Nature and Extent of Corruption in Universal Primary

Education (UPE) in Uganda

A Research Report

Submitted to

Anti-Corruption Coalition, Uganda (ACCU)

By

Julius Kiiza, PhD (Sydney) First Class Master of Public Policy (Sydney); B.A Hons (Makerere)

Dept of Political Science & Public Administration

Makerere University,

juliuskiiza@yahoo.com

September 2006

2

List of Acronyms and Abbreviations

ACCU Anti-Corruption Coalition, Uganda

AG Auditor General

CCF Christian Children Fund Acenlworo Child and Family Program

CFO Chief Finance Officer

DEO District Education Officer

ESA Education Standards Agency

LG Local Government

MoES Ministry of Education and Sports

MoFPED Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic Development

SFG School Facilities Grant

SMC School Management Committee

TAACC The Apac Anti-Corruption Coalition

UDC Uganda Development Corporation

UDN Uganda Debt Network

UPE Universal Primary Education

3

Executive Summary This study examines the UPE program in Uganda, with a view to identifying the nature and extent

of corruption therein. The focus is on five purposively selected districts – Apac in Northern

Uganda; Hoima and Bundibugyo in Western Uganda; Soroti in Eastern Uganda and Mukono in

Central Uganda. Apac was selected because of the vigilance of community-based actors such as

Christian Children Fund Acenlworo Child and Family Program (CCF). Hoima was selected

because it appears to be a ‘sane’ district. Mukono and Soroti were meant to factor the central and

Eastern dimensions into our analysis; while Bundibugyo was chosen because corruption in that

district took an ugly twist with the establishment of two ghost schools – Bundibugyo Public

Primary School and Lamica Primary School. These ghost schools received UPE funds between

1998 – 2003 to finance ghost infrastructure, pay ghost teachers and teach ghost pupils.

The high level of corruption in UPE seems to confirm the claim by Uganda’s development

partners, that corruption in Uganda is pervasive and institutionalized. If this is true, the delivery of

pro-poor primary education will be compromised. Hence the need to present evidence that will be

used for urgent interventions, including, but not limited to, NGO advocacy work. The object of this

study, then, was to contribute to the emerging culture of evidence-based advocacy work and policy

influence. The ultimate goal was to fortify the struggles of anti-corruption institutions like ACCU

and promote accountability, transparency and effectiveness in the delivery of UPE.

The study was carried out between April and September 2006. Methodological triangulation was

used. First, we reviewed the documents on UPE. [The Value for Money Audit report prepared by

the Auditor General; the Ministry of Education and Sports (MoES) reports on UPE; relevant letters

of key officials; the reports of major CSOs such as Bundibugyo NGO/CBO Forum and other

studies were all reviewed]. Then, a largely qualitative analysis was done, focusing on the

embezzlement of UPE funds, the corrupt tendering processes, the presence or absence of ghosts in

the UPE sub-sector, as well as the key factors that promote or constrain accountability in UPE.

Our study participants were purposively selected from a broad spectrum of stakeholders – central

government institutions, local government, national and local politicians, donors, CSOs, the

academia and even the private sector.

4

The main finding of this study is that a lot of knowledge now exists within central government

institutions, civil society and LGs on the nature, magnitude and negative implications of corruption

in the UPE program. What is lacking is action.

We recommend tough action against the perpetuators of corruption. Corrupt or non-

performing companies should be ordered to refund tax-payers’ money. They should also be

barred from winning further government contracts.

Second, any public official who colludes with mafia companies to cause financial loss to

Uganda must be declared a national enemy. They must be dismissed and their property

attached until they refund the monies.

We also recommend the introduction of positive motivators or “enhancers” such as the

CAO of the Year; DEO of the Year, CFO of the Year; CSO of the Year, Headteacher of the

Year, and Contractor of the Year awards. These should be granted to individual or

institutional actors who excel in fighting corruption or delivering value-for-money services.

Fourth, a broad coalition of stakeholders should be mobilized in the struggle against

corruption. Government officials, faith-based organizations, families, schools, colleges and

universities, and CSOs all have a role to play.

Fifth, we call for deliberate efforts to restore public sector ethics and build nationalism. In

Tanzania, recruits into the public service are made to swear: Kila Mutanzania ni Ndugu

Yangu! [Every Tanzanian is my brother/sister]. This political religion, which is crucial for

nation-building, should be adopted by Uganda. Nationalism should be taught in families,

schools, churches, government institutions and even CSOs.

Sixth, institutional capacity development should be encouraged. Government should, for

example, recruit, train and deploy bursars/accountants at every UPE school. There is also

need to equip school inspectors, Headteachers, and members of the SMC in basic financial

management skills. PTAs, CSOs and other grassroots institutions that hold public officials

to account should also be trained in basic accounting. The aim is to enable them make

sense of basic things like reading a balance sheet.

But that is not all. Public education should be enabled to compete with the best privately

provided education. To make this happen, the Education Standards Agency, needs to be

5

strengthened as a basis for transforming boona basome (poor quality) UPE into high

quality primary education. Additionally, individuals seeking to work directly for

government as politicians or mainstream civil servants must be obliged to take their

children to UPE schools and other public schools. That way, they will work tirelessly to

enhance the quality of public education

Eighth, an entrepreneurial construction agency must be established along the model of the

effective public construction agency of Rwanda. This agency should take charge of all

local and central government construction work, given the technical incapacity of

embryonic private companies. However, the public agency should play a nurturing role

(comparable to the developmental role of UDC) and should gradually let private companies

take over construction tenders.

Ninth, PTAs, which are organs of civil society, should be empowered to check the powers

of the statutory SMCs. Moreover, success stories of civil society organizations such as

TAACC or CCF need to be reproduced in other districts.

Tenth, the British legal tradition that calls for proof in the courts of law “beyond reasonable

doubt” should be modified to suit Uganda’s national interest. Given the cunning nature of

corrupt officials, government employess who are reasonably suspected to have caused

substantial financial or material loss to the nation should be relieved of their duties in the

public interest.

To reduce the widespread “justification” of corruption as a coping mechanism, poverty

must be substantially reduced via progressive taxation, adequate remuneration of civil

servants and a stop on the hemorrhage of public resources needed for national

development.

Finally, the political will to fight corruption must be created through concerted civil society

activism and donor pressure. The challenge is big but not impossible. Together, we can

disable corruption.

6

Table of Contents

Executive Summary

1. Introduction 7 1.1 Aim and Scope of Study 8 1.2 Rationale of the Study 9 1.3 Conceptualizing Corruption in the Primary Sub-sector 9 1.4 Terms of Reference 10 1.5 Study Methodology 11 1.6 Outputs 12 1.7 Organization of the Report 13 2. Institutional Context of UPE 13

3. Major Achievements and Challenges of UPE 15

4. Awareness of Corruption: Is Inaction a Deliberate Government Policy? 16

4.1 High Government Awareness Exists: Evidence from AG’s Report of 2003 16 4.2 High Knowledge Also Exists Among CSOs: The Bundibugyo NGO/CBO Forum 18 4.3 Abundant Local Government Knowledge Exists 20

5. Findings from Apac, Bundibugyo, Hoima, Mukono and Soroti 21 5.1 Magnitude of Corruption 21 5.2 Selected Cases of Theft and Embezzlement 25 5.3 Flawed Tendering/Procurement Processes 27 5.4 Ghost Schools, Ghost Teachers, and Ghost Pupils 30 5.5 Constraints to Accountability and Transparency in UPE Sector 33

6. Conclusion: Proposed Solutions 38 References 42 List of Study Participants 43

7

Notwithstanding Government’s many laudable policy and technical achievements, there is a

widely help perception in Ugandan society that corruption is pervasive, institutionalized and on the increase.

Statement of Uganda’s Development Partners on Governance and Anti-Corruption, Consultative Group Meeting, Kampala, April 2003

Large scale corruption and embezzlement at the top, which is carried out with impunity, has worked to

encourage the proliferation of administrative corruption at the grassroots. IGG, Second National Integrity Survey, April 2003

1. Introduction

Over the last few decades, universal primary education has gained broad acceptance as a key

instrument in the pursuit of wider national, regional and international development goals. The 1948

Universal Declaration of Human Rights was perhaps the first bold assertion, at the international

level, that “everyone has a right to education.” Forty years later, participants in the World

Conference on Education for All, assembled in Jomtien, Thailand from 5–9 March 1990 asserted

that education is a “fundamental right” for all. Article 1 of the Jomtien Declaration on Education

for All provides that every person – child, youth and adult – has a right to basic education.

At the beginning of the 21 Century, all the 191 United Nations member-states agreed on a

blueprint of eight “Millennium Development Goals” (MDGs). Among these MDGs, the provision

of universal primary education (UPE) by the target date of 2015 features as top-priority No. 2.1

While international declarations on the universalization of basic education now abound,

enlightened stakeholders realize that successful delivery of UPE calls for more than moralistic

declarations. What is needed, it appears, is an expanded vision that surpasses present resource

levels, conventional delivery systems and forms of governance. The misgovernance associated

with corruption in the UPE program is one of the key factors that need to be addressed if the

chances of delivering quality UPE by the target date of 2015 are to be boosted.

1 The full list of the MDGs is as follows: (1) Eradication of extreme poverty and hunger; (2) Delivery of universal primary education; (3) Promotion of gender equality and women’s empowerment; (4) Reducing child mortality; (5) Improving maternal health; (6) Combating HIV/AIDS and other diseases; (7) Promoting environmental sustainability; and (8) Developing a global partnership for development.

8

1.1 Aim and Scope of Study

The purpose of this study, then, was to examine the UPE program in Uganda, with a view to

identifying the nature and extent of corruption therein. The focus was on five purposively selected

districts, namely Apac in Northern Uganda; Hoima and Bundibugyo in Western Uganda; Soroti in

Eastern Uganda and Mukono in Central Uganda. Apac was selected because of the vigilance of

community-based actors such as Christian Children Fund Acenlworo Child and Family Program

(abbreviated as CCF).2 Hoima was selected because it appears to be a ‘sane’ district. Mukono and

Soroti were meant to factor the central and Eastern dimensions into our analysis; while

Bundibugyo was chosen because corruption in that district took an ugly twist with the

establishment of two ghost schools – Bundibugyo Public Primary School and Lamica Primary

School. These ghost schools received UPE funds between 1998 – 2003 to finance ghost

infrastructure, pay ghost teachers and teach ghost pupils (Interviews, 2006).

Other ghost schools – such as Bwirire Primary School in Teso, which has ‘ghost infrastructure,

ghost teachers and ghost pupils’ (Anonymous Interviewer, 2006) – continue to drain tax-payers’

moneys. The existence of ghost schools is important for a simple reason. UPE resource transfers

from central government institutions (Ministry of Education and Sports; Ministry of Finance,

Planning and Economic Development; and Bank of Uganda) to local government institutions

(Districts, Sub-Counties, schools) are only effected after key LG authorities, particularly the

School Management Committees and the Chief Administrative Officer, have “ascertained”

existence of schools in their areas of jurisdiction. UPE funds are transferred to district authorities

after LGs have submitted to the centre (a) a list of pupils enrolled; (b) accountability for resources

received in the previous financial year; and (c) budgets for the next funding cycle. The continued

existence of ghost schools surviving on UPE resources seems to confirm the claim by Uganda’s

development partners, that corruption in Ugandan society is pervasive and institutionalized. If this

is true, then, the much cherished benefits of decentralized governance (such as bringing services

closer to beneficiary communities) may be lost.

2 CCF is a civil society organization doing budget tracking in Kwani and Kole counties in Apac District. It has 600 Monitors in 50 schools (Interviews, 2006).

9

1.2 Rationale of the Study

The rationale for grappling with the problem of corruption in the primary education sub-sector is

two-pronged. First, while several anti-corruption institutions (such as the IGG) and legal

mechanisms (such as the Public Finance and Accountability Regulations of 2003) have been put in

place to fight corruption, the vice continues unabated (see Monitor 26 March 2006 on Jim

Muhwezi; Monitor 23 April 2006 on alleged corruption scandal involving Keith Muhakanizi and

his former political boss, Isaac Musumba). Second, the embezzlement of UPE monies; the illegal

delays or diversions of teachers’ salaries; the flawed tendering processes; the reported problem of

ghost teachers or pupils and other such vices have combined to compromise the quality, efficiency

and effectiveness of UPE. As a result, the chances of the rural and urban poor (who predominantly

populate UPE schools) escaping from extreme poverty are compromised. In other words, the

delivery of Uganda’s priority PEAP (Poverty Eradication Action Plan) outcomes (and the MDGs)

is negatively affected. Since the people living below poverty constitute a substantial proportion of

the Ugandan population (35% in 2003; 38% in 2004 and about 40% in 2006), corruption in the

UPE sub-sector inevitably undermines long-term national development.

Accordingly, a study designed to document the magnitude of corruption in UPE will go a long way

in presenting evidence for urgent interventions, including, but not limited to, NGO advocacy work.

The object of this study, then, was to contribute to the emerging culture of evidence-based

advocacy work and policy influence. The ultimate goal was to fortify the struggles of anti-

corruption institutions like ACCU and promote accountability, transparency and effectiveness in

the delivery of critical pro-poor services such as UPE.

1.3 Conceptualizing Corruption in the Primary Sub-sector

Corruption is a multi-pronged vice. It may be grand or petty; isolated or systemic (ACCU, 2004:

2). Corruption takes place in the public, the private as well as the NGO sectors. While corruption

in the private and NGO sectors is undoubtedly important, our interest is in “official” corruption in

the UPE sub-sector. Our research findings indicate that corruption in the UPE program is

predominantly petty in nature; that is, it mainly involves small monies and limited valued

resources. This corruption is nevertheless significant because it appears to be systemic and/or has

been reproduced over time. More importantly, corruption in the UPE sub-sector is important

10

because it involves the misuse of public resources meant to deliver critical pro-poor developmental

goals (such as fighting illiteracy and rural poverty). The main ‘beneficiaries’ are the corrupt

politicians, some Local Government officials, contractors, Headteachers, some chairpersons of

some School Management Committees (SMCs) and other actors.

Because of the aforementioned problem areas, this study operationalizes and investigates

corruption by focusing on the related issues of:

Theft or embezzlement of public funds in the UPE sub-sector

Flawed tendering processes

Ghost schools, ghost teachers or ghost pupils

The key constraints to accountability and transparency in the UPE program; and

The role of grassroots stakeholders (such as CBOs and SMCs)

In all the above cases (which are consistent with our Terms of Reference (see Section 1.4 below),

corruption is conceptualized as:

A force that disorientates planned expenditures within the primary education sub-sector from

official work to private gain

A practice that condemns to misery and social depravity the defenseless, voiceless and

powerless rural and urban poor via the misuse of official resources

A vice that distorts and/or renders inconsequential the UPE educational services ; and

A cancer that compromises the good use of public office, state power and expendable resources

with the primary education sub-sector.

1.4 Terms of Reference

The terms of reference given to us were as follows:

Visit relevant government bodies, CSOs and major libraries and document the magnitude of

corruption in the Universal Primary Education program.

Conduct in-depth studies and document relevant cases in at least four districts in Uganda.

Document the key factors impeding accountability and transparency in the UPE program.

11

Propose plausible solutions to ameliorate the identified constraints; and

Collate and document all information in a manner that will have ease of reference.

1.5 Study Methodology

Methodological triangulation was used in this study. First, we reviewed the documents on UPE in

Uganda. [The Value for Money Audit report prepared by the Auditor General (2003); the Ministry

of Education and Sports (MoES) reports on UPE capitation and schools facilities grants; relevant

letters of key officials; reports of CSOs such as Bundibugyo NGO/CBO Forum and other studies

of individual researchers, government agencies and NGOs were particularly helpful]. After our

critical documentary reviews, a largely qualitative analysis was done, focusing on the

embezzlement of UPE funds, the corrupt tendering processes, the presence or absence of ghosts in

the UPE sub-sector, as well as the key factors that promote or constrain accountability in UPE.

It must be categorically stated that this study was predominantly qualitative. Quantitative

approaches were limited to raw and semi-processed data from official sources. Government

documents, studies of civil society organisations (CSOs) and relevant reports of donor agencies

were consulted to contextualize our study and ensure triangulation.

The study participants (representing the major institutional and individual stakeholders) were

purposively selected. They included (a) selected officials of central government agencies such as

MoES; Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic Development (MoFPED), and Bank of

Uganda (BoU); (b) selected local politicians such as LCV and LCIII officials; (c) relevant local

civil servants such as the Chief Administrative Officers (CAOs); District Inspectors of Schools;

Sub-country Chiefs and their teams;3 (d) grassroots institutions such as the Local Councils and the

School Management Committees (which are statutory organs representing government at the

school level); and (f) selected civil society organizations such as the Anticorruption Coalition,

Uganda (ACCU), ActionAid, The Apac Anti-Corruption Coalition (TAACC), and Christian

Children’s Fund Acenlworo Child and Family Program (CCF).

3 It is worth footnoting that the CAO and Sub-country Chief are the government accounting officers at District and Sub-Country levels repectively. They were, therefore, important study participants.

12

Data Collection Techniques

Different data collection techniques were used. As already hinted, critical document analysis and

literature review (using the literature search guide as a tool) were important sources of information

for this study. We also carried out key informant interviews (KIIs) targeting people who are highly

knowledgeable about the research issues raised in this study. Our KIIs used unstructured interview

guides, which allowed for flexibility in the data collection process.

A major principle of qualitative research – that is carrying out interviews until one reaches a

“saturation point” – guided our research endeavors. We attained this saturation point by the time

we interviewed about 15 respondents for each district (giving an overall total of 60 respondents).

At first sight, this sample appears to be small (in comparison with the large samples used in

quantitative studies). On deeper analysis, however, the sample size does not compromise the

validity of our findings and the reliability of our conclusions for a simple reason. Our study was

largely qualitative. Evidence shows that what matters more than a large sample in qualitative

studies is the use of methodological triangulation, the representativeness of study participants and

the seriousness of the interview effort – which were all taken care of in this study. The study lasted

five (5 months) between April and September 2006 – although most of the fieldwork was done in

August and September 2006.

1.6 Outputs

The major output of this study is a Report written in a simple, non-technical and policy-relevant

language documenting the following:

The major institutional players in the UPE program

The real threat of abuse of UPE resources by unscrupulous contractors, LG officials and some

SMCs, singly or in collusion with other accomplices

The critical role of nationalistic LG officials and CSOs in promoting transparency and

accountability in the use of UPE funds

Local Government institutional weaknesses constraining the effective delivery of value-for-

money services, particularly in the education sub-sector; and.

Evidence-based recommendations necessary for ameliorating the problems of UPE.

13

1.7 Organization of the Report

The rest of this report is structured as follows. Section 2 outlines the institutional context of UPE

in Uganda and underlines the key institutional players involved in the flow of resources from the

Centre (MoES, MoFPED; BoU, etc) to the district and local levels. Section 3 highlights the major

achievements and challenges of UPE in Uganda. Section 4 follows with a presentation of the major

findings and the relevant recommendations (on a case-by-case basis) for ameliorating the shortfalls

identified. The report ends with a recap of our evidence-based recommendations outlining what

needs to be done to disable corruption in the UPE sub-sector.

2. Institutional Context of UPE

In Uganda, the flow of UPE resources takes place at three major levels (see Diagram 1). First is the

highest institutional cum governmental level. This consists of a powerful presidency. [It is

President Milton Obote who announced in 1969 that universal primary education would be his

government’s policy for the “Common Man”, thanks to the social contract (coined the Common

Man’s Charter), which the Obote I government was signing with Ugandans. It is President Yoweri

Museveni who ‘owns’ the current UPE when he announces in December 1996 that come January

1997, Uganda would adopt a universal primary education policy]. The top institutional players in

the UPE policy also include Parliament; cabinet in general; and donor agencies (such as DFID,

USAID and World Bank).

The second or “middle” level institutions involved in the UPE program include the line Ministry of

Education and Sports (MoES); the super-ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic

Development (MoFPED), Bank of Uganda (BoU) and specialized groups or agencies (such as

Education Standards Agency). In a donor-driven economy like Uganda, virtually all of these are

funded and/or have close partnerships with donors. In the context of Uganda’s decentralized

service delivery, the third level of institutions involved in UPE includes LG institutions

(particularly the District and Sub-Country authorities), the SMCs plus grassroots stakeholders such

as ACCU, CCF, and TAACC, which hold statutory LG actors to account for their commissions or

omissions.

14

Diagram 1: Institutional Framework for UPE Resource Flows in Uganda

Source: Adapted from Kiiza, et al, 2006

Notes: PEC Presidential Economic Council: President (Chair) plus Ministers of economic affairs

MoFPED Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic Development (most dominant ministry)

NPA National Planning Authority (Semi-autonomous, under supervision of MoFPED)

UBoS Uganda Bureau of Statistics (Responsible for government data collection) CSOs/NGOs Civil Society Organizations/Non-Governmental Organizations

PRESIDENCY

Parliament

MoES Cabinet

MoFPEDTechnical/ Specialized Groups

NPACentral Bank

Grassroots Stakeholders (eg. CSOs/NGOs)

D O N O R S

D O N O

R S

LG Actors

15

3. Major Achievements and Challenges of UPE

Critical studies (such as this one) that focus on institutional ‘deviations’ from acceptable behaviour

run the risk of appearing to be unappreciative of the positive achievements of Government

programs (such as UPE). To avoid this error, this section outlines the major achievements of UPE.

The aim is to show that several problems persist, notwithstanding the major achievements, and that

if corruption in the UPE program is not disabled, the delivery of the much cherished pro-poor UPE

targets may be substantially compromised.

The stated goal of UPE is to provide a critical mass of “facilities and resources to enable Ugandan

children of school-going age to enter and remain in school and successfully complete the primary

cycle of education”(MoES, 2004: 10 emphasis added). The specific objectives of the UPE program

include transforming society in a substantial way (by, for example, eradicating illiteracy);

eliminating gender and social disparities; and equipping every Ugandan with the basic skills and

knowledge needed for self and national development.

In pursuit of these cherished ends, government expenditure on the education sub-sector has

increased substantially, particularly after 2000. The share of the education sector in the total

discretionary recurrent budget has been over 30%, with over 60% being allocated to the primary

education sub-sector. As a result of increased resource commitments, school enrolment has

increased from 3.0 million in 1996 (before UPE) through 5.3 million (1997) and 6.9 million (2001)

to 7.6 million in 2003, although the figure declined to 7.4 million in 2004 (AG, 2003: 5; MoES,

Data Base, 2006). Between 2000 and 2004, teachers on government payroll increased from 82,148

to 147,291. The proportion of enrolment in government-aided primary schools rose from 82% in

2000 to 89% in 2002 and 91% in 2004. The rate of increase in enrolment in government-aided

schools exceeds that of overall enrolment in primary schools. The percentage distribution of pupils

in government, private and community schools is 91%, 5% and 4% respectively.

The strategic role of the state in the provision of primary education signifies that the erosion of the

quality and effectiveness of government-aided UPE schools (via, for example, wrong classroom to

pupil ratios associated with delayed or incomplete construction of classrooms) will dramatically

16

lower the quality of national education and development. This, then, points to the need to

strengthen specialized quality control institutions like Education Standards Agency (ESA).

While Uganda has made notable gains in the delivery of UPE, several shortfalls (such as shoddy

construction work) have persisted, affecting the quality and accessibility of primary education.

4. Awareness of Corruption: Is Inaction a Deliberate Government Policy?

A major question posed by this study is: Are the major actors aware of the magnitude of corruption

in the UPE sub-sector? If so, is government inaction a deliberate policy perpetuated by central and

local government officials?

4.1 High Government Awareness Exists: Evidence from AG’s Report of 2003

Evidence from different government reports indicates that government has high awareness of

official corruption in general and abuse of UPE resources in particular. A typical case in point is

the Auditor General’s Value for Money Audit on the Universal Primary Education Program of

July 2003. In this key report (which was prepared for MoES) on the School Facilities Grant and

the Capitation Grants (the main components of UPE finances), the AG noted, among other things,

that influence peddling was a major factor constraining transparency and value for money in the

UPE program. The SFG tender agreement requires that payments will only be made for a stage of

construction that has been satisfactorily completed and approved by the standard SFG certificate of

works issued by the district. Sites are supposed to be completed within 3 months of

commencement. Moreover, retention money is to be paid after the defects period of 6 months.

The AG established that “contractors obtained certificates for stages not completed and went ahead

to get full payments in advance inclusive of retention fees” (AG, 2003: 8). Table 4.1 summarizes

typical cases of payments for incomplete work in selected districts. The AG notes that:

SFG classrooms at Bulunguli P.S had been commissioned by MoES officials as complete yet the

walls were not plastered, the window bars were smaller than those recommended and the

classrooms nether had concrete floor nor a blackboard. These classes were in use at the time of

inspection (AG, 2003: 9).

17

The AG’s conclusion was that the targeted classroom to pupil ratio of 1:55 could not be achieved

because of corruption in the UPE sub-sector. (The current classroom to pupil ration varies between

33 in Kalangala, 41 in Kampala and 47 in Wakiso to 103 (Apac), 129 (Arua) and 185 in Pader,

giving the national average of 84 pupils per class).

Table 4.1: Typical Cases of Payments for Incomplete Work in Selected Districts

District School Contractor Contract Amount Paid Status of Work on

Inspection Expected completion date

Ntungamo Rwanda P. S Mutunzi C 35,000,000 34,443,825 Roofing incomplete Nov 2001 Ntungamo Bujuzya P. S Mubangizi H 35,000,000 34,443,825 Latrine collapsed before

completion; Classroom incomplete

Nov 2001

Iganga Bulunguli P. S “SMC” 24,760,000 23,522,000 Done up to roofing Aug 2001 Iganga Busuyi (1) P.S 8,578,000 8,149,100 Done up to roofing Mar 2000 Iganga Busuyi (2) P.S 8,578,000 8,149,100 Done up to roofing Mar 2000 Iganga Bugomba P.S 8,578,000 8,149,100 Done up to roofing Mar 2000 Katakwi Abwanget Kuju PS Pioneer Co of

Amuria 11,708,000

11,708,000

Partly roofed

Mar 2002

Katakwi Angatuny PS Larry Stationers

25,418,000

25,418,000

Water system not done valued at 2,314,242; shoddy work

Nov 2001

Katakwi Odiding P.S Pioneer Co of Amuria

20,616,000

20,616,000

Partly roofed

Dec 2001

Tororo Kachonga P.S (Classrooms

Ludo Enterprises

17,156,000

17,156,000

Partly plastered

Feb 2001

Tororo Kachonga P.S (Furniture)

Welfare Agencies (Ally Hamya)

2,700,000

2,700,000

Not delivered after 2 years

Feb 2001

Source: AG, Value for Money Audit on Universal Primary Education, 2003: 9

Conclusion: It can be inferred from the above that government is aware of the problem of

corruption in UPE. In many cases, government officials collude with contractors, Headteachers

and other actors to abuse UPE resources. What is difficult to ascertain is whether widespread

corruption within central and LG circles renders corruption the covert policy of the current

government.

18

Recommendations: Central government authorities need to take studies of the AG, IGG and PAC

seriously. Second, district authorities must only pay for work that is completed and certified.

Third, engineers who certify stages as complete when they are not, must be charged with

negligence of duty and ordered to pay for the losses incurred by the tax-payer.

4.2 High Knowledge Also Exists Among CSOs: The Case of Bundibugyo NGO/CBO Forum

Evidence suggests that CSOs operating in Uganda are highly knowledgeable about corruption in

UPE. The Bundibugyo NGO/CBO Forum is a case in point. This Forum is an umbrella

organization of CSOs operating in Bundibugyo district. It operates through community institutions

called the Community-Based Monitoring Committees that report on a quarterly basis to the Forum

on the problems of corruption.

In its first and second Quarter Report of 2005, the NGO/CBO Forum documents several corruption

scandals in the UPE program. The following examples serve to illustrate the point at issue:

Karambi Primary School in Burondo Parish, is under construction in the first half of 2005.

Even before completion, the walls and floor are cracking. This arises from the shoddy work

that has been done. Moreover, no pit-latrines have been constructed at the school.

In the case of Bundimasoli P. S in Burondo Parish, the Headteacher convinces the

chairman of the SMC to sign blank cheques. Later, the Headteacher withdraws the funds

and uses them with no clear accountability. In the same school, value for money is not

exhibited. A dozen of pens costs 6,000/= when the retail price is 200/= per pen.

In Bundimbugha P.S, Mitunda Parish, 9 primary school girls are defiled in the first quarter.

The cases are reported to the relevant authorities, but no action is taken against the culprits.

In Buhanda P.S in Bundiyama Parish, money for August and September 2004 was not

utilized at all for official purposes, according to a leading member of the SMC. Reports

indicate that the Headteacher used up all the money and did not account for it. The same

Buhanda P. S was given Shs 5,400,000/= to repair the school building. By May 2005, no

work had been done.

In Itojo Primary School, Itojo Parish, the admission book indicates 503 pupils but the daily

attendance list shows 250 pupils only. In Kyabandara P.S, in the same Parish, the

19

admission book indicates 400 pupils but the daily attendance list shows 250 pupils. The

same school gets a new Headteacher in 2005. The old Headteacher does not officially

handed over to the incoming Headteacher. And so, accountability for UPE resources is not

seen.

In Kasozi P.S, Karugutu Parish, 651 pupils were enrolled in the school but the actual

headcount shows only 505 pupils. The staff list indicates 7 teachers but only 3 are found at

school. Between February and June 2004, the school received 870,000/= which he

Headteacher accounted for. But in the accountability report, a store is rented in town at

60,000/= yet the school has a store. A chalk board is shown to have cost Shs 260,000/=

when the market price is between 50,000/= and 80,000/=. The July – September 2004

releases were not displayed on the notice-boards and no accountability is seen.

In Karugutu P.S, Karugutu Parish, the funds released to the school in the first quarter of

2005 totaled Shs 669,723/=. The Headteacher accounts for Shs 634,608/=. The balance of

Shs 37,115/= is not accounted for. Moreover, the funds at this school are not used in

accordance with the MoES guidelines. When the Headteacher is asked ‘why’, he explains

that diversion of funds was caused by delays in the disbursement of funds from the centre.

The school also collected Shs 3,000/= per parent per year, but the transactions for this

money cannot be seen because no records were kept.

Conclusion: It can be concluded from the above that CSOs and other grassroots monitors are not

just knowledgeable about corruption in UPE. They are working hard to expose and, hopefully,

uproot, the vice in the primary education sector. Shocking corruption scandals have been

unearthed. Unfortunately, according to key informers, no serious action had been taken (by the

time we did fieldwork) to kick corruption out of the primary education sector.

Recommendation: There is need for anti-corruption struggles to be broadened and deepened. More

actors such as faith-based organizations and PTAs need to be mobilized and empowered to rescue

pro-poor UPE resources. Pressure also needs to be stepped up to cause government to take action

on those implicated in corruption scandals. We also recommend the provision of basic legal

education to the citizens and the training of civil society institutions on the duty of citizens to take

corrupt officials to court. These will probably result in reduced corruption.

20

4.3 Abundant Local Government Knowledge Exists

Under Uganda’s system of decentralized service delivery, LG institutions are critical players in the

success or failure of government programs at district and local levels. Documentary evidence

shows that many LG authorities have abundant knowledge of corruption and resource waste in the

UPE program. In a letter dated 18 October 2005, Ref. No. CR 207/1, the Bundibugyo CAO, Mr.

John Asiimwe, writes a staggering 26 companies or individuals warming them that they had

violated their contractual obligations by doing incomplete and/or shoddy construction works for

government.4 The CAO’s letter is worth quoting at length:

You are aware that you entered into a contractual agreement to perform construction works … and you have failed to carry out your obligations for the said contract and the inspection carried out from 28th September 2005 to 13 Oct 2005 by my Technical Staff indicated that the work is incomplete and there are defects on some sites dues to shoddy work… Your actions now constitute a breech of contract and you are therefore notified and demanded to comply with the following: (i) That within 3 weeks time from receipt of this letter, you will have completed the works and correcting the defects pending handover. (ii) Failure to do (i) above, will show that you are sabotaging government programs and the law will take its own course and also the concerned companies will not be recommended for pre-qualification for more jobs next financial year 2006/2007. You are therefore in the process of being blacklisted…

The interviewees we talked to indicated that John Asiimwe’s tough anti-corruption stance has led

to a substantial reduction in corruption in the district. However, “Mafia companies like Jamaica

have given birth to new Mafia companies that are competing for LG tenders under the guise of

new identities” (Interview with District Authorities, 2006). Interviewees indicated that shoddy

companies are able to metamorphose and survive because they are owned by influential (local)

politicians and/or have “guardians” within government institutions.

4 The 26 companies or individuals are: Jamaica Contractors Ltd, Rwenzori Snow Co Ltd, Mbusa Gideon, SKP Building Contractors Ltd, Allied Building Contractors Ltd, Pearl Engineering Ltd, Kibamba Semu, Rwatanite Friendly Group, United Civil Engineering Standards Contractors Ltd, Sunday Tadeo, Jan & M Co. Ltd, New Moon Investments Ltd, Monday Bernard, Kaba Civil Engineering Ltd, Makune Sebbi, Agro Initiatives Ltd, Bakulihare Yokonia, Mumbere Samson, Monday Sikahwa, Balyeijukya Peter, Flamingo Construction Co. Ltd, Busobozi Juma, Musinguzi Robert, Buheesi Renovators & Contractors Ltd, Mugerra Martin and Byaruhanga Yusuf.

21

Conclusion: While a number of government officials collude with corrupt companies and

individuals, not every government official is corrupt.

Recommendation: The anti-corruption crusaders should ally with the morally upright government

officials (such as John Asiimwe) to expose corrupt practices and reduce abuse of public resources.

Effective anti-corruption officials and cases should be showcased to demonstrate to the country

that there is hope in the struggle against misgovernance. We recommend the introduction of the

CAO of the Year; DEO of the Year, CFO of the Year; Headteacher of the Year, CSO of the Year

and Contractor of the Year awards. These should be given to individual or institutional actors who

excel in fighting corruption plus companies that deliver value-for-money services. These positive

incentives should augment the severe sanctions that should be imposed on corrupt officials and

contractors.

5. Findings from Apac, Bundibugyo, Hoima, Mukono and Soroti in Comparative Perspective

This section presents our major findings from primary sources in comparative perspective. The

information is organized thematically in accordance with our ToRs. Accordingly, we present

findings on:

(a) The magnitude of corruption in the UPE sub-sector

(b) The theft or embezzlement of UPE funds

(c) The flaws in the tendering/ procurement process

(d) The issue of ghost schools, ghost teachers or ghost pupils; and

(e) The key constraints to accountability and transparency in UPE.

5.1 Magnitude of Corruption

This section does not pretend to present “hard” quantitative data or statistical evidence of the trend

and magnitude of corruption. This would be a futile exercise given that reliable quantitative data

on corruption (in Uganda) does not exist (and is unlikely to exist in the foreseeable future, given

the clandestine nature of most corruption-related behaviours). What this section does is to give a

vivid description of the gravity of corruption using primary (qualitative) responses from our

interviewees.

22

Reference has already been made to documentary evidence showing that the magnitude of

corruption in the primary school sub-sector is high. As a follow, we conducted in-depth interviews

to establish whether, in the opinion of our interviewees, corruption in UPE was increasing,

decreasing or fairly constant between 1997 and 2006. The responses were mixed. Most CAOs and

other local civil servants pointed out that corruption was on the decline. What was on the increase,

it was argued, was the reportage on corruption, arising, according to respondents, from increased

civil society activism, improved school inspection, media coverage and publicity on FM stations.

[This view upholds the claim of President Museveni that corruption under his government has not

increased; that what has increased is arguably the exposure and media coverage].

According to the Deputy DEO of Bundibugyo district,

The mismanagement of UPE funds has been going down because of the advent of a new CAO [Mr

John Asiimwe] who came to Bundibugyo in July 2004. Unlike previous Local Government officials

and some CAOs in other parts of Uganda, Mr. Asiimwe has taken corruption in the district head-

on. In the UPE program, the shoddy construction work that used to be performed by Mafia

companies such as Jamaica is no longer tolerated (Interviews, August 2006).

Mr. Michael Asaku, the Headteacher of Aminit primary school in Kamuda Sub-County, Soroti

District also argued that corruption was under control. He however conceded that the guidelines

pertaining to use of UPE funds are typically “adjusted.” This arguably arises from the need by

Headteachers to keep the schools running as they wait for delayed releases of resources from the

centre. The Chairperson of the SMC for Arapai Primary School complained:

People accuse Headteachers of “eating” UPE monies; but this is not the case. The real problem is

that money is little and is hardly, if ever, released on time. To keep the schools running, school

authorities are forced to divert some UPE resources to finance critical needs. Diversion, in this

case, is not a sign of corruption. It is necessitated by the real challenges on the ground. The

alternative available to school authorities is to close the schools and wait for UPE resources from

the centre.

23

A substantial number of respondents argued that UPE money is too little to be embezzled and that

by the time it is received, “the Headteacher has incurred so many debts to keep school running.

Headteachers typically spend the money before it is received and accounts for it later” (Interviews,

2006). The Deputy DEO of Soroti, Mr Everest Okello, also argued that “UPE funds do not come

promptly. Delays in the release of UPE finances cause challenges in the use of, and accountability

for, UPE funds. In short, Headteachers incur debts and pay later when the monies arrive”.

Most of the Soroti schools we visited display the amount of funds received and how it is allocated.

No instances of embezzlement were reported at the level of allocation of funds to schools.

According to the Assistant DEO, “Reports of misuse of funds were last made in 2002/2003 in

Gweri Primary School , Gweri Sub-County; and Serere Primary School in Serere township. Other

cases were reported in Kateta, Kadungulu, and Arapai Sub-Counties around 2002/2004”. A key

official from the Internal Auditor’s office revealed that most of these cases arose out of limited

knowledge of financial management by Headteachers, worsened by the absence of professional

bursars or accountants in primary schools. In his opinion, corruption was on the decline.

However, according to the Coordinator of the Apac Anti-Corruption Coalition (TAACC), Mr Tom

Oponya, the trend of corruption is not visibly changing for the better. “The people who

misappropriate public resources are getting more cunning in the way they do their things. At one

time, corruption was seen as bribery and normal but now, it is done in a hidden way. It has

completely changed form but there is no peculiar reduction” (Interviews, 2006).

In Kwania and Kole Counties where the Christian Children Fund (CCF) operates, the vice has,

according to respondents, gone down. “CCF empowers children to monitor the use of UPE funds.

Unlike adults who may be compromised, mission-driven children are difficult to bribe.

HeadTeachers now know everybody is watching them so they do not divert the money” (Program

Officer, CCF). According to Grace Ocare,

“Before the Ministry of Education and Sports started buying text books for schools, the

Headteachers would deceive our monitors that UPE money was being used to buy textbooks. Yet

24

the books were, in actual sense, not being bought. Now that the Ministry buys the books for

schools and since CCF also buys some books for schools, Headteachers can no longer give lame

excuses (Interviews, 2006).”

Mr Nebba Insingoma, former LCII Chairman, Buhamba Parish, Kitoba Sub-County (Hoima

District) presented a nuanced view. According to him,

Overt corruption may have reduced, but covert corruption is still a problem. Collusion between

the Headteacher, the Chairman of the School Management Committee and suppliers of stationery

and other school facilities has continued to cause the loss of UPE resources. While uncritical

auditors may find Headteachers with “proper” receipts, the truth of the matter is that the price of

most items purchased is inflated.

This view was upheld by David Obwang, (Program Coordinator, ActionAid Uganda). According

to him, Headteachers have ties with suppliers of school requirements. Some even have forged

stamps and receipt books. So, they present “evidence” of items procured which is not correct in

the real sense. Yet, it is difficult to verify whether what is on paper is on the ground. I am

convinced UPE is not taking us anywhere (Interviews, 2006).

In Soroti, Asuret Sub-County, a SMC member revealed: “Headteachers also function as

purchasing officers. This creates conflicts of interest. Besides, some Headteachers were ‘strongly

encouraged’ to purchase school supplies from ‘certain’ shops – such as Tick or Malta shop –

which dealt in UPE materials. The DEO would direct Headteachers to buy from certain shops, or

their receipts would not be recognized” (Interview, 2006). A key informer revealed that while

those shops are no longer existing, it is possible that such influences still exist. [We lacked the time

and financial resources needed for prolonged stay in the field, to establish whether (a) the practices

still existed; (b) whether the DEO wanted to ensure that UPE schools get quality materials from

verified shops; or (c) whether the DEO was, in essence, creating business for shops in which he

had private interests. Further investigative studies are necessary].

25

Conclusion: Corruption is clearly more serious in some districts than others. Corruption in UPE

continues to be associated with deficiencies in public sector ethics and the associated selfishness of

key actors in the UPE sub-sector. However some species of corruption (such as diversion of funds

to keep the school running) are associated with institutional weaknesses, particularly the delays in

the release of UPE funds from the centre. Another key institutional problem is the absence of

professional bursars or accountants.

Recommendations: As anti-corruption institutional and individual actors step up the struggle

against corrupt practices (such as the collusion between different UPE stakeholders), government

should make an effort to: (a) minimize delays in the disbursement of UPE funds; and (b) recruit,

train and motivate bursars/accountants who should now be deployed at school level.

5.2 Selected Cases of Theft and Embezzlement

We found no shocking evidence of theft or embezzlement of UPE resources in Hoima and Mukono

districts. In Soroti, the CAO, Mr. George William Omuge, said there are important cases of misuse

of UPE money. “In Agorigori Primary School, for example, the Headmaster failed to account and

was put to task.” [The CAO could not recall how much money was involved and was not in

position to find out at that stage, given that our visit was “impromptu”]. According to the CAO,

“There are some important cases of misuse of money. One time, the Headteacher of Agorigori

Primary School failed to account and was reprimanded. Some Headteachers have been dismissed;

but the greatest tool we use is to target their salaries, which we ‘tax.’ We keep on deducting a

certain percentage from the salary until the stolen money is recovered.”

The most shocking evidence of embezzlement was obtained from Apac. “In Apwori Primary

School, Chawente Sub-County, the Headteacher used to forge the signature of the SMC chairman

and obtain money from the bank. However, he would keep deceiving the CCF Monitors that he

was not getting UPE funds. In one of the PTA meetings held in 2003, which was also attended by

members of CCF, it was established that the Headmaster had withdrawn 2 million from the bank

and left a balance of only 200 shillings” (CCF Interviews, 2006). According to key informers, the

Headteacher’s services were not terminated. He was simply transferred – a kid’s glove approach to

corrupt practices indeed (Interviews, 2006).

26

The Headteacher of Adigo Primary School diverted a sum of Shs. 630,000/= from the first Quarter

of the 2002 budget that was meant to purchase school furniture. According to interviewees, the

Headteacher used the money to cause the “release” of the following people who had been

imprisoned at the Central Police Station, Apac District: Francis Okello Francis, Opio Atedero,

Newton Odyek, L. Ojuka, Omara and Benon Ogweng [District Court, before Levi Atepo- Grade II

Magistrate, Apac; under Criminal Case No. 413/2001). The same Headteacher purchased a Nokia

mobile phone at Shs. 250,000/= without supporting SMC minutes.

In 2003, the Headteacher of Arido Primary School, Mr. Lawrence Adonyo, misappropriated

money in a crude way. “He could write his own minutes, put names without signatures, forge the

signature of SMC Chairman and withdraw the money. When the CCF monitors went to his office,

he was not in office” (CCF Interviews, 2006). It was further revealed that CCF child monitors

were sent to the Headmaster’s office to make a follow-up and monitor the use of UPE resources.

“This was a classic case of the biblical Davids of today confronting the biblical Goliath” [1 Samuel

17: 45-57]. The Headmaster bribed the child monitors with 30,000/= to keep quiet. The monitors

did not keep quiet but instead took the money to CCF offices. [The 20,000 and 10,000 bank notes

are kept on the file]. The CCF office wrote the Headmaster twice to go to CCF and explain but he

did not. He eventually lobbied the DEO to transfer him. The DEO obliged. [The Headmaster ran

away before CCF could establish how much money he had misappropriated].

Another case involved the Headmaster of Ogil Primary school in Nambieso Sub-county. This

Headmaster closed the school one week to the official date of closure (in 2005). He was suspected

to have misappropriated UPE funds. During the holidays, he asked for transfer and went away. The

case was not followed.

The Headmaster of Boda Primary School, Chawente Sub-County also used to misappropriate UPE

monies by buying less UPE materials than he was supposed to buy. “He thought because the road

to his school was poor, he couldn’t be apprehended. However, CCF monitors reached his school

and put him to task. Now he is a changed man” (Interviews, CCF Program Officer, 2006).

27

Conclusion: Abundant evidence exists suggesting important cases of theft/embezzlement of UPE

resources. Two issues run through. First is the increased vigilance and activism of civil society

organizations. Second is, unfortunately, the “kids’ glove” form of punishment dished out to the

perpetuators of corruption. The former should be encouraged; while the latter should be fought.

Recommendation: The vigilance of civil society organizations based in Apac (and Bundibugyo)

should be extended to other parts of Uganda. However, if this activism is to deliver improved pro-

poor services, the state, which monopolizes the legitimate use of force, needs to get serious.

Corrupt officials should be dismissed. They must also be caused to refund the lost monies. If this

does not work, their property should be attached till the stolen monies are recovered. This tough

approach has helped countries like China to substantially reduce official corruption. It should be

tried in Uganda.

5.3 Flawed Tendering/Procurement Processes

Flawed tendering/procurement processes were reported in all the districts we studied. In Hoima

(which is widely believed to be a “sane” district), we found Kibingo Moslem Nursery and Primary

School in Kyabigambire Sub-County to be a distinctive case of shoddy work. We observed that the

timber used was of poor quality and was warping. The veranda has already separated from the

main wall. The cement finishing on the floor has already worn off, suggesting that wrong cement

to sand ratios were used (i.e too little cement). Some of the school walls are not straight,

suggesting poor workmanship. Constructed only in 2004/2005, this building is supposed to last 30

years, which will certain not happen (unless remedial measures are taken). The Chairman of the

SMC for Kibingo Muslem School said he never signed the completion certificate. He argued that

he was supposed to sign but was bypassed. Yet the contractor received full payment (except the

retention fee). The building has been rejected by parents. The District Inspector forced the pupils

to enter but the PTA refused for fear the building would collapse on their children any time.

At the core of the above shoddy work, according to the Deputy Headteacher, is dirty local politics.

The contractor TUIKATE represented by Jackson Mutegeki is a front for the Speaker of the

District Council, who appears to have connived with the former Headteacher. The former

28

Headteacher Mr. Latif Kabuleeta, was suspended in September 2005 and his salary withheld and

later interdicted in June 2006 (Interviews, 2006).

In Soroti, the District Tender Board [now District Contracts Committee] was also riddled with

corruption and influence peddling. A leading LG official who asked for anonymity stated thus:

Our District Tender Board is, in theory, a technical institution that awards tenders on merit. A

firm competes for government contracts in a transparent manner and wins or loses on technical

grounds. But that is only true in theory. In practice, politicians do influence the decisions of the

Tender Board. Some councilors hide behind companies that are supposedly private, use their

political muscle to get contracts and proceed to do shoddy work. This complicates the work of

district civil servants such as the District Engineer or the CAO, who is the district accounting

officer. Imagine you are a District Engineer and your political boss (meaning District Councilors

and LCV Chair) is involved. Your technical work will be heavily influenced by political

considerations. For instance, before contractors are fully paid, a certificate of supervision has to

be signed by the District Engineer, the Engineering Assistant, Sub-County Chief and Headteacher.

But how easy is it to tell a company owned by your local political boss that the contractor does not

merit a certificate of completion? Your job would be at stake (Interviews, 2006).

In Mukono, political interference was also found to compromise meritocratic tendering processes.

For example, in Koome Sub-County (located on Koome Island), the Sub-County Chief owns a

construction company called Surex Contractors. This company has been wining almost all

construction tenders (eg to build primary schools). Yet, according to an influential local civil

servant who requested anonymity, the structures constructed by Surex Contractors are poor in

quality. [Because of time and financial resource limitations, we were not able to independently

verify this piece of information]. Since the Sub-County Chief is a “friend” of the LC III

Councilors, his work has not been queried (Interviews, 2006). This, then, appears to be a

distinctive case of connivance.

In Bundibugyo, two private companies were repeatedly reported by respondents as key players in

the flawed tendering/procurement processes – Kaba Civil Engineering Co Ltd (the first company

29

that constructed a shoddy building at Bundibugyo Public School) and Jamaica Contractors.

Jamaica Contractors is particularly notorious. According to key informers, this company belongs

to Elisha Kyamukama, a brother to Hon. Jane Alisemera, woman MP., Bundibugyo District. [Time

constraints could not allow us to verify this information with the Registrar of Companies]. Because

of its political connections, locally and nationally, Jamaica has been winning a substantial number

of LG tenders. In 2002/2003, Jamaica won two tenders to construct four class room blocks at

Bundikakemba Primary School and four at Bundikahondo Primary School. The work was

abandoned at ring beam level and before completion of gable ends respectively. That

notwithstanding, Jamaica was awarded another two contracts in 2003/2004, one to build an office,

a store and a 5-stance latrine at Busoru Primary School; and the other, to construct a staff house at

Bundimagwara Primary School. Both pieces of assignment were done unprofessionally (See

CAO’s Letter, 18/10/2005). In 2004/2005, notorious Jamaica wins three new tenders to construct

(a) two classrooms at Bundibugyo Public School, (b) two classrooms at Njuule Primary School,

and (c) an office and a store at Kaleyala Primary School. All these were found to be shoddy

(CAO’s Letter, 18/10/ 2005). While the new CAO and the DEO have mounted a struggle against

Jamaica and other corrupt companies, Jamaica has, according to key informers, metamorphosed

into new “Mafia companies” which continue to lobby for LG tenders.[Because of time and

financial constraints, we were not able to establish who these new companies are].

Comparable cases of corrupt tendering/procurement processes were found in Apac. A few

examples will suffice here.

A 5-stance pit latrine under UNICEF funding was allocated to Akwon Primary School

Ongoceng Parish, Aduku Sub-County. The company that did the construction is alleged to

belong to one civil servant called Mr. Charles Apat who works in the Water Department

and is also a UNICEF DIT member. The latrine collapsed before use and no action was

taken by the authorities.

There is substandard construction work at Alworoceng Primary School (toilet), in Ibuje

Sub-county. The work was contracted to a company identified as CLEVE Adams.

Payments were fully effected; but no action taken on the substandard work.

30

The construction of a pit latrine at Adigo primary school, Loro Sub-County was done poorly. The

company that was contracted to do the work belongs to one Felix Odur. The toilet has collapsed.

Payment was completed but no action was taken by responsible authorities. The same company

owned by Felix Odur was contracted to construct a pit latrine at Amido Primary School. The

latrine collapsed soon after construction. The work was certified by District authorities; full

payment was made and no action was taken on the shoddy work.

Kanya–Kanya Co. Ltd was awarded a tender to construct a stance toilet in Nora Primary

School, Aber Sub-County. The work was sub- standard and has cracks on floors and walls.

Yet payment was fully effected and no action was taken by responsible authorities to

challenge the shoddy work.

Conclusion: Tendering in general and construction work in particular, has been a fertile arena for

UPE resource waste. Resource waste has been perpetuated via corrupt public/private partnerships,

an issue that appears to challenge received wisdom that closer partnerships between the state and

business companies provides hope for more effective public service delivery.

Recommendation: Several interviewees suggested that construction work should be taken off the

weak shoulders of Local Governments and SMCs. What Uganda needs is a clean, well resourced

public construction company comparable to Uganda National Housing Corporation or the effective

public construction agency of Rwanda. However, while state leadership in the construction sector

should continue, there should be deliberate efforts to build the capacities of private construction

companies – via, for example, improved training in Kyambogo and Kichwamba technical

institutions. This hardcore cum technical training should be backed by training in the soft sciences

needed for national development and effective public service delivery. These are

nationalism/patriotism plus public sector ethics.

5.4 Ghost Schools, Ghost Teachers, and Ghost Pupils

Another issue worth noting is the problem of ghost schools, ghost teachers and ghost pupils. Our

study uncovered three ghost schools – one in Teso and two in Bundibugyo. The Teso ghost school

31

is called Bwirire Primary School (which is still nomadic, according to interviewees) and the two in

Bundibugyo are Lamica Primary School and Bundibugyo Public School (both of which have since

been formalized). Bundibugyo Public School is particularly an interesting case. According to a key

official of Bundibugyo NGO/CBO Forum, the school started in 1998 as a ghost that was propped

up by the area Councilor, Justus Nkayarwa. It got UPE monies till 2003 when it was “discovered”.

NGO/CBO interviewees pointed out that the DEO who connived with Councilor Nkayarwa, the

late Philemon Byakutaaga, was demoted and retired. [He later on died]. The Chief Accountant and

Inspectors were transferred. The school, which now has shoddy structures built by Jamaica

Contractors, was formalized in 2004. It has 289 pupils, is headed by Mrs Proscovia Bisabali,

benefits from WFP foods and is fully government aided. [The last Management and PTA meeting

took place on 10 September 2006].5

The problem of ghost teachers was found to be relatively insignificant. The Assistant DEO of

Soroti argued: “You can’t completely rule out the possibility of a ghost teacher or ghost pupil here

and there. But this problem is not systemic. It is minor.” In Apac, a report of IBM on Aduku

Primary School (dated 17 August 2006), which was submitted to TAACC shows that one teacher,

Ruth Akello, retired in 2002; but she still gets her salary (as a ghost). Another report of TAACC

monitors dated 19 August 2006 shows that in Kamdini Primary School, Robert Odoc was not

teaching but was getting a full salary. [The monitors claim he is an alcoholic although the

Headmaster told them he was sick]. In Mukono, Mr. Ntege, an Inspector of Schools, said that

ghost teachers occur when the death or transfer of a teacher is not followed, immediately, with an

update of official records. In Hoima, Dr. Patrick Mwesigwa (CAO), Joseph Lubega (Education

Officer), and the District Inspector of Schools asserted that there are “no vacancies for ghost

teachers” in Hoima District. “Even when a teacher dies or is transferred, it is hard for anybody to

benefit from ghost teachers. For one thing, every teacher has a bank account where his/her salary is

deposited. This reduces the incentives for any corrupt officials to create ghosts. They just would

not benefit from it.”

5 There are leading indicators that that the school was put up in a hurry. It is located in a valley with no space for expansion. No sufficient space for co-curricular activities exists (eg for children to play during break time). No land is ear marked for staff quarters. The structures which should last for 30 years (“completed” in 2004 ) are already collapsing. Indeed, the latrines are only a couple of metres away from classrooms.

32

Ghost pupils were found to be a more serious problem than ghost teachers. In Soroti, the Inspector

of Schools, Peter Okubu, revealed that cases of ghost pupils were common when Kaberamaido,

Amuria and Katakwi were still part of Soroti District – it was too big. “But these were eliminated

in 2001-2002.” In the case of Abapiri Primary School, Chawente Sub-County (Apac), during term

II in 2006, the Headteacher inflated the number of pupils in the school to obtain UPE monies.

According to a CCF Programe Officer, “The actual number of pupils is 277 but the man is using

over 900 pupils” (Interviews, 2006]. In Hoima, the CAO argued that there cannot be ghost pupils

under his administration. Inspections is carried out every after 3 months to verify and/or clean up

school records. The County Inspector of Buhaguzi County also said that the way registers are

designed cannot allow existence of ghost pupils. “If a pupil is absent for a prolonged period, such

a pupil should not be put on the next page. Moreover, a daily attendance list is displayed on the

notice-board by the class teachers showing the number of those present and those absent. The list

is gender disaggregated. Thus, if an Inspector comes, he [“or she”, I added] has to count students

who are present and verify the numbers displayed on the notice board” (Interviews, 2006). In

short, display of attendance lists, close Inspection plus monthly submissions of student enrolments

to the district have eliminated the possibility of ghost pupils in Hoima. According to the Deputy

CAO, “Hoima is the leading district in payrolls without ghosts. You can verify this

independently.” [Time and resource constraints made it hard for us to do national level verification

of this claim].

Conclusion: Tough actions from assertive district authorities appear to have caused substantial

reductions in UPE resource misuse. It seems reasonable to conclude that ghost schools, ghost

teachers and ghost pupils can hardly exist without the collusion of LG authorities and the school

administration.

Recommendation: A culture of zero-defects and zero tolerance of ghosts should be cultivated. Any

CAO, DEO, District Inspector, finance officer, Headteacher or SMC member who is found to

perpetuate ghosts should be dismissed forthwith and forced to pay back lost UPE resources.

Second, we recommend the deepening of a culture of improved computerization and data

management at District, Sub-County and school levels. This calls for reliable power. Generators

33

should be budgeted for and supplied to these different units as local communities await effective

rural electrification.

5.5 Constraints to Accountability and Transparency in UPE Sector

Under the system of financial decentralization, a bottom-up approach to accountability is used.

Accountability for UPE funds comes from the school authorities. Each school has a Finance

Committee consisting of teachers who are headed by a Deputy Headteacher. When UPE monies

are received, the Committee makes a budget and submits it to the School Management Committee.

In theory, the Head teacher may not withdraw or spend UPE monies without the approval of the

SMC. None of the schools we visited lacked this institutional/procedural arrangement.

Headteachers are provided with vote control sheets, cash books and cash analysis books. They are

accountable to the CAO (the chief accounting officer in the district) who works with the DEO and

the CFO. The CAO, DEO and CFO are the signatories to the Education Sector Account. They

receive UPE funds from the centre, sign school cheques and deposit them at school accounts (in

Stanbic Bank). The CAO has overall accountability for resources spent in the district and is

accountable to the MoES (which works on financial matters in partnership with the MoFPED),

with the Auditor General exercising regularity cum compliance functions.

Several factors were found to constrain accountability and transparency in the use of UPE funds.

First, is lack of political will to fight corruption. Top NRM-O politicians claim that official

corruption will be dealt a heavy blow under their newly re-elected government. According to a

leading legal scholar, “These people have been around for 20 years. Omwana akulema mu buto

mbu ndimuzala mubukadde! [A Luganda proverb meaning: Time is money! Anybody who wishes

to made dramatic changes does so before the appropriate opportunity wanes]. Another academic

(Political Science, Makerere University) stated:

“This claim of the regime in Kampala is of rhetorical value. It is PR [public relations] gymnastics

at its best. The truth of the matter is that top politicians (and some bureaucrats) are unwilling to

dismantle the corrupt practices that have enabled them to build economic empires via crony

capitalism. A top minister is censured for impropriety but is recycled by the appointing authority

34

who cites his ‘patriotic’ contribution to the bush war in the 1980s. The minister squanders global

funds for AIDS, tuberculosis and malaria. He and his accomplices build mansions and drive

prestigious vehicles. All they get as ‘punishment’ is a sack (sic). None of their ill-gotten wealth is

touched, perhaps because ‘they fought’ or mobilized funds for the 2006 presidential elections. A

top army officer asks for bribes to lubricate military procurement. He is involved in the delivery of

junk helicopters which compromise our national security. He can’t be touched. He is too dear to

the appointing authority and must, ironically, be elevated to a ministerial position. Robert Rutaagi,

the boss of National Medical Stores, causes problems in virtually all public institutions where he is

deployed. He is simply shifted from one fat position to another. Where is the political will in all

this to fight corruption? (Interviews, 2006).

In short, the claim is that corruption at the top permeates all administrative, political and social

systems. This appears to uphold the proverbial assertion: “Fish starts rotting from the head. Other

parts only follow.”

The second problem is the death of morals and public sector ethics. According to Nebba Isingoma,

a former LCII Chairman (Hoima), “most perpetuators of corruption in UPE are the Mathews, the

Toms, Jacksons, Moses or Mohammeds of this world. They were baptized into Christainity or

socialized into Islamic moral principles. The disconnect between the strict moral principles of

Christianity or Islam and the moral degeneration of public officials suggests that Uganda has a

complex ethical problem. Our morals have died, and with them, public ethics. This has been a

problem since Amin’s time.”

Closely related to above is the problem of widespread societal normalization of corruption. “You

can’t do anything about it, is what most people claim. According to one study participant, “Even if

Museveni is replaced with Besigye or Jesus Christ or Nabbi Mohammed, corruption will

continue”. For Didson Kahunga (a private sector worker), Uganda has a gigantic problem: “A

modest public official who is corruption-free is despised; the extravagant one is praised. A

Headteacher or nurse works diligently, puts public resources to official use, walks on foot or

moves by public means, and feeds his or her family on beans and cassava. He [or she] is blamed

by society for being stupid. A revenue officer or MP grabs public monies, builds mansions in 12

35

months, drives state-or-the-art prados and eats pork or chicken everyday. He is adored for being

‘smart’. This is the problem we face as Ugandans.” A major consequence of this has been the

institutionalization of a culture of bribe-giving and bribe-taking. [Nothing gets done in the Land

Office, for example, unless one gives a bribe. And in Mulago Hospital, “ovamu omusayi?” (any

bribe?) is what corrupt medical practitioners typically ask patients before attending to them].

As already hinted, third, the delay in the remittance of UPE funds from the centre was cited as an

important cause of “diversion of resources” from budgeted priorities. This is a form of corruption

which is, nevertheless, necessitated by the difficult contingencies school authorities often face.

Fourth, the institutional weaknesses of local authorities were found to be crucial impediments to

accountability and transparency. Most school inspectors were found to be former teachers who had

no training in accounting. This means Uganda’s inspectors lack the skills they need to do proper

inspection. Headteachers typically lack financial management skills. Many have never used

cashbooks: they only use cash analysis books and control sheets to show how much money has

been allocated to different budgeted items. [In Hoima, Headteachers were taken through a one-day

training workshop on how to account for UPE funds. This was gauged as having been timely but

inadequate – Interviews, 2006]. Members of the SMC (including, in most cases, the treasurer on

the School Finance Committee) typically lack financial management skills.6 Sub-Counties (which

are now important units of decentralization) have one Sub-Accountant whose workload demands

more than they were professionally trained to handle. All these shortfalls compromise

accountability and transparency in UPE.

Fifth, political interference is another key constraint to accountability and transparency. This

seems to arise from the creation of too many political (and administrative) offices with no clear

mandates and reporting relations. At national level, political oversight is exercised by MPs; at

district and sub-county levels, by the District Council and Sub-County Councils respectively. At

village levels are the local councils of course. According to one Ugandan political scientist, “all

these politicians have inflated egos. At the national level, MPs who have been bribed left, right and

6 It is, however, important to note that some SMC members are knowledgeable people such as retired civil servants or mansions who can detect shoddy construction work, for example.

36

centre think they are so important that they must get Shs 60 million each from tax-payers’ money.

They want luxurious, state-funded vehicles even when teachers’ salaries have not been paid for

three months. Uganda’s MPs will even quarrel if you do not call them ‘Honourable’. But what is

so honourable about allowing oneself to be bribed with a mere Shs 5 million as a basis for

granting a Kisanja (third term) to the President? At the local government level, District and Sub-

County Councilors think they are the ‘people’s parliament’ supposedly speaking for the common

citizen. The LCV Chairperson claims to be the people’s president, elected by universal suffrage.

And the RDC claims he [or she] is the district boss given that RDCs are direct appointees of the

President.” What merits emphasis is that all local politicians claim to be bosses of the CAO and

other local civil servants. They politically interfere in the awarding of tenders and may cause the

CAO to make mistakes. Yet the CAO is the district accounting officer who will attract the wrath of

the IGG or Auditor General if financial impropriety is discovered.

Sixth, the Ugandan private sector is still weak and unprofessional. Most of the companies faulted

for shoddy construction work have hardly spent 10 years in business. Most were hurriedly set up to

exploit opportunities created by pro-market reforms such as privatization, contracting-out, and

market-based public admninistratin in the 1990s. Thus, “while many of these companies are

corrupt by intent, they are also corrupt by default. By this I mean, they just lack the technical

capacity needed to do high quality work. That is why many recently-constructed building, both

public and private, are bicupuli [shoddy structures]” (Interviews, 2006.

Seventh, Uganda’s relatively weak civil society was cited as a mixed blessing. Activist CSOs like

ACCU, UDN, TAAC, Bundibugyo NGO/CBO Forum or CCF have struggled to hold different

authorities to account for their commissions or omissions – a great achievement on a very risky

subject matter. However, Uganda’s civil society is still generally weak and donor-dependent

(Dicklich, 1998). There is therefore need for the strengthening of civil societies, backed by the

deepening of the civic competencies of the citizenry (via political and legal education).

Eighth, the weakened role of Parents/Teachers Associations (PTAs) under the system of “bonna

basome” (state funded Education for All) was found to be problematic. According to Aaron

Mukwaya, (Makerere University) “For all its good intentions, UPE has promoted political

37

underdevelopment and social irresponsibility. A substantial number of parents now think they are

not answerable for the provision of uniform, stationery or even lunch for their children. Some think

they have no role to play in the formulation of school policies. PTAs, which used to be active in the

past, now play a reduced role in school affairs, compared to the statutory SMCs. This is a

mistake.” This view suggests that PTAs, as organs of civil society, should be revived and enabled

to play a greater role in primary (and post-primary) education.

Ninth, there is a real problem associated with the legal justice system of Uganda. An official of

URA who works for government on a full-time basis, earning Shs 1.5 million a month may cause

loss of public revenue by deliberately under-assessing the tax liability of imported products. This is

done on the understanding that the millions that are not collected for government will be shared

out equally between the URA officer and the importer. Using such dubious means, the URA

officer amasses wealth and is able to purchase a mansion worth Shs 400 million after 18 months of

service. Attempts by the state to probe how this full-time public official amassed this wealth so

quickly on a Shs 1.5 million monthly salary prove futile. For, the state has to find evidence to

convince court beyond reasonable doubt that this URA official got monies from illegal sources.

Proving, in the English law tradition, “beyond reasonable doubt” may further Western legal

justice, but it is a roadblock in the struggle against official corruption. [A number of Headteachers,

as noted, present receipts that may be certified as “proper” when actually the items purchased were

over-invoiced, thanks to the subtle culture of collusion that exists].

At the core of most of the above problems is poverty. While national politicians claim that national

poverty has declined from 52% in 1992 to 35% in 2003, national poverty is now on the increase

again (estimated at 40% in 2006). Additionally, national ‘averages’ need to be taken with care.

They appear to be impressive because the incomes of a few rich urban-dwellers have gone up

substantially over the recent past, thereby pulling the national average up without corresponding

improvements in the incomes of the rural and urban poor. The truth of the matter is that poverty is

biting hard in rural Uganda. Till recently, teachers (who are members of the rural elite) have been

earning Shs 150,000/= a month. Many local Government employees, LC officials and citizens

spend months without touching Shs 10,000/=. If such people sit on SMCs, as they often do, or

38

have means of diverting UPE resources, the temptation is too high. As Kahunga points out, “While

man does not live by bread alone, man cannot live without any bread” (Interviews, 2006).

None of the problems bedeviling UPE and other local services will be resolved unless political

interference is minimized. Politicians need to learn that their legitimate mandate is to exercise

political oversight over technocratic civil servants, not to push them around. The use of political

power to shape technocratic decisions on issues such as what company qualifies for which tender,

is not just illegal. It is likely to deepen the problem of shoddy and/or incomplete classrooms, which

will compromised the delivery of quality education services. Political interference should,

therefore, stop. Uganda’s politicians must “Let the Managers Manage!” The managers of

government business are the technocratic civil servants who are recruited on merit, not the

politicians who are often elected because they shout loudest.

6. Conclusion: Proposed Solutions

Chairman Mao Zedong argued that a correct diagnosis of any given problem provides more than

50% of the answer. We have spent some time researching, documenting and diagnosing the

problem of corruption in Uganda’s UPE program. On every theme examined in this study, we have

made mini-conclusions and evidence-based recommendations (which we uphold here). For the

avoidance of doubt, we now recap the following evidence-based recommendations as avenues for

overcoming corruption, promoting transparency and improving education service delivery.

First, a lot of knowledge now exists within central government institutions, civil society and LGs

on the nature, magnitude and negative implications of corruption in the UPE program. It is widely

known, for example, that firms such as Jamaica Contractors performed shoddy work and got paid

before completion of their contractual obligations. We recommend a tough approach to such mal-

practices. Corrupt or non-performing companies should be ordered to refund tax-payers’ money

and should be barred from winning any further government contracts.

Second, any public official who colludes with mafia companies to cause financial loss to Uganda

must be declared a national enemy. They must be relieved of their duties forthwith, as

39

investigations continue. Their property should be attached until they refund the monies. If the risk

of corruption becomes high, many public officials will reform.

Third, much as tough sanctions that deter negative behaviour are important, the struggle against

corruption calls for positive motivators or “enhancers” as well. These are the interventions that

showcase success stories (such as the work of Bundibugyo NGO/CBO Forum or TAAC or CAOs

such as John Asiimwe or even companies that perform well). Thus, we recommend the

introduction of the CAO of the Year; DEO of the Year, CFO of the Year; CSO of the Year,

Headteacher of the Year, and Contractor of the Year awards. These should be given to individual

and institutional actors who excel in fighting corruption or delivering value-for-money services to

the citizenry.

Fourth, corruption, to an important degree, is a moral/ethical issue. It is a complicated issue calling

for the active involvement of a broad coalition of stakeholders. Faith-based organizations

(churches and mosques) need to call people back to their ethical values. Families need to socialize

children to become responsible citizens. Schools, colleges and universities need to promote legal

education emphasizing the rights and duties of citizens and the remedies available to them if their

individual or group rights are violated. CSOs involved in civic education need to penetrate society

and empower communities with anti-corruption research and advocacy skills. The state, as the

ultimate custodian of the public interest, must ensure that nationalism and public ethics are re-

established. In Tanzania, recruits into the public service are made to swear: Kila Mutanzania ni

Ndugu Yangu! [Every Tanzanian is my brother/sister]. This is the political religion that Uganda

needs to borrow. And if every other Ugandan or African is “my brother”, I will not construct

shoddy classes that may collapse and kill innocent pupils. They are “my brothers”. Nor would I

delay teachers’ salaries or steal public monies. Public monies, by definition, belong to “my

brothers”.

Fifth, institutional capacity development should be encouraged. Government should, for example,

recruit, train and deploy bursars/accountants at every UPE school. There is also need to equip

school inspectors, Headteachers, and members of the SMC in basic financial management skills.

PTAs, CSOs and other grassroots institutions that hold public officials to account should also be

40

trained in basic accounting. The aim is not to transform them into financial experts; only to equip

them with practical skills (such as making sense of a balance sheet). One-day training workshops

will not do. What is needed is a new culture of continuous learning.

But that is not all. Boona basome (poor quality) UPE needs to be transformed into high quality

primary education, which will serve as a foundation stone for high quality post-primary learning.

Thus, specialized quality control institutions, such as the Education Standards Agency, need to be

strengthened. Public education should be made to compete with the best privately provided

education. In addition to strengthening quality control institutions, individuals seeking to work

directly for government as politicians or mainstream civil servants must be obliged to take their

children to UPE schools and other public schools. That way, they will work tirelessly to ensure

that the education standards of public institutions exceed those of private educators.

Seventh, the embryonic and weak nature of most private construction companies seems to question

the usefulness of conventional public/public partnerships in service delivery. What Uganda needs

is a lead construction company along the model of the successful public construction agency of

Rwanda. For this institution to work, the corruption-ridded state in Uganda must be transformed

into a developmental state (along the model of post-war Taiwan or Korea). The challenge is big

but worth trying, given the huge developmental dividends associated with developmentalist states.

Eighth, there is need to revisit the role of CSOs. The PTAs, which are organs of civil society, need

to be revived to check the powers of the statutory SMCs. Success stories of CSOs such as TAACC

or CCF need to be spread and reproduced in other districts. For, in the struggle against corruption,

everyone stands to reap long-term gains if things go right, and everyone ultimately loses if things

go wrong.

Ninth, the British legal tradition that demands for proof “beyond reasonable doubt” should be

modified to suit Uganda’s pressing national interest. In the struggle against corruption, any public

official who is suspected by a reasonable person to have caused substantial financial or material

loss to the nation should be relieved of their duties in the public interest. Plus, they should be

41

declared unfit to serve the public in a civil, political, or military capacity. This is the bitter but

curative approach that is needed, given the wide-spread level of official corruption.

For all the above to work, poverty must be substantially reduced via progressive taxation, adequate

remuneration of government employees and a stop on the hemorrhage of public resources via

corrupt practices. Second, the political will to fight corruption must be created. Given the absence

of this will at the moment, a broad coalition of forces must be mobilized. Donors should withhold

funds if donations and domestic revenues are, in their judgment, being used by corrupt state

officials to build crony capitalism, reward cronies with favours or bribe the opposition into silence.

Faith-based organizations, community-based CSOs and the press all have a role to play. The

challenge is big but not impossible. Together, we can disable corruption. For God and My

Country!

42

References

Auditor General, 2003: Value for Money Audit on Universal Primary Education: A Report Prepared for the Ministry of Education and Sports, Kampala. CAO [Chief Administrative Officer], Letter to Jamaica Contractors Ltd and 25 Others, Ref. No. CR. 207/1, dated 18 October 2005. Dicklich, Susan, 1998: The Elusive Promise of NGOs in Africa: Lessons from Uganda, (New York: St. Martins's Press). Kiiza, Julius, John Mubazi and Anna Ninsiima, 2006: Institutions, Research Performance andPolicymaking in Uganda, A Research Report written for Global Development Network under the Bridging Research and Policy Program. Kiyaga-Nsubuga, John, 2005: The Role of Local Leadership in Improving the Delivery of Services at Community Level: Uganda’s Experience with Primary Education, A paper presented at the Ministerial Conference on Leadership Capacity Building for Decentralized Governance and Poverty Reduction in Sub-Saharan Africa, Kigali, Rwanda, 06 – 08 June. MoES [Ministry of Education and Sports], 2004: Enhancing UPE: A Stakeholders’ Handbook, Kampala, May. MoES [Ministry of Education and Sports], Data Base, 2006