 percent) professional ser vices (05 percent) and other (2 percent)1

Some obvious constraints on US exports to Rus sia have resulted from a reduction in demand A

deterioration of bilateral relations and implementation of sanctions and counter- sanctions have

directly or indirectly afected all businesses Figures 65 and 66 provide data regarding a dramatic

drop in the sale of US agricultural production in Rus sia with all other categories of exports in

goods showing big cuts as well (see Figures 67ndash69)

Exports of civilian aircraft engines and parts put the state of Washington in first place among

other states as a leading exporter to the Rus sian market (Figure 610)

1 American Chamber of Commerce in Rus sia ldquoInvestment and Import to Rus sia 2nd Surveyrdquo 13

Diversity and Constraints

06

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 41 102017 404 PM

Figure 61 US Exports of Civilian Aircraft Engines Equipment and Parts to Rus sia US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

$2500000000

$2000000000

$1500000000

$1000000000

$500000000

$-

Figure 62 US Exports of Drilling and Oil Field Equipment US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

0

$5000000

$10000000

$15000000

$20000000

$25000000

$30000000

$35000000

$40000000

$45000000

$50000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 42 102017 404 PM

Figure 63 US Exports of Industrial Engines to Rus sia US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

0

$5000000

$10000000

$15000000

$20000000

$25000000

$30000000

$35000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Figure 64 US Exports of Phar ma ceu ti cal Preparations to Rus sia US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

0

$5000000

$10000000

$15000000

$20000000

$25000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 43 102017 404 PM

Figure 65 US Exports of Meat and Poultry to Rus sia US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Meat poultry etc

$1000000000

$800000000

$600000000

$400000000

$200000000

$-

$1200000000

$1400000000

$1600000000

Figure 66 US Exports of Soybeans to Rus sia US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

0

$20000000

$40000000

$60000000

$80000000

$100000000

$120000000

$140000000

$160000000

$180000000

$200000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 44 102017 404 PM

Figure 67 US Exports of Vehicles Engines and Parts to Rus sia US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Other parts and accessories of vehicles

Automotive tires and tubes

Bodies and chassis for passenger cars

Engines and engine parts (carburetors pistonsrings and valves)

Trucks buses and special purpose vehicles

Passenger cars new and used

$2500000000

$2000000000

$1500000000

$500000000

$-

$1000000000

Figure 68 US Exports of Medicinal Equipment to Rus sia US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

$10000000

$15000000

$20000000

$25000000

$30000000

$35000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 45 102017 404 PM

Figure 610 US Exports to Rus sia by States (2016 US$ Value) Million US$ 2013ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoState and Metropolitan Area Trade Datardquo

Iowa Kentucky

North Dakota

Oklahoma

South Carolina

Washington

0

$500

$1000

$1500

$2000

2013 2014 2015 2016

District of Columbia

Iowa

Kentucky

North Dakota

Oklahoma

South Carolina

Washington

Figure 69 US Exports of Excavating Machinery to Rus sia US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

0

$5000000

$10000000

$15000000

$20000000

$25000000

$30000000

$35000000

$40000000

$45000000

$50000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 46 102017 404 PM

47

Upon reviewing the current trend in US- Russia economic relations we must acknowledge that

the existing trade model is obsolete and exhausted Imports are resource- oriented and reflect

constraints of the Rus sian economic structure while five groups of goodsmdash oil metals nuclear

fuels fertilizers and fishmdash make up more than 90 percent of total imports from Rus sia (Figure 71)

Each of these industries has a limited capacity for growth in the foreseeable future

Rus siarsquos core export to the United Statesmdash oilmdash will inevitably decrease in the mid- term under any

scenario The value and volume of Rus sian exports to the United States are open to global market

volatility and po liti cal pressures with limited hedging mechanisms

Overall US exports to Rus sia are unsustainable due to bilateral po liti cal tensions the whims of

commodity markets and changing domestic policies Sanctions and counter- sanctions have

created additional barriers particularly in finance banking high- tech energy and agro- business

According to the American Chamber of Commerce 69 percent of US companies working in the

country consider the impact of US sanctions against Rus sia on their business as negative At the

same time 60 percent of companies do not expect big changes in business relations between

Rus sia and the United States under Trump1 as the new law codifies existing sanctions fortifies

them and extends them to new sectors

Current US investments are low due to the weak rule of law in Rus sia a lack of property right

protections and proper contract enforcement high levels of statization and monopolization in the

economy a poor business climate outdated capital stock dependence on natural- resource

sectors and of course sanction and counter- sanction mea sures Bloated administrative compo-

nents created as risk mitigation instruments have also served as impediments The countryrsquos

institutional weakness low level of productivity bud get constraints and a declining inflexible

workforce will restrain future economic growth even if commodity prices recover Rus sian eco-

nomic policy will likely continue to be statist and protectionist relying mostly on import

substitutions

1 Ibid 11

Existing Trends and Future Scenarios

07

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 47 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations48

What scenarios can be expected in such a challenging environment

One probability (no peace no war) is based on the assumption that matters will not deteriorate

further and implementation of the Sanctions Act will be cursory This will cause relatively slow

degradation in the economic field with occasional flashes of activity in selected areas (eg closer

cooperation against Islamist terrorist groups in Syria)

A second worse case or critical scenario is the intensive and full- scale execution of current sanc-

tion legislation and even the imposition of new economic punitive and restrictive mea sures which

could incite asymmetric retaliatory actions and lead to the introduction of additional protectionist

policies This in turn could trigger a further escalation of mutual confrontation and could eventu-

ally destroy the fundamentals of the current bilateral trade system Rus sian leadership has charac-

terized the Sanctions Act as a declaration of a trade war that ends all hope for improving bilateral

relations2

2 Дмитрий Медведев ldquoПодписание президентом США нового санкционного закона против России создает несколько

последствийrdquo [The US Presidentrsquos signing of the package of new sanctions against Rus sia will have a few conse-

quences] Facebook August 2 2017 https wwwfacebook com Dmitry Medvedev posts 10154587161801851

Figure 71 US Imports from Rus sia Share of Oil Metals Nuclear Fuel Fertilizers and Fish Million US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

93

94

93

94

95

96

93

92

87

89

0

$5000

$10000

$15000

$20000

$25000

$30000

$35000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

US Imports from Russia

Share of Oil Metals Nuclear FuelFertilizers and Fish

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 48 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 49

The best case and most favorable scenario looks less probable now It assumes the realization of

structural reforms in Rus sia in such a way that would adapt Rus siarsquos foreign policy to national

economic needs reduce confrontations with the West and make a concerted efort to integrate

Rus sian businesses into global supply and value chains A revitalization of the structural reform

agendamdash including eforts to diversify economic activities through de- monopolization and support

for SMEs a restructuring of the banking sector the creation of a vibrant business climate to foster

entrepreneurships and innovation the implementation of administrative and judicial reforms to

tackle red tape and endemic corruption and the reduction of state control over key sectors of the

economy via wide- spread privatization could kick- start the development of a nonoil economy and

improve long- term growth prospects Despite ongoing discussion of reform strategies deep

economic and po liti cal changes are extremely complicated over the next po liti calelectoral cycle

(2018ndash2024) particularly because of re sis tance of vested interests and growing commodity prices

The urgency to tackle structural shortcomings in natu ral resource- dependent economies usually

correlates with the price of those resources and the degree to which resource rents drive eco-

nomic activity However there may be marginal improvements in the efficiency of the current

economic system

Future US- Russia relations can be thought of through three pillars one pillar focuses on areas

where both countries maintain a competitive rivalry another looks at potential areas of interaction

under pres ent conditions a third pillar and one that has evaporated from the current bilateral

agenda concentrates on future cooperation Stronger economic ties could not only be a kind of

po liti cal shock absorber but contribute to the building of this future (particularly business contacts

aim to support future structural reforms) although po liti cal factors are depressing the prospects

for cooperation To escape deadlock it will be impor tant to establish the right balance between

politics and economics and create a model of collaboration within the framework of contention

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 49 102017 404 PM

About the Author

Vadim Grishin PhD MBA has been involved in the reform pro cess in Rus sia as adviser to the

deputy prime minister of Rus sia in 1992ndash1993 and 2006ndash2010 He has extensive experience

working with the Bretton Woods Institutions He was the board member of the World Bank Group

and served as se nior adviser at the International Monetary Fund Currently he is a con sul tant to the

chief economistrsquos office of the International Finance Corporation and teaches the economics of

transition at Georgetown University in Washington DC

50

594-71613_ch99_4Pindd 50 102017 403 PM

Blank

COVER PHOTO ADOBE STOCK

1616 Rhode Island Avenue NW

Washington DC 20036

202 887 0200 | wwwcsisorg

v++ISBN 978-1-4422-8035-9

Lanham bull Boulder bull New York bull London

4501 Forbes Boulevard

Lanham MD 20706

301 459 3366 | wwwrowmancom

A U T H O R

Vadim Grishin

Myths and Realities

A Report of the

CSIS RUSSIA AND EURASIA PROGRAM

US-RussiaEconomicRelations

O C T O B E R 2 0 1 7

Euml|xHSLEOCy280359z

The Man Pupu Nyor Rock Formations at the Northern Urals also known as Seven

Strong Man or Little Mountain of the God in the local tribe (Mansi) language

Page 40: U.S.-Russia Economic Relations: Myths and Realities · 2020-04-17 · OCTOBER 2017 U.S.- Russia Economic Relations Myths and Realities AUTHOR Vadim Grishin A REPORT OF THE CSIS RUSSIA

US-Russia Economic Relations34

through 2022 and additional investments in the construction of a new robotic plant in Titanium

Valley a special economic zone located in the Sverdlovsk region that will open in 2018 The pro-

cessing of titanium forgings in all Boeing civil aircraft will be performed there including 787s 737

MAXs and 777Xs17 The contract extension with AVISMA may add several hundred million dollars

in value to annual US imports from Rus sia

How can such heavy reliance on imports of Rus sian titanium exist during a period of rising geopo-

liti cal tensions The answer is straightforward VSMPO- AVISMA is a highly specialized natu ral

mono poly producing 45 percent of the worldrsquos aerospace titanium Only four other countries

smelt high- grade titanium in industrial quantities the United States Germany Japan and China

Overall global production capacity is limited while demand is growing The United States cur-

rently imports around 79 percent of all the titanium it consumes each year18

17 ldquoBoeing and VSMPO Avisma to Launch Second Joint Production Siterdquo Rus sian Aviation Insider December 22 2016

http wwwrusaviainsider com boeing - and - vsmpo - avisma - to - launch - second - joint - production - site

18 Jon Ostrower and Andy Pasztor ldquoBoeing United Technologies Stockpile Titanium Partsrdquo Wall Street Journal

August 7 2014 https wwwwsj com articles boeing - united - technologies - stockpiling - titanium - parts - 1407441886

Figure 511 US Imports from Rus sia Civilian Aircrafts and Parts US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 1992ndash2016)

0

$20000000

$40000000

$60000000

$80000000

$100000000

$120000000

$140000000

$160000000

$180000000

$200000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Parts-civilian aircraft

Civilian aircraft

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 34 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 35

The Sanctions Act authorizes the secretary of the trea sury (in a nonmandatory way) to impose

restrictions (without specifying them) against Rus sian state- owned entities operating in the railway

metals and mining sectors of the Rus sian economy Despite the commanding heights of Rus siarsquos

state sector owner ship in its economy (70 percent of GDP) the metal- producing companies have

remained mostly in private hands

NUCLEAR AFFAIRS

Historically owners and operators of the 104 commercial nuclear power reactors in the United

States have purchased more than 80 percent of their uranium from foreign countries Uranium

shipping from Rus sia accounted for about 13 percent of the 58 million pounds of uranium pur-

chased overseas in 201219 At the same time the Rus sian state- owned mono poly Rosatom ac-

counts for 20 percent of Kazakhstanrsquos uranium production (which in turn comprises 11 percent of

all US uranium imports) and 20 percent of US domestic uranium production capacity (with

owner ship of exploration tracts in Wyoming)20

Nuclear fuel and nuclear power continue to be po liti cally sensitive topics both in the United

States and Rus sia Bilateral cooperation in this sector (being surprisingly stable with imports of

nuclear fuel from Rus sia at a level of $1 billion annually in the last five years [Figure 512 and 513])

is under constant po liti cal and lobbying pressure and has been a source of several po liti cal scan-

dals21 Consequently upside risks in this area of interaction are minimal and downside risks are

much higher especially when we are seeing more decommissioning of nuclear plants in the

United States than new constructions The US EIArsquos 2017 Annual Energy Outlook assumes

that about 25 percent of the nuclear capacity now operating will be removed from ser vice

by 205022

WHY IS THE GRASS GREENER ON THE OTHER SIDE

The United States continues to significantly reduce imports of chemical fertilizers as domestic pro-

duction increases In 2016 the United States imported 13 percent less ammonia and 11 percent

less urea and UAN which is a liquid urea and ammonium nitrate fertilizer Rus sia accounts for

around 40 percent of UAN imported by the United States The United States canceled antidumping

duties on imports of ammonium nitrate and urea from Rus sia in 2016 but it did not prevent import

19 US EIA ldquoThe US Relies on Foreign Uranium Enrichment Ser vices to Fuel Its Nuclear Power Plantsrdquo Today in

Energy August 28 2013 https wwweia gov todayinenergy detail php idshy=shy1273

20 Colin Chilcoat ldquoDoes Rus sia Really Own 20 Percent of the USrsquo Uranium Reservesrdquo OilPricecom May 6 2015

http oilpricecom Alternative - Energy Nuclear - Power Does - Russia - Really - Own - 20 - Of - The - US - Uranium - Reserves

html

21 Michelle Ye Hee Lee ldquoThe Facts behind Trumprsquos Repeated Claim about Hillary Clintonrsquos Role in the Rus sian Ura-

nium Dealrdquo Washington Post October 26 2016

22 US EIA ldquoAnnual Energy Outlook 2017 with Projections to 2050rdquo 81ndash82

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 35 102017 404 PM

Figure 512 US Imports from Rus sia Share of Oil Metals and Nuclear Fuel Million US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 1992ndash2016)

87

86

90

90

90

91

88

86

7882

0

$5000

$10000

$15000

$20000

$25000

$30000

$35000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

US Imports from Russia

Share of Oil Metals and Nuclear Fuel

Figure 513 US Imports from Rus sia Nuclear Fuel Materials US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

$-

$200000000

$400000000

$600000000

$800000000

$1200000000

$1000000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 36 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 37

drops twice last year (Figures 514 and 515) According to forecasts UAN imports are expected to

decline further to 15 million tons this year down over 46 percent from 28 million tons imported

last year23 The downside trend in imports of fertilizers will likely continue because of oversupply

BIG FISH

US imports of fish and shellfish from Rus sia are best understood in comparison with US fish

exports to the Rus sian market which slipped to zero in August 2014 after Rus sia issued an order

banning certain agricultural imports from the United States (Figure 516) While the volume of US

supply was not very large it was impor tant because it broke up the monopolistic dominance of a

few vertically integrated Rus sian companies that have kept prices high by restricting the entry of

new producers Seeking to implement import substitution policies Rus sia has tried to reduce

exports as well as imports of fish and seafood products in the last couple of years This symmetri-

cal approach was intended to ldquocompensaterdquo for a decrease of fish products in the domestic

23 Deepika Thapliyal ldquoPotashCorp Forecasts Sharp Drop in US Nitrogen Imports in 2017rdquo ICIS News February 7

2017 https wwwicis com resources news 2017 02 07 10076734 potashcorp - forecasts - sharp - drop - in - us - nitrogen

- imports - in - 2017

Figure 514 US Imports from Rus sia Share of Oil Metals Nuclear Fuel and Fertilizers Million US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

90

93

92

93

94

95

92

91

85

86

0

$5000

$10000

$15000

$20000

$25000

$30000

$35000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

US Imports from Russia

Share of Oil Metals Nuclear Fuel and Fertilizers

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 37 102017 404 PM

Figure 515 US Imports from Rus sia Chemical- Fertilizers US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

S-

$200000000

$400000000

$600000000

$800000000

$1000000000

$1200000000

$1400000000

$1600000000

$1800000000

$2000000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Figure 516 US Exports to Rus sia Fish and Shellfish US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

0

$10000000

$20000000

$30000000

$40000000

$50000000

$60000000

$70000000

$80000000

$90000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Fish and shellfish

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 38 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 39

consumer market caused by Rus siarsquos import ban but it has failed As result the group most af-

fected by the self- imposed counter- sanctions were Rus sian consumers

With a significant drop in fish imports a devaluation of the ruble and inflationary pressures on

seafood prices yearly consumption of fish in Rus sia has declined precipitously In 2015 alone

fish prices increased 20 percent and consumption dropped to 14 kilograms per person24 from

22 kilograms in 201425 In 2016 food rose to 355 percent of house hold expenditure as a result of

increases in food prices26 This has pushed vertically integrated fishing monopolies to sell even

more of their catch abroad rather than deliver to the Rus sian Federation (Figure 517) Thus we

cannot exclude the possibility of further growth in US fish and shellfish imports from Rus sia on a

marginal scale

24 Александр Савельев ldquoПотребление рыбы в России упало до 14 кг на человекаrdquo [Fish consumption in Rus sia fell to

14 kg per person] Экономика Интерфакс January 28 2015 http wwwinterfax ru business 492038

25 Илья Шестаков ldquoПотебление рыбы в России снизилось на 10 процентов из- за роста ценrdquo [Fish consumption in

Rus sia dropped by 10 percent due to price increases] RNS March 8 2017 https rnsonline consumer - market

Potreblenie - ribi - v - Rossii - snizilos - na - 10 - iz - za - rosta - tsen - 2017 - 03 - 08

26 Zoya Sheftalovich and Christian Oliver ldquoRus siarsquos Boom (Farming) Economyrdquo Politico November 8 2016 http

wwwpolitico eu article russias - boom - farming - economy

Figure 517 US Imports from Rus sia Fish and Shellfish US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

0

$50000000

$100000000

$150000000

$200000000

$250000000

$300000000

$350000000

$400000000

$450000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 39 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations40

SPACE ODYSSEY

Among high- end products beyond the top five groups of goods imported from Rus sia cheap and

efficient Rus sian engines have been used to launch US rockets into space for about 16 years

(Figure 518) There was a serious po liti cal strug gle around a 2014 ban on the purchase of Rus sian

RD-180 rocket engines revealing the conflicting business interests of power ful high- tech companies

This restrictive mea sure was temporary and was quickly lifted because of significant cost impacts

and risks of disruption to launch schedules27 For the same reason the Sanctions Act does not autho-

rize ldquothe imposition of any sanction or other condition limitation restriction or prohibition that

directly or indirectly impedes the supply by any entity of the Rus sian Federation of any product or

ser vice or the procurement of such product or ser vice by any contractor or subcontractor of the

United States or any other entity relating to or in connection with any space launch conducted for

the National Aeronautics and Space Administration or any other nonndash Department of Defense

customerrdquo28

Nevertheless many experts believe that US domestic alternatives to replace Rus sian engines will

be viable in five to eight years

27 Ken Dilanian ldquoWhy Does the US Use Rus sian Rockets to Launch Its Satellitesrdquo NBC News updated November 15

2016 http wwwnbcnews com why - does - u - s - use - russian - rockets - launch - its - satellites - n588526

28 Countering Amer i carsquos Adversaries through Sanctions Act HR 3364

Figure 518 Spacecraft Excluding Military US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

0

$20000000

$40000000

$60000000

$80000000

$100000000

$120000000

$140000000

$160000000

$180000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 40 102017 404 PM

41

Diversity and technological complexity are the most vis i ble advantages supporting US exports to

Rus sia Three major groups of export goods include civilian aircraft engines and parts (Figure 61)

drilling and oil field equipment (Figure 62) and industrial machines and engines (Figure 63)

Despite sanctions against the transfer of advanced oil producing and pro cessing technologies the

realization of US drilling and oil field equipment in Rus sia is sustainable although some bilateral

proj ects have been frozen

Another category of goods that has demonstrated resilience is the phar ma ceu ti cal industry (Fig-

ure 64) because most drugs in Rus sia are imported (about 70 percent of the Rus sian phar ma ceu-

ti cal market in value) Import substitution policies have had only modest results in this industry

As confirmed by American Chamber of Commerce surveys US exports to Rus sia are closely

connected to US FDI 30 percent of total imports of US companies working in the Rus sian

market come from the United States (more than $2 billion in 2016) In other words about

40 percent of all US exports to Rus sia are related to a US corporate- sector business pro cess in

the country The major sectors of activity of these companies are energy and natu ral resources

(52 percent) manufacturing (17 percent) information and communications technology or ICT

(13 percent) retail (7 percent) automotive industry (6 percent) phar ma ceu ti cal production

(1 percent) professional ser vices (05 percent) and other (2 percent)1

Some obvious constraints on US exports to Rus sia have resulted from a reduction in demand A

deterioration of bilateral relations and implementation of sanctions and counter- sanctions have

directly or indirectly afected all businesses Figures 65 and 66 provide data regarding a dramatic

drop in the sale of US agricultural production in Rus sia with all other categories of exports in

goods showing big cuts as well (see Figures 67ndash69)

Exports of civilian aircraft engines and parts put the state of Washington in first place among

other states as a leading exporter to the Rus sian market (Figure 610)

1 American Chamber of Commerce in Rus sia ldquoInvestment and Import to Rus sia 2nd Surveyrdquo 13

Diversity and Constraints

06

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 41 102017 404 PM

Figure 61 US Exports of Civilian Aircraft Engines Equipment and Parts to Rus sia US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

$2500000000

$2000000000

$1500000000

$1000000000

$500000000

$-

Figure 62 US Exports of Drilling and Oil Field Equipment US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

0

$5000000

$10000000

$15000000

$20000000

$25000000

$30000000

$35000000

$40000000

$45000000

$50000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 42 102017 404 PM

Figure 63 US Exports of Industrial Engines to Rus sia US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

0

$5000000

$10000000

$15000000

$20000000

$25000000

$30000000

$35000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Figure 64 US Exports of Phar ma ceu ti cal Preparations to Rus sia US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

0

$5000000

$10000000

$15000000

$20000000

$25000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 43 102017 404 PM

Figure 65 US Exports of Meat and Poultry to Rus sia US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Meat poultry etc

$1000000000

$800000000

$600000000

$400000000

$200000000

$-

$1200000000

$1400000000

$1600000000

Figure 66 US Exports of Soybeans to Rus sia US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

0

$20000000

$40000000

$60000000

$80000000

$100000000

$120000000

$140000000

$160000000

$180000000

$200000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 44 102017 404 PM

Figure 67 US Exports of Vehicles Engines and Parts to Rus sia US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Other parts and accessories of vehicles

Automotive tires and tubes

Bodies and chassis for passenger cars

Engines and engine parts (carburetors pistonsrings and valves)

Trucks buses and special purpose vehicles

Passenger cars new and used

$2500000000

$2000000000

$1500000000

$500000000

$-

$1000000000

Figure 68 US Exports of Medicinal Equipment to Rus sia US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

$10000000

$15000000

$20000000

$25000000

$30000000

$35000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 45 102017 404 PM

Figure 610 US Exports to Rus sia by States (2016 US$ Value) Million US$ 2013ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoState and Metropolitan Area Trade Datardquo

Iowa Kentucky

North Dakota

Oklahoma

South Carolina

Washington

0

$500

$1000

$1500

$2000

2013 2014 2015 2016

District of Columbia

Iowa

Kentucky

North Dakota

Oklahoma

South Carolina

Washington

Figure 69 US Exports of Excavating Machinery to Rus sia US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

0

$5000000

$10000000

$15000000

$20000000

$25000000

$30000000

$35000000

$40000000

$45000000

$50000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 46 102017 404 PM

47

Upon reviewing the current trend in US- Russia economic relations we must acknowledge that

the existing trade model is obsolete and exhausted Imports are resource- oriented and reflect

constraints of the Rus sian economic structure while five groups of goodsmdash oil metals nuclear

fuels fertilizers and fishmdash make up more than 90 percent of total imports from Rus sia (Figure 71)

Each of these industries has a limited capacity for growth in the foreseeable future

Rus siarsquos core export to the United Statesmdash oilmdash will inevitably decrease in the mid- term under any

scenario The value and volume of Rus sian exports to the United States are open to global market

volatility and po liti cal pressures with limited hedging mechanisms

Overall US exports to Rus sia are unsustainable due to bilateral po liti cal tensions the whims of

commodity markets and changing domestic policies Sanctions and counter- sanctions have

created additional barriers particularly in finance banking high- tech energy and agro- business

According to the American Chamber of Commerce 69 percent of US companies working in the

country consider the impact of US sanctions against Rus sia on their business as negative At the

same time 60 percent of companies do not expect big changes in business relations between

Rus sia and the United States under Trump1 as the new law codifies existing sanctions fortifies

them and extends them to new sectors

Current US investments are low due to the weak rule of law in Rus sia a lack of property right

protections and proper contract enforcement high levels of statization and monopolization in the

economy a poor business climate outdated capital stock dependence on natural- resource

sectors and of course sanction and counter- sanction mea sures Bloated administrative compo-

nents created as risk mitigation instruments have also served as impediments The countryrsquos

institutional weakness low level of productivity bud get constraints and a declining inflexible

workforce will restrain future economic growth even if commodity prices recover Rus sian eco-

nomic policy will likely continue to be statist and protectionist relying mostly on import

substitutions

1 Ibid 11

Existing Trends and Future Scenarios

07

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 47 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations48

What scenarios can be expected in such a challenging environment

One probability (no peace no war) is based on the assumption that matters will not deteriorate

further and implementation of the Sanctions Act will be cursory This will cause relatively slow

degradation in the economic field with occasional flashes of activity in selected areas (eg closer

cooperation against Islamist terrorist groups in Syria)

A second worse case or critical scenario is the intensive and full- scale execution of current sanc-

tion legislation and even the imposition of new economic punitive and restrictive mea sures which

could incite asymmetric retaliatory actions and lead to the introduction of additional protectionist

policies This in turn could trigger a further escalation of mutual confrontation and could eventu-

ally destroy the fundamentals of the current bilateral trade system Rus sian leadership has charac-

terized the Sanctions Act as a declaration of a trade war that ends all hope for improving bilateral

relations2

2 Дмитрий Медведев ldquoПодписание президентом США нового санкционного закона против России создает несколько

последствийrdquo [The US Presidentrsquos signing of the package of new sanctions against Rus sia will have a few conse-

quences] Facebook August 2 2017 https wwwfacebook com Dmitry Medvedev posts 10154587161801851

Figure 71 US Imports from Rus sia Share of Oil Metals Nuclear Fuel Fertilizers and Fish Million US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

93

94

93

94

95

96

93

92

87

89

0

$5000

$10000

$15000

$20000

$25000

$30000

$35000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

US Imports from Russia

Share of Oil Metals Nuclear FuelFertilizers and Fish

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 48 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 49

The best case and most favorable scenario looks less probable now It assumes the realization of

structural reforms in Rus sia in such a way that would adapt Rus siarsquos foreign policy to national

economic needs reduce confrontations with the West and make a concerted efort to integrate

Rus sian businesses into global supply and value chains A revitalization of the structural reform

agendamdash including eforts to diversify economic activities through de- monopolization and support

for SMEs a restructuring of the banking sector the creation of a vibrant business climate to foster

entrepreneurships and innovation the implementation of administrative and judicial reforms to

tackle red tape and endemic corruption and the reduction of state control over key sectors of the

economy via wide- spread privatization could kick- start the development of a nonoil economy and

improve long- term growth prospects Despite ongoing discussion of reform strategies deep

economic and po liti cal changes are extremely complicated over the next po liti calelectoral cycle

(2018ndash2024) particularly because of re sis tance of vested interests and growing commodity prices

The urgency to tackle structural shortcomings in natu ral resource- dependent economies usually

correlates with the price of those resources and the degree to which resource rents drive eco-

nomic activity However there may be marginal improvements in the efficiency of the current

economic system

Future US- Russia relations can be thought of through three pillars one pillar focuses on areas

where both countries maintain a competitive rivalry another looks at potential areas of interaction

under pres ent conditions a third pillar and one that has evaporated from the current bilateral

agenda concentrates on future cooperation Stronger economic ties could not only be a kind of

po liti cal shock absorber but contribute to the building of this future (particularly business contacts

aim to support future structural reforms) although po liti cal factors are depressing the prospects

for cooperation To escape deadlock it will be impor tant to establish the right balance between

politics and economics and create a model of collaboration within the framework of contention

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 49 102017 404 PM

About the Author

Vadim Grishin PhD MBA has been involved in the reform pro cess in Rus sia as adviser to the

deputy prime minister of Rus sia in 1992ndash1993 and 2006ndash2010 He has extensive experience

working with the Bretton Woods Institutions He was the board member of the World Bank Group

and served as se nior adviser at the International Monetary Fund Currently he is a con sul tant to the

chief economistrsquos office of the International Finance Corporation and teaches the economics of

transition at Georgetown University in Washington DC

50

594-71613_ch99_4Pindd 50 102017 403 PM

Blank

COVER PHOTO ADOBE STOCK

1616 Rhode Island Avenue NW

Washington DC 20036

202 887 0200 | wwwcsisorg

v++ISBN 978-1-4422-8035-9

Lanham bull Boulder bull New York bull London

4501 Forbes Boulevard

Lanham MD 20706

301 459 3366 | wwwrowmancom

A U T H O R

Vadim Grishin

Myths and Realities

A Report of the

CSIS RUSSIA AND EURASIA PROGRAM

US-RussiaEconomicRelations

O C T O B E R 2 0 1 7

Euml|xHSLEOCy280359z

The Man Pupu Nyor Rock Formations at the Northern Urals also known as Seven

Strong Man or Little Mountain of the God in the local tribe (Mansi) language

Page 41: U.S.-Russia Economic Relations: Myths and Realities · 2020-04-17 · OCTOBER 2017 U.S.- Russia Economic Relations Myths and Realities AUTHOR Vadim Grishin A REPORT OF THE CSIS RUSSIA

Vadim Grishin 35

The Sanctions Act authorizes the secretary of the trea sury (in a nonmandatory way) to impose

restrictions (without specifying them) against Rus sian state- owned entities operating in the railway

metals and mining sectors of the Rus sian economy Despite the commanding heights of Rus siarsquos

state sector owner ship in its economy (70 percent of GDP) the metal- producing companies have

remained mostly in private hands

NUCLEAR AFFAIRS

Historically owners and operators of the 104 commercial nuclear power reactors in the United

States have purchased more than 80 percent of their uranium from foreign countries Uranium

shipping from Rus sia accounted for about 13 percent of the 58 million pounds of uranium pur-

chased overseas in 201219 At the same time the Rus sian state- owned mono poly Rosatom ac-

counts for 20 percent of Kazakhstanrsquos uranium production (which in turn comprises 11 percent of

all US uranium imports) and 20 percent of US domestic uranium production capacity (with

owner ship of exploration tracts in Wyoming)20

Nuclear fuel and nuclear power continue to be po liti cally sensitive topics both in the United

States and Rus sia Bilateral cooperation in this sector (being surprisingly stable with imports of

nuclear fuel from Rus sia at a level of $1 billion annually in the last five years [Figure 512 and 513])

is under constant po liti cal and lobbying pressure and has been a source of several po liti cal scan-

dals21 Consequently upside risks in this area of interaction are minimal and downside risks are

much higher especially when we are seeing more decommissioning of nuclear plants in the

United States than new constructions The US EIArsquos 2017 Annual Energy Outlook assumes

that about 25 percent of the nuclear capacity now operating will be removed from ser vice

by 205022

WHY IS THE GRASS GREENER ON THE OTHER SIDE

The United States continues to significantly reduce imports of chemical fertilizers as domestic pro-

duction increases In 2016 the United States imported 13 percent less ammonia and 11 percent

less urea and UAN which is a liquid urea and ammonium nitrate fertilizer Rus sia accounts for

around 40 percent of UAN imported by the United States The United States canceled antidumping

duties on imports of ammonium nitrate and urea from Rus sia in 2016 but it did not prevent import

19 US EIA ldquoThe US Relies on Foreign Uranium Enrichment Ser vices to Fuel Its Nuclear Power Plantsrdquo Today in

Energy August 28 2013 https wwweia gov todayinenergy detail php idshy=shy1273

20 Colin Chilcoat ldquoDoes Rus sia Really Own 20 Percent of the USrsquo Uranium Reservesrdquo OilPricecom May 6 2015

http oilpricecom Alternative - Energy Nuclear - Power Does - Russia - Really - Own - 20 - Of - The - US - Uranium - Reserves

html

21 Michelle Ye Hee Lee ldquoThe Facts behind Trumprsquos Repeated Claim about Hillary Clintonrsquos Role in the Rus sian Ura-

nium Dealrdquo Washington Post October 26 2016

22 US EIA ldquoAnnual Energy Outlook 2017 with Projections to 2050rdquo 81ndash82

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 35 102017 404 PM

Figure 512 US Imports from Rus sia Share of Oil Metals and Nuclear Fuel Million US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 1992ndash2016)

87

86

90

90

90

91

88

86

7882

0

$5000

$10000

$15000

$20000

$25000

$30000

$35000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

US Imports from Russia

Share of Oil Metals and Nuclear Fuel

Figure 513 US Imports from Rus sia Nuclear Fuel Materials US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

$-

$200000000

$400000000

$600000000

$800000000

$1200000000

$1000000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 36 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 37

drops twice last year (Figures 514 and 515) According to forecasts UAN imports are expected to

decline further to 15 million tons this year down over 46 percent from 28 million tons imported

last year23 The downside trend in imports of fertilizers will likely continue because of oversupply

BIG FISH

US imports of fish and shellfish from Rus sia are best understood in comparison with US fish

exports to the Rus sian market which slipped to zero in August 2014 after Rus sia issued an order

banning certain agricultural imports from the United States (Figure 516) While the volume of US

supply was not very large it was impor tant because it broke up the monopolistic dominance of a

few vertically integrated Rus sian companies that have kept prices high by restricting the entry of

new producers Seeking to implement import substitution policies Rus sia has tried to reduce

exports as well as imports of fish and seafood products in the last couple of years This symmetri-

cal approach was intended to ldquocompensaterdquo for a decrease of fish products in the domestic

23 Deepika Thapliyal ldquoPotashCorp Forecasts Sharp Drop in US Nitrogen Imports in 2017rdquo ICIS News February 7

2017 https wwwicis com resources news 2017 02 07 10076734 potashcorp - forecasts - sharp - drop - in - us - nitrogen

- imports - in - 2017

Figure 514 US Imports from Rus sia Share of Oil Metals Nuclear Fuel and Fertilizers Million US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

90

93

92

93

94

95

92

91

85

86

0

$5000

$10000

$15000

$20000

$25000

$30000

$35000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

US Imports from Russia

Share of Oil Metals Nuclear Fuel and Fertilizers

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 37 102017 404 PM

Figure 515 US Imports from Rus sia Chemical- Fertilizers US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

S-

$200000000

$400000000

$600000000

$800000000

$1000000000

$1200000000

$1400000000

$1600000000

$1800000000

$2000000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Figure 516 US Exports to Rus sia Fish and Shellfish US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

0

$10000000

$20000000

$30000000

$40000000

$50000000

$60000000

$70000000

$80000000

$90000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Fish and shellfish

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 38 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 39

consumer market caused by Rus siarsquos import ban but it has failed As result the group most af-

fected by the self- imposed counter- sanctions were Rus sian consumers

With a significant drop in fish imports a devaluation of the ruble and inflationary pressures on

seafood prices yearly consumption of fish in Rus sia has declined precipitously In 2015 alone

fish prices increased 20 percent and consumption dropped to 14 kilograms per person24 from

22 kilograms in 201425 In 2016 food rose to 355 percent of house hold expenditure as a result of

increases in food prices26 This has pushed vertically integrated fishing monopolies to sell even

more of their catch abroad rather than deliver to the Rus sian Federation (Figure 517) Thus we

cannot exclude the possibility of further growth in US fish and shellfish imports from Rus sia on a

marginal scale

24 Александр Савельев ldquoПотребление рыбы в России упало до 14 кг на человекаrdquo [Fish consumption in Rus sia fell to

14 kg per person] Экономика Интерфакс January 28 2015 http wwwinterfax ru business 492038

25 Илья Шестаков ldquoПотебление рыбы в России снизилось на 10 процентов из- за роста ценrdquo [Fish consumption in

Rus sia dropped by 10 percent due to price increases] RNS March 8 2017 https rnsonline consumer - market

Potreblenie - ribi - v - Rossii - snizilos - na - 10 - iz - za - rosta - tsen - 2017 - 03 - 08

26 Zoya Sheftalovich and Christian Oliver ldquoRus siarsquos Boom (Farming) Economyrdquo Politico November 8 2016 http

wwwpolitico eu article russias - boom - farming - economy

Figure 517 US Imports from Rus sia Fish and Shellfish US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

0

$50000000

$100000000

$150000000

$200000000

$250000000

$300000000

$350000000

$400000000

$450000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 39 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations40

SPACE ODYSSEY

Among high- end products beyond the top five groups of goods imported from Rus sia cheap and

efficient Rus sian engines have been used to launch US rockets into space for about 16 years

(Figure 518) There was a serious po liti cal strug gle around a 2014 ban on the purchase of Rus sian

RD-180 rocket engines revealing the conflicting business interests of power ful high- tech companies

This restrictive mea sure was temporary and was quickly lifted because of significant cost impacts

and risks of disruption to launch schedules27 For the same reason the Sanctions Act does not autho-

rize ldquothe imposition of any sanction or other condition limitation restriction or prohibition that

directly or indirectly impedes the supply by any entity of the Rus sian Federation of any product or

ser vice or the procurement of such product or ser vice by any contractor or subcontractor of the

United States or any other entity relating to or in connection with any space launch conducted for

the National Aeronautics and Space Administration or any other nonndash Department of Defense

customerrdquo28

Nevertheless many experts believe that US domestic alternatives to replace Rus sian engines will

be viable in five to eight years

27 Ken Dilanian ldquoWhy Does the US Use Rus sian Rockets to Launch Its Satellitesrdquo NBC News updated November 15

2016 http wwwnbcnews com why - does - u - s - use - russian - rockets - launch - its - satellites - n588526

28 Countering Amer i carsquos Adversaries through Sanctions Act HR 3364

Figure 518 Spacecraft Excluding Military US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

0

$20000000

$40000000

$60000000

$80000000

$100000000

$120000000

$140000000

$160000000

$180000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 40 102017 404 PM

41

Diversity and technological complexity are the most vis i ble advantages supporting US exports to

Rus sia Three major groups of export goods include civilian aircraft engines and parts (Figure 61)

drilling and oil field equipment (Figure 62) and industrial machines and engines (Figure 63)

Despite sanctions against the transfer of advanced oil producing and pro cessing technologies the

realization of US drilling and oil field equipment in Rus sia is sustainable although some bilateral

proj ects have been frozen

Another category of goods that has demonstrated resilience is the phar ma ceu ti cal industry (Fig-

ure 64) because most drugs in Rus sia are imported (about 70 percent of the Rus sian phar ma ceu-

ti cal market in value) Import substitution policies have had only modest results in this industry

As confirmed by American Chamber of Commerce surveys US exports to Rus sia are closely

connected to US FDI 30 percent of total imports of US companies working in the Rus sian

market come from the United States (more than $2 billion in 2016) In other words about

40 percent of all US exports to Rus sia are related to a US corporate- sector business pro cess in

the country The major sectors of activity of these companies are energy and natu ral resources

(52 percent) manufacturing (17 percent) information and communications technology or ICT

(13 percent) retail (7 percent) automotive industry (6 percent) phar ma ceu ti cal production

(1 percent) professional ser vices (05 percent) and other (2 percent)1

Some obvious constraints on US exports to Rus sia have resulted from a reduction in demand A

deterioration of bilateral relations and implementation of sanctions and counter- sanctions have

directly or indirectly afected all businesses Figures 65 and 66 provide data regarding a dramatic

drop in the sale of US agricultural production in Rus sia with all other categories of exports in

goods showing big cuts as well (see Figures 67ndash69)

Exports of civilian aircraft engines and parts put the state of Washington in first place among

other states as a leading exporter to the Rus sian market (Figure 610)

1 American Chamber of Commerce in Rus sia ldquoInvestment and Import to Rus sia 2nd Surveyrdquo 13

Diversity and Constraints

06

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 41 102017 404 PM

Figure 61 US Exports of Civilian Aircraft Engines Equipment and Parts to Rus sia US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

$2500000000

$2000000000

$1500000000

$1000000000

$500000000

$-

Figure 62 US Exports of Drilling and Oil Field Equipment US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

0

$5000000

$10000000

$15000000

$20000000

$25000000

$30000000

$35000000

$40000000

$45000000

$50000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 42 102017 404 PM

Figure 63 US Exports of Industrial Engines to Rus sia US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

0

$5000000

$10000000

$15000000

$20000000

$25000000

$30000000

$35000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Figure 64 US Exports of Phar ma ceu ti cal Preparations to Rus sia US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

0

$5000000

$10000000

$15000000

$20000000

$25000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 43 102017 404 PM

Figure 65 US Exports of Meat and Poultry to Rus sia US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Meat poultry etc

$1000000000

$800000000

$600000000

$400000000

$200000000

$-

$1200000000

$1400000000

$1600000000

Figure 66 US Exports of Soybeans to Rus sia US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

0

$20000000

$40000000

$60000000

$80000000

$100000000

$120000000

$140000000

$160000000

$180000000

$200000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 44 102017 404 PM

Figure 67 US Exports of Vehicles Engines and Parts to Rus sia US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Other parts and accessories of vehicles

Automotive tires and tubes

Bodies and chassis for passenger cars

Engines and engine parts (carburetors pistonsrings and valves)

Trucks buses and special purpose vehicles

Passenger cars new and used

$2500000000

$2000000000

$1500000000

$500000000

$-

$1000000000

Figure 68 US Exports of Medicinal Equipment to Rus sia US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

$10000000

$15000000

$20000000

$25000000

$30000000

$35000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 45 102017 404 PM

Figure 610 US Exports to Rus sia by States (2016 US$ Value) Million US$ 2013ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoState and Metropolitan Area Trade Datardquo

Iowa Kentucky

North Dakota

Oklahoma

South Carolina

Washington

0

$500

$1000

$1500

$2000

2013 2014 2015 2016

District of Columbia

Iowa

Kentucky

North Dakota

Oklahoma

South Carolina

Washington

Figure 69 US Exports of Excavating Machinery to Rus sia US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

0

$5000000

$10000000

$15000000

$20000000

$25000000

$30000000

$35000000

$40000000

$45000000

$50000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 46 102017 404 PM

47

Upon reviewing the current trend in US- Russia economic relations we must acknowledge that

the existing trade model is obsolete and exhausted Imports are resource- oriented and reflect

constraints of the Rus sian economic structure while five groups of goodsmdash oil metals nuclear

fuels fertilizers and fishmdash make up more than 90 percent of total imports from Rus sia (Figure 71)

Each of these industries has a limited capacity for growth in the foreseeable future

Rus siarsquos core export to the United Statesmdash oilmdash will inevitably decrease in the mid- term under any

scenario The value and volume of Rus sian exports to the United States are open to global market

volatility and po liti cal pressures with limited hedging mechanisms

Overall US exports to Rus sia are unsustainable due to bilateral po liti cal tensions the whims of

commodity markets and changing domestic policies Sanctions and counter- sanctions have

created additional barriers particularly in finance banking high- tech energy and agro- business

According to the American Chamber of Commerce 69 percent of US companies working in the

country consider the impact of US sanctions against Rus sia on their business as negative At the

same time 60 percent of companies do not expect big changes in business relations between

Rus sia and the United States under Trump1 as the new law codifies existing sanctions fortifies

them and extends them to new sectors

Current US investments are low due to the weak rule of law in Rus sia a lack of property right

protections and proper contract enforcement high levels of statization and monopolization in the

economy a poor business climate outdated capital stock dependence on natural- resource

sectors and of course sanction and counter- sanction mea sures Bloated administrative compo-

nents created as risk mitigation instruments have also served as impediments The countryrsquos

institutional weakness low level of productivity bud get constraints and a declining inflexible

workforce will restrain future economic growth even if commodity prices recover Rus sian eco-

nomic policy will likely continue to be statist and protectionist relying mostly on import

substitutions

1 Ibid 11

Existing Trends and Future Scenarios

07

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 47 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations48

What scenarios can be expected in such a challenging environment

One probability (no peace no war) is based on the assumption that matters will not deteriorate

further and implementation of the Sanctions Act will be cursory This will cause relatively slow

degradation in the economic field with occasional flashes of activity in selected areas (eg closer

cooperation against Islamist terrorist groups in Syria)

A second worse case or critical scenario is the intensive and full- scale execution of current sanc-

tion legislation and even the imposition of new economic punitive and restrictive mea sures which

could incite asymmetric retaliatory actions and lead to the introduction of additional protectionist

policies This in turn could trigger a further escalation of mutual confrontation and could eventu-

ally destroy the fundamentals of the current bilateral trade system Rus sian leadership has charac-

terized the Sanctions Act as a declaration of a trade war that ends all hope for improving bilateral

relations2

2 Дмитрий Медведев ldquoПодписание президентом США нового санкционного закона против России создает несколько

последствийrdquo [The US Presidentrsquos signing of the package of new sanctions against Rus sia will have a few conse-

quences] Facebook August 2 2017 https wwwfacebook com Dmitry Medvedev posts 10154587161801851

Figure 71 US Imports from Rus sia Share of Oil Metals Nuclear Fuel Fertilizers and Fish Million US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

93

94

93

94

95

96

93

92

87

89

0

$5000

$10000

$15000

$20000

$25000

$30000

$35000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

US Imports from Russia

Share of Oil Metals Nuclear FuelFertilizers and Fish

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 48 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 49

The best case and most favorable scenario looks less probable now It assumes the realization of

structural reforms in Rus sia in such a way that would adapt Rus siarsquos foreign policy to national

economic needs reduce confrontations with the West and make a concerted efort to integrate

Rus sian businesses into global supply and value chains A revitalization of the structural reform

agendamdash including eforts to diversify economic activities through de- monopolization and support

for SMEs a restructuring of the banking sector the creation of a vibrant business climate to foster

entrepreneurships and innovation the implementation of administrative and judicial reforms to

tackle red tape and endemic corruption and the reduction of state control over key sectors of the

economy via wide- spread privatization could kick- start the development of a nonoil economy and

improve long- term growth prospects Despite ongoing discussion of reform strategies deep

economic and po liti cal changes are extremely complicated over the next po liti calelectoral cycle

(2018ndash2024) particularly because of re sis tance of vested interests and growing commodity prices

The urgency to tackle structural shortcomings in natu ral resource- dependent economies usually

correlates with the price of those resources and the degree to which resource rents drive eco-

nomic activity However there may be marginal improvements in the efficiency of the current

economic system

Future US- Russia relations can be thought of through three pillars one pillar focuses on areas

where both countries maintain a competitive rivalry another looks at potential areas of interaction

under pres ent conditions a third pillar and one that has evaporated from the current bilateral

agenda concentrates on future cooperation Stronger economic ties could not only be a kind of

po liti cal shock absorber but contribute to the building of this future (particularly business contacts

aim to support future structural reforms) although po liti cal factors are depressing the prospects

for cooperation To escape deadlock it will be impor tant to establish the right balance between

politics and economics and create a model of collaboration within the framework of contention

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 49 102017 404 PM

About the Author

Vadim Grishin PhD MBA has been involved in the reform pro cess in Rus sia as adviser to the

deputy prime minister of Rus sia in 1992ndash1993 and 2006ndash2010 He has extensive experience

working with the Bretton Woods Institutions He was the board member of the World Bank Group

and served as se nior adviser at the International Monetary Fund Currently he is a con sul tant to the

chief economistrsquos office of the International Finance Corporation and teaches the economics of

transition at Georgetown University in Washington DC

50

594-71613_ch99_4Pindd 50 102017 403 PM

Blank

COVER PHOTO ADOBE STOCK

1616 Rhode Island Avenue NW

Washington DC 20036

202 887 0200 | wwwcsisorg

v++ISBN 978-1-4422-8035-9

Lanham bull Boulder bull New York bull London

4501 Forbes Boulevard

Lanham MD 20706

301 459 3366 | wwwrowmancom

A U T H O R

Vadim Grishin

Myths and Realities

A Report of the

CSIS RUSSIA AND EURASIA PROGRAM

US-RussiaEconomicRelations

O C T O B E R 2 0 1 7

Euml|xHSLEOCy280359z

The Man Pupu Nyor Rock Formations at the Northern Urals also known as Seven

Strong Man or Little Mountain of the God in the local tribe (Mansi) language

Page 42: U.S.-Russia Economic Relations: Myths and Realities · 2020-04-17 · OCTOBER 2017 U.S.- Russia Economic Relations Myths and Realities AUTHOR Vadim Grishin A REPORT OF THE CSIS RUSSIA

Figure 512 US Imports from Rus sia Share of Oil Metals and Nuclear Fuel Million US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 1992ndash2016)

87

86

90

90

90

91

88

86

7882

0

$5000

$10000

$15000

$20000

$25000

$30000

$35000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

US Imports from Russia

Share of Oil Metals and Nuclear Fuel

Figure 513 US Imports from Rus sia Nuclear Fuel Materials US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

$-

$200000000

$400000000

$600000000

$800000000

$1200000000

$1000000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 36 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 37

drops twice last year (Figures 514 and 515) According to forecasts UAN imports are expected to

decline further to 15 million tons this year down over 46 percent from 28 million tons imported

last year23 The downside trend in imports of fertilizers will likely continue because of oversupply

BIG FISH

US imports of fish and shellfish from Rus sia are best understood in comparison with US fish

exports to the Rus sian market which slipped to zero in August 2014 after Rus sia issued an order

banning certain agricultural imports from the United States (Figure 516) While the volume of US

supply was not very large it was impor tant because it broke up the monopolistic dominance of a

few vertically integrated Rus sian companies that have kept prices high by restricting the entry of

new producers Seeking to implement import substitution policies Rus sia has tried to reduce

exports as well as imports of fish and seafood products in the last couple of years This symmetri-

cal approach was intended to ldquocompensaterdquo for a decrease of fish products in the domestic

23 Deepika Thapliyal ldquoPotashCorp Forecasts Sharp Drop in US Nitrogen Imports in 2017rdquo ICIS News February 7

2017 https wwwicis com resources news 2017 02 07 10076734 potashcorp - forecasts - sharp - drop - in - us - nitrogen

- imports - in - 2017

Figure 514 US Imports from Rus sia Share of Oil Metals Nuclear Fuel and Fertilizers Million US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

90

93

92

93

94

95

92

91

85

86

0

$5000

$10000

$15000

$20000

$25000

$30000

$35000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

US Imports from Russia

Share of Oil Metals Nuclear Fuel and Fertilizers

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 37 102017 404 PM

Figure 515 US Imports from Rus sia Chemical- Fertilizers US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

S-

$200000000

$400000000

$600000000

$800000000

$1000000000

$1200000000

$1400000000

$1600000000

$1800000000

$2000000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Figure 516 US Exports to Rus sia Fish and Shellfish US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

0

$10000000

$20000000

$30000000

$40000000

$50000000

$60000000

$70000000

$80000000

$90000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Fish and shellfish

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 38 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 39

consumer market caused by Rus siarsquos import ban but it has failed As result the group most af-

fected by the self- imposed counter- sanctions were Rus sian consumers

With a significant drop in fish imports a devaluation of the ruble and inflationary pressures on

seafood prices yearly consumption of fish in Rus sia has declined precipitously In 2015 alone

fish prices increased 20 percent and consumption dropped to 14 kilograms per person24 from

22 kilograms in 201425 In 2016 food rose to 355 percent of house hold expenditure as a result of

increases in food prices26 This has pushed vertically integrated fishing monopolies to sell even

more of their catch abroad rather than deliver to the Rus sian Federation (Figure 517) Thus we

cannot exclude the possibility of further growth in US fish and shellfish imports from Rus sia on a

marginal scale

24 Александр Савельев ldquoПотребление рыбы в России упало до 14 кг на человекаrdquo [Fish consumption in Rus sia fell to

14 kg per person] Экономика Интерфакс January 28 2015 http wwwinterfax ru business 492038

25 Илья Шестаков ldquoПотебление рыбы в России снизилось на 10 процентов из- за роста ценrdquo [Fish consumption in

Rus sia dropped by 10 percent due to price increases] RNS March 8 2017 https rnsonline consumer - market

Potreblenie - ribi - v - Rossii - snizilos - na - 10 - iz - za - rosta - tsen - 2017 - 03 - 08

26 Zoya Sheftalovich and Christian Oliver ldquoRus siarsquos Boom (Farming) Economyrdquo Politico November 8 2016 http

wwwpolitico eu article russias - boom - farming - economy

Figure 517 US Imports from Rus sia Fish and Shellfish US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

0

$50000000

$100000000

$150000000

$200000000

$250000000

$300000000

$350000000

$400000000

$450000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 39 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations40

SPACE ODYSSEY

Among high- end products beyond the top five groups of goods imported from Rus sia cheap and

efficient Rus sian engines have been used to launch US rockets into space for about 16 years

(Figure 518) There was a serious po liti cal strug gle around a 2014 ban on the purchase of Rus sian

RD-180 rocket engines revealing the conflicting business interests of power ful high- tech companies

This restrictive mea sure was temporary and was quickly lifted because of significant cost impacts

and risks of disruption to launch schedules27 For the same reason the Sanctions Act does not autho-

rize ldquothe imposition of any sanction or other condition limitation restriction or prohibition that

directly or indirectly impedes the supply by any entity of the Rus sian Federation of any product or

ser vice or the procurement of such product or ser vice by any contractor or subcontractor of the

United States or any other entity relating to or in connection with any space launch conducted for

the National Aeronautics and Space Administration or any other nonndash Department of Defense

customerrdquo28

Nevertheless many experts believe that US domestic alternatives to replace Rus sian engines will

be viable in five to eight years

27 Ken Dilanian ldquoWhy Does the US Use Rus sian Rockets to Launch Its Satellitesrdquo NBC News updated November 15

2016 http wwwnbcnews com why - does - u - s - use - russian - rockets - launch - its - satellites - n588526

28 Countering Amer i carsquos Adversaries through Sanctions Act HR 3364

Figure 518 Spacecraft Excluding Military US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

0

$20000000

$40000000

$60000000

$80000000

$100000000

$120000000

$140000000

$160000000

$180000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 40 102017 404 PM

41

Diversity and technological complexity are the most vis i ble advantages supporting US exports to

Rus sia Three major groups of export goods include civilian aircraft engines and parts (Figure 61)

drilling and oil field equipment (Figure 62) and industrial machines and engines (Figure 63)

Despite sanctions against the transfer of advanced oil producing and pro cessing technologies the

realization of US drilling and oil field equipment in Rus sia is sustainable although some bilateral

proj ects have been frozen

Another category of goods that has demonstrated resilience is the phar ma ceu ti cal industry (Fig-

ure 64) because most drugs in Rus sia are imported (about 70 percent of the Rus sian phar ma ceu-

ti cal market in value) Import substitution policies have had only modest results in this industry

As confirmed by American Chamber of Commerce surveys US exports to Rus sia are closely

connected to US FDI 30 percent of total imports of US companies working in the Rus sian

market come from the United States (more than $2 billion in 2016) In other words about

40 percent of all US exports to Rus sia are related to a US corporate- sector business pro cess in

the country The major sectors of activity of these companies are energy and natu ral resources

(52 percent) manufacturing (17 percent) information and communications technology or ICT

(13 percent) retail (7 percent) automotive industry (6 percent) phar ma ceu ti cal production

(1 percent) professional ser vices (05 percent) and other (2 percent)1

Some obvious constraints on US exports to Rus sia have resulted from a reduction in demand A

deterioration of bilateral relations and implementation of sanctions and counter- sanctions have

directly or indirectly afected all businesses Figures 65 and 66 provide data regarding a dramatic

drop in the sale of US agricultural production in Rus sia with all other categories of exports in

goods showing big cuts as well (see Figures 67ndash69)

Exports of civilian aircraft engines and parts put the state of Washington in first place among

other states as a leading exporter to the Rus sian market (Figure 610)

1 American Chamber of Commerce in Rus sia ldquoInvestment and Import to Rus sia 2nd Surveyrdquo 13

Diversity and Constraints

06

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 41 102017 404 PM

Figure 61 US Exports of Civilian Aircraft Engines Equipment and Parts to Rus sia US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

$2500000000

$2000000000

$1500000000

$1000000000

$500000000

$-

Figure 62 US Exports of Drilling and Oil Field Equipment US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

0

$5000000

$10000000

$15000000

$20000000

$25000000

$30000000

$35000000

$40000000

$45000000

$50000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 42 102017 404 PM

Figure 63 US Exports of Industrial Engines to Rus sia US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

0

$5000000

$10000000

$15000000

$20000000

$25000000

$30000000

$35000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Figure 64 US Exports of Phar ma ceu ti cal Preparations to Rus sia US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

0

$5000000

$10000000

$15000000

$20000000

$25000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 43 102017 404 PM

Figure 65 US Exports of Meat and Poultry to Rus sia US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Meat poultry etc

$1000000000

$800000000

$600000000

$400000000

$200000000

$-

$1200000000

$1400000000

$1600000000

Figure 66 US Exports of Soybeans to Rus sia US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

0

$20000000

$40000000

$60000000

$80000000

$100000000

$120000000

$140000000

$160000000

$180000000

$200000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 44 102017 404 PM

Figure 67 US Exports of Vehicles Engines and Parts to Rus sia US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Other parts and accessories of vehicles

Automotive tires and tubes

Bodies and chassis for passenger cars

Engines and engine parts (carburetors pistonsrings and valves)

Trucks buses and special purpose vehicles

Passenger cars new and used

$2500000000

$2000000000

$1500000000

$500000000

$-

$1000000000

Figure 68 US Exports of Medicinal Equipment to Rus sia US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

$10000000

$15000000

$20000000

$25000000

$30000000

$35000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 45 102017 404 PM

Figure 610 US Exports to Rus sia by States (2016 US$ Value) Million US$ 2013ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoState and Metropolitan Area Trade Datardquo

Iowa Kentucky

North Dakota

Oklahoma

South Carolina

Washington

0

$500

$1000

$1500

$2000

2013 2014 2015 2016

District of Columbia

Iowa

Kentucky

North Dakota

Oklahoma

South Carolina

Washington

Figure 69 US Exports of Excavating Machinery to Rus sia US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

0

$5000000

$10000000

$15000000

$20000000

$25000000

$30000000

$35000000

$40000000

$45000000

$50000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 46 102017 404 PM

47

Upon reviewing the current trend in US- Russia economic relations we must acknowledge that

the existing trade model is obsolete and exhausted Imports are resource- oriented and reflect

constraints of the Rus sian economic structure while five groups of goodsmdash oil metals nuclear

fuels fertilizers and fishmdash make up more than 90 percent of total imports from Rus sia (Figure 71)

Each of these industries has a limited capacity for growth in the foreseeable future

Rus siarsquos core export to the United Statesmdash oilmdash will inevitably decrease in the mid- term under any

scenario The value and volume of Rus sian exports to the United States are open to global market

volatility and po liti cal pressures with limited hedging mechanisms

Overall US exports to Rus sia are unsustainable due to bilateral po liti cal tensions the whims of

commodity markets and changing domestic policies Sanctions and counter- sanctions have

created additional barriers particularly in finance banking high- tech energy and agro- business

According to the American Chamber of Commerce 69 percent of US companies working in the

country consider the impact of US sanctions against Rus sia on their business as negative At the

same time 60 percent of companies do not expect big changes in business relations between

Rus sia and the United States under Trump1 as the new law codifies existing sanctions fortifies

them and extends them to new sectors

Current US investments are low due to the weak rule of law in Rus sia a lack of property right

protections and proper contract enforcement high levels of statization and monopolization in the

economy a poor business climate outdated capital stock dependence on natural- resource

sectors and of course sanction and counter- sanction mea sures Bloated administrative compo-

nents created as risk mitigation instruments have also served as impediments The countryrsquos

institutional weakness low level of productivity bud get constraints and a declining inflexible

workforce will restrain future economic growth even if commodity prices recover Rus sian eco-

nomic policy will likely continue to be statist and protectionist relying mostly on import

substitutions

1 Ibid 11

Existing Trends and Future Scenarios

07

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 47 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations48

What scenarios can be expected in such a challenging environment

One probability (no peace no war) is based on the assumption that matters will not deteriorate

further and implementation of the Sanctions Act will be cursory This will cause relatively slow

degradation in the economic field with occasional flashes of activity in selected areas (eg closer

cooperation against Islamist terrorist groups in Syria)

A second worse case or critical scenario is the intensive and full- scale execution of current sanc-

tion legislation and even the imposition of new economic punitive and restrictive mea sures which

could incite asymmetric retaliatory actions and lead to the introduction of additional protectionist

policies This in turn could trigger a further escalation of mutual confrontation and could eventu-

ally destroy the fundamentals of the current bilateral trade system Rus sian leadership has charac-

terized the Sanctions Act as a declaration of a trade war that ends all hope for improving bilateral

relations2

2 Дмитрий Медведев ldquoПодписание президентом США нового санкционного закона против России создает несколько

последствийrdquo [The US Presidentrsquos signing of the package of new sanctions against Rus sia will have a few conse-

quences] Facebook August 2 2017 https wwwfacebook com Dmitry Medvedev posts 10154587161801851

Figure 71 US Imports from Rus sia Share of Oil Metals Nuclear Fuel Fertilizers and Fish Million US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

93

94

93

94

95

96

93

92

87

89

0

$5000

$10000

$15000

$20000

$25000

$30000

$35000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

US Imports from Russia

Share of Oil Metals Nuclear FuelFertilizers and Fish

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 48 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 49

The best case and most favorable scenario looks less probable now It assumes the realization of

structural reforms in Rus sia in such a way that would adapt Rus siarsquos foreign policy to national

economic needs reduce confrontations with the West and make a concerted efort to integrate

Rus sian businesses into global supply and value chains A revitalization of the structural reform

agendamdash including eforts to diversify economic activities through de- monopolization and support

for SMEs a restructuring of the banking sector the creation of a vibrant business climate to foster

entrepreneurships and innovation the implementation of administrative and judicial reforms to

tackle red tape and endemic corruption and the reduction of state control over key sectors of the

economy via wide- spread privatization could kick- start the development of a nonoil economy and

improve long- term growth prospects Despite ongoing discussion of reform strategies deep

economic and po liti cal changes are extremely complicated over the next po liti calelectoral cycle

(2018ndash2024) particularly because of re sis tance of vested interests and growing commodity prices

The urgency to tackle structural shortcomings in natu ral resource- dependent economies usually

correlates with the price of those resources and the degree to which resource rents drive eco-

nomic activity However there may be marginal improvements in the efficiency of the current

economic system

Future US- Russia relations can be thought of through three pillars one pillar focuses on areas

where both countries maintain a competitive rivalry another looks at potential areas of interaction

under pres ent conditions a third pillar and one that has evaporated from the current bilateral

agenda concentrates on future cooperation Stronger economic ties could not only be a kind of

po liti cal shock absorber but contribute to the building of this future (particularly business contacts

aim to support future structural reforms) although po liti cal factors are depressing the prospects

for cooperation To escape deadlock it will be impor tant to establish the right balance between

politics and economics and create a model of collaboration within the framework of contention

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 49 102017 404 PM

About the Author

Vadim Grishin PhD MBA has been involved in the reform pro cess in Rus sia as adviser to the

deputy prime minister of Rus sia in 1992ndash1993 and 2006ndash2010 He has extensive experience

working with the Bretton Woods Institutions He was the board member of the World Bank Group

and served as se nior adviser at the International Monetary Fund Currently he is a con sul tant to the

chief economistrsquos office of the International Finance Corporation and teaches the economics of

transition at Georgetown University in Washington DC

50

594-71613_ch99_4Pindd 50 102017 403 PM

Blank

COVER PHOTO ADOBE STOCK

1616 Rhode Island Avenue NW

Washington DC 20036

202 887 0200 | wwwcsisorg

v++ISBN 978-1-4422-8035-9

Lanham bull Boulder bull New York bull London

4501 Forbes Boulevard

Lanham MD 20706

301 459 3366 | wwwrowmancom

A U T H O R

Vadim Grishin

Myths and Realities

A Report of the

CSIS RUSSIA AND EURASIA PROGRAM

US-RussiaEconomicRelations

O C T O B E R 2 0 1 7

Euml|xHSLEOCy280359z

The Man Pupu Nyor Rock Formations at the Northern Urals also known as Seven

Strong Man or Little Mountain of the God in the local tribe (Mansi) language

Page 43: U.S.-Russia Economic Relations: Myths and Realities · 2020-04-17 · OCTOBER 2017 U.S.- Russia Economic Relations Myths and Realities AUTHOR Vadim Grishin A REPORT OF THE CSIS RUSSIA

Vadim Grishin 37

drops twice last year (Figures 514 and 515) According to forecasts UAN imports are expected to

decline further to 15 million tons this year down over 46 percent from 28 million tons imported

last year23 The downside trend in imports of fertilizers will likely continue because of oversupply

BIG FISH

US imports of fish and shellfish from Rus sia are best understood in comparison with US fish

exports to the Rus sian market which slipped to zero in August 2014 after Rus sia issued an order

banning certain agricultural imports from the United States (Figure 516) While the volume of US

supply was not very large it was impor tant because it broke up the monopolistic dominance of a

few vertically integrated Rus sian companies that have kept prices high by restricting the entry of

new producers Seeking to implement import substitution policies Rus sia has tried to reduce

exports as well as imports of fish and seafood products in the last couple of years This symmetri-

cal approach was intended to ldquocompensaterdquo for a decrease of fish products in the domestic

23 Deepika Thapliyal ldquoPotashCorp Forecasts Sharp Drop in US Nitrogen Imports in 2017rdquo ICIS News February 7

2017 https wwwicis com resources news 2017 02 07 10076734 potashcorp - forecasts - sharp - drop - in - us - nitrogen

- imports - in - 2017

Figure 514 US Imports from Rus sia Share of Oil Metals Nuclear Fuel and Fertilizers Million US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

90

93

92

93

94

95

92

91

85

86

0

$5000

$10000

$15000

$20000

$25000

$30000

$35000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

US Imports from Russia

Share of Oil Metals Nuclear Fuel and Fertilizers

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 37 102017 404 PM

Figure 515 US Imports from Rus sia Chemical- Fertilizers US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

S-

$200000000

$400000000

$600000000

$800000000

$1000000000

$1200000000

$1400000000

$1600000000

$1800000000

$2000000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Figure 516 US Exports to Rus sia Fish and Shellfish US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

0

$10000000

$20000000

$30000000

$40000000

$50000000

$60000000

$70000000

$80000000

$90000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Fish and shellfish

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 38 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 39

consumer market caused by Rus siarsquos import ban but it has failed As result the group most af-

fected by the self- imposed counter- sanctions were Rus sian consumers

With a significant drop in fish imports a devaluation of the ruble and inflationary pressures on

seafood prices yearly consumption of fish in Rus sia has declined precipitously In 2015 alone

fish prices increased 20 percent and consumption dropped to 14 kilograms per person24 from

22 kilograms in 201425 In 2016 food rose to 355 percent of house hold expenditure as a result of

increases in food prices26 This has pushed vertically integrated fishing monopolies to sell even

more of their catch abroad rather than deliver to the Rus sian Federation (Figure 517) Thus we

cannot exclude the possibility of further growth in US fish and shellfish imports from Rus sia on a

marginal scale

24 Александр Савельев ldquoПотребление рыбы в России упало до 14 кг на человекаrdquo [Fish consumption in Rus sia fell to

14 kg per person] Экономика Интерфакс January 28 2015 http wwwinterfax ru business 492038

25 Илья Шестаков ldquoПотебление рыбы в России снизилось на 10 процентов из- за роста ценrdquo [Fish consumption in

Rus sia dropped by 10 percent due to price increases] RNS March 8 2017 https rnsonline consumer - market

Potreblenie - ribi - v - Rossii - snizilos - na - 10 - iz - za - rosta - tsen - 2017 - 03 - 08

26 Zoya Sheftalovich and Christian Oliver ldquoRus siarsquos Boom (Farming) Economyrdquo Politico November 8 2016 http

wwwpolitico eu article russias - boom - farming - economy

Figure 517 US Imports from Rus sia Fish and Shellfish US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

0

$50000000

$100000000

$150000000

$200000000

$250000000

$300000000

$350000000

$400000000

$450000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 39 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations40

SPACE ODYSSEY

Among high- end products beyond the top five groups of goods imported from Rus sia cheap and

efficient Rus sian engines have been used to launch US rockets into space for about 16 years

(Figure 518) There was a serious po liti cal strug gle around a 2014 ban on the purchase of Rus sian

RD-180 rocket engines revealing the conflicting business interests of power ful high- tech companies

This restrictive mea sure was temporary and was quickly lifted because of significant cost impacts

and risks of disruption to launch schedules27 For the same reason the Sanctions Act does not autho-

rize ldquothe imposition of any sanction or other condition limitation restriction or prohibition that

directly or indirectly impedes the supply by any entity of the Rus sian Federation of any product or

ser vice or the procurement of such product or ser vice by any contractor or subcontractor of the

United States or any other entity relating to or in connection with any space launch conducted for

the National Aeronautics and Space Administration or any other nonndash Department of Defense

customerrdquo28

Nevertheless many experts believe that US domestic alternatives to replace Rus sian engines will

be viable in five to eight years

27 Ken Dilanian ldquoWhy Does the US Use Rus sian Rockets to Launch Its Satellitesrdquo NBC News updated November 15

2016 http wwwnbcnews com why - does - u - s - use - russian - rockets - launch - its - satellites - n588526

28 Countering Amer i carsquos Adversaries through Sanctions Act HR 3364

Figure 518 Spacecraft Excluding Military US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

0

$20000000

$40000000

$60000000

$80000000

$100000000

$120000000

$140000000

$160000000

$180000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 40 102017 404 PM

41

Diversity and technological complexity are the most vis i ble advantages supporting US exports to

Rus sia Three major groups of export goods include civilian aircraft engines and parts (Figure 61)

drilling and oil field equipment (Figure 62) and industrial machines and engines (Figure 63)

Despite sanctions against the transfer of advanced oil producing and pro cessing technologies the

realization of US drilling and oil field equipment in Rus sia is sustainable although some bilateral

proj ects have been frozen

Another category of goods that has demonstrated resilience is the phar ma ceu ti cal industry (Fig-

ure 64) because most drugs in Rus sia are imported (about 70 percent of the Rus sian phar ma ceu-

ti cal market in value) Import substitution policies have had only modest results in this industry

As confirmed by American Chamber of Commerce surveys US exports to Rus sia are closely

connected to US FDI 30 percent of total imports of US companies working in the Rus sian

market come from the United States (more than $2 billion in 2016) In other words about

40 percent of all US exports to Rus sia are related to a US corporate- sector business pro cess in

the country The major sectors of activity of these companies are energy and natu ral resources

(52 percent) manufacturing (17 percent) information and communications technology or ICT

(13 percent) retail (7 percent) automotive industry (6 percent) phar ma ceu ti cal production

(1 percent) professional ser vices (05 percent) and other (2 percent)1

Some obvious constraints on US exports to Rus sia have resulted from a reduction in demand A

deterioration of bilateral relations and implementation of sanctions and counter- sanctions have

directly or indirectly afected all businesses Figures 65 and 66 provide data regarding a dramatic

drop in the sale of US agricultural production in Rus sia with all other categories of exports in

goods showing big cuts as well (see Figures 67ndash69)

Exports of civilian aircraft engines and parts put the state of Washington in first place among

other states as a leading exporter to the Rus sian market (Figure 610)

1 American Chamber of Commerce in Rus sia ldquoInvestment and Import to Rus sia 2nd Surveyrdquo 13

Diversity and Constraints

06

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 41 102017 404 PM

Figure 61 US Exports of Civilian Aircraft Engines Equipment and Parts to Rus sia US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

$2500000000

$2000000000

$1500000000

$1000000000

$500000000

$-

Figure 62 US Exports of Drilling and Oil Field Equipment US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

0

$5000000

$10000000

$15000000

$20000000

$25000000

$30000000

$35000000

$40000000

$45000000

$50000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 42 102017 404 PM

Figure 63 US Exports of Industrial Engines to Rus sia US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

0

$5000000

$10000000

$15000000

$20000000

$25000000

$30000000

$35000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Figure 64 US Exports of Phar ma ceu ti cal Preparations to Rus sia US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

0

$5000000

$10000000

$15000000

$20000000

$25000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 43 102017 404 PM

Figure 65 US Exports of Meat and Poultry to Rus sia US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Meat poultry etc

$1000000000

$800000000

$600000000

$400000000

$200000000

$-

$1200000000

$1400000000

$1600000000

Figure 66 US Exports of Soybeans to Rus sia US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

0

$20000000

$40000000

$60000000

$80000000

$100000000

$120000000

$140000000

$160000000

$180000000

$200000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 44 102017 404 PM

Figure 67 US Exports of Vehicles Engines and Parts to Rus sia US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Other parts and accessories of vehicles

Automotive tires and tubes

Bodies and chassis for passenger cars

Engines and engine parts (carburetors pistonsrings and valves)

Trucks buses and special purpose vehicles

Passenger cars new and used

$2500000000

$2000000000

$1500000000

$500000000

$-

$1000000000

Figure 68 US Exports of Medicinal Equipment to Rus sia US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

$10000000

$15000000

$20000000

$25000000

$30000000

$35000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 45 102017 404 PM

Figure 610 US Exports to Rus sia by States (2016 US$ Value) Million US$ 2013ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoState and Metropolitan Area Trade Datardquo

Iowa Kentucky

North Dakota

Oklahoma

South Carolina

Washington

0

$500

$1000

$1500

$2000

2013 2014 2015 2016

District of Columbia

Iowa

Kentucky

North Dakota

Oklahoma

South Carolina

Washington

Figure 69 US Exports of Excavating Machinery to Rus sia US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

0

$5000000

$10000000

$15000000

$20000000

$25000000

$30000000

$35000000

$40000000

$45000000

$50000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 46 102017 404 PM

47

Upon reviewing the current trend in US- Russia economic relations we must acknowledge that

the existing trade model is obsolete and exhausted Imports are resource- oriented and reflect

constraints of the Rus sian economic structure while five groups of goodsmdash oil metals nuclear

fuels fertilizers and fishmdash make up more than 90 percent of total imports from Rus sia (Figure 71)

Each of these industries has a limited capacity for growth in the foreseeable future

Rus siarsquos core export to the United Statesmdash oilmdash will inevitably decrease in the mid- term under any

scenario The value and volume of Rus sian exports to the United States are open to global market

volatility and po liti cal pressures with limited hedging mechanisms

Overall US exports to Rus sia are unsustainable due to bilateral po liti cal tensions the whims of

commodity markets and changing domestic policies Sanctions and counter- sanctions have

created additional barriers particularly in finance banking high- tech energy and agro- business

According to the American Chamber of Commerce 69 percent of US companies working in the

country consider the impact of US sanctions against Rus sia on their business as negative At the

same time 60 percent of companies do not expect big changes in business relations between

Rus sia and the United States under Trump1 as the new law codifies existing sanctions fortifies

them and extends them to new sectors

Current US investments are low due to the weak rule of law in Rus sia a lack of property right

protections and proper contract enforcement high levels of statization and monopolization in the

economy a poor business climate outdated capital stock dependence on natural- resource

sectors and of course sanction and counter- sanction mea sures Bloated administrative compo-

nents created as risk mitigation instruments have also served as impediments The countryrsquos

institutional weakness low level of productivity bud get constraints and a declining inflexible

workforce will restrain future economic growth even if commodity prices recover Rus sian eco-

nomic policy will likely continue to be statist and protectionist relying mostly on import

substitutions

1 Ibid 11

Existing Trends and Future Scenarios

07

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 47 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations48

What scenarios can be expected in such a challenging environment

One probability (no peace no war) is based on the assumption that matters will not deteriorate

further and implementation of the Sanctions Act will be cursory This will cause relatively slow

degradation in the economic field with occasional flashes of activity in selected areas (eg closer

cooperation against Islamist terrorist groups in Syria)

A second worse case or critical scenario is the intensive and full- scale execution of current sanc-

tion legislation and even the imposition of new economic punitive and restrictive mea sures which

could incite asymmetric retaliatory actions and lead to the introduction of additional protectionist

policies This in turn could trigger a further escalation of mutual confrontation and could eventu-

ally destroy the fundamentals of the current bilateral trade system Rus sian leadership has charac-

terized the Sanctions Act as a declaration of a trade war that ends all hope for improving bilateral

relations2

2 Дмитрий Медведев ldquoПодписание президентом США нового санкционного закона против России создает несколько

последствийrdquo [The US Presidentrsquos signing of the package of new sanctions against Rus sia will have a few conse-

quences] Facebook August 2 2017 https wwwfacebook com Dmitry Medvedev posts 10154587161801851

Figure 71 US Imports from Rus sia Share of Oil Metals Nuclear Fuel Fertilizers and Fish Million US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

93

94

93

94

95

96

93

92

87

89

0

$5000

$10000

$15000

$20000

$25000

$30000

$35000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

US Imports from Russia

Share of Oil Metals Nuclear FuelFertilizers and Fish

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 48 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 49

The best case and most favorable scenario looks less probable now It assumes the realization of

structural reforms in Rus sia in such a way that would adapt Rus siarsquos foreign policy to national

economic needs reduce confrontations with the West and make a concerted efort to integrate

Rus sian businesses into global supply and value chains A revitalization of the structural reform

agendamdash including eforts to diversify economic activities through de- monopolization and support

for SMEs a restructuring of the banking sector the creation of a vibrant business climate to foster

entrepreneurships and innovation the implementation of administrative and judicial reforms to

tackle red tape and endemic corruption and the reduction of state control over key sectors of the

economy via wide- spread privatization could kick- start the development of a nonoil economy and

improve long- term growth prospects Despite ongoing discussion of reform strategies deep

economic and po liti cal changes are extremely complicated over the next po liti calelectoral cycle

(2018ndash2024) particularly because of re sis tance of vested interests and growing commodity prices

The urgency to tackle structural shortcomings in natu ral resource- dependent economies usually

correlates with the price of those resources and the degree to which resource rents drive eco-

nomic activity However there may be marginal improvements in the efficiency of the current

economic system

Future US- Russia relations can be thought of through three pillars one pillar focuses on areas

where both countries maintain a competitive rivalry another looks at potential areas of interaction

under pres ent conditions a third pillar and one that has evaporated from the current bilateral

agenda concentrates on future cooperation Stronger economic ties could not only be a kind of

po liti cal shock absorber but contribute to the building of this future (particularly business contacts

aim to support future structural reforms) although po liti cal factors are depressing the prospects

for cooperation To escape deadlock it will be impor tant to establish the right balance between

politics and economics and create a model of collaboration within the framework of contention

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 49 102017 404 PM

About the Author

Vadim Grishin PhD MBA has been involved in the reform pro cess in Rus sia as adviser to the

deputy prime minister of Rus sia in 1992ndash1993 and 2006ndash2010 He has extensive experience

working with the Bretton Woods Institutions He was the board member of the World Bank Group

and served as se nior adviser at the International Monetary Fund Currently he is a con sul tant to the

chief economistrsquos office of the International Finance Corporation and teaches the economics of

transition at Georgetown University in Washington DC

50

594-71613_ch99_4Pindd 50 102017 403 PM

Blank

COVER PHOTO ADOBE STOCK

1616 Rhode Island Avenue NW

Washington DC 20036

202 887 0200 | wwwcsisorg

v++ISBN 978-1-4422-8035-9

Lanham bull Boulder bull New York bull London

4501 Forbes Boulevard

Lanham MD 20706

301 459 3366 | wwwrowmancom

A U T H O R

Vadim Grishin

Myths and Realities

A Report of the

CSIS RUSSIA AND EURASIA PROGRAM

US-RussiaEconomicRelations

O C T O B E R 2 0 1 7

Euml|xHSLEOCy280359z

The Man Pupu Nyor Rock Formations at the Northern Urals also known as Seven

Strong Man or Little Mountain of the God in the local tribe (Mansi) language

Page 44: U.S.-Russia Economic Relations: Myths and Realities · 2020-04-17 · OCTOBER 2017 U.S.- Russia Economic Relations Myths and Realities AUTHOR Vadim Grishin A REPORT OF THE CSIS RUSSIA

Figure 515 US Imports from Rus sia Chemical- Fertilizers US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

S-

$200000000

$400000000

$600000000

$800000000

$1000000000

$1200000000

$1400000000

$1600000000

$1800000000

$2000000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Figure 516 US Exports to Rus sia Fish and Shellfish US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

0

$10000000

$20000000

$30000000

$40000000

$50000000

$60000000

$70000000

$80000000

$90000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Fish and shellfish

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 38 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 39

consumer market caused by Rus siarsquos import ban but it has failed As result the group most af-

fected by the self- imposed counter- sanctions were Rus sian consumers

With a significant drop in fish imports a devaluation of the ruble and inflationary pressures on

seafood prices yearly consumption of fish in Rus sia has declined precipitously In 2015 alone

fish prices increased 20 percent and consumption dropped to 14 kilograms per person24 from

22 kilograms in 201425 In 2016 food rose to 355 percent of house hold expenditure as a result of

increases in food prices26 This has pushed vertically integrated fishing monopolies to sell even

more of their catch abroad rather than deliver to the Rus sian Federation (Figure 517) Thus we

cannot exclude the possibility of further growth in US fish and shellfish imports from Rus sia on a

marginal scale

24 Александр Савельев ldquoПотребление рыбы в России упало до 14 кг на человекаrdquo [Fish consumption in Rus sia fell to

14 kg per person] Экономика Интерфакс January 28 2015 http wwwinterfax ru business 492038

25 Илья Шестаков ldquoПотебление рыбы в России снизилось на 10 процентов из- за роста ценrdquo [Fish consumption in

Rus sia dropped by 10 percent due to price increases] RNS March 8 2017 https rnsonline consumer - market

Potreblenie - ribi - v - Rossii - snizilos - na - 10 - iz - za - rosta - tsen - 2017 - 03 - 08

26 Zoya Sheftalovich and Christian Oliver ldquoRus siarsquos Boom (Farming) Economyrdquo Politico November 8 2016 http

wwwpolitico eu article russias - boom - farming - economy

Figure 517 US Imports from Rus sia Fish and Shellfish US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

0

$50000000

$100000000

$150000000

$200000000

$250000000

$300000000

$350000000

$400000000

$450000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 39 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations40

SPACE ODYSSEY

Among high- end products beyond the top five groups of goods imported from Rus sia cheap and

efficient Rus sian engines have been used to launch US rockets into space for about 16 years

(Figure 518) There was a serious po liti cal strug gle around a 2014 ban on the purchase of Rus sian

RD-180 rocket engines revealing the conflicting business interests of power ful high- tech companies

This restrictive mea sure was temporary and was quickly lifted because of significant cost impacts

and risks of disruption to launch schedules27 For the same reason the Sanctions Act does not autho-

rize ldquothe imposition of any sanction or other condition limitation restriction or prohibition that

directly or indirectly impedes the supply by any entity of the Rus sian Federation of any product or

ser vice or the procurement of such product or ser vice by any contractor or subcontractor of the

United States or any other entity relating to or in connection with any space launch conducted for

the National Aeronautics and Space Administration or any other nonndash Department of Defense

customerrdquo28

Nevertheless many experts believe that US domestic alternatives to replace Rus sian engines will

be viable in five to eight years

27 Ken Dilanian ldquoWhy Does the US Use Rus sian Rockets to Launch Its Satellitesrdquo NBC News updated November 15

2016 http wwwnbcnews com why - does - u - s - use - russian - rockets - launch - its - satellites - n588526

28 Countering Amer i carsquos Adversaries through Sanctions Act HR 3364

Figure 518 Spacecraft Excluding Military US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

0

$20000000

$40000000

$60000000

$80000000

$100000000

$120000000

$140000000

$160000000

$180000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 40 102017 404 PM

41

Diversity and technological complexity are the most vis i ble advantages supporting US exports to

Rus sia Three major groups of export goods include civilian aircraft engines and parts (Figure 61)

drilling and oil field equipment (Figure 62) and industrial machines and engines (Figure 63)

Despite sanctions against the transfer of advanced oil producing and pro cessing technologies the

realization of US drilling and oil field equipment in Rus sia is sustainable although some bilateral

proj ects have been frozen

Another category of goods that has demonstrated resilience is the phar ma ceu ti cal industry (Fig-

ure 64) because most drugs in Rus sia are imported (about 70 percent of the Rus sian phar ma ceu-

ti cal market in value) Import substitution policies have had only modest results in this industry

As confirmed by American Chamber of Commerce surveys US exports to Rus sia are closely

connected to US FDI 30 percent of total imports of US companies working in the Rus sian

market come from the United States (more than $2 billion in 2016) In other words about

40 percent of all US exports to Rus sia are related to a US corporate- sector business pro cess in

the country The major sectors of activity of these companies are energy and natu ral resources

(52 percent) manufacturing (17 percent) information and communications technology or ICT

(13 percent) retail (7 percent) automotive industry (6 percent) phar ma ceu ti cal production

(1 percent) professional ser vices (05 percent) and other (2 percent)1

Some obvious constraints on US exports to Rus sia have resulted from a reduction in demand A

deterioration of bilateral relations and implementation of sanctions and counter- sanctions have

directly or indirectly afected all businesses Figures 65 and 66 provide data regarding a dramatic

drop in the sale of US agricultural production in Rus sia with all other categories of exports in

goods showing big cuts as well (see Figures 67ndash69)

Exports of civilian aircraft engines and parts put the state of Washington in first place among

other states as a leading exporter to the Rus sian market (Figure 610)

1 American Chamber of Commerce in Rus sia ldquoInvestment and Import to Rus sia 2nd Surveyrdquo 13

Diversity and Constraints

06

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 41 102017 404 PM

Figure 61 US Exports of Civilian Aircraft Engines Equipment and Parts to Rus sia US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

$2500000000

$2000000000

$1500000000

$1000000000

$500000000

$-

Figure 62 US Exports of Drilling and Oil Field Equipment US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

0

$5000000

$10000000

$15000000

$20000000

$25000000

$30000000

$35000000

$40000000

$45000000

$50000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 42 102017 404 PM

Figure 63 US Exports of Industrial Engines to Rus sia US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

0

$5000000

$10000000

$15000000

$20000000

$25000000

$30000000

$35000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Figure 64 US Exports of Phar ma ceu ti cal Preparations to Rus sia US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

0

$5000000

$10000000

$15000000

$20000000

$25000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 43 102017 404 PM

Figure 65 US Exports of Meat and Poultry to Rus sia US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Meat poultry etc

$1000000000

$800000000

$600000000

$400000000

$200000000

$-

$1200000000

$1400000000

$1600000000

Figure 66 US Exports of Soybeans to Rus sia US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

0

$20000000

$40000000

$60000000

$80000000

$100000000

$120000000

$140000000

$160000000

$180000000

$200000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 44 102017 404 PM

Figure 67 US Exports of Vehicles Engines and Parts to Rus sia US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Other parts and accessories of vehicles

Automotive tires and tubes

Bodies and chassis for passenger cars

Engines and engine parts (carburetors pistonsrings and valves)

Trucks buses and special purpose vehicles

Passenger cars new and used

$2500000000

$2000000000

$1500000000

$500000000

$-

$1000000000

Figure 68 US Exports of Medicinal Equipment to Rus sia US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

$10000000

$15000000

$20000000

$25000000

$30000000

$35000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 45 102017 404 PM

Figure 610 US Exports to Rus sia by States (2016 US$ Value) Million US$ 2013ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoState and Metropolitan Area Trade Datardquo

Iowa Kentucky

North Dakota

Oklahoma

South Carolina

Washington

0

$500

$1000

$1500

$2000

2013 2014 2015 2016

District of Columbia

Iowa

Kentucky

North Dakota

Oklahoma

South Carolina

Washington

Figure 69 US Exports of Excavating Machinery to Rus sia US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

0

$5000000

$10000000

$15000000

$20000000

$25000000

$30000000

$35000000

$40000000

$45000000

$50000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 46 102017 404 PM

47

Upon reviewing the current trend in US- Russia economic relations we must acknowledge that

the existing trade model is obsolete and exhausted Imports are resource- oriented and reflect

constraints of the Rus sian economic structure while five groups of goodsmdash oil metals nuclear

fuels fertilizers and fishmdash make up more than 90 percent of total imports from Rus sia (Figure 71)

Each of these industries has a limited capacity for growth in the foreseeable future

Rus siarsquos core export to the United Statesmdash oilmdash will inevitably decrease in the mid- term under any

scenario The value and volume of Rus sian exports to the United States are open to global market

volatility and po liti cal pressures with limited hedging mechanisms

Overall US exports to Rus sia are unsustainable due to bilateral po liti cal tensions the whims of

commodity markets and changing domestic policies Sanctions and counter- sanctions have

created additional barriers particularly in finance banking high- tech energy and agro- business

According to the American Chamber of Commerce 69 percent of US companies working in the

country consider the impact of US sanctions against Rus sia on their business as negative At the

same time 60 percent of companies do not expect big changes in business relations between

Rus sia and the United States under Trump1 as the new law codifies existing sanctions fortifies

them and extends them to new sectors

Current US investments are low due to the weak rule of law in Rus sia a lack of property right

protections and proper contract enforcement high levels of statization and monopolization in the

economy a poor business climate outdated capital stock dependence on natural- resource

sectors and of course sanction and counter- sanction mea sures Bloated administrative compo-

nents created as risk mitigation instruments have also served as impediments The countryrsquos

institutional weakness low level of productivity bud get constraints and a declining inflexible

workforce will restrain future economic growth even if commodity prices recover Rus sian eco-

nomic policy will likely continue to be statist and protectionist relying mostly on import

substitutions

1 Ibid 11

Existing Trends and Future Scenarios

07

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 47 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations48

What scenarios can be expected in such a challenging environment

One probability (no peace no war) is based on the assumption that matters will not deteriorate

further and implementation of the Sanctions Act will be cursory This will cause relatively slow

degradation in the economic field with occasional flashes of activity in selected areas (eg closer

cooperation against Islamist terrorist groups in Syria)

A second worse case or critical scenario is the intensive and full- scale execution of current sanc-

tion legislation and even the imposition of new economic punitive and restrictive mea sures which

could incite asymmetric retaliatory actions and lead to the introduction of additional protectionist

policies This in turn could trigger a further escalation of mutual confrontation and could eventu-

ally destroy the fundamentals of the current bilateral trade system Rus sian leadership has charac-

terized the Sanctions Act as a declaration of a trade war that ends all hope for improving bilateral

relations2

2 Дмитрий Медведев ldquoПодписание президентом США нового санкционного закона против России создает несколько

последствийrdquo [The US Presidentrsquos signing of the package of new sanctions against Rus sia will have a few conse-

quences] Facebook August 2 2017 https wwwfacebook com Dmitry Medvedev posts 10154587161801851

Figure 71 US Imports from Rus sia Share of Oil Metals Nuclear Fuel Fertilizers and Fish Million US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

93

94

93

94

95

96

93

92

87

89

0

$5000

$10000

$15000

$20000

$25000

$30000

$35000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

US Imports from Russia

Share of Oil Metals Nuclear FuelFertilizers and Fish

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 48 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 49

The best case and most favorable scenario looks less probable now It assumes the realization of

structural reforms in Rus sia in such a way that would adapt Rus siarsquos foreign policy to national

economic needs reduce confrontations with the West and make a concerted efort to integrate

Rus sian businesses into global supply and value chains A revitalization of the structural reform

agendamdash including eforts to diversify economic activities through de- monopolization and support

for SMEs a restructuring of the banking sector the creation of a vibrant business climate to foster

entrepreneurships and innovation the implementation of administrative and judicial reforms to

tackle red tape and endemic corruption and the reduction of state control over key sectors of the

economy via wide- spread privatization could kick- start the development of a nonoil economy and

improve long- term growth prospects Despite ongoing discussion of reform strategies deep

economic and po liti cal changes are extremely complicated over the next po liti calelectoral cycle

(2018ndash2024) particularly because of re sis tance of vested interests and growing commodity prices

The urgency to tackle structural shortcomings in natu ral resource- dependent economies usually

correlates with the price of those resources and the degree to which resource rents drive eco-

nomic activity However there may be marginal improvements in the efficiency of the current

economic system

Future US- Russia relations can be thought of through three pillars one pillar focuses on areas

where both countries maintain a competitive rivalry another looks at potential areas of interaction

under pres ent conditions a third pillar and one that has evaporated from the current bilateral

agenda concentrates on future cooperation Stronger economic ties could not only be a kind of

po liti cal shock absorber but contribute to the building of this future (particularly business contacts

aim to support future structural reforms) although po liti cal factors are depressing the prospects

for cooperation To escape deadlock it will be impor tant to establish the right balance between

politics and economics and create a model of collaboration within the framework of contention

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 49 102017 404 PM

About the Author

Vadim Grishin PhD MBA has been involved in the reform pro cess in Rus sia as adviser to the

deputy prime minister of Rus sia in 1992ndash1993 and 2006ndash2010 He has extensive experience

working with the Bretton Woods Institutions He was the board member of the World Bank Group

and served as se nior adviser at the International Monetary Fund Currently he is a con sul tant to the

chief economistrsquos office of the International Finance Corporation and teaches the economics of

transition at Georgetown University in Washington DC

50

594-71613_ch99_4Pindd 50 102017 403 PM

Blank

COVER PHOTO ADOBE STOCK

1616 Rhode Island Avenue NW

Washington DC 20036

202 887 0200 | wwwcsisorg

v++ISBN 978-1-4422-8035-9

Lanham bull Boulder bull New York bull London

4501 Forbes Boulevard

Lanham MD 20706

301 459 3366 | wwwrowmancom

A U T H O R

Vadim Grishin

Myths and Realities

A Report of the

CSIS RUSSIA AND EURASIA PROGRAM

US-RussiaEconomicRelations

O C T O B E R 2 0 1 7

Euml|xHSLEOCy280359z

The Man Pupu Nyor Rock Formations at the Northern Urals also known as Seven

Strong Man or Little Mountain of the God in the local tribe (Mansi) language

Page 45: U.S.-Russia Economic Relations: Myths and Realities · 2020-04-17 · OCTOBER 2017 U.S.- Russia Economic Relations Myths and Realities AUTHOR Vadim Grishin A REPORT OF THE CSIS RUSSIA

Vadim Grishin 39

consumer market caused by Rus siarsquos import ban but it has failed As result the group most af-

fected by the self- imposed counter- sanctions were Rus sian consumers

With a significant drop in fish imports a devaluation of the ruble and inflationary pressures on

seafood prices yearly consumption of fish in Rus sia has declined precipitously In 2015 alone

fish prices increased 20 percent and consumption dropped to 14 kilograms per person24 from

22 kilograms in 201425 In 2016 food rose to 355 percent of house hold expenditure as a result of

increases in food prices26 This has pushed vertically integrated fishing monopolies to sell even

more of their catch abroad rather than deliver to the Rus sian Federation (Figure 517) Thus we

cannot exclude the possibility of further growth in US fish and shellfish imports from Rus sia on a

marginal scale

24 Александр Савельев ldquoПотребление рыбы в России упало до 14 кг на человекаrdquo [Fish consumption in Rus sia fell to

14 kg per person] Экономика Интерфакс January 28 2015 http wwwinterfax ru business 492038

25 Илья Шестаков ldquoПотебление рыбы в России снизилось на 10 процентов из- за роста ценrdquo [Fish consumption in

Rus sia dropped by 10 percent due to price increases] RNS March 8 2017 https rnsonline consumer - market

Potreblenie - ribi - v - Rossii - snizilos - na - 10 - iz - za - rosta - tsen - 2017 - 03 - 08

26 Zoya Sheftalovich and Christian Oliver ldquoRus siarsquos Boom (Farming) Economyrdquo Politico November 8 2016 http

wwwpolitico eu article russias - boom - farming - economy

Figure 517 US Imports from Rus sia Fish and Shellfish US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

0

$50000000

$100000000

$150000000

$200000000

$250000000

$300000000

$350000000

$400000000

$450000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 39 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations40

SPACE ODYSSEY

Among high- end products beyond the top five groups of goods imported from Rus sia cheap and

efficient Rus sian engines have been used to launch US rockets into space for about 16 years

(Figure 518) There was a serious po liti cal strug gle around a 2014 ban on the purchase of Rus sian

RD-180 rocket engines revealing the conflicting business interests of power ful high- tech companies

This restrictive mea sure was temporary and was quickly lifted because of significant cost impacts

and risks of disruption to launch schedules27 For the same reason the Sanctions Act does not autho-

rize ldquothe imposition of any sanction or other condition limitation restriction or prohibition that

directly or indirectly impedes the supply by any entity of the Rus sian Federation of any product or

ser vice or the procurement of such product or ser vice by any contractor or subcontractor of the

United States or any other entity relating to or in connection with any space launch conducted for

the National Aeronautics and Space Administration or any other nonndash Department of Defense

customerrdquo28

Nevertheless many experts believe that US domestic alternatives to replace Rus sian engines will

be viable in five to eight years

27 Ken Dilanian ldquoWhy Does the US Use Rus sian Rockets to Launch Its Satellitesrdquo NBC News updated November 15

2016 http wwwnbcnews com why - does - u - s - use - russian - rockets - launch - its - satellites - n588526

28 Countering Amer i carsquos Adversaries through Sanctions Act HR 3364

Figure 518 Spacecraft Excluding Military US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

0

$20000000

$40000000

$60000000

$80000000

$100000000

$120000000

$140000000

$160000000

$180000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 40 102017 404 PM

41

Diversity and technological complexity are the most vis i ble advantages supporting US exports to

Rus sia Three major groups of export goods include civilian aircraft engines and parts (Figure 61)

drilling and oil field equipment (Figure 62) and industrial machines and engines (Figure 63)

Despite sanctions against the transfer of advanced oil producing and pro cessing technologies the

realization of US drilling and oil field equipment in Rus sia is sustainable although some bilateral

proj ects have been frozen

Another category of goods that has demonstrated resilience is the phar ma ceu ti cal industry (Fig-

ure 64) because most drugs in Rus sia are imported (about 70 percent of the Rus sian phar ma ceu-

ti cal market in value) Import substitution policies have had only modest results in this industry

As confirmed by American Chamber of Commerce surveys US exports to Rus sia are closely

connected to US FDI 30 percent of total imports of US companies working in the Rus sian

market come from the United States (more than $2 billion in 2016) In other words about

40 percent of all US exports to Rus sia are related to a US corporate- sector business pro cess in

the country The major sectors of activity of these companies are energy and natu ral resources

(52 percent) manufacturing (17 percent) information and communications technology or ICT

(13 percent) retail (7 percent) automotive industry (6 percent) phar ma ceu ti cal production

(1 percent) professional ser vices (05 percent) and other (2 percent)1

Some obvious constraints on US exports to Rus sia have resulted from a reduction in demand A

deterioration of bilateral relations and implementation of sanctions and counter- sanctions have

directly or indirectly afected all businesses Figures 65 and 66 provide data regarding a dramatic

drop in the sale of US agricultural production in Rus sia with all other categories of exports in

goods showing big cuts as well (see Figures 67ndash69)

Exports of civilian aircraft engines and parts put the state of Washington in first place among

other states as a leading exporter to the Rus sian market (Figure 610)

1 American Chamber of Commerce in Rus sia ldquoInvestment and Import to Rus sia 2nd Surveyrdquo 13

Diversity and Constraints

06

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 41 102017 404 PM

Figure 61 US Exports of Civilian Aircraft Engines Equipment and Parts to Rus sia US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

$2500000000

$2000000000

$1500000000

$1000000000

$500000000

$-

Figure 62 US Exports of Drilling and Oil Field Equipment US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

0

$5000000

$10000000

$15000000

$20000000

$25000000

$30000000

$35000000

$40000000

$45000000

$50000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 42 102017 404 PM

Figure 63 US Exports of Industrial Engines to Rus sia US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

0

$5000000

$10000000

$15000000

$20000000

$25000000

$30000000

$35000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Figure 64 US Exports of Phar ma ceu ti cal Preparations to Rus sia US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

0

$5000000

$10000000

$15000000

$20000000

$25000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 43 102017 404 PM

Figure 65 US Exports of Meat and Poultry to Rus sia US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Meat poultry etc

$1000000000

$800000000

$600000000

$400000000

$200000000

$-

$1200000000

$1400000000

$1600000000

Figure 66 US Exports of Soybeans to Rus sia US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

0

$20000000

$40000000

$60000000

$80000000

$100000000

$120000000

$140000000

$160000000

$180000000

$200000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 44 102017 404 PM

Figure 67 US Exports of Vehicles Engines and Parts to Rus sia US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Other parts and accessories of vehicles

Automotive tires and tubes

Bodies and chassis for passenger cars

Engines and engine parts (carburetors pistonsrings and valves)

Trucks buses and special purpose vehicles

Passenger cars new and used

$2500000000

$2000000000

$1500000000

$500000000

$-

$1000000000

Figure 68 US Exports of Medicinal Equipment to Rus sia US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

$10000000

$15000000

$20000000

$25000000

$30000000

$35000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 45 102017 404 PM

Figure 610 US Exports to Rus sia by States (2016 US$ Value) Million US$ 2013ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoState and Metropolitan Area Trade Datardquo

Iowa Kentucky

North Dakota

Oklahoma

South Carolina

Washington

0

$500

$1000

$1500

$2000

2013 2014 2015 2016

District of Columbia

Iowa

Kentucky

North Dakota

Oklahoma

South Carolina

Washington

Figure 69 US Exports of Excavating Machinery to Rus sia US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

0

$5000000

$10000000

$15000000

$20000000

$25000000

$30000000

$35000000

$40000000

$45000000

$50000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 46 102017 404 PM

47

Upon reviewing the current trend in US- Russia economic relations we must acknowledge that

the existing trade model is obsolete and exhausted Imports are resource- oriented and reflect

constraints of the Rus sian economic structure while five groups of goodsmdash oil metals nuclear

fuels fertilizers and fishmdash make up more than 90 percent of total imports from Rus sia (Figure 71)

Each of these industries has a limited capacity for growth in the foreseeable future

Rus siarsquos core export to the United Statesmdash oilmdash will inevitably decrease in the mid- term under any

scenario The value and volume of Rus sian exports to the United States are open to global market

volatility and po liti cal pressures with limited hedging mechanisms

Overall US exports to Rus sia are unsustainable due to bilateral po liti cal tensions the whims of

commodity markets and changing domestic policies Sanctions and counter- sanctions have

created additional barriers particularly in finance banking high- tech energy and agro- business

According to the American Chamber of Commerce 69 percent of US companies working in the

country consider the impact of US sanctions against Rus sia on their business as negative At the

same time 60 percent of companies do not expect big changes in business relations between

Rus sia and the United States under Trump1 as the new law codifies existing sanctions fortifies

them and extends them to new sectors

Current US investments are low due to the weak rule of law in Rus sia a lack of property right

protections and proper contract enforcement high levels of statization and monopolization in the

economy a poor business climate outdated capital stock dependence on natural- resource

sectors and of course sanction and counter- sanction mea sures Bloated administrative compo-

nents created as risk mitigation instruments have also served as impediments The countryrsquos

institutional weakness low level of productivity bud get constraints and a declining inflexible

workforce will restrain future economic growth even if commodity prices recover Rus sian eco-

nomic policy will likely continue to be statist and protectionist relying mostly on import

substitutions

1 Ibid 11

Existing Trends and Future Scenarios

07

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 47 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations48

What scenarios can be expected in such a challenging environment

One probability (no peace no war) is based on the assumption that matters will not deteriorate

further and implementation of the Sanctions Act will be cursory This will cause relatively slow

degradation in the economic field with occasional flashes of activity in selected areas (eg closer

cooperation against Islamist terrorist groups in Syria)

A second worse case or critical scenario is the intensive and full- scale execution of current sanc-

tion legislation and even the imposition of new economic punitive and restrictive mea sures which

could incite asymmetric retaliatory actions and lead to the introduction of additional protectionist

policies This in turn could trigger a further escalation of mutual confrontation and could eventu-

ally destroy the fundamentals of the current bilateral trade system Rus sian leadership has charac-

terized the Sanctions Act as a declaration of a trade war that ends all hope for improving bilateral

relations2

2 Дмитрий Медведев ldquoПодписание президентом США нового санкционного закона против России создает несколько

последствийrdquo [The US Presidentrsquos signing of the package of new sanctions against Rus sia will have a few conse-

quences] Facebook August 2 2017 https wwwfacebook com Dmitry Medvedev posts 10154587161801851

Figure 71 US Imports from Rus sia Share of Oil Metals Nuclear Fuel Fertilizers and Fish Million US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

93

94

93

94

95

96

93

92

87

89

0

$5000

$10000

$15000

$20000

$25000

$30000

$35000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

US Imports from Russia

Share of Oil Metals Nuclear FuelFertilizers and Fish

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 48 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 49

The best case and most favorable scenario looks less probable now It assumes the realization of

structural reforms in Rus sia in such a way that would adapt Rus siarsquos foreign policy to national

economic needs reduce confrontations with the West and make a concerted efort to integrate

Rus sian businesses into global supply and value chains A revitalization of the structural reform

agendamdash including eforts to diversify economic activities through de- monopolization and support

for SMEs a restructuring of the banking sector the creation of a vibrant business climate to foster

entrepreneurships and innovation the implementation of administrative and judicial reforms to

tackle red tape and endemic corruption and the reduction of state control over key sectors of the

economy via wide- spread privatization could kick- start the development of a nonoil economy and

improve long- term growth prospects Despite ongoing discussion of reform strategies deep

economic and po liti cal changes are extremely complicated over the next po liti calelectoral cycle

(2018ndash2024) particularly because of re sis tance of vested interests and growing commodity prices

The urgency to tackle structural shortcomings in natu ral resource- dependent economies usually

correlates with the price of those resources and the degree to which resource rents drive eco-

nomic activity However there may be marginal improvements in the efficiency of the current

economic system

Future US- Russia relations can be thought of through three pillars one pillar focuses on areas

where both countries maintain a competitive rivalry another looks at potential areas of interaction

under pres ent conditions a third pillar and one that has evaporated from the current bilateral

agenda concentrates on future cooperation Stronger economic ties could not only be a kind of

po liti cal shock absorber but contribute to the building of this future (particularly business contacts

aim to support future structural reforms) although po liti cal factors are depressing the prospects

for cooperation To escape deadlock it will be impor tant to establish the right balance between

politics and economics and create a model of collaboration within the framework of contention

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 49 102017 404 PM

About the Author

Vadim Grishin PhD MBA has been involved in the reform pro cess in Rus sia as adviser to the

deputy prime minister of Rus sia in 1992ndash1993 and 2006ndash2010 He has extensive experience

working with the Bretton Woods Institutions He was the board member of the World Bank Group

and served as se nior adviser at the International Monetary Fund Currently he is a con sul tant to the

chief economistrsquos office of the International Finance Corporation and teaches the economics of

transition at Georgetown University in Washington DC

50

594-71613_ch99_4Pindd 50 102017 403 PM

Blank

COVER PHOTO ADOBE STOCK

1616 Rhode Island Avenue NW

Washington DC 20036

202 887 0200 | wwwcsisorg

v++ISBN 978-1-4422-8035-9

Lanham bull Boulder bull New York bull London

4501 Forbes Boulevard

Lanham MD 20706

301 459 3366 | wwwrowmancom

A U T H O R

Vadim Grishin

Myths and Realities

A Report of the

CSIS RUSSIA AND EURASIA PROGRAM

US-RussiaEconomicRelations

O C T O B E R 2 0 1 7

Euml|xHSLEOCy280359z

The Man Pupu Nyor Rock Formations at the Northern Urals also known as Seven

Strong Man or Little Mountain of the God in the local tribe (Mansi) language

Page 46: U.S.-Russia Economic Relations: Myths and Realities · 2020-04-17 · OCTOBER 2017 U.S.- Russia Economic Relations Myths and Realities AUTHOR Vadim Grishin A REPORT OF THE CSIS RUSSIA

US-Russia Economic Relations40

SPACE ODYSSEY

Among high- end products beyond the top five groups of goods imported from Rus sia cheap and

efficient Rus sian engines have been used to launch US rockets into space for about 16 years

(Figure 518) There was a serious po liti cal strug gle around a 2014 ban on the purchase of Rus sian

RD-180 rocket engines revealing the conflicting business interests of power ful high- tech companies

This restrictive mea sure was temporary and was quickly lifted because of significant cost impacts

and risks of disruption to launch schedules27 For the same reason the Sanctions Act does not autho-

rize ldquothe imposition of any sanction or other condition limitation restriction or prohibition that

directly or indirectly impedes the supply by any entity of the Rus sian Federation of any product or

ser vice or the procurement of such product or ser vice by any contractor or subcontractor of the

United States or any other entity relating to or in connection with any space launch conducted for

the National Aeronautics and Space Administration or any other nonndash Department of Defense

customerrdquo28

Nevertheless many experts believe that US domestic alternatives to replace Rus sian engines will

be viable in five to eight years

27 Ken Dilanian ldquoWhy Does the US Use Rus sian Rockets to Launch Its Satellitesrdquo NBC News updated November 15

2016 http wwwnbcnews com why - does - u - s - use - russian - rockets - launch - its - satellites - n588526

28 Countering Amer i carsquos Adversaries through Sanctions Act HR 3364

Figure 518 Spacecraft Excluding Military US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

0

$20000000

$40000000

$60000000

$80000000

$100000000

$120000000

$140000000

$160000000

$180000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 40 102017 404 PM

41

Diversity and technological complexity are the most vis i ble advantages supporting US exports to

Rus sia Three major groups of export goods include civilian aircraft engines and parts (Figure 61)

drilling and oil field equipment (Figure 62) and industrial machines and engines (Figure 63)

Despite sanctions against the transfer of advanced oil producing and pro cessing technologies the

realization of US drilling and oil field equipment in Rus sia is sustainable although some bilateral

proj ects have been frozen

Another category of goods that has demonstrated resilience is the phar ma ceu ti cal industry (Fig-

ure 64) because most drugs in Rus sia are imported (about 70 percent of the Rus sian phar ma ceu-

ti cal market in value) Import substitution policies have had only modest results in this industry

As confirmed by American Chamber of Commerce surveys US exports to Rus sia are closely

connected to US FDI 30 percent of total imports of US companies working in the Rus sian

market come from the United States (more than $2 billion in 2016) In other words about

40 percent of all US exports to Rus sia are related to a US corporate- sector business pro cess in

the country The major sectors of activity of these companies are energy and natu ral resources

(52 percent) manufacturing (17 percent) information and communications technology or ICT

(13 percent) retail (7 percent) automotive industry (6 percent) phar ma ceu ti cal production

(1 percent) professional ser vices (05 percent) and other (2 percent)1

Some obvious constraints on US exports to Rus sia have resulted from a reduction in demand A

deterioration of bilateral relations and implementation of sanctions and counter- sanctions have

directly or indirectly afected all businesses Figures 65 and 66 provide data regarding a dramatic

drop in the sale of US agricultural production in Rus sia with all other categories of exports in

goods showing big cuts as well (see Figures 67ndash69)

Exports of civilian aircraft engines and parts put the state of Washington in first place among

other states as a leading exporter to the Rus sian market (Figure 610)

1 American Chamber of Commerce in Rus sia ldquoInvestment and Import to Rus sia 2nd Surveyrdquo 13

Diversity and Constraints

06

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 41 102017 404 PM

Figure 61 US Exports of Civilian Aircraft Engines Equipment and Parts to Rus sia US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

$2500000000

$2000000000

$1500000000

$1000000000

$500000000

$-

Figure 62 US Exports of Drilling and Oil Field Equipment US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

0

$5000000

$10000000

$15000000

$20000000

$25000000

$30000000

$35000000

$40000000

$45000000

$50000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 42 102017 404 PM

Figure 63 US Exports of Industrial Engines to Rus sia US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

0

$5000000

$10000000

$15000000

$20000000

$25000000

$30000000

$35000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Figure 64 US Exports of Phar ma ceu ti cal Preparations to Rus sia US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

0

$5000000

$10000000

$15000000

$20000000

$25000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 43 102017 404 PM

Figure 65 US Exports of Meat and Poultry to Rus sia US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Meat poultry etc

$1000000000

$800000000

$600000000

$400000000

$200000000

$-

$1200000000

$1400000000

$1600000000

Figure 66 US Exports of Soybeans to Rus sia US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

0

$20000000

$40000000

$60000000

$80000000

$100000000

$120000000

$140000000

$160000000

$180000000

$200000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 44 102017 404 PM

Figure 67 US Exports of Vehicles Engines and Parts to Rus sia US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Other parts and accessories of vehicles

Automotive tires and tubes

Bodies and chassis for passenger cars

Engines and engine parts (carburetors pistonsrings and valves)

Trucks buses and special purpose vehicles

Passenger cars new and used

$2500000000

$2000000000

$1500000000

$500000000

$-

$1000000000

Figure 68 US Exports of Medicinal Equipment to Rus sia US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

$10000000

$15000000

$20000000

$25000000

$30000000

$35000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 45 102017 404 PM

Figure 610 US Exports to Rus sia by States (2016 US$ Value) Million US$ 2013ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoState and Metropolitan Area Trade Datardquo

Iowa Kentucky

North Dakota

Oklahoma

South Carolina

Washington

0

$500

$1000

$1500

$2000

2013 2014 2015 2016

District of Columbia

Iowa

Kentucky

North Dakota

Oklahoma

South Carolina

Washington

Figure 69 US Exports of Excavating Machinery to Rus sia US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

0

$5000000

$10000000

$15000000

$20000000

$25000000

$30000000

$35000000

$40000000

$45000000

$50000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 46 102017 404 PM

47

Upon reviewing the current trend in US- Russia economic relations we must acknowledge that

the existing trade model is obsolete and exhausted Imports are resource- oriented and reflect

constraints of the Rus sian economic structure while five groups of goodsmdash oil metals nuclear

fuels fertilizers and fishmdash make up more than 90 percent of total imports from Rus sia (Figure 71)

Each of these industries has a limited capacity for growth in the foreseeable future

Rus siarsquos core export to the United Statesmdash oilmdash will inevitably decrease in the mid- term under any

scenario The value and volume of Rus sian exports to the United States are open to global market

volatility and po liti cal pressures with limited hedging mechanisms

Overall US exports to Rus sia are unsustainable due to bilateral po liti cal tensions the whims of

commodity markets and changing domestic policies Sanctions and counter- sanctions have

created additional barriers particularly in finance banking high- tech energy and agro- business

According to the American Chamber of Commerce 69 percent of US companies working in the

country consider the impact of US sanctions against Rus sia on their business as negative At the

same time 60 percent of companies do not expect big changes in business relations between

Rus sia and the United States under Trump1 as the new law codifies existing sanctions fortifies

them and extends them to new sectors

Current US investments are low due to the weak rule of law in Rus sia a lack of property right

protections and proper contract enforcement high levels of statization and monopolization in the

economy a poor business climate outdated capital stock dependence on natural- resource

sectors and of course sanction and counter- sanction mea sures Bloated administrative compo-

nents created as risk mitigation instruments have also served as impediments The countryrsquos

institutional weakness low level of productivity bud get constraints and a declining inflexible

workforce will restrain future economic growth even if commodity prices recover Rus sian eco-

nomic policy will likely continue to be statist and protectionist relying mostly on import

substitutions

1 Ibid 11

Existing Trends and Future Scenarios

07

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 47 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations48

What scenarios can be expected in such a challenging environment

One probability (no peace no war) is based on the assumption that matters will not deteriorate

further and implementation of the Sanctions Act will be cursory This will cause relatively slow

degradation in the economic field with occasional flashes of activity in selected areas (eg closer

cooperation against Islamist terrorist groups in Syria)

A second worse case or critical scenario is the intensive and full- scale execution of current sanc-

tion legislation and even the imposition of new economic punitive and restrictive mea sures which

could incite asymmetric retaliatory actions and lead to the introduction of additional protectionist

policies This in turn could trigger a further escalation of mutual confrontation and could eventu-

ally destroy the fundamentals of the current bilateral trade system Rus sian leadership has charac-

terized the Sanctions Act as a declaration of a trade war that ends all hope for improving bilateral

relations2

2 Дмитрий Медведев ldquoПодписание президентом США нового санкционного закона против России создает несколько

последствийrdquo [The US Presidentrsquos signing of the package of new sanctions against Rus sia will have a few conse-

quences] Facebook August 2 2017 https wwwfacebook com Dmitry Medvedev posts 10154587161801851

Figure 71 US Imports from Rus sia Share of Oil Metals Nuclear Fuel Fertilizers and Fish Million US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

93

94

93

94

95

96

93

92

87

89

0

$5000

$10000

$15000

$20000

$25000

$30000

$35000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

US Imports from Russia

Share of Oil Metals Nuclear FuelFertilizers and Fish

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 48 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 49

The best case and most favorable scenario looks less probable now It assumes the realization of

structural reforms in Rus sia in such a way that would adapt Rus siarsquos foreign policy to national

economic needs reduce confrontations with the West and make a concerted efort to integrate

Rus sian businesses into global supply and value chains A revitalization of the structural reform

agendamdash including eforts to diversify economic activities through de- monopolization and support

for SMEs a restructuring of the banking sector the creation of a vibrant business climate to foster

entrepreneurships and innovation the implementation of administrative and judicial reforms to

tackle red tape and endemic corruption and the reduction of state control over key sectors of the

economy via wide- spread privatization could kick- start the development of a nonoil economy and

improve long- term growth prospects Despite ongoing discussion of reform strategies deep

economic and po liti cal changes are extremely complicated over the next po liti calelectoral cycle

(2018ndash2024) particularly because of re sis tance of vested interests and growing commodity prices

The urgency to tackle structural shortcomings in natu ral resource- dependent economies usually

correlates with the price of those resources and the degree to which resource rents drive eco-

nomic activity However there may be marginal improvements in the efficiency of the current

economic system

Future US- Russia relations can be thought of through three pillars one pillar focuses on areas

where both countries maintain a competitive rivalry another looks at potential areas of interaction

under pres ent conditions a third pillar and one that has evaporated from the current bilateral

agenda concentrates on future cooperation Stronger economic ties could not only be a kind of

po liti cal shock absorber but contribute to the building of this future (particularly business contacts

aim to support future structural reforms) although po liti cal factors are depressing the prospects

for cooperation To escape deadlock it will be impor tant to establish the right balance between

politics and economics and create a model of collaboration within the framework of contention

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 49 102017 404 PM

About the Author

Vadim Grishin PhD MBA has been involved in the reform pro cess in Rus sia as adviser to the

deputy prime minister of Rus sia in 1992ndash1993 and 2006ndash2010 He has extensive experience

working with the Bretton Woods Institutions He was the board member of the World Bank Group

and served as se nior adviser at the International Monetary Fund Currently he is a con sul tant to the

chief economistrsquos office of the International Finance Corporation and teaches the economics of

transition at Georgetown University in Washington DC

50

594-71613_ch99_4Pindd 50 102017 403 PM

Blank

COVER PHOTO ADOBE STOCK

1616 Rhode Island Avenue NW

Washington DC 20036

202 887 0200 | wwwcsisorg

v++ISBN 978-1-4422-8035-9

Lanham bull Boulder bull New York bull London

4501 Forbes Boulevard

Lanham MD 20706

301 459 3366 | wwwrowmancom

A U T H O R

Vadim Grishin

Myths and Realities

A Report of the

CSIS RUSSIA AND EURASIA PROGRAM

US-RussiaEconomicRelations

O C T O B E R 2 0 1 7

Euml|xHSLEOCy280359z

The Man Pupu Nyor Rock Formations at the Northern Urals also known as Seven

Strong Man or Little Mountain of the God in the local tribe (Mansi) language

Page 47: U.S.-Russia Economic Relations: Myths and Realities · 2020-04-17 · OCTOBER 2017 U.S.- Russia Economic Relations Myths and Realities AUTHOR Vadim Grishin A REPORT OF THE CSIS RUSSIA

41

Diversity and technological complexity are the most vis i ble advantages supporting US exports to

Rus sia Three major groups of export goods include civilian aircraft engines and parts (Figure 61)

drilling and oil field equipment (Figure 62) and industrial machines and engines (Figure 63)

Despite sanctions against the transfer of advanced oil producing and pro cessing technologies the

realization of US drilling and oil field equipment in Rus sia is sustainable although some bilateral

proj ects have been frozen

Another category of goods that has demonstrated resilience is the phar ma ceu ti cal industry (Fig-

ure 64) because most drugs in Rus sia are imported (about 70 percent of the Rus sian phar ma ceu-

ti cal market in value) Import substitution policies have had only modest results in this industry

As confirmed by American Chamber of Commerce surveys US exports to Rus sia are closely

connected to US FDI 30 percent of total imports of US companies working in the Rus sian

market come from the United States (more than $2 billion in 2016) In other words about

40 percent of all US exports to Rus sia are related to a US corporate- sector business pro cess in

the country The major sectors of activity of these companies are energy and natu ral resources

(52 percent) manufacturing (17 percent) information and communications technology or ICT

(13 percent) retail (7 percent) automotive industry (6 percent) phar ma ceu ti cal production

(1 percent) professional ser vices (05 percent) and other (2 percent)1

Some obvious constraints on US exports to Rus sia have resulted from a reduction in demand A

deterioration of bilateral relations and implementation of sanctions and counter- sanctions have

directly or indirectly afected all businesses Figures 65 and 66 provide data regarding a dramatic

drop in the sale of US agricultural production in Rus sia with all other categories of exports in

goods showing big cuts as well (see Figures 67ndash69)

Exports of civilian aircraft engines and parts put the state of Washington in first place among

other states as a leading exporter to the Rus sian market (Figure 610)

1 American Chamber of Commerce in Rus sia ldquoInvestment and Import to Rus sia 2nd Surveyrdquo 13

Diversity and Constraints

06

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 41 102017 404 PM

Figure 61 US Exports of Civilian Aircraft Engines Equipment and Parts to Rus sia US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

$2500000000

$2000000000

$1500000000

$1000000000

$500000000

$-

Figure 62 US Exports of Drilling and Oil Field Equipment US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

0

$5000000

$10000000

$15000000

$20000000

$25000000

$30000000

$35000000

$40000000

$45000000

$50000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 42 102017 404 PM

Figure 63 US Exports of Industrial Engines to Rus sia US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

0

$5000000

$10000000

$15000000

$20000000

$25000000

$30000000

$35000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Figure 64 US Exports of Phar ma ceu ti cal Preparations to Rus sia US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

0

$5000000

$10000000

$15000000

$20000000

$25000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 43 102017 404 PM

Figure 65 US Exports of Meat and Poultry to Rus sia US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Meat poultry etc

$1000000000

$800000000

$600000000

$400000000

$200000000

$-

$1200000000

$1400000000

$1600000000

Figure 66 US Exports of Soybeans to Rus sia US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

0

$20000000

$40000000

$60000000

$80000000

$100000000

$120000000

$140000000

$160000000

$180000000

$200000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 44 102017 404 PM

Figure 67 US Exports of Vehicles Engines and Parts to Rus sia US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Other parts and accessories of vehicles

Automotive tires and tubes

Bodies and chassis for passenger cars

Engines and engine parts (carburetors pistonsrings and valves)

Trucks buses and special purpose vehicles

Passenger cars new and used

$2500000000

$2000000000

$1500000000

$500000000

$-

$1000000000

Figure 68 US Exports of Medicinal Equipment to Rus sia US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

$10000000

$15000000

$20000000

$25000000

$30000000

$35000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 45 102017 404 PM

Figure 610 US Exports to Rus sia by States (2016 US$ Value) Million US$ 2013ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoState and Metropolitan Area Trade Datardquo

Iowa Kentucky

North Dakota

Oklahoma

South Carolina

Washington

0

$500

$1000

$1500

$2000

2013 2014 2015 2016

District of Columbia

Iowa

Kentucky

North Dakota

Oklahoma

South Carolina

Washington

Figure 69 US Exports of Excavating Machinery to Rus sia US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

0

$5000000

$10000000

$15000000

$20000000

$25000000

$30000000

$35000000

$40000000

$45000000

$50000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 46 102017 404 PM

47

Upon reviewing the current trend in US- Russia economic relations we must acknowledge that

the existing trade model is obsolete and exhausted Imports are resource- oriented and reflect

constraints of the Rus sian economic structure while five groups of goodsmdash oil metals nuclear

fuels fertilizers and fishmdash make up more than 90 percent of total imports from Rus sia (Figure 71)

Each of these industries has a limited capacity for growth in the foreseeable future

Rus siarsquos core export to the United Statesmdash oilmdash will inevitably decrease in the mid- term under any

scenario The value and volume of Rus sian exports to the United States are open to global market

volatility and po liti cal pressures with limited hedging mechanisms

Overall US exports to Rus sia are unsustainable due to bilateral po liti cal tensions the whims of

commodity markets and changing domestic policies Sanctions and counter- sanctions have

created additional barriers particularly in finance banking high- tech energy and agro- business

According to the American Chamber of Commerce 69 percent of US companies working in the

country consider the impact of US sanctions against Rus sia on their business as negative At the

same time 60 percent of companies do not expect big changes in business relations between

Rus sia and the United States under Trump1 as the new law codifies existing sanctions fortifies

them and extends them to new sectors

Current US investments are low due to the weak rule of law in Rus sia a lack of property right

protections and proper contract enforcement high levels of statization and monopolization in the

economy a poor business climate outdated capital stock dependence on natural- resource

sectors and of course sanction and counter- sanction mea sures Bloated administrative compo-

nents created as risk mitigation instruments have also served as impediments The countryrsquos

institutional weakness low level of productivity bud get constraints and a declining inflexible

workforce will restrain future economic growth even if commodity prices recover Rus sian eco-

nomic policy will likely continue to be statist and protectionist relying mostly on import

substitutions

1 Ibid 11

Existing Trends and Future Scenarios

07

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 47 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations48

What scenarios can be expected in such a challenging environment

One probability (no peace no war) is based on the assumption that matters will not deteriorate

further and implementation of the Sanctions Act will be cursory This will cause relatively slow

degradation in the economic field with occasional flashes of activity in selected areas (eg closer

cooperation against Islamist terrorist groups in Syria)

A second worse case or critical scenario is the intensive and full- scale execution of current sanc-

tion legislation and even the imposition of new economic punitive and restrictive mea sures which

could incite asymmetric retaliatory actions and lead to the introduction of additional protectionist

policies This in turn could trigger a further escalation of mutual confrontation and could eventu-

ally destroy the fundamentals of the current bilateral trade system Rus sian leadership has charac-

terized the Sanctions Act as a declaration of a trade war that ends all hope for improving bilateral

relations2

2 Дмитрий Медведев ldquoПодписание президентом США нового санкционного закона против России создает несколько

последствийrdquo [The US Presidentrsquos signing of the package of new sanctions against Rus sia will have a few conse-

quences] Facebook August 2 2017 https wwwfacebook com Dmitry Medvedev posts 10154587161801851

Figure 71 US Imports from Rus sia Share of Oil Metals Nuclear Fuel Fertilizers and Fish Million US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

93

94

93

94

95

96

93

92

87

89

0

$5000

$10000

$15000

$20000

$25000

$30000

$35000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

US Imports from Russia

Share of Oil Metals Nuclear FuelFertilizers and Fish

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 48 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 49

The best case and most favorable scenario looks less probable now It assumes the realization of

structural reforms in Rus sia in such a way that would adapt Rus siarsquos foreign policy to national

economic needs reduce confrontations with the West and make a concerted efort to integrate

Rus sian businesses into global supply and value chains A revitalization of the structural reform

agendamdash including eforts to diversify economic activities through de- monopolization and support

for SMEs a restructuring of the banking sector the creation of a vibrant business climate to foster

entrepreneurships and innovation the implementation of administrative and judicial reforms to

tackle red tape and endemic corruption and the reduction of state control over key sectors of the

economy via wide- spread privatization could kick- start the development of a nonoil economy and

improve long- term growth prospects Despite ongoing discussion of reform strategies deep

economic and po liti cal changes are extremely complicated over the next po liti calelectoral cycle

(2018ndash2024) particularly because of re sis tance of vested interests and growing commodity prices

The urgency to tackle structural shortcomings in natu ral resource- dependent economies usually

correlates with the price of those resources and the degree to which resource rents drive eco-

nomic activity However there may be marginal improvements in the efficiency of the current

economic system

Future US- Russia relations can be thought of through three pillars one pillar focuses on areas

where both countries maintain a competitive rivalry another looks at potential areas of interaction

under pres ent conditions a third pillar and one that has evaporated from the current bilateral

agenda concentrates on future cooperation Stronger economic ties could not only be a kind of

po liti cal shock absorber but contribute to the building of this future (particularly business contacts

aim to support future structural reforms) although po liti cal factors are depressing the prospects

for cooperation To escape deadlock it will be impor tant to establish the right balance between

politics and economics and create a model of collaboration within the framework of contention

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 49 102017 404 PM

About the Author

Vadim Grishin PhD MBA has been involved in the reform pro cess in Rus sia as adviser to the

deputy prime minister of Rus sia in 1992ndash1993 and 2006ndash2010 He has extensive experience

working with the Bretton Woods Institutions He was the board member of the World Bank Group

and served as se nior adviser at the International Monetary Fund Currently he is a con sul tant to the

chief economistrsquos office of the International Finance Corporation and teaches the economics of

transition at Georgetown University in Washington DC

50

594-71613_ch99_4Pindd 50 102017 403 PM

Blank

COVER PHOTO ADOBE STOCK

1616 Rhode Island Avenue NW

Washington DC 20036

202 887 0200 | wwwcsisorg

v++ISBN 978-1-4422-8035-9

Lanham bull Boulder bull New York bull London

4501 Forbes Boulevard

Lanham MD 20706

301 459 3366 | wwwrowmancom

A U T H O R

Vadim Grishin

Myths and Realities

A Report of the

CSIS RUSSIA AND EURASIA PROGRAM

US-RussiaEconomicRelations

O C T O B E R 2 0 1 7

Euml|xHSLEOCy280359z

The Man Pupu Nyor Rock Formations at the Northern Urals also known as Seven

Strong Man or Little Mountain of the God in the local tribe (Mansi) language

Page 48: U.S.-Russia Economic Relations: Myths and Realities · 2020-04-17 · OCTOBER 2017 U.S.- Russia Economic Relations Myths and Realities AUTHOR Vadim Grishin A REPORT OF THE CSIS RUSSIA

Figure 61 US Exports of Civilian Aircraft Engines Equipment and Parts to Rus sia US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

$2500000000

$2000000000

$1500000000

$1000000000

$500000000

$-

Figure 62 US Exports of Drilling and Oil Field Equipment US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

0

$5000000

$10000000

$15000000

$20000000

$25000000

$30000000

$35000000

$40000000

$45000000

$50000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 42 102017 404 PM

Figure 63 US Exports of Industrial Engines to Rus sia US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

0

$5000000

$10000000

$15000000

$20000000

$25000000

$30000000

$35000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Figure 64 US Exports of Phar ma ceu ti cal Preparations to Rus sia US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

0

$5000000

$10000000

$15000000

$20000000

$25000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 43 102017 404 PM

Figure 65 US Exports of Meat and Poultry to Rus sia US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Meat poultry etc

$1000000000

$800000000

$600000000

$400000000

$200000000

$-

$1200000000

$1400000000

$1600000000

Figure 66 US Exports of Soybeans to Rus sia US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

0

$20000000

$40000000

$60000000

$80000000

$100000000

$120000000

$140000000

$160000000

$180000000

$200000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 44 102017 404 PM

Figure 67 US Exports of Vehicles Engines and Parts to Rus sia US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Other parts and accessories of vehicles

Automotive tires and tubes

Bodies and chassis for passenger cars

Engines and engine parts (carburetors pistonsrings and valves)

Trucks buses and special purpose vehicles

Passenger cars new and used

$2500000000

$2000000000

$1500000000

$500000000

$-

$1000000000

Figure 68 US Exports of Medicinal Equipment to Rus sia US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

$10000000

$15000000

$20000000

$25000000

$30000000

$35000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 45 102017 404 PM

Figure 610 US Exports to Rus sia by States (2016 US$ Value) Million US$ 2013ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoState and Metropolitan Area Trade Datardquo

Iowa Kentucky

North Dakota

Oklahoma

South Carolina

Washington

0

$500

$1000

$1500

$2000

2013 2014 2015 2016

District of Columbia

Iowa

Kentucky

North Dakota

Oklahoma

South Carolina

Washington

Figure 69 US Exports of Excavating Machinery to Rus sia US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

0

$5000000

$10000000

$15000000

$20000000

$25000000

$30000000

$35000000

$40000000

$45000000

$50000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 46 102017 404 PM

47

Upon reviewing the current trend in US- Russia economic relations we must acknowledge that

the existing trade model is obsolete and exhausted Imports are resource- oriented and reflect

constraints of the Rus sian economic structure while five groups of goodsmdash oil metals nuclear

fuels fertilizers and fishmdash make up more than 90 percent of total imports from Rus sia (Figure 71)

Each of these industries has a limited capacity for growth in the foreseeable future

Rus siarsquos core export to the United Statesmdash oilmdash will inevitably decrease in the mid- term under any

scenario The value and volume of Rus sian exports to the United States are open to global market

volatility and po liti cal pressures with limited hedging mechanisms

Overall US exports to Rus sia are unsustainable due to bilateral po liti cal tensions the whims of

commodity markets and changing domestic policies Sanctions and counter- sanctions have

created additional barriers particularly in finance banking high- tech energy and agro- business

According to the American Chamber of Commerce 69 percent of US companies working in the

country consider the impact of US sanctions against Rus sia on their business as negative At the

same time 60 percent of companies do not expect big changes in business relations between

Rus sia and the United States under Trump1 as the new law codifies existing sanctions fortifies

them and extends them to new sectors

Current US investments are low due to the weak rule of law in Rus sia a lack of property right

protections and proper contract enforcement high levels of statization and monopolization in the

economy a poor business climate outdated capital stock dependence on natural- resource

sectors and of course sanction and counter- sanction mea sures Bloated administrative compo-

nents created as risk mitigation instruments have also served as impediments The countryrsquos

institutional weakness low level of productivity bud get constraints and a declining inflexible

workforce will restrain future economic growth even if commodity prices recover Rus sian eco-

nomic policy will likely continue to be statist and protectionist relying mostly on import

substitutions

1 Ibid 11

Existing Trends and Future Scenarios

07

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 47 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations48

What scenarios can be expected in such a challenging environment

One probability (no peace no war) is based on the assumption that matters will not deteriorate

further and implementation of the Sanctions Act will be cursory This will cause relatively slow

degradation in the economic field with occasional flashes of activity in selected areas (eg closer

cooperation against Islamist terrorist groups in Syria)

A second worse case or critical scenario is the intensive and full- scale execution of current sanc-

tion legislation and even the imposition of new economic punitive and restrictive mea sures which

could incite asymmetric retaliatory actions and lead to the introduction of additional protectionist

policies This in turn could trigger a further escalation of mutual confrontation and could eventu-

ally destroy the fundamentals of the current bilateral trade system Rus sian leadership has charac-

terized the Sanctions Act as a declaration of a trade war that ends all hope for improving bilateral

relations2

2 Дмитрий Медведев ldquoПодписание президентом США нового санкционного закона против России создает несколько

последствийrdquo [The US Presidentrsquos signing of the package of new sanctions against Rus sia will have a few conse-

quences] Facebook August 2 2017 https wwwfacebook com Dmitry Medvedev posts 10154587161801851

Figure 71 US Imports from Rus sia Share of Oil Metals Nuclear Fuel Fertilizers and Fish Million US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

93

94

93

94

95

96

93

92

87

89

0

$5000

$10000

$15000

$20000

$25000

$30000

$35000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

US Imports from Russia

Share of Oil Metals Nuclear FuelFertilizers and Fish

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 48 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 49

The best case and most favorable scenario looks less probable now It assumes the realization of

structural reforms in Rus sia in such a way that would adapt Rus siarsquos foreign policy to national

economic needs reduce confrontations with the West and make a concerted efort to integrate

Rus sian businesses into global supply and value chains A revitalization of the structural reform

agendamdash including eforts to diversify economic activities through de- monopolization and support

for SMEs a restructuring of the banking sector the creation of a vibrant business climate to foster

entrepreneurships and innovation the implementation of administrative and judicial reforms to

tackle red tape and endemic corruption and the reduction of state control over key sectors of the

economy via wide- spread privatization could kick- start the development of a nonoil economy and

improve long- term growth prospects Despite ongoing discussion of reform strategies deep

economic and po liti cal changes are extremely complicated over the next po liti calelectoral cycle

(2018ndash2024) particularly because of re sis tance of vested interests and growing commodity prices

The urgency to tackle structural shortcomings in natu ral resource- dependent economies usually

correlates with the price of those resources and the degree to which resource rents drive eco-

nomic activity However there may be marginal improvements in the efficiency of the current

economic system

Future US- Russia relations can be thought of through three pillars one pillar focuses on areas

where both countries maintain a competitive rivalry another looks at potential areas of interaction

under pres ent conditions a third pillar and one that has evaporated from the current bilateral

agenda concentrates on future cooperation Stronger economic ties could not only be a kind of

po liti cal shock absorber but contribute to the building of this future (particularly business contacts

aim to support future structural reforms) although po liti cal factors are depressing the prospects

for cooperation To escape deadlock it will be impor tant to establish the right balance between

politics and economics and create a model of collaboration within the framework of contention

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 49 102017 404 PM

About the Author

Vadim Grishin PhD MBA has been involved in the reform pro cess in Rus sia as adviser to the

deputy prime minister of Rus sia in 1992ndash1993 and 2006ndash2010 He has extensive experience

working with the Bretton Woods Institutions He was the board member of the World Bank Group

and served as se nior adviser at the International Monetary Fund Currently he is a con sul tant to the

chief economistrsquos office of the International Finance Corporation and teaches the economics of

transition at Georgetown University in Washington DC

50

594-71613_ch99_4Pindd 50 102017 403 PM

Blank

COVER PHOTO ADOBE STOCK

1616 Rhode Island Avenue NW

Washington DC 20036

202 887 0200 | wwwcsisorg

v++ISBN 978-1-4422-8035-9

Lanham bull Boulder bull New York bull London

4501 Forbes Boulevard

Lanham MD 20706

301 459 3366 | wwwrowmancom

A U T H O R

Vadim Grishin

Myths and Realities

A Report of the

CSIS RUSSIA AND EURASIA PROGRAM

US-RussiaEconomicRelations

O C T O B E R 2 0 1 7

Euml|xHSLEOCy280359z

The Man Pupu Nyor Rock Formations at the Northern Urals also known as Seven

Strong Man or Little Mountain of the God in the local tribe (Mansi) language

Page 49: U.S.-Russia Economic Relations: Myths and Realities · 2020-04-17 · OCTOBER 2017 U.S.- Russia Economic Relations Myths and Realities AUTHOR Vadim Grishin A REPORT OF THE CSIS RUSSIA

Figure 63 US Exports of Industrial Engines to Rus sia US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

0

$5000000

$10000000

$15000000

$20000000

$25000000

$30000000

$35000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Figure 64 US Exports of Phar ma ceu ti cal Preparations to Rus sia US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

0

$5000000

$10000000

$15000000

$20000000

$25000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 43 102017 404 PM

Figure 65 US Exports of Meat and Poultry to Rus sia US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Meat poultry etc

$1000000000

$800000000

$600000000

$400000000

$200000000

$-

$1200000000

$1400000000

$1600000000

Figure 66 US Exports of Soybeans to Rus sia US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

0

$20000000

$40000000

$60000000

$80000000

$100000000

$120000000

$140000000

$160000000

$180000000

$200000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 44 102017 404 PM

Figure 67 US Exports of Vehicles Engines and Parts to Rus sia US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Other parts and accessories of vehicles

Automotive tires and tubes

Bodies and chassis for passenger cars

Engines and engine parts (carburetors pistonsrings and valves)

Trucks buses and special purpose vehicles

Passenger cars new and used

$2500000000

$2000000000

$1500000000

$500000000

$-

$1000000000

Figure 68 US Exports of Medicinal Equipment to Rus sia US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

$10000000

$15000000

$20000000

$25000000

$30000000

$35000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 45 102017 404 PM

Figure 610 US Exports to Rus sia by States (2016 US$ Value) Million US$ 2013ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoState and Metropolitan Area Trade Datardquo

Iowa Kentucky

North Dakota

Oklahoma

South Carolina

Washington

0

$500

$1000

$1500

$2000

2013 2014 2015 2016

District of Columbia

Iowa

Kentucky

North Dakota

Oklahoma

South Carolina

Washington

Figure 69 US Exports of Excavating Machinery to Rus sia US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

0

$5000000

$10000000

$15000000

$20000000

$25000000

$30000000

$35000000

$40000000

$45000000

$50000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 46 102017 404 PM

47

Upon reviewing the current trend in US- Russia economic relations we must acknowledge that

the existing trade model is obsolete and exhausted Imports are resource- oriented and reflect

constraints of the Rus sian economic structure while five groups of goodsmdash oil metals nuclear

fuels fertilizers and fishmdash make up more than 90 percent of total imports from Rus sia (Figure 71)

Each of these industries has a limited capacity for growth in the foreseeable future

Rus siarsquos core export to the United Statesmdash oilmdash will inevitably decrease in the mid- term under any

scenario The value and volume of Rus sian exports to the United States are open to global market

volatility and po liti cal pressures with limited hedging mechanisms

Overall US exports to Rus sia are unsustainable due to bilateral po liti cal tensions the whims of

commodity markets and changing domestic policies Sanctions and counter- sanctions have

created additional barriers particularly in finance banking high- tech energy and agro- business

According to the American Chamber of Commerce 69 percent of US companies working in the

country consider the impact of US sanctions against Rus sia on their business as negative At the

same time 60 percent of companies do not expect big changes in business relations between

Rus sia and the United States under Trump1 as the new law codifies existing sanctions fortifies

them and extends them to new sectors

Current US investments are low due to the weak rule of law in Rus sia a lack of property right

protections and proper contract enforcement high levels of statization and monopolization in the

economy a poor business climate outdated capital stock dependence on natural- resource

sectors and of course sanction and counter- sanction mea sures Bloated administrative compo-

nents created as risk mitigation instruments have also served as impediments The countryrsquos

institutional weakness low level of productivity bud get constraints and a declining inflexible

workforce will restrain future economic growth even if commodity prices recover Rus sian eco-

nomic policy will likely continue to be statist and protectionist relying mostly on import

substitutions

1 Ibid 11

Existing Trends and Future Scenarios

07

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 47 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations48

What scenarios can be expected in such a challenging environment

One probability (no peace no war) is based on the assumption that matters will not deteriorate

further and implementation of the Sanctions Act will be cursory This will cause relatively slow

degradation in the economic field with occasional flashes of activity in selected areas (eg closer

cooperation against Islamist terrorist groups in Syria)

A second worse case or critical scenario is the intensive and full- scale execution of current sanc-

tion legislation and even the imposition of new economic punitive and restrictive mea sures which

could incite asymmetric retaliatory actions and lead to the introduction of additional protectionist

policies This in turn could trigger a further escalation of mutual confrontation and could eventu-

ally destroy the fundamentals of the current bilateral trade system Rus sian leadership has charac-

terized the Sanctions Act as a declaration of a trade war that ends all hope for improving bilateral

relations2

2 Дмитрий Медведев ldquoПодписание президентом США нового санкционного закона против России создает несколько

последствийrdquo [The US Presidentrsquos signing of the package of new sanctions against Rus sia will have a few conse-

quences] Facebook August 2 2017 https wwwfacebook com Dmitry Medvedev posts 10154587161801851

Figure 71 US Imports from Rus sia Share of Oil Metals Nuclear Fuel Fertilizers and Fish Million US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

93

94

93

94

95

96

93

92

87

89

0

$5000

$10000

$15000

$20000

$25000

$30000

$35000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

US Imports from Russia

Share of Oil Metals Nuclear FuelFertilizers and Fish

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 48 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 49

The best case and most favorable scenario looks less probable now It assumes the realization of

structural reforms in Rus sia in such a way that would adapt Rus siarsquos foreign policy to national

economic needs reduce confrontations with the West and make a concerted efort to integrate

Rus sian businesses into global supply and value chains A revitalization of the structural reform

agendamdash including eforts to diversify economic activities through de- monopolization and support

for SMEs a restructuring of the banking sector the creation of a vibrant business climate to foster

entrepreneurships and innovation the implementation of administrative and judicial reforms to

tackle red tape and endemic corruption and the reduction of state control over key sectors of the

economy via wide- spread privatization could kick- start the development of a nonoil economy and

improve long- term growth prospects Despite ongoing discussion of reform strategies deep

economic and po liti cal changes are extremely complicated over the next po liti calelectoral cycle

(2018ndash2024) particularly because of re sis tance of vested interests and growing commodity prices

The urgency to tackle structural shortcomings in natu ral resource- dependent economies usually

correlates with the price of those resources and the degree to which resource rents drive eco-

nomic activity However there may be marginal improvements in the efficiency of the current

economic system

Future US- Russia relations can be thought of through three pillars one pillar focuses on areas

where both countries maintain a competitive rivalry another looks at potential areas of interaction

under pres ent conditions a third pillar and one that has evaporated from the current bilateral

agenda concentrates on future cooperation Stronger economic ties could not only be a kind of

po liti cal shock absorber but contribute to the building of this future (particularly business contacts

aim to support future structural reforms) although po liti cal factors are depressing the prospects

for cooperation To escape deadlock it will be impor tant to establish the right balance between

politics and economics and create a model of collaboration within the framework of contention

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 49 102017 404 PM

About the Author

Vadim Grishin PhD MBA has been involved in the reform pro cess in Rus sia as adviser to the

deputy prime minister of Rus sia in 1992ndash1993 and 2006ndash2010 He has extensive experience

working with the Bretton Woods Institutions He was the board member of the World Bank Group

and served as se nior adviser at the International Monetary Fund Currently he is a con sul tant to the

chief economistrsquos office of the International Finance Corporation and teaches the economics of

transition at Georgetown University in Washington DC

50

594-71613_ch99_4Pindd 50 102017 403 PM

Blank

COVER PHOTO ADOBE STOCK

1616 Rhode Island Avenue NW

Washington DC 20036

202 887 0200 | wwwcsisorg

v++ISBN 978-1-4422-8035-9

Lanham bull Boulder bull New York bull London

4501 Forbes Boulevard

Lanham MD 20706

301 459 3366 | wwwrowmancom

A U T H O R

Vadim Grishin

Myths and Realities

A Report of the

CSIS RUSSIA AND EURASIA PROGRAM

US-RussiaEconomicRelations

O C T O B E R 2 0 1 7

Euml|xHSLEOCy280359z

The Man Pupu Nyor Rock Formations at the Northern Urals also known as Seven

Strong Man or Little Mountain of the God in the local tribe (Mansi) language

Page 50: U.S.-Russia Economic Relations: Myths and Realities · 2020-04-17 · OCTOBER 2017 U.S.- Russia Economic Relations Myths and Realities AUTHOR Vadim Grishin A REPORT OF THE CSIS RUSSIA

Figure 65 US Exports of Meat and Poultry to Rus sia US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Meat poultry etc

$1000000000

$800000000

$600000000

$400000000

$200000000

$-

$1200000000

$1400000000

$1600000000

Figure 66 US Exports of Soybeans to Rus sia US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

0

$20000000

$40000000

$60000000

$80000000

$100000000

$120000000

$140000000

$160000000

$180000000

$200000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 44 102017 404 PM

Figure 67 US Exports of Vehicles Engines and Parts to Rus sia US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Other parts and accessories of vehicles

Automotive tires and tubes

Bodies and chassis for passenger cars

Engines and engine parts (carburetors pistonsrings and valves)

Trucks buses and special purpose vehicles

Passenger cars new and used

$2500000000

$2000000000

$1500000000

$500000000

$-

$1000000000

Figure 68 US Exports of Medicinal Equipment to Rus sia US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

$10000000

$15000000

$20000000

$25000000

$30000000

$35000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 45 102017 404 PM

Figure 610 US Exports to Rus sia by States (2016 US$ Value) Million US$ 2013ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoState and Metropolitan Area Trade Datardquo

Iowa Kentucky

North Dakota

Oklahoma

South Carolina

Washington

0

$500

$1000

$1500

$2000

2013 2014 2015 2016

District of Columbia

Iowa

Kentucky

North Dakota

Oklahoma

South Carolina

Washington

Figure 69 US Exports of Excavating Machinery to Rus sia US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

0

$5000000

$10000000

$15000000

$20000000

$25000000

$30000000

$35000000

$40000000

$45000000

$50000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 46 102017 404 PM

47

Upon reviewing the current trend in US- Russia economic relations we must acknowledge that

the existing trade model is obsolete and exhausted Imports are resource- oriented and reflect

constraints of the Rus sian economic structure while five groups of goodsmdash oil metals nuclear

fuels fertilizers and fishmdash make up more than 90 percent of total imports from Rus sia (Figure 71)

Each of these industries has a limited capacity for growth in the foreseeable future

Rus siarsquos core export to the United Statesmdash oilmdash will inevitably decrease in the mid- term under any

scenario The value and volume of Rus sian exports to the United States are open to global market

volatility and po liti cal pressures with limited hedging mechanisms

Overall US exports to Rus sia are unsustainable due to bilateral po liti cal tensions the whims of

commodity markets and changing domestic policies Sanctions and counter- sanctions have

created additional barriers particularly in finance banking high- tech energy and agro- business

According to the American Chamber of Commerce 69 percent of US companies working in the

country consider the impact of US sanctions against Rus sia on their business as negative At the

same time 60 percent of companies do not expect big changes in business relations between

Rus sia and the United States under Trump1 as the new law codifies existing sanctions fortifies

them and extends them to new sectors

Current US investments are low due to the weak rule of law in Rus sia a lack of property right

protections and proper contract enforcement high levels of statization and monopolization in the

economy a poor business climate outdated capital stock dependence on natural- resource

sectors and of course sanction and counter- sanction mea sures Bloated administrative compo-

nents created as risk mitigation instruments have also served as impediments The countryrsquos

institutional weakness low level of productivity bud get constraints and a declining inflexible

workforce will restrain future economic growth even if commodity prices recover Rus sian eco-

nomic policy will likely continue to be statist and protectionist relying mostly on import

substitutions

1 Ibid 11

Existing Trends and Future Scenarios

07

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 47 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations48

What scenarios can be expected in such a challenging environment

One probability (no peace no war) is based on the assumption that matters will not deteriorate

further and implementation of the Sanctions Act will be cursory This will cause relatively slow

degradation in the economic field with occasional flashes of activity in selected areas (eg closer

cooperation against Islamist terrorist groups in Syria)

A second worse case or critical scenario is the intensive and full- scale execution of current sanc-

tion legislation and even the imposition of new economic punitive and restrictive mea sures which

could incite asymmetric retaliatory actions and lead to the introduction of additional protectionist

policies This in turn could trigger a further escalation of mutual confrontation and could eventu-

ally destroy the fundamentals of the current bilateral trade system Rus sian leadership has charac-

terized the Sanctions Act as a declaration of a trade war that ends all hope for improving bilateral

relations2

2 Дмитрий Медведев ldquoПодписание президентом США нового санкционного закона против России создает несколько

последствийrdquo [The US Presidentrsquos signing of the package of new sanctions against Rus sia will have a few conse-

quences] Facebook August 2 2017 https wwwfacebook com Dmitry Medvedev posts 10154587161801851

Figure 71 US Imports from Rus sia Share of Oil Metals Nuclear Fuel Fertilizers and Fish Million US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

93

94

93

94

95

96

93

92

87

89

0

$5000

$10000

$15000

$20000

$25000

$30000

$35000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

US Imports from Russia

Share of Oil Metals Nuclear FuelFertilizers and Fish

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 48 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 49

The best case and most favorable scenario looks less probable now It assumes the realization of

structural reforms in Rus sia in such a way that would adapt Rus siarsquos foreign policy to national

economic needs reduce confrontations with the West and make a concerted efort to integrate

Rus sian businesses into global supply and value chains A revitalization of the structural reform

agendamdash including eforts to diversify economic activities through de- monopolization and support

for SMEs a restructuring of the banking sector the creation of a vibrant business climate to foster

entrepreneurships and innovation the implementation of administrative and judicial reforms to

tackle red tape and endemic corruption and the reduction of state control over key sectors of the

economy via wide- spread privatization could kick- start the development of a nonoil economy and

improve long- term growth prospects Despite ongoing discussion of reform strategies deep

economic and po liti cal changes are extremely complicated over the next po liti calelectoral cycle

(2018ndash2024) particularly because of re sis tance of vested interests and growing commodity prices

The urgency to tackle structural shortcomings in natu ral resource- dependent economies usually

correlates with the price of those resources and the degree to which resource rents drive eco-

nomic activity However there may be marginal improvements in the efficiency of the current

economic system

Future US- Russia relations can be thought of through three pillars one pillar focuses on areas

where both countries maintain a competitive rivalry another looks at potential areas of interaction

under pres ent conditions a third pillar and one that has evaporated from the current bilateral

agenda concentrates on future cooperation Stronger economic ties could not only be a kind of

po liti cal shock absorber but contribute to the building of this future (particularly business contacts

aim to support future structural reforms) although po liti cal factors are depressing the prospects

for cooperation To escape deadlock it will be impor tant to establish the right balance between

politics and economics and create a model of collaboration within the framework of contention

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 49 102017 404 PM

About the Author

Vadim Grishin PhD MBA has been involved in the reform pro cess in Rus sia as adviser to the

deputy prime minister of Rus sia in 1992ndash1993 and 2006ndash2010 He has extensive experience

working with the Bretton Woods Institutions He was the board member of the World Bank Group

and served as se nior adviser at the International Monetary Fund Currently he is a con sul tant to the

chief economistrsquos office of the International Finance Corporation and teaches the economics of

transition at Georgetown University in Washington DC

50

594-71613_ch99_4Pindd 50 102017 403 PM

Blank

COVER PHOTO ADOBE STOCK

1616 Rhode Island Avenue NW

Washington DC 20036

202 887 0200 | wwwcsisorg

v++ISBN 978-1-4422-8035-9

Lanham bull Boulder bull New York bull London

4501 Forbes Boulevard

Lanham MD 20706

301 459 3366 | wwwrowmancom

A U T H O R

Vadim Grishin

Myths and Realities

A Report of the

CSIS RUSSIA AND EURASIA PROGRAM

US-RussiaEconomicRelations

O C T O B E R 2 0 1 7

Euml|xHSLEOCy280359z

The Man Pupu Nyor Rock Formations at the Northern Urals also known as Seven

Strong Man or Little Mountain of the God in the local tribe (Mansi) language

Page 51: U.S.-Russia Economic Relations: Myths and Realities · 2020-04-17 · OCTOBER 2017 U.S.- Russia Economic Relations Myths and Realities AUTHOR Vadim Grishin A REPORT OF THE CSIS RUSSIA

Figure 67 US Exports of Vehicles Engines and Parts to Rus sia US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Other parts and accessories of vehicles

Automotive tires and tubes

Bodies and chassis for passenger cars

Engines and engine parts (carburetors pistonsrings and valves)

Trucks buses and special purpose vehicles

Passenger cars new and used

$2500000000

$2000000000

$1500000000

$500000000

$-

$1000000000

Figure 68 US Exports of Medicinal Equipment to Rus sia US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

$10000000

$15000000

$20000000

$25000000

$30000000

$35000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 45 102017 404 PM

Figure 610 US Exports to Rus sia by States (2016 US$ Value) Million US$ 2013ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoState and Metropolitan Area Trade Datardquo

Iowa Kentucky

North Dakota

Oklahoma

South Carolina

Washington

0

$500

$1000

$1500

$2000

2013 2014 2015 2016

District of Columbia

Iowa

Kentucky

North Dakota

Oklahoma

South Carolina

Washington

Figure 69 US Exports of Excavating Machinery to Rus sia US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

0

$5000000

$10000000

$15000000

$20000000

$25000000

$30000000

$35000000

$40000000

$45000000

$50000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 46 102017 404 PM

47

Upon reviewing the current trend in US- Russia economic relations we must acknowledge that

the existing trade model is obsolete and exhausted Imports are resource- oriented and reflect

constraints of the Rus sian economic structure while five groups of goodsmdash oil metals nuclear

fuels fertilizers and fishmdash make up more than 90 percent of total imports from Rus sia (Figure 71)

Each of these industries has a limited capacity for growth in the foreseeable future

Rus siarsquos core export to the United Statesmdash oilmdash will inevitably decrease in the mid- term under any

scenario The value and volume of Rus sian exports to the United States are open to global market

volatility and po liti cal pressures with limited hedging mechanisms

Overall US exports to Rus sia are unsustainable due to bilateral po liti cal tensions the whims of

commodity markets and changing domestic policies Sanctions and counter- sanctions have

created additional barriers particularly in finance banking high- tech energy and agro- business

According to the American Chamber of Commerce 69 percent of US companies working in the

country consider the impact of US sanctions against Rus sia on their business as negative At the

same time 60 percent of companies do not expect big changes in business relations between

Rus sia and the United States under Trump1 as the new law codifies existing sanctions fortifies

them and extends them to new sectors

Current US investments are low due to the weak rule of law in Rus sia a lack of property right

protections and proper contract enforcement high levels of statization and monopolization in the

economy a poor business climate outdated capital stock dependence on natural- resource

sectors and of course sanction and counter- sanction mea sures Bloated administrative compo-

nents created as risk mitigation instruments have also served as impediments The countryrsquos

institutional weakness low level of productivity bud get constraints and a declining inflexible

workforce will restrain future economic growth even if commodity prices recover Rus sian eco-

nomic policy will likely continue to be statist and protectionist relying mostly on import

substitutions

1 Ibid 11

Existing Trends and Future Scenarios

07

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 47 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations48

What scenarios can be expected in such a challenging environment

One probability (no peace no war) is based on the assumption that matters will not deteriorate

further and implementation of the Sanctions Act will be cursory This will cause relatively slow

degradation in the economic field with occasional flashes of activity in selected areas (eg closer

cooperation against Islamist terrorist groups in Syria)

A second worse case or critical scenario is the intensive and full- scale execution of current sanc-

tion legislation and even the imposition of new economic punitive and restrictive mea sures which

could incite asymmetric retaliatory actions and lead to the introduction of additional protectionist

policies This in turn could trigger a further escalation of mutual confrontation and could eventu-

ally destroy the fundamentals of the current bilateral trade system Rus sian leadership has charac-

terized the Sanctions Act as a declaration of a trade war that ends all hope for improving bilateral

relations2

2 Дмитрий Медведев ldquoПодписание президентом США нового санкционного закона против России создает несколько

последствийrdquo [The US Presidentrsquos signing of the package of new sanctions against Rus sia will have a few conse-

quences] Facebook August 2 2017 https wwwfacebook com Dmitry Medvedev posts 10154587161801851

Figure 71 US Imports from Rus sia Share of Oil Metals Nuclear Fuel Fertilizers and Fish Million US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

93

94

93

94

95

96

93

92

87

89

0

$5000

$10000

$15000

$20000

$25000

$30000

$35000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

US Imports from Russia

Share of Oil Metals Nuclear FuelFertilizers and Fish

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 48 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 49

The best case and most favorable scenario looks less probable now It assumes the realization of

structural reforms in Rus sia in such a way that would adapt Rus siarsquos foreign policy to national

economic needs reduce confrontations with the West and make a concerted efort to integrate

Rus sian businesses into global supply and value chains A revitalization of the structural reform

agendamdash including eforts to diversify economic activities through de- monopolization and support

for SMEs a restructuring of the banking sector the creation of a vibrant business climate to foster

entrepreneurships and innovation the implementation of administrative and judicial reforms to

tackle red tape and endemic corruption and the reduction of state control over key sectors of the

economy via wide- spread privatization could kick- start the development of a nonoil economy and

improve long- term growth prospects Despite ongoing discussion of reform strategies deep

economic and po liti cal changes are extremely complicated over the next po liti calelectoral cycle

(2018ndash2024) particularly because of re sis tance of vested interests and growing commodity prices

The urgency to tackle structural shortcomings in natu ral resource- dependent economies usually

correlates with the price of those resources and the degree to which resource rents drive eco-

nomic activity However there may be marginal improvements in the efficiency of the current

economic system

Future US- Russia relations can be thought of through three pillars one pillar focuses on areas

where both countries maintain a competitive rivalry another looks at potential areas of interaction

under pres ent conditions a third pillar and one that has evaporated from the current bilateral

agenda concentrates on future cooperation Stronger economic ties could not only be a kind of

po liti cal shock absorber but contribute to the building of this future (particularly business contacts

aim to support future structural reforms) although po liti cal factors are depressing the prospects

for cooperation To escape deadlock it will be impor tant to establish the right balance between

politics and economics and create a model of collaboration within the framework of contention

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 49 102017 404 PM

About the Author

Vadim Grishin PhD MBA has been involved in the reform pro cess in Rus sia as adviser to the

deputy prime minister of Rus sia in 1992ndash1993 and 2006ndash2010 He has extensive experience

working with the Bretton Woods Institutions He was the board member of the World Bank Group

and served as se nior adviser at the International Monetary Fund Currently he is a con sul tant to the

chief economistrsquos office of the International Finance Corporation and teaches the economics of

transition at Georgetown University in Washington DC

50

594-71613_ch99_4Pindd 50 102017 403 PM

Blank

COVER PHOTO ADOBE STOCK

1616 Rhode Island Avenue NW

Washington DC 20036

202 887 0200 | wwwcsisorg

v++ISBN 978-1-4422-8035-9

Lanham bull Boulder bull New York bull London

4501 Forbes Boulevard

Lanham MD 20706

301 459 3366 | wwwrowmancom

A U T H O R

Vadim Grishin

Myths and Realities

A Report of the

CSIS RUSSIA AND EURASIA PROGRAM

US-RussiaEconomicRelations

O C T O B E R 2 0 1 7

Euml|xHSLEOCy280359z

The Man Pupu Nyor Rock Formations at the Northern Urals also known as Seven

Strong Man or Little Mountain of the God in the local tribe (Mansi) language

Page 52: U.S.-Russia Economic Relations: Myths and Realities · 2020-04-17 · OCTOBER 2017 U.S.- Russia Economic Relations Myths and Realities AUTHOR Vadim Grishin A REPORT OF THE CSIS RUSSIA

Figure 610 US Exports to Rus sia by States (2016 US$ Value) Million US$ 2013ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoState and Metropolitan Area Trade Datardquo

Iowa Kentucky

North Dakota

Oklahoma

South Carolina

Washington

0

$500

$1000

$1500

$2000

2013 2014 2015 2016

District of Columbia

Iowa

Kentucky

North Dakota

Oklahoma

South Carolina

Washington

Figure 69 US Exports of Excavating Machinery to Rus sia US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

0

$5000000

$10000000

$15000000

$20000000

$25000000

$30000000

$35000000

$40000000

$45000000

$50000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 46 102017 404 PM

47

Upon reviewing the current trend in US- Russia economic relations we must acknowledge that

the existing trade model is obsolete and exhausted Imports are resource- oriented and reflect

constraints of the Rus sian economic structure while five groups of goodsmdash oil metals nuclear

fuels fertilizers and fishmdash make up more than 90 percent of total imports from Rus sia (Figure 71)

Each of these industries has a limited capacity for growth in the foreseeable future

Rus siarsquos core export to the United Statesmdash oilmdash will inevitably decrease in the mid- term under any

scenario The value and volume of Rus sian exports to the United States are open to global market

volatility and po liti cal pressures with limited hedging mechanisms

Overall US exports to Rus sia are unsustainable due to bilateral po liti cal tensions the whims of

commodity markets and changing domestic policies Sanctions and counter- sanctions have

created additional barriers particularly in finance banking high- tech energy and agro- business

According to the American Chamber of Commerce 69 percent of US companies working in the

country consider the impact of US sanctions against Rus sia on their business as negative At the

same time 60 percent of companies do not expect big changes in business relations between

Rus sia and the United States under Trump1 as the new law codifies existing sanctions fortifies

them and extends them to new sectors

Current US investments are low due to the weak rule of law in Rus sia a lack of property right

protections and proper contract enforcement high levels of statization and monopolization in the

economy a poor business climate outdated capital stock dependence on natural- resource

sectors and of course sanction and counter- sanction mea sures Bloated administrative compo-

nents created as risk mitigation instruments have also served as impediments The countryrsquos

institutional weakness low level of productivity bud get constraints and a declining inflexible

workforce will restrain future economic growth even if commodity prices recover Rus sian eco-

nomic policy will likely continue to be statist and protectionist relying mostly on import

substitutions

1 Ibid 11

Existing Trends and Future Scenarios

07

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 47 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations48

What scenarios can be expected in such a challenging environment

One probability (no peace no war) is based on the assumption that matters will not deteriorate

further and implementation of the Sanctions Act will be cursory This will cause relatively slow

degradation in the economic field with occasional flashes of activity in selected areas (eg closer

cooperation against Islamist terrorist groups in Syria)

A second worse case or critical scenario is the intensive and full- scale execution of current sanc-

tion legislation and even the imposition of new economic punitive and restrictive mea sures which

could incite asymmetric retaliatory actions and lead to the introduction of additional protectionist

policies This in turn could trigger a further escalation of mutual confrontation and could eventu-

ally destroy the fundamentals of the current bilateral trade system Rus sian leadership has charac-

terized the Sanctions Act as a declaration of a trade war that ends all hope for improving bilateral

relations2

2 Дмитрий Медведев ldquoПодписание президентом США нового санкционного закона против России создает несколько

последствийrdquo [The US Presidentrsquos signing of the package of new sanctions against Rus sia will have a few conse-

quences] Facebook August 2 2017 https wwwfacebook com Dmitry Medvedev posts 10154587161801851

Figure 71 US Imports from Rus sia Share of Oil Metals Nuclear Fuel Fertilizers and Fish Million US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

93

94

93

94

95

96

93

92

87

89

0

$5000

$10000

$15000

$20000

$25000

$30000

$35000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

US Imports from Russia

Share of Oil Metals Nuclear FuelFertilizers and Fish

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 48 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 49

The best case and most favorable scenario looks less probable now It assumes the realization of

structural reforms in Rus sia in such a way that would adapt Rus siarsquos foreign policy to national

economic needs reduce confrontations with the West and make a concerted efort to integrate

Rus sian businesses into global supply and value chains A revitalization of the structural reform

agendamdash including eforts to diversify economic activities through de- monopolization and support

for SMEs a restructuring of the banking sector the creation of a vibrant business climate to foster

entrepreneurships and innovation the implementation of administrative and judicial reforms to

tackle red tape and endemic corruption and the reduction of state control over key sectors of the

economy via wide- spread privatization could kick- start the development of a nonoil economy and

improve long- term growth prospects Despite ongoing discussion of reform strategies deep

economic and po liti cal changes are extremely complicated over the next po liti calelectoral cycle

(2018ndash2024) particularly because of re sis tance of vested interests and growing commodity prices

The urgency to tackle structural shortcomings in natu ral resource- dependent economies usually

correlates with the price of those resources and the degree to which resource rents drive eco-

nomic activity However there may be marginal improvements in the efficiency of the current

economic system

Future US- Russia relations can be thought of through three pillars one pillar focuses on areas

where both countries maintain a competitive rivalry another looks at potential areas of interaction

under pres ent conditions a third pillar and one that has evaporated from the current bilateral

agenda concentrates on future cooperation Stronger economic ties could not only be a kind of

po liti cal shock absorber but contribute to the building of this future (particularly business contacts

aim to support future structural reforms) although po liti cal factors are depressing the prospects

for cooperation To escape deadlock it will be impor tant to establish the right balance between

politics and economics and create a model of collaboration within the framework of contention

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 49 102017 404 PM

About the Author

Vadim Grishin PhD MBA has been involved in the reform pro cess in Rus sia as adviser to the

deputy prime minister of Rus sia in 1992ndash1993 and 2006ndash2010 He has extensive experience

working with the Bretton Woods Institutions He was the board member of the World Bank Group

and served as se nior adviser at the International Monetary Fund Currently he is a con sul tant to the

chief economistrsquos office of the International Finance Corporation and teaches the economics of

transition at Georgetown University in Washington DC

50

594-71613_ch99_4Pindd 50 102017 403 PM

Blank

COVER PHOTO ADOBE STOCK

1616 Rhode Island Avenue NW

Washington DC 20036

202 887 0200 | wwwcsisorg

v++ISBN 978-1-4422-8035-9

Lanham bull Boulder bull New York bull London

4501 Forbes Boulevard

Lanham MD 20706

301 459 3366 | wwwrowmancom

A U T H O R

Vadim Grishin

Myths and Realities

A Report of the

CSIS RUSSIA AND EURASIA PROGRAM

US-RussiaEconomicRelations

O C T O B E R 2 0 1 7

Euml|xHSLEOCy280359z

The Man Pupu Nyor Rock Formations at the Northern Urals also known as Seven

Strong Man or Little Mountain of the God in the local tribe (Mansi) language

Page 53: U.S.-Russia Economic Relations: Myths and Realities · 2020-04-17 · OCTOBER 2017 U.S.- Russia Economic Relations Myths and Realities AUTHOR Vadim Grishin A REPORT OF THE CSIS RUSSIA

47

Upon reviewing the current trend in US- Russia economic relations we must acknowledge that

the existing trade model is obsolete and exhausted Imports are resource- oriented and reflect

constraints of the Rus sian economic structure while five groups of goodsmdash oil metals nuclear

fuels fertilizers and fishmdash make up more than 90 percent of total imports from Rus sia (Figure 71)

Each of these industries has a limited capacity for growth in the foreseeable future

Rus siarsquos core export to the United Statesmdash oilmdash will inevitably decrease in the mid- term under any

scenario The value and volume of Rus sian exports to the United States are open to global market

volatility and po liti cal pressures with limited hedging mechanisms

Overall US exports to Rus sia are unsustainable due to bilateral po liti cal tensions the whims of

commodity markets and changing domestic policies Sanctions and counter- sanctions have

created additional barriers particularly in finance banking high- tech energy and agro- business

According to the American Chamber of Commerce 69 percent of US companies working in the

country consider the impact of US sanctions against Rus sia on their business as negative At the

same time 60 percent of companies do not expect big changes in business relations between

Rus sia and the United States under Trump1 as the new law codifies existing sanctions fortifies

them and extends them to new sectors

Current US investments are low due to the weak rule of law in Rus sia a lack of property right

protections and proper contract enforcement high levels of statization and monopolization in the

economy a poor business climate outdated capital stock dependence on natural- resource

sectors and of course sanction and counter- sanction mea sures Bloated administrative compo-

nents created as risk mitigation instruments have also served as impediments The countryrsquos

institutional weakness low level of productivity bud get constraints and a declining inflexible

workforce will restrain future economic growth even if commodity prices recover Rus sian eco-

nomic policy will likely continue to be statist and protectionist relying mostly on import

substitutions

1 Ibid 11

Existing Trends and Future Scenarios

07

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 47 102017 404 PM

US-Russia Economic Relations48

What scenarios can be expected in such a challenging environment

One probability (no peace no war) is based on the assumption that matters will not deteriorate

further and implementation of the Sanctions Act will be cursory This will cause relatively slow

degradation in the economic field with occasional flashes of activity in selected areas (eg closer

cooperation against Islamist terrorist groups in Syria)

A second worse case or critical scenario is the intensive and full- scale execution of current sanc-

tion legislation and even the imposition of new economic punitive and restrictive mea sures which

could incite asymmetric retaliatory actions and lead to the introduction of additional protectionist

policies This in turn could trigger a further escalation of mutual confrontation and could eventu-

ally destroy the fundamentals of the current bilateral trade system Rus sian leadership has charac-

terized the Sanctions Act as a declaration of a trade war that ends all hope for improving bilateral

relations2

2 Дмитрий Медведев ldquoПодписание президентом США нового санкционного закона против России создает несколько

последствийrdquo [The US Presidentrsquos signing of the package of new sanctions against Rus sia will have a few conse-

quences] Facebook August 2 2017 https wwwfacebook com Dmitry Medvedev posts 10154587161801851

Figure 71 US Imports from Rus sia Share of Oil Metals Nuclear Fuel Fertilizers and Fish Million US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

93

94

93

94

95

96

93

92

87

89

0

$5000

$10000

$15000

$20000

$25000

$30000

$35000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

US Imports from Russia

Share of Oil Metals Nuclear FuelFertilizers and Fish

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 48 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 49

The best case and most favorable scenario looks less probable now It assumes the realization of

structural reforms in Rus sia in such a way that would adapt Rus siarsquos foreign policy to national

economic needs reduce confrontations with the West and make a concerted efort to integrate

Rus sian businesses into global supply and value chains A revitalization of the structural reform

agendamdash including eforts to diversify economic activities through de- monopolization and support

for SMEs a restructuring of the banking sector the creation of a vibrant business climate to foster

entrepreneurships and innovation the implementation of administrative and judicial reforms to

tackle red tape and endemic corruption and the reduction of state control over key sectors of the

economy via wide- spread privatization could kick- start the development of a nonoil economy and

improve long- term growth prospects Despite ongoing discussion of reform strategies deep

economic and po liti cal changes are extremely complicated over the next po liti calelectoral cycle

(2018ndash2024) particularly because of re sis tance of vested interests and growing commodity prices

The urgency to tackle structural shortcomings in natu ral resource- dependent economies usually

correlates with the price of those resources and the degree to which resource rents drive eco-

nomic activity However there may be marginal improvements in the efficiency of the current

economic system

Future US- Russia relations can be thought of through three pillars one pillar focuses on areas

where both countries maintain a competitive rivalry another looks at potential areas of interaction

under pres ent conditions a third pillar and one that has evaporated from the current bilateral

agenda concentrates on future cooperation Stronger economic ties could not only be a kind of

po liti cal shock absorber but contribute to the building of this future (particularly business contacts

aim to support future structural reforms) although po liti cal factors are depressing the prospects

for cooperation To escape deadlock it will be impor tant to establish the right balance between

politics and economics and create a model of collaboration within the framework of contention

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 49 102017 404 PM

About the Author

Vadim Grishin PhD MBA has been involved in the reform pro cess in Rus sia as adviser to the

deputy prime minister of Rus sia in 1992ndash1993 and 2006ndash2010 He has extensive experience

working with the Bretton Woods Institutions He was the board member of the World Bank Group

and served as se nior adviser at the International Monetary Fund Currently he is a con sul tant to the

chief economistrsquos office of the International Finance Corporation and teaches the economics of

transition at Georgetown University in Washington DC

50

594-71613_ch99_4Pindd 50 102017 403 PM

Blank

COVER PHOTO ADOBE STOCK

1616 Rhode Island Avenue NW

Washington DC 20036

202 887 0200 | wwwcsisorg

v++ISBN 978-1-4422-8035-9

Lanham bull Boulder bull New York bull London

4501 Forbes Boulevard

Lanham MD 20706

301 459 3366 | wwwrowmancom

A U T H O R

Vadim Grishin

Myths and Realities

A Report of the

CSIS RUSSIA AND EURASIA PROGRAM

US-RussiaEconomicRelations

O C T O B E R 2 0 1 7

Euml|xHSLEOCy280359z

The Man Pupu Nyor Rock Formations at the Northern Urals also known as Seven

Strong Man or Little Mountain of the God in the local tribe (Mansi) language

Page 54: U.S.-Russia Economic Relations: Myths and Realities · 2020-04-17 · OCTOBER 2017 U.S.- Russia Economic Relations Myths and Realities AUTHOR Vadim Grishin A REPORT OF THE CSIS RUSSIA

US-Russia Economic Relations48

What scenarios can be expected in such a challenging environment

One probability (no peace no war) is based on the assumption that matters will not deteriorate

further and implementation of the Sanctions Act will be cursory This will cause relatively slow

degradation in the economic field with occasional flashes of activity in selected areas (eg closer

cooperation against Islamist terrorist groups in Syria)

A second worse case or critical scenario is the intensive and full- scale execution of current sanc-

tion legislation and even the imposition of new economic punitive and restrictive mea sures which

could incite asymmetric retaliatory actions and lead to the introduction of additional protectionist

policies This in turn could trigger a further escalation of mutual confrontation and could eventu-

ally destroy the fundamentals of the current bilateral trade system Rus sian leadership has charac-

terized the Sanctions Act as a declaration of a trade war that ends all hope for improving bilateral

relations2

2 Дмитрий Медведев ldquoПодписание президентом США нового санкционного закона против России создает несколько

последствийrdquo [The US Presidentrsquos signing of the package of new sanctions against Rus sia will have a few conse-

quences] Facebook August 2 2017 https wwwfacebook com Dmitry Medvedev posts 10154587161801851

Figure 71 US Imports from Rus sia Share of Oil Metals Nuclear Fuel Fertilizers and Fish Million US$ 2007ndash2016

Source US Census Bureau ldquoTrade in Goods with Rus siardquo (see data for 2007ndash2016)

93

94

93

94

95

96

93

92

87

89

0

$5000

$10000

$15000

$20000

$25000

$30000

$35000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

US Imports from Russia

Share of Oil Metals Nuclear FuelFertilizers and Fish

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 48 102017 404 PM

Vadim Grishin 49

The best case and most favorable scenario looks less probable now It assumes the realization of

structural reforms in Rus sia in such a way that would adapt Rus siarsquos foreign policy to national

economic needs reduce confrontations with the West and make a concerted efort to integrate

Rus sian businesses into global supply and value chains A revitalization of the structural reform

agendamdash including eforts to diversify economic activities through de- monopolization and support

for SMEs a restructuring of the banking sector the creation of a vibrant business climate to foster

entrepreneurships and innovation the implementation of administrative and judicial reforms to

tackle red tape and endemic corruption and the reduction of state control over key sectors of the

economy via wide- spread privatization could kick- start the development of a nonoil economy and

improve long- term growth prospects Despite ongoing discussion of reform strategies deep

economic and po liti cal changes are extremely complicated over the next po liti calelectoral cycle

(2018ndash2024) particularly because of re sis tance of vested interests and growing commodity prices

The urgency to tackle structural shortcomings in natu ral resource- dependent economies usually

correlates with the price of those resources and the degree to which resource rents drive eco-

nomic activity However there may be marginal improvements in the efficiency of the current

economic system

Future US- Russia relations can be thought of through three pillars one pillar focuses on areas

where both countries maintain a competitive rivalry another looks at potential areas of interaction

under pres ent conditions a third pillar and one that has evaporated from the current bilateral

agenda concentrates on future cooperation Stronger economic ties could not only be a kind of

po liti cal shock absorber but contribute to the building of this future (particularly business contacts

aim to support future structural reforms) although po liti cal factors are depressing the prospects

for cooperation To escape deadlock it will be impor tant to establish the right balance between

politics and economics and create a model of collaboration within the framework of contention

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 49 102017 404 PM

About the Author

Vadim Grishin PhD MBA has been involved in the reform pro cess in Rus sia as adviser to the

deputy prime minister of Rus sia in 1992ndash1993 and 2006ndash2010 He has extensive experience

working with the Bretton Woods Institutions He was the board member of the World Bank Group

and served as se nior adviser at the International Monetary Fund Currently he is a con sul tant to the

chief economistrsquos office of the International Finance Corporation and teaches the economics of

transition at Georgetown University in Washington DC

50

594-71613_ch99_4Pindd 50 102017 403 PM

Blank

COVER PHOTO ADOBE STOCK

1616 Rhode Island Avenue NW

Washington DC 20036

202 887 0200 | wwwcsisorg

v++ISBN 978-1-4422-8035-9

Lanham bull Boulder bull New York bull London

4501 Forbes Boulevard

Lanham MD 20706

301 459 3366 | wwwrowmancom

A U T H O R

Vadim Grishin

Myths and Realities

A Report of the

CSIS RUSSIA AND EURASIA PROGRAM

US-RussiaEconomicRelations

O C T O B E R 2 0 1 7

Euml|xHSLEOCy280359z

The Man Pupu Nyor Rock Formations at the Northern Urals also known as Seven

Strong Man or Little Mountain of the God in the local tribe (Mansi) language

Page 55: U.S.-Russia Economic Relations: Myths and Realities · 2020-04-17 · OCTOBER 2017 U.S.- Russia Economic Relations Myths and Realities AUTHOR Vadim Grishin A REPORT OF THE CSIS RUSSIA

Vadim Grishin 49

The best case and most favorable scenario looks less probable now It assumes the realization of

structural reforms in Rus sia in such a way that would adapt Rus siarsquos foreign policy to national

economic needs reduce confrontations with the West and make a concerted efort to integrate

Rus sian businesses into global supply and value chains A revitalization of the structural reform

agendamdash including eforts to diversify economic activities through de- monopolization and support

for SMEs a restructuring of the banking sector the creation of a vibrant business climate to foster

entrepreneurships and innovation the implementation of administrative and judicial reforms to

tackle red tape and endemic corruption and the reduction of state control over key sectors of the

economy via wide- spread privatization could kick- start the development of a nonoil economy and

improve long- term growth prospects Despite ongoing discussion of reform strategies deep

economic and po liti cal changes are extremely complicated over the next po liti calelectoral cycle

(2018ndash2024) particularly because of re sis tance of vested interests and growing commodity prices

The urgency to tackle structural shortcomings in natu ral resource- dependent economies usually

correlates with the price of those resources and the degree to which resource rents drive eco-

nomic activity However there may be marginal improvements in the efficiency of the current

economic system

Future US- Russia relations can be thought of through three pillars one pillar focuses on areas

where both countries maintain a competitive rivalry another looks at potential areas of interaction

under pres ent conditions a third pillar and one that has evaporated from the current bilateral

agenda concentrates on future cooperation Stronger economic ties could not only be a kind of

po liti cal shock absorber but contribute to the building of this future (particularly business contacts

aim to support future structural reforms) although po liti cal factors are depressing the prospects

for cooperation To escape deadlock it will be impor tant to establish the right balance between

politics and economics and create a model of collaboration within the framework of contention

594-71613_ch01_4Pindd 49 102017 404 PM

About the Author

Vadim Grishin PhD MBA has been involved in the reform pro cess in Rus sia as adviser to the

deputy prime minister of Rus sia in 1992ndash1993 and 2006ndash2010 He has extensive experience

working with the Bretton Woods Institutions He was the board member of the World Bank Group

and served as se nior adviser at the International Monetary Fund Currently he is a con sul tant to the

chief economistrsquos office of the International Finance Corporation and teaches the economics of

transition at Georgetown University in Washington DC

50

594-71613_ch99_4Pindd 50 102017 403 PM

Blank

COVER PHOTO ADOBE STOCK

1616 Rhode Island Avenue NW

Washington DC 20036

202 887 0200 | wwwcsisorg

v++ISBN 978-1-4422-8035-9

Lanham bull Boulder bull New York bull London

4501 Forbes Boulevard

Lanham MD 20706

301 459 3366 | wwwrowmancom

A U T H O R

Vadim Grishin

Myths and Realities

A Report of the

CSIS RUSSIA AND EURASIA PROGRAM

US-RussiaEconomicRelations

O C T O B E R 2 0 1 7

Euml|xHSLEOCy280359z

The Man Pupu Nyor Rock Formations at the Northern Urals also known as Seven

Strong Man or Little Mountain of the God in the local tribe (Mansi) language

Page 56: U.S.-Russia Economic Relations: Myths and Realities · 2020-04-17 · OCTOBER 2017 U.S.- Russia Economic Relations Myths and Realities AUTHOR Vadim Grishin A REPORT OF THE CSIS RUSSIA

About the Author

Vadim Grishin PhD MBA has been involved in the reform pro cess in Rus sia as adviser to the

deputy prime minister of Rus sia in 1992ndash1993 and 2006ndash2010 He has extensive experience

working with the Bretton Woods Institutions He was the board member of the World Bank Group

and served as se nior adviser at the International Monetary Fund Currently he is a con sul tant to the

chief economistrsquos office of the International Finance Corporation and teaches the economics of

transition at Georgetown University in Washington DC

50

594-71613_ch99_4Pindd 50 102017 403 PM

Blank

COVER PHOTO ADOBE STOCK

1616 Rhode Island Avenue NW

Washington DC 20036

202 887 0200 | wwwcsisorg

v++ISBN 978-1-4422-8035-9

Lanham bull Boulder bull New York bull London

4501 Forbes Boulevard

Lanham MD 20706

301 459 3366 | wwwrowmancom

A U T H O R

Vadim Grishin

Myths and Realities

A Report of the

CSIS RUSSIA AND EURASIA PROGRAM

US-RussiaEconomicRelations

O C T O B E R 2 0 1 7

Euml|xHSLEOCy280359z

The Man Pupu Nyor Rock Formations at the Northern Urals also known as Seven

Strong Man or Little Mountain of the God in the local tribe (Mansi) language

Page 57: U.S.-Russia Economic Relations: Myths and Realities · 2020-04-17 · OCTOBER 2017 U.S.- Russia Economic Relations Myths and Realities AUTHOR Vadim Grishin A REPORT OF THE CSIS RUSSIA

Blank

COVER PHOTO ADOBE STOCK

1616 Rhode Island Avenue NW

Washington DC 20036

202 887 0200 | wwwcsisorg

v++ISBN 978-1-4422-8035-9

Lanham bull Boulder bull New York bull London

4501 Forbes Boulevard

Lanham MD 20706

301 459 3366 | wwwrowmancom

A U T H O R

Vadim Grishin

Myths and Realities

A Report of the

CSIS RUSSIA AND EURASIA PROGRAM

US-RussiaEconomicRelations

O C T O B E R 2 0 1 7

Euml|xHSLEOCy280359z

The Man Pupu Nyor Rock Formations at the Northern Urals also known as Seven

Strong Man or Little Mountain of the God in the local tribe (Mansi) language

Page 58: U.S.-Russia Economic Relations: Myths and Realities · 2020-04-17 · OCTOBER 2017 U.S.- Russia Economic Relations Myths and Realities AUTHOR Vadim Grishin A REPORT OF THE CSIS RUSSIA

COVER PHOTO ADOBE STOCK

1616 Rhode Island Avenue NW

Washington DC 20036

202 887 0200 | wwwcsisorg

v++ISBN 978-1-4422-8035-9

Lanham bull Boulder bull New York bull London

4501 Forbes Boulevard

Lanham MD 20706

301 459 3366 | wwwrowmancom

A U T H O R

Vadim Grishin

Myths and Realities

A Report of the

CSIS RUSSIA AND EURASIA PROGRAM

US-RussiaEconomicRelations

O C T O B E R 2 0 1 7

Euml|xHSLEOCy280359z

The Man Pupu Nyor Rock Formations at the Northern Urals also known as Seven

Strong Man or Little Mountain of the God in the local tribe (Mansi) language