SURVIAC-TR-2006-185

Technical Report U.S. Coast Guard Sector Command Center-Joint San Diego Performance Analyses

Sector Command Center Watchstander Structure Front End Analysis (FEA) Report

Prepared for: Sector Command Center Operations U.S. Coast Guard Sector San Diego 2710 N. Harbor Drive San Diego, CA 92101-1064

Leonard Guenther Lead Analyst Don Sine Andrea Sine Analysts October 1, 2005 – August 20, 2006 Distribution authorized to US Government agencies and their contractors (Special Authority) (17 July 2001). Other requests for this document shall be referred to the Survivability Vulnerability Information Analysis Center (SURVIAC), AFRL/HEC Bldg. 196, ATTENTION: Information Specialist, 2261 Monahan Way, Wright-Patterson AFB, OH 45433-7022

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OMB No. 074-0188 Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing this collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188), Washington, DC 20503 1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank)

2. REPORT DATE

3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVEREDTechnical Report

4. TITLE AND SUBTITLEU.S. Coast Guard Sector Command Center Watchstander Structure Front-End Analysis (FEA) Report

5. FUNDING NUMBERS SPO700-03-D-1380; TAT 05-45

6. AUTHOR (S)Leonard Guenther, Don Sine, Andrea Sine

7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME (S) AND ADDRESS (ES) 8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER

Survivability/Vulnerability Information Analysis Center (SURVIAC) 46 OG/OGM/OL-AC/SURVIAC 2700 D Street Bldg. 1661 Wright-Patterson AFB, OH 45433-7605

SURVIAC-TR-2006-185

9. SPONSORING / MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 10. SPONSORING / MONITORING AGENCY REPORT NUMBER

11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES

12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENTT

Distribution authorized to US Government agencies and their contractors (Special Authority) (October 2001).

12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE

C

13. ABSTRACT The HPT Team conducted a performance analyses to define appropriate human performance interventions using the Peak Performance System (PPS) New Performance Planning (NPP) Front-End Analysis (FEA) methodology outlined in the Coast Guard Human Performance Technology (HPT)/Instructional Systems Design (ISD) Handbook, TRACEN YORKTOWNINST M1550.1. The FEA process consisted of a comprehensive review of all influences on performance to ensure that appropriate interventions were identified.

14. SUBJECT TERMSHuman Performance Support, Human Factors Engineering, Requirements Engineering

15. NUMBER OF PAGES129

System Configuration 16. PRICE CODE

17. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF REPORT

Unclassified

18. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE

Unclassified

19. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF ABSTRACT

Unclassified

20. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT

Unlimited

NSN 7540-01-280-5500 Standard Form 298 (Rev. 2-89)Prescribed by ANSI Std. Z39-18 298-102

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The Survivability Vulnerability Information Analysis Center (SURVIAC) has prepared this report for the U. S. Coast Guard. In no event shall either the U. S. Coast Guard or SURVIAC have any responsibility or liability for any consequences of any use, misuse, inability to use, or reliance upon the information contained herein, nor does either warrant or otherwise represent in anyway the accuracy, adequacy, efficacy, or applicability of the contents hereof.

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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

This work was supported by the command and crew of U. S. Coast Guard Sector San Diego who passionately expressed their considered opinion on how best to improve the overall performance of Sector San Diego Command Center – Joint (SCC-J).

NOTICE

This report documents the performance of Sector San Diego’s SCC-J specifically addressing the work performed by the Operations Unit Controller and the Situation Unit Controller.

DISCLAIMER

The views, opinions, and/or findings contained in this report are those of the authors and should not be construed as an official U. S. Coast Guard position, policy, or decision, unless so designated by other documentation.

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ACRONYMS

Acronym Definition ACTD Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration AIS Automated Information System AOR Area of Responsibility AP Accomplished Performer AtoN Aids to Navigation C2 Command and Control C2PC Command and Control Personal Computer CGMS Coast Guard Message System CG Coast Guard DHS Department of Homeland Security DVL Data Voice Log EAP Employee Assistance Program EHSS Electronic Harbor Security System EPIRB Emergency Position-Indicating Radio Beacon ETA Estimated Time of Arrival FACSFAC Fleet Area Control and Surveillance Facility FEA Front End Analysis FIST Field Intelligence Support Team FOIA Freedom of Information Act FVB Foreign Vessels Branch GCCS-M Global Command and Control System-Maritime GFI Government Furnished Information HVA/HIV High Value Asset / High Interest Vessel HVAC Heating Ventilation Air Conditioning IAW In Accordance With LE Law Enforcement MA Major Accomplishment MARSEC Maritime Security MER Marine Environmental Response MDA Maritime Domain Awareness MISLE Marine Information for Safety and Law Enforcement NOA Notice of Arrival NPP New Performance Planning NRC National Response Center OGA Other Governmental Agencies OHP Optimizing Human Performance OOD Officer on Duty OUC Operations Unit Controller PACAREA Pacific Area (Command)

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Acronym Definition PAO Public Affairs Officer PCS Permanent Change of Station PQS Personnel Qualification Standards QRS Quick Reference Sheets RNA Restricted Navigation Area SAR Search and Rescue SCC-J Sector Command Center, Joint SDO Sector Duty Officer SIPRNET Secret Internet Protocol Router Network SITREP Situation Report SME Subject Matter Expert SOP Standard Operating Procedures SUC Situation Unit Controller SURVIAC Survivability/Vulnerability Information Analysis Center USCG United States Coast Guard VTS Vessel Traffic Service

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Since September 11th, the requirement for greater security of our nation’s ports, population centers, and coastal boundaries has grown exponentially. As the lead agency for Maritime Homeland Security (MHS), the U.S. Coast Guard is a key organization in achieving greater security and therefore must have the appropriate ready forces, interoperable equipment, training, and doctrine to meet this new to meet this new and multi-faceted security requirement.

The primary goal of this U. S. Coast Guard Sector Command Center Performance Analyses project is to enhance the Coast Guard San Diego Sector Command Center – Joint (SCC-J) overall mission execution by improving the existing and future watchstander performance through the application of human performance technology principles to determine optimal performance support solutions.

Comprehensive Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) is a key factor of nearly all SCC-J tasks relating to the overall goal of enhanced maritime security. Although the SCC-J watchstanders recognize the importance of achieving MDA, watchstanders and Sector staff articulate different opinions on what MDA means, achieving it, and key threats to the San Diego maritime domain.

This report addresses MDA as well as Situational Awareness (SA) and Common Operating Picture (COP) by providing policy definitions and recommendations for improving the SCC-J’s ability to realize these key concepts. Considerations for improving watchstander SA are provided in Appendix D. CDR Rod Walker’s statement, “If the SCC-J watchstanders were fully aware of all their responsibilities they would be scared to death”, stuck the project analysts as an accurate depiction of the SCC-J situation. No one advocates terrified watchstanders, but by lacking broad situational awareness achieved through practice and experience, the watchstanders fall short of the comprehensive MDA defined in Commandant Policy.

How sensors and equipment integrate to achieve MDA is an important question to answer. The parallel question is how to integrate the various watchstanders. In fact, sensors and equipment are only tools that support the watchstanders in carrying out the mission of the SCC-J. Commandant Policy broadly defines the SCC-J mission and draft Sector SOP further refines the watchstander duties. To create an integrated team the SCC-J must repeatedly practice and exercise their missions to reach proficiency and establish best practices. Formalize the lessons learned from these exercises in qualification standards, watchstander performance manuals, updated Quick Reference Sheets (QRS), and criteria for adding or removing SCC-J sensors and equipment.

The SCC-J can meet the Commandant’s priority to maximize maritime awareness and become the regional maritime security leader through coordinating frequent joint exercises of varied scope, including events as broad as the 2005 Exercise Bay Shield highlighted in the 2007 Coast Guard Budget in Brief.

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This report shows that of the tasks performed in SCC-J, approximately 40% of the Situation Unit Controller (SUC) tasks overlap with the Operations Unit Controller (OUC) tasks and the projected overlap of Sector Duty Officer (SDO) with OUC duties is at least this great, if not greater. Not formally defining the division of task creates confusion and personnel motivational issues, as well as the potential for errors such as failed communication and uncompleted tasks. One recommendation is running mission and QRS based exercises designed to formally establish the division of tasks and accurately define position responsibilities, time-out the exercises to record best practices and key activities that enhance situational awareness.

The SCC-J training and qualification program currently has gaps in the support it provides the watchstanders. Appendix G compares FEA identified tasks to existing SCC-J Personnel Qualification Sheets (PQS) and Operations Specialist PQS to show the gaps between qualification standards and tasks performed. To meet performance requirements outlined in Commandant Policy and Sector SOP drafts, the report provides specific examples of how the SCC-J can better support its watchstanders and improve the SCC-J training and qualification program.

To develop support tools such as improved qualification standards and clear-cut QRS, SURVIAC recommends ensuring the alignment of Commandant Directives and Sector draft SOP then merge the SCC-J best practices identified in frequent multi-agency exercises into policy and measurable standards that watchstanders can identify with and act upon. Recommendations throughout the report support this effort and Appendix H specifically compares existing policy statements and highlights areas where alignment could be further developed.

Performance improvement recommendations that address general site visit findings are organized into four categories of influencers; Assignment and Selection (A/S), Skill and Knowledge (S/K), Motivation and Incentive (M/I), Environmental (ENV). These recommendations are found in the Conclusions Section and differ from the task specific recommendations found in the Findings Section by providing a more macro focus on overall job accomplishment.

The tired adage, “Put a good person into a bad system, and the bad system will win every time”, is not germane to the SCC-J situation; however, this sentiment is paraphrased by watchstanders expressing their frustration with equipment that fails to live up to its advertised capability and with unsettled policy. In truth the SCC-J already has many of the necessary tools in place; now it must exercise them to establish the procedures and practices that will enable the high performing integrated team envisioned by the SCC-J officers and crew.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

1. INTRODUCTION............................................................................................................... 1

1.1 SCC-J SAN DIEGO BACKGROUND ........................................................................ 1

1.2 REVIEW OF ALIGNMENT .......................................................................................... 1 1.2.1 Requester................................................................................................................... 2 1.2.2 Project Stakeholders and Roles .............................................................................. 2 1.2.3 Scope and Objectives ............................................................................................... 3

1.3 SCC-J SAN DIEGO ORGANIZATIONAL OVERVIEW........................................ 3 1.4 Sector Command Center – Joint Overview .............................................................. 4

1.5 RELEVANT ANALYSES OVERVIEW ....................................................................... 4

2. METHODOLOGY .............................................................................................................. 5

2.1 NEW PERFORMANCE PLANNING FEA ................................................................. 6 2.1.1 Analysis Taxonomy ................................................................................................. 7

2.2 SITES VISIT..................................................................................................................... 8 2.2.1 Site Visit Narrative Summaries.............................................................................. 9

3. FINDINGS ......................................................................................................................... 11

3.1 OUC WATCHSTANDER MAJOR ACCOMPLISHMENTS AND TASKS ...... 11 3.1.1 Major Accomplishment OUC-A: Secure Facility.............................................. 13

3.1.1.1 Task OUC-A1: Respond to Fire Alarms......................................................... 14 3.1.1.2 Task OUC-A2: Respond to Armory Alarms ................................................. 14 3.1.1.3 Task OUC-A3: Respond to Perimeter Alarms .............................................. 15 3.1.1.4 Task OUC-A4: Respond to Base Intruder ..................................................... 16 3.1.1.5 Task OUC-A5: Enforce Sector Security Zone................................................ 16 3.1.1.6 Task OUC-A6: Process and Disseminate Information ................................ 17 3.1.1.7 Task OUC-A7: Respond to Information Inquiry.......................................... 18

3.1.2 Major Accomplishment (OUC-B): Accurate Publicly Releasable Information ................................................................................................................................... 18

3.1.2.1 Task OUC-B1: Explain FOIA Policy To Inquirer.......................................... 19 3.1.2.2 Task OUC-B2: Release Personnel Information ............................................. 20

3.1.3 Major Accomplishment (OUC-C): Maritime Laws Enforced ......................... 22 3.1.3.1 Task OUC-C1: Document Law Enforcement Incident ................................ 23 3.1.3.2 Task OUC-C2: Coordinate and Facilitate Vessel Escorts ............................ 23 3.1.3.3 Task OUC-C3: Use Sensors to Validate Information ................................... 24

3.1.3.4 Task OUC-C4: Draft LE SITREP for Command Release ............................. 24 3.1.3.5 Task OUC-C5: Run Cyberlynx and SD Sheriffs Search for LE Data ......... 24 3.1.3.6 Task OUC-C6: Coordinate USCG and OGA Assets .................................... 25 3.1.3.7 Task OUC-C7: Coordinate Incident Logistics for LE Units ........................ 25 3.1.3.8 Task OUC-C8: Dispatch Coast Guard Assets ............................................... 26 3.1.3.9 Task OUC-C9: Investigate Situation and Distinguish as LE Case ............. 26 3.1.3.10 Task OUC-C10: Brief Command and D11..................................................... 27

3.1.4 Major Accomplishment (OUC-D): Distressed Person Assistance ................. 27 3.1.4.1 Task OUC-D1: Coordinate Immediate Responders..................................... 28 3.1.4.2 Task OUC-D2: Document SAR Case.............................................................. 28 3.1.4.3 Task OUC-D3: Conduct Risk Assessment..................................................... 29 3.1.4.4 Task OUC-D4: Brief SAR Case........................................................................ 29 3.1.4.5 Task OUC-D5: Monitor SAR Case Progress ................................................. 29 3.1.4.6 Task 6 (OUC-D6): Plan SAR Case................................................................... 30 3.1.4.7 Task 7 (OUC-D7): Dispatch Coast Guard Assets ......................................... 30 3.1.4.8 Task 8 (OUC-D8): Investigate SAR Incident Possibilities ........................... 31

3.1.5 Major Accomplishment (OUC-E): Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) ... 31 3.1.5.1 Task OUC-E1: Use Sensors to Validate Information ................................... 32 3.1.5.2 Task OUC-E2: Review Message Board for Pertinent Data ......................... 32 3.1.5.3 Task OUC-E3: Monitor Radio Communications.......................................... 33 3.1.5.4 Task OUC-E4: Make Notifications to SCC-J Command, D11 and OGAs. 33 3.1.5.5 Task OUC-E5: Review MDA Data From SUC .............................................. 34 3.1.5.6 Task OUC-E6: Track Blue Force Assets ......................................................... 34 3.1.5.7 Task OUC-E7: Supervise Watch floor ............................................................ 35

3.1.6 Major Accomplishment (OUC-F): Personnel Issues Resolved....................... 35 3.1.6.1 Task OUC-F1: Brief Command on Personnel Incident................................ 35 3.1.6.2 Task OUC-F2: Check In/Out New PCS Member......................................... 36 3.1.6.3 Task OUC-F3: Recall Watchstanders ............................................................. 36 3.1.6.4 Task OUC-F4: Verify Clearance of SCC-J Visitors ....................................... 36

3.1.7 Major Accomplishment (OUC-G): Successful Environnemental Protection (Clean Waters) ........................................................................................................................ 37

3.1.7.1 Task OUC-G1: Brief Pollution Reports to SCC-J Command ...................... 37 3.1.7.2 Task OUC-G2: Monitor Pollution Incident Until Resolved........................ 38 3.1.7.3 Task OUC-G3: Coordinate Coast Guard Assets for Prevention Dept....... 38

3.1.8 Major Accomplishment (OUC-H): Accomplished Coast Guard Watchstanders ........................................................................................................................ 38

3.1.8.1 Task OUC-H1: Train SCC-J Watchstanders on Equipment and Sensors.. 39 3.1.8.2 Task OUC-H2: Train Unqualified Watchstanders ........................................ 39 3.1.8.3 Task OUC-H3: Train SCC-J Watchstanders on USCG Mission Areas ...... 40 3.1.8.4 Task OUC-H4: Train SCC-J Watchstanders on SCC-J AOR ....................... 40 3.1.8.5 Task OUC-H5: Train SCC-J Watchstanders on Assets and Resources...... 41

3.9.1 Major Accomplishment (OUC-I): Effective Aid to Navigation...................... 41 3.1.9.1 Task OUC-I1: Send AtoN Discrepancy Message ......................................... 42 3.1.9.2 Task OUC-I2: Send AtoN Discrepancy Correction Message....................... 42

3.2 SUC WATCHSTANDER MAJOR ACCOMPLISHMENTS AND TASKS ....... 43 3.2.1 Major Accomplishment (SUC-A): Secure Facility ............................................ 44

3.2.1.1 Task SUC-A1: Respond to Fire Alarms.......................................................... 45 3.2.1.2 Task SUC-A2: Respond to Armory Alarms ................................................... 45 3.2.1.3 Task SUC-A3: Respond to Perimeter Alarms ............................................... 46 3.2.1.4 Task SUC-A4: Respond to Base Intruder....................................................... 46 3.2.1.5 Task SUC-A5: Enforce Sector Security/Safety Zone ................................... 47

3.2.2 Major Accomplishment (SUC-B): Accurate Publicly Releasable Information . ................................................................................................................................... 47

3.2.2.1 Task SUC-B1: Explain FOIA Policy to Inquirer ............................................ 48 3.2.2.2 Task SUC-B2: Release Personnel Information .............................................. 48

3.2.3 Major Accomplishment (SUC-C): Maritime Laws Enforced .......................... 49 3.2.3.1 Task SUC-C1: Monitor Vessel Escorts ........................................................... 50 3.2.3.2 Task SUC-C2: Monitor Sensors....................................................................... 50 3.2.3.3 Task SUC-C3: Provide LE SITREP Input for OUC to Provide to D11....... 51 3.2.3.4 Task SUC-C4: Run Cyberlynx/EPIC Search for LE Data ........................... 51 3.2.3.5 Task SUC-C5: Coordinate USCG and OGA Assets ..................................... 52 3.2.3.6 Task 6 (SUC-C6): Fill Out Neptune Shield SCORE Cards .......................... 52 3.2.3.7 Task SUC-C7: Monitor SIPRNET Intelligence Sites ..................................... 53 3.2.3.8 Task SUC-C8: Monitor NLETS........................................................................ 53

3.2.4 Major Accomplishment (SUC-D): Distressed Person Assistance .................. 54 3.2.4.1 Task SUC-D1: Record Initial Report of SAR Incident.................................. 54 3.2.4.2 Task SUC-D2: Make Notifications to SCC-J Command, D11, OGA.......... 55 3.2.4.3 Task SUC-D3: Assist OUC in Coordinating Asset Logistics ...................... 55 3.2.4.4 Task SUC-D4: Assist OUC in Prosecuting SAR Case .................................. 56

3.2.5 Major Accomplishment (SUC-E): Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) .... 56 3.2.5.1 Task SUC-E1: Input Vessel Data into MISLE................................................ 57 3.2.5.2 Task SUC-E2: Make Entries Into SCC-J Logs................................................ 57 3.2.5.3 Task SUC-E3: Monitor Sensors ....................................................................... 57 3.2.5.4 Task SUC-E4: Review Message Board for Pertinent Data and Disseminate ............................................................................................................................... 58 3.2.5.5 Task SUC-E5: Monitor Radio Communications........................................... 58 3.2.5.6 Task SUC-E6: Monitor Critical Infrastructure Inspections ......................... 59 3.2.5.7 Task SUC-E7: Coordinate Unscheduled HVA/HIV Escort........................ 59 3.2.5.8 Task SUC-E8: Monitor Lightering Operations Outside of Harbor............ 60 3.2.5.9 Task 9 (SUC-E9): Respond to Pertinent Classified Message Traffic .......... 60 3.2.5.10 Task SUC-E10: Ensure Commercial Vessels Follow Harbor Check-In Procedures........................................................................................................................... 61 3.2.5.11 Task SUC-E11: Work with OGA to Coordinate Activities.......................... 61

3.2.6 Major Accomplishment (SUC-F): Personnel Issues Resolved ........................ 62 3.2.6.1 Task SUC-F1: Make Notification of Active Duty Member Incident.......... 62 3.2.6.2 Task SUC-F2: Check In/Out New PCS Member.......................................... 63 3.2.6.3 Task SUC-F3: Recall Watchstander ................................................................ 63 3.2.6.4 Task SUC-F4: Verify Security Clearance of SCC-J Visitors......................... 63

3.2.7 Major Accomplishment (SUC-G): Successful Environmental Protection (Clean Waters) ........................................................................................................................ 64

3.2.7.1 Task SUC-G1: Receive and Disseminate Spill Report Information ........... 64 3.2.7.2 Task SUC-G2: Make Hazardous Spill Notifications .................................... 65 3.2.7.3 Task SUC-G3: Coordinate Assets to Respond to Incident .......................... 65

4. CONCLUSIONS ................................................................................................................... 66

4.1 ASSIGNMENT AND SELECTION........................................................................... 67

4.2 SKILL AND KNOWLEDGE....................................................................................... 69

4.3 MOTIVATION AND INCENTIVE........................................................................... 71

4.4 ENVIRONMENTAL..................................................................................................... 72

4.5 MARITIME DOMAIN AWARENESS ..................................................................... 74

4.6 SCC-J ALIGNMENT WITH COMMANDANT STAFFING STANDARDS.... 74

4.7 QUICK REFERENCE SHEET ADMINISTRATION ............................................. 75

5. NEXT STEPS.......................................................................................................................... 76

5.1 PERFORMANCE TRACKING................................................................................... 76

5.2 SCC-J HUMAN FACTORS INTEGRATION.......................................................... 76

APPENDIX A: ABBREVIATED SME BIOGRAPHIES ...................................................... 1

APPENDIX B: MAJOR ACCOMPLISHMENT AND TASK DATA ............................. 1

APPENDIX C: HUMAN FACTORS IN THE SCC-J PHYSICAL LAYOUT ................. 1

APPENDIX D: SITUATIONAL AWARENESS CONSIDERATIONS.......................... 1

APPENDIX E: MARITIME DOMAIN AWARENESS...................................................... 1

APPENDIX F: NAVY WATCHSTANDER INTEGRATION .......................................... 1

APPENDIX G: SKILL SET COMPARISON....................................................................... 1

APPENDIX H: SECTOR POLICY TABLE........................................................................... 1

APPENDIX I: QUICK REFERENCE SHEET PRIORITIZATION.................................. 1

APPENDIX J: FEA REFERENCE LIST................................................................................. 1

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1-2: SCC-J Structure Hierarchy..................................................................................... 4 Figure 2-1: OHP FEA Process.................................................................................................... 6

LIST OF TABLES Table 1-1: Alignment Meeting Participants............................................................................. 2 Table 1-2: SCC-J FEA Analyses Project Stakeholders ............................................................ 2 Table 2-1: Dates Visited and Persons Interviewed................................................................. 9 Table 3-1: OUC Major Accomplishments and Tasks ........................................................... 11 Table 3-2: SUC Major Accomplishments and Tasks ............................................................ 43 Table 4-1: Findings, and Recommendations ......................................................................... 66 Table 4-2: Assignment and Selection Findings ..................................................................... 67 Table 4-3: Skills and Knowledge Findings ............................................................................ 69 Table 4-4: Motivation and Incentive Findings ...................................................................... 71 Table 4-5: Environmental and Workplace Findings ............................................................ 72

1. INTRODUCTION

The primary goal of the U. S. Coast Guard Sector Command Center Performance Analyses project is to assist the Coast Guard in improving existing and future watchstander performance by applying human performance technology principles to determine and plan for development of optimal performance support solutions.

The SURVIAC applied the U. S. Coast Guard preferred Optimizing Human Performance (OHP) Front End Analysis (FEA) methodology to perform the analysis in three primary phases; data collection, site visit, and data research and analysis. The data collected included Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) and instructions from various Coast Guard, DHS, and Navy organizational levels in addition to other relevant open source documents outlined in Appendix J. Additional data was gathered through a site visit performed by three analysts who interviewed twenty-five members of the Sector command, tenant commands, Navy, and National Guard over the course of twelve days. The Operations Unit Controllers (OUC)1 and Situation Unit Controller (SUC)2 watchstanders identified by the Sector command as exemplar performers were the primary focus of the interviews.

The report describes the existing SCC-J watchstander world of work using the FEA’s Major Accomplishment (MA) and Task breakdown methodology. SURVIAC used this information to develop recommendations for improving SCC-J watchstander performance across the full mission scope, to include traceability to the Sector mission requirements as defined by the Commandant.

1.1 SCC-J SAN DIEGO BACKGROUND

To strengthen the unity of command in port, waterway, and coastal areas of operation, the Commandant of the Coast Guard established new integrated operational field units called “Sectors” throughout the Coast Guard. Sectors incorporate an integrated Sector Command Center (SCC) infrastructure to promote a common operating picture. They are the single point of contact for all maritime stakeholders, whether they are Department of Homeland Security (DHS) partners, other governmental agencies, commercial port operators, or the general public, which is imperative in this time of rapid coordination, intelligence sharing, and response.

1.2 REVIEW OF ALIGNMENT

In accordance with the FEA methodology (further described in Section 2.0), a SCC-J FEA project alignment meeting was held on November 10, 2005 from 1:00 pm to 2:30 pm EST via teleconference. The purpose of the meeting was to align project goals and objectives with SCC-J San Diego expectations. This was accomplished by:

1 Defined as the watchstander with overall responsibility for Search and Rescue case prosecution. 2 Defined as the watchstander with general SCC-J duties of monitoring sensors, relaying information, and assisting the OUC.

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Validating task goals and objectives Confirming contractual requirements Identifying subject matter experts and key stakeholders Reviewing processes and plan Reviewing and developing schedule for completing tasks and submitting the

deliverables Discussing constraints, limitations, and/or assumptions Establishing vital relationships and lines of communication

Table 1-1: Alignment Meeting Participants, provides a list of meeting participants and their individual contact information.

Table 1-1: Alignment Meeting Participants Name Organization Telephone e-mail

OSCS Sean Benson SCC-J San Diego (619) 278-7662 sbenson@d11.uscg.mil

Lt Angela Cook SCC-J San Diego (619) 278-7663 ACook@d11.uscg.mil

LCDR Sean Mahoney SCC-J San Diego (619) 278-7095 smahoney@d11.uscg.mil

OSC Ginger Quintero SCC-J San Diego (619) 278-7 gquintero@d11.uscg.mil

Leonard Guenther SURVIAC/BAH (703) 412-7469 guenther_leonard@bah.com

Andrea Sine SURVIAC/BAH (703) 412-7455 sine_andrea@bah.com

Don Sine SURVIAC/BAH (619) 680-4733 sine_don@bah.com

1.2.1 Requester

Commanding Officer U.S. Coast Guard Sector San Diego 2710 N. Harbor Drive San Diego, CA 92101-1064

1.2.2 Project Stakeholders and Roles

The major stakeholders in this project and their roles are identified in Table 1-2: USCG Analyses Project Stakeholders.

Table 1-2: SCC-J FEA Analyses Project Stakeholders

Name Role Responsibility or Interest in Project Captain Strangfeld Project Sponsor Sector Commander

Commander Rod Walker Project Stakeholder Deputy Sector Commander

Commander Sean Mahoney Project Stakeholder Logistics Department Head

Lieutenant Angela Cook Project liaison SCC-J Chief OSCS Sean Benson Project liaison Primary point of contact for project; SCC-J

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Name Role Responsibility or Interest in Project Supervisor Overall responsibility for successful completion of the project. Leonard Guenther Project Manager

Provide HSI expertise and manage interview completion

Don Sine Analyst

Provide FEA expertise and manage interview completion Andrea Sine Analyst

Mark Smith Analyst Provide process research and expertise

Rex Hayes Analyst Provide MDA research and expertise

Ann Christoffersen Analyst Technical editing and communications

1.2.3 Scope and Objectives

As stated in the introduction, the SCC-J FEA focused on MAs and Tasks associated with the job of OUC and SUC watchstander. The outcomes of the analysis are intended to be used to develop performance interventions (curriculum, policy changes, new and upgraded tools etc.) capable of supporting the desired SCC-J performance. Ultimately the analysis will be used to enhance current operations, further developing the system’s ability to benefit watchstander situational awareness and operational maritime domain awareness. Performance interventions include solutions that impact performance, such as:

Skills & knowledge - How are current behaviors taught and what other training type intervention would aid in improving performance

Environmental - Provide an evaluation of the SCC-J Command Center in regards to their technology and space utilization.

Personnel selection - Characteristics of an accomplished performer that are influenced by or resulting from specific career path.

Motivation & incentive – Criteria that either encourages or discourages performers to perform at the highest levels.

1.3 SCC-J SAN DIEGO ORGANIZATIONAL OVERVIEW

The SCC-J San Diego watchstanders fit into the larger SCC-J structure as depicted in Figure 1-2: SCC-J Structure Hierarchy.

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Project Managers

ASSISTANT CONTROLLERSSNOS/OS3

(APPRENTICE LEVEL)

SECURITY / EKMSOS2

(APPRENTICE TOJOURNEYMAN LEVEL)

COMMS UNIT CHIEFOSC

SUC CONTROLLERSOS2/OS1

(APPRENTICE TOJOURNEYMAN LEVEL)

SITUATION UNIT CHIEFOSC

TECH SUPPORT UNIT CHIEFOSC

OPS UNIT CONTROLLERSOS1 / GS-11

(JOURNEYMAN LEVEL)

OPERATIONS UNIT CHIEFOSC

SCC-J SUPERVISOROSCS

COMMAND CENTER CHIEFLCDR / LT

Figure 1-2: SCC-J Structure Hierarchy

1.4 Sector Command Center – Joint Overview

Sector San Diego SCC-J, as a direct representative of Commanding Officer Sector San Diego, is broadly responsible for the coordination of Coast Guard Search and Rescue (SAR), law and security enforcement, pollution and all hazards incident response and mitigation operations. These missions require the SCC-J to work closely with other DHS agencies, and with other federal, state and local partners to jointly respond to and mitigate the effects of maritime threats and vulnerabilities. Professional training, qualification, and development is a key SCC-J responsibility for ensuring the operational readiness of SCC-J personnel and Sector partner agencies.

1.5 RELEVANT ANALYSES OVERVIEW

The information provided in this section is a reflection of opinions formulated after extensive research and accomplished performer interviews. Relevant information drawn from the references was used as a benchmark to formulate the analysis plan. References have also been sited throughout the findings and recommendations to bolster observations/recommendations by the analysis team. Appendix J: FEA Reference List includes all relevant information found from the sources cited, including past studies, government documentation on current policies, and SOP.

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2. METHODOLOGY

The SCC-J San Diego analyses project was conducted by applying a systematic, robust performance assessment model. The SURVIAC Analysis Team conducted this performance assessment following these basic steps:

a. Review of United States Coast Guard literature, Government Furnished Information (GFI), publications and technical data related to operations

b. Collaboration with SCC-J command to identify OUC and SUC Accomplished Performers (AP) and subject matter experts (SME)

c. SURVIAC Analysis Team internal working group sessions to develop notional lists of watchstander Job Accomplishments and Major Accomplishments

d. Interviews with SCC-J SMEs to identify and validate organizational goals and objectives that will be linked to Job Accomplishments and MAs

e. Site visit to Sector San Diego to interview subject matter experts and accomplished performers using OHP FEA job aids

f. Develop intervention recommendations and final report

Use of an effective human performance model within the workplace is considered the tool upon which human performance improvement is founded3. In the case of any performance analysis effort, two underlying factors shape the assessment.

The assessment must focus on accomplishments--what OUC and SUC watchstanders produce--not simply on what they do. Helping SCC-J San Diego performers accomplish the wrong tasks more efficiently does not help the Coast Guard improve performance.

The assessment includes the observance of exemplary performers, that is, SCC-J watchstanders whose accomplishments exceed standards. Understanding how exemplary performers work can reveal ways to improve the performance of other watchstanders.

The OHP FEA process used by the SURVIAC was originally developed by Dr. Joseph Harless and provides the foundation that links to other systems such as learning management, assignment and selection etc. When applied properly, the process challenges organizational assumptions about perceived performance concerns and focuses time and effort on the right issue. The prescribed set of steps (Figure 2-1: OHP FEA Process), including decision tables, flow charts, and structured job-aids, result in a standardize methodology that yields consistent results.

3 Paul Elliott, Chapter 4, Moving From Training to Performance

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Rapid Prototype and Revision

Alignment

Diagnostic Analysis

New Performance Planning Analysis

Pre-Design Analysis

Design

DevelopmentTestingImplementationEvaluation

Work Environment-Motivation-Incentives

Continuous Improvement

Interventions Other Than Training

Skill/Knowledge Interventions

Figure 2-1: OHP FEA Process

2.1 NEW PERFORMANCE PLANNING FEA

Application of the New Performance Planning (NPP) OHP FEA methodology was selected as most appropriate for the SCC-J analyses for the following primary reasons:

During the alignment meeting it was noted that the Sector construct is new to the USCG and that many of the performance requirements such as SOP are still in draft form. The NPP FEA is the procedure used when “new accomplishments” must be produced due to creation of new job assignments, assumption of additional responsibilities, or the introduction of new technology in the workplace.

The NPP FEA model focuses analysis efforts on effective performance of the job and considers all potential influences, both training and non-training. This is a very important aspect of the analysis since human performance is a combination of factors not simply training or access to equipment.

The NPP FEA is part of the larger Peak Performance System model. This system model includes intervention design and development phases, which allows performance technologists and course designers to build upon the data gathered in the FEA phase to develop performance-based training and other performance interventions as illustrated in Figure 2-1: Peak Performance System Model.

The desired outcome of NPP is to document the new performance and identify the human performance interventions--skills/knowledge training, work environment

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improvements, and worker incentives--required to achieve the desired performance. The major steps of a new performance assessment are as follows:

Determine major accomplishments Collect data on major accomplishments Produce a task list for major accomplishments Collect data on tasks

After accomplishment and task data is collected for the NPP FEA, a project plan is created for the design and implementation of interventions identified through the assessment.

Prioritize the interventions Develop specifications for the selection and assignment of workers Develop specifications for required information support, including training

documentation, job aids, and electronic performance support Develop specifications for the redesign and enhancement of the work

environment Develop specifications for the redesign and enhancement of worker incentives

SURVIAC analysts involved in the SCC-J analysis are trained and certified in the NPP FEA methodology, and have successfully employed the methodology on numerous performance analyses projects. Experience in applying NPP FEA principles is critical to ensuring that outcomes are consistent with Coast Guard expectations in both quality and design.

2.1.1 Analysis Taxonomy

This section provides an overview of the OHP FEA data capture taxonomy and describes the layout of the information presented in Section 3.0 Findings. The information collected for the MAs and Tasks is also provided in the interview summary sheets, Appendix B: Major Accomplishments and Task Data.

The OHP FEA focuses on accomplishments rather than activities. During interviews, watchstanders were asked to breakdown MAs associated with their job into task specific information, in the form of judgments, which was then captured for the MAs and Tasks. The information, provided in the taxonomy depicted below, is used to design appropriate interventions later in the process.

Stimulus (signal) to start a task Criteria: Standards for the accomplishments and behavior. The standards

typically fall into one or more categories: - Accuracy: Maximum error-tolerance allowed. - Time: Maximum time allowed to produce. - Productivity: Quantity which must be produced in a given time.

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- Safety: Standard for avoiding injury to personnel, equipment, or environment.

Changes which could affect the output in the near future Frequency of producing the accomplishments Interactions when producing this output (people, tools, equipment) Importance of MAs as they relate to the job accomplishment in terms of the

consequence if the output is not produced correctly: - Most Important: Constitute danger or intolerable hazards to

health/environment; and/or would result in an intolerable loss to the organization

- Important: Seriously jeopardize the job accomplishment, but does not constitute intolerable penalty

- Moderate: Would harm the job accomplishment, but not seriously - Low: Would not directly affect the job accomplishment

Difficulty the watchstander performer might have in producing the accomplishment using the following scale:

- Most Difficult - Difficult - Moderate Difficulty - Low Difficulty

To assist OUC/SUC watchstander APs in determining MA and Task difficulty, the following guidelines were provided as an example of a ‘Most Difficult’ activity/output:

- Large number of -tasks - Requires difficult decision making - Requires application of rules which have exceptions - Requires dexterity to produce - Must be produced rapidly - Takes much experience to do well

2.2 SITES VISIT

SURVIAC coordinated with personnel at the SCC-J San Diego to identify and schedule interviews with suitable APs as well as interviews with various members of the Sector command and tenant commands.

SCC-J San Diego Watchstanders that best demonstrated optimal performance on the job were selected for interviews. The individuals chosen were considered by their supervisors to be exemplars in their respective positions. Table 2-1: Dates Visited and Persons Interviewed provides a summary of the dates the interviews took place, the

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persons interviewed, and the role of each person interviewed. Where feasible, at least two SURVIAC members were present during each of the interviews.

Table 2-1: Dates Visited and Persons Interviewed Date of Visit Person Interviewed Role of Person Interviewed

12/5/05 OS2 Clinton Dotson SUC watchstander 12/6/05 Mr. Rich Dann OUC Civilian watchstander

12/07/05 OS2 Christopher Hill LT Chris Bruno BM1 Greg Texier

SUC watchstander CO USCGC Haddock XPO USCGC Haddock

12/08/05 OS1 Jason Watson LT Angela Cook

SUC watchstander SCC-J Chief

12/09/05 OSCS Sean Benson ENS Courtney Harrison OS1 Patrick Hasselbring

SCC-J Supervisor SCC-J Technology Liaison OUC watchstander

12/11/05 LT Dan Youngberg Air Operation Department Head 12/12/05 Mark Mutchler

BMCS Jim Savinski LT Joel Huggins CDR Rod Walker

OUC Watchstander Station San Diego OIC Chief, Enforcement Division Deputy Sector Commander

12/13/05 LT Eric Williams OSC Scott Bailey OSC Roberto Colon

Foreign Vessels Technology Chief OUC Supervisor

12/14/05 OS1 Nicola Lesourd OS1 Patrick Hasselbring

SUC Watchstander OUC Watchstander

12/15/05 BMCM Bozenhart OSC Ginger Quintero OS1 Steve Howell

OIC USCGC Petrel SUC Supervisor OUC Watchstander

12/16/05 CDR Michael Tanner Response Department Head

2.2.1 Site Visit Narrative Summaries

This section presents a narrative summary of the sites visited by SURVIAC during the AP Interviews and Data-Gathering phase of this analysis.

• OUC Interviews: Four OUC watchstanders were interviewed over the two week period to create a comprehensive list of OUC MAs and Tasks. Each watchstander shared their views of what their daily accomplishments and tasks were, and helped to validate information from other interviews.

• SUC Interviews: Four SUC watchstanders were interviewed during the two week site visit to SCC-J San Diego to create a comprehensive list of SUC MAs and Tasks. Each watchstander shared their views of what their daily accomplishments and tasks were, and helped to validate information from other interviews.

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• Command Interviews: During the SCC-J analysis, it was important to gather information from both the SCC-J supervisors and command in order to determine and verify the expectations of the SCC-J watchstanders as well as their expectations for the SCC-J as a whole. Everyone interviewed felt that significant progress has been made since the implementation of the new Sector concept and watchstander positions. It was evident that additional steps could be made to better utilize the watchstander’s capabilities.

• Patrol Boat Commanding Officer Interviews: The SCC-J watchstanders have a reciprocal relationship with the SCC-J assets, therefore it was important to interview the Cutter Commanding Officers to determine their view of their relationship with the watchstanders. The watchstander capabilities and their view on SCC-J effectiveness were discussed. During the interviews the predominant complaint from the Commanding Officers was the lack of communication between the communications4 watchstanders and the SUC watchstanders.

• Prevention Department Interviews: This interview covered SUC duties and the Sector Duty Officer (SDO) position and its potential impact. The need for specific SUC training and a clear way to track information were the two items most emphasized.

• Response Department Interviews: During the interviews, the watchstanders’ relationship with the Response Department was discussed, as well as current strengths and weaknesses of the SCC-J and suggestions for improvement.

• Station Officer in Charge (OIC) Interview: The interview consisted primarily of a discussion about SUC and communication watchstander duties. An overall complaint was the general lack of training and experience that the watchstanders currently exhibit, causing some significant communication barriers.

• Navy Personnel Interviews: Navy personnel were interviewed to determine the extent of their relationship with the current watchstanders and how they all interact on a daily basis. Various Navy watchstanders and supervisors were interviewed at the SCC-J and at Navy Region Southwest .

4 Defined as the watchstander responsible for coordinating and maintaining the radio transmissions

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3. FINDINGS

The OHP FEA process is designed to link performer job accomplishments to organizational strategy to ensure that people are ‘doing the right things right.’ Prior to the SCC-J site visit, the SURVIAC conducted extensive literature research and performed interviews with SCC-J leadership SMEs to determine the Coast Guard goals and objectives with respect to watchstander operations. Based on the information gathered, it was determined that the Coast Guard expects the watchstanders to support and or provide the following capability:

Maritime Domain Awareness Coordinated operations Stable/safe marine environment Prevention of loss of life

3.1 OUC WATCHSTANDER MAJOR ACCOMPLISHMENTS AND TASKS

Nine MAs and fifty-one Tasks were identified for the OUC watchstander, which are presented in Table 3-1: OUC Watchstander Major Accomplishments and Tasks.

Table 3-1: OUC Major Accomplishments and Tasks Major Accomplishment Task ID# Associated Tasks

OUC-A1 Respond to Fire Alarms

OUC-A2 Respond to Armory Alarms

OUC-A3 Respond to Perimeter Alarms

OUC-A4 Respond to Base Intruder

OUC-A5 Enforce Sector Security Zone

OUC-A6 Process and Disseminate Information

OUC-A

Secure Facility

OUC-A7 Respond to Information Inquiry

Explain FOIA Policy to Inquirer OUC-B1

OUC-B2 Release Personnel Information

OUC-B3 Respond to Media Inquiry

OUC-B4 Brief Next of Kin on Coast Guard Actions

OUC-B

Accurate Publicly Releasable Information

OUC -B5 Brief Public Affairs Staff

OUC -C1 Document Law Enforcement Incident

OUC -C2 Coordinate and Facilitate Vessel Escorts

OUC -C

Maritime Laws Enforced

OUC -C3 Use Sensors to Validate Information

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Major Accomplishment Task ID# Associated Tasks

OUC -C4 Draft LE SITREP for Command Release

OUC -C5 Run Cyberlynx and SD Sheriffs search for LE data

OUC -C6 Coordinate USCG and OGA assets

OUC -C7 Coordinate Incident Logistics for LE Units

OUC -C8 Dispatch Coast Guard Assets

OUC -C9 Investigate Situation and Distinguish as LE case

OUC -C10 Brief Command and D11

OUC -D1

Coordinate Immediate Responders

OUC -D2 Document SAR Case

OUC -D3 Conduct Risk Assessment

OUC -D4 Brief SAR Case

OUC -D5 Monitor SAR Case Progress

OUC -D6 Plan SAR Case

OUC -D7 Dispatch CG Assets

OUC -D

Distressed Person Assistance

OUC -D8 Investigate SAR Incident Possibilities

OUC -E1 Use Sensors to Validate Information

OUC -E2 Review Message Board for Pertinent Data

OUC -E3 Monitor Radio Communications

OUC -E4 Make Notifications to SCC-J Command, D11, and OGA.

OUC -E5 Review MDA Data from SUC

OUC -E6 Track Blue Force Assets

OUC -E

Maritime Domain Awareness

OUC -E7 Supervise Watch floor

OUC -F1 Brief Command on Personnel Incident

OUC -F2 Check In/Out New PCS Member

OUC -F3 Recall Watchstanders

OUC -F

Personnel Issues Resolved

OUC -F4 Verify Clearance of SCC-J Visitors

OUC -G1 Brief Pollution Reports to SCC-J Command

OUC -G2 Monitor Pollution Incident Until Resolved

OUC -G

Successful Environmental Protection (Clean Waters) OUC -G3 Coordinate Coast Guard Assets for Prevention

Department

OUC -H1 Train SCC-J Watchstanders on Equipment and Sensors

OUC -H

Accomplished Coast Guard Watchstanders OUC -H2 Train Unqualified Watchstanders

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Major Accomplishment Task ID# Associated Tasks

OUC -H3 Train SCC-J Watchstanders on USCG Mission Areas

OUC -H4 Train SCC-J Watchstanders on SCC-J AOR

OUC -H5 Train SCC-J Watchstanders on Assets and Resources

OUC -I1 Send AtoN Discrepancy Message OUC -I

Effective Aid to Navigation OUC -I2 Send AtoN Discrepancy Correction Message

Each of the following MA and Task sections includes a standard set of information, derived from the interviews and summarized as follows:

a. General description b. Most critical action and criteria c. Performance Barriers d. Performance Facilitators e. Recommendations (as applicable)

In the performance of any task an OUC must have access to the required knowledge and/or procedures of a task. It is not always necessary to train this knowledge to memory; in some cases having this procedure on a job aid is sufficient and in fact use of a job aid with extensive training is often a recommended intervention. The FEA methodology algorithm uses the Task criteria of Speed, Frequency, Complexity, and Consequences of error to make this determination. Appendix B shows the SME criteria input and the recommended intervention based on this algorithm.

3.1.1 Major Accomplishment OUC-A: Secure Facility

a. General Description: (OUC-A) Secure Facility includes responding to alarms, enforcing base security and disseminating information. Responsibility for successful accomplishment of this MA is shared by the OUC and SUC. Although this MA involves a relatively small part of the total watch time, it is also moderately complex and must be executed properly.

b. Most Critical Action/Criteria: In order to successfully complete the tasks, all responders involved must understand how security equipment works and they must be able to disseminate the appropriate information to the correct personnel.

c. Performance Facilitators: The major facilitator for this accomplishment is the Sector Alarm System.

d. Performance Barriers: According to the OUCs interviewed, the most significant barrier to this accomplishment is the lack of knowledge in regards to the alarm system and their ability to communicate effectively with other personnel in the Sector. SUCs noted that additional training in how to handle on base situations would be beneficial.

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e. Recommendations: Add or improve existing training to ensure all responders have comprehensive knowledge of the base layout, security system operation, and situations that may occur.

3.1.1.1 Task OUC-A1: Respond to Fire Alarms

a. General Description: Responding to Fire Alarms is a frequent task that occurs approximately once a week. Response timeliness is critical to this task, because a slow or delayed response could have devastating consequences. This task is often complicated by the lack of understanding of the operation of the alarm system and the high frequency of false alarms.

b. Most Critical Action/Criteria: When completing this task in an emergency situation, it is critical to get the word out to everyone rapidly. It is also imperative that the watchstander coordinates access to the Sector facilities for the fire department. APs interviewed stated that facilitating fire department access has posed a very real problem in the past.

c. Performance Facilitators: Support from the Officer of the Day (OOD) watchstander, for assistance in investigating fire alarms, was identified as the primary facilitator to successful completion of this task.

d. Performance Barriers: The reliability of the fire alarm system, as configured, results in a high frequency of false alarms, which was identified as the primary barrier to successful completion of this task. APs stated that it was easy to become complacent in responding to the alarms for this reason. In addition, several watchstanders reported that they do not understand the operation of the installed system.

e. Recommendations: Consider evaluating and upgrading/repairing the existing fire alarm system. Develop a Job Aid for operating the system and evaluating alarm signals.

3.1.1.2 Task OUC-A2: Respond to Armory Alarms

a. General Description: APs interviewed stated that the need to respond to Armory Alarms occurred on a monthly basis. Since the consequences of performing this task incorrectly can be devastating, watchstanders must ensure that they accomplish each step correctly and in an efficient manner, since seconds count. During an armory alarm situation the OUCs are responsible for ensuring watch floor lockdown and dispatching responders to the scene.

b. Most Critical Action/Criteria: Because alarms thus far have been accidental, the watchstanders view execution of this task as generally easy, however there are critical details that must be achieved in order to respond successfully in an actual emergency. When an armory alarm is tripped it is important to ensure that there is an actual break-

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in and not just an accidental tripping of the alarm. It is also imperative that the watchstander ensures that the OOD does not put himself/herself in harms way. Communication during this task is critical to make sure that everyone in the Sector is safe.

c. Performance Facilitators: An accomplished OOD, as the first on-scene responder to an Armory Alarm, is a major facilitator in completing this task. Accomplished performance by the San Diego Harbor Police is also a facilitator, because they would ultimately be responsible for responding to the alarm and resolving the security event. Correctly positioned cameras located at various points in the Sector are also facilitators.

d. Performance Barriers: Similar to other alarm situations, the continually faulty tripping of the armory alarm has caused the watchstanders to disregard alarm notifications. Without appropriate alarm system training, the OUC watchstanders are not adequately equipped to respond to armory alarms. The most critical barrier to this task is the fact that the base security force is not armed. It was noted that in an actual armory break-in situation, the security force would not be able to protect the Sector until the Harbor Police arrived.

e. Recommendations: Enforce a policy that requires authorized armory users to notify whomever monitors the alarm prior to entry and exit to reduce the false alarms and ensure the response to an armory alarm is timely and thorough.

3.1.1.3 Task OUC-A3: Respond to Perimeter Alarms

a. General Description: Response to Perimeter Alarms is required on an unpredictable basis. The consequences for not completing this task correctly and in a timely manner could be devastating to the Sector; seconds count. The OUC is responsible for dispatching responders to investigate the possible perimeter breach. Additionally, the OUC needs to pay close attention to all perimeter cameras during emergency situations to maintain a complete situational awareness.

b. Most Critical Action/Criteria: Understanding and closely monitoring a properly functioning Perimeter Alarm system is critical to completing this task successfully.

c. Performance Facilitators: Clear understanding of how the Perimeter Alarm system functions and what each of the signals provided by the system represents facilitates successful and rapid response to this task. Watchstanders that closely monitor a properly functioning system should be capable of determining exactly what specific segment of the perimeter has been breached.

d. Performance Barriers: Lack of familiarity with the alarms system was presented as a barrier to accomplished performance. Several of the SCC-J watchstanders interviewed were unfamiliar with system operation. The fact that the base camera system is not as all-inclusive as the perimeter alarm system and does not directly correspond to the perimeter segments shown on the perimeter system display also impacts the performers

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ability to clearly understand the system. In addition, station equipment and vehicles positioned without regard to the perimeter system may prevent watchstanders full view of the area. For example, during the site visit a fork lift was parked between two perimeter sensors so that it would send a false alarm to the system. Finally, APs stated that the alarm system is not continuously monitored by the watchstander, which would limit their ability to use the tool to detect an intrusion.

e. Recommendations: Develop SOP for monitoring and responding to the perimeter alarm system including a Job Aid for operating the equipment.

3.1.1.4 Task OUC-A4: Respond to Base Intruder

a. General Description: Response to a base intruder historically has occurred very infrequently but there could be devastating consequences and the speed of response is critical.

b. Most Critical Action/Criteria: A successful response to a base intruder incorporates many factors. The OUCs make sure that everyone on base is locked-down and that the SCC-J is also in lock-down. It is also critical to make sure that someone is monitoring the cameras at all times and that the front gate is opened so the Harbor Police are able to gain access to the Sector.

c. Performance Facilitators: Key facilitators in this task are a clear understanding of the resources at the disposal of the OUC. An accomplished watchstander will ensure that the Harbor Police have immediate uninhibited access to the base, since they will provide the armed respond. Superb decision making ability during emergencies will help keep the unarmed OODs, that provide the eyes and ears for the base during normal operations, out of harms way if an actual armed intrusion occurs.

d. Performance Barriers: Lack of adequate, properly equipped resources to respond to a base intrusion is a barrier to accomplished performance. Beyond the SCC-J watch there is no night watch to respond to emergency situations. In addition, there is no one designated to monitor the Sector Security cameras 24/7 for inappropriate activity, which may prevent detection of a base intrusion all together.

e. Recommendations: Develop SOP for SCC-J watchstanders and base OOD/security that includes intruder response with an escalating response posture based on DHS and locally derived threat levels, train and maintain base OOD/security skills. Formalize the procedures and include this task in the PQS. Identify technology or procedures that permit continuous monitoring of the system by an appropriate watchstander(s).

3.1.1.5 Task OUC-A5: Enforce Sector Security Zone

a. General Description: In order to effectively enforce the waterside Sector Security Zone a constant monitoring of the area is necessary. Infringements on the zone happen

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on roughly a monthly basis and though a timely response is necessary, seconds are not critical.

b. Most Critical Action/Criteria: Maintaining situational awareness is the most critical action. When a zone breach has occurred, it is important to catch the situation as it is happening.

c. Performance Facilitators: The greatest facilitators to this process are information and assistance from the Harbor Police and the SCC-J Patrol Boats because they provide added surveillance and policing and are able to provide the watchstanders with additional information when necessary.

d. Performance Barriers:, Communications is a challenge and lengthens the time it takes to remove them from the security zone. Boaters that do come into the area don’t always answer their radios.

e. Recommendations: Develop a method to increase boater awareness of the Sector Security Zone and its boundaries in the San Diego Harbor. Establish a better means to monitor and enforce the Sector Security/Safety Zone. Develop an alternate means to communicate with boaters.

3.1.1.6 Task OUC-A6: Process and Disseminate Information

a. General Description: Processing and disseminating information is an important task especially when notifying the command. However, it is only moderately difficult to execute and time is not always a significant factor. Watchstanders must distinguish between pertinent and insignificant information and then determine the appropriate people to notify based on the severity of the situation.

b. Most Critical Action/Criteria: A clear understanding of notification requirements in each situation is imperative to successful completion of this task. Watchstanders can leverage the “5 Ws” (who, what, where, when, and why) which assist in organizing their response to significant Sector events.

c. Performance Facilitators: An updated recall/contact list was identified as a facilitator to accomplished performance for this task.

d. Performance Barriers: The OUCs noted that while the updated contact lists assisted in identifying the correct individuals and their phone numbers, immediate accessibility to the individuals was not guaranteed and as such was considered a performance barrier.

e. Recommendations: A Job Aid is needed to provide watchstanders with an accurate process for disseminating information and the appropriate people on-call and/or available continuously. Consider developing a standard method and technology solution to facilitate timely dissemination of routine and emergency information.

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3.1.1.7 Task OUC-A7: Respond to Information Inquiry

a. General Description: Responding to information inquiries happens on an unpredictable basis and speed is not a significant factor. The watchfloor is often the first point of contact for base inquiries, especially after hours. During an OUCs normal work day they handle numerous phone calls in regards to a variety of base situations, not just emergency cases. There is a moderate level of consequence associated with incorrect accomplishment of this task, primarily because maintaining confidentiality is key. The OUCs stated that at times information inquiries can impede the execution of other critical tasks.

b. Most Critical Action/Criteria: Giving out inappropriate and/or inaccurate information could have negative consequences so maintaining a clear understanding of the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) policies is critical. It is also very important to determine whether or not the person requesting the information has the right to the information.

c. Performance Facilitators: As mentioned earlier, a clear understanding of the policies and procedures regarding FOIA and the release of information is the watchstanders primary facilitator for accomplishing this task successfully. In addition, updated and well written case logs can help to provide detailed accounts of previous situations the watchstander can use to establish precedence. When responding to information requests, an accomplished watchstander will also leverage the experience of the Public Affairs Office and Officer, since they are the first point of contact when dealing with the issues of releasing information.

d. Performance Barriers: APs stated that the primary barrier to performance was having inadequate or incomplete information regarding the information request, making it difficult to apply FOIA guidelines and process requests correctly.

e. Recommendations: Consider reviewing existing guidelines and clarifying processes to update SOP and ensure proper case documentation.

3.1.2 Major Accomplishment (OUC-B): Accurate Publicly Releasable Information

a. General Description: MA (OUC-B) Accurate Publicly Releasable Information includes the processing and disseminating of information to various people including the media and other SCC-J personnel. The responsibility for accomplishing this MA is shared by the OUC and SUC. Although this MA involves the shortest percentage of total watch time of all the major accomplishments and is the primary responsibility of the Public Affairs Office, there are aspects of the MA that make it moderately difficult to complete, to include strict compliance with the accepted information release protocol.

b. Most Critical Action/Criteria: Watchstanders must have a comprehensive understanding of FOIA policy, access to detailed case information, and a clear understanding of the information that the public is requesting.

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c. Performance Facilitators: The most important facilitator for this MA is access to the public affairs office and an accomplished Public Affairs Officer (PAO). All OUCs said that they would defer to them in the majority of cases.

d. Performance Barriers: APs stated that the inability to acquire Public Affairs Office assistance when needed was the most significant barrier to this accomplishment. Another significant barrier was not having accurate and up to date information to evaluate the request.

3.1.2.1 Task OUC-B1: Explain FOIA Policy To Inquirer

a. General Description: Application of FOIA to release information is one of the primary means by which members of the public become informed about their government. Watchstanders must be able to deal with requests for information in a customer-friendly manner, to include explanation of FOIA, so that the requesters clearly understand why some information may not be released. Although the principles and use of FOIA are not complicated, the introduction of unnecessary bureaucratic hurdles caused by an incomplete understanding of the act by the watchstanders, may unnecessarily prevent disclosure of appropriate information. This task occurs on an unpredictable basis and is generally easy to complete.

b. Most Critical Action/Criteria: When explaining the policy it is important to make sure that the inquirer understands the correct procedures for requesting and receiving information. This procedure includes the understanding that the request for information must be in writing and signed, an email is not sufficient.

c. Performance Facilitators: A clear understanding of the process is required, since completion of this task is primarily the FOIA Officer’s responsibility. An unprepared or untrained OUC/SUC could easily be creating additional work himself by attempting to process the request independently.

d. Performance Barriers: Those OUC watchstanders that do not have a comprehensive understanding of the procedures can be put in a position to answer inquiries when then do not have to. The OUC is the primary point of contact on the watch floor and therefore people expect them to be able to provide information quickly. Since FOIA protocol must be strictly followed to disseminate information properly, watchstanders must be able to explain the rules to requesters tactfully, particularly when they are unable to release information.

e. Recommendations: Have the Public Affairs personnel provide training for all watchstanders on a routine basis. Create a Job Aid that provides a detailed description of the FOIA policy and its significance to the SCC-J.

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3.1.2.2 Task OUC-B2: Release Personnel Information

a. General Description: The request for release of personnel information happens on an unpredictable basis. There can be a high consequence of error if information is released to an inappropriate party or if the information released is inaccurate. The OUCs stated that this was a moderately difficult task because of the rules regarding confidentiality.

b. Most Critical Action/Criteria: The APs interviewed stated that the most critical action was maintaining a professional attitude during conversations related to releasing personnel information. The requester often gets agitated if information can not be given to them, therefore maintaining a calm demeanor is always important, no matter what the task.

c. Performance Facilitators: In order to release personnel information to the right people an updated contact list is critical.

d. Performance Barriers: When an updated list is unavailable or the right people are unreachable the task is very difficult to perform.

e. Recommendations: Provide the OUCs with training on personnel issues and have a SOP developed to refer to in regards to what information can and can not be released. Formalize the procedures and include this task in the PQS. Consider developing a job aid, to include the updated contact list, that concisely lays out the procedures and can be easily accessed.

3.1.2.3 Task OUC-B3: Respond to Media Inquiry

a. General Description: The APs stated that media personnel call almost daily to determine if there are any stories to report. In general, actual media related inquiries occur between weekly and monthly. Responding to the media can be a difficult task if the right protocol isn’t followed.

b. Most Critical Action/Criteria: A clear understanding of procedures is absolutely necessary. All policies of FOIA apply to media inquiries as well. The OUCs stressed the importance of keeping privileged information private. The watchstander must understand that if next of kin notifications have not occurred during applicable situations, no information can be divulged. They also stated that it is important to keep in mind that the media is often just looking for a good story.

c. Performance Facilitators: Knowing the rules is imperative, since the watchstander is often the initial point of contact for off-Sector phone calls, particularly after hours. Watchstanders must be capable of facilitating the processing of these requests by leveraging the Public Affairs Office, which is has primary responsibility for processing/addressing media inquiries.

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d. Performance Barriers: Lack of information is the primary barrier to accomplished performance. If an incident has occurred but the OUC has not been informed of the situation, there is a significant challenge in disseminating accurate and appropriate information.

e. Recommendations: Enforce a Sector SOP that the SCC-J is always kept informed of all SCC-J situations, especially after hours when they are the primary point of contact for all base inquiries. Create SOP for appropriate information to release.

3.1.2.4 Task OUC-B4: Brief Next of Kin on Coast Guard Actions

a. General Description: Briefing next of kin on Coast Guard actions is an extremely difficult task that should generally not fall under the OUCs responsibility. When these emergency situations occur it is important to notify family members on a timely basis.

b. Most Critical Action/Criteria: Acquiring a clear understanding of the situation and communicating only the facts to the appropriate family member(s) is the most critical action.

c. Performance Facilitators: Solid interpersonal and communications skills are a facilitator to accomplishing this task effectively. Successful OUCs will also leverage other government resources to provide up to date and accurate case information. They will also use the Public Affairs Office to help with identifying points of contact for the family.

d. Performance Barriers: Inexperience handling these events is a barrier to accomplished performance since it can be very challenging to talk to relatives of Coast Guard members in adverse situations. Watchstanders should understand that briefing next of kin should generally be a command function, not the task of a watchstander. They should also be wary of media inquiries during these events, since they can be substantial barriers to performing required task. If the media is able to acquire and communicate information before the next of kin has been notified, there are serious ramifications for the Coast Guard.

e. Recommendations: Formalize the procedures and include this task in the PQS.

3.1.2.5 Task OUC-B5: Brief Public Affairs Staff

a. General Description: Since the Public Affairs staff is not always available during critical incidents, keeping them up to date on case information is a critical task. The OUC must communicate all pertinent case information to the PAO and be available for further questions and input. Although briefing the PAO happens unpredictably it is a moderately difficult endeavor with a high level of consequence if the task is not completed.

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b. Most Critical Action/Criteria: When briefing the PAO it is important to inform him of the time that the incident occurred, what the Coast Guard has done since that time, and who is involved. Ensuring names are not released to the press before the next of kin has been notified is crucial.

c. Performance Facilitators: When a case occurs, it is often helpful to have a Public Affairs (PA) staff member on the watch floor. If the PAO is unable to be present on the watch floor, keeping him or his assigned representative up to date through email and digital photos is important, since they can assist with the task. It is imperative that someone from the Public Affairs Office is available at all times.

d. Performance Barriers: The OUCs expressed their concern with being able to get in contact with the Public Affairs Office during critical situations. If they aren’t able to be reached, the PAO is kept out of the information loop, having potentially detrimental affects on the SCC-J. Maintaining accurate case information is also a challenge.

e. Recommendations: Formalize the procedures and include this task in the PQS. Develop a process/technology to facilitate timely access to an appropriate Public Affairs Office representative.

3.1.3 Major Accomplishment (OUC-C): Maritime Laws Enforced

a. General Description: MA (OUC-C) Maritime Laws Enforced involves the coordination and dispatching of assets, investigating the incident and documenting all related information. Law Enforcement cases take up about a third of the OUCs time and are moderately difficult with a potential for a high level of complexity. The responsibility for accomplishment of this MA is shared by the OUC and SUC watchstanders, with the OUC being the primary authority on the watch floor. It was mentioned that a clear delineation between LE and SAR cases should be established.

b. Most Critical Action/Criteria: During the OUC interviews it was noted that timely intelligence and descriptors, times and positions of the incident, situation specifics and visuals of the situation are critical pieces of information that allow the Coast Guard to respond to a law enforcement incident successfully.

c. Performance Facilitators: The most important facilitator for Law Enforcement Incidents is timely communications with all parties involved.

d. Performance Barriers: One of the greatest barriers during Law Enforcement incidents that were expressed by all of the OUCs was malfunctioning equipment. If the search tools were unavailable such as MISLE and Cyberlynx, searching for wants and warrants becomes a substantial challenge. Also, the availability of assets, including those from other government agencies (OGA)can pose additional challenges.

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3.1.3.1 Task OUC-C1: Document Law Enforcement Incident

a. General Description: LE incidents tend to be documented on a weekly basis, depending on the occurrence. Because details are important for both briefing and future reference purposes, the consequence of error is high, however this task is relatively simple.

b. Most Critical Action/Criteria: The OUCs stated that when documenting an LE case it is important to include information on all parties involved, the response actions taken and the exact times that the incident and related responses occurred.

c. Performance Facilitators: Influences on positive performance include a quick network and system to locate data, MISLE running appropriately and complete case information.

d. Performance Barriers: Negative influences on performance include lack of access to the appropriate networks and the length of time the documentation process takes.

e. Recommendations: Create an SOP for documentation guidelines as well as a specific documentation structure. Formalize the procedures and include this task in the PQS.

3.1.3.2 Task OUC-C2: Coordinate and Facilitate Vessel Escorts

a. General Description: The coordination and facilitation of vessel escorts is generally outside of the OUCs responsibility, however, about once monthly, it is a task that the OUC must complete. The OUCs said that the task was easy to complete because generally asset availability is not an issue. What is critical, however are the specifics of the request. Once the escort has been coordinated, the SUC is responsible for its monitoring.

b. Most Critical Action/Criteria: The OUC needs to know who is requesting the escort, where they are going and where they are coming from. If it is the asset requesting the escort the OUC must have specific escort instructions.

c. Performance Facilitators: Completion of this task is aided by good communications between the Coast Guard and the requestor of the escort as well as the OUC having a previous knowledge of the requestor’s authority.

d. Performance Barriers: Communications can also be a roadblock for the OUCs if the appropriate information is not conveyed in a timely and appropriate manner. The time of day can also be a barrier if the request occurs when few escorts are available.

e. Recommendations: Develop a Job Aid that contains the daily availability of all vessels and their specific capabilities. Formalize the procedures and include this task in the PQS.

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3.1.3.3 Task OUC-C3: Use Sensors to Validate Information

a. General Description: Using sensors to validate information is a moderately difficult task that occurs weekly.

b. Most Critical Action/Criteria: During an LE case it is critical to obtain the location of the incident so that the OUC can determine which sensors to use to validate the information and then obtain a description of the incident through the use of sensors.

c. Performance Facilitators: The greatest facilitators for this task are understanding how to use the sensors themselves and the accurate relaying of information.

d. Performance Barriers: The sensors range of effectiveness can be a hindrance to the OUC if the incident occurs outside of the range of available sensors. Faulty and malfunctioning equipment and an unknown incident location commonly pose problems for the OUC for incident validation.

e. Recommendations: Develop scenario based training on coordinating the use of USCG and OGA sensors to assist in information validation, work in particular with the Navy watchstanders. Formalize the procedures and include this task in the PQS.

3.1.3.4 Task OUC-C4: Draft LE SITREP for Command Release

a. General Description: Drafting SITREP reports is a moderately difficult task that occurs approximately once a month. The OUC must gather all pertinent data and ensure that the proper documentation procedures are followed.

b. Most Critical Action/Criteria: In order for an OUC to draft a LE SITREP for command release it is helpful for the case information to be complete in MISLE.

c. Performance Facilitators: The most important positive influence on performance is complete and detailed case information.

d. Performance Barriers: A lack of case documentation creates a significant barrier in this task. Also, if the responding asset during the case did not gather complete information then research is difficult. MISLE access is crucial for SITREP writing and the OUCs expressed concerns about their intermittent lack of access to this system.

e. Recommendations: Formalize data compilation responsibilities and procedures, include this task in the PQS.

3.1.3.5 Task OUC-C5: Run Cyberlynx and SD Sheriffs Search for LE Data

a. General Description: Running a Cyberlynx and/or San Diego Sheriffs search for LE data is a moderately difficult task that is necessary on a daily basis and seconds do count. OUCs search these databases for pertinent information on both vessels and

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boaters. Any previous incidents that have been documented in these systems should be relayed back to the Coast Guard requesting officer.

b. Most Critical Action/Criteria: If an asset is on scene at a LE incident, they need the information quickly and accurately. To complete this task, quick communications with the reporting asset are key.

c. Performance Facilitators: For an OUC, it is critical for them to have an understanding of Cyberlynx, previous knowledge of a San Diego Sheriff’s search, and complete suspect information. If the Coast Guard personnel already know the information that is needed, it can be passed along to the OUC without further prompts for additional information.

d. Performance Barriers: Barriers that make this task complicated are the operational status of the Cyberlynx database, the San Diego sheriff’s website, and the relaying of incorrect suspect information to the OUC.

e. Recommendations: Formalize the procedures and include this task in the PQS.

3.1.3.6 Task OUC-C6: Coordinate USCG and OGA Assets

a. General Description: Coordination of USCG and OGA assets occurs on a weekly basis, is moderately difficult, and has a moderate consequence of error and speed can be a factor, depending on the situation. It is an OUCs job to analyze the situation and apply the appropriate asset to the scene.

b. Most Critical Action/Criteria: When coordinating assets it is important to take into consideration asset availability, asset speed, the assets current location and what asset would be most appropriate for the situation.

c. Performance Facilitators: Similar to other tasks, good communications between the OUC and all agencies is an important facilitator when coordinating assets.

d. Performance Barriers: Conversely, poor communications can be a significant road block. Barriers in determining status of Coast Guard assets along with the availability of OGAs are an additional negative influences.

e. Recommendations: Enforce a protocol for asset reporting that enables the OUC to keep track of CG and OGA assets. Formalize the procedures and include this task in the PQS.

3.1.3.7 Task OUC-C7: Coordinate Incident Logistics for LE Units

a. General Description: The task of coordinating incident logistics for LE units is a relatively easy one that occurs on a monthly basis with only a moderate consequence of error.

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b. Most Critical Action/Criteria: When the OUC is completing this task it is beneficial for the CG asset to communicate their specific needs. Additionally, prior knowledge of OGA and local LE availability is critical.

c. Performance Facilitators: In addition to good communications, accurate contact numbers for OGAs and CG assets are important facilitators.

d. Performance Barriers: Availability and the length of time it will take for an asset to give support can both be barriers for the OUC in this task.

e. Recommendations: Enforce a protocol that provides watchstanders with up to date asset availability information, and asset alternatives if primary are otherwise engaged. Formalize the procedures and include this task in the PQS.

3.1.3.8 Task OUC-C8: Dispatch Coast Guard Assets

a. General Description: The OUC is tasked with dispatching Coast Guard assets to a LE incident on a weekly basis and speed is generally not a factor. The OUCs interviewed said that this task was moderately difficult due to the on scene knowledge required and noted that the authority they are given in these situations is important.

b. Most Critical Action/Criteria: The OUCs expressed that knowing the status and capabilities of an asset are important details to keep in mind when considering to dispatch them to a LE incident.

c. Performance Facilitators: Accurate asset contact information, good communications and knowing the location of the asset in relation to the vicinity of the incident are important.

d. Performance Barriers: Incomplete information regarding asset maintenance, crew fatigue, and incidents taking place across the U.S./Mexican border are all barriers potential barriers for the OUC when attempting to dispatch assets.

e. Recommendations: Enforce a protocol that provides watchstanders with up to date asset availability information, and recommended asset alternatives if previously engaged. Formalize the procedures and include this task in the PQS.

3.1.3.9 Task OUC-C9: Investigate Situation and Distinguish as LE Case

a. General Description: Situations occur daily in the SCC-J AOR that require investigation to distinguish them as an LE case or not. In these cases speed is a factor and the task is moderately difficult with a moderate consequence of error.

b. Most Critical Action/Criteria: Having consistent and persistent situational awareness is the most critical aspect of this task. Additionally, gathering detailed situation information is also important.

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c. Performance Facilitators: For an OUC, accurate information and a credible reporting source are significant performance facilitators.

d. Performance Barriers: Poor communications and ineffective sensors make validating LE reports a challenge for OUCs.

e. Recommendations: Formalize the procedures and include this task in the PQS.

3.1.3.10 Task OUC-C10: Brief Command and D11

a. General Description: Keeping the SCC-J command and D11 briefed and informed during LE cases is crucial. It is important for the OUCs to provide the command with the most accurate and up to date information. These briefs are easy to execute and tend to occur on a weekly basis.

b. Most Critical Action/Criteria: The most important detail when carrying out this task is complete incident information.

c. Performance Facilitators: For an OUC, the greatest facilitator to briefing the SCC-J command and D11 is information that is direct and to the point.

d. Performance Barriers: A common barrier is the OUCs lack of access to personnel familiar with the law enforcement situation. This lack of direct information and poor communications creates an unclear picture of the incident. An OUC also expressed that the command has a tendency to go overboard with questions that aren’t necessary to enhance the case understanding.

e. Recommendations: Formalize the procedures and include this task in the PQS.

3.1.4 Major Accomplishment (OUC-D): Distressed Person Assistance

a. General Description: MA (OUC-D) Assisting distressed persons involves the disseminating of information, coordinating appropriate assets and investigating and monitoring incidents. The responsibility for accomplishment of this MA is primarily that of the OUC. SAR cases occupy the largest percentage of total watch time and have steps that make them moderately difficult to complete with intricacies that make them complex.

b. Most Critical Action/Criteria: In order to successfully complete the tasks associated with this MA the OUCs must have an understanding of Command and Control Personal Computer (C2PC) functions and SAR tools, be able to gather and disseminate SAR information, and fully understand asset capabilities.

c. Performance Facilitators: The OUCs referred to OGAs and the watch floor equipment and software as their greatest facilitators for this accomplishment.

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d. Performance Barriers: Poor communications, malfunctioning systems and unavailable assets were mentioned as some of the most frustrating performance barriers.

3.1.4.1 Task OUC-D1: Coordinate Immediate Responders

a. General Description: When coordinating immediate responders the OUC must consider what assets are needed for the particular SAR situation. This coordination happens on a weekly basis where seconds do not count. Carrying out of the task is easy but the consequences of error are high.

b. Most Critical Action/Criteria: To accomplish this task the OUC needs to know what type of SAR case it is, the position of the incident, the nature of distress and how many people are involved.

c. Performance Facilitators: The greatest facilitator for this task, outside of Coast Guard assets, is the availability of the San Diego Regional Aquatic Lifesaving Emergency Task Force as an additional resource for the OUC

d. Performance Barriers: Inadequate communications and the inability to locate appropriate SCC-J responders because of inaccurate contact numbers are two of the most significant barriers for this task.

e. Recommendations: Enforce a protocol that enables the watchstander to communicate with appropriate SCC-J responders. Formalize the SCC-J procedures and include this task in the PQS.

3.1.4.2 Task OUC-D2: Document SAR Case

a. General Description: The OUC must document all critical details and make sure that information is passed down to subsequent OUC watches if necessary. Initial case information may be gathered by the SUC and then passed along to the OUC. Documenting a SAR case happens on a weekly basis at a moderately difficult level with a high level of consequence but speed of completion, in regards to seconds, is not a contributing factor.

b. Most Critical Action/Criteria: The details critical to the task include good chronological logs, properly filled out QRS forms, a complete case package and completed MISLE information.

c. Performance Facilitators: Facilitators to accomplished performance for this task include properly functioning systems and updated MISLE logs.

d. Performance Barriers: The OUCs expressed frustration in the frequent malfunctioning of SAR critical computer systems. They also noted frequent problems with incomplete pass down logs and poor communication between key participants.

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e. Recommendations: Enforce protocol that ensures completed pass down logs. Introduce a preventive and corrective maintenance program for the SCC-J systems.

3.1.4.3 Task OUC-D3: Conduct Risk Assessment

a. General Description: The OUCs said that conducting risk assessments are important, but are done infrequently. When completing a risk assessment speed is not a factor and the task is easy but there is a high consequence of error.

b. Most Critical Action/Criteria: Critical details to keep in mind are the fatigue of the crew to be assigned to the situation, the current weather, what the on scene conditions are and the nature of the case.

c. Performance Facilitators: The key performance facilitator for the OUC is the risk assessment sheet.

d. Performance Barriers: The main barrier is the infrequency with which the task is completed because many OUCs have rusty risk assessment skills.

e. Recommendations: Ensure that required risk assessments are completed. More cases would benefit from having risk assessments completed. Include risk assessment in periodic training schedule.

3.1.4.4 Task OUC-D4: Brief SAR Case

a. General Description: Briefing SAR cases occurs on a weekly basis. The brief is easy to complete and speed is not a factor. Similar to LE case briefings, the OUC must relay pertinent information in a timely manner and make sure that key personnel are updated regularly in emergency situations.

b. Most Critical Action/Criteria: The OUCs feels it is necessary to always keep key people informed. Related to the five W’s, the nature of the case, where it is at, what the intentions are and what resources are assigned are also critical details.

c. Performance Facilitators: Key performance facilitators include the SCC-J bang list and the chat space.

d. Performance Barriers: The most significant performance barrier is not being able to reach the necessary people in a timely manner.

e. Recommendations: Formalize the SCC-J procedures and include this task in the PQS.

3.1.4.5 Task OUC-D5: Monitor SAR Case Progress

a. General Description: On average, monitoring SAR case progress occurs on a weekly basis. The carrying out of this task is easy with only a moderate level of consequence and speed is not generally a factor. Once the immediate tasks of dispatching assets has

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occurred, the OUC must continually follow-up with the case to make sure additional actions are not needed.

b. Most Critical Action/Criteria: Details that are useful include acquiring resource position updates, the time left on scene, what the resource capabilities are and the nature of the distress.

c. Performance Facilitators: Key performance facilitators include good communications between involved parties and keeping everyone involved following the SAR plan.

d. Performance Barriers: Similar to other tasks where good communications are a facilitator, they can also be a barrier if the communications are poor. Also incomplete pass down logs and poor planning from the beginning contribute to performance barriers.

e. Recommendations: Formalize the SCC-J procedures and include this task in the PQS.

3.1.4.6 Task 6 (OUC-D6): Plan SAR Case

a. General Description: Planning a SAR case occurs on a weekly basis and requires detailed situational information. Completing this task is moderately difficult, there is a high level of consequence but speed is not a factor.

b. Most Critical Action/Criteria: It is critical for the OUC to have all of the information related to the position of the incident, the nature of the distress, the on scene conditions, how many people are involved and what the available resources are.

c. Performance Facilitators: The QRS, C2PC, and a complete pass down log are key performance facilitators when planning a SAR case.

d. Performance Barriers: Malfunctioning software, like C2PC, poor communications and inaccurate information are performance barriers.

e. Recommendations: Use training to improve communication practices. Repair malfunctioning software.

3.1.4.7 Task 7 (OUC-D7): Dispatch Coast Guard Assets

a. General Description: Dispatching Coast Guard assets for SAR cases is a relatively easy task that occurs once a week. When dispatching the assets, speed (seconds) is not a factor but there is a high consequence if the assets are not sent.

b. Most Critical Action/Criteria: The OUCs must consider the location of the incident, the on scene conditions, the fatigue of the crew, the assets operating limitations and the duration of time that will need to be spend on scene before dispatching assets.

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c. Performance Facilitators: In order to dispatch assets appropriately it is important for the OUC to have knowledge of all capable and ready resources.

d. Performance Barriers: Not having an resources ready to dispatch can be a significant performance barrier with potentially devastating consequences.

e. Recommendations: Formalize the SCC-J procedures to reflect current resource status and capabilities and include this task in the PQS.

3.1.4.8 Task 8 (OUC-D8): Investigate SAR Incident Possibilities

a. General Description: Investigating SAR incident possibilities is the investigative work performed to determine the nature or existence of a SAR case. For SAR cases this occurs on a weekly basis and the task is moderately difficult with a high consequence of error, but speed, in regards to seconds, is not a factor.

b. Most Critical Action/Criteria: Details that are critical to the investigation are the position of the incident in question, the number of high sites engaged and the amplifying information.

c. Performance Facilitators: Key performance facilitators for the OUC include ACTD (direction finding equipment), C2PC and good communications.

d. Performance Barriers: Performance barriers occur when not enough information has been given, the information given is of poor quality and when the OUC has to assume a significant amount of the information.

e. Recommendations: Formalize the SCC-J procedures and include this task in the PQS.

3.1.5 Major Accomplishment (OUC-E): Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA)

a. General Description: MA (OUC-E) Maritime Domain Awareness is a government wide initiative, with the Coast Guard playing a critical role in its execution. The scope of MDA is wide sweeping, but for the OUC it generally involves tasks associated with tracking Blue Force assets and monitoring their AOR through various means such as sensors and radar. This accomplishment utilizes about 10% of the OUCs work day. It is easy to execute with a low level of complexity. OUCs had a general concept of MDA, however, they also felt like the specifics of the accomplishment had not been defined for them. (see Appendix E)

b. Most Critical Action/Criteria: The OUC watchstanders expressed that information from CGMS (i.e. ships locator and daily SITREP) was vital to realizing MDA. They also stated that information on scheduled movements and the encrypted radio frequencies are also critical for effective MDA.

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c. Performance Facilitators: The most important performance facilitators for MDA are the constant vigilance and associated information sharing of the other SCC-J watchstanders on duty and the OGA watches.

d. Performance Barriers: This accomplishment produced the greatest amount of discord for the OUCs in regards to what hinders their progress. The lack of effective equipment is a significant problem in maintaining MDA. The OUCs emphasized that the equipment is often malfunctioning and what does work gets changed out on a regular basis, creating a lack of consistency and frustration.

3.1.5.1 Task OUC-E1: Use Sensors to Validate Information

a. General Description: Monitoring the sensors for information validation is a daily task for the OUCs that can have potentially devastating consequences if not done correctly and is very difficult to execute because of equipment capabilities. The OUCs use the sensors for gathering additional MDA information.

b. Most Critical Action/Criteria: In order to successfully complete this task the OUCs need to have accurate reporting of information, accurate sightings of potential incidents and good coordination among agencies.

c. Performance Facilitators: Key players that assist the OUC in validating sensor information are the other watchstanders, the Navy, the Air National Guard, the Foreign Vessels Branch and the incoming, reported vessels in the Restricted Navigation Area.

d. Performance Barriers: Equipment problems are a major factor in this task. The OUCs explained that what was advertised as the equipments capability is not necessarily what has been given, adding an extra challenge to their job. Additional barriers include weather conditions creating unclear sensor images and inaccurate reporting from the Foreign Vessels Branch.

e. Recommendations: Develop QRS based exercises that use the Sensors as performance tools. See the Environmental recommendations in Section Four of this report. Formalize the SCC-J procedures and include this task in the PQS.

3.1.5.2 Task OUC-E2: Review Message Board for Pertinent Data

a. General Description: OUCs review the message boards on a daily basis mostly to ensure that nothing has been missed by the previous watch or in previous communications. This task is primarily the responsibility of the SUC and Navy watchstanders.

b. Most Critical Action/Criteria: The details that are most important on the message board are the date-time-group to check if the message was received in time, and the details of the message/tasking.

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c. Performance Facilitators: For this task, the situational awareness of other OUC watchstanders is the greatest facilitator. If other OUCs have been keeping up with message traffic the relieving OUCs should be able to follow right along during their subsequent watch.

d. Performance Barriers: A barrier for progress is if the server is malfunctioning and messages are unable to be received.

e. Recommendations: Record OUC best practices, formalize the SCC-J procedures, and include this task in the PQS.

3.1.5.3 Task OUC-E3: Monitor Radio Communications

a. General Description: Although the radio communications are the Communications Watchstander’s primary job, it is important for the OUCs to keep an ear out for pertinent information as well. Since the watch floor has access to radio communications the OUCs monitor this information on a daily basis.

b. Most Critical Action/Criteria: The OUCs pay particular attention to distress calls and record the nature of the distress, the position and the number of people involved.

c. Performance Facilitators: The radios and the fellow watchstanders are key performance facilitators for the OUC.

d. Performance Barriers: Unreliable and outdated equipment is significant barrier, along with secure communications being hard to understand. The lack of access to Navy radio frequencies in the SCC-J was also cited.

e. Recommendations: Pursue the acquisition of Navy radio frequency monitoring capabilities in the SCC-J. Formalize the SCC-J procedures, and include this task in the PQS.

3.1.5.4 Task OUC-E4: Make Notifications to SCC-J Command, D11 and OGAs

a. General Description: Notifying key personnel is a moderately difficult task that occurs on an unpredictable basis and speed is important in the relaying of messages. If the appropriate people are not notified of situations, there could be devastating consequences.

b. Most Critical Action/Criteria: OUCs need to know who is in the Sector San Diego AOR, what vessels/traffic are approaching San Diego, what movements are happening inside the bay and whether the ships entering the port match any Foreign Vessels Branch information.

c. Performance Facilitators: Like the other MDA tasks, the SCC-J watchstanders and the OGA’s, particularly the border patrol, San Diego harbor police and Customs are key facilitators for the OUC because of the additional information they are able to provide.

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d. Performance Barriers: Malfunctioning equipment and inaccurate information are barriers to OUC performance.

e. Recommendations: Formalize the SCC-J procedures, and include this task in the PQS.

3.1.5.5 Task OUC-E5: Review MDA Data From SUC

a. General Description: The SUC is generally the gatherer of information, who then passes what is collected on to the OUC. In general, the OUC reviews this data on a daily basis.

b. Most Critical Action/Criteria: What the OUC is concerned with is the current radar picture, the current vessel movement list, and any current intelligence information.

c. Performance Facilitators: The other SCC-J watchstanders and the data they gather are the primary facilitators for the OUC in this task.

d. Performance Barriers: The inconsistent ability to properly gather information between SUCs is the most significant barrier.

e. Recommendations: Formalize the SCC-J procedures, and include this task in the PQS.

3.1.5.6 Task OUC-E6: Track Blue Force Assets

a. General Description: Tracking Blue Force assets is a daily task for the OUC. It is moderately difficult with a moderate consequence of error. The OUCs must maintain an overall awareness of available assets and be able to locate and dispatch them when necessary.

b. Most Critical Action/Criteria: In order to successful track blue forces it is very helpful for their Automated Information System (AIS) technology to be turned on. Additionally up to date position reports are critical, along with notifications if movements vary from planned operations.

c. Performance Facilitators: Blue force resources are performance facilitators for the OUC, along with all non-Coast Guard watch stations because they are able to provide additional asset information that the OUC may not have access to.

d. Performance Barriers: The OUCs were frustrated by the significant barriers in this task. Equipment is critical and its frequent malfunctioning is a barrier for the watchstanders. Also, all units do not keep the SCC-J informed of their movements or changes to their planned movements. Additionally, because the AIS technology is not secure, most Blue Force assets do not operate with AIS energized.

e. Recommendations: Enforce protocols that enable the SCC-J to track Blue Force Assets. Formalize the SCC-J procedures, and include this task in the PQS.

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3.1.5.7 Task OUC-E7: Supervise Watch floor

a. General Description: The OUCs act as a supervisor for the SCC-J watch floor. These supervisory duties are performed on a daily basis, and are considered to be easy.

b. Most Critical Action/Criteria: By maintaining contact with all watchstanders the OUC is able to stay on top of all information and make sure that the information that comes in is shared with the appropriate parties.

c. Performance Facilitators: Other watchstanders are the primary facilitator for this task.

d. Performance Barriers: What frustrates the OUCs, however, is the lack of communication with the other watchstanders. At times, the lack of experience and qualifications of personnel act as a barrier and contribute to a watch floor that is not functioning at its optimal potential.

e. Recommendations: Record OUC best practices, formalize the SCC-J procedures and include this task in the PQS.

3.1.6 Major Accomplishment (OUC-F): Personnel Issues Resolved

a. General Description: MA (OUC-F) For an OUC, resolving personnel issues is only a small part of their job. The tasks associated with it are relatively easy and there is a low level of complexity.

b. Most Critical Action/Criteria: There are specific details that are important when dealing with personnel issues. Security clearance forms, accurate personnel contact information and the five W’s of a personnel incident are critical.

c. Performance Facilitators: The facilitators for this major accomplishment vary by the task. However, there was an emphasis placed on the importance of security forms and up to date contact information for Sector personnel.

d. Performance Barriers: All of the OUCs mentioned that not being able to reach the necessary people, in a timely manner, is the most significant barrier for this accomplishment.

3.1.6.1 Task OUC-F1: Brief Command on Personnel Incident

a. General Description: Although the actual briefing of this task is easy, personnel incidents happen on an unpredictable basis and a timely briefing to the Command is important.

b. Most Critical Action/Criteria: During an emergency personnel situation it is crucial to notify the Employee Assistance Program (EAP) and it requires a critical incident stress management response.

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c. Performance Facilitators: Depending on the incident there are various performance facilitators. They include the SCC-J command, specifically the Command Master Chief and the logistics officer, the chaplain, the medical staff, and the EAP. All of these people are able to provide the OUC with input, support and accurate information to add to the information necessary to brief the command.

d. Performance Barriers: Barriers occur if the command notifications can not be made in a timely manner, the right people are unreachable and if the occurrence occurs after hours.

e. Recommendations: Formalize the SCC-J procedures, and include this task in the PQS.

3.1.6.2 Task OUC-F2: Check In/Out New PCS Member

a. General Description: This is a very small task for the OUC. They are required to check in and out new PCS members on roughly a monthly basis. Primarily, this task falls under the SUC’s responsibility.

b. Most Critical Action/Criteria: Providing and recording accurate information.

c. Performance Facilitators: Correct information eases the process for the OUC.

d. Performance Barriers: Poor communications slow down the process.

e. Recommendations: None noted.

3.1.6.3 Task OUC-F3: Recall Watchstanders

a. General Description: Recalling watchstanders happens infrequently. It is an easy task and although a timely response is important, seconds are not a factor. During emergency situations this task generally falls to the SUC so that the OUC can be free to carry out more complex tasks.

b. Most Critical Action/Criteria: An updated recall list is critical for performance

c. Performance Facilitators: Being able to reach the watchstanders and having them be available for recall is very important.

d. Performance Barriers: If the watchstanders information has not been entered incorrectly or if they are unreachable, the task becomes a challenge.

e. Recommendations: None noted.

3.1.6.4 Task OUC-F4: Verify Clearance of SCC-J Visitors

a. General Description: The OUCs commented that the clearance of SCC-J visitors is not generally their responsibility, but they do monitor visitors daily. Verifying clearances is an easy task with a moderate level of consequence and speed is not a factor.

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b. Most Critical Action/Criteria: OUCs need to know whether or not a visitor request has been received, they must see valid identification and they must know the purpose of the visit.

c. Performance Facilitators: Fellow watchstanders are the greatest facilitator for the OUC, along with whomever is assigned as the visitors escort.

d. Performance Barriers: Because of the number of people visiting the watch floor, it can be hard to identify who is a visitor and who has entered the watch floor that is not authorized to be there.

e. Recommendations: Ensure watchstanders recognize that this task is the responsibility of everyone on watch in the SCC-J. Formalize the SCC-J procedures and include this task in the PQS.

3.1.7 Major Accomplishment (OUC-G): Successful Environnemental Protection (Clean Waters)

a. General Description: MA (OUC-G) Maintaining successful environmental protection takes only a small percentage of the OUCs overall duties. The tasks associated with the accomplishment are easy with a low level of complexity.

b. Most Critical Action/Criteria: What is most critical in environmental protection are timely reports and the actual pollution check sheet (QRS) and form for recording information.

c. Performance Facilitators: The ability to communicate with Coast Guard assets is the most significant facilitator when it comes to maintaining clean waters.

d. Performance Barriers: Identifying available resources and notifying personnel of pollution incidents are the most significant barriers.

3.1.7.1 Task OUC-G1: Brief Pollution Reports to SCC-J Command

a. General Description: OUCs brief pollution reports to the SCC-J command on a daily basis. The brief procedure is easy with only a moderate level of consequence. However, a timely briefing is a key factor so that the command is constantly informed.

b. Most Critical Action/Criteria: Obtaining the who, what, where, when and why are the most important details to keep the command informed of during pollution incidents.

c. Performance Facilitators: Other watchstanders are the primary resource for the OUC, especially if they have additional information.

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d. Performance Barriers: Similar to other tasks in other accomplishment areas, the right people are not always around to be briefed, so the OUC is often tasked with going through the phone list to get a hold of a decision maker.

e. Recommendations: Formalize the SCC-J procedures and include this task in the PQS.

3.1.7.2 Task OUC-G2: Monitor Pollution Incident Until Resolved

a. General Description: The OUCs interviewed stated that monitoring a pollution incident until resolved is an easy task, with a moderate level of consequence. They carry out this task on almost a daily basis. OUCs are primarily interested in keeping track of dispatched assets and then the results of clean-up efforts.

b. Most Critical Action/Criteria: Ensuring that accurate incident status information is maintained by SCC-J watchstanders

c. Performance Facilitators: Other watchstanders are the most significant facilitator for this task.

d. Performance Barriers: Again, not being able to reach the necessary people in a timely manner is the roadblock that most significantly hinders this tasks success.

e. Recommendations: Formalize the SCC-J procedures and include this task in the PQS.

3.1.7.3 Task OUC-G3: Coordinate Coast Guard Assets for Prevention Dept.

a. General Description: Coordinating Coast Guard assets occurs on an unpredictable basis with a moderate consequence of error. The task is easy to complete but speed is a factor in order to mobilize assets effectively.

b. Most Critical Action/Criteria: Knowing available asset status and knowledge of correct resources to contact.

c. Performance Facilitators: Utilizing SCC-J personnel and their available resources are the key performance facilitators for OUCs in this task

d. Performance Barriers: If appropriate resources can not be located and dispatched accordingly, the task is very difficult.

e. Recommendations: Formalize the SCC-J procedures and include this task in the PQS.

3.1.8 Major Accomplishment (OUC-H): Accomplished Coast Guard Watchstanders

a. General Description: The OUCs are currently the primary information authority on the SCC-J watch floor, placing a great deal of training responsibility in their hands. Keeping watchstanders up to date on necessary skill sets and providing on the job training is a significant part of the OUCs daily job.

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b. Most Critical Action/Criteria: For an OUC, it is critical for them to have a clear understanding of all equipment on the watch floor, a vision of the SCC-J AOR and the ability to explain the Coast Guard mission and responsibility quickly and accurately.

c. Performance Facilitators: Documentation such as an up to date PQS and QRS’ along with significant operational experience and the ability to teach and train watchstanders are all key facilitators.

d. Performance Barriers: Some OUCs expressed a frustration in the inexperience of many of the SUC and Communication watchstanders that are present and have been present on the watch floor. Qualifying watchstanders should not be a significant part of the daily responsibility, but because of the new ratings they are heavily tasked with training. Additionally, the OUCs mentioned that mission training happens only sporadically and necessary mission skills are not exercised on a regular basis.

3.1.8.1 Task OUC-H1: Train SCC-J Watchstanders on Equipment and Sensors

a. General Description: OUC watchstanders are the most experienced watchstanders on the floor, this enables them to identify weaknesses and areas of improvement for other watchstanders, especially in regards to working with equipment and sensors. This OUC provided training occurs on about a weekly basis.

b. Most Critical Action/Criteria: An OUC needs to have a clear understanding and knowledge of the equipment they are using and be able to clearly articulate this information to other watchstanders.

c. Performance Facilitators: An OUCs greatest asset and performance facilitator for training watchstanders on equipment and sensors is their operational experience.

d. Performance Barriers: The constant influx of new equipment and the changing of software creates a lack of knowledge on how all of the SCC-J watch floor systems work. Additionally, the OUCs mentioned an occasional unwillingness from other watchstanders to learn the equipment and necessary skills.

e. Recommendations: Provide up to date and thorough training of all software before the watchstanders are required to use it. Formalize the SCC-J procedures and include this task in the PQS.

3.1.8.2 Task OUC-H2: Train Unqualified Watchstanders

a. General Description: Training unqualified watchstanders is something the OUCs are faced with frequently. It is a moderately difficult task because unqualified watchstanders can be a hindrance in emergency situations.

b. Most Critical Action/Criteria: The critical details that are required for this task are certified and qualified watchstanders, up to date PQS sheets and accurate publications and directives.

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c. Performance Facilitators: Being able to mold and shape other watchstanders’ situational awareness, i.e., appropriate thought process and knowledge. Additionally a positive attitude and good PQS forms also aid the OUC in performance.

d. Performance Barriers: A barrier to this task is when the OUC becomes involved with a case and is then unable to take time to train. OUCs are frustrated by the occasional ‘qualified’ watchstander on the SCC-J watch floor that is actually not fully qualified.

e. Recommendations: Formalize the SCC-J procedures and include this task in the PQS.

3.1.8.3 Task OUC-H3: Train SCC-J Watchstanders on USCG Mission Areas

a. General Description: OUCs are tasked with training watchstanders on USCG mission areas on about a weekly basis, depending on need.

b. Most Critical Action/Criteria: The OUCs stated that critical details to accomplish this task are accurate case documentation and an up to date QRS for the mission areas.

c. Performance Facilitators: Similar to other training tasks, performance facilitators for OUCs include up to date PQS and QRS along with the ability to be a good teacher and communicator.

d. Performance Barriers: The unpredictable nature of missions makes it hard to train on these skills and creates marginally qualified watchstanders.

e. Recommendations: Train the watchstanders through exercises that directly relate to the USCG mission and the missions that they are required to perform. Formalize the SCC-J procedures and include this task in the PQS.

3.1.8.4 Task OUC-H4: Train SCC-J Watchstanders on SCC-J AOR

a. General Description: OUCs help keep other watchstanders qualified by training them on the SCC-J AOR. This task may occur on a weekly basis, but the time spent carrying it out is short, with brief explanations when necessary.

b. Most Critical Action/Criteria: What the OUC needs, but does not always have on hand, are visual displays of the AOR. Additionally, hands on training and actually showing watchstanders where the AOR is critical, but not always taken as a priority.

c. Performance Facilitators: Key performance facilitators include Power Point presentations and detailed charts for who is responsible for what areas. The OUCs also commented that repetition is key to fully understanding the Sector AOR.

d. Performance Barriers: If a lack of knowledge is evident during a case, there isn’t time to train. Also, when the watchstanders are not familiar with the San Diego area in general, the task is more difficult

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e. Recommendations: Formalize the SCC-J procedures and include this task in the PQS.

3.1.8.5 Task OUC-H5: Train SCC-J Watchstanders on Assets and Resources

a. General Description: Training SCC-J watchstanders on assets and resources is an easy task that occurs on about a weekly basis, depending on the need of the other watchstanders.

b. Most Critical Action/Criteria: The most critical details for this task include having the time to do the training and watchstanders having specific experience in utilizing the assets they are being trained on.

c. Performance Facilitators: The most significant performance facilitator is when a watchstander has had real-time, hands on experience on the assets they are being trained on so they are able to fully relate to that assets capabilities.

d. Performance Barriers: It was a common comment throughout the interview process with the OUC watchstanders as well as other command staff that many SUC watchstanders have not had any significant experience on Coast Guard vessels. Without this knowledge, a great deal of time is spent on training and the appropriate resource may not be dispatched.

e. Recommendations: Provide all watchstanders with hands-on, real-time experience on all of the SCC-J assets. In order for the watchstanders to be full functional in the SCC-J, they need to have at least a general knowledge of every asset’s capabilities and, ideally, they should have spent time on every asset to enhance their understanding. Formalize the SCC-J unit familiarization procedures and include this in the PQS.

3.9.1 Major Accomplishment (OUC-I): Effective Aid to Navigation

a. General Description: This major accomplishment was considered a moderately difficult task but its level of complexity was simple. This accomplishment takes up the least amount of the OUC watchstanders time.

b. Most Critical Action/Criteria: The light list and thorough reports that reflect what is actually wrong are the most critical criteria for this task.

c. Performance Facilitators: Appropriate, clear and timely communications are key in this accomplishment.

d. Performance Barriers: Incorrect information being relayed can be a major barrier to success.

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3.1.9.1 Task OUC-I1: Send AtoN Discrepancy Message

a. General Description: Sending the AtoN discrepancy message is an easy task that occurs on an unpredictable basis. There is a high consequence of error if this task is not carried out, speed is not a factor.

b. Most Critical Action/Criteria: The light list number and the correct discrepancy are critical details in this task.

c. Performance Facilitators: Accurate and specific communications are key.

d. Performance Barriers: If there is confusion between the use of civilian terminology versus Coast Guard terminology, the task is hard to accomplish.

e. Recommendations: None noted.

3.1.9.2 Task OUC-I2: Send AtoN Discrepancy Correction Message

a. General Description: Sending a correction message is a very similar task to sending the discrepancy message. The task is easy, speed is not a factor, these types of situations occur on an unpredictable basis.

b. Most Critical Action/Criteria: The OUC interviewed said that making sure the information is correct in the message is the most critical detail.

c. Performance Facilitators: Good communications are essential.

d. Performance Barriers: Poor communications can be a significant barrier.

e. Recommendations:: None noted.

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3.2 SUC WATCHSTANDER MAJOR ACCOMPLISHMENTS AND TASKS

Seven Major Accomplishments (MA) and thirty-eight Tasks were identified for the SUC. The MAs and Tasks identified for the SUC watchstander are listed in Table 3-2: SUC Watchstander Major Accomplishments and Tasks. Each of the MA and Task sections includes a standard set of information, derived from the interview summary sheet (Appendix B) presented as follows:

f. General description g. Most critical action and criteria h. Performance Barriers i. Performance Facilitators j. Recommendations (as applicable)

In the performance of any task an SUC must have access to the required knowledge and/or procedures of a task. It is not always necessary to train this knowledge to memory, in some cases having these procedure on a job aid is sufficient, often a job aid with extensive training is recommended. The FEA methodology algorithm uses the Task criteria of Speed, Frequency, Complexity, and Consequences of error to make this determination Appendix B shows the criteria input from the SMEs and the recommended intervention based on this algorithm.

Table 3-2: SUC Major Accomplishments and Tasks

Major Accomplishment Task ID# Associated Tasks

SUC -A1 Respond to Fire Alarms

SUC-A2 Respond to Armory Alarms

SUC-A3 Respond to Perimeter Alarms

SUC-A4 Respond to Base Intruder

SUC-A

Secure Facility

SUC-A5 Enforce Sector Security/Safety Zone

Explain FOIA Policy to Inquirer SUC-B1

SUC-B2 Release Personnel Information

SUC-B

Accurate Publicly Releasable Information

SUC-B3 Respond to Media Inquiry

SUC-C1 Monitor Vessel Escorts

SUC-C2 Monitor Sensors

SUC-C3 Provide LE SITREP input for OUC to provide to D11

SUC-C4 Run Cyberlynx/EPIC Search for LE data

SUC-C5 Coordinate USCG and OGA Assets

SUC-C

Maritime Laws Enforced

SUC-C6 Fill Out Neptune Shield SCORE Cards

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Major Accomplishment Task ID# Associated Tasks

SUC-C7 Monitor SIPRNET Intelligence Sites

SUC-C8 Monitor NLETS

SUC-D1 Record Initial Report of SAR Incident

SUC-D2 Make Notifications to SCC-J Command, D11, OGA

SUC-D3 Assist OUC in Coordinating Asset Logistics

SUC-D

Distressed Person Assistance

SUC-D4 Assist OUC in Prosecuting SAR Case

SUC-E1 Input Vessel Data into MISLE

SUC-E2 Make Entries Into SCC-J Logs

SUC-E3 Monitor Sensors

SUC-E4 Review Message Board to Pertinent Data and Disseminate

SUC-E5 Monitor Radio Communications

SUC-E6 Monitor Critical Infrastructure Inspections

SUC-E7 Coordinate Unscheduled HVA/HIV Escort

SUC-E8 Monitor Lightering Operations Outside of Harbor

SUC-E9 Respond to Pertinent Classified Message Traffic

SUC-E10 Ensure Commercial Vessels Follow Harbor Check-In Procedures

SUC-E

Maritime Domain Awareness

SUC-E11 Work with OGA to Coordinate Activities

SUC-F1 Make Notification of Active Duty Member Accident/Incident

SUC-F2 Check In/Out New PCS Member

SUC-F3 Recall Watchstanders

SUC-F

Personnel Issues Resolved

SUC-F4 Verify Security Clearance of SCC-J Visitors

SUC-G1 Receive and Disseminate Spill Report Information

SUC-G2 Make Hazardous Spill Notifications

SUC-G

Successful Environmental Protection (Clean Waters) SUC-G3 Coordinate Assets to Respond to Incident

3.2.1 Major Accomplishment (SUC-A): Secure Facility

a. General Description: Maintaining a Secure Facility is a small part of an SUC’s job. Since the SUC is not the authority on the watch floor, performing this accomplishment is easy and the level of complexity is very simple. The SUC does monitor alarm systems, assist during emergency situations and respond to inquiries as appropriate.

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b. Most Critical Action/Criteria: For the SUCs the security cameras and alarms systems are the most critical aspects to this task.

c. Performance Facilitators: Along with the cameras and alarm systems being critical details to this accomplishment, they are also performance facilitators when working properly.

d. Performance Barriers: The SUCs were more concerned by the malfunctioning alarm systems than the OUCs. The alarm system response falls into more of the SUCs daily tasks and when the alarms don’t work properly and the SUCs haven’t been trained on how to use them, accomplishing these tasks is frustrating and unnecessarily time consuming.

3.2.1.1 Task SUC-A1: Respond to Fire Alarms

a. General Description: Although responding to fire alarms should be a rare task, the SUCs respond to them on a weekly basis. This is a very easy task to complete but there is a high consequence of error and speed is definitely a factor. The SUCs are often faced with the challenge of establishing whether or not the fire alarm is actually working, alerting them to a fire, or if it’s a typical false alarm. Many SUCs also said that training on the full capabilities of the alarm system would be very beneficial.

b. Most Critical Action/Criteria: In an emergency fire situation the SUC will need to ensure that whoever is responding takes the appropriate actions and is able to gain access to the Sector. Additionally, timely notifications are critical.

c. Performance Facilitators: Since they have not yet been trained on the alarm systems, the key performance facilitator for SUCs would be properly trained watchstanders.

d. Performance Barriers: The SUCs were frustrated by the fact that the alarm system shows them where the fire is but they won’t know the type of fire.

e. Recommendations: Troubleshoot and repair the installed system. Develop a Job Aid for operating the system.

3.2.1.2 Task SUC-A2: Respond to Armory Alarms

a. General Description: The SUCs interviewed stated that responding to Armory Alarms occurs on an unpredictable basis. The actual task that they are responsible for is easy, but there is a high consequence of error during an emergency situation when speed would be a factor.

b. Most Critical Action/Criteria: An SUC needs everyone to be accountable in armory alarm situations. Also, knowing who is the Gunners Mate (GM) is critical because they will sign in to get the armory keys.

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c. Performance Facilitators: The key performance facilitator for the SUC is a working alarm and phone system.

d. Performance Barriers: What frustrates all the watchstanders with this task is that the armory alarm goes off every time someone goes into or out of the Armory. Consequently, the beeping noise the alarm makes is generally ignored because they watchstanders have gotten used to the fact that the alarm is not generally a security risk.

e. Recommendations: Enforce a policy that requires authorized armory users to notify whomever monitors the alarm prior to entry and exit to reduce the false alarms and ensure the response to an armory alarm is timely and thorough.

3.2.1.3 Task SUC-A3: Respond to Perimeter Alarms

a. General Description: When questioned about perimeter alarms, not all of the SUCs even knew that they existed. For the ones that did they considered it an easy task to complete that occurs on an unpredictable basis. Generally, the SUC will monitor the perimeter and assist the OUC with the dispatching of necessary assets.

b. Most Critical Action/Criteria: For an SUC to successfully respond to perimeter alarms they need to have good attention to detail, be constantly searching the command center monitors for base security and know who to notify if an incident does occur.

c. Performance Facilitators: The SUCs noted that the system set-up for the perimeter alarms is good and it is their most significant performance facilitator in this task.

d. Performance Barriers: Though the system set-up for perimeter alarms may be good, if the SUC watchstanders are not paying attention to the monitors and the details of the base, incidents can be missed. Also, the location of the monitors in the SCC-J for the perimeter alarms is not conducive to quick response or continuous monitoring.

e. Recommendations: Develop SOP for monitoring and responding to the perimeter alarm system including a Job Aid for operating the equipment.

3.2.1.4 Task SUC-A4: Respond to Base Intruder

a. General Description: Base Intruder incidents have happened on a rare, unpredictable basis but the consequences of the situation could be devastating. The task is easy to carry-out yet the response must occur quickly because seconds count in these situations.

b. Most Critical Action/Criteria: What is critical for an SUC to pay attention to when an intruder has gotten into the Sector are timely notifications to necessary personnel and command. Additionally paying close attention to monitors and maintaining an alert watch are key.

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c. Performance Facilitators: The key performance facilitators for SUC watchstanders when responding to base intruders are the perimeter sensors and base cameras. These systems allow the watchstanders to monitor actions and determine the intruder’s location.

d. Performance Barriers: The SUCs find it difficult to deal with intruder situations when they occur after hours because there is not a 24 hour manned and armed front gate and therefore they have incomplete information.

e. Recommendations: Develop SOP for SCC-J watchstanders and base OOD/security that includes intruder response with an escalating response posture based on DHS and locally derived threat levels, train and maintain base OOD/security skills. Formalize the procedures and include this task in the PQS.

3.2.1.5 Task SUC-A5: Enforce Sector Security/Safety Zone

a. General Description: Enforcing the Security/Safety Zone is a task with a low level of difficulty that the SUCs complete on a daily basis. The SUC must respond to these security breeches in a rapid manner because the consequences could potentially be devastating.

b. Most Critical Action/Criteria: What is most critical when dealing with security and safety zone issues is attention to detail, timely notifications of necessary personnel and having a knowledge of the security and safety zones and the ability to differentiate between the two.

c. Performance Facilitators: When the cameras are functioning properly they are a key facilitator in Security Zone situations for the SUC watchstanders.

d. Performance Barriers: This task relies primarily on the systems in place which have a poor reliability record. If the systems fail then the SUC has to rely on human factors that are not as accurate and efficient.

e. Recommendations: Establish boater awareness of the Sector Security Zone and its boundaries in the San Diego Harbor. Establish a better means to monitor and enforce the Sector Security/Safety Zone.

3.2.2 Major Accomplishment (SUC-B): Accurate Publicly Releasable Information

a. General Description: Resolving public affairs incidents also takes up a very small percentage of the SUCs job. The responsibility for these tasks falls primarily on the Public Affairs Office and when they are unavailable the SUCs said they would generally differ to the OUCs. However, there are some basic tasks involved in this major accomplishment that the SUCs must be able to complete and there are infrequent instances when they are tasked with handling basic public affairs situations.

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b. Most Critical Action/Criteria: When an SUC has to handle a Public Affairs situation what is most critical for them to have is detailed case information. This information should range from the details of the case to accurate contact information. Additionally a general understanding of FOIA policies is also critical.

c. Performance Facilitators: Since Public Affairs is not something the watchstanders are expected to have extensive training in, the Public Affairs office and personnel are the SUC watchstanders greatest asset in this task.

d. Performance Barriers: SUCs are tasked with general Public Affairs tasks occasionally and their lack of training and experience makes this task difficult to carry out, especially when necessary personnel are unreachable.

3.2.2.1 Task SUC-B1: Explain FOIA Policy to Inquirer

a. General Description: Explaining the FOIA policy to an inquirer is a task that happens infrequently for the SUCs and is moderately difficult because of the policy specifics. Although the principles and use of FOIA are not complicated, the introduction of unnecessary bureaucratic hurdles caused by an incomplete understanding of the act by the watchstanders, may unnecessarily prevent disclosure of appropriate information. SUCs do not need to be concerned with time, in regards to seconds when completing this task and there is a low consequence of error.

b. Most Critical Action/Criteria: The SUCs need to have a firm understanding of the FOIA policy because not knowing it poses a challenge in Public Affairs incidents.

c. Performance Facilitators: Similar to the OUC task, the public affairs representative can be the greatest facilitator for the SUC since they are the expert in these particular situations.

d. Performance Barriers: Inexperience dealing with information inquiries and a lack of understanding of FOIA can be roadblocks for SUCs.

e. Recommendations: Have the Public Affairs personnel provide training for all watchstanders on a routine basis. Create a Job Aid that provides a detailed description of the FOIA policy and its significance to the SCC-J.

3.2.2.2 Task SUC-B2: Release Personnel Information

a. General Description: For SUC watchstanders knowing what information is appropriate to release is the most challenging part of releasing personnel information. Remembering the rules of confidentiality are key, and they always can differ to the OUC on duty if necessary. In general, time is not a critical factor in this task and the situations happen infrequently.

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b. Most Critical Action/Criteria: What the SUC must keep in mind is the information in the Privacy Act, whether or not next of kin notifications have occurred and what the commands knowledge of the situation is.

c. Performance Facilitators: Because personnel issues are complicated, the SCC-J command can act as the most significant facilitator for the SUC when releasing personnel information. They provide an expertise and authority that the SUC lacks.

d. Performance Barriers: A lack of information is a barrier for SUCs. Without the proper understanding of a situation, the right steps can not be taken to disseminate information appropriately.

e. Recommendations: Provide the SUCs with training on personnel issues and have a SOP developed to refer to in regards to what information can and can not be released. Formalize the procedures and include this task in the PQS.

3.2.2.3 Task SUC-B3: Respond to Media Inquiry

a. General Description: Required knowledge of FOIA policies and the Privacy Act make this is a moderately difficult SUC task. SUCs deal with media inquiries on about a weekly basis with a high consequence of error if inappropriate information is divulged. The speed of response is not a factor for this task.

b. Most Critical Action/Criteria: Responding to a media inquiry is similar to releasing personnel information. The SUC must pay strict attention to FOIA policies and the Privacy act and remember to keep privileged information quiet.

c. Performance Facilitators: A trained and experienced OUC watchstander is a significant asset in this task. Additionally, the Public Affairs Office is also a facilitator because they are the ones who should primarily be dealing with the media.

d. Performance Barriers: Again, a lack of case information makes this task a challenge, along with the fact that SUCs are not trained in Public Affairs.

e. Recommendations: Enforce a Sector SOP that the SCC-J is always kept informed of all SCC-J situations, especially after hours when they are the primary point of contact for all base inquiries. Create SOP for appropriate information to release.

3.2.3 Major Accomplishment (SUC-C): Maritime Laws Enforced

a. General Description: SUCs consider Law Enforcement (LE) activities to be one of their primary jobs which takes up about half of their time on the watch floor. Dealing with LE situations is moderately difficult and moderately complex. During the tasks associated with this accomplishment the SUCs are often the first person of contact for boarding officers and the primary gatherer of case information. Some SUCs mentioned their interest in having more LE training opportunities outside of the watch floor.

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b. Most Critical Action/Criteria: Having detailed asset knowledge and a clear understanding of the SCC-J watch floor and AOR capabilities is critical.

c. Performance Facilitators: The most significant facilitators for this task are the Coast Guard and OGA assets. Since the SUC is an information liaison in LE situations, having good knowledge of asset and SCC-J capabilities is key.

d. Performance Barriers: Malfunctioning systems and poor communications are barriers that the SUCs were the most frustrated with.

3.2.3.1 Task SUC-C1: Monitor Vessel Escorts

a. General Description: For an SUC watchstander, monitoring vessel escorts is a daily task. It is important for the watchstander to keep in constant communication with the escort assigned and help facilitate any changes if need be. Although speed is not a factor, the task is moderately difficult to complete with a moderate level of consequence.

b. Most Critical Action/Criteria: When monitoring escorts the SUC must keep in mind the time the vessel is supposed to arrive, the type of vessel being escorted, what the inbound/outbound times are, what the vessels destination is, what the purpose of the trip is and if it is a foreign vessel or not.

c. Performance Facilitators: The Navy watchstanders are a key facilitator for the SUC because they keep track of Navy escorts and movements. Also, the Surface Operations Officer is important because they keep the SCC-J watch floor updated of any possible escort changes.

d. Performance Barriers: Like many of the SCC-J tasks, equipment problems are a barrier for SUCs. Beyond the equipment, the vessels needing escorts are not always on time and they often forget they even have an escort assigned.

e. Recommendations: Formalize the procedures for monitoring vessel escorts and include this task in the PQS.

3.2.3.2 Task SUC-C2: Monitor Sensors

a. General Description: Monitoring sensors is task the SUC watchstanders must perform on a daily basis. For the SUCs, this is a very difficult task because of the quality of the sensor. A rapid response to situations noticed from sensors is important. The SUCs also monitor the sensors to help the California Border Patrol (CBP) , providing support for their efforts as much as possible.

b. Most Critical Action/Criteria: What the SUCs pay close attention to are the northbound contacts from the border and any out of the ordinary details. Varying opinions as to what constituted MDA in regards to sensor use were expressed.

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c. Performance Facilitators: There are a few positive influences for this task including working equipment and available Coast Guard assets. The SUCs collaboration with OGAs is also very helpful.

d. Performance Barriers: Unfortunately, the sensor equipment is often not working and the assets are unavailable. These situations make monitoring the sensors on a daily basis a challenge for the SUC watchstanders.

e. Recommendations: Provide watchstanders with updated equipment and a daily list of available assets. Formalize the procedures and include this task in the PQS.

3.2.3.3 Task SUC-C3: Provide LE SITREP Input for OUC to Provide to D11

a. General Description: LE SITREP are easy for an SUC to complete. Sometimes the SUC will call additional people to ascertain specific information to include in the report. This type of input is needed infrequently, there is a moderate level of consequence and speed is not a factor for completion.

b. Most Critical Action/Criteria: What is most important for the SUC to keep in mind when filling out the SITREP are the five W’s of the situation, the specific vessel information and the passengers information.

c. Performance Facilitators: An SUC relies heavily on the boarding team, the Coast Guard assets and the communications watchstander when compiling law enforcement information. All of these parties are able to provide detailed information to be passed along to the OUC.

d. Performance Barriers: If communications are faulty and the appropriate information has not been given, it is hard for the SUC to provide useful input.

e. Recommendations: Formalize the procedures and include this task in the PQS.

3.2.3.4 Task SUC-C4: Run Cyberlynx/EPIC Search for LE Data

a. General Description: An SUC runs a Cyberlynx/EPIC search infrequently. The OUC watchstander is primarily responsible for the execution of this task. The task is moderately difficult to complete because it is necessary for the SUC to be familiar with the systems.

b. Most Critical Action/Criteria: What is critical for the SUC in this task is accurate and detailed information on the persons in question, given by the boarding officers, and valid warrants documented in the system.

c. Performance Facilitators: A boarding team usually originates the search request and other watchstanders, the communications center and the databases become the key facilitators for the SUC.

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d. Performance Barriers: Frequently these database systems are down, causing a significant delay in the relay of information back to the boarding team. Additionally, if enough information hasn’t been gathered on the passengers in question, the searches often come back with little or no results.

e. Recommendations: Provide familiarization training on the LE databases. Formalize the procedures and include this task in the PQS.

3.2.3.5 Task SUC-C5: Coordinate USCG and OGA Assets

a. General Description: The SUC acts as a liaison for the OUC when coordinating OGA assets. LE incidents occur on an infrequent basis, requiring an infrequent coordination of OGA assets. This task can be moderately difficult for SUCs when assets are not available and when assets’ capabilities are unknown. There is a moderate consequence of error and speed is not a factor, in regards to seconds.

b. Most Critical Action/Criteria: SUCs need to have a clear understanding of the assets capabilities and be able to disseminate the situation information completely to the assets being coordinated.

c. Performance Facilitators: All of the SCC-J watchstanders are the key facilitators in this task.

d. Performance Barriers: Since OGA assets are not all dispersible from the SCC-J watch floor there is not always appropriate availability. Specifically, the SUCs noted frustration in other agencies, like the CBP, shutting down without notification and consequently, not being available for dispatching.

e. Recommendations: Enforce a protocol for asset reporting that enables the SUC to keep track of CG and OGA assets. Formalize the procedures and include this task in the PQS.

3.2.3.6 Task 6 (SUC-C6): Fill Out Neptune Shield SCORE Cards

a. General Description: Completing the Neptune Shield SCORE cards is a task that has been passed down to the SUC because they are the ones working with the information that is requested. It is a daily task where speed is not a factor. The SCORE cards are easy to complete and there is a low consequence of error.

b. Most Critical Action/Criteria: When filling out the SCORE cards the SUC must document the number of boardings that occurred that day, the number of escorts that occurred that day and what the MARSEC level was.

c. Performance Facilitators: Generally, the SUCs stated that they get the information for the SCORE cards from the morning brief.

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d. Performance Barriers: The SUCs encounter barriers when the previous mid-watch didn’t input the right maritime law enforcement information and if the Communication Center wasn’t able to get the boarding information.

e. Recommendations: Formalize the SCORE care documentation procedures and include this task in the PQS.

3.2.3.7 Task SUC-C7: Monitor SIPRNET Intelligence Sites

a. General Description: This is a very minimal task for SUCs because not all SUCs use it or have a login/password. Generally, the Navy watchstanders monitor the intelligence sites, performing the task for the SUC.

b. Most Critical Action/Criteria: None noted.

c. Performance Facilitators: None noted.

d. Performance Barriers: Frequently SIPRNET is down which affects their ability to use C2PC. Not all of the SUCs use it because not all have a login/password.

e. Recommendations: Determine the best practices for using this tool, establish standards of practice. Provide the watchstanders with clear guidance on what they are expected to do on the SIPRNET. Formalize the procedures and include this task in the PQS.

3.2.3.8 Task SUC-C8: Monitor NLETS

a. General Description: The SUC watchstanders had a great deal to say about NLETS, specifically, that it is not a useful system. The LE information it provides is not specific to the San Diego area and rarely concerns the SCC-J AOR. SUCs monitor its output on a daily basis, speed is not a factor and it is easy to complete with a very low consequence of error.

b. Most Critical Action/Criteria: The only real critical detail for this task is knowing the AOR for the SCC-J to see if any of the information coming through the system pertains to them.

c. Performance Facilitators: The SUCs joked that the only facilitator for this task is a working printer. AOR knowledge and situational awareness are key facilitators.

d. Performance Barriers: For the SUCs, NLETS provides too much irrelevant information, the format of the messages is hard to decipher, the printer often malfunctions, and often the previous watch hasn’t monitored the output so there are hundreds of papers to sort through.

e. Recommendations: This task takes too much time sorting through reports that are irrelevant to the SCC-J MDA. Consider removing the NLETS system from watch floor

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or, at a minimum, find an efficient sorting mechanism that reduces the number of irrelevant reports.

3.2.4 Major Accomplishment (SUC-D): Distressed Person Assistance

a. General Description: Since the OUC watchstander was previously known as the SAR controller, the amount of responsibility that the SUC has in assisting distressed person tasks is minimal. However, SUCs are available for assistance during these cases and assisting distressed persons constitutes about ten percent of their job. SUCs consider this accomplishment to be moderately difficult yet the complexity of their tasks is simple.

b. Most Critical Action/Criteria: SUCs need to pay close attention to the details of distressed person incidents so they are able to then pass along the information to the OUC watchstanders.

c. Performance Facilitators: The OUC is the most significant facilitator for this task since they are the ones with the most SAR training and experience.

d. Performance Barriers: Communications with people involved in SAR incidents and with other SCC-J personnel are what create the biggest barriers for this accomplishment. A formalized set of SUC specific procedures needs to be developed and then include this task in the PQS.

3.2.4.1 Task SUC-D1: Record Initial Report of SAR Incident

a. General Description: During this task the SUC is primarily concerned with gathering as much initial information as possible, to help alleviate some work from the OUC. This is a moderately difficult task to complete, it happens infrequently, the consequences could be devastating and speed is a significant factor so that the information can quickly be passed along to the appropriate personnel.

b. Most Critical Action/Criteria: To accomplish Task 1 (SUC-D1) the SUC needs to record the position of the incident, the nature of the distress, the number of people on board, a description of the vessel, the type of survival gear on board the vessel, what, if any, the injuries are for the people on board, a current phone number where they can be contacted and whether or not they have VHF radio capabilities.

c. Performance Facilitators: There are multiple performance facilitators for this task. The OUCs expertise, the assistance from other watchstanders and recording correct information from the reporting source are all key for the SUC.

d. Performance Barriers: When the SUC receives information from a frantic caller, the communication device they are using are hard to understand, the caller doesn’t know their location and/or the OUC is not around, this task becomes increasingly more difficult to complete.

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e. Recommendations: Provide watchstanders with a SOP for gathering SAR case information. Formalize the SUC specific procedures and include this task in the PQS.

3.2.4.2 Task SUC-D2: Make Notifications to SCC-J Command, D11, OGA

a. General Description: Assisting distresses persons can often turn into emergency SAR cases. When significant incidents occur, the SUC is tasked with keeping the SCC-J Command, D11 and OGAs of important details. This task is moderately difficult to complete with a high consequence of error. A case of this significance occurs on about a monthly basis. Although this task does not constitute a command briefing, like the OUCs task, it is primarily a relaying of information.

b. Most Critical Action/Criteria: The SUC must keep the five W’s, the ETA and the patients vital signs at the front of their mind when making the appropriate notifications to the SCC-J command, D11 and OGA. The SUC watchstanders often deal with cruise ship incidents, making a rapid request for paramedics critical as well.

c. Performance Facilitators: The primary facilitator to accomplished performance for this task is, again, the OUC watchstanders because of their extensive SAR knowledge.

d. Performance Barriers: Relaying the SAR information to the necessary personnel is a challenge if the information is incomplete.

e. Recommendations: Formalize the SUC specific notification procedures and include this task in the PQS.

3.2.4.3 Task SUC-D3: Assist OUC in Coordinating Asset Logistics

a. General Description: Assisting the OUC in coordinating asset logistics is a moderately difficult task that occurs on approximately a monthly basis. The SUC is responsible for providing the OUC with up to date asset availability and they must be able to locate necessary assets quickly. The results of not coordinating assets could be devastating.

b. Most Critical Action/Criteria: For the SUC, keeping the who, what, when, where and why of a SAR case in mind and knowing the asset capabilities is critical when coordinating asset logistics.

c. Performance Facilitators: Key performance facilitators include, once again, the OUC and the other watchstanders, particularly the Communications Center because of the detailed case information they can all provide.

d. Performance Barriers: Unfortunately, the watch floor can often get inundated with phone calls of little significance to the Coast Guard mission, causing unnecessary barriers.

e. Recommendations: Formalize the SUC specific procedures and include this task in the PQS.

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3.2.4.4 Task SUC-D4: Assist OUC in Prosecuting SAR Case

a. General Description: The prosecution of SAR cases falls into the OUCs realm of responsibility. There are infrequent situations where the SUC must assist the OUC in case management in which case the consequence of error would be devastating and time would be a significant factor. In general, the SUC may be responsible for the initial gathering of information but the prosecution of the case is not their job.

b. Most Critical Action/Criteria: During a SAR case the SUC is primarily responsible for gathering additional case information and fielding phone calls, in order to leave the OUC free to carry-out the SAR case.

c. Performance Facilitators: Detailed case information and available assets are vital when prosecuting a SAR case.

d. Performance Barriers: If more then one case occurs at a time, it is hard for the SUCs to assist. Additionally, the phone calls the watch floor receives have the potential to take up a great deal of time, taking the SUC away from assisting the OUC.

e. Recommendations: Formalize the SUC specific procedures and include this task in the PQS.

3.2.5 Major Accomplishment (SUC-E): Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA)

a. General Description: Maritime Domain Awareness takes up the most significant part of the SUCs general responsibilities. It is a moderately difficult accomplishment, mostly because there is a lack of mission definition, and it is moderately complex. When interviewed, the SUCs had very little, if any, idea of what actually constituted MDA. They were able to define tasks associated with the MA, but their understanding did not stretch any deeper then that (see Appendix E).

b. Most Critical Action/Criteria: Information from Coast Guard ships locators, daily SITREP and classified information from the California Border Patrol are critical criteria for this accomplishment. Also, the encrypted radio frequencies also play a critical role for the SUCs in Maritime Domain Awareness.

c. Performance Facilitators: Having working tools for AOR monitoring and communications with OGAs are the most significant performance facilitators for this task.

d. Performance Barriers: The barriers for this accomplishment are varied, however, not having the right sensors to monitor the AOR and poor communications between government agencies were primary concerns.

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3.2.5.1 Task SUC-E1: Input Vessel Data into MISLE

a. General Description: SUCs input vessel specific data into Marine Information for Safety and Law Enforcement (MISLE) on a monthly basis. It is an easy task with a low consequence of error and speed is not a factor.

b. Most Critical Action/Criteria: When an SUC is tasked with inputting vessel data, it is critical for them to document the vessels call sign and name.

c. Performance Facilitators: Having various databases available for research on vessels is the most significant performance facilitator for the SUCs.

d. Performance Barriers: Some of the research resources provide a great deal of information but do not allow the watchstanders to locate the appropriate vessel.

e. Recommendations: Formalize the SUC specific procedures and include this task in the PQS.

3.2.5.2 Task SUC-E2: Make Entries Into SCC-J Logs

a. General Description: SCC-J logs need to be kept up to date on a daily basis. It is a very easy task to complete with a moderate level of consequence and time is not a factor. All of the available logs contain pertinent information regarding daily activities, appropriate protocols and notes from other watchstanders.

b. Most Critical Action/Criteria: The SUC needs to pay close attention to detail and make timely and accurate log entries. It is also critical that the information is passed down from watch to watch so that no information is lost during shift changes.

c. Performance Facilitators: Performance facilitators for this task include Microsoft Access, pen and paper logs and the data voice log. Other logs of importance are the day to day pass down logs, the JHOC log, and the SUC log

d. Performance Barriers: Sometimes the SUCs can be overloaded with case information, causing some critical details to be overlooked and incidents left undocumented.

e. Recommendations: Create a standard watch relief process for every shift. Formalize the SUC specific procedures and include this task in the PQS.

3.2.5.3 Task SUC-E3: Monitor Sensors

a. General Description: SUCs monitor sensors daily. It is a very easy task with a moderate level of consequence because the SUCs need to keep a constant watch of all sensors, but speed is not a factor. Some sensors have a delay in their output, specifically the ones that the Navy watchstanders monitor, which gives the SUCs a picture that is not up to date.

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B. Most Critical Action/Criteria: For an SUC, making sure the cameras are in good working order and optimizing the RADAR settings for mission/tasking requirements are critical details.

c. Performance Facilitators: The current sensor system is the most significant asset for the SUCs.

d. Performance Barriers: The sensor system, however, is not adequate to carry out the task. The sensors are often unclear and don’t cover the appropriate areas. Also, the SUCS said that the unclassified Global Command and Control System–Maritime (GCCS-M) system doesn’t show blue force tracks and a classified system would be better. Additionally, it was suggested that a 50kw RADAR could be a better quality and have less wattage.

e. Recommendations: Formalize the SUC specific procedures and include this task in the PQS. Refrain from adding new equipment that is not fully mission ready and dependable.

3.2.5.4 Task SUC-E4: Review Message Board for Pertinent Data and Disseminate

a. General Description: Reviewing the message board is a daily task with a low level of consequence. It is very easy to complete but speed must be a factor in order to capture pertinent information in a timely manner. The SUCs monitor the message board for pertinent information that pertains to their AOR and could have an impact on MDA.

b. Most Critical Action/Criteria: Critical information from the message boards needs to be gathered quickly and disseminated without delay.

c. Performance Facilitators: Functioning message systems can be the greatest facilitator for the SUC in this task.

d. Performance Barriers: The SUCs were frustrated with this task because items that are critical for performance, such as CGMS, are rarely working properly and the CG server is often down. The computers and these programs can be key performance facilitators when they are working but when the Coast Guard web server is down, messages are unavailable. Additionally, not all of the watch floor personnel have been trained appropriately on message traffic so they do not know what to looking for.

e. Recommendations: Record best practices, formalize the SCC-J procedures and include this task in the PQS.

3.2.5.5 Task SUC-E5: Monitor Radio Communications

a. General Description: SUCs monitor radio communications on a delay basis and they consider the task to be moderately difficult. Staying on top of the communications is a task that is time sensitive and has a moderate consequence of error. The

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Communications Center is primarily responsible for addressing these communications, but there have been times when critical communications were missed.

b. Most Critical Action/Criteria: Generally, the SUC is responsible for keeping an ear out for communications that pertain to them, or incidents they may have to become involved in.

c. Performance Facilitators: The Communications Center radio systems are the greatest facilitator for SUC watchstanders as well as attention to detail. The systems used for communication, like the VHF and UHF and the Data Voice Log (DVL) are significant performance facilitators as well.

d. Performance Barriers: The barriers for the SUC occur when the equipment is malfunctioning.

e. Recommendations: Formalize the SCC-J procedures for monitoring radio communications and include this task in the PQS.

3.2.5.6 Task SUC-E6: Monitor Critical Infrastructure Inspections

a. General Description: Monitoring critical infrastructure inspections is a moderately difficult task that needs to be carried out on a daily basis. SUCs need to have rapid action during these structure inspections because the consequence of error could be devastating.

b. Most Critical Action/Criteria: An SUC must have a basis awareness of infrastructures and a knowledge of assets and their locations in order to carry out this task appropriately. Additionally, timely notifications to necessary parties and maintaining an active presence are also critical details.

c. Performance Facilitators: The facilitators for the SUC in this task include the OUC QRS and the RADAR system.

d. Performance Barriers: Unfortunately, there are no current sensors to monitor these infrastructures, and the SUCs are required to go on word of mouth.

e. Recommendations: Formalize the SCC-J procedures and include this task in the PQS.

3.2.5.7 Task SUC-E7: Coordinate Unscheduled HVA/HIV Escort

a. General Description: SUCs coordinate unscheduled High Value Asset (HVA) and High Interest Vessel (HIV) escorts on an unpredictable basis. This task is moderately difficult because of asset availability. There is a low level of consequence but the SUCs stated that speed, in regards to seconds can be a factor, especially if the request for an escort is made at the last minute.

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b. Most Critical Action/Criteria: The SUCs must pay close attention to detail, make timely reports and notifications and ensure that the vessel requesting the escort is logged.

c. Performance Facilitators: When an HVA/HIV escort is requested that has not been scheduled there are various facilitators that enhance this process. The Coast Guard assets and Navy assets, along with RADAR and the communications watchstanders are critical for the SUC.

d. Performance Barriers: Obtaining assets can be a challenge if the vessels have already completed their required daily underway time. Additionally, some stations have time restrictions for the amount of time they can be deployed.

e. Recommendations: Develop SOP for handling unscheduled escorts. Formalize the SCC-J procedures and include this task in the PQS.

3.2.5.8 Task SUC-E8: Monitor Lightering Operations Outside of Harbor

a. General Description: SUCs monitor lightering operations outside of the San Diego Harbor on a weekly basis. This task which involves monitoring the sensors for unusual activity is considered to be very easy by the SUCs.

b. Most Critical Action/Criteria: An SUC needs to consider the vicinity that the operation is taking place, they need to make timely notifications to the SCC-J command and most importantly, they need to be made aware that the operations are taking place.

c. Performance Facilitators: Performance facilitators for the SUC include when Chevron makes notifications to the watch floor and when the lightering ships have alerted the SUCs that lightering operations will be taking place.

d. Performance Barriers: Even when the appropriate notifications have taken place there is no way for the SUC to observe the lightering area other then through RADAR and AIS. Additionally, untimely notifications by lightering units can also hinder performance.

e. Recommendations: Formalize the SCC-J procedures and include this task in the PQS.

3.2.5.9 Task 9 (SUC-E9): Respond to Pertinent Classified Message Traffic

a. General Description: Generally, the Navy watchstanders are responsible for classified message traffic. However, they gather information that the SUC must respond to on a daily basis. There is a low consequence of error, but speed is a factor when messages are of a critical/emergency nature.

b. Most Critical Action/Criteria: When responding to pertinent classified message traffic the SUC needs to have a secure terminal with SIPRNET capability, a clear

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understanding of what the messages are relaying and the ability to understand what messages pertain to the AOR.

c. Performance Facilitators: The SUCs consider SIPRNET and potential message traffic training to be the most significant performance facilitators for this task.

d. Performance Barriers: Unfortunately, SUCs are not all properly trained on how to read message traffic and the information that is conveyed can quickly become outdated.

e. Recommendations: In order to appropriately carry out this task, all watchstanders need access to SIPRNET, along with appropriate training on message traffic.

3.2.5.10 Task SUC-E10: Ensure Commercial Vessels Follow Harbor Check-In Procedures

a. General Description: A daily task for the SUCs is to ensure that commercial vessels follow the specific harbor check in procedures. The SUC needs to have the rules and regulations for entering the San Diego port at their fingertips. This is a moderately difficult task with a moderate consequence of error and speed is not a significant factor.

b. Most Critical Action/Criteria: The SUCs need the vessels to make timely notifications and it is important to have good contacts in the Foreign Vessels Branch.

c. Performance Facilitators: The key performance facilitators for the SUC in this task include SANS, the Foreign Vessels Branch (FVB), AIS and RADAR.

d. Performance Barriers: When AIS and RADAR are down, this task is challenging to carry out. Additionally, if a vessel doesn’t put in a Notice of Arrival (NOA) or the vessel doesn’t communicate their intention to enter the port, additional barriers are encountered.

e. Recommendations: Formalize the SCC-J procedures and include this task in the PQS.

3.2.5.11 Task SUC-E11: Work with OGA to Coordinate Activities

a. General Description: One of the primary MDA concepts is for the SCC-J to work with OGAs to coordinate activities. These activities include such things as marine events and OGA exercises. This specific task is one that the SUC carries out on a daily basis.

b. Most Critical Action/Criteria The critical details for this task include good communications with the OGAs and knowing the capabilities and resources of each agency.

c. Performance Facilitators: Having a good working relationship with the OGAs is the most significant performance facilitator for SUCS in this task.

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d. Performance Barriers: Sometimes the other agencies are hesitant to share information creating a significant roadblock for collaboration. The SUCs mentioned that sometimes it’s hard to get the DoD person to relinquish control of the EHHS system cameras.

e. Recommendations: Formalize the SCC-J procedures and include this task in the PQS.

3.2.6 Major Accomplishment (SUC-F): Personnel Issues Resolved

a. General Description: Resolving personnel issues for an SUC is a very easy task with a simple level of complexity. Even though it is a simple task, it does take up a significant part of the SUCs daily watch because of the number of visitors entering into and out of the SCC-J.

b. Most Critical Action/Criteria: The SUCs find the security clearance forms to be the most important criteria for this accomplishment.

c. Performance Facilitators: The computer programs and accurate information are key performance facilitators.

d. Performance Barriers: There are varied barriers for each task but communications issues seem to be the prevailing concern.

3.2.6.1 Task SUC-F1: Make Notification of Active Duty Member Incident

a. General Description: Making notifications of active duty member accidents/incidents is an easy task that occurs on an unpredictable basis with a moderate level of consequence. Although timely notifications are important, seconds are not a factor. Generally the SUC will start with notifying the OUC and then move up the chain of command if necessary.

b. Most Critical Action/Criteria: To complete this task the SUC must have documentation about the active duty member, notify the chain of command and advise D11 if necessary.

c. Performance Facilitators: Emails and telephone communications are the most significant performance facilitator for the SUC. They provide the critical details about incidents that make the notifications possible.

d. Performance Barriers: If active duty members have been jailed in Mexico it creates major communications barriers for the SUC and complicates law enforcement issues that must be elevated up the chain of command.

e. Recommendations: Formalize the procedures and include this task in the PQS.

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3.2.6.2 Task SUC-F2: Check In/Out New PCS Member

a. General Description: Checking in and out of new PCS members is a very easy task with a low consequence of error that occurs on an unpredictable basis where time is not a factor. The SUCs must be sure to document all pertinent PCS member information.

b. Most Critical Action/Criteria: It is most critical for the SUC to make sure that all of the information is accurate and detailed information is obtained.

c. Performance Facilitators: The computer programs the SUCs use for documentation are the most beneficial for this process.

d. Performance Barriers: When the computer system is down the SUCs face the most challenge in completing this task.

e. Recommendations: None noted.

3.2.6.3 Task SUC-F3: Recall Watchstander

a. General Description: Although recalling watchstanders is an easy task that happens on an unpredictable basis with a low level of consequence. It is important, during emergency situations, to have the necessary personnel on hand and accessible.

b. Most Critical Action/Criteria: What is critical to this task is keeping accurate and up to date information on all watchstanders.

c. Performance Facilitators: The greatest performance facilitators for this task are the computer programs that all watchstanders contact information is documented in. These programs assist in keeping the information organized and easily accessible for the SUCs.

d. Performance Barriers: When the information on the watchstanders is inaccurate the task is hard to complete on a timely basis because the appropriate watchstanders can not be reached and consequently, not recalled.

e. Recommendations: None noted

3.2.6.4 Task SUC-F4: Verify Security Clearance of SCC-J Visitors

a. General Description: The SUCs proved that they take this task very seriously during the site visit. Although verifying security clearances is very easy and is done on a daily basis, there could be a high consequence of error if an unauthorized person is allowed onto the watch floor.

b. Most Critical Action/Criteria: The SUCs must pay close attention to detail in regards to checking identifications and clearance information. Additionally it is important to

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make sure that there is an appropriate reason for the visit and that the visitor has a “need to know”.

c. Performance Facilitators: Since verifying clearances is critical for watch floor security, having accurate and timely information about visitors is key.

d. Performance Barriers: At times, however, the security verification isn’t present or is unable to be quickly located and/or a need to know was not established, therefore verifying security clearances is a challenge.

e. Recommendations: Formalize the clearance procedures and include this task in the PQS.

3.2.7 Major Accomplishment (SUC-G): Successful Environmental Protection (Clean Waters)

a. General Description: Successful environmental protection is one of the most simple and easy to execute accomplishments for the SUC. It takes up less then ten percent of their total work time and most of the tasks occur very infrequently.

b. Most Critical Action/Criteria: The pollution QRS and check sheet along with an updated MHLS bang list are the most critical details.

c. Performance Facilitators: The National Response Center (NRC) was mentioned as the most significant performance facilitator.

d. Performance Barriers: Like many other major accomplishments, being able to reach the appropriate people in a timely manner is the most significant performance barrier for this task.

3.2.7.1 Task SUC-G1: Receive and Disseminate Spill Report Information

a. General Description: Receiving and disseminating spill report information is very easy and it occurs on a weekly basis. The SUC must be sure to collect detailed information that can be clearly disseminated to necessary parties. There is a high consequence of error if reports are not dealt with appropriately and timely, therefore speed, in regards to seconds, is a factor.

b. Most Critical Action/Criteria: The completion of Task SUC-G1 requires a report number, information on the area that the incident occurred and verification that the reported incident was not a drill.

c. Performance Facilitators: The SUCs depend on the NRC providing them with detailed reports along with reports from the public and the Response department to accomplish this task.

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d. Performance Barriers: Sometimes the Response department does not respond in a timely manner and in that case the Assistant Sector Duty Officer (ASDO) will be notified to try resolve the situation.

e. Recommendations: Formalize the procedures and include this task in the PQS.

3.2.7.2 Task SUC-G2: Make Hazardous Spill Notifications

a. General Description: Making hazardous spill notifications to the command is a moderately difficult task with a potentially devastating consequence of error. These incidents occur infrequently but during emergency situations, making rapid notifications is crucial.

b. Most Critical Action/Criteria: The completion of this task is making notifications of the report number, identifying the area that the incident occurred and ensuring that it was not a drill. Depending on the type of spill either the command and/or the ASDO should be notified.

c. Performance Facilitators: Immediate access to both the NRC and Marine Environmental Response (MER) are the key facilitators for the SUC.

d. Performance Barriers: Not being able to reach the appropriate people in a timely manner is the most significant barrier.

e. Recommendations: Formalize the procedures for duty personnel recall, how to contact then and include this task in the PQS.

3.2.7.3 Task SUC-G3: Coordinate Assets to Respond to Incident

a. General Description: Coordinating assets to respond to pollution incidents is an easy task that occurs infrequently, has a moderate consequence of error and the SUCs do not consider speed to be a significant factor. The SUCs must keep the incident details in mind while also having an understanding of asset capability.

b. Most Critical Action/Criteria: The SUC needs to know the who, what, when, where and why of a situation and there must be an NRC number. Most importantly, the SUC must know assets’ operations and position to dispatch appropriate assets to the scene.

c. Performance Facilitators: Having assets available during pollution incidents is key. Additionally, the SUCs mentioned that having the Coast Guard on scene at pollution incidents provides good visibility for the SCC-J. SUCs need to know asset capability.

d. Performance Barriers: The necessary people to contact are sometimes unreachable and the assets needed are preoccupied with other Coast Guard tasks.

e. Recommendations: Develop a matrix of assets capabilities and current status of assets. Formalize the procedures and include this task in the PQS.

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4. CONCLUSIONS

This section summarizes the performance influence conclusions found in four categories of influences: Assignment and selection (A/S), Skill Knowledge (S/K), Environmental (ENV), and Motivation/Incentive (M/I). These findings form the basis for the recommendation and performance interventions. Table 4-1: Findings and Recommendations demonstrates the how the data is organized within the separate columns.

Table 4-1: Findings, and Recommendations Code Finding Recommendation Finding Type

The initial sentence provides a general statement of fact regarding observations made at SCC-J. Amplifying statements regarding specific examples of behaviors observed or potential problems identified from within a Finding category.

This provides specific recommendations for resolving a finding or a discussion of alternatives when multiple factors affect an identified impact.

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4.1 ASSIGNMENT AND SELECTION

Personnel Assignment and Selection A/S influences on performance are those elements that address personnel requirements and/or standards for an existing position or a position to be created. Recommendation made for assignment and selection are found in Table 3-2: Assignment and Selection Findings.

Table 4-2: Assignment and Selection Findings Code Finding Recommendation A/S- 1 The Coast Guard policy of filling

Sector Command Center billets with Operations Specialist (OS) creates both challenges and opportunities for SCC-J San Diego. There is a gap between the OS Rating Performance Requirements (CG-3303C-19) and the performance requirements for an SCC-J watchstander. The senior OS rated watchstanders that were affected by the OS rating merger bring unique skill sets from their former ratings. Having all OS rate billets in the SCC-J provides the opportunity for a natural progression from OS ‘A’ School graduate communications watch through SUC to OUC watch.

The training recommendations in Appendix G show the differences between the OS Rating Performance Requirements and the SCC-J Performance Requirements. Use this information to develop a watchstander qualification process that closes this gap. Leverage the unique skill sets from former ratings to develop training programs, Quick response Sheets, and in SCC-J management. An example would be using the former Radarman expertise to develop radar operation training and in the decisions to install or change SCC-J radar equipment. Develop watch qualification programs with a clear linkage from graduate communications watch through SUC to OUC watch.

A/S-2 The civilian OUC billets in the SCC-J provide a means for avoiding the loss of process continuity and knowledge that is routinely occurs when active duty military members are transferred. The informal training and mentoring performed by the civilian OUC watchstanders mitigated in part the knowledge lost when qualified Title 10 reserve watchstanders were deactivated.

Formally include training and mentoring duties in the civilian OUC Position Descriptions.

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Code Finding Recommendation A/S-3 The SDO watch position represents a

significant change to the current SCC-J watch structure. Maintaining a large number of qualified SDO watchstanders presents significant SCC-J operational currency and situational awareness challenges for watchstanders on a semimonthly watch rotation. For example, the dynamic nature of the SCC-J challenges even a seasoned OUC’s ability to stay current in a 1 and 5 rotation.

Include a balance of theses two variables to match the SDO performance expectations with the real challenge of supporting best quality SDO performance. 1. Reduce the number of watch standers in the SDO rotation. PRO: Reducing the SDO watch rotation would provide watchstanders with greater exposure to SCC-J missions and presumably produce higher qualifications levels. CON: Fewer junior officer benefit from this professional growth opportunity and those in the rotation bear a greater burden that could adversely effect their primary billet duties. 2. Adopt the policy of command-sponsored time dedicated by an individual to stay current and qualified to stand SDO watch. PRO: Shifting the command philosophy toward a professional SDO watch would enable the higher level of qualification desired. CON: Any conflict with the officer’s primary billet duties would need to be managed and supported at the Sector command level.

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4.2 SKILL AND KNOWLEDGE

Skill and knowledge influences on performance are the cognitive information, abilities or discrimination processes, which a performer must have memorized, or have accessible to accomplish a task. Observations made for skills and knowledge can be found in Table 3-3: Skills and Knowledge Findings.

Table 4-3: Skills and Knowledge Findings Code Finding Recommendation S/K-1 a. The SCC-J training and

qualification program does not fully support the performance outlined in Commandant policy and Sector SOP draft. b. The watchstander PQS sheets do not address all tasks performed by SCC-J watchstanders and are not performance based. c. The QRS’ are not exercised frequently. Consequently the watchstanders lack proficiency and the QRS become outdated due to obsolescence. d. The US Navy and OGA positions are not used to their fullest potential, nor do they act as part of an integrated SCC-J team. e. Watchstander knowledge of USCG and OGA asset capability varies by watchstander. USCG stations have higher asset familiarization criteria than current SCC-J requirements. f. The SCC-J supervisors are not currently qualified to stand SUC/OUC watch. g. Several SCC-J processes are non-standard and could lead to operational error. These include; watch relief, initial call emergency situation data collection.

a. Revise the PQS by addressing gaps identified in Appendices G and H employing the performance based approach used in Coast Guard enlisted rating PQS. b. Conduct exercises using the QRS’ as part of a training program that includes the agency or department responsible for the QRS. Revise and eliminate obsolete QRS based on exercise lessons learned. Appendix I provides recommendations on the treatment of the existing QRS. c. Cross train the Navy watch with the SUC watch. Include the Navy and OGA assets in frequent SCC-J sponsored multi-agency exercises. The Navy watch roles and report conclusions are outlined in Appendix F. d. Work with SCC-J assets to develop comprehensive asset fact sheets and required asset familiarization rides as part of initial SUC/OUC qualification and continuing training. e. Make watch position qualification a high priority for newly reporting CPOs. f. Work with Experienced SCC-J watchstanders to develop standard procedures and checklists for common tasks such as these that have critical details.

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Code Finding Recommendation S/K-2 a. A major emphasis of the current

training effort has been on using the sensors and computer programs. The frequent introduction of new computer software and systems into the SCC-J is confusing and is adversely effecting the performance of the watchstanders, the SUC in particular.

a. Improve the training program by treating the computer programs and sensors as tools for completing specific tasks with in a QRS oriented scenario. This performance based training would focus on tasks leading to outcomes versus learning how a specific software program functions.

S/K-3 a. The SCC-J watchstanders have difficulty realizing Maritime Domain Awareness.

b. Watchstanders are applying their own definition of MDA to determine when it is achieved. Individual watchstanders and SCC-J leaders express different opinions when identifying and prioritizing threats to the Port of San Diego.

c. Monitoring north bound vessel traffic, a key MDA function, is only actively monitored by the California ANG approximately 40 hours per week.

d. The SUC are not provided clear guidance or expectations regarding the monitor and use of SIPRNET intelligence sites.

a. Define the requirements of MDA for the individual watchstander in clear, achievable terms. Appendix H links policy to application to provide an outline for this important task.

b. Use the existing Coast Guard and Navy

resources to continuously monitor this traffic. Display this data more prominently on a knowledge wall display.

c. Define the specific research or inquiry

required to exploit SIPRNET by documenting the knowledge and best practices of experienced Sector and Navy personnel.

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4.3 MOTIVATION AND INCENTIVE

Motivation and Incentive (M/I) influences on performance are the intrinsic and/or extrinsic factors that may influence a performer to conduct or not conduct a task. Typically, motivation/incentive influences include feedback, recognition, independence, and monetary/non-monetary rewards. Our analysis found that motivations and incentives influence many aspects of Coast Guard watchstander performance and contribute to overall mission performance. While positive motivation and incentive influences promote accomplished performance, negative motivations and incentives hinder operator performance. Findings associated with motivation and incentive influences provided in Table 3-4: Motivation and Incentive Findings.

Table 4-4: Motivation and Incentive Findings Code Finding Recommendation M/I-1 The SCC-J watchstanders observed by

the PSA team were motivated and intelligent people that expressed general frustration by a perceived lack of guidance and training. The SCC-J operational exercise observed by the PSA team was frustrating to the individual and his supervisor in part because they had not previously trained on the specific QRS. All SCC-J watchstanders interviewed stated their desire for signed SOP guidance.

Dramatically increase the frequency of QRS and mission based exercises. Include multiple assets and OGA in the planning and execution of the exercises. Follow through with the development of the planned SOP publishing and QRS updates as swiftly as possible.

M/I-2 Tasks that only have negative impact on the watchstander are not consistently completed. SAR and LE cases with durations of less than 20 minutes take longer to document than to prosecute. Such cases are not consistently documented. The true mission impact of Sector San Diego is not documented due to a time consuming documentation process.

a. Determine if an abbreviated process for documenting short SAR and LE cases exists, or can be developed. Baring this, emphasize the importance of documenting cases to Sector and Coast Guard funding justification.

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4.4 ENVIRONMENTAL

Environmental influences on performance are the workplace provided factors such as policies, procedures, instrumentation, ergonomics, tools, and climate, which facilitate the accomplishment of a task. Recommendations made for environmental and workplace can be found in Table 3-5: Environmental and Workplace Recommendations.

Table 4-5: Environmental and Workplace Findings Code Finding Recommendation ENV-1 A variety of habitability problems

arise from the design and layout of the SCC-J command center. There is no stowage provided for equipment within the SCC-J There were several complaints of poor air quality and reports that the HVAC system was prone to frequent failure. The mini- kitchen’s location outside the secured area and the lack of a small oven hamper its usability.

Identify a suitable space within the secure area for equipment required for immediate use. Identify space elsewhere on the base for equipment not routinely used by the SCC-J. Identify and repair HVAC discrepancies. Consider moving the security door so the kitchen is within the secure SCC-J space. Provide the watchstanders with a small oven.

ENV-2 The physical layout of the command center and the equipment location hinders performance by presenting barriers to efficient communication and work flows. Neither the flow of information between watchstanders nor the type data they monitor were evaluated in design of the SCC-J layout. The proposed corner location of the SDO watch station doesn’t allow the SDO to concurrently monitor data, perform work, and effectively communicate with the watch. The most prominent screen on the SCC-J data display (knowledge wall) is cable television which provides limited Sector San Diego related MDA information.

Conduct some level of human factors design analysis as discussed in Appendix C to consider and remedy the human integration issues present in the SCC-J. Prioritize all potential knowledge wall data feeds based on value to situational awareness and achieving MDA. Make the highest priority data the most prominent.

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Code Finding Recommendation ENV-3 The SCC-J provides a variety of base

services that do not directly relate to the primary MDA mission. The SCC-J serves as the primary base after-hours point of contact, handling routine phone calls, answering alarms, opening the gate, monitor for intruders, etc.

Reallocate/reassign tasks do not directly advance the Sector San Diego SCC-J operational missions. Utilize base duty watches to handle base duties that significantly detract from the core SCC-J operational missions.

ENV-4 Watchstanders do not express a high confidence factor in their ability to use installed equipment to identify and track contacts. The watchstanders ability to track Blue Force assets is adversely effected by multiple factors including; vessels deactivating AIS, deviations for planned operations, and outdated unit status information. The current mismatch of capability and expectation creates watchstander and supervisor dissatisfaction. Sensor equipment in the SCC-J is replaced frequently and watchstanders perceive no relief from this routine swapping of systems. The SCC-J’s equipment “test-bed” atmosphere is a significant disruption that distracts from core SCC-J operations.

Continually work with assets and watchstanders to improve communications procedures. Apply lessons learned from frequent mission exercises and watchstander experience to develop and enforce specific criteria for adding or removing SCC-J equipment. The removal of the Hawkeye system is viewed as win for the SCC-J and represents the independent approach required to avoid technology disruptions within the SCC-J.

ENV-5 Extraneous data that watchstanders must evaluate adds an unnecessary distraction. The NLETS prints a tremendous number of reports, less than 5% are applicable to the Sector San Diego operations.

Determine the absolute value of this system. Either remove the NLETS or identify a process for filtering the data processed by the watch.

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Code Finding Recommendation ENV-6 Design of the SDO position must be

systemic to realize a benefit since many of the SDO tasks currently performed by the OUC. The new SDO position creates an overlap of task responsibility and a potential for error associated to multiple layers of communications and personnel working independently on the same task.

In defining the SDO job, specify for SDO tasks that overlap OUC task, how and when the respective watch would perform each task and any step hierarchy. Also specify specific task ‘hand-off’ points between watchstanders to avoid confusion and frustration.

4.5 MARITIME DOMAIN AWARENESS

Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) has received attention at the highest levels of government and was cited by SCC-J watchstanders as a key concern in that they were unsure how to know or measure if they had achieved it sufficiently. Appendix E discusses MDA in greater detail but the finding of this report is that SCC-J watchstanders want and need a formal understanding of MDA and actionable tasks to carry out the objectives defined by the Commandant on a daily basis.

4.6 SCC-J ALIGNMENT WITH COMMANDANT STAFFING STANDARDS

The Commandant Staffing Standards (draft) is compared with the San Diego SOP (draft) and the FEA identified accomplishments in Appendix H. The table shows the gap between the Staffing Standards and the SOP and FEA. The information in this table can be extrapolated to determine: 1) Is the command center operating in alignment with the CONOPS set out by Commandant? 2) Is the SCC-J SOP in alignment with its expected duties? 3) Is the SCC-J properly staffed for the expected duties?

Appendix H shows that the work performed by the SCC-J is in large part aligned with the Commandant’s staffing standards. There are clear gaps in the areas covered by the draft SCC-J SOP that need to be addressed.

The major accomplishments performed by the SCC-J but not addressed in the Staffing Standards cover three main areas: administration, training and base security. The SCC-J training tasks should remain the responsibility of the SCC-J. The Sector should evaluate whether shifting administration and base security tasks to another division within the Sector or retaining them as the responsibility of the SCC-J watchstanders is in the best interest of the Sector given staffing levels and the Sector’s expectations for the SCC-J.

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Further study would be needed to determine the exact percentage of total SCC-J work associated with these administration, training and base security tasks.

4.7 QUICK REFERENCE SHEET ADMINISTRATION

Currently the SCC-J supervisors are working to make the QRS system a more functional, effective tool for the watchstanders. The existing system has over a hundred QRS and most of the QRS have not been exercised by the currently assigned watchstanders. Supervisor experience and FEA observations indicate that some QRS procedures are out of date or place task responsibilities on an inappropriate watchstander or division. To assist in revising the SCC-J QRS system the table in Appendix I recommends how the knowledge contained in the existing QRS should be treated, i.e., as job aids, training, or a combination of both.

A stated goal of the current QRS revision effort is to reduce the total number of QRS to a manageable number. The recommendation is that a reduced number of QRS is a possible outcome of a revision effort not a goal. To accurately determine the requirement for a QRS and the specific content the report recommends that each individual QRS’ be followed as part of multi-agency, multi-division exercises designed to test the QRS and train the watchstanders. The lessons learned in these exercises can be used to update, combine, or eliminate QRS.

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5. NEXT STEPS

This report outlined SCC-J major accomplishments, the associated task, observed behaviors, and specific recommendations to improve the SCC-J performance providing a benchmark and the information needed for developing a long term performance improvement plan. The next step is to set goals for departments and individuals that are measurable and in alignment with Coast Guard and Sector policy to ensure that performance goals are met. The improvement process is best viewed as a long term project with ongoing monitoring and revision rather than a single, one time event. SURVIAC is prepared to assist in developing any of the report recommendations performance support tools.

5.1 PERFORMANCE TRACKING

The SCC-J should focus on establishing baselines for their current processes. In reviewing the documentation provided for this project it was discovered that several requirements have been identified (e.g. customer satisfaction, accessibility of data, timeliness of data, accuracy of data, recency, availability, timeliness of briefings), but there is no indication that these requirements are being measured, monitored or improved on. The establishment of a set of performance measures would be a great value add not only to Sector San Diego, but to the PAC AREA as well. PAC AREA has gone to great lengths to establish a set of performance measures and measures of effectiveness. Much of the data used at the Area level will come from the Sector level. Sector SD will have to address this not only to satisfy Area, but to also satisfy their own customers (a requirement identified in the draft SOP). Once a clear set of measures of effectiveness are established Sector SD will be able to plan for improvements not only in the way they do business, but in the business they’re doing. Setting clear goals and objectives and plans for achieving them will aid the Sector in achieving better MDA, Waterways Management and Homeland Security.

5.2 SCC-J HUMAN FACTORS INTEGRATION

Human Factors Engineering (HFE) endeavors to reduce errors attributable to factors external to the individual rather than human deficiencies such as inattention or insufficient skill. HFE would consider the physical layout of the SCC-J, sensor user interfaces, communications equipment design, computer location, and even the building which can all have an impact on a watchstander’s performance. Appendix C discusses these factors at greater length.

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A-1

OS1 Jason Watson serves the SCC-J San Diego as an SUC watchstander. He previously served from 2002 to 2005 aboard USCGC Munroe. OS1 Watson has specific training in RADAR technology.

Mark Mutchler serves the SCC-J as one to the two civilian OUC watchstanders. He has over 8 years of experience as a SAR controller and additional experience as an Executive Duty Officer and a Desk Force Supervisor. Mark has been at Sector San Diego since he left his position as the Group Duty Officer in Port Angeles, Washington in 2001.

OS1 Nicola Lesourd serves as the SCC-J San Diego as an SUC watchstander. Before becoming a SUC watchstander he was stationed at the USCG Air Station in Kodiak, Alaska. OS1 Lesourd has also completed the Telecommunications Specialist Training.

OS1 Steve Howell currently serves the SCC-J San Diego as an OUC watchstander.

OS2 Christopher Hill currently serves the SCC-J San Diego as an SUC watchstander. He started at the SCC-J in March 2003 in the Communications Watch Center. OS2 Hill has additional experience on the USCGC Wrangle from February 2003 to October 2003 in the Kingdom of Bahrain.

OS1 Patrick Hasselbring has been at the SCC-J since his time aboard the USCGC Baranof in the Middle East from December 2003 to December 2004. He currently serves as an OUC watchstander.

OS2 Clinton Dotson currently serves the SCC-J San Diego as an SUC watchstander. He has five years of Coast Guard experience and was previously stationed in Washington State.

Rich Dann serves the SCC-J as one of the two civilian OUC watchstanders. He retired from the USCG in 2003 and has been at Sector San Diego since 1998. Rich Dann has over 12 years of controller experience, with specific attention placed on SAR activities. His Coast Guard experience extends over more then 20 years and he has had additional experience onboard various cutters and in SARMIS training.

The following personnel were identified by the Sector as Subject Matter Experts and generously contributed their time and thought to the project by participating in extended interviews with the SURVIAC PSA team. The interviews typically lasted for several hours and required the interviewees to recall a great deal of information. The SURVIAC PSA team extends our sincere appreciation to each of them as well as the other members Sector San Diego who participated in less formal interviews.

APPENDIX A: ABBREVIATED SME BIOGRAPHIES

2006-08-16

APPENDIX B: MAJOR ACCOMPLISHMENT AND TASK DATA

Major Accomplishment Task ID# Associated Tasks Speed Consequence Frequency Complexity Recommendation

OUC-A1 Respond to Fire Alarms

H H L L

Job Aid with Extensive Training

OUC-A2 Respond to Armory Alarms

H H L L

Job Aid with Extensive Training

OUC-A3 Respond to Perimeter Alarms H H L L

Job Aid with Extensive Training

OUC-A4 Respond to Base Intruder H H L H

Job Aid with Extensive Training

OUC-A5 Enforce Sector Security Zone L L L L Job Aid

OUC-A6 Process and Disseminate Information L L L L

Job Aid

Secure Facility

OUC-A7 Respond to Information Inquiry L L L L

Job Aid

OUC-B1 Explain FOIA Policy to Inquirer L L L L Job Aid

OUC-B2 Release Personnel Information L H L L

Job Aid with Extensive Training

OUC-B3 Respond to Media Inquiry L L L L Job Aid

OUC-B4 Brief Next of Kin on Coast Guard Actions L H L L

Job Aid with Extensive Training

Resolved Public Affairs Incident

OUC -B5 Brief Public Affairs Staff L L L L Job Aid

OUC -C1 Document Law Enforcement Incident L L H L Job Aid Maritime Laws Enforced

OUC -C2 Coordinate and Facilitate Vessel Escorts L L L L Job Aid

B-1

Major Accomplishment Task ID# Associated Tasks Speed Consequence Frequency Complexity Recommendation

OUC -C3 Use Sensors to Validate Information H L H L

Job Aid with Extensive Training

OUC -C4 Draft LE SITREP for Command Release L L L L Job Aid

OUC -C5 Run Cyberlynx and SD Sheriffs search for LE data H H H H

Job Aid with Extensive Training

OUC -C6 Coordinate USCG and OGA assets L L H H Job Aid

OUC -C7 Coordinate Incident Logistics for LE Units L L L L Job Aid

OUC -C8 Dispatch Coast Guard Assets L L H L Job Aid

OUC -C9 Investigate Situation and Distinguish as LE case H L H L

Job Aid with Extensive Training

Maritime Laws Enforced (cont.)

OUC -C10 Brief Command and D11 L L L L Job Aid

OUC -D1

Coordinate Immediate Responders L H L L

Job Aid with Extensive Training

OUC -D2 Document SAR Case L L H L Job Aid

OUC -D3 Conduct Risk Assessment L H L H

Job Aid with Extensive Training

OUC -D4 Brief SAR Case L L L L Job Aid

OUC -D5 Monitor SAR Case Progress L L L L Job Aid

OUC -D6 Plan SAR Case L H L H

Job Aid with Extensive Training

Distressed Person Assistance

OUC -D7 Dispatch CG Assets L H L L

Job Aid with Extensive Training

B-2

Major Accomplishment Task ID# Associated Tasks Speed Consequence Frequency Complexity Recommendation

OUC -D8 Investigate SAR Incident Possibilities L H L H

Job Aid with Extensive Training

OUC -E1 Use Sensors to Validate Information L H H H

Job Aid with Extensive Training

OUC -E2 Review Message Board for Pertinent Data L L H H

Job Aid with Extensive Training

OUC -E3 Monitor Radio Communications H H H L

Job Aid with Extensive Training

OUC -E4 Make Notifications to SCC-J Command, D11, and OGA H H L H

Job Aid with Extensive Training

OUC -E5 Review MDA Data from SUC L H H L

Job Aid with Extensive Training

OUC -E6 Track Blue Force Assets L L H H Job Aid

Maritime Domain Awareness

OUC -E7 Supervise Watch floor L L H L Job Aid

OUC -F1 Brief Command on Personnel Incident H H L L

Job Aid with Extensive Training

OUC -F2 Check In/Out New PCS Member L L L L Job Aid

OUC -F3 Recall Watchstanders L L L L Job Aid

Personnel Issue Resolved

OUC -F4 Verify Clearance of SCC-J Visitors L L H L

Train to Memory

Successful Environmental Protection (Clean Waters)

OUC -G1 Brief Pollution Reports to SCC-J Command H L H L

Job Aid with Extensive Training

B-3

Major Accomplishment Task ID# Associated Tasks Speed Consequence Frequency Complexity Recommendation

OUC -G2 Monitor Pollution Incident Until Resolved H L H L

Job Aid with Extensive Training

OUC -G3 Coordinate Coast Guard Assets for Prevention Department H H L L

Job Aid with Extensive Training

OUC -H1 Train SCC-J Watchstanders on Equipment and Sensors L L L L Job Aid

OUC -H2 Train Unqualified Watchstanders L H L H

Job Aid with Extensive Training

OUC -H3 Train SCC-J Watchstanders on USCG Mission Areas L L L L Job Aid

OUC -H4 Train SCC-J Watchstanders on SCC-J AOR L L L L Job Aid

Accomplished Coast Guard Watchstanders

OUC -H5 Train SCC-J Watchstanders on Assets and Resources L L L L Job Aid

Effective Aid to Navigation OUC -I1 Send AtoN Discrepancy Message L H L L Job Aid

B-4

Major Accomplishment Task ID# Associated Tasks Speed Consequence Frequency Complexity Recommendation

OUC -I2 Send AtoN Discrepancy Correction Message L L L L Job Aid

Major Accomplishment Task ID# Associated Tasks Speed Consequence Frequency Complexity Recommendation

SUC-A1 Respond to Fire Alarms

H H L L

Job Aid with Extensive Training

SUC-A2 Respond to Armory Alarms

H H L L

Job Aid with Extensive Training

SUC-A3 Respond to Perimeter Alarms

H H L L

Job Aid with Extensive Training

SUC-A4 Respond to Base Intruder

H H L L

Job Aid with Extensive Training

Secure Facility

SUC-A5 Enforce Sector Security/Safety Zone

H H H L

Job Aid with Extensive Training

SUC-B1 Explain FOIA Policy to Inquirer L L L H

Job Aid

SUC-B2 Release Personnel Information

L H L H

Job Aid with Extensive Training

Resolved Public Affairs Incident

SUC-B3 Respond to Media Inquiry

L H L H

Job Aid with Extensive Training

B-5

Major Accomplishment Task ID# Associated Tasks Speed Consequence Frequency Complexity Recommendation

SUC-C1 Monitor Vessel Escorts L L H H

Job Aid

SUC-C2 Monitor Sensors L L H H

Job Aid

SUC-C3 Provide LE SITREP input for OUC to provide to D11 L L L L

Job Aid

SUC-C4 Run Cyberlynx/EPIC Search for LE data L L L L

Job Aid

SUC-C5 Coordinate USCG and OGA Assets L L L L

Job Aid

SUC-C6 Fill Out Neptune Shield SCORE Cards L L H L Job Aid

SUC-C7 Monitor SIPRNET Intelligence Sites L L H L Train to Memory

Maritime Laws Enforced

SUC-C8 Monitor NLETS L L H L Train to Memory

SUC-D1 Record Initial Report of SAR Incident

H H H H

Job Aid with Extensive Training

SUC-D2 Make Notifications to SCC-J Command, D11, OGA

L H L L

Job Aid with Extensive Training

SUC-D3 Assist OUC in Coordinating Asset Logistics

H H L L

Job Aid with Extensive Training

Distressed Person Assistance

SUC-D4 Assist OUC in Prosecuting SAR Case Train to Memory

Maritime Domain Awareness

SUC-E1 Input Vessel Data into MISLE L L L L

Job Aid

B-6

Major Accomplishment Task ID# Associated Tasks Speed Consequence Frequency Complexity Recommendation

SUC-E2 Make Entries Into SCC-J Logs

H L H L

Job Aid with Extensive Training

SUC-E3 Monitor Sensors

H L H L

Job Aid with Extensive Training

SUC-E4 Review Message Board to Pertinent Data and Disseminate H L H L

Job Aid

SUC-E5 Monitor Radio Communications

H L H L

Job Aid with Extensive Training

SUC-E6 Monitor Critical Infrastructure Inspections

H H H L

Job Aid with Extensive Training

SUC-E7 Coordinate Unscheduled HVA/HIV Escort

H L L H

Job Aid with Extensive Training

SUC-E8 Monitor Lightering Operations Outside of Harbor L L L L

Job Aid

SUC-E9 Respond to Pertinent Classified Message Traffic

H L H L

Job Aid with Extensive Training

SUC-E10 Ensure Commercial Vessels Follow Harbor Check-In Procedures

H L H L

Job Aid with Extensive Training

SUC-E11 Work with OGA to Coordinate Activities

L H H L

Job Aid with Extensive Training

B-7

B-8

Major Accomplishment Task ID# Associated Tasks Speed Consequence Frequency Complexity Recommendation

SUC-F1 Make Notification of Active Duty Member Accident/Incident L L L L

Job Aid

SUC-F2 Check In/Out New PCS Member L L L L

Job Aid

SUC-F3 Recall Watchstanders L L L L

Job Aid

Personnel Issue Resolved

SUC-F4 Verify Security Clearance of SCC-J Visitors

L H H L

Job Aid with Extensive Training

SUC-G1 Receive and Disseminate Spill Report Information

H H L L

Job Aid with Extensive Training

SUC-G2 Make Hazardous Spill Notifications

H H L L

Job Aid with Extensive Training

Successful Environmental Protection (Clean Waters)

SUC-G3 Coordinate Assets to Respond to Incident

L L L L

Job Aid with Extensive Training

APPENDIX C: HUMAN FACTORS IN THE SCC-J PHYSICAL LAYOUT Background & Findings: What we discovered and why it is salient to the SCC-J The physical layout of the SCC-J, the sensors, communications equipment, computers, and even the building can have a great impact on a watchstander’s performance. When we look at human reliability we discover that even on a good day, seemingly innocuous elements of the SCC-J environment can stress the watchstander. Common maladies such as headaches and eye strain often have root causes traceable to glare from poorly designed lighting systems, poor temperature control, bad air quality, or other conditions. Providing complex, confusing, or frequently changing sensor systems makes it difficult for a watchstander to detect, diagnose, and respond to critical situations. Correctly positioning the tools watchstanders use and the people they interact with increases watchstander efficiency and reduces human error. These issues include the frequent sounding of alarms; poor user interfaces that make it difficult to recognize changes in the maritime environment; and poor navigation or irrelevant data, forcing watchstanders to spend precious time to identify critical data. An example is the wall distance and between the communications watch and the SUC that increases the potential for a missed or corrupted flow of information. There are many identifiable distractions in the SCC-J that create environmental problems for watchstanders. These distractions come from a variety of sources: poor traffic flow through the SCC-J; non-essential personnel congregating in the SCC-J; undisciplined telephone traffic; doors opening; alarms sounding; other operators talking on the radio, etc. The SCC-J must identify and eliminate the distractions that are not conducive to efficient operations. Solutions to the SCC-J problems: Specific criteria and process to consider The application of Human Factors Engineering (HFE) to reduce errors is based on existing theories that, while errors can be attributed to deficiencies on the part of the human (slips, lapses, inattention, fatigue, insufficient skill or knowledge, etc.) the majority of the errors are due to factors external to the individual, and, as such, are preventable. These external factors are classified as situational factors and design factors. Situational factors include aspects of the operational setting, other than design, which influence human error risk. These include: task difficulty, time constraints, interfering activities, poor communications, and excessive workloads. Design factors, which contribute to human errors, include aspects of the system hardware, software, procedures, environment, and training, which affect human error

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likelihood. These include: equipment design features; information characteristics (availability, access, readability, accuracy and meaningfulness); workspace arrangement; procedures and processes; environments; and training. Together the situational factors and the design factors constitute the human-systems interfaces. To integrate human factors into SCC-J design the process must at a minimum specifically consider the following factors.

• Equipment selection • Workstation/ console design • Workplace layout • User interface design (e.g. computing facilities and screen design) • Function allocation (between humans and automation) • Working environments (e.g. climate, lighting, noise.)

To consider and remedy the human factors the process options range from using SCC-J staff and input from this report to more formal follow-on Booz Allen assistance to commissioning a User-centered Design study by the SPAWAR Systems Center. Regardless of the process selected to create a human centered design, it should have the following qualities:

• Watchstander (SUC, OUC, and SDO) tasks and responsibilities defined and considered with system functions.

Positioning of watchstanders is consistent with the equipment and people they are required to monitor and utilize.

• Users are actively involved. Designs consider watch responsibilities, functions, and the opinions of experienced controllers.

• Design solutions are iterated The SCC-J requirements are complex and difficult to express, allow for amending designs

• The design plan should identify any constraints, which limit the layout. Examples of constraints might include:

Pre-selected or legacy equipment Financial limitations Physical limitations

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Specific recommendations for improving the existing conditions: • Make the Command Center more like an operational center where only essential

personnel are present. • Non-essential personnel (non-watchstanders) should hold impromptu meetings

outside of the Command Center. • Telephone calls are principally for official business only. • Keep access to the Command Center limited to official personnel. • Radio communications should be conducted by the appropriate watchstander. • Remove unnecessary/unused equipment, software, and miscellaneous items. • The alarms repaired or adjusted to eliminate false-alarms and annoying sounds.

Example of a Command Center designed using HFE principles The Integrated Command Environment (ICE) Lab located in Dahlgren, Virginia, has brought together technology, Human Factors Engineering, and User-Centered Design processes.

The ICE Lab is a product of a process that evolved over a period of years and incorporated the concept of the Multi-Modal Watch station (MMWS). The MMWS permits a cooperative approach to command and control, and enables the watchstanders to interact with each other in a seamless and integrated manner. This provides a clear platform for clear and concise communications, commands given and received in a timely fashion, and enables the watchstanders to support each other immediately. The design of the Lab incorporated the AGILE Process (HFE process) and Spiral Development.

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APPENDIX D: SITUATIONAL AWARENESS CONSIDERATIONS Situational awareness involves an OUC or SUC understanding what is going on around them, and using that information to foresee how it impacts current and future events. As a result, situational awareness may impact OUC and SUC performance depending on the mental workload caused by the task or process complexity. Differences exist between an experienced and inexperienced individual’s possession of situational awareness. Some of these differences are with task management and prioritization, pre-mission planning, contingency planning, goal setting, pattern matching, levels of situational awareness attended to, information seeking, and self-monitoring. Therefore, an accomplished OUC or SUC performer with high possession of situational awareness may pose a greater likelihood of making good decisions and achieving success in their performances than OUCs or SUCs with lower possession of situational awareness. Enhancing an individual’s level of situational awareness may be possible through focused training programs. Before implementation of a situational awareness training program, careful attention must be placed on identifying the specific skills needed to carryout the major accomplishments of an OUC or SUC. The major accomplishment and task list along with the accompanying data provide this benchmark. Using this data the key situational awareness elements for each of these OUC and SUC specific skills must then be identified. In order for OUCs and SUCs to carry out their job effectively, clear information must be relayed to other team members involved in the situation. Key situational awareness elements for OUCs and SUCs might include knowing what type of key information to look for on the various monitors, listen for inside of radioed in messages, or even search for within reports that they view daily. Two of the accomplished SUCs interviewed (Mr. Dann and Mr. Mutchler) provided specific examples of how they reviewed messages and monitored internet sites to gain situational awareness. These best practices of accomplished performers must be recorded and shared with the other watchstanders through training and job aids as appropriate. All OUCs and SUCs can possess knowledge on who needs to receive this information as well as the best way to disseminate or relay the information after learning how to filtering through the information in search of necessary cue words or details,. The transfer of information is only one part in the process, how the information is received proves just as critical. OUCs and SUCs must know what kinds of information to look for, which person(s) is to receive this information, and when and how is the information disseminated. In order to handle situations quicker and more effectively, research reveals that command and control units should be encouraged to interact and communicate together as much as possible. Therefore,

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development of excellent verbal communication and auditory listening skills through best practice sharing and completing exercises is critical for OUC and SUCs. Future work is recommended in improving situational awareness of the OUC and SUC by using focused training programs geared towards enhancing the necessary cognitive skills needed to achieve high levels of situational awareness. One suggestion is to use a situational awareness technique that involves freezing exercises and asking participants about their perception of the key situational awareness elements needed for the particular task. If incorporated into OUC and SUC training, this technique might aid in perceiving, comprehending, and predicting key elements of individual tasks or processes. In addition, to help keep high consequence and/or high unpredictable frequency processes fresh in an OUCs or SUCs mind mock exercises and simulations held periodically or monthly aimed at discussing and identifying proper responses/processes for these tasks would be beneficial.

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APPENDIX E: MARITIME DOMAIN AWARENESS

Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) is critical to Homeland Security. MDA has received attention at the highest levels of government. There is a National Security Presidential Directive and a Homeland Security Presidential Directive that underscores the importance of Maritime Domain Awareness, that is, knowing what is in the maritime environment. President Bush proclaimed on January 20, 2002, “The heart of the Maritime Domain Awareness program is accurate information, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance of all vessels, cargo, and people extending well beyond our traditional maritime borders.” The National Plan to Achieve Maritime Domain Awareness states, “The purpose of MDA is to facilitate timely, accurate decision-making.” Furthermore it states that MDA is achieved by

1. collecting, analyzing and disseminating data, information and intelligence to decision makers

2. applying functional and operational knowledge in the context of known and potential threats

These two points are salient to the duties of the Sector Watch-Stander and will be amplified later in this section. A component of MDA is the Common Operational Picture (COP). While MDA and COP are generic terms, COP is tailorable to a particular agency and a “toolset” to achieve COP should be developed and implemented in order to acquire and disseminate relevant MDA information. Currently there is on-going discussion as to what exactly COP means for the Coast Guard and then as it relates to the Sector and then finally how to achieve COP with the Watch Stander. COP will continue to evolve and be refined in the years ahead. It is safe to say that there will be a minimum level of expectation for the Watch Stander to perform in order to achieve this COP. At a minimum, a strong case can be made for COP tasks to include:

own force status, position and capabilities, maritime environment commercial vessel positions, destinations and cargo

information, receiving maritime data, relaying maritime data, and lastly reacting to this maritime data.

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The Watch Stander can meet all of these minimum (basic) COP requirements through a structured and standardized training program. The cross agency agreements are in place already so it would be a Coast Guard/Sector responsibility to tap into their data and to also provide an avenue to send relevant data. As an example of each bullet above, the following are to be used as further amplification as to the intent. own force status, position and capabilities - a current list of “ready” aircraft and ships, their location if already on patrol and their capabilities (AUF helicopters) to meet Homeland Security demands if required. maritime environment commercial vessel positions, destinations and cargo information - the Watch Stander should be on a distribution list for all commercial traffic expected to arrive/depart the designated port in their area of responsibility (AOR), what the cargo is and if there has been a threat level assigned (either as a suspect target of interest (TOI) or a High Value Target (HVT)). receiving maritime data – data or information from own/friendly forces in the form of reports, sensors, intelligence and or other communications. relaying maritime data – data that needs to be shared at the appropriate level. reacting to this maritime data - the appropriate action can be in the form of launching an alert Coast Guard asset to a suspect (from track, cargo load, personnel, intelligence (HUMINT, SIGINT, etc)) TOI. The appropriate response needs to be coordinated as well with other Coast Guard forces and with other agency forces. Doctrine and policy needs to be developed to present a hierarchy to the watchstander for what type of response is required for what type of targets. NSPD 41/HSPD 13 states, “It is critical that the US develop an enhanced capability to identify threats in the Maritime Domain as early and as distant from our shores as possible by integrating intelligence, surveillance, observation and navigation systems into a Common Operational Picture accessible throughout the US government.” It will be the responsibility of the Sector Command Center’s Watch Standers to not only know what is in their maritime environment AOR but also to convey that information in a timely fashion to the correct destinations (agencies) and/or take action so as send the appropriate response. One of the findings during the interviews at the SCC-J, was that a more thorough and comprehensive understanding of Maritime Domain Awareness and of the Common Operation Picture is required. It was our intent to provide an understanding of MDA and COP in this section. The list of reverences at the front of this report also contains information, policy and doctrine related to MDA and COP if a further understanding is required. The Coast Guard Sector initiative has as its purpose a “unity of command” for the designated areas, typically the ports, waterways and coastal areas. These sectors have been designated as Sector Command centers and serve as the single focal point for maritime information

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gathering and dissemination. The “Joint” designation ties together other government and commercial agencies that have a vested interest in the maritime environment and are part of the data gathering and dissemination process. This is why the Sector Watch Stander is a key component in ensuring the United States attain MDA and reacts to the information accordingly. The Sector Watch Stander is the front line of defense for maritime Homeland Security. Critical Coast Guard Definitions and Explanations The Commandant has defined Maritime Domain as “all areas and things of, on, under, relating to, adjacent to, or bordering on a sea, ocean, or other navigable waterway, including all maritime related activities, infrastructure, people, cargo and vessels and other conveyances”. Maritime Domain Awareness has been defined by the Commandant as “the effective understanding of anything associated with the maritime domain that could impact the security, safety, economy, or environment of the United States”. Maritime Domain Awareness Objectives from the Commandant that directly affect SCC-J San Diego are: A. Persistently monitor in the global domain: a. Vessels and craft b. Cargo c. Vessel crews and passengers d. All identified areas of interest B. Access and maintain data on vessels, facilities, and infrastructure C. Collect, fuse, analyze and disseminate information to decision makers to facilitate effective understanding D. Access, develop and maintain data on MDA-related mission performance. The tasks for the SCC-J Watch Stander are to (1) collect, analyze and disseminate data, information and intelligence to decision makers (2) apply functional and operational knowledge in the context of known and potential threats Current Status of SCC-J Watch Standers as it relates to MDA/COP The receiving and sharing of information is paramount. Steps have been taken in that area as evident by the incorporation of the San Diego Harbor Police into the SCC-J and the addition of the Navy and California National Guard watch standers. A better understanding of what these organizations bring to the SCC-J still needs to be expanded upon. Coordinating with these and other agencies on terrorism exercises, to enhance collaboration and create a more comprehensive understanding of MDA with the watchstanders is another

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key concept. By providing watchstanders with a hands-on view of MDA and the resources available, a more applicable understanding can be achieved. One way the SCC-J could incorporate their current skill set is to enhance their use of their auxiliary forces. Since 9/11 many Coast Guard units across the United States have been relying on volunteers from its auxiliary to assist in monitoring and policing local waterways. Through these policing programs, people have been encouraged to report sightings of suspicious activities. It is important to utilize every asset available to the Coast Guard and bridge gaps between the public and private sectors to maintain a thorough situational awareness. SIPRNET is an MDA resource for the SCC-J that due to its lack of operability on a continuous basis it is currently under utilized. However, if all watchstanders had access and an understanding of what information can be accessed through SIPRNET, the latest intelligence can be used to assist in MDA. The general finding is that SCC-J watchstanders need a formal understanding of MDA and actionable tasks to carry out its objectives. They need to be able to apply the concepts defined by the Commandant to the San Diego AOR on a daily basis. Through the building of agency relationships, strategic information sharing and comprehensive MDA training, SCC-J watchstanders will enhance the MDA awareness in San Diego. The effort must be ongoing to account for the continuous change in OGA resources and procedures, the change in equipment and most importantly the normal rotation of qualified SCC-J watchstanders.

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APPENDIX F: NAVY WATCHSTANDER INTEGRATION

Navy’s Role with the USCG Sector San Diego Introduction The mission of the Navy Watch at the Sector Command Center- Joint (SCC-J) is to act as liaison from the Navy Region Southwest (NRSW) Force Protection Program to the US Coast Guard Sector San Diego SCC-J to support and enhance Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) detection, assessment and warning capabilities by employing designated technology and response capabilities. The NRSW Program Manager (PM) Force Protection has overall staff responsibility for the manning of naval personnel to the SCC-J. Establishment of the Navy Watch at the SCC-J is in accordance with the Maritime Strategy for Homeland Security and expedites operational response to threats, man-made or natural, and their possible consequences. The SCC-J leverages information and the resources of federal, state and local law enforcement and emergency response agencies to increase MDA, identify threats to Homeland Security, defend critical national port infrastructure and defend high value military assets in the Sector. The SCC-J provides command and control (C2) capabilities and shares information vertically and horizontally across each agency’s area of responsibility. Navy Watch Stander and Supervisor The Navy Watch Supervisor and the Navy Watch Stander are direct representatives of the Program Director, Naval Region Southwest Public Safety (Supporting Commander) assigned perform liaison functions to the USCG Sector San Diego SCC-J (Supported Commander). The Navy Watch Supervisor and the Navy Watch Stander provide operational support directly to the SCC-J Watch Officer. The Navy Watch Stander does not have authority to direct the movement of any naval vessel or security craft unless prior coordination has been made with the SCC-J Watch Officer and approved by proper NRSW Public Safety authority. The NRSW Watch performs a liaison function at the USCG Sector San Diego SCC-J, which is a critical element for success of the NRSW Regional ATFP plan. The Navy Watch is a direct representative of the Program Director, NRSW Public Safety and performs duties to ensure mutual understanding and cooperation, unity of purpose and focused action. The NRSW Watch billet requires for success, continuous

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training in NRSW ATFP plans and procedures, as well as thorough indoctrination of the SCC-J. The Navy watchstanders in order to properly perform their duties must be:

• Knowledgeable of the NRSW Public Safety's organization, mission, capabilities, tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) and communications equipment.

• Aware of the Naval Bases, their key tenant commands and critical assets in the NRSW Metro area.

• Knowledgeable of the USCG Sector San Diego SCC-J organization, mission, capabilities and procedures.

• Able to monitor and operate designated video surveillance equipment along with other technology systems provided to enhance response to perceived threats.

Watch Supervisor Duties The Navy Watch Supervisor within the USCG SCC-J is responsible to facilitate the integration of Navy sensor-derived information into the SCC-J tactical picture. The Watch Supervisor is also responsible to oversee activities of the Navy Watch Standers while they conduct vessel surveillance tasks to monitor naval movement within the harbor and facilitate Navy-Coast Guard integrated port security operations. Watch Stander Duties The Navy Watch Stander performs the following duties, as required.

• Monitor Naval Ship Movement: Compile, de-conflict and monitor U.S.

Navy vessel harbor movements and exercises. Confirm commencement and termination of all diving operations within Navy Security zones. Notify the SCC-J Watch Officer of deviations to published schedules. (Requires close coordination with Navy Port Operations.)

• Monitor Suspicious Activity: Be alert for and monitor suspicious activities that might potentially threaten the security of the homeland, domestic critical infrastructure and critical or high value military assets within the Sector AOR. Evaluate those activities against other sources of information. Report suspicious activities to both Navy and USCG supervisor. Maintains situational awareness of AT/FP tactical picture within the AOR via Common Operational Picture (COP) and Electronic Harbor Security System (EHSS) .

• Conduct Communication Checks: Maintain communications with the Regional Dispatch Center (RDC), Regional Operations Center (ROC) (when

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activated) and other locations as directed, which may include C3F Maritime Operations Center (CMOC), other waterfront security operations, Port Operations, via ASOCC chat.

• Prepare Daily Updates and Presentations: Prepare and provide morning briefings to Commander, USCG Sector San Diego and staff. Provide functional briefings to distinguished visitors, as required.

• Joint Operations: After coordination with NRSW RDC, operate and utilize EHSS to monitor harbor movements in support of AT/FP operations. Operate the Radar Display Operation Picture (RDOP), as required, in support of ongoing Coast Guard, California National Guard, Customs and Border Patrol (CBP) Operations.

• Monitor C2 Systems: Developing a COP via C2PC, and providing that information to the SCC-J staff when needed. Ensure the C2PC system is “synched” to gateway server and contacts “Last Reports” are updated thus enabling C2PC. Insert event cases into ASOCC and monitor JPEN for alerts, as required.

• Liaison: Act as Navy liaison to the USCG Sector San Diego SCC-J operations. • Print and File the Navy Watch Electronic Log: The purpose of printing and

filing the Electronic Log is to protect the log in case of a system crash or accidental log deletion. The printout log will be signed and dated by each Watch Stander then filed in the designated binder. To keep Chain of Command informed of daily activities at the SCC-J, an email of the log and updated Tug Sheet will be sent to SCC-J Navy-OIC every morning at 0800. The log will cover a full 24-hour period in chronological order for each watch.

Watch Bill and manning The Navy Watch at the SCC-J is 24/7 and is broken down into two watches daily. The watch bill is written by the Leading Petty Officer (LPO) who is also the approving authority for all changes. Augmentation of the watch during times of increased FPCON requires an additional Navy Watch Stander(s), which may initially be accomplished by using supervisors to stand watch. Findings, Recommendations and Conclusions

• The VCNO and the Deputy Commander of the Coast Guard signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) earlier that ensures Navy participation and support of the SCC-J in perpetuity.

• Commander, Navy Region Southwest (NRSW), Admiral Hering, has directed the NRSW Force Protection Program to man the SCC-J with two watchstanders during each twelve-hour period.

• NRSW has ordered that the Navy watchstanders will report directly to the Section Duty Officer.

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• NRSW has ordered that the Navy watchstanders will integrate themselves fully into the SCC-J and offer their services at all times.

• Navy watchstanders bring different Knowledge, Skills and Abilities to the SCC-J that will enhance the over-all mission and operation of the Command Center.

• Navy is seeking to get better cameras and more cameras to help reduce blind spots within the AOR.

• Navy watchstanders should and could take over some or all of the SUC duties during surge periods.

• Navy is dedicated to the SCC-J, and wants to ensure MDA, FP/AT, and security.

• Navy watchstanders can assist the USCG in training, PQS requirements, and planning.

• SCC-J should include Navy watchstanders during all drills and exercises. • SCC-J should include the Navy watchstanders in training. • SCC-J should work to get Navy radio frequencies in the SCC-J so that they

can communicate with or at a minimum, monitor the Navy asset activities. • SCC-J should make an attempt to brief and inform the NRSW and the 3rd

Fleet Commander on the capabilities and limitations of the command center. • The current chain of command for the Navy watch is as follows: FCI Santiago

is the LPO for the Navy at the SCC-J, and reports directly to the Navy Watch Supervisor, QMC Calfy, who reports to Commander Cunha, the Program Director Public Safety.

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APPENDIX G: SKILL SET COMPARISON

Finding Recommendation

A total of 74 tasks were identified that either OUC, SUC or both watchstanders perform. Only 22% of these tasks are addressed by the appropriate SUC or OUC PQS.

This finding is a strong indication that watchstanders are left to their own devices to discover what it takes to become not only proficient in their current job, but what it takes to get qualified.

20% of all tasks identified are performed by both the OUC and SUC.

40% of the SUC tasks are also performed by the OUC.

An opportunity for error is built in when people share overlapping tasks without a clear differentiation of who specifically performs the task or series of steps within the task. Recommend that specific watch functions and areas of responsibility are identified for each watch position and that clear guidance is provided to the watchstanders.

35% of all identified SCC-J tasks are covered by the OS Rating PQS (E-4 to E-7)

29% of the SUC tasks are covered by OS Rating PQS (E-4 to E-7)

50% of the OUC tasks are covered by OS Rating PQS (E-4 to E-7)

Recommend developing a syllabus to address actual tasks performed on the job. Use current knowledge-based PQS as amplifying information to the performance-based syllabus. Create a final Qualification Exam and interview to award qualification.

Recommend both the SUC and the OUC performance-based PQS syllabi mirror each other in those tasks that overlap. This will build standardization into the process.

45% of the OUC FEA identified tasks are addressed in the OUC PQS

29% of the SUC FEA identified tasks are addressed in the SUC PQS

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Major Accomplishment Documented SCC- J Tasks OUC

FEA SUC FEA

OUC PQS

SUC PQS

OS Rating PQS

Respond to Fire Alarms X X X X

Respond to Armory Alarms X X X X

Respond to Perimeter Alarms X X X X

Respond to Base Intruder X X

Enforce Sector Security Zone X X X X

Process and Disseminate Information X X X

Secure Facility

Respond to Information Inquiry X X X

Explain FOIA Policy to Inquirer X X X X

Release Personnel Information X X

Respond to Media Inquiry X X X X

Brief Next of Kin on Coast Guard Actions X

Resolved Public Affairs Incident

Brief Public Affairs Staff X

Record Initial Report of SAR Incident X X

Coordinate Immediate Responders X X

Document SAR Case X X X

Conduct Risk Assessment X X X

Make Notifications to SCC-J Command X X

Brief SAR Case X X

Monitor SAR Case Progress X X

Plan SAR Case X X X

Dispatch Coast Guard Assets X X

Assist OUC in Coordinating Logistics X X

Investigate SAR Incident Possibilities X X

Distressed Person Assistance

Assist OUC in Prosecuting SAR Case X X

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Major Accomplishment Documented SCC- J Tasks OUC

FEA SUC FEA

OUC PQS

SUC PQS

OS Rating PQS

Document Law Enforcement Incident X X

Coordinate and Facilitate Vessel Escorts X

Monitor Vessel Escorts X

Use Sensors to Validate Information X

Monitor Sensors X

Provide LE SITREP Input for OUC to Provide to D11 X X

Draft LE SITREP for Command Release X X

Run CyberLynx, SD Sheriffs Search for LE Data X X

Run CyberLynx, EPIC Search for LE Data X X

Coordinate USCG and OGA Assets X X X

Coordinate Incident Logistics for LE Units X

Dispatch Coast Guard Assets X X

Investigate Situation and Distinguish as LE Case X X

Brief Command and D11 X X

Fill-out Neptune Shield SCORE Cards X

Monitor SIPRNET Intelligence Sites X

Maritime Laws Enforced

Monitor NLETS X

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Major Accomplishment Documented SCC- J Tasks OUC

FEA SUC FEA

OUC PQS

SUC PQS

OS Rating PQS

Input Vessel Data into MISLE X

Make Entries into SCC-J Logs X X

Monitor Sensors X

Use Sensors to Validate Information X

Review Message Board for Pertinent Data X

Review Message Board for Pertinent Data and Disseminate X

Monitor Radio Communications X X X

Make Notifications to SCC-J Command, D11, OGA X X

Monitor Critical Infrastructure Inspections X

Coordinate Unscheduled HVA/HIV Escort X

Monitor Lightering Operations Outside of Harbor X

Respond to Pertinent Classified Message Traffic X X X X

Ensure Commercial Vessels Follow Harbor Check-in Procedures X

Work with OGA to Coordinate Activities X

Review MDA Data from SUC X

Track Blue Force Assets X

Maritime Domain Awareness

Supervise Watch Floor X

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Major Accomplishment Documented SCC- J Tasks OUC

FEA SUC FEA

OUC PQS

SUC PQS

OS Rating PQS

Brief Command on Personnel Incident X X

Check IN/OUT New Personnel X X X X

Recall Watch Standers X X X X

Personnel Issues Resolved

Verify Clearance of SCC-J Visitors X X X

Receive and Disseminate Spill Report Information X

Make Hazardous Spill Notifications X

Brief Pollution Reports to SCC-J Command X

Monitor Pollution Incident until Resolved X

Successful Environmental Protection (Clean Waters)

Coordinate Coast Guard Assets for Prevention Department X X

Train SCC-J Watchstanders on Equipment and Sensors X

Train Unqualified Watchstanders X

Train SCC-J Watchstanders on USCG Mission Areas X

Train SCC-J Watchstanders on SCC-J AOR X

Qualified Coast Guard Watch Standers

Train SCC-J Watchstanders on Assets and Resources X

Send Discrepancy Message X X Effective Aid to Navigation

Send AtoN Discrepancy Correction Message X X

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APPENDIX H: SECTOR POLICY TABLE Table H-1 Policy Comparison provides a side-by-side comparison of the tasks from the Coast Guard Draft Sector Command Center Staffing Standards to the SCC-J draft SOP and to the actual observations of this FEA. The table provides contrast between Commandant policy and the current tasks actually being performed at SCC-J San Diego. The gap between the Staffing Standards and the SOP and FEA identified by the SURVIAC should be studied to determine three things: 1) is the command center operating in alignment with the CONOPS set out by Commandant;5 2) is the command center properly staffed for the expected duties; and 3) is the command center SOP and training plan in alignment with the expected duties. The 17 tasks identified as not being addressed in the Staffing Standards cover three main areas: administration, training and base security. Further study would be needed to determine the percentage of work the tasks associated with administration and base security equate to. Based on those findings senior leadership may wish to decide whether to remove those tasks to another division within the Sector or leave them as the responsibility of the SCC-J watchstanders. The training tasks would still be best left under the leadership of the command center. Table H-1 Policy Comparison

Commandant Staffing Standard (Draft) SCC-J SOP

(Draft) FEA

(Actual)

Waterways Management Maintain accessible real-time data on:

1. Current and forecasted weather, tides, tidal currents and other environmental data X

2. All commercial and military vessel arrivals and movements. X X 3. The High/Significant Interest Vessel (HIV/SIV) Boarding Programs. X X 4. All active maritime incidents (and their status). X X 5. All marine events (and their status). X X 6. All maritime bridges, facilities, and infrastructure (and their status). X 7. Threat levels and vulnerability assessments. X 8. MARSEC levels and security alerts. X 9. All security zones and safety zones. X 10. All aids to navigation (and their status). X

5 The CONOPS was the basis for the Staffing Standards

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11. Develop and promulgate appropriate Notice to Mariners and Security Alerts. X

Maritime Domain Awareness

12. Monitor, analyze, evaluate, and respond to data provided by all available sensors and systems for potential threats to people and property. The primary CG sensors available to SCC will be those associated with Rescue 21, MISLE, the Hawkeye core C2 system and sensors, as well as those employed by deployed cutters and aircraft.

X X

13. Analyze, evaluate, and respond appropriately to alerts provided by non-CG sensor operators. Various local port partners are presently engaged in an effort to acquire additional port-security sensors.

X X

14. Receive, analyze, and distribute, as appropriate, to both CG and non-CG local port partners, intelligence information that could potentially impact the people and property.

X X

15. Contribute to the USCG Common Operational Picture (COP), and monitor portions applicable to the sector. X

16. Maintain within the COP the current location and status of Blue Force assets (both CG and non-CG) within the Sector AOR. X

17. Monitor and coordinate the ingress into, as well as the egress from, all maritime security zones – including surface, sub-surface, and air. (Sub-surface and air pictures may not be in the short term.)

X

18. Maintain a situational display of the Sector. (a) imagery and raw sensor data as appropriate; (b) waterways-management status information; and (c) active case and incident status information.

X

19. Share situation-display information, as appropriate, with: (a) CG units within the Sector and local port partners; (b) other government agencies (OGAs ) with responsibilities within the AOR; (c) SCCs within adjacent AORs; (d) the appropriated District Command Center; (e) National Response Center (NRC); (f) Deepwater assets. This sharing shall be accomplished in near real-time, with appropriate levels of security protection.

X

Resource Management 20. Maintain a current display of the readiness status of all pertinent

CG and non-CG assets, including vessels, aircraft, communications equipment, and people.

X

21. Dispatch and direct CG and non-CG assets to LE, SAR, and other emergency responses as directed by the cognizant CG

X X

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commanders.

22. Coordinate response-resource assignments, using the appropriate chain of command, with the appropriate CG District, National Strike Force Command Center (NSFCC), OGAs, and SCCs, especially adjacent Sectors.

X X

Response/Prevention/Targeted Operations 23. Dispatch and direct, as authorized by the cognizant Sector

Commander or COTP; all CG response operations and investigative actions (SAR, LE, Environmental, Marine Casualty, PWCS, AtoN etc..).

X X

24. Provide Command and Control for all ongoing preventative operations (Routine maritime & shore side patrols, RBS, vessel escorts etc…).

X X

25. Provide command and control for all pre-planned operations targeting a specific mission area or threat. X X

26. Maintain and archive case files and other documentation for all Response (SAR, LE, Spill etc) activities. X X

27. Provide an ICS-201 Incident Briefing to the cognizant CG or OGA Incident Commander when responsibility for a response is transferred to a dedicated Incident Command Post.

28. Coordinate with, and support as appropriate, all Federal incident commanders. X X

Communications 29. Maintain and operate all voice and data communications

capabilities required to accomplish the responsibilities set forth within this document.

X X

30. Act as the primary point of contact for the public and the OGAs concerning all operational matters except (a) when Incident Information and Liaison Officer responsibilities are assumed by a dedicated Incident Command Post (ICP), or (b) when operational matters are assumed by the District Commander.

X

31. Augment communications of Maritime Safety and Security Teams (MSSTs) and other CG/OGA surveillance, crisis response, and consequence management teams, when assigned.

32. Maintain and operate Video-Tele-Conference (VTC) and Data Collaborations Portal (DCP) capabilities to higher headquarters command centers (that is, District, Region, Area, Headquarters).

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Information Management 33. Manage locally developed situation display – which includes the

local COP shared with Sector – specified local port partners – as security Sensitive Information

X

34. Manage all DoD/NATO/DHS – classified information in accordance with Dod/NATO/DHS established protocols and procedures. X X

FEA identified Major Accomplishments performed by SCC-J but NOT addressed in the Commandant staffing standards 35. Secure Facility X

36. Resolved Public Affairs Incident X

37. Personnel Issues Resolved X

38. Accomplished Coast Guard Watchstanders X

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APPENDIX I: QUICK REFERENCE SHEET PRIORITIZATION Table I-1 Quick Response Sheet Recommendations provides recommended treatment of the QRS that are currently in the SCC-J QRS library. The QRS that have the recommendation “Job Aid with extensive training” are QRS that would be exercised routinely during SCC-J scheduled training. The QRS that have the recommendation “Job Aid” are QRS that would be demonstrated to a watchstander as part of qualification but would not necessarily be part of routine training exercises. The overall intent of this table is to help prioritize the QRS for training and review purposes. The recommendations are base on an algorithm that is part of the FEA system used in development of this report and referenced in the Coast Guard training system SOP for analysis. To arrive at the recommendation the algorithm considers the following six factors:

1. Speed – Do seconds count in the performance of this QRS? 2. Consequences – Is improper performance of this QRS likely to result in death or

significant financial consequences? 3. Frequency – Is this QRS used daily or weekly? 4. Complexity – Does this QRS have ten or more steps, fine judgments, or rules with

many exceptions? 5. Change – Is this QRS likely to change significantly in the following year? 6. Barrier – Are there any environmental barriers to using this QRS?

The answers to these six factor questions were provided by SCC-J Chief, OSCS Sean Benson and SCC-J Senior OUC, Mr. Rich Dann.

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Table I-1 Quick Response Sheet Recommendations

Quick Response Sheet

Recommended Skill and

Knowledge Support

SEARCH AND RESCUE

SAR IN MEXICAN TERRITORY Job Aid with extensive training MEDICO Job Aid with extensive training MEDEVAC Job Aid with extensive training MAN OVERBOARD Job Aid with extensive training AIRCRAFT TRACK ANALYSIS Job Aid with extensive training AIRCRAFT INCIDENT/OVERDUE Job Aid with extensive training AIR FORCE PARA-RESCUE JUMPERS Job Aid with extensive training PERSONS TRAPPED IN CAPSIZED VESSELS Job Aid with extensive training VESSEL FIRE AT SEA Job Aid with extensive training UNCORRELATED MAYDAY TRANSMISSION Job Aid with extensive training SUBMARINE MISSING/SUNK Job Aid with extensive training DIVE ACCIDENTS / HYPERBARIC CHAMBERS Job Aid with extensive training DIRECTION FINDING FACILITIES Job Aid with extensive training MASS RESCUE OPERATIONS (MRO) Job Aid with extensive training DSC ALERT Job Aid with extensive training NAVIGATIONAL ASSISTANCE TO VESSELS Job Aid OVERDUE/UNREPORTED VESSELS Job Aid 121.5MHZ ELT'S / EPIRBS Job Aid 406 MHZ EPIRBS Job Aid FLARE SIGHTINGS Job Aid SALVAGE Job Aid BECALMED SAILING VESSELS Job Aid CASPER Job Aid INLAND SAR PROCEDURES Job Aid

LAW ENFORCEMENT

HIJACKED/MISSING VESSEL Job Aid with extensive training SUSPICIOUS ACTIVITY INCIDENT REPORT Job Aid with extensive training TERRORISM Job Aid with extensive training SMUGGLING Job Aid with extensive training COOPERATION WITH OTHER LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES Job Aid with extensive training EPIC / TECS CHECKS Job Aid with extensive training HOT PURSUIT Job Aid with extensive training FOREIGN FISHING VESSEL (FFV) SIGHTINGS Job Aid SUSPECT / LOOKOUT VESSEL SIGHTING, BOARDING, AND SEIZURES Job Aid STATEMENT OF NO OBJECTION Job Aid ARREST BY BOARDING OFFICER Job Aid STOLEN BOATS Job Aid ASYLUM REQUEST FROM WITHIN FOREIGN TERRITORIAL JURISDICTION Job Aid ASYLUM REQUEST FROM OUTSIDE FOREIGN TERRITORIAL JURISDICTION Job Aid

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Recommended Skill and Quick Response Sheet Knowledge Support

TERMINATION OF MANIFESTLY UNSAFE VOYAGE / NEGLIGENT OPERATION Job Aid POST ARREST PROCEDURES Job Aid OUTSTANDING ARREST WARRANTS DISCOVERED DURING BOARDING Job Aid BOATING UNDER THE INFLUENCE Job Aid VESSEL SEIZURES GUIDELINES Job Aid

OPERATIONAL READINESS

RAILROAD CASUALTY Job Aid with extensive training PIPELINE CASUALTY Job Aid with extensive training COMMUNICATIONS TELEPHONE OUTAGE Job Aid with extensive training LOST COMMUNICATIONS WITH AIRCRAFT Job Aid with extensive training CELLULAR SAR Job Aid with extensive training SEA MARSHAL - LOST COMMUNICATIONS Job Aid with extensive training OBTAINING UNLISTED TELEPHONE NUMBERS Job Aid with extensive training HIGH PRECEDENCE MESSAGES ADDRESSED TO AM EMBASSY/US DAO MEXICO CITY Job Aid with extensive training INTERPRETERS Job Aid with extensive training EMERGENCY GENERATOR Job Aid with extensive training INTERFERENCE ON COAST GUARD FREQUENCIES Job Aid TRANSPORTABLE COMMUNICATIONS CENTER (TCC) Job Aid SPECIAL PURPOSE COMMUNICATIONS Job Aid

PERSONNEL

DEATH OR SERIOUS INJURY/ILLNESS TO COAST GUARD PERSONNEL Job Aid with extensive training ADVOCACY PROBLEMS Job Aid with extensive training CASUALTY AND SURVIVOR INFORMATION Job Aid AIDS TO NAVIGATION

REPORT OF COLLISION WITH AIDS TO NAVIGATION Job Aid with extensive training HAZARDS TO NAVIGATION Job Aid with extensive training REPORT OF MARKING A WRECK Job Aid AIDS TO NAVIGATION DISCREPANCY AND BNM Job Aid BROADCAST NOTICE TO MARINERS Job Aid BOATING SAFETY / AUXILIARY BOATING ACCIDENTS Job Aid with extensive training AUXILIARY EMERGENCY MOBILIZATION INFORMATION Job Aid with extensive training COAST GUARD AUXILIARY Job Aid

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APPENDIX J: FEA REFERENCE LIST • US Coast Guard Sector Organizational Construct (Sector Design Criteria) • US Coast Guard Commandant (CG-81) Memo 5400 of 2 May 04 (Sector Organization

Construct) • Communication Watchstander Qualification Guide • DHS Secure Border Initiative (web site) • US Coast Guard Draft Sector Command Center (SCC) Staffing Standards • US Coast Guard Group Operations Manual • Homeland Security Presidential Directive (HSPD-13) • HSToday, various issues in 2005 and 2006 • US Coast Guard Maritime Law Enforcement Manual, COMDTINST M16247.1D • National Plan to Achieve Maritime Domain Awareness (for the national Strategy for

maritime Security October 2005) • National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD-41) • Navy All Hands, February 2005 • Navy League, SEAPOWER, August 2005 • NDIA National Defense, February 2005 • NDIA National Defense, June 2005 • SCC-J OUC PQS • SCC-J SAR and LE QRS (DRAFT) • SECTOR SCC-J MANUAL: San Diego SCC-J SOP (DRAFT) • SCC-J SUC PQS • USCG (CG-7M) Maritime Domain Awareness brief December 7, 2005

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• USCG (CG-7M) Maritime Domain Awareness Concept of Operations brief December 7,

2005 • USCG (CG-7M) Maritime Domain Awareness Office of Plans, Policy and Assessment

web page • US Naval Institute Proceedings, August 2004 • US Naval Institute Proceedings, March 2005 • US Naval Institute Proceedings, August 2005 • www.HSToday.com (website) • www.uscg.mil (website)

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About Survivability Vulnerability IAC SURVIAC is the DoD’s institution for collecting, analyzing, and disseminating scientific and technical information (STI) related to all aspects of survivability and lethality for aircraft, ground vehicles, ships and spacecraft, to conventional homeland security threats including chemical, biological, directed energy, and non–lethal weapons.

SURVIAC is a contractor operated, DoD sponsored service available to all government and industry users to provide studies, analyses, data gathering, and other operational, and logistics requirements related to survivability and lethality technologies.

SURVIAC Provides:

An extensive library of relevant survivability and lethality Database of historical combat damage Free subscription to our SURVIAC Bulletin newsletter (see our inquiry page for distribution restrictions) Access to approved set of models and simulations

SURVIAC Support- When interest in our products and services warrants, we will come to your location. We bring a variety of information sources including:

SURVIAC Information Briefing SURVIAC booth and promotional materials Survivability training and awareness courses created and conducted for your

particular needs Training on specific SURVIAC distributed models

SURVIAC is a DoD Information Analysis Center (IAC) sponsored by the Joint Aircraft Survivability Program Office (JASPO) and Joint Technical Coordinating Group on Munitions Effectiveness (JTCG/ME). SURVIAC is a part of Aerospace Survivability and Safety Flight, USAF 46th Test Wing, Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio.

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Published by: The Survivability/Vulnerability Information Analysis Center (SURVIAC) 46 OG/OGM/OL-AC/SURVIAC 2700 D Street Bldg. 1661 Wright-Patterson AFB, OH 45433-7605 Phone: (937) 255-4840 DSN: 785-4840 Fax: (937) 255-9673 DSN: 785-9673 E-mail: kevin.crosthwaite@wpafb.af.milWWW: http://www.bahdayton.com/surviac/index.htm

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