UNREPORTED

IN THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS

OF MARYLAND

No. 1459

September Term, 2013

MEHMET YAVUZ CORAPCIOGLU

v.

SHARON ROOSEVELT

Eyler, Deborah S.,

Kehoe,

Rodowsky, Lawrence F.

(Retired, Specially Assigned),

JJ.

Opinion by Eyler, Deborah S., J.

Filed: July 16, 2014

Mehmet Yavuz Corapcioglu (“Father”), the appellant, and Sharon Roosevelt

(“Mother”), the appellee, have one child together, Darren Yavuz Corapcioglu (“Darren”).

Darren was born in Texas on November 8, 1999, while Father and Mother were living

together there. Father and Mother were not married to each other, and Mother was married

to a man in Maryland, Eric Karl Benck (“Husband”), to whom she remains married. In

January 2000, Mother left Father in Texas and took Darren to Maryland, where she resumed

living with Husband. Nevertheless, Mother and Father continued their intimate relationship

until February 2001. During that time, Father had access to Darren. In 2001, Father got

married.

In December 2001, in the Circuit Court for Montgomery County, Mother filed suit

seeking custody of Darren. Mother had Darren baptized in January 2002. Then, in May

2002, while the case still was pending, Father took Darren to Turkey without Mother’s

permission. Father is from Turkey and is a citizen of that country. The parties became

embroiled in an international custody dispute. Father prevailed in a Hague Convention

action, but Mother appealed and prevailed in the Supreme Court of Turkey.

The parties then reached a comprehensive agreement regarding custody, visitation,

and numerous other issues. On July 15, 2004 they filed a Consent Custody Order embodying

their agreement. Darren was returned to the United States the following day. The court

approved and entered the Consent Custody Order on July 20, 2004 (“the 2004 Consent

Order”). Among other provisions, the 2004 Consent Order required Mother to correct

misrepresentations she had made about Darren’s paternity.

On March 30, 2009 the court entered a supplemental Consent Custody Order, in which

the parties agreed to a number of modifications regarding custody and visitation (“the 2009

Consent Order”). Among them, Father and Mother agreed to jointly make decisions

concerning Darren’s mental health, and to use the services of a Parent Educator/Coordinator

(“parenting coordinator”) in the event they could not agree on such a matter.

Despite the consent orders, the parties have almost continuously battled in court, and

are not strangers to this Court. The present appeal stems from two orders entered by the1

circuit court in August 2013 and October 2013, respectively. In the first, the court denied

a motion filed by Father seeking to have the court order the correction of Darren's baptismal

records, in which Husband is listed as Darren’s father. In the second, the court denied

Father’s motion to appoint a parenting coordinator.

Father asks five questions on appeal, which we have rephrased and combined as

follows:

I. Did the circuit court err by denying Father’s motion to correct Darren’s

baptismal records?

II. Did the circuit court err by denying Father leave to amend that motion?

See Corapcioglu v. Roosevelt, 170 Md. App. 572 (2006), aff’d, Roosevelt v.1

Corapcioglu, 415 Md. 434 (2010) (addressing counsel fees and costs awarded to Mother);

Corapcioglu v. Roosevelt, (unreported) No. 2212, 2008 Term, filed June 25, 2010

(addressing a modification of the Consent Order); and Corapcioglu v. Roosevelt,

(unreported) No. 1014, 2012 Term, filed August 16, 2013 (addressing Father’s request to

modify the Consent Order).

2

III. Did the circuit court err by denying Father’s motion to appoint a

parenting coordinator?

IV. Did the circuit court’s denial of Father’s motion to appoint a parenting

coordinator effectively terminate Father’s joint legal custody with

respect to Darren's mental health?

For the reasons to follow, we shall affirm the orders of the circuit court.

FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS

A. Father’s Motion to Correct Darren’s Baptismal Records

The 2004 Consent Order awarded Mother primary physical and sole legal custody of

Darren, and set forth a detailed visitation schedule for Father. That order provided:

ORDERED, that [Mother] shall inform all persons who she is aware has [sic]

been misinformed about Darren’s paternity. These people will be notified that

[Father] is the father of the child. In the future, the paternity of Darren shall

be represented correctly to the third parties . . . .

According to Father, this provision was included in the 2004 Consent Order because he was

aware that Mother had told her relatives, neighbors, and Husband’s coworkers that Husband

was Darren’s father.

As noted, Mother had had Darren baptized in January 2002, specifically, on January

13. The baptism thus took place two and a half years before the court entered the 2004

Consent Order. Darren was baptized at the Messiah Lutheran Church, in Germantown.

Father was unaware of the baptism at the time. Some time later, after the parties entered into

3

the 2004 Consent Order, Father obtained a copy of Darren’s baptismal certificate from the

church secretary. The certificate contains the following relevant information:2,3

DATA FOR BAPTISM

NAME: Darren (Yavus Corapcioglu)

DATE OF BIRTH: Nov 8, 1999

PLACE OF BIRTH: College Station, Tex.

FATHER: Eric Karl Benck

MOTHER: Sharon Roosevelt

* * *

SPONSORS: . . . Elise and Gary Bowman[4]

DATE OF BAPTISM: Jan. 13, 2002

As noted, Eric Karl Benck is Mother's Husband. Handwritten on the bottom of the certificate

are the words: “Use only 1st Name in Bulletin [and] for Baptism but whole name on

Certificate. Not enrolled as member [at] Messiah yet.”

On June 28, 2013, Father filed a pro se “Motion to Correct the Baptismal Church

Records in which [Mother] Listed her Husband as the Father of [Father’s] Son Darren Yavuz

The record does not reflect when Father obtained Darren’s baptismal certificate, only2

that it was “some years after [the baptism] happened.”

The 2004 Consent Order contains a provision requiring Mother to furnish Father a3

copy of Darren’s baptismal certificate. According to Mother, she told Father about the

baptism in the spring of 2004.

Elise and Gary Bowman are Husband’s sister and brother-in-law. 4

4

Corapcioglu and Other Appropriate Relief.” In his motion, Father pointed out that Husband

is listed as Darren’s father on the baptismal certificate, and explained that he was unaware

of Mother’s “deceitful representation at the Messiah Lutheran Church” until he obtained the

baptismal certificate from the church secretary. He argued that,

by not using [Darren’s] middle and last names in the church Bulletin and at the

Baptism ceremony, the members of the church were misled to believe that

[Mother’s] husband was Darren’s father. Members of the Messiah Lutheran

Church where [Mother] and her husband attend services still believe

[Mother’s] husband is the father of [Darren].

Father asserted in his motion that, after discovering the baptismal certificate, he made

many attempts “in good faith” to have the baptismal records corrected. He attached to his

motion an email he sent to Mother on April 16, 2013, in which he asked her to

[p]lease correct the church records that you and [Husband] registered your

husband as Darren’s father without my knowledge and provide me with

verifiable proof that you did so. The false registration should also be corrected

at the church bulletin sent to the congregation as it was done at that time and

a copy of the bulletin should be provided. If you do not do so before May 1,

2013, I will take legal action without any further notice.

Father stated in his motion that Mother responded with an email on May 1, 2013, in which

she wrote: “. . . [Husband] was never listed as Darren’s father in any official church records.

He is listed as a PRESENTER, not parent, on the baptismal record. A presenter does not

have to be a parent and neither parent has to be a presenter.”

Father further explained in his motion that after unsuccessfully trying to resolve the

issue with Mother he enlisted the help of the Circuit Counselor for the Lutheran Church –

Missouri Synod (“LCMS”), a division of the Lutheran Church to which Messiah Lutheran

5

Church belongs. Attached to his motion is an email he received on November 22, 2005, from

The Reverend Lester P. Stano, Circuit Counselor for Circuit Six of the LCMS. In the email,

Rev. Stano informed Father, in relevant part, as follows:

I had a long conversation with Pastor Hill [the pastor of Messiah Lutheran

Church] today. He indicates that he baptized your son without any knowledge

of the affair [between Father and Mother] at the time. He claims that what he

recorded [on the baptismal certificate] was based only on what he was told.

He also stated that the individuals in question [Mother and Husband] attend his

church VERY infrequently, in fact, they have only been there no more than 6

times since the baptism. [Pastor Hill] is saying that he will not be forced to

print anything in the bulletin unless he has broken some state law, especially

since this family “used” him and they are very nominal attenders. . . .

I have no authority to force anything else in this issue. I also do not want to

be triangulated in a personal/family dispute. . . .

Father argued that by “not correcting the church records,” Mother had violated the

2004 Consent Order and was in contempt. He asked the court “to order [Mother] to correct

[Darren’s] baptismal records and provide [Father] with a notarized and variable copy of the[5]

corrected baptismal records.” Father also asked the court “to order [Mother] to provide him

with a notarized and variable copy of the church Bulletin distributed to the members of

Messiah Lutheran Church containing the retraction of the earlier announcement and

correcting the paternal information of Darren.”

Mother, through counsel, responded by filing a “motion to dismiss” for failure to state

a claim for which relief could be granted. She argued that the court did not have jurisdiction

Although the motion refers to a “variable copy” of the baptismal record,“verifiable5

copy” was more than likely intended.

6

over Messiah Lutheran Church, and could not order a change to its baptismal records or the

publication of a retraction in its bulletin.

Mother also argued that Father’s request for relief was barred by the doctrine of laches

because Darren’s baptism had taken place in 2002 and Father had waited until 2013 to file

his motion. In addition, Mother asserted that Father’s claim was barred by res judicata

because the “very same issue regarding Darren’s baptismal records was raised a number of

times during a four day merits hearing in 2006.” That hearing, held in June and July of 2006,

concerned one of Father’s requests to modify the 2004 Consent Order. Mother attached a

transcript of the following colloquy that took place during that hearing, on June 27, 2006:

[FATHER’S ATTORNEY]: On the baptism. The thing that [Father]

was concerned about with the baptism was the fact that [Husband] was listed

as the father of [Darren].

* * *

[MOTHER]: . . . I never told [Father] about the baptism in 2002. He

couldn’t express a concern about it.

[FATHER’S ATTORNEY]: Oh, okay. So when did you tell him about

the baptism?

[MOTHER]: In Turkey, in the spring of 2004.

* * *

[FATHER’S ATTORNEY]: . . . The thing that [Father] was concerned

about in the baptism was the fact that he felt the child’s parentage was

misrepresented at the baptism. Am I right? . . .

[MOTHER]: Yes, I remember because there was a provision in the

consent order about that.

7

* * *

[FATHER’S ATTORNEY]: Okay. Have you made it clear to the people

who were involved in the baptism that Darren is not [Husband’s] son?

* * *

[MOTHER]: Anybody that was confused about it, the minister that was

involved in the baptism knew at the time.

[FATHER’S ATTORNEY]: Okay. Were there people who were

confused about who was the father of the child? Was there anybody?

* * *

. . . [Reading from the Consent Order] “that [Mother] shall inform all persons

who she is aware has been misinformed about Darren’s paternity. These

people will be notified that [Father] is the father of the child. In the future, the

paternity of Darren shall be represented correctly to the third parties.” Have

you done that?

[MOTHER]: Everybody that I was confused about, that I know of, that

I can identify, knows.

Mother also attached a copy of another colloquy concerning Darren’s baptismal

records that took place during the hearing on July 5, 2006:

[FATHER’S ATTORNEY]: . . . What is the baptism issue?

[FATHER]: The problem, the way the child was registered in the

church. He’s registered as [Husband’s] son, in the church records, and I’m

trying to correct that since I found out. And, actually, it’s not a problem with

[Mother]. It’s a problem with the pastor, and my lawyer is trying to deal with

it right now.

On August 30, 2013, the circuit court held a hearing on Father’s motion. The court

observed that the motion was “very unusual,” and explained that “even if it were a

8

meritorious request, I’m not so sure the court has the authority to even do what you’re asking

the court to do. We have this separation of church and state thing.” Father responded that

he was not asking the court to order the church to change Darren’s baptismal record; rather,

he was asking the court to require Mother to comply with the misrepresentation provision in

the 2004 Consent Order. Specifically, he was seeking an order directing Mother “to

approach the church and ask the church to correct the church records. I’m not suing the

church. I’m asking the church to correct the records.” Father also asserted that Mother had

engaged in “parental misrepresentation” and “basic parental fraud.”

Mother responded that Father was effectively asking the court to order a change in the

church’s records and to require Mother to address the church’s congregation. She argued

that, under the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, the court lacked jurisdiction to

order the relief Father was seeking.

The court agreed with Mother and repeatedly explained to Father (who was

unrepresented) that it did not have the authority to do what he was asking. The judge stated:

I can’t order [Mother] to go to church and do anything. She has a first

amendment –

* * *

. . . the mechanism that you have filed and that you are attempting to use – this

is a defendant’s motion to correct the baptismal church record in which

plaintiff listed her husband as the father of defendant’s son, Darren, and other

appropriate relief. This motion must necessarily be denied.

* * *

9

. . . I’m not suggesting to you that there is no remedy, or at least no legitimate

way, to get that issue before the court. It is just that this way is not the way to

get that before the court, and I can’t give you legal advice. You need to talk

to a lawyer –

* * *

– but this motion will never be granted by any judge in this court or in this

state. Now what you are arguing is a breach of contract or a person refusing

to comply with something that they’ve consented to, but that is not what you

have filed. . . . so this motion has to be denied.

The court entered an order on September 10, 2013, denying Father’s motion “with

prejudice.” Father noted a timely appeal.

B. Father’s Motion to Appoint a Parenting Coordinator

In the 2009 Consent Order, Father and Mother agreed to equal physical custody of

Darren and that “[Mother] shall continue to have sole legal custody of Darren except in the

area of mental health. . . .” They also agreed:

The parties shall engage and have monthly meetings with a Parent

Educator/Coordinator to assist them in developing more effective means of

communicating with one another. In the event that [Mother] and [Father] are

unable to reach agreement on parenting matters pertaining to mental health

and/or fall outside the providence of [Mother’s] sole legal custodial authority

and requires the cooperation and/or participation of both parents, the parties

shall seek the assistance of the Parent Educator/Coordinator in the resolution

of the issue(s). If the issue(s) is still unresolved following three meetings with

the Parent Educator/Coordinator, then the Parent Educator/Coordinator shall

issue a temporary resolution of the issue(s) which shall remain in effect until

changed by the Court or further agreement by the parties. . . .

All decisions regarding mental health services provided to Darren (e.g.,

treatment or evaluations) shall be made jointly by the parents. In the event that

the parents are unable to reach a mutually agreeable solution, they shall utilize

the services of Parent Educator/Coordinator in a manner described earlier in

this section.

10

The parties employed the services of Kelly Zinna, Ph.D., a psychologist, as the

parenting coordinator. Dr. Zinna served in that capacity for four years, until early 2013,

when Father unilaterally terminated her services because he disagreed with her “professional

judgment.” According to Father, his disagreement concerned Dr. Zinna’s recommendation

that Darren discontinue treatment and medication prescribed by a psychiatrist Darren was

seeing. Father maintains that Mother stopped taking Darren to the psychiatrist after Dr.

Zinna made her recommendation.

On April 3, 2013, after terminating Dr. Zinna’s services, Father sent an email to

Mother proposing three candidates to replace Dr. Zinna as the parenting coordinator. The

parties thereafter exchanged emails proposing names of various other candidates, but,

according to Father, Mother refused to meet with any of his proposed candidates.

On June 25, 2013, Mother sent an email to Father stating:

Darren is doing well without parent coordination. He got straight A’s this year

and is thriving and socially well-adjusted according to [one of Darren’s

teachers]. Parent coordination was not effective for us and Darren is still

doing fine. It is time for parent coordination to be discontinued and move on.

Although I will not initiate litigation, I will argue this in court if you chose

[sic] to go that route.

On September 30, 2013, Father filed a pro se “Motion to Appoint a Parent

Educator/Coordinator and Other Appropriate Relief.” In his motion, he argued that Mother

was “in contempt of the [2009 Consent] Order by obfuscating and blocking the process to

find a new parent coordinator.” He also argued that the 2009 Consent Order was a contract,

and that by agreeing to use the services of a parenting coordinator, Mother was required to

11

cooperate in the appointment of a new one. He asserted that there still were “many

unresolved issues between the parties” involving Darren’s “physical, emotional and mental

health,” and that the parties needed “the services of a parent coordinator to resolve their

issues in the best interest of the child.” Father asked the court to appoint as a parenting

coordinator one of the three candidates he had proposed.

On October 23, 2013, Mother filed an opposition to Father’s motion. She

acknowledged that the parties had worked with a parenting coordinator for nearly four years,

under the 2009 Consent Order. She asserted, however, that pursuant to Rule 9-205.2(f)(2),

the court could not require the parties to work with a parenting coordinator for a period

exceeding two years, unless the parties agreed to an extension. Mother did not agree to an

extension because, in her view, parenting coordination is expensive and had not been

successful for the parties, and was not necessary.

The court denied Father’s motion in a written order entered on October 28, 2013.

Father filed a motion for reconsideration of that order on November 4, 2013, and a notice of

appeal on November 27, 2013. The court denied Father’s motion for reconsideration on

December 6, 2013.

We shall include additional facts as relevant to the issues.

DISCUSSION

I.

12

In his “Motion to Correct the Baptismal Church Records in which [Mother] Listed her

Husband as the Father of [Father’s] Son Darren Yavuz Corapcioglu and Other Appropriate

Relief,” Father asked the court to order Mother “to correct [Darren’s] baptismal records,” and

“to provide him with a notarized and variable copy of the church Bulletin distributed to the

members of the Messiah Lutheran Church containing a retraction of the earlier

announcement and correcting the paternal information of Darren.” He based his motion on

the 2004 Consent Order, in particular the provision requiring Mother to “inform all persons

who she is aware has [sic] been misinformed about Darren’s paternity. These people will be

notified that [Father] is the father of the child.”

The circuit court dismissed Father’s motion for failure to state a claim, on the ground

that granting Father’s requested relief would violate the First Amendment’s separation

between church and state. Father argues on appeal that his motion did not implicate the First

Amendment because “[Mother’s] actions amount to paternity fraud” and “the issue is simply

a matter of intentional misrepresentation of paternity and enforcement of a consent order.”

The cases Father cites regarding “paternity fraud” -- Hodge v. Craig, 382 S.W.3d 325

(Tenn. 2012), and Dier v. Peter, 815 N.W.2d 1(Iowa 2012) -- are inapposite. In both cases,

a mother intentionally misrepresented to a putative father that he was the biological father

of her child. And, in both cases, when the men later discovered they were not the fathers,

they sued the mothers for damages. The courts recognized a cause of action for paternity

fraud. These cases have nothing to do with the relief Father was seeking in his motion.

13

We need not address any of the constitutional arguments advanced by the parties or

the constitutional decisions made by the circuit court. On the language of the 2004 Consent

Order, Father’s motion did not state a claim for which relief could be granted. That order

required Mother to inform people she was aware had been misinformed about Darren’s

paternity to correct the misinformation. It is clear from the allegations in Father’s motion,

especially the email correspondence from Rev. Stano, that Pastor Hill, who performed the

baptism, now knows, and has known since 2005, that Father, not Mother’s Husband, is

Darren’s father. It also is clear from the allegations in Father’s motion that the members of

the congregation present during the baptism were not misinformed about Darren’s paternity.

The church bulletin for that day did not give a last name for Darren, so the congregation

members present were not given any information about his paternity. Husband’s mere

participation in the baptism did not amount to a communication by mother that he was

Darren’s father. So, with respect to the baptism, which was the sole topic of the motion, the

congregation was not misinformed to begin with, and Pastor Hill had been disabused of his

misinformation. Therefore there was nothing that Mother could be ordered to do pursuant

to the 2004 Consent Order that had not been done already. For that reason, we shall affirm

the order denying Father’s motion. 6

We emphasize as well that in the 2006 proceeding, as quoted above, Mother testified6

that she had told everyone she thought was confused about Darren’s paternity what the actual

situation was. Father’s real dispute is not with Mother, who has complied with the 2004

Consent Order, but with the Messiah Lutheran Church, which is not a party to this case, was

(continued...)

14

II.

During the August 30, 2013 hearing on Father’s motion, the following colloquy took

place after the court ruled that Father’s motion would be denied:

[FATHER]: Your honor, I would like to have 15 [days] to amend the

petition so that if the allegations are not sufficient.

THE COURT: Well, I will tell you that if you simply file an amendment

to this – you can say that two and two is five all day but that’s not going to

make it five. If you just amend this motion, it will be denied. You need to talk

to a lawyer. That’s – what you’re saying to the court that you want – that she

did [sic] and what you’re asking this court to do in this motion are two

different things. So maybe you should talk to a lawyer and he or she will tell

you what an appropriate way to get this issue before the court is. They

probably might advise you not to, but at least if you got before the court with

the proper pleading, maybe the court might address the issue.

* * *

[FATHER]: Can I file another motion to order her –

THE COURT: You can file anything that you want to file as long as it

is the proper pleading to grant the court jurisdiction to do what it is you’re

asking the court to do. . . .

Father did not file an additional motion in the days immediately following the hearing. On

September 10, 2013, the court entered an order denying Father’s motion with prejudice.7

(...continued)6

not the subject of the motion, was not served with the motion, and has long ago made a

decision not to change Darren’s baptismal record.

Based upon the court’s colloquy with Father, it is clear the court did not expressly7

deny him leave to amend his motion. However, the court’s dismissal of Father’s motion with

prejudice had the practical effect of prohibiting amendment.

15

Citing Rule 2-322(c), which concerns amendments to complaints, Father contends the

court improperly denied him leave to amend his motion to correct Darren’s baptismal

records. Father argues that, under McMahon v. Piazze, 162 Md. App. 588 (2005), leave to

amend under 2-322(c) should be granted liberally, especially in cases where the best interest

of the child is at stake. In that case, we held that the circuit court abused its discretion by not

granting a father leave to amend his petition to modify a consent custody order, in which he

had alleged material changes in circumstances. The court dismissed the petition for failure

to allege facts sufficient to show a material change in circumstances and denied the father’s

request to amend. We concluded on appeal that the court should have granted the father

leave to amend because he may have been able to include additional allegations of fact

relevant to whether there was a change in circumstances in an amended petition. 162 Md.

App. at 598-99.

Here, for the reasons we have explained, there was no amendment Father could have

made to his motion to make it legally viable. Accordingly, the court did not err in denying

leave to amend.

III.

As discussed, in the 2009 Consent Order, the parties agreed to use the services of a

parenting coordinator. The parties selected Dr. Zinna, who served in that capacity until early

2013, when Father terminated her services. Father and Mother disagreed on the need for

continued parenting coordination, and, in September 2013, Father filed a motion asking the

16

court to appoint one of his proposed candidates as the parenting coordinator for the parties.

The court denied Father’s motion in a written order stating that it was doing so upon

consideration of Father’s motion and Mother’s opposition.

In 2009, when the consent order was entered, Maryland did not have any statute or

rule granting a court the authority to appoint a “parenting coordinator” or governing

parenting coordination at all. A rule granting such authority was adopted by the Court of

Appeals effective July 1, 2011. It defines “parenting coordination” as “a process in which

the parties work with a parenting coordinator to reduce the effects or potential effects of

conflict on the parties’ child.” Md. Rule 9-205.2(b)(1). And it defines “parenting

coordinator” as “an impartial provider of parenting coordination services.” Md. Rule 9-

205.2(b)(2).

Rule 9-205.2(f), entitled “Appointment of Parenting Coordinator by Court,” provides,

in relevant part,

In an action in which the custody of or visitation with a child of the parties is

in issue and the court determines that the level of conflict between the parties

with respect to that issue so warrants, the court may appoint a parenting

coordinator in accordance with this section. . . .

(2) Appointment Upon Entry of Judgment. Upon entry of a judgment

granting or modifying custody or visitation, the court, with the consent of the

parties and after a hearing, may appoint a parenting coordinator. . . . Unless

sooner terminated in accordance with this Rule, the appointment of a post-

judgment parenting coordinator shall not exceed two years unless the parties

and the parenting coordinator agree in writing to an extension for a specified

longer period.

17

On appeal, Father contends that because the terms of the 2009 Consent Order required

the parties to engage a parenting coordinator, the court should have appointed a parenting

coordinator when the parties reached an impasse about Darren’s mental health treatment, and

erred by not doing so. Father maintains that the two-year time limit for parenting

coordinators, in Rule 9-205.2(f)(2), does not apply because that rule governs parenting

coordinators appointed by the court “post-judgment,” and the relevant provisions in the 2009

Consent Order did not constitute a “post-judgment appointment” of a parenting coordinator.

Father’s motion sought the appointment post-judgment of a parenting coordinator.

“Post-judgment” means at or after a final judgment is entered, i.e., not when the case is

pendente lite. Here, a final judgment was entered in 2004 and was modified in 2009. In the

latter judgment, the parties agreed to use a parenting coordinator; the court did not appoint

one, however, and did not have the authority to do so in 2009.

Regardless of the language of the 2009 Consent Order, Father’s 2013 motion for

appointment of a parenting coordinator was governed by Rule 9-205, which was then in

effect and provides the only authority for the court to appoint a parenting coordinator. That

rule makes plain that a post-judgment parenting coordinator only can be appointed with the

consent of the parties. Md. Rule 9-205.2(f)(2). Although the parties had agreed, in 2009,

to use the services of a parenting coordinator, that did not amount to consent to the court

appointing a parenting coordinator. And, as stated above, the rule that now authorizes a court

to appoint a parenting coordinator post-judgment limits that authority to when the parties

18

consent. Here, the parties did not consent. Mother did not want the court to appoint a

parenting coordinator because she did not think that parenting coordination had been

effective or that it was needed, and continuing to pay a parenting coordinator would be

expensive. Without the parties’ consent, the court could not appoint a parenting coordinator,

and therefore did not err in declining to do so.

We note, moreover, that even if the 2009 Consent Order established consent by the

parties to the court appointment of a parenting coordinator – which it did not – the parties

already had engaged a parenting coordinator for 4 years and it would be inconsistent with the

2 year appointment limitation in the rule for the court to appoint a parenting coordinator for

an additional time period. Also, the role described for the parenting coordinator in the 2009

Consent Order is not permitted by the parenting coordination rule. The consent order states

that the parenting coordinator can make decisions that will stand until overruled by the court.

It does not limit those decisions to the sort of time-bound minor decisions the parenting

coordinator rule permits. Indeed, decisions about mental health treatment for Darren plainly

would not be within the authority of a parenting coordinator to make.

Finally, Father’s assertion that the court should have granted his motion in order to

enforce the 2009 Consent Order is without merit. His actual request of the court was to

appoint a parenting coordinator.

IV.

19

Father contends that by denying his motion to appoint a parenting coordinator, the

court effectively terminated his joint legal custody of Darren regarding Darren’s mental

health. This is so because, according to Father,

without the existence of a parent coordinator, no decision can be made

regarding mental health services provided to the child if the parties are unable

to reach a mutually agreeable solution as they are now. . . . It is quite apparent

that without the tie breaking authority of a parenting coordinator on mental

health issues, the child would be denied any treatment or evaluation if one

parent opposes or disagrees with the medication or treatment or evaluation. .

. . Without the availability of a parent coordinator, the other parent has no

remedy to provide to his/her child any help although he/she has joint legal

custody on mental health of Darren.

Father’s argument is without merit. As we have stated, the decision making authority

of a parenting coordinator is limited. Rule 9-205.2(g), entitled “Services Permitted,”

provides, in relevant part

As appropriate, a parenting coordinator may: . . . (2) if there is an operative

custody and visitation order, assist the parties in amicably resolving disputes

about the interpretation of and compliance with the order and in making any

joint recommendations to the court for any changes to the order; (3) educate

the parties about making and implementing decisions that are in the best

interest of the child; . . . (6) assist the parties in modifying patterns of behavior

and in developing parenting strategies to manage and reduce opportunities for

conflict in order to reduce the impact of any conflict upon their child; . . . (9)

decide post-judgment disputes by making minor, temporary modifications to

child access provisions ordered by the court if (A) the judgment or post-

judgment order of the court authorizes such decision making, and (B) the

parties have agreed in writing or on the record that the post-judgment

parenting coordinator may do so.

Rule 9-205.2(h), entitled “Services Not Permitted,” prohibits a parenting coordinator from

“mak[ing] parenting decisions on behalf of the parties,” except for those decisions authorized

20

by 9-205.2(g)(9) (temporary modifications to child access provisions, not relevant here). Md.

Rule 9-205.2(h)(3).

A parenting coordinator would not have the authority to make a decision regarding

Darren’s mental health treatment in the event of Mother and Father’s continued

disagreement, so the refusal of the court to appoint a parenting coordinator had no impact on

the parties’ shared legal custody regarding Darren’s mental health treatment. Father still

shares legal custody on questions of Darren’s mental health; in the event of an impasse, the

parties can seek a decision from the court.

ORDERS OF THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR

MONTGOMERY COUNTY AFFIRMED.

COSTS TO BE PAID BY THE APPELLANT.

21