University of Amsterdam, Distributed Systems1 Distributed Systems DOAS Marinus Maris.
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Transcript of University of Amsterdam, Distributed Systems1 Distributed Systems DOAS Marinus Maris.
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University of Amsterdam, Distributed Systems 1
Distributed Systems
DOAS
Marinus Maris
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University of Amsterdam, Distributed Systems 2
Centralized versus distributed systems
Centralized Distributed
device
Hostcomputer
device
device
devicedevice
device
Hostcomputer
device
device
devicedevice
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University of Amsterdam, Distributed Systems 3
Intelligent Distributed Systems
NID
NID
NID
NID NID
NID
Hostcomputer
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University of Amsterdam, Distributed Systems 4
Networked Intelligent Devices
Every sensor and actuator is equipped with local intelligence and a network connection
NIDs can:– Analayze their
environment– Communicate– Negotiate– Take decisions and
actions autonomously
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University of Amsterdam, Distributed Systems 5
Embedded
Systems
Smar
t
Senso
rs
Actuat
ors
NetworksAlgorit
hmsNIDs
To create distributed NID networks, synergie between technologies is required
NIDs
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University of Amsterdam, Distributed Systems 6
Typical NID architecture
Reactieve laag
Deductieve laag
Sensor/actuator
input output
Reactieve laag
Deductieve laag
Sensor/actuator
input output
NID1 NID2
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University of Amsterdam, Distributed Systems 7
Typical Distributed System Architecture
central
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University of Amsterdam, Distributed Systems 8
Why distributed?
Distributed monitoring and control enables:• Local intelligence, so fast and appropriate response• Good scalability• Hierarchical decomposition into sub-control groups. This
lowers the computational complexity since the groups need only partial knowledge
• Sub-groups can be optimized for space and (response) time
• Graceful degradation. Failure of one device won’t lead to total system failure.
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University of Amsterdam, Distributed Systems 9
Typical use: Robust Control Networks for complex systems
shipsships process industryprocess industry offshoreoffshore
• Increase the robustness of such control systems• Improve the reaction time in case of calamities• Reduce required manpower for emergency recovery
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University of Amsterdam, Distributed Systems 10
(Some) Distributed Intelligence Methods
• Rule Based• Fuzzy Logic• Neural Networks• Bayesian Networks • Gradient method• Demand-supply method
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University of Amsterdam, Distributed Systems 11
Example case: Chilled Water System on a Ship
Zone 2
Zone 1
users
seawater
seawater coolingfluid
coolingfluid
coolingwater
coolingwater
users
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University of Amsterdam, Distributed Systems 12
Decomposition into subsystems
Zee-water
1
Koel-middel
1
Koelwater
vóór
crossover
1
Koelwater
na
crossover
1
VIT1 NVIT1
Crossoverkoel-
middel
Crossoverkoelwater
Zee-water
2
Koel-middel
2
Koelwater
vóór
crossover
2
Koelwater
na
crossover
2
VIT2 NVIT2
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University of Amsterdam, Distributed Systems 13
Assign states to the subsystems
(voorbeelden)
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University of Amsterdam, Distributed Systems 14
Network Architecture
Ethernet
LonWorks
Sensorsand
actuators
Router Bridge
Ship ControlCenter
Hub
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University of Amsterdam, Distributed Systems 15
Method 1: Rule-based
• Knowledge of system is represented in rules, such as:
– if pipe leaks then close valves
Rules are simple however…• Difficult to maintain• So make a hierarchy of rules (e.g. define for each
subsystem a small set of rules):
– If koelmiddel1 defect then close it and open cross-over
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University of Amsterdam, Distributed Systems 16
2. Bayesian Network (voor probleem-analyse)
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University of Amsterdam, Distributed Systems 17
Adding evidence: “kleppenKW gesloten”
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University of Amsterdam, Distributed Systems 18
Adding evidence: “CoolingVIT1”=false
Waar zit nu de grootste kans op het defect
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University of Amsterdam, Distributed Systems 19
3. Gradient Method: Determines the shortest path in a network (in this case pipes)
Seawater (zone 1) Cooling fluid (zone 1) Cooling water (zone 1)
Cooling water (zone 2)Cooling fluid (zone 2)Seawater (zone 2)
VU11
1
4 8
14 19
181332 6
6 8 13 18
14 19
2 3 41
105
211
552211 1
552
1
11
Seawater (zone 1) Cooling fluid (zone 1) Cooling water (zone 1)
Cooling water (zone 2)Cooling fluid (zone 2)Seawater (zone 2)
VU11
1
4 8
14 19
181332 6
11 13 18 23
19 24
2 10 91
105
211
552211 1
552
1
11
Seawater (zone 1) Cooling fluid (zone 1) Cooling water (zone 1)
Cooling water (zone 2)Cooling fluid (zone 2)Seawater (zone 2)
VU11
1
14 19
181332
23 28
24 29
2 101
105
211
552211 1
552
1
11
20 189
4 86
• Scales very well• Cannot exploit multiple sources for cooling
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University of Amsterdam, Distributed Systems 20
4. Demand Supply Control Method
• Free market principle• Negotiation between suppliers and demanders• Cooling is the product• Priority determines which party will deliver the
product
• Scales well• Can exploit multiple sources• Due to the inertia of the medium (water) the lack of
cooling may be discovered rather late
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University of Amsterdam, Distributed Systems 21
Comparison Methods (chilled water system)
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University of Amsterdam, Distributed Systems 22
Hybrid Approach
Reactive layer
Deductive Layer
Rule-based
Demand-supply
Isolates defects
Exploits multiple sources
Creates a path betweensource and destination
Gradient method
All methods have their own specific advantages and drawbacks, so use a hybrid approach, for example:
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University of Amsterdam, Distributed Systems 24
Voorbeeld: Gebouw beveiliging “Compound security”
compound
buffer zone
hek
w eg
intelligentesensordevices
centralebew akings
post
pan/tilt/zoomcamera
onveiliggebied
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University of Amsterdam, Distributed Systems 25
Compound Security, User-interface
Node is (nog) niet actief
Node niet meer actief
Node actief, geen detectie
Node actief, detectie
Node actief, Geen detectie, voorheen wel detectie
Mogelijke toestanden:
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University of Amsterdam, Distributed Systems 26
Distributed Systems, general advantages
• Scalable• Quick response times• Lower communication bandwidth required• Robust (graceful degradation)• Autonomous decision making through negotiation• Reduces false alarm rate through combining
different sensor information• Low power requirements• Cheap• Quick and easy installation (sensors can be
thrown out)
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University of Amsterdam, Distributed Systems 27
Typical disadvantages / challenges
• Localization • Ad-hoc networking• Sensor-fusion • Security • Lower power• More computing power required per node • Communication and processing are more complex• The intelligence layer
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University of Amsterdam, Distributed Systems 28
A possible future….