U.S. Coast Guard Evergreen Process Evergreen I.pdfU.S. Coast Guard Evergreen Process Version 1.0 May...

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U.S. Coast Guard Evergreen Process

Version 1.0 May 2005

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U.S. Coast Guard Evergreen Process Working Document Not for Circulation


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TABLE OF CONTENTS

FOREWORD ................................................................................................................ 1

I. THE ROOTS OF EVERGREEN .............................................................................. 2Long View’s Legacy ................................................................................................................... 4Long View Review ..................................................................................................................... 4The Long View Strategies .......................................................................................................... 5Illustration: MDA Timeline....................................................................................................... 6

II. PROJECT EVERGREEN........................................................................................ 7Background ................................................................................................................................ 7Evergreen Scenario Research and Interviews ............................................................................ 7Identifying and Choosing Future Scenario Worlds to Explore .................................................. 8Illustration: Evergreen Scenario Planning Concept .................................................................. 8Illustration: Project Evergreen Scenario Space ......................................................................... 9Illustration: The Coast Guard Evergreen Process ................................................................... 10The Evergreen Scenarios: Capsule Summaries ........................................................................ 11

Rising Tide ..................................................................................................................................11Forever War .................................................................................................................................13Fortress Americas ........................................................................................................................15Code Quebec ...............................................................................................................................17Left Behind ..................................................................................................................................19

The Project Evergreen Strategy Workshop .............................................................................. 21Forging “Robust” Strategies ..................................................................................................... 21U.S.C.G. Project Evergreen Core Strategies ............................................................................ 23From Evergreen Strategy to Evergreen Action ........................................................................ 25

III. INSTITUTIONALIZING THE EVERGREEN PROCESS ................................................26Building Strategic Intent .......................................................................................................... 26The Elements of Strategic Renewal ......................................................................................... 26The Cycle of Strategic Renewal ............................................................................................... 27The Cycle of Strategic Renewal: Conceptual Diagram............................................................ 28Definition of Terms and Processes ........................................................................................... 29Establishing Evergreen within the Coast Guard ...................................................................... 30

Use of Contingent Strategies to Instill Strategic Intent ...............................................................30Broader External Events Monitoring and Internal Communications ..........................................31The Interface between Evergreen and the Budgeting Process ....................................................31

Taking Evergreen to the Coast Guard ...................................................................................... 32Management and Performance Evaluation ..................................................................................32Education .....................................................................................................................................32Taking Evergreen to the Field Commanders ...............................................................................32

Outreach: DHS, Broader Government, Congress, the Public .................................................. 33

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Creating and SustainingStrategic Intent

in the Coast Guard

1 Readers of this publication will see the terms “Evergreen” and“Project Evergreen” throughout this document. Evergreen is thename for the entire process of developing and executing strategies,as well as instilling strategic intent throughout the Coast Guard.Project Evergreen, on the other hand, refers more narrowly to thescenario-based strategy development exercise that ran fromAugust to December 2003.

FOREWORD

For more than two centuries, the United States CoastGuard has been “always ready to respond” when cit-izens stood in need. Today, the Service’s readinessand ability to react are at the very core of its identi-ty, and the Coast Guard has justified pride in know-ing it can respond to unexpected events with alacri-ty, creativity, and excellence. The capacity to reactquickly and appropriately to the unforeseen and un-predictable must always be a distinguishing featureof the Service.

The world the Coast Guard must operate in, howev-er, is changing profoundly. The terror attacks of Sep-tember 11th are the most vivid illustration, but accel-erating change has been buffeting the Service sincethe end of the Cold War. Rapid, almost dizzying ad-vances in technology, global networks, trans-nation-al forces, and international markets are profoundlyreshaping global maritime security. The emergingmaritime domain is a much riskier place, and ischanging the face of every Coast Guard mission. It isessential today that the Coast Guard think and actwith an understanding of the forces behind thechanging world of the 21st century.

Two or three decades ago, Coast Guard programscould establish doctrine and acquire assets, confidentthat while the size or scope of their mission portfoliomight change, the future would be pretty consistentwith the past, and any surprises could be managed byreacting and adapting. Change and surprise weresimply opportunities to excel. Today, however,change and surprise have the potential to fracture thebasic premises of the organization. The hard programand acquisition decisions made today can eitherleave the Service on a reasonably good footing to re-act to uncertain future threats, or leave it severely

disadvantaged. It is not enough to be a world-classresponder anymore; the Coast Guard needs to be-come a world-class anticipator as well.

To achieve this, the Coast Guard has committed todeveloping a method for anticipating the full range ofplausible future operating environments it may face.To its present toolkit of world-class rapid reactionskills, the Coast Guard is adding a world-class capa-bility to think “over the horizon,” complementing itstactical excellence with sophisticated and flexiblestrategic thinking.

The Coast Guard is doing this through an enterprisewe call Evergreen.

The purpose of Evergreen is to provide the CoastGuard with the essential tools, knowledge and in-sights to act effectively despite much greater uncer-tainty about the future. The process is not designed tosupersede or diminish the tradition of rapid responseand tactical flexibility that has been hallmark of theCoast Guard. Rather, its purpose is to complementand build on that proud legacy. Evergreen providesstrategic processes and actions that will ensure thatthe Service is and remains “always ready,” no matterwhat the future may bring.

The Evergreen1 process is the result of seven years ofCoast Guard experience with scenario-based strate-gic planning – a technique for thinking about future

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The modern United States Coast Guard is the prod-uct of a series of metamorphoses in response toevolving national needs. In 1790, when Congressestablished the Revenue Marine, securing funds forthe fledgling federal government was the pressingnational issue. Another pressing need of the new na-tion was to make commerce by sea safer; one ofCongress’s first acts was providing funds to buildlighthouses, an act that eventually led to the estab-lishment of the Lighthouse Service. In 1848, theLife-Saving Service was created to satisfy the na-tion's humanitarian instincts and to protect the sea-farers on whom this maritime nation depended. In1915, the Lifesaving Service merged with the Reve-nue Cutter Service to become the United StatesCoast Guard. The Lighthouse Service joined theCoast Guard in 1939. During both World Wars, theCoast Guard moved to the Department of the Navyand fought side by side with the other services. Safe-ty, law enforcement, and, later, environmental pro-tection became major focuses of Coast Guard activi-ty and attention after the Second World War. And

most recently, the events of September 11th and theresulting national commitment to homeland securityhave ushered in yet another era for the Service. Thehistory of the Coast Guard, then, is the continuingstory of how it has changed the nature, scope andmix of its services to meet the evolving needs of thenation.

Three years prior to the terror attacks of September11th, the Coast Guard, recognizing this history of fre-quent alterations, initiated a comprehensive strategicplanning exercise called Long View. Emerging plansfor a massive recapitalization of Coast Guard assets(known as the Integrated Deepwater System, or sim-ply Deepwater) stirred concern among the Service’sleadership about the lack of attention to long-termchallenges and issues facing the nation in the mari-time domain, and the lack of truly strategic long-termplanning in the organization. Long View was con-ceived in response as a process for understanding andmanaging the risks and uncertainty facing the CoastGuard over the next 20 years.

I. THE ROOTS OF EVERGREEN

uncertainty that was developed in the 1960s and isnow used by leading organizations world-wide.Since 1998, more than 300 officers, senior enlistedpersonnel, civilians, and contractors in the CoastGuard have contributed to strategy development andimplementation using this approach. We have exper-imented with this technique, and we have criticallyevaluated the strategies that emerged from it in thecold light of reality several years later. We have tak-en the processes apart and rebuilt them as we learnedwhat worked best and what needed alteration to suitthe unique requirements of the Coast Guard.

The term Evergreen is emblematic of our intent. Weare instituting a continuous process of strategicplanning and strategic renewal, based upon the cal-endar of each Commandant’s command tenure.This will allow the Coast Guard to maintain strate-gic continuity as it prepares for large changes in itsoperating environment. It will address not only thepressing crises of the moment, but also the less ur-

gent, but potentially more important issues over thehorizon. And like all good doctrine, Evergreen con-tains critical feedback channels to ensure learningand improved performance in the future.

From the start, Evergreen was meant not only to de-velop long-range plans or strategies, but also to in-still strategic intent throughout the Coast Guard.Strategic intent is a shared organizational under-standing of where the Service as a whole is goingand why. Strategic intent infuses everyday actionsacross the entire Service with a larger purpose, keep-ing ultimate organizational objectives top-of-mind asCoast Guard people go about their daily tasks. This,more than any particular plan or strategy, is the guid-ing vision of Evergreen.

We firmly believe that broader strategic thinkingmust balance the inevitable “tyranny of the present”if the Coast Guard is to maintain its readiness, keepand nourish its people, and act as an efficient and ef-fective steward of the public trust.

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Role of Federal Government

U.S. Economic Vitality

Threats to U.S. Society

Demand for Maritime Services

Limited or Substantial Strong or Weak Low or High Low or High

Long View was, in an important sense, “counter-cul-tural.” Traditionally, the Coast Guard has rewardedpeople for superior reaction and response. LongView, while in no way devaluing these imperatives,was devoted to inculcating an additional capacity foranticipation. By anticipating future risks and chang-es in operating conditions, the Service would be ableto deliver superior reaction and response, with theright assets, positioned in the right places, with theright skill sets, all geared to a changing world.

Long View predated the events of 9/11. But the col-lapse of the Soviet Union, the accelerating pace ofglobalization, and the relentless march of the infor-mation revolution already suggested the inevitabilityof fundamental change, with direct and potentiallyfar-reaching consequences for Coast Guard missionsand operations.

The question became how to anticipate, with anydegree of confidence, important trends and eventsalmost a quarter century out. The Coast Guard ad-dressed this challenge by embracing an innovativemechanism for strategy development known as sce-nario-based strategic planning.

Scenario-based planning is a tool for the develop-ment of long-term strategies. It works particularlywell for organizations facing operating environmentsmarked by potentially rapid change and high uncer-tainty. Whereas traditional planning “assumes away”uncertainty with one comprehensive single-pointforecast, scenario planning explicitly considers andexplores a range of plausible future operating envi-ronments. The United States Air Force had success-fully embraced scenario planning, as had a numberof leading global companies such as Royal DutchShell, IBM and 3M. The Coast Guard saw in scenar-io planning a creative and rigorous way to anticipatea range of risks, challenges and issues not yet on itsradar screen, as well as a way to inform strategic andoperational decisions throughout the Service.

In Long View, the Coast Guard and a consulting com-pany, the Futures Strategy Group, constructed five dis-tinct scenario “worlds” that described different plausi-ble future operating environments of 2020. Each ofthese scenarios was informed by extensive researchand interviews designed to flesh out a broad array ofkey variables: trends, forces for change, and events.The project team developed a “future space” formedby the four scenario dimensions shown below.

Combining the dimensions in their polar extremesyielded 16 discrete scenarios, from which the CoastGuard leadership ultimately chose five. The guidingcriterion for selection was to choose the set that, to-gether, best captured the range of challenges and op-portunities the Service might face between thepresent and the year 2020. Summary descriptions ofthe five Long View scenarios follow:

Balkanized America: The world is troubled by re-gional and ethnic conflicts. Terrorism strikes fre-quently, and increasingly close to home. The U.S.involves itself only in international forums that serveits narrow, parochial interests. The scope of federalgovernment activity has been scaled back to mostlyessential economic and security roles. At the sametime, regional, state and local governments have in-herited broad policy and regulatory responsibilities,including environmental protection, previously con-trolled by Washington. The U.S. economy is lethar-gic, though certain sectors and geographical regionsare strong.

Pan-American Highway: Large regional trade blocshave coalesced around two currencies: the dollar (inthe Americas) and the euro (in Europe and neighbor-ing nations). Inter-American trade and commerce isbooming. Asia in particular was mired in a deepslump for most of the first decade of the new centu-ry after the devaluation of the yuan in China. A grabfor Vladivostok by China caused a four-way militarystalemate in the Northwest Pacific between China

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and the U.S., Russia, and Japan. In response to cri-ses and ongoing tension in Asia and the Americas,the U.S. has reallocated its military presence: theNavy to the Northwest Pacific, to monitor a shakypeace; and the Army to the Americas, with hemi-spheric defense its primary mission.

Pax Americana: Over the past 20 years, the worldhas suffered economic catastrophe, social and polit-ical instability, and regional wars. For the U.S., it wasa difficult period that shattered our arrogance andgave us a taste of real vulnerability. The U.S. of2020, having suffered 125,000 civilian and militarycasualties, is a very different country from the onethat entered the new millennium. Outside the U.S.,there are sporadic incidents of terrorism perpetratedby extremist groups. The U.S. spends heavily onanti-terror programs.

Planet Enterprise: Transnational corporate behe-moths have vastly increased their power in a fast-paced, prosperous world. They have successfully pit-ted national governments against one another in or-der to force down the general level of regulation andgovernment intervention, and to ensure permeabilityof borders and free trade. The threat of general war orserious terrorism is perceived to be at an all-time low,because of dramatically heightened U.S. military andsurveillance superiority and commitment to the“world economic order.”

Taking on Water: The world economy is strong andstable, with the exception of the U.S. and LatinAmerica. Europe and the Pacific Rim have embracedfree market reform, while the U.S. is muddlingthrough with stagnant economic growth and heavysocial burdens related to an aging population. A stag-nant economy and ever-ballooning entitlements havecaused heavy and persistent federal budgetary pres-sures. High levels of environmental deterioration,spread unevenly across the globe, affect economicstability, but little is done in response. Economicallydisplaced persons from the Caribbean and LatinAmerica are flooding into the U.S., legally and ille-gally, in record numbers.

In a structured three-day workshop, teams of seniorCoast Guard officers and civilians immersed them-

selves in these five worlds and developed ten strate-gies that were common or “robust” across them.Summaries of these strategies are on the followingpage.

Long View’s Legacy

Long View went a long way toward creating a trulystrategic long-term agenda for the Coast Guard.Sound, creative strategies and related initiativesemerged from the Long View process as it wound upin 1999. Strategic dialogues between organizational“silos” were both launched and supported by LongView activities. Participants felt intellectually chal-lenged, and, in some cases, changed by the experi-ence. Most visibly, and importantly, the concept ofMaritime Domain Awareness (MDA) – a strategyembraced as a key antidote to the threats posed byterrorism – crystallized as Long View's Strategy 4,long before 9/11. MDA has evolved into a criticalorganizing principle for the Coast Guard in its post-September 11th role in the new Department of Home-land Security.

Overall, however, actual incorporation of Long Viewstrategies into formal Coast Guard planning activitiesproved to be uneven. Perhaps the greatest stumblingblock was Long View's lack of integration into then-ongoing budgeting and planning activities. It seemsclear that, if long-term planning and strategy devel-opment were not somehow "baked into" budgetingand planning, they would not be taken seriously.

Long View Review

In October 2002, the Coast Guard, having re-exam-ined the process and output of Long View in light of9/11 and the impending move to the Department ofHomeland Security (DHS), decided that a more thor-ough re-evaluation of that output would be a goodbasis for launching an examination of near-termCoast Guard strategy. A key component of that effortwas an analysis of the successes and shortcomings ofLong View. In the months following 9/11, it becameapparent that the project’s original strategies, if im-plemented decisively, would have better prepared theCoast Guard for that event.

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1. Take a leadership role in defining and developing an integrated maritime management system.

2. Shift from a program-focused approach to mission planning and execution to an integrated cross-programmatic approach that better serves the nation.

3. Institute a geographically based unified command structure that can plan and execute diverse missions simultaneously.

4. Acquire full maritime domain awareness.

5. Identify, prioritize and energize strategic partnerships and alliances in line with organizational needs and emerging mission requirements.

6. Develop a flexible, dynamic human resources system that provides the capabilities essential for complex, diverse and multi-mission operations and management.

7. Acquire or cultivate the ability to manage information, create knowledge, design effective business processes, use decision support tools, optimize resources and manage risks in order to create and balance successful mission outcomes.

8. Develop a philosophy of information management and an information technology acquisition approach that leverages the best capabilities of the marketplace and the best practices of successful agencies and firms, and seek wherever possible to purchase the best systems the market has to offer rather than develop systems in house.

9. Maintain critical focus on core Coast Guard missions by outsourcing non-core functions where justified by analyses of all costs and benefits.

10. Cultivate and manage a clear and commanding public image of the Coast Guard’s identity, missions, and the value the Service delivers to U.S. citizens in the performance of its missions.

The Long View Strategies

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events. Consequently, terrorism was treated some-what academically, without full appreciation for itsmyriad impacts – economic, political, psychologicaland otherwise – on the nation.

The strategies that emerged from Long View alsoheld up well. As stated above, “Maritime DomainAwareness” is a cornerstone of the Coast Guard’scurrent strategy in the campaign against terrorism.Further, the concept has been subsumed in a largerpresidentially directed effort to create a NationalMaritime Security Strategy (NSPD-41/HSPD-13).(See chart below.)

Long View Review uncovered, however, several hid-den assumptions that affected the initial study. TheCoast Guard was assumed to be eternally budget-deprived. Deepwater was deemed inviolate. Andthe concept of an extended war was not included inany scenario. While these assumptions did not driveLong View to poor strategies, they may have bluntedthe challenge to traditional thinking about CoastGuard missions and capabilities.

The “Long View Review” examined four questions:

• Did Long View suffer from unstated or hidden as-sumptions?

• How did Long View perform through the lens of 9/11 and the year that followed?

• Which of the additional 80 scenario-contingentstrategies developed for Long View that did not makethe final list in 1998 were relevant in 2002-04?

• How thoroughly and how well were Long Viewstrategies implemented?

The evaluation team judged the content of the scenar-ios to be broadly sound. All five scenarios remainedplausible and strategically viable three years after thecompletion of Long View. Strikingly, several of thescenarios had described significant terrorist threatson U.S. soil. The major shortcoming identified by theCore Team was the fact that none of the five scenar-ios called for an extended period of terrorism (orwar) as a central scenario theme. They appeared ei-ther as “background” circumstances or transitional

19992000

20012002

20032004

2005

Project Long View Initiated

MDA Codified in CG Strategic Plan

10/01 Sector Command Center –Joint (SCC-J) Hampton Roads –Stood Up in Response to 9/11

4/02 First MDA Coordinator Appointed

11/03 Coast Guard (CG) MDA Steering Committee Established

4/04 - Nationwide Automatic Identification System (AIS) Project Approval (Transponder-based Vessel Identification)

- SCC-J San Diego Initial Operating Capability

5/04 - National MDA Summit

6/04 - AIS Satellite Contract Awarded- Project Hawkeye Port and Coast MDA Testbed in Miami Initial Operating Capability

- Additional Sensors, Command & Control CapabilityInstalled in New York and Boston for Political Conventions

8/04 - Project Evergreen Initiated

9/04 - Senior Steering Group Established- SCC-J Hampton Roads Initial Operating Capability

11/04 - Project Evergreen Confirms MDA and Expands Supporting Strategies

12/04 - MDA Program Integration Office Established- National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD)-41/ Homeland Security Presidential Directive (HSPD)-13 Signed

1998

MDA Timeline

Significant National Event

Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) Concept Was Born through Long View Project

9/03 MDA Steering Committee Established

9/01 September 11th Terrorist Attacks

10/03 USCG Partners with DOJ on ProjectSeaHawk in Charleston

1/05 1st Two Secure Passive AIS sites in Juneau, AK Operational2/05 Gulf of Mexico - VTS in Lower Mississippi River Operational3/05 AIS Capability Deployed on Weather Buoy4/05 Vice Chief of Naval Operations (USN) &

Vice Commandant (USCG) Resolve to Extend Partnerships (SCC-Js) in Ports of Joint Interest

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Background

Project Evergreen, like the Long View Review, wasborn into the aftermath of the September 11, 2001terror attacks on the United States.

The Service responded creditably to the crisis, evac-uating a million people from Manhattan, ensuringthe security of New York Harbor, dispatching StrikeTeams to deal with the anthrax murders, patrollingports throughout the United States, and in generalcoming through admirably in the biggest crisis to hitAmerica in half a century or more.

But this response had a down side. Reserves werecalled up for far longer periods than they had everanticipated. Some assets, such as small boats andtheir crews, were pushed beyond their limits. CoastGuard personnel faced substantially new risks inPorts, Waterways and Coastal Security (PWCS) op-erations with little or no training and insufficientequipment for confronting terrorism. The Servicescrambled to meet a new set of challenges it was notprepared for, with assets and people designed andtrained for a very different world.

When the initial crisis period passed, the CoastGuard found itself in an entirely new landscape.A “new normalcy” of a permanently higher opera-tional tempo, more attention from the public, the ad-ministration, and the Congress, and continuing inte-gration into a new Department, all combined to createan entirely different strategic environment for the U.S.Coast Guard in the first decade of the 21st century.

Project Evergreen was a result of the lessons learnedfrom Long View, 9/11, the Long View Review, andthe new challenges of moving into the Department ofHomeland Security. From the start, Project Ever-green was envisioned as both a tool for developinglong-range strategies and as a catalyst for instillingstrategic intent throughout the Coast Guard organiza-tion.

Project Evergreen was launched in the autumn of2003 under the guidance of the Coast Guard’s Officeof Strategic Analysis (G-CCX), with direction andfacilitation support provided by the Futures StrategyGroup (FSG). Members of the Coast Guard coreteam were drawn from G-CCX and other representa-tive parts of the headquarters organization, including,among others, Human Resources, Intelligence, Pub-lic Affairs, Budget & Programs, and Reserves.

Evergreen Scenario Research and Interviews

The project plan called for a broad range of inter-views, including the entire Leadership Council andthe senior-most members of headquarters operationsand staffs. Beyond this group, a range of junior offic-ers and enlisted people across the various CoastGuard districts was also interviewed. Finally, theperspectives of a select group of non-Coast Guardopinion leaders, with backgrounds in foreign policy,fisheries, and port security, among others, were inte-grated into the research results. The objective ofthese interviews was to gain insight into the forcesfor change that would affect Coast Guard missions

II. PROJECT EVERGREEN

The Long View Review team identified several areasfor improvement. One qualified as a significantweakness – strategy implementation. With the devel-opment of “robust” strategies, the project had simplycome to an end. The strategies were neither properlydelivered to the field nor executed. Many organiza-tions do “too much planning and not enough action,”in the words of the review team. But effective strate-gic planning must lead to action. It must prioritize re-source allocation and contribute to organizationalalignment.

The massive shift in the course of world historycaused by 9/11, along with the unstated assumptionsof the Long View scenarios, indicated the need fornew (or significantly reworked) scenarios and moreorganization-wide use of the scenarios. Upon complet-ing its analysis, the team recommended that the CoastGuard embark on a second iteration of scenario-basedplanning. This effort came to be known as ProjectEvergreen.

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and operations and to understand how these “driv-ers” were likely to converge to create unanticipatedchallenges and opportunities. These interviews,blended with the knowledge and insight of the coreteam, provided a solid foundation for the next step inthe process: defining the Coast Guard’s future “in-quiry space.” (See diagram below.)

Identifying and Choosing Future ScenarioWorlds to Explore

The initial research and interview phase of the sce-nario exercise identified a large number of driversthat would shape the Coast Guard’s future operatingenvironment. As in the previous Long View project,the Project Evergreen team sorted, merged andboiled down the drivers and identified four high-lev-el forces for change. These forces, dubbed “dimen-sions,” are the large-scale, elementary variables thatdefine an organization’s future planning space. In theProject Evergreen case, four dimensions were iden-tified:

• Rate of Globalization (Increasing or Decreasing)

• U.S. Economy (Strong or Weak)

• Perception of Threat to Security and Quality of Life(High or Low)

• U.S. Concept of Sovereignty (Traditional or Non-Traditional)

Combining and varying these dimensions in theirextreme states generated 16 possible combinations –16 discrete scenarios. The project team tentativelynamed and sketched out plausible stories for each ofthese candidate scenarios (see chart on next page).

The Leadership Council chose five of these scenar-io “worlds” to be fleshed out and “lived in” in ex-haustive detail. They chose the five they felt posedthe greatest risks and opportunities to the CoastGuard, while also capturing the broadest range ofplausible outcomes over the planning horizon.

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Project Evergreen Scenario Space

Note: The five highlighted rows represent the scenarios chosen for development by the Coast Guard Leadership.

Rate of

Globalization

Public Perception of Threat to Security and

Quality of Life U.S. Concept of

Sovereignty U.S. Economy

Strength Name

1 Increasing High Traditional Strong

2 Increasing High Traditional Weak

3 Increasing High Expansive Strong

4 Increasing High Expansive Weak “Forever War”

5 Increasing Low Traditional Strong

6 Increasing Low Traditional Weak “Left Behind”

7 Increasing Low Expansive Strong “Rising Tide”

8 Increasing Low Expansive Weak

9 Decreasing High Traditional Strong “Fortress Americas”

10 Decreasing High Traditional Weak

11 Decreasing High Expansive Strong

12 Decreasing High Expansive Weak “Code Quebec”

13 Decreasing Low Traditional Strong

14 Decreasing Low Traditional Weak

15 Decreasing Low Expansive Strong

16 Decreasing Low Expansive Weak

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After the five scenarios were selected, the projectteam created fuller, more detailed stories for each ofthe five. Each scenario world contained a “future his-tory” chronology and a narrative that highlightedcritical distinguishing features of the scenario world.These two scenario features brought a sense of realplausibility to those who would be expected to planwithin them. In addition, for each, a detailed “char-acteristics matrix” was developed, delineating thestate of a common set of 45 drivers culled from thescenario research and interviews. The state of each

driver was characterized and described within eachof the five worlds to give the scenarios granularityand plausibility. Moreover, by fleshing out the driv-ers, the scenario team was able to produce realisti-cally detailed and internally coherent scenario docu-ments that workshop participants in the next phasewould be able to use with confidence.

Summary descriptions of the five scenarios can befound on the following 10 pages.

Force Structure

Authorities

Competencies

Capabilities

Partnerships

00

Leadership Leadership CouncilCouncil

Office of Strategic Analysis

ExecuteCore

Strategies

Identify & Monitor Trigger Events

FutureMissionNeeds

StrategicImperativesEmbracingCore ActionStrategies

Contingent Strategies

DevelopDevelopScenariosScenarios

TodayToday

The Coast Guard Evergreen ProcessThe Coast Guard Evergreen ProcessForgeForge

StrategiesStrategiesExecuteExecute

StrategiesStrategies

USCGMission Drivers

Key Forcesfor Changes

Dimensions ofPlanning

Space

*Current strategy seton pp. 23-24

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Rate of

Globalization

U.S.

Economy

Perception of Threat to Security and Quality of Life

U.S. Concept of

Sovereignty

Increasing Strong Low Expansive

Rising Tide

From the vista of 2025, it seemslike a lifetime ago when worldpolitics were tied up in an unendinglist of seemingly intractable prob-lems: terrorism, conflict in theMiddle East, nuclear proliferation,AIDS, poverty in Africa, to cite but afew. It was probably no coincidencethat the beginning of the 21st centurywas a low point for global coopera-tion and multilateralism. That beganto change with the dramatic Pales-tinian-Israeli peace accord of 2008.World leaders are hardly holdinghands in solidarity around everysingle issue, and human nature has certainly not changed in the last two decades. But a newspirit of multilateral cooperation has clearly taken hold. This comes at a critically importantmoment as world leaders struggle with the downside of rapid world growth and rising prosperity:the threat of large-scale ecological disaster.

The global economy is finally on a development path that is benefitting all but the most remoteand disconnected countries. Greater political freedom and economic opportunity have under-mined terrorism and extremist politics. Cross-border integration has increased and acceleratedthe movement of goods, services, people, culture and ideas. It has also made cities more hetero-geneous. People are traveling more. And all of these exchanges are breaking down barriers,eroding distrust, and making evident the positive possibilities of inter-dependence and coopera-tion.

But this is clearly not Shangri-la. This connected, globally minded world is not without profoundchallenges. Severe weather events occur with disturbing frequency, climates are shifting, and sealevels are rising. All of this is pointing to an environment that is rebelling under continued abuse,and possibly teetering on disaster. The large number of aged is severely straining many coun-tries’ national retirement and medical programs. And there are serious social challenges, someassociated with continued advances in technology.

Climatic shifts and rising sea levels many had long feared (and others had stubbornly denied)have come to settle the debts of the world’s environment-degrading excesses. Extreme weatherpatterns are causing frequent and severely destructive atmospheric conditions throughout theworld. The polar ice caps have continued to recede to the point where the arctic region is navi-gable fully half the year.

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The call to action to prevent further degradation of the environment is urgent, and the responseis finally more than window dressing. Few developed nations are willing to be seen asperpetuators of the problem. A real international community is working to deter and persuade“free rider” nations. Hydrocarbon reduction efforts are largely UN-led, with strong backing frommost developed countries. Many smaller and less developed countries are profiting from cleanair and water credits, and industrialized nations are cutting back on heavily polluting manufactur-ing and services. These changes are having a balancing effect between have- and have-notnations. Specifically in the U.S., the virtual elimination of the terrorism as a perceived clear andpresent danger, coupled with an increased interest in safeguarding environmental resources,has prompted a dramatic change of focus resulting in the Department of Homeland and Environ-mental Security (DHES).

US baby-boomers and their counterparts in Europe have hit retirement, and the resulting popu-lation graying is placing an extremely heavy burden on many nations’ social services.The population shift, together with a reduction in overall population in several European coun-tries, has brought national pensions to the brink of insolvency in spite of otherwise reasonablyhealthy economies. Increased immigration from Africa and the Middle East into Europe is awelcome influx in countries where the working population needs to be bolstered, but is a jolt tothe system for other nations content with their economies.

The world of “always-on” Internet, through a variety of convenient, yet intrusive devices, isallowing less and less personal privacy. Paranoia over theft of identity and intellectual propertyhas risen sharply, and is not altogether unwarranted. A sad irony associated with today’scommunication capabilities that create a virtual connection to others is that those best con-nected through technology are often the least connected with reality.

Rising Tide

Illustrative Challenges and Opportunities for the Coast Guard in Rising Tide

Challenges Opportunities

More complex funding model (fee for service, other public sector)

Increased globalization leads to increased uses of waterways and increased stress on Coast Guard resources

Cultural challenges going from military to non-military uniformed service

Increased profile and mission set for Coast Guard (LE, regulatory, SAR, etc.)

Northwest passage opens up – new mission for Coast Guard

Strong U.S. economy, significant maritime commerce, no serious funding constraints

Need for maritime domain intelligence, most logically provided by the Coast Guard

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Forever War

Rate of

Globalization

U.S.

Economy


U.S. Concept of

Sovereignty

Increasing Weak High Expansive

It is not our worst nightmare – noteven close. We are free and still thesingle most powerful nation of earth.We trade with the world and, if ourtechnology no longer dominates, weare first among equals. We are backon the moon. While we have sufferedreverses in our unilateral foreignpolicy, we have also led in somehuge multilateral victories. Domesti-cally, there has been a sustainedresurgence in a localized serviceethic and a sense of community thathas done much to replace the failingsocial safety net.

But if not our worst nightmare, life in 2025 certainly has become a bad dream. The UnitedStates is a nation stretched thin. We are stretched thin in our global military deployments. Weare stretched thin defending our nation from constant and frequently successful terroristattacks. Our economy is stretched thin under a staggering debt leading to worrisome unem-ployment and a sense of personal economic vulnerability. Almost all families are dual (ormore) income and tend toward living in multi-generational settings. Community activities areoften the center of social life.

Meanwhile, our non-security infrastructure is in patch-and-repair condition, while our schoolsand social services do more with less every day. Even our social fabric is stretched thin. Thedomestic political scene is now made up of inter-generational tensions and dozens ofcompeting political groups whose style is bitter, in-your-face, and uncompromising. Singleissue politics and opponent-demonizing are now so common as to make us wonder what itwas once like when opponents actually worked together for common good (or even shared ameal together).

For the past 15 years, our armed forces have been engaged in combat across the globeagainst myriad enemies who strike with weapons of global terror at the U.S., its citizens, andits allies. St. Petersburg, Russia was devastated by a nuclear device in 2007 and a nuclearweapon was discovered on its way to Boston in 2022. Now China, once a partner, hasbecome a geo-political and military adversary with impressive regional power, emergingglobal reach, an active arms diplomacy, world-class strategic weapons, and a space pro-gram. After a ten-year period of stable democratic rule in Iraq, the U.S. is now back in force

14



Illustrative Challenges and Opportunities for the Coast Guard in Forever War


Sustained terror siege and intense pressure on the Coast Guard not to allow another maritime terror attack

DHS hamstrung by earmarked funding – Coast Guard is stretched thin, with chronic funding uncertainty

Terror and crime have become blurred – search and rescue very risky

Huge training challenge given declining education and basic skills

Unable to shed legacy missions

Draft is on – Coast Guard is attractive

Natural resources (e.g., fisheries) are considered a national security issue

Critical role for Coast Guard in domestic and foreign port security

Critical role in DHS regional maritime C2

Full interoperability with Navy communications, weapons systems, and logistics

Forever War

to sustain the regime against fundamentalist attack. In so doing, the U.S. has earned the hatredof Muslims generally, and Iran in particular. While the U.S. is hated by many for its actions in thePersian Gulf, it has also experienced significant multilateral successes, including peace on theKorean peninsula, the “managed merger” of China and Taiwan, and the suppression of the globalWMD threat. As a result of these pressures and commitments, the draft is back within theframework of a National Service Act that fills military and Homeland Security needs first.

The U.S. has adopted a fairly classic repeat of the “national security state” from the Cold War era.The Federal Government is officially laissez-faire in the management of the economy. However,the size and importance of the DOD and DHS budgets superimpose a kind of commandeconomy in defense and security-related areas. The government is very interventionist in thesematters, and Congress uses security, rather than economic development, as the channel forpork-barrel activities. The Federal Government and the states share responsibilities and a verytight budget for social programs. Many environmental regulations have been suspended to helpstruggling industries.

In general, the global economy is moderately strong. It is, in fact, a very global marketplaceincreasingly structured around information flows, digital relationships and Asian markets. By2025 the U.S. is not the undisputed economic or technological leader. The best growth prospectsare in Asia. On the strength of its internal market and exports to U.S. and Europe, China (withJapan and a unified Korea) is emerging as the new economic power. Globalization and worldtrade are based on the tripod of American security guarantees, Asian economic growth, and e-based economic structures.

15



Fortress Americas

Rate of

Globalization

U.S.

Economy


U.S. Concept of

Sovereignty

Decreasing Strong High Traditional

The world has changed dramati-cally in the past 20 years, andthe United States, reacting to aseries of physical and economicthreats, has been leading manyof the changes. On the surface,everything seems to be on apositive trajectory, but this beliesshades of gray in almost everyaspect of life.

The terror attacks in 2008 and2009 raised our national para-noia to a new level. In 2008 the simultaneous mining of three harbors resulted in the loss of2,356 lives when a large cruise ship sank in the approach to Key West and three smaller shipswere sunk in the Charleston and San Francisco harbors. Just a year later, a small boat riggedwith high explosives rammed an oil tanker in the Louisiana Offshore Oil Platform (LOOP) nearNew Orleans. Though only seven lives were lost, it took over a month to clean up the oil spill,and operations in the LOOP were disrupted throughout the cleanup process.

A very harsh response, unprecedented in scope, was approved by Congress with overwhelm-ing popular support. Significantly, the focus began to shift incrementally to securing ourborders rather than hunting down terrorists abroad. This included draconian measures againstillegal immigration; intrusive, highly restrictive limits on the movements of new immigrants; andintensive surveillance and tracking, including monitoring and control of land, air, and maritimeborders. We have not, however, stopped terrorism. In recent years, low-level attacks in publicplaces and corporate offices are becoming ever more common in the U.S. Responses are amixture of physical security, certification, and intrusion into the privacy of individuals throughsuch means as the national ID that everyone must now carry. The pervasive invasion ofprivacy is becoming a big issue as corporations struggle to maintain competitive edges andprivate groups are increasingly reactionary. Their violence is now added to that of the foreignterrorists.

While the U.S. was dealing with problems that had their genesis outside its borders, China wasbrewing trouble internally. As the tension spread to the general population, Beijing was unableto quell the discontent, and the ensuing turmoil remained on the verge of civil uprising through-out the next decade. The Chinese miracle manufacturing machine became unreliable for awhile after 2012, and some of its customers began to look for alternative sources of cheapmanufacturing.

16



Fortress Americas

The U.S., historically the leading proponent of globalization, has precipitated a global trendtoward regionalization. The Free Trade Association of the Americas – the FTAA – was born in2014, but not before the U.S. and Canada made concessions on future supply contracts andtrade support to the region’s oil exporters. The FTAA, though only a decade old, is alreadyshowing signs of success that many believed would take 20 to 30 years. The U.S. now views thewestern hemisphere as its home, and it is focusing its trade and defenses in its somewhatexpanded back yard.

The United States economy, which on balance has been growing slowly for the past decade, nowseems to be entering the most buoyant period since the “go-go” days of the 1990s. It still has anenormous debt, but this year promises to provide the first budget surplus in the past quarter-century. Real interest rates remain high, however, crowding out some of the entrepreneurs thathave been the historic bedrock of American innovation. To some extent, big research consortiahave replaced entrepreneurs. The U.S. is once again the technology engine for the rest of theworld and large, research-driven organizations are ramping up their hiring. Its massive invest-ment in systems technology, originally driven by security concerns, is providing efficiency gainsfor industry. In addition, a new energy technology promises to eventually break long-term depen-dence on foreign oil.


Maritime terror – harbor mining, attack on ships

Complicated diplomatic and hemispheric security relationships

Recruiting is difficult for Coast Guard – strong economy offers many opportunities

Lack of clarity, role ambiguity between DHS and DOD

North-South trade route exploding

Shifting resources away from migrant interdiction

New offshore trade platforms for Coast Guard to manage (challenges, too)

Access to pervasive new information sources

Illustrative Challenges and Opportunities for the Coast Guard in Fortress Americas

17



Code Quebec

Rate of

Globalization

U.S.

Economy


U.S. Concept of

Sovereignty

Decreasing Weak High Expansive

In 2025, the world has suffered throughoutbreaks of infectious disease that havekilled millions. World trade is staggeringback to its feet, under super-strict healthregulations and certification procedures.Although developing countries have beenhardest hit, both health-wise and eco-nomically, the developed world has notbeen spared. The worst effects of a firstglobal pandemic were dodged by richernations in the mid-2000s. But a “secondwave” of infection hit the United States, inparticular, extremely hard.

The first epidemic, “SARS 2,” hit theUnited States in the mid-2000s, strikingwestern port cities. Tens of thousands died, the worst epidemic since the flu of 1918. Xenopho-bia crept into the country and into politics, and legislation brought invasive, beyond-USAPATRIOT Act measures to attempt to halt the spread of disease. Technology fostered theconstant surveillance thought necessary to keep America safe from disease.

Routine air travel was more or less wiped out by the first wave of sickness. The second waveproved even more devastating, even if the death toll was lower. In 2012, a new and virulentstrain of multi-drug-resistant tuberculosis spread to the general population, and previousoveruse of antibiotics guaranteed that its worst impact, paradoxically, would be felt among thosesegments of the population that had enjoyed the best access to health care previously. Globally,MDRTB became known as “the rich man’s disease,” since it replicated its pattern of attackingthose portions of the population that had been most medicated.

In America, xenophobia, directed mainly outside the United States during SARS 2, now turnedagainst fellow citizens. Towns “battened down the hatches,” unfamiliar faces became mostunwelcome, and yet at the same time local and neighborhood solidarity also increased. “Livingin the bubble” became the only way most people could feel safe.

18



Code Quebec

Illustrative Challenges and Opportunities for the Coast Guard in Code Quebec

The “new world order” is a far cry from that envisioned just after the end of the Cold War. It is stillbased on U.S. power, but the power of the U.S. to fund cures and to certify health – and thereforeeconomic opportunity – has gained in importance relative to its raw military might. The world of2025 is one of strict border controls, quarantines, and a two-track global economy, with thosecertified disease-free in the more privileged, but still suffering, camp, and the majority of the worldin the other.

The United States government, under constant pressure from its beleaguered citizenry to revert toisolationism, has decided that its best chance of avoiding further outbreaks is to “push the bordersout” by sending well-trained people overseas to ensure that other countries do not become thebreeding ground of further contagion, at the same time maintaining rigorous control of its borders.

The Foreign Medical Corps spearheads this effort to keep disease out of the United States bycuring it at its sources. Like the “war on poverty,” the “war on drugs,” and the “war on terror,” the“war on disease” is essentially unwinnable, endless, and short on positive headlines. But olderorganizations such as Medecins sans Frontieres and the Red Cross have developed closeworking relationships with the FMC. The FMC has also offered an outlet to young Americanseager for a mission and anxious to escape the highly localized, intrusive society that the U.S.has become.

This, along with new medicines, treatment regimens and government action, seems to be finallybeating back this latest attack. But the outcome, in 2025, still remains in doubt. And for a generationexpecting a world of ever-expanding opportunity, the first quarter of the 21st century has produced,instead, a series of massive psychological jolts, a sense of extreme vulnerability, and a blightedeconomy.


Ensuring health of Coast Guard personnel

Zero tolerance for immigration – closed U.S. borders

Refocus on disease, over traditional missions

New migration routes, created by health crisis. Cuba, with its developed public health infrastructure, is a much desired destination.

More funding and attention (like 9/11)

Opportunity to build small assets

International humanitarian mission – Coast Guard well positioned to deliver

Coast Guard experience in foreign negotiations and nation building activities

Coast Guard attractive career option – good work, health benefits

19



Left Behind

Rate of Globalization

U.S.

Economy


U.S. Concept of

Sovereignty

Increasing Weak Low Traditional

The U.S. in the year 2025 is feeling oldand weary. Fifteen years of muscularforeign policy and aggressive forwarddeployment have taken their toll, andnow America has pulled back.

The American people no longer want tobe the world’s cop. They certainly do notwant to be going it alone – and that isessentially what the nation had beendoing, at tremendous cost, for more thana decade. A failed U.S. anti-terrorintervention in Indonesia in 2010 wasthe start of a series of setbacks that hasled to military, economic and diplomatic retrenchment. By any estimation, the billions spent onconventional overseas deployment have become a huge drain on the U.S. economy – and thesource of growing anti-Americanism abroad.

The good news is that by 2016 the war on terror was effectively won – mostly through globallycoordinated special operations and intelligence. But up to that time, the nation spent heavily(and some say wastefully) on creating a massive domestic security infrastructure. Civil libertieshave unquestionably been compromised along the way, but Americans by and large accept thisas the price of attaining a reasonably high level of security.

The wind-down of foreign entanglements has only made more pressing the domestic problemsof the country. The U.S. economy is in a seemingly permanent state of malaise. This is cer-tainly not a depression, but Americans are experiencing a prolonged period of economicdifficulty not seen in decades. Households are forced to work longer and harder just to get by.Few families are fortunate enough to make ends meet on a single salary. Only a handful ofsectors — industrial agriculture, entertainment, biotechnology and select high-tech sectors —are still global leaders and therefore creating good jobs.

Politicians nibble on the edges of big, hard problems such as Social Security and entitlements,but fail to forge consensus on long-term solutions in an ugly and contentious political climate.Billions have been spent supporting foreign military commitments and creating a huge domesticsecurity infrastructure. But the industrial and transportation systems (including roads, rail andports) are deteriorating. Similarly, the “soft” infrastructure of hospitals, schools and socialservices is in marked decline. Local budgets for police, fire and emergency personnel havebeen cut to the bone. On the West Coast, this fact is causing huge concern and challenges ata time of rising volcanic and seismic activity in the Pacific “Ring of Fire.”

20



Left Behind

Illustrative Challenges and Opportunities for the Coast Guard in Left Behind

Much of the rest of the world is doing well economically. Europe, with its aggressive push intoglobal markets, has surpassed US in per capita income. But the big stories are the growth anddevelopment of China, India and the emerging “little tigers” of Southeast Asia. China, havingpeacefully achieved de facto control over Taiwan, is exerting worrisome economic and diplomaticinfluence across Asia and the Middle East and Africa as well. Latin America is a mixed bag. TheUS is accepting large numbers of temporary workers from Mexico to take unwanted jobs inagriculture and hospitality services. Cuba in the post-Fidel era is muddling through economically,but no better.

With science and technology investments seriously lagging, many of our best and brightest inthe U.S. are leaving to pursue their dreams abroad, and especially in the new high-tech corridorsof China, India and South Asia. In all but a handful of technical fields, U.S. universities areconsidered first tier. But there is a feeling that the U.S. has its best days behind it, even though inabsolute terms the country is still large and capable. The action taking place is elsewhere. Inthis and in many other ways, America feels as though it is being left behind.


Transition to post-terror world

“Get our white hat back” – asserting a positive U.S. presence in world

Intense competition for domestic funding

Harshly conflicted U.S. domestic political situation, making change and growth difficult

Crumbling port and industrial infrastructure, with negative implications for safety and the environment

Poor economy makes Coast Guard careers appear attractive

International engagement: Coast Guard has maintained high profile and good representation abroad

Retain and grow non-terror roles and missions at time of frequent volcanoes, earthquakes, and other natural disasters

21



The Project Evergreen Strategy Workshop

The most critical step of any scenario planning exer-cise is the strategy workshop. These are typicallyfour-day offsite affairs that are intended to removeparticipants from day-to-day distractions in order toget full immersion in the process. In October 2003,the Project Evergreen workshop was held at a gov-ernment conference center in Virginia. The objectiveof the workshops was to have each of the five scenar-io world teams immerse itself in the details of a sin-gle scenario. The teams were each composed ofsome ten Coast Guard Service members and civilianemployees, under the leadership of a flag officer orSenior Executive Service member. Great effortswere made to create diverse teams balanced by rank,technical or functional background, race and gender.

For most of the four-day workshop, participants hadknowledge only of their own team’s scenario. Theteam’s objective was to develop, on the basis of thechallenges and opportunities presented by that sce-nario, a set of strategies to guide the Coast Guard inanticipation of that particular world – under the strictworking assumption that that world is, in fact, goingto take place.

A common workbook guided the groups along apath from general discussion of daily life in the sce-nario on the first day, gradually through more fo-cused discussion, ultimately leading to the essentialstrategy question: given what we now know aboutthe challenges and opportunities in this scenarioworld, and given what we know today about theCoast Guard’s strengths and weaknesses, what doesthe Service need to begin doing right away to betterposition itself for future success?

On the final day of the workshop, the five scenarioworld teams presented their strategies to the entire56-person workshop group. The bulk of that day wasspent stress-testing scenario-specific strategies with-in each of the other four teams’ scenarios, to deter-mine which of all the strategies were “robust” orworkable across all five scenario futures. Core teammembers and facilitators captured key observationsand comments so that all workshop strategies couldbe systematically evaluated and ranked in the nextphase of the process.

Forging “Robust” Strategies

The scenario workshop produced a total of 49 draftstrategies. Over the course of the following week,the project core team dissected and evaluated each ofthe strategies, with critical commentary and guid-ance provided by team members who had beenpresent in workshop discussions. In a scenario inno-vation, the project team also employed risk analysistechniques to explore downside effects of specificstrategy implementation options.

Sixteen core strategies were proposed that would al-low the Coast Guard to succeed in a variety of poten-tial futures. The strategies were presented at the No-vember 2003 Flag Conference, where senior CoastGuard officers and civilians critiqued the strategiesand discussed potential obstacles to implementation.

Based on feedback from the Commandant, the Lead-ership Council and other senior Coast Guard leaders,the Evergreen strategies underwent another round ofreview. Several strategies were dropped, refocused,or merged; a few were re-designated as implementa-tion initiatives. The strategy statements themselvescontinued to be refined as new insights emergedfrom risk analyses and other evaluations conductedby the Working Group, facilitators and other contrib-utors.

In the end, Project Evergreen produced eleven strat-egies. These strategies serve the following four high-level strategic imperatives:

1. Shape the global maritime setting to promoteU.S. national interests.

2. Know maritime conditions, anomalies, andthreats to prevent, protect and respond.

3. Create and manage an integrated U.S. MaritimeDomain to preserve and promote the national in-terest.

4. Position the Coast Guard to act with strategic in-tent in a complex and uncertain environment.

The final set of Project Evergreen strategies is de-tailed over the following pages.

22




23



U.S.C.G. Project Evergreen Core Strategies

The U.S. Coast Guard’s future operating environment will be marked by traditional andunfamiliar security threats as well as challenges to national borders, marine resources,safe and efficient commerce, and conventional concepts of sovereignty. In the face of thisaccelerating complexity and the responsibilities of being a “plank owner” in the newDepartment of Homeland Security, the U.S. Coast Guard will enhance its capabilities andcompetencies in four enduring mission areas:

Defending national and homeland security interests

Enforcing laws and treaties in the U.S. Maritime Domain2

Promoting safe and efficient maritime activities, and

Protecting the marine environment.

To these ends, the Coast Guard will implement the following strategies.

2 The U.S. Maritime Domain (surface, subsurface, and air) “encompasses all U.S. ports, inland waterways, harbors,

navigable waters, Great Lakes, territorial seas, contiguous waters, customs waters, coastal seas, littoral areas, the U.S.Exclusive Economic Zone, and oceanic regions of U.S. national interest, as well as the sea lanes to the United States,U.S. maritime approaches, and the high seas surrounding America.”

24



3 Strategic Imperatives: The guiding imperatives that are necessary to anticipate and meet the challenges of the future with strategic intent and maximum flexibility.4 Core Action Strategies: The organizational courses of action that proved to be effective in optimizing the Coast Guard’s service to the nation across all the future

operating environments described in the Evergreen scenarios. Taking these actions will enable the Coast Guard to fulfill the strategic imperatives.5 End States: The desired results of implementing the Core Action Strategies.

STRATEGIC

IMPERATIVES3

Shape the globalmaritime setting topromote U.S.national interests.

CORE ACTION STRATEGIES4

1. Execute a robust international engagement effortwithin the framework of national strategies to advanceglobal maritime safety and security and facilitate com-merce, through multilateral agreements, multinationaloperations, international training efforts and diplo-matic missions in support of national interests.

2. Act as the lead U.S. agency for negotiating inter-national maritime standards, as national interests dic-tate.

3. Establish a tiered maritime safety and security re-gime to detect, identify, track, and eliminate threatsto safety, commerce, and homeland security.

4.a Lead the inter-agency establishment of require-ments for maritime-relevant intelligence, surveillance,reconnaissance, navigation and observation systemsthat support homeland security, maritime safety andmobility, and natural resources protection.

4.b Lead government and private sector maritimestakeholders in development of maritime safety andsecurity strategies.

5. Lead a partnership of maritime stakeholders to en-sure appropriate access to integrated systems, sen-sors, intelligence, information and analysis of mari-time activities and conditions to gain a complete op-erating picture of the U.S. Maritime Domain.

6. Implement risk management doctrine and systemsto support effective decision-making in the U.S. Mari-time Domain.

7. Create a national network of integrated DHS-aligned regional command and control centers toachieve seamless interoperability and coordinationamong all DHS agencies, state and local authorities.

8. Control and respond to air, surface, and subsur-face activities from the inland waterways to the sea-ward boundary of the EEZ to protect and enhance thesafe and legitimate use of the U.S. Maritime Domain.

9. Institutionalize strategic thinking to link all activi-ties and investments to broader organizational ob-jectives.

10. Develop a requirements-driven human resourcessystem to ensure continuous alignment of compe-tencies (skill, knowledge, and aptitude) with organi-zational needs.

11. Employ an acquisition and logistics process thatsupports the continuous assessment of all require-ments to optimize the availability of appropriate re-sources and capabilities.

END STATES5

1. The CG is recognized globally as the vital U.S.ambassador for maritime safety and security.

2. All international maritime standards relating tothe maritime domain are negotiated through ei-ther the leadership or advice/support of the U.S.Coast Guard.

3. Threats to life, commerce, and homeland se-curity in the maritime domain are optimally ad-dressed as quickly and as far from our shores asis necessary with overlapping, tiered response ordeterrence.

4.a No maritime-relevant intelligence, surveil-lance, reconnaissance, navigation, and observa-tion system is designed and deployed without U.S.Coast Guard requirements included.

4.b All levels of government and the private sec-tor will recognize the U.S. Coast Guard as the leadfederal agency for establishing standards andcompetencies for maritime safety and security pre-vention and response.

5. U.S. Coast Guard coordinates the definition ofcomplete operating picture requirements and en-sures all source information is received from anddisseminated to pertinent maritime partners.

6. A nationally integrated risk management sys-tem that is consistent with U.S. Coast Guard au-thorities and responsibilities supports effectivedecision-making in the U.S. Maritime Domain.

7. U.S. Coast Guard, state, local and other DHSassets are optimally employed and coordinatedthrough a unified command authority using a com-mon operating picture.

8. The United States is able to exert positive con-trol over all activities of interest occurring in theU.S. Maritime Domain.

9. All U.S. Coast Guard planning, budgeting, andexecution are driven by continuous assessmentand understanding of future constituency needsand missions requirements.

10. Technical and leadership competency require-ments are based on current and future work andworkloads, and we have systems in place that con-tinually develop, allocate, and transform humancapital accordingly.

11. Readiness standards are balanced betweencurrent and future mission needs, while acquisi-tion and logistics systems continuously meetreadiness standards.

Know maritimeconditions,anomalies, andthreats to prevent,protect, andrespond.

Create andmanage anintegrated U.S.MaritimeDomain,as an expansiveborder region, topreserve andpromote thenational interest.

Position theCoast Guard toact with strategicintent in acomplex anduncertainenvironment.

25



From Evergreen Strategy to EvergreenAction

The Long View Review team noted the dangers of“too much planning and too little action.” So whathave been the hard results of all this meeting andtalking and writing?

The final eleven Project Evergreen strategies are in-forming Coast Guard activities across a wide rangeof settings, from headquarters to field commands.The rich and diverse pool of Coast Guard personnelthat participated in the strategy development processhave helped to plant the seeds of Evergreen learningthroughout the organization. A testament to the pow-er of its ideas is that Project Evergreen has expandedwell beyond the original participants in the scenarioworkshop. Evidence of the translation of Project Ev-ergreen ideas into vital actions can be seen across theentire Service:

• In the budgeting and planning area, Project Ever-green strategies have been used to stress-test thelong-term viability of specific new expenditures.

• An Area commander has adopted Project Ever-green as the format for submitting the Area budget(and direct reports are exhorted to devote 10 percentof every working day to strategic thinking).

• The senior Coast Guard officer overseeing themanagement of the massive Deepwater capital ac-quisition project makes a point of keeping theProject Evergreen strategies posted on his desk,where they can inform his decision-making.

• The output of Project Evergreen is already helpingto shape and inform national Homeland Securitystrategies.

• Human resource planners not only used the strat-egies as the foundation of their own planning, butalso used the scenarios themselves to better under-stand potential labor markets, the dynamics of turn-over, and the competencies that would be necessaryin the workforce in order to achieve the strategies.

• Personnel from the Office of Strategic Analysis(G-CCX) have applied Project Evergreen learning to

project work on Haiti and on Maritime DomainAwareness.

• Evergreen is beginning to be infused into theCoast Guard’s Baldrige quality evaluation process.

• An informal community of Evergreen veteransshares e-mails and perspectives on breaking newsevents related to scenario themes or related strate-gies, thus keeping both scenarios and related ProjectEvergreen strategies fresh and vital.

Of course, the examples above, and their informal,seemingly ad hoc nature, show just how early we arein the Evergreen process. Evergreen has only begunto affect the way the Coast Guard does its business.

But these examples also are quite consistent with theCoast Guard’s image of Evergreen as a process thatgoes well beyond formal strategy development. Infact, the individual initiatives of Coast Guard mem-bers and employees to creatively apply the lessonsto their everyday work – not just carrying out ProjectEvergreen strategies but incorporating its thinking –will be critical to sustaining the impact on the enter-prise. It is only through the work of committed, pas-sionate, informed people that the broader strategicvision of the organization can be brought to bear onthe everyday work of the Coast Guard, which is, inthe end, the only outcome that matters. In the wordsof one Flag officer, “We want to do our daily busi-ness with strategic intent.”

The bottom line is this: Effective strategy executionrequires a culture of strategic thinking. At the sametime, sustaining a culture of strategic thinking andintent is predicated upon faithful and credible strat-egy execution. Addressing both of these challengessimultaneously will be the major challenge in ener-gizing and sustaining Evergreen.

As the Service proceeds through the “cycle of strate-gic renewal,” the effects of Evergreen will be felt inmore obvious, formal, and dramatic ways. It is tothat cycle that we must now turn.

26



Building Strategic Intent

The Evergreen process is the result of over sevenyears of Coast Guard work with scenario-based stra-tegic planning, incorporating the insights and expe-rience of more than 300 officers, senior enlisted per-sonnel, civilians, and contractors. The scenario plan-ning technique has been adapted to fit Coast Guardneeds, and the strategies that have emerged from theprocess have been shown by subsequent events to beboth appropriate and resilient. An emerging doctrineof Coast Guard strategic planning, based on Ever-green, will provide the foundation for a service thatacts with strategic intent and is truly prepared for alleventualities.

Acting with strategic intent – what does that mean tothe Coast Guard?

Strategic intent consists of:

• Adopting a systems view

• Focusing on intent

• Thinking across time

• Creating and testing hypotheses

• Being intelligently opportunistic.

Strategic intent means that the Service knows whereit is going, as well as where it has been. It means thatstrategies are accompanied by a “vision of success”– clear pictures of what the Service looks like if thestrategies succeed. It means that near-term decisionsare made within a framework that includes long-termgoals and aspirations.

Just how does this work in practice? If there arethree different ways to solve a near-term require-ment, then the solution chosen is the one that mostclosely reflects Evergreen strategies. Acting withstrategic intent means that the budget and planningprocess represents both strategic priorities and near-term exigencies. Critically, it means that strategyshapes the budget, not the other way around.

The Elements of Strategic Renewal

How is strategic intent inculcated within the Service?

First, the Evergreen cycle of strategic renewal ismade a formal part of the Commandant’s commandcycle. Acting with strategic intent is thus interwoveninto the Commandants’ tenures.

Second, while long-range strategy fixes the Service’snavigation point, the operational realities of the cur-rent setting are not ignored. Contingency strategies,with trigger events and trends, are established alongwith constant scanning and updating activities.Changes in current events may suggest that a contin-gent strategy now be considered for inclusion in theformal set of core “robust” strategies. Thus the pro-cess remains “evergreen” in both the strategic andoperational sense.

Third, and arguably the most important element inthe long run, Evergreen scenario planning informsbudgeting and planning, management practices, andthe education and training systems of the CoastGuard. This means that Evergreen strategies contrib-ute to resource allocation decisions. It means that theEvergreen scenario planning is introduced or taughtat all appropriate levels of military and civilian edu-cation and training. Further, it means that the Ever-green process and resultant strategies are used as astrategic planning module of the Coast Guard perfor-mance evaluation and management system.

Fourth, the Evergreen process is used as a frameworkfor ad hoc decisions that require a long-term and stra-tegic perspective. The Evergreen process provides atool for “futures due diligence” as critical decisionsare made. For example, Evergreen is used to bridgethe inevitable gap between longer-term support andlogistics decisions and the exigencies of missionplanning, by using the scenarios as a framework forcoordinated operational and support planning.

III. INSTITUTIONALIZING THE EVERGREEN PROCESS

27



The Cycle of Strategic Renewal

The Evergreen process is intimately linked to theCommandants’ four-year command cycle. A newCommandant inherits the strategic planning andbudgeting legacy of his or her predecessor. Duringthe Commandant’s first two years, he or she can onlyaffect many large Coast Guard issues on the mar-gins. The Evergreen process acknowledges that real-ity of government service. The first year of a Com-mandant’s tenure (June to June) begins with an in-depth reassessment of the strategic context of theCoast Guard, an evaluation of new strategic priori-ties, a synthesis of previous strategic initiatives withthe new priorities, and early implementation initia-tives.

This process does not assume significant changes instrategic priorities passing from one Commandant'scommand to another. But at each new command, theprocess does begin with a clean strategic slate as aform of risk management – nothing critical shouldbe assumed or overlooked. The Evergreen processoperates under the assumption of continuity. Howev-er, it also operates under the belief that few thingsare more damaging to an organization than strategybased upon either momentum (“we have always

done it this way”) or the tyranny of the present (“to-day's trends and issues should drive our strategicthinking”).

The Coast Guard strategic cycle begins with the de-velopment of the incoming Commandant’s Direc-tion. Historically, the Commandant's Direction is thepersonal statement of critical priorities and agendaitems that the incoming Commandant intends to pur-sue during the next four years. It is not usually in-tended to be a list of strategies, though its prioritiescertainly have strategic impact. These items form thecore of the Commandant’s initial management agen-da. The sources of the Commandant's Direction in-clude personal experiences, priorities, goals and in-terests; the strategic and operational context of theCoast Guard; and broader Department of HomelandSecurity strategy. Evergreen complements the Com-mandant’s Direction well, since it provides the newCommandant with an analysis of the broader strate-gic context within which he or she will have to lead.

The cycle of strategic renewal begins with theCommandant’s Direction and proceeds through theCommandant’s tenure as shown on the followingpage.

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The U.S. Coast Guard Cycle of Strategic Renewal

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Definition of Terms and Processes

Commandant’s Direction

• The official near- and medium-term agenda of the new-ly selected Commandant.

• Sources of this document include:

- Department of Homeland Security strategy,

- The strategic context,

- The operational context,

- The newly selected Commandant’s personal goalsand priorities.

Core Team

The internal scenario team, typically working with a spe-cialty contractor. The Core Team is 8 to 12 people includ-ing civilians, senior enlisted personnel, and officers rang-ing from O4 to O6. They contribute to every stage of thescenario process, and in the Coast Guard experience re-main engaged through all Evergreen Phases.

Coast Guard Leadership Council (CGLC)

The Commandant, Vice Commandant, Chief of Staff, At-lantic Area Commander, Pacific Area Commander, theMaster Chief Petty Officer of the Coast Guard and an ap-pointed Senior Executive service officer (senior civilian).

Evergreen Phase I: Develop multiple strategicplanning scenarios

• Compile the list of mission drivers from research andinterviews (Core Team)

• Develop the dimensions that will form the boundariesof the planning space (Core Team and incoming Lead-ership Council)

• Select Scenarios (Leadership Council)

• Develop Scenarios (Core Team)

Evergreen Phase II: Develop strategies using themultiple scenarios

• Set strategy workshop goals (Core Team and Leader-ship Council)

• Design strategy workshop (Core Team)

• Conduct strategy workshop(s) (Core Team, LeadershipCouncil, officers, senior civilians, and senior enlistedpersonnel)

• Synthesize core strategies (Core Team)

• Perform a continuity analysis and a risk analysis (CoreTeam)

• Accept Strategies (The Leadership Council, the FlagCorps

Evergreen Phase III: Strategy implementationinitiatives and relevance analysis

• Perform gap analysis between current state and strate-gies (Leadership Council, Core Team and all appropri-ate offices and programs across the Service)

• Develop strategy implementation initiatives (Leader-ship Council, Core Team and all appropriate offices andprograms across the Service)

• Develop contingency strategies and trigger events(Core Team)

• Initiate trend and issues research (G-CCX)

Evergreen Phase IV: Operationalize andimplement strategies

• Develop implementation roadmaps (Leadership Coun-cil, Core Team and all appropriate offices and programsacross the Service)

• Assign responsibilities (Leadership Council)

• Coordinate with the budget and planning office (Lead-ership Council and all appropriate offices and pro-grams across the Service)

• Coordinate activities with the proposed Office of Per-formance Management and Decision Support (G-CPD), the Chief Knowledge Officer (CG-6) and all ap-propriate offices and programs across the Service

Evergreen Review

• Mid-course look at successes, failures, additions, orcorrections in the Evergreen output and process as a re-sult of experience and current events (G-CCX and allinvolved program, projects and offices).

Commandant’s Mid-Term Review

• The Commandant’s review of his first two years andcourse corrections for the balance of his term. This re-view may result in a re-issuance or adjustment of theCommandant’s Direction.

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Establishing Evergreen within theCoast Guard

Making Evergreen a defining part of the CoastGuard way of doing business is the final phase of theprocess, and arguably the most important. The meredevelopment of plans on paper will not accomplishthis goal; nor will a scenario planning process con-fined to a limited number of officers or Headquartersplanning units.

Critical actions to ingrain Evergreen in Coast Guardculture are driven by four key reinforcing principles:

• Decision-making processes up and down the orga-nization are driven by a common and coherent un-derstanding of long-term Coast Guard strategic pri-orities – strategic intent.

• Rigorous and continuous tracking of external con-ditions contributes to reevaluation of strategic direc-tion in light of these inevitable and potentially desta-bilizing changes.

• A culture of strategic awareness evolves thattouches all Coast Guard personnel and that takesSemper Paratus to the next level, beyond response,to enable superior awareness and anticipation.

• Evergreen awareness and learning are proactivelyshared throughout the Department of Homeland Se-curity and among all other stakeholders, locally, na-tionally and globally.

On a more individual level, the goal of Evergreencannot simply be to change processes, or even todevelop strategies. The broader and perhaps far moreimportant aim of the effort is to change how peoplethink – to develop strategic thinking as a matter ofcultural habit in Coast Guard men and women. Thisincludes:

• an ability to think of problems in terms of systems,rather than just in mechanical or linear fashion;

• an ability to think not just by reference to the past,but with anticipation of what the future might bring;

• an ability to think outside the Coast Guard, interms of partnerships;

• an ability to think not just in terms of the necessaryoptimization of operational subroutines or unit per-formance, but beyond that to a holistic appreciationof the requirements for sustained organizational ex-cellence across the entire Service.

One of the most difficult challenges facing the Ser-vice as it tries to instill strategic intent in its peoplearises from its very multi-mission nature. The CoastGuard must be highly efficient and effective at alarge variety of tasks. That has forced a certain levelof specialization onto the Service, which has histor-ically led to a natural pride in the particular special-ty to which one has often devoted one’s career. Pridein one’s specialty, much like pride in one’s militaryservice branch, leads in turn to group loyalties andspecialized focus that sometimes can get in the wayof what is best for the Service – and the nation – asa whole.

Evergreen is all about finding the common strategicobjectives that bind the Service together, despite ap-parent division and incompatibility. What follow areaction steps that are helping to make the overarchingstrategic vision embedded in these four objectives areality, while maintaining within the Service theflexibility to adapt to changing conditions.

Use of Contingent Strategies to InstillStrategic Intent

“Contingent strategies” are those strategies that areonly effective – or acceptable – under certain futureconditions. This is in contrast to the eleven “robust”Evergreen strategies that were judged likely to beeffective under a broad range of future conditions.

Since some of these contingent strategies are notsimply effective, but absolutely necessary, under cer-tain plausible future conditions, the Coast Guard willtake actions to ensure that it identifies contingentstrategies and recognizes when conditions areemerging that require execution of each contingentstrategy. Fortunately, the steps needed to ensure thatthe strategies are put in place at the right time willalso serve to involve a broader group of Coast Guardpersonnel in the Evergreen process.

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Those steps are as follows:

• Identify leading indicators that would indicate thata contingent strategy must be executed.

• Set up and operate a monitoring system to keeptrack of leading indicators and provide early warn-ing.

• Establish mechanisms to ensure that the results ofmonitoring are made part of decision-making pro-cesses at appropriate leadership levels.

Since contingent strategies can range from globaland all-embracing to local and focused, their propertreatment will inevitably involve many different lev-els and types of Coast Guard personnel. Personnelwill be oriented in the broader Evergreen processwhen they are tapped for involvement. This will en-sure that they understand their vital role in carryingout the strategic objectives of the Service as a whole.

Broader External Events Monitoring andInternal Communication

The essence of strategy is combining an awarenessof the operating environment with an ability to com-municate strategic direction throughout the organi-zation. Evergreen, in order to succeed, requires con-stant scanning and communication.

Aside from the more focused monitoring of indica-tors linked to specific strategies, a more general ap-proach of using the scenarios to scan the news willbenefit the Coast Guard. Participants in all three ofthe Coast Guard’s scenario-based planning projectsdeveloped an informal network of future-orientedthinkers. Their identification with the “scenarioworlds” that they “inhabited” during their projects,and their knowledge of some of the other “worlds,”give them a ready framework with which to analyzethe news. They often bring to the attention of theircolleagues news items that would otherwise go un-noticed: an epidemic of drug-resistant TB in Russianprisons, say, or increased volcanic activity aroundthe Ring of Fire, or an increase in the popularity ofgated communities.

This informal “prairie fire” of interest in the futurehas altered and enriched the way these people appre-hend the news, their world, and the future of the

Coast Guard. By overlaying a bit of structure andtechnology on this natural offshoot of the Evergreenprocess, an interactive website or “blog” for record-ing these observations and insights, the Coast Guardwill multiply the positive impact of Evergreen, in-volve more and more people in the ongoing strategicdialogue, and invest them in the never-ending pro-cess of strategic renewal.

Regular updates are also issued by G-CCX to keepleadership and Service members aware of the latestEvergreen activities and to enhance the knowledgeof the Evergreen process and output across the Ser-vice.

The Interface between Evergreen and theBudgeting Process

Perhaps no element of the institutionalization of Ev-ergreen is more critical than linking the Evergreenprocess into budgetary decisions, for both the incre-ment and the base. Evergreen input will inform thebudget process; Evergreen strategies will be translat-ed into terms that staff and operational leaders canuse; the risk management/due diligence function ofEvergreen will be emphasized; and allocation offunds will be consistent with the strategic objectivesof the organization as a whole, as expressed by theEvergreen process.

The budget process has evolved to include Evergreenboth directly and indirectly. At the outset of the pro-cess, the Office of Budget and Programs (CG-82)issues strategy and budget guidance “themes,” eachwith dollar limits that reflect prevailing overall bud-get constraints. The Department’s official strategyand Evergreen are inputs at this stage, to assure thatthe themes contribute to the strategic direction of theCoast Guard. Later, when individual budgets aresubmitted, Project Evergreen is used explicitly tojustify requests by showing that expenditures willsupport specific strategies.

This cannot be a one-way interaction, with budgetprocesses and people bending to Evergreen norms.The output of Evergreen will be translated into termsthat make sense from a budgetary perspective.Where possible, the budgetary impacts of strategiesand contingencies identified in the course of the Ev-ergreen process will be quantified. To achieve this,

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intensive interaction between budgeting and strategyunits, including prominent representation of budgetpersonnel in the Evergreen process and close interac-tion of Evergreen process people at the front end ofthe budget cycle, will be the norm.

Taking Evergreen to the Coast Guard

The final category of actions necessary to institution-alize Evergreen into the Coast Guard involves em-bedding the Evergreen process throughout the entireService.

Management and Performance Evaluation

For Evergreen to succeed, it must become a centralfeature of the management framework of the Ser-vice. Evergreen concepts and strategies should bepart of the Coast Guard Commandant’s PerformanceChallenge (CPC) process. The proposed Office ofPerformance Management and Decision Support (G-CPD) will be responsible for applying the BaldrigeAward criteria (also known as the Commandant’sPerformance Excellence Criteria) across the Serviceas organizational standards of management excel-lence. Quality Performance Consultants help units toevaluate their performance and supply recommenda-tions for management improvements. A voluntaryCommandant’s Quality Award system exists formore mature Coast Guard units and staffs. Evergreenshould be included as the module of the strategicplanning category. But more immediately, the CPCprocess will provide a regularized training and edu-cation link to Evergreen through its train-the-man-agement team approach to improving managerialexcellence. This approach can be used as a forcemultiplier to spread and reinforce knowledge of sce-nario planning, the Evergreen strategies, and upcom-ing Evergreen activities. Evergreen, as a cutting-edge management tool, is particularly appropriatefor inclusion in the ongoing Baldrige activities of G-CPD.

Education

It is critical to refresh the cadre of people in theCoast Guard who are trained to think strategically

and who understand the Evergreen cycle. The Ever-green process and scenario planning will be intro-duced or taught at all appropriate levels of enlisted,civilian and officer education and training. TheCoast Guard Academy, OCS, and the LeadershipSchools will be fruitful venues for Evergreen train-ing and awareness activities.

It is crucial that the future leadership be grounded inthe logic of Evergreen, be fully apprised of the Ever-green strategies and how they were developed, andaccustom themselves to thinking with strategic in-tent. A segment on Evergreen, and the scenario plan-ning process, can be inserted into the Academy andother leadership curricula either in a course formator as Spotlight Lectures. The Management andLeadership Department is a logical place to centerthese activities.

It is also vital that future Evergreen strategy exercisesinclude emerging leadership in separate scenarioworkshops as a check on, and complement to, the stra-tegic ideas of their elders. The experience of LongView, in which a workshop at the Academy was in-cluded, demonstrated the value of getting a look atstrategy through the eyes of people who will have tolive with the long-term decisions of current leader-ship, and whose youth provides needed diversity.

Taking Evergreen to the Field Commanders

All good ideas, needless to say, do not emerge fromHeadquarters. It is important that Evergreen extendits reach to the Areas, and perhaps to some Districts.As mentioned above, this is already occurring duringthe annual budgeting process. It will eventually beembedded in the thinking process of the Area andDistrict leadership.

The Areas will engage in something as close as pos-sible to the “full-out” scenario workshop experience.These workshops could examine particular issues ofimportance to the Area across a spread of differentscenarios. Alternatively, the Areas could examine“wild card events,” such as terrorist attacks, environ-mental disasters, mass migrations, and other eventsthat could conceivably occur no matter how the fu-ture unfolds.

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Outreach: DHS, Broader Government,Congress, the Public

Evergreen is a vitally important part of the CoastGuard's never-ending effort to provide the greatestpossible service to the American public as efficientlyas possible. By allowing the Service to avoid futurehazards and grasp future opportunities, Evergreenacts as the fulcrum for complementing the CoastGuard’s status as the world’s greatest first respond-ers and world-class fast reaction team with a newskill set of strategic intent and the ability to antici-pate possible massive changes on the horizon.

But it is not enough to know that ourselves. For Ev-ergreen to succeed, we will make certain that ourconstituencies – departmental, Congressional, andthe general public – understand what it is, why it isso important, and how it can serve their needs aswell. As an example, Evergreen is already helpingthe Chief of Naval Operation’s Strategic StudiesGroup at the Naval War College, which is using Ev-ergreen scenarios to good effect to help their partic-ipants think more expansively about the future.

Our constituencies should know that Evergreen is anecessary, cutting-edge risk management and due-diligence activity that is consistent with the Govern-ment Performance and Results Act, and a superbmechanism for avoiding expensive failures of imag-ination. The Coast Guard has a particular duty to ar-ticulate how its current efforts are going to prepare

for the relatively distant future, because its currentacquisitions will often be in use three or four de-cades down the line. Evergreen is a process that bet-ter ensures that Coast Guard acquisitions are goingto be capable of fulfilling vital national needs in thatdistant future. Regular adjustment to the Evergreenscenarios and strategies, on a schedule correspond-ing to the tenure of the Commandant and top leader-ship, is the best way to guarantee that these vital ac-quisitions are wise ones.

The Coast Guard will also fulfill its duty as a gooddepartmental citizen through continued outreachupwards to DHS management, and, to the extentpossible and appropriate, use of Evergreen outputand process to enhance DHS strategy, budget anddecision processes.

Finally, outreach to the general public via communi-cations and continuing two-way dialogue will al-ways be a critical way for the Coast Guard to accom-plish its duties. That is as true of Evergreen as of anyother Coast Guard initiative. Regular communica-tion with the public will be an integral part of theEvergreen process as we move forward.

This book is just the first step in that importantendeavor.

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U.S. Coast Guard Evergreen Process Evergreen I.pdfU.S. Coast Guard Evergreen Process Version 1.0 May...

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Transcript of U.S. Coast Guard Evergreen Process Evergreen I.pdfU.S. Coast Guard Evergreen Process Version 1.0 May...