US ARMY WAR COLLEGEnetwork centric operations that enabled the military to swiftly defeat Iraqi...

US ARMY WAR COLLEGE

INFORMATION AS POWER

VOLUME 4

AN ANTHOLOGY OF SELECTED UNITED STATES ARMY WAR COLLEGE STUDENT PAPERS

Faculty Review Board

Cynthia E. Ayers, Jeffrey L. Caton, John H. Greenmyer, Dennis M. Murphy, Constance A. Phlipot, and David J. Smith

Information as Power is a refereed anthology of United States Army War College (USAWC) student papers related to information as an element of national power. It provides a medium for the articulation of ideas promul-gated by independent student research in order to facilitate understanding of the information element of power and to better address related national security issues. The anthology serves as a vehicle for recognizing the analyses of Army War College students and provides a resource for USAWC graduates, senior military officers, and interagency national security practi-tioners concerned with the information element of national power. Special thanks to David J. Smith for his significant editorial and adminis-trative support, to Ritchie Dion for his meticulous layout editing, and to Jennifer Nevil for the cover design.

Information as Power

INFORMATION AS POWER

An Anthology of Selected United States Army War College Student Papers

Volume Four

Editors:

Jeffrey L. Caton, Cori E. Dauber, Jeffrey L. Groh, David J. Smith

Information as Power

An Anthology of Selected United States Army War College Student Papers

Volume Four

Executive Agent for the Anthology:United States Army War College

The views contained in this publication are those expressed by the authors and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the United States Army War College, the Department of Defense, or any other Department or Agency within the United States Government. This publication is cleared for public release; distribution is unlimited.

Published January 2010.

This publication is available on line at the following:

http://www.carlisle.army.mil/dime or,

http://www.csl.army.mil/InfoAsPower.aspx

Cover photograph by Staff Sgt. DeNoris A. Mickle, USAF.Used by permission.

U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGECARLISLE BARRACKS, PENNSYLVANIA 17013

ContentsPreface

Section 1: Information Effects in the Cognitive Dimension

Introduction Professor Dennis M. Murphy

Speed Versus Accuracy: A Zero Sum Game Colonel Jeffrey L. Scott

Developing an Operational Level Strategic Communication Model for Counterinsurgency Colonel David P. Anders

Empowering United States Public Diplomacy for the War of Ideas Lieutenant Colonel Douglas W. Little

National Communication Strategy Colonel Suhail M. Alseraidi

Section 2: Information Effects through Network and Knowledge-based Operations

Introduction Professor William O. Waddell

Defining and Deterring Cyberwar Lieutenant Colonel Scott W. Beidleman

Impeding Network Centric Warfare: Combatant Command Information Technology Support Colonel David A. Barlow

Knowledge Centric Warfare: An Introduction Lieutenant Colonel Robert B. Sofge

Enabling Security, Stability, Transition, and Reconstruction Operations through Knowledge Management Commander Timothy L. Daniels

Endnotes

3

5

43

59

65

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69

107

89

21

129

149

Preface

The Information in Warfare Working Group (I2WG) of theU.S.ArmyWarCollege (USAWC) ispleased topresent thisanthologyofselectedstudentworkfromAcademicYear2009

representing examples of well-written and in-depth analyses on thevitalsubjectofInformationasPower.Thisisthefourthvolumeofaneffortthatbeganin2006.TheI2WGchartercallsforittocoordinateandrecommendthedesign,developmentandintegrationofcontentand courses related to the information element of power into thecurriculum to prepare students for senior leadership positions. Thispublicationisanimportantcomponentofthateffort.

Interestingly, oneneeds to goback to theReagan administration tofind the most succinct and pointed mention of information as anelement of power in formal government documents.1 Subsequentnationalsecuritydocuments,toincludethe2007NationalStrategyforStrategicCommunication andPublicDiplomacy, allude todifferentaspectsofinformationbutwithoutaholistic,overarchingstrategyordefinition.Still,itisgenerallyacceptedintheUnitedStatesgovernmenttoday that information is an element of national power along withdiplomatic, military and economic power…and that information iswoven through theother elements since their activitieswillhave aninformational impact.2 Giventhisdearthofofficialdocumentation,Drs.DanKuehlandBobNielsonprofferedthefollowingdefinitionoftheinformationelement:“useofinformationcontentandtechnologyas strategic instruments to shape fundamental political, economic,militaryandcultural forcesona long-termbasis toaffect theglobalbehavior of governments, supra-governmental organizations, andsocietiestosupportnationalsecurity.”3Informationaspoweriswieldedina complexenvironmentconsistingof thephysical, informational,andcognitivedimensions.

Thecurrentinformationenvironmenthasleveledtheplayingfieldfornotonlynationstates,butnon-stateactors,multinationalcorporationsand even individuals to affect strategic outcomes with minimalinformationinfrastructureandlittlecapitalexpenditure.Anyonewith

viii Information as Power

acameracellphoneandpersonaldigitaldevicewithinternetcapabilityunderstands this. Adversary use of information as an asymmetricstrategicmeanshasbeenextremelyeffectiveinthecurrenttheatersofIraqandAfghanistan leadingRichardHolbrooke to famouslymuse:“How can a man in a cave out-communicate the world’s leadingcommunicationssociety?”4Andso,whiletheUnitedStatesiscertainlya military “superpower” whether it maintains that same status withregardtoinformationisdebatable.

On the other hand, the U.S. military has increasingly leveragedadvances in information infrastructure and technology to gainadvantagesonthemodernbattlefield.OneexamplefromOperationIraqiFreedomisthesignificantincreaseinsituationalawarenessfromnetworkcentricoperationsthatenabledthemilitarytoswiftlydefeatIraqiforcesinmajorcombatoperations.5

Clearly,managingthe“message”whilecontrollingandexploitingthenecessarytechnological“means”representcriticalchallengesintoday’sinformationenvironment.WehopethatthisanthologywillservenotonlytoshowcasetheeffortsoftheCollegebuttoinformthebroaderbody of knowledge as the Nation considers how best to operateeffectivelyandproactivelywithinthisenvironmentwhilecounteringcurrentandpotentiallyfutureadversaries.

ProfessorDennisM.MurphyChair,InformationinWarfareWorkingGroupUnitedStatesArmyWarCollege

Section one

InformationEffectsintheCognitiveDimension

introduction

Dennis M. MurphyProfessorofInformationinWarfare

CenterforStrategicLeadershipU.S.ArmyWarCollege

This section focuses on “information effects” that includethose actions, images, and words that ultimately influenceperceptionsandattitudesleadingtoachangeinbehavior.Rafal

RohozinskiandDennisMurphyrightlynotethat“ifIO(informationoperations)ismeanttoaccomplishaplannedintent,thentheconceptof‘informationeffects’compelsabroaderanalyticallensthatincludestheunintendedconsequencesofboth IOandkinetic actions.” TheDepartmentofDefense(DoD)laterincludedthissameexplanationintheirdescriptionoftheconceptofstrategiccommunication.Inshort,themessagessoldiersandU.S.governmentofficialssend,boththroughinformational means and other actions, will in some way influencethe receivers: adversary, friendly, and neutral; foreign and domestic.This section considers strategic communication as a way to achievethese information effects. Public Diplomacy, military InformationOperations and Public Affairs are inherently capabilities (means) ofstrategic communicationandare explicitly statedas such innascentDoDliteratureonthistopic.Thepapersinthissectiongrapplewithsomeofthe issuespresent inthesecapabilitiesandtheabilityoftheUnitedStatestousethemeffectivelytoachievestrategicobjectives.

ColonelJeffreyL.Scottexaminestherequirementforandtheroleofspeedandaccuracyininformingandinfluencingkeyaudiences.Hispaperprovidesanoverviewofhowtheenemyuses information; theenemy’s strategy to disrupt U.S. operations; and the application ofcurrent decision making processes in defeating the enemy’s strategy.It concludes with a recommendation for an information strategydevelopedtoovercomethespeedversusaccuracydilemmaandincreaseoperationaleffectiveness.

4 Information as Power

ColonelDavidP.Andersconsiderstheroleofstrategiccommunicationincounterinsurgencyoperations,offeringamodeltooperationalizetheconcept. Hearguesthatstrategiccommunicationshouldbemadeaprioritybydirecting itbe a lineofoperationon equal footingwithsecurity,governance,anddevelopmentwithinthecounterinsurgencyspectrumthusensuringcontinuousstrategic,operationalandtacticalleadershipattentionandinput.Thestepsindevelopingthisoffensivemodelcanbeidentifiedbyansweringthe“fiveW’s”(why,who,where,what,when),andmostimportantlythe“how”ofthecounterinsurgentstrategiccommunicationenvironment.

Lieutenant Colonel Douglas W. Little explores how U.S. hubrisregardingitsglobalinfluenceinaunipolarworldmarginalizedaonceindependent and effective Department of State public diplomacyeffort.Similarly,thepaperillustrateshowamisguidedU.S.impressionoftheuniversalityofthedemocraticpeacetheoryandafundamentalmisunderstandingoftherootsofinternationalterrorismcontinuetoimpedesustainableprogressinthewarofideas.Thepaperconcludeswith recommendations to revitalize U.S. public diplomacy and toestablishasustainableandeffectivevisionforthefuture.

Finally,ColonelSuhailM.AlseraidioftheUnitedArabEmiratesprovidesafascinatingconceptuallookatwhataU.S.NationalCommunicationStrategyshouldlooklike.ColonelAlseraidi,anInternationalFellowintheArmyWarCollegeclassof2009,providesinsightsthroughtheeyesofapartnernationanditsownuniqueculturallensontheappropriateapproachtostrategiccommunicationwiththeworldinthisshort,butimportantessay.

Well-writtenandinsightful,thesepapersservetoinformthemilitaryandthenationasitcontinuestoconductmilitarycampaignsintwotheaterswhileengagingtheworld.

SPeed VerSuS accuracy: a Zero Sum Game

Colonel Jeffrey L. ScottUnitedStatesArmy

An effective information strategy requires credibility.Truthfuland accurate messaging develops and maintains credibility,however, the collection of correct information required for

accurate messaging sacrifices speed. Speed is required to providecurrent,relevantinformationtoinformandinfluencekeypopulations.Thesacrificeinspeedtoreleasemessagesresultsintheinabilityto“tellyour side of the story” first. Constantly disputing initial publishedaccountsreducestheabilitytoeffectivelyinformandinfluenceselectkeyaudiences,andovertimereducessourceandmessagecredibility.Thedilemmaofspeedversusaccuracyinmessagingcreatesazerosumgameininformationstrategythatreducesoperationaleffectiveness.

Thispaperexaminesthetrade-offsbetweenspeedandaccuracyinanirregularwarfare information environment. Itbeginsby establishingtherequirementfor,andtherolesof,speedandaccuracyininformingand influencing key audiences. The paper provides an overview ofhowtheenemyusesinformation,theenemy’sstrategytodisruptU.S.operations, and the application of Boyd’s OODA loop in defeatingthe enemy’s strategy. It concludes with a recommendation forovercoming the speed versus accuracy dilemma through developingandimplementinganeffectiveinformationstrategyinwhich“actionsandwords”arecongruent,ensuringtheaccuracyandspeedrequiredtoinformandinfluencekeypopulations.

InMarch2006,U.S.andIraqiSpecialForcesengagedanddefeatedaJaishalMahdi(JAM)forceresponsibleforthemurdersofseveralIraqiciviliansandIraqiSoldiers.Withinanhourofleavingtheengagementsite,JAMhadstagedthebodiesofdeadfighterstoappearascivilians,photographedthescene,andpostedtheimagesonthewebalongwithapressreleaseclaimingU.S.forceshadkilledthemenwhiletheyprayedinamosque.AlthoughU.S.forcesphotographedandvideotapedtheaction,ittookthreedaystoreleasetheinformation.1TheuntimelyU.S.


releaseofinformationappearedasareactiontoenemypropagandaandresultedinlossofcredibilityfortheU.S.effort.

In July 2008, U.S. led coalition forces in Afghanistan stated theyconductedanairstrikewhichkilledinsurgents.2Localsclaimedtheairstrikekilledcivilians.Aninvestigationrevealedtheairstrikekilled47civiliansattendingaweddingparty.3ThespeedofresponsebytheU.S.forcesresultedininaccuratestatementsbeingmadebeforethefactsofthesituationwerefullyknown.ThedisseminationofmisinformationdamagedU.S.credibilityandgavetheenemyanopportunitytoexploitagainsttheU.S.effort.

In both examples, the misapplication of speed in disseminatinginformation to key audiences damaged the credibility of the U.S.mission.Withtheimportanceofinformationintoday’sirregularwarfareenvironment,howdoyoudevelopaneffectivestrategytoovercomethespeedversuscredibilitydilemma?Aneffectiveinformationstrategyisbasedondecentralization.OperationsplannedandconductedandthedailyinteractionsoftheunitsandSoldiersonthegroundmustsendthemessage.Onlythencananinformationstrategymaintainthespeedtoenableandenhanceactionandbolstertheorganization’scredibilityduetoenhancedoperationaleffectiveness.

Credibility and Speed

Accuracy is essential to an effective information strategy. Manysimply believe presenting factual information guarantees credibility.However, does accuracy equal credibility? Credibility is a conditionbasedupontheaudiences’perceptionsofthemessageandsource.4Istheorganizationtrustworthyandisthemessagebelievable?

The audience considers three factors in determining credibility:accuracyofmessagecontent,unbiasedpresentation,andtheaudience’sreactiontothesource.5Anyverifiedorperceivederrorininformationpresentedisviewedasinaccuracy.Presentingonlyonepointofviewoftheissuesoromissionofunfavorableinformationisconsideredbias.Theaudience’sreactiontothesourceisbasedontheaudience’spastandpresentexperiences(bothactualandperceived)withthesource.6Asacondition,credibilitymustbedevelopedandmaintainedbythesource

7Information Effects in the Cognitive Dimension

withtheaudience.Becauseitmustbedevelopedandmaintainedwiththeaudience,credibilitymustbeorientedtowardactionandnotbasedsolelyonwords.

Credibility isdevelopingthe“coresofcredibility”–integrity, intent,capability, and results – that make the communicator and thecommunicator’smessagebelievablewithkeypopulations.7InSpeed of Trust, Stephen Covey goes to great lengths to explain the “cores ofcredibility”becausetheyaretheessenceofdevelopingandmaintainingtheconditionofcredibility.8Integrityismorethanjusthonestyandareputationofbeingtruthful.Itisbeingcongruentwithactionsandwords.Intentinvolvestransparency–nohiddenagendasormotives.Intentisderivedfromthebehavioroftheorganizationandisdirectlyrelatedtointegrity.Theaudiencemustbelievetheorganizationhastheirinterest in mind. Capabilities are displayed through professionalism(expertiseandknowledge)oftheorganization.Lastly,theorganizationproducesresults.Theyareoperationallyeffective.Theorganizationisperceivedbytheaudiencetofinishwhatitstarts.9Theapplicationoforlackofadherencetothese“coresofcredibility”inallactionswiththeaudiencedeterminestheirpastandpresentexperienceseitherpositiveornegative.Asstatedearlier,theseexperiencesdeterminetheaudience’sreactiontotheorganizationasasource–whetheritistrustworthyandtheirmessagebelievable.

Indeterminingthequalityandcredibilityof information,timelinessof information is required to ensure it is relevant to the audience.The requirement for currency, and the fact technology acceleratesinformation delivery to the audience, makes speed an importantcomponentofinformationstrategy.Itisessentialtoreleaseinformationto inform audiences of one’s positive actions with sufficient speedto prevent the enemy from exploiting and discrediting one’s actionthroughtheuseofmisinformationanddisinformation.

Speed is importantwhen reportingunfavorablenews resulting fromtheactionsoffriendlyforces.Releasingfactualinformationrelatedtonegative events prevents the negative credibility which results fromallowing theenemy to release the informationfirst.Failure toapplyspeed in releasingnewsofnegative actiongives the appearanceof acoverup,alackoftransparency.Itenhancestheeffectivenessofenemy


propaganda by allowing him to release the information first. Thedelayedreleasebyfriendlyforceseitherbecomesanendorsement,orconfirmstheaccuracyof theenemy’s informationthereby increasingtheircredibility.10

Speedismostcommonlyassociatedwith,andseenasarequirementin, crisis response communications. A crisis is “a significant threatto operations that can have negative consequences if not handledproperly.”11Acrisiscausesaninformationvacuum.Incrisisresponse,speed is required to allow the organization to tell its side of thestoryandfill the informationvoidbeforetheenemycandosowithmisinformationordisinformation.However,therearefactorslimitingtheapplicationofspeedinrespondingtoacrisisevent.Thesizeoftheincident,theamountofconfusioncreatedbytheincident,thelocationof the incident, and the ability to respond to the incident scene allaffecttheabilitytocollectthefactualinformationrequiredtoquicklyinformaudiencesoftheincident.12

In February 2007, an incident in Afghanistan provided an exampleoftheriskassociatedwithapplyingspeedinresponsetoacrisiseventwithout collecting and confirming the facts and de-conflicting themessagewithintheorganization.AsuicidebomberattackedaKhosthospital opening ceremony. Different U.S. elements and the localmediaparticipatingintheceremonyimmediatelybegantodisseminatedifferent accounts of the event. After several weeks of attemptingto correct the initial misinformation disseminated, the end resultremainedunchanged.ThelocalaudienceperceivedtheUnitedStatestohaveintentionallyspreaddisinformationconcerningtheevent.13

Disseminationofinaccurateinformationaffectsthe“coresofcredibility”of integrity, intent, and capability of the organization. Inaccurateinformation damages the organization’s reputation of truthfulnessandresultsinincongruencebetweenactionsandwords.Itmakestheorganization look inconsistent and displays a lack of transparency.Disseminating inaccurate information requires retractions andcorrectionswhichinturnmaketheorganizationlookincompetent.14Thisdoesnotmeanspeedshouldbesacrificedtomitigatetherisktocredibility.


InOngoing Crisis Communication: Planning, Managing, and Responding,Timothy W. Coombs presents instances in which speed in crisisresponsedisplayedcontrolofthesituation.Heexplainshowaquickresponsedemonstratestheorganizationistakingactionandiscapablewhilea slowonedisplays incompetence.15Theproperapplicationofspeedinresponsedemonstratescompetenceandincreasesthecapabilityelementofthe“coresofcredibility.”

The proper application of speed and its affect on credibility is notlimitedtocrisisresponse.Asdiscussed,itholdstrueforallsituationsrelatedtoaneffectiveinformationstrategy.Thisisthezerosumgameofspeedandaccuracyininformationstrategy.Inirregularwarfare,thisisthevulnerabilitytheenemyattacks.

The Enemy’s Strategy

In irregular warfare, the enemy understands he cannot defeat themilitaryforcesofthestrongeropponent.Destroythestrongerforces’credibility andhedestroys their ability to informand influencekeyaudiencesinordertomaintainthesupportnecessarytosucceed.Thisistheintentoftheenemy’sstrategy.16Inordertofulfillthisstrategicintentand keep their message in front of supporters and opponents alike,theenemyreliesonactionintheformofterrorismandintimidation.These are acts of violence conducted by the enemy to influenceaudiences’ perceptions, cognitions, and actions.17 In The Accidental Guerrilla,DavidKilcullenlabeledthisuseofphysicalactiontoachieveinformationeffectsas“armedpropaganda.”18Theseviolentactshavelittlemilitaryvaluebutsendamessagetotheenemy’stargetaudiences–theirsupportersandopponents.Becausenegativeinformationmoreeasily influences than positive, these negative events have a greaterimpact.19Additionally,becausetheenemycontrolsthetime,place,andmanneroftheviolentacts,itincreasestheircredibilityasasourceandprovidesaleveloflegitimacywiththeaudience.20“Armedpropaganda”gainsandmaintainsactiveandpassivesupportofthepopulationtheyarefightingfor,erodesthepoliticalwilloftheopponent,andseparatesthe opposingdecisionmakers from thepopulace.21 If terrorism andintimidationaredesignedtosendamessage,themediaisthemessenger.


RichardJostenstates“terrorismisstrategiccommunicationinthepurestdefinition–messageandaction–utilizingtheglobalcommunicationsnetwork more to influence than inform.”22 Without the media, theenemy’s“armedpropaganda”wouldbeineffective.Itwouldnotreachitstargetaudiences.Thequestiontobeanswerediswhyarenationalandinternationalmediasoquicktodisseminatetheenemy’smessage?Just as negative information is more apt to influence than positiveinformation,violentactionmakesbetternewsthanpeaceful,orderlybehavior.AccordingtoPratkanisandAronson,

…editors and reporters tend to look for stories that 1) are new and timely, 2) involve conflict or scandal, 3) concern the strange or unusual, 4) happen to famous or familiar people, 5) capable of being made dramatic and personal, 6) simple to convey in a short space or time, 7) contain visual elements and, 8) fit a theme that is currently prominent in the news and society.23

Theenemyhasbecomeadeptat exploiting themedia.TheTaliban’smedia campaign drives the news media and commands headlinescreatingtheperceptiontheyarestrongerthantheyreallyare.24Theirspectacularattacksgainmediaheadlinesandfacilitatetheirimmediateresponse to journalists to shape the story to their advantage.25 TheTaliban outpace the Afghan government in accessibility and speedtowardsthemedia.Theymakeregularcallsandsendtextmessagestojournalists,oftenwithinminutesofattacks,topublicizetheiractions.26

This“speedstrategy”utilizedbytheTalibanmakesuseofgatekeeping,priming,andframing.27Gatekeepinginvolvesintimidatingcommunityleadersandjournalistsinordertopreventthemfrommakingstatementsand reportingactionsunfavorable to their causeornotgiving themdueprominenceinthemedia.Priminginvolvesthetimingof“armedpropaganda” to ensure the correct amountof space and time in themedia is devoted to their message. It allows them to command theheadlinesinthemedia.Thisforcestheaudiencestofocusontheirissueandthinkabouttheirmessage.Theconstantcontactandimmediateavailability to journalistsallowtheTalibanto framethe informationinsuchawaythatitwillinfluencetheaudiencewiththe“facts”theyprovide.


The use of “armed propaganda” and “speed strategy” increases theenemy’sabilitytocontroloperationaltempoandplacesU.S.forcesinareactionaryposture.28Constantlybeinginareactionarypostureleadstothelossofinitiativewhichinturnreducesoperationaleffectiveness.“Armed propaganda” and “speed strategy” attack credibility – theintentoftheenemystrategy–byreducingtheopponent’soperationaleffectiveness.

Boyd’s OODA Loop

Many attempt to apply John Boyd’sOODA (Observe, Orient, Decide,Act) loop in response to theenemy’s“armed propaganda” and “speedstrategy.” The application of theOODA loop is not incorrect in thisenvironment.Itisjusttheapplicationof the wrong OODA loop conceptdeveloped by Boyd – his idea ofthe rapid OODA loop – for thesituation(seefigure1).Boyd’s intentoftherapidOODAloopistoincreasespeedindecisionmakingandexecutionofkineticactionatthetacticallevel.29Tacticalengagementsrequireimmediateactionandresults.

Intheinformationenvironment,theimmediateresponsetoaspecificinstanceof“armedpropaganda” is thereleaseofpublic information.The application of speed in releasing public information involvesproviding the facts required to facilitate public safety to the media.Thislimitstheenemy’sabilitytoframethe“facts”oftheincidentwithmisinformation and disinformation and increases one’s credibilitybyshowingcontroloverthesituationaswellasconcernforthelocalpopulace.Becausetheorganizationreactstoaspecificeventwhichispart of an overall strategy designed to influence, it is impossible tocounterthewaythespecificeventhasinfluenceafterthefact.Itisthesameasdirectlyrefutingeachpieceofenemypropagandaproduced.30One cannot “out-loop” and disrupt the enemy’s OODA loop byapplyingtherapidOODAloopinareactionarystate.Theapplication

OBSERVE

ACT

DECIDE

ORIENT

Figure 1: Traditional Rapid OODA Loop


of the rapid OODA loop in this environment causes a trade-offbetweenspeedandaccuracyof informationresultingintheinabilitytodevelopandmaintaincredibility.Bypursuingthiscourseofaction,theenemy’suseof“armedpropaganda”and“speedstrategy”disruptshisopponent’sability toproduce longtermeffects.Theopponent isinaconstantreactionarystateandcedesthe initiativetotheenemy.TheapplicationoftheOODAloopineffectiveinformationstrategygoesbeyondBoyd’s ideaof the rapidOODAlooptohis laterworkconcerningoperationalandstrategiclevelstrategies.

BoydlaterexpandedtheOODAlooptheorytosupporthisstrategicperspective(seefigure2).Asfigure2depicts,Boyd’sexpandedOODAloop is much more detailed and complicated than his earlier rapidOODA loopconcept.This expanded theory isbasedon interactionandisolation.Successdependsonsustainingandimprovingtheabilitytointeractwithintheoperatingenvironmentandtoisolatetheenemybylimitinghisabilitytointeractwithinthatsameenvironment.32

Boydarguesthatinteractionandisolationoccuronthreelevels:physical,mental,andmoral.Physicalinteractionoccurswiththeexchangeofmatter,energy,andinformationwithothersoutsideoftheorganization– friend and foe.33 The physical includes both communication and

CulturalTraditions

OBSERVATIONS

OBSERVE ORIENT DETECT ACT

AnalysisAnd

Synthesis

PreviousExperiences

CulturalTraditions

GeneticHeritage

NewInformation

ACTION(TEST)

DECISION(HYPOTHESIS)

UnfoldingCircumstances

OutsideInformation

Unfolding Interaction with

Environment

Unfolding Interaction with

Environment

Implicit Guidance & Control

Implicit Guidance & Control

Feedback

Feedback

FeedForward

FeedForward

FeedForward

BOYD’S OODA LOOP

Figure 2: Boyd’s OODA Loop31


actionsconductedwith theoutsideworld.Mentallyanorganizationinteracts by gathering and assessing the information from varyingsources in order to develop mental images and impressions andmatchingthosewiththeeventsoccurringaroundtheorganization.34It is properly identifying positive and negative trends and changesto those trends in the environmentwhichdirect appropriate action.Moral interaction occurs by preventing mismatches in words anddeeds.Itisabidingbythe“codeofconductandstandardsofbehaviorone is expected to uphold.”35 Sustaining and improving interactionwiththeenvironmentisdevelopingandmaintainingcredibilitywithkeyaudiences.

Isolation limits the opponent’s ability to sustain and improve hisinteraction with the environment. In the physical realm, he cannotgain support from others; mentally, he cannot make sense of hissurroundings; morally, he fails to abide by the code of conduct orstandardsofbehaviordeemedacceptable.36Theopponentisunabletodevelopandmaintaincredibility.

According toBoyd, interactionwith theoperatingenvironment is aconstantloopthatbeginswithobservation.Observationprovidestheinformation necessary for interaction in the mental realm. It is theprimary source of new information which influences decisions andaction.Aspartoftheconstantloop,observationcollectsfeedbackintheformofassessmentoffriendlyactionsincludingthereactionsoftheenemyandreactionsandperceptionsofkeyaudiences.However,allthisinformationismeaninglesswithoutproperorientation.

Boyd’sexpandedOODAloopplacesorientationinthecentrallocation,influencing all other elements of the loop.Orientationprovides thevision, focus, and direction to process the information gathered byobservation,andguideandcontrolaction.37Itdictatesone’sabilitytointeractinthephysicalandmoralrealms.Orientationistheadaptiveportionoftheloop.ecausetheenvironmentisconstantlychanging,one’sorientationmustcontinuetogrow,evolve,andadapttointeractwith the environment. It detects changes in the environment andfacilitatesthenecessaryorganizationaladaptabilitytointeractwiththeenvironmentandoperatewithintheopponent’sOODAloopisolatinghimfromtheenvironment.Properorientationfacilitatesspeedinthe


physicallevelbutmoreimportantlyitallowsonetosetatempothatisolates theopponent inthemental realmand limits theopponent’sabilitytoadapttothechangingsituation.38

Information Strategy

Irregular warfare doctrine, specifically counterinsurgency doctrine,stresses the importance of information and an indirect approach inwinning andmaintaining the supportofkeypopulations.39CurrentU.S. practice establishes Information Operations (IO) as a separateLine of Operation (LOO) or as a LOO encompassing all otherLOOs.40Theconceptiscorrect–allactionsendsthecorrectmessage–buttheapplicationisincorrect.FM3-24describesallinformationrequirements–publicinformation,commandinformation,expectationmanagement, media engagement, influence operations, counter-propaganda, Soldier/leader interaction, etc. – as IO and activitieswithintheIOLOO.41Bydefinitionanddoctrine,IO,asafunction,isaninformationactivitydesignedtoachievespecificeffects–attackadversarialhumanandautomateddecisionmakingandprotectfriendlyforces’decisionmaking– just asPsychologicalOperations (PSYOP)andPublicAffairs(PA)areinformationactivitiesdesignedtoachievespecificeffectsinsupportoftheoperation.42

ThemisapplicationofIOdegradestheintendedfunctionofIOandlimitstheeffectivenessandcapabilitiesofotherinformationactivitiesbycentralizingallinformationrequirementsunderIO.Decentralizationflattens the organization and increases operational effectiveness.Decentralization facilitates integrating all information activities intooperational planning.43 Properly placing information requirementsbackundertheappropriateinformationactivitiesallowsaccessofthosetrainedandresponsibleforplanningandexecutingthoseactivitiestotheplanningprocessandthecommander.Properlydefininginformationstrategyandapplyingitastheall-encompassingLOOwouldincreaseoperationaleffectivenessandprovidethedecentralizationrequiredtoproperlyemployallinformationactivitiesinirregularwarfare.

Defininginformationstrategyasthe planning, coordination, and execution of kinetic and non-kinetic operations in conjunction with all information activities (strategic communication,44 PA, PSYOP, and IO) in order to


send a consistent message to key audiences enabling the achievement of the military and ultimately the political end facilitatesdecentralizationandcongruencyinwordanddeeds.Thisdecentralizationandcongruencywouldincreasethespeedofinformationdisseminationandcredibilityoftheorganizationincreasingoperationaleffectiveness.

Effective information strategy (see figure 3) is a continuous processof analysis, coordination,planning, execution, andassessment.Bothkineticandnon-kineticoperationsrequireutilizingBoyd’sexpandedOODAlooptobeeffective.Allactionsmustbebasedontheproperobservationsandorientation.Informationstrategymustbepre-active,pro-active, and reactive.45 Although depicted on the chart as beingsequentialstages,pre-activeandpro-activearecontinuous,overlappingfunctions.

INFORMATION STRATEGY

PRO-ACTIVE REACTIVEPRE-ACTIVE

ANALYSIS, COORDINATION, PLANNING, EXECUTION, ASSESSMENT

CRISIS RESPONSE

PUBLIC INFORMATION

PUBLIC SAFETY

PUBLIC AID

RECONSTRUCTION

CREDIBLE ACTION

ACTION = WORDSKINETIC/NON-KINETIC

SOLDIER/LEADER INTERACTION

DEFUSE THREATS

RISK MANAGEMENT

SHAPING

ENGAGING AUDIENCES

RAPPORT BUILDING

SOCIAL MEDIA

COUNTER-PROPAGANDA

EXPECTATION MANAGEMENT

ANTICIPATION RESTORATION

SCPA – INFORMPSYOP – INFLUENCEIO – DECISION MAKERS/SYSTEMS

Figure 3: Information Strategy


Observationinthepre-activeandpro-activestagesidentifiesexistingtrendsandchangestothosetrendswithinkeyaudiencesandinenemyactivity. Proper orientation provides the flexibility and adaptabilityenablingeffective exploitation,mitigation, and theability to changeestablishedanddevelopingtrendsinordertoachievethedesiredeffectsnecessarytoreachthemilitaryandpoliticalobjectives.Thepre-activeand pro-active stages are designed to anticipate shock points in theestablishedtrendsandlimittheneedforthereactivestage.Anticipationofshockpointsisnotlimitedtopotentialeventsresultingfromenemyaction.ThecurrentciviliancasualtiessituationinAfghanistanprovidesanexcellentexampleofashockpointresultingfromtheactionofU.S.forces. The initial incident in early 2007 which made internationalmediaheadlinescanbeconsideredtheactualshockpoint.Allofthefollowingeventsarerelatedcrisiseventsexploitedbytheenemy.TheseeventscontinuetogeneratenegativeconsequencestoU.S.operations.

Pre-activeactivitiesencompassBoyd’sthreelevels–physical,mental,andmoral.Theorganizationinteractswiththeenvironmenttogatherand assess information. It matches the information with on-goingevents and identifies trends and changes required to those trends todetermine appropriate future action. Pre-active activities shape theenvironmentinfavoroftheorganization.

Engaging audiences, engaging media, and building rapport providethesocialnetworkingnecessarytoshapetheinformationenvironment.Engaging audiences involves two-way communication creatingstable relationships, not just selling the organization or its cause.Engagingthemediaestablishescontactwithjournalistsandfacilitatesaccessibilityof theorganizationtothemedia insuchamannertheywillseekoutinformationfromtheorganization.Itiscongruentwithbuildingrapport.Buildingrapportdevelopsthe“coresofcredibility”ofintegrity,intent,andcapabilitywitheachaudience.This,coupledwith“actionsequalwords”pro-activeactivities,developsandmaintainstheorganization’scredibility.

Socialmediaisanemergingsetoftechnologiesutilizedtodisseminateinformationoutsideofmainstreammedia sources.Theuseof socialmedia increases speed of information dissemination and interactionwithkey audiences. Socialmedia, in the formofblogs, e-mail, and


sites such as YouTube, Facebook, Twitter, etc., decentralizes theresponsibility of publishing information from organizations to theindividual. Additionally, mainstream media is incorporating socialmedia through their use of the sites listed above to encourage the“man on the street” to send information directly to local, national,andinternationalnewsoutlets.Aneffectiveinformationstrategymustincorporate this technology into pre-active activities to inform andinfluencekeyaudiencesandmaintaintheinitiativeintheinformationenvironment. Implementation of this decentralized method ofinformationdisseminationwillrequireefficientpolicies,training,andoperational guidance to effectively use social media in informationstrategy.

Effectivecounter-propagandadoesnotgetcaughtup in the reactivecycleofattemptingtodirectlyrefuteeachpieceofenemypropaganda.Thisreactivementalityonlydrawsattentiontotheenemy’sactionandpropaganda.Effectivecounter-propagandawillisolatetheenemyfrominteractingwithkeyaudiencesbydiscreditingtheenemyasasourceaswellashismessage.Identifyingtheenemy’spropagandathemesenablescounter-propagandaefforts tobecomepartofplannedPsychologicalOperations (PSYOP) programs and public information. RoutinePSYOPproducts,publicinformation,andSoldierinteractionwithkeyaudiencesshouldcountertheenemy’sthemeswithoutdirectlycallingattentiontotheenemy’spropagandaproducts.Anexcellentexampleofcounter-propagandaistheroutinereleaseofmessagesfromrespectedMuslimsdenouncingtheextremistuseofsuicidebombers,thekillingofinnocentMuslims,andotheratrocitiescarriedoutunderthebannerof Jihad. It attacks the enemy’s themeof jihad, their legitimacyandcreates a negative reaction in the audience when the atrocities arecontinued.Itdiscreditstheenemywiththekeyaudiences.

Expectationmanagementinvolveskeepingallaudiencesinformedoftheactionsandgoalsoffriendlyforcesandthegovernment.Transparencyisavitalcomponentofexpectationmanagement.Keepingtheaudiencesinformedlimitsrumorswhichfeedtheunrealisticexpectationsoftheaudiences.Theorganizationmustmonitorperceptionsandexpectationsofthepopulaceandprovideconsistentmessagingoffutureconditionsandgoalsthatdonotexceedtheabilitiesoftheorganization.Effective


expectationmanagementsupportsthe“coresofcredibility”ofintent,capability,andresults.

Pro-activeactivitiesencompassBoyd’sphysicalandmorallevels.ItisthephysicalinteractionoftheunitandtheSoldierswithkeyaudiences– the destruction of enemy forces, security operations, trainingpartnerednationalsecurityforces,infrastructuredevelopment,etc.,aswellas information.ThisSoldier/leader interaction,regardlessof themission,occurswheneverSoldiersareoutinthepopulace.It ishowtheyinteractwithandtreatthepopulacewhileconductingoperations.Pro-activeactivitiesestablishthemoralelementofBoyd’sthreelevels– thecodeof conduct and standardsofbehaviorone is expected touphold–essentialforcredibility.Pro-activeactivitiesmaintainallthe“coresofcredibility.”

Additionally, pro-active activities employ action and informationtodefuse threats to currentpositive trends and riskmanagement topreventcrises.Defusingthreatsincludeactionstakentoreducetheriskof the enemycreatinga shockpoint in current trendsorproducingcrises. Risk management consists of Rules of Engagement (ROE),EscalationofForce (EOF), andotherpolicies implemented to limitnegativeperceptionsandthecreationofacrisisbyfriendlyforces.

Thereactivestageisonlyexecutedasacrisisresponsetoaspecificcrisis.Thepurposeofthereactivestageistorestoreorderandmaintainthecredibility of the organization and mission. As stated earlier, crisisresponsedealsprimarilywithdisseminationofpublicinformationandactiontoensurepublicsafety.Speedinreleaseofpublicinformationpreventstheenemyfromexploitingtheeventthroughthedisseminationofmisinformationanddisinformation.

Conclusion

The trade-off between accuracy and speed in the informationenvironment creates a zero sum game. Both are intertwined withthe “cores of credibility”– integrity, intent, capability, and results –requiredtodevelopcredibilitywithkeyaudiences.Accuracyrequirestimetocollectinformationsacrificingspeed;speedsacrificesaccuracy.Inaccuracyininformationdamagesintegrity,intent,andcapability–


themessageandsourceareuntruthful,havehiddenagendas,andthesource is incompetent.Lackof speeddamages intent and capability–impliesacover-up,alackoftransparencyandincompetenceduetolackofcontrol.

Unable to defeat the military forces of the stronger opponent, theenemyattacks thecounterinsurgent’scredibility inorder to limithisabilitytogainandmaintainthesupportofkeyaudiences.Theenemy’sstrategiesof“armedpropaganda”and“thespeedstrategy”exploitthespeedversusaccuracydilemma.“Armedpropaganda”and“thespeedstrategy”allowtheenemytocontroloperationaltempoandseizetheinitiative,andplacesU.S.forcesinaconstantreactionarystate.

ThemisapplicationoftherapidOODAloopbyU.S.forcesinreactiontoacrisiswillnot“out-loop”anddisrupttheenemy’sOODAloop.Additionally,thecentralizationofallinformationrequirementsundertheinformationactivityofIOdegradesthefunctionofIOandlimitsthecapabilitiesofother informationactivities.ApplicationofBoyd’sexpandedOODAloopcoupledwithan informationstrategy that ispre-activeandpro-activeanticipatesnegativetrendsandpotentialshockpointsinpositivetrendsandfacilitatessettingoperationaltempoandmaintaininginitiative.Defininginformationstrategyasthe planning, coordination, and execution of kinetic and non-kinetic operations in conjunction with all information activities (strategic communication, PA, PSYOP, and IO) in order to send a consistent message to key audiences enabling the achievement of the military and ultimately the political end facilitates decentralization and congruency in words and deeds.Decentralizationofinformationactivitiescreatesaflatterorganizationallowingthoseresponsibleforplanningandexecutingthoseactivitiesaccess totheplanningprocessandthecommander. Becausekineticandnon-kineticoperationsplanningandexecutionareconductedinconjunctionwithallinformationactivities,theinteractionofunitsandSoldiersonthegroundandactionssendtheorganization’smessagetokeyaudiences.Theapplicationofinformationstrategyatalloperationallevels (tactical, operational, and strategic) in this manner maintainsthespeedandaccuracytoenableandenhanceactionandbolstertheorganization’scredibilityduetoenhancedoperationaleffectiveness.

deVeloPinG an oPerational StrateGic communication model for counterinSurGency

Colonel David P. AndersUnitedStatesArmy

Thevolatile,uncertain,complex,andambiguousenvironmentoftheinformationagehasaccentuatedthenecessityofastrategiccommunication paradigm that can effectively articulate our

nationalpoliciesandinterests.

United States (U.S.) military units are not sufficiently organized ortrainedtoanalyze,plan,andintegratethefullspectrumofresourcesavailable to promote America’s interests.1 Military commanders atthe theater strategic, operational, and tactical levels are nonethelesschallenged with the vital task of how to successfully communicateinformationandideastomultipleaudiences,localandinternational,individuallyandsimultaneously,aswefightinthecounterinsurgenciesofIraqandAfghanistan.

Strategistsinbothwarsagreewithclassiccounterinsurgency(COIN)theoriststhattherealfightis forthesupportofthepopulation,andthat communication is essential to victory.2 Of equal importance isensuring that timely, accurate, and positive information concerningthese wars is presented to the policy makers and citizens of thecoalitionpartnersparticipatinginthewarswiththeirnationaltreasuresand thebloodof their soldiers.Unfortunately, theU.S.militaryhasbeenhistoricallyineffectiveincommunicatingaccurate,truthful,andpositive information to these populations and international targetmarkets because of a failure to expedite information in a proactivemanner.Consequently,theinformationinitiativeislostandtheresultisareactiontotheenemy’sdisinformationstrategy.TheU.S.militaryhas failed to achieve thedesired information effects at the strategic,operational, and tactical levels due to a passive/reactive approach toStrategicCommunication(SC).


Military doctrine does not adequately address this challenge. Theenemyisacutelyskilledatexploitingthe24/7newscycletoexaggerate,twist, and distort the truth in order to discredit the host nationgovernmentandvillainizecoalitionandU.S.forcesintheeyesofthelocalpopulation,theMuslimpeople,andtheinternationalmedia.AlQaeda understands that today’s information age has fundamentallychangednotonlythespeedofhowpeoplecommunicate,butalsohowpeopleformtheiropinions.3Alltheenemyneedsisanevent,notfacts,to exploit theirmessage.AbuGhraib is apainful exampleofhowatacticaleventcanhaveincrediblestrategicimplications.

The general themes and messages provided by Central Command(CENTCOM),theInternationalSecurityandAssistanceForce(ISAF),andNorthAtlanticTreatyOrganization (NATO),donotconstitutestrategicoroperationallevelguidanceoutliningaproactiveapproachtoSCintheAfghanTheater.4ThispaperprovidesarecommendationforaSCmodelforfutureoperationallevelheadquartersastheyenterintoaCOINenvironment.

Key Definitions

TheUnitedStatesGovernment(USG)usesSCtoprovidetop-downguidance relative to using the informational instrument of nationalpowerinspecificsituations.Itisdefinedas:

The focused USG processes and efforts to understand and engage key audiences to create, strengthen, or preserve conditions favorable to advancing national interests and objectives through the use of coordinated information, themes, messages, and products synchronized with the actions of all instruments of national power.5

TheprimarymilitaryactivitiesthatsupportSCthemesandmessagesareinformationoperations(IO),publicaffairs(PA),anddefensesupporttopublicdiplomacy(DSPD).JointPub3-13,Information Operations,definesIOas:

The integrated employment of the core capabilities of electronic warfare, computer networks operations, psychological operations, military deception, and operations security in concert with specified supporting and related


capabilities, to influence, disrupt, corrupt or usurp adversarial human and automated decision making while protecting our own.6

Joint Pub 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, definesPAas“thosepublic information,commandinformation,andcommunityrelationsactivitiesdirectedtowardboththe external and internal publics with interest in the Departmentof Defense (DOD).”7 The same document defines DSPD as “thoseactivities and measures taken by DOD components to support andfacilitateUSGpublicdiplomacyefforts.”8

Operationalizing Strategic Communication

SCemployedat theoperational level inCOINisdesigned toeffectthe perceptions, attitudes and beliefs of target audiences in supportofUSGobjectives.Effectivelyemployingthecommunicationsmeanslistedinthepreviousparagraphisimportantinachievingthedesiredinformation effects. But actions speak louder than words. What amilitaryunitdoesalso sendsaSCmessage, andarguably this is themessagethatthetargetpopulationsreceivesmosteffectively.Militarycommandersmustbecognizantofthisandwhatmustbeanticipatedandincorporatedintheoverallplan.9

ThismakesSCanoffensiveresourceandmuchmorethanjustindividualstoriesandinterviewstobeplacedindifferentmediavenuesasaresultofanevent.SCiscomprisedbyeverything,kineticandnon-kinetic,thatisdoneonthebattlefieldandthroughouttheAreaofOperation(AO)andAreaofInterest(AI)toachieveaninformationeffect.

Asaprincipleofwar,thetermoffensiveissynonymouswithinitiative.The surest way to accomplish an assigned mission is to gain andexploit the initiative and to force an enemy to react in a desiredand anticipated manner. Military commanders desire the initiativeto control their environment and impose theirwill on the enemy.10By employing SC as an offensive resource it is operationalized andmore effectively synchronized in operational plans (OPLANs). TheoperationalizationofSCwillestablishanoffensive,aggressiveapproachin the employment of this essential line of operation (LOO) in theCOINfight.Thecenterofgravity(COG)forboththeinsurgentand


counterinsurgentattheoperationalandtacticallevelisthepopulation.The first step to gaining the initiative from the insurgent is tounderstandhowtheyarecommunicatingtheirmessagestothepeopleand what the effectiveness of that message is.With that knowledgethe counterinsurgent can then formulate a plan that will force theinsurgenttoreacttotheenvironmentalandinformationeffectscreatedbyanoffensive,aggressiveSCstrategy.Whilethiswillbeachallengebecauseitisimpossibletocontroltheinformationenvironment100%ofthetime,maintainingtheflexibilitytoreactrapidlyandtruthfullytounpredictableeventscanunderminetheinsurgent’smessage.

In order to effectively accomplish this concept, SC should beprioritizedas aLOOonequal footing in theCOINspectrumwithsecurity,governance,anddevelopment,ensuringcontinuousstrategic,operational, and tactical leadership attention and input across theinformation environment. The steps in developing this offensivemodelcanbeidentifiedbyansweringthe“fiveW’s”(why,who,where,what,when),andmostimportantlythe“how”ofthecounterinsurgentstrategiccommunicationenvironment.

Thefirststepisansweringthe“why.”Thiswillidentifywhatinformationeffectwewishtoachieveinthemacroaswellaswitheachtargetaudience.Steptwois“whoandwhere.”Whoarethetargetaudiencesthatthecounterinsurgentistryingtoreachandwheredotheyreside?Therearerisksofunintendednegativesecondandthirdorderinformationeffectswhendeliveringaneffectivemessagetothedesiredtargetaudience.Thekeytothisstepishowtoeffectivelysynergizeormitigatethatriskintheinformationenvironment.Stepthreeis“what.”Whatarethemessagesthatwewanttobeacceptedbyeachtargetaudience?Stepfouristhe“when.”Whendowesendthemessagesandatwhatarethefrequencyofthemessagestospecifictargetaudiences.Finally,the“how”isthemostimportant,anditistwo-fold.Howdowedeliverthemessages?What is thebestvehicle fordeliverytothedesiredtargetaudiences?Amessagecanbedeliveredkineticallyornon-kinetically,byactionordeed,throughthemediaorthroughinterpersonalcommunicationthatcanachievethedesiredeffectatthetactical,operational,orstrategiclevel individually,sequentially,orsimultaneously.Additionally,whendeliveringthemessagebyinterpersonalmeanstheU.S.messengermay


notbethemosteffective.Insteadkeyinfluencerswithintheculturalmilieuof the target audience (TA) could act as aprinciple agent toachieve the best information effects. The second “how” is the mostdifficult.Howdowemeasuretheeffectivenessofthemessagewithineachtargetaudience?

Why Strategic Communication Needs to be a Separate Line of Operation

TheUSGinstrumentsofnationalpowerareexpressedintheacronymDIMEstandingfordiplomatic,information,military,andeconomicelements. Diplomacy is the principal instrument for engaging withotherstatesandforeigngroupstoadvanceU.S.values,interests,andobjectives. The informational instrument is diverse and purposelyhasnosinglecenterofcontrol.AspartoftheU.S.Constitutionandtherighttofreedomofspeech,informationisfreelyexchangedwithminimal government control. Information available from multiplesourcesinfluencesdomesticandforeignaudiencesincludingcitizens,adversaries, and governments. The USG uses SC to provide top-downguidanceandfocusinspecificsituationsforspecificthemesandmessages.Thepurposeofthemilitaryinstrumentofnationalpoweristofightandwinthenationswars.Theeconomicinstrumentisthefreemarketeconomyitself.InkeepingwithU.S.valuesandconstitutionalimperatives,individualsandentitieshavefreedomofactionworldwide.The USG’s financial strategies and resources support the economicinstrumentofnationalpower.11

There is a clear parallel between our instruments of national powerand the traditional COIN LOOs. Joint Publication 1-02 defines aLOOas“alogicallinethatconnectsactionsonnodesand/ordecisivepoints related in time and purpose with an objective.”12 LOOs areused for synchronizing operations against enemies that hide amongthepopulace.AplanbasedonLOOscoordinatestheactionsofjoint,interagency, multinational, and host nation (HN) forces toward acommonpurpose.EachLOOrepresentsamethodologyalongwhichtheHNgovernmentandCOINforcecommanderintendtocounterandgaintheinitiativeovertheinsurgentstrategy.ThedesiredendstateistheacceptancebythepeopleofthelegitimacyoftheHNgovernment.13


FieldManuel (FM)3-24,Counterinsurgency, listsexamplesofCOINLOOsas:CombatOperations/CivilSecurityOperations,HNSecurityForces,EssentialServices,Governance,andEconomicDevelopment.14TheFMuses thefigurebelowtorepresentthe individualLOOsasasinglestrandofrope.Onceintertwinedtheropebecomesstrongerthantheindividualstrands.“TheoverallCOINeffortisfurtherstrengthenedthroughIO,whichsupportandenhanceoperationsalongallLOOsbyhighlightingthesuccessesalongeachone.”15

Figure 1: The strengthening effect of interrelated logical lines of operations16

Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF)-82 used the same approach asdepictedinFM3-24asitdevelopedLOOsforOperationEnduringFreedom(OEF)VIIIreplacingIOforSCinordertobetterincorporateallinformationalcapabilitiesandresourcesavailabletoanoperationallevel headquarters. As the headquarters prepared for the MissionReadiness Exercise a specific decision was made not to place SC asa separateLOObecause itwas felt thatSCwas an essentialpartofeachoftheidentifiedLOOs:security,governanceanddevelopment–exactlyasdepictedinfigure1.Inretrospect,therewasaninherentflawinthislogic.OnceCJTF-82deployed,theoperationallevelplanwasassessedandevaluatedonamonthlybasis.Objective and subjectivemetricsofthecommander’svisionofthedesiredendstateofeachLOOwerereviewedwiththetaskforceleadershipatmonthlyCommander’sOperationalAssessmentBriefing(COAB).Unfortunately,eventhoughitwasafunctionofsecurity,developmentandgovernance,therewasno specific evaluation criteria associated with SC. Consequently SCwasnotsynchronizedandcoordinatedacrosstheLOOswithaspecificobjective,butratheraddressedineachLOOindividually.TheoutcomewasaSCplanthatwasnotaseffectiveasitcouldhavebeen.Itdidnothaveanoverarchingplanfocusingeffortsatthedesiredtargetaudiences


(people,military,andgovernment)thatquicklyexploitedthesuccessesoftheAfghanpeopleandgovernmentwhilealsouncoveringthebrutaltacticsoftheenemyintheirwaragainstpeopleofAfghanistan.WhatwasmissingbynothavingSCasaseparateLOOwasavisionfromthecommanderofwhattheinformationalendstateshouldbe.

Thekeytoanoffensiveinformationenvironmentliesinclearlystatedinformationintent.Subordinatecommandersneedavisionofwhatthecommanderwantstheinformationenvironmenttolooklikeattheendofthemilitaryoperation.ThisarticulateswhatthedesiredperceptionsandattitudesoftheTAsare,andwhataretheinformationcapabilitiesoftheenemyattheconclusionoftheoperation.17

InOn War,Carl vonClausewitz famously identifies a trinityof thepeople,themilitary,andthegovernment.Clausewitzarguedthattheactive support of each segment was critical to success.18 This trinityremainsasrelevantintheCOINstruggletodayasever.InAmericansociety,andarguablyeverysociety in this informationageofa24/7newscycle,themediaplaysauniqueandimportantrolebyservingasthecriticalinformationlinkamongthethreeelements.19Theeffectiveconductofmilitaryoperationsdemandseffectivecommunicationwiththepeople.SuccessfulSCistheabilitytoexploittheinformationlink.

Security, governance, and development mirror the instruments ofnational power of military, diplomacy and economics. The missingLOO is SC to mirror information. Using SC as an offensive toolplacesitasaseparateLOOonequalfootingintheCOINconstructas security, governance anddevelopment. Itwould require adesiredendstatearticulatedbythecommanderandobjectiveandsubjectivemeasuresofeffectiveness(MOE)aswellasmeasuresofperformance(MOP)toassessitsprogressandeffectivenessinthesamemannerastheotherLOOs.

How the Insurgent Employs Strategic Communication

Ifresistanceisequaltomeanstimeswill20–theabilityoftheinsurgenttomaintaintheirfightagainsttheHNisindirectrelationtothewillofthepeopletoprovideactiveorpassivesupport.SCinfluencesthewillofthepeopleandtheirperceptionofhowtheHNgovernmentand


thecoalitionforcesthataresupportingthemcanprovidefortheneedsofthepeople.InsurgentsuseSCtoaffectperceptions,attitudes,andbeliefsaswell.Theseperceptionsbecomerealityand,aswasdescribedinClausewitz’strinity,isthebondthateitherunitesthepeopletothegovernment,ortotheinsurgent.

Yettheinsurgent’sSChasnoresponsibilitytobetruthfulandfreelyexaggeratesorliestoensurehismessageisdelivered.Heisnotobligedtoprove;heisjudgedbywhathepromises,notbywhathedelivers.Thenewmediaoftheinformationagealsoaidthiseffort.Theenemycantransmitamessageinrealtimebypassingeditorsandrestrictivesourcerequirements.Consequently,propagandaisapowerfulweaponfortheinsurgent.Withnorealorpositivepolicybutwithgoodpropaganda,hecanwin.21

ThehighlyrespectedBritishstrategistColinS.Graywroteaninterestingessay in2005offering12 specificcharacteristics that canbeusedasanexampleofhowtheworldviewstheAmericanwayofwar.Theseinclude:Apolitical,Astrategic,Ahistorical,Problem-SolvingOptimistic,CulturallyIgnorant,TechnologicallyDependent,FirepowerFocused,Large-Scale, Profoundly Regular, Impatient, Logistically Excellent,andSensitivitytoCasualties.22Gray’sthesisofthesecharacteristicsiscredible because he is not a U.S. citizen. His view therefore, allowsan outside perspective on how we fight and the distinctiveness thatseparatesusfromrestoftheworld.ThougheachofthesecharacteristicscanarguablybeexploredwithintheCOINenvironment,itisworthfocusingonsomeinordertobetterunderstandhowtheenemycouldbeusingtheseperceptionsagainstusintheireffectiveuseofSC.

Culturally Ignorant:

Americans are not inclined to be respectful of the beliefs, habits, and behaviors of other cultures…the American way of war have suffered from the self-inflicted damage caused by a failure to understand the enemy of the day.23

Ofcourse,thisdoesnotonlyapplytotheenemy,buttothepopulationwhere we are fighting COIN. The enemy SC will exploit everyopportunitywherecoalitionforcesviolateculturaltraditionsornorms


to exasperate local or Muslim people emotions with the intent ofinflaming the localpopulaceor internationalcommunityagainstouroperations.

Technologically Dependent:

America is the land of technological marvels and of extraordinary technology dependency…American soldiers say that the human beings matter most, but in practice the American way of war, past, present, and prospectively future, is quintessentially and uniquely technologically dependent.24

The enemy’s SC exploits these both defensively and offensively. Asan example from thedefensiveperspective the enemy exploits everyopportunitytoportrayouruseofUnmannedArielVehicles(UAVs),ordrones,inthemediaasaroboticU.S.instrumentofdeaththatisemployedduetoourlackofpersonnelonthegroundandthattheyarbitrarilykillinnocentswiththeirHellfiremissiles.InfacttheUAVwasdeveloped,andisprimarilyusedasareconnaissanceasset.Theironboardcamerasstreambackrealtimevideoandprovidecommandersatalllevelsaperspectivethatcannotbeseenbytheunitsontheground.Theyarearmedandhavethetechnologytodeliverprecisionguidedmunitions,buttheiremploymentinthatfunctionislessthandesiredandintheeventcloseairsupportisrequiredotherplatformsavailableproducefarbettereffectsthantheUAV.

The insurgenthasused thisdependencyasanoffensive toolaswell.Themonopolyenjoyedbynation-statesoverinformationasanelementofpowerwaslostastechnologyimprovedandasthemeanstotransmitinformation became smaller, faster, and cheaper.25 The informationexplosionofthelastdecadehasproducedawaveofnewmediavehiclesthat the insurgent is effectively employing against the U.S. and itscoalitionpartners.Islamicextremistwebsitesgrewfromtwentytoover4,000 in only five years.26 Individuals and non-state entities, armedwithnewmediacapabilitiesandunfetteredbybureaucratic,moral,orethicalstandardswillcontinuetouseinformationasanasymmetricalweapon.27Theparadoxofthistechnologyisthatwerefusetoexploitthecapabilityourselvesandyieldinstantaneousinformationeffectstoourenemies.


Firepower Focused:

It has long been the American way in warfare to send metal in harm’s way in place of vulnerable flesh....Needless to say, perhaps, a devotion to firepower, while highly desirable in itself, cannot help but encourage the U.S. armed forces to rely on it even when other modes of military behavior would be more suitable. In irregular conflicts in particular…resorting to firepower solutions readily becomes self-defeating.28

Ourenemy’suse this“DavidandGoliath”analogyoffirepowerandproportionalitywithgreateffect.Typically,whencloseair support isusedinacontactwithcoalitiontroopsandinsurgentsinAfghanistan,there is a claim of non-combatant casualties by the insurgent. Themereclaimisenoughtogarnerinternationalattentioninthemedia.Compounded with the speed by which the insurgent posts theseaccusations the informationeffect is significant. Islamic radicals andother factions opposed to the United States have demonstrated norespect for the truth when they manufacture charges of Americanatrocities. While the U.S. forces take great care to avoid inflictingciviliancasualties,suchcasualtieswillinevitablyoccur.Afewinjuredciviliansbecomeamassacreof innocents,first intheArabpressandthenoftensubstantiatedbytheWesternmedia.29

Regardlessof the accusationsbeingproven falseornot, the effect isachieved and the perceived civilian casualty death toll continues toclimb.Themediavictory iswonbothat the localpopulation targetmarketaswellaswiththepopulationsof theUnitedStatesandourcoalitionallies.Intoday’sinformationenvironmentoncethemessageisdeliveredtoattempttodenyorcounteritbecomeslargelyineffective.30

Profoundly Regular:

Few, if any, armies have been equally competent in the conduct of regular and irregular warfare….As institutions, however, the U.S. armed forces have not been friendly either to irregular warfare or to those in its ranks who were world-be practitioners and advocates of what was regarded as the sideshow of insurgency. American soldiers…have always been prepared nearly exclusively for real war, which is to say combat against a tolerably symmetrical, regular enemy.31


Gray’s assessment gains credence as one examines the lack of newdoctrine concerning counterinsurgency in the period immediatelyfollowingtheVietnamWar.TheU.S.ArmyfailedtoformaconsensusonthelessonsofVietnamanddidnotaccepttheideathatrevolutionarywar requires aqualitativelydifferent response from theconventionalwarfare it knows so well how to fight.32 Our inability to initiallyrecognizeoracknowledgethatourforceswereinvolvedininsurgenciesinbothIraqandAfghanistanisanotherexampleofourreticenceasanarmytoengageinthistypeofwarfare.Ourenemiesknowthisanduseittotheirbenefit.Sincetheinsurgentalonecaninitiatetheconflict,strategic,operational,andtacticalinitiativeishisbydefinition.Heisfreetochoosehishourandtowaitsafelyforafavorablesituation.33AnArmyfightingconventionalwarfaretacticscannotdefendadequatelytheseasymmetrictactics.Onlysincenewcounterinsurgencydoctrinewaspublishedin2006haveweseenrealprogressinIraq.

Afghanistan continues to be a challenge. New COIN doctrine isbeingimplementedtoincludeanunderstandingoftheimportanceofSC.However,thelackofsecurityforces(bothAfghanandcoalition)servingthroughoutthecountrytoensuretheperceptionofsafetytothe Afghan population is working against HN and coalition forces.TheenemywillcontinuetousetheirSCandtheirperceptionofourdesire tofightaconventionalfightagainstusasU.S. forcesworktoconvincetheAfghanpeople,aswellasinternationalanddomesticTA’sofourwellmeaningintensions.

Impatient:

Americans have approached warfare as a regrettable occasional evil that has to be concluded as decisively and rapidly as possible.34

TheAmericancharacteristicofimpatienceisaresultofoureconomicandpoliticalsystems.TheUnitedStatesisanationofpeoplewhoexpectimmediatesatisfactionandourenemiesusethisagainstus.Whileboththe insurgent and counterinsurgent are vying for the supportof thepeople, so are they vying for the attention of the U.S. population.AtargetaudienceofenemySCisthewillofAmericanpeople.TheyperceivethistobeourstrategicandoperationalCOG.AsevidentintheVietnamWar,theAmericanpeopledislikeaprotractedinsurgency


regardless of battlefield victories. Using this example as an historicdefeatoftheU.S.military,allthemoderndayinsurgenthastodoissurvive.Winningsimplymeansnotlosing.KnowingtheimpatienceoftheU.S.populationtimeisonthesideoftheinsurgent.

Sensitivity to Casualties:

In common with the Roman Empire, the American guardian of world order is much averse to suffering a high rate of military casualties….Both superstates had and have armies that are small, too small in the opinion of many, relative to their responsibilities. Moreover, well-trained professional soldiers, volunteers all, are expensive to raise, train, and retrain, and are difficult to replace. American society has become so sensitive to casualties that the domestic context for U.S. military action is no longer tolerant of bloody adventures in muscular imperial governance.35

October 3, 1993 is a red letter day for the enemies of the UnitedStates.The impactof, and eventual reaction to, the lossof eighteenspecialoperationsandconventionalU.S.militarymenonthatdayinMogadishu,Somalia,hasbecomeanessentialtextbooktacticinthestrategickitbagofourenemies.Ourenemiescontinuetoseekasimilarspectacular catastrophic event for its informational effect. ThoughAmericandeathsarethemosteffective,massiveHNciviliancasualtieswillalsodegradeU.S.supportofacounterinsurgency.

Inadditiontothemasscasualties,inflictingoneortwodeathsaday,every day, with IEDs has the same informational effect over time.Coupled with graphic video, the act and images create a powerfulnegativeeffectontheAmericanpeople.

It is safe to say that the insurgents and international terrorists inAfghanistanareusingtheseperceptionsofhowAmericansfighttheirwarsagainstusintheirSCnotonlytotheAfghanpeople,butalsototheinternationalcommunityandtheU.S.population.Onedoesnothavetoagree100%withMr.Graytoseethevalueofhisobservations.As part of a strategic intelligence preparation of the informationenvironment, understanding how the United States is perceived byothers and how the enemy may use those perceptions against us in


their SC, an operational headquarters can anticipate informationopportunitiesandpositivelyinfluenceanoffensiveSCplan.

Desired Effects and Objectives for Strategic Communication

Theideathataninsurgencywinsorlosesbyitsabilitytowintheheartsandmindsofthepeopleisanoldcliché.However,likesomanyclichés,ithappenstobetrue.Whilesomeinsurgenciesmightbedefeatedbysheerbruteforce,thisoptionisruledoutbyanyWesterndemocracytodayonthegroundsofmoralityandpracticality.Additionally,bruteforce typically only grows more insurgents. Maintaining AmericanlegitimacywhilewagingaCOINwar,asviewedintheeyesoftheworldandtheeyesoftheU.S.people,requiresthatweadheretothehighstandardsofbehaviordemandedintheWesterndemocratictradition.Italsoiscriticaltohelpalliedgovernmentsfightinginsurgentstowintheactive,orpassive,supportoftheirpopulations.

InSeptember2007theDODpublishedanSCplanforAfghanistan.WithinthisdocumentitoutlinedthedesiredendstatefortheSCas“TheAfghanpeople andpeople inAlliedandpartner countries recognizeandsupporttheeffortsoftheAfghangovernment,theUnitedStates,itsAllies andpartners in stabilizing and reconstructingAfghanistan.The Afghan people strongly support their government and rejectinsurgency,terrorism,andthenarcoticstrade.”36ThoughpublishedbyDODandintendedat thestrategic level, thisendstateaddresses thestrategic,operational, and tactical levels.While theBrigadeCombatTeam (BCT) commanders areworkingdirectlywith thepopulationandtheAfghanleadershipandsecurityforcesattheprovinciallevels,theyalsohavedirect andcontinuouscontactwithmedia fromboththeUnitedStatesandinternationalpress.Clearly,tacticaleventsandactionshavebothoperationalandstrategicimpacts.

At the operational level CJTF-82 identified an overarching COINapproach that focused on the people of Afghanistan and sought toachieveeffectsinconcertwiththeDODplan.Theseeffectsaddressedboth the Afghan people as well as the insurgents. For the Afghanpeople those effects are: Connect People to the Government, BuildTrustandConfidenceinGovernment,andSolidifyPopularSupportofGovernment.TheSCeffectsontheinsurgentsare:SeparateInsurgents


fromthePeople,LimitInsurgentOptionstoReconcile,Capture,Kill,or Flee, and Discredit Insurgent Vision and Ideology. This COINapproachisdepictedinthefollowingslidethatwasusedintheCJTF-82commandbriefgiventoVIPsvisitingtheheadquartersatBagramAirfieldnearthecapitalKabul,Afghanistan.

Figure 2: Comprehensive Approach37

In COIN the focus is more on discrediting the insurgent’s SC andmeansintheeyesofthepopulationthanontakingouttheinsurgentkinetically. Insurgents are often the brothers and cousins of thepopulationyouaretryingtoinfluence.Killingorcapturingthemwillnotwinheartsandminds,butmaywellfuelfuturerecruits.The“win”must be based on convincing the people (and the insurgents wherepossible)thelegitimacyoftheHNgovernment,andthattheirwayhasthebestinterestsofthepopulationatheart,whichalsomeansthattheinsurgent’smessageandmethodsarediscredited.38

Identifying Target Audiences

TheDoDSCPlanforAfghanistanidentifiestwelvetargetaudiences(TA) at the strategic level. ThoseTAs are: The Afghan Population,theAfghanGovernment, theGovernmentandMilitaryofPakistan,the Pakistan Population, Governments of ISAFTroop Contributing


Nations, Populations of ISAFTroop Contributing Nations, EnemyLeadership, Taliban Rank and File, Governments of Central Asia,CentralAsianPopulations, InternationalGovernmentOrganizations(IGO) and Non-Governmental Organizations (NGO) Community,andfinallyU.S.domesticaudiences.39

WhiletheseTAsarefocusedatthestrategiclevel,fromanoperationalperspective this list is too broad. As discussed throughout thisdocument,theprimarytargetaudienceandCOGinanyinsurgency/COINisthepeople.InadditiontotheAfghanpeople,boththeAfghanleadershipandsecurityforcesarecriticaltothesuccessintheCOINeffortsandareoperationallevelTAs.SecondonlytotheAfghanTAsaretheU.S.TAs.OperationalSCcanandshouldbedirectedattheU.S.policymakersaswellastheU.S.populationsincethegoalofSCis to inform and educate. ISAF contributing government leadershipandpopulationsarealsocriticalTAsandcanbeeffectivelyreachedattheoperationallevel.ThefinalTAthatcanbeeffectivelyreachedattheoperationallevelistheinternationalMuslimcommunity.

Themes, Messages and Talking Points

Themes,messagesandtalkingpointsarekeyelementsofSCandarenestedhorizontallyandverticallyandanchoredintruth.AthemeisatopicofdiscourseordiscussionthatisusedbystrategiccommunicatorsanddirectedtoaTAinorderforthemtounderstandandacceptanideaorconcept.AnexampleofathemeforAfghanistancouldbe“theTaliban are a negative force that purposely targets innocent Afghancivilians.Theyengageincriminalactivityandbrutaltacticsfortheirown gain and cannot offer long-term solutions for the people ofAfghanistan.”

Amessageisnestedunderathemeandismorespecificinsupportinginformation. Messages are directed to specific TAs. Strategiccommunicators deliver the message that will resonate the mosteffectively.DifferentmessagesdirectedatdifferentTAscansupportthesametheme.Asanexample,thefollowingmessagesupportstheexampleofthethemeproposedinthepreviousparagraph.“TheTalibanseektounderminetheauthorityofthelegitimateAfghangovernment.Their


campaignofterrorisdesignedtoconvincethepeopleofAfghanistanthattheirgovernmentcannotprovidesecurity.”

Talkingpointsaretimelyandtruthfulanecdotesspecifictothemessagebeing delivered and support one of the themes. Just as there arenumerousmessagespertheme,therecanbenumeroustalkingpointspermessage.

ThePublicAffairsofficerforanorganizationisresponsibletoprovidethethemesandmessagesprovidedfromthehigherheadquartersandpertinenttalkingpointstotheleadershipandstrategiccommunicators.Whattheywillnotdoismakeadecisionregardinghowoftenmessagesshouldbedelivered to theTAs.This is a leaderdecision.WhatTAsare addressed, how often they are addressed, and the frequency ofthe messages should be planned in advance as part of an offensiveSCplannestedintheoverallcampaign.CriticaltothesuccessofanoffensiveSCplanistheconsistencyofthemesandmessages.Messagesdelivered to TAs should be consistent and frequent. MeasureableobjectivesshouldbeestablishedaspartoftheSCLOOwithmeasuresofeffectiveness(MOE)identifiedforthoseobjectives.MOEmustbepartofinitialplanningsuchthatabaselinecanbeestablishedagainstwhichtomeasure.AkeyfunctionoftheMOEwillbetodetermineifthefrequencyofmessagingisadequate;whetherornotthemessageisresonatingwiththeTA.OneMOEfordeterminingwhetheramessageisresonatingwithaTAisifthemessageisrepeatedorsupportedbythatTA.Determining the correct frequencyofmessagesdelivered to thecorrectTA,andincorporatingthatasapillaroftheoperationisthegoalofaproactive,offensiveSCplan.ThisdefinestheoperationalizationofSC.HowSCissynchronizedwithinthecampaignensurestheseamlessapplicationofthisLOO.

Synchronizing SC with the other LOOs – The Joint Effects Process

ThesynchronizationofSCwithallthekineticandnon-kineticresourcesandassetsacrossacombined-jointtaskforceisdauntingchallengeandcanonlyaccomplishedbythedirect involvementandmonitoringofthetopleadershipandstaffofanorganization.InordertosynchronizeSCitmustbeplannedinadvanceandinconcertwiththeotherLOOs.This JointEffectsProcess (JEP) isdoneat theoperational staff level


under the direct supervision and guidance of the commander andhis key subordinates (deputy commander, chief of staff, director ofoperations).

TheoperationallevelstaffofCJTF-82duringOEFVIIIhadaseriesofboards,bureaus and cells, developed into abattle rhythm,whichculminatesinamonthlyCommandersOperationalAssessmentBrief(COAB) delivered by the CJTF staff and BCT commanders to theCJTF-82CommandingGeneral(CG).Theseboards,bureausandcells(BB&C)allhadtheirownspecificdesignatedoutputsthatfedlinearlyandsequentiallytothenextBB&C.TheJEPisbasedonthestandardtargeting methodology of decide, detect, deliver and assess (D3A).Thisisbothalethalandnon-lethaltargetingprocessthatsupportstheLOOs,theirobjectivesandthedesiredeffectsasthebasisforplanningandrecommendationstosustain,alter,orchangeplannedoperationsorevents.

Objectivesaredefinedas“theclearlydefined,decisive,andattainablegoaltowardwhicheveryoperationisdirected.”40Objectivesprescribefriendlygoals.Effectsare“thephysicalorbehavioralstateofasystemthatresultsfrom an action, a set of actions, or another effect.”41 Effects describesystembehaviorintheoperationalenvironment.MOEare“acriterionused to assess changes in system behavior, capability, or operationalenvironmentthat istiedtomeasuringtheattainmentofanendstate,achievementofanobjective,orcreationofaneffect.”42Theyarethebasisofevaluatinganeffect.Theyanswerthequestion“Istheforcedoingtherightthings,orareadditionaloralternativeactionsrequired?”

TheJEPasarticulatedinD3Astartswiththe“decide.”Decideanswersthe question what can we do to achieve the desired objectives andeffectswitheachoftheLOOs?Detectidentifieswhereweachievetheeffectsformaximumresults. Deliveridentifieswhoorwhatdeliversthe action that achieves the desired effect. Assess at the operationallevel is done at the CJ5 (Future Plans) staff section using regularlyscheduled, reoccurring polling ofTAs, as well as by input from theseparatestaffsectionsattheCJTFheadquarters,andbygettingdirectfeedbackbytheBCTcommanders.TheassessmentisdonenotonlyfortheSCLOO,butalsoforsecurity,governanceanddevelopment.


TheJEPisconductedthroughouttheCJTFbattlerhythmandensuresamethodical,thorough,synchronizedandcomprehensivemethodtoanalyze,measure,andmaintaintheinitiativeinanoffensiveapproachacross all LOOs at the operational level of COIN. From the SCstandpoint,theJEPconfirmsordeniesthefrequencyandeffectivenessof the information engagements, planned, or unplanned, across theinformation environment.With that analysis and recommendationsfromthestaff,theCGorhisdesignee,canmakethedecisiontoincreaseordecreasefrequency,methodsormessagestoeachTA.

Framing a Comprehensive, Offensive SC Model

As previously stated, the CJTF reoccurring battle rhythm meetingsculminates in a monthly Commanders Operational AssessmentBriefing(COAB)deliveredbytheCJTFstaffandBCTcommandersto the CJTF-82 CG. The purpose of the briefing is to provide anassessmentoftheoperationalenvironmenttotheCG.EachLOOisassessedbasedonobjectivesanddesiredeffectsattheoperationallevel,bytheCJTFstaff,andatthetacticallevelbytheBCTcommanders.AttheendofthebriefingtheCGgivesguidancetocommandersandstafffocusingontheLOOsandtheirrespectiveobjectivesandeffects.ThechartusedtovisualizethisiscalledtheEffectsHierarchy.TheguidancegivenprovidesthestaffandsubordinatecommandersabaselinefromwhichtoworkfromandcommandersintentthroughthenextCOAB.

The effects hierarchy becomes the visual aid that assists in thesynchronizationofalltheLOOstowardtheCOINgoalsarticulatedintheComprehensiveApproach(seefigure2.).Itisthebaseplanforthemodelandensuresproactiveanalysisandinitiativeisappliedtoachievetheobjectives.

As stated previously, SC was not identified as a separate LOO duringOEFVIII,butwasratherconsideredembeddedineachoftheotherthreeLOOs.Unfortunately,bynotidentifyingSCasaseparateLOOtherewerenoobjectivesorMOEestablishedforSCandtherewasnosystematic,reoccurring,objectivemethodofevaluatingtheinformationeffects.

Specific objectives and effects for SC within the effects hierarchyshould be determined in relation to the situation and assessment


of the current environment. SC objectives should be based on thenumberof information engagements in relation to specificTAs andtheotherLOOs.Desiredeffectsfortheseobjectivesshouldfocusonthe understanding and acceptance of the messages by the specificTAs.Therearemultiplemethodsofmeasuringtheeffectivenessoftheinformation engagements. The most objective method of knowingwhenyouhaveachievedyourdesiredeffectsiswhenyourTArepeatsor supports by action, word or deed, your messages. This can bedeterminedbypollingresultsofthepopulation,local,international,ornational(U.S.)mediaornewsstories,quotesfromkeylocal,national,or international leaders, and theobjectiveobservationsor subjectiveperceptionsoftheBCTcommanders.AlloftheseinformationeffectsandresultsareanalyzedandpresentedtotheCGduringtheCOAB.

Additionally, systems need to be in place to provide a real timeinformational response to theevents thatwilloccuronadailybasiseitherthroughplannedorunplannedoperationsandactionsinorderto gain and maintain the informational initiative on the enemy.Everythingwedoandeverythingtheenemydoeshaveaninformationeffect. The positive is exploited at the informational level to ensurethedesiredeffectisachievedwiththeTA.Thesameshouldbedoneto exploit the negative enemy actions as well. These types of eventsbecomeinformationdecisionpointsandabattledrilltakesplaceattheheadquartersintheJointOperationsCenter(JOC)toquicklyexploittheeventandprovideanoffensiveinformationengagementtodesiredTAs.

This is accomplished by manning an information cell comprised ofpublicaffairsandinformationoperationsrepresentativesontheJOCfloor continuouslyoperating in thevicinityof theChiefofCurrentOperations,who is responsible for theday todayoperations in theJOC. The information cell will provide “information ammunition”for distribution to the desired TAs in the form of an informationengagement.TheleadershipoftheCJTFmusttrustthejudgmentandcapabilitiesof the informationcell inorder for this technique tobesuccessful.ThisreinforcestherequirementfortheCJTFcommandertoarticulateexactlywhathisvision is for the informationendstate.Using that commander’s intent the information cell can act quickly


and decisively in order to exploit an information opportunity. TheChiefofCurrentOperations,oratmosttheDirectorofOperations(CJ3),musthavereleaseauthorityfortheseinformationengagements.

Another responsibility of the information cell would be to managetheCommandersWebPage.This is anunclassifiedwebpagewhichprovides a daily update of current written and visual information,accessedfrominternetbyanyonewithacomputer.TheCommander’sWebPageusestheinternettodelivertothedesiredTA’sacurrent,uptodateinformationengagementthatutilizesrealtimetalkingpointstoconstantlyreinforcetheoperationallevelthemesandmessages.

Unplanned or unintended negative actions by friendly forces, alsoknown as “wild cards,” must also be acted upon immediately. Theenemy will most certainly exploit this. Speed is critical here as welland involves both the leadership and the staff. Press releases, pressconferences,interviews,phonecallstokeyhostnationleadershipandinfluencers,etc.,takesplaceasquicklyaspossibleinordertoensurethisnegativeeventisannouncedfirstbytheHNorbytheCoalitionForces,andnottheenemy.Anexplanationisgivenandassurancethatacombinedinvestigationisbeingdone.Thiscountersthesensationalismof the informational effect that the insurgent will surely attempt toconvey.

The enemy has also exploited claims of non-combatant casualtiesfollowing engagements where close air support (CAS) were used insupportofcoalitionoperations.Everyaircrafthascamerasonboardthat record their engagements. A simple solution is to immediatelyrelease this footage which shows rifle or RPG fire coming from thehouse thatwas engaged.Unfortunately, the ability to declassify andreleasethistypeoffootagetothemediahasbeenextremelybureaucraticandtimeconsuming.Bythetimethereleaseauthorityhasbeengivena week has passed and the negative event has become a fact in themindsoftheTAregardlessofprovingitfalseornot.Someheadwayhasbeenmadetoimprovetheprocess,butthetruefixishavingthereleaseauthorityattheCJTFCGlevel.Onlybyhavingthereleaseauthorityattheoperationallevelcommandercanweeffectivelyachievethespeedtocountertheenemy’sdisinformationcapability.


Conclusion

One can look in any nationally circulated periodical, surf theinternet,orflipthroughcabletelevisiononanygivendayandseeanexampleofanunintended,orpoorlyarticulatedSCmessage,whetherdiplomatic,militaryoreconomic.Withinthisinformationspectrum,there are multiple stories of Afghanistan and the counterinsurgencystruggle that the country is involved in everyday.Operational levelheadquarterscannotbepassiveorreactiveinhowtheyfunctionintheinformationenvironmentunlesstheyarewillingtoacceptdefeat.SCisaLOOthatiscriticalinthispoliticalandphysicalstruggle.TheJEPcreatesanoffensivemodelthat,whenemployedeffectively,providesaproactivemethodologythatcananticipateinformationopportunitiesandmaintaintheinitiativeoverouradversaries.ThemessagesoftheAfghan government and coalition forces need to be presented in apositive,truthful,andproactivemannertoensurethesupportoftheAfghan people and the international community in a struggle withglobalimplications.

emPowerinG united StateS Public diPlomacy for the war of ideaS

Lieutenant Colonel Douglas W. LittleUnitedStatesArmyNationalGuard

Following the events of September 11, 2001 (9/11), PresidentBush described the Global War onTerror (GWOT) as morethan a battle of arms, but a battle of ideas.1 In his 2002

National Security Strategy (NSS), President Bush placed particularemphasison implementingeffectivepublicdiplomacyasameanstogain the trust and confidence of those who may otherwise supportinternationalterrorism.2PresidentBushhopedtocapitalizeonpublicdiplomacy’s powerful ability to foster relationships and culturalunderstandingamongpeopleofdifferingnationsto influenceglobalattitudesandactionsinthewarofideas.3However,eightyearsintotheGWOT, internationalpollingdatademonstratesU.S. failure togainsubstantivegroundinthewarofideas.4Infact,yearsofmarginalizingpublic diplomacy has left the United States with an emaciated andarguablyineffectiveweaponinthewarofideas.5EnvelopedwithintheDepartmentofState (DoS),devoidofan independentvision,andashadow of its prior budgetary and personnel strength, current U.S.public diplomacy remains ill-prepared to confront the crucial andformidable struggle in the battle of ideas now or in the foreseeablefuture.

ThispaperexploreshowU.S.hubrisregardingitsglobalinfluenceinaunipolarworldledtomarginalizingtheonceindependentandeffectivepublicdiplomacyeffortundertheUnitedStatesInformationAgency(USIA). Additionally, a presupposed universality of the democraticpeace theory and a fundamental misunderstanding of the roots ofinternational terrorismcontinue toobscure adefinitive strategy andprogress by U.S. public diplomacy in the war of ideas. The paperconcludeswithrecommendationstoempowerU.S.publicdiplomacyandestablishasustainableandeffectivevisionforconfrontingthewarofideasinthefuture.


Public Diplomacy Failure Analysis

“IfIweregrading,Iwouldsayweprobablydeservea‘D’ora‘D-plus.’”6StarktestimonyfromformerDefenseSecretaryRumsfled,deliveredtotheU.S.ArmyWarCollegeinMarch2006,regardingU.S.performancein the war of ideas to date. Such assessment is considerably moredammingwhenconceding,inadditiontothePresident’s2002NSS,theUnited States National Strategy for Combating TerrorismalsoconcludedsuccessintheGWOThingesonwinningthewarofideas.7

Considering America’s war of ideas began long before the events of9/11,SecretaryRumsfeld’scurrentassessmentofU.S.strategyinthisstruggle is rather generous. Reasonable arguments might trace theWest’swarofideaswithIslamicextremismasfarbackasthefalloftheOttomanEmpireorearlier.8However,America’swarofideasostensiblybeganwiththeIranHostageCrisis.Analyzingthiscrisis,InternationalRelations Professor, Adda Bozeman, in 1979 described America’songoing intelligence collection failures and profound ignorance ofcomplexculturalpatternsandhistoricalperspectivesoftheregionasthesourcesofthatcrisis.9Thesecriticismsappropriatelyreverberateintoday’sGWOT(nowOverseasContingencyOperations)andpainfullyillustratejusthowlittleprogresstheUnitedStateshasmadeoverthelast30yearsinthewarofideas.

Suchlackofprogressinthewarofideaswarrantsstrategicreevaluation.Developing an effective and enduring strategy for U.S. publicdiplomacyinthewarofideasrequiresanalysisoffactorscontributingto America’s ineffective response to its greatest security challenge indecades. While a multiplicity of factors undoubtedly contributes toU.S. public diplomacy’s recent ineffectiveness, the most prominentimpedimentsare:America’spowerparadox, inappropriatelyapplyinga ‘one size fits all’ universality to the democratic peace theory, andAmerica’sfundamentalaversionofreligiousideologicalstruggles.10

America’s Power Paradox – The Dismantling of United States Public Diplomacy11

The fall of Communism in the early 1990’s placed America in aposition of unparalleled dominance. As the world’s preeminent


superpower,Congressargueddemocracy’striumphoverCommunismwoulditselfsufficeasthemosteffectiveandlastingpublicdiplomacyfortheUnitedStates.12CompetitionoverscarcebudgetdollarspressedWashingtontoquestionthecontinuedneedforabroad,independentpublicdiplomacyagencyinaunipolarworld.

Followingadecadeofprogressivebudgetcutsandstaffreductions,amajor restructuring of U.S. public diplomacy dramatically reducedits autonomy and flexibility.13 In October 1999, the Foreign AffairsReform and Restructuring Act reduced U.S. public diplomacy to asubsidiary within the DoS. The Act placed U.S. public diplomacyunderthedirectionofanewUnderSecretaryforPublicDiplomacyandPublicAffairs.14ThefledglingDepartmentofPublicDiplomacyandPublicAffairs,asAmerica’spremierweaponinthewarofideas,founditselfill-suitedtomeettheneedsofanaggressiveforeignpolicyagendabytheBushadministration.Intheabsenceofanestablished,effective,androbustpublicdiplomacyefforttohelpsuccessfullyfacilitatethisnewforeignpolicy,thestagewassetforadismalcollapse.

In the GWOT, the Bush administration needed a well-orchestratedpublicdiplomacyefforttoreassuretheinternationalcommunitythattheobjectivewasnotU.S.imperialismorathreatagainstIslam,butaglobalstruggleagainstthosewhoperpetrateterrorism.Unfortunately,duetotheorganizationalstructurewithintheStateDepartment,theUnderSecretaryofPublicDiplomacyandPublicAffairslackeddirectoversight or control of the regional bureaus and field posts neededto synchronize the agenda.15 To compound the problem, regionalfieldpostslackedacoordinatedstrategicapproachtotheirmission.16Somefieldpostswereleftvacant.Moreover,ofthosefilled,only60%contained officers with the minimum required language proficiencyskills.17Securityconcernslimitedtheeffectiveoutreachofthesepostsand average staff tours in theMiddleEast regionwere22% shorterthantoursinotherpartsoftheworld.18

Maintaining a forward posture, President Bush used his 2002 NSStodeclaretheUnitedStateswouldactpreemptivelyandunilaterally,ifnecessary,topreventfuturehostilitiesagainstAmericaninterests.19While this stancewas adomestic public affairs success,without thenecessary foundation established by an effective public diplomacy


agency,suchanaggressiveapproachquicklycreatedconcernsofU.S.hegemony within the international community.20 These perceptionsundermined American influence abroad and eroded much of theworld’s sympathy and support previously garnered after events of9/11.21 As President Bush worked to build a case against Iraq andformulateacoalition,PewResearchCenterpollsindicatedthatU.S.public diplomacy failed to contain growing animosity toward U.S.foreign policy across the globe.22Worldpublic opinion trends from1999 to 2003 demonstrated marked decreases in U.S. favorabilityratingsinbothMuslimandEuropeancountries.23

On May 1, 2003, after approximately two and a half months ofconflict,thePresidentstoodaboardtheUSSAbrahamLincolninfrontof a banner that proclaimed “Mission Accomplished” to announcethat major combat operations in Iraq had ended.24 What had onlybegunwasthedevastatingblowtoU.S.publicdiplomacythatwoulddegradeitsabilitytoinfluenceworldopiniononU.S.foreignpolicy.In the subsequentmonths,extensive investigations failed touncoversubstantial or conclusive evidence to support the claims by U.S.intelligenceagenciesthatSaddamHusseinpossessedweaponsofmassdestructionorhaddefinitivetiestoal-Qaeda.25Consequently,America’smoral authority was severely marred, debilitating its soft power inglobal influence.26Atthetime,evenformerU.S.UnderSecretaryofPublic Diplomacy and Public Affairs, Karen Hughes, acknowledgedthatrepairingtheU.S.imageabroadcouldtakeyearsifnotdecades.27

One Size Does Not Fit All

ThesecondimpedimenttoU.S.publicdiplomacy’seffectivenessinthewar of ideas is amisunderstandingof the Muslim culture, attitudesandbehaviors.Inanoversimplificationofthedemocraticpeacetheory,America’s foreignpolicy objective of democratizing theMiddleEastneglectstoconsiderhowsuchanagendamayaffectregionalculture.

ProfoundrespectforhistoryandculturaltraditiondefinesandbindsMiddleEasterncultures.28Assuch,fearsregardingWesterncolonizationoftheirholylandsremainattheforefrontoftheirconsciousness.U.S.military stationed in the Middle East and Western coalition forcesinvadingIraqandAfghanistanexacerbatetheseconcerns.29Similarly,


despiteWesternviewsofSaddamHusseinandtheTalibanasabusiveregimes,removaloftheseleadersoverlooksthat,intheMuslimfaith,evencorruptortyrannicalleadersengenderobedience,solongastheydonot interferewithMuslim’s religiouspractices.30Thus,attacksontheseregimesthreatenevenmoderateMuslims,wideningthegapwiththeWestandfurthercomplicatingthewarofideas.31

Imposing Western values on Muslim cultures similarly complicatesthewar of ideas.Civil liberties, human rights, separationof churchandstate,andpoliticalfreedomshonoredintheWesterndemocracieshavenoapplicabletranslationintheMuslimculture.32Muslimsargue,theseprinciples fail tohonortheprimacyofIslamandare thereforeGodless, and represent the West’s attempt to corrupt Islam andsuppress Muslims.33 Attempts to demonstrate religious tolerance tothe Muslim culture also fail to resonate. Muslims consider religioustolerance as evidence of moral decline rather than virtuous.34WhattheWestviewsasfreedom,Muslimsviewaspurposelessgratificationoftheindividual.35MuslimsargueIslamofferspersonalsubmissiontoahigherauthority.36Therefore,U.S.policiesespousingthespreadofdemocracy,promotingindividuallibertiesor,preservinghumanrightswilllikelyengenderresentment,suspicion,andresistancewithtargetaudiences in the Middle East.To Muslims, such agendas suggest aWesternattitudeofpoliticalandmoralsuperiorityoverIslam.37

Application of Western values to theorize the etiology of Islamicterrorism similarly obscures the true foundations of this extremism,further complicating strategic development in the war of ideas.Perceptionsofsocial injustice, incomedisparity,andlackofpoliticalrepresentation, as the causes of Islamic terrorism dominateWesternpoliticalthought.38However,historicalanalysisrefutesthesetheoriesasproblemsexistingintheMuslimworldthroughoutthemodernera.39Rather,theintrusionofWesternizationintotheMuslimworldlikelyfuelscurrentIslamicterrorism.40Acceleratedbyglobalization,WesterninfluencedirectlythreatenstodisruptthesocialfabricthatdominatestheMuslimworld.41InMuslimsocieties,religionisorganicandloyaltytotheextendedfamilywithinapatriarchalstructureisimplicit.42Thissocialstructureishierarchicalandeveryoneknowshisorherplace.43Individualityordisloyaltytothissocialarchitectureisstrictlyshunned,


andattimeswithdireconsequences,asevidencedby“honorkillings.”44Thus,intrusionofWesternsocialvaluesthreatenstodismantleMuslimsocialandreligiousstructuresthatprovidetheveryfoundationoftheirsocieties.45Suchperceivedexternal threats stimulategreater religiousconvictionamongMuslimsandmobilizesresistanceasanobligationtoprotectIslam.46

America’s Aversion to Religious Ideological Struggles

A final impediment to the development of an effective publicdiplomacy strategy in the war of ideas is America’s natural aversionto religious ideological struggles. Religious tolerance, separation ofchurchandstate,andfreedomofspeecharefundamentaltoAmericansociety. Thus, the concept of discrediting religious viewpoints, eventhose considered extreme, is hypocritical and unnatural to mostAmericans.47 Non-Muslims defining Islamic extremism to Muslimspresents a formidable challenge.48 In Islam, non-Muslims haveno authority to opine on matters of the internal struggle that onlyMuslims can wage.49 As a result, much of U.S. public diplomacyefforts to date disproportionately focused on addressing methods toimprove America’s global favorability ratings.50 Far more relevant toU.S.national security is a public diplomacy strategy that empowersmoderateMuslimsaroundtheworldtoconfrontandarrestthespreadof Islamic extremism.51 While both improving America’s image andundermining terroristorganizations’ ability to recruit are relevant inthewarofideas,presumingonewillsolvetheotherisaflawedstrategydestinedforfailure.52

The Current State of U.S. Public Diplomacy: ‘Ready, Fire, Aim’

SunTzustated,“…ifyouknowtheenemyandknowyourself;youneednotfeartheresultsofahundredbattles.”53Arguably,theUnitedStateshasdoneneitherinthewarofideas.AsSenatorJohnMcCainnotes,abolishing the USIA and subsequently marginalizing the remainingU.S.publicdiplomacyprogramswithintheDoSunilaterallydisarmedtheUnitedStatesinthewarofideas.54

Infact,intheyearssincetheconsolidationoftheUSIAintotheDoS,there is no evidence that Department officials are involving public


diplomacy when considering new foreign policy initiatives.55 TheUSIAwasthelargestpublicdiplomacyoperationofanynationever,aswellastheworld’slargestpublisher.56USIAboastedagreateroverseasrepresentationthananyotherU.S.governmentagency.57Themergerof public diplomacy within the DoS reduced the number of publicdiplomacyofficersbyhalf.58Sincethemerger,thenumberofoverseaspublicdiplomacystaffhasremainedessentiallyunchanged.59Similarly,U.S. public diplomacy sufferedmarked reductions in fundinguponmerging with the DoS. Although increased from its nadir in 2001,U.S.publicdiplomacy’sfundinginofjustover$800million(includingbroadcasting)islessthanthefundingitreceivedin1957(inconstantdollars).60To add perspective, public diplomacy’s current funding isapproximately 4% of the DoS’s overall foreign affairs budget and amere0.6%oftheDOD’sbudget.61

Not only does the DoS fail to have a recruitment program for thepublicdiplomacycareerpath,butalso,publicdiplomacyofficersareconspicuouslyabsentfromthesenior-mostranksofthedepartment,demonstratinganoveralllackofintegration.62Publicdiplomacyofficersreportthattheynowspendtheoverwhelmingmajorityoftheirtimeaddressingadministrativedutiesasopposedtotheirprimaryintendedresponsibilityofdirectcontactwiththeirtargetpopulations.63

An initial evaluation that public diplomacy has horribly failedin its mission to explain the United States to other nations is anoversimplification.Deeperinspectionrevealsthemisappropriateuseofpublicdiplomacyasamodalityforcrisismanagement.Whetherdrivenbyfiscalconsiderations,hubris,orperhapsacombinationofboth,afterthecollapseoftheBerlinWall,thecostly‘peacedividend’presumptionthattheUnitedStatesnolongerneededtodevotethecontinuedleveloffunding,personnel,orefforttowarditspublicdiplomacyprogramsprevailedwithintheexecutiveandlegislativebranchesofgovernment.

Thechoicetomarginalizepublicdiplomacyinitiativesprecipitatedacascadingdecline inAmerica’s ability tomaintain its global positiveimage. Currently, the United States lacks the solid foundation ofa world well versed in the virtues, human rights, and freedoms forwhich America stands and espouses. There is no established base ofcredibilitytobufferliesandmisconceptions,norastablenetworkof


fieldambassadorsgroomedbyyearsoffamiliarityintheirhostnationstostemthetideofanimosityandisolatetheextremists.

WhatremainsoftheoncevibrantandeffectiveUSIAisanAmericanpublicdiplomacythatisamereshellofitsformercapability.SubsumedwithintheDoS,U.S.publicdiplomacyeffortsappearfixedonapublicaffairs-centric focus as opposed to developing an enduring strategicplantowinthewarofideas.U.S.publicdiplomacyleadershiplacksdirectsupervision,controlorinputoftheirfieldofficers.Inadequatebudgets prevent modernizing to keep pace with informationtechnology advances or filling staffing requirements causing criticalvacancies in field offices. Current public diplomacy officers appeardisproportionately saddled with administrative responsibilities,impeding them performing their primary function of networkingwiththeirtargetpopulations.Similarly,manypublicdiplomacyfieldofficerslackthenecessarylanguageskillsenablingthemtoengagewiththeirtargetaudience.ThisisthearsenalavailabletotheUnitedStatestoconfront,arguably,thegreatestchallengeinthehistoryofAmericanpublicdiplomacy,thewarofideas.

Failuretoimplementeffectivepublicdiplomacyinthewarofideasalsoyieldsdirectconsequencesforthewarfighter.Asanti-Americanismrises,losinggroundinthewarofideastranslatesintogreaterresistanceandhostilityofthehostpopulousagainstthedeployedtroops.Expandingwar efforts means more frequent and perhaps longer deployments.Secondaryeffectsadverselyinfluencedivorcerates,mentalhealth,andretentionamongmilitarymembers.64

Failure to contain the spread of extremism will produce additionalregionsofglobalhostility,requiringnewmobilizationrequirementsformilitarymembers.Similarly,failuretosucceedinthewarofideasrisksextending the sanctuary, funding, and recruitment of enemy forcesin theGWOT.65A losing effort in thewarof ideasmayaffectU.S.abilitytoformormaintaincoalitionsintheGWOT,forcingtheU.S.militarytoassumealargerrolecreatingmorefrequentandorlongerdeploymentswithlargerareasofresponsibility.66Alliesmayrefusetoassist in thewareffort, aswas thecasewithTurkey, creatinggreaterlogisticchallengesfortroop,supply,andequipmentmovements.67


Inabilitytoinspirelike-mindedalliances,partnerships,andcoalitionsto sacrifice for common interests, changes the dynamic of theoperational environment for Joint Force Commanders.68 Ability toformalliancesobviatesU.S.troopsfromshoulderingfargreatertheaterresponsibilities, and averts the politically disastrous impression ofAmericanunilateralismtoforwarditsowninterests.Failuretostaffthenecessarynumberofoverseaspublicdiplomacyofficers riskscausingmilitarymissiondrift.MilitarymembersmayfindthemselvesassumingpublicdiplomacyrolesandresponsibilitiesthatU.S.publicdiplomacyisunderstaffedandunder-fundedtoexecute.69

Recommendations to Empower U.S. Public Diplomacy

To improve the effectiveness of U.S. public diplomacy, changesmustbeginattheveryhighest levels.TheUnderSecretaryofPublicDiplomacymusthavedirectaccesstothePresident,bepresentduringthedevelopmentofforeignpolicy,andhaveaseatatNationalSecurityCouncil meetings.70 This crucial input will provide insight intointernationalreactionstoproposedforeignpolicyinitiativesandwillhelp shapenecessarypreemptivepublicdiplomacy strategies to gaingreaterreceptiontoAmericaninfluenceabroad.NowisanidealtimeforPresidentObamatoestablishthisculturalchange,therebycreatingthestandardforfutureadministrationsregardingtheimportanceandrelevanceofU.S.publicdiplomacyinadvancingnational interests.71SuchrecognitionbytheExecutiveofficewillbetterdelineatelinesofauthority,engendergreaterpriority,andfosterinteragencycooperationforPublicdiplomacyinitiatives.72AsformerprominentUSIAdirectorEdwardR.Morrowwarned,“Publicdiplomacyneedstobeinatthetakeoffofforeignpolicies,notjustattheoccasionalcrashlanding.”73

First, and foremost, the Under Secretary of Public Diplomacy andPublicAffairsmustcoordinateallU.S.publicdiplomacyefforts.Unityof effort and interagency coordination of public diplomacy relatedprogramswithintheWhiteHouse,theDODandtheDoS,preventsirregular emphasis and competing priorities. Cooperation amongdepartments facilitates successful implementation of U.S. foreignpolicyagendas.Synchronizedstrategyenablesastreamlined,uniform


approach reducing the likelihood of both gaps and redundancy invariousareasofeffortorgeographicregions.

Similarly,theUnderSecretaryofPublicDiplomacyandPublicAffairsmustbeinthedirectchainofcommandforallpublicdiplomacyeffortsdownto thevery leveloffieldofficers.Asdiscussed,a synchronizedapproachatall levelswithclearmissionobjectives isessential to thesuccessofanyagenda.ItistheresponsibilityoftheUnderSecretarytocreate,implementandthenadjuststrategyasnecessary.Withouttheauthorityoverallareasandassetsofpublicdiplomacy,theflexibilityof implementingurgentchanges in strategy is lost.Additionally, thepotential for essential regions to gounderstaffed andfield agents tolackaunifiedmissionfocusbecomesadangerousreality.

ThetrainingandrecruitingpublicdiplomacyfieldofficersmustreceivegreateremphasiswithintheDoS.Publicdiplomacystrategyisonlyaseffectiveasitsmessengers.Havingasfewas60%offieldofficersmeetthemostminimumstandardsinlanguageproficiencyoftheirhostnationisapoortestimonytotheeffectivenessofanyprogram.Iffieldofficersarenotabletoconverseandinteractfluentlyandseamlesslywiththeirtargetpopulationthencredibilityislost,andsoisthemessagetheyaretryingtodeliver.GiventheintensityoftherancorthatexistsinMuslimregions,theUnitedStatescanillaffordfieldofficervacanciesduetounderstaffing.Similarly,ifpublicdiplomacyistheweaponofchoiceinthewarofideasrecruitmentofpublicdiplomacyofficersmustreceivefargreateremphasisandpriority.

PreparingasuccessfulvisionforU.S.publicdiplomacyinthewarofideas requires a return toColdWar eraprominence in thenationalsecuritystrategy.A2008surveyofUSIAalumniargueprecedentexiststowarrantsuchaction.74Seventy-twopercentofthosesurveyedreportedthatpublicdiplomacywasinstrumentaltothedefeatofcommunism.75Asimilarlylargemajority(77%)echothatpublicdiplomacyplaysanequally critical role in today’s conflicts.76These expertsnote the topsixU.S.PublicdiplomacyprioritiesduringtheColdWararethesamepublicdiplomacyprioritiesidentifiedintoday’swarofideas.77

AttheheightoftheColdWar,theUnitedStatesdevotednearly10,000employees and a $1 billion dollar budget to its public diplomacy


programs.78Additionally,publicdiplomacyservedasanindependentforeignaffairsentitywithintheexecutivebranchandboastedthemostextensive global presence of any U.S. government agency.79Today’spublicdiplomacybudgetof$859millionand1,332publicdiplomacyofficersareameagershadowbyColdWarstandards.80

TomakeU.S.publicdiplomacymoreeffectiveinthewarofideas,theUnited States must regain its base of credibility; beginning with itsallies.Recentinternationalpollingdataindicatesthat,sincethestartoftheGWOT,theUnitedStateshaslostasubstantialdegreeofinfluenceglobally, even among its closest allies.81 In 2008 polls of America’straditional allies,Britain,France andGermany,onlyBritain showedaslimmajority(53%)reportingfavorableviewsoftheUnitedStattes,withFrance(42%)andGermany(31%)reportingsmallerminorities.82This data reflects a significant decline in United States favorabilityamong these close allies, who in 2000 had each demonstrated largemajoritiesreportingfavorableviewsoftheUnitedStates.83

Notably, the United States currently suffers unprecedented anti-AmericanisminWesternEurope,evenintheUnitedKingdomwhere41% of individuals polled believe that America is a greater threatto world peace than Iran.84 Similarly, other allies such as Japan andAustralia, where clear majorities held favorable views of the U.S. in2000,reportedsteadydeclinesinU.S.favorabilitysincethebeginningofGWOTtopresent.85InTurkey,aNATOally,U.S.favorabilityratingshaveplummetedfrom52%in2000to12%in2008.86Similarly,only13%ofthosepolledinTurkeyheldfavorableviewsofAmericans.87

Equally concerning, of the 24 countries polled in the 2008 PewGlobalAttitudesProject(GAP),21viewtheUnitedStatesashavingapredominantlynegativeinfluenceintheircountry.88Nineteenofthetwenty-fourcountiespolledsimilarlyreportedtheU.S.economyhada negative influence on their country.89 Fortunately, most countriespolled in the Pew GAP viewed Americans more favorably than theUnited States itself, indicating less hostility toward the Americanpeople.90Anotableexceptiontothisfinding,however,occurredintheLatinAmericancountriespolled,Mexico,ArgentinaandBrazil,wherestrong negative views of the United States correspond closely withsimilarnegativitydirectedagainstAmerciancitizens.91


United States public diplomacy must also regain credibility withMuslimnationstosucceedinthewarofideas.ThisstrategyrequirestheUnitedStates todemonstrate itswillingness todepart frompastpolicies,transitionawayfromtheconfrontationalterm,“warofideas”andemphasizeculturalconnectionswithMuslimnations.ExpandingU.S.publicdiplomacyprogramstobridgerelationswithIranisaboldstrike, one likely to find success rebuilding U.S. credibility amongMuslims.

UnitedStatesengagmentofIranviapublicdiplomacyisaformidabletask;particularlywhenconsideringthesignificantnumberofIranianswhoholdnegativeviewsoftheU.S.government,butdevelopingsuchrelationsisacornerstonetoprogressinthewarofideas.RecentWorldPublicOpinion.orgpollsdemonstratethecriticalnatureofthisgoal.Specifically,74%ofIraniansfeeltheU.S.Governmenthasanegativeinfluenceontherestoftheworld.92WhilealargemajorityofIranians(>80%) believe the United States seeks to control Middle East oilreservesforitsowninterests.93Eighty-fourpercentofIraniansbelievetheUnitedStatesobjectivelyseeks toweakenanddividetheIslamicworld.94Equallyconcerning,64%ofIranianspolled feel theUnitedStatesintentionallydesirestohumiliatetheIslamicworld.95

Despite remnants of distrust between the two nations, Steven Kull,director of World Public Opinion.org, believes Iran is currentlyexpressingagreaterreadiness tonormalizerelationswiththeUnitedStates, particularly in such areas as tourism, trade, and journalistic,educational,culturalandathleticexchanges.96HisopinionstemsfromasignificantdecreaseinhostilitytowardtheUnitedStatesillustratedby comparing polling data from 2006 and 2008 where the beliefthatviolentconflictbetweentheWestandMuslimsisinevitable,hasdroppedto12%in2008comparedto25%in2006.97Additionally,decreasingnumbersofIraniansstatetheUnitedStatesisadirectthreattotheircountryandhostiletoIslam(65%in2006,vs.51%in2008).98Similarly,fewerIraniansconsiderU.S.militarypresenceintheMiddleEast adirect threat against Iran (55% in2008,down from73% in2006)orviewAmericansunfavorably(37%in2008,downfrom49%in 2006).99 Equally reassuring, 76% of Iranians polled felt attacksagainstU.S.citizensintheUnitedStateswasneverjustifiable.100


Perhapsmorecompellingisdatasuggestingthateffortstonormalizerelations with Iran may aid U.S. foreign policy objectives in theMiddleEastandmitigateconcernsregardingIraniannuclearweaponsdevelopment.AmajorityofIraniansreportedregionalconcessionsandconcessionswiththeirnuclearenergyprogramwouldbeacceptableinexchangefornormalizedrelationswiththeUnitedStates.101Infact,amajorityofIraniansopposenuclearweaponsdevelopmentwithanearequalmajoritystatingsuchweaponsviolatetheprinciplesofIslam.102SimilarmajoritiesendorsetheNuclearNon-ProliferationTreatyallowingtheInternationalAtomicEnergyAgencyfullandpermanentaccesstoIraniannuclearfacilitiesinexchangeforallowingIrantoconductfull-cyclenuclearenergyproduction.103AmajorityofIranianspolledstatedtheywouldendsupportforarmedanti-governmentgroupsinIraqfornormalizedrelationswiththeUnitedStates.104Twenty-fourpercentofIraniansexpressedwillingnesstorecognizetheStateofIsrael.105Thatnumber nearly doubled when posed as a condition for normalizingrelationswiththeUnitedStates.106Finally,themajorityofIranianshadnodesireforIraniandominancewithintheirregion,preferringinstead,the development of cooperative relations with surrounding MiddleEasterncountries.107

Polling data collected in the United States and Iran also suggestsmajoritiesinbothnationsbelievecommonground,withsimilarwantsandneeds,existsbetweenthem.108BothAmericansandIraniansviewterrorismasanationalthreatandbothhavestrongnegativeopinionstoward Osama bin Laden.109 Both the majorities of Americans andIraniansrejecttheconceptofattacksagainstcivilians.110AlargemajorityofIranianssupporttheprinciplesoffreeelectionsandfreedomofthepress.111Nearlyequalmajoritiesfromeachcountry(69%ofIraniansand 73% of Americans) support bilateral discussions on ways tostabilizeIraq.112

The recent ease on U.S. restrictions regarding stem cell researchby the Obama administration represents a poignant opportunityfor U.S. Public diplomacy to initiate relations with Iran. Iran is aninternational leader in stem cell research whose scientists developedhumanembryonicstemcelllinesasfarbackas2003andwho,in2008,devoted2.5billioninfundingtothecountry’sstemcellresearchover


thenextfiveyears.113Infact,severalotherMuslimcountries,suchasMalaysia, Egypt andTurkey, are also actively involved in their ownstemcellresearchprograms.114UnitedStatespublicdiplomacycouldconduct andorchestrate international scientific symposiadevoted totheadvancementofstemcellresearchandthedevelopmentofglobalinternationalethicsstandardsforsuchresearch.

Prior to anyU.S. public diplomacy exchangewith Iran, theUnitedStatesmustrespectthatpollingdatademonstratesamajorityofIraniansaresatisfiedwiththeirformofgovernment.115Similarly,themajorityof IraniansdisapproveofU.S. attempts to spreaddemocracywithinIran.116ThesedatawarrantfurtherreviewbytheDoS,whocontinuestoidentifypromotingdemocracyasoneoftheprimaryobjectivesofU.S.publicdiplomacy.117

Successinthewarofideasmayalsorequiremodificationstocurrentforeign policy objectives. International opinion surveys demonstratethatmuchofthedeclineinAmerica’simageoverthelastseveralyearssurroundsoppositiontorecentU.S.foreignpolicy initiativesanditsexpandingglobalmilitarypresence.118Indeed,pollingdataofMuslimpublics intheMiddleEast indicatewidesupportforthewithdrawalofU.S.Forces fromtheMiddleEast, includingU.S.naval forces inthePersianGulf.119Similarly,internationalconcernsexistthatfeelthebuild up of U.S. military presence in the Middle East over the lastseveral decades actually exacerbates threats of nuclear proliferationand terrorism.120 Ironically,while largemajoritiesofMuslimspolleddisapprove of terrorist attacks against Americans, equal majoritiessupportalQaeda’smethodsofpressuringtheUnitedStatestoremoveallitsforcesandbasesfromMuslimlands.121LargemajoritiesviewtheU.S.militarypresenceintheMiddleEastasameanstoweakenanddividetheIslamicworld.122

Polls carried out in Iraq in 2008 also demonstrate a growing desirefor decreased U.S. military presence in the region. Data indicatesthat the majority of Iraqis are impatient with the pace of U.S.militarywithdrawal.123Eighty-fourpercentofIraqispolleddesirethewithdrawalofU.S.forceswithinayear.124Ofparticularconcern,71%of Iraqis feel the U.S. desires to occupy Iraq with permanent basesand61%viewthepresenceofU.S.forcesinIraqasdestabilizingtheir


security situation.125 Such findings are an ominous predictor of theIraqi’s willingness to cooperate with the coalition forces, or supportan insurgency.126Sixty-onepercentof Iraqis supportattacksonU.S.troops, while 68% of Iraqis endorse non-military assistance by theUnited States, to include, building schools, health clinics and otherassistancewithorganizingcommunities.127

While global opinion polls should not dictate any country’s foreignpolicy, countries should not routinely dismiss them. As such, theU.S. should re-evaluate its military force structure in the MiddleEast.PhasedreductionsofAmerican forcesandbases in theMiddleEastbasedonatimetableratifiedthroughtheUNSecurityCouncil,demonstratesU.S.commitmenttointernationalgoverningbodiesandmultilateralism.

Conclusion

Concluding budget cuts and staff reductions alone account forU.S. public diplomacy’s ineffectiveness in the war of ideas to dateoversimplifiesthegreatercomplexityofissuesathand.UponmergingwithintheDoS,U.S.publicdiplomacyabandonedtheveryprinciplesthatdefineitsfunctionality,independence,agility,coordinatedaction,adirectvoicewiththeexecutiveoffice,andperson-to-personcontactwithtargetpopulations.RatherthanappropriatelyvettingaggressivenewforeignpolicyinitiativesthroughU.S.publicdiplomacy,AmericablindlyattemptedtosuperimposeWesternvaluesuponanestablishedforeignculturewithpredictableresults toonlythenquestion,“Whydotheyhateus?”Lastly,America’sapprehensionstowardconfrontingideological struggles led to a disproportionate emphasis for publicdiplomacy on pubic relations as opposed to confronting the morechallengingissueofcontainingthespreadofIslamicextremism.

Success in the war of ideas requires a comprehensive, coordinated,overarching strategy for U.S. public diplomacy, something lackingsincetheColdWarera.Ratherthanviewedasarelicofapastconflict,thesuccessofpublicdiplomacy(orUSIA)duringtheColdWarerashouldserveasatemplateforthelevelofnationalcommitmentandemphasisnecessaryforpublicdiplomacytofavorablyinfluencethewarofideas.128Internationalanti-AmericanismandthespreadofIslamic


extremismthreatenU.S.interestsgloballyandcreateagrowingnationalsecuritythreat.TheUnitedStatesmustprioritizeitspublicdiplomacyefforts to counter these threats. Inorder todo so itmust engage inthe war of ideas with as much vigor and capital as it dedicated towinningtheColdWar.129Similarly,publicdiplomacymustregaintheprominenceitheldduringtheColdWareraasacentralcomponentofnationalstrategyandAmerica’spremierepoliticalweapontocontainSovietinfluencebeyonditsborders.130

As recent opinion polls indicate, Islamic extremism is losing favorineventhemostconservativeofMuslimcountries.Nowistheidealtime for thenewadministration to capitalizeupon thismomentumandredefineAmerica’sapproachtothewarofideas.Rebuildingpublicdiplomacy will enable the United States to distance itself from theambiguous and arguably confrontational term, “war of ideas,” andlaunchanew,inclusivedirectionaimedatcreatingculturalharmonywithmoderateMuslims.

national communicationS StrateGy

Colonel Suhail M. AlserraidiUnitedArabEmirates

The time has come to look anew at our institutions of public diplomacy. We must do much more to confront hateful propaganda, dispel dangerous myths and get out the truth. We must increase our exchanges with the rest of the world. We must work closer than ever with educational institutions, the private sector and nongovernmental organizations and we must encourage our citizens to engage the world to learn foreign languages, to understand different cultures and to welcome others into their homes.

—SecretaryofStateCondoleezzaRice1

Nature of the Information Environment

TheUnitedStatesisandhasbeenforthepasteightyears,engagedinadifficultlong-termstruggleagainstsecularandreligiousextremists.This major struggle, especially in the Middle East, has shown thatcommunicationisacriticalfactorinovercomingextremists.Theneedtoengage,enforce,inform,understandandinfluencepeople,notonlyoverseasaudiencesbutalsotheAmericanpublic,hasbecomevital.

However,atthebeginningofthisstrugglethepublicdiplomacyeffort,especiallyfortheArabandMuslimworld,reflectedasystemthatwasoutmoded,lackedresourcesandhadnostrategicdirection.TheUnitedStateshadprevioussuccessesinpublicdiplomacy,suchastheFulbrighteducation two-way exchanges, the Marshall Plan, the United Statesmoon landing, and the reunification of Germany. In recent times,onlytheReaganyearshadcommunicationstrategiesthattookafrontroleinallpoliticalchallenges.Thestrategywassimpleandclearwitha mission “to win the ColdWar once and for all” stated personallyby President Reagan. Many people today expect public diplomacyto instantly produce goodwill among other nations without firstestablishinganatmosphereoftrustandunderstanding.Whatisneededin this struggle with militants is presidential leadership, resources,and full commitment by the government and private organizations.To demonstrate the need for an effective strategic communication


strategy, theHeritageFoundationconductedapollandstated inanarticle that “many in the Arab world believe that the United StateswantstodestroyIslamandreplaceitwithChristianity.”2

Strategic Intent

ThestrategicintentofstrategiccommunicationistoassistinwinningtheWaronTerrorbywinningthebattleofideas.Thebattleofideasispartof theoverallpublicdiplomacy strategyexcept its task isnottochange foreignviewsof theUnitedStatesand itspolicies,but toensurethatunfavorablesentimentsand“day-to-daygrievancestowardtheUnitedStatesanditsalliesdonotmanifestthemselvesintheformof violent extremists.”3Thequestionof theprimarymission for thebattleof ideas iswhether todefeat the terroristsor tobuild a long-term relationship of trust, understanding, and support for UnitedStatesforeignpolicyobjectives.ArabandMuslimnationsmayseethefirst choice as being taken advantage of for United States purposes.ThesecondchoiceconsiderstheArabandMuslimworldaslong-termpartners.Toachievethestrategicintentofwinningthewaronterrorwe must choose to become full partners with Muslim nations. ToaccomplishthiswemustunderstandthatoverallUnitedStatespolicyisthemostimportantpartofthetask.TheUnitedStatescannotexpectothernationstoaccepttheirpoliciesifothernationsdon’tunderstandthem,havelittleornoinputanddisagreewiththepolicies.Therefore,wemustacceptthefactthatweneedtheassistanceofothernationsandpeopleandtheirviews,beliefsandinterests.Thisbeginswithlistening.

Goals and Objectives

The goal of strategic communication is to help defeat terrorism byproducing counterterrorism ideas through words, deeds and imagesthatseparateterroristsfromtheirbaseandgeneralaudiences.Thiswillresultintheavoidanceofviolencetoachievepoliticalobjectives,endingattemptsofradicalizingandrecruitingnewmembersandmakingthosewhodouseviolenceisolatedandcondemned.

Theobjectiveofstrategiccommunicationistobeproactive,sustainedwith a coordinated and coherent set of actions that supportUnitedStatesstrategicobjectives.Someactionstoachievetheseobjectivesare:


1.Understandingofglobalattitudesandcultures.InreferencetotheArabandMuslimworld,theUnitedStatesmustunderstandthattheir societies and countries arediverse culturally, linguistically,ethicallyandreligiouslyandthustheUnitedStatesmustcustomizetheirmessageandideastoeachnation.

2.Learntolisten.TheUnitedStatesneedstohearthevoicesofothernations,especiallyArabandMuslimpoliticalsectors,notjustpro-Americangroups.TheUnitedStatesneedstolisten,addressandinteractwiththeArabworldanditsdifferentvoicesandbewillingtohavefrank,truthful,respectfulandtoughdiscussionsinwhichthey,attimes,mustbereadytolose.

3.Understand the transformation of the media, especially withyoungadults.InformationflowisprimarilybyviralmethodssuchasGoggle,YouTube,Wikipedia,blogs,chatrooms,etc.,andnotbroadcasts.Thefocusisnotonthedeliverymeansbutonwhatthe content of the message is and its credibility to the people.Terrorist organizations have used the media to their advantagethrough fast responses, flexibility, decentralized leadership andlocal autonomy. They recognize that bad news is “good” sincebombssellandschoolsdon’t.Theriseofpan-Arabmediaoutletshavevastlyincreased(e.g.,Al-Jazeera)andthewebisavailabletoall.Thetraditionalmediaarelosingtheirinfluencetothecitizenreportsonnewmedia.Censorshiporhidingofinformationhasbecomeimpossible,andbalanced,validatedreportinghaschangedtopolarized,targetgroupreporting.

4.TheworldtodayiswatchingthedeedsandactionsoftheUnitedStatestocomparethemwithUnitedStatesstrategiccommunicationmessages.Communicationtodayisglobaland“bad”actionsarequickly seen and measured. Also, domestic messages sent forsupport athomecanhaveanegative result internationally.TheUnitedStatesmustalsounderstandthatwhattheysayattimesisnotwhatothershear.Conceptssuchas“democracy,”“rule-of-law”and“freedom”havedifferentmeaningsindifferentcultures.TheUnitedStatesvaluesystemisconfusingtoothers,especiallyintheArab andMuslimworld,particularly consideringUnitedStatesculturalhomogeneityvs.culturaldiversityandtheacceptanceof


alternatelifestyles.Thus,thefocusoftheUnitedStatesmessageshould be cultural concepts that are globally valued such ashuman dignity, health, personal safety, environment, educationandeconomicwell-being.

Conclusion

ThebattleofideaswillbeacontinuingchallengetotheUnitedStates.The nation must mobilize and utilize its best talent, expertise andresourcesbothwithinandoutsidethegovernment.Itneedsanationalstructureforstrategiccommunication,increasedfinancialsupportandstrongleadershipfromthehighestlevels.Fortunately,thenewUnitedStatesPresidentmaybeuptoallthechallenges.HisdecisiontomakehisfirstofficialinterviewasPresidentontheArabictelevisionstation,Al-Arabiya,showshisunderstandingofculture,respectandvalueofdialogue. President Obama’s comments at the G-20 Conference of“listeningtoothers”bringsthepromiseofafreshstartinU.S.-worldrelations.HisSecretaryofState,HillaryClinton,commentson“smartpower”4 which she defines as relying heavily on global engagementandpublicdiplomacyalso shows that theUnitedStateswillnotactunilaterallyasithasinthepast.

Theunderstanding,supportandleadershipforUnitedStatesstrategiccommunicationisrising.ThisisprovenbytheintroductioninCongressofthe“StrategicCommunicationActof2009”byRepublicanWilliamThornberry (R-TX-13) on January31, 2009.The subtitle states “toimprove the conduct of strategic communication by the FederalGovernment.”5Onceagain,theUnitedStatesisrisingtoachallenge.

Section two

InformationEffectsthroughNetworkandKnowledge-basedOperations

introduction

William O. WaddellDirector,CommandandControlGroupDirector,CyberspaceOperationsGroup

CenterforStrategicLeadershipU.S.ArmyWarCollege

Section two is focused on the practical application of existinginformation theories and concepts concerning informationavailabilityanditsusageinnationalandtheateroperations.Since

theonsetoftheinformationage,activitiesandconsiderationsinvolvedintheprotection,availabilityandapplicationofinformationhavebeendebatedandputintotheory;howeverthesetheoriesbecomesomewhatarchaic after time since the information environment continues topresentaneverchangingmedium.StartingwiththeconceptofNet-CentricWarfaredevelopedin1998andtheJointVisionseries(2010and 2020) many new information related conceptual ideas haveemergedand taken root inmilitaryplanningandoperations.Whilethe initial concepts stillhave somemerit, theyneed tobe“roundedout,” updated, and refocused. Protecting information that rides theinformation super-highway has moved up to front and center innational and strategic considerations, as vulnerabilities in militarynetworksandthecommercial internetraisesignificantthreatstothewellbeingoftheU.S.culture.Additionally,empoweringmilitaryandgovernment agencies with the timely flow of accurate information,anddeveloping“knowledge”fromthatinformationisafulltimeissueasempowerment involvesmore than justgetting the informationtotheright location.Finally,thedevelopmentofrepositoriesofcriticaland historic information that is available to a ubiquitous audience,whilemaintainingtheappropriatelevelofsecuritywillmovemilitaryplannersanddecisionmakerstonewlevelsofsuccess.Eachoftheseauthorsexploresoneoftheseconceptsastheypresenttheirthesisonhowtoimproveinformationprotection,flow,andavailability.

The first monograph, written by Lieutenant Colonel Scott W.Beidlemanexplorestheprotectionaspectofinformationrequirements,


writing about the potential for cyber attack to cause exceptionallygravedamagetoastate’snationalsecurity,andexaminingwhatissueswouldmakeacyberattackanactofwar.Heconsiderseffortstoapplyexisting international norms to cyberspace, and also assesses howtraditionalconceptsofdeterrenceapplyincyberspace.Heconcludesthatcyberattack,undercertainconditions,mustbetreatedasanactofwar;thatdeterrenceworkstodissuadecyberaggression;andprovidesrecommendationstoprotectAmericannationalinterests.

Next, Colonel David A. Barlow argues that the requirement forunimpededinformationsharingisacentraltenetofnetworkcentricwarfareandisnotcurrentlyarealityacrosstheatersofoperation.Hefurthercontendsthatthedifferentcombatantcommandinformationtechnologysupportmethodologiesimpedenetworkcentricoperationswithin the Department of Defense. His paper examines desktopcollateralinformationtechnologysupporttothecombatantcommandsas it pertains to network centric warfare at the theater level, andproposesasinglesolutionprovidedbyasingleagencytoservicealltencombatantcommands.Byexaminingthestrengthsandweaknessesofthecurrent supportmethodsheprovides strategic recommendationsaimedatimprovingnetworkcentricwarfare.

Lieutenant Colonel Robert B. Sofge writes that Knowledge CentricWarfare, an evolutionary step beyond Network Centric Warfare,provides a conceptual underpinning to propel a fundamental shiftin the joint forceas it focusesonknowledgevice information.Builtuponthephilosophicalpositionthatknowledgeisinseparablefromtheknower,thispaperrejectstheobjectificationofknowledgeandarguesthatdeliberatelydevelopingtheprivateandculturalmentalmodelsoftheforcewillachievetheChairman’svision.

Finally,CommanderTimothyL.Danielswritesthatknowledgecreatedandsharedwithinandamongresponsibleorganizationsenablestimelyandeffectiveproblemsolving,decision-making,andactioncriticaltosuccessfulSecurity,Stability,Transition,andReconstructionOperations(SSTRO) in complex and uncertain environments. He exploresknowledgemanagementasanSSTROenablerandexaminestheuseoftheIntelligentComplexAdaptiveSystem(ICAS)ModeltodemonstratestrategicKnowledgeManagement(KM)application.Additionally,he

67Information Effects through Network and Knowleged-based Operations

exploresorganizationalcultureasabarriertoKMimplementationandidentifiesstrategicleaderfocusareasforovercomingculturalbarriers.Finally,heprovidesrecommendationsforrealizingthestrategicutilityofKMaspartofSSTROtoachievenationalsecurityobjectives.

These excellent papers provide a depth of research and thoughtconcerning the future development of information processes andnetwork structure. They lay the groundwork for the developmentof new and innovative ideas to meet the information requirementsemerginginfuturemilitaryandcommercialventures.

defininG and deterrinG cyber war

Lieutenant Colonel Scott W. BeidlemanUnitedStatesAirForce

Cyberspace is the nervous system—the control system of our country.—PresidentGeorgeW.Bush1

Whatifonedaythecontrolsystemsofamajordamsuddenlyreleased torrents of water upon nearby communities, orsafetysystemsofnuclearpowerplantsmalfunctioned,or

air traffic control systems of major airports shut down, or financialtransactions of major banks and stock exchanges stopped ordisappeared?What if these eventshappened simultaneously? Is suchascenariotheplotofaHollywoodblockbuster,orthenewrealityoftwenty-firstcenturycyberwar?

SincethepublicdebutoftheInternetintheearly1990s,notallusershaveactedwithpeacefulpurposesincyberspace.ThemagnitudeandfrequencyofcyberattackshavegrowncontinuouslysincetheinceptionoftheWorldWideWeb,fromthenuisanceofindividualhackersintheearlyyearstopotentialstate-sponsoredcyberaggressionrecentlyagainstEstoniaandGeorgia.Indeed,cyberspacehasemergedasasettingforwaronparwithland,sea,air,andspace.ThisisunsettlingsincetheInternet and information and communications technologies (ICT)haveincreasinglybecomeintegratedintoallaspectsofhumansociety.In fact, computers control much of America’s critical infrastructureand essential processes in manufacturing, utilities, banking, andcommunications.2EvenPresidentBushdeclaredcyberspaceasAmerica’snervoussystemandthecontrolsystemofthecountry.3CyberspaceisAmerica’soperatingsystem,analogoustoanational-levelWindowsXP.Asystemcrashwouldcausegravedamagetotheeconomyandnationalsecurity,andrebootingAmericamightnotbeeasy.Consequently,thispaperassertsthatcyberattackshavethepotentialtocausegravedamagetothenationalsecurityoftheUnitedStatesandmustbetreatedasanactofwar.Asafirstlineofdeterrenceinthisrelativelynewdomainof


war,theUnitedStatesshouldleadeffortstoestablishaninternationalregimeoflaws,norms,anddefinitionstodeteraggressionincyberspace.

The question of cyber deterrence reveals several more fundamentalquestions,theanswerstowhichtheinternationalcommunityhasnotreachedconsensus.Doescyberattackconstituteauseofforce?Iscyberattackanactofwar?Dothetraditionalconceptsofdeterrenceprevailin cyberspace? These questions are difficult to answer because therearenocommon,codified,legalstandardsregardingcyberaggression.MorethanadecadeaftertheadventoftheInternet,theinternationalcommunitystillhasnosanctionedbodyofnormstoconstrainstates’actionsincyberspace.

ThispaperbeginsbyexaminingtheincreasingscopeanddestructivenessofcyberattacksandestablishingcyberwarasathreattothenationalinterestsoftheUnitedStates.Next,itdefinescyberwarandattemptstoassesscyberattackasanactofwarregardingcurrentinternationallaw. Then the study applies the traditional concepts of deterrenceto cyberspace and concludes with recommendations. The researchconcludesthatdeterrencecanworkincyberspace,buttheUnitedStatesmustpursueacomprehensiveapproachthatcombinesthefieldingofdefensive and offensive cyber capabilities with a concerted effort toestablishaninternationalregimetoconstraincyberaggression.

A Threat to National Security

Since its arrival as a public domain in the 1990s, the Internet andICT have become integrated into all aspects of human society.Advances in ICT continuously fuel globalization, which increasesthe interdependence of states’ economies, politics, and security.Concurrently, it increases states’ vulnerabilities to cyber attack.Likeany other medium, cyberspace provides avenues to pursue peacefulendsaswellasaggression.

Oneoftheearliestattacksincyberspacetogainnotorietyoccurredin1994atRomeLab, amilitary researchanddevelopment laboratory.Two hackers intruded into the lab’s network 150 times but causedno damage.4 One of the hackers from Israel was acquitted becauseno Israeli laws applied to the incident.5 A few years later the Love


Bugvirusinfectedover60millioncomputersworldwideandcausedorganizationsasdiverseastheBritishParliamentandtheFordMotorCompanytoshutdowntheirservers.6Again,theFilipinoperpetratorwasnotchargedorpunishedbecause“creatingcomputerviruseswasnotacrimeunderPhilippinelaw.”7

In1997, the U.S. military conductedEligibleReceiver, thenation’sfirst information warfare exercise. This exercise tasked a group ofhighly trained computer experts, known as a government red team,toindependentlyexamineplansandoperationsfromtheperspectiveofadversaries.8Theredteam“wasabletoinfiltrateandtakecontrolofPacificcommandcentercomputers,aswellaspowergridsand9/11emergencysystemsinninemajorU.S.cities.”9TheseresultssuggestedthatAmerica’scriticalmilitaryandcivilianinfrastructureswerehighlyvulnerable.Infact,theverynextyearhackersconfirmedthefindingsofEligibleReceiverwhentheyattackedDepartmentofDefensenetworksandcompromisedover500computersinanincidentdubbed“SolarSunrise.”10 This attack targeted logistics and accounting systemsessential to managing and deploying U.S. military forces at a timewhentheUnitedStateswasconsideringmilitaryactionagainstIraqfortheirfailuretocomplywithUnitedNations’(UN)resolutions.11Theseevents servedas signsof things tocomeas smaller-scalehacker-levelassaultsgavewaytomoreorganizedanddestructiveattacks,escalatingtoreputedstate-levelattacksonEstoniaandGeorgia.

SinceEstoniadeclaredindependencefromtheSovietUnionin1991,ithaszealouslyembracedinformationandcommunicationstechnologyandhasbecomeoneofthemostwirednationsinEurope.Morethan65percentofEstonianshaveaccesstotheInternetandtheyconductvirtually all of the administrative functions of their society online.12Thisincludes97percentoftheirbankingtransactions,aswellasvotingandpayingtaxesonline.13Infact,Estoniahasembracedcyberspacetosuchahighdegreethatallofitscitizenscarrynationalidentificationcards embedded with electronic identity chips and the country’sparliamentdeclaredInternetaccessabasichumanrightin2000.14ThishighdegreeofrelianceonICTmadeEstoniaextremelyvulnerabletocyberattack.


For two weeks beginning in late April 2007 this eastern Europeannationenduredtheworld’sfirstcyberattackthatthreatenedthenationalsecurityofanentirestate.15Thepersistentattacksinvolvedcomputerrobot networks, known as botnets, that seized more than a millioncomputersfrom75countriesanddirectedthemtobarragetargetsinEstonia,eventually“bringingthe functioningofgovernment,banks,mediaandotherinstitutionstoavirtualstandstill.”16Themajorityoftheattackscameintheformofdistributeddenialofservice(DDOS)attacksthatoverwhelmedwebsiteswithamassivenumberofrequestsfor informationandcrippled theunderlyingnetworkof routersandservers.17AlthoughEstonianofficialssaidthesourcesoftheattackshadpossibletiestotheRussiangovernment,insufficientevidenceexistedtoaccuseMoscowformally.Whiletheinvestigationcontinues,sofaronlyonepersonhasbeenconvictedandfined in thecyberattackagainstEstonia.18

AyearaftertheEstoniaattacks,Georgiasufferedtheworld’sfirstcyberattacks thatcoincidedwithconventionalattacks.19Thecyberattackswere staged to begin shortly before the initial Russian airstrikes aspart of the Russian invasion in August 2008.20 The attacks focusedongovernmentwebsites,withmedia,communications,banking,andtransportationcompaniesalsotargeted.21Thesebotnet-drivenDDOSattackswereaccompaniedbyacyberblockadethatreroutedallinternalGeorgianInternettrafficthroughRussiaandblockedelectronictrafficinandoutofGeorgia.22TheimpactofthecyberattacksonGeorgiawassignificant,butlessseverethantheEstoniaattackssinceGeorgiansocietyisamuchlessdependentontheInternet.TheseattacksseverelylimitednotonlyGeorgia’s ability to communicate to theworld anditsownpeople,butalso its ability to shape internationalperceptionwhile fighting a war in which “accusations of genocide have beenlevied.”23 Similar to the Estonian attacks, circumstances suggestedRussianinvolvement,buttherewasnohardevidencetosubstantiateits complicity. However, experts believe the cyber attacks bore “themarkingsofatrainedandcentrallycoordinatedcadreofprofessionals,”and “were too successful to have materialized independent of oneanother.”24 As evidenced by the cyber attacks on the two formerSovietrepublics,greaterdependenceoncyberspaceequatestogreatervulnerability.


IntheUnitedStates,whereInternetusehaspenetrated73percentoftheAmericanpopulation,cyberspaceplaysavitalrole incontrollingcriticalinfrastructureandprocessesinmanufacturing,utilities,banking,and communications, aswell asmilitary systems.25Recognizing thisvulnerability, President Bush declared that a healthy, functioningcyberspace was essential to U.S. national interests.26 In fact, cyberaggression threatens threeof the four coreU.S.national interests asdefined by the U.S. Army War College: security of the homeland,economicwell-being,andastableinternationalorder.27

The critical infrastructure of homeland security is extremely relianton ICT, specifically the supervisory control and data acquisition(SCADA)systems.SCADAsystemsarethecomputersystemsthatuseICTtomonitorandadjust switchingandotherprocessesof criticalinfrastructureslikepowerplants.Thesesystemsarefrequentlyunmannedandareremotelyaccessedbyengineersviatelecommunicationslinks.28TheChairmanoftheJointChiefsofStaffrecognizedthedestructivepotentialofcyberattacksagainstcriticalinfrastructuresandcomparedcyberwarwithweaponsofmassdestructionwhenhestated,

Catastrophic threats involve the acquisition, possession, and use ofweaponsofmassdestruction(WMD)ormethodsproducingWMD-like effects. Such catastrophic effects are possible in cyberspacebecauseoftheexistinglinkageofcyberspacetocriticalinfrastructureSCADAsystems.Well-plannedattacksonkeynodesofthecyberspaceinfrastructure have the potential to produce network collapse andcascadingeffectsthatcanseverelyaffectcriticalinfrastructureslocally,nationally,orpossiblyglobally.29

Thecorrespondingvulnerabilitieshavenotgoneunnoticed.AlQaedacomputersseizedinAfghanistancontainedmodelsofadamcompletewithengineeringsoftwarethat“enabledthesimulationofacatastrophicfailure of dam controls,” as well as “programming instructions fordigitalswitchesthatrunpower,water,transport,andcommunicationsgrids.”30Additionally, in late2001theFBIuncoveredmultiplecasesofelectronic surveillanceof“emergency telephonesystems,electricalgenerationandtransmissionequipment,waterstorageanddistributionsystems, nuclear power plants, and gas facilities across the U.S.”emanatingfromSaudiArabia,Indonesia,andPakistan.31Furthermore,


hackersfrequentlyemploymaliciouscomputercodeknownasworms,to identify and exploit vulnerabilities within a network.32 In onesuch instance, the “Slammer” computer worm corrupted the safetymonitoringsystemsofanuclearpowerplantinOhioforfivehoursin2003byexploitingaprogramcodebackdoorthroughtheInternet.33AnotherwormknownasMSBlastwasreportedlylinkedtothemajorpower outage that hit the northeast United States in August 2003,whereit“crippledkeydetectionsystemsanddelayedresponseduringacriticaltime.”34In2007,researchersattheIdahoNationalLaboratory“launchedanexperimentalcyberattack”causingagenerator to self-destruct by changing the device’s operating cycle.35 Industry expertshypothesizethat“cyberattacksonkeyelectricalfacilitiescouldknockoutpowertolargegeographicareasformonths,harmingthenation’seconomy.”36

Likehomelandsecurity,economicwellbeingisanothernationalinterestthathasseriousvulnerability tocyberattack.TheglobaleconomyislinkedtoU.S.andinternationalfinancialsystemscontrolledbycomputernetworks.Infact,“finance,wholesaleandretailtrade,transportation,muchofmanufacturing,andmanyserviceindustrieswouldslowtoacrawlwithoutcomputers.”37Estimatedeconomiclossesduetocyberattacksamounted to$226billionworldwide in2003.38TheaveragecorporationtradedontheNewYorkStockExchangesufferedlossesuptofivepercentinthedaysfollowinganattack,whichtranslatedintoshareholder lossesup to$200million.39 In2006,a jihadistwebsitepromotedanaspirationalthreatto“carryoutcyberattacksontheU.S.financialindustrytoretaliateforabusesattheGuantanamoBayprisonfacility.”40Oneyearlater,theaforementionedcyberattackonEstoniaforcedtwomajorbankstosuspendoperations,resultinginthelossofmillionsofdollars.41Similarly,theattacksonGeorgia’sbankingsystemin August, 2008, shut down electronic financial transactions for 10days.42Certainly,globalfinancialmarketsarevolatileenoughwithoutthe added disruption and uncertainty of cyber attacks. A successfulmajorattackonaprimaryfinancialcenterlikeWallStreetortheNikkeiwouldnotonlydamageeconomiesworldwide,butalsolikelyinducefiscalpanicforanyoneconcernedabouttheirpensionsandlifesavings,aswellasseverelydamagepeoples’faithintheirgovernments.


In addition to damaging security and economic well being, cyberaggression can adversely affect a stable international order, as thecumulative damage from cyber attacks against critical infrastructure“…can ignite panic, cause a loss of confidence, create uncertainty,anddestroytrustinmodernsociety.”43Sustaineddisruptionstobasicservicescould lead toamobmentality.“Thefragilityof socialorderwasdemonstratedin2008whenfuelpriceincreasesledtowidespreadviolentprotestsacrosstheglobe.”44

Inshort,sincetheinceptionoftheInternet,cyberattackshavegrowninscopeanddestructivenesstowheretheymaynowthreatenAmerica’score national interests of homeland security, the economy, andinternationalstability.Infact,aggressionincyberspacehasemergedasathreattothenationalsecurityofallsovereignstates.However,“thereis currently no international, legally binding instrument that wouldaddresscyberattacksasthreatstonationalsecurity.”45Giventhis,cancyberattackthreatennationalsecurityandnotbeconsideredanactofwar?

Cyber Attack as an Act of War

Statesexistinananarchicworldwheresecurityisaself-helpsystem.States maintain order and security by exercising their monopoly onlegitimate violence.46 This legitimacy is derived and defined by theinternational regime of laws, norms, and definitions regarding warand aggression. Therefore, international stability is underpinnedby a common understanding of this regime that ultimately frameshow states behave in the anarchic system. Similarly, definitions ofcyberwar and related terms are critical tohow the lawsofwar andinternationaltreatiesproscribethescopeanduseofcybercapabilitiesfor martial purposes.47 In other words, norms and definitions guidehow states should behave in cyberspace. Uncertainty caused by thelackofacommonunderstandingregardingcyberattackcouldescalateconflictsunintentionallyifstateshavedifferentinterpretationsofwhatis permissible in cyberspace.48 A common understanding of cyberwar can also guide how a state deters cyber attacks. For clarity andconsistency,adefinitionofcyberwarmustbeprecededbyadefinitionofcyberspace.


DefiningcyberspaceisachallengeduetoitsexpansiveandglobalnatureandtherapidrateofchangeofICT.Dr.DanKuehl,aninformationoperationsexpertattheNationalDefenseUniversityidentifiedoveradozendefinitionsofcyberspaceincirculation,rangingfromGoogle’s“the place between the phones” to several variations within theDepartmentofDefense.49

TheDepartmentofDefensedefinitionhasmaturedovertime.Earlyjointdoctrinelimitedcyberspaceto“anotionalenvironmentinwhichdigitized information is communicated over computer networks,”implying cyberspace was simply a communications medium of atheoreticalorimaginarynature.50In2006,theChairmanoftheJointChiefsofStaffreferredtocyberspaceasa“domaincharacterizedbytheuseofelectronicsandtheelectromagneticspectrumtostore,modify,and exchange data via networked systems and associated physicalinfrastructures,”whichrecognizedcyberspaceasadomainthatstretchedbeyondcomputers.51Inthesameyear,theAirForce’sCyberTaskForcemorebluntlydeemedcyberspaceasanoperationalwarfightingdomainwheretheelectromagneticspectrumwasthemaneuverspace.52Finally,theOctober2008updateofJointPublication(JP)1-02, theofficialmilitarydictionary,refinedcyberspaceasa“globaldomainwithintheinformation environment consisting of the interdependent networkof information technology infrastructures, including the Internet,telecommunications networks, computer systems, and embeddedprocessorsandcontrollers.”53ThisdefinitioninJP1-02providesasolidbasisfordefiningcyberwar.Inadditiontorecognizingtheomnipresentnature of cyberspace, this definition references the informationenvironment, inferring cyberspace pervades and links the physicalworld, where people and society’s critical infrastructures reside, theinformationrealm,wheredataiscreatedandstored,andthecognitiverealm where human perceptions and decisions are made.54 Theselinkagesmakecyberwarfareanattractivesupplementoralternativetoconventionalwarandtiecyberspacetonationalsecurity.

President Bush underscored the national security implicationsof cyberspace when he characterized it as the nervous system ofthe nation’s critical infrastructures, controlling public and privateinstitutional assets in the “agriculture, food, water, public health,


emergencyservices,government,defenseindustrialbase,informationandtelecommunications,energy,transportation,bankingandfinance,chemicalsandhazardousmaterials,andpostalandshipping”sectors.55

Thepresidentspecificallystatedcyberspace“iscomposedofhundredsofthousandsofinterconnectedcomputers,servers,routers,switches,andfiberopticcablesthatmakeourcriticalinfrastructureswork.”56

Fromthisdefinitionanditsimplications,onecoulddeducethatcyberwarissimplywarfareinthecyberspacedomain,butthissimplificationisinsufficientfortworeasons.First,‘warfareincyberspace’istoobroadadefinition.Droppingabombonatelecommunicationscenterisnotcyberwar.Moreover,cyberwarisnotsynonymouswithinformationoperations (IO), but it could be a subset since IO is comprised ofpsychological operations, military deception, operations security,electronicwarfare,andcomputernetworkoperations(CNO).57CNOinvolves actions through “the use of computer networks” to attack“information resident in computers and computer networks, or thecomputersandnetworksthemselves.”58Cyberwarusescyberspacetoattackpersonnel, facilities,orequipment inaddition to informationandcomputers.59

Second, defining cyber war as warfare in cyberspace ignores thecomplexity of applying the more fundamental legal aspects of warto cyberspace. What is war in cyberspace? The original draftersof international law did not envision situations created by cybercapabilities and the current regime of international law is still notcomprehensiveinthisregard.Currently,theUNCharter,HagueandGenevaConventions,andrelatedtreatiesaretheonlybasisfromwhichtoassessactsofwar.

International lawdoesnotdefinetheterm“actofwar.”Inthesensethatwaris“thelegalconsequenceoftheuseofforce”betweenstates,international law isorganizedon the conceptsof “useof force” andaggression.60AstateofwarmayexistwhenanationviolatesArticle2(4)of theUNCharter.Article2(4)prohibits states fromthreateningorusingforce“…againsttheterritorialintegrityorpoliticalindependenceofanystate.”61However,notallforceisprohibited.TheCharteroutlawstheuseofaggressiveforcewhilerecognizingtherightofstatestouseforce in self-defense as specified inArticle51.62The termaggressive


generallyreferstotheactionsofthefirstpartyresortingtoforceorthethreatthereof.63Furthermore,theUNdefinesaggressioninArticle1of theUNGeneralAssemblyResolution3314as“theuseofarmedforcebyastateagainstthesovereignty,territorialintegrity,orpoliticalindependence of another state.”64 Thus the “trigger for the inherentright of self-defense” that defines a legal state of war “is contingentonauseofforceamountingtoanarmedattack.”65Sothekeyissueinunderstandingcyberwarinvolvestheconceptofarmedattack.

Unfortunately, the UN Charter does not provide a definition ofarmedattacktoapplytocyberspace.However,theGeneralAssembly’sResolution3314providesseveralexamplesofaggressionthatconstitutearmedattack.66Suchactionsincludeinvasionorattack,bombardment,blockadeofportsorcoasts,andattacksonland,sea,orairforcesofanother state.67 These examples manifest themselves in the physicalworld and fall within the traditional approach of kinetic means ofattackthatproducephysicaleffectsonastateanditssovereignty.Howdoes one translate these ideas into cyberspace where the concept ofkineticmeansdoesnoteasilyapply?

Incyberspace,cyberattackisthemechanismthatequatestotheuseofforce.Cyberattack,althoughnotdefinedofficially,canbeviewedasasubsetofcyberoperationsemployingthehostileuseofcomputersand information technology infrastructure to achieve effects orobjectives inor throughcyberspace.68Cyberwaroccurswhencyberattacksreachthethresholdofhostilitiescommonlyrecognizedaswarby the international community and defined by international law.Whilecyberattacksarehostileactsincyberspace,notallcyberattacksequatetoarmedattack.Cyberattackscanrangefromthedefacingofindividual web sites to the organized shut down of electrical powergrids,butdefacingwebsiteshardlyamountstoanactofwar.Cyberattacks can target individuals, objects, or entire societies, and theireffects can range from mere annoyance to physical destruction anddeath.69 Somewhere along this spectrumof conflict in cyberspace, acyberattackcrossesthethresholdandbecomesanarmedattack.

Alogicaldiscriminatortogaugeacyberattackistojudgetheactionbytheeffectorconsequenceitproduces,ratherthanitsmeansofdelivery.“Armedattackshouldnotbedefinedbywhetherornotkineticenergy


isemployedorreleased,butratherbythenatureofthedirectresultscaused.”70Thisissupportedbyinternationallawwhichrecognizesthatthe use of “unarmed, non-military physical force” can produce thesamesevereeffectsasanarmedattack,soactionslikethe“spreadingoffireacrossafrontier”orthe“diversionofariverbyanupstreamstate”would constitute armed attacks in terms of Article 2(4) of the UNCharter.71Cyberattacksmaynotexactlyfittheunarmed,non-militaryphysicalforceparadigm,buttheycancausecommensurateeffects.

Following this logic, any cyber attack that causes the same level ofdamage as a traditional armed or kinetic attack, either through thedestructionofphysicalpropertyor lossof life,wouldbe consideredanarmedattack.Whetherapowerplantisbombedbyaircraftoritselectricalgriddestroyedbymaliciouscode,ablackout isablackout.Until recently this quantitative approach towards assessing cyberattacks achieved consensus among legal scholars.72 However, cyberattackscancausedamagetootheraspectsofsocietybesidesphysicalpropertyandpeople.AsseeninEstoniaandGeorgia,acyberattackcan inflict economic and psychological damage as well. Scholarsarguethataneffects-basedapproachtoclassifyingarmedattackisnotcongruentwiththequalitativeandinstrument-basedparadigmoftheUNCharterthatplacesgreaterrestrictionsonmilitaryactivityversusnon-militaryactivity.73Forinstance,along-term,devastatingeconomicembargothatcausesenormoussufferingwouldnotbeconsideredanarmedattack,butaminor,armedborderincursionwouldequatetoanarmedattack.74OnemethodthatattemptstobridgethisquantitativeandqualitativegapandmayprovideamorecomprehensiveassessmentofcyberattackisknownasSchmittAnalysis.

In1999,ProfessorMichaelN.SchmittcreatedaframeworkthatcanbeusedtoassesswhetheracyberattackequatestoauseforceintermstheUNCharter.Foragivenattackscenario,themethodevaluatessevenqualitativefactorsandproducesacumulativescorethat“determinestheoveralllevelofforcefulness,whichiseitheraboveorbelowtheArticle2(4) threshold” of the UN Charter.75 Some of the more pertinentfactorsincludeseverity,whichmeasuresthelevelofphysicalinjuryordamagetoproperty;immediacy,whichevaluateshowfasttheeffectsare seen;directness,whichmeasures towhatextent theattack is the


solecauseoftheeffect;andinvasiveness,whichassessestowhatdegreetheattackcrossesintothetargetedstate.76

In2003,ateamofresearchersappliedtheSchmittAnalysistoanotionalcyberattackscenariowhereterroristsremotelyusedmaliciouscodetostrikethesoftware-intensivecontrolsystemsoftheWashingtonD.C.subway.77Thesimulatedattackcausedseveraltraincollisions,killing30peopleandcausingextensivepropertydamage.Theanalysisconcludedthat an armed attackoccurred. It is clear that any cyber attack thatproduceseffectstantamounttotraditionalarmedforcewillscoreabovethethresholdofanarmedattack.Whatisnotclearisthecaseofcyberattacksthatcauseextremeeconomicdamage.TheseverityfactoroftheSchmittAnalysisisdesignedtoweighphysicaldestructionheavierthaneconomicimpact.Also,sincemostcyberattackswouldemanatefromoutsidethetargetedstate,cyberattacksearnlowerinvasivenessscoresthantraditionalarmedattacks,aswasthecaseinthesubwayscenario.78The economic impacts of the Estonian and Georgian cyber attackswereconsiderableandtheyillustratethepotentialformoredevastatingfutureattacksoneconomies.As thispotentialdevelops, theSchmittcriteriaappliedtocyberattackmayneedtoadjustment.

Internationallawisalsounclearregardingactsofeconomiccoercion.The prevailing view among scholars interpreting Article 2(4) of theUNCharteristhatthecharteronlyprohibitsarmedforceandwouldnotproscribeactsofeconomiccoercion.79Alternatively,somescholarssuggesteconomiccoercionbecomeseconomicaggressioniftheactionjeopardizesastate’ssecurity.80AcyberattackofthisconsequencewouldmeettheArticle2(4)thresholdforauseofforce,butprobablynotthearmedattackthresholdforselfdefenseinArticle51.

Givenitspotential tocausegravedamagetonationalsecurity,cyberattackmustbetreatedasanactofwar,orintermsofinternationallaw,asa“useof force”andanarmedattack.However,assessingwhetheracyberattack isactuallyanactofwar isacomplicatedeffort.Eachcasemustbeexamined in itsowncontextagainst international lawsandcircumstancesbecausenosinglerulesetexists thatdefineswhatconstitutes auseof forceor armedattackunder all circumstances.81Furthermore, the current regime of international laws, norms, anddefinitions were designed a half century before the advent of cyber


capabilities and thus are not well suited for cyberspace application.Existing international law impedes the development of a commonunderstandingofcyberaggressionandhindersastate’sabilitytodetercyberattacksagainstthem.

Deterring Cyber War

Ingeneral,deterrenceisastateofmind.Itistheconceptofonestateinfluencinganotherstate tochoosenot todosomethingthatwouldconflictwiththeinterestsoftheinfluencingstate.Similarly,thecentralideaofdeterrencefromtheperspectiveoftheDepartmentofDefenseis“todecisivelyinfluencetheadversary’sdecision-makingcalculusinordertopreventhostileactionsagainstU.S.vitalinterests.”82Deterredstatesdecidenottotakecertainactionsbecausetheyperceiveorfearthatsuchactionswouldproduceintolerableconsequences.83Theideaof influencingstates’decisionsassumes that statesare rationalactors“willingtoweightheperceivedcostsofanactionagainsttheperceivedbenefits, and tochoosea courseof action” logicallybasedon“somereasonablecost-benefitratio.”84

Thus the efficacyof cyberdeterrence relies on the ability to imposeorraisecostsandtodenyorlowerbenefitsrelatedtocyberattackina state’s decision-making calculus. Credible cyber deterrence is alsodependentonastate’swillingnesstousetheseabilitiesandapotentialaggressor’sawarenessthattheseabilitiesaswellasthewilltousethemexist. While a state’s ability to deter cyber attacks is a subset of itsoverarchingdefensestrategycomprisedofallinstrumentsofnationalpower,thispaperfocusesonstates’actionstodetercyberattackwithinthecyberspacedomain.Effectivecyberdeterrence incyberspacewillemploy a comprehensive scheme of offensive and defensive cybercapabilitiessupportedbyarobustinternationallegalframework.

Offensive capabilities are the primary tools used to impose or raisecostsindeterrence.Offensivecybercapabilitiesandoperationsprovideastatethemeansandwaysforretaliationandenhancetheperceivedprobabilitythataggressorswillpayseverelyfortheiractions.Amorerobustcapabilitytranslatestoamorecredibleimpositionofcosts.Untilrecently,U.S.effortstodevelopoffensivecybercapabilitieshavelagged


effortson thedefensive side.ThedailyonslaughtofattacksonU.S.networks,coupledwiththelikelihoodthatpotentialU.S.adversarieswillbelessdependentonelectronicnetworksthantheUnitedStates,hasprioritizedactivitiesforgatheringintelligenceanddefendingU.S.capabilities over those for disrupting enemy capabilities.85 However,theUnitedStateshasrecentlygainedmomentuminthedevelopmentofoffensivecybercapabilities.

In 2006, the United States published the National Military Strategy for Cyber Operations with the expressed intent to achieve “militarystrategicsuperiorityincyberspace.”86Oneofitsmaingoalsistoensure“adversaries are deterred from establishing or employing offensivecapabilities against U.S. interests in cyberspace.”87 Unlike the air,land, and seadomains, theUnitedStates currently lacksdominancein cyberspace.88 In fact, without a significant effort, the UnitedStateswill lose its current technological advantages and“risksparitywith adversaries” in cyberspace.89To this end, theUnitedStateshastakenmeasures insupportofoffensivecyberoperations.Whileeachmilitaryservicehassomeformofcyberfootprint,theU.S.AirForcehasincorporatedoperatingincyberspaceaspartofitscoremissiononpar with flying and space operations. For instance, the commanderof the Air Force’s provisional cyber operations command envisionsinitialoffensive cyberoperations as subduingorkillingdatapacketsthatthreatenU.S.systems,withthepotentialtoexpandinthefuturetomissionsnormallyexecutedbyconventionalforcesinthepast.90TheUnitedStatescontinuestomodernizeitscyberforces,createnewhackerunits,andconductcyberwarexercises,91withtheintentto“penetrateanddisruptforeigncomputersystems.”92However,theUnitedStatesisnotaloneinpursuingcyberattack.Over120countriesalreadyhaveoraredevelopingcomputerattackcapabilities,reinforcingtheneedforastrongdefense.93

In addition to offensive means, defensive capabilities play a criticalrole in deterring cyber attack. Defensive cyber capabilities not onlyensureessential servicesand functionsof societycontinueunabated,they also deny or lower the benefits an aggressor might obtain viacyber attack. Defensive cyber capabilities increase a state’s resistanceto attacks and reduce the consequences of attacks. They enable the


statetostrengthenthesecurityofpotentialtargetsandcorrespondinglylimitoreliminateanaggressor’sability to threatenthestate throughcyberspace.Ultimatelytheyreducetheprobabilityofsuccessthatanaggressorwillachieveitsgoals.

TheUnitedStateshasemployedadefensivecyberpolicyasoutlinedin the National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace. This strategy focusesonpreventingcyber attacks againstAmerica’s critical infrastructures,reducing national vulnerability to cyber attacks, and minimizingdamageandrecoverytimefromattacksthatdooccur.94ItrecognizestheneedtounitealllevelsandfacetsofgovernmentwithprivateindustryandindividualInternetuserstofullyintegratedefensiveefforts.Also,itoutlinesbroad,robustdefensivemeasuresandcapabilitiestodetercyber attack. For instance, the United States continues to invest indefense of cyberspace infrastructure by “diversifying and limitingthenumberofaccesspointsthatcouldbeusedforanattack.”95Also,the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is leading integratedeffortsbetweenthepublicandprivatesectors,liketheU.S.ComputerEmergencyReadinessTeamdesignedtoanalyzethreatsandcoordinateresponsestocyberattacks.96

However, the current U.S. approach focuses on deterring attacks inAmericancyberspace,implyingthatcyberspacerecognizesstateborders.Cyber attacks against the infrastructure or economies of other statescanhavesevereeffectsthatcascadetotheUnitedStates.Theglobalizedinterdependenceofcyberspaceunderscorestheadage‘ariskacceptedbyoneisariskassumedbyall,’thusimplyingthatcyberaggressionrequiresa cosmopolitan solution. Unfortunately, U.S. deterrent strategies dolittletofosterthecraftingofinternationalstandardsforstatebehaviorincyberspace.Incontrast,Estonia,aveteranofthelargestcyberattackinhistory,promotesadefensivestrategytosecurecyberspacewithabroaderperspective.LiketheUnitedStates,Estoniaseekstoprotectitscriticalinfrastructure,topreventcyberattacks,andtoensureaswiftrecoveryofsystemsshouldanattackoccur.97However,Estoniaalsochampionsthedevelopmentofinternationalnormstoregulatecyberattacks.98

Over and above offensive and defensive cyber capabilities, the mostcriticalcomponentofacomprehensiveapproachtodetercyberattackisarobustinternationallegalframeworkthataddressescyberaggression.


International law and norms are fundamental to deterrence becausestates“sharean interest inadoptingorcodifyingcommonstandardsfor the conduct of international transactions…or in promoting orbanningspecifickindsofbehaviorby”states.99Multilateralagreementsprovidethemostefficientwayofrealizingthesesharedinterests.100Thecommonacceptanceofnormsmoderatesstateinteractionandmakesstate behavior more predictable, which leads states to “combine toinsistonrespectforspecificnormsof…conductbythosewhoviolatetheirconsensus.”101Inthisway,internationallawbuildstheframeworkthatguideshowandwhenstatesemployoffensiveanddefensivecybercapabilitiesandformsthefoundationofcyberdeterrence.Internationallawaddscertaintytopunitiveactionsandamplifiesthecostsofcyberattackbyengenderinganegativeresponsefromtheentireinternationalcommunity, not just from the attacked state. Moreover, it addscredibilitytothethreatofreprisalbyprovidinglegitimacytoretaliatoryactionsandbyincreasingthepotentialtoisolatetheaggressivestate.Also,internationallawprovidesameasureofprotectiontostatesthatlackrobustdefensiveandoffensivecybercapabilitiesandservesastheirfirstandpossiblyonlylineofdeterrence.

However, recall that there iscurrently“nobinding international lawoncybersecurity”that“expressesthecommonwillofcountries.”102Infact,thelackofinternationalnorms, laws,anddefinitionstogovernstateactionsincyberspacehascreatedagrayareathatcanbeexploitedbyaggressivestatesaslongastheiractionsskirttheimprecisethresholdscontainedintheUNcharter.103Forexample,inresponsetoaccusationsofstate-sponsoredcyberwaragainstEstonia,“theheadoftheRussianMilitaryForecastingCentrestatedthattheattacksagainstEstoniahadnotviolatedanyinternationalagreementsbecausenosuchagreementsexist,” suggesting that even if Russia’s complicity could be proved,Estonia’s options for reprisal were limited.104 Such an environmentthwartsdeterrencebecauseitlowerstheprobability“ofreprisaleveniftheattacker’sidentityissuspected”andreducesanattacker’spotentialcostsofpursuingcyberattack.105Oddly,thisvoidininternationallawisuniquetocyberspace.

Historically, each time warfare was introduced to a new domain,international law reactedbydevelopingdomain-specificguidance in


someformoftreatyorconvention.Forexample,therulesgoverningactionsontheseashaveexistedascustomarylawforcenturies,basedon theGrotiandoctrine of ‘freedomof the seas’ datingback to theearly1600s.106ThiscustomarylawnowexistsastheUnitedNationsConventionontheLawoftheSea.Also,fiveyearsafterWorldWarI, the war in which the airplane made its debut as a weapon, theinternational community drafted the 1923 Hague Rules of AerialWarfare.Althoughnotratified,theseruleshaveenduredto“formthebasis of all current regulationof airwarfare.”107Moreover, ten yearsafterthelaunchofSputnik,theinternationalcommunityagreedtotheprinciplesoftheOuterSpaceTreatyin1967.Despitetheseprecedents,roughly16yearsaftertheWorldWideWebburstontothepublicscene,nointernationalregimeexiststogovernstateactionsincyberspace.108

Inadditiontoalackofregulatoryframework,ineffectiveattributionofcyberattacksfurtherunderminesdeterrenceincyberspaceandwidenstheexploitablegrayarea.Thethreatofoffensivecybercapabilitieswillnotdeteraggressioniftheattackedstatecannotidentify itsattacker.Likewise,deterrencefaltersiftheUNcannotidentifywheretotargetsanctions. In the aftermathof theEstonian attacks, “neitherNATOnor European Commission experts were able to find any proof ofofficialRussian governmentparticipation.”109Thiswould reduce theprobabilityoflegitimatereprisaltozeroandnearlyeliminatethecostsofpursuingcyberattack.Reversingthisrecurringthemeincyberattackinvestigationsrequiressignificantinternationalinvestment.

Insummary,theconceptofdeterrenceisapplicabletocyberspacesinceitfocusesonthedecisioncalculusofastate,notthedomaininwhichitisemployed.Whileoffensiveanddefensivecybercapabilitiesarecriticaltodeterringaggression,employingthesecapabilitiesdependsonrobustinternationalnormsforstatebehaviorincyberspace.Internationallawisthefirstlineofdeterrenceincyberspace.

Conclusions and Recommendations

Sincethe launchofthe informationsuperhighwayinthe1990s,thedestructiveness of cyber attackhas grown consistently inmagnitudetotheextentthatitcannowthreatensthecriticalinfrastructurethat


forms the basis of modern society. In short, cyber attack can causegravedamagetonationalsecurity.Infact,itcanpreventastatefromfunctioning.110Rationalthoughtrealizescyberattackcanbeanactofwar,butcommonsenseandtheruleoflawcanconflictincyberspace.Thecurrentregimeofinternationallaws,norms,anddefinitionsisnotonlyinsufficienttoaddresscyberaggression,itactuallyintensifiesthedangersofcyberattackbycreatingagrayareaoflegitimacythatcanbeexploitedbycyberaggressors.Thisloophole,coupledwithinsufficienttechniquesto identifyassailants,underminesastate’sabilitytodetercyber attack.To reverse this trend, theUnitedStatesmustpursue apolicy of changing the existing regime which in this case refers tothe “complex of norms, treaties, international organizations, andtransnationalactivitythatorders”cyberspace.111

In conjunction with the UN, the United States should lead amultilateral effort to adapt the existing international regime of lawsandnormsgoverningwarfaretoaddressaggressionincyberspace,orbuildanewregimeforthenewwarfightingdomain.OnlytheUNhasthe“membershipandcapabilitytoaddresstheseissuesinameaningfulwaythatwillhaveaglobalimpact”tothisglobalproblem.112Regulationwithinindividualcountriesalonewillproveineffective.113Alreadytheworldhasseen“Internetactivitiesconsideredtobelegitimateinonecountryviolatethelawsinanother.”114

Additionally, theUnitedStates should lead aUNeffort to establishaninstitutionto“serveasaclearinghouseandcoordinationcenter”topoolinternationalcybersecurityinitiativesandmaintainstandards.115Theregimeandinstitutionwoulddefineinternationalrelationswithincyberspaceandprovideamechanismfortheinternationalcommunitytoinitiatesanctionsorpunitiveactionsfornoncompliance.Theknow-ledgethatacyberattackisanactofwarprovokingasevereandcostlyreprisalfromtheglobalcommunitywouldserveasastrongdeterrenttowould-becyberaggressors.Theproposalforsuchanewregimefullysupports theU.S.NationalSecurityStrategy, inwhichthePresidenturges, “where existing institutions and regimes can be reformed tomeet new challenges, we…must reform them. Where appropriateinstitutionsdonotexist,we…mustcreatethem.”116


TheCouncilofEurope’s(CoE)ConventiononCybercrimeprovidestheUnitedStateswithasolidbasisonwhichtobuildanewinternationalregime.TheCoErecognizedthataddressingthetransnationalcharacterofcybercrimerequiredaglobaleffort.117Thetreatyfostersinternationalcooperationtofightcrimeincyberspaceanddefinesvariousoffensesascybercrimeswiththeintentto“establishacommoncriminalpolicy,”improve deterrence, and “reduce the number of countries in whichcriminalscanavoidprosecution.”118However,thisconventioncannotbe extended to cyberwar as it treats cyber attacks as crimes againstprivate and public property and makes no distinction between thescope and impact of the attack, “thereby disregarding the nationalsecuritydimensionofthethreat.”119Despitetheseshortcomings,theconventionstillservesasamodelforinternationalcooperationandthedevelopmentofalarger-scaleregime.

TheUnitedStates isuniquelysuitedto leadthiseffort.“TheUnitedStates…actsasanarchitectofglobalandregionalsecurityaffairs forthepurposeofcontainingnew-eradangers.”120Moreimportantly,thiseffortallowstheUnitedStatestoshapeinternationalnormsforstatebehaviorincyberspaceinaccordancewithAmericannationalinterests;to do otherwise risks forfeiting this advantage to other nations. Forexample,Chinaisengaged“inthedebateofdefiningcyberwarfare,inpartthroughtheShanghaiCooperationOrganization,inordertohaveahandintheshapingofalegalframeworkandrulesofengagementrelatedtothisnewwarfare.”121

Tostrengthenthenewregime’sabilitytodetercyberattack,theUnitedStates should also lead research anddevelopment efforts to improveattribution techniques. This includes accelerating ventures like themultilateraleffortwithintheUNtotraceoriginalsourcesofInternetcommunicationsandreducetheanonymityofcyberspace;creatingan“InternationalCaller-IDcapability”ofsorts fortheInternet.122Suchan effort “requires multilateral actions that transcend jurisdictionsand national boundaries.”123 Ultimately, an acknowledged ability totrack aggression is essential todeter future attacksby increasing theprobability of reprisal and elevating the costs of resorting to cyberattack.124


Cyber attack can cause grave damage to national security and mustbe treated as an act of war. A robust international regime of laws,norms,anddefinitionsprovidesthebasisfordeterrenceincyberspace.TheUnitedStatesisuniquelysuitedtoleadeffortstoconstrainstatebehavior in thisnewglobal,warfightingdomain.The Internet is an“interconnected global network of 600 million users served by 15million hosts connecting nearly 200 countries.”125 Consequently,cyberspaceistheworld’snervoussystem;thecontrolsystemofmodernsociety.Itsprotectionisaninternationalexistentialconcernthatshouldbeaddressedwithurgency.

imPedinG network centric warfare: commbatant command information

technoloGy SuPPort

Colonel David A. Barlow, Ph.D.UnitedStatesArmy

ThedifferentinformationtechnologysupportmethodsusedbythetenUnitedStatescombatantcommandsimpedenetworkcentricoperationswithintheDepartmentofDefense.Network

Centric Warfare (NCW) is the method used by the combatantcommands to wage war. Information technology is a fundamentalenablerofnetworkcentricwarfare.Thetencombatantcommandsusedifferentmethodstoprovidedesktopinformationtechnologysupporttotheirheadquartersstaffs.Theresultisdifferentsetsofapplications,capabilities, andbusinessprocesses that impede information sharingbetween commands and the Department of Defense (DoD), andsometimesbetweenacombatantcommandanditsowncomponents.InformationTechnology (IT) support at the combatant commands,meanttobeaNCWenabler,oftenfailstosupportinformationsharing.

Unimpededinformationsharingisacentraltenetofnetworkcentricwarfare.1,2ThecurrentdisjointedITsupportmethodsatthecombatantcommands impede information sharing within and between thecommands.ThislackofseamlessinformationsharingdoesnotsupportNCW,andinterfereswiththecombatantcommands’synchronizationoftheelementsofnationalpower.ThroughexaminationofseveraloftheITapplicationsmeanttofacilitateinformationsharing,thispaperwill demonstrate the important role combatant command desktopITsupportplaysinNCW.Thejoint,interagency,intergovernmental,andmultinational(JIIM)natureofthecurrentandfutureoperationalenvironmentimposeahugeinformationsharingrequirementonthecombatantcommands.3DevelopingNCWcapabilitiestobetterenablethe combatant commands to synchronize the elements of nationalpowerwillrequiretheDoDtofundamentallychangethewayinwhichitprovisionsITsupportatthecombatantcommands.


ThispaperaddressessecretcollateralandbelowITsupport,commonlyknown as “SIPRNet” (Secret Internet Protocol Router Network)and “NIPRNet” (Non-classified Internet Protocol Router Network)services. The JointWorldwide Intelligence Communications System(JWICS),whilefundamentallyanITsystem,isprovisionedthroughthe Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA). DIA provisions JWICSsupportseparatelyanddistinctlyfromtheorganizationsthatprovisioncollateralITservicesatthecombatantcommands.

This paper examines desktop collateral information technologysupporttothecombatantcommandsasitpertainstonetworkcentricwarfareatthetheaterlevel.Itproposesasinglesolutionprovidedbya single agency to service all tencombatant commands. It examinesthe strengths andweaknesses of the current information technologysupportmethodologyandtheproposedsolution.Basedonthisstudy,thepaperprovidesstrategicrecommendationsaimedatimprovingthenetworkcentricwarfarecapabilitiesacrossthecombatantcommands.

Background

TheUnitedStates combatant commands exist toprovide commandand control of the broad array of forces and functions that theindividualServicesandDefenseAgenciescanprovide.4,5ThedoctrinalframeworkinwhichthecombatantcommandersasserttheircommandandcontrolhasbecomeNCW.6

In itsmostbasic form,NCWseeks to achieve increased agility andeffectiveness when compared to industrial age warfare. NCW firstrequires shared awareness. People and systems normally achieveshared awareness through information sharing. NCW practitionersthenleveragethissharedawarenesstoachieveagreaterdegreeofself-synchronization.Theemergenceofself-synchronizingbehavioristhecoreof thepowerofNCW, leadingdirectly to increasedagilityandeffectiveness.7 Within the context of IT support at the combatantcommands, self-synchronizing behavior automates many internaland external staff functions, reduces administrative work, improvesgenerationofinformationfromdata,andincreasesstaffresponsiveness.


Thisincreasedstaffresponsivenesscouldtaketheformoffasterdecisionmaking,moretimeforconceptualthinking,oracombinationofboth.

The DoD intends its “plug and play” information infrastructure totietogetheralloftheinformationgenerationandanalysisassetsthatfallunderthecommandandcontrolofthecombatantcommanders.8ThisinfrastructureenablesthesharedawarenessthatNCWrequires.Thissameinfrastructureservesastheconduitofself-synchronizationat all levels. The physical instantiation of the DoD informationinfrastructure at any particular combatant command headquartersis comprised of a set of information technology (IT) systems andsupportingpersonnel.TheITsystemsandsupportthatarethesubjectofthispapercomprisethe“lastmile,”quiteoftenliterally,oftheDoDinformationinfrastructure.

TheDoDprovisionsITsupportatthecombatantcommandsthrougha multi-tiered system, shown in figure 1. The Secretary of Defense,throughtheAssistantSecretaryofDefenseNetworksandInformationIntegration(NII)/DoDChiefInformationOfficer(CIO),determinesoverallDoDITpolicy.TheOSD(NII)’sstatedmissionisto“enablenet-centricoperations.”9TheDefenseInformationSystemsAgency(DISA)

Secretary of Defense

Assistant Secretary of Defense (Networks &

Information Integration)

Defense Information Systems Agency

Strategic Command

Joint Task Force –Global Network

Operations

Combatant Commands Army/Navy/Air Force

The GIG

GIG Operations and Defense

Combatant Command HQDesktop InformationTechnology Support“The last IT mile”

Provided by the executive agents(Army, Navy, or Air Force)and/or the combatant command

The DISNNCES

Figure 1: DoD Organization for IT Support at the Combatant Command Headquarters


worksforOSDNIIandisresponsiblefortheGlobalInformationGrid(GIG), a broad-band telecommunications network and associatedservices. The GIG is similar in nature to a commercial IT servicesproviderwhenviewedfromacomputernetworkingperspective.

The data transport portion of the GIG is the Defense InformationSystems Network (DISN). The GIG/DISN provides “points-of-presence”atvariousDoDlocations,includingallcombatantcommands,for high-speed network services access. DISA funds DISN servicesthroughaDefenseWorkingCapitalFund(DWCF),withtheServicespayingformostofthecombatantcommands’DISNsupport.10DISA,viatheGIG/DISN,providesNCW-enablingenterprise-levelsoftwareservices–collaborationtools–toallDoDnetworkusers.DISAcallsthis program“NetworkCentricEnterprise Services” (NCES).TheseNCESreplaceindividualcombatantcommandcollaborationtoolsthathavelimitedornointeroperabilityandtenuousfunding.TheNCEStools enable network-centric collaboration across all DoD elements,including the combatant commands. NCES has freed all DoDelements,includingthecombatantcommands,fromhavingtooperateandmaintain(andfundinmanycases)theirownfundamentallynon-networkcentricsetsofcollaborationtools.

Joint Publication 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States, states that the U.S. Strategic Command (STRATCOM) hasresponsibilityto“plan,integrate,andcoordinateDODglobalnetworkoperations.”11 STRATCOMdoessothroughtheJointTaskForce–GlobalNetworkOperations(JTF-GNO).12ThecommanderofDISAisdual-hattedasthecommanderofJTF-GNO.13

ThedesktopITsupportconsideredinthispaperistheuserinterfacetotheGIG;the“lastITmile”betweentheGIG/DISNandeachITuser.This“last ITmile” is extremely important toNCWasmuchof theinformationthatcombatantcommands’use iscreated,manipulated,andstoredbythevarious“lastITmile”systemsconnectingtheGIG/DISNtothecombatantcommands’desktops.

Desktop IT support at a combatant command headquarters is thepurchase, installation, operation, and maintenance of hardware andsoftwaresystemstosupportthebusinessprocessesofthatheadquarters.


ThisITsupportencompassesalluserdevicessuchasthedesktopandlaptopcomputersandthesoftwareonthosecomputers.ItalsoincludescellulardevicesandsoftwareusedtoprovidemobileemailandInternetaccess.ThelocalnetworkinfrastructureispartofdesktopITsupport.This infrastructure includes server roomswithassociatedserversandsupportinfrastructure,mostsoftwarerunontheserversintheserverroom(s),24x7helpdeskservices,andthelogisticssystemthatsupportseveryITitem,cradletograve.Thelevelofsupportrequiredissignificant–meetingthe24x7,high-reliabilityITrequirementsofthecombatantcommanderandhisstaffisanextremelydemandingmission.Likewise,thecostissignificant–intheneighborhoodof$25millionannuallypercombatantcommanderwhenacontractorprovidesthesupport.

AsaprimaryenablerofNCW,ITsupporthasbecomeevermorevitalto the functioningof thenationaldefense.Ascomputernetworkingdevelopedinthe1990’s,desktopITsupportstruggledtokeeppace,particularly from an organizational perspective. The Services eachdevelopedtheirownmethodstoprovidethissupport,onlymodestlyunifiedbythecommonhardware(IBM-PCarchitectures),operatingsystem and office productivity software (Microsoft products), andtheTCP/IPprotocol.Inall theServices,desktopITsupportstartedas a small-unit activity. IT systems were not standardized from anyperspective. Over time, each Service has adopted a much morecentralized approach.TheNavyhas completely contractedout theirdesktopITsupporttoasinglecontractor.TheArmyandtheAirForceeachuseacombinationofcontractors,servicepersonnel,centralizedprovisioning, and standards to provide their versions of desktop ITsupport.TheServices’motivation for central and standard solutionshas been driven much more by lack of resources than enhancingNCWcapabilities.However,thesecentralandstandardsolutionshaveenhancedtheServices’NCWcapabilities.FromthedesktopITsupportperspective,theseenterprisesolutionsbetterenableinformationsharingandimprovethepotentialforself-synchronizationwithintheServices.

TheDoDassignseachcombatantcommandaServiceasitsexecutiveagent.14TheService,asexecutiveagent,hasnumerousresponsibilities,includingprovisioningofITsupport.15Foreachcombatantcommand,the executive agent accomplishesprovisioningof IT supportunique


to that command, primarily influenced by the executive agent’s ITsupportsystem.ExecutiveagentcontrolofITsupportfunding,orlackthereof,hasalsoinfluencedthewidespectrumofITsupportmethodsemployedatthecombatantcommands.

There are several DoD Directives that deal with informationtechnology.16 None of the directives specifically address desktop ITsupport.Theirperspectiveisstrategic,yettheirdirectionappliesquitespecificallytothe“tactical”problemofprovisioningdesktopITsupportatthecombatantcommands’headquarters.SeveralofthesedirectivesaddressconstructingandenablinganetworkcentricDoD.Allofthemapplydirectionattheenterprise level,raisingbutnotaddressingthequestion:IstheDoDandJointCommunity,comprisedmainlyofthecombatantcommands,an“enterprise?”Anetwork-centricapproachtowarfarewouldseemtorequiretheanswertobearesounding“yes!”YetgiventhecurrentdesktopITsupportsituation,thereiscertainlynotsuchanenterprise–particularlywhenitcomestodataandinformationmanagement.

The DoD Directive Management of DoD Information Resources and Information Technology,servesasthecapstoneDoDinformationsystemdirective.WhileitdoesnotdirectlyaddresscombatantcommandITsupport,itdoesdirectDoDComponentstouseDoD-wideautomatedinformationsystemsandsoftware.17ThisDirective,alongwithDoDDirective“ITPortfolioManagement,”18requirealevelofITmanagementexpertiseandresourcesnormallyfoundonlyatorganizationsprovidingenterprise-level IT support. These organizations are few within theDoD – DISA, the Services’ communications commands, and theDefenseIntelligenceagency(DIA)areexamples.

TheDoDDirective “DataSharing in aNet-CentricDepartmentofDefense,”mandatesthatDoDdatabevisible,accessible,understandable,and trustable; and by inference, retained for possible future use.19The implementing guidance for this directive clearly recognizes themagnitude and difficulty of implementing this mandate, explicitlybreaking the implementation into “communities of interest” in anattempttobuildthiscapabilityincrementally.20Additionaldirectiononnetworkcentricdataconformity,providedbyDoDDirective8320.03,


mandatesuniqueidentification(UID)standardsfor“discreteentities.”Itinfersthateachcombatantcommandissuchadiscreteentity.21

Joint doctrine does not directly address the provisioning of desktopITsupporttothecombatantcommands.JointPublication6-0,“JointCommunications Systems,” does not address combatant commandheadquartersITsupport;thereaderislefttoinferthatitisacombatantcommandJ-6responsibility.22ThefocusofJointPub6-0isonforceprojectioncommunicationsandnetworkoperations,allsupportedbytheGIG.

IT Support Methods

The differences in IT support methods at the ten combatantcommandsarewellillustratedbyexaminingtheextremes.OnoneendofthatspectrumistheNavy-provisionedsupportofPacificCommand(PACOM)andontheotherendisthe“do-it-ourselves”approachofEuropean Command (EUCOM). The two commands have manysimilarities. Both are geographic combatant commands (GCC),responsible for engagement with large numbers of countries spreadover large geographic areas.Bothhave assigned forces through theircomponentcommands,andbothhavebeeninexistencesincetheendofWorldWarII.TheexecutiveagentforPACOMistheNavy,whiletheexecutiveagentforEUCOMistheArmy.

TheNavyprovidesITsupporttoPACOMviatheNavyMarineCorpsIntranet (NMCI). NMCI is a consolidated, enterprise approach toproviding IT support to Navy and Marine Corps forces, activities,andsupportedcommandssuchasPACOM.Atendstate,NMCIwillsupportover700,000userswithstandardsetsofhardwareandsoftwareservices.23NMCIisamulti-yearcontractedeffortcostingseveralbilliondollars,andhasbeenthesubjectofconsiderablecongressionalscrutiny.It has suffered from most issues that large enterprise-wide projectstend to incur–particularlyprojects focusedon satisfying theneedsofhundredsofthousandsofcustomers.24TheITServicesDivisioninthePACOMJ6providesthestaffinterfacebetweenthePACOMstaffandNMCI;NMCIstaffmanagesalltheIThardware,software,andnetworkoperations.HeadquartersPACOMbusinessprocessesand/or


technicalrequirementsthatrequirechangestotheNMCIstandardizedsolution(s)mustbeimplementedinsuchawaythatallNMCIusersremain supported and all security requirements remain satisfied. Inpractice, customization of enterprise IT systems is a difficult taskbothadministrativelyandtechnically.Therefore,reactiontimetouserrequirementsthatnecessitatechangeisusuallylengthy.Thistendstoforceorganizationstocomplywithexistingnetworkstandardsratherthanpursuesolutionsthatwouldrequirenetworkchanges.25

Although the Army is the executive agent for EUCOM, most ofEUCOM’sITsupportisself-provided.UsinganITservicescontractprovided and managed by the General Services Agency (GSA),26EUCOM has a task order that provides all aspects of IT supportwiththeexceptionoftheunclassifiednetworkinfrastructure–cable,switchesandroutersprovidedandmanagedbytheArmy.Acontractorprovides all other IT support through the task order off the GSAcontract.All the IThardware, software, andnetworkoperations aremanaged directly by the Headquarters Enterprise Services Divisionin the EUCOM J6. Because the IT contractor responds directly toEUCOM’srequirements,EUCOM’sdesktopITservicesdirectlyreflectthelocalrequirementsoftheEUCOMHeadquartersstaff–i.e.theyarecustomizedandoftenhavelimitedcompatibilitywithcomponentsandothercombatantcommandITsystems, fromabusinessprocessperspectiveand/oratechnicalinterfaceperspective.

NCW-Related Problems Created by IT Support Methods

ThecurrentcombatantcommandHQITsupportmethodssignificantlyimpedetheNCWtenetsofsharedawarenessandself-synchronization.Fundamentally,theNCWissueisinformationsharing–itisextremelydifficult, ifnotimpossible,foralltherequiredpartiestoseeanduseeach others’ information due to fundamental incompatibilities thatthesupportmethodologiesintroduceintotheinformationtechnologysystems.Thissectionofthepaperwillexamineseveralexampleswheresystemsand/orsupportmethodsinhibitratherthanempowerNCW.

Tasker Management. TaskermanagementisanexcellentexampletocomprehensivelyexhibithowthecurrentITmethods inhibitNCW.


The “tasker” is a documented requirement for some kind of work.Tasker systems areused throughout theDoD.Normally,DoD staffelements use taskers for staff actions and not direct command andcontrolofforces.Assuch,taskerinformationissometimesassociatedwith the non-military elements of national power – an importantconsiderationasNCWatthecombatantcommandlevelmustconsiderandhelpsynchronizeallelementsofnationalpower.

Taskersdrivemuchoftheworkthatoccursatcombatantcommands–andthetaskermanagementsystemscontainmuchoftheinformationthat this work generates. There is a diversity of tasker managementsystemsinuseinthecombatantcommands,aswellastheJointStaff.This diversity has lead to inaccessible information both inside andoutsidethecommands,aswellasad-hocmethodstobridgethesystemsso that taskers can flow between the Joint Staff and the combatantcommands, and between the combatant commands and theircomponentcommands.Insomecases,thisinformation,whenstoredinthepersonalaccount(s)ofastaffmember, isdestroyedwhenthatstaffmemberdepartsacommand.TheimpactonNCWisthatmuchof the information generated by the work of combatant commandsis excluded frompresent and futureNCWsharedawareness efforts,impeding progression to the self-synchronization sought throughNCWmethods.

For many years, EUCOM has used Microsoft Outlook as the ITsoftware system supporting its tasker management business process.Using this system, little data is accessible beyond the action officer,except for those recipients of the emails generated by the businessprocess.Whenactionofficersdepartthecommand,ITmanagementpersonneldeletetheiraccountsforsecurityreasons–alongwithalloftheinformationtheyacquiredandgeneratedduringtheirassignments.27

PersonalOutlookfilesarenotpublicallysearchable–sotheusercanonlymanuallytransferthisinformationbyemailsandattachments.

As a self-supporting IT services organization, EUCOM developeditsowntaskermanagementsystem.Severalyearsago,Outlookwasaconvenienttoolthatmetthebusinessprocess–NCWwasnotafactorandtheextremely limited informationavailabilitywasanacceptablerisk.Forseveralyears,EUCOMhasattempted,onitsown,todevelop,


purchase,andimplementothersoftwaresystemstobettersupporttaskermanagement.Todate,theseeffortshavebeenunsuccessfulduetolackofresourcesintheCommand,mostnotablygovernmentITpersonswith business software expertise. The resulting deleterious secondordereffectsofsoftwarecustomizationtomeetbusinessprocessesandusertrainingandacceptancehavecausedOutlooktoremaininplace,despiteitsinformationmanagementandNCWissues.

EUCOM’scomponentsallusedifferenttaskermanagementsystems.Of note, U.S. Air Force Europe (USAFE) has implemented aspecifically tailored Microsoft product for tasker management thatprovidesforinformationavailabilitytoallitsusers.AfricaCommand(AFRICOM),derivedfromandcollocatedwithEUCOM,haschosentoimplementthissameMicrosoftproduct,tailoredtotherequirementsof AFRICOM. EUCOM has chosen to replace its Outlook-basedtaskermanagementsystemwithagovernment-ownedsoftwareproductoriginallydesignedforconfigurationmanagement.ThissoftwarehasauserinterfacecustomizedbyEUCOM(usingacontractor)fortaskermanagement.Whilealltheseexamplecommandshavetakenstepsina positive direction for information management and NCW, noneof the tasker management systems are directly compatible, and willrequire“gluingtogether”oftheirrespectivedata-managementsystemstocreatetheinformationcompatibilityrequiredforNCW.

The lack of a single common tasker management system across theDoD,oratleastasetofcompatiblesystemsacrosstheJointcommunity,isdirectlytheresultofthefracturedmethodsusedtodeliverdesktopITservices.DoDleaveseachcommandtodevelopitsownsystem–andeachdoes sobecause itmust.Thecombatantcommandsmightrealizeahugesavingsinstaffeffortiftheyhadeasyandroutineaccesstoalltheirpreviouswork.Yetpastworkisofteninaccessibleatbest.The “knowledge” foundation required to support shared awarenessacrossthebroadspectrumofcombatantcommandworkdocumentedby taskers simply does not yet exist – and may not exist until anagencywiththerightexpertiseininformationmanagement,businessenterprisesoftware,andNCWdevelopsandfieldsacommontaskermanagementsystemacrosstheJointcommunity.


TSCMIS.Severalofthecombatantcommandshaveeachdevelopedtheir own Theater Security Cooperation Management InformationSystems (TSCMIS). Each TSCMIS serves as an information focuspointforthecommand’stheatersecuritycooperationprograms,aswellatooltoenhancethecommand’stheaterawarenessdirectlysupportingcommand and control. The systems are the combatant commands’majorITlinktoinformationsupportingthenon-militaryelementsofnationalpower.TheinformationcontainedinthesesystemsisalreadyessentialtothesharedawarenessrequiredbyNCW.However,thelackofasingleITservicesproviderforall thecombatantcommandshascausedthosewhoneedaTSCMISsystemtodeveloptheirown.Therehas been effort at the OSD level to pull the individual combatantcommands’TSCMISdevelopmentprocesses together.While agoodidea,thishascreatedacompetitionbetweenthecommandsforwho’ssystemwill“win,”requiringadditionalresourcestobespentadvertisinganddefendingtheexistingsystems.Withoutanysingleagencyinplaceto both guide the development and become the program manager(PM), a single TSCMIS solution for all the combatant commandsseems unlikely. The resulting system incompatibilities will continuetobeanimpedimenttotheseamlessinformationsharingthatNCWrequires.

Defense Messaging System.TheDefenseMessagingSystem(DMS)isanITsystemthatdirectlysupportsDoD-widecommandandcontrol(C2). DMS is essential to the combatant command C2 mission.All DMS messages are stored and thus form an historical record ofcombatantcommandC2actions.ThisinformationisessentialforthesharedawarenessrequiredbyNCW.Unlikestandardemailmessaging,DMShasrequireddeliverytimes,assureddelivery,precedence,aswellassecurityanddirectoryservicefeaturestailoredtotheDoDmission.DISAhasoverallresponsibilityfortheDMS,buttheexecutiveagentsusually provide DMS service to the combatant commands. EachServiceexecutesthismissiondifferently,usingdifferentusersoftware,and sometimes with indifferent funding priorities. The result is thecombatant commands have different user interfaces and differentaccess to the stored messages. More importantly, the combatantcommandssometimesfindthemselvesembroiledinfundingdisputeswiththeirexecutiveagentsoverthecontinuedfinancingofthisvital


system.WhenthisenormousstoreofhistoricalC2dataistransformedper DoD Directive 8320.02 to enable NCW data sharing, Serviceimplementation and funding differences will likely not produce theunifiedresultsneededbythecombatantcommandsforfutureNCWdevelopment. DMS also has an uncertain future, as DoD has notdevelopedareplacementforthislegacysystem.IftheDoDeliminatesDMSwithoutfieldinganequivalentreplacement,thiscouldforcethecombatantcommandstocomeupwiththeirownindividualsolutions.ThedataandfunctionalincompatibilitiesthiscouldintroducewouldbedetrimentaltofutureDoDNCWefforts.

Global Command and Control System – Joint.TheGlobalCommandandControlSystem–Joint (GCCS-J) is theDoDJointCommandandControl(C2)enterpriseinformationtechnologysystemofrecordtiedmostcloselywithimplementingauserinterfaceforNCWatthecombatantcommands.TheDoDusesGCCS-Jtocorrelateandsharesituational awareness and to monitor, direct, and execute missions.GCCS-Jprovidesoperationalenvironmentawarenessbygeneratinganear real-time picture necessary to conduct joint and multinationaloperations. The system integrates imagery, intelligence, status offorces,andplanninginformation.28DoDfieldedtheGCCS-Jtothecombatant commands several years ago, and is currentlydevelopingandfieldingperiodichardwareandsoftwareupgrades.

ThereareseveralissuesassociatedwithlocalITsupportandGCCS-J,a DISA program of record. Maintaining currency in hardware andsoftware; and promoting wide-spread use by combatant commandpersonnel are the two most important issues affecting NCWcapabilities.EachcombatantcommandhasresponsibilityforfundingmostGCCS-Jupgrades(withfundingfromitsexecutiveagent); thePMthensupports thepurchasing,fielding,andtrainingofGCCS-Jupgrades in cooperationwith the combatant commandsdesktop ITsupportprocess.Asfundingisalmostalwaysinshortsupply,GCCS-Jfundingrequiresprioritizedrecognitionbythecombatantcommander.GCCS-Jisnotwidelyusedoutsideofjointcommands;thereforemanysenior commanders have only cursory knowledge of its capabilities.This makes it difficult for the IT staffs to get GCCS-J upgradesprioritizedtoachievereliableandtimelyfunding.


ThelackofcomfortwithGCCS-JonthepartofjointseniorleadershipaswellastheirstaffshasledtolimiteduseofGCCS-J.PeopletendtouseenterpriseITsystemsthat their leadershipuses;when leadershipavoidsorworksaroundanenterprisesystem,sodoes therestof theorganization.29ForGCCS-J,thesmalluser-basemeans limiteduser-demandforneworexpandedcapabilities.Thesystembecomesstove-piped. A single common combatant command IT services providercould better manage the funding and upgrades, as well as promotetheuseofGCCS-JandotherfutureNCWsystemsattheuserlevel.Thosesameuserscouldprovidevaluablefeedbacktoasingleagencywherethatfeedbackwouldaffectcurrentandfuturesystems.Asitis,combatantcommandusersprovidefeedbackonallITsystemstotheirlocalITservicesproviders,whoinmostcaseshavelittleornoinfluenceoverthefielded.

Multi-National Information Systems. The Multi-National Inform-ationSystems(MNIS)isaDISAprogramthatprovidestheCombinedEnterprise Regional Information Exchange System (CENTRIXS)andother coalitionnetworking capabilities.DISAglobally links theindividualcombatantcommandCENTRIXSnetworks;thecombatantcommandsownandoperatetheirlocalnetworkelementsinvirtuallythesamemodelasusedforNIPRNetandSIPRNetcapabilities.However,theCENTRIXSsetofhardwareandsoftwareisrelativelylimitedandstandardizedsointheory,thedataissuesforNCWarefarfewerthanin the U.S.-only IT services discussed above. However, the tenuousyear-to-yearfundingofthecombatantcommandCENTRIXnetworkscombinedwiththedifferentformsofdesktopITsupporthavecreatedastatictechnologyandusertrainingsituation.Thiseffectivelypreventsanynetwork(s)-wideimprovementsinNCWcapabilities,suchasthedatasharingtechniquerequiredbytheDoDDirective“DataSharinginaNet-CentricDepartmentofDefense.”30

Senior Leader Decisions. Combatant commands, in particular thegeographic combatant commands, tend to be current operations-focused and have tightly constrained resources. Therefore, seniorleadership decisions that impact desktop IT support within thesecommandswillalmostalwaysgiveprioritytothecurrentoperationsrequirements over long-term requirements such as implementing


NCW-capable systems. Users generally view desktop IT support asautility,much like electricpower and telephone service.This couldbeasuitablemodelifITsupportwasregulatedandprovisionedlikeother utilities – regulated by DoD to international standards andprovisionedbylarge,independentproviderssuchastheServicesand/orDISA.However,desktopITsupportatthecombatantcommandsisneitherregulated(withtheexceptionofsecurity)norindependentlyprovisioned. In all dimensions, with some security exceptions, itresponds to the requirements of the combatant command. Thecombatantcommands’focusoncurrentoperations,mostespeciallyinthegeographiccombatantcommands,makesitextremelydifficultforthemtosupportlong-termNCW-enablingefforts.

Possible Solutions and Analysis

The solution space for supporting NCW through combatantcommands’desktopITsupportisfairlywellconstrained.Aconsistentconstraint is the level of classification – Secret – and therefore therequirementforheavyinvolvementofU.S.governmentpersonnelandU.S. security clearances formost IT supportpersonnel.ThecurrentdesktopITsupportsolutionisadiverse,evolutionarysetofdifferentsupport structures. It represents the least centralized, most locally-controlled overall solution. The most centralized solution would beforasingleDoDAgency,most logicallyDISA,toprovidecentrally-managed desktop IT support for all the combatant commands. Inthemiddleof this solution spacewouldbe thedifferent IT supportstructurespresently inplace,with additional oversight andprogrammanagement from JTF-GNO and DISA. These three points in thesolutionspaceareanalyzedindetailbelow,withafocusonmeetingtheneedtosupportNCWthroughdesktopITsupportatthecombatantcommands.

Therearethreemajorareastoexaminewhencomparingandcontrastingthesethreepossiblesolutions.Thefirstisthemostcritical–doesthesolutioncontinuetosupportongoingcombatantcommandoperationsatleastaswellasthepresentsolution?Thesecond:doesthesolutionsignificantly improve the future NCW capabilities of the supportedcommand,inclusiveoftheJIIMenvironment,andtheDoD?Finally,


whatresourcesandbureaucraticchangeswilltheDoDhavetomaketoimplementthesolution?

Thestatusquohasmanaged toprovide suitabledesktopITsupporttoconductcurrentoperations.Asdiscussedpreviously inthispaper,the statusquodoesnot supportNCWina suitablemanner, failingmost particularly in the management of data and information, andthe adoption of NCW-focused systems. In fact, it places the futureofNCWinthecombatantcommandsinperil.Forthatreasonalone,it is not a suitable solution for the future of desktop IT support atthe combatant commands.However, the current setof IT solutionsdoes provide some significant advantages to some of the combatantcommands, i.e. local control of both IT resources and the fundingthatbuysandsupportsthoseITresources.Asthissolutionisalsothecurrentsolution,changestoresourcingorbureaucraticsystemsarenotrequired.

AsolutionthatincreasestheoversightofDISAandJTF-GNOtocontroltheseparatecombatantcommanddesktopITsupportsystemscouldsignificantlyimprovethefutureofNCWinthecombatantcommands.ThissolutionbuildsontheDoDITsupportmodelalreadyinplace,in which JTF-GNO provides a significant level of network controlfocusedonsecurity,andDISAprovidesprogrammanagementofafewDoDITsystems-of-record(e.g.GCCS-JandMNIS),someweb-basedDoD-wideNCW-enablingcollaborationtools,aswellassupportandassistancewithnetworksecuritysystems.ThissolutioncouldimprovethefutureofNCWITsystemswithinthecombatantcommandsifitisabletoovercomethesignificantresistanceto“newandimproved”thatITusersexhibitwhenaskedtogiveuptheir“triedandtrue”solutions.The major obstacles are choice and often the overwhelming currentoperations focus of some of the commands. The local IT supportownershipofsomeofthecombatantcommandsgivesthemanoption;iftheydonotliketheDISA-providedsolution,theycankeeporseektheirown.StovepipesolutionsdonotsupportNCWwithinDoDorintheJIIMenvironment.ThosecommandswithService-provisionedsolutions face the opposition of the Services to adapt their Service-orientedITsystemstoincludewhataretypicallyJoint-onlysolutions.Adaptation almost always costs resources. This solution does take


advantage of existing resource and bureaucratic systems. However,itwouldrequireadditionalresourcingofJTF-GNO,DISA,andthecombatantcommands’ITservices.TightercontrolandadditionalPMworkautomaticallyincursadditionalresourcecosts,withnooffsettingsavings.Inaddition,compliancewithadditionalcontrolandadditionalPMfieldingswillrequireadditionalworkbytheITsupportservicesatthecombatantcommands,againwithnooffsettingsavings.

Handingoverresponsibility forallcombatantcommanddesktopITsupport to DISA is not as radical a solution as might first appear.Presently, DISA provides DISN services to each of the combatantcommands.Eachcombatantcommandhasa supportingDISAfieldoffice. In terms of IT, the DISN brings high-capacity SIPRnet andNIPRnetconnectionsfromtheGlobalInformationGrid(GIG)tothecombatant commanddesktop IT systems.DISAalsoprovides somePMservices,someweb-basedDoD-wideNCW-enablingcollaborationtools (NCES) aswell as a significant level of assistance via training,inspections, systems, and exercise support in the network securityarena.GivingDISAresponsibility forall elementsof thecombatantcommands’ITsupport is the logicalnextsteptostronglybolsteringthe future of NCW in the combatant commands and the DoD. ItremovesthemostsignificantobstacletoITsystemsthatenableNCWat the combatant commands,mainly the reluctance and inabilityofthecombatantcommandstopulltheirownresourcesawayfromthecurrentoperationsmissiontosupportfutureITsystemsdevelopmentandfielding.

An Example of Success

A DoD agency already successfully provides a service to all thecombatantcommands–andpartofthissuccessfulserviceprovisioningincludesdesktop IT support.TheDefense IntelligenceAgency (DIA)provides the Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communications System(JWICS)toeachcombatantcommandaspartofanoverallintelligencesupport package.31 This IT support includes hardware, software,and DIA personnel and contractors to provide desktop support, plusfuture systems development, fielding, and training. DIA supportsthe combatant commands’ intelligence IT completely, enabling the


commandstofocustheirintelligenceresourcesontheirmissions,ratherthan partially on intelligence IT support. This DIA JWICS supportmodel,appliedtocollateralITsupport,couldstronglyenhanceNCWfroma technologyperspective.Asapure informationservicesagency,DISAcouldbringmuchmoreexpertise to theproblemof improvingdesktopITtechnologytosupportNCWthantheoneortwopersonsateachcombatantcommandwhomighthavethistaskasanadditionalduty; DISA could also bring more expertise to bear than any of theServices.ADISAsolutionfollowstheexisting“chain-of-command”forNCW IT solutions. OSD/NII has the mission of enabling network-centric operations. The commander of DISA works for the AssistantSecretaryofDefense,NII.DISAisalreadyresponsiblewithinDoDforprovidingnetwork-centricenterpriseservices–withtheexceptionofthe“lastITmile”tothedesktopsofthecombatantcommands.That“lastITmile”isabsolutelycriticaltomaximizingtheNCWcapabilitiesofthecombatantcommands.

Recommendations1.DISA should prepare to assume responsibilities for desktop IT

supporttothecombatantcommands.2.DISAshouldquicklyassumesupportofthecombatantcommands’

coalition desktop IT services as part of its MNIS program. TheCENTRIXnetworkspresentanopportunityforDISAtoassumeawell-definedbutsmallportionofdesktopITsupportdutiesforthecombatantcommands.Asatestcase,thisshouldprovideDISAandtheDoDwiththeexperienceneededtoeventuallyassumeallcombatantcommanddesktopITsupport.

3.DISA and combatant command representatives should studythe DIA model used for providing intelligence support to thecombatantcommands.Whereappropriate,DISAshouldanalyzetheexperiencesgainedbyDIAandadaptandadopttheseexperiencestosupportdesktopITsupportatthecombatantcommands.ThisstudygroupmustplacespecialemphasisonsupportingNCW.

4.DoD should extract the additional resources required by DISAfromtheexistingdesktopITsupportstructuresatthecombatantcommands. This includes personnel and funding. DISA could


adapt the Defense Working Capital Fund approach to includefuture costs of providing desktop IT support to the combatantcommands, enabling baseline IT service costs to continue to befunded by the Services (as the combatant command executiveagents),withoptionaland/orenhanceddesktopITsupportservicestobefundedbytherequiringcombatantcommand(s).

Conclusion

ThispaperhasdiscusseddesktopITsupportatthecombatantcommandsanditseffectonNCWcapabilities.WithspecificfocusoninformationsharingasanenableroftheNCWtenetofself-synchronization,thispaperexaminedseveralexamplesofcurrentcombatantcommandITsystems. It also examined the effects of combatant command seniorleader decisions regarding IT support to current operations versusmodernizationtosupportDoD-wideNCWcapabilities.TheresearchrevealedthatthecurrentdesktopITsupportmethodsdonotadequatelysupportcombatantcommandNCWcapabilities.Afterexaminingthreepossible future combatant command desktop IT support methods,thispaperprovidedtherecommendation,withsupportingdiscussion,thatDISAbecomethesingleproviderofdesktopITsupporttoallthecombatantcommands.

knowledGe centric warfare: an introduction

Lieutenant Colonel Robert B. SofgeUnitedStatesMarineCorps

On 15 January 2009, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs ofStaff (CJCS) published his Capstone Concept for JointOperations, calling it the most fundamental of all U.S.

military concepts.1 In it, Admiral Mullen describes a vision for thefuturejointforceintermsoffourmilitaryactivities:combat,security,engagement,andreliefandreconstruction.HelaudsU.S.forcestodayas the most capable in our nation’s history. However, after praisingpeopleasourgreatestadvantage,hestatesthatourpatriotism,training,discipline, leadership, and ability to adapt are not enough to meetfuturechallenges.Somehow,somethingismissing.

Missingarenewcapabilitiesandimprovedcapacitiesofexistingonesas well as doctrine, tactics, techniques, and procedures. The CJCSadvocates new methods of integration, as well as better selection,education, training, equipment, andmanagementof the force– ledbybroadlyeducated,adaptive,andthinkingprofessionalstomeetthefullspectrumofnationalsecuritychallenges.Beyondtheprofessionalcommitmentandhonorimbuedinthecurrentforce,wemustcultivatetheall-importantabilitytotakeproperactionintheabsenceofspecificguidance.2

The Chairman offers 17 institutional implications for the jointforcetofulfillhisvision.Eightofthesecallfordirectmorecoherentdevelopmentofknowledgeandadaptabilitywithinourforce:3

• Improveknowledgeofandcapabilitiesforwagingirregularwarfare.• Improve knowledge of and capabilities for nuclear warfare and

operations in chemical, biological, and radiological nuclearenvironments.

• Improveknowledgeof andcapabilities for security, engagement,andreliefandreconstructionactivities.


•Markedlyincreaselanguageandculturalcapabilitiesandcapacities.• Institutemechanismstopreparegeneral-purposeforcesquicklyfor

newmissionsets.• Improveorganizationalsolutionsforprotractedmissionsthatcut

acrossgeographicalboundaries.•Developinnovativeandadaptiveleadersdowntothelowestlevel.• ImproveServiceand institutionaladaptability todealwithrapid

change.

The Chairman’s imperatives signal both a shift of focus within,and expansion of, the military domain from today’s framework ofNetwork CentricWarfare (NCW) toward what Phister and PlonishcallKnowledgeCentricWarfare (KCW).4Atfirst this appears tobeasimpleevolutionarystepfromthecentricityofthe1980’splatformsandthe1990’snetworkstothefuturecentricityofknowledge.5Butitisalsoaprofoundshiftbacktowhathasbeenmostimportantallalong–thephysicalandmentalcapacityandcapabilityofourSoldiers,Sailors,AirmanandMarines, aswell as thatof theprofessionals supportingthem.

The shift is timely and appropriate because the threat has changed.InsteadofoperatingwithintheeffectiveandclearlydefinedWestphalianconceptofpoliticalandmilitarycompetitionbetweenstates,wenowdobattlewithconditions.AlthoughU.S.andcoalitionmilitarymightisunrivaled,theelusivenatureofourcollectivepoliticalobjectivesisfrustrating. Fortunately, in improving each warrior’s understandingof the broad range of the tools of war and techniques for the localornationalapplicationoftheinstrumentsofpower,webecomemoreeffective. By integrating knowledge itself more thoroughly into theforce,wecreatethecapabilitytobesuccessfulnotonlyinawaragainstpeople,butalsoinawaramongthepeople.6

This paper proposes a more careful focus for the collective jointforce to support the Chairman’s vision. It proposes a knowledge-centric framework for understanding the complex nature of warfareatall levels. It suggests that thenecessaryevolutionarystepthatwillcapturethepromisesaswellasfillthevoidswithinNCWresides in


centeringourwarfightingontologyonthepeoplewhofightwarsandwhat they know – and not the technology supporting them. Thisthesisisovertlyphilosophicalsinceknowledgeresidesinhumanswhoknow–living,breathing,understanding,andfallible,butpotentiallybrilliant,peoplewhoarecentraltoanyenterprise.Thisthesispresentsanepistemological challenge to thosewhomisunderstand the subtlebutenormousdifferencebetweenknowledgeandinformation,whichisbornofthegradualcorruptionofwhatitmeanstoknow.

Due to the tremendous gains inour capacity to store, process, andmanipulateinformationinthemodernage, many people now mistake thecapture of data and information,however contextually rich, as thepreservation and distribution ofknowledge. Accordingly, knowledgecentricityisaresponsetothedilemmathatwhileweswimininformation,wearestarvingforknowledge.

KCWtakesthebestofthenetwork-centricoperationalconceptstothenextlevel.Itcullstheprovenideologicaltenantsfromthoselessviableand,withfocusonthewarrior,appliesallwehavelearned.In1998,theintroductionofNCWrevolutionizedthewaybothwarriorsandthinkersviewwar,yetthisconceptremainssomehowincomplete.Thecomplex,intricate,andawe-inspiringtechnologicalmarvelsofsiliconeandsteelwehavecreateddonotcapturewhatClausewitzcalledthepassionofwar.KCWfocusesonwhatweknowandhowweknowit–onwhatisinourmindsandhowitgotthere.Itisknowledgeofourselvesandtheenemyinabroader,moreintegratedcontext,creatingaknowledgeedge by “leveraging and exploiting information, communicationsandother technologies,andby theapplicationofhumancognition,reasoningandinnovation.”7KnowledgeCentricWarfare,empoweredbytechnology,embracesthefundamentalsofKnowledgeManagement(KM) togenerate an advantageby influencingdecision-making andenhancing effective execution.8 KCW centers on the warfighter,developingthensynthesizingthementalacumenandtechnicalsavvy

Figure 1: The Knowledge Pyramid

Data

Information

Knowledge

Wisdom


requiredtofulfilltheChairman’svisionwhiledevelopingacollectivelysuperiorforce.

KCW,likeKM,isanintegrativeconcept–itattemptstoreassembleourperceptionoftheworldinsomesemblanceofhowit“really”isbybeamingitsmessagesattheintersectionofpeople,process,andtechnology.Theambiguityofthe“informationage”environmentinitiallyfosteredthedevelopmentofInformationTechnology(IT)solutionstoKMwiththevaguepromisethatorganizationalcommitment,zeal,andmoneymighttransformtheseekingfirmintothevaunted“learningorganization.”

The notion that KM can be purchased from a software vendorand deployed by an institution initially blurred the KM picture byemphasizing the wrong node of KM’s process-people-technologytriad.Currentresearchinthequesttomanageknowledgeisshiftinginstitutional focus away from primarily IT solutions to a moreintegrated, people-centric view, thereby relegating technology to asupportingrole,thoughonestillessential.TheorganizationalimperativeofknowledgetransferisnowassumingamoresocialcharacterintheformofCommunitiesofPracticeandotherITenabledforums.

Physical Dimension- systems- platforms- sensors

Informational Dimension- collection- processing- storage

Cognitive Dimension- mental models- perception- opinion- knowledge

Social Dimension

Figure 2: The Information Environment9


Similarly,KCWisabroad,abstractconceptcenteringattheintersectionof our technological capacity, the processes embedded within ourwar-fighting apparatus, and, most importantly, the people usingbothtoprevailinthemodernstruggleofwills.InPowertotheEdge:Command,ControlintheInformationAge,theauthorsdiscussfourdimensions of command and control (C2): physical, informational,cognitive,andsocial(seefigure2).10

Physically,NCWconnectsplatformsensorsandsystemsintoacohesivewhole.Attheinformationlevel,dataispulled,posted,processed,andstored.11Oftenoverlooked(orassumed)isthecognitivedevelopmentof the people using these systems and sensors as well as the socialdomain in which they operate. KCW emphasizes the cognitive andsocialdomainsofnotonlyC2,butalsothenatureofwarfareitself.

Philosophical Roots: Epistemology, Semiotics, and Cognition

Whatisknowledge?Thisiscertainlyaquestionfortheages,andonethatphilosophers,scientists,poets,religiousleaders,andtherestoftheworld’sgreatthinkershavestruggledwithforrecordedhistory.Indeed,one’sanswer to thisquestion framesone’sapproach tomany things,butaworkableanswerisacorecomponentofKCW.Fortunately,bystandingontheshouldersofthegreatthinkersofourtime,itispossibletodevelopatleastaworkingdefinitionofwhatknowledgeisforthepurposesofcreatingtheKCWframework.

Epistemology,fromtheGreekwordepisteme,meaning“knowledge,”is a branch of philosophy that considers the nature, origin, andlimitsofhumanknowledgeandunderstanding.12Amongtheancientphilosophers,bothPlato’stheoryofformsandAristotle’sexaminationofcauseandeffectholdsthatknowledgeispossiblewhensubjectedtoreasonandlogic.Conversely,ancientskepticism,likethatofPyrrho,isaphilosophyofdoubtthatgenerallysuspendsjudgmentonourcapacitytoknowanythingandholdsthattrueknowledgeisimpossible,maskedbyappearancesandsensorymisperception.13

Modern (17th-19th century) philosophers and epistemologists –Descartes,Locke,Hume,andKantamongthem–ponderedthetrue


natureofknowledgeandsetrigorousstandardsforwhatconstitutedactualknowledgeasopposedtosomelesserformofintellectualactivity.Twoprincipleschoolsofthoughtemerged:rationalism,whichpositsthat certain a priori knowledge exists in the mind; and empiricism,which asserts that all knowledge is experiential.14 Though rooted inmore ancient philosophy, John Locke’s “blank slate” is a modernexpressionofempiricism.15Famously,Descartes’Cogito Ergo Sum,or“Ithink,thereforeIam,”isaskepticalphilosophicproof.Aftercarefulexamination,hedeterminedallofhispreviousknowledgewassimplybelief when subjected to his standard that all knowledge is certaincognitionandcertainty is freedomfromdoubt.Theonly irrefutableclaimtoknowledgehecouldmakewasthatbecausehecouldthink,hemustexist,andhisexistencewasthereforetrue.16

Kant, inter alia, distinguished knowledge from opinion and faithby theorizing about levels of ascent, where each level is subject toincreasingly stringent justification. At the lowest level, a knower canholdapropositionweaklysupportedbyreasoning–anopinion.Morestringent, but still subjective beliefs are assents held strongly, butthey lack objective sufficiency. Knowledge, the final rung, is “assentthat is sufficient both subjectively and objectively.”17 Clearly, Kant’sclassificationsrelyontheirsufficiency–needingsomeformofinternalorexternaljustificationtocrossthethresholdsofpropositionalascension.

Usingapropositionconstructfortheconsiderationofwhatconstitutesknowledge, the claim to having knowledge of a given propositionrequiresthreethings:truth,belief,andjustification,each“individuallynecessary and jointly sufficient”18 to support the epistemologicalclaim.Assuch,theJustifiedTrueBelief(JTB)constructisamodelforknowledge(wherepisthepropositionandKistheknower)generallygivenas:19

Sknowsthatpifandonlyif:pistrue;20Kbelievesthatp;Kisjustifiedinbelievingp(eitherinternallyorexternally).21


Prominently, the philosophic pursuit ofTruth, solidly in the realmofepistemology,exceeds the scopeof thispaper.But theacceptanceof JTB as a working definition for knowledge, however contingentor tentative, is sufficient to the extent that knowledge inextricablyrequires a knower. Of the several challenges remaining, those ofutmost concern are: discovery of how knowledge manifests itselfwithinanorganization;methodsofcapturing,reusing,andgeneratingknowledge;andtechniquesofrepresentingknowledge.

Cognition

Cognition is the process or act of knowing, inclusive of perceptionandjudgment.Itistheexperienceofknowing,asopposedtofeelingorwilling.22Cognitivescienceisarelativelynewinterdisciplinaryfieldembracing“philosophy,psychology,artificialintelligence,neuroscience,linguistics, and anthropology”23Arguably, cognitive awareness is thesine qua non of knowledge and is the threshold for distinguishingknowledgefromotherwisecontextuallyrichinformation.

Semiotics

All instruction is either about things or about signs; but things are learned by means of signs.24

—Augustine(OnChristianDoctrine,I:2).

Semiotics is a branch of philosophy that concerns itself withsignificationandlanguage,particularlyasitrelatestotheconceptsorthingsthatsigns(soundsorsymbols)represent.Itisimportantbecauseithaseverythingtodowithhowweconveyelementsofwhatweknow.Thecapacitytoaccuratelyconveyandinterpretmeaningbothwithinandbeyondorganizationalboundsposesasignificantchallenge,evenas we use a “common” language to explicate data and information.In an increasingly globalized world, changing languages whilepreserving meaning is a tremendous informatics challenge. Brodnerassertsthatsemioticchallengesaretheprinciplereason“mostrealITimplementationshaveturnedouttobeabarriertoratherthananenablerfororganizingmoreproductiveworkandvaluecreationprocesses.”25


Broadly, semiotics isbroken into threecategories: semantics, syntax,andpragmatics.

Semanticsisthestudyofmeaningwithinlanguagebestillustratedbyan old joke that highlights different meanings of the word “secure”withintheU.S.ArmedForces:

Commander:“Securethatbuilding!”•ASailorimmediatelyturnsoutthelightsandlocksthedoors.•ASoldierpostsanMPandnoonegetsinwithoutaspecialpass.•AMarinesetsupmachineguncrossfire,laysdownamortarbarrage,

andcallsforairstrikesandartillerysupport.•AnAirmantakesoutatwo-yearleasewithanoptiontobuy.

Giventhesamecommand,eachaudienceinterpretsitdifferentlyandactsaccordinglybasedontheculturalmodeltowhichtheysubscribe.Discussionofculturalmodelsfollows.

Syntaxconcerns itselfwiththeformaluseofrulesandstandardsforcombiningsymbolstoconveymeaning.Propergrammaticalstructuresforthewriterandlogicalprecisionforthecomputerprogrammerareexamplesofsyntax,whicheffectivelyconveystheintendedmeaningorinstructionthroughtheapplicationofspecificrules.

Pragmatics involves the studyofconveyingmoremeaning thanthatwhich is explicitly stated. Inference is requiredon the receiving endofapragmaticstatementtoderivethefullestmeaning.Amomentofreflectionmight reveal thatmostmisunderstandingsbetweenpeoplearetheproductofpragmaticmisfires.Pragmatismrequiresmorethancontext–itrequiresaprioriknowledge(butnotintheKantiansense)andissensitivetonotonlywhatissaidorwritten,butalsotowhatisnot.26

Sharedmeaningreducessemioticchallengeswithingroups.Developingasharedlexiconisacriticalcomponentinthedevelopmentofsharedmeaning, especially acrossorganizationalboundaries.Beyond sharedmeaning,understandinghowknowledgeflowswithinanorganizationandhowsharedmeaningbecomesasharedunderstandingisimportant.


InDynamicTheoryofOrganizationalKnowledgeCreation,Nonakacautions“althoughtheterms‘information’and‘knowledge’areoftenusedinterchangeably,thereisacleardistinctionbetweeninformationandknowledge.”27HethenquotesDretske:

Information is that commodity capable of yielding knowledge, and what information a signal carries is what we can learn from it. Knowledge is identified with information-produced (or sustained) belief, but the information a person receives is relative to what he or she already knows about the possibilities at the source.28

Organizational Learning and Knowledge Transfer

There are three general approaches to knowledge transfer withinorganizations:thepositivistapproachinwhichobjectshaveindependentmeaning in the world; the social-constructionist view that assumesknowledge is a social construction whose meaning derived from itsusage;andthesocio-cognitiveperspectivethatassumesknowledgeisinternalizedinthemindandbodyoftheknowerandthenreconciledthrough external influences. The validity of the accepted approachdependson thephilosophicalnotionofwhat constitutesknowledgewhich,inturn,determinesthethresholdthatinformationmustcrosstobecomeknowledge.

Nonakapositedtherearetwotypesofknowledge:tacitandexplicit.Hetheorizesknowledgeiscreated,ortransferred,throughtheconversionofthetwotypes.29Tacitknowledgeistheknowledgeinsideone’shead,and explicit knowledge is tacit knowledge somehow externalized,recorded in someway to facilitate its disembodied transfer.Nonakafurther identifies four modes of knowledge conversion between thetwotypes(Seefigure3,nextpage):30•Tacit-to-tacit:Occursbetweenpeoplethruface-to-facesocialization

–sharedexperience,observation,imitation,andpractice.•Explicit-to-explicit:Betweenindividualsthrusomemedium:phone,

email,etc.•Tacit-to-explicit: Externalization of knowledge – recording what

youknow.


•Explicit-to-tacit:Similar to traditional learning, internalizationofdisemodiedknowledge.

Nonaka’smodelexhibitssignificantexplanatorypower,butissubjecttomisinterpretationifnotconsideredinhisfullcontext.Specifically,theinterplaybetweenthetacitandexplicitknowledgeinvolvesacyclethat creates or transfers knowledge through at least one iteration.Contributingtotheconfusion,Nonakahimselfusesexplicitknowledgeandinformationinterchangeablyinhisdiscussionofexplicit-to-explicit,or thecombinationknowledgetransfermode:“Thereconfiguringofexistinginformationthroughthesorting,adding,recategorizing,andrecontextualizingofexplicitknowledgecanleadtonewknowledge.”31Thisobjectificationofknowledge,disembodiedfromtheknowerasatypeonintellectualcurrency,hasallowedtermslike“knowledge-base”toreplace“data-base”inourevolvinglexiconandundermineswhatitmeanstoknow.

Thepositivistapproachtoknowledgetransferassumesthatdisembodiedknowledgecanbestoredanditsmeaningadequatelycodifiedtoqualifyas knowledge.32 The principal challenge associated with a positivistperspectiveistheassumptionthataretrieverwillbeabletointerpret,incontext,thecapturedknowledge.

Thesocial-constructionistapproachtoknowledgetransfer,builtuponconstructivist theory, posits derivation of meaning comes throughusage. Constructivists assert individuals construct knowledge forthemselvesincontextofthephysicalworldaroundthemwhilebuilding

Figure 3: Nonaka’s Model of Knowledge Transfer

Socialization Externalization

Internalization Combination

Tacit Knowledge

Explicit Knowledge

Explicit Knowledge

Tacit Knowledge To

From


onknowledgepreviouslyacquired.ImmanuelKant,JeanPiaget,andLevVygotskyareamongimportantcontributorstotheconstructivisttheory.33Vanden,34citedinLauzon,asserts,“learningisaconstructiveprocessinwhichthelearnerisbuildinganinternalrepresentationofknowledge,apersonalinterpretationofexperience…anactiveprocessinwhichmeaningisdevelopedbasedonexperience.”35

SituatedCognitionisasubsetorbranchofconstructivismdevelopedbyLave.Itassertsthatwhileknowledgeisacquiredthroughthecontextofactivity,knowledgetransferstakeplaceonlyinasimilarsituation,andtheyarelargelyunintentional.36TheconditionofasimilarcontextistheunderpinningofCommunitiesofPractice,37orforumsofsimilarexperience.Similarityofexperienceandcontextenablesthetransferofknowledge.38

EtienneWengerandJeanLavefirstintroducedthetermCommunitiesofPractice(CoP)morethan15yearsago.39Inalaterwork,Wenger,etal.,defineCoPas“groupsofpeoplewhoshareaconcern,asetofproblems,orapassionaboutatopic,andwhodeepentheirknowledgeandexpertise in thisareaby interactingonanongoingbasis.”40Theauthors assert that while the term is relatively new, the idea of acommunityofpractice is quiteold.They citemedieval guilds as anearlyexample,andbelievetheconceptretainsthecapacitytocreateaframeworkandinfrastructureinamodernlearningorganization.41

TheshiftinthinkingfromaKMperspectiveisimportantasitmovesawayfromviewingknowledgeasanobjectorartifact.Thisisatendencyof IT-dominatedKMefforts that focusoncodificationandcapture.As a result, data, information, and knowledge are culled from theircontextinatacit-to-explicitknowledgetransferprocess,andthuslosemeaning.Thistendencyisaffirmedina2004casestudyofaDanishsoftwarefirmwhere“management’spreoccupationwithimplementingtechnological solutions for codifying, archiving, and creating globalaccesstoinformation[was]conflictingwiththepractitioners’focusonseekingcontext-richinformationthroughcollegialnetworks.”42

Instead, inaconnectionistviewofknowledge, inwhichtheknowerisarequiredentityandtheseparationoftheknowerfromtheknownis impractical (if not philosophically impossible), CoPs create a


vehicleforsharingtacitknowledge.Nonakabelievesthatthemajorityof organizational knowledge is tacit, embodied in the people thatcomprise the organization.43 CoPs create and exploit the social andcultural underpinnings of knowledge by facilitating tacit-to-tacitknowledge transfer.44 The largest store of organizational knowledgemay be tapped by creating conditions conducive to the transfer ofelusiveanddifficult-to-capturetacitknowledge.45So,itisnotdifficulttounderstandthebroadappealofaCommunitiesofPracticeapproachtomanagingandcreatingorganizationalknowledge.CoPsareeffectivebecausethesharedculturalmodelsuponwhichtheyarebasedfacilitatethetransferofinformation,therebycreatingknowledge.

Structure, Design, and Membership of a Community of Practice (CoP)

CoPscantakemanyforms;theyaretypicallyorganizedaroundcommongoals.Theycanbesponsoredbyanorganizationorexistoutsideanyformalrecognition.46IneithercaseaccordingtoWenger,aCoPsharesthreefundamentalcharacteristics:adomainofknowledge,acollectionofpeopleconcernedwiththedomain,andasharedpractice.47Practiceistheoperativeword;itistheenginethatdrivesnegotiationwithinthecommunity.PracticefosterssharingofknowledgeandbestpracticesbythosewhoareactuallyengagedintheCoP.Thepracticingcommunityultimatelydiscoversnewknowledge.

WengerofferssevenconditionsuponwhichaCoPshouldbedesigned“withalighthand”:theabilitytoevolve,opendialogueamongvaryingperspectives,differentlevelsofparticipation,bothpublicandprivatespaces,afocusonvalue,abalancebetweenfamiliarityandexcitement,and rhythm.48Within thisfluiddesign,Dalkir,49 citingKim,breakscommunity membership into five categories – visitors, novices,regulars, leaders, and elders – each beginning with different levelsof participation that potentially mature through participation.50 Anexamplewouldbeavisitorwhobecomesanoviceparticipantbecausethevisitorfoundvalueinparticipating.Throughexposure,time,andparticipation,theindividualcouldevolveintoaleaderwithintheCoP.


Fisher’s 2004 study on CoP within the Data Management UserTechnology (DMUT) Division at the IBM Corporation expandsWenger’s three fundamentals of a CoP while adopting them in amoreformalfashion.Abandoningthelight-handedapproach,Fisherstresses the important role of common goals and missions withinthe IBM communities.51 The purpose of the formalized goals andmissions directed by management, as opposed toWenger’s more adhoc approach, is to provide a rally point for the diverse and cross-functional members of the communities within the division. Eachknowledgedomaincentersonaproductgroupandcommunitiesfallinto twodistinct categories: skill-based communities andgoal-basedcommunities.Employeestypicallybelongtoatleastonecommunityofeachtypeandcanbelongtomorethanonegroupinaskill-basedCoP.52

At IBM’s DMUT, the skill-based CoPs function much as Wengerdescribes.Workerswithacommonskillsetsharebestpracticesinaninformal,collaborativeenvironment.Fisherspecifiedfourmechanismsadopted at IBM for the nurturing of these skill communities: skill-based councils sponsored by companies whose members form theCoP; collaborative communication and learning facilitated by boththe company intranet and Lotus Notes to transfer knowledge anddocument best practices; mentorship, which closely observes Kim’smodel; and physical proximity, a deliberate attempt to collocateknowledgeworkersclosetotheirskill-basedcommunities.53

Goal-basedcommunitiesperformadifferentfunctionatDMUT.Morealignedwithtraditionalwesterncorporatehierarchy,thesecommunitiesform among specific product groups and their membership ismultidisciplinary. They focus on the product; producing it on timeand within budget. The goal-based communities interact with eachother and govern the skill-based communities. Firmly grounded incorporatereality,Fishernotesthat“theskillcommunitiesdonotexisttoexhibitperfectionintheirskills;theyexisttocontributethoseskillstoaspecificbusiness-relatedgoal,suchasthedesign,development,andshipmentofProductAonscheduleonbudget.”54

ThisvaluablecasestudydescribesonewaytoestablishmentCoPsina largecorporationandoffersaconcreteexampleofCoPsinaction.


Fisher concludes bydescribing the struggle tofindbalancebetweenthedifferenttypesofCoPsatIBM–perfectingskillsaswellascreatingandsharingknowledgeversusthebusinessimperativesofscheduleandbudget.ThestudydoesnotofferanymetricstoassessthevalueaddedbytheCoPs.

For all their utility, CoPs do not offer a complete KM solution inindustry,noraretheythepanaceaforKCW.Whilethereareenthusiasticsponsors of the concept and a growing body of literature on CoPs,actually measuring the CoP contribution to business enterpriseremains difficult. If it cannot be measured, how has it managed tocreateacompetitiveadvantage?55Inafarminganalogy,practitionersareencouragedtoplowafertilefieldintheproperplacehopingforaviableyield;however,this“faith-based”approachisnotanoptionwhenthesecurityofthenationisatstake.Othermodelsandtheoriesoflearninghaveapplicableexplanatorypower intheknowledgetransferprocess(See Table 1).56 Additionally, within CoPs themselves, undisclosedissuesthatcouldlimittheirviabilityarelurkingindarkcorners.

ThesocialdynamicwithinaCoPislefttonatureinmuchliterature.Roberts allows that issues of power, trust, and predisposition arepowerful influences in the community. The development of sharedmeaningwithinthecommunitymightsimplyreflectthedominanceof powerful community members. Issues of trust, based on a hostof sociological factors, can inhibit sharing of knowledge. Likewise,members’ predispositions regarding participation might limit thedegreetowhichtheCoPisaviablesolutionincertainenvironments.

Hemre describes the importance of recognizing CoP life cycles andtheir relativevaluesover time.57Wengerofferscautionregarding thedual-edgednatureofCoPs:“sharedperspectivesonadomain, trust,a communal identity, longstanding relationships, and an establishedpractice–arethesamequalitiesthatcanholdithostagetoitshistoryand its achievements.”58 Communities might become atrophied bycertain historical best practices and immobilized in the communitypowerstructure.Thesecircumstancescouldinhibitthecreativityandinnovation thatwas their charter. In viewof thepowerofdoctrine,suchobstaclestoadynamicCoPcouldbedebilitating.


TheprincipalcontributiontothedevelopmentofKMandtoKCWbytheCoPapproachisthedeparturefromprincipallytechnologicalsolutions toward sociological considerations in the construction oflearningorganizations.TheirrelianceonthesocialnatureoflearningandknowledgetransferbringsrichcontexttotheKCWtriad.Whereastechnologicalcontributionsreceivemuchemphasisandleansix-sigmainitiativesaggressivelystudyprocesses,theCoPconceptbringsthesamelevelofattentiontounderstandingthemostimportantcomponentofknowledgeanditsmanagement–thepeople.

Amorecomplexandpowerfulsocio-cognitiveapproachtoknowledgetransferrevealstheprofoundimpactofmentalmodelsonindividualcognitiveprocesses,somewhatincontrasttothesocialconstructionists’emphasis on shared practice and experience.59 Cultural and privatemental models create an interpretive framework for socio-culturalfeedback and strategic thinking processes (categorical and reflective

Theory Principal Authors Key Points Model

Problem Based Learning Barrows and Kelson

Hands on active learningInvestigation and resolution of messy, real-world problems

Cultural

Experiential learning Kolb

Four stage cycleCombines experience, perception, cognition, and behavior

Cultural

Affordance Theory Gibson World is a perception and perception

drives action Private

GOMS Model Card, Moran, and Newell

Human information processingPredictive behavior in uncertain situ-ations

Private

Discovery Learning Bruner

Inquiry based instructionBest for learners to discover facts and relationships

Private

Situated Learning Lave Learning is unintentional

Role of activity, context, and culture Cultural

Stage Theory of Cognitive Development

PiagetCognition develops in four stages: sensorimotor, preoperational, concrete, and formal

Private

Multiple Intelligences Theory

Gardner

Seven ways people understand the world: Linguistic, Logical-Mathematical, Visual-Spatial, Body-Kinesthetic, Musical-Rhythmic, Interpersonal, Intrapersonal

Cultural

Table 1: Learning Theories


thinking). The implication is that nuanced interpretation is aprerequisite to knowledge. Further, the cognitive interplay of therelativestrengthofculturalandmentalmodelsexplainshowthesamedata applied to the same scenariobydifferentpeople often leads todifferent knowledge outcomes. It follows that the objectification ofknowledgeuponwhichboththepositivistandsocialconstructionistapproachtoknowledgetransferrelyistoosimplistic.60Tounderstandthecreationandtransferofknowledgeonemustaccountforcognitiveprocessesandthefactorsthat influencethem.RingbergandReihlenofferafour-steprecursiveprocess:61

•Cognitivecontext:embodiedculturalandprivatemodels•Cognitivecontent:reflective/categorical/strategicprocessing•Environmentalfeedback:divergent-convergentsocialprocesses•Cognitiveoutcome:collective,negotiated,unique,orstereotypical

knowledge

Thecognitiveoutcomeorknowledgethisprocessproducesusingthesocio-cognitivemodeloffersagreatdealofflexibilityandbetterreflectsreal-worldobservedphenomena.

Negotiatedknowledgeemergesfromdiscrepanciesbetweenthementalmodelsoftheparticipants.Itistypicalofcross-boundaryinformationexchange between practitioners of different disciplines who holddifferentassumptions.62However,theexchangeremainsvaluableonlyaslongastheparticipantsremainengagedandtheydissect,understand,and ultimately resolve their discrepancies. Resolution constitutes anadjustmentintheparticipants’culturalorprivatemodelsanditformsthebasisformoreeffectiveknowledgetransferinthefuture(seefigure4).63

Collectiveknowledgereliesonsharedculturalmodelsthatcomefromshared experience, education, or training – items that are typical inmilitaryorganizations.64Itrelieslessonreflectivethinkingandmoreoncategoricalthinking.Knowledgetransferinthisscenarioisakintothesilenthandandarmsignalssharedamonginfantryman,producedbyintensetrainingtodevelopsharedculturalmodels.Morepersonally,itisthepowerof“thelook”betweenahusbandandwife,emanating


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from the shared traditions, customs and habits developed throughan intense personal relationship. One of the challenges of this typeofknowledge is that it limitsknowledge transfer fromthoseoutsidethegroup.Empirically,aglimpseofthechallengesamongthemilitarybranches,services,andtheinteragencysupportthisconcept.

Theremainingtwoknowledgetransferscenariosrelatetothedegreeofcategoricalthinkingorreflectivethinkinginvolved.Uniqueknowledgeembedsahighdegreeofreflection,withlimitedsocialinteractionandlittlecategoricalinfluence.65Self-createdconceptualworldsdominatethecognitivecapacityof thosewithuniqueknowledge.ThetransferofuniqueknowledgeisrarerduetolimitedsocialinteractionofwhatRingbergandReihlencallanemancipatedpostmodernistdisposition.However,often thosewithuniqueknowledge are able to contributedisproportionatelytoout-of-the-boxthinkingthatisperhapsforeigntocategoricalthinkers,providedasocialbridgeconnectsthetwo.66

Stereotypicalknowledgereferstotransferscenarioswherecategoricalthinkingdominateswithlittleevidentreflection.Routinesforthesakeof the routine, which are characteristic of large bureaucracies, are atypicalmanifestationofstereotypicalknowledge.67Withoutreflection,stereotypicalknowledgemayleadtoblindspotsorcognitivecomfortinsituationsthatshouldbealarming.

Adopting a more complex view of knowledge creation and transfer,whereprivate and culturalmodels are of critical importance for thegenerationandidentificationofthefourtypesofknowledge,isakeystep in the evolutionofKCW.Additionally, the activedevelopmentof private and cultural mental models held by each of us (applyingrelevant aspects of the learning theories introduced Table 1.) is ofparamountimportance.

Toward the Centricity of Knowledge

This paper offers theoretical justification to alter the philosophicalaim point in the development of the future force. Our professionaldevelopment should focus on the cognitive capacity of those whopopulate our networks, as opposed to the technical capacity of thenetworkitself.Thisshiftwillenableustobuildaforcemorecapable


ofembracing the full spectrumof traditional andemergentmilitaryresponsibilities.Thiscognitivedevelopment,inturn,requiresdeliberatefocus on developing the mental and cultural models inherent ineveryone.EvolvingfromNCWtoKCWrequiresareexaminationoftheassumptionsuponwhichNCWrests.

DavidAlbertsdescribesNCWashavingfourbasictenets.First,arobustlynetworked force shares information more readily. Second, sharinginformationbothincreasesthequalityoftheinformationsharedandfacilitatescollaboration.Third,sharedawarenessistheresultofgreatercollaborationandleadstoself-synchronization.Finally,takentogether,thepreviousthreetenantsdramaticallyimprovemissioneffectiveness.68This analysis assumes that when connections have been established,theywillbeusedtoachieveeffectiveends.Implicitly,NCWassumesconnectedpeoplewillcollaboratetogeneratenewlevelsofknowledgebecausetheyareconnected.

AttheheartofNCWisMetcalf ’slaw.IntroducedbyGeorgeGilderin1993inanarticleaboutMetcalf ’sobservations,thelawstatesthatthevalueofanetworkisproportionaltothesquareofitsusers.69InthecaseofNCW,thisvalueisroughlyanalogoustowarfightingcapacity.It follows that more nodes equal more combat power. Additionally,Alberts asserts that network-centric operations apply to more thanjusthigh-intensity,force-on-forcewarfare.Heclaimsnetworkscreatethepotential,albeitsubtly,tobesuccessfulinirregularwarfarewhenappliedappropriately.70

However,wearereallyusingallofthenetworkstocreateknowledgeinthemindsofthehumanbeings.Thus,weshouldfocusonthecognitivedispositions of our force through a deliberate effort to create theconditionsthatgiverisetonewknowledge.71Amoreviableassumptionisthattechnicalcapabilitywillcontinuetoincreaseduetotheglobalnature of computing in the information age. It is more effective todevelop our minds using existing networks, social and technical, togenerateawarfightingadvantage.

The modularization of warfighting organizations into smaller andself-containedfightingenterprisesempoweredbytheability toshareinformationrepresentsamoveawayfromindustrialageorganizational


theory.72 The older and more rigid C2 mechanisms have yieldedgrudgingly to flatter and more efficient structures. In the newerconstruct, the demand for strategic knowledge at the tactical levelcompelsdevelopmentof intellectual adroitness across the force.Theubiquitous nature of information flow in modern society respectsneither linear nor vertical lines of communication. The premise ofthe“strategiccorporal”whosereal-timetacticalactionshavestrategicconsequencesrelegatestheformalchainofcommandtonothingmorethansimplyanotheractoronthenationalsecuritystage.73

Privatementalandsharedculturalmodelsperformthesense-makingfunction in cognition. Taken together, they form the multifacetedlensthroughwhichweviewtheworld.KCW,specificallycategoricalthinkingisthepointofleverage.

Thedeliberatedevelopmentofreflectivethinkingisanotherusefullever.Strategicthinkingisnottheexclusiveterritoryofnationalstrategists.Strategy,ortheartfulapplicationofends,waysandmeanstoachievenational security, can be used at any level in an organization -- theendcanbe localorglobal.The socio-cognitivemodelofknowledgetransfer provides a method to understand the impact of mentalmodeldevelopmentand the resultant typesofknowledgeproduced.Fortunately,arenewedKMeffortisunderway.Ifitisproperlyapplied,it may provide the strategic advantage necessary to accelerate theevolutionoftheforceandrealizetheCJCS’svision.

Knowledge Management in the U.S. Army

TheArmyfirstrecognizedKMin2001,emphasizingtheITdemandsoftheemergingconceptinvogueatthetime.Morerecently,theArmypublishedFieldManual (FM)6-01.1,Army Knowledge Management (AKM),adoctrinethatadvances,develops,andarticulates12principleslargelyadaptedfromtheciviliansector(seefigure5).74

“It’sallaboutincreasingcollaboration,andthathashugeimplicationsfor war fighters,” according to Bob Neilson, KM adviser to theArmy’sCIO.“It’saboutnotonlysharinginformationbuthavingtheresponsibilitytoprovideknowledgeacrosstheenterprise.”75FM6-01.1relies heavily on Nonaka’s theories of knowledge types and transfer


processes.76 Consequently, there remains mixed messages regardingwhat constitutes information as opposed to knowledge as well ascritical semantic difference. However, the document is a significantstepforwardbecause itestablishesstructureandfunctionsforaKMstaffinsupportofcommanders.

Conclusion

Althoughacompellingfactorinwarfarethroughtheages,technologyitselfisbutonefactoraccountingforthesuperiorityofoneforceoveranother.Currently,amongthedominanttechnologiesarethecomputernetworks born of the information age. Although this burgeoningtechnologycancaptureandstoreinformation,aswellasprocessanddeliverinformationatthelimitsofimaginationbymeansofvastarraysofgranularityandconcisesummation,itdoesnotcreateknowledge.The analysis and synthesis leading to genuine understanding isirrevocablyamentalprocess.Assuch,increasingtheusefulnessofthenetworks,both socially and technologically,mustdependultimatelyonthedevelopmentofthecognitivecapacityofthosewhousethem.

KCWliesattheintersectionofpeople,processes,andtechnology.Thiscompositeconceptcrossesacademicandorganizationboundariesbydefinition. KWC focuses on developing knowledgeable warfightingprofessionals–whattheyknow,howtheyknowit,whytheybelieveit,

Figure 5: Transformation and KM Principles

Building Blocks for Transformation:The Key Elements of Capability

U.S. ArmyKnowledge Management Principles

ProcessProtect/secure informationEmbed knowledgeEnterprise level standardization

People/Culture Train and educateReward Knowledge SharingCollaborateUse every interactionPrevent Knowledge loss

TechnologyCollaborative toolsOpen ArchitecturesRobust search capabilitySingle sign-on

KM

≈


wheretheylearnedit,andhowthatknowledgeenablesothers.KCWfacilitates enterprise-level thinking in an effort to achieve strategicsynergyatthejointandinteragencylevel.

JustasNCWbuiltuponPlatformCentricWarfare,KCWwillbuilduponNCW–alogical,morerefined,andpowerfulconceptthatfocusesonusingthetoolsratherthanbuildingthem.ThefocusofNCWhasbeentobuild,protect,andpopulatethenet.ThefocusofKCWisusethenettodevelopandprotecttheknowledge,andthusknowthenetthoroughly.77KCWisaboutwarfightersandtheircapacitytoknow.

The true strength of a knowledge centric approach is it its intrinsicabilitytopreparewarriorsfortheunexpected.InInevitableSurprises,PeterSchwartzadvisesthatwhilewewillbesurprisedinthefuture,wecanbeinapositiontodealwithitbyincreasingourabilitytobothsee opportunity and respond to surprise. He admonishes readers toplace“very,veryhighpremiumonlearning”whilenotingthatmostfailurestoadaptare infact failuresto learnquicklyenough.78KCWcreatesaframeworkthatenablesustolearnquicklyenoughtorespondvigorouslytotheinevitablesurprise,andthusprotectthenation.

enablinG Security, Stability, tranSition and reconStruction oPerationS throuGh

knowledGe manaGement

Commander Timothy L. DanielsUnitedStatesNavy

Thechallengesinherentintoday’sstrategicenvironmentamplifythe criticality for adaptive and responsive leadership andorganizations.Globalizationandrapidlydiffusedinformation

flowstightenglobalinterconnectednessandcreatetheexpectationfornearinstantaneousanddecisiveaction.Strategicleadersfacedemandsforeffectiveandtimelyanalysisanddecision-makingthatjuxtaposeahostofill-structuredorwickedproblems.1Theseunique,crosscutting,and interactively complex problems often require perpetual sets ofneithercorrectnorincorrectcascadingsolutions.Additionally,leadersandorganizationsfaceanexternalenvironmentcharacterizedasvolatile,complex, uncertain and ambiguous (VCUA).2 It is an environmentrequiringinnovation,acceleratedtransformation,pervasivesensingandcontinual learning. In essence, tumultuousness prevails. The VCUAenvironmentdrives rapidexternaland internalchange,decisionandresourcedemands,andevolvingmissionsandstrategicfociasleadersandorganizationsattempttoshape,influence,adaptandrespond.

The post-conflict Security, Stability, Transition, and Reconstruction(SSTR) efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan typify strategic operationsin tumultuous and VCUA external environments.3 Compoundingthe substantive challenges inherent in this environment, however,is an equally complex internal environment comprised of multipleorganizations collectively responsible for the SSTR mission. AsoutlinedinNational Security Presidential Directive-44(NSPD-44),theSecretaryofStatehasoverall responsibility for coordinating, leadingand integratingU.S.SSTReffortsacrossall“U.S.DepartmentsandAgencieswithrelevantcapabilities”andalsothoseofthenation’scoalitionpartners.4SpecifictotheUnitedStatesaloneandalthoughdependentonthesituation,theseorganizationsmayencompasstheDepartments


of Defense, Treasury, Energy, Agriculture, Commerce, Health andHuman Services, Transportation, and Homeland Security, amongothers.AccomplishingtheSSTRmission,thus,requirescollaboration,coordination, synchronization, and synthesized execution across anextremelycomplexnetworkofresponsibleorganizationswithdifferingvalues,cultures,norms,technologies,policiesandgoals.Additionally,in-theater organizations characterized by discontinuous membershipexacerbateinternalchallengesthroughinconsistentebbsandflowsofinformation,situationalawareness,and,mostimportantly,experience-derived knowledge.5 Collectively, this complex multi-organizationalconstruct must effectively address a myriad of SSTR requirementsand wicked problems that transcend organizational hierarchies andauthorities.6

Addressingill-structuredorwickedproblemsinthecontextofSSTRefforts requires that the network of responsible organizations buildsufficientcollaborativeandSSTR-specificlong-termproblemsolvingcapacity.7Buildingthiscapacity,inturn,necessitatesthatleadersandorganizationswithin thenetworkcreate, acquireordrawupon, andaddtoacollectiveSSTRknowledgebasethroughlearning.LearningoccursbyattemptingtostructureoraddressSSTRproblems;namely,the “designing” cognitive function of operational art.8 Learningalso occurs by assessing decision or solution implementation andadjustingbasedonoutcomes.Overall,however,thecomplexproblemsthemselvesoftenbecome“themainobjects tobedealtwithandthedriving forcebehindknowledgeacquisition.”9Agrowingknowledgebase,thus,iscriticaltogeneratingnewideasandfosteringinnovationand creativity required to address or structure other, emerging, orfutureSSTRproblems.Inessence,theknowledgecreatedoracquiredthroughaddressingSSTRwickedproblemsbecomestheveryresourcerequiredtocontinueeffectivelydoingso.

The effortsby theUnitedStates andCoalitionpartners in Iraq andAfghanistan clearly demonstrate that collaboration, organizationallearning, and knowledge sharing are essential elements of post-conflictSecurity,Stability,Transition,andReconstructionOperations(SSTRO. Specifically, knowledge created and shared within andamongresponsibleorganizationsenablestimelyandeffectiveproblem


solving, decision-making, adaptivity and responsiveness critical tosuccessful SSTRO in VCUA post-conflict environments. As such,Knowledge Management (KM) provides a key strategic SSTROenabler. Organizational culture, however, poses a major barrier toeffectiveknowledgemanagementemploymentwithinandacross theU.S.DepartmentofDefense(DOD)andinteragencyorganizations.

The analysis provided herein explores KM as a strategic SSTROenablerandspecificallyexaminestheeffortsoftheCombinedSecurityTransition Command-Afghanistan (CSTC-A) using the IntelligentComplexAdaptive System (ICAS)Model ofKM.The ICASmodeldescribes how KM creates the organizational intelligence necessaryforeffectiveandefficientresponsetotheenvironmentscharacteristicofSSTRO.Accordingly,applyingtheICASmodeldemonstratesthestrategic utility of KM for SSTRO-tasked DOD and interagencyorganizations.ImplementingKMtoachievestrategicsuccess,however,necessitatesovercomingprohibitiveculturalbarriers.Consideringthis,theanalysisprovidedhereinalsoexploresorganizationalcultureas abarrier toKM implementationanduse and includes focus areas forovercoming culture-centric obstacles. Finally, the analysis concludeswiththreerecommendationscenteredonrealizingthestrategicutilityofKMaspartofSSTROandinachievingnationalsecurityobjectivesoverall.

Analytical Precursors – Learning Organizations and Organizational Knowledge

Successfully accomplishing the SSTR mission necessitates unity ofaction and effort.Themulti-organizationalnetworkmust effectivelyfunctionasawhole inaddressingSSTRchallengespresentedbytheexternalVCUAenvironment,aswellasthewickedproblemsinherentintheoverallSSTRmission.Anintegralcomponentinachievingthisstrategicend-stateistoestablishaninternalenvironmentthathasthecapability and capacity to do so. This is largely possible given threeorganizational mandates. First, organizations within the networkmust value collective knowledge creation, sharing, acquisition, andapplication.Second,organizationswithinthenetworkmustunderstandhowtheiractionsaffectboththeexternalandinternalenvironments.


Finally, organizations within the network must not only recognizerequirementsforchange,butalsohavethecapacitytoeffectivelyandintelligently change based on internal and external drivers. In thiscontext, two critical enabling concepts emerge, specificallyLearningOrganizationsandKM.AlthoughthefocusofthisanalysisisonKMas a strategic SSTRO enabler, Learning Organizations and KM aresynergisticandmutuallysupportive.10Further,LearningOrganizationspossesordevelopacultureoflearning,whichisaknowledge-centricendeavor,andorganizationalcultureisasignificantdeterminerofKMsuccess.11 As such, briefly exploring certain key aspects of LearningOrganizations as an enabling component of the internal SSTROenvironment,aswellasKMsuccess,providesaworthwhilebackdropforthefollow-onKManalysisherein.

Harvard Business School professor David Garvin (1998) defines alearningorganizationas“anorganizationskilledatcreating,acquiring,and transferringknowledge, andatmodifying itsbehavior to reflectnewknowledgeandinsights.”12

InthecontextofSSTROandKM,developinganetworkoflearningorganizations will help create the required internal environmentpreviouslydescribedfromthreeperspectives.First,learningorganizationsareknowledge-centricandvaluethecreationandsharingofknowledge;learning becomes an important aspect of the overall organizationalculture,which,inturn,affectseffectiveKMimplementationanduse.13Second,learningorganizationsutilizeasystemsthinkingapproachtounderstand decision and action implications.14 Organizational andnetworkknowledgeisanessentialcomponentofsystemsthinkingasit assists inunderstanding complexity and recognizinghigh-leveragechange.15 Accordingly, a system thinking focus has the potential toimprovedecision-making.Finally,learningorganizationsseektoadaptorchange,includingorganizationalbehaviororstructureifrequired,based on the effectiveness of their actions.16 Faced with an externalVCUA environment, adaptivity and agility increase organizationaleffectivenessandresponsiveness.Inacomplexinternalenvironment,adaptivityandagilitybetterpositionorganizationstoembracechange,suchasthatassociatedwithKMimplementationanduse.


Exploring KM as a strategic enabler for SSTRO also requiresunderstanding the concept of knowledge in organizations. ThomasDavenportandLaurencePrusak(1998)defineknowledgeasfollows:

Knowledge is a fluid mix of framed experience, values, contextual information, and expert insight that provides a framework for evaluating and incorporating new experiences and information. It originates and is applied in the minds of knowers. In organizations, it often becomes embedded not only in documents or repositories but also in organizational routines, processes, practices, and norms.17

Thereisanintuitiveunderstandingthatknowledgegoesbeyonddataand information – a type of hierarchy or continuum that builds ormoves from data to information to knowledge. Data represents“discrete, objective facts about events.”18 Although organizationallyvaluable,databyitselfhasnomeaning.Conversely,addingmeaningorvaluetodata,throughcontextualization,categorization,calculation,correction,and/orcondensation, transformsdata into information.19Information provides increased organizational value over data, andorganizationsinvestheavilyinprocessesandtechnologytoolsdedicatedto informationmanagement.Similar to information,knowledgehasmeaning,butdespite frequent interchangeableuse, informationandknowledgearenotthesame.Unlikeinformation,knowledge“isaboutbeliefs and commitment” and “is a function of a particular stance,perspective, or intention.”20 Also unlike information, knowledge iscloser to action; the final intellectual asset required for planning orimplementingsolutionstoproblems.21

Organizationally, knowledge tacitly or explicitly derives frominformation through individuals or groups as either a manageableprocess or asset.22 Tacit knowledge, which has both technical andcognitive dimensions, is personal, contextual, non-tangible, ortypicallywithinthemindoftheknowersuchas“know-how,”mentalmodels, heuristics, intuition, innate intelligence or the ability toreason.23Tacitknowledgepredominantlyderivesfromexperienceandpractice, and is a resource that improves the speed and effectivenessofdecision-makingandproblemsolving.Explicitknowledge,ontheotherhand, is systematic, formalandsomethingexpressible,capableofcodification,ordocumentableinsomeformofmedia.24Tacitand


explicitknowledge,however,donotexistasseparateordiscreetentitieswithinorganizations.Accordingtopioneeringexpertswithinthefieldoforganizationalknowledge,IkujiroNonakaandHirotakaTakeuchi,tacit and explicit knowledge interact, known as organizationalknowledgecreation, through fourmodesof“knowledgeconversion”referred to as Socialization (tacit to tacit), Externalization (tacit toexplicit), Combination (explicit to explicit), and Internalization(explicittotacit)–theSECImodel.25

Knowledge Management as a Strategic Enabler

Increasinglyoverthepastdecade,theconceptandpracticeofKnowledgeManagementasamechanismtoimproveorganizationalperformancepervades organizational literature and focus.26 In general, KMencompassesthe“captureand/orcreation,sharinganddissemination,and acquisition and application” of knowledge.27 Practitioners viewknowledgeasanincreasinglyvaluablein-tangiblecommoditydue,inlargepart,topioneeringworksbyauthorssuchasPeterDruckerwho,in1993,introducedknowledgeandthe“knowledgeworker”asthe“basiceconomicresource”ofsociety.28However,amajorityofKMresearch,investmentandapplicationgenerallyoccurswithintheprivatesector(oneexceptionbeingtheU.S.military)wherethevalueofKMincludesincreased innovativeness, betterdecision-making, reduced costs, andfasterresponsiveness.29Today,theprivatesectorpredominantlyviewsKM as critical to increasing the “capacity to integrate and applydistributedknowledgetocreateagility,responsiveness,andadaptivity”in a complex anduncertainbusiness environment.30 It is a businessenvironment characterized by the geographically unconstrainedtransfer and exchange of capital, products, services, information,and knowledge throughout a global network of independent andinterdependentfirms,enterprises,andconsumers.Withintheprivatesector,thus,KMdeliversasustainablecompetitiveadvantagecriticaltomeetingthedemandsandchallengesofaninterconnected,complexanduncertainglobalizedbusinessenvironment.31

Contextually, the strategic value of KM within the public sectorparallels that of the private sector albeit not profit or competition-driven.Explicitandtacitknowledgewithinthepublicsectorisequally,


if not more, important as public sector organizations are primarilyknowledge-intensive.32Assuch,numerouspublicsectororganizationswereearlytoadoptandcontinuetoleverageKMasastrategicenabler.ManyU.S.federalagencies,suchastheDOD,havewellestablishedKM technologies, tools and programs geared toward managing avastarrayofdataand information.33Oneof themost recognized inKM literature is the U.S. Army’s After Action Review (AAR) andCenter for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) programs.34 LeveragingthesuccessandeffectivenessofCALLandotherprograms,theArmyis increasing its focus on KM. In July 2008, the Chief of Staff andSecretaryoftheArmyjointlyissuedamemorandumpromulgatingtheArmy’s12KnowledgeManagementPrinciplesasa“firststep”towarddevelopingan“enterpriseapproach”toKMfromthe“cultural,processchange,andtechnical”perspectives.35Otherwell-recognizedprogramswithin DOD include the U.S. military knowledge portals, such asArmyKnowledgeOnline (AKO),NavyKnowledgeOnline (NKO),and Defense Knowledge Online (DKO), that provide information,communication, collaboration, decision support, education, andtrainingenvironmentsforagloballydistributedworkforce.36Inadditiontoportals,theU.S.militaryisleveragingKMcommunitiesofpracticeto increase collaboration,build expertise, expedite informationflow,and improvedecision-making andproblem solving.37TheAirForceMaterial Command (AFMC) pioneered KM within the Air Force(AF)promoting communities of practice as a “key technique acrosstheAF.”38TheseDODusesofKMarebynomeanscomprehensiveand represent only a few examples. Overall, DOD KM techniques,tools,andpracticesspanafullrangeoffunctionsincludingacquisition,intelligence, logistics, andoperationswith current and future trendsmovingtowardJointand“cross-serviceintegration.”39

WithintheU.S.publicsector,thehorrificterroristattacksofSeptember11, 2001, represent the most poignant lesson in the criticality ofgovernmentKMandcoordinatedaction.40The lessons learned fromthese attacks resulted in President George W. Bush establishing theDepartmentofHomelandSecurity(DHS)torectifycriticalknowledgesharing and coordination gaps.41 More recently, KM is receiving arenewed national security and interagency strategic focus as lessonsemergefromthesignificantsecurityandstabilitychallengesfacedin


IraqandAfghanistan.AnApril2008RANDSSTRstudy regardingU.S.civilianpersonnelidentifiesKMasacriticalcomponentfordriving“continuousperformanceimprovementbyidentifyingandaddressinggaps in effective leadership and implementing and maintainingprograms that capture organizational knowledge and promotelearning.”42Additionally,inNovember2008theProjectonNationalSecurityReformidentified“enhancingknowledgemanagementacrossallcomponentsofthenationalsecuritysystem”asacorereform.43AsevidencedbytherelativelyrecentfocusonKMatthenationalstrategiclevel, KM is receiving increasing recognition as a strategic enableracrossthespectrumofU.S.publicsectoractivities.

Asidefromthemilitaryelementofnationalpower,withinthepublicsectorrealmthereisaprimaryfocusonaddressingormanagingsocialorpublicproblems,characterizedaswicked,whereknowledgeisintegraltostructuringorunderstandingtheseproblems.44SpecifictoSSTRO,theproblemsetsfacedbythemulti-organizationalnetworkrepresentthe full spectrum of public issues including political, economic,infrastructure, informational, social, humanitarian, and legal, oftenwithinsocietiesmarkedbyfledglinggovernanceandreducedsecurity.Regarding the security and stability aspects of SSTRO, U.S. Armydoctrine recognizesKMas“key tounderstandingandexists tohelpcommandersmakeinformed,timelydecisionsdespitethecomplexityinherentinstabilityoperations.”45Aspecific,presentdaymanifestationis the focus Multi-National Corps-Iraq (MNC-I) is placing on KMasacriticalenablingcapabilityforoperationsinIraq.46However,themulti-organizationalnetworkresponsibleforSSTRO,whichinmanyregardsissimilartothecomplexnetworksfoundintheglobalbusinessenvironment,mustsynergizeeffortsandactionsacrossthespectrumofSSTROgiventhewickednatureofproblemsfaced.Assuchandgiventhe spectrum of problems, KM use and focus must transcend onlycertaindepartmentsororganizationstothewholeofU.S.governmentwith SSTR capabilities and responsibilities.47 As articulated by theChairmanoftheJointChiefsofStaff,eventhesuccessoffuturemilitaryoperations“willrequiretheintegratedapplicationofalltheinstrumentsofnationalpower.”48Derivedtactical,operational,andstrategictacitandexplicitknowledgewithintheSSTRnetwork,thus,becomecriticaldynamicstrategicresourcesthatSSTRorganizationsandthenetwork


asawholemustmanage.Itistheaccumulated,largelytacitknowledgethatenablestheexpanding,sharedSSTRknowledgebasenecessaryforcontinuouscollectivelearning,increasedproblemsolvingcapacity,andimprovedresponsiveness,adaptability,anddecision-making.

Managing SSTRO knowledge as a resource within the multi-organizational network, however, presents three primary challenges.Thesechallenges,though,arealsotheprimaryjustificationsforKMasastrategicenabler.First,tacitknowledgeisdifficulttocapture,share,andifpossible,makeexplicit;doingsotakesfocusandresourcesandissubjecttoindividualandorganizationalculturalandsocialdynamics.49However, the knowledge transfer speed and effectiveness requiredforresponsiveness,adaptabilityandagilityincomplexanduncertainenvironments requires rapid and effective knowledge transfer andsharing.50Rapidtransferandsharingmustincludebothtacitandexplicitknowledge,butrealizingthisstrategiccapabilityissignificantlyeasierwithexplicitknowledge.Second, inadiscontinuousmembermulti-organizational environment, individual tacit and explicit knowledgeebbs and flows as individuals rotate in and out of organizationalpositions within the network. Continually expanding and accessingthecollectivenetwork’sknowledge,however,improvesproblemsolvingcapacity, responsiveness, and decision-making.51 Finally, leveragingSSTROcapabilitiesfrommultiple,globallylocatedorganizationsresultsin geographical and organizational knowledge dispersion. Further,organizations within the responsible network vary in technologies,size, structure, cultural values, policies and procedures.52 Effectivelyaddressing SSTRO challenges and achieving unity of action andeffort,however,requireseffectiveknowledgesharingandcollaborationthroughoutthemulti-organizationalnetwork.Inthisoverallcontext,despitethesignificantchallengestoKMimplementationanduse,KMrepresentsapowerfulstrategicenabler formeetingthedemandsandchallengesofSSTROinaVCUAenvironment.

CSTC-A and the Intelligent Complex Adaptive System (ICAS) KM Model

Overall,themissionoftheCombinedSecurityTransitionCommand-Afghanistan (CSTC-A) is to “plan, program and implement


structural, organizational, institutional and management reforms ofthe Afghanistan National Security Forces (ANSF)” in partnershipwiththeGovernmentoftheIslamicRepublicofAfghanistanandtheinternationalcommunity.53CSTC-AaccomplishesitsSSTROmissionthrough advisors, mentors and trainers to the Afghan Ministries ofDefenseandInterior,aswellasaninternalstafftomanagetheplanningandprogrammingeffortsrequiredtoorganize,man,train,equip,andbuild facilities for theANSF.As aUnitedStatesCentralCommand(USCENTCOM)organization,CSTC-Amust coordinate its effortswiththeNATO-ledInternationalSecurityAssistanceForce(ISAF)andtheU.S.Embassy.54Understandingthis,collaborationandknowledgesharingareessentialtoCSTC-Amissionaccomplishment.

Key componentsof theCSTC-ASSTROmission areplanning andprogrammingforANSFgenerationincludingmanning,equipping,andbuilding facilities. Shared responsibilities necessitate synchronizationacrossU.S.andISAForganizationstoeffectivelytrain,field,andequipAfghanNationalArmy(ANA)unitsandAfghanNationalPolice(ANP)forces.ComponentmembersoftheCSTC-Astaffprimarilyaccomplishassignedtasksthroughdirectinternalinteractionwithothermembersof the staff,aswellasdirectexternal interactionwithcorrespondingcomponentmembersofISAFandotherU.S.organizations.EquippingtheANSF,forexample,requiresinternalinteractionbetweenCSTC-ACJ7,CJ4,CJ8,CJ-Engineering,theCSTC-ADeputyCommandingGenerals for ANA and ANP development, the CSTC-A DeputyCommanding General, and the CSTC-A Commanding General.Externally,ANSFequippingrequiresinteractionswithstaffmembersfromtheANAandANP,AfghanMinistriesofDefenseandInterior,ISAF,theDefenseSecurityCooperationAgency(DSCA),U.S.ArmyG8, and USCENTCOM J4. Equipping the ANSF also requiresperiodic external interactionswith theDODInspectorGeneral andtheU.S.CongressGovernmentAccountabilityOffice(GAO)aspartof their accountability and oversight functions. Due to the VCUAenvironment associated with SSTRO, the duration and extent ofinteractions is extremely dynamic and often varies depending oninternally and externallydriven changes to goals,policies,priorities,andstrategicfocus.


Viewed through a KM lens, the description of CSTC-A within itsstrategic and operational environment mirrors that of an IntelligentComplexAdaptive System (ICAS).55As such, the ICASKMmodelis useful in identifying the criticality of KM within the CSTC-Aconstruct and specifically byusing thefive keyprocesseswithin themodelof“understanding,creatingnewideas,solvingproblems,makingdecisions, and taking actions to achieve desired results.”56 CSTC-Aperforms these processes through continuously evolving interactionwith key organizations and stakeholders. For example, CSTC-ApurchasesANSFequipment throughtheDSCAandassociatedU.S.military service organizations as part of the Foreign Military Sales(FMS)program.AspartoftheCSTC-ACJ-4equippingmission,anequipmentprocurement“sub-system”formstoaddressthefullrangeof related activities. These activities include requirements definition(understanding); identifying alternatives when specific equipmentis unavailable or delivery schedules do not support operational andstrategicrequirements(creatingnewideasandproblemsolving);signingMemorandumsofAgreement(MOAs)basedonequipmenttypesandquantities being purchased (making decisions); and executing andmonitoringcontractsanddeliveryschedules(takingactionstoachievedesired results). Shared knowledge is central to these processes as itrepresentsthecriticalorganizationalornetworkresourcethatenableseffectiveactionindynamic,complexanduncertainenvironments.57

TheequippingexampledescribedaboverepresentsoneofmanyCSTC-Asub-systems formed to ensure mission accomplishment. However,usingtheICASKMmodeldescribestheadaptivenatureofCSTC-Aasstaff“sub-systems”dynamicallyformandevolvetoaddressSSTROproblems or issues. Internal and external organizational cooperationandcollaborationareessentialtoachievingunityofactionandeffort.Amongthechallenges,however,isknowledgeattenuationasmembersoftheCSTC-Astaff,aswellasotherorganizations,frequentlyrotatein and out of these sub-systems due to U.S. and coalition militarydeployment cycles, which can range from six to 15 months, orcivilianpositiontransfers.Knowledgeattenuationsignificantlyaffectsorganizationaleffectivenesswhenkeyindividualsorleaderswithinthesub-system ineffectively transfer critical experience-based knowledgeto follow-on members. Knowledge “vacuums” are frequent as new


membersacquireorcreatesufficientknowledgetoaddvaluetosub-systemeffortsandperformance.

TheICASKMmodelalsoidentifieseightorganizationalcharacteristicsuseful in analyzing CSTC-A through a KM lens. As depicted infigure 1, these characteristics, which emerge from the nature of theorganization, include organizational intelligence, shared purpose,selectivity, optimum complexity, permeable boundaries, knowledgecentricity,flow,andmultidimensionality.58Overall,thesecharacteristicsdescribehowflexiblyanorganization,withinitsenvironment,appliesthe right knowledge at the right time to attain goals.59 Within theICAS model and specific to CSTC-A, these characteristics manifestthrough hierarchical and sub-system interactions that facilitatevertical internal knowledgeflows and externalhorizontal knowledgeflows throughoutall levelsof theorganization.Further, informationtechnologytoolssuchase-mail,videoteleconferencing,sharedportals,andmeetingsenable theseknowledgeflowsandcommunicategoals,strategicandoperationaldirection,andpriorities.Additionalenablers

Organizational Intelligence

Shared Purpose Multidimensionality Knowledge

CentricityOptimum

Complexity

Creativity Complexity Change

Selectivity

Permeable Boundary

Flow

Figure 1: Overview of the ICAS Model60


includetraining,personnelskillalignment,andorganizationalagilitycriticaltoeffectivelyrespondingtothedynamicexternalandinternalenvironments.Overall,theICASmodeldescribesCSTC-Aknowledgemanagementthroughitscapacityandabilitytosolvecomplexproblemsaswellasmakeandimplementdecisionstoachieveoperationalandstrategicgoals.61

Socio-Cultural Implications for Knowledge Management

The“firstgeneration”ofKM,whichevolvedtoroughlythemid-1990s,neglected much of the socio-cultural aspects of knowledge.62 Twostudiescompletedinthelate1990sidentifiedcultureasoneofthemainbarriers to KM implementation.63 During this first generation, KMeffortslargelyconcentratedoninformationtechnologyand“convertingtacit to explicit knowledge” that was more easily shared throughinformation systems.64 Consequently, despite significant codificationand technology investments, ineffectivenessand failurecharacterizedmany KM endeavors. Over the past decade, however, the second-,third-, or “next-generation” of KM study and practice increasinglyfocus on socio-cultural aspects of KM as organizational knowledgederivesfrompeopleandissubjecttogroupandsocialdynamicssuchas organizational culture.65 These dynamics significantly increase incomplexitywithmulti-organizationalnetworksandcontextually, theintroductionofComplexAdaptiveSystemsandChaostheoriesinlatergenerationKMmodelsprovesinstrumentalinunderstandingtheroleofKMinorganizations.66However,organizationalcultureremainsakeydeterminanttoKMsuccessasitaffectsthespectrumofknowledge“captureand/orcreation,sharinganddissemination,andacquisitionandapplication”activities.67

Organizational knowledge is primarily tacit and as such requiresindividualwillingnesstoshareandtheabilitytoeffectivelyarticulateortransferwhat is in individualminds.68Further, tacitknowledgeismoreprevalentinincreasinglycomplexenvironmentsandproblems.69Consideringthattacitknowledgesharingisthebasisfororganizationalknowledgecreation,thesocialinteractionthatenablestacitknowledgesharingbecomescritical.70Organizationalculturesandsubculturesserve


asagoverningmechanismsforthisinteractionandarekeycomponentsof “ensuring that critical knowledge and informationflowwithin anorganization.”71 Culture dynamically manifests in how organizationsvalue trust, openness, internal and external knowledge, change,innovation,learning,andcollaboration.Trustisfundamentaltointernaland external knowledge sharing and can significantly influence theextenttowhichindividualsarewillingtoshareknowledge.72Capturedknowledge,ideas,collaboration,andlearningcontributetoandenhanceknowledgecreation,sharing,acquisitionandapplicationbyincreasingorganizationalmemory,absorptiveandproblemsolvingcapacities,andinnovation.73Byextension,cultureisoftenacriticalenablertoimprovedorganizational performance in complex environments. Culture alsoaffectstheeffectivenessofmulti-organizationalnetworkenvironmentsacrossthedimensionsofrelationships,accessibility,experience,language,values, and interests.74 Contextually, thus, organizational culture isan essential element of KM yet often presents significant barriers toeffectiveKMimplementationanduse.

Overcoming Cultural Barriers

AlthoughculturalbarrierstoKMeffortscoverabroadspectrum,threeprimarycategoriesemerge.Thefirstcategoryisbarrierstoknowledgesharingandincludestrust,collaboration,socialcapital,andlanguage.Thesecondcategoryisbarrierstoknowledgeacquisitionandincludeslearning,receptiveness,andabsorptivecapacity.Thethirdcategoryisbarriers to application and includes organizational risk aversion andintolerance.Due to thenatureof knowledge inorganizations, thesecategories are not discreet and significantly influence one another.Further, all of these cultural barriers exist to lesser or more degreeswithinandacrosstheU.S.DODandinteragencyenvironment.Giventhat organizational culture is the “medium in which organizationsreside,” changing culture is both a difficult and lengthy process.75ImplementingandusingKM,however,invariablynecessitatesculturalchange.Resultantly,resistanceisinevitableandpresentsanobstacleorblocktoeffectiveorsuccessfulchange.76Resistanceoccursfrombothindividualsandgroupswhichmakesaddressingresistancechallenging.77

Ifunaddressed,however,resistancecanderailachangeeffortandmayresult in the unintended consequences of negative organizational


turmoil,employeedissatisfaction,orthenecessitytorefocusachangeeffort toward damage control vice successfully implementing therequired change. As such, understanding and overcoming resistancemustbeanintegralpartofanyKMorganizationalchangestrategy.

Overall,theculturalbarrierstoknowledgesharingcenteronknowledgecreationandcapture.Theprimarybarriertoknowledgesharingislackof trust.78 Trust develops and improves through social interaction,whichisthebasisforknowledgecreation.Accordingly,organizationalculturesthatlimitordiscouragesocialinteractionjeopardizeknowledgecreation and, by extension, knowledge management initiativesoverall.79Collaboration,ortheextenttowhichorganizationsleveragecombinativeintellectualeffortsinachievinggoals,alsoaffectsknowledgesharingandincludestheorganizationalcomponentsofepistemologyandidentity.80Epistemologyreferstothe“nature”andperspectiveofknowledgewithinanorganizationornetwork–eitherobjectivist(i.e.,knowledgeasanobject,valuingexplicitover tacit)orpractice-based(i.e.,knowledgeasembeddedinpracticeandsociallyconstructed).81Organizations with an objectivist perspective tend not to value thesocial interaction and communication critical to collaboration andknowledgesharing.82Additionally,identityreferstotheextenttowhichtheorganizationornetwork share a senseofpurposeordirection.83

Lackingasharedidentitydecreasesthelikelihoodofknowledgesharing,whichisessentialtoeffectivecollaboration.84Relatedtocollaboration,socialcapitalis“thestockofrelationships,context,trust,andnormsthat enableknowledge sharingbehavior.”85These relationshipsoftenarecontingentoninternalandexternalpoliticsaswellasperceptionsofknowledgeasasourceofpower,whichcanerodeorganizationaltrustand, thus, knowledge sharing.86 Finally, language encompasses thetechnologies,vocabularies,andmentalmodelsor“framesofreference”withinorganizations.87Differencesintechnologies,vocabularies,andunderlyingassumptionslimittheeffectivenessofcommunicationandknowledge sharing; however, these differences typically exist withinorganizationsandacrossmulti-organizationalnetworks.

The barriers to knowledge acquisition center on understanding, orcontextualizing, knowledge relative to the knowledge needs of theorganization or network.88 Individual and organizational learning is


inherent in knowledge acquisition and is critical to expanding thecapacity of organizations or networks to understand and recognizeknowledgedeficiencies,obsolescence,andopportunitiesinaddressingor solving problems.89 Organizational cultures that inhibit learningalsolimitthecapacityoforganizationstoadapt,develop,andchangebased on experience-derived knowledge.90 A second cultural barrierto knowledge acquisition is the lack receptiveness to internally andexternallygeneratedideas,suchasa“not-inventedheresyndrome.”91Organization cultures characterized by a lack of receptivenesssignificantly limit how organizations contextualize new knowledgerelative to their organization as well as implement change based onlessonslearnedandinresponsetoenvironmentaldemands.92Thefinalculturalbarriertoknowledgeacquisitionisloworlackingabsorptivecapacity within organizations. Absorptive capacity, or opennessto change and innovation, relates to existing internal and externalknowledge and determines how effectively organizations understandand leverage knowledge as a mechanism for successful change.93Organization cultures that do not value openness, learning, orinnovationlackinabsorptivecapacityandareineffectualinthechangerequiredforeffectiveKMimplementationanduse.

Finally,thebarrierstoapplicationfocusonhoworganizationsuseorapplyknowledgeindecision-making,problemsolving,orchangeefforts.Thefirstculturalbarriertoknowledgeapplicationisriskaversion.Risk-averseorganizationsarereluctanttoembraceenvironmentaluncertaintyandtheinnovationandcreativityrequiredtoadaptinachievingdesiredresults.94Risk-averseorganizationalculturesarealsolesslikelytovalueorapplyunprovenknowledgeaspartofdecision-makingorproblemsolvingprocesses.Further,riskaversiondeterminesthedegreetowhichorganizationalleaderswillundergochange.95Themoreriskaversetheorganizationalculture, the lesser thedegreeofchangeorganizationalleadersarewillingtoundergo.96Thefinalculturalbarriertoknowledgeapplicationisintoleranceformistakesoraperceivedneedforhelp.97Intolerantculturesareless likelytoembracecollaboration,aswellasapply new or unproven knowledge in decision-making or problemsolving.98 Organizational intolerance stifles knowledge base growthandresultantlylimitseffectiveKMuseasastrategicenabler.


Overcomingculturalbarrierstoknowledgecreation,acquisition,andapplication requires a threefold strategic leader focus. First, leadersmust provide an organizational vision that incorporates knowledgeand learning.99 Providing a vision is the “primary task of strategicleaders” and “sets the long-term direction for an organization.”100In the context of KM, related tasks are to communicate, develop,and implement the vision in a way that promotes inter- and intra-organizational interaction and relationship building.101 Second,leadersmustdevelopandshapeanorganizationalculturethatvaluesknowledge, collaboration, learning, and innovation. Organizationalculture “supports and helps to communicate” the vision and is atthe foundation of KM implementation and use.102 Organizationalculturesthatvalueknowledge,collaboration,learning,andinnovationcreatesynergisticandmutuallysupportiveenvironmentswherethesecharacteristicsthrive.103Inshapingorganizationalcultures,KMtoolssuchassocialnetworkanalysisassiststrategicleadersinunderstandingknowledge flows within and between organizations and providea framework for identifying where gaps or barriers exist.104 Onceidentified,leaderscanfocusresourcesandeffortsinbridgingknowledgegapsandovercomingidentifiedbarriers.Finally,strategicleadersmustbuild and shape joint, interagency, and multi-national relationshipsthat enable and encourage knowledge sharing, acquisition, andapplication.105These relationships are critical to realizing awholeofgovernmentKMapproachandleveragingthecollectivecapabilitiesofthemulti-organizationalnetworkinachievingSSTROunityofactionandeffort.

Recommendations

The preceding analysis explores KM as a strategic SSTRO enablerwithin an internal multi-organizational network environment andexternalVCUAenvironment.Knowledgeobtained fromconductingSSTRO and through addressing the myriad of associated wickedproblems is a dynamic strategic resource requiring effective internalandcross-organizationalmanagement.Assuch,KMprovidesacritical“deliberate and systemic” enabling mechanism for coordinating andleveraging the “people, processes, technology, and organizationalstructure”forsynergistic“knowledgecreation,sharing,andapplication”


insuccessfullyexecutingSSTRO.106Theanalysiscontainedhereinalsoexplores cultural barriers to KM implementation and use. PreviousKMinitiativeslargelyfailedduetoaprimaryfocusontechnologyandknowledgecodificationwhileneglectingthesocio-culturalaspectsofKM that are integral toKMsuccess. In this regard, it is critical forstrategicleaderstofocusonovercomingprohibitiveculturalbarriersaspartofanyKMendeavor.Inthecontextoftheoverallanalysisprovidedherein,threespecificrecommendationsfollow.

First, tomeet thenear-term challenges associatedwith SSTRO, theU.S.DepartmentofDefenseandtheU.S.DepartmentofStateOfficeof the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS),under the authority granted in NSPD 44, must develop a formallyrecognized and KM-enabled SSTR community of practice.107 Thereasons for this are twofold.First, communitiesofpractice facilitatethe trust-building social construct necessary for increased tacit andexplicitknowledgesharingandcapture,acceleratedlearning,improvedinnovation,andmoreefficientandeffectivestrategyimplementation.108Second, communities of practice help mitigate negative knowledgeattritionandenhance,throughimprovedknowledgesharingwithinthenetwork,thederivedutilityofotherknowledgeprocessesandKMbestpracticessuchasAARsandlessonslearned.109Acomprehensivesocialnetwork analysis (SNA) shouldprecede establishing the communitytoensureeffectivecaptureandgapanalysisofknowledgeflowswithinthe network. Further, strategic leaders within responsible SSTRorganizationsmustchampionthecommunityanddrivesharedvision,norms,values,language,change,andinvestmenttoachievesynergisticaccomplishmentofobjectives,goals,andoverallSSTROstrategy.

Second, given the increasingly widespread recognition of KM as astrategic enabler, the collective National Security apparatus mustdevelop and implement a whole of government KM strategy. TheJanuary 2009 U.S. Government Counterinsurgency Guide clearlyarticulates the primary justification for a whole of government KMstrategy given “one of the most critical yet pervasive shortcomingsthat interagency operations face is the failure to manage and shareknowledge.”110 A comprehensive strategy must encompass all facetsofKM,specificallypeople,processes, technology,andorganizational


structure, andmustbeginwith strategic leadership.As expressedbyorganizationalmanagementauthorPeterDrucker:

One does not ‘manage’ people. The task is to lead people. And the goal is to make productive the specific strengths and knowledge of each individual.111

LeadershipiscriticaltoKMstrategydevelopmentandimplementationas it drives the vision, cultural and structural change, process re-engineering, and technology investment essential to KM effortsuccess.112Alsocriticalarepeopleasknowledge“existswithinpeople,partandparcelofhumancomplexityandunpredictability.”113AwholeofgovernmentKMstrategymustfirstfocusonsocio-culturalaspectsof KM, with process, technology, and structural aspects changed ordesignedtosupport.114Further,leveragingongoingandplannedKMefforts and lessons learned, including thosederived fromdevelopingaSSTRcommunityofpractice, is essential to efficient andeffectivedevelopmentofamoreholisticstrategy.ThroughholisticandeffectiveimplementationanduseacrossandwithinthespectrumofU.S.agencyfunctions, KM provides an integral and unifying tool for achievingnationalsecurityobjectives.

Finally, the U.S. Department of Defense, the U.S. Department ofState, as well as the broader interagency must focus on becominglearningorganizations.Learningorganizationsand“anorganizationalcultureandstructurethatsupports learningandthesharinganduseofknowledge”arecriticalsuccessfactorsinKMimplementationanduse.115 Additionally, learning organizations emphasize shared vision,systems thinking, communities of practice, a learning culture, lesshierarchical or more “self-organizing” structures, and an externalenvironment focus.116These characteristics enablewhatNonakaandTakeuchimetaphoricallyrefertoasa“hypertext”organization,oronethatleveragescombinativeandcomplementarybureaucracyandtaskforceefficienciesandeffectiveness.117Essentially,itisanorganizationwiththe“strategicability toacquire,create,exploit,andaccumulatenewknowledgecontinuouslyandrepeatedly inacyclicalprocess.”118

Thus, focusingonbecoming learningorganizations, in concertwithKMimplementationanduse,will significantly improveU.S. federalagency agility, responsiveness, innovation, and decision-making in


addressingandmanagingthemyriadofchallengesintoday’sstrategicenvironment.

Conclusion

TheUnitedStatesfacesanincreasinglycomplexanduncertainworldtypifiedbyahostofwickedproblems.TheongoingSSTROeffortsinpost-conflictIraqandAfghanistanarebutoneexampleofthechallengesfacedinthisenvironmentandonethatclearlyhighlightsthecriticalrolethatwholeofgovernmentcollaborationandknowledgesharingplayinachieving strategic success. In responding to this environment, KMprovidesapowerfulstrategicenablerthatfacilitatesimprovedcollectiveagility,responsiveness,innovation,decision-making,andcontinuouslyexpanding long-term problem solving capacity. Accordingly, U.S.federal agencies are increasingly focusing on KM to develop thesestrategiccompetencies–competenciesthatpositiontheUnitedStatestomoreeffectivelymeetU.S.nationalsecurityobjectives.RealizingKMasastrategicenabler,however,requiresovercomingprohibitiveculturalbarriers.Foremost,thisnecessitatesstrategicleaderfocusasleadershipdrivesthevision,culture,andrelationshipsrequiredforcontinuouslyimprovedknowledgesharing,acquisition,andapplication.Includingand beyond SSTRO, overcoming barriers transcends organizationalboundaries as responsibility for achievingunityof effort andoverallstrategic success falls onnetworksof knowledge and capabilities.Assuch,itisimperativethatstrategicleaderscollectivelypursueawholeof government KM strategy in concert with developing learningorganizations. In today’s environment, knowledge and continuouslearningarevitalstrategicresourceswecannolongeraffordtolose.

endnoteS

Preface1. Reagan,Ronald.National Security Decision Directive 130.Washington,D.C.:

TheWhiteHouse,6March1984,http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nsdd/nsdd-130.htm(accessedNovember12,2009).

2. Emergent NATO doctrine on Information Operations cites Diplomatic,MilitaryandEconomicactivitiesas“InstrumentsofPower.”ItfurtherstatesthatInformation,whilenotaninstrumentofpower,formsabackdropasallactivityhasaninformationalbackdrop.

3. Neilson,RobertE.andDanielT.Kuehl,“EvolutionaryChangeinRevolutionaryTimes: A Case for a New National Security Education Program,” National Security Strategy Quarterly(Autumn1999):40.

4. R.S.Zaharna,“AmericanPublicDiplomacyintheArabandMuslimWorld:A Strategic Communication Analysis,” American University: Washington,DC, November 2001, http://www.fpif.org/pdf/reports/communication.pdf(accessedNovember12,2009).

5. Groh,JeffreyL.andDennisM.Murphy,“LandpowerandNetworkCentricOperations: how information in today’s battlespace can be exploited,”NECWORKS,Issue1,March2006.

Section One: Information Effects in the Cognitive Dimension

Speed Versus Accuracy: A Zero Sum Game1. CoriE.Dauber,“TheTruthisoutthere:RespondingtoInsurgentDisinformation

andDeceptionOperations,”Military Review(January-February2009):13-14.OperationVALHALLAconductedon26March2006by10thSpecialForcesGroupandIraqiSpecialForcesresultedinthediscoveryanddestructionofanenemyweaponscache,thereleaseofabadlybeatenhostagebeingheldbyJAMmembers, thedetentionof16 JAM,and16-17 JAMkilled.Onlyone IraqiSoldierwasinjuredduringtheoperation.

2. “USPlanesHitAfghanWeddingParty,Killing27,”The Sydney Morning News,07 July 2008, http://www.smh.com.au/cgi-bin/common/articles/2008/07/07(accessed 23 April 2009). The event occurred 06 July 2008 in Nangarhar,Afghanistan. In the article a U.S. spokesman blamed the claims of civiliancasualtiesonmilitantpropaganda.

3. Candance Rondeauz, “Civilian Airstrike Deaths Probed,” The Washington Post, 25 July 2008, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/07/24/AR2008072403465(accessed23April2009).


4. Earl R. Carlson and Herbert I. Abelson, Factors Affecting Credibility in Psychological Warfare Communications (Human Resources Research Office,George Washington University, Silver Springs, MD, 1956): 7. Carlson andAbelsondefinecredibilityasanecessaryconditionforacommunicationtobeeffectiveanditscontentstobebelievedbyanaudience.Theystatedcredibilityofamessageexistswiththeaudience.

5. Ibid.,12.

6. Ibid.,10-12.

7. StephenM.R.Covey,The Speed of Trust: The One Thing That Changes Everything(Free Press, New York, NY, 2006): 54. Covey presents integrity, intent,capability,andresultsasthe“4coresofcredibility.”Thesearetheelementsthatmakeordestroycredibility.

8. WhileCoveyisgenerallycategorizedasa“self-help”author,theapplicationofhiscriteriaisappropriatehereforseveralreasons.Hisschemawasdevelopedout of extensive experience in the business world, and has been appliedsuccessfullythere.Itisareasonableassumptiontomakethattheelementsthatdefinecredibilityforabusinessaudiencemightworkinothersettingsaswell.Speculationisnecessarywheresubstantialempiricalworkonwhatestablishesspeakercredibilityincross-culturalsettingsismissing,butthisdoespointtotheneedforsuchresearchgoingforward.

9. Ibid.,Integrity,59-72.Intent,73-90.Capabilities,91-108.Results,109-125.

10. CarlsonandAbelson,24.

11. Timothy W. Coombs, Crisis Management and Communication, http://www.instituteforpr.org/essential_knowledge/detail/crisi_management_and_communications(accessed30April2009).

12. Timothy W. Coombs, Ongoing Crisis Communication: Planning, Managing, and Responding,2ndEd.(SagePublications,2007):130,http://www.sagepub.com/upm_data/14131.chapter8.pdf(accessed30April2009).

13. ScottRussell,e-mailmessagetoauthor,13January2009.In2007,MAJRusselland I deployed to Afghanistan with the 13th PSYOP Battalion supportingCJTF-82. MAJ Russell, Tactical PSYOP Detachment 1320 Commander,servedasthePSYOPofficerfor4BCT,82ABNDIV.IservedasthePSYOPTaskForce-Afghanistan(POTF-AF)Commanderresponsibleforplanningandexecuting PSYOP for CJTF-82 and coordinating all U.S. PSYOP efforts inAfghanistan.

14. Coombs,Crisis Management and Communication.

15. Coombs,Ongoing Crisis Communication: Planning, Managing, and Responding,129.

16. David Kilcullen, The Accidental Guerrilla: Fighting Small Wars in the Midst of a Big One(Oxford,NewYork,2009):29.KilcullenarguesAQstatements

151Notes for Section One

indicateastrategicintenttoprovoketheU.S.intoactionsthatwoulddestroyitscredibility.Theenemyunderstandscredibilityisbasedonaction,notjustwords.

17. Scott Gerwehr and Kirk Hubbard, “What isTerrorism? Key Elements andHistory,”Psychology of Terrorism,ed.BruceBongar,etal,(OxfordUniversityPress, New York, 2007): 87. Gerwehr and Hubbard stated terrorism couldbeseenasaformofsocialinfluence,employingactsofextra-normalviolenceto influence a target population’s emotions, motives, objective reasoning,perceptions,andultimatelybehavior.

18. Kilcullen, Accidental Guerrilla, 300. Based on Gerwehr and Hubbard’sdescription of terrorism as a form of social influence, the term “armedpropaganda” aptly describes terrorism and acts of intimidation as used byinsurgentsandenemyforcesinirregularwarfare.

19. JamesN.BreckenridgeandPhilipG.Zimbardo,“TheStrategyofTerrorismandPsychologyofMaas-MediatedFear,”Psychology of Terrorism,ed.BruceBongar,LisaM.Brown,LarryE.Beutler,JamesN.Breckenridge,PhilipG.Zimbardo,(OxfordUniversityPress,NewYork,2007):122.Theystatedthissupportstheasymmetricalprinciple.Whenapplyingthisprincipletoirregularwarfare,itiseasierforinsurgentstodestroypublictrustthanitisforthegovernmenttobuildpublictrust.

20. GerwehrandHubbard,“WhatisTerrorism?,”91.

21. Ibid.,92-93.

22. RichardJ.Josten,“StrategicCommunications,”IO Sphere(JointInformationOperations Center, Summer 2006) http://www.au.af.mil/inf-ops/iosphere/iosphere_summer06_josten.pdf(accessed17April2009),19.

23. AnthonyPratkanisandElliotAronson,Age of Propaganda: The Everyday Use and Abuse of Persuasion(W.H.FreemanandCompany,NewYork,2001):274.

24. JasonMotlagh,“Afghanistan’sPropagandaWar:TheTaliban’sPublicRelationsMachine,”USNEWS.COM,posted12November2008,http://www.usnews.com/article/news/iraq/2008/11/12/afghanistan-propaganda-war-the-taliban-public-relations-machine(accessed15April2009).

25. JoannaNathan,“Selling theTaliban,”The Wall Street Journal,02September2008,linkedfromInternational Crisis Grouphttp://www.crisigroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=5656&1=1 (accessed16April 2009).The June2008 jailbreakinKandaharandtheassaultontheonlyfivestarhotelinKabul;theFebruary2007suicidebomberattackatBagramAirbasewhileVicePresidentCheneywas visiting; and the 2007 South Korean hostage incident are a few of theexamplesofTalibanattacksthatgrabbedmediaheadlines.

26. ABC News (Australian Broadcasting Corporation), “Taliban Show NewMedia Savvy,” posted 20 August 2007, http://www.abc.net.au/news/stories/2007/08/20/2009153.htm (accessed 16 April 2009). From personal


experience,immediatelyfollowingthe2007suicidebomberattackatBagram,inquiriesby themedia to theCJTF-82PAOweremadebeforenewsof theincidenthadbeenreceivedintheCJTFHQs.

27. “Speedstrategy”isatermdevelopedbySGTJoeAtneosenduringour2007rotation in Afghanistan. As a member of the POTF-AF S2 section, SGTAtneosenwasresponsiblefortrackingTalibanpropagandatrendsandmethods,determiningperceptionsoftheAfghanpopulace,andanalysisthatfacilitatedPSYOPplanningandsupportfortheCJTF-82mission.

28. U.S. Department of the Army, Counterinsurgency, Field Manual 3-24,(Washington D.C.: U.S. Department of the Army, December 15, 2006):1-103.Iftheinsurgentsmaintainthemomentum,theymaintaintheinitiative.

29. FransP.B.Osinga,Science, Strategy, and War: The Strategic Theory of John Boyd(Routledge,NewYork,2007):237.

30. Effective counter-propaganda seldom, if ever directly refutes each piece ofenemy propaganda produced. An effective counter-propaganda programidentifiesandmonitorsenemythemesandincorporatesdiscrediting/counteringthosethemeswithplannedPSYOPprogramsandpublicinformation.Itispartof theorganization’sdaytodayplannedandexecutedactionsandmessages.AnexamplewouldbeTalibannight letters inAfghanistan.Night letters arenormallyhandwrittenorcrudelyprintedlettersdeliveredatnighttoprotectthe source and add to the intimidation factor of just appearing at selectedindividual or public locations. The common theme ofTaliban night lettersis tonot support theGovernmentofAfghanistanandNATOforcesor facepunishmentbytheTaliban.Insteadofrefutingeachnightletter,countertheestablishedtheme.DirectlyrefutingeachnightletteronlyhighlightsthepieceofenemypropagandaandthefactthegovernmentofAfghanistanandNATOforcesareunable to stop thedisseminationofnight letters.However, ifyoudiscredittheenemy’stheme/messageyourrenderthenightlettersineffective.

31. Osinga,Science, Strategy, and War,231.ThisistheonlydiagramBoyddevelopeddepictingtheOODAloop.DiagramsoftherapidOODAloopasdepictedinfigure1werenotdevelopedbyBoyd.

32. JohnBoyd,“TheStrategicGameof ? and ?,”ed.ChetRichardsandChuckSpinney(June2006),http://www.d-n-i.net/boyd/strategic_game.ppt(accessed19April2009):33.

33. Ibid.,37.

34. Osinga,Science, Strategy, and War,215.

35. Boyd,“TheStrategicGameof?and?,”37.

36. Ibid.,36.

37. Osinga,Science, Strategy, and War,230.

38. Ibid.,235-236.


39. DepartmentofDefense,Irregular Warfare (IW) Joint Operating Concept (JOC),Version1.0,(DepartmentofDefense,WashingtonD.C.,11September2007),http://www.dtic.mil/futurejointwarfare/concepts/iw_joc1_o.pdf (accessed27May09),B-3.Theterm“indirectapproach”has threedistinctmeaningswithinthecontextofIW:1.Unbalanceanddislocateadversariesbyattackingthem physically and psychologically where they are most vulnerable andunsuspecting,ratherthanwheretheyarestrongestorinthemannertheyexpecttobeattacked.2.Empower,enable,andleverageIAandmultinationalstrategicpartnerstoattackadversariesmilitarilyornon-militarily,ratherthanrelyingondirectandunilateralmilitaryconfrontationbyUSjointforces.3.Takeactionswithoragainstotherstatesorarmedgroupsinordertoinfluenceadversaries,ratherthantakingactionstoinfluenceadversariesdirectly.

40. U.S.DepartmentoftheArmy,Counterinsurgency,5-18.

41. Ibid.,5-18–5-34.

42. ChairmanoftheJointChiefsofStaff,Information Operations,JointPublication3-13,(DepartmentofDefense,WashingtonD.C.13February2006):ix.JP3-13definesIOas:“Theintegratedemploymentofthecorecapabilitiesofelectronicwarfare, computer network operations, psychological operations, militarydeception,andoperations security, inconcertwith specified supportingandrelatedcapabilities,toinfluence,disrupt,corrupt,orusurpadversarialhumanandautomateddecisionmakingwhileprotectingourown.”ThespecificeffectIOistoachieveistodisrupttheadversarialdecisionmaking–enemyleadersandtheirnetworks.IfIOislimitedtointegratingthecore,specifiedandrelatedcapabilitiestothistargetsetasitwasintendedtodo,itwouldbemoreeffectiveandproduceresults.

43. Past experiences with several organizations have separated IO and otherinformationactivitiesintoseparatenon-kineticstaffsectionsororganizationslimitingaccessandintegrationintokineticoperationalplanning.

44. Strategic Communication, as defined in JP 1-02, is the “focused UnitedStatesGovernmenteffortstounderstandandengagekeyaudiencestocreate,strengthen, or preserve conditions favorable for the advancement of UnitedStates Government interests, policies, and objectives through the use ofcoordinatedprograms,plans,themes,messages,andproductssynchronizedwiththeactionsofallinstrumentsofnationalpower.”StrategicCommunicationisacoordinationfunctiontosynchronizeinteragencyandmilitaryinformationactivitiesandaction.

45. Heritage Lectures, No. 1065, “Public Diplomacy: Reinvigoration America’sStrategic Communication Policy,” presented by Edwin J. Feulner, Ph.D.,HelleC.Dale,ColleenGraffy,MichaelDoran,Ph.D.,JosephDuffy,Ph.D.,TonyBlankleyonFebruary13,2008,(TheHeritageFoundation,WashingtonD.C., March 14, 2008), http://www.heritage.org/research/nationalsecurity/upload/hl_1065.pdf(accessed13January2009):5.ColleenGraffypresentedtheconceptofapre-activeapproachasonethat“anticipatesandhelpsshape


stories”inthemedia.Thisconceptwasexpandedbytheauthortoincludeotheraspects of social networking and actions required to shape the informationenvironmentincludingallkeyaudiences.

Developing an Operational Strategic Communication Model for Counterinsurgency1. U.S.DepartmentofState,QDR Execution Roadmap for Strategic Communications

(Washington,DC:U.S.DepartmentofState,September2006),2.

2. KennethPayne,“WagingCommunicationWar,”Parameters 38,no.2(Summer2008):37.

3. ThomasX.Hammes,“InformationOperationsin4GW,”in Global Insurgency and the Future of Armed Conflict,ed.TerryTerriff,AaronKarpandReginaKarp(NewYork,NY:Routledge,2008):204.

4. Theauthor’spersonalexperienceincounterinsurgencyhasbeeninAfghanistanatthetacticallevelasabattalioncommanderinOperationEnduringFreedom(OEF)VI(July–November2005),andattheoperationallevelastheDirectorofOperationsforCombinedJointTaskForce(CJTF)82inOEFVIII(January2007-April2008).

5. U.S. JointChiefsofStaff,Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States,Joint Publication 1 (Washington, DC: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, May 14,2007):1-9.

6. U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Information Operations, Joint Publication 3-13(Washington,DC:U.S.JointChiefsofStaff,February13,2006):GL-9.

7. U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, JointPublication1-02(Washington,DC:U.S.JointChiefsofStaff,April12,2001asAmendedThruOctober17,2008):442.

8. Ibid.,152.

9. Dennis M. Murphy, “The Trouble With Strategic Communication(s),” IOSphere(Winter2008):26.

10. U.S. Department of the Army, Operations, Field Manual 3-0 (Washington,DC:U.S.DepartmentoftheArmy,February27,2008),A-1.

11. U.S. JointChiefsofStaff,Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States,I-9–I-10.

12. U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, 316.

13. U.S. Department of the Army, Counterinsurgency, Field Manual 3-24(Washington,DC:U.S.DepartmentoftheArmy,December2006):5-3.

14. Ibid.

15. Ibid.,5-5.


16. Ibid.,5-6.

17. DennisM.Murphy,Fighting Back: New Media and Military Operations(CarlisleBarracks,PA:U.S.ArmyWarCollege,CenterforStrategicLeadership,2008):12.

18. CarlvonClausewitz,On War,ed.andtrans.MichaelHowardandPeterParet(Princeton,NJ:PrincetonUniversityPress,1976):89.

19. Barry E. Venable, “The Army and the Media,” Military Review (January-February2002):71.

20. Clausewitz,On War, 77.

21. DavidGalula,Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice(Westport,CN:PraegerSecurityInternational,1964):9.

22. Colin S. Gray, “The American Way of War: Critique and Implications,” inRethinking the Principles of War, ed. Anthony D. McIvor (Annapolis, MD:NavalInstitutePress,2005):27-33.

23. Ibid.,29.

24. Ibid.

25. Murphy,Fighting Back: New Media and Military Operations,4.

26. Timothy L. Thomas, “Cyber Mobilization: A Growing CounterinsurgencyCampaign,”IOSphere(Summer2006):6.


28. Gray,“TheAmericanWayofWar:CritiqueandImplications,” 30.

29. JamesS.Corum,Fighting the War On Terror: A Counterinsurgency Strategy(St.Paul,MN:ZenithPress,2007):187.


31. Gray,“TheAmericanWayofWar:CritiqueandImplications,”32.

32. JohnA.Nagl,Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife (Chicago,IL:UniversityofChicagoPress,2005):205.

33. Galula,Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice,3.

34. Gray,“TheAmericanWayofWar:CritiqueandImplications,”32.

35. Ibid.,33.

36. U.S. Department of Defense, Strategic Communication Plan for Afghanistan(Washington,DC:U.S.DepartmentofDefense, September2007):1.

37. Combined Joint Task Force-82, “Command Brief,” Bagram Airfield,Afghanistan,March2008.

38. Deirdre Collings and Rafal Rohozinski, Shifting Fire: Information Effects in Counterinsurgency and Stability Operations, A Workshop Report (CarlisleBarracks,PA,U.S.ArmyWarCollege,2006):16.


39. U.S.DepartmentofDefense,Strategic Communication Plan for Afghanistan,2.

40. U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Operations Planning, Joint Publication 5-0(Washington,DC:U.S.JointChiefsofStaff,December26,2006):GL-18.

41. Ibid.,GL-11.

42. Ibid.,GL-17.

emPowerinG united StateS Public diPlomacy for the war of ideaS

1. GeorgeW.Bush,The National Security Strategy of the United States of America (Washington,DC:TheWhiteHouse,September2002):9.

2. Ibid.,6.

3. BruceGregory,“PublicDiplomacyandNationalSecurity:LessonsfromtheU.S. Experience,” Small Wars Journal (April 2008), http://smallwarsjournal.com/mag/docs-temp/82-gregory.pdf(accessedJanuary21,2009).

4. KristinM.Lord,Voices of America: U.S. Public Diplomacy for the 21st Century(Washington,DC,TheForeignPolicyProgramatBrookingsandTheBrookingsProjectonU.S.RelationswiththeIslamicWorld,November2008):7.

5. DavidE.Morey,“WinningtheWarofIdeas,”TestimonybytheCo-Chairmanof the Council on Foreign Relation’s Independent Task Force on PublicDiplomacy,deliveredtotheSubcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats and International Relations (U.S. Congress, February 10, 2004): 2, http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/congress/public_diplomacy_morey_feb04.pdf(accessedDecember12,2008).

6. DonaldRumsfeld,“Rumsfeld:U.S.LosingWarofIdeas,”March27,2006,http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2006/03/27/terror/main1442811.shtml(accessedJanuary62009).

7. GeorgeW.Bush,U.S. National Strategy for Combating Terrorism(Washington,DC,TheWhiteHouse,September2006):1,23.

8. SherifaD.Zuhur,Precision in the Global War on Terror: Inciting Muslims through the War of Ideas (Carlisle Barracks, PA, U.S. Army War College, StrategicStudies Institute, April 2008): 74, http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB843.pdf(accessedDecember10,2008).

9. AddaB.Bozeman, “Iran: U.S.ForeignPolicy and theTraditionofPersianStatecraft,”Orbis23,no.2(Summer1979):387-388.

10. AdamGarfinkle,“Comte’sCaveat:HowWeMisunderstandTerrorism,”Orbis52,no.3(Summer2008):406-407.

11. G.JohnIkenberry,“TheParadoxofAmericanPower:WhytheWorld’sOnlySuperpowerCan’tgoitAlone,byJosephS.NyeJr,OxfordUniv.Press,2002,”[Book Review] Foreign Affairs 81, no. 2 (March/April 2002), http://www.


foreignaffairs.com/articles/57639/g-john-ikenberry/the-paradox-of-american-power-why-the-worlds-only-superpower-can(accessedDecember10,2008).

12. Kathy R. Fitzpatrick, The Collapse of American Public Diplomacy (Hamden,CT,QuinnipiacUniversity,SchoolofCommunications,2008):4,http://www.publicdiplomacy.org/Fitzpatrick2008.pdf(accessedJanuary4,2009).

13. AmbassadorPamelaHydeSmith, “Politics andDiplomacy:TheHardRoadBack to Soft Power,” Georgetown Journal of International Affairs 8 (Winter/Spring2007):4.

14. Rosaleen Smyth, “Mapping US Public Diplomacy in the 21st Century,”Australian Journal of International Affairs55,no.3(2001):425.

15. PublicDiplomacyCouncil,A Call for Action on Public Diplomacy(Washington,DC,PublicDiplomacyCouncil,January2005):9.

16. U.S. Government Accountability Office, U.S. Public Diplomacy: State Department Efforts to Engage Muslim Audiences Lack Certain Communication Elements and Face Significant Challenges,GAO-06-535(WashingtonDC,U.S.GovernmentAccountabilityOffice,May2006):18.

17. Ibid.,35-37.

18. Ibid.,35.

19. Bush,The National Security Strategy of the United States of America,6.

20. CasimirA.Yost,“AssessingtheBushAdministration’sForeignPolicy,”National Interest(May14,2003):2.

21. Ibid.

22. Pew Global Attitudes Project, America’s Image Further Erodes, Europeans Want Weaker Ties (Washington, DC: Pew Research Center, March 182003).

23. Ibid.

24. BrooksKraft-Corbis,“TheEndofCowboyDiplomacy,”Time(July17,2006):23.

25. JosephS.Nye, Jr.,“PublicDiplomacy in the21stCentury,”May10,2004,http://www.theglobalist.com/StoryId.aspx?StoryId=3885 (accessed August 8,2008).

26. JosephS.Nye, Jr., “TheDeclineofAmerica’s SoftPower,WhyWashingtonShouldWorry,”Foreign Affairs83,no.3(May-June2004):16-21.

27. Anne Gearan, “Hughes: Fixing US Image May Take Years,” Associated Press, September 28, 2006, http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?file=/n/a/2006/09/28/national/w132824D75.DTL&type=printable (accessed Sep-tember30,2008).

28. Bozeman,“Iran:U.S.ForeignPolicyandtheTraditionofPersianStatecraft,”388.


29. AmirTaheri,“WhatDoMuslim’sThink?”American Interest(May/June2007):6, http://www.the-american-interest.com.ezproxy.usawcpubs.org/ai2/article.cfm(accessedDecember10,2008).

30. Ibid.,13.

31. Ibid.,10.

32. Bozeman,“Iran:U.S.ForeignPolicyandtheTraditionofPersianStatecraft,”391.

33. ZeynoBaran,“FightingtheWarofIdeas,”Foreign Affairs84,no.6(November/December 2005), http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/61200/zeyno-baran/fighting-the-war-of-ideas(accessedDecember10,2008).

34. Robert R. Reilly, “Winning theWar of Ideas,” September 22, 2007, linkedfrom The Public Diplomacy Home Page, http://www.publicdiplomacy.org/85.htm(accessedDecember10,1008).

35. Ibid.

36. Ibid.

37. Garfinkle,“Comte’sCaveat,”413.

38. Ibid.,406-408.

39. Ibid.,407-408.

40. Ibid.,408.

41. Ibid.,410.

42. Ibid.

43. Ibid.

44. Ibid.

45. Ibid.,412.

46. Ibid.

47. William Rosenau, “Waging the ‘War of Ideas’,” in McGraw-Hill Homeland Security Handbook,ed.DavidKamien(NewYork,McGraw-Hill,2006):1132,http://www.rand.org/pubs/reprints/2006/RAND_RP1218.pdf (accessedJanuary6,2009).

48. Gregory,“PublicDiplomacyandNationalSecurity.”

49. AntulioJ.EchevarriaII,Wars of Ideas and The War of Ideas(CarlisleBarracks,PA, U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, June 2008): vii,http://www.StrategicStudiesInstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB866.pdf (accessedDecember29,2008).

50. Robert Satloff, “How to Win The War Of Ideas,” The Washington Post,November10,2007.

51. Ibid.


52. Echevarria,Wars of Ideas and The War of Ideas,24.

53. SunTzu,Art of War,trans.SamuelB.Griffith(NewYork,OxfordUniversityPress,1971):84.

54. JohnHughes,“TheKeytoaBetterU.S.Image,”The Christian Science Monitor(June26,2008):9,http://www.csmonitor.com/2008/0626/p09s03-coop.html(accessedFebruary2,2009).

55. William J. Hybl, “Getting the People Part Right: A Report on the HumanResourcesDimensionofU.S.PublicDiplomacy,”TheUnitedStatesAdvisoryCommissiononPublicDiplomacy(WashingtonD.C.,2008):5.

56. Smith,“PoliticsandDiplomacy:TheHardRoadBacktoSoftPower,”4.

57. Ibid.

58. Ibid.

59. Hybl,“GettingthePeoplePartRight,”5.

60. Lord,Voices of America,37.


62. Hybl,“GettingthePeoplePartRight,”4-5.

63. Ibid.,4.

64. MicheleA.FlournoyandTammyS.Schultz,Shaping U.S. Ground Forces for the Future: Getting Expansion Right (Washington, DC, Center for a NewAmericanSecurity,June13,2007):10-11.

65. AnthonyJ.Blinken,“WinningtheWarofIdeas,”Washington Quarterly25,no.2(Spring2002):104.


67. Ibid.,3-4.

68. U.S.JointForcesCommand,The Joint Operating Environment 2008: Challenges and Implications for the Future Joint Force(Washington,DC,U.S.JointForcesCommand,2008):26,https://us.jfcom.mil/sites/J5/j59/default.aspx(accessedApril2,2009).

69. American Academy of Diplomacy, A Foreign Affairs Budget for the Future: Fixing the Crisis in Diplomatic Readiness(Washington,DC,AmericanAcademyofDiplomacy,October2008):3.

70. CarnesLordandHelleC.Dale,“PublicDiplomacyandtheColdWar:LessonsLearned,” Heritage Foundation Backgrounder,no.2070(September18,2007):3, http://www.heritage.org/Research/NationalSecurity/bg2070.cfm (accessedFebruary2,2009).

71. Ibid.,2.

72. Ibid.,7.


73. Stephen Johnson, Helle C. Dale, Patrick Cronin Ph.D., “Strengthening USPublicDiplomacyRequiresOrganization,Coordination,andStrategy,”Heritage Foundation Backgrounder,no.1875(August5,2005):3,http://www.heritage.org/Research/PublicDiplomacy/bg1875.cmf(accessedFebruary2,2009).

74. Fitzpatrick,The Collapse of American Public Diplomacy,8.

75. Ibid.

76. Ibid.

77. Ibid.,8-9.

78. Reilly,“WinningtheWarofIdeas.”

79. Fitzpatrick,The Collapse of American Public Diplomacy,4.

80. American Academy of Diplomacy, A Foreign Affairs Budget for the Future: Fixing the Crisis in Diplomatic Readiness,24.

81. AndrewKohut,Some Positive Signs for U.S. Image: Global Economic Gloom – China and India Notable Exceptions(Washington,DC,PewResearchCenter,PewGlobalAttitudesProject,releasedJune12,2008):21.

82. Ibid.

83. Ibid.

84. Ibid.

85. Ibid.

86. Ibid.

87. Ibid.,24.

88. Ibid.,27.

89. Ibid.,28.

90. Ibid.,24.

91. Ibid.

92. “IranianPublicOpiniononGovernance,NuclearWeaponsandRelationswiththe United States,” linked from WorldPublicOpinion.org, 2008, http://www.worldpublicopinion.org/incl/printable_version.php?pnt=527(accessedMarch6,2009).

93. Ibid.

94. “Iranians Favor Direct Talks with US on Shared Issues, Mutual Access forJournalists, MoreTrade,” linked from World Public Opinion.Org, 2008, https://www.worldpublicopinion.org/incl/printable_version.pha?pnt=468(accessedMarch6,2009).

95. Ibid.

96. Ibid.


97. “IranianPublicOpiniononGovernance,NuclearWeaponsandRelationswiththeUnitedStates”

98. “Iranians Favor Direct Talks with US on Shared Issues, Mutual Access forJournalists,MoreTrade”

99. Ibid.

100. “Iranians Overwhelmingly Reject Bin Laden,” linked from World Public Opinion.Org, 2006, https://www.worldpublicopinion.org/incl/printable_version.php? pnt=313 (accessed March 6, 2009). Similar data from 2008addressingthissamequestionisnotavailable.


102. “IraniansOpposeProducingNuclearWeapons,SayingItIsContrarytoIslam”,linkedfromWorld Public Opinion.Org,2008,https://www.worldpublicopinion.org/incl/printable_version.php?pnt=469(accessedMarch6,2009).

103. Ibid.

104. Ibid.

105. Ibid.

106. Ibid.

107. Ibid.

108. “Iranians andAmericansBelieve IslamandWestCanFindCommonGround,”linked from World Public Opinion.Org, January 30, 2007, https://www.worldpublicopinion.org/pipa/articles/brmiddleeastnafricara/312(accessedMarch6,2009).

109. “IraniansOverwhelminglyRejectBinLaden”

110. Ibid.


112. Ibid.

113. “Iran Invests2.5b inStemCellResearch,” linked fromPayvandNews (Iran),November7,2008,http://www.payvand.com/news/08/nov/1059.htlm(accessedMarch10,2009).

114. “StemCellResearchinIran,”ScienceandReligionNews,November17,2008,http://sciencereligionnews.blogspot.com/2008/09/stem-cell-research-in-iran.htlm(accessedMarch10,2009).


116. Ibid.


117. U.S.DepartmentofState,“BudgetSummaryandSummaryTables,FY2008BudgetinBriefforU.S.DepartmentofState,”February5,2007,http://www.state.gov/s/d/rm/rls/bib/2008/html/79738.htm(accessedFebruary2,2009).

118. Pew Research Center, Some Positive Signs for U.S. Image: Global Economic Gloom – China and India Notable Exceptions,24-NationPewAttitudesSurvey,ThePewGlobalAttitudesProject(June2008):28.

119. “Muslim Publics Oppose Al Qaeda’s Terrorism, But Agree With its Goal ofDrivingUSForcesOut,”linkedfromWorld Public Opinion.org,2008,http://www.worldpublicopinion.org/incl/printable_version.php?pnt=591 (accessed March 6,2009).

120. FrancisFukuyama,“ANewEra,”American Interest(January-February2009),http://www.the-american-interest.com/ai2/article.cfm?piece=535 (accessed March 3,2009).

121. Ibid.

122. Ibid.

123. StevenKull,Director,Programon InternationalPolicyAttitudes, Iraqi Public Opinion on the Presence of US Troops,TestimonybeforeHouseCommitteeonForeignAffairs,SubcommitteeonInternationalOrganizations,HumanRights,andOversight,linkedfromWorld Public Opinion.org, July23,2008,http://www.worldpublicopinion.org/incl/printable_version.php?pnt=517(accessedMarch6,2009).

124. Ibid.

125. Ibid.

126. Ibid.

127. Ibid.

128. LordandDale,“PublicDiplomacyandtheColdWar”


130. LordandDale,“PublicDiplomacyandtheColdWar”

National Communications Strategy1. Rice, Condoleezza Rice. 2005 “Announcement of Nomination of Karen P.

Hughes”14March2005,http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2005/43385.htm

2. HelleC.,Dale,“U.S.PublicDiplomacy:TheSearchforaNationalStrategy,”Heritage Foundation,ExecutiveMemorandum,no.1029,February11,2008

3. JamesGlassman,“WinningtheWarofIdeas,”The Washington Institute for Near East Policy,July8,2008

4. Marc Lynch, Public diplomacy and strategic communication: “TheConversion,”Foreign Policy (February20, 2009), http://Lynch.foreignpolicy.

163Notes for Section Two

com/posts/2009/02/20/public_diplomacy_and_strategy_commincation(accessedMarch30,2009)

5. U.S.Congress,House, Introduction of Strategic Communication Act of 2009,111thCong.,January13,2009

Section Two: Information Effects through Network and Knowledge-based Operations

Defining and Deterring Cyberwar

1. GeorgeW.Bush,National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace(WashingtonDC:TheWhiteHouse,February2003):5

2. Ibid.

3. Ibid.

4. Steven A. Hildreth, “Cyberwarfare,” Congressional Research Service policypaper,June19,2001

5. Ibid.

6. MargaretKane,“ILoveYouEmailWormInvadesPCs,”ZDNet News,May4, 2000, http://news.zdnet.com/2100-9595_22-107318.html?legacy=zdnn,(accessedDecember1,2008).

7. LincolnP.Bloomfield, Jr., “Cybersecurity:Ensuring the Safety andSecurityof Networked Information Systems,” remarks at the Southeastern EuropeanCybersecurity Conference, Sophia, Bulgaria, September 8, 2003, U.S.DepartmentofState,http://www.state.gov/t/pm/rls/rm/23874.htm(accessedOctober30,2008).

8. Joint Publication 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms(WashingtonDC,Dept.ofDefense,April12,2001,amendedthroughOctober17,2008):459,http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/new_pubs/jp1_02.pdf(accessedNovember23,2008).

9. Frontline:Cyberwar!,http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/cyberwar/warnings(accessedNovember30,2008).

10. Ibid.

11. Ibid.,Bloomfield.

12. ChristopherRhoads,“Politics&Economics:EstoniaGaugesBestResponsetoCyberAttack,”The Wall Street Journal,May18,2007.

13. “Cyberwar is genuineThreat,”RSA Conference Daily,October23,2007,http://newsweaver.co.uk/rsaconference/e_article000935998.cfm?x=bbs1LTr,b8gpBBSr,w(accessedOctober28,2008).


14. “Cyberwarfare101:CaseStudyofaTextbookAttack,”Stratfor(April18,2008),http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/cyberwarfare_101_case_study_textbook_attack(accessedNovember5,2008).

15. Joshua Davis, “Hackers Take Down the Most Wired Country in Europe,”Wired Magazine,Iss.15.09(August21,2007),http://www.wired.com/print/politics/security/magazine/15-09/ff_estonia(accessedOctober16,2008)

16. Ibid.,“Cyberwarfare101:CaseStudyofaTextbookAttack”

17. Adam Smith, “Under Attack, Over the Net,” Time International (June 11,2007):50.

18. ClayWilson,“Botnets,Cybercrime,andCyberterrorism:VulnerabilitiesandPolicyIssuesforCongress,” Congressional Research Service Report for Congress,RL32114(January29,2008):8.

19. JohnMarkoff,“BeforetheGunfire,Cyberattacks,”The New York Times,August13,2008.

20. Ibid.

21. Ibid.

22. “RussianInvasionofGeorgia,RussianCyberwaronGeorgia,”Georgia Update,http://georgiaupdate.gov.ge/doc/10006922/CYBERWAR-%20fd_2_.pdf,(accessedNovember14,2008).

23. “Cyberwarfare101:Georgia,Russia:TheCyberwarfareAngle”Stratfor(August12, 2008), http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/georgia_russia_cyberwarfare_angle,(accessedNovember5,2008).

24. TravisWentworth,“RussianNationalistsWagedaCyberWaragainstGeorgia.FightingBackisVirtuallyImpossible,”Newsweek(September1,2008).

25. InternetWorldStats,http://www.internetworldstats.com/top20.htm(accessedNovember11,2008).

26. Bush,National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace,vii.

27. U.S. Army War College, “National Security Policy and Strategy CourseDirective,”(CarlisleBarracks,PA,2008):App.I,124.

28. Wilson,22.

29. GeneralPeterPace,ChairmanoftheJointChiefsofStaff,National Military Strategy for Cyberspace Operations (Washington DC, Dept. of Defense,December2006):C-1,http://www.dod.mil/pubs/foi/ojcs/07-F-2105doc1.pdf(accessedNovember30,2008).

30. World Federation of Scientists, “Toward a Universal Order of Cyberspace:ManagingThreatsfromCybercrimetoCyberwar,”reportandrecommendationsofthePermanentMonitoringPanelonInformationSecurity(November19,2003):10.

31. Ibid.


32. Jason Fritz, “How China Will Use Cyber Warfare to Leapfrog in MilitaryCompetitiveness,”Culture Mandala,Vol.8,No.1(October2008):51.

33. KevinPoulsen,“SlammerWormCrashedOhioNukePlantNework,”Security Focus(August19,2003),http://www.securityfocus.com/news/6767(accessedNovember14,2008).

34. Robert Lemos, “MSBlast and the Northeast Power Outage,” CNet News(February 16, 2005), http://news.cnet.com/8301-10784_3-5579309-7.html(accessedDecember1,2008).

35. JeanneMeserve,“Sources:StagedCyberAttackRevealsVulnerabilityinPowerGrid” CNN, http://www.cnn.com/2007/US/09/26/power.at.risk/index.html,(accessedOctober28,2008).

36. Ibid.

37. BrianCashell,WilliamD.Jackson,MarkJicklin,etal.,“TheEconomicImpactof Cyber Attacks,” CRS Report for Congress RL 32331, April 1, 2004, CRS-1, http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/779/govtaffairs/images/CRS_Cyber_Attacks.pdf,(accessedDecember1,2008).

38. Cashell,etal.,Summarypage.

39. Ibid.

40. “USWarnsofPossibleFinancialCyberAttack”NBC News and News Services(November 30, 2006) http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/15975889/ (accessedDecember1,2008).

41. Stratforonline,“Cyberwarfare101:CaseStudyofaTextbookAttack,”http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/cyberwarfare_101_case_study_textbook_attack,(accessedNovember8,2008).

42. EnekenTikk,KadriKaska,KristelRunnimeri,etal,“GeorgianCyberAttacks:LegalLessonsIdentified,”(Tallinn:NATOCooperativeCyberDefenceCentreofExcellence,2008):7.

43. WorldFederationofScientists,9.

44. Fritz,66.

45. EnekenTikk,etal,13.

46. Max Weber, The Theory of Social and Economic Organization, (New York:Collier-MacMillan,1964):154.

47. Richard W. Aldrich, “The International Legal Implications of InformationWarfare,” Airpower Journal (Fall 1996): 100, http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/au/aldrich.pdf,(accessedNovember3,2008).

48. DuncanB.Hollis,“E-warrulesofengagement”Los Angeles Times(October8,2007):A15.


49. Dr. Dan Kuehl, “From Cyberspace to Cyberpower: Defining the Problem,”http://www.maxwell.af.mil/au/awc/cyberspace/documents/Cyber%20Chapter%20Kuehl%20Final.doc(accessedNovember3,2008).

50. Ibid.,2.

51. Pace,3.

52. Dr.LaniKass,“AWarfightingDomain,”AFCyberspaceTaskForcebriefing,(September 26, 2006): 14, http://www.au.af.mil/info-ops/usaf/cyberspace_taskforce_sep06.pdf(accessedNovember3,2008).

53. JP1-02,141.

54. JointPublication3-13,“InformationOperations,”(WashingtonDC,February13,2006):I-1–I-2.

55. Bush,1.

56. Ibid.

57. JP3-13,II-1.

58. Ibid.,II-5.

59. KeithB.Alexander,“WarfightinginCyberspace,”Joint Force Quarterly,Issue46 3d Quarter 2007 (Washington DC, National Defense University Press):60, http://www.carlisle.army.mil/DIME/documents/Alexander.pdf, (accessedNovember,23,2008).

60. WalterG.Sharp,Jr.,Cyberspace and the Use of Force(FallsChurch,VA:AegisResearch,1999):28.

61. United Nations Charter, Article 2(4), http://www.un.org/aboutun/charter/.(accessedNovember4,2008).

62. ThomasC.Wingfield,The Law of Information Conflict: National Security Law in Cyberspace(FallsChurch,VA:AegisResearch,2000):37.

63. Ibid.

64. UnitedNations,Resolution3314,“DefinitionofAggression,”December14,1974, http://www.un-documents.net/a29r3314.htm (accessed November 3,2008).

65. ThomasC.Wingfield,The Law of Information Conflict: National Security Law in Cyberspace(FallsChurchVA,AegisResearch,2000):81.

66. BrunoSimma,TheCharteroftheUnitedNations:ACommentary,(Oxford,UKI,OxfordUniversityPress,1994):670.

67. UnitedNations,GeneralAssemblyResolution3314.

68. JP1-02,141.

69. Michael N. Schmitt, Computer Network Attack and the Use of Force in International Law: Thoughts on a Normative Framework (Colorado Springs,


CO: Institute for InformationTechnology, 1999): 17, http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA471993&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf(accessedNovember3,2008).

70. Ibid.,17.

71. Sharp,101.

72. ThomasWingfieldandJamesB.Michael,An Introduction to Legal Aspects of Operations in Cyberspace(Monterrey,CA,NavalPostgraduateSchool,April28,2004):10.

73. Ibid.

74. Michael N. Schmitt, quoted inWingfield, The Law of Information Conflict: National Security Law in Cyberspace,116.

75. Wingfield,The Law of Information Conflict: National Security Law in Cyberspace,122.

76. Schmitt,18-19.

77. ThomasWingfield,JamesB.Michael,DumindaWijesekera,Measured Responses to Cyber Attacks Using Schmitt Analysis: A Case Study of Attack Scenarios for a Software-Intensive System (Washington, DC, IEEE Computer Society, November 2003)http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/nps/ws09-with-pub-info.pdf (accessed Nov-ember10,2008).

78. Ibid.

79. Wingfield,The Law of Information Conflict: National Security Law in Cyberspace.87-89.

80. Ibid,90.

81. Ibid,56.

82. Department of Defense, Deterrence Operations Joint Operating Concept(WashingtonDC,DepartmentofDefense,December2006):5.

83. ColinS.Gray,“DeterrenceandtheNatureofStrategy,”inDeterrence in the 21st Century,ed.MaxG.Manwaring,(London,FrankCass,2001):18.

84. Robert H. Dorff and Joseph R. Cerami, “Deterrence and CompetitiveStrategies:ANewLookatanOldConcept,”inDeterrence in the 21st Century,ed.MaxG.Manwaring,(London,FrankCass,2001):111.

85. JulianE.Barnes,“HackingCouldBecomeWeaponinUSArsenal,”Los Angeles Times, September 28, 2008, http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/nation/la-na-cyber8-2008sep08,0,5570856,print.story(accessedNovember4,2008).

86. Pace,ix.

87. Ibid.,13.


88. GeneralJamesCartwright,quotedbyDavidBlake,“FightinginCyberspace,”Military Periscope(April25,2007),http://www.militaryperiscope.com/special/special-200704251756.shtml(accessedSeptember3,2008).

89. Pace,10.

90. “MilitaryPondersCyberWarRules,”Los Angeles Times,April7,2008.

91. Fritz,42.

92. BradleyGraham,“BushOrdersGuidelinesforCyber-Warfare,”The Washington Post(February7,2003)http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn?pagename=article&node=&contentId=A38110-2003Feb6&notFound=true(accessedNovember14,2008).

93. General Accounting Office, “Information Security: Computer Attacks atDepartment of Defense Pose Increasing Risks,” http://www.fas.org/irp/gao/aim96084.htm,(accessedNovember4,2008).

94. Bush,viii.

95. Fritz,42.

96. UnitedStatesComputerEmergencyResponseTeam,http://www.us-cert.gov/aboutus.html(accessedNovember12,2008).

97. MinistryofDefence,Estonia,Cyber Security Strategy(Tallinn,Estonia,MinistryofDefence,2008):7.

98. Ibid.,4-5.

99. CharlesW.Freeman, Jr.,Diplomatic Strategy and Tactics (WashingtonD.C.,U.S.InstituteofPeace,1997):84.

100. Ibid.

101. CharlesW.Freeman,Jr.,ArtsofPower:StatecraftandDiplomacy(WashingtonDC:USInstituteofPeace,1997):38.

102. MinistryofDefence,Estonia,Cyber Security Strategy,17.

103. Tikk,etal.,22.

104. Fritz,61.

105. Tikk,etal.,22.

106. JamesB.Morell,The Law of the Sea: The 1982 Treaty and Its Rejection by the United States(London,UK,McFarland,1992):2.

107. RichardH.Wyman,“TheFirstRulesofAirWarfare,”Air University Review,March-April 1984 (Maxwell AFB, AL, Air University Press, 1984), http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/aureview/1984/mar-apr/wyman.html(accessedDecember1,2008).


108. “AHistoryoftheInternet1962-1992”Computer History Museum,http://www.computerhistory.org/internet_history/internet_history_90s.shtml (accessedDecember1,2008).

109. Fritz,58.


111. JohnT.RourkeandMarkA.Boyer,International Politics on the World Stage,glossary, http://highered.mcgraw-hill.com/sites/0073526304/student_view0/glossary.html(accessedonDecember22,2008).




115. Ibid.,32.

116. GeorgeW.Bush,The National Security Strategy of the United States of America(WashingtonD.C.,TheWhiteHouse,2006):36.

117. Kristin Archick, “Cybercrime: The Council of Europe Convention,” CRS Report for CongressRS21208(September28,2006):1.

118. Ibid.,2-3.

119. MinistryofDefence,Estonia,Cyber Security Strategy,18

120. RichardL.Kugler,Policy Analysis in National Security Affairs: New Methods for a New Era(WashingtonDC,NationalDefenseUniversityPress,2006):87.

121. Fritz,43.

122. DeclanMcCullagh,“UNAgencyEyesCurbsonInternetAnonymity,”CNET News(September12,2008),http://news.cnet.com/8301-13578_3-10040152-38.html?tag=nl.e703(accessedOctober16,2008).


124. Ibid.,26.

125. Ibid.,18.

Impeding Network Centric Warfare: Combatant Command Information Technology Support1. David S. Alberts, John J. Garstka, and Frederick P. Stein, Network Centric

Warfare: Developing and Leveraging Information Superiority (The DoDCommandandControlResearchProgram[CCRP]PublicationSeries,1999):35-36.

2. DavidS.AlbertsandRichardE.Hayes,Understanding Command and Control(The DoD Command and Control Research Program [CCRP] PublicationSeries,2006):201.


3. Michael G. Mullen, Capstone Concept for Joint Operations, Version 3.0(Washington,DC,U.S.DepartmentofDefense,TheJointStaff,January15,2009):4,10,33.

4. U.S.DepartmentofDefense,Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States,JointPublication1(Washington,DC,U.S.DepartmentofDefense,TheJointStaffJ7,May14,2007):III-12.

5. U.S.DepartmentofDefense,Functions of the Department of Defense and Its Major Components,Directive5100.01, (Washington,DC,U.S.Departmentof Defense, Assistant Secretary of Defense [Director of Administration andManagement],August1,2002,certifiedcurrentasofNovember21,2003):3,9-10.

6. DonaldRumsfeld,Quadrennial Defense Review Report(Washington,DC,TheDepartmentofDefense,February6,2006):58-61.

7. AlbertsandHayes,Understanding Command and Control,2.

8. Alberts,Garstka,andStein,Network Centric Warfare: Developing and Leveraging Information Superiority,114.

9. AssistantSecretaryofDefense(NetworksandInformationIntegration)/DoDChiefInformationOfficer,“Vision/Mission,”http://www.defenselink.mil/cio-nii/docs/card.pdf(accessedJanuary11,2009).

10. DISA Direct Home Page, “Defense Working Capital Fund (DWCF)TelecommunicationsServicesBillingPricesforFY2009,”https://www.disadirect.disa.mil/products/asp/BillingRates/Final_DWCF_FY09_Price_Book_Ver11.pdf(accessedJanuary11,2009),3-31.

11. U.S.DepartmentofDefense,Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States,JointPublication1,III-14.

12. U.S.StrategicCommand,“U.S.StrategicCommandSnapshot,”http://www.stratcom.mil/fact_sheets/SnapShot.doc(accessedJanuary14,2009).

13. U.S.StrategicCommand,“U.S.StrategicCommandSnapshot,”http://www.stratcom.mil/fact_sheets/fact_jtf_gno.html(accessedJanuary15,2009).

14. U.S.DepartmentofDefense,Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States,JointPublication1,III-2–III-3.

15. Forexample,EUCOMDirective50-1definestherelationshipbetweenU.S.ArmyEurope–asthesupporting“executiveagent”–andEUCOM.ED50-1predatesdesktopcomputing,butdoesaddresscommunicationssupportintheformoftelephonesandmessaging.

16. Two of the most pertinent directives are Management of DoD Information Resources and Information Technology, Directive 8000.01 and Information Technology Portfolio Management,Directive8115.01.

17. U.S.DepartmentofDefense,Management of DoD Information Resources and Information Technology,Directive8000.01(Washington,DC,U.S.Department


of Defense, Assistant Secretary of Defense, Networks and InformationIntegration,February27,2002,certifiedcurrentasofApril23,2007):3.

18. U.S. Department of Defense, Information Technology Portfolio Management,Directive8115.01,(Washington,DC,U.S.DepartmentofDefense,AssistantSecretary of Defense, Networks and Information Integration), October 10,2005):2-3.

19. U.S. Department of Defense, Data Sharing in a Net-Centric Department of Defense,Directive8320.02(Washington,DC,U.S.DepartmentofDefense,Assistant Secretary of Defense, Networks and Information Integration/DepartmentofDefenseChiefInformationOfficer,December2,2004,certifiedcurrentasofApril23,2007):2-3.

20. U.S. Department of Defense, Guidance for Implementing Net-Centric Data Sharing,Guidance8320.02-G(Washington,DC,U.S.DepartmentofDefense,Assistant Secretary of Defense, Networks and Information Integration/DepartmentofDefenseChiefInformationOfficer,April12,2006):11-15.

21. U.S. Department of Defense, Unique Identification (UID) Standards for a Net-Centric Department of Defense, Directive 8320.03 (Washington, DC,U.S. Department of Defense, Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition,Technology, and Logistics/Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel andReadiness,March23,2007):5.

22. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Communications Systems, Joint Pub 6-0(Washington,DC:U.S.DepartmentofDefense,TheJointStaffJ6,March20,2006):III-4.

23. Program Executive Office - Enterprise Information Systems, “Navy MarineCorpsIntranet(NMCI),”https://enterprise.spawar.navy.mil/cmt_uploads/28/NMCI%20BLII-ONEnet.pdf(accessedJanuary12,2009).

24. U.S.GovernmentAccountabilityOffice,Information Technology: DOD Needs to Ensure That Navy Marine Corps Intranet Program Is Meeting Goals and Satisfying Customers (Washington, DCm U.S. Government AccountabilityOffice,December2006):2-5.

25. CynthiaRettig,“TheTroublewithEnterpriseSoftware,”MIT Sloan Management Review49,no.1(Fall2007):21-22.

26. U.S. General Services Administration Millennia web page, http://www.gsa.gov/millennia(accessedJanuary12,2009).

27. Withtheexceptionofinformationtheusersplacedingroup-accessiblenetworkstorage; this isnotnormallypartof thetaskermanagementbusinessprocessandthedataisnotmeta-tagged.Adiscussionofthestructureandmanagementofgroup-accessiblenetworkstorageisanimportantpartofinformationsharingandthusNCW,butbeyondthescopeofthispaper.


28. U.S.DepartmentofDefense,“Defense InformationSystemsAgencyGlobalCommandandControlSystem–Joint,”http://www.disa.mil/gccs-j/(accessedJanuary12,2009).

29. John E. Ettlie et al., “Strategic predictors of successful enterprise systemdeployment,”International Journal of Operations & Production Management 25,no.10(2005):956.

30. U.S. Department of Defense, Data Sharing in a Net-Centric Department of Defense,Directive8320.2(December2004):2-3.

31. Sharon A. Houy, “WorkingTogether:Why DIA Now Employs CombatantCommandIntelAgents,”Armed Forces Journal,(December2008):34-37.

Knowledge Centric Warfare: An Introduction1. AdmMike.G.Mullen,Capstone Concept for Joint Operations (Washington,

DC:U.S.JointChiefsofStaff,January15,2009):iii.

2. Ibid.,iv.

3. Ibid.

4. PaulW.PhisterJr.andIgorG.Plonish,Information and Knowledge Centric Warfare: The Next Steps in the Evolution of Warfare. (Rome, NY: Air ForceResearchLaboratory,June,2004):8.

5. Ibid.

6. GenRupertSmith,The Utility of Force: The Art of War in the Modern World (NewYork:AlfredA.Knopf,2007):19.

7. Dr.MichaelEvans,“KnowledgeManagementandWarfareintheInformationAge”briefingslides(Canberra,AU,LandWarfareStudiesCentre,2002)

8. Ibid.

9. Adapted from U.S. Army War College, Information Operations Primer:Fundamentals of Information Operations (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. ArmyWarCollege,DepartmentofMilitaryStrategy,Planning,andOperationsandCenterforStrategicLeadership,November,2008):2.

10. David S. Alberts and Richard E. Hayes, Power to the Edge: Command and Control in the Information Age (Washington, DC: DoD Command andControlResearchProgram,2003):113.

11. AlbertsandHayes,15.

12. Matthias Steup, “Epistemology,” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy(Winter 2008 Edition), http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2008/entries/epistemology/(accessedMarch17,2009).

13. SvavarHrafnSvavarsson,“Pyrrho’sDogmaticNature,”Classical Quarterly52,no.1(January1,2002):248-256,inProQuest(accessedMarch23,2009).


14. PeterMarkie,“Rationalismvs.Empiricism,”inThe Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2008 Edition), http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2008/entries/rationalism-empiricism/(accessedMarch15,2009).

15. Peter D. Klein, “Epistemology,” in Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy (London: Routledge 1998, 2005), http://www.rep.routledge.com/article/P059(accessedMarch24,2009).

16. Markie,“Rationalismvs.Empiricism.”

17. Steup,“Epistemology.”

18. Ibid.

19. Ibid.

20. Although the truth-condition enjoys nearly universal consent, there isa reasonable objection to it. Consider Newtonian Physics as a part of ouroverallscientificknowledge.ButNewtonianPhysicsisfalse.Isitpossibletoknowsomethingthatisfalse?Theanswerisno,withatwo-foldcaveat.Thefirst is that when we clam to “know” Newtonian Physics, we are claimingto understand the explanatory power of the theory in the realm in whichitapplies, implyinganunderstandingof recentlydiscoveredweaknesses -atrueassertion.Secondly,wecandistinguishbetweenNewtonianphysicsandupdatedtheoreticalphysicsatthecuttingedgewherethemorerecentabsorbstheformerandexplainshowandwhereNewtonianPhysicsfails.

21. AfamousarticlebyEdmundGettier in1963challengesJTB.The“GettierProblem” involves the transference of justification from an ultimately falsebelief to a belief that is coincidentally true. Both propositions have metascensioncriterionforknowledge,yetoneofthepropositionsisfalseandthusnotknowledge.

22. “Cognition,” Encyclopedia Britannica, online 2009, http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/124474/cognition(accessedFebruary01,2009).

23. PaulThagard,Mind:IntroductiontoCognitiveScience,2nded.,(Cambridge,MA:MITPress,2005):10.

24. MartinRyder,“Semiotics:LanguageandCulture”(May,2004),http://carbon.cudenver.edu/~mryder/semiotics_este.html(accessedMarch21,2009).

25. PeterBrödner,“TheMiseryofDigitalOrganisationsandtheSemioticNatureofIT,”AI & Society23,no.3(May1,2009):331-351,inProQuest(accessedMarch23,2009).

26. BrendanS.Gillon,“OntheSemantics/PragmaticsDistinction.”Synthese165,no.3(December1,2008):373-384,inProQuest(accessedMarch23,2009).

27. IkujiroNonaka,“ADynamicTheoryofOrganizationalKnowledgeCreation.”Organization Science 5, no. 1 (1994): 19, in EBSCO (accessed March 19,2009).


28. F. Dretske, Knowledge and the Flow of Information (Cambridge, MA: MITPress.1981):44,86.

29. Nonaka,“ADynamicTheoryofOrganizationalKnowledgeCreation,”14.

30. Ibid.,19.

31. Ibid.,18.

32. Torsten Ringberg and Markus Reihlen. “Socio-Cognitive Approach toKnowledgeTransfer,”Journal of Management Studies,45,no.5(July2008).

33. Robert L. Cambell, “Jean Piaget’s Genetic Epistemology: Appreciationand Critique,” Revised version of two lectures presented at the Instituteof Objectivist Studies Summer Seminar, Charlottesville,VA, July 7 and 8,2006,http://hubcap.clemson.edu/~campber/piaget.html(accessedMarch23,2009).

34. R.Vanden,Technology Based Learning Environment Designs for Ill-Structured Knowledge Domains, Unpublished Thesis (Ontario: University of Guelph,1998).

35. A. Lauzon, “Situating Cognition and Crossing Borders: Resisting thehomogenyofMediatedEducation.”British Journal of Educational Technology,30,no.3(1999)inEBSCO(accessedMarch4,2009).

36. Ibid.

37. CoP researchadapted fromapaperwrittenby the author to satisfy courserequirementsatWaldenUniversity,March,2007.

38. An excellent description on the application of a CoP in the U.S. Army isCompany Command: Unleashing the Power of the Army Profession(WestPoint,NY:CenterforLeaderDevelopmentandOrganizationalLearning,2005).

39. J. Lave and E. Wenger, Situated Learning (Cambridge, MA: CambridgeUniversityPress,1991).

40. E. Wenger, R. McDermott, and W. Snyder, Cultivating Communities of Practice: A Guide to Managing Knowledge (Boston:HarvardBusinessSchoolPress,2002).

41. Ibid.

42. C. Elmholdt, “Knowledge Management and the Practice of KnowledgeSharingandLearningatWork:ACaseStudy.”Studies in Continuing Education26,no.2(2004).

43. Ikujiro Nonaka, “The Knowledge Creating Company.” Harvard Business Review85,no.7/8:(1991):162-171.

44. EWenger.CommunitiesofPractice:Learning,MeaningandIdentity(NewYork:CambridgeUniversityPress,1998).

45. Nonaka,“TheKnowledgeCreatingCompany.”


46. K.Dalkir,Knowledge Management in Theory and Practice (NewYork:ElsevierButterworthHeinemann,2005).

47. Wenger,Cultivating Communities of Practice: A Guide to Managing Knowledge,45-47

48. Ibid.

49. Dalkir,Knowledge Management in Theory and Practice.

50. A.Kim,Community Building on the Web.(Berkeley,CA:PeachpitPress,2000).

51. L. Fisher, “Sustaining Communities of Practice in the Workplace: A CaseStudy,”STC Proceedings(2004),inEBSCO(accessedFebruary15,2008).

52. Ibid.

53. Kim,Community Building on the Web.

54. Fisher,“SustainingCommunitiesofPracticeintheWorkplace:ACaseStudy,”37.

55. G.Lakomski,“OnKnowinginContext,”British Journal of Management15(2004):89-95.

56. LearningTheoriesKnowledgebase,“LearningTheories&Models,”http://www.learning-theories.com/problem-based-learning-pbl.html(accessedMarch24th,2009).

57. A. Hemre, “Building and Sustaining Communities of Practice at EricssonResearch Canada,” in Knowledge Management Tools and Techniques, ed. M.Rao(Burlington,MA:Butterworth-Heinemann,2005).

58. Wenger,Cultivating Communities of Practice: A Guide to Managing Knowledge,141.

59. RingbergandReihlen,“Socio-CognitiveApproachtoKnowledgeTransfer,”921.

60. Ibid.,919.

61. Ibid.,924.

62. Ibid.

63. FigurefromRingbergandReihlen,“Socio-CognitiveApproachtoKnowledgeTransfer,”923,modifiedtoreflectdivergentandconvergentcreativeprocessesassociatedwithsocializationastaughtintheU.S.ArmyWarCollege’sStrategicThinkingsyllabus.

64. Ibid.,925.

65. Ibid.,926.

66. Ibid.,928.

67. Ibid.,926.


68. BrianRobinson,“Armyretoolsknowledgeculture,”Federal Computer Week,(September 05, 2008) http://fcw.com/Articles/2008/09/05/Army-retools-knowledge-culture.aspx(accessedMarch23,2009).

69. David S. Alberts, John J. Garstka and Fredrick P. Stein, Network Centric Warfare: Developing and Leveraging Information Superiority(Washington,DC:DoDC4ISRCooperativeResearchProgram,1999):29.

70. SusanSmithNash“NetworkCentricWarfareandImplicationsforDistributedEducation,” Online Learning, April 9, 2005, http://www.xplanazine.com/2005/04/network-centric-warfare-and-implications-for-distributed-education(accessedMarch15,2009).

71. CDRPhilipG.Pattee,USN(Ret),in“NetworkCentricOperations:ANeedfor Adaptation and Efficiency,” Air & Space Power Journal, (Spring 2008),makes the specific point that while viewing the strategic environment as aComplexAdaptiveSystem,socialnetworksmustincludediversitybeyondtheDoDinwhathecalls“networkednationalsecurity.”

72. Tom Czerwinski, Coping with the Bounds: Speculations on Nonlinearity in Military Affairs (Washington, DC: DoD Command and Control ResearchProgram,1998):158.

73. AlbertsandHayes,Power to the Edge: Command and Control in the Information Age,65.

74. AdaptedfromU.S.DepartmentoftheArmy,Knowledge Management,FieldManual6-01(WashingtonDC:U.S.DepartmentoftheArmy,August29,2008), and Alberts, Network Centric Warfare: Developing and Leveraging Information Superiority,29.

75. Robinson,“Armyretoolsknowledgeculture.”

76. U.S.DepartmentoftheArmy,Knowledge Management,FieldManual6-01.1(WashingtonDC:U.S.DepartmentoftheArmy,August29,2008).

77. PhisterandPlonish,Information and Knowledge Centric Warfare: the Next Steps in the Evolution of Warfare.

78. PeterSchwartz,Inevitable Surprises(NewYork:GothamBooks,2003),233.

Enabling Security, Stability, Transition, and Reconstruction Operations through Knowledge Management

1. HorstW.J.RittelandMelvinM.Webber,“DilemmasinGeneralTheoryofPlanning,”Policy Sciences 4(1973):155-169.Seealso:JeffConklin,“WickedProblems and Social Complexity,” in Dialogue Mapping: Building Shared Understanding of Wicked Problems(Chichester,England:JohnWiley&Sons,2006): 3-23. A discussion of ill-structured problems may be found in U.S.Department of the Army, Commander’s Appreciation and Campaign Design,


Training and Doctrine Command Pamphlet 525-5-500 (Fort Monroe, VA:U.S.DepartmentoftheArmy,January28,2008),9-11.

2. COL Stephen A. Shambach, ed., “The Strategic Leadership Environment,”Strategic Leadership Primer, 2nd ed. (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army WarCollege,DepartmentofCommand,LeadershipandManagement,2004):12-13.

3. Forthepurposesof thispaper,SSTRencompassesthoseactivities,missions,and efforts as outlined or defined in the following sources and referencesembeddedinthesesources:

• George W. Bush, National Security Presidential Directive/NSPD-44 (Washington,D.C.:TheWhiteHouse,7December2005):1-6.

• U.S. Department of Defense, Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations, Directive 3000.05(Washington,D.C.:U.S.DepartmentofDefense,November28,2005):1-11.

• COLDavidB.Haight,Preparing Military Leaders for Security, Stability, Transition and Reconstruction Operations, Strategy Research Project(CarlisleBarracks,PA:U.S.ArmyWarCollege,March30,2007):2.

4. Bush,National Security Presidential Directive/NSPD-44,2.

5. Rahinah Ibrahim and Mark Nissen, “Discontinuity in Organizations:Developing a Knowledge-Based Organizational Performance Model forDiscontinuousMembership,”International Journal of Knowledge Management 3,no.1(January-March2007):10-28.

6. EdwardP.WeberandAnneM.Khademian,“WickedProblems,KnowledgeChallenges,andCollaborativeCapacityBuildersinNetworkSettings,”Public Administration Review68,no.2(March-April2008):336.

7. Ibid.,334-339.

8. U.S. Department of the Army, Commander’s Appreciation and Campaign Design,13-14.

9. Beatriz Munoz-Seca and Josep Riverola, Problem-Driven Management: Achieving Improvement in Operations through Knowledge Management (NewYork,NY:PalgraveMacmillan,2004):6.

10. Jozef Loermans, “Synergizing the Learning Organization and KnowledgeManagement,”Journal of Knowledge Management6,no.3(2002):285-294.

11. LenaAggestam,“LearningOrganizationorKnowledgeManagement–WhichCameFirst,TheChickenortheEgg?”Information Technology and Control 35,no.3A(2006):299.

12. DavidA.Garvin,“BuildingaLearningOrganization,”Harvard Business Review on Knowledge Management (Boston,MA:HarvardBusinessSchoolPublishing,1998),51.


13. Aggestam,“LearningOrganizationorKnowledgeManagement–WhichCameFirst,TheChickenortheEgg?,”298-300.

14. PeterSenge,The Fifth Discipline: The Art & Practice of The Learning Organization (NewYork,NY:CurrencyDoubleday,1990):6-11.

15. Ibid.,69.

16. Chris Argyris, Reasons and Rationalizations: The Limits to Organizational Knowledge(NewYork,NY:OxfordUniversityPress,2004):10.

17. ThomasH.DavenportandLaurencePrusak,Working Knowledge(Boston,MA:HarvardBusinessSchoolPress,1998):5.

18. Ibid.,2.

19. Ibid.,4.

20. Ikujiro Nonaka and Hirotaka Takeuchi, The Knowledge-Creating Company(NewYork,NY:OxfordUniversityPress,1995):58.

21. DavenportandPrusak,Working Knowledge,6.

22. Ibid.,12.

23. NonakaandTakeuchi,The Knowledge-Creating Company,8-9.Seealso:VernaAllee, The Future of Knowledge: Increasing Prosperity through Value Networks (Burlington,MA:ElsevierScience,2003):97.

24. Ibid. Also, Kimiz Dalkir, Knowledge Management in Theory and Practice (Burlington,MA:ElsevierButterworth-Heinemann,2005):8.

25. NonakaandTakeuchi,The Knowledge-Creating Company,62-73.TheNonakaand Takeuchi model is referred to as the SECI model of organizationalknowledgecreation.

26. American Productivity & Quality Center (APQC), Retaining Valuable Knowledge: Proactive Strategies to Deal With a Shifting Work Force (Texas:AmericanProductivity&QualityCenter,2002),7. AfunctionaldefinitionofKnowledgeManagement is “a systematicprocessof connectingpeople topeopleandpeopletotheknowledgeandinformationtheyneedtoeffectivelyperformand createnewknowledge. Thegoal of aknowledgemanagementinitiativeistoenhancetheperformanceoftheorganizationandthepeopleinit,throughtheidentification,capture,validation,andtransferofknowledge.”

27. Dalkir,Knowledge Management in Theory and Practice,43.

28. PeterF.Drucker,Post-Capitalist Society(NewYork,NY:HarperCollins,1993):6-8.

29. MichaelE.D.KoenigandT.KantiSrikantaiah,eds.,Knowledge Management Lessons Learned: What Works and What Doesn’t (Medford, NJ: InformationToday,Inc.,2004):127.

30. AmritTiwana,The Knowledge Management Toolkit: Orchestrating IT, Strategy, and Knowledge Platforms(UpperSaddleRiver,NJ:PrenticeHall,2002):6.


31. DavenportandPrusak, Working Knowledge,15-17.

32. Annick Willem and Marc Buelens, “Knowledge Sharing in PublicSector Organizations: The Effect of Organizational Characteristics onInterdepartmental Knowledge Sharing,” Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory17(January2007):581.

33. ElsaRhoads,Kevin J.O’Sullivan, andMichael Stankowsky, “AnEvaluationofFactorsthatInfluencetheSuccessofKnowledgeManagementPracticesinU.S.FederalAgencies,”International Journal of Knowledge Management3,no.2(April-June2007):32.

34. DavenportandPrusak,Working Knowledge,8.SeealsoAmericanProductivity&QualityCenter(APQC),Retaining Valuable Knowledge: Proactive Strategies to Deal With a Shifting Work Force,46.AdditionalinformationonCALL,theBattleCommandKnowledgeSystem,andotherU.S.ArmyKMinformationcanbe accessed through theU.S.ArmyCombinedArmsCenterwebsite athttp://usacac.army.mil/cac2/index.asp.

35. U.S.ArmyChief of Staff,GeneralGeorgeW.Casey, Jr. andU.S. Secretaryof the Army Pete Geren, “Army Knowledge Management Principles,”memorandumfordistributiontoU.S.DepartmentoftheArmycommands,July 23, 2008. See also: U.S. Department of the Army, Operations, FieldManual 3-0 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of the Army, February27, 2008): 7-10. The U.S. Army is incorporating KM into capstone FieldManuals.Asanexample,FM3-0,Operations,specificallyidentifiesKMas“theartofcreating,organizing,applying,andtransferringknowledgetofacilitatesituational understanding and decisionmaking. Knowledge managementsupports improving organizational learning, innovation, and performance.Knowledgemanagementprocessesensurethatknowledgeproductsandservicesarerelevant,accurate,timely,anduseabletocommandersanddecisionmakers.”The“KnowledgeandInformationManagement”sectionalsoidentifiestheKMcomponentsofpeople,processes,andtechnology.

36. R. William Maule, “Military Knowledge Management,” Encyclopedia of Knowledge Management, ed. David G. Schwartz (Hershey, PA: Idea GroupReference,2006):628-630.

37. Ibid.,628.Seealso:FaridaHasanalietal.,Communities of Practice: A Guide for Your Journey to Knowledge Management Best Practices(Houston,TX:AmericanProductivity&QualityCenter,2002):1-7.APQCdefines communities as:“Networksofpeople–smallandlarge–whocometogethertoshareideaswithandlearnfromoneanotherinphysicalandvirtualspace.Thesecommunitiesofpractice,ofinterest,andoflearningareheldtogetherbyacommonpurposeormission.Theyaresustainedbyadesiretoshareexperiences, insights,andbestpractices.”

38. SummerE.Bartczak,JasonM.Turner,andEllenC.England,“ChallengesinDevelopingaKnowledgeManagementStrategy:ACaseStudyoftheAirForce


MaterialCommand,”International Journal of Knowledge Management4,no.1(January-March2008):49.

39. Maule,“MilitaryKnowledgeManagement,”628.

40. Rhoads,O’SullivanandStankowsky,“AnEvaluationofFactorsthatInfluencetheSuccess ofKnowledgeManagementPractices inU.S.FederalAgencies,”32.Seealso: ThomasH.KeanandLeeH.Hamilton,The 9/11 Commission Report (Washington, D.C.: National Commission on Terrorist AttacksUpon the United States, 2004): 416-419, http://www.9-11commission.gov/report/911Report.pdf(accessedFebruary28,2009).Section13.3(page417)specified promoting a “need to share culture of integration” and includedthe recommendation “information procedures should provide incentives forsharing,torestoreabetterbalancebetweensecurityandsharedknowledge.”

41. Ibid.

42. Terrence K. Kelly and Thomas S. Szayhna, Stabilization and Reconstruction Staffing: Developing U.S. Civilian Personnel Capabilities (SantaMonica,CA:RANDCorporation,2008):68.

43. Project on National Security Reform, Forging a New Shield (Washington,DC:ProjectonNationalSecurityReform,November2008):A8-697.

44. RittelandWebber,“DilemmasinGeneralTheoryofPlanning,”160-162.

45. U.S. Department of the Army, Stability Operations, Field Manual 3-07(Washington,D.C.:U.S.DepartmentoftheArmy,October6,2008):4-5.U.S.ArmydoctrineonknowledgemanagementisfoundinU.S.DepartmentoftheArmy,KnowledgeManagementSection,FieldManual6-01.1 (Washington,D.C.: U.S. Department of the Army, August 29, 2008). See also: U.S.Departmentof theArmy,Operations,FieldManual3-0(Washington,D.C.:U.S.DepartmentoftheArmy,February27,2008):7-10.

46. LTCHowardLim,“KnowledgeManagementatMNC-I:Trends,Challenges,andOpportunties,”October2008,brieflinkedfromtheUnitedStatesArmyCombined Arms Center Home Page, Center for Army Lessons Learned athttp://usacac.army.mil/cac2/call/index.asp.

47. Rhoads,O’SullivanandStankowsky,“AnEvaluationofFactorsthatInfluencetheSuccessofKnowledgeManagementPracticesinU.S.FederalAgencies,”35.

48. U.S.JointChiefsofStaff,CapstoneConceptforJointOperationsVersion3.0(Washington,D.C.:U.S.JointChiefsofStaff,January15,2009):6.

49. 49 Donald Hislop, Knowledge Management in Organizations: A Critical Introduction(NewYork,NY:OxfordUniversityPress,2005):44-54.

50. Chyan Yang and Hsueh-Chuan Yen, “A Viable Systems Perspective toKnowledgeManagement,”Kybernetes36,no.5/6(2007):644-648.


51. S.Vassiliadis,M.Kohne,andJ.Barber,“AreNetworkstheObviousChoice?When to Choose the Network Option,” in Getting Real about Knowledge Networks (NewYork,NY:PalgraveMacmillan,2006):109-110.

52. Ibid.,183-207.

53. The Combined Security Transition Command – Afghanistan Home Page,http://www.cstc-a.com(accessed14November2008).

54. NorthAtlanticTreatyOrganization(NATO)InternationalSecurityAssistanceForce (ISAF)HomePage,http://www.nato.int/isaf/ (accessedDecember10,2008). Effective October 5, 2006, ISAF assumed overall responsibility forAfghanistansecurityandstabilityefforts.

55. Dalkir,Knowledge Management in Theory and Practice,69.Thedefinitionofcomplexadaptivesystemsis“organizationsthatarecomposedofalargenumberofself-organizingcomponents,eachofwhichseekstomaximizeitsownspecificgoalsbutwhichalsooperatesaccordingtotherulesandcontextofrelationshipswiththeothercomponentsandtheexternalworld.”ComponentmembersoftheCSTC-Astaffareempoweredtoself-organizebutarehierarchicallypartoftheCSTC-Aorganization.AssuchthecomplexadaptivesystemrepresentedbyCSTC-Aisconsideredintelligent.

56. Ibid.,70.

57. Ibid.,69-70.

58. Ibid.,70-71.

59. Ibid.

60. Ibid.

61. Ibid.,71.

62. Hislop,Knowledge Management in Organizations: A Critical Introduction,44.

63. GillianWrightandAndrewTaylor,“StrategicKnowledgeSharingforImprovedPublic Service Delivery: Managing an Innovative Culture for EffectivePartnerships,” in Knowledge Management: Current Issues and Challenges, ed.ElayneCoakes(Hershey,PA:IRMPress,2003):190.

64. Kenneth A. Grant and Candace T. Grant, “Developing a Model of NextGeneration Knowledge Management,“ Issues in Informing Science and Information Technology,no.5(2008):580.

65. Ibid.,580-587.

66. Grant and Grant, “Developing a Model of Next Generation KnowledgeManagement,”580-587.

67. Dalkir, Knowledge Management in Theory and Practice, 179. Dalkir as wellas Nonaka and Takeuchi use E. Schein’s (1985 and 1999) definition oforganizationalcultureas“apatternofbasicassumptions—invented,discovered,ordevelopedbyagivengroupasitlearnstocopewithitsproblemsofexternal


adaptation and internal integration—that has worked well enough to beconsideredvalidandtherefore,tobetaughttonewmembersasthecorrectwaytoperceive,thinkandfeelinrelationtothoseproblems.”


69. Yang and Yen, “A Viable Systems Perspective to Knowledge Management,“647.

70. NonakaandTakeuchi,The Knowledge-Creating Company,85.



73. Jennifer Lewis Priestley and Subhashish Samaddar, “Multi-OrganizationalNetworks: Three Antecedents of KnowledgeTransfer,” International Journal of Knowledge Management 3, no. 1 (January-March 2007): 87. Absorptivecapacityisdefinedas“anorganization’sabilitytorecognizethevalueofexternalinformation, assimilate it and apply it to generate economic rents” and “iscriticaltoitsinnovativecapabilities.”

74. AndreaBack et al., eds.,Getting Real about Knowledge Networks: Unlocking Corporate Knowledge Assets(NewYork,NY:PalgraveMacmillan,2006):129-143.


76. AsinferredinJohnP.Kotter,Leading Change(Boston,MA:HarvardBusinessSchoolPress,1996):10.

77. JohnP.KotterandLeonardA.Schlesinger,“ChoosingStrategiesforChange,”in Organizational Behavior and the Practice of Management, ed. David R.Hampton, Charles E. Summer, and Ross A. Webber (Glenview, IL: Scott,ForesmanandCompany,1983):735.


79. Ibid.

80. Sajda Qureshi, Robert Briggs, and Vlatka Hlupic, “Value Creationfrom Intellectual Capital: Convergence of Knowledge Management andCollaboration in the Intellectual Bandwidth Model,” Group Decision and Negotiation 15(2006):209.

81. Hislop,Knowledge Management in Organizations: A Critical Introduction,13-37.

82. Ibid.,39.

83. PriestleyandSamaddar,“Multi-OrganizationalNetworks:ThreeAntecedentsofKnowledgeTransfer,”88.Sharedidentityorpurposefacilitatesbothintra-andinter-organizationalknowledgesharing.

84. Ibid.


85. PattiAnklam,“KnowledgeManagement:TheCollaborationThread,”Bulletin of the American Society for Information Science and Technology28,no.6(August-September2002):9.

86. Kristen Bell DeTienne, et al., “Toward a Model of Effective KnowledgeManagementandDirections forFutureResearch: Culture,Leadership,andCKOs,”Journal of Leadership & Organizational Studies10,no.4(Spring2004):32. See also: Hislop, Knowledge Management in Organizations: A Critical Introduction,90-92.

87. Davenport and Prusak, Working Knowledge, 97. See also: Dalkir, Knowledge Management in Theory and Practice,189.Dalkirreferstothefactthatmentalmodelsarealsocalledbasicunderlyingassumptionsandrepresentpossibilities–managersusementalmodelsto“diagnoseproblemsandmakedecisions.”


89. Munoz-SecaandRiverola,Problem-Driven Management: Achieving Improvement in Operations through Knowledge Management,230-231.



92. GillianWrightandAndrewTaylor,“StrategicKnowledgeSharingforImprovedPublic Service Delivery: Managing an Innovative Culture for EffectivePartnerships,”194-196.


94. Andrew P. Ciganek, En Mao, and Mark Srite, “Organizational Culture forKnowledgeManagementSystems:AStudyofCorporateUsers,”International Journal of Knowledge Management4,no.1(January-March2008):5-6.

95. JaniceE.CarrilloandCherylGaimon,“ManagingKnowledge-BasedResourceCapabilitiesunderUncertainty,”Management Science50,no.11 (November2004):1516.

96. Ibid.


98. Ibid.


100. COL Stephen A. Shambach, ed., “Strategic Leadership Tasks,” StrategicLeadershipPrimer,2nd ed. (CarlisleBarracks,PA:U.S.ArmyWarCollege,DepartmentofCommand,LeadershipandManagement,2004):44.

101. Ibid.Seealso:RolandK.Yeo,“BuildingKnowledgeThroughActionSystems,ProcessLeadership andOrganizationalLearning,”Foresight 8,no.4 (2006):37.

102. Ibid.,45.Seealso:Dalkir,Knowledge Management in Theory and Practice,185.


103. Yeo, “Building Knowledge Through Action Systems, Process Leadershipand Organizational Learning,” 38. Collaborative cultures with open trans-boundary communication and dialogue foster knowledge sharing based onsocial construct that leads to systems thinking and shared vision necessaryfororganizationallearning.WrightandTaylor,“StrategicKnowledgeSharingfor ImprovedPublicServiceDelivery: Managing an InnovativeCulture forEffectivePartnerships,”203.Innovativeculturesencourageknowledgesharing,acquisition,andapplicationthatfurthersupportscollaborationandlearning.

104. Anklam,“KnowledgeManagement:TheCollaborationThread,”9-10.

105. Shambach,ed.,“StrategicLeadershipTasks,”45-46.


107. InformationspecifictoS/CRSisavailableat:TheUnitedStatesDepartmentofStateOfficeoftheCoordinatorforReconstructionandStabilizationHomePage,http://www.state.gov/s/crs/(accessedFebruary17,2009).Seealso:FaridaHasanalietal.,Communities of Practice: A Guide for your Journey to Knowledge Management Best Practices,3.

108. Verna Allee, The Future of Knowledge: Increasing Prosperity Through Value Networks,122-124.Seealso:SineenadPaisttanand,L.A.Digman,andSangM. Lee, “Managing Knowledge Capabilities for Strategy ImplementationEffectiveness,” International Journal of Knowledge Management 3, no. 4(October-December2007):85.

109. Hislop,Knowledge Management in Organizations: A Critical Introduction,58-67.

110. Henrietta Fore, Robert Gates, and Condoleezza Rice, U.S. Government Counterinsurgency Guide (Washington, D.C.: Bureau of Political-MilitaryAffairs,2009):19.

111. PeterF.Drucker,The Essential Drucker(NewYork,NY:HarperCollins,2001):81.

112. Steven Cavaleri and Sharon Seivert, Knowledge Leadership: The Art and Science of the Knowledge-Based Organization(Burlington,MA:Elsevier,Inc.,2005):269-274.Seealso:Dr.KristenBellDeTienneetal.,“TowardaModelof Effective Knowledge Management and Directions for Future Research:Culture,Leadership,andCKOs,”34.


114. American Productivity & Quality Center (APQC), Retaining Valuable Knowledge: Proactive Strategies to Deal With a Shifting Work Force,7.

115. Murray E. Jennex, Stefan Smolnik, and David Croasdell, “KnowledgeManagementSuccess,”International Journal of Knowledge Management3,no.2(April-June2007):ii.


116. DavenportandPrusak,Working Knowledge,169.Seealso:Aggestam,“LearningOrganizationorKnowledgeManagement–WhichCameFirst,TheChickenortheEgg?,”298.

117. NonakaandTakeuchi,The Knowledge-Creating Company,160-171.

118. Ibid.,166.

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