Universal Compliance: A Strategy for Nuclear Security (2007 Report Card on Progress)

8/14/2019 Universal Compliance: A Strategy for Nuclear Security (2007 Report Card on Progress)

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UNIVERSALCOMPLIANCEA Strategy for

Nuclear Security

George Perkovich WITH

Deepti ChoubeyRose GottemoellerJessica T. MathewsSharon Squassoni

N E W

2 0 0 7 R e p o r t C a r d

o n P r o g r e s s


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UNIVERSAL COMPLIANCE

A Strategy for Nuclear Security

George Perkovich WITH

Deepti Choubey

Rose Gottemoeller

Jessica T. Mathews

Sharon Squassoni

June 2007

N E W

2 0 0 7 R e p o r t C a r d

o n P r o g r e s s


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2007 Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. All rights reserved.

No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted inany form or by any means without permission in writing from theCarnegie Endowment.

Te Carnegie Endowment normally does not take institutionalpositions on public policy issues; the views presented here do notnecessarily reect the views of the Endowment, its staff, or itstrustees.

Carnegie Endowment for International Peace1779 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20036202-483-7600Fax 202-483-1840www.CarnegieEndowment.org

For print and electronic copies of this report, visitwww.CarnegieEndowment.org/strategy .


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ACKNOWLEDGMENTSTis report, like its predecessor, benetted from inputs and critiquesfrom several colleagues in the U.S. and abroad. Some of them preferto be anonymous. Tose whom we can thank include Pierre Gold-schmidt, a non-resident scholar with the Carnegie Endowment forInternational Peace, Monika Heupel, a former visting scholar at theCarnegie Endowment, Michael Krepon of the Henry L. StimsonCenter, and Laura Holgate and Corey Hinderstein of the Nuclear

Treat Initiative. We also thank Joe Cirincione and Jon Wolfsthal fortheir continued collaboration, which we value greatly.


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A 2007 Report Card | 5

In March 2005, we argued that a strategy based on the principleof universal compliance offers the only way to secure the world

against the spread and use of nuclear weapons. Central to thisstrategy is the argument that the nuclear weapon states must showthat tougher nonproliferation rules not only benet the powerfulbut constrain them as well. Nonproliferation is a set of bargains

whose fairness must be self-evident if the majority of countries isto support their enforcement.... Te only way to achieve this isto enforce compliance universally, not selectively, including theobligations the nuclear states have taken on themselves.

Events of the past two years have deepened this conviction.errorists and hostile regimes attempting to acquire or use nuclear

weapons can be stopped only by coordinated international effortsto strengthen and enforce rules. o obtain this cooperation, thestates that hold nuclear weapons for status and security mustprovide much greater equity to those that do not.

Tis strategic imperative is difficult for the United States,Russia, France, the United Kingdom, China, India, Pakistan,and Israel to accept, but they will face a much more dangerous

world if they do not. If their intentions are not clearly to seek a world without nuclear weapons, a number of other states will seekequity through proliferation, while a greater number will look

the other way, thinking that the original nuclear weapon statesdeserve the competition.

Toward Universal Compliance: A 2007 Report Card


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6 | Toward Universal Compliance

Tis Report Card analyzes how the priority policy recom-mendations we made in 2005 have fared. What have governmentsdone since then? What issues have been neglected, and to whateffect? What, if any, recommendations would we change today?

Our recommendations for action were grouped under the head-ings of six broad obligations with which all actors should complyto create an effective nonproliferation regime. We have assigned a

letter grade to each obligation, marking global progress and effortfrom 2005 through mid-2007. Te United States has stronglyaffected the outcomes on which these grades are based becauseit is the most powerful actor in the international system and thehistoric leader of the nonproliferation regime. Yet the UnitedStates alone cannot adopt and implement most of the policies werecommend, and certainly cannot determine real-world outcomes

without the active cooperation of many other states and institu-tions. Responsibility for the rather dismal performance reportedhere is therefore widely shared.

OBLIGATION ONE:Make Nonproliferation Irreversible. Revise therules managing the production of ssile materials; clarify and tightenthe terms by which states can withdraw from the NPT.

GRADE: D

Te acquisition of uranium enrichment and reprocessing plants by additional states should be precluded. In return,the United States and other states that currently possesssuch facilities must provide internationally guaranteed,economically attractive supplies of the fuel and servicesnecessary to meet nuclear energy demands.


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Leading nuclear technology providers, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and other actors have discussedthese objectives extensively since the end of 2004. However, littleprogress has been made. Te discussion itself may have prompted

Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, and South Africa to seek toenter the enrichment business before an international consensuscould be created to bar new entries.

A major tension bedevils efforts to alter nuclear fuel productionnorms and rules. For the sake of global security, it would be best tohave binding rules prohibiting the spread of national ssile mate-rial production facilities. In February 2004, President George W.Bush proposed a moratorium on building enrichment and repro-cessing facilities in states that did not already have them. Tatproposal met widespread resistance. France proposed an alterna-

tive within the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) to condition thepotential provision of enrichment, reprocessing, and heavy watertechnology on criteria including membership in and full compli-ance with the NP , implementation of the Additional Protocol,and assessments that such activities were economically justiedand would not cause regional insecurity. Te United States rejectsthis criteria-based approach, as others probably would if theproposal were more energetically advanced today.

Nonnuclear weapon states such as Australia, Argentina,Brazil, Canada, and South Africa do not want to get shut out ofan enrichment market that will grow if nuclear energy enjoys arenaissance. Other states resent being denied access to additionalnuclear technologies when they feel that they have not beneted

from nuclear cooperation as it is, and the nuclear weapon stateshave not delivered on the original disarmament bargain.


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Te United States and other countries have fallen back to avoluntary approach, premised on the argument that the marketfor nuclear fuel supplies has always worked well for states thatfulll their NP obligations. o bolster condence in the market,new proposals are being offered to back up existing arrangements

with terms so reassuring that countries will choose not to under-take the expense of indigenous enrichment and reprocessing.

Te gentle, modest spirit of this voluntary approach is widely welcomed. But it would likely attract the states that do not posea security threat in any case, while those interested in enrichinguranium for export or in hedging or breaking their nonprolifera-tion commitments would choose to ignore them.

Perhaps in principle everyone has their price, and if the UnitedStates and other potential fuel-service providers offered fuel and

spent-fuel services at low enough prices and high enough reli-ability levels, all potential hedgers would recommit themselvesto eschew enrichment and reprocessing. And if prices were lowenough and spent-fuel services attractive enough, perhaps theinternational community would agree that any state that launcheddevelopment of indigenous ssile material production capabilitiesinstead of relying on international fuel services would be castinga shadow of doubt over the peacefulness of its nuclear program.But realistically, as long as there was no rule being violated, theinternational community would merely watch and wait until thestate broke an established rule, probably at a stage much closer tothe acquisition of nuclear weapons.

In any case, fuel suppliers have not yet offered anything remotely

attractive enough to overcome resistance to a perceived new layerof discrimination in the nonproliferation regime. Suppliers nowemphasize market mechanisms and multi-tiered assurances so


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that potential purchasers would have backups and reserves in theevent one source was cut off. However, some developing countriesfear that current nuclear suppliers, led by the Permanent Five(P-5), could interrupt supplies in order to punish allegedtransgressions not only in the nuclear proliferation domain but inhuman rights or other areas. Guarantees will never be ironclad,but the refusal of the United States and others to offer more than

improved market mechanisms will not persuade many states tolimit their rights to fuel cycle activities.

One offer that could make a real difference would be to guar-antee the taking back of spent nuclear fuel. States seeking to buildnew reactors would be spared the enormous costs, environmentalconcerns, and political hassles of dealing with nuclear waste. Teprospect of escaping from the waste problem could be attractive

enough to motivate many states to agree to new international ruleslimiting the spread of enrichment and reprocessing facilities. Atthe moment, Russia is the only state that has expressed interest inproviding this take-back service. More recently, it has wavered onthe matter. A major priority therefore must be to clarify Russiasplans and to persuade others, including the United States, to takethe overall problem seriously enough to overcome domestic polit-ical resistance to taking back spent fuel.

Te U.S. Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP) programannounced in 2006 sends mixed signals regarding the acceptanceof spent fuel. GNEP envisions providing cradle to grave fuelservices for states that agree not to acquire their own enrich-ment and reprocessing capabilities, but does not detail how it

would accomplish that. GNEP would revive reprocessing in theUnited States for domestic and, possibly, foreign spent fuel. It would assign responsibility to fuel suppliers to dispose of spent


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fuel so that the material is secured, safeguarded, and disposed ofin a manner that meets shared nonproliferation policies. Whatthat vague phrase means, and whether its terms would conditionnuclear activities in any binding way, are hugely important ques-tions that are unanswered so far.

Tere is a paradox here. Citizens can be frightened or angeredby images of importing other peoples nuclear waste. Tis fear

might be obviated by offering as-yet-unproven technologies forreprocessing spent fuel in ways that will result in the hazards fromthe remaining waste lasting hundreds rather than thousands ofyears. Yet without a global rule prohibiting the spread of enrich-ment and reprocessing activities, how will citizens assess theobvious costs against the uncertain nonproliferation benets? Ifthe system is voluntary, then the benets of importing spent fuel,

most likely from good guy states, will not be very great if thebad guys are free to enrich and reprocess. Relying merely on avoluntary enticement package increases the risk that the UnitedStates would stimulate a renaissance of reprocessing withoutgetting the advertised nonproliferation benets.

A less controversial innovation than GNEP is the nuclear fuelbank being created by a private organization, the Nuclear TreatInitiative, and the IAEA. Starting with funds from a generousgrant from Warren Buffett, the Nuclear Treat Initiative woulddonate US$50 million to the IAEA to procure low-enricheduranium (LEU), provided that member states committed at leastan additional US$100 million in cash or in kind for this purpose.Tis US$150 million should provide sufficient means to accumu-

late enough LEU suitable for fabrication into fuel to make one fullreactor core load. Te IAEA would control the material, which would be located outside the six states that currently supply fuel.Te banked material would be sold to any state whose fuel supply


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was interrupted for a reason other than noncompliance with itssafeguard obligations. Freeing a fuel reserve from strings that theUnited States and other current suppliers might attach is meantto address the concerns of states that have become skeptical of thereliability of international nuclear cooperation.

Te IAEA is also exploring a more far-reaching approach.In 2005, an IAEA expert group issued a report, Multilateral

Approaches to the Nuclear Fuel Cycle(available at www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/2005/infcirc640.pdf). Longer-term options discussed in this document included convertingexisting facilities to multilateral enterprises and establishing newregional or multinational facilities. While these ideas are not new,the current context of greater enthusiasm for nuclear energy maynow prompt greater political will to undertake the required nan-

cial and legal actions. Yet regional or other multilateral fuel cycle centers in a world

where some states retain nuclear weapons raise questions aboutcompetition that states do not like to acknowledge publicly. Iran

would probably volunteer to let enrichment-related facilities on itsterritory serve as a regional facility. But Egypt and Saudi Arabiaalready are alarmed by Irans nuclear program and would notaccept the idea of a regional facility on Iranian soil. Egypt mightvolunteer to host a center, but Saudi Arabia would counter that itshould host the site. Te same competitive considerations wouldarise in East Asia, South Asia, and North and South America. Inreality, enrichment and reprocessing capabilities are not primarilycommercial assets today. Tey are politically, strategically, and

psychologically important as signiers of power and technolog-ical prowess. Tis will remain true so long as serious efforts arenot under way to devalue nuclear weapons.


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States should agree to end the production of HEU [highlyenriched uranium] and to adopt a temporary pause in theseparation of plutonium.

No positive action has been taken to pursue this objective.In fact, with respect to plutonium the trend is negative. TeUnited States, Russia, France, Japan, and India display interest

in continuing or expanding plutonium separation as part of theirvisions of the nuclear energy future. Although GNEP, as champi-oned by the Bush administration, ultimately seeks to recycle spentfuel without separating plutonium, it would add great materialand political impetus to reprocessing, breaking a decades-old U.S.policy of eschewing commercial reprocessing and preventing itsspread internationally. France, Russia, and the United Kingdom

applaud this shift and the contracts it may open to them.

Te UN Security Council should pass a new resolutionmaking a state that withdraws from the NP responsible forviolations committed while it was still a party to the treaty.States that withdraw from the treaty should be barred fromlegally using nuclear assets acquired internationally before

their withdrawal.

No progress has been made on this objective.Security Council members have found it so difficult to reach

consensus on how to induce or compel Iran and North Korea tocomply with Security Council resolutions that they have no driveand goodwill left for more proactive initiatives.

Tere is a risk today that states could edge up to acquiringnuclear weapon capabilities and then seek to withdraw from theNP and quickly proceed to manufacture nuclear weapons. In


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Universal Compliance , we recommended that the Security Counciltake anticipatory action to dissuade states from taking this path.But in international politics, it is far easier to respond to crisesthan to prevent them.

Many states resist the notion of requiringall states that withdraw from the NP to forfeit use of nuclear assets acquiredinternationally. Tus, France and Germany (on behalf of the

European Union) tried to persuade NP parties at the 2005Review Conference to declare that the forfeiture penalty shouldapply to states found innoncompliance with safeguard obligationsif they sought to withdraw from the treaty. (Enforcing suchforfeiture would be problematic, but the legal basis would exist forholding a noncompliant state at risk of sanction or other measuresif it did not comply.) Egypt, supported by Iran, vehemently

objected. Tese and other nonnuclear weapon states oppose anytightening of rules that would affect nonnuclear weapon states

without corresponding concessions by the nuclear weapon statesin the area of disarmament or nuclear cooperation. Some wentso far as to suggest that states with impeccable nonproliferationcredentials might want to threaten to withdraw from the NPto regain some of the leverage they lost over the nuclear weaponstates when the treaty was indenitely extended in 1995.

Te goal of deterring withdrawal from the NP by clarifyingconsequences should not be abandoned. Tere is no sound basisfor objecting to a rule that noncompliant states must forfeit the useof nuclear assets acquired through international cooperation.

Te deeper problem here is that the permanent members of the

Security Council are not united in trying to enforce nonprolifera-tion norms. Russia and China clearly do not want terrorists oradditional states to acquire nuclear weapons. However, their trust


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in the judgment of the U.S. government in assessing threats anddevising strategies has plummeted since the onset of the Iraq War.Russia and China, as states trying to catch up to Western levelsof wealth and power, prefer to avoid enforcement measures thatentail lost economic and political opportunities. Tis is particu-larly true with respect to states that supply energy to China or thatbuy arms and other products from powerful Russian industries.

Terefore, Russia and China are more reluctant than the UnitedStates, France, and the United Kingdom to endorse either bindingsanctions or military measures to enforce nonproliferation rules.Beijing and Moscow notice that when the United Nations andother multilateral bodies mobilize for sanctions or military inter-vention, it is often on behalf of norms established mostly by rich

Western states.

All states should agree to suspend nuclear cooperationwith countries that the IAEA cannot certify are in fullcompliance with their nonproliferation obligations.

A little progress has been made here. Te NSG adopted newlanguage in its guidelines in 2006, saying that, in principle,

transfers of trigger list itemsthose with clear proliferationsensitivityshould be suspended in case a country is found innoncompliance with its safeguards obligations. However, theNSG does not include all potential suppliers of nuclear tech-nology assistance, including Pakistan and India. Moreover, itoperates by consensus and its decisions are not legally binding. Inshort, it experiences the basic tensions among the multiple, oftencompeting interests of the P-5 states noted above, and it remainsto be seen how and whether the new language in the NSG Guide-lines will be enforced.


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OBLIGATION TWO:Devalue the Political and Military Currencyof Nuclear Weapons. All states must diminish the role of nuclearweapons in security policies and international politics. The nuclearweapon states must do more to make their nonproliferation commit-ments irreversible, especially through the steady veried dismantle-ment of nuclear arsenals.

GRADE: F

Te ve recognized nuclear weapon states have sent unhelpfulsignals about the role of nuclear weapons in their security policiesand in international politics.

A recent study sponsored by the U.S. Department of Defensefound that policymakers and experts around the world believe that

the United States is increasing its emphasis on nuclear weapons.Many think the United States has made a doctrinal shift fromdeterrence to nuclear warghting and rst use, and is blurring theline between nuclear and conventional weapons. Tis widespreadperception is erroneous and unfair, but it impedes cooperation

with the United States in strengthening nonproliferation rules.In fact, the United States has reduced the role of nuclear

weapons in its policies. With its tremendous advantage in conven-tional military capabilities, the United States would be best off ina world where no one had nuclear weapons. Te commanders ofU.S. strategic forces understand that nuclear warfare with othermajor nuclear powers (that is, Russia or China) is unlikely. Te

wars the United States is most likely to ght will be on a differentscale and of a political nature that makes it extremely doubtfulthat nuclear weapons will be useful. Terefore, the U.S. StrategicCommand steadily looks for conventional means to accomplishthe objectives that civilian leaders require of it.


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If a U.S. administration wanted to show the world that it isdevaluing nuclear weapons, the basis for doing so exists. Formerhigh-level U.S. officials George Shultz, Henry Kissinger, WilliamPerry, and Sam Nunn pointed the way in a Wall Street Journal op-ed piece in which they called for the United States to workintensively with leaders of the countries in possession of nuclear

weapons to turn the goal of a world without nuclear weapons into

a joint enterprise. Nunn elaborated in congressional testimony:We cannot defend America without taking [steps toward nucleardisarmament]; we cannot take these actions without the coop-eration of other nations; we cannot get the cooperation of othernations without embracing the vision of a world free of nuclear

weapons. Tis strategy and attendant policies recommendedby Nunn and his Republican and Democratic coauthors echo

Universal Compliance .Te Wall Street Journal article by Nunn and colleagues elic-

ited enthusiastic reactions in Europe, Egypt, India, and Japan,among other places. ellingly, in the United States, individualsand groups that in decades past would have charged softness or

worse were largely silent. Te fact is, nuclear weapons have neverbeen less useful to the United States. While American politicianshave yet to realize this, the defense establishment already has.

Perhaps to balance the psychological effects of U.S. militarypredominance, Russia has raised the prole of nuclear weaponsin its security policies and international politics. In its last fullarticulation of nuclear strategy, in 2000, Russia declared thatit could conduct a limited nuclear war involving the use of

strategic nuclear weapons. Russia plans to replace single warheadson opol-M intercontinental ballistic missiles with multiple warheads. Officials have hinted at an intention to withdraw from


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the 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces reaty. Te INFreaty, completed by Ronald Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev,

was the rst to eliminate a whole class of nuclear weapons. Russianofficials, including President Vladimir Putin, publicly hail newstrategic nuclear missile systems as a measure of Russian power.

In a major speech in January 2006, French president JacquesChirac called nuclear deterrence fundamental to Frances

independence and security Nuclear deterrence became thevery image of what our country is capable of producing when ithas set itself a task and holds to it. France is currently underno direct threat from a major power, Chirac said, but the rise ofterrorism, the prospect of future hostility between the differentpoles of power, and the emerging assertions of power basedon the possession of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons

all warrant maintenance of the French nuclear deterrent. Francealso has interests away from its shores, and therefore, Chiracsaid, must have a substantial capability to intervene outside ourborders. o reduce the risks and raise the credibility of suchintervention, nuclear deterrence of counterattacks is vital, heimplied. In sum, nuclear deterrence remains the fundamentalguarantee of our security. If a country with Frances status andcomparatively safe external security environment feels that itneeds nuclear weapons to preserve its independence and security,could not many other states make an even stronger case for thenecessity of a nuclear deterrent?

Chinas 2006 annual defense white paper reaffirmed that itsnuclear forces have two missions: deterrence of a nuclear attack

and nuclear retaliation. Beijing continued to declare a no-rst-use doctrine: Additional missions for Chinas nuclear forcesinclude deterrence of conventional attacks against the Chinese


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mainland, reinforcing Chinas great power status, and increasingits freedom of action by limiting the extent to which others cancoerce China.

Te United Kingdom has done more than the other recog-nized nuclear weapon states to reduce the role of nuclear weaponsin its security policy and international politics. Still, in December2006, Prime Minister ony Blair announced that his government

would renew its rident submarinebased nuclear deterrent. Blairsaid it was improbable that the United Kingdom would facenuclear threats in the future, but no one can say its impossible.He announced that it would be possible to cut Britains nuclearstockpile by a further 20 percent, leaving fewer than 160 opera-tionally available warheads.

Tus, the ve original nuclear weapon states seem to begin

with the assumption that nuclear weapons are the answer, thenstruggle to say what the question is: We have these weapons; itis unthinkable to give them up; therefore, how should we ratio-nalize the ongoing value we attach to them?

Te United States, Russia, China, France, and the UnitedKingdom must disavow the development of any new types of

nuclear weapons, reaffirm the current moratorium on nuclearweapon testing, and ratify the Comprehensive est Ban

reaty.

Te ve nuclear weapon states recognized under the NP havenot disavowed development of new types of nuclear weapons.Nor have India and Pakistan. (Israel is silent on the matter, whileNorth Korea has recommitted to eliminating its nuclear weaponcapabilities.)


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Te Bush administration has irted with researching anddeveloping a new earth-penetrating warhead, but in the face ofcongressional resistance has switched to proposals to develop anew reliable replacement warhead. Te idea is to reduce uncer-tainties over the future dependability of multiple types of warheadsby developing a new design whose integrity could be maintainedindenitely without explosive testing.

If the United States proceeds with this replacement program inthe current international environment, the effort will be misun-derstood by U.S. allies, exploited by adversaries, and detrimentalto efforts to prevent the spread and use of nuclear weapons.Congress should insist that a thorough reassessment of the roleand purposes of nuclear weapons in the twenty-rst century beundertaken before a decision is made on whether a new warhead

is needed. All states that possess nuclear weapons have committed to

maintaining a de facto international moratorium on nuclear weapon testing. However, in regard to the Comprehensive estBan reaty (C B ), ratication has gone unsupported by theUnited States (or, more accurately, by the Republican Party, asSenate Democrats generally are nearly unanimous in favoringratication). China has followed suit, along with India and Paki-stan, which, unlike the United States, have not even signed thetreaty. China does not object to ratifying the C B but is waitingfor the United States to go rst. Israel has signed the treaty and bysome accounts has wanted to ratify it but has been discouragedfrom doing so by the Bush administration. Because the C B

has always been the top indicator of the nuclear weapon statescompliance with their disarmament obligations under Article VIof the NP , the ongoing refusal to allow the C B to take force


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Indeed, seeing the disarmament challenge in regional as wellas global terms is illuminating. India and Pakistan, with theirhistory of enmity, opacity, and distrust, would have to elaborateconditions and procedures that would render them condentenough to dismantle their last weapon. Te Middle East, withits multiple conicts, is even more problematic, as states in thatregion possess not only nuclear weapons but also chemical and

perhaps biological weapons. Nor do most of these states offer thelevels of transparency and whistle-blower protection that wouldbuild the condence of neighbors and the international commu-nity that cheating on disarmament agreements would be exposedin time for them to take countermeasures.

Te point here is that the international communityprincipallythe states possessing nuclear weaponshas not begun to explore

issues relating to the disarmament challenge seriously, even at theexpert level. No state in possession of nuclear weapons has even asingle employee or interagency group tasked with specifying hownuclear arsenals could be eliminated nationally and globally: noone responsible for identifying acceptable standards and methodsof verication, standards and procedures to account for all ssilematerials, adaptations necessary to securely manage the nuclearindustry in a world without nuclear weapons, or whistle-blowerprotections necessary to deter or detect violations.

Te modest recommendation in Universal Compliance that allstates with nuclear weapons should prepare studies detailing stepsthey think necessary to veriably eliminate nuclear arsenals wasmeant as a measure of intention to someday fulll the nuclear disar-

mament part of the nonproliferation bargain. Instead of trying toavoid this issue, the United States, the United Kingdom, France,


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Russia, and China should engage it. In addition to exploring howto veriably eliminate their own nuclear arsenals, the establishednuclear weapon stateswhich are also the permanent membersof the UN Security Councilcould facilitate expert discussionsof the conditions necessary to implement North Koreas denu-clearization and the establishment, some day, of a zone free of

weapons of mass destruction (a WMD-free zone) in the Middle

East, which has been endorsed as an objective by NP partiesand by Israel.

OBLIGATION THREE:Secure All Nuclear Materials. All statesmust maintain robust standards for securing, monitoring, andaccounting for all ssile materials in any form. Such mechanismsare necessary both to prevent nuclear terrorism and to create thepotential for secure nuclear disarmament.

GRADE: C-

Te United States should encourage formation of a high-level Contact Group to Prevent Nuclear errorism to establisha new global standard for protecting weapons, materials, and facilities.

wo modest efforts in this direction have begun. In July 2006,the United States and Russia launched the Global Initiative toCombat Nuclear errorism. Te scope of this effort is broad,encompassing technical, legal, and political mechanisms, but itis quite amorphous. It is not overseen by high-level emissaries,

which deprives the initiative of the drive its objectives warrant.Tirty nations support the initiative. However, the activities it


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prescribes would cover neither nuclear weaponry nor facilities,installations, and materials used for military nuclear purposes.

Te privately funded Nuclear Treat Initiative, the IAEA,and the Institute for Nuclear Materials Management are

working together to create an institution that would help deneand promulgate nuclear security best practices globally. Teproposed World Institute for Nuclear Security would serve as a

forum where government and industry nuclear policymakers andoperators could share security strategies and best practices that

went beyond current international standards to improve materialsecurity. Participation would be voluntary, reecting the lack ofinternational leadership and appetite needed to establish tougherbinding standards. Te World Institute for Nuclear Securitylikely would focus rst on strengthening control over materials

that could be used directly in nuclear weapons: HEU, separatedplutonium, and mixed oxide fuel.

In parallel, the IAEA is developing guidance documentsdescribing standards for nuclear material security that the agency

would urge all states to meet. Te product of a consensual process,these recommended standards will stop short of the state of theart. Adherence will be voluntary in any case.

Te United States, Russia, and their partners shouldvigorously identify, secure, and remove nuclear materials fromall vulnerable sites within four years.

Despite major tensions between the United States and Russia,the two countries continue to press hard to implement commit-ments to complete nuclear material and warhead protection,control, and accounting work in Russia by 2008. American andRussian specialists continue to work together at some of the


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Russian Federations most sensitive sites, and this progress is laud-able. However, as we found in our 2005 assessment, Moscow and

Washington still have not committed to consolidating all nuclearmaterials in highly secure central storage sites, and too muchmaterial remains dispersed in facilities throughout the weaponscomplex. Te same is true for other nuclear weapon states.

OBLIGATION FOUR:Stop Illegal Transfers. States must establishenforceable prohibitions against efforts by individuals, corporations,and states to assist others in secretly acquiring the technology, mate-rial, and know-how needed to develop nuclear weapons.

GRADE: C

All states should now establish and enforce nationallegislation to secure nuclear materials, strengthen exportcontrols, and criminalize illicit trade, as [UN SecurityCouncil Resolution 1540] requires .

UN Security Council Resolution 1540, adopted in 2004, isthe rst resolution to impose binding nonproliferation obligationson all UN member states, regardless of their specic consent. Itrequires all states to establish effective domestic controls to preventproliferation of WMD, their means of delivery, and related mate-rials to and from nonstate actors , and to criminalize violations ofthese rules.

If effectively implemented, Resolution 1540 would make ahuge difference. Yet three years after its adoption, implementationof 1540 is weak. While the vast majority of states support theobligations in principle, no state has as yet treated implementation


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As of March 22, 2007, 112 states had signed the AdditionalProtocol, but only 78 of those are enforcing it, the United Statesand Russia not among them. Iran signed the protocol, andobserved it voluntarily from 2003 to January 2006. Key statesthat have not signed include Egypt and Saudi Arabiaboth withnew interest in nuclear power programsas well as Argentina andBrazil, the latter of which has a uranium enrichment program.

Te IAEA continues to place great emphasis on making the Additional Protocol a condition of cooperation, as do the UnitedStates and a few other countries. Other states on the IAEABoard of Governors resist. Within the NSG, no consensus existseither. Te United States favors making the Additional Protocol acondition of supply, while France and Russia would insist on theprotocol implementation as a condition of supply of only the most

sensitive itemsparticularly those related to uranium enrichmentor plutonium separationbut not of all transfers.

Egypt, Brazil, Argentina, and other leading nonnuclear weapon states wishing to expand their nuclear activities resistlinking nuclear cooperation to adoption of the AdditionalProtocol. You cant create an additional obligation, an Egyptianofficial said recently, when nonnuclear weapon states are threat-ened each day with nuclear weapons and the nuclear weaponstates have done nothing to disarm. How are you going to addan obligation on us when the other guy has no obligations?

Tis resistance is genuinely framed as an issue of equity andprotest against further limitations being imposed on nonnuclear

weapon states without corresponding sacrices by the recog-

nized nuclear weapon states along with Israel, India, and Paki-stan. Some states also may resist because the Additional Protocol would impede their option in the future to conduct research and


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development that would hasten achievement of the capacity toproduce nuclear weapons if they decided to withdraw from theNP . If North Korea and Iran do not forgo nuclear weapon capa-bilities, states in Northeast Asia and the Middle East may decidenot to accept any new international rules that would reducetheir hedging options in the future. Te Additional Protocol is apowerful nonproliferation tool precisely because it raises the risks

of hedging.Te leadership and goodwill to persuade the NSG to make the

Additional Protocol mandatory probably will not appear whilethe Indian civil nuclear cooperation deal, the Iran case, and delib-erations on international fuel services are pending. Leadership

will be required from the highest levels of the French, British,Russian, and U.S. governments, among others. Tis will have to

await elections running through 2008.

Members of the Nuclear Suppliers Group should expandtheir voluntary data sharing with the IAEA and make itobligatory for transfer of all controlled items.

Despite widespread recognition that the A. Q. Khan prolifera-

tion network and others like it pose a grave threat to internationalsecurity, little has been done to signicantly raise transparencyrequirements among exporters and importers of sensitive nucleartechnology and material.

Te Additional Protocol requires that states notify the IAEAof the export of a long list of equipment listed in Annex II ofthe Additional Protocol. But there are no binding obligations onimporters of many of these items. Were the protocolor analo-gous rulesmandatory, and were importers as well as exportersrequired to notify the IAEA of transfers, then participants in


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proliferation networks such as Khans would be at legal risk,unlike before. Partners would face no new restrictions on tech-nology transfer. Tey would merely have to be transparent aboutit. Te secrecy that covert networks depend on would be chal-lenged, while the availability of technology and material to trans-parent actors would not be affected. Whereas A. Q. Khan, as aresident of a state that was not a party to the NP , did not have

to declare exports, his networks activities would have been moreprecarious if his network partners and buyers in other states hadbeen obligated to report imports. Still, there is strong resistance tomaking the Additional Protocol mandatory, and, if it were mademandatory, to adding notication requirements for importers.

A less ambitious step would be for the director-general of theIAEA to invoke Article VIII.A of the IAEA Statute and send a

guideline to all member states specifying that the agency wouldbe supported in its mission if each state would provide infor-mation about exports and imports of specied equipment andnonnuclear material that could help it detect possible unde-clared nuclear activities. Te Board of Governors could be askedto approve this request, and if it did so, member states would bepressed to comply.

Corporations should [adopt] voluntary actions to block trade,loan, and investment activity with those illegally seekingnuclear capabilities.

Over the years, businesses have been motivated to exert theirinuence on behalf of international norms from environmentalprotection to the abolition of apartheid. Tis has often occurredin response to moral campaigns by mass-based nongovernmentalmovements. However, there is no such movement advocating


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corporate vigilance in withholding economic cooperation fromentities suspected of being involved in nuclear proliferation.

In the absence of public pressure, the Bush administrationdeserves credit for using national legislation and Security CouncilResolutions 1373 and 1540 to block nancial ows into NorthKorea and IranResolution 1373 obligates all states to crimi-nalize the provision or collection of funds for terrorist purposes.

Legitimate nancial institutions know that their reputations couldbe harmed severely if it turned out that entities with which they

were trading were directly or indirectly beneting actors involvedin illicit proliferation. Te United States has made clear that it

will ban businesses tainted by such trading from the Americanmarket. Because the U.S. market and the dollar as a currency areso important, many international businesses prefer to disinvest

from Iran or other states sanctioned by the United Nations. Tus,Chinese entities have withdrawn from North Korea, and Euro-pean banks from Iran, signicantly raising the costs of the twocountries nuclear activities.

Private nancial leverage would become still more usefulif governments shared information with each other and theircorporate and nancial institutions regarding entities thatevidence suggested were involved in activities related to terrorismor proliferation.

Te Proliferation Security Initiative should be grounded ininternational law and widened.

Te Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) is a sound innova-

tion of the Bush administration to mobilize states on a volun-tary basis to enhance national legislation and international lawto ensure that shipments of controlled items can be searched


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and seized under national authority, to share intelligence, andto strengthen training and cooperation in actual intercepts innationally controlled areas on the seas, in the air, and on land.Since the PSI is a set of activities and not a formal organization,there is no official list of member countries. However, accordingto the U.S. State Department website, more than eighty states hadparticipated in the PSI as of November 2006. About twenty states

have formally committed to the PSI, and a handful have signedship-boarding agreements with the United States. Te remainingcountries have provided mainly rhetorical support.

Many statesin particular China, South Korea, India, andIndonesiawere originally reluctant to endorse the PSI. Teyviewed it as a manifestation of U.S. aggressiveness and a threatto the principle of national sovereignty. Tere were also concerns

that the PSI would violate international law, interfere with legaltrade, and provoke North Korea. Tese concerns have lessened

with time, as fears of irresponsible interdiction activities havenot materialized. China and other states now participate in PSI-related activities on an informal, low-prole basis.

Te United States has made efforts to strengthen the legal basis ofinterdictions. It lobbied for Resolution 1540, the Security Councilrequirement that every state criminalize WMD proliferation tononstate actors in its national legislation. It concluded bilateralship-boarding agreements with ag-of-convenience states andsupported amendments to the Convention for the Suppression ofUnlawful Acts. Finally, the United States ceased invoking the rightof self-defense under Article 51 of the UN Charter as justication

for high-seas interdictions. Te actual impact of the PSI at presentis difficult to gauge. Tough the initiative has helped strengthenthe legal and technical frameworks for interdictions, it is unclear


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how many interdictions have actually occurred over the pastfour years, given the dearth of unclassied information. It is alsounclear how many interdictions would have taken place anywayand whether the PSI has deterred proliferation. Yet the PSI is animportant complement to other nonproliferation instrumentsand lls an enforcement gap in the nonproliferation regime.Efforts to strengthen its legal basis should therefore be continued.

Mechanisms to share intelligence and cooperate in interdictionactivities should be advanced.

OBLIGATION 5: Commit to Conict Resolution. Statesthat possess nuclear weapons must use their leadership to resolveregional conicts that compel or excuse some states pursuit ofsecurity by means of nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons.

GRADE: C+

Te major powers must concentrate their diplomaticinuence on diffusing the conicts that underlie [states]determination to possess nuclear weapons, particularly inIran, the Middle East, Northeast Asia, and South Asia.

IranIn March 2005 we wrote that the challenge before the interna-tional community today is to clarify Irans intentions and give itevery incentivepositive and negativeto meet its energy, polit-ical, and security needs without technologies that pose inherent

threats of nuclear weapon proliferation. In negotiations withFrance, Germany, and the United Kingdom, Iran had earlieragreed to offer objective guarantees that its nuclear program


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was exclusively for peaceful purposes. We believed then, as wedo now, that the only objective guarantee that would restorelost condence would be that Iran forgo technologies to enrichuranium or separate plutonium. How long Iran would need todo this before its bona des were restored would depend on howrapidly and thoroughly it cooperated with the IAEA to answerkey unresolved questions and on how fully it reassured its neigh-

bors and the UN Security Council that any resumption of fuelcycle activity would not pose a threat.

From August 2005 through April 2007, the IAEA issued ninereports on Iran. Tese reports noted Iranian cooperation where itoccurred, and highlighted outstanding issues that remained to beresolved. Each of these unresolved matters raises doubts that all ofIrans nuclear activities have been for peaceful purposes:

E Te source(s) of LEU and HEU particles found at Iranian loca-tions remains unresolved.

E Natural uranium and LEU particles found at a ehran univer-sity have not been satisfactorily explained.

E Iran has not responded to longstanding questions whoseanswers are necessary to ensuring that its P-1 and P-2 uraniumenrichment centrifuge programs did not involve military-related actors or purposes.

E Iran still has not enabled the IAEA to resolve questions about adocument describing how to cast and machine uranium metalinto hemispheres, an operation whose only known purpose isnuclear weapon manufacturing.

E Iran still has not provided information necessary to resolveoutstanding inconsistencies relating to plutonium experi-ments.


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Te IAEA continues to report that Iran has not agreed toany of the required transparency measures, which are essentialfor the clarication of certain aspects of the scope and natureof its nuclear program. In essence, the evidence that Iran stillhas not satisfactorily explained indicates the involvement ofmilitary-related actors and purposes that contravene Irans coreNP obligation to conduct nuclear activities exclusively for

peaceful purposes.Te international community has not mobilized sufficiently

strong negative or positive incentives to motivate Irans decisionmakers to comply with all of the IAEAs demands or with threesuccessive legally binding UN Security Council resolutions thatstem from Irans breaches of its nonproliferation obligations.Perhaps mobilization of such incentives is impossible.

Irans fractious leadership nds it difficult to make strategicdecisions, and for now insists that it will never agree to ceaseactivities related to uranium enrichment. Even when some Iranianemissaries hint at a possible suspension of enrichment to allownegotiations to resume, they insist that it would be only for a fewmonths, and only in return for the suspension of UN sanctions.Tis impasse tempts some to urge a compromiseto accept,now , Irans enrichment of uranium limited to a specic number ofcentrifuges or quantity of material containing no more than 4.5percent uranium 235. Tis, it is suggested, would end the Iraniannuclear crisis.

Unfortunately, this is not likely the case. Iran could seekmilitary gains from limited-scale activities in declared facilities

because such experience and know-how could be directly usefulin operating clandestine facilities. Moreover, legitimate limited-scale activities could provide a cover for illicit purposes. When no


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enrichment-related activity is allowed, then any solid intelligenceis evidence of violations; when some activity is allowed, it becomesan explanation for all suspicious activity. Moreover, limited-scaleenrichment would allow Iran to stockpile fuel to the point whereit could then withdraw from the NP and quickly increase theenrichment level of the stockpiled fuel to produce weapons. Nordoes a deal on limited-scale enrichment actually represent a major

concession or tempering of ambitions by Iran. Irans capabilities would be limited to what they are now, but there is no reason,on the basis of past experience, to believe that ehran would notbreak the limits once its technological capability grew.

In Universal Compliancebefore the Iranian case had beenreported to the UN Security Council, as we urgedwe suggestedthat the Security Council convey on paper a model draft of a posi-

tive resolution that would endorse nuclear, economic, and polit-ical benets if Iran would suspend its fuel cyclerelated activitiesand enable the IAEA to certify that it was in full compliance withits obligations.

Security Council Resolution 1747, adopted March 24, 2007,moves in that direction. Sanctions block international cooperation

with Iran on activities related to the nuclear fuel cycle and deliverysystems, bar travel of specic Iranian individuals involved inthese programs, and freeze nancial assets of designated entitiesand individuals. Perhaps more important, the UN sanctionsauthority gives states political cover with their own populationsand with Iran to take additional steps to withhold investment,export credits, and other forms of commerce with Iran. Tis

has given more impetus to the U.S.-led effort to induce privatenancial institutions to withdraw from projects in Iran in orderto avoid legal or reputational costs in light of Security Council


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Resolutions 1373 and 1540. Tese direct and indirect economicsanctions, with the prospect of more to follow, have promptedrenewed debate in Iran over the costs and benets of defying theUnited Nations and the IAEA. Without such a debate, there isno chance of persuading Iranian leaders to end their march ofdeance and comply with UN and IAEA demands.

Economic and political pressure can and should continue to

be exerted on Irans vulnerabilities. Iran cannot grow and enjoyits natural potential as the major economic and political power inthe Persian Gulf without signicant international investment andaccess to technology. Te majority of Iranians also want politicalacceptance of their country as a state that will not threaten thestability and security of its neighbors. Irans most talented citizensand entrepreneurs do not want to be treated as pariahs, even if the

Revolutionary Guards, President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, andother powerful elements in the polity dismiss the value of inter-national acceptance.

Besides authorizing tighter sanctions, Resolution 1747 containsan annex that, for the rst time, species the Security Councilsbacking of positive elements of a comprehensive agreement

with Iran. Tis annex deserves much greater attention thanit has received. It offers a starting point for U.S. participation ininternational negotiations with Iran. Indeed, U.S. support forthe positive elements in Resolution 1747 reects a genuine shiftin the Bush administrations policy along the lines we urged inearly 2005.

Te annex declares the Security Councils goal to be a compre-

hensive agreement with Iran. Under such an agreement, thecouncil would reaffirm Irans right to develop nuclear energy forpeaceful purposes and commit to support actively the building


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of new light water reactors in Iran through international jointprojects with legally binding, multilayered fuel assurances toIran. All of this, of course, depends on resolution of the crisis,and that in turn cannot be achieved unless Iran stops activitiesrelated to producing ssile materials. By means of the annex toResolution 1747, the members of the Security Council, includingthe United States, offer the prospect that Iran could be welcomed

to resume fuel cyclerelated activitiesafter conrmation by theIAEA that all outstanding issues and concerns have beenresolved. Unlike proponents of a deal to endorse limited-scaleIranian enrichment now, the Security Council properly under-stands that Iran must rst rectify its noncompliance with itsIAEA obligations and build condence in its nuclear intentions.

Tis is a vital, often missed point. Iran cannot come into

compliance with its IAEA safeguard agreement and UN SecurityCouncil resolutions as long as core questions about its past nuclearactivities are unresolved. It is highly possible that Iran cannotresolve these issues without admitting that the highlighted activi-ties were in fact related to nonpeaceful applications of nuclearenergy or were conducted by military organizations. Such activi-ties would be a violation of Article II of the NP .

Iranian leaders would not be paranoid to fear that such anadmission would invite severe reprisals by the United States, ifnot others. Terefore, U.S. officials and Irans P-5 and IAEAinterlocutors should do more, in public and private, to reassurethe Iranians that they will not be penalized further for comingclean about the past.

Te Security Council did this in the case of Libya. In February2004, the IAEA reported to the Security Council that Libya was in breach of its obligation to comply with the provisionsof its Safeguards Agreement. wo months later, the president of


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the Security Council welcomed Libyas decision to abandon itsprograms for developing weapons of mass destruction and theirmeans of delivery and its active cooperation with the IAEA.Libya was commended for coming into compliance, and thematter was closed. Te United States, the United Kingdom, andothers subsequently normalized relations with Libya.

Libya is not Iran, of course. Among other things, Iran, unlike

Libya, will want to continue a major nuclear energy program.Tis signicantly complicates the task of assuring the worldthat the program is exclusively for peaceful purposes. Still, themechanism for recording a past violation of the NP and closingthe books without penalty is relevant to Iran. So, too, is the factthat the United States normalized relations with Libya as part ofthe nonproliferation deal, even though the regime of Muammar

al-Qadda continues to violate human rights and belligerentlyoppose Arab League rapprochement with Israel.

As we urged in 2005, a Security Council resolution includingpositive elements should also include a guarantee that Iraniansovereignty and territorial integrity will be respected as long asIran does not attack others. Such a guarantee would be strongerthan a unilateral declaration by the United States. Te annexto Resolution 1747 moves in this direction, but does not go farenough. Te Security Council supports a new conference topromote dialogue and cooperation on regional security issues, asIranian officials have urged. It proposes a range of cooperativeefforts in trade, investment, civil aviation, telecommunications,high technology, and agriculture. All of this could be further

specied and improved through negotiation, of course.Finally, prudence warrants taking measures now to headoff the most undesirable consequences if Iran does proceed toacquire nuclear weapon capabilities. Irans neighbors, especially,


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to stop defensively trying to ignore Israels nuclear status, andinstead to proactively call for regional dialogue to specify condi-tions necessary to achieve a zone free of nuclear, chemical, andbiological weapons.

Numerous extremely difficult issues need to be addressed. Among them are recognition of each others existence by allparties, the establishment of security-related condence-building

measures, national transparency, and intrusive verication proto-cols. Yet the states in the region, including Iran, lack the con-dence to begin exploring these issues on their own, a deciencythat is key not only to Israels threat perception but also to theperceptions of Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and other states inthe area. Te United States lacks the domestic political interest orregional legitimacy to initiate such dialogue. Tis may be an area

where some combination of European states, working with UNleadership, could invite key regional states to gather to developa research and dialogue agenda on the conditions necessary toimplement a veriable WMD-free zone in the Middle East.

wo new developments underline the need for suchdiscussions.

In the past year, Egypt, the Gulf Cooperation Council states, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and urkey have announced plans to launchsignicant civilian nuclear programs. Each says that growingdomestic demand for electricity and its nite oil and gas reservesmake nuclear energy production necessary. In private, leaders ofeach country also acknowledge that Irans nuclear program stim-ulates their interest in developing a potential countercapability.

For now they do not seek nuclear weapons, but rather a humanand technical infrastructure that is advanced, prestigious, andeconomically promising enough to allow these countries to stand


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proud before their own people and their neighbors, includingIran. And if these programs become controversial among nonpro-liferation watchmen, Egypt will lead a chorus of states chargingthat Israels nuclear weapon program faces no outside pressureand that any effort to impede Arab nuclear programs is rankhypocrisy and prejudice.

An international forum to address conditions necessary for a

WMD-free zone can provide a useful context for states to assessthe intentions behind these budding nuclear programs and todevise procedures and policies for mutual reassurance. Beyondregional dialogue, the United States and other outside powersshould be guided by four principles in their efforts to stop prolif-eration in the Middle East:

E Avoid transforming any bid for a nuclear energy program by alarge state such as Egypt or urkey into a nationalist campaignto defy the United States. Washington made a grave mistakein the 1990s by opposing Irans nuclear program (includingthe Bushehr power reactor so publicly that the issue became asymbol of Iranian nationalism and deance. Tis mistake mustnot be repeated. Quiet, professional diplomacy that makes a

clear distinction between nuclear power programs and nuclear weapon programs must be pursued in close coordination withthe IAEA.

E Rather than oppose civil nuclear programs, move quickly tocooperate with responsible authorities to dene the elementsof the most economically and environmentally benecialprogram. Serious high-level efforts should be made to proposeattractive international fuel service arrangements that wouldmake indigenous enrichment and reprocessing obviouslyuneconomical by comparison.


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E Make sure Iran does not get away with violating its safeguardobligations and the mandates of the UN Security Council.Iranian enrichment activities should be accepted only after theIAEA le is closed and Iran has built condence that its nuclearactivities are entirely and exclusively for peaceful purposes. IfIran continues to defy the IAEA and the Security Council,ensure that it experiences costs sufficient to deter other states

from following suit.E Recognize that progress on the Israeli-Palestinian agenda

is vital to mobilizing efforts to contain nuclear competitionin the region. Without such progress, and as long as Israelsnuclear status remains unaddressed, Arab populations willoppose stronger nonproliferation rules and enforcement astactics intended, above all, to serve what they perceive as Israelsunjust interests.

Te second new development is the NP Review Confer-ence scheduled for 2010. Many international observers feel thatthe nonproliferation regime is near collapse and that the 2010meeting will indicate whether it can be saved. Te 2005 ReviewConference was a debacle in part because Egypt used proceduralpower to prevent the conference from advancing on any front aslong as its demands regarding a WMD-free zone and nucleardisarmament were not addressed satisfactorily.

Te matter of the WMD-free zone will be more crucial thanever if current trends continue. If the United States and otherfriends of Israel try to ignore or deect this issue, they will only

intensify perceptions that the nonproliferation regime is not basedon the objectives of universality and equity, but, rather, followsthe whims of Washington: America bends the rules for its friendIndia, ignores the rules for its friend Israel, and does everything to


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punish its enemies Iran (and Iraq in 2003). Rather than allow thiscorrosive perception to spread, the United States and others shouldurge the Conference on Disarmament in advance to convene anexpert group to explore whether and how a regional zone free of

WMD could be veried. Tis exploration would not be mean-ingfuland should not be initiatedif all states in the proposedzone did not send emissaries, including Israel, Syria, Iran, Saudi

Arabia, and Iraq. If, with Washingtons support, Egypt could notpersuade these other states to participate, perhaps the core polit-ical-security challenges of the region would be better understood,and the NP review process would be less prone to derailment.

Northeast AsiaIn October 2006, North Korea tested a nuclear weapon. In

2005, the United States had tightened nancial pressure onNorth Korea by designating the Macao-based Banco Delta Asiaas a money-laundering culprit. Tis started a run on the bank,

which prompted the Macao government to take it over and freezeUS$25 million in North Korean assets. Tese sanctions incensedthe North Korean leadership, which escalated the confrontation.Te nuclear test followed in part to compel a lifting of sanc-tions and also to draw the United States into direct negotiationsto normalize relations. But North Koreas volatile overreactionturned China, Japan, Russia, South Korea, and the United Statesmore intently against it, inviting tougher international sanctions.

In subsequent months, the Bush administration moved awayfrom the strategy of pure confrontation it had pursued under the

direction of longtime undersecretary of state John Bolton and VicePresident Dick Cheney. Te administration, under the directionof the State Department, became prepared to negotiate directly


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with North Korea in addition to participating in the six-partytalks. Te frozen bank accounts and the regional outrage over thenuclear tests provided new leverage against Pyongyang.

In February 2007, following bilateral U.S.North Koreannegotiations, North Korea agreed in the six-party talks to achieveearly denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, as part of anaction for action process. Te reciprocal actions to be taken

include shutting down and sealing for the purpose of eventualabandonment the Youngbyon nuclear facility. North Korea andthe United States will start bilateral talks aimed at resolvingpending bilateral issues and moving toward full diplomatic rela-tions. Te United States has pledged to begin the process ofremoving North Korea from its list of state sponsors of terrorismand removing barriers to trade. Working groups are to be estab-

lished to address a range of issues crucial to denuclearization ofthe peninsula, normalize bilateral relations, foster economic andenergy cooperation, and establish a northeast Asia peace andsecurity mechanism.

Tere is plenty of reason to doubt whether North Korea willever eliminate all of its nuclear weaponrelated capabilities. Still,if the February 2007 deal keeps North Korea from producingmore bomb material and conducting more nuclear tests, it will bea major accomplishment.

Further progress will not be made, however, without recog-nizing that North Korea wants above all to normalize relations

with the United States. North Korea is poorer and weaker thanany of its neighbors, and is mindful of ancient Korean tensions

with China and Japan. Te desire for normal relations with theUnited States as a distant and powerful balancer is understand-able in this light, even if North Korea has pursued them in asometimes incomprehensible way.


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Finally, Northeast Asia lacks institutions and other forumsto manage relations among North Korea, South Korea, Japan,China, Russia, and the United States. Tis region is so impor-tant to global security and economics that high priority shouldbe attached to sustaining the interactions begun through the six-party talks, whether or not these talks can lead to more formalmechanisms for regional diplomacy. Te breadth of issues to be

addressed pursuant to the February 2007 agreement offers plentyof work to be done in this format.

South AsiaPakistan and India have made signicant progress towardresolving the Kashmir dispute, since March 2005. While the poli-tics involved in resolving the Kashmir dispute remain daunting,

the leaders of Pakistan and India seem to have internalized theexistential imperative of nuclear deterrence. State-to-state warfareis no longer seen as a reasonable policy option.

In Universal Compliance , we highlighted seven key policyobjectives. Te common thread was to encourage and facilitatedevelopments within and between Pakistan and India to stabilizetheir relationship and reduce the risk that conict could escalateinto nuclear war. Fortunately, the two states have made signi-cant progress since March 2005.

We urged the United States to offerand India and Pakistanto acceptcooperative threat reduction programs that wouldprovide equipment, briengs, and training to improve control andaccounting of nuclear materials, as well as their physical protec-

tion, especially against theft by terrorists. We acknowledged thatsuch cooperation would be extremely sensitive matter for all sides.


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We are unable to say from public sources whether progress hasbeen made in this area. However, the highest levels of leadershipin Pakistan and India have given serious attention to securingtheir nuclear arsenals.

Given the ongoing development and testing of missiles byIndia and Pakistan, and exercises by their mobile missile forces,

we urged the two antagonists to negotiate and implement risk

reduction measures such as missile test ight protocols, advancednotication of the movement of missiles for training purposes,and exchanges of missile test schedules on an annual basis. Asa means of defusing potential crises, India and Pakistan haveupgraded the hotlines between the two states ranking officials.

In Universal Compliance , we wrote that the armys dominantrole in Pakistan is a systemic problem.... Pakistan cannot be stable

over the long term under military rule.... Te capacity of civilianpolitical parties and institutions must be strengthened. TeUnited States and other governments have been slow to recognizeand act on the strategic imperative of political reform in Pakistan.Te Pakistani military has increased its penetration and control ofall facets of Pakistani politics and economics. Te North Atlantic

reaty Organization and, nally, U.S. leaders have recognizedthat Pakistani military intelligence services have played at besta double game in Afghanistan, and have heightened rather thanmoderated instability in Balochistan. Te military governmentof President Pervez Musharraf has cultivated and manipulatedIslamist parties and jihadi groups for both external and internalpurposes, in part to stymie competition from more modern polit-

ical parties. Only in early 2007 did Washington begun to takeseriously the imperatives of genuine political reform in Pakistan.


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OBLIGATION SIX:Persuade India, Israel, and Pakistan to acceptthe same nonproliferation obligations accepted by the weapon state

signatories [to the NPT].

GRADE D-

Te U.S.-Indian civilian nuclear deal announced in July 2005strongly affects the global nonproliferation regime. India is centralto what we referred to as the Tree-State Problem. India, Israel,and Pakistan never signed the NP and therefore are not formallybound to key nonproliferation rules. Tey possess nuclear weaponsand are not going to give them up for the foreseeable future.

We noted that for many years supporters of nonproliferationhave been suspended between the unrealistic hope that these

countries will reverse their nuclear status and the unappetizingprospect of accepting them as new full-edged nuclear weaponstates in order to bring them into the nonproliferation regime.Te result has been little movement in either direction.

o end this state of suspension, we recommended droppingthe demand that India, Israel, and Pakistan give up their nuclear

weapons absent durable peace in their respective regions and prog-

ress toward global disarmament. Pakistan will not give up nuclear weapons if India does not, and India will not if China does not,and China will not if the United States and Russia do not.

Recognizing this, diplomacy should be focused on persuadingthe three states to accept all of the nonproliferation obligations acceptedby the ve original nuclear weapon states . We suggested that thesecommitments could be recorded in a new Security Council resolu-tion superseding Resolution 1172, which was adopted shortly afterthe 1998 nuclear tests. Resolution 1172 is overly ambitious and


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repugnant to India and Pakistan in its refusal to recognize theirnuclear status and its insistence that they eliminate their nucleararsenals independent of the disarmament efforts of others.

Responsible stewards of nuclear weapon capabilities shouldadopt these policies as a matter of international security in anycase. Still, as a further inducement, we proposed that the NSGremove restrictions on transferring equipment that India, Pakistan,

and Israel need to bring safeguarded nuclear plants up to thehighest safety standards, including even trigger list technology.

We knew that this relaxation of international restrictions wouldbe controversial, but we argued that the three states explicitadoption of nonproliferation and arms control policies practicedby the earlier nuclear weapon states warranted such cooperation.Cooperation to prevent nuclear accidents is as much a moral-

political obligation as nonproliferation.In a note, we went further and suggested that were these states

to dismantle uranium enrichment and plutonium reprocessingfacilities, and place all nuclear reactors under internationalsafeguards, international cooperation in supplying power reactorsand fuel cycle services would make sense from a global securitystandpoint.

Te nuclear deal announced by President Bush and Indianprime minister Manmohan Singh in July 2005 falls signicantlyshort of our proposal. Under the deal, the United States and India

would begin a series of national and bilateral steps that would endrestrictions on nuclear cooperation with India that have been inplace since 1978 because India does not have international safe-guards on all of its nuclear facilities and materials. Once U.S.domestic restrictions were lifted, India and the United States(joined by Russia, France, and the United Kingdom) would try


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to persuade the NSG to change its rules to allow full nuclearcooperation with India. India would also have to negotiate a safe-guard agreement and Additional Protocol with the IAEA. If and

when all these steps were taken, India would gain long-soughtacceptance as a state possessing nuclear weapons and access tolong-denied nuclear cooperation.

As of May 2007, doubts remain that all the necessary steps will

be taken. Nevertheless, it is worthwhile to explore the implica-tions of the deals completion.

First, by focusing only on India and ignoring Pakistan andIsrael, the agreement did not address the structural problem of thethree states exclusion from the formal nonproliferation regime.

Second, and more important, the U.S. and Indian govern-ments claimed that under the deal India would assume the same

responsibilities and practices accepted by other leading countries with advanced nuclear technology (read nuclear weapon states).But in fact, India did not agree to cease production of ssile mate-rials for military purposes, as the United States, Russia, France,the United Kingdom, and China have (although China has notdeclared this). Nor did India sign the C B , as the others have.

Tird, in agreeing to allow India a safeguard exemption for fastbreeder and power reactors that had heretofore been presentedas civilian, the deal put an American stamp of approval on whatmany observers see as an expansion of Indias military nuclearcapabilities beyond what they were perceived to be before.

Fourth, the United States proposed to removeall restrictionson nuclear cooperation with India, whereas we called for a more

modest lowering of trade barriers unless India (and, as relevant,Pakistan and Israel) dismantled its uranium enrichment andplutonium reprocessing facilities and placed all of its reactors


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In many ways, the behavior of all actors involved in the Indiadeal illustrates the great extent to which cooperative securitydepends on the leadership of major powers. When that leadershipundermines a rule-based system, others do not ll the gap, butinstead follow. Te result is a slide to pure power competition inthe nuclear domain. It was precisely the exceptionally destructivenature of nuclear technology that made world leaders conclude

four decades ago that a universal, rule-based system had to becreated to manage it.

If it proceeds, the India deal will make less favored nonnuclear weapon states such as Egypt, Iran, and South Africa more bitterlyoppose NSG efforts to strengthen nonproliferation rules. Whyloosen rules for India and tighten them on us? they ask.

If the deal is concluded, international security requires

redressing its effects, not compounding them.Te main challenge perhaps falls most heavily on China. Te

principal aw in the India deal is the failure to constrain Indiasproduction of ssile materials for weapons, in line with the prac-tices followed by the original nuclear weapon states. Were Chinato join the United States, Russia, France, and the United Kingdomin explicitly declaring a moratorium on such production, and topersuade its erstwhile friend Pakistan to declare that it would joinsuch a moratorium if India did, the pressure on India would beenormous. Te value of a ssile material production moratoriumas a benchmark of progress toward nuclear disarmament wouldbe enormous.


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Conclusion: The Final Grade: D+Te world needs better than near-failing performance if it is to bespared a nuclear disaster. Even a relatively small nuclear detona-tion in a city anywhere in the world would profoundly change the

way we live. Beyond the direct casualties, grave damage would bedone to the mobility of people, international commerce, and basicliberties. Te material and psychological well-being of societies

everywhere would suffer.Many people assume that the United States is the most likely

target of terrorist nuclear attack and the most likely participant ina nuclear conict between states. American presidents reinforcethis assumption when they say more often and more intenselythan other leaders that nuclear proliferation is the greatest threatto international security.

Other people, especially in the developing world, do not seethings this way. For many Africans, AIDS and poverty and inter-necine conict are immediate dangers. Nuclear proliferation and

war are distant abstractions. In South America, stalled economicgrowth, inequality, corruption, and perceived U.S. arrogance aremuch bigger problems than nuclear proliferation. And so on.

It is tempting to see proliferation as a problem that the UnitedStates must deal with, perhaps along with Russia and a few otherstates. Yet this misses the reality that, however unfairly, the conse-quences of a nuclear detonation will be in direct proportion tothe international power of the state being attacked. If the UnitedStates or its closest allies are attacked with nuclear weapons, thereaction will affect everyone. Te shock waves will ripple through


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the global economy. Depending on who is involved in suchattacks, whole regions could become embroiled in conict, which

would then ripple further along economic and cultural lines ofcommunication.

Just as the consequences of a nuclear attack would affecteveryone, so too everyone must contribute to preventing prolifer-ation. Rules are necessary to prevent nuclear technology, material,

and know-how from being misused, and to make and enforcesuch rules, states have to cooperate.

Rule-based systems, however, do not spontaneously emergeand enforce themselves. Leaders must build them and hold themtogether. Historically, the United States has been an indispensableleader in this area. Tat leadership became more difficult whenthe United States became the sole global superpower. Predomi-

nance tends to produce resistance and balancing by others whoprefer multipolarity. Te Bush administration has exacerbateddisaffection with U.S. power through a range of activities andbehaviors, most signicantly the Iraq War. Its greatest failing,as we argued in 2005, was to underappreciate the internationalteamwork necessary to stop the spread of nuclear weapons. Byrejecting the give-and-take of diplomacy and the legitimacyof other peoples need for securityincluding the demand forgreater equity in the international systemthe United States lostpower to achieve what it wants other than through brute force,

whose limits became clear in Iraq.Terefore, the United States bears great responsibility for the

worlds poor nonproliferation performance. In many areas, such as

the tightening of limits or criteria for the spread of ssile materialproduction capabilities, the problem is not a lack of good ideas,but rather a failure to attend to the equity interests of others. And


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in cases in which resistance to updated and better-enforced rulesstems from non-nuclear weapon states undeclared intentions topreserve options for military activities, those states deserve theopprobrium.

Te D+ is an overall average of six component grades. Here, thegrading metaphor is quite telling: Te sole F was earned becauseof the failure of the states that now possess nuclear weapons to

devalue their political and military currency. Tis failure weak-ened the whole enterprise and diminished its effectiveness in areas

where real effort was actually being made, as in stopping illegaltransfers. ime and again we see that the policies and posturesof the states with nuclear weapons, especially the United States,

weaken the willingness of others to establish and enforce ruleslimiting the spread of sensitive technologies or enforcing rules

against underdogs who break them.Te D+ is a better average than we would have awarded in

2005. Some progress vis--vis North Korea, Iran, and India andPakistan has been made. Indian-Pakistani relations show theultimate importance of local leadership and resolve. Leadingcircles in New Delhi and Islamabad realized the intolerable risksof conict that could escalate to nuclear weapon use, and haveengaged in sustained diplomacy on Kashmir and other sourcesof risk. In regard to North Korea and Iran, the most obviouschanges occurred within the Bush administration: It dropped itsrefusal to participate in direct diplomacy with the governmentsin Pyongyang and ehran, and thereby strengthened multilateralpressure on both countries. China, for this and other reasons,

then exerted more determined leadership, as did France and theUnited Kingdom, in particular, regarding Iran. Te six-partytalks with North Korea and the P-5+1 diplomacy w

Universal Compliance: A Strategy for Nuclear Security (2007 Report Card on Progress)

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