UNSAFE KNOWLEDGE NIKOLAJ NOTTELMANN, SDU M&M Conference, Lund, May 2014.

14
UNSAFE KNOWLEDGE NIKOLAJ NOTTELMANN, SDU &M Conference, Lund, May 2014

Transcript of UNSAFE KNOWLEDGE NIKOLAJ NOTTELMANN, SDU M&M Conference, Lund, May 2014.

Page 1: UNSAFE KNOWLEDGE NIKOLAJ NOTTELMANN, SDU M&M Conference, Lund, May 2014.

UNSAFE KNOWLEDGE

NIKOLAJ NOTTELMANN, SDU

M&M Conference, Lund, May 2014

Page 2: UNSAFE KNOWLEDGE NIKOLAJ NOTTELMANN, SDU M&M Conference, Lund, May 2014.

The Safety Condition

• S’s belief is safe iff in most near-by possible worlds in which S continues to form her belief about the target proposition in the same way as in the actual world, her belief continues to be true. Pritchard(2005), Carter(2009)

• S’s belief B is safe just in case the method S employed to arrive at B did not put S in serious epistemic danger. Bogardus(2014)

• S’s belief p is safe iff. in all near-by possible word in which S does not form her belief p on a quite different basis from the actual world, still p.

• Williamson (2000: 149), paraphrasing Sosa (1996, 2000).

Page 3: UNSAFE KNOWLEDGE NIKOLAJ NOTTELMANN, SDU M&M Conference, Lund, May 2014.

Example of safe belief• Typical perceptual belief under

normal circumstances

• I make visual contact with a cup on the table, and therefore comes to believe that a cup is on the table.

• The method here does not put me in danger: In most near-by worlds (whether the cup is still there or not), I would get to the truth concerning whether a cup is on the table by visually inspecting the scene.

Page 4: UNSAFE KNOWLEDGE NIKOLAJ NOTTELMANN, SDU M&M Conference, Lund, May 2014.

Example of unsafe belief• True perceptual belief under unusual

circumstances:

• I visually inspect whether a cup is on the table, make visual contact with a holographic image of a cup, arrive at belief that a cup is on the table (this is true, since a cleverly disguised real cup is also there)

• Here, the method brings me in danger. In many near-by possible worlds I would arrive at a false belief on the issue whether a cup is on the table by visually inspecting the scene.

Page 5: UNSAFE KNOWLEDGE NIKOLAJ NOTTELMANN, SDU M&M Conference, Lund, May 2014.

The point of a safety-based analysis of knowledge

• If knowledge requires safety, this explains why in many Gettier-cases the subjects does not gain knowledge:

• The subject’s belief is true, but unsafe.

• E.g. The holographic cup from before, Gettier’s two classic cases etc.

Page 6: UNSAFE KNOWLEDGE NIKOLAJ NOTTELMANN, SDU M&M Conference, Lund, May 2014.

Unsafe knowledge, take one• Halloween Party: I am invited to a Halloween party at Andy’s House.

Andy has hired Judy to stand at a junction and direct people towards the party. Andy does not want Michael to find the party. Unbeknownst to me, Andy has therefore instructed Judy to point Michael towards Andy’s House down the left road, but then immediately call him, so that the party is moved to Adam’s House down the right road. I nearly choose to disguise myself as Michael, but don’t. When I arrive at the junction, Judy accurately directs me down the left road towards the party.

• Comesaña(2005, 397)

• Verdict: I get to know that the party is at the house down the left road.

Page 7: UNSAFE KNOWLEDGE NIKOLAJ NOTTELMANN, SDU M&M Conference, Lund, May 2014.

Comment’s on Comesaña’s Example

• Unsafe belief?

• Indeed in one reading, it is NOT the case that in most near-by possible word in which S does not form her belief about the location of the party on a basis quite different from Judy’s testimony, the party is down the left road:

• Had the subject dressed up as Michael, which presumably in many near-by worlds he does, he would have been wrong, since here the party would have moved down the right road.

• But arguably, the c.f. ought to be evaluated w.r.t the subject as he was at the time of the actual belief-formation. By then, “epistemic danger” had entirely passed since he did NOT chose to dress up as Michael.

• So, really S’s belief is safe in any sense that matters. See Bogardus(2014)

Page 8: UNSAFE KNOWLEDGE NIKOLAJ NOTTELMANN, SDU M&M Conference, Lund, May 2014.

Unsafe knowledge, take two• (Atomic Clock) A normal subject Smith forms true belief that it is 8.22

by consulting the world’s most accurate atomic clock reading “8.22”. However, that this clock is currently working is actually an improbable coincidence. Had a nearby alien isotope decayed, the clock would have stopped functioning, freezing on the reading “8.22”. By all likelihood the alien isotope should already have decayed and the risk is high that it will decay very soon. Nevertheless Smith competently acquires a correct belief about the current time by looking at a (still) fully functioning and highly accurate clock.

• Paraphrased from Bogardus(2014).

• Bogardus’ verdict: Smith’s belief is unsafe, not just unsafely safe. But still, by consulting the clock, Smith comes to know that it is 8.22!

Page 9: UNSAFE KNOWLEDGE NIKOLAJ NOTTELMANN, SDU M&M Conference, Lund, May 2014.

Too environmentally lucky?• Consider the following revision:

• (Environmentally lucky atomic clock) Everything as in (Atomic Clock). Except at the time, when Smith gains true belief by looking at the atomic clock, she could just as easily have consulted atomic-clock* or atomic-clock**, which are hanging in two adjacent rooms. Smith always consults one clock only, when establishing the current time. Atomic-clock* is just as the original atomic clock, only it is frozen at “8.21”. The same goes for atomic-clock**, only it is frozen at “8.23”. Had Smith looked at atomic-clock* or atomic-clock**, Smith would have formed a false belief about the current time.

• Here many would judge that Smith fails to gain knowledge (parallel to fake barn cases). But (Atomic Clock) and (Environmentally lucky atomic clock) are naturally read as sharing the feature that error possibilities are present in the close actual spatio-temporal environment!

Page 10: UNSAFE KNOWLEDGE NIKOLAJ NOTTELMANN, SDU M&M Conference, Lund, May 2014.

More on temporal environmental luck

• This objection is not entirely ad hoc!

• Too much temporal environmental luck seems like a promising explanation why you cannot gain knowledge by consulting a Russellian Clock Tower.

• That the Russellian Clock did not work at the time it was consulted, seems to matter less on reflection:

• Imagine it did not work but the error was immediately discovered and fixed before the clock needed to move its hand in order to show the time accurately. Does this impede knowledge?

Page 11: UNSAFE KNOWLEDGE NIKOLAJ NOTTELMANN, SDU M&M Conference, Lund, May 2014.

Unsafe Knowledge, take 3.

• (Lucky Sheep Observer) Anna is a zoological expert about to turn around and direct her gaze towards the center of a

field behind her, her mind occupied with the question whether there is a sheep in that field and determined to settle

this issue by way of visual inspection. Given the absence of unusual interference with her cognitive situation, she

would soon lay her eyes upon a sheep grazing in the field. Given the perfect optical conditions and her impeccable

sheep-discerning abilities she will acquire true belief that a sheep is in the field. However, a highly unusual bus with

a very convincing all-over image of an empty field on its side (including the windows) is about to park between the

subject and the field with the sheep, perfectly blending into the landscape. Since this is a one-of-a-kind bus and the

subject will mistakenly come to believe that no sheep is in the field, if the bus should park with its windows closed

(which they normally are) before she could turn around, this is incredibly bad luck from a cognitive perspective.

However, due to a streak of incredibly good luck, passengers inside the bus on both of its sides simultaneously and

most unusually decide to roll down its windows (perhaps due to an improbable lottery outcome), thus spoiling the

optical illusion of an empty field before Anna’s belief-forming process has fully terminated, and also allowing Anna to

see right through the bus and spot the sheep grazing in the field behind the bus. Should the windows of the bus be

rolled back up before Anne has become entirely convinced that a sheep is in the field, the illusion of an empty filed

would once again become so eerily convincing that Anne would think she had dreamt up the bus, rub her eyeballs,

look closely again, and come to think that no sheep is in the field. The windows, however, stay down and Anna

comes truly to believe that a sheep is in the field by looking straight at it through the bus.

Page 12: UNSAFE KNOWLEDGE NIKOLAJ NOTTELMANN, SDU M&M Conference, Lund, May 2014.

Desirable features of this example

• Source of knowledge (sheep on field) is not phony or frail. Arguably, believer is in an actual position sufficiently to establish this.

• Believer is not phony.

• Actual method or basis for belief is not phony (at least on a natural description as visual inspection of landscape).

• Source of unsafety is far too exotic to support arguments that knowledge is undermined on account on intellectual imprudence, epistemic vice etc.

Page 13: UNSAFE KNOWLEDGE NIKOLAJ NOTTELMANN, SDU M&M Conference, Lund, May 2014.

What if unsafe knowledge exist?

• 1. Safety is no panecure for Gettier case diagnosis.

• 2. Safety accounts of knowledge do not accurately capture our folk concept.

• 3. Causal theories of knowledge rebound?

Page 14: UNSAFE KNOWLEDGE NIKOLAJ NOTTELMANN, SDU M&M Conference, Lund, May 2014.

•THANK YOU