US DOE Solar Powered Satellite - Military Implications - 1978

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Satellite Power System (SPS)Military Implications

October 1978

U.S. Department of EnergyOff ce of Energy ResearchSatellite Power System Project Off ceWash ington, D.C. 20545Under Contract No . EG-77-C-01-4024

DOE/NASASATELLITE POWER SYSTEMConcept DevelopmentandEvaluation Program


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Available from:National T echnical I nformation Service (NTISU S. Department of Commerce5285 Port Royal RoadSpr ingfield, V ir ginia 22161

Price: Printed copy: $5.25M icrofiche: $3 OO


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HCP/R-4024-01Dist. Category UC- 11, 41, 60, 63,63a, ,c,e,64,66e,%f,97c

Satelli te Power System (SPS)Mili tary Implications

October 1978

Prepared by:Michael J . OzeroffPacific Palisades, California 90272for thePRC Energy Analysis CompanyMcLean, Virginia 22102

Prepared for:U.S. Department of EnergyOffice of Energy ResearchSatellite P ower System P roject Off ceWashington, D.C. 20545Under Contract No. EG-77-C-01-4024

DOE/NASASATELLITE POWER SYSTEMConcept DevelopmentandEva uat on Program


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NOTICEThis report was preparedas an account of work sponsored by theUnited States Government. Neither the United States nor the UnitedStates Department of Energy, nor any of their employees, makes anywarranty, express or implied, or assumes any legal liability orresponsibility for the accuracy, completeness, or usefulness of anyinformation, apparatus, product, or procassdisclosed,or representsthat i ts usewould not infringe privately owned rights. Referenceherein to any specific commercial product, process, or service bytrade name, mark, manufacturer, or otherwise, does not necessarilyconstitute or imply its endowment, recommendation, or favoring bythe United States Government or any w n c y thereof. Theviews andopinions of authors expressed herein do not necessarily state orreflectthose of the United States Government or any qpncy thereof.

I


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EXECUTI VE SUPMARYThi s s t udy exam nes the pot ent i al m l i t ar y r ol e, bot h of f ens i ve

and def ensi ve, of a Sat el l i t e Power Syst em (SPS) . The f i ndi ngs ar ebased on uncl assi f i ed document s and r eport s, but ar e bel i eved to beconsi st ent wi t h r el evant c l ass i f i ed wor k.

The ver y l ar ge or bi t al power sour ce of t he SPS coul d have a numberof pot ent i al m l i t ar y appl i cat i ons. Per haps t he most ar r est i ng, butcer t ai nl y one i n t he ver y di st ant f ut ur e i s t he poss i bi l i t y of devel op-i ng an ant i - bal l i s t i c def ense weapon ut i l i z i ng l aser or par t i cl e beams.Near er t er mposs i bi l i t i es i nc l ude ant i - sat el l i t e weapons and per hapssome f or m of psychol ogi cal weapons.

A number of pot ent i al m l i t ar y suppor t poss i bi l i t i es are descr i bed.Power r el ay vi a l aser beam t o ot her sat el l i t es or to ai r c raf t or r emot el and si t es may be f easi bl e.abl e pl at f orm for numer ous support f unct i ons such as sur vei l l ance, coin-muni cat i ons, navi gat i on and ot her s.

The sat el l i t e may provi de a hi ghl y desi r -

An SP S wi t h m l i t ar y capabi l i t i es may have a st r ong negat i ve i mpac t on i nt er nat i onal r el at i ons i f i t i s not i nt er nat i onal i zed. Speci alt r eat i es or agr eement s wi l l pr obabl y be r equi r ed t o assur e a vi abl e SPS.Devel opment of a nat i onal pol i cy on m l i t ary ut i l i z at i on of t he SPS wi l li mpose cer t ai n i nt er nat i onal r el at i ons i mpacts .

The SPS satel l i t e woul d be vul ner abl e to m l i t ar y act i on of anenemy wi t h good s pace capabi l i t y, but woul d exper i ence l i t t l e or not hr eat f r om sabot eur s or t er r or i s t s , except vi a t he gr ound cont r ol s .The sat el l i t e' s i nt r i ns i c sur vi vabi l i t y i s hi gh because of i t s s i ze,r obust ness and r edundancy. Vul nerabi l i t y of t he gr ound segment i s notgr eat l y di f f er ent f rom that of ot her l ar ge i ndust r i al compl exes, buti t s i mpor t ance suggest s t hat st r ong pr otect i ve measures woul d be pro-vi ded f or i t .

The paper concl udes wi t h an out l i ne of some of t he key i ssuesi nvol ved, and a number of r ecommendat i ons or f ur t her st udy, i ncl udi ngsome areas f or l onger t er m ef f or t s .


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V

ACKN9TKED NT

The author i s deeply indebted to D r . Robert M. Salter, J r. f orhi s assistance i n the preparation of th i s paper. Special thanks areal s o due to the PRC Energy Anal y si s Company f or Tr o vi s i on of r e s e a r c hmaterials.


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TABLE OF CONTEErTS

Executive Summary ........................................ iiiAcknowledgment ........................................... V

I . I ntroduction ............................................. 111. Obj ective and Task Statement ............................. 3

111. Survey of Relevant L iterature and Related Work -......-... 5I V . Analysis and Evaluation .................................. 7

1. Task 1 - SPS Xilitary Potential ...........-.........- 72. Task 2 - Impact on I nternational Relations .......-... 183. Task 3 - SPS Vulnerability ...................-....... 16

V . Key I ssues and General Observations ...................... 33VI . Recommendations for Further Study ( Task 4 ) ............... 37

3941

VI I . Longer Term Studies ........................................V I I I . Bibliography .............................................


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I . INTRODUCTION

This report has been prepared f or PRC Energy A nalysi s Company underP.O. No. ! J 4121. I t i s intended to be one of the several inputs to theprel iminary assessments being made i n the Satel l i te Power System (SPS)Concept Development and Evaluation Program. Thi s Program, a j o i n t DOE-NASA pl an, i nvol ves a seri es of studies over a three year peri od, to resul ti n recormendations as to the uti l i ty and desir abi l i ty of the SPS conceptand the advi sabi l i ty of i ts development and implementati on.

The report addresses mi l i tary impli cations of the SPS, as one nf thei ns t i t ut i onal / i nt e r nat i onal i ssues having a si gni f i cant beari ng on thesoci etal assessment area of the Program. The soci etal assessment i n turni s one of the three major task areas, the others being environmental andcomparati ve assessments, which make up the current s y s t em study, and whichw i l l be examined together i n an i ter ati ve manner i n order t o help i narr iving at a recommended system def i ni ti on.

T he SPS i s a proposed means of providing ut i l i ty el ectr i cal powerfrom the i nexhaustibl e sol ar resource. I t consists of two pri nci palsegments. T he space segment i s a large, geo-synchronous satel l i te- borneso l ar cel l array, together with microwave conversion equipment and anantenna f or beaming the col l ected energy to earth. The ground segment i san appropriate receivi ng antenna array (rectenna), al so with conversionequipment to transform. the received microwave energy to a form suitablef or ut i l i ty use. A f ter being transformed the converted power i s fed tothe local uti l i ty grid f or distribution.satel l i te array and the rectenns are on the order of 100 square kilometerseach i n si ze, and the net output power to the ut i l i ty i s to be 5,000 mega-watts.

The system i s large -- the

A lthough, as was stated, the focus of th i s study i s an examinationof the potenti al mi l i ta ry aspects of the SPS, i t was required that thestudy resul ts be unclassi f i ed. I n additi on, no need-to-know author i zati on


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was avai l able, i n par t because of t ime constraints.the relevant l i teratur e examined was of an uncl assi f i ed nature. Accessto some cl assif i ed reports was avai l abl e to the author because of anexi sti ng relationshi p with the Rand Corporation, but these we r e a minorportion of the source l i terature. The substanti al exclusion of class i f iedmaterials from thi s study meant that some prior wor k coul d not be uti l i zed,and precluded making more def i ni ti ve statements i n a few key areas. A t thesame t ime , an acquaintance wi thxhe Cl assi fi ed l i teratu re assures t hat t hi sstudy i s consi stent wi th related broad national goals.

A ccordingly, most of


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11. OBJECTIVE AXD TASK STATEXENT

The obj ecti ve of this study i s to determine what rol e the SPS has,i f any, i n the U.S. mil i tary posture, both of fensively and defensively.T o achieve thi s obj ective, four specific tasks are called out, as f ol l ows .

1. I nvestigate SPS potentialities as a weapon or other supportiveelement of U. S. m i l i t a r y preparedness.

2. I nvestigate the potential for impacts on international relations.3. I nvestigate the relati ve vulnerabil i ty to overt mi l i tary action,

ter ror i st attack s or sabotage.I denti f y questions needing further study and an approach that canbe taken ( I ) wi thout securi ty clearanc-e and, (2) with securitycl earance.

4 .


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111. SURVEY OF RELEVANT LITERATURE AND PSLATED WORK

I n carryi ng out thi s study, pri nci pal dependence f or source data wasto be placed on materials avai l abl e i n the open literature. The f act thatthe study report was to be unclassif i ed neant that only l imited use couldbe made of cl assi f i ed materials, since thei r substantive data was usuallycl assi f i ed. However, researchers involved i n relevant cl assi f i ed areas,whi le decl i ning f or the most part to di scuss the subj ect on an uncl assi f i edbasis, did ai d the author i n confi rming that there was no breach of securitywhi le assurfng relevance and consistency.

Sources which were used included a number of i t em s from the extensi vebibl iography provided by the sponsor. A number of Rand studi es wereconsulted -- these included both satel l i t e-related works which were mostlycl assi f i ed, and studies rel ati ng to tprrori sm and sabotage, which f or themost part are not. I n addi tion to these, the usual open l i ter ature sourceswere uti l ized to a somewhat l esser extent.

A s has been implied earli er, the avail abl e substantive l i ter atur e onth i s question is not yet very extensive though growing. A lthough satellitesand thei r appl i cati ons have been with us f or many years, the concept ofvery l arge ut i l i ty systems i s relatively new, and has recei ved concertedattenti on only recently . Correspondingly, consideration of the mi l i tarysi gni f i cance of such systems i s also recent though of somewhat earli erorigin. The bibl iography i s included at the end of the paper.


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- 7-I V. ANALYSI S AND EVALUATION

To carry out the investigations required i n th i s study, we addresseach of the tasks i n turn, i n ef f ect asking how i t applies, or what i s i tssignificance to the SPS. I n some instances the SPS has to be evaluated asa whole, i n others l ogi c di ctates that the di f ferent segments of the Systembe considered separately. The work of the f i r s t three tasks i s descri bedi n thi s section, that of the fourth i s i n Section VI.

Task 1.of U S. mi l i tary preparedness.

The SPS potential i t ies as a weapon or other supporti ve element

(a) Space Segment.I n examining thi s question, i t i s evident, to begin wi th,

that the pri ncipal i nterest i n the SP S from a mi l i tary point ofv iew i s i n the space segment. The ground segment, al thoughhaving a number of unique features that di sti ngui sh it f r o mother ut i l i ty stati ons and comparable i ndustr i al complexes, hasl i t t l e that could be considered parti cul arly si gni f i cantmil i tari l y. Perhaps the one feature that could be an exceptionto th i s statement l ies i n the requirement f or communicationbetween the ground segment ( the rectenna) and the satellite.P i l ot beam si gnals are required t o be sent f rom the rectennacenter to the satellite antenna array to provide control f orthe power beam. A l s o , telemetry receivi ng and transmitti ngequipment i s requi red f or overal l command and control of thesatellite, and i t may be advantageous to l ocate thi s functi onat the rectenna si te. To the extent that the rectenna isconnected to the satel l i te or these two functi ons, i t nay havesome r ol e mil i tar i ly , but onl y because of the connection. W ew i l l return to thi s question later.


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The space segment of the SPS, i .e . , the synchronous al ti tudesatellite, has substantial potenti al mi l i tary impli cations,mainly because of i ts very l arge power capabi l i ty and i ts orbit.A lthough many satellites have been and continue to be ut i l i zedat synchronous al ti tude, none has ever remotely approached norrequi red the power l evel proj ected f or the SPS sate l l i te .l evel s for present-day synchronous satellites are generallymeasured i n hundreds of wa t t s . The potenti al of having manygigawatts avai l able on orbit i s a to tal l y new prospect. Someof the possibl e potenti al i ti es are outli ned i n the fol lowing,i n which weapon possi bi l i ti es are described f i r st , followed bypossibil ities for other m i l i t a r y support elements.

Power

(7:) l?eapon possi bi l i ti esOne of the most chall enging prospects f or mi l i tary

application of the SPS satellite i s the possibi l i ty ofdevelopment of a satel l i te- borne bean weapon f or ant i -ball- istic-missile (ABII) use. One possi bl e versi on ofsuch a weapon would be a high-energy laser beam, func-t i m i n g as a thermal weapon, to disabl e or destroyenemy missiles. The synchronous or bi t provi des anexcel l ent vantage point f rom which substanti al l y anenti re hemisphere of the earth can be conti nuouslyscanned from one satell ite, and the avai l able primarypower (assuming the f ul l output of the satel l i te canbe devoted t o the laser f or thi s use) means that Seamoutput powers up to gigawatts might be possi bl e.However, cal cul ated values for the laser power requi redfor m i s s i l e k i l l from synchronous al ti tude, even thoughvery imprecise, i ndi cate that the requi red l aserperformance i s s t i l l a l ong way of f . For example, a


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boost-phase k i l l from such an al ti tude may requi re laserbeam power of the order of tens of gi gawatts, f or atypical set of parameters. Extrapolations from today'slaser beam powers, perhaps up t o one megawatt, to therange of several gigawatts are very uncertain, and makeclear that an effective laser system at such al ti tudesmust be considered a rather remote possi bi l i ty.such high energi es, other approaches such as the Synchro-beam concept which uti l i zes synchrotron radi ati on mayturn out to have some advantage over the laser, but aremore specul ati ve at present. Other arrangements i nwhich, f or example, an intermediate laser relay platformmight be used, could possi bl y of f er some advantages.However, these arc beyond the scope of the present study.

For

An al ternati ve to the use of lasers would involvepar ti cl e beams. A lthough these have been suggested i nthe past for weapon use i n satel l i tes , a prime stumbling-block has al so been the l arge power requirement. A stqith l asers, i n the SPS case the primary power avai l abl ei s probably suf f i ci ent f or any f oreseeable weapon system,so that other system elements become l imi ti ng. Theenergy required from a par ti cl e beam f or m i s s i l e k i l lor disablement may be less than that from a laser beambecause of i ts penetrating power, but thi s nay be out-weighed by other factors.

T heoreticall y, highly coll imated rel ati vi sti cel ectron beams can be propagated over long di stancesut i l i z i ng so-cal led space-charge focusing ar i si ng fromparti al neutral i zati on of the beam's coulomb charge byambient posi ti ve i ons i n space regions. Such an electronbeam, i f "sti f f " enough, i .e. , at GeV part ic le levels,


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could overcome some of the propcagation l i mi tati onsimposed from par ti cl e traj ectory bending i n the earth'smagnetic f i el d. Consideration has been given i n unclas-si f i ed sources to propagation of electron weapon beamsi n the earth's atmosphere through use of a laser beam topreheat a path and "pave the way" f or the fol lowi ngelectron beam.on surface and airborne tar gets from the SPS.

This consideration might permit attack

Neutral beam weapons i n space have al so been di s-cussed i n unclassif i ed peri odi cal s, but such beams wouldnot remain coll imated over l arge distances ( as i s poten-ti al l y possible with an el ectron beam). Even a l owdivergence beam of one microradian w i l l s t i l l spread outmuch too f ar at moderate ranges. A t very hi gh beam cur-rents, such a beam might be useful against rel ati vel yhard in-space targets.

Tn summary, i t can be said that , at th i s t i m eei ther a parti cl e or l aser beam ABN system is an in-tri gui ng prospect, but requi res f ar more developmentbefore a proper assessment of i ts f easi bi l i ty or prac-t i c a l i t y can be made. The ef fecti veness of such an ABEIsystem directed instead against ai rcraf t i s probablynot suf f i ci ently di f f erent from that agai nst missilesi n the boost phase to j ust i f y any di f f erent conclusion.

A second potenti al weapon appl i cati on of the SPSsate l l i te i s as an anti - satel l i te weapon. This alsowould requi re a high-energy l aser or parti cl e beam, asbefore, to be used for di sabli ng or destroyi ng m i l i t a r -i l y important enemy satellites during states of war.For the most part , the ki l l / range considerations ares i m i l a r to those f or missiles, except that satel l i tes


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are probably sof ter targets than re-entry vehicl es, sothat the ef f ecti ve ranges agai nst satellites would begreater. The SPS satel l i te i t s e l f i s of course notintended to be highl y maneuverable, so that i ts sphereof influence i s limited to the space around it.

The anti - satel l i te weapon capabi l i ty may of coursealso be used f or sel f- defense purposes. I n thi s rol ethe range requirement i s greatly reduced. I t i snecessary to disabl e or destroy an incoming weapon onlyf ar enough away to remain out of che range of i ts l ethalo r damaging eff ects. I n practi ce th i s means that k i l lranges of a few ki lometers against conventional weaponcarriers and a few hundred ki lometers agai nst nucl earweapon carr i ers may be adcquate f or th i s f unction.Thus, the sel f-defense functi on nay be done w i t h con-siderably less power than the anti-satellite weapon.

A t?i i rd possible weapon appl i cati on oE the SPSsatel l i te i s perhaps best considered as a psychologicalweapon, di rec rd pri nci pal l y at enemy personnel Twopossibl e vari ants are i ndicated here. I n the f i rs t , iti s suggested that i t might be feasible to redir ect themain microwave power beam away from i ts rectenna andonto areas where enemy personnel are present, ei ther i nmi l i tary operations, or, possibly, ci vi l i an acti vi ti esof various kinds. This might al s o be done bv a smal l er,perhaps lover-powered bean from an antenna designed i orthe purpose, so as not to i nterrupt the main power bean.The objecti\.e of thi s tact i c would be to t ry to disruptnormal operations and ac ti v i ti es by inducins fear orpanic, and causing personnel to seck shel ter f rom theradi ation. A ppropriate shel ter from the microwave


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radiation i s not usually readily available, so that thepsychological ef f ect may be qui te strong.

The second means suggested f or accomplishing asonewhat similar result i s t o ut i l i ze a hi gh energylaser beam from the satellite, i nstead of the mainpower beam, as an anti-personnel weapon. I t might beparticularl y effective i f an I R wavelength we re used,so that the beam i s not visible. A s a further extensionof thi s approach, i t might be f easi bl e to transmi t highenough energy to i gni te combustible materials, thusadding to the psychological ef f ect. A high-energyparti cl e beam might al so be used i n place of or i naddition to the l aser beam.

fii) Supportive elementsThe ways i n which the SPS space segment might

provide supporti ve elements for U.S. mi l i tary prepared-ness f a l l broadly i nto two areas. One of these i s adirect result OE the high power avai l abl e on thesatellite, and the other comes about because at synchro-nous al ti tude the satellite represents a very desir ableplatform wi th the added advantages of ample power andpayload capabi l i ty. Most of the uncl assif i ed appl i ca-tions or functi ons noted here are not new, but areincluded for completeness, o r because new or improvedcapabil ities may be possible as a result of the greaterpower, weight and supporting services available at theorbital al t i tude.

The f i rst area of i nterest that may have i nteresti ngdefensive mil i tary i mpli cations i s the concept of a powerrel ay usi ng l aser beams as the transmi ssi on means. While


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power transmissi on by means of a microwave beam i s ofcourse a key element of the SPS, the use of laser beamsf or transmission, with their di f f erent characteri sti cs,gives rise to systems wi th qui te di f f erent advantages.Among the notable di f ferences between l aser and microwavetransmission are the beam and target si zes -- those forthe laser being a very sm a l l fraction of the correspondingmicrowave dimensions. These smal ler dimensions f or laserpower transmission are essenti al elements i n the proposedideas. Three possibl e appl i cations of laser power rel ayare noted i n the lol lowing paragraphs.

The f irst application i s one i n which the l aserbeam power rel ay would be made from the SPS satell itet o other satel l i tes or platforms, f or m i l i t a r y uses.One such use might be the so-cal led hunter-ki l l ersatel l i tes. FOT such appl i cations, conversion toelectr ic i ty on the receiving satel l i te i s probably thepreferred route. Conversion eff i ci encies f or a rela-t i v e l y low-power thermoelectronic converter f or thi spurpose have been cal cul ated at over 4 0% , and i t i sl i kel y that scale-up to several megawatts i s possible.

I t is evident then that th i s kind of approach maybe capable of providing ample anounts of power t o varioussatel l i tes, either on a continuous or i ntermi ttent on-demand basi s, and thus remove what has always been adi f f i ci i l t and f rustrating design restri cti on. Theef f ects might be to s i m p l i f y the receiving satellitesor reduce their costs, extend thei r l i f etimes, expandthei r capabi l i ti es, provide si l ent unenergized sparesfor survi vabi l i ty improvement, or coEbinations of theseand other f actors.


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The second appli cation r el ates to the possibl e useof laser power relay to ai rcr af t. One example of thiskind of proposed usage has been descri bed i n a systemi n which a l arge commercial ai r transport may be poweredduring crui sing f l i ght by a continuous.high energy laserbeam. The ai rcraf t ut i l i zes conventional j et enginesf or take-off and climb to crui sing al ti tude. I t i sequipped wi th a laser-powered turbof an engine whichtakes over f or the cruise regime. The turbofan receivesthe focused laser energv di rectl y i n i ts "combustion"chamber thus producing the requi red high temperaturegas f or i ts operation.

For a mil i tary mission, such as that of the A irborneEarly Warning and Command aircraft f or example, laserrel ay power from the SPS satellite would permi t a sub-stant i al operational inprovement, since it would all owessenti al l y unl imited on-station (cruise) t ime . Also,di f f erent operational procedures might be possibl e anddesi rabl e. For example. i t might be qui te f easi bl e andef f ecti ve to keep some bonbers al of t constantl y, loiter-i ng near a location of interest.

The thi rd appl i cation of laser power rel ay wouldbe to transmit power to remote mi l i tary operations onearth.power where perhaps l ong supply lines are the onlyalternati ve, o r parti cul ar demands for mobil i ty, o rcovertness militate agai nst earth-based supply.method to be used f or conversion from laser energywould l i kel y be detersi ned by the end use required.

Here the possi bl e advantage would be t o provide

The

The second main area of i nterest i n the SPSsatellite f or m i l i t a r y support comes about because of


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i ts desirabil ity as a platform on which or from whichvari ous operations might be carri ed out.earlier, the reason for i ter ati ng these here i s not toimply that they are newly-conceived functions, but ratherto point out that they may acqui re new or improvedcapabi l i ti es because of the advantages of fered by theSPS platform.

As was suggested

An example o the use of the satellite as a platformf or functi ons of mi l i tary i nterest would be for an in-spection stati on from which examination of other satel--l i tes or vehicles could be carried out. I ts l arge pay--load and power capaci ty means that a vari ety of bothpassive and acti ve sensing systems could be carri ed.The f act that manned assembly of the satellite i splanned to take place at synchronous al ti tude i m p l i e sthe possibi l i ty of a manned inspecti on stati on, whichwould certai nl y enhance t3 r inspc:tion potenti al . I tmay well be that routi ne rxi ntcnance and repair functionsfor the SFS satel l i te would requi re that the satell itebe manned more ut- less continuously. I t may also be ofsome i nterest i n tli i s context to consider the possi bi l i tyof providing a repair function for other satel l i tes,although accessi bi l i ty to them may be a problem.Presumably some type of space retri eval and reposi ti on-i ng vel i icle system would be required, so that satellitesrequi ri ng repai r could be brought to the SPS. and af terreyclir be replaced i n their proper orbi tal l ocati ons.

Another example of a supporting mi l i tary functionthat might be advantageously car ri ed on the SP S s a te l l i t ei s that of survei l l ance and early warning. Here agai nthe resoi i rces avai l able on the platform make possi bl e


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ample redundancy a range of options i s l i ke ly to beavailable.

(b) Ground segment.A s has been indicated i n the preceding secti ons, the

principal potentials of mi l i tary signi f i cance of the SPS l iesi n the space segment.should be noted as possibly being of i nterest as a supportiveelement i n the mil i tary context. This i s involved wi th thecommunication provisi ons between the rectenna and satellite.

However, one feature of the ground segment

The system requi res that a coded microwave pi l ot beam besent from the rectenna center to the satel l i te antenna array toprovi de control of the power beamference wi th the power beam operation by unauthorized persons,such as saboteurs or terror i sts.) Also, it may be that tel emetryequipment f or overal l cont ro l of the satellite would be locatedat the rectenna as well. Thus , t h e rectenna may be a keycommunications center i or S?S operation. ..J ith extensive andunique communications capabi l i ty i n place, i t may be l ogi cal toprovide speci ali zed, secure l i nks f or m i l i t a r y use at such sites.These l i nks may extend only to the satel l i te under control andto i ts piggyback systems, or may uti l i ze the satell ite as arelay for a more extensive system, including l i nks to otherpoints. I t might be of considerable i nterest to explore ihetlieror not the mai n power bean could be uti l i zed i n any way toprovide 3 secure down l i nk.

(Coding i s to prevent i nter-


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Task 2. l mpact s on I nt er nati onal Rel at i onsA bas i c di f f i cul t y exi s t s i n pl anni ng f or SPS devel opment wi t h

r egar d t o t he appl i cabi l i t y of exi s t i ng i nt er nat i onal t r eat i es andspace l aws.condi t i ons f or space usage i n an er a dom nat ed by sci ent i f i c, communi -cat i on, navi gat i on, and sur vei l l ance sat el l i t es havi ng r el at i vel y modestt r ansm ssi on l i nk power s. Thi s body of space j ur i spr udence di d notant i ci pat e syst ems of t he magni t ude and number s of vehi c l es pr oj ect edf or SPS. I n f a ct , t here i s some concer n t hat t he exi st i ng r egul at or ys t ruc tu re i s even adequat e f or t he bur geoni ng communi cat i on f i el d l etal one t he gr eat i ncr eases est i mat ed f or pr ogr ams of t he scal e cont empl at ed f or t he SYS (and ot her) concept( s). Thi s di f f i cul t y i s f ur t heraggr avated by t he f act t hat t he pr obl em must be r esol ved EOLI in or der .t o assur e t he f ut ur e f or SPS and t o per m t pur sui t of ttie ext ensi vef i scal and pr ogr ammat i c comm t ment s necessar y f or i t s accompl i shment .

These agr eement s and convent i ons wer e adopt ed t o c over

I t wi l l pr obabl y be desi r abl e t o adopt extr aor di nar y pr ocedur esand measures t o guar ant ee t he SPS concept vi abi l i t y. Such measur escoul d i ncl ude speci al t r eat i es wi t h maj or wor l d power s and/ or i nt erna-t i onal i z i ng of SPS .of soci et al and econom c demands of t he t went y- f i r st cent ur y, and t hest at us of t echnol ogy and i nt er nati onal l aw i n t hat er a t o est abl i sh af r amewor k wi t hi n whi ch t he SPS can be st r uct ur ed.

I t wi l l be necessar y t o make accur at e f or ecast s

A m l i t ar i l y- or i ent ed SPS woul d i nevi t abl y have a much st r ongeri mpact on i nt er nat i onal r el at i ons t han one wi t h n o m l i t ar y capabi l i t y,unl ess of cour se i t wer e t rul y i nt er nat i onal , i n whi ch case t he m l i t ar yaspect t ends to l ose i t s s i gni f i cance. For an SPS whi ch has, or i st hought t o have some m l i t ar y capabi l i t y, i t i s bel i eved t hat the re ar eat l east t hr ee areas of par t i cul ar concer n:

Communi cat i on I nt er act i ons ( EH Spect r umUsage)Orbi t al Pos i t i on Al l ocat i onsSel f - Def ense Yeasur es Per m t t ed


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Although the f i r st two O F these areas are covered to some extentunder exi sti ng treaties and regulatory riechanisms (as noted above),these may be i l l - suited to cope w i t h systems of the scale and character-ist ics of SPS. I n the foll owing section, the three areas are discussedi n more detai l .

SPS Communication I nteracti onsThe radio-frequency crowding due to Comsat and I ntel sat along wi th

thei r mi l i tary counterparts and with other space systems i s alreadyapproaching crit ical proportions. Crowding exi sts both i n frequencyspectrum and i n posi ti on assignments along the geosynchronous track.This i s expected t o get wor se as a consequence of growth i n telecommuni-cati ons f requency requi rements and from data nets, cable televi si on,interactive satel l i tes (such as the Canadian A nik), navsats, metsats,and upgraded L andsat systems.

There i s present specul ation as to f uture soluti ons of th i s problemalone -- even without the introduction of SPS . Some space planners havesuggested reservi ng space uti l i zati on for space-unique functi ons. T hi swould mean abandonment of commercial (and pence-time mi l i tary) telecon-munications and repl acing them w i t h l and- l i nes and under-sea cabl es.Such a transi ti on would be enhanced by recent developments i n laserf i ber-opti c cabl es, packet-switching computer systems, and microminia-turization of sending and receivi ng equipment.

These cabl e systems wi l l probably be demanded i n any case with theadvent of video telephone which w i l l requi re orders-of-magni tude increasei n communication t raf f i c volume -- and also wi l l not tolerate the one-quarter-second communication del ays i nherent i n comsat s on geosynchr onousorbits.

Further, the burgeoning i n teleconuaunication data volumes w i l l beaggravated because of future electronic m a i l and computeri zed textualedi ti ng and handling systems. Othe r forms of data communications w i l l


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al so increase. Computing power ( i nstructi on complexity, etc.) continuest o increase a thousand-fold every ten years.

M i l i tary usage of space telecommunications w i l l continue i n thef uture but with hardened l i nk s which w i l l i nclude transmission mediaother than rf -- laser beams, f or example.(protected) l and and sea cabl e systems i s l i k e l y to i ncrease, refl ect-i ng the computerized communication and laser data l i nk improvementsdi scussed above.

M i l i tary employment of

A l l of thi s adds up t o the observation that although some typesof future commercial communications vi a space may be phased out i nfavor of greatly improved terrestrial cable, space usage f or r f comun-ications w i l l continue to be cr i ti cal -- parti cul arl y f or projectedL andsat requirements.form w i l l introduce a quantum jump i n rf telecommunication i nter ferenceand spectrum crowding.

Superposi tion of SPS i n i ts presently contemplated

One possibl e way to alleviate these problems temporari l y might beto i nv i te other users to share SPS platforms and to employ SPS powerl inks as modulated carriers. Perhaps some fracti on of SPS solar-derivedenergy could be transmitted by laser beams which are then simultaneouslyemployed for data transmission; the value of such transmissi on mightof f set the lower l aser l i nk eff i ci ency f or power transfer purposes.A t the long l i nk di stances involved, reduction i n temporal coherencyof the l aser beam might render such l i nks as usel ess f or communicationpurposes, however.

Future space users w i l l necessari l y tend towards GHz frequencies(such as kU band) and toward laser l i nks (from lower orbi t al ti tudes)f or wide-band data transmission. However, interference from SPS higherharmonic si debands or from sum-and-di ff erence f requenci es from i nter-fering pairs of SPS transmissions w i l l continue to represent a problemf or the bulk of space users.

The regul atory machinery f or present space frequency al l ocati on


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i s geared to exi sti ng space systems and to reasonable f uture extrapola-ti ons from thi s base. It w i l l be ?zecssszzy f or the U . S . to ai r thepotenti al SPS r f i nterference problem from the outset and to seek bind-i ng i nternati onal agreements t o all ow cl ear channels at the SPS 2 . 4 5 3lHzfundamental transmissi on frequency and i ts higher harmonics beforeembarking on the prodigious enterpri se that SPS represents. The poten-t ial problem f or r f i nterf erence by the SPS, unless resolved by pr i ortreaties wi th major powers, courts danger that such powers can, i n t i m e sof hosti l i ti es, use such i nterf erence as an excuse for acti on agaixistthe SPS.

I n the above discussion in-space i nterf erence wi th other spacesystems i s highl ighted. However, there are a number of other ways i nwhich SPS can i nteract with other rf emitters and receivers includingthrough Pntenna si de lobes to ground equipment, physi cal changes i nionospheric regions used f or broadcast radio ref l ecti on, and interacti oni n these same regions wi th higher frequency si gnal s through t he anomalousabsorption phenomenon -- t o name a few.cati on encroachments must be i denti f i ed and treated i n the ensuing inter-

A l l of these potent i al communi-

nat i onal agreements.I n addition, it i s possibl e that high power beams employed by the

SPS -- particularly at laser wavelengths -- could di sturb upper atmos-pheri c energv balances v i a radi ati ve transport phenomena i n a s i m i l a rfashion to that forecast for SST thermal pol luti on. The extent towhich thi s parti cul ar problem woul d exist f or regions not di rectl yover U. S. ground receiv ing stati ons i s not known, but as i n the cornu-ni cati on interference case i t could be a propaganda poi nt f or a host i lepower, parti cul arl y one vying f or third-world support against the U.S.

I f SPS i s internationalized i n an ef f ort to share the benefits --and the responsibi l i t ies -- among other nati ons, presumably thesenations w i l l al so have receivi ng stati ons.requirement i f such countri es are on di f f erent continents; but even wi th

This w i l l certainly be a


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adjacent lands, i t i s uneconomical to transmit power over excessivel ylong land-lines. I n these other regions of the world the above envi -ronmental and communication i nterference wi th surface (and airborne)systems may be more acute.I t was noted earlier that tactical and strategi c mi l i tary spacesystems could be qui te suscepti bl e t o jamming from upper space, suchas might be provided by the SPS. T his, of course, i s a symmetricalproblem -- we can inter f ere wi th mi l i tary systems of foreign powers orvice versa. I f SPS i s i nternational i zed, then another nation havingsuch a system could employ i t against us. A l ternatively, a hos t i lepower could commandeer SPS elements -- take over a country that hasone, capture control of the space system, etc.Orbi tal Position A ll ocations

The baseli ne design of the SPS cal ls f or satellite operation i ngeostationary or bi t. Because that or bi t i s already heavi ly used, andthe to tal number of posi tions avai l able i n i t i s l imi ted (though thel i m i t i s not well-defined), i t must be considered as a limited resource,i n an analogous sense to that of the electromagnetic spectrum. Theminimum separati on between satellites depends on f actors such assatel l i te- to- satel l i te occultati on, r f si gnal formats, transmissionpower, station-keeping perormance, etc., with a principal criterionbeing the amount of r f i nterf erence that can be tol erated betweensatellites.

A t the present t i m e , there i s disagreement as to the actual mini-mum spacing needed f or satellites i n geostationary or bi t. Cal culatedval ues range from 2" to 0.2". The or bi t i s cur rentl y occupied by up-wards of 100 acti ve satell ites, and thi s number i s l i k e l y to more thandouble i n the next ten to twelve years.should reduce the requi red minimum spacing, though probably not to amajor extent.

Improvements i n technology


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Since the detai l ed characteri sti cs of the satellites that mightoccupy the or bi t cannot be known beforehand, i t i s not possible tospeci fy exact separations that w i l l be needed, and theref ore the f uturecapaci ty of the orbi t cannot be preci sely determined. What is ur gent l yneeded i s proper i nternational speci f i cation and regul ati on of goesta-tionary satellites, so that the l imi ted orb i tal space can be uti l i zedi n an optimal way. T hi s i s particularly significant for the SPS systembecause of both i ts very l arge radi ated microwave power, which may placeadditi onal constraints on or bi t separation, and the need, i n a maturesystem, f or posi ti ons for as many as twenty to t hi r ty satel l i tes.

I t should be noted that some earl y steps have been taken towardsi nternati onal management of the geostationary o rbi t, and i t i s t o beexpected that they w i l l be extended further wi th the u l t ima t e a i m ofa f ul l y regulated system. The achievement of thi s ul timate goal, aswi th many i nternati onal ventures i s l i kely to be a l engthy and complexprocess, however, and one that i s made much more di f f i cul t by theinclusion of militarily-oriented Satellites.

A military SPS, or at least one wi th acknowledged mi l i tary capa-bi l i ty , makes the requirement f or orbi t space more demanding, whi l e atthe same t i m e i ncreasing the di f f i cu l ty of obtaining such space.Presumably most, i f not al l nations would, i n thei r own best i nterests,resist having a mil i tary capabil i ty placed i n orb i t by another unl essi t were to of f er them some parti cul ar benef i t which outweighed themil i tary threat. I f m i l i t a r y capability i s not acknowledged, but onlysuspected, the resi stance to i t may he j ust as great and i n some casesgreater, because of suspi ci on of the unknown. The f act that the SPSi s a space system, wi th the potenti al of carryi ng powerful new andunknown kinds of weapons, wi th a very l arge power capabi l i ty, andpotenti al l y having "access" to ( threat.ening?) most areas of the earth,would i ndi cate that it constitutes a di f f i cul t question f or i nternationalagreement. Unless the SPS i s truly internationalized to a l arge degree,


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questi ons such as thi s may make i ts ef f ecti ve development i n an orderlywor l d di f f i cul t i f not impossible.

SPS Self-Defense.The present treaties prohibiting space systems beari ng "nucl earweapons or weapons of mass-destruction", whi le permi tti ng sel f -defenseweapons, are i n a s i m i l a r status to the communication spectrum agree-ments discussed earlier i n that these treaties were made i n an era thatdid not contemplate systems l i k e the SPS. For one thi ng, the sc al e ofSPS i s such that new def i ni ti ons, relati onshi ps, and weapon conceptsmay need to be elaborated.

Self-defense systems designed to protect SPS vehicl es might al sobe consi dered as "weapons of mass-destruction". For example, the SPSpower beam i tsel f might be construed as a potenti al weapon of mass-destruction i f it were to be redirected ei ther by U.S. military forces,or by others who may have commandeered the space pl atform.

I n th i s category al s o, a potenti al problem area i s the suggesteduse of SPS to laser-power aircraft during hi gh-al ti tude crui se phasesas described i n Section I V- 1. I t i s possible that the same lasersemployed f or ai rcraf t propulsion could be redi rected f or SPS self-protecti on. However, when used wi th bombers or crui se missile carriers,the SPS could be viewed as a component of a weapon of mass-destructionalthough the weapon itself i s not i n space.

A lso, there i s concern that the ai rcraft-poweri ng laser spot besuff iciently smaller than the ai r cr af t' s col l ector, and that controlmechanisms be accurate enough, that there i s no over-spill. A t a i rcra f tprogression rates the dwell t i m e f or such over-spil l to il l umi natepersonnel on the ground would be a number of mil l i seconds, whi l e i t i sestimated t h a t i nj ury would resul t from only a fraction of thi s expo-sure t i m e . Each SPS platform would have the power capaci ty to continu-ously operate 50 such l asers (or 1,000 for a f leet o 20 SPS' s) .


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Par t i cl e beams of el ect r ons or neut r al i zed pr otons m ght beempl oyed f or sel f - def ense, and pr ovi di ng t hat t he par t i cl e ener gy i shel d bel ow GeV l evel s, t he at mospher e and/ or ear t h' s magnet i c f i el dmay pr ovi de adequat e shi el di ng for ground syst ems. However , t heexi st ence whet her r eal or onl y suspect ed, of par t i cl e beam weapons onan orbi t al pl at f or m i s l i k e l y to r ai se suspi ci ons about t he oper atorof t he pl at f or m even t hough t he weapons have no capabi l i t y agai nsteart h t ar get s. Her e agai n, t he appearance of aggr ess i ve i nt ent , i n anat i onal i st i c envi r onment coul d cause a subst ant i al negat i ve i mpact oni nt er nat i onal r el at i ons .


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Task 3.ter r or i st attacks o r sabotage.

Relative vulnerabi l i ty of the SPS to overt mil i tary acti on,

I n this task as i n Task 1, we examine each of the main segmentsof the SP S i ndivi dual l y si nce vulnerabi l i ty considerations f or themdi f fer . A s before, the breakdown i s i nto the space segment and theground segment. The space segment i ncludes the SPS satel l i te, thenecessary ground-based communications f ac i l i t i es or satellite control,and any essenti al on-orbi t assembly or maintenance f aci l i ti es, si ncethese are unique to the SPS, and may be si gni f i cant i n vul nerabi l i tyconsiderations. T he ground segment i ncludes the rectenna complex andthe necessary interconnecti ons to the ut i l i ty gri d, but not manufactur-i ng and construction f aci l i ti es since they are basi call y not unl i kethose for other systems and thus do not i ntroduce unique new si tuat i onsor problems.

(a) Space Segment.I n considering the SPS satel l i te i t se l f , t h e principal

area of concern about: vul nerabi l i ty has to do with overtm i l i t a r y action. I t i s highly unlikely that terrorism couldpose a di rect threat to the satell ite on orbi t because ofi ts i naccessi bi l i ty, although i t certainl y could during t hemanufacture and preparati on on earth, and might possi bl y bea f actor duri ng orbi tal assembly. Si mi l arl y, the potenti alf or sabotage may possibl y extend to the on-orbi t assemblyphase, but i s very unlikely i n orbi tal operations.

On the other hand, i ndi rect t err or i st o r saboteur acti oncould be taken agai nst the sat el l i te vi a the ground controlf aci l i ty . This could be done f or example, by physi call yattacki ng and gaini ng control of the fac i l i ty so as to sendincorrect or damaging c ommand s to the satel l i te , or bydamaging or destroying the f aci l i ty , i nterrupting i ts power,


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or otherwise i nterferi ng with i ts operation so that no com-mands could be sent. Si mi larly, attack s could be di rectedat the rectenna, so as to i nterrupt the pi l ot beam operation.The suscepti bi l i ty of the satellite to such ki nds of adverseacti ons w i l l be to some extent a function of the system designphil osophy, si nce the di f f erent satellite functions can bedesigned to varying levels of independence from earth comand.The design can, of course, al so be uti l i zed t o make the actualoperation of cormand equipment di f f i cul t f or anyone but highlysk i l l ed operators, and thus place another obstacle i n theterror i sts way.

Sabotage of the satellite i s also considered a ratherunlikely threat.manufacture of the myriad of components f or the satel l i tegives ample opportuni ti es f or saboteurs because of the greatquanti ti es involved, the nature of the satellite is such thatat successi vel y l ater stages i n i ts constructi on and operation,these opportuni ti es become successivel y more restr i cted. ?artsand materials are subjected to extensive inspecti on and test-i ng because of thei r end use , and thi s should be qui te eff ec-ti ve against sabotage. Also, the f i nal assembly is to bedone on orbi t, a highly i sol ated environment t o say the least,by operators who are necessari l y careful l y screened andselected, all owing even l ess scope f or saboteurs i n th is phase.

The threat of overt mi l i tary acti on against the space

Although certai nl y the preparation and

segment -- both satel l i te and ground-based control system --i s real, although as would be expected, i ts execution wouldclearly constitute an act of war.ki l ler capability up to synchronous al ti tudes, i f not opera-ti onal l y avai l abl e today, almost certainl y w i l l be wi thinthe t i m e span of i nterest here. Thus, al though vari ous

Satel l i tes with hunter-


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hardening measures and sel f -defense provi sions can be imple-mented, i t i s undoubtedly saf e t o say that absolute protectionof the satell ite cannot be assured. I n t h i s as i n other ki ndsof mi l i tary exchanges some weapons must be expected to getthrough.

The l arge scale of the satellite tends to make i t some-what less vul nerabl e than would be the case otherwise. Thisis so because of both i ts physical si ze and the very highpower generated. The l arge si ze means that redundant sub-systems can readi l y be provided, and indeed may be mandatoryf or rel i abi l i ty reasons. The high power l evel means thatmany paral l eled (redundant) energy ci rcui ts can be used i nthe design. Both of these f actor s act to prevent a totalloss of power operati on i n the event of weapon damage shortof total destructi on. The one principal i t e m which is notprovided with redundant back-up i n the current base- l ineconcept i s the transmi tti ng antenna, and although i t i s arel ati vel y massive structure, i t may be the,most vulnerablecomponent of the satel l i te. I t may be argued that a redundantantenna design ought to be considered or surv i vabi l i ty rea-sons. The l arge scale al so means of course that substanti alweapons are needed to do more than par ti al l y di sabl e thesate l l i te . I t may turn out that because of thi s l arge si ze,the high or bi tal al ti tude and the fact of being i n a spaceenvironment, nuclear weapons would be the only l i kel y oneswith a good probabi l i ty of achievi ng assured destructi on.

I f t he satell ite were to requi re manned operati on, i tappears that the vulnerabi l i ty to mi l i tary acti on could begreatl y increased. This comes about basi cal l y because thehuman body i s very f ragil e i n 3 space envi ronment, and can-not survive wi thout extensi ve and elaborate l i fe-support


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systems. Such systems would be very diEf icult to hardenadequately agai nst the range of weapons that might be usedagainst them. A ccordingly, the l i fe-support systems wouldprobably be a preferred sof t spot i n such a manned satellite.

(b) Ground Segment.The ground segment as considered here consi sts basi cal l y

of the rectenna complex with associ ated i nterconnecti ons tothe ut i l i ty gr id. For the most par t, such i nterconnecti onsw i l l be within and part of the rectenna complex. Di str i bu-ti on systems to more than one ut i l i ty f or example, i f l ocatedaway from the rectenna are considered par t of the overal lut i l i ty system rather than the rectenna.

The vulnerabi l i ty of the rectenna f aci l i ty to overtmil i tary action i s essential l y not greatl y di f f erent fromthat of other l arge i ndustri al complexes or other ut i l i t i es.Clearly the acility itself i s subject to a l arge range ofmil i tary acti ons, and presents a l arger target than mostpresent-day ut i l i ti es. A lthough i ts operation i s not depend-ent on a cr i ti cal f uel supply l i ne such as coal or o i l , whichcan be rather easi l y i nterdi cted, i t does require other kindsof materi als and suppl i es for maintenance and continued oper-ati on. Concealment, hardening, protecti ve shel ter i ng andother s i m i l a r measures provide l imited protecti on.the rectenna i s most l i kel y to be part of an i nterconnecteduti l i t y gr id, so that the loss of any one stati on i s notnecessaril y cr i ti cal , i ts l arge capaci ty makes i t a veryattracti ve target.evidence of the desi rabi l i ty of reducing an opponent's indus-t r ia l capaci ty by acti on against hi s power generation systems.

A lthough

The hi story of recent wa r s gi ves ample

Susceptibi l i ty t o terr or i st attack or sabotage of the


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ground segment and i ts operations i s probably not substan-ti al l y di f f erent from that of other ut i l i ty stati ons or indus-trial complexes. I n one respect the terror i st threat may besomewhat l es s f or a rectenna f aci l i ty than f or other smallerut i l i ty stati ons f or example.power capaci ty of the rectenna, plus i ts l i kel y key rol e i ncontrol l i ng the incoming power beam imply that i t would bel ogical to provide a substanti al protective force f or i t i norder to assure continuous operation. Th i s might take theform of protecti ve bar r i ers around the rectenna, guard forces,warning and al er t systems, and other such i nstal l ati on secur-i ty measures. The existence of such measures may tend tomake the j ob of ter ror i sts very di f f i cul t, and may deter al lbut the most determined and sophi sti cated ones, and l essenthe impact of those attacks which ar e undertaken. Saboteurac ti v i ti es al so would probably be hampered somewhat by suchmeasures, although perhaps not as substantially as those Ofthe terro ri sts. I n nei ther case i s the threat removed, buti ts dimensions may be al tered.

The l arge physical si ze and

Fear of the unknown ef f ects of microwave radi ati on mightalso operate to i nhibi t terr or i st actions to some extent. A tpresent, the f ul l range of ef f ects of microwave energy on hu-mans is not understood. For example, the acceptabl e maximumexposure l i m i t s to microwave power i n the U. S. ver sus thosei n the Soviet and some other European nati ons d i f f er by afactor of one thousand. This l ack of understanding andagreement f i nds part of i ts expression i n widespread publ i csuspici on and perhaps f ear of microwave radi ati on, somewhatakin to that regarding nuclear radiation. T o the extent thatsuch suspici on or apprehension i s s t i l l present at the t i m eof an operational SPS, some terr or i st acti ons involvi ng


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physi cal presence at the rectennil s i te may well be avoided.This would not of course have any ef f ect on the use of weap-ons or other tacti cs at a distance, or perhaps attack s i nvol v-i ng l imi ted exposure to the radi ati on, though it might l essenthei r severi ty.

I n pre-operational stages of manufacture, assembly andtest, the ground segment i s expected to be as vulnerable tot he threats of adverse acti ons as other kinds of industrialproducts or sys t ems. There i s nothing parti cul arl y uniqueabout the rectenna components and sub-assemblies that mightpl ace them i n a di f f erent category of hazard.


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V. KEY I SSUES AND GENERAL OBSERVATI ONS

There ar e many quest i ons wi t h m l i t ar y si gni f i cance i mpi ngi ng upont he concept , st r uct ur e and oper at i on of a f ut ur e SPS sys t em Among t hechi ef ones ar e t hose l i st ed i n t he f ol l owi ng sect i on, wher e t hey areshown gr ouped i nt o f our di f f er ent cat egor i es. I t shoul d be emphasi zedt hat many of t hese quest i ons ar e i nt er r el at ed and t hus cannot be re-sol ved i ndependent l y; al so t he gr oupi ng i s not necessar i l y the pr ef err edone. The or der of l i s t i ng has no par t i cul ar s i gni f i cance.Mi l i t ar y I mpl i cat i ons

-- I s t her e any U S. m l i t ar y benef i t to be had f r oman i nt er na-

Of what val ue woul d an SPS ABM weapon be?t i onal SPS?

- Shoul d a l aser power r el ay be devel oped f or m l i t ar y use?- Of what val ue ar e psychol ogi cal weapons on t he SPS?- Shoul d m l i t ar y aspect s of an SPS be over t or covert?- Does m l i t ary appl i cat i on of t he SPS j us t i f y i t s econom cs?

Nat i onal Pol i c y- Shoul d an SPS be nat i onal or i nt er nat i onal ?- Shoul d an SPS have any weapon- r el at ed f unct i ons?- Shoul d t he U. S. s ta r t an SPS wi t h the ul t i mat e ai mof maki ng i t

i nt er nat i onal ?- Woul d a U. S. SPS have a negat i ve ef f ect on f or ei gn r el at i ons ?

I nt er nat i onal I s s ues- How shoul d t he EM spect r umusage be det er m ned t o accommodat e

SPS equi t abl y?- How shoul d geost at i onar y or bi t usage be r esol ved?- Shoul d the SPS car r y i nt er nat i onal l shar ed weapons?- Woul d any nat i on be t r ust ed to have s uch l ar ge power sour ces

on or bi t ?


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- What provi sions should be made for acci dental l oss of controlof the power beam?

Technology Questions- I s an ABM weapon feasible using the SPS?- I s a power rel ay to ai rcr af t or other satel l i tes feasible?- Can an SPS operate unmanned?- How can l os s of control of the power beam be prevented?A s indicated earlier, SPS platforms could be modifi ed to host a

number of military as w e l l as ut i l i ty users. I n f act , combining SPSwi th mi l i tary functions could enhance both sets of systems. A lthoughthe SPS i s projected to be economically competi tive as a major U.S.energy source -- and certai nl y one that would not depl ete U. S. energyresources -- there may be considerable i nert i a to overcome i n i ni ti at-i ng a project of thi s scope and novel nature. Correspondingly, l argespace weapon platforms, such as f or midcourse ABM, w i l l also be d i f f i -cult to "sell", agai n because of magnitude, but al so because they maysi t f or years i n space awaiti ng thy alarm. T he combination of tw o st1c.hfuncti ons may be highl y synergisti c from a programmatic standpoi nt.

The development oE an SPS system would represent a major commit-ment whether undertaken as a national or i nternati onal project. T hechoice, on the part of the U.S. , as to whether to attempt such a pro-gram alone, or i n concert with others on an i nternational basi s, w i l lrequi re some pr i or decision as to possible mi l i tary uti l i zation. I tseems clear for example that i f the U.S. i ntent i s to take E ~ l l dvan-tage of whatever mi l i tary potenti al may be avai l abl e from the SPS,then she shou l d implement the system alone, or perhaps with someselected al l ies. In th is way independent control of the overal lsystem operation as well as tlint O F the mil i tary adjuncts could bereadily maintained. O n thc othrr hand, if the i ntent from the outseti s f or an internati onal system, then i t Seems equal l y cl ear that


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m l i t ar y appl i cat i ons woul d pl ay no part i n t he SPS systemI f t he SPS wer e t o be successf ul l y i mpl ement ed, whet her wi t h or

wi t hout assoc i at ed m l i t ar y f unct i ons , i t seems i nevi t abl e t hat t hi swoul d gi ve a very st r ong i mpet us to the devel opment of some f or m ofABM weapon.cont i nuat i on of r ecent and cur r ent ef f or t s i n thi s di r ect i on) i s j us tt he f act of t he exi st ence of a ver y l ar ge power sour ce on or bi t , andt he demonst r at ed success of hi gh power m cr owave t r ansm ssi on. Theset wo f act or s i nevi t abl y i mpl y hi gh power beam weapon pot ent i al . Laseror par t i cl e beams woul d be t he l i kel y candi dat es. The achi evement ofa successf ul ABM syst em coul d have f ar- r eachi ng consequences.i t i s cl ear l y many year s i n t he f ut ur e, t hi s f act or deser ves t he mostcaref ul at t ent i on, si nce i t may be extr emel y i mpor t ant i n det er m ni ngt he cour se of SPS devel opment .

The r at i onal e f or t hi s ( apar t ent i r el y f r omsi mpl y a

Al t hough


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VI . RECOMMENDATI ONS FOR FURTHER STUDY

I t i s recammended that the fol lowing topi cs be considered f orstudy during f i scal year 1979 i n order to ai d i n providing answers tothe key i ssues i dentif i ed i n thi s study.

- What i s the worth of the expected mi l i tary contr i buti on of theSPS system?

- I denti f y the factors that would be used to determine the desir-abl e extent of mi l i tary appl i cation of the SPS.

- Provide an evaluati on of the worth of having a power r el ay fromthe SPS satellite to other satellites and to ai rc raf t.- Determine the potenti al impact of SPS on f uture world mi l i tarypostures. Woul d i t have a de-stabi l i zi ng ef fect? Would i thave potential benef i ts i n times of i nternational al erts?

- I s it f easibl e to consider developing an "i nternational lZBMweapon" rather than a U. S. version, and i f so what are therelative advantages and disadvantages?Give a comparison of the advantages and disadvantages of hav-i ng a U.S. SPS system versus an i nternati onal one.

-

- What are the prospects f or developing a successful ABX weaponwith the SPS system?- How can the problem of rf spectrum crowding be resolved satis-factor i ly so that the SPS spectrum requi rements can be sat is f ied?How can the geostationary or bi t posi ti ons be determined orall ocated i n such a way that the SPS w i l l be assured of su f f i -ci ent space(s)?

-

- What are the prospects that the SPS could operate unmanned?- I denti f y the provi sions that are necessary to assure adequateinvulnerability oE the SPS system.


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Securi ty ClearanceI n consi dering the two study approaches to be taken, ei ther wi th

or without securi ty clearances, i t would be appropr iate to consider asomewhat di f f erent study content f or the two cases. For the approachto be taken wi thout secur i ty cl earance, the study should emphasize anSPS without mi l i tary functions or adjuncts, or at least a minimal m i l i -tary content.more l i ke ly U.S. pl us other nations, or a trul y i nternati onal system.Because the entir e cl assi f i ed area i s avoided, the study output i s max-imized i n the areas where the greatest ef f or t i s appl ied. A lthough theavoidance of classif ied areas can simpl i fy the work considerably, theother s i d e of the coin i s that an ef f or t aimed at multi-national involve-ment introduces another di f f erent set of problems.the program, at a l ater time when mi l i tary appl i cation questions areraised and w i l l have to be answered.

It could possibly be a solely U. S. venture, but perhaps

I t may al so delay

A study to be done wi th secur i ty clearance should be di rected atidentifying or recommending opportuni ti es of mi l i tary ut i l i ty whichthe SPS may present. The study shoul d examine al l possi ble mi l i taryaspects of the SPS, involving al l pertinent cl assi f i ed materi als andsources.cons f or each potenti al appl i cation that can be i denti f i ed.analyses avai l able, decisions on system questions can then be made atthe national l evel which are consistent wi th nati onal aims and objec-tives.would necessari ly be a closely-held U.S. program, or at the most oneinvolving a small number of c l ose allies.

I t should analyze as clearly as possible al l of the pros andWith such

I t seems sel f -evi dent that a militarily-oriented SPS system


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V I I . LONGER TEILY STUDIES

As one outcome of th i s bri ef preli minary study of the proposedSPS system, i t i s suggested that there are several areas that are de-serving of a much more extensi ve study because of thei r importance tothe system.

I n the f i r s t of these we emphasize the importance of a thoroughevaluation of the ABM weapon potenti al of the SPS system. This poten-t ia l may be such that at one extreme i t might cause the abandonment o relimination of I CBY systems as we know them. I t would undoubtedly in-vol ve major pol i cy questions and decisions as w e l l as str i ctl y techni-cal and engineeri ng mat t e r s .

The second study area suggested involves the use of the r f spectrum,and i n parti cul ar how provisions can be made f or the SPS (and other sys-tems) to be provided wi th necessary frequency al l ocati ons when they areneeded. A s has been i ndi cated earlier i n this paper, the di f f i cul t i esattendant on rf spectrum usage, crowding, interf erence, etc. have be-come severe, and threaten to get much worse. They may become so c r i t i -cal as l i ter al l y t o prevent the implementation of new systems.essent i al that means be establ i shed to prevent such an occurrence.

I t i s

A thi rd study area, probably cl assi f i ed, would involve examiningthe kinds of services that the SPS could provi de that might be of bene-f i t i n tactical or strategi c warfare. For example, could laser powerrel ay be extended to cr ui se m ss i l es and actual l y be useful on a world-wide basi s?

The four th study would i nvesti gate what measures an agressor ni ghttake agai nst an SPS such as degrading i ts performance, or capturi ng ori n some way holding the system hostage.

Final ly , a f i f th study i s suggested that would i nvesti gate theorganization and control o a shared ci vi l /mil i tary SPS system.turn out that the proj ected development costs of an SPS system are t oo

I t may


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high for the ci v i l sector al one, so that they are shared by the military.For thi s eventual i ty i t i s of i nterest t o examine how the SPS systemcould be organized t o operate i n di f f er e nt situations.


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BIBLIOGRAPHY

A rndt, G. D. & L . L eopold, "Environmental Considerations f or the MicrowaveBeam From a Sol ar Power Satel l i te", NASA, J SC, 1978Bedrosian, E ., "SURVSATCOM:A nalysis", The Rand Corporation, R-1570/1, December 1974.The Pro l i f erati on Approach - V o l . 1, SystemBekey, I . , "I ntegrati ng Space Developments: 1980-95", A stronauti cs & Aero-nautics, 16, 2, February 1978, p.50.Bekey, I . & H. Mayer, "1980-2000: Raising our Sights f or Advanced SpaceSystems", A stronautics X A eronautics, 14, 718, J uly-August 1976, p.34.Berger, Howard et al , "E f fects of T echnological Advances on I nternati onalStabi l i ty: Chapter 4, High Energy Lasers i n Space", Science A ppli cati ons,I nc., August 1, 1977.Bloomquist, C . E . , "A Survey of Satell ite Power Stati ons" , PRC SystemsSciences Company, DSE/2071-1, September 1976.Brown, W C. , "Transmission of Power from Space to Earth", Raytheon Co. ,August 1977."Cable-Satel l i te Wrangle Focuses on Top Secret Tampering I nformation",Washington Star , September 5, 1978.Cantafio, L . J . et al , "GSSPS: Taking a New Approach t o the Space Sol arPower Station'', A stronautics & A eronautics, 15, 11, November 1977, p.36.Coneybear, J . F., "The U se of L asers f or Transmission of Power", Radiati onEnergy Conversion i n Space, V ol. 61 of Progress i n Astronautics & Aeronau-tics, K. W Billman, ed., A IAA , 1978, p.279.David, L . , "The M i l i tary Uses of Outer Space", American A stronauti calSociety, 77-251, October 1977.DeLeon, P. et al , "Terrorism A gainst U.S. Government I nstal l ati ons andPersonnel", The Rand Corporation, IJ N-9748, February 1977.Dickinson, R. M , "SPS Microwave Subsystem I mpacts and Benefi ts", J etPropulsi on L aboratory, C. I . T. , September 1977Disher, J . H., "Next Steps i n Space T ransportation & Operations", A stronau-tics & A eronautics, 16, 1, J anuary 1978, p.22.Duncan, L . M . & J . Zinn, "Ionosphere-Microwave I nteracti ons f or Sol ar PowerSate l l i te" , L os Alamos Sc i enti f i c L aboratory, LA-UR 78-758, March 1978.


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Bibliography cont'd.

Eberhardt, A . W., "Candidate Locations f or SPS Antennas", M arshal l SpaceF l i ght Center, NASA, TM-78146, November 1977.Eberhardt, J . , "SUNSAT: Col l ecting Solar Power i n Orbit", Sci ence News,113, 16, A p r i l 22, 1978, p.256.Edler, H. G . , "An Overview of P rospective Organizational Structures i n theSol ar Power Satel l i te Fi eld", I nternational Technical Servi ces, I nc., Draft,J une 30, 1978."F inal Report of the ERDA Task Group on Satel l i te Power Stations", E W A ,November 1976.Glaser, P. E . , "Space Sol ar Power:A . D. L i tt l e, I nc., Cambridge, Mass.

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Gorman, D., et al , "Orbi tal Assembly and Maintenance Study", ExecutiveSummary, M arti n M arietta Corp., MCR-7.5-313, August 1975.Hertzberg, A . & K . Sun, "L aser A i rcraf t Propulsion", Radiation EnergyConversion i n Space, Vol . 61 of Progress i n Astronautics & A eronautics,K . W. Billman, ed., A IAA , 1978, p.243.Hunter, 14 . I{., "Strategi c Dynamics and Space-Laser Weaponry", October 1977J enkins, B., Combatting I nternati onal Terrori sm: The Role of Congress",T i i t Itand Corporation, P5808, J anuary 1977.

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J enkins, B ., "I nternational Terrorism: Trends and Potenti al i ti es", TheRand Corporation, P6117, Flay 1978.J enkins, B ., "The Potenti al f or Nuclear Terrorism", The Rand Corporation,P5876, May 1977.J eruchim, M. I ., " A Survey of I nterference Problems and A ppl i cations t oGeostationary Satel l i te Networks", Proc. I .E .E .E. , 65, 3, 317, 1977-L aser Focus, V.13, 12, December 1977, p.20.L ovell , S i r Bernard, "The Great Competition i n Space", Foreign A f f ai rs, 51,1, October 1972, p.137.Mallin, J . , "Terrorism as a Y i l i tary l.Jeapon", A i r Universi ty Review, 28 , 2,J anuary-February 1977, p.54.The Need For and Deployment of I nexhausti bl e Energy Resource Technologies",tReport of Technology Study Panel , U.S. ERDA, Se.ptember 1977.


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Bibl.iography cont' .O ' N e i l l , G. K . , "Space Colonies and Energy Supply to the Earth", Sci ence,190, 4218, December 1975, p.943.O ' N e i l l , G. K . , "The Colonization of Space", Physics Today, 27, 9,September 1974, p.32."Preliminary Baseline SPS Concept Recommendations to DOE/NASA", M arshal lSpace F l i ght Center, J anuary 24, 1978."P ol i ti cal and L egal I mpli cations of Developing and Operating a Sate l l i t ePower System", Econ, I nc., 77-195-1, August 15, 1977.Robinson, C ; . S., "M i l i tari zati on and the Outer Space T reaty - Time f or aRestatement of Space Law", A stronautics & A eronautics, 16, 2, February 1978,p.50.Salter, i i . P I . , "A ppl ications of El ectron Beams i n Space for Energv Storageand O p t i c a l Beam Generation", Radiation Energy Conversion i n Space, Vol . 61of Progress i n A stronautics & A eronautics, I C W Billman, ed., A I A A , 1978,p.81.Sanborn, Col. ?I. W. , "National P I i l i tary Space Doctrinet', A i r UniversityReview, 28, 2, J anuary-Fcbruarv 1977, p.75.Schlesinger, J . Y, . , "Policy Statement: Satel l i te Power System", DOE,November 1977.Smart, Cen. J . E ., "S trategic I mpli cations of Space A ctivi ties", StrategicKevi erg, Fa11. 1974, p. 1.9.SYS Basel ine Review, XSFC-.JSC, NASA/DOE Briefing, J uly 13, 1978-"SPS Concept Development and Evaluation Program Plan ( J ul y 1977-August 1980)" ,DOE/ET-0034, March 1978.Tel l , R . A . , "Environmental Nonionizing Radiation Exposure: A PreliminaryA nalysis of the Problem and Contiquing Work Within EPA". U.S. EPA, ORP 73-2.1 . h ~e Should Ran the Ni l i ta ry Use of Satel l i tes", N ature, 273, J une 8, 1978,1p.416.

Woodcock, C. Y,. , "Satel l i te Power System f or L arge-Scale Power Generation",Boeing Co., October 12, 1976.I 1Y amaura, I ., Measurements of 1.8-2.7 G H z 1-licrowave A ttenuati on i n the HumanTorso", I .E .E .E . Transacti ons, MWTT, August 1977, p.707.

US DOE Solar Powered Satellite - Military Implications - 1978

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