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on red-eyed, soot-facedMarines.

Given these circumstances, it is

not surprising that the Marinesgreeted with hoots of derision thecommunique by General Almondthat Seoul had been liberated at1400 the previous afternoon, the25th of September. "Three monthsto the day after the North Koreanslaunched their surprise attacksouth of the 38th Parallel," themessage proclaimed, "the combattroops of X Corps recaptured thecapital city of Seoul." To theirastonishment, the Marines learnedthat their corps commander con-sidered the military defenses ofSeoul to be broken. "The enemy isfleeing the city to the northeast,"the communique concluded. AnAssociated Press correspondentreflected the infantry's skepticism:"If the city had been liberated, theremaining North Koreans did notknow it."

In truth the Marines and soldierswould still be fighting for full pos-session of the capital 48 hours pastGeneral Almond's announced lib-eration date, but the issue wasinsignificant. The troops viewedthe battle from purely a tacticalperspective; their corps comman-der sensed the political ramifica-tions. Of far greater significance atthis point was the fact that fiveinfantry regiments with a total lackof experience waging coalitionwarfare with combined arms in anenormous urban center were nev-ertheless prevailing against a well-armed, disciplined enemy.General MacArthur's visionarystroke at Inchon had succeeded ininvesting the city of Seoul in just 11days. In view of the allies' dis-heartening performance in theKorean War to date, MacArthur,and Almond, had earned the rightto boast.

Further, although the Marines

might not like to admit it, GeneralAlmond was essentially correct inhis flash message the night of the25th—the main body of the NorthKorean defenders, the remnants ofa division, was indeed retreatingnorth. What surprised all compo-nents of X Corps was the NKPAdecision to expend the equivalentof an armored brigade in suicidalnight attacks and die-hard defenseof the main barricades to keep theAmericans ensnared in the city.

Analyzing the NKPA decision toevacuate the main body of theirdefenders from Seoul is alwaysrisky, but there is evidence that thepullback resulted as much fromtheir surprise at the unexpectedcrossing of the 32d Infantry andthe 17th ROK Infantry from thesoutheast on the 25th—paired withthe rapid advance of the 7thMarines, threatening the northernescape routes—as from the steadyhut predictable advance of the 5thand 1st Marines. Regardless, it wasobvious to Almond and 0. P. Smiththat seizing such a mammothobjective as Seoul would requireuncommon teamwork amongServices, nations, and combatarms. Allied teamwork throughoutthe night attacks of 25-26September had proven exemplary.

The Marines employed Corsairsand artillery to soften the barri-cades, then switched to 4.2-inchand 81mm mortars. The assaultcompanies delivered machine gunand rocket fire on the fortificationsto cover the deliberate minesweep-ing operations by combat engi-neers. Then came the M-26Pershing tanks, often with othertanks modified as flamethrowers orbulldozers. On the heels of thetanks came the infantry with fixedbayonets. The process wasunavoidably time-consuming—each barricade required 45-60 min-utes to overrun—and each of theseintermediate objectives took its toll

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in Marine and civilian casualties.The city smoked and burned.

As Lieutenant Colonel JackHawkins' 1st Battalion, 1st Marines,fought its way clear of the railroadyards and entered a parallel thor-oughfare his riflemen stared inhorror at the rampant destruction.As it appeared to Private First ClassMorgan Brainard, the scene wasone of "great gaping skeletons ofblackened buildings with theirwindows blown out... telephonewires hanging down loosely fromtheir drunken, leaning poles; glassand bricks everywhere; literally atown shot to hell."

Not all the fighting took placearound the barricaded intersec-tions. There were plenty of otherNKPA soldiers holed up in thebuildings and rooftops. Many ofthese soldiers became the prey ofMarine scout-sniper teams, somearmed with old Springfield '03 boltaction rifles fitted with scopes, oth-ers favoring the much newer Mi-Csemi-automatic rifles, match-condi-tioned weapons graced with cheekpads, flash suppressors, leatherslings, and 2.2x telescopic sights.The snipers often worked in teamsof two. One man used binocularsor a spotting scope to find targetsfor the shooter.

Many of the buildings in the citycenter were multi-story, and,according to Private First ClassBrainard, "it meant going up thestairs and kicking open the doorsof each room, and searching thebalconies and backyard gardens aswell." Often the Marines had tofight their way through the build-ings, smashing their way throughthe walls like Smedley Butler'sMarines in Vera Cruz in 1914.

Colonel Puller led his regimentfrom very near the forward ele-ments. On this day he dismountedfrom his jeep and stalked up MaPo Boulevard shortly behindLieutenant Colonel Sutter's 2d

Combat Engineers in the Seoul Campaignmong the many unsung heroes who providedongoing combat support to the infantry regi-Tnents of the 1st Marine Division in the recapture

of Seoul were the dauntless practitioners of LieutenantColonel John H. Partridge's 1st Engineer Battalion. Asdid the division as a whole, the engineers representedan amalgam of World War II veterans, new recruits, anda spirited group of reservists, including members of the3d Engineer Company, United States Marine CorpsReserve, from Phoenix, Arizona.

Fortunately, the Inchon landing caught the NKPAforces in the region off guard, and the battalion hadtime to shake itself down in non-urgent missions beforebreaking into small units to tackle enemy minefields.The engineers at first cleared beach exits and assemblyareas in the Inchon area, then moved out to help recon-noiter the roads leading east to Seoul. Of immediateconcern to Major General Oliver P. Smith and his oper-ations officer, Colonel Alpha L. Bowser, Jr., was whetherthe numerous bridges along the highways and sec-ondary roads were sturdy enough to support theMarines' new M-26 Pershing tank with its 46 tons ofcombat-loaded weight.

The Marines encountered the first serious NKPAminefields (both antitank and anti-personnel) in thevicinity of Kimpo Airfield. The subsequent arrival ofhighly-trained, first-line North Korean reinforcements indefensive positions guarding the approaches to Seoulled to minefielcls of increasing size and sophistication.Soviet Red Army advisors had trained the NKPA in minewarfare, and many of the mines encountered by the

Marines were made in Russia. These mines slowed theadvance of the 1st Marine Division as it reached theouter defenses of Seoul along the Kalchon west ofYongdungpo or the avenues of approach to Hill 296 andits many subordinate peaks and ridgelines. Partridge'sengineer teams performed their high-stress mine-clear-ing missions with progressive efficiency. This helpedsustain the division's momentum and limited the timeavailable to the enemy to more fully develop defensivepositions within the city.

In Seoul, the Marines encountered barricaded road-blocks every 200 to 300 yards along the main boule-vards. The North Koreans seeded most approacheswith mines. The Marines formulated the necessary team-work on the spot. The rifle company commanderwould shower the obstacle with fire, including smokeor white phosphorus mortar shells. Under this coverthe engineer squad would hustle forward to clear themines. Behind them would come the tanks, followedby the infantry. It was dangerous, often costly work.Sometimes a mine would detonate among the engi-neers. Sometimes they would miss a string and a tankwould be lost. Most often, however, this painstakingprocess worked. Each barricade took an average of 45minutes to clear. Utilizing this well-coordinated andincreasingly proficient approach, the infantry battalionsof the 1st Marines advanced an average of 1,200 yardseach day—a small gain on a map, but an inexorableadvance to the North Koreans.

The 1st Engineers provided another exceptional ser-vice to the division in the Seoul campaign—river cross-

Gen Oliver P. Smith Collection, Marine Corps Research Center

179

ing. The Han was a broad tidal river, and its fewbridges had been blown up during the first week of thewar. The Marines had amphibian tractors and DUKWson hand to transport riflemen and small vehicles acrossagainst the current, but the campaign would never suc-ceed without the means of ferrying, first, tanks andartillery, then heavy trucks and trailers. Major GeneralEdward A. Almond, USA, commanding X Corps, hadproven disingenuous in his repeated assurances thatheavy bridging material would arrive in plenty of timeto support the Marines' crossing in force. "GeneralAlmond promises bridge material," General 0. P. Smithrecorded in his journal. "This is an empty promise."

Thinking ahead, and acting on his own initiative,Lieutenant Colonel Partridge had obtained a pair of 50-ton pontoons in San Diego and had zealously protectedthem from the enraged embarkation officer who had tosomehow load these unwelcome monsters on shipsalready stuffed with "essential" combat cargo. The pon-toons proved priceless. Partridge had at least one sec-

tion on hand to support the crossing of the 5th Marinesat Haengju on 20 September. Lieutenant Colonel HenryP. Crowe's 1st Shore Party Battalion quickly establisheda smooth functioning ferry service, doubling their pro-ductivity with the arrival of Partridge's second pontoon.Here the 7th Marines crossed, as well as the companyof M-26 tanks needed so direly by Colonel Puller in hisfirst full day of street fighting in Seoul. GeneralAlmond's bridging material arrived in time to supportthe crossing of General MacArthur's official party asthey arrived in Seoul on 29 September.

Greater glories awaited the 1st Engineer Battalion inthe forthcoming Chosin Reservoir campaign, where theycleared an expeditionary airfield at Hagaru-ri andassembled the air-dropped Treadway Bridge inFunchilin Pass below Koto-ri, but their yeoman perfor-mance in close support of the 1st Marine Division'sassault on Seoul set a standard of combined arms oper-ations and greatly facilitated the timely recapture of thecapital.

Battalion, 1st Marines, as it clawedits way along each city block.Sergeant Orville Jones, Puller'shand-picked driver throughout1950-55, followed his colonel inthe jeep, a short distance to therear. Sometimes the Marines fight-ing door-to-door along the Streetwould be appalled to see ChestyPuller walking fully exposed andabreast of the action, Jonesrecalled. "Holy Jeez,' they wouldyell to each other—'Don't letChesty get ahead of us—move it!"

Yet even the famously aggres-sive Chesty Puller could not expe-dite the methodical reduction ofthe barricades. Puller admitted,"progress was agonizingly slow."Said the engineer Captain NicholasA. Canzona: "It was a dirty, frus-trating fight every yard of the way."

Army Lieutenant Robert L.

Strickland, a World War II veterannow assigned as a cameraman forX Corps, got caught up in thestreet fighting. He sought shelterin an open courtyard behind aburning building, but the enemyfire came from all directions. "Wegot so much fire of all kinds that Ilost count," he said. "I have seen

a lot of men get hit both in this warand in World War II, but I think Ihave never seen so many get hit sofast in such a small area."

David Douglas Duncan, veteranMarine and extraordinary combatphotographer for Lfe magazine,accompanied the 1st Battalion, 1stMarines, during their advancethrough the rail yards towards thestation. Describing the action inhis subsequent photo book This isWar, Duncan highlighted the time-ly arrival of Marine Pershing tanksthat "growled up across the rail-road tracks, into the plaza—andmet the enemy fire head on."Then, Duncan continued: "Thetanks traded round for round withthe heavily-armed, barricadedenemy—and chunks of armor andbits of barricade were blown highinto the air. They were killingthemselves at point-blank range."

Private First Class Brainard ofCompany A, 1st Marines, describeda barricade that had just beendemolished by a pair of M-26Pershing tanks:

We pass by the barricadewhich had been constructed

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with large-sized rice bags .

and also with odd bits of fur-niture, such as tables, chairs,and wooden doors, all piledup together. There wereabout ten dead gookssprawled in and around theobstruction, and the black-ened antitank gun was tippedover on its side with lots ofunused shells scatteredaround it.

The 1st and 5th Marines werenow converging close enough thatColonel Puller's men could clearlysee Lieutenant Colonel Murray'stroops still fighting to clear thefinal eastern finger of Hill 296, theridge that extended into the heartof Seoul. Certain riflemen in 1stBattalion, 1st Marines, spokeadmiringly of the 5th Marinesbeing "once more on top of thehighest hill in the local vicinity—born billy goats."

The 5th Marines may haveappreciated the compliment, butby 26 September they were sickand tired of the steep northwestapproaches and the stubbornlydefending remnants of the 25th

NKPA Brigade. Captain Robert A.McMullen's Company I, the menwho had spearheaded LieutenantColonel Taplett's crossing of theHan back at Haengju and earnedthe praise of General Almond bytheir double envelopment of Hill125, would again be in the spot-light on the 26th. Taplett assignedMcMullen the mission of sweepingthe eastern terminus of the hugelower spur of Hill 296 that extend-ed very near the major intersectionof the Kaesong-Seoul highway andMa Po Boulevard. Ahead, lessthan a mile to the northeast layGovernment House. And not farbeyond the palace was the bound-ary between the 1st and 7thMarines. By design, Murray's regi-

Photo by Frank Noel, Associated Press ment, which had sustained theWhile the Pershing tank "Dead Eye Dick" advances beyond a captured North highest casualties the precedingKorean barricad a Marine sniper team waits for the 45mm antitank rounds to week, was close to being pinchedabate before moving into new firing positions. out and assigned a reserve role.

A brief helping hand from a Marine amid a day of great ter- downed power lines, and scattered families.ror for the civilians—high explosives, burning buildings, Photo by David Douglas Duncan

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Private First Class Eugene A. Obregon

Bom in 'nc'mber 19.3 . Private FirM la~s

bregon nli ·ted in th larine Corp~ in June191'. ~igned to the -th ~Iarine~. he 'i\'a~ part

of the 1st Provisional larine Brigade. \"hich \"as ru hedto Korea in ugu·t L9'50. 11e participated in the blo dybattles at the 'aktong River-crucial victorie~, whi hhelped sa\ e (h Pu 'an Perimeter from collapse.

\,(rhen the -th 1arin s re- 'mharked to join the 1st1arine ( i\'ision for the assault landing at Inchon on 1.,

: 'ptemb 'r, Obregon again took part. On 26 .'eplember,during the battle to n:caplure the outh Korean capital,hL heroic action. \vere I' 'cognized by a posthumousaward of the M dal of r10nor. The official citation reads,in part:

For conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity at the riskf his life ah >VI.' and beyond the call of duty whil '

'elTing wilh ompany ,Third Battalion. Fifth.\-(arines, FirM 1arine Di\'ision (Reinforced). in actionagainst enemy aggressor ~ rce' at ,eoul. Korea. on26 'eptemher 1950. While s rving a~ an ammunitioncarri 'I' of a machine-gun ~quad in a larine rifle com­pany \"hi h was temporaril . pinn d dO'i\'n by hostilefire, Prh'atc First las. Ohr g n bs f\'ed a fellO\\larine fall wounded in the lin f fire. rmed ani}

with a pistol. he unhesitatingly dash d from his cov­er d position to (he side of the casualty. Firing hispistol \ ith one hand as he ran, he grasp d hi. c m­rad by the arm 'i\'ith his other hand and, de pite th •great peril to himself dragged him to (he ide of theroad.

:till under nemy fire, h wa. bandaging theman's wounds \ hen hostile troops of approximatelplm n strength began advancing to\: ard his posi­lion. uickly seizing the wounded iVlarine's carbine,he pia' d his own bod a~ a shield in front of himand lay ther firing accurat Iy and efTective! into thehostile group until he hims -If \: a~ fatally wounded

hy en my machine-gun-fire. Private Firt Ias~

Ohr gon enahl ~d his fellO\\ Marines to rescue thw und'd man and aid d 'ssentially in repelling lheattack.

The fellmv larin .. whose life bregon had ~a\ d,was Private First Class Bert til. Johns n. He I' 'CO\ redfrom hi. w unds and wa. I' turned lO active dULY·

bregon's acrifice was Illem rializ d when a buildingal amp Pendleton. a ~hip, and a high school in the Los

ng Ie area 'i\'er~ named after him.-Captain John C. Chapin. L'. leR (Ret)

But Hill 296 and Colonel Wol'shard-core survivors were notthrough with the 5th Marines.Company 1's stouthearted advanceencountered fier~e oppositionfrom the start. At one pointMcMullen led his troops into amaze of trenches manned by 200North Koreans and forced themout by the sheer velocity of theassault-only to lose the pOSitionto a vicious counterattack. Thetwo forces struggled across this

contested ground the balance ofthe afternoon. At day's end theMarines held the field but were toodepleted to exploit their advan­tage. Captain McMullen fellwounded and was evacuated. Hehad qualified for his seventhPurple Heart in two wars. TwoMarines in Company G, 3dBattalion, 5th Marines, fighting insomewhat lower ground adjacentto Company 1's battlefield, eachreceived their fifth wound since

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the regiment's arrival in Pusan 53days earlier.

Elsewhere during Company G'sday-long fight, Corporal BertJohnson, a machine-gunner, andPrivate First Class Eugene A.Obregon, his ammunition humper,tried to set up their weapon in anadvanced position. The NorthKoreans charged, woundingJohnson with submachine gun fire.Obregon emptied his pistol at theshadows closing in, then dragged

to lose a tank to Japanese sappers.In downtown Seoul on 26September, however, this distinc-

Boulevard.

Johnson to a defilade position todress his wounds. When theenemy swarmed too close,Obregon picked up a carbine andemptied the clip, always shieldingJohnson with his body. There weretoo many of them, and in the endthe North Koreans shot him topieces. But Obregon had delayedtheir attack long enough for otherMarines to hustle down the slopeand rescue Johnson. Private FirstClass Obregon's family wouldreceive his posthumous Medal ofHonor.

The two rifle companies hadfought their damnedest, hut the 5thMarines still could not fight theirway clear of the highlands.Stymied, Lieutenant ColonelRaymond Murray marshaled hisforces for the final breakthroughon the morrow.

Nor was Murray in a position tomaximize his supporting arms, ashe had been able to do in the ear-lier assault on Smith's Ridge. Henoted with some envy the volumeof heavy-caliber indirect fire andthe frequent Corsair missions being

delivered in support of Puller'sadvance to his right front. "Chestyused a lot of artillery," Murray saidlater. "And you could almost see aboundary line between the two of[us], the smoke coming up from hissector and very little smoke com-ing up from mine." LieutenantColonel Jon Hoffman, author ofPuller's definitive biography, notedthe irony that Puller had been crit-icized six years earlier at Peleliu forabjuring supporting arms while hisinfantry elements shattered them-selves in direct assaults againstBloody Nose Ridge. By compari-son, Colonel Harold D. "Bucky"Harris, commander of the 5thMarines at Peleliu, had receivedpraise for his policy of being "lav-ish with ordnance and stingy withthe lives of my men." Now, in thestreets of Seoul, it was Puller's turnto be "lavish with ordnance."

Another bitter lesson learned bythe 1st Marine Division at Peleliuwas how to protect its tanks fromsuicide sapper attacks. The "OldBreed" was the only division in thesubsequent battle of Okinawa not

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tive streak ended. A nimble-footedNorth Korean darted out from therubble, caught 2d Battalion, 1stMarines' riflemen by surprise, andflung a satchel charge atop a pass-ing flame tank, then vanished inthe blast and smoke. The crewescaped unscathed, but the tankwas destroyed. Angered andembarrassed by this bad luck, 2dBattalion's NCOs forcibly remindedtheir men to watch the adjacentalleys and rubble piles, not thetanks. This paid off. The NK1Alaunched a dozen more sapperattacks against Marine tanks oper-ating in the center of the boule-vard; Lieutenant Colonel Sutter'stroops cut each one of them down.

There was no real "school solu-tion" that applied to the kaleido-scopic action taking place on thestreets of Seoul on the 26th ofSeptember. Captain Norman R.Stanford, commanding CompanyE, 2d Battalion, 1st Marines, had asmuch tactical experience as any-one on the scene, having served asa company commander in the 1stMarines throughout Peleliu aridOkinawa. Sutter ordered Stanfordto follow Company F up the boule-vard in trace, then take the rightfork while Company F took the leftat a designated intersection ahead.Sutter's closing guidance was suc-cinct: "Move out fast and keepgoing." But Company F encoun-tered a particularly nasty barricadejust past the intersection and couldnot advance up the left fork.

Captain Stanford went forwardto assess the delay. From 200yards away the NKPA barricadelooked unassailable:

I took one look at the AT[antitank] muzzle blasts kick-ing aside the pall of smokeover the roadblock, and I

Photo by David Douglas I)uncan

Frightened civilians scurry to shelter while three Marine Corps Pershing tanksduel with North Korean antitank guns at a barricaded intersection along Ma Po

glanced at the thin flicker ofautomatic fire running acrossthe barricade like a single lineof flame and dived off thesidewalk into an alley.

Stanford's radio failed at thiscritical juncture. He had theoption of bypassing Company Fand the barricade and carrying outhis assigned mission along theright fork, notwithstanding hisnaked left flank, or bowlingstraight ahead through Company F,smashing the barricade, andattacking with Company E up theleft fork. He had the firepower—four tanks, an engineer platoon,rocket squads, and a 75mm recoil-less rifle section attached. "I knewthat we could go through anythingfor 250 yards," he said, risking thesecond option. He hurled hisforces forward, towards the barri-cade. "We had it hot and heavy

among the burning buildings andthe crumbled sandbags of the bar-ricade, and then they broke andran . . . and we butchered themamong the Russian AT [antitank]guns and the Japanese Nambumachine guns." Company E losttwo officers and 18 men in theirheadlong assault. Captain Stanfordwas one of the wounded.

Sutter's battalion, like Taplett'salong the ridge just to the west,had fought their best, but "the flee-ing enemy" had limited hisadvance to 1,200 yards. Seoulwould not fall this day.

Further to the northwest, andnow not very far away, the 7thMarines veered towards the capitalin keeping with 0. P. Smith'sorders to pinch Out the 5thMarines. Company D, 2dBattalion, 7th Marines, led theadvance along the KaesongHighway as it threaded through

184

two towering hills, the now-infa-mous Hill 296 on the right and Hill338 on the left. First LieutenantWilliam F. Goggin, the machinegun officer, led the advance party.

Compared to all the grief beingexperienced by the other two reg-iments on the 26th, the 7th Marinesenjoyed what at first appeared tobe a cakewalk. Thousands ofgrateful civilians thronged theright-of-ways and hillsides, cheer-ing the approaching Marines. Itwas an uncommon experience forMarines of any war to date, a wel-come grace note to serve as a par-tial offset for the horrors to come.The North Koreans, of course, tookprompt advantage of this opportu-nity.

The dense crowds preventedCompany D from maintaining itsown outriding flank protectionalong the ridges on both sides ofthe road and caused the van to

overshoot the intended linkuppoint with the 5th Marines. Thecompany unwittingly entered thecity and the final defenses of oneof the sacrificial battalions leftbehind by the departed 25th NKPABrigade.

Sudden machine gun fire fromthe front felled First LieutenantWilliam F. Goggin, halted the col-umn, and created panic among thewell wishers. Then other machineguns opened up at close rangealong the high ground on bothsides. Another enemy force scram-bled downhill to establish a block-ing position in the rear. CompanyD was abruptly encircled and cutoff.

Captain Richard R. Breen,

though wounded early in the fight-ing, maintained his presence ofmind. He still commanded a large,fresh, well-armed company. Oncethe civilians vanished and hisMarines went to ground in goodfiring positions, he figured his mencould hold their own, despite thedanger. When Colonel Litzenbergcalled to see what kind of help heneeded, Breen answered calmly,"We're okay, Colonel."

Had Company D's entrapmentoccurred two days earlier the ensu-ing darkness might have provencatastrophic, but by now the NKPAforces lacked the punch to finishthe job. Additionally, CaptainBreen received some spectacularhelp. Two U.S. Air Force C-47s

dropped ammunition, rations, andmedicine to the surroundedMarines just before dusk (oneplane, badly shot up by NorthKorean antiaircraft gunners, had tocrash-land at Kimpo). During thenight Lieutenant (junior grade)Edward Burns, USN, the regimen-tal surgeon, led a high-balling con-voy of jeep ambulances throughthe enemy perimeter to retrieve 40of Company D's most seriouslywounded men.

Lieutenant Colonel Parry's 3dBattalion, 11th Marines, still indirect support of the 7th Marines,was the first artillery unit to crossthe Han. At that point the infantryregiment extended from the northbank of the Haengju ferry crossing

By the third full day of the battle for Seoul, the city lay in everywhere, and a thousand fires blazed furiously.ruins. Shell holes buckled the streets, rubble lay strewn Exhausted Marines regroup for the final barricade assault.

Photo by Frank Noel, Associated Press

185

to the edge of Seoul, "a sector of18 miles," said Parry, whichrequired him to deploy "three bat-teries on three separate azimuths."Company D's encirclement on theedge of Seoul on the 26th caused apredicament. The company hadcrossed into the 5th Marines zone,and "it was several hours beforewe were able to obtain clearanceto shoot." But Parry's gunnersmade up for the delays with pin-point defensive fires around theCompany D perimeter throughoutthe night. "We were credited bythe company commander with sav-ing their bacon," Parry said. Theanticipated NKPA night attack didnot materialize.

By now all of Colonel Homer L.Litzenberg's 7th Marines hadreceived their separate baptisms offire. One member of Company B,1st Battalion, 7th Marines, recalledhis own first combat encounter:

The company was above

Seoul when we ran into a fire-fight. We were moving atnight. [There were] green trac-ers coming in, red tracers goingout. It was confusing. . . I wasscared [and] pretty muchhugged the ground. I didn'teven know how to dig a fox-hole, but the Gunnery Sergeanttold me how: "Make it like agrave."

The 26th of September, thoughdevoid of major tactical gains inthe fight for Seoul, ended with asignificant operational break-through. At Suwon, 27 miles southof Seoul, three U.S. Army tanks ofthe 7th Cavalry raced into theperimeter of the 7th Division short-ly before midnight. The EighthArmy had fought its way clear ofthe Pusan Perimeter, and its lead-ing elements had linked up with XCorps.

For the 1st Marine Division, theclimax of the Inchon-Seoul cam-

paign came on 27 September, andmost of 0. P. Smith's disheveledtroops seemed to sense the oppor-tunity as soon as the new daydawned. Sunrise brought a specialrelief to Company ID, 7th Marines,after its all-night vigil in the steeppass at the city limits. Litzenherg'srelief column of tanks, infantry,and engineers fought their wayinto the position against negligibleopposition. Captain Breen re-ceived his second wound duringthe extraction of his company, butthe volume of enemy fire haddiminished sharply from the previ-ous day. While no one enjoyedbeing cut off, surrounded, andpinned down for 18 hours,Company D had acquitted itselfwell and learned lessons thatwould prove valuable in the hillfights ahead.

On this day, the 5th Marinesfinally fought their way clear ofHill 296 and into the city streets.By 0930, Taplett's 3d Battalion hadlinked up with Sutter's 2dBattalion, 1st Marines. Taplettwheeled northeast, grimly aimingfor the huge red banners still flyingover Government House andChang Dok Palace.

As the lead battalions of bothregiments lengthened their strides,a sense of friendly rivalry spurredthem into a race to raise thenational colors over key land-marks. The 1st Marines foughttheir way into several embassies,led by Company E, pausing toraise the flag over first the French,then the Soviet (with great irony),and finally the United States resi-dences. Growled one gunnerysergeant: "It looks like the 4th ofJuly around here."

Lieutenant Colonel Taplett's 3dBattalion, 5th Marines, had a briefbut fierce fight on its finalapproach to the palace. Die-hardNorth Koreans, bolstered by a pairof self-propelled guns, fought to

Marines of Company G, 5th Marines, jubilantly yank down the Communist flagat Government House and run up the American and United Nations flags.

Photo courtesy of Leatherneck Magazine

186

the end. Taplett's tank-infantryteams carried the day. ColonelRobert D. Heini preserved the dra-matic climax: "Moving at the highport up KwangwhamunBoulevard, Company G, 5thMarines burst into the Court of theLions at Government House,ripped down the red flag, andGunnery Sergeant Harold Beaverran up those same colors his fore-bears had hoisted 103 years earlieratop the Palace of theMontezumas." Two KoreanMarines raised their national colorsat the National Palace.

The fight for Seoul continued,especially along the towering

ridgelines to the north, but by duskin the city the NKPA had ceased tooffer organized resistance. Twelvedays after the surprise landing atInchon (and two days afterGeneral Almond's victory commu-nique), X Corps had seized solepossession of the capital city of theRepublic of South Korea.

The 7th Marines continued toadvance through the high groundnorth of the city, cutting the high-way from Seoul to Uijonghu on the28th. In this fighting LieutenantColonel Thornton M. Hinkle, com-manding 2d Battalion, 7th Marines,was wounded and evacuated.Major Webb D. Sawyer took corn-

187

mand. Meanwhile, the 31stInfantry and 17th ROK Infantryattacked to the east, successfullysealing off the last NKPA escaperoutes. There were still smallbands of North Korean troopsloose within the city—two of thesestruck the 2d Battalion, 1stMarines, in predawn counterat-tacks as late as the 29th. The firstoccurred at 0445, when an obser-vation post on Hill 132 was infil-trated by an estimated 70 to 100North Korean troops. A secondattack hit the left flank of the bat-talion a short time later. Bothattacks were repulsed with a lossof 28 Marines wounded and four

Private First Class Stanley R. Christianson

private First Class Christianson was born in January1925 in Mindore, Wisconsin. After he enlisted inthe Marine Corps in October 1942, he served with

the 2d Division in three World War II campaigns. Forhis services, he was awarded a Letter of Commendation.Following duty during the occupation of Japan, he hada variety of assignments, including drill instructor atParris Island.

When the Korean War broke out, he was a memberof Company E, 2d Battalion, 1st Marines, and took partin the Inchon assault. For his actions at Inchon, hereceived a Bronze Star Medal. During the subsequentbattle for Seoul, he gave his life on 29 September, at theage of 25, on Hill 132. Private First Class Chistianson'scitation for the Medal of Honor awarded him reads, inpart:

Manning one of the several listening posts coveringapproaches to the platoon area when the enemycommenced the attack, Private First ClassChristianson quickly sent another Marine to alert therest of the platoon. Without orders, he remained inhis position and, with full knowledge that he wouldhave slight chance of escape, fired relentlessly atoncoming hostile troops attacking furiously withrifles, automatic weapons and incendiary grenades.Accounting for seven enemy dead in the immediatevicinity before his position was overrun and he him-self fatally struck down, Private First ClassChristianson was responsible for allowing the rest ofthe platoon time to man positions, build up astronger defense on that flank and repel the attack

I)epartrnent of Defense Photo (USMC) A-43986

with 41 of the enemy destroyed, and many morewounded and three taken prisoner.

After the war, his sacrifice was recognized by the ded-ication of a statue in his honor at Camp Lejeune, NorthCarolina. —Captain John C. Chapin, USMCR (Ret)

killed, among them Private FirstClass Stanley R. Christianson, whosubsequently received the Medalof Honor for his actions. Despitethese counterattacks, the war wasmoving north, well above Seoul.Indeed, South Korean troops wereabout to cross the 38th Parallel.

On 29 September, GeneralMacArthur and South KoreanPresident Syngman Rhee and theirwives returned to Seoul for a tri-umphant ceremony, accompaniedby a large official retinue. Theconcentration of so many VIPswithin the smoldering city so soonafter the heavy fighting madeGeneral 0. P. Smith nervous.Isolated NKPA antiaircraft gunnersstill exacted a price against alliedplanes flying over the city's north-ern suburbs, especially the slowflying observation aircraft of VMO-6, which lost a single-engine OYand an HO3S-1 helicopter on theday of the ceremony. Smith posi-tioned Lieutenant Colonel Taplett's3d Battalion, 5th Marines, on thehill overlooking the palace andLieutenant Colonel Ridge's 3dBattalion, 1st Marines, along theroute to be taken by the digni-taries—out of sight, but loaded forbear.

Despite the cost of more than700 Marine casualties in seizingmost of Seoul during the climacticthree days of 25-28 September,only a handful of Marines attendedthe commemorative ceremony.Generals Smith and Craig, ColonelPuller, and Lieutenant ColonelMurray were there (Puller barelySO; when a Military Police officerbarred his jeep from the sedanentrance he ordered SergeantJones to drive over the officiousmajor), but Colonels Litzenbergand Brower were still fighting thewar north of the city and the 1stMarine Aircraft Wing senior offi-cers were gainfully employed else-where. In retrospect it is unfortu-

tors.

nate that more of those who hadbattled so hard for the victory—Marines, Navy corpsmen, soldiers,ROK troops, men of all ranks andspecialties, grunts and aviatorsalike—could not have shared thisspecial occasion. For a momenton the afternoon of the 27th, Seoulhad seemed their dearly-won city.Two days later they were beingtold to remain out of sight of theofficial celebrants.

MacArthur conducted the specialceremony at high noon in theNational Palace, ignoring the tinkleof broken glass that fell from theceiling dome windows with everyconcussive rumble of distantartillery. "Mr. President," he intonedin his marvelous baritone voice, "Bythe grace of a merciful Providenceour forces fighting under the stan-dard of that greatest hope and inspi-ration of mankind, the UnitedNations, have liberated this ancientcapital city of Korea . . . . I amhappy to restore to you, Mr.

President, the seat of your govern-

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ment that from it you may better ful-fill your constitutional responsibili-ties." With tears running down hischeeks, MacArthur led the digni-taries in the Lord's Prayer. PresidentRhee was nearly overcome withemotion. To MacArthur he said:"We love you as the savior of ourrace."

The ceremony at the nationalcapital represented DouglasMacArthur at his legendary finest.In the best of all worlds the KoreanWar would have ended on thisfelicitous note. In reality, howev-er, the blazing speed with whichMacArthur had reversed the seem-ing disaster in South Korea con-tained the seeds of a greater disas-ter to come in the north. TheUnited States and the UnitedNations, flush with September'sgreat victories, were fatally modify-ing their war aims to include thecomplete subjugation of NorthKorea and the forcible reunifica-tion of the entire peninsula.Already there were plans afoot to

Photo by Frank Noel, Associated Press

South Korean civilians curiously observe one of their exhausted Marine libera-

deploy the Marines north of the38th Parallel. General Almondtook 0. P. Smith aside as they wereleaving the ceremony and issued awarning order. The 1st MarineDivision would soon be makinganother "end-run" amphibiouslanding on the northeast coast.

Other threats materialized. Onthe day following the Seoul cere-mony, Chinese Premier Chou En-Lai warned the world that hisnation "will not supinely tolerate"the invasion of North Korea. Few

people in the West took him seri-ously.

In the meantime, Almondordered Smith to seize and defenda series of blocking positions northof Seoul. The 5th Marines attackednorthwest. The 3d Battalion, 5thMarines, executed an aggressivereconnaissance in force as far asthe town of Suyuhyon againstwhat the division special actionreport described as "moderateenemy resistance."

The 7th Marines drew the short-

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est straw, the division objective ofUijongbu, a vital road junction inthe mountains 16 miles due northof Seoul. Here the highway andrailroad tracks veer northeasttowards the port of Wonsan andbeyond, an important escape routefor NKPA forces fleeing the "ham-mer and anvil" of the now con-verging Eighth Army with X Corps.

Smith reinforced the 7th Marinesby attaching Major Parry's 3dBattalion, 11th Marines (reinforcedwith a battery of 155mm howitzersfrom 4th Battalion, 11th Marines),plus one company each ofPershing tanks, combat engineers,and Korean Marines, and an Armyantiaircraft battery. This constitut-ed a sizable force, virtually a smallbrigade, but Colonel Litzenbergwould need every man in histhree-and-a-half day battle for theroad junction. Intelligence reportsavailable to Litzenberg indicatedhe would be opposed by an amal-gamation of NKPA units, includingthe remnants of the Seoul CityRegiment; the 2d Regiment, 17thRifle Division, withdrawn from thePusan Perimeter after the Inchonlanding; and the fresh 75thIndependent Regiment, whichreached Uijongbu from Hamhungthe day before the 7th Marinesattacked.

Principal air support forLitzenberg's advance would comefrom the Corsair pilots ofLieutenant Colonel Frank J. Cole'sVMF-312, the Checkerboardsquadron, newly arrived at Kimpofrom Itami, Japan. Cole had corn-manded the same squadron as amajor at the end of World War IIand had trained his new aviatorsexceptionally well.

On 1 October, ColonelLitzenberg led his well-armed forcenorthward. Advance aerial andmap reconnaissance led him toconclude that the NKPA wouldmost likely make a stand at

Photo by Frank Noel, Associated Press

A Marine mortar section moves north of Seoul past a grateful band of South Koreans.

Nuwon-ni where the highwaypassed through a narrow defile—averitable "Apache Pass."Litzenberg planned for LieutenantColonel Raymond G. Davis' 1stBattalion, 7th Marines, to execute atactical feint along the high groundon both sides, while Major MauriceE. Roach's tank-heavy 3d Battalion,7th Marines, barreled straightthrough the pass during the dis-traction. The plan ran awry whenRoach encountered a thick mine-field in the pass. Litzenberg shift-ed both battalions to the highground, and the Checkerboards ofVMF-312 appeared at dawn on the2d with a vengeance, bombing,strafing, and dropping napalm can-isters. Davis and Roach scratched

forward slowly along both ridges;the engineers labored in the mine-fields. But the North Koreans con-tested every yard, shooting downthree Corsairs, disrupting the engi-neers, and limiting the Marines toless than a quarter-mile gain thatday. During this fighting, SecondLieutenant Joseph R. Owen, themortar officer in Company B, 1stBattalion, 7th Marines, learned bit-ter lessons in tactical communica-tions. "The North Koreans," hesaid, "used whistles and bugles forbattlefield command, more effec-tive by far than our walkie-talkies."In addition, Lieutenant Lloyd J.Englehardt of VMO-6 flew hisglassy-nosed HO3S-1 helicopterthrough heavy fire to rescue

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downed Checkerboard pilotCaptain Wilbur D. Wilcox near thevillage of Chun-chon.

On 3 October, the regimentunveiled a good-luck piece,General Clifton B. Cates,Commandant of the Marine Corps,nicknamed "Lucky" Cates for hissurvival amid the First World War'sbloodiest battlefields. Cates hadflown to Korea to observe hisMarines in action. Litzenberg'sforce put on a stellar show. Theengineers having at considerablecost cleared the minefield in thedefile, Major Webb D. Sawyer's 2dBattalion, 7th Marines, poundedstraight up the middle. Soon theybegan overrunning enemy fieldpieces and had the enemy on the

run. The NKPA had staked every-thing on holding the pass atNuwon-ni and had little left todefend Uijongbu. Litzenberg un-leashed all his forces. Sawyer'smen stormed through the ruinedtown by late afternoon, the majorpausing to telephone Litzenherg—widely known by his nickname"Litz the Blitz"—saying, "This is theMayor of Blitz!"

The Uijongbu drive cost the 7thMarines 13 killed and 111 wound-ed, but the combat experience wasworth the price to the newlyformed regiment. ObservedLieutenant Joseph Owen: "ForBaker-One-Seven it was combattraining under fire; in those five

days we became a good Marinerifle company."

The battle for the Nuwon-niPass marked the end of significantfighting in the Inchon-Seoul cam-paign. Almost immediately the 1stMarine Division turned over itsassigned sector to the 1st CavalryDivision of the Eighth Army andbegan returning by regiments tothe vicinity of Inchon for re-embarkation.

The leading elements of thedivision and other X Corps compo-nents assembled at a UnitedNations cemetery near Inchon on 6October to honor their dead.Division Chaplain Robert M.

Schwyhart led the spiritual salute.

Major General Oliver P. Smith laida wreath on the grave of CorporalRichard C. Matheny, a stalwartsquadleader of the 5th Marineswho before his death qualified inswift succession for the BronzeStar, Silver Star, and Navy Cross.

The combined Inchon-Seoulcampaign cost the 1st MarineDivision 2,450 casualties, accord-ing to the official history (415killed or died of wounds; 2,029wounded in action; 6 missing inaction). North Korean gunnersshot down 11 fighters of the 1stMarine Aircraft Wing. For theirpart, the Marines destroyed or cap-tured 47 Russian-built tanks andsufficient heavy mortars, fieldguns, antitank guns, machine guns,and rifles to equip a good-sizedbrigade. A preponderance of the14,000 NKPA fatalities claimed byX Corps in the campaign resultedfrom the combined air-ground fireof the Marines.

Such statistics had more rele-vance in World War II than in themurky political and psychologicalnature of limited warfare in theAtomic Age. The Cold Warbetween the United States and theSoviet Union and their respectiveallies and surrogates was fullyunderway by 1950. In Seoul inSeptember of that year, the UnitedNations for the first time restoredthe freedom of a democratic capi-tal captured by Communist forceof arms. The fact that all of XCorps' hard-fought gains would beswept away by the ChineseCommunist counter-offensive threemonths later added to the bitter-sweet irony of this protracted war.In the final accounting, the 1953ceasefire left Seoul firmly estab-lished as the capital of theRepublic. Seoul's flourishinggrowth and development over theensuing half century remain a trib-ute to the sacrifices of all thosewho fought and died to recapture

From lefi BGen Edward A. Cra(; the Commandant of the Marine Co'7s, GenClifton B. Cates; and MajGen Oliver P Smith, inspect the North Korean flag thatrecently was hauled down by Marines at Government House in Seoul.

l'hoto courtesy of Leatherneck Magazine

191

and protect the ancient city.

Operation Yo-Yo

The Wonsan Landing

General MacArthur orderedGeneral Almond to re-embark XCorps and execute a series ofamphibious landings along theeast coast of North Korea. The 1stMarine Division would board des-ignated shipping at Inchon andland tactically at Wonsan, the mainevent. The 7th Division wouldproceed south to Pusan to boardits ships for a subsequent landingnorth of Wonsan. The original D-Day for the Marines at Wonsan was15 October. The actual landingdate was not even close.

Operation Chromite was thecodename for the Inchon landing.The troops would nickname the

Wonsan campaign "Operation Yo-Yo."

Inchon and Wonsan serve asbook-end examples of amphibiouswarfare's risks and rewards. By allrights it should have been Inchon,with its legion of tactical andhydrographic dangers, that sput-tered in execution. Wonsan,scheduled for attack by a largerand, by now, more experiencedlanding force against a sharplydiminished enemy threat, shouldhave been a snap. But in the ironyof war, Inchon stands as a master-piece, Wonsan as a laughingstock,as ill-conceived a landing as theUnited States ever conducted.

In late September 1950, therewas nothing particularly wrongwith the concept of a long-distance"Right Hook" amphibious landingfrom the Sea of Japan to seize

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Wonsan and other smaller portsalong the North Korean coast.Wonsan at the time represented areasonable objective, and the 1stMarine Division had proven itsamphibious prowess in the diffi-cult landing at Inchon and wasexpected to be available for thenew mission in early October.

Wonsan had the best naturalharbor in the Korean peninsula.Located 80 miles north of the 38thParallel, the port's bulwark-likeKalma Peninsula provided anenormous sheltered harbor, aseven-inch tidal range, weak cur-rents, rare fog, and a moderatebeach gradient—all incomparablymore favorable than Inchon.Wonsan's near-shore topographyalso offered a decent lodgementarea, suitable for a division beach-head, before the Taebaek

1st Marine Division Daily Casualties, Seoul CampaignDate Killed Died Missing Wounded Total Battle

in Action of Wounds in Action in Action Casualties

20 Sep 24 1 3 119 147

21 Sep 30 3 0 198 231

22 Sep 27 3 0 135 165

23 Sep 19 7 0 117 143

24 Sep 68 4 0 217 289

25 Sep 33 4 1 238 276

26 Sep 29 7 0 167 203

27 Sep 33 3 0 153 189

285ep 8 4 0 31 43

295ep 19 1 0 49 69

3OSep 11 2 0 48 61

lOct 2 1 0 16 19

2Oct 15 1 0 81 97

3Oct 2 1 0 35 38

4Oct 0 0 0 3 3

5Oct 1 1 0 3 5

Total 321 43 4 1,510 1,878

Appendix J. Montross & Canzana. The Inchon-Seoul Operation, 1955

Mountains—eastern North Korea'slong, towering spine—rearedupwards from the coastal plain.The port's strategic appeal cen-tered on the combination of itsaccessible harbor with a high-capacity airfield, petroleum refin-ing facilities, and its locationastride major railroads and high-

ways leading west to the NorthKorean capital of Pyongyang,north to Hungnam, and southwestto Seoul.

On 4 October, General Almondformally assigned the 1st MarineDivision the mission of seizing andsecuring the X Corps base of oper-ations at Wonsan, protecting the

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airfield, and continuing inlandoperations as assigned. Threeunforeseen developments almostimmediately knocked the Wonsanplans into a cocked hat: massiveport congestion; a drastically accel-erated invasion of North Korea;and the successful mining of theircoastal ports by the North Koreans.As a consequence, MacArthur'scelebrated "Right Hook" becamesuspended in mid-air, leaving theMarines (and all of X Corps) hang-ing in limbo—out of action—throughout a critical three-weekperiod. The Wonsan landing,when it finally occurred, has beenaptly described by military histori-ans as "the most anticlimactic alanding as Marines have evermade."

The 1st Marine Division opera-tions order directed a simultaneouslanding of the 1st and 7th Marinesabreast on the eastern shore of theKalma Peninsula, each supportedby an artillery battalion and a bat-talion of Korean Marines. Wonsanairfield lay directly inland, as closeto the landing beaches as Kadenaand Yontan had been to theHagushi beaches at Okinawa.

On 7 October, the day followingthe cemetery ceremony in Inchon,Major General 0. P. Smith reportedas landing force commander forthe Wonsan expedition to RearAdmiral James H. Doyle, USN,commanding the Attack Force, U.S.Seventh Fleet. The division beganembarking at Inchon the next day.It would take a week.

Here MacArthur's plans began tounwind. No one, it seems, hadforeseen the tremendous strainabout to be placed on the only twomedium-capacity ports available,Inchon and Pusan, during a time ofconflicting requirements to offloadthe mammoth supplies needed forthe Eighth Army's invasion of west-ern North Korea while simultane-ously backloading two large divi-

amphibious assault is an exact andtime-consuming science. The 1stMarine Division, now fully fleshedout with the 7th Marines and othermissing components, had 25,840officers and men on the rolls forthe Wonsan expedition, easily thelargest division of any nation fight-ing in the Korean War. AdmiralDoyle's Attack Force contained 66amphibious ships plus six corn-mercial cargo ships, hut many ofthe vessels arrived late in thecrowded port, few contained thepreloaded 10-day levels of Class I,II, and IV supplies as promised,and the Attack Force still providedinsufficient total lift capacity for allthe division's rolling stock. Theprecise art of combat loadingbecame the improvised "art of thepossible," but each compromisecost time. As the division's specialaction report dryly noted, GeneralAlmond's prescribed D-day of 15October "was moved progressively

Gen Oliver P. Smith Collection, Marine Corps Research Center

From left, MajGen Oliver P. Smith, MajGen EdwardM. Almond, and RAdm JamesH. Doyle discuss plans for the Wonsan landing on board the Mount McKinley.

sions for the X Corps' "RightHook." The piers, staging areas,and access roads in both ports

became impossibly congested.Chaos reigned.

Combat loading for an opposed

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back to a tentative date of 20October."

As junior officer in Company B,1st Battalion, 7th Marines, SecondLieutenant Joseph R. Owenassumed the demanding duties ofcompany embarkation officer. "Wewere assigned an old LST that ourNavy had used in World War II," hesaid, "hut which was now leased toJapan for use as a cargo ship." TheJapanese captain spoke no Englishhut conveyed to Owen by angrygestures his displeasure at whatseemed to him to be gross over-loading of his ship's safe lift capac-ity. When Owen's runner chargedthe bolt on his carbine the skipperabruptly acquiesced. "There was ashortage of shipping," Owen ratio-nalized, "and, we were informed,we would be afloat for only a fewdays."

Private First Class MorganBrainard of Company A, 1stBattalion, 1st Marines, boarded hisassigned LST without bitching: "All

we knew at that moment was thatwe were steaming south; that wewere in dry clothes with a roof overour heads, and assured of two hotmeals a day and the chance to takesalt water showers . . . . Our sliceof life seemed to be improving."

Most of Admiral Doyle's WonsanAttack Force completed loadingthe 1st Marine Division and sortiedfrom Inchon on 15 October, theoriginal D-Day. By that time theother two factors that would ren-der the planned assault meaning-less had materialized. Five daysearlier, Republic of Korea's I Corpshad seized Wonsan by overlandadvance from the south. On 13October, Major General FieldHarris, commander of the 1stMarine Aircraft Wing, flew intoWonsan airfield, followed the nextday by the Checkerboards ofLieutenant Colonel Cole's VMF-312and other elements of MarineAircraft Group 12.

In the meantime, AdmiralDoyle's advance force commanderdiscovered that the North Koreanshad sewn the approaches toWonsan with more than 2,000 anti-ship mines, both contact and mag-netic. The U.S. Navy had only 12minesweepers available in the-ater—as compared to the 100employed in support of theOkinawa landing five years earli-er—and even when reinforced byKorean and Japanese craft, themission proved overwhelming.Two U.S. minesweepers hit minesand sank on 12 October. Heavyfire from North Korean coastdefense guns hampered rescueoperations. A Japanese sweepersank on the 18th; the next day ahuge mine practically vaporized aSouth Korean craft. Doyle's exper-iments in dropping 1,000-poundbombs and anti-submarine depthcharges to create enough over-pressure to detonate nearby minesfailed. Even the fact that a linear,tactical landing had been replacedby a simpler administrative offloadfrom amphibian tractors and land-ing craft in column did not helpexpedite the problem. Rear Ad-miral Allan E. Smith, commandingTask Force 95, the advance force,voiced the frustration of all handswhen he reported: "we have lostcontrol of the seas to a nationwithout a navy, using pre-WorldWar I weapons, laid by vessels thatwere utilized at the time of thebirth of Christ."

General Almond's frustrationknew no bounds. On 20 October,with the war fast shifting awayfrom his active influence (theEighth Army entered the NorthKorean capital Pyongyang the pre-vious day), and with no end insight to the tedious minesweeping,Almond departed the flagship byhelicopter and established hiscommand post ashore at Wonsan.

As for the embarked Marines,

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rampant rumors swept the tiaris-ports, especially beginning theafternoon of 19 October when thetask force suddenly got underway,heading south. "War's over!"exclaimed many a Marine, "We'regoing back to Pusan and thenheading home!" But the shipswere only taking new precautionsto protect themselves in hostilewaters. For the next week—and aweek is a very long time at sea onboard transports as claustrophobi-cally crowded as these—the shipsreversed course every 12 hours,first heading south, then north,then starting over. Here emergedthe sarcastic nickname "OperationYo-Yo." As voiced by MarineCorps historians Lynn Montrossand Nicholas A. Canzona in 1957:"Never did time die a harder death,and never did the grumblers haveso much to grouse about."

The Japanese-crewed LST trans-porting Lieutenant Owen's compa-ny soon ran low on provisions andfresh water. As Owen recalled: "athree-week ordeal of misery andsickness . . . . The stench below-decks made the air unbreathable."

Before long sickness swept theembarked landing force. Longlines of Marines suffering fromdysentery and gastroenteritis over-whelmed poorly-equipped sickbays. The "Binnacle List" on boardthe converted civilian transportMarine Phoenix ran to 750 Marinesat the height of the epidemic. Theattack transport Bayfield (APA 33)reported a confirmed case of small-pox. As a final insult to the divi-sion's pride, a traveling USO showfeaturing Bob Hope and MarilynMaxwell beat them to Wonsan, per-forming for an appreciative audi-ence of Marine aviators and ROKsoldiers while the fierce "spear-head" assault troops rocked in mis-ery among the offshore swells.

At long last, on 26 October, the1st Marine Division landed on the

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A4313

Finally off the ships, the 1st Marine Division, which ended ashore by Navy LCVP towards Wonsan, North Korea.its interminable "Operation Yo-Yo" on 26 October, chugs

In the anticlimactic landing of the 1st Marine Division at Wonsan airfield. A chill wind blows in from the loomingWonsan, troops dismount from a column of LVT-3Cs and Taebaek Mountains.their escorting LVTA-5 armored amphibians along the Department of Defense Photo (USN) 421366

196

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A130364The 1st Marine Division suJjired the ignominy of landing at uinn of soaked infantrymen straggles ashore among good-Wonsan weeks after South Korean forces had seized the port hearted catcalls by VMF-312, the "Checkerboard" squadron.and the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing had arrived. Here a col-

Kalma Peninsula below Wonsan."The day was bright and cold,"recalled Private First Class Brainardof Company A, 1st Marines, "andthe sea had a real chop to it as our[LVT] slid down the ramp andnosed forward into the water."The captain of Brainard's shipwished the departing Marines luckover the public address system,adding that MacArthur's headquar-ters had just announced that thetroops should be "home byChristmas."

The airmen of the Checkerboardsquadron hooted in derision as theinfantry streamed ashore, puffingwith exertion after three weeks ofenforced inactivity. Lieutenant

Owen encountered more sarcasticinsults from the ROK troops whohad captured the town 16 daysbefore: "They had learned the mid-dle-finger salute, which they ren-dered to us with great enthusiasm."

Colonel Puller bristled at theignominy of his regiment beingcategorized as rear echelon troopsdue to no fault of their own. ThenBrigadier General Edward A. Craigmet Puller on the beach with thewelcome news that he had justbeen selected for promotion tobrigadier general. Puller's trade-mark scowl vanished momentarily.Then he turned to the job at hand.His regiment was about to be dis-persed over a huge area of enemy

197

territory, beginning with thedeployment of Lieutenant ColonelJack Hawkins' 1st Battalion, 1stMarines, on a special mission torelieve a ROK force guarding asupply depot at the coastal town ofKojo, 40 miles south.

Puller's dilemma reflected thedrastic changes in United Nations'strategic objectives being formulat-ed it seemed, day-by-day. The warin North Korea had evolved fromthe establishment of coastal oper-ating bases and the methodicalelimination of residual NKPAforces to a wide-open race to theYalu River, the Chinese border.General 0. P. Smith, accustomed toa relatively narrow zone of action

in the Inchon-Seoul campaign,suddenly found himself responsi-ble for a zone measuring 300 mileslong by 50 miles deep. WithGeneral Almond already calling fortwo infantry regiments to advanceas far north as Hamhung, Smithknew Puller's 1st Marines would

be hard-pressed to cover anuncommonly large piece of realestate around the port of Wonsan.The Kojo assignment was but thefirst of several far-flung missionsPuller would have to handle.

Half of Hawkins' battaliondeparted within hours after their

198

landing on the 26th. The troopswere still shaking out their sea legswhen they clambered into a longline of empty gondola cars of acoal train bound for Kojo. It wasan uncomfortable and singularlydirty ride. Captain Barrow notedthat the residual coal "left a markon all of us." The train had tomake two trips to deliver the entirebattalion, and those units travelingby road, like the attached artillerybattery, did not arrive until the sec-ond night.

The troops dismounted from thetrain at Kojo stiff and disoriented.The town itself proved pic-turesque, but the supply dump hadbeen largely emptied by thedeparting ROK garrison, too manyhills dominated the town, andthere was a critical lack of intelli-gence about a North Korean "guer-rilla force" reportedly lurking inthe area. "Quite candidly," admit-ted Barrow, "I never understoodour mission."

The situation bothered Hawkinsacutely. The late-afternoon ap-proach of 3,000 refugees towardsKojo made him more uneasy.These Hawkins diverted into anassembly area outside the seaport,but their unimpeded approachreflected the vulnerability of hisposition. The largely depletedsupply dump lay in low ground,difficult to defend. A well-definedavenue of approach into the sea-port lay open from the south andsouthwest. "Therefore," Hawkinswrote shortly after the Kojoaction, "I decided to placeCompany B in outpost positionsto cover these approachesThe remainder of the battalionwould be deployed on the hillmassif west of Kojo."

Accordingly, Captain Wesley C.Noren deployed Company B onoutpost duty along three scatteredhills two miles south of town. Asnight fell, Noren placed his men

Men of the 1st Marines sweep through the village ofKojofol-lowing the sudden, violeni and well-coordinated North

Gen Oliver P. Smith Collection, Marine Corps Research Center

Korean night attacks of 27 October on the 1st Battalion'spositions.

on 50 percent alert: each foxholeto contain one man awake, theother halfway zipped-up in hissleeping hag. The night was chilly;that morning the Marines had dis-covered the first ice of the seasonin the rice paddies. Their last fire-fight in burning Seoul a month agohad left them gasping in the heat.Now they began to shiver.

The security measures pre-scribed by Hawkins and Norenwere normal under the assumedthreat—light probing attacks bysmall bands of guerrillas. No onethen knew that Noren's dispersedplatoons had taken their nightpositions within direct observationof a significant organized force, the10th Regiment, 5th NKPA Division.Colonel Cho Ii Kwon commanded

this regiment, one of the highlydisciplined forces led by veteransof the fighting in China that hadspearheaded the invasion of SouthKorea four months earlier. Choand his men had successfully evad-ed the "hammer and anvil" trap setby the United Nations forces afterInchon and returned essentiallyintact across the border. The regi-ment had left its tanks and artilleryalong the Naktong River, but stillpossessed plenty of mortars andmachine guns. With more than athousand assault troops at hand,Cho had the numbers and leader-ship to overwhelm Noren's out-posts and simultaneously attackthe flank of Hawkins' main posi-tions west of Kojo.

Rarely in their long history had

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the 1st Marines been in such mor-tal danger. Cho's veterans movedout of their staging areas at night-fall and approached each outpostwith disciplined stealth. Thesemen were superb night-fighters.Some infiltrated undetected towithin 10 feet of the nearestMarine foxholes. At precisely2200, they attacked with sub-machine guns, grenades, and shrillscreams.

Noren's rifle squads never had achance. Seven Marines died inone platoon before they couldeven scramble out of their sleepingbags. Vicious hand-to-hand fight-ing swept the hilltops. Some unitswere cut off and scattered. Well-drilled junior non-commissionedofficers grabbed disorganized mdi-

gloom, heading south, like vam-pires trying to outrun the sun.There was just enough light for theentire battalion to enjoy a "TurkeyShoot," including the newly arrivedBattery F, 2d Battalion, 11thMarines. Seventy-five of this groupof North Koreans never made itback to their sanctuary. Perhapstwice again as many NKPA bodieslay within the original Marine posi-tions.

viduals and formed small counter-attacks. When the 1st Platoon,abruptly missing 30 men, had toabandon Hill 109 just north ofNoren's command post, SergeantClayton Roberts singlehandedlycovered their withdrawal with hislight machine gun until the NorthKoreans slipped in close and killedhim.

Captain Noren kept his head,swiftly calling in mortar fire andtrying to make sense of the pande-monium. One thing was sure—this was no guerrilla band. Judgedby their night-fighting skills alone,Noren knew he was under attackby one of the original Inmin Gunoutfits, supposedly destroyed bythe United Nations' breakout.

Captain Noren held the scat-tered pieces of his beleagueredcompany together until 2350, nosmall achievement in the confu-sion, then radioed Hawkins forpermission to withdraw. Hawkinsassented. The battalion comman-

der was much more in the darkthan Noren, but he knew thatCaptain Robert P. Wray's CompanyC on the right rear flank had beenhit hard by a violent surpriseattack. Noren then executed amasterful point-by-point withdraw-al under extreme enemy pressure.By 0200, he organized the surviv-ing members of Baker Companyinto a 360-degree defensive circlealong the railroad tracks about2,500 yards below Kojo. At 0300,Noren established radio contactwith the 4.2-inch mortar platoonwhose steady fire then helped dis-rupt the NKPA forces convergingon the small band.

Noren held his new positionthroughout the rest of the night.At the first grayness of dawn hebegan evacuating his wounded,dragging them north in ponchosthrough the thin ice and thick mudof the rice paddies. Suddenly aforce of 200 of Colonel Cho's nightfighters appeared out of the

200

Fragmented reports of a majorattack against 1st Battalion, 1stMarines, at Kojo began to arrive atthe division command post around0700 the next morning. Coin-cidentally, the first three heli-copters of VMO-6 were just beingferried from Kimpo to Wonsan air-field. Captain Gene W. Morrisonrecalled landing at Wonsan duringthe emergency and not even shut-ting down his helicopter. Hereceived an urgent cockpit brief-ing, then lifted off immediately forKojo on a medical evacuation mis-sion.

The sudden violence of the well-coordinated NKPA night attacks hadshocked Lieutenant ColonelHawkins deeply. His reports todivision throughout the 28th reflect-ed the concerns of an isolated com-mander under protracted stress:"Received determined attackfrom sunset to sunrise by largeenemy force," he reported in onemessage that reached GeneralSmith about 1230. "One companystill heavily engaged. . . . Have suf-fered 9 KIA, 39 WIA, 34 MIA prob-ably dead . . . . If this position is tobe held a regiment is required .

Shall we hold here or withdraw toNorth? Send all available heli-copters for wounded."

Smith directed Colonel Bowserto send Puller and an additionalbattalion of the 1st Marines byimmediate train to reinforceHawkins. Smith also arranged forair strikes, destroyer bombard-

Sketch by Col Charles H. Waterhouse, USMCR (Ret)

A Navy co'psman drags a wounded Marine out of the line of fire. The artistadded the Red Cross band on the corpsman's arm to provide color to the compo-sition, admitting in his original caption that most corpsmen discarded the bras-sard as too tempting a target to enemy snipers.

Aerial Medical Evacuation

~ramati i~1provem nt in. mcdi al care ~ r c m­

bat ca ualu . I ecame vld nt by the nd of theoul campaign. ccording to hi torian J. R b rt

kin, a surg ons op rat d on 2,1 4 patients dur­ing th fighting r r Inchon and ut. Only nine fLhese m n di d, a remarkabl advanc in th survivalmt' of those 'I, u~t1ties \ ho made it back to an aid ta­tion.• eveml factor ontributed to this breakthrough,bUI one nOtable newcomer \. a. the increa' ~d u e I'organic obs 1\ alion aircraft-prin ipally th heli­copter-for m c.lical evacuation of ,everel woundedmen.

The use of larine orp air raft t a uat a. ual-ties under fir began a arlya 1928 in i aragua \\'h nFirst Lieutenanl hristian F. hilt land d his 02

r 'air biplane in the du ty tr et. of QUilali, a bravurap >rformanc , r p at d 10 tim " that resulted in the r ­'ue of _0 m n and a !edal of I Tonor for the intrepidpilot. Lat r, during th 1915 bani for kinawa'Kuni hi Ridge, Ih Marines eva 'umed hundred f theirasualries to a r ar ho 'pital by perim mal u of th ir

-1 ingl - ngine ob. el ation aircrafl, which trundl dalofl from a dirt road just behind the front line..

larine bservation quadr n 6 ( 1 -6) had beenone of th' ob 'ervation quadrons that evacuatedwounded m 'n from th Kunishi Ridge bani fi ld. InKor~a five ear' laler the quadr n again. upponed rheIsL [arine Di ision. 'oJ hile the -1. c asionall trans­p ned\' ounded men in 19-0, th mi sion in rea, inglybe ame th pI' in e of the -quadron\ helicoplers, thenation' first wartime use f th new technology.

The V 1 -6 pil ts tlC\Y 'ikorsk H03 -lob ervationh Ii pt r luring the, coul campaign. b n h atb hind th pilot could accommodate three pa. nger,but there" a:- insufficient r om in th cabin for a ·tretch­er. To eva uate a non-ami ulatory patienl, according tohi'torians (and helicopter pil (') Li ut nant olon I

a,y . Park r and Major Frank M. Batha, Jr., the cr w

had to remov th right I' ar " indow and load thMret her headfir t through the gap. The ca ·ualt· feetjUlt>d out the open windo\' .

Primiti e as lhis arrang ment may ha e been, thepit ts of \ ( -6 safely evacuat d 139 crili ally wound dMarin . during the oul campaign. Mo. t of Lhes m nowed their live, t lhi tim I acuation. An unspokenI ut ignificant ic.l benefit to these mission f mercywa their impact on the 1110ral of the Marine. till

ngaged in c mbat. impl kn wing that thi marvelousn" tlyin ma hin was on all t e acuate their bud­di's I' thems) s should the need ari e wa greatlyreassuring.

The profi iency of the VM -6 h Ii opt I' pi! ISpro d r assuring l the fixed- ing pilots a w 11.

201

Marin helicopter had res 'ued (arine ircraft roup33' fir t downed a\'iator a' early as the :-econd da ofthe 1st Brigade's ommitment to the PUS'1I1 Peninsula.Included in Major Robert P. Keller's post- 'coul campaignevaluation of hi Black he pquadr n's role in clo, eair support operati n \ ere these comments: ''The heli­coptcr, have done a wonderful servi e in r suingdowned pilot under the velY guns of the enemy. Thepilot should not talt out cro, 'ountry unless he is 'urethat helicopter' are a ailable."

lajor incent J. ollschalk' 10-6 lo:t tv-a Y-lsand two helicopters 10 enemy fire during the 'coul cam­paign. Fortunatel, al lea L, non of the air ran weretran, porting ca ualtie' at Ihe time. Three months later,the 'quadran would Iran'ition to the Bell HTL- 1 heli­c ptcr hi h could carry a stretcher mounted on each'kid, in cf~ ct doubling the medical eva ualion pa load.In ugust ]951. in one of the high poinL,> of larineCorp' aviation history, 1ajor Gen ral hristian F. • chilt,the hero of 1 ng-ag Quilali. took command of th > lsIlarine Air raft ing in K rea.

ment, and a hospital-configuredLST to be dispatched to Hawkins'aid.

Hawkins, convinced that theNKPA would return that night ingreat force, continued to sendalarming messages to GeneralSmith, but things had calmeddown when Puller arrived withSutter's 2d Battalion, 1st Marines, at2230. There were no furtherattacks by the 10th NKPARegiment. Puller was decidedlyunsympathetic to Hawkins' con-cerns (and in fact would replacehim in command of 1st Battalion,1st Marines, with LieutenantColonel Donald M. Schmuck aweek later).

The next day, Captain Noren led

a patrol south to recover a numberof his missing troops who hadgone to ground after being cut offduring the night. Similarly,Captain George B. Farish, a VMO-6 helicopter pilot on a reconnais-sance mission below Kojo, spottedthe word "HELP" spelled out inrice straw in an open field, landedwarily, and promptly retrievedsmart-thinking Private First ClassWilliam H. Meister, one of Noren'slost sheep, from his nearby hidingplace. The battalion's final countfor that bloody night came to 23killed, 47 wounded, and 4 missing.

On the same day, CaptainBarrow led Company A south on areconnaissance in force, accompa-nied by a destroyer offshore and a

section of Corsairs overhead. Justas he reached his assigned turn-around point, a Corsair pilotadvised him that a large number ofenemy troops were digging in sev-eral miles farther south. Barrowdirected the pilot to expend hisordnance on the target. He did so.Barrow then asked him if he couldadjust naval gunfire. "Yeah, I cando that," came the reply. For thenext half-hour the destroyer deliv-ered a brisk fire, expertly adjustedby the pilot, who at the endreported many casualties and flee-ing remnants. Barrow returned toKojo without firing a shot, butfully convinced he had avengedBaker Company and taught hisunknown opponent a lesson in

With the Kojo area secured, the 1st Marines, in coordination with Marine Corsairs, move out in reconnaissance injbrce.Gen Oliver P. Smith Collection, Marine Corps Research Center

202

Iwon, another 60 miles above

combined arms firepower.0. P. Smith could illafford to

keep Puller and two battalions sofar below Wonsan. With the 7thand 5th Marines already on theirway far northward towardsHamhung, and an urgent require-ment at hand for 3d Battalion, 1stMarines to proceed to Majon-ni,Smith had no Marine infantry unitsleft to cover Wonsan's port, air-field, and road junctions. Membersof the 1st Amphibian TractorBattalion and other combat sup-port Marines doubled as riflemento fill the gaps until Puller's force

returned in early November. The1st Marine Division, however,would remain widely dispersed, acontinuing concern to Smith.Indeed, his three infantry regi-ments would not be linked up forsix weeks, from the administrativelanding at Wonsan until the with-drawing columns from the ChosinReservoir fought their way downto Chinhung-ni during the secondweek in December.

Other changes were in the wind.On 29 October, General Barr's 7thDivision commenced its adminis-trative landing at the small port of

203

Hungnam. In the dramatic butstrategically unsound "Race to theYalu," two of Barr's units wouldbecome the only U.S. forces toactually reach the river. Mean-while General Almond continuedto look for opportunities to exploitthe 1st Marine Division's amphibi-ous capabilities. When Pullerreturned from Kojo, Almondwarned him to be ready for anamphibious landing 220 milesnortheast of Wonsan. The targetwas Chongjin, a seaport danger-ously near the North Korean bor-der with the Soviet Union.

Colonel Puller wasted little timeworrying about another "End Run."Of more immediate concern to himwas the commitment of LieutenantColonel Ridge's 3d Battalion, 1stMarines, to the defense of the keyroad junction at Majon-ni, adeployment that would last 17days and provoke a dozen sharpfirefights.

The mountain town of Majon-nioccupied a bowl-like plateau,encircled by higher ground, about26 miles west-southwest ofWonsan. The roads from Wonsan,Pyongyang, and Seoul intersecthere, and the highlands containthe headwaters of the Imjin River.Ridge's battalion arrived on 28October to provide a screeningand blocking force.

The terrain around Majon-ni lentitself more readily to the defensethan Kojo, but Kojo had beenmuch more accessible for theMarines. There were no rail lines,and the "highway" from Wonsanwas a single-lane road that twistedthrough mountain passes, switch-backs, hairpin turns, and precipi-tous dropoffs. The troops called it"Ambush Alley."

In 1978, two Marine generalsrecalled their experiences as youngofficers involved in the defenseand resupply of Majon-ni. To

National Archives Photo (USMC) 127-N-A4553

The 5th Marines load on board a patched-up train for the move north toHambung in pursuit of the retreating North Koreans