Unmanned Aircra, Systems (UAS) Integra5on in the Na5onal ...
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Unmanned Aircra, Systems (UAS) Integra5on in the Na5onal Airspace System (NAS) Project Detect and Avoid UAS INTEGRATION IN THE NAS Jay Shively DAA Sub-Project Manager 1
Transcript of Unmanned Aircra, Systems (UAS) Integra5on in the Na5onal ...
UnmannedAircra,Systems(UAS)Integra5onintheNa5onalAirspace
System(NAS)Project
DetectandAvoid
UAS INTEGRATION IN THE NAS JayShivelyDAASub-ProjectManager 1
Present:• UASIntegra6onintotheNAS• RTCASC228MOPSandAutonomy• ICAORPASPanelandAutonomyFuture:Singleoperatorcontrolofmul6pleA/CPlaybookHuman-AutonomyTeamingPaLernsHATModel
Outline
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FullUASIntegra6onVisionoftheFuture
Mannedandunmannedaircra,willbeabletorou2nelyoperatethroughallphasesofflightintheNAS,basedonairspace
requirementsandsystemperformancecapabili2es.
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UAS-NASPhase2ProjectOrganiza6onStructure
PRO
JEC
T O
FFIC
E LE
VEL
Project Support: TechnicalStaff Engineer Dan Roth, AFRCSystems Eng Lead TBD, TBD
Project LeadershipProject Manager (PM) Laurie Grindle, AFRCDeputy PM Robert Sakahara, AFRCDeputy PM, Integration Davis Hackenberg, AFRCChief Engineer William Johnson, LaRC
SUBP
RO
JEC
T LE
VEL
Command and Control (C2)
Subproject ManagerMike Jarrell, GRC
Subproject Technical LeadJim Griner, GRC
Detect and Avoid (DAA)
Subproject ManagerJay Shively, ARC
Subproject Technical LeadsConfesor Santiago, ARC; Lisa Fern,
ARC; Tod Lewis, LaRC
Integrated Test & Evaluation
Subproject ManagerHeather Maliska, AFRC
Subproject Technical LeadsJim Murphy, ARC; Sam Kim, AFRC
ELEM
NET
/TW
P LE
VEL
Technical Work Packages (TWP): Terrestrial Extensions, Ka-band Satcom, Ku-band Satcom, C-band Satcom
Technical Work Packages (TWP): Alternative Surveillance, Well Clear, ACAS Xu, External Collaboration, Integrated Events
Technical Work Packages (TWP):, Integration of Technologies into LVC-DE, Simulation Planning and Integration, Integrated Flight Test
Project Support: Project Planning & ControlLead Resource Analyst April Jungers, AFRCResource Analysts Winter Preciado, AFRC
Warcquel Frieson, ARCJulie Blackett, GRCPat O’Neal, LaRC
Scheduler Irma Ruiz, AFRCRisk Manager Jamie Turner, AFRCChange/Doc. Mgmt Lexie Brown, AFRCAdmin Sarah Strahan, AFRC
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DAAOpera6onalEnvironments
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60K’ MSL
18K’ MSL
10K’ MSL
500’ AGL
MINIMUM ENROUTE ALTITUDE
Cooperative Traffic
Non-cooperative Aircraft
HALE aircraft
Ground Based Radar
UAS Ground Control Station
GBSAA Data
Alternative DAA Sensors
ACAS Xu
Airborne Radar
Class 2 & 3 UAS DAA System for Transition
to Operational Altitude (> 10kft MSL)
C2 Datalink DAA System for
Operational Altitudes (> 500ft AGL)
Terminal Area Ops
LegendCurrentResearchAreas(FY14-FY16)ProposedResearchAreas(FY17–FY20)
• PhaseIMOPSRTCASC-228completeandpublished(March,2017)
– Transi6ontoClassAairspace– DAAMOPS– On-boardRADARMOPS– C2TerrestrialRadioMOPS
• Phase2(2021)
– Opera6oninClassC,D– TerminalAreaOpera6ons– LowSWAPA/C,sensors– GBSAA
Status
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General.Whenweathercondi6onspermit,regardlessofwhetheranopera6onisconductedunderinstrumentflightrulesorvisualflightrules,vigilanceshallbemaintainedbyeachpersonopera6nganaircra`soastoseeandavoidotheraircra`.Whenaruleofthissec6ongivesanotheraircra`theright-of-way,thepilotshallgivewaytothataircra`andmaynotpassover,under,oraheadofitunlesswellclear.
Piloted“seeandavoid”=UAS“detectandavoid”Pilotsvisionreplacebysensors(on-oroff-boardorboth)Pilotjudgmentofwellclear=mathema6calexpressionofwellclearHorzMissDistance=4000`;VertMissDistance=450`;modTau=35sec;DMOD=4000`
SeeandAvoid:FARSec.91.113
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TwoFunc6ons:1) Maintainwellclear
1) Seeandavoid2) CollisionAvoidance
1) TCAS2) ACAS-Xu
DAA
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Background
• Anearlycri6calques6onforthePhaseIMOPSforDAAsystemswaswhat,ifany,levelofDAAmaneuverguidancewouldberequiredtosupportacceptableperformanceonmaintainingwellclear?• PhaseIMOPSassump6onsspecifythatthepilotincommandwillexecutemaneuverstoremainwellclear– i.e.,Noautoma6c/autonomousDAAcapability
• Displaytypesgivenlevel/typeofmaneuverguidance:– Informa2ve:Providesessen6alinforma6onofahazardthattheremote
pilotmayusetodevelopandexecuteanavoidancemaneuver.Nomaneuverguidanceautoma6onordecisionaidingisprovidedtothepilot
– Sugges2ve:Automa6onprovidesarangeofpoten6alresolu6onmaneuverstoavoidahazardwithmanualexecu6on.Analgorithmprovidesthepilotwithmaneuverdecisionaidingregardingadvantageousordisadvantageousmaneuvers
– Direc2ve:Automa6onprovidesspecificrecommendedresolu6onguidancetoavoidahazardwithmanualorautomatedexecu6on.Analgorithmprovidesthepilotwithspecificmaneuverguidanceonwhenandhowtoperformthemaneuver
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Dra`MOPSInformedbyHITLs:SurveillanceRange
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Timeun5lCPA
WellClearThreshold(~35sec)
Aircra,ManeuverTime
(~30sec)
~35sec~65sec
NMAC
0sec~80sec~90sec
PilotResponseTime
(~15sec)
ATCInterac5onTime
(~10sec)
Latency
TOTALRESPONSETIME:DetectIntruders
PilotsDetermineResolu5onNego5ateClearancewithATCanduplink
maneuvertoaircra,
Approximatedetec5onrange=8nm
Approximatedetec5onrange=6nm
Aler6ng
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Symbol Name PilotAc6on BufferedWellClearCriteria
TimetoLossofWellClear
AuralAlertVerbiage
TCASRA
• Immediateac2onrequired• ComplywithRAsenseandver6calrate• No6fyATCassoonasprac6cablea`er
takingac6on
*DMOD=0.55nmi*ZTHR=600`
*modTau=25sec
0sec(+/-5sec)(TCPAapproximate:
25sec)“Climb/Descend”
4 DAAWarningAlert
• Immediateac2onrequired• No6fyATCassoonasprac6cablea`er
takingac6on
DMOD=0.75nmiHMD=0.75nmiZTHR=450`
modTau=35sec
25sec(TCPAapproximate:
60sec)
“Traffic,ManeuverNow”
x2
3 Correc6veDAAAlert
• Oncurrentcourse,correc2veac2onrequired
• CoordinatewithATCtodetermineanappropriatemaneuver
DMOD=0.75nmiHMD=0.75nmiZTHR=450`
modTau=35sec
55sec(TCPAapproximate:
90sec)
“Traffic,Avoid”
2 Preven6veDAAAlert
• Oncurrentcourse,correc6veac6onshouldnotberequired
• Monitorforintrudercoursechanges• TalkwithATCifdesired
DMOD=0.75nmiHMD=1.0nmiZTHR=700`
modTau=35sec
55sec(TCPAapproximate:
90sec)“Traffic,Monitor”
1 GuidanceTraffic• Noac5onrequired• Trafficgenera6ngguidancebands
outsideofcurrentcourse
Associatedw/bandsoutsidecurrentcourse
X N/A
0 None(Target) • Noac5onrequired• Nocoordina6onrequired
Withinsurveillancefieldofregard X N/A
*ThesevaluesshowtheProtec6onVolume(notwellclearvolume)atMSL5000-10000`(TCASSensi6vityLevel5)
AutonomousCAisop5onal.Manufacturerscan,ifdesired,automatecollisionavoidance–muchasAirbushasautomatedTCASintheA380.
AutopilotmodetoexecutetheResolu6onAdvisory.
Noac6onforatrafficadvisory.AutonomousMaintainWellClear(MWC)func6onisoutofscope.Partlybecausethesolu6onissugges5ve.Phase2–closureratesareslower,butA/Carecloser,aircra`arelessagile–6melinesmaydictateauto-DAA.Ini6alstudyofthetradespace(OSU-Woods).
DAAPhase1MOPS
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RPASManualonRemotelyPilotedAircra`(RPAS)Doc10019Autonomousaircra`:Anunmannedaircra`thatdoesnotallowpilotinterven6oninthemanagementoftheflight.AutonomousOpera6on:Anopera6onduringwhicharemotelypilotedaircra`isopera6ngwithoutpilotinterven6oninthemanagementoftheflight.andtheRPASManualonRemotelyPilotedAircra6(RPAS)restrictsthescopetoexclude“autonomousaircra`andtheiropera6ons…”
ICAO
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However,Lostlinkopera6ons,bydefini6on,areopera6ngwithoutpilotinterven6on(i.e.,pilotoutoftheloop,sec6on2.13).Therefore,basedonthedescrip6ons(sec6on2.1)andtherestric6oninscope,lostlinkopera6onsareexcludedfromtheRPASpanelscope.However,theseopera6onsarediscussedinchapters4,8,9,10,11and14oftheRPASManual.TheICAOdefini6onofautonomousopera6onsinadvertentlyexcludeslostlinkopera6ons.
ICAO
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SystemCharacteris5c
Pilotcanintervene Pilotcan’tintervene(lostlink)
Pilotcan’tintervene(design)
Determinis6c Automa6on Automa6on* Automa6on
Stochas6c HAT Autonomy Autonomy
Automa6onTable
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Abilityofpilottointervene
ICAO:Automa6onisinscope,Autonomyisoutofscope.*Currentlostlink.
• LOA– Sheridan– Parasuraman,WickensandSheridan
• Avia6onSystems– Aviate– Navigate– Communicate
• Phaseofflight– T.O.– Enroute– Approach– LandingWaypointNaviga6on:RPASxxisautomatedatlevelxx,innav,fortheenroutephase.
Mul6-dimensionalnature
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Singleoperatorcontrolofmul6pleUASDoD–AFRL“Heterogeneous-UASIntegra6oninasingle-operatorVSCSEnvironment(HIVE)”UASEXCOMScienceandResearchPanel’s(SARP)-Workshoponmul6pleUAScontrolledbyasingle operator,June27&28.Boeing–“don’tseeabusinessmodelwithoutit.”Supervisorycontrol–astepbeforenetworkmanagement(UTM).
Future
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Delega6onControl:Playbook®
• Delega6on:onewayhumansmanagesupervisorycontrolwithheterogeneous,intelligentassets
• Playbook®:onesmeansofdelega6on• Plays:analogoustofootball– Quickcommands–complex
ac6ons
• APlayprovidesaframework– Referencesanacceptablerangeof
plan/behavioralterna6ves– Requiressharedknowledgeof
domainGoals,TasksandAc6ons– Supervisorcanfurtherconstrain/
s6pulate• Poten6allyfacilitatesintui6vecoopera6vecontrolofUnmannedSystems
ApagefromAlonzoStagg’s1927Playbook
Example:ProsecuteTarget
Tools:Armlaser➔Lasetarget➔SendcoordinatestoweaponizedUAV➔ToggleUAVs➔Armmissile➔Fire
Scripts:Select‘Lase’script➔ToggleUAVs➔Armweapons➔Fire
Plays:Select‘ProsecuteTarget’play➔Fire
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
Plays Scripts Tools
% C
orre
ct
Control Mode
Secondary Task Performance (% Correct Hits)
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
2.5
3.0
3.5
4.0
4.5
5.0
Plays Scripts Tools
Ove
rall
Rat
ing
Control Mode
NASA-TLX Ratings
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
Plays Scripts Tools
Rea
ctio
n Ti
me
Control Mode
Primary Task Performance (RT)
Target Acquisition
Target Prosecution
ShorterReac6onTimeforPlays
PlayshadlowerworkloadHigherAccuracyforPlays
LevelsofAutoma5onSimula5on
Manned-UnmannedTeaming:MUM
Level IV Control: Control of Payload and Vehicle Excluding Take-off and Landing
Extend to simultaneous control of multiple heterogeneous UAS
Manned-UnmannedTeaming:MUM
Goals:• ApplyPlaybook®methodologyandDelConlessonslearnedtohelicoptercockpit;Testinsimula6on
• IncreasecapabilityandefficiencyofUAScontrolbyhelicopterpilots
• Supervisorycontrolofmul6ple,heterogeneousUAS
• Developinfrastructureandlayfounda6onforlaterefforts
Propor6onofTargetsMarkedbyControlMode(OutofTotalPossible)
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
NoUAV Manual Playbook
Prop
or5o
n
ControlMode
p < .05
0
5
10
15
20
25
Manual Playbook
Time(s)
ControlMode
UASRoutePlanningTimebyControlMode
Results
0
2
4
6
8
10
Temporal Frustra6on Performance Overall
AverageRa
5ng
WorkloadDimension
NoUAV Manual Playbook
NASA–TLXRa6ngs
p < .05 p < .05 p < .05
p < .05
HigherAccuracyPlaybook
LowerRoutePlanningTimeforPlaybook
LowerworkloadforPlaybookonseveraldimensions
FlightDemonstra6on2009
Ft.OrdCA,23APR2009
Goal:• Demonstratesini6alproofofconceptof
Delega6onControl(Playbook)inflight–supervisorycontrolofmul6pleair/groundassetsinMOUTScenario
Method:• Live/VirtualDemo–ControllingRMAX,CMU
MAXRoverand2virtualUASwithDelega6onControl
• VoiceRGNControl(USAF)
Features:• Delega6oncontrolhuman-machineinterface
supportscontrolandmonitoring4payloads• Automa6onTransparency• LiveUGV-UAVcoordina6onforslungloaddrop• Reducedoperatorworkload/highsitua6on
awareness
Live RMAX Virtual Shadow
Virtual Sky Warrior
Live CMU
MAX Rover
FlightDemonstra6on2011
Ft.Hunter-LiggeECA,19May2011Purpose:• Buildonprevioussimula6onsandflighttestexaminingsingleoperatorcontrolofmul6pleheterogeneousground/airunmannedsystemsthroughdelega6oncontrolemployment– Operatorperformancedatacollec6on/workload
assessments– Heterogeneousflightassets:BoeingScanEagleand
YamahaRMAX;twovirtualUAS– Tes6nginopera6onallyrelevantmissionscenarios– Mul6-sensorcross-cueinsupportofbothtarge6ng
andconvoysupport• ArmyAFDD/BoeingCRADAKeyObjec6ve:• DevelopandtestDelConTopPriorityPlays;routerecon,convoysupport,troopsincontact
Demonstratedinnumeroussimula6onsandflighttests(evenNOPE).
• AFRL–Basesecurity,UASgroundsta6on
• RCO–Dispatch,cockpit
• HAT
SupervisoryControlSummary
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HATAgent
HAT Agent
Operator
Interface
DisplayAudioVisual
Context - Time Pressure- User Info- more
Queries/Requests - A v. B- Why?- What If?
Automation
Plays- Goals- Risks to
achieving goals- Mitigations
AlertsContextResponses to Queries- Alternatives- Transparency info - Predicted Outcomes - Reasoning - Confidence level
Transparency Info
RequestsPolling for Risks
Etiquette Rules/C
ontextual S
ensitivity
Authority Info
Scratch Pad
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ProblemswithAutoma6on
• BriLle– Automa6ono`enoperateswellforarangeofsitua6onsbutrequires
humaninterven6ontohandleboundarycondi6ons(Woods&Cook,2006)
• Opaque– Automa6oninterfaceso`endonotfacilitateunderstandingortracking
ofthesystem(Lyons,2013)
• MiscalibratedTrust– Disuseandmisuseofautoma6onhaveleadtoreal-worldmishapsand
tragedies(Lee&See,2004;Lyons&Stokes,2012)
• Out–of-the-LoopLossofSitua6onAwareness– Trade-off:automa6onhelpsmanualperformanceandworkloadbut
recoveringfromautoma6onfailureiso`enworse(Endsley,2016;Onnasch,Wickens,Li,Manzey,2014)
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HATSolu6onstoProblemswithAutoma6on
• BriLle– Nego5ateddecisionsputsalayerofhumanflexibilityintosystem
behavior
• Opaque– Requiresthatsystemsbedesignedtobetransparent,presentra5onale
andconfidence– Communica6onshouldbeintermstheoperatorcaneasilyunderstand
(sharedlanguage)
• MiscalibratedTrust– Automa6ondisplayofra5onalehelpshumanoperatorknowwhento
trustit
• Out–of-the-LoopLossofSitua6onAwareness– Userdirectedinterface;adaptable,notadap6veautoma6on– Greaterinterac6on(e.g.,nego5a5on)withautoma6onreduces
likelihoodofbeingoutoftheloop
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Legend
HumanOperator
Intelligent/Cogni2veAgent
AutomatedTools
Communica2onOnly
SupervisoryRela2onshipCoopera2veRela2onship
Co-loca2on(e.g.,onboardanairplane,ingroundstaJon)
Bothimplybi-direc2onalinforma2onflow,usuallyusingautomatedtools
RCOUse-Case
FLYSKY12isenroutefromSFOtoBOS.ThereisonePOBandadispatcherflightfollowing.• Onboardautoma6ondetectsfuelimbalanceandalertsPOBanddispatcher.• POBrequestsautoma6ondiagnosefuelimbalance.Automa6onreportstoPOBaleakinle`tank.
• POBrequeststhatagentmanagefuel.Agentopensthecrossfeedandturnsoffthepumpsintherightsidetodrawfuelfromthele`.
• POBcontactsdispatchaboutneedtodivert.• Dispatcherrequestsdivertplanningfromdispatchautoma6on.• DispatcheruplinksflightplantoPOB.POBinspectstheflightplanandagrees.
• POBrequestsagentcoordinatedivertwithATC.Agentreportsdivertisapproved.POBtellsagenttoexecute.
Top-LevelActorRela6onships
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WObj:Airline Flight
WObj:Ground
Operations
WO:Aircraft
WObj:ATC
Operations
Worker Tools
OnboardPilot
OnboardAgent
GroundAgent
Worker Tools
ATC
Worker Tools
Ground Operator
Top-LevelSystemWork
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WObj:Airline Flight
Airline Flight
WObj:Ground
Operations
WO:Aircraft
WProc:Airline Operations
WObj:ATC
Operations
WPOut:Fly aircraft
WPOut:Telemetry data
Voice comm
WPOut:Telemetry data
Voice comm
WPOut:Direct traffic (e.g., clearances)Provide information (e.g., traffic)Voice comm
WPOut:Alerts (e.g., weather) Mitigations (e.g., reroutes)Voice comm
Ground Operations
ATC Operations
Worker Tools
OnboardPilot
OnboardAgent
Worker Tools
Ground Operator
Worker Tools
• Autonomy– Notintoday’s“approved”UAS– WordsMaLer• ICAO
• Businesscaseforsingleoperatorsupervisorycontrolofmul6pleUAS– Playbookdelega6onisonesuccessfulmethod
• HAT– Coopera6veagentwithknowledgeofworkdomain– Sharedworldknowledge– Canweextendedtonetworksupervision
Summary
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