Unlawful Detainer Jurisprudence

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Republic of the Philippines Supreme Court Manila SECOND DIVISION VIEGELY SAMELO, represented by Attorney-in-Fact CRISTINA SAMELO, Petitioner, - versus - MANOTOK SERVICES, INC., allegedly represented by PERPETUA BOCANEGRA (deceased), Respondent. G.R. No. 170509 Present: CARPIO, J., Chairperson, BRION,

description

unlawful detainer, property

Transcript of Unlawful Detainer Jurisprudence

Republic of the PhilippinesSupreme CourtManila SECOND DIVISION VIEGELY SAMELO, represented by Attorney-in-Fact CRISTINA SAMELO,Petitioner, - versus - MANOTOK SERVICES, INC., allegedly represented by PERPETUA BOCANEGRA (deceased),Respondent. G.R. No. 170509 Present: CARPIO, J., Chairperson,BRION,PEREZ,SERENO, andREYES, JJ. Promulgated: June 27, 2012 x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x DECISION BRION, J.: Before us is the petition for review on certiorari[1] filed by Viegely Samelo (petitioner), represented by her attorney-in-fact Cristina Samelo, to challenge the decision dated June 21, 2005[2] and the resolution dated November 10, 2005[3] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 85664.

Background Facts Manotok Services, Inc. (respondent) alleged that it is the administrator of a parcel of land known as Lot 9-A, Block 2913, situated at 2882 Dagupan Extension, Tondo, Manila. On January 31, 1997, the respondent entered into a contract with the petitioner for the lease of a portion of Lot 9-A, Block 2913, described as Lot 4, Block 15 (subject premises). The lease contract was for a period of one (1) year, with a monthly rental of P3,960.00. After the expiration of the lease contract on December 31, 1997, the petitioner continued occupying the subject premises without paying the rent.[4] On August 5, 1998, the respondent, thru its President Rosa Manotok, sent a letter to the petitioner demanding that she vacate the subject premises and pay compensation for its use and occupancy.[5] The petitioner, however, refused to heed these demands. On November 18, 1998, the respondent filed a complaint for unlawful detainer against the petitioner before the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC), Branch 3, Manila.[6] The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 161588-CV. The respondent prayed, among others, that the petitioner and those claiming rights under her be ordered to vacate the subject premises, and to pay compensation for its use and occupancy. In her answer, the petitioner alleged that the respondent had no right to collect rentals because the subject premises are located inside the property of the Philippine National Railways (PNR). She also added that the respondent had no certificate of title over the subject premises. The petitioner further claimed that her signature in the contract of lease was obtained through the respondents misrepresentation. She likewise maintained that she is now the owner of the subject premises as she had been in possession since 1944.[7] The MeTC Ruling The MeTC, in its judgment[8] of March 28, 2002, decided in favor of the respondent, and ordered the petitioner to vacate the subject premises and to deliver their peaceful possession to the respondent. The MeTC held that the only issue to be resolved in an unlawful detainer case is physical possession or possession de facto, and that the respondent had established its right of possession over the subject premises. It added that the petitioners right under the lease contract already ceased upon the expiration of the said contract. It further ruled that the petitioner is already estopped from questioning the right of the respondent over the subject premises when she entered into a contract of lease with the respondent. The dispositive portion of the MeTC judgment reads: WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered for the plaintiff and against defendant, ordering the latter and all persons claiming rights under her: 1. To vacate the premises located at 2882 Dagupan Extension, Tondo, Manila, and deliver the peaceful possession thereof to the plaintiff[;] 2. To pay plaintiff the sum of P40,075.20 as compensation for the use and occupancy of the premises from January 1, 1998 to August 30, 1998, plus P4,554.00 a month starting September 1, 1998, until defendant and all person[s] claiming rights under her to finally vacate the premises[;] 3. To pay plaintiff the sum of P5,000.00 for and as attorneys fees; and 4. To pay the cost of suit.[9] The RTC Decision The petitioner filed an appeal[10] with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 50, Manila. The RTC, in its decision[11] of July 1, 2004, set aside the MeTCs decision, and dismissed the complaint for unlawful detainer. The RTC held, among others, that the respondent had no right to collect rentals as it failed to show that it had authority to administer the subject premises and to enter into a contract of lease with the petitioner. It also ruled that the subject premises, which were formerly owned by the PNR, are now owned by the petitioner by virtue of her possession and stay in the premises since 1944. The CA Decision Aggrieved by the reversal, the respondent filed a petition for review with the CA, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 85664.[12] The CA, in its decision of June 21, 2005, reversed and set aside the RTC decision, and reinstated the MeTC judgment. The CA held that the petitioner is now estopped from questioning the right of the respondent over the subject property. It explained that in an action involving the possession of the subject premises, a tenant cannot controvert the title of his landlord or assert any rights adverse to that title, without first delivering to the landlord the premises acquired by virtue of the agreement between themselves. The appellate court added that the petitioner cannot claim that she repudiated the lease contract, in the absence of any unequivocal acts of repudiation. The CA further held that the only issue in an ejectment suit is physical or material possession, although the trial courts may provisionally resolve the issue of ownership for the sole purpose of determining the issue of possession. It explained that the issue of ownership is not required to determine the issue of possession since the petitioner tacitly admitted that she is a lessee of the subject premises.[13] The petitioner moved to reconsider this decision, but the CA denied her motion in its resolution dated November 10, 2005.[14] In presenting her case before this Court, the petitioner argued that the CA erred in ruling that a tenant is not permitted to deny the title of his landlord. She maintained that the respondent is not the owner or administrator of the subject premises, and insisted that she had been in possession of the land in question since 1944. She further added that she repudiated the lease contract by filing a case for fraudulent misrepresentation, intimidation, annulment of lease contract, and quieting of title with injunction before another court.[15] The Courts Ruling We find the petition unmeritorious.

Respondent has a better right of possession over the subject premises An action for unlawful detainer exists when a person unlawfully withholds possession of any land or building against or from a lessor, vendor, vendee or other persons, after the expiration or termination of the right to hold possession, by virtue of any contract, express or implied.[16] The only issue to be resolved in an unlawful detainer case is physical or material possession of the property involved, independent of any claim of ownership by any of the parties involved.[17] Thus, when the relationship of lessor and lessee is established in an unlawful detainer case, any attempt of the parties to inject the question of ownership into the case is futile, except insofar as it might throw light on the right of possession.[18] In the present case, it is undisputed that the petitioner and the respondent entered into a contract of lease. We note in this regard that in her answer with affirmative defenses and counterclaim before the MeTC, the petitioner did not deny that she signed the lease contract (although she maintained that her signature was obtained through the respondents misrepresentations). Under the lease contract, the petitioner obligated herself to pay a monthly rental to the respondent in the amount of P3,960.00. The lease period was for one year, commencing on January 1, 1997 and expiring on December 31, 1997. It bears emphasis that the respondent did not give the petitioner a notice to vacate upon the expiration of the lease contract in December 1997 (the notice to vacate was sent only on August 5, 1998), and the latter continued enjoying the subject premises for more than 15 days, without objection from the respondent. By the inaction of the respondent as lessor, there can be no inference that it intended to discontinue the lease contract.[19] An implied new lease was therefore created pursuant to Article 1670 of the Civil Code, which expressly provides: Article 1670. If at the end of the contract the lessee should continue enjoying the thing leased for fifteen days with the acquiescence of the lessor, and unless a notice to the contrary by either party has previously been given, it is understood that there is an implied new lease, not for the period of the original contract, but for the time established in Articles 1682 and 1687. The other terms of the original contract shall be revived. An implied new lease or tacita reconduccion will set in when the following requisites are found to exist: a) the term of the original contract of lease has expired; b) the lessor has not given the lessee a notice to vacate; and c) the lessee continued enjoying the thing leased for fifteen days with the acquiescence of the lessor.[20] As earlier discussed, all these requisites have been fulfilled in the present case. Article 1687 of the Civil Code on implied new lease provides: Article 1687. If the period for the lease has not been fixed, it is understood to be from year to year, if the rent agreed upon is annual; from month to month, if it is monthly; from week to week, if the rent is weekly; and from day to day, if the rent is to be paid daily. Since the rent was paid on a monthly basis, the period of lease is considered to be from month to month, in accordance with Article 1687 of the Civil Code. [A] lease from month to month is considered to be one with a definite period which expires at the end of each month upon a demand to vacate by the lessor.[21] When the respondent sent a notice to vacate to the petitioner on August 5, 1998, the tacita reconduccion was aborted, and the contract is deemed to have expired at the end of that month. [A] notice to vacate constitutes an express act on the part of the lessor that it no longer consents to the continued occupation by the lessee of its property.[22] After such notice, the lessees right to continue in possession ceases and her possession becomes one of detainer.[23] Estoppel of tenant We find no merit in the petitioners allegation that the respondent had no authority to lease the subject premises because the latter failed to prove that it is its owner or administrator. The Rules of Court protects the respondent, as lessor, from being questioned by the petitioner, as lessee, regarding its title or better right of possession over the subject premises. Section 2(b), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court states that the tenant is not permitted to deny the title of his landlord at the time of the commencement of the relation of landlord and tenant between them. Article 1436 of the Civil Code likewise states that a lessee or a bailee is estopped from asserting title to the thing leased or received, as against the lessor or bailor. These provisions bar the petitioner from contesting the respondents title over the subject premises. The juridical relationship between x x x [a] lessor and x x x [a lessee] carries with it a recognition of the lessor's title. As [lessee, the petitioner is] estopped [from denying the] landlord's title, or to assert a better title not only in [herself], but also in some third person while [she remains] in possession of the subject premises and until [she surrenders] possession to the landlord. This estoppel applies even though the lessor had no title at the time the relation of [the] lessor and [the] lessee was created, and may be asserted not only by the original lessor, but also by those who succeed to his title.[24] Once a contact of lease is shown to exist between the parties, the lessee cannot by any proof, however strong, overturn the conclusive presumption that the lessor has a valid title to or a better right of possession to the subject premises than the lessee. The Court thus explained in Tamio v. Ticson:[25] Indeed, the relation of lessor and lessee does not depend on the formers title but on the agreement between the parties, followed by the possession of the premises by the lessee under such agreement. As long as the latter remains in undisturbed possession, it is immaterial whether the lessor has a valid title or any title at all at the time the relationship was entered into. [citations omitted] The issue of ownership We are likewise unpersuaded by the petitioners claim that she has acquired possessory rights leading to ownership[26] over the subject premises, having been in possession thereof since 1944. We emphasize that aside from her self-serving allegation, the petitioner did not present any documentary evidence to substantiate her claim that she stayed on the subject premises since 1944. That the petitioner presented certificates of title of the Manila Railroad Company over certain properties in Tondo, Manila, which allegedly cover the subject premises, is of no moment. One cannot recognize the right of another, and at the same time claim adverse possession which can ripen to ownership, thru acquisitive prescription. For prescription to set in, the possession must be adverse, continuous, public, and to the exclusion of [others].[27] Significantly, the RTC decision failed to state its basis for concluding that the petitioner stayed in the subject premises since 1944. At any rate, we hold that no need exists to resolve the issue of ownership in this case, since it is not required to determine the issue of possession; the execution of the lease contract between the petitioner, as lessee, and the respondent, as lessor, belies the formers claim of ownership. We reiterate that the fact of the lease and the expiration of its term are the only elements in an action for unlawful detainer. The defense of ownership does not change the summary nature of [this] action. x x x. Although a wrongful possessor may at times be upheld by the courts, this is merely temporary and solely for the maintenance of public order. The question of ownership is to be settled in the proper court and in a proper action.[28] Interest on rentals due Additionally, the petitioner is liable to pay interest by way of damages for her failure to pay the rentals due for the use of the subject premises.[29] We reiterate that the respondents extrajudicial demand on the petitioner was made on August 5, 1998. Thus, from this date, the rentals due from the petitioner shall earn interest at 6% per annum, until the judgment in this case becomes final and executory. After the finality of judgment, and until full payment of the rentals and interests due, the legal rate of interest to be imposed shall be 12%. WHEREFORE, in light of all the foregoing, we DENY the petition. The decision and the resolution of the Court of Appeals dated June 21, 2005 and November 10, 2005, respectively, in CA-G.R. SP No. 85664 are AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the unpaid rentals shall earn a corresponding interest of six percent (6%) per annum, to be computed from August 5, 1998 until the finality of this decision. After this decision becomes final and executory, the rate of legal interest shall be computed at twelve percent (12%) per annum from such finality until its satisfaction. SO ORDERED.

Republic of the PhilippinesSupreme CourtManila SECOND DIVISION REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES and NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION, both represented by the PRIVATIZATION MANAGEMENT OFFICE, Petitioners, - versus - SUNVAR REALTY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, Respondent. G.R. No. 194880 Present: CARPIO, J., Chairperson,BRION,PEREZ,SERENO, andREYES, JJ. Promulgated: June 20, 2012x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x D E C I S I O N SERENO, J.:

This is a Rule 45 Petition questioning the Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City, which ordered the dismissal of the Complaint for unlawful detainer filed by petitioners herein with the Metropolitan Trial Court.Petitioners Republic of the Philippines (Republic) and National Power Corporation (NPC) are registered co-owners of several parcels of land located along Pasong Tamo Extension and Vito Cruz in Makati City, and covered by four Transfer Certificates of Title (TCTs).[1] The main subject matter of the instant Petition is one of these four parcels of land covered by TCT No. 458365, with an area of approximately 22,294 square meters (hereinafter, the subject property). Eighty percent (80%) of the subject property is owned by petitioner Republic, while the remaining twenty percent (20%) belongs to petitioner NPC.[2] Petitioners are being represented in this case by the Privatization Management Office (PMO), which is the agency tasked with the administration and disposal of government assets.[3] Meanwhile, respondent Sunvar Realty Development Corporation (Sunvar) occupied the subject property by virtue of sublease agreements, which had in the meantime expired.The factual antecedents of the case are straightforward. On 26 December 1977,[4] petitioners leased the four parcels of land, including the subject property, to the Technology Resource Center Foundation, Inc., (TRCFI) for a period of 25 years beginning 01 January 1978 and ending on 31 December 2002.[5] Under the Contract of Lease (the main lease contract), petitioners granted TRCFI the right to sublease any portion of the four parcels of land.[6]Exercising its right, TRCFI consequently subleased a majority of the subject property to respondent Sunvar through several sublease agreements (the sublease agreements).[7] Although these agreements commenced on different dates, all of them contained common provisions on the terms of the sublease and were altogether set to expire on 31 December 2002, the expiration date of TRCFIs main lease contract with petitioners, but subject to renewal at the option of respondent:[8]The term of the sublease shall be for an initial period of [variable] years and [variable] months commencing on [variable], renewable for another twenty-five (25) years at SUNVARs exclusive option.[9]According to petitioners, in all the sublease agreements, respondent Sunvar agreed to return or surrender the subleased land, without any delay whatsoever upon the termination or expiration of the sublease contract or any renewal or extension thereof.[10]During the period of its sublease, respondent Sunvar introduced useful improvements, consisting of several commercial buildings, and leased out the spaces therein.[11] It also profitably utilized the other open spaces on the subject property as parking areas for customers and guests.[12]In 1987, following a reorganization of the government, TRCFI was dissolved. In its stead, the Philippine Development Alternatives Foundation (PDAF) was created, assuming the functions previously performed by TRCFI.[13]On 26 April 2002, less than a year before the expiration of the main lease contract and the sublease agreements, respondent Sunvar wrote to PDAF as successor of TRCFI. Respondent expressed its desire to exercise the option to renew the sublease over the subject property and proposed an increased rental rate and a renewal period of another 25 years.[14] On even date, it also wrote to the Office of the President, Department of Environment and Natural Resources and petitioner NPC. The letters expressed the same desire to renew the lease over the subject property under the new rental rate and renewal period.[15]On 10 May 2002, PDAF informed respondent that the notice of renewal of the lease had already been sent to petitioners, but that it had yet to receive a response.[16] It further explained that the proposal of respondent for the renewal of the sublease could not yet be acted upon, and neither could the proposed rental payments be accepted.[17] Respondent acknowledged receipt of the letter and requested PDAF to apprise the former of any specific actions undertaken with respect to the said lease arrangement over the subject property.[18]On 03 June 2002, six months before the main contract of lease was to expire, petitioner NPC through Atty. Rainer B. Butalid, Vice-President and General Counsel notified PDAF of the formers decision not to renew the contract of lease.[19] In turn, PDAF notified respondent of NPCs decision.[20]On the other hand, petitioner Republic through then Senior Deputy Executive Secretary Waldo Q. Flores likewise notified PDAF of the formers decision not to renew the lease contract.[21] The Republic reasoned that the parties had earlier agreed to shorten the corporate life of PDAF and to transfer the latters assets to the former for the purpose of selling them to raise funds.[22] On 25 June 2002, PDAF duly informed respondent Sunvar of petitioner Republics decision not to renew the lease and quoted the Memorandum of Senior Deputy Executive Secretary Flores.[23]On 31 December 2002, the main lease contract with PDAF, as well as its sublease agreements with respondent Sunvar, all expired. Hence, petitioners recovered from PDAF all the rights over the subject property and the three other parcels of land. Thereafter, petitioner Republic transferred the subject property to the PMO for disposition. Nevertheless, respondent Sunvar continued to occupy the property.On 22 February 2008, or six years after the main lease contract expired, petitioner Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), advised respondent Sunvar to completely vacate the subject property within thirty (30) days.[24] The latter duly received the Notice from the OSG through registered mail,[25] but failed to vacate and remained on the property.[26]On 03 February 2009, respondent Sunvar received from respondent OSG a final notice to vacate within 15 days.[27] When the period lapsed, respondent Sunvar again refused to vacate the property and continued to occupy it.On 02 April 2009, the PMO issued an Inspection and Appraisal Report to determine the fair rental value of the subject property and petitioners lost income a loss arising from the refusal of respondent Sunvar to vacate the property after the expiration of the main lease contract and sublease agreements.[28] Using the market comparison approach, the PMO determined that the fair rental value of the subject property was 10,364,000 per month, and that respondent Sunvar owed petitioners a total of 630,123,700 from 01 January 2002 to 31 March 2009.[29]On 23 July 2009, petitioners filed the Complaint dated 26 May 2009 for unlawful detainer with the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Makati City. Petitioners prayed that respondent Sunvar be ordered to vacate the subject property and to pay damages for the illegal use and lost income owing to them:WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, it is most respectfully prayed that after proper proceedings, judgment be rendered: 1. Ordering defendant SUNVAR REALTY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION and all persons, natural and juridical, claiming rights under it, to vacate the subject property and peacefully surrender the same, with the useful improvements therein, to the plaintiffs or to their authorized representative; and 2. Ordering defendant SUNVAR REALTY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION to pay plaintiffs damages in the amount of SIX HUNDRED THIRTY MILLION ONE HUNDRED TWENTY THREE THOUSAND SEVEN HUNDRED PESOS (630,123,700.00) for the illegal and unauthorized use and occupation of the subject property from January 1, 2003 to March 31, 2009, and the amount of TEN MILLION THREE HUNDRED SIXTY-FOUR THOUSAND PESOS (10,364,000.00) per month from April 1, 2008 until the subject property, together with its improvements, are completely vacated and peacefully surrendered to the plaintiffs or to their authorized representative.[30] Respondent Sunvar moved to dismiss the Complaint and argued that the allegations of petitioners in the Complaint did not constitute an action for unlawful detainer, since no privity of contract existed between them.[31] In the alternative, it also argued that petitioners cause of action was more properly an accion publiciana, which fell within the jurisdiction of the RTC, and not the MeTC, considering that the petitioners supposed dispossession of the subject property by respondent had already lasted for more than one year.In its Order dated 16 September 2009, the MeTC denied the Motion to Dismiss and directed respondent Sunvar to file an answer to petitioners Complaint.[32] The lower court likewise denied the Motion for Reconsideration[33] filed by respondent.[34] Respondent later on filed its Answer[35] to the Complaint.[36]Despite the filing of its Answer in the summary proceedings for ejectment, respondent Sunvar filed a Rule 65 Petition for Certiorari with the RTC of Makati City to assail the denial by the MeTC of respondents Motion to Dismiss.[37]In answer to the Rule 65 Petition of respondent, petitioners placed in issue the jurisdiction of the RTC and reasoned that the Rules on Summary Procedure expressly prohibited the filing of a petition for certiorari against the interlocutory orders of the MeTC.[38] Hence, they prayed for the outright dismissal of the certiorari Petition of respondent Sunvar.The RTC denied the motion for dismissal and ruled that extraordinary circumstances called for an exception to the general rule on summary proceedings.[39] Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration,[40] which was subsequently denied by the RTC.[41] Hence, the hearing on the certiorari Petition of respondent proceeded, and the parties filed their respective Memoranda.[42]In the assailed Order dated 01 December 2010, which discussed the merits of the certiorari Petition, the RTC granted the Rule 65 Petition and directed the MeTC to dismiss the Complaint for unlawful detainer for lack of jurisdiction.[43] The RTC reasoned that the one-year period for the filing of an unlawful detainer case was reckoned from the expiration of the main lease contract and the sublease agreements on 31 December 2002. Petitioners should have then filed an accion publiciana with the RTC in 2009, instead of an unlawful detainer suit.Hence, the instant Rule 45 Petition filed by petitioners.[44]IPetitioners Resort to a Rule 45 PetitionBefore the Court proceeds with the legal questions in this case, there are procedural issues that merit preliminary attention.Respondent Sunvar argued that petitioners resort to a Rule 45 Petition for Review on Certiorari before this Court is an improper mode of review of the assailed RTC Decision. Allegedly, petitioners should have availed themselves of a Rule 65 Petition instead, since the RTC Decision was an order of dismissal of the Complaint, from which no appeal can be taken except by a certiorari petition.The Court is unconvinced of the arguments of respondent Sunvar and holds that the resort by petitioners to the present Rule 45 Petition is perfectly within the bounds of our procedural rules.As respondent Sunvar explained, no appeal may be taken from an order of the RTC dismissing an action without prejudice,[45] but the aggrieved party may file a certiorari petition under Rule 65.[46] Nevertheless, the Rules do not prohibit any of the parties from filing a Rule 45 Petition with this Court, in case only questions of law are raised or involved.[47] This latter situation was one that petitioners found themselves in when they filed the instant Petition to raise only questions of law.In Republic v. Malabanan,[48] the Court clarified the three modes of appeal from decisions of the RTC, to wit: (1) by ordinary appeal or appeal by writ of error under Rule 41, whereby judgment was rendered in a civil or criminal action by the RTC in the exercise of its original jurisdiction; (2) by a petition for review under Rule 42, whereby judgment was rendered by the RTC in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction; and (3) by a petition for review on certiorari before the Supreme Court under Rule 45. The first mode of appeal is taken to the [Court of Appeals] on questions of fact or mixed questions of fact and law. The second mode of appeal is brought to the CA on questions of fact, of law, or mixed questions of fact and law. The third mode of appeal is elevated to the Supreme Court only on questions of law.[49] (Emphasis supplied.)There is a question of law when the issue does not call for an examination of the probative value of the evidence presented or of the truth or falsehood of the facts being admitted, and the doubt concerns the correct application of law and jurisprudence on the matter.[50] The resolution of the issue must rest solely on what the law provides on the given set of circumstances.[51]In the instant case, petitioners raise only questions of law with respect to the jurisdiction of the RTC to entertain a certiorari petition filed against the interlocutory order of the MeTC in an unlawful detainer suit. At issue in the present case is the correct application of the Rules on Summary Procedure; or, more specifically, whether the RTC violated the Rules when it took cognizance and granted the certiorari petition against the denial by the MeTC of the Motion to Dismiss filed by respondent Sunvar. This is clearly a question of law that involves the proper interpretation of the Rules on Summary Procedure. Therefore, the instant Rule 45 Petition has been properly lodged with this Court.IIPropriety of a Rule 65 Petition in Summary ProceedingsProceeding now to determine that very question of law, the Court finds that it was erroneous for the RTC to have taken cognizance of the Rule 65 Petition of respondent Sunvar, since the Rules on Summary Procedure expressly prohibit this relief for unfavorable interlocutory orders of the MeTC. Consequently, the assailed RTC Decision is annulled.Under the Rules on Summary Procedure, a certiorari petition under Rule 65 against an interlocutory order issued by the court in a summary proceeding is a prohibited pleading.[52] The prohibition is plain enough, and its further exposition is unnecessary verbiage.[53] The RTC should have dismissed outright respondent Sunvars Rule 65 Petition, considering that it is a prohibited pleading. Petitioners have already alerted the RTC of this legal bar and immediately prayed for the dismissal of the certiorari Petition.[54] Yet, the RTC not only refused to dismiss the certiorari Petition,[55] but even proceeded to hear the Rule 65 Petition on the merits. Respondent Sunvars reliance on Bayog v. Natino[56] and Go v. Court of Appeals[57] to justify a certiorari review by the RTC owing to extraordinary circumstances is misplaced. In both cases, there were peculiar and specific circumstances that justified the filing of the mentioned prohibited pleadings under the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure conditions that are not availing in the case of respondent Sunvar.In Bayog, Alejandro Bayog filed with the Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of Patnongon-Bugasong-Valderama, Antique an ejectment case against Alberto Magdato, an agricultural tenant-lessee who had built a house over his property. When Magdato, an illiterate farmer, received the Summons from the MCTC to file his answer within 10 days, he was stricken with pulmonary tuberculosis and was able to consult a lawyer in San Jose, Antique only after the reglementary period. Hence, when the Answer of Magdato was filed three days after the lapse of the 10-day period, the MCTC ruled that it could no longer take cognizance of his Answer and, hence, ordered his ejectment from Bayogs land. When his house was demolished in January 1994, Magdato filed a Petition for Relief with the RTC-San Jose, Antique, claiming that he was a duly instituted tenant in the agricultural property, and that he was deprived of due process. Bayog, the landowner, moved to dismiss the Petition on the ground of lack of jurisdiction on the part of the RTC, since a petition for relief from judgment covering a summary proceeding was a prohibited pleading. The RTC, however, denied his Motion to Dismiss and remanded the case to the MCTC for proper disposal.In resolving the Rule 65 Petition, we ruled that although a petition for relief from judgment was a prohibited pleading under the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure, the Court nevertheless allowed the filing of the Petition pro hac vice, since Magdato would otherwise suffer grave injustice and irreparable injury:We disagree with the RTCs holding that a petition for relief from judgment (Civil Case No. 2708) is not prohibited under the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure, in light of the Jakihaca ruling. When Section 19 of the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure bars a petition for relief from judgment, or a petition for certiorari, mandamus, or prohibition against any interlocutory order issued by the court, it has in mind no other than Section 1, Rule 38 regarding petitions for relief from judgment, and Rule 65 regarding petitions for certiorari, mandamus, or prohibition, of the Rules of Court, respectively. These petitions are cognizable by Regional Trial Courts, and not by Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, or Municipal Circuit Trial Courts. If Section 19 of the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure and Rules 38 and 65 of the Rules of Court are juxtaposed, the conclusion is inevitable that no petition for relief from judgment nor a special civil action of certiorari, prohibition, or mandamus arising from cases covered by the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure may be filed with a superior court. This is but consistent with the mandate of Section 36 of B.P. Blg. 129 to achieve an expeditious and inexpensive determination of the cases subject of summary procedure. Nevertheless, in view of the unusual and peculiar circumstances of this case, unless some form of relief is made available to MAGDATO, the grave injustice and irreparable injury that visited him through no fault or negligence on his part will only be perpetuated. Thus, the petition for relief from judgment which he filed may be allowed or treated, pro hac vice, either as an exception to the rule, or a regular appeal to the RTC, or even an action to annul the order (decision) of the MCTC of 20 September 1993. As an exception, the RTC correctly held that the circumstances alleged therein and the justification pleaded worked in favor of MAGDATO, and that the motion to dismiss Civil Case No. 2708 was without merit. xxx [58] (Emphasis supplied.)On the other hand, in Go v. Court of Appeals, the Court was confronted with a procedural void in the Revised Rules of Summary Procedure that justified the resort to a Rule 65 Petition in the RTC. In that case, the preliminary conference in the subject ejectment suit was held in abeyance by the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) of Iloilo City until after the case for specific performance involving the same parties shall have been finally decided by the RTC. The affected party appealed the suspension order to the RTC. In response, the adverse party moved to dismiss the appeal on the ground that it concerned an interlocutory order in a summary proceeding that was not the subject of an appeal. The RTC denied the Motion to Dismiss and subsequently directed the MTCC to proceed with the hearing of the ejectment suit, a ruling that was upheld by the appellate court.In affirming the Decisions of the RTC and CA, the Supreme Court allowed the filing of a petition for certiorari against an interlocutory order in an ejectment suit, considering that the affected party was deprived of any recourse to the MTCCs erroneous suspension of a summary proceeding. Retired Chief Justice Artemio V. Panganiban eloquently explained the procedural void in this wise:Indisputably, the appealed [suspension] order is interlocutory, for it does not dispose of the case but leaves something else to be done by the trial court on the merits of the case. It is axiomatic that an interlocutory order cannot be challenged by an appeal. Thus, it has been held that the proper remedy in such cases is an ordinary appeal from an adverse judgment on the merits incorporating in said appeal the grounds for assailing the interlocutory order. Allowing appeals from interlocutory orders would result in the sorry spectacle of a case being subject of a counterproductive ping-pong to and from the appellate court as often as a trial court is perceived to have made an error in any of its interlocutory rulings. However, where the assailed interlocutory order is patently erroneous and the remedy of appeal would not afford adequate and expeditious relief, the Court may allow certiorari as a mode of redress. Clearly, private respondent cannot appeal the order, being interlocutory. But neither can it file a petition for certiorari, because ejectment suits fall under the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure, Section 19(g) of which considers petitions for certiorari prohibited pleadings: x x x x x x x x x Based on the foregoing, private respondent was literally caught between Scylla and Charybdis in the procedural void observed by the Court of Appeals and the RTC. Under these extraordinary circumstances, the Court is constrained to provide it with a remedy consistent with the objective of speedy resolution of cases. As correctly held by Respondent Court of Appeals, the purpose of the Rules on Summary Procedure is to achieve an expeditious and inexpensive determination of cases without regard to technical rules. (Section 36, Chapter III, BP Blg. 129) Pursuant to this objective, the Rules prohibit petitions for certiorari, like a number of other pleadings, in order to prevent unnecessary delays and to expedite the disposition of cases. In this case, however, private respondent challenged the MTCC order delaying the ejectment suit, precisely to avoid the mischief envisioned by the Rules. Thus, this Court holds that in situations wherein a summary proceeding is suspended indefinitely, a petition for certiorari alleging grave abuse of discretion may be allowed. Because of the extraordinary circumstances in this case, a petition for certiorari, in fact, gives spirit and life to the Rules on Summary Procedure. A contrary ruling would unduly delay the disposition of the case and negate the rationale of the said Rules.[59] (Emphasis supplied.)Contrary to the assertion of respondent Sunvar, the factual circumstances in these two cases are not comparable with respondents situation, and our rulings therein are inapplicable to its cause of action in the present suit. As this Court explained in Bayog, the general rule is that no special civil action for certiorari may be filed with a superior court from cases covered by the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure. Respondent Sunvar filed a certiorari Petition in an ejectment suit pending before the MeTC. Worse, the subject matter of the Petition was the denial of respondents Motion to Dismiss, which was necessarily an interlocutory order, which is generally not the subject of an appeal. No circumstances similar to the situation of the agricultural tenant-lessee in Bayog are present to support the relaxation of the general rule in the instant case. Respondent cannot claim to have been deprived of reasonable opportunities to argue its case before a summary judicial proceeding.Moreover, there exists no procedural void akin to that in Go v. Court of Appeals that would justify respondents resort to a certiorari Petition before the RTC. When confronted with the MeTCs adverse denial of its Motion to Dismiss in the ejectment case, the expeditious and proper remedy for respondent should have been to proceed with the summary hearings and to file its answer. Indeed, its resort to a certiorari Petition in the RTC over an interlocutory order in a summary ejectment proceeding was not only prohibited. The certiorari Petition was already a superfluity on account of respondents having already taken advantage of a speedy and available remedy by filing an Answer with the MeTC.Respondent Sunvar failed to substantiate its claim of extraordinary circumstances that would constrain this Court to apply the exceptions obtaining in Bayog and Go. The Court hesitates to liberally dispense the benefits of these two judicial precedents to litigants in summary proceedings, lest these exceptions be regularly abused and freely availed of to defeat the very goal of an expeditious and inexpensive determination of an unlawful detainer suit. If the Court were to relax the interpretation of the prohibition against the filing of certiorari petitions under the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure, the RTCs may be inundated with similar prayers from adversely affected parties questioning every order of the lower court and completely dispensing with the goal of summary proceedings in forcible entry or unlawful detainer suits.IIIReckoning the One-Year Period in Unlawful Detainer CasesWe now come to another legal issue underlying the present Petition whether the Complaint filed by petitioners is properly an action for unlawful detainer within the jurisdiction of the MeTC or an accion publiciana lodged with the RTC. At the heart of the controversy is the reckoning period of the one-year requirement for unlawful detainer suits.Whether or not petitioners action for unlawful detainer was brought within one year after the unlawful withholding of possession will determine whether it was properly filed with the MeTC. If, as petitioners argue, the one-year period should be counted from respondent Sunvars receipt on 03 February 2009 of the Final Notice to Vacate, then their Complaint was timely filed within the one-year period and appropriately taken cognizance of by the MeTC. However, if the reckoning period is pegged from the expiration of the main lease contract and/or sublease agreement, then petitioners proper remedy should have been an accion publiciana to be filed with the RTC.The Court finds that petitioners correctly availed themselves of an action for unlawful detainer and, hence, reverses the ruling of the RTC.Under the Rules of Court, lessors against whom possession of any land is unlawfully withheld after the expiration of the right to hold possession may by virtue of any express or implied contract, and within one year after the unlawful deprivation bring an action in the municipal trial court against the person unlawfully withholding possession, for restitution of possession with damages and costs.[60] Unless otherwise stipulated, the action of the lessor shall commence only after a demand to pay or to comply with the conditions of the lease and to vacate is made upon the lessee; or after a written notice of that demand is served upon the person found on the premises, and the lessee fails to comply therewith within 15 days in the case of land or 5 days in the case of buildings.[61]In Delos Reyes v. Spouses Odenes,[62] the Court recently defined the nature and scope of an unlawful detainer suit, as follows:Unlawful detainer is an action to recover possession of real property from one who illegally withholds possession after the expiration or termination of his right to hold possession under any contract, express or implied. The possession by the defendant in unlawful detainer is originally legal but became illegal due to the expiration or termination of the right to possess. The proceeding is summary in nature, jurisdiction over which lies with the proper MTC or metropolitan trial court. The action must be brought up within one year from the date of last demand, and the issue in the case must be the right to physical possession. (Emphasis supplied.)Hence, a complaint sufficiently alleges a cause of action for unlawful detainer if it states the following elements:1. Initially, the possession of the property by the defendant was by contract with or by tolerance of the plaintiff. 2. Eventually, the possession became illegal upon the plaintiffs notice to the defendant of the termination of the latters right of possession. 3. Thereafter, the defendant remained in possession of the property and deprived the plaintiff of the latters enjoyment. 4. Within one year from the making of the last demand on the defendant to vacate the property, the plaintiff instituted the Complaint for ejectment.[63]On the other hand, accion publiciana is the plenary action to recover the right of possession which should be brought in the proper regional trial court when dispossession has lasted for more than one year. It is an ordinary civil proceeding to determine the better right of possession of realty independently of title. In other words, if at the time of the filing of the complaint, more than one year had elapsed since defendant had turned plaintiff out of possession or defendants possession had become illegal, the action will be, not one of forcible entry or illegal detainer, but an accion publiciana.[64]There are no substantial disagreements with respect to the first three requisites for an action for unlawful detainer. Respondent Sunvar initially derived its right to possess the subject property from its sublease agreements with TRCFI and later on with PDAF. However, with the expiration of the lease agreements on 31 December 2002, respondent lost possessory rights over the subject property. Nevertheless, it continued occupying the property for almost seven years thereafter. It was only on 03 February 2009 that petitioners made a final demand upon respondent Sunvar to turn over the property. What is disputed, however, is the fourth requisite of an unlawful detainer suit.The Court rules that the final requisite is likewise availing in this case, and that the one-year period should be counted from the final demand made on 03 February 2009.Contrary to the reasoning of the RTC,[65] the one-year period to file an unlawful detainer case is not counted from the expiration of the lease contract on 31 December 2002. Indeed, the last demand for petitioners to vacate is the reckoning period for determining the one-year period in an action for unlawful detainer. Such one year period should be counted from the date of plaintiffs last demand on defendant to vacate the real property, because only upon the lapse of that period does the possession become unlawful.[66]In case several demands to vacate are made, the period is reckoned from the date of the last demand.[67] In Leonin v. Court of Appeals,[68] the Court, speaking through Justice Conchita Carpio Morales, reckoned the one-year period to file the unlawful detainer Complaint filed on 25 February 1997 from the latest demand letter dated 24 October 1996, and not from the earlier demand letter dated 03 July 1995:Prospero Leonin (Prospero) and five others were co-owners of a 400-square meter property located at K-J Street, East Kamias, Quezon City whereon was constructed a two-storey house and a three-door apartment identified as No. 1-A, B, and C. Prospero and his co-owners allowed his siblings, herein petitioners, to occupy Apartment C without paying any rentals. x x x x x x x x x Petitioners further contend that respondents remedy is accion publiciana because their possession is not de facto, they having been authorized by the true and lawful owners of the property; and that one year had elapsed from respondents demand given on July 3, 1995 when the unlawful detainer complaint was filed. The petition fails. Contrary to petitioners contention, the allegations in the complaint make out a case for unlawful detainer. Thus, respondent alleged, inter alia, that she is the registered owner of the property and that petitioners, who are tenants by tolerance, refused to vacate the premises despite the notice to vacate sent to them. Likewise, contrary to petitioners contention, the one-year period for filing a complaint for unlawful detainer is reckoned from the date of the last demand, in this case October 24, 1996, the reason being that the lessor has the right to waive his right of action based on previous demands and let the lessee remain meanwhile in the premises. Thus, the filing of the complaint on February 25, 1997 was well within the one year reglementary period.[69] (Emphasis supplied.)From the time that the main lease contract and sublease agreements expired (01 January 2003), respondent Sunvar no longer had any possessory right over the subject property. Absent any express contractual renewal of the sublease agreement or any separate lease contract, it illegally occupied the land or, at best, was allowed to do so by mere tolerance of the registered owners petitioners herein. Thus, respondent Sunvars possession became unlawful upon service of the final notice on 03 February 2009. Hence, as an unlawful occupant of the land of petitioners, and without any contract between them, respondent is necessarily bound by an implied promise that it will vacate upon demand, failing which a summary action for ejectment is the proper remedy against them.[70] Upon service of the final notice of demand, respondent Sunvar should have vacated the property and, consequently, petitioners had one year or until 02 February 2010 in which to resort to the summary action for unlawful detainer. In the instant case, their Complaint was filed with the MeTC on 23 July 2009, which was well within the one-year period.The Court is aware that petitioners had earlier served a Notice to Vacate on 22 February 2008, which could have possibly tolled the one-year period for filing an unlawful detainer suit. Nevertheless, they can be deemed to have waived their right of action against respondent Sunvar and continued to tolerate its occupation of the subject property. That they sent a final Notice to Vacate almost a year later gave respondent another opportunity to comply with their implied promise as occupants by mere tolerance. Consequently, the one-year period for filing a summary action for unlawful detainer with the MeTC must be reckoned from the latest demand to vacate.In the past, the Court ruled that subsequent demands that are merely in the nature of reminders of the original demand do not operate to renew the one-year period within which to commence an ejectment suit, considering that the period will still be reckoned from the date of the original demand.[71] If the subsequent demands were merely in the nature of reminders of the original demand, the one-year period to commence an ejectment suit would be counted from the first demand.[72] However, respondent failed to raise in any of the proceedings below this question of fact as to the nature of the second demand issued by the OSG. It is now too late in the proceedings for them to argue that the 2009 Notice to Vacate was a mere reiteration or reminder of the 2008 Notice to Vacate. In any event, this factual determination is beyond the scope of the present Rule 45 Petition, which is limited to resolving questions of law.The Court notes that respondent Sunvar has continued to occupy the subject property since the expiration of its sublease on 31 December 2002. The factual issue of whether respondent has paid rentals to petitioners from the expiration of the sublease to the present was never raised or sufficiently argued before this Court. Nevertheless, it has not escaped the Courts attention that almost a decade has passed without any resolution of this controversy regarding respondents possession of the subject property, contrary to the aim of expeditious proceedings under the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure. With the grant of the instant Petition and the remand of the case to the MeTC for continued hearing, the Court emphasizes the duty of the lower court to speedily resolve this matter once and for all, especially since this case involves a prime property of the government located in the countrys business district and the various opportunities for petitioners to gain public revenues from the property.WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the Petition for Review on Certiorari dated 14 February 2011, filed by petitioners Republic and National Power Corporation, which are represented here by the Privatization Management Office. The assailed Decision dated 01 December 2010 of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 134, is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Metropolitan Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 63, is DIRECTED to proceed with the summary proceedings for the unlawful detainer case in Civil Case No. 98708.SO ORDERED.

Republic of the PhilippinesSupreme CourtManila THIRD DIVISION DOLORES ADORA MACASLANG, Petitioner, -versus - RENATO AND MELBA ZAMORA,Respondents.G.R. No. 156375 Present: CARPIOMORALES, Chairperson,BRION,BERSAMIN,VILLARAMA, andSERENO, JJ. Promulgated: May 30, 2011x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x D E C I S I O N BERSAMIN, J.: The Regional Trial Court (RTC) is not limited in its review of the decision of the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) to the issues assigned by the appellant, but can decide on the basis of the entire records of the proceedings of the trial court and such memoranda or briefs as may be submitted by the parties or required by the RTC. The petitioner appeals the decision promulgated on July 3, 2002,[1] whereby the Court of Appeals (CA) reversedfor having no basis in fact and in law the decision rendered on May 18, 2000[2] by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 25, in Danao City (RTC) thathad dismissed the respondents actionfor ejectment against the petitioner, andreinstated the decision dated September 13, 1999 of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) of DanaoCity (ordering the petitioner as defendant to vacate the premises and to pay attorneys fees of P10,000.00 and monthly rental of P5,000.00 starting December 1997 until they vacated the premises).[3] We grant the petition for review and rule that contrary to the CAs conclusion, the RTCas an appellate court properly considered and resolved issues even if not raised in the appeal from the decisionrendered in an ejectment case by the MTCC. ANTECEDENTS On March 10, 1999, the respondents filed a complaint for unlawful detainer in the MTCC, alleging that the [petitioner] sold to [respondents] a residential land located in Sabang, DanaoCity and that the [petitioner] requested to be allowed to live in the house with a promise to vacate as soon as she would be able to find a new residence. They further alleged thatdespitetheir demand after a year, the petitioner failed or refused to vacate the premises. Despite the due service of the summons and copy of the complaint, the petitioner did not file heranswer. The MTCC declared her in defaultupon the respondents motion to declare her in default, and proceeded to receivethe respondentsoral testimony and documentary evidence. Thereafter, on September 13, 1999, the MTCC rendered judgment against her, disposing: WHEREFORE, considering the foregoing, Judgment is hereby rendered in favor [of] plaintiffs (sic) spouses Renato Zamora and Melba Zamora and against defendant Dolores AdoraMacaslang, ordering defendant to vacate the properties in question, to pay to plaintiffs Attorneys Fees in the sum of P10,000.00 and monthly rental of P5,000.00 starting December, 1997 until the time the defendant shall have vacated the properties in question. SO ORDERED.[4] The petitioner appealed to the RTC, averring the following as reversible errors, namely: 1. Extrinsic Fraud was practiced upon defendant-appellant which ordinary prudence could not have guarded against and by reason of which she has been impaired of her rights. 2. Defendant-Appellant has a meritorious defense in that there was no actual sale considering that the absolute deed of sale relied upon by the plaintiff-appell[ees] is a patent-nullity as her signature therein was procured through fraud and trickery.[5] and praying through her appeal memorandum as follows: Wherefore, in view of the foregoing, it is most respectfully prayed for that judgment be rendered in favor of defendant-appellant ordering that this case be remanded back to the Court of Origin, Municipal Trial Court of Danao City, for further proceedings to allow the defendant to present her evidence, and thereafter, to render a judgment anew.[6] On May 18, 2000, the RTC resolved the appeal, to wit:[7] WHEREFORE,judgment is hereby rendered dismissing the complaint for failure to state a cause of action. The same may, however, be refiled in the same Court, by alleging plaintiffs cause of action, if any. Plaintiffs Motion for Execution of Judgment of the lower court is rendered moot by this judgment. SO ORDERED. The respondents appealed to the CA, assailing the RTCs decision for disregarding the allegations in the complaint in determining the existence or non-existence of a cause of action. On July 3, 2002, the CA reversed and set aside the RTCs decision and reinstated the MTCCs decision in favor of the respondents, disposing: WHEREFORE,foregoing premises considered, the Petition is hereby GIVEN DUE COURSE. Resultantly, the impugned decision of the Regional Trial Court is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE for having no basis in fact and in law, and the Decision of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities REINSTATED and AFFIRMED. No costs. SO ORDERED.[8] The petitionersmotion for reconsideration was denied onNovember 19, 2002. ISSUES Hence, the petitioner appeals the CAs adverse decision, submitting legal issues, as follows: 1. Whether or not the Regional Trial Court in the exercise of its Appellate Jurisdiction is limited to the assigned errors in the Memorandum or brief filed before it or whether it can decide the case based on the entire records of the case, as provided for in Rule 40, Sec. 7. This is a novel issue which, we respectfully submit, deserves a definitive ruling by this Honorable Supreme Court since it involves the application of a new provision, specifically underlined now under the 1997 Revised Rules on Civil procedure. 2. Whether or not in an action for unlawful detainer, where there was no prior demand to vacate and comply with the conditions of the lease made, a valid cause of action exists? 3. Whether or not in reversing the Regional Trial Court Decision and reinstating and affirming the decision of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court, which was tried and decided by the MCTC in violation of the Rules on Summary Procedure, the Court of Appeals sanctioned a gross departure from the usual course of judicial proceedings?[9] The issues that this Court has to resolve are stated thuswise: 1. Whether or not the CA correctly found that the RTC committed reversible error in ruling on issues not raised by the petitioner in her appeal; 2. Whether or not the CA correctly found that the complaint stated a valid cause of action; 3. Whether or not the CA erred in finding that there was a valid demand to vacate made by the respondents on the petitioner; and 4. Whether or not the petitioners defense of ownership was meritorious. RULING We grant the petition for review. A.As an appellate court, RTC may ruleupon an issue notraised on appeal In its decision, the CA ruled that the RTC could not resolve issues that were not assigned by the petitioner in her appeal memorandum, explaining: Indeed(,) We are rather perplexed why the Regional Trial Court, in arriving at its decision, discussed and ruled on issues or grounds which were never raised, assigned, or argued on by the Defendant-appellee in her appeal to the former. A careful reading of the Defendant-appellees appeal memorandum clearly shows that it only raised two (2) grounds, namely (a) alleged extrinsic fraud, (b) meritorious defenses based on nullity of the Deed of Sale Instrument. And yet the Trial Court, in its decision, ruled on issues not raised such as lack of cause of action and no prior demand to vacate having been made. Only errors assigned and properly argued on the brief and those necessarily related thereto, may be considered by the appellate court in resolving an appeal in a civil case. Based on said clear jurisprudence, the court a quo committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction when it resolved Defendant-appellees appeal based on grounds or issues not raised before it, much less assigned by Defendant-appellee as an error. Not only that. It is settled that an issue which was not raised during the Trial in the court below would not be raised for the first time on appeal as to do so would be offensive to the basic rules of fair play, justice and due process (Victorias Milling Co., Inc. vs. CA, 333 SCRA 663). We can therefore appreciate Plaintiffs-appellants dismay caused by the Regional Trial Courts blatant disregard of a basic and fundamental right to due process.[10] The petitioner disagrees with the CA and contends that the RTC as an appellate courtcould rule on the failure of the complaint to state a cause of action and the lack of demand to vacate even if not assigned in the appeal. We concur with the petitioners contention. The CA might have been correct had the appeal been a first appeal from the RTC to the CA or another proper superior court, in which instance Section 8 of Rule 51, which applies to appeals from the RTC to the CA,imposesthe express limitation of the review to only those specified in the assignment of errorsor closely related to or dependent on an assigned error and properly argued in the appellants brief, viz: Section 8. Questions that may be decided. No error which does not affect the jurisdiction over the subject matter or the validity of the judgment appealed from or the proceeding therein will be considered unless stated in the assignment of errors, or closely related to or dependent on an assigned error and properly argued in the brief, save as the court may pass upon plain errors and clerical errors. Butthe petitioners appeal herein,being taken from the decision of the MTCC to the RTC, was governed by a different rule, specifically Section 18 of Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, to wit: Section 18. xxxxxxThe judgment or final order shall be appealable to the appropriate Regional Trial Court which shall decide the same on the basis of the entire record of the proceedings had in the court of origin and such memoranda and/or briefs as may be submitted by the parties or required by the Regional Trial Court. (7a)As such,the RTC, in exercising appellate jurisdiction,was not limited to the errors assigned in the petitioners appeal memorandum, but coulddecide on the basis of the entire record of the proceedingshad in the trial court and such memoranda and/or briefs as may be submitted by the parties or required by the RTC. The difference between the procedures for deciding on review is traceable to Section 22 of Batas PambansaBlg. 129,[11]which provides: Section 22. Appellate Jurisdiction. Regional Trial Courts shall exercise appellate jurisdiction over all cases decided by Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in their respective territorial jurisdictions.Such cases shall be decided on the basis of the entire record of the proceedings had in the court of origin [and] such memoranda and/or briefs as may be submitted by the parties or required by the Regional Trial Courts. The decision of the Regional Trial Courts in such cases shall be appealable by petition for review to the Court of Appeals which may give it due course only when the petition shows prima facie that the lower court has committed an error of fact or law that will warrant a reversal or modification of the decision or judgment sought to be reviewed.[12] As its compliance with the requirement of Section 36 of Batas PambansaBlg. 129to adopt special rules or procedures applicable to such cases in order to achieve an expeditious and inexpensive determination thereof without regard to technical rules, the Court promulgated the 1991 Revised Rules on Summary Procedure, whereby it institutionalized the summary procedure for all the first level courts. Section 21 of the 1991 Revised Rules on Summary Procedurespecifically stated: Section 21. Appeal. Thejudgment or final order shall be appealable to the appropriate Regional Trial Court which shall decide the same in accordance with Section 22 of Batas PambansaBlg. 129. The decision of the Regional Trial Court in civil cases governed by this Rule, including forcible entry and unlawful detainer shall be immediately executory, without prejudice to a further appeal that may be taken therefrom. Section 10 of Rule 70 shall be deemed repealed. Later on, the Court promulgated the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, effective on July 1, 1997, and incorporated in Section 7 of Rule 40 thereof the directive to the RTC to decide appealed caseson the basis of the entire record of the proceedings had in the court of origin and such memoranda as are filed,viz: Section 7. Procedure in the Regional Trial Court. (a) Upon receipt of the complete record or the record on appeal, the clerk of court of the Regional Trial Court shall notify the parties of such fact. (b) Within fifteen (15) days from such notice, it shall be the duty of the appellant to submit a memorandum which shall briefly discuss the errors imputed to the lower court, a copy of which shall be furnished by him to the adverse party. Within fifteen (15) days from receipt of the appellants memorandum, the appellee may file his memorandum. Failure of the appellant to file a memorandum shall be a ground for dismissal of the appeal. (c) Upon the filing of the memorandum of the appellee, or the expiration of the period to do so, the case shall be considered submitted for decision. The Regional Trial Court shall decide the case on the basis of the entire record of the proceedings had in the court of origin and such memoranda as are filed. (n) As a result, the RTC presently decides all appeals from the MTC based on the entire record of the proceedings had in the court of origin and such memoranda or briefs as are filed in the RTC. Yet, even withoutthe differentiation in the procedures of deciding appeals, thelimitation of the review to onlythe errors assigned and properly argued in the appeal brief or memorandum and the errors necessarily related to such assigned errorsought not to have obstructed the CA from resolving the unassigned issues by virtue of their coming under one or several of the following recognized exceptions to the limitation, namely: (a) When the question affectsjurisdiction over the subject matter; (b) Matters that are evidently plain or clerical errors within contemplation of law; (c) Matters whose consideration is necessary in arriving at a just decision and complete resolution of the case or in serving the interests of justice or avoiding dispensing piecemeal justice; (d) Matters raised in the trial court and are of record having some bearing on the issue submitted that the parties failed to raise or that the lower court ignored; (e) Matters closely related to an error assigned; and (f) Matters upon which the determination of a question properly assigned is dependent.[13] Consequently, the CA improperly disallowed the consideration and resolution of the two errors despite their being: (a)necessary in arriving at a just decision and acomplete resolution of the case; and (b) matters of record having some bearing on the issues submitted that the lower court ignored. B.CA correctly delved into and determinedwhether or not complaint stateda cause of action The RTC opined that the complaint failed to state a cause of action because the evidence showed that there was no demand to vacate made upon the petitioner. The CA disagreed, observingin its appealed decision: But what is worse is that a careful reading of Plaintiffs-appellants Complaint would readily reveal that they have sufficiently established (sic) a cause of action against Defendant-appellee. It is undisputed that as alleged in the complaint and testified to by Plaintiffs-appellants, a demand to vacate was made before the action for unlawful detainer was instituted. A complaint for unlawful detainer is sufficient if it alleges that the withholding of possession or the refusal is unlawful without necessarily employing the terminology of the law (Jimenez vs. Patricia, Inc., 340 SCRA 525). In the case at bench, par. 4 of the Complaint alleges, thus: 4. After a period of one (1) year living in the aforementioned house, Plaintiff demanded upon defendant to vacate but she failed and refused; From the foregoing allegation, it cannot be disputed that a demand to vacate has not only been made but that the same was alleged in the complaint. How the Regional Trial Court came to the questionable conclusion that Plaintiffs-appellants had no cause of action is beyond Us.[14] We concur with the CA. A complaint sufficiently alleges a cause of action for unlawful detainer if it states the following: (a)Initially, the possession of the property by the defendant was by contract with or by tolerance of the plaintiff; (b)Eventually, such possession became illegal upon notice by the plaintiff to the defendant about the termination of the latters right of possession; (c)Thereafter, the defendant remained in possession of the property and deprived the plaintiff of its enjoyment; and (d)Within one year from the making of the last demand to vacate the propertyon the defendant, the plaintiff instituted the complaint for ejectment.[15] In resolving whether the complaint states a cause of actionor not, only the facts alleged in the complaint are considered. The test is whether the court can render a valid judgment on the complaint based on the facts alleged and the prayer asked for.[16] Only ultimate facts, not legal conclusions or evidentiary facts, are considered for purposes of applying the test.[17] To resolve the issue, therefore, a look at the respondents complaint is helpful: 2. On September 10, 1997, defendant sold to plaintiffs a residential land located in Sabang, Danao City, covered by Tax Dec.0312417 RB with an area of 400 square meters, including a residential house where defendant was then living covered by Tax Dec. 0312417 RB, a copy of the deed of absolute [sale] of these properties is hereto attached as Annex A; 3. After the sale, defendant requested to be allowed to live in the house which plaintiff granted on reliance of defendants promise to vacate as soon as she would be able to find a new residence; 4. After a period of one (1) year living in the aforementioned house, plaintiffs demanded upon defendant to vacate but she failed or refused. 5. Plaintiffs sought the aid of the barangay Lupon of Sabang, Danao City for arbitration but no settlement was reached as shown by a certification to file action hereto attached as Annex B; 6. Plaintiffs were compelled to file this action and hire counsel for P10,000 by way of attorneys fee; 7. Defendant agreed to pay plaintiffs a monthly rental of P5,000 for the period of time that the former continued to live in the said house in question. WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed of this Honorable Court to render judgment ordering the defendant to vacate the properties in question, ordering the defendant to pay plaintiffs attorneys fees in the sum of P10,000, ordering the defendant to pay the plaintiffs a monthly rental of P5,000 starting in October 1997, until the time that defendant vacates the properties in question. Plaintiffs pray for such other refiefs consistent with justice and equity.[18] Based on its allegations, the complaintsufficiently stated a cause of action for unlawful detainer. Firstly, it averred that the petitioner possessed the property by the mere tolerance of the respondents. Secondly, the respondents demanded that the petitioner vacate the property, thereby rendering her possession illegal. Thirdly,she remained in possession of the property despite the demand to vacate. And, fourthly, the respondents instituted the complaint on March 10, 1999,which was well within a year after the demand to vacate was made around September of 1998 or later. Yet, even as we rule that the respondents complaint stated a cause of action, we must find and hold that both the RTC and the CA erroneously appreciatedthe real issue to be about the complaints failure to state a cause of action. It certainly was not so, butthe respondents lack of cause of action. Their erroneous appreciationexpectedly prevented the correct resolution of the action. Failure to state a cause of action and lack of cause of action are really different from each other.On the one hand, failure to state a cause of actionrefers to the insufficiency of the pleading, and is a ground for dismissal under Rule 16 of the Rules of Court. On the other hand, lack of cause action refers to a situation where the evidence does not prove the cause of action alleged in the pleading. Justice Regalado, a recognized commentator on remedial law, has explained the distinction:[19] xxx What is contemplated, therefore, is a failure to state a cause of action which is provided in Sec. 1(g) of Rule 16. This is a matter of insufficiency of the pleading. Sec. 5 of Rule 10, which was also included as the last mode for raising the issue to the court, refers to the situation where the evidence does not prove a cause of action. This is, therefore, a matter of insufficiency of evidence. Failure to state a cause of action is different from failure to prove a cause of action. The remedy in the first is to move for dismissal of the pleading, while the remedy in the second is to demur to the evidence, hence reference to Sec. 5 of Rule 10 has been eliminated in this section. The procedure would consequently be to require the pleading to state a cause of action, by timely objection to its deficiency; or, at the trial, to file a demurrer to evidence, if such motion is warranted. A complaint states a cause of action if it avers the existence of the three essential elements of a cause of action, namely: (a) The legal right of the plaintiff; (b) The correlative obligation of the defendant; and (c) The act or omission of the defendant in violation of said legal right. If the allegations of the complaint do not aver the concurrence of these elements, the complaint becomes vulnerable to a motion to dismiss on the ground of failure to state a cause of action.Evidently, it is not the lack or absence of a cause of action that is a ground for the dismissal of the complaint but the fact that the complaint states no cause of action.Failure to state a cause of action may be raised at the earliest stages of an action through a motion to dismiss, but lack of cause of action may be raised at any time after the questions of fact have been resolved on the basis of the stipulations, admissions, or evidence presented.[20] Having found that neither Exhibit C nor Exhibit E was a proper demand to vacate,[21] considering that Exhibit C (the respondents letter dated February 11, 1998)demanded the payment of P1,101,089.90, and Exhibit E (theirletter dated January 21, 1999) demandedthe payment of P1,600,000.00, the RTC concluded that the demand alleged in the complaint did not constitute a demand to pay rent and to vacate the premises necessary in an action for unlawful detainer. It was this conclusion that caused the RTC to confuse the defect as failure of the complaint to state a cause of action for unlawful detainer. The RTCerred even in that regard. To begin with, it was undeniable that Exhibit D (the respondents letter dated April 28, 1998) constitutedthedemand to vacate that validly supported their action for unlawful detainer, because of its unmistakable tenor as a demand to vacate, which the following portion indicates:[22] This is to give notice that since the mortgage to your property has long expired and that since the property is already in my name, I will be taking over the occupancy of said property two (2) months from date of this letter. Exhibit D, despite not explicitly using the wordvacate, relayed to the petitionerthe respondents desire to take over the possession of the property by givingher no alternative exceptto vacate.The word vacate,according toGolden Gate Realty Corporation v. Intermediate Appellate Court,[23]is not a talismanic word that must be employed in all notices to vacate.The tenantsin Golden Gate Realty Corporationhad defaulted in the payment of rents, leading theirlessorto notify them to pay with a warning that a case of ejectment would be filed against themshould they not do so. The Court held that the lessor had thereby given strong notice that you either pay your unpaid rentals or I will file a court case to have you thrown out of my property,for therewas no other interpretation of the import of the notice due to the alternatives being clear cut, in that the tenants must pay rentals that had been fixed and had become payable in the past, failing in which they must move out.[24]Also, the demand not being to pay rent and to vacate did not render the cause of action deficient. Based on the complaint, the petitioners possession was allegedly based on the respondents tolerance, not on any contract between them. Hence, thedemand to vacate sufficed. C.Ejectment was not proper dueto defense of ownership being established The respondents cause of action for unlawful detainer was based on their supposed right to possession resulting from their having acquired it through sale. The RTCdismissed the complaint based on its following findings, to wit: In the case at bench, there is conflict between the allegation of the complaint and the document attached thereto. Simply stated, plaintiff alleged that she bought the house of the defendant for P100,000.00 on September 10, 1997 as stated in an alleged Deed of Absolute Sale marked as Exhibit A to the complaint. Insofar as plaintiff is concerned, the best evidence is the said Deed of Absolute Sale. The Court is surprised why in plaintiffs letter dated February 11, 1998, marked as Exhibit C and attached to the same complaint, she demanded from the defendant the whooping sum of P1,101,089.90. It must be remembered that this letter was written five (5) months after the deed of absolute sale was executed. The same letter (Exhibit C) is not a letter of demand as contemplated by law and jurisprudence. The plaintiff simply said that she will appreciate payment per notarized document. There is no explanation what this document is. Plaintiffs letter dated April 28, 1998 (Exhibit D) contradicts her allegation that she purchased the house and lot mentioned in the complaint. Exhibit D, which is part of the pleading and a judicial admission clearly shows that the house and lot of the defendant was not sold but mortgaged. Again, for purposes of emphasis and clarity, a portion of the letter (Exhibit D) reads: This is to give notice that since the mortgage to your property has long expired and that since the property is already in my name, I will be taking over the occupancy of said property two (2) months from date of this letter. x xxx Exhibit E, which is a letter dated January 21, 1999, shows the real transaction between the parties in their case. To reiterate, the consideration in the deed of sale (Exhibit A) is P100,000.00 but in their letter (Exhibit E) she is already demanding the sum of P1,600,000.00 because somebody was going to buy it for P2,000,000.00. There are indications that point out that the real transaction between the parties is one of equitable mortgage and not sale.[25] Despite holding herein that the respondents demand to vacate sufficed, we uphold the result of the RTC decision in favor of the petitioner. This we do,because therespondents Exhibit Cand Exhibit E, by demandingpayment from the petitioner, respectively,of P1,101,089.90 and P1,600,000.00, revealedthe true nature of the transaction involving the property in question as one of equitable mortgage, not a sale. Our upholding of the result reached by the RTC rests on the following circumstancesthat tended to show that the petitioner had not really sold the property to the respondents, contrary to the latters averments, namely: (a)The petitioner, as the vendor, was paid the amount of only P100,000.00,[26] a price too inadequate in comparison with the sum of P1,600,000.00 demanded in Exhibit E;[27] (b) The petitioner retained possession of the property despite the supposed sale; and (c) The deed of sale wasexecuted as a result or by reason of the loan the respondents extended to the petitioner,because they still allowed the petitioner to redeem the property by paying her obligation under the loan.[28] Submissions of the petitioner further supported the findings of the RTCon the equitable mortgage. Firstly, there was the earlier dated instrument (deed of pactode retro)involving the same property, albeit the consideration was only P480,000.00, executed between the petitioner as vendor a retro and the respondent Renato Zamora as vendee a retro.[29] Secondly, there were two receipts for the payments the petitioner had made to the respondentstotaling P300,000.00.[30] And, thirdly, the former secretary of respondent Melba Zamora executed an affidavit acknowledging that the petitioner had already paid a total of P500,000.00 to the respondents.[31] All these confirmed the petitioners claim that she remained the owner of the property and was still entitled to its possession. Article 1602 of the Civil Codeenumerates the instances when a contract, regardless of its nomenclature, may be presumed to be an equitable mortgage, namely: (a) When the price of a sale with right to repurchase is unusually inadequate; (b) When the vendor remains in possession as lessee or otherwise; (c) When upon or after the expiration of the right to repurchase another instrument extending the period of redemption or granting a new period is executed; (d)When the purchaser retains for himself a part of the purchase price; (e)When the vendor binds himself to pay the taxes on the thing sold; and, (f) In any other case where it may be fairly inferred that the real intention of the parties is that the transaction shall secure the payment of a debt or the performance of any other obligation. The circumstances earlier mentioned were, indeed, badges of an equitable mortgage within the context ofArticle 1602 of the Civil Code. Nonetheless, the findingsfavorable to the petitioners ownership are neitherfinally determinative of the title in the property, nor conclusive in any other proceeding where ownership of the property involved herein may be more fittingly adjudicated.Verily, where the cause of action in an ejectment suit is based on ownership of the property, the defense that the defendantretainedtitle or ownership is a proper subject for determination by the MTC but only for the purpose of adjudicating the rightful possessor of the property.[32]This is based on Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, viz: Section 16. Resolving defense of ownership. When the defendant raises the defense of ownership in his pleadings and the question of possession cannot be resolved without deciding the issue of ownership, the issue of ownership shall be resolved only to determine the issue of possession.(4a) D.MTC committed procedural lapsesthat must be noted and corrected The Court seizes theopportunity to note and to correctseveralnoticeable procedural lapses on the part of the MTCC, to avoid the impression that the Court condones or tolerates the lapses. The first lapse wasthe MTCCs granting of the respondents motion to declare the petitioner in default following her failure to file an answer. The proper procedurewas not for the plaintiffs to move for the declaration in default of the defendant who failed to file the answer. Such a motion to declare in default has been expressly prohibited under Section 13, Rule 70 oftheRules of Court.[33]Instead, the trial court, either motuproprio or on motion of the plaintiff, should render judgment as the facts alleged in the complaint might warrant.[34]In other words, the defendants failure to file an answer under Rule 70 of the Rules of Courtmight result to a judgment by default, not to a declaration of default. The second lapse wasthe MTCCsreception of the oral testimony of respondent Melba Zamora. Rule 70 of the Rules of Courthas envisioned the submission only of affidavits of the witnesses (not oral testimony) and other proofs on the factual issues defined in the order issued within five days from the termination of the preliminary conference;[35]and has permittedthe trial court, should it find the need to clarify material facts, to thereafterissue an order during the 30-day period from submission of the affidavits and other proofs specifying the matters to be clarified, and requiring the parties to submit affidavits or other evidence upon such matters within ten days from receipt of the order.[36] The procedural lapses committed in this case are beyond comprehension.The MTCC judge could not have been unfamiliar with the prevailing procedure, considering that therevised version of Rule 70, although taking effect only on July 1, 1997,was derived from the 1991 Revised Rule on Summary Procedure, in effect since November 15, 1991. It was not likely, therefore, that the MTCC judge committed the lapses out of his unfamiliarity with the relevant rule. We discern thatthe cause of the lapses was his lack of enthusiasm in implementingcorrect procedures in this case. If that was the true reason, the Court can only be alarmed and concerned, for a judge should not lack enthusiasm in applying the rules of procedure lest the worthy objectives of their promulgation be unwarrantedly sacrificed and brushed aside. The MTCC judge should not forget that the rules of procedure were always meant to be implemented deliberately, not casually, and their non-compliance should only be excused in the higher interest of the administration of justice. It is timely, therefore, to remind all MTC judges to display full and enthusiastic compliance with all the rules of procedure, especially those intended for expediting proceedings. WHEREFORE,we grant the petition for review on certiorari; set aside the decision promulgated on July 3, 2002 by the Court of Appeals; and dismiss the complaint for unlawful detainer for lack of a cause of action. The respondents shall pay the costs of suit. SO ORDERED.

Republic of the PhilippinesSupreme CourtManila SECOND DIVISION RUBEN C. CORPUZ, represented by Attorney-in-Fact Wenifreda C. Agullana, Petitioner, -versus- Sps. HILARION AGUSTIN andJUSTA AGUSTIN, Respondents. G.R. No. 183822 Present: CARPIO, J., Chairperson,PEREZ,SERENO,REYES, andPERLAS-BERNABE, JJ.* Promulgated: January 18, 2012 x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x DECISION SERENO, J.: This Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assails the Decision[1] dated 08 January 2008 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 90645, which affirmed the Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Laoag City and its Resolution[2] dated 15 July 2008 denying the Motion for Reconsideration. The RTC, in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction, affirmed the Decision of the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Laoag City, which had dismissed the unlawful detainer case filed by herein petitioner.The Factual Antecedents The Court adopts the findings of fact of the CA as follows: Ruben C. Corpuz (Ruben) filed a complaint for ejectment against Spouses Hilarion and Justa Agustin on the allegation that he is the registered owner of two parcels of land located in Santa Joaquina, Laoag City covered by TCT No. 12980 issued on October 29, 1976 by the Laoag City Register of Deeds and with technical descriptions as follows: 1) A parcel of land (Lot No. 20 of the Cadastral Survey of Laoag), with improvements thereon, situated in the barrio of Santa Joaquina, Municipality of Laoag. Bounded x x x containing an area of five thousand seven hundred and fifty nine (5,759) square meters more or less x x x. 2) A parcel of land (Lot No. 11711 of the Cadastral Survey of Laoag), with the improvements thereon, situated in the barrio of Santa Joaquina, Municipality of Laoag. Bounded x x x, containing an area of twenty thousand seven hundred and forty five (20,745) square meters, more or less x x x.

Aforesaid parcels of land were formerly owned by Elias Duldulao in whose name Original Certificate of Title No. O-1717 was issued. Duldulao sold said properties on August 27, 1951 to Francisco D. Corpuz, father of Ruben C. Corpuz. The elder Corpuz allowed spouses Agustin