United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Study Guide© London International Model United Nations 2015...

United Nations Security Council (UNSC)

Study Guide

© London International Model United Nations 2015 LIMUN | Charity No. 1096197 www.limun.org.uk

Table of Contents

Welcome Letters .......................................................................................................................................... 1 Introduction to the United Nations Security Council ...................................................................... 2 Topic A: Piracy in the Gulf of Guinea ..................................................................................................... 3 History of the Topic ..................................................................................................................................... 4 Current Situation ......................................................................................................................................... 6 Executive Summaries of Past Relevant Resolutions ........................................................................ 8 Measures Thus Far by UNSC or other relevant Committees ...................................................... 10 Policy Options for the UNSC .................................................................................................................. 11 Notes/Bibliography ................................................................................................................................. 13 Topic B: The situation in Iraq and Syria and the international fight against ISIL. ............ 15 Introduction ............................................................................................................................................... 15 Current Situation/Involved Parties .................................................................................................... 16 History .......................................................................................................................................................... 18 Role of the United Nations Security Council .................................................................................... 20 Issues the resolution should address ................................................................................................ 21 Bibliography ............................................................................................................................................... 22


1

Welcome Letters

Director: Sandeep Rajgopal Greetings delegates! I am Sandeep Rajgopal, or San for short, and am currently

a second year Double-‐Degree Master of Public Policy student at the University

of Tokyo, having completed my first year of my masters at the Hertie School of

Governance and am currently a second year Double-‐Degree Master of Public

Policy student at the University of Tokyo, having completed my first year of my

masters at the Hertie School of Governance in Berlin. This will be the 16th

Model United Nations I will be attending, and I am honored to have been

appointed Director of paramount body of the United Nations system, the

United Nations Security Council at LIMUN 2015. I await February eagerly, as I

am convinced discourse within this committee will be intriguing and fruitful, an aspect augmented

by the fascinating nature of topics that will be debated. See you all in London!!

Assistant Director: Justus Loebler

Hi everyone, my name is Justus Loebler and it is my great pleasure to

co-‐chair the Security Council at LIMUN 2015. I am looking forward to a

magnificent conference in London and to welcoming you for fruitful

debates. After finishing my undergraduate studies in astrophysics in

Munich, Germany, I am now studying Transport at Imperial College in

London. I participated in several MUN conferences both as delegate

and as chair. LIMUN 2015 will be my 10th anniversary MUN so I am

particularly looking forward to it. At Imperial College I am working as

Treasurer for the MUN society. Over the years I have always valued the international atmosphere

of the MUN conferences I visited and the collaboration with so many young people in taking affords

to change the world we are living in to the better. MUN conferences offer a great opportunity to

get to know how international diplomacy works and why it fails in particular situation. The

experience you will get both in a political and in a personal sense will be one of the best you have

ever had in your life. I am looking forward to meet you all in February. Best, Justus


2

Introduction to the United Nations Security Council

The United Nations Security Council is the paramount council of the United Nations with 5

permanent members and 10 rotating members. Its establishment and nature is enshrined in

Chapter V of the United Nations Charter. Chapters VI, VII, VII and XII all contain provisions

pertaining the powers of the Security Council, which, to alleviate the burden of the shoulders of

you delegates, shall be elucidated in the following paragraph.

Chapter VI pertains to the Pacific Settlement of Disputes, within which, under articles 33 to 38, the

Security Council may call upon the settlement of such disputes by the parties involved, investigate

such disputes and recommend appropriate procedures or methods of adjustment or resolution of

the issue in a pacific manner. Chapter VII deals with the Action with Respect to Threats to the

Peace, Breaches of the Peace and Acts of Aggression, within which, under articles 39 to 41, the

Security Council may determine any of the three aforementioned violations, call upon parties

involved to comply with provisional measures and invoke non-‐armed measures towards the

resolution of it. Articles 42 to 50 pertain to the utilization of armed-‐measures, the procedures

towards invoking and carrying out such measures and responsibilities and options for UN member

states in light of such measures being employed. Article 51 of the same chapter VII finally iterates

the inherent right of member states towards individual and collective self-‐defense. Chapter VIII

contains only articles 52 to 54, which enshrine the practices involving regional arrangements,

particularly in regards to how the Security Council may utilize such regional arrangements, but also

how these will always require explicit authorization from the Security Council, should they wish to

get seriously involved in matters. Finally we have Chapter XII, which pertains to the International

Trusteeship System, under whose articles 83 and 84 mentions the Security Council as the sole

approver of terms regarding such trusteeship agreements, as well as the body to whom the

administering authority would be obligated as a contractual partner in this agreement. It is vital to

note that passage of a resolution in the Security Council is conditional on the affirmative voting of 9

member states and the absence of usage of the veto power, which a certain 5 states hold.

As diplomatic delegates to the most powerful body of the UN system, we hope that you will

perform your duties with dignity, equity and diligence, without forsaking the policy of your state.


3

Topic A: Piracy in the Gulf of Guinea

Let us begin with the fundamentals:

geography. See the red arrow on the image

on the right-‐hand side? That is where the

Gulf of Guinea is. In the northeast of the

southern Atlantic Ocean, just above the

equator and encompassing the territorial

waters of Benin, Cameroon, Equatorial

Guinea, Gabon, Ghana, Nigeria, São Tomé

and Príncipe, as well as, Togo.

The etymology of the word Guinea most

probably originates from the Berber word

for Negro, aguinaou, though it could have

originated from a corrupted pronunciation of Ghana as well. 1

Now that the geography has been clarified, let us delve into what the etymology and definition of

the term piracy itself. The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) of 1982

defines piracy in article 101 of part VII on the High Seas as following2:

“Piracy consists of any of the following acts:

(a) any illegal acts of violence or detention, or any act of depredation,

committed for private ends by the crew or the passengers of a private

ship or a private aircraft, and directed:

(i) on the high seas, against another ship or aircraft, or against

persons or property on board such ship or aircraft;

(ii) against a ship, aircraft, persons or property in a place

outside the jurisdiction of any State;


4

(b) any act of voluntary participation in the operation of a ship or of

an aircraft with knowledge of facts making it a pirate ship or aircraft;

(c) any act of inciting or of intentionally facilitating an act described in

subparagraph (a) or (b).”

Briefly also a few words to the etymology of piracy; it presumably is derived from the Latin term

pirata and the ancient Greek peirates, which meant brigand and came from the verb form peira,

which signified “attempt” or “experience”.3

History of the Topic

Though historically too little is known about the piracy situation in this area, maritime piracy has

been part and parcel of seafaring in most parts of the world since earliest history. In the African

context, particularly the Barbary Pirates from Tripoli were particularly renowned for their success,

in a negative sense.4 However piracy in the Gulf of Guinea is known to have reemerged in the 1970s

and 80s due to political instability in the region.5 In addition one must consider the wealth of

natural resources in the region, and the thereof resulting lucrative nature of conducting piracy in

the region. As a result one can pinpoint the origin of recent piracy in the region to the oil boom in

the 1970s in Nigeria.6 One must acknowledge, as well, that piracy has been commonplace in the

region for a long time, and it was only in 2007 that the Piracy of the Gulf of Aden overtook

numerically the incidence rate of that of the Gulf of Guinea. However the trend has reversed once

more recently, due to the excellent efforts conducted by this council and other United Nations

member states in the Gulf of Aden by virtue of following United Nations Security Council

resolutions:

• 1816 (2008)

• 1838 (2008)

• 1846 (2008)

• 1851 (2008)

• 1897 (2009)

• 1918 (2010)


5

• 1950 (2010)

• 1976 (2011)

• 2015 (2011)

• 2020 (2011)

The United Nations Security Council also passed following resolutions on Piracy in the Gulf of

Guinea as well, which will be demystified in detail section III of this study guide:

• 2018 (2011)

• 2039 (2012)

As early as 2004, the Gulf of Guinea was identified as being only second to the perilous Straits of

Malacca in terms of number of piracy incidents, however, piracy as a topic in an international sense

only came to our consciousness due to the incidents around the Gulf of Aden and its link to the

sensitive issue of Somalia as a struggling state.7 Piracy in the Gulf of Guinea only entered into

prominence when reports from the International Maritime Bureau of the International Chambers of

Commerce, a recognized entity on this subject, as adjudged by the International Maritime

Organization, documented the incidence of piracy in that region at a level of 966 in 2012.8 At this

point it is important to note that incidence rates should always be considered with the notion that

a significant majority of piracy is unreported, as are the detailed resolutions of these incidents due

to the involvement of private entities in the subject at hand and the thereof resulting necessity for

them to maintain confidence by investors and stakeholders in them.

Piracy is an issue that has always been challenging to tackle as pirates due not pertain to any state,

and their acts are committed either in international waters or territorial waters against ships that

carry a different flag, and may have sailors and freight that may pertain each to a completely

different country once again. This multi-‐national aspect fog our efforts even more. Furthermore in

territorial waters one is reliant upon the state to whom the territory belongs to act adequately.

Even if this is the case, pirates are known to hop from one set of territorial waters to the next,

particularly possible in a region as densely populated by states as the Gulf of Guinea. International

coordination is paramount to the resolution of the matter. Nonetheless, one must also note that, as


6

well as resolutions, measures have already been taken in the sphere. Regardless as you will discern

from section II, the situation is all but under control and the danger is more relevant than ever.

Current Situation Though it was, initially, the spike in absolute numbers that called upon our attention in regards to

the issue at hand and our interest and success in the issue of piracy in the Gulf of Aden, it must be

noted that piracy in the Gulf of Guinea is significantly different to that of that region and that

absolute numbers aren’t as relevant as normally would one fathom them to be.

The Gulf of Guinea is more densely populated by states, as was mentioned afore, however in

addition one must note that there are 8 states with oil production and reserves on the West Coast

of Africa.9 They produce 5 million barrels of oil per day and possess 10% of all known oil reserves on

our planet.10 The geostrategic importance of securing the Gulf of Guinea is thus greater than in

other instances. Furthermore one must consider that the level of sophistication, due to the

lucrative rewards in question (oil), is much higher than it was in the Gulf of Aden. This is

compounded by the fact that international freight vessels have, in part, increasingly attempted to

cut costs, whether by personnel or by quality of the freighter, which mitigates the effect of even

the Best Management Practices (BMP4) issued by the International Maritime Bureau, of the

International Chamber of Commerce and propagated conjunctly by the International Maritime

Organization.

8 factors have been identified in academia as crucial to the issue at hand11:

• Legal and jurisdictional weaknesses

• Favorable geography

• Conflict and disorder

• Underfunded law enforcement

• Inadaquate security

• Permissive political environments

• Cultural acceptability


7

• Promise of reward

Though efforts have addressed these issues to an extent, their prevalence to varying degrees in the

various states still plays a crucial role.

Legal and jurisdictional weaknesses have been addressed partially, however the efforts and the

nature of them need to be different than in the Gulf of Aden case, as the Gulf of Aden involved

predominately just one state, whose jurisdictional weakness was well established and thus we

could exert more control, however the multitude of states in this case, plus their different

situations complicates the matter.12 Furthermore unlike Somalia, whose existence as a sovereign

state could be challenged by virtue of the provisions within the Montevideo Convention, all states

in question here satisfy the provisions and are truly sovereign entities.13

This issue also ties in with underfunded law enforcement. States in the region have tried to mitigate

their shortcomings by even hiring from private entities, but without the presence of a strong law

enforcement and judicial process to follow it that will apprehend and punish pirates, who can be

convicted of the act, the simple return of pirates to their original act, with the pretention that

punishment is meager and non-‐threatening, will occur continuously with frequency. 14 The

underfunded law enforcement poses a serious issue, as the pirates are increasingly sophisticated in

their actions with clear plans and decoy maneuvers being part of their methodology. Their

allegiance or belonging to terrorist organizations and organized crime is the source of this

sophistication and their access to resources.

The conflict and disorder of the Niger Delta is also a significant factor, as this permeates into the

Gulf of Guinea and thus amalgamates the issue further. West Africa’s struggle with the Ebola-‐

outbreak further compounds the issue, and could increase the disorder in the region should it enter

states within the Gulf of Guinea region. Security is also inadequate in the region due to the conflict

with terrorist/militant organizations such as Boko Haram or the Movement for the Emancipation of

the Niger Delta.

The cultural acceptability and permissiveness of the politics in the region is debatable and different

from state to state, and even from internal regional to region, however, the situation in this case is

not indifferent to the Gulf of Aden scenario, whereby dissatisfied individuals are taking up piracy

due to the promise of reward from it.15 A reward that is significantly higher than any normal

earning may yield. The unequal distribution of profits from oil exports is a crucial factor, as citizens


8

surely feel that only few are profiting from the situation, whilst the remainder of the country

remains where it always has been; in abject poverty.16 The permissiveness of politics depends on

the internal regions within the individual states, but in states that rank fairly poorly in corruption

indices, the possibility of permissiveness from regional politics isn’t to be excluded. One

consideration that should be made is for the elections in Nigeria in February 2015, whose outcome

could affect the political stability in the region, and could thus amalgamate the incidence of piracy

in the region.17

Finally we must realize that geography places a crucial role and that the presence of a multitude of

territorial waters allows pirates to evade capture from one law enforcement team by entering

another jurisdictional territory. Thus coordination is crucial. Combined Maritime Task Forces don’t

exist in this region, like they have effectively existed in the Gulf of Aden. Naturally, these require

the explicit permission of states to enter sovereign territorial waters of other states, a vital

challenge to the issue at hand. In terms of geography we must also consider the increasing range of

these groups, as they are growing bolder and more confident in navigating wider regions, which

would complicate anti-‐piracy measures even more. One factor, aside from everything else, is the

falling oil prices, thus it might be an interesting exercise of the mind to forecast how this may affect

piracy activities in the region.

Positively, the Gulf of Guinea pirates have a focus on seizure and theft of cargo and valuables,

rather than ransom-‐based hijackings, thus resulting in a lower incidence of fatalities and injury to

crew than was the case in the Gulf of Aden case. However, this also means the pirates are in and

out quicker, and can even conduct their activities in stealth, such as siphoning the oil without

anyone noticing soon enough.

Cost of the piracy is significantly high for all states involved, with estimates for the Nigerian

economy, when the incidence rate was lower, being $202 million from 2005 to 2008, and since

2006 oil production has dropped 20% as a result as well. 18

Executive Summaries of Past Relevant Resolutions There are two resolutions of direct relevance by the United Nations Security Council on this issue:

Resolution 2018 (2011) and 2039 (2012).


9

Resolution 2018 is the first resolution on the matter and conducts its role in a manner appropriate

for a first resolution on the matter. It condemns the piracy, welcomes joint efforts planned and/or

undertaken by the regional states and actors (such as the Economic Community of West African

States, the Economic Community of Central African States and the Gulf of Guinea Commission). It

articulates an encouragement for them to develop domestic laws, a region counter-‐piracy

framework which should include both information-‐sharing and operational coordination

mechanisms, as well as noting the importance of implementing regulations and international

agreements for safety and security of navigation. It requests that all actions should not impair or

deny freedoms that are customary in the navigator’s sense. It calls upon cooperation to exist with

both the shipping and insurance industry along with the International Maritime Organization in

issuing guidance towards measures against piracy. It further calls upon cooperation in prosecution

of alleged perpetrators upon the issue. There is also encouragement offered to the international

community to assist, if and when requested, the states concerned in the region. Finally it speaks of

welcoming the intention of the Secretary-‐General to deploy a UN assessment mission and

proclaims its eagerness to receive and view the report.

Essentially, one would have to conclude, that the resolution is relatively shallow and soft in its

approach. Apart from the occasional request, most of the notions are recommendations or

encouragements. Furthermore responsibility is almost entirely placed upon the regional actors to

adapt themselves accordingly to the situation, and support is merely offered, should it be

requested, nominally to the states involved. One can thus see, why this resolution yielded little

result by its own virtue. One should also note that this resolution was released whilst efforts were

still seriously focused on the Gulf of Aden and the peak incidence rate had not yet struck. The

follow-‐up resolution 2039 in 2012 should thus be more telling in its nature.

United Nations Security Council resolution 2039 in 2012 begins by welcoming the issued report by

the secretary-‐general, whose drafting was welcomed in resolution 2018 and encouraging its

implementation, as appropriate. This latent insertion, suits the UNSC’s general nature of non-‐

intervention in domestic affairs and thus weakens this clause significantly. The primary

responsibility is then stressed to be lying with the states of the Gulf of Guinea and relevant regional

bodies. Clause 3 stresses the responsibility of the states within the region to deal with the issue at

hand and to develop a strategy for it. Alike this clause are also clauses 5-‐7 which once more


10

reaffirm the responsibility for the issue upon the states within the region and furthermore merely

reiterate the actions to be taken from resolution 2018, in an albeit slightly more detailed form.

Clause 4 and 9 divert tasks to the Secretary-‐General, such that he facilitate the convening

aforementioned (in resolution 2018) summit and, as a novelty to this resolution, support the efforts

of mobilizing resources. Clause 9's action could be deemed the only novelty to this resolution from

the actions/recommendations/encouragements iterated in resolution 2018, though one must

stress that the vagueness of this clause hinders its effectiveness. Clause 8 repeats the support to be

provided by international partners, but maintains its vague stance. And clause 10, also in regards to

the Secretary General, requests his regular information on the matter.

As can be seen by the clauses iterated and the tone of the analysis, resolution 2039 is a typical

follow-‐up resolution, that all but represents a reiteration of resolution 2018 from the year prior.

The resolution, and thus the intention of the council can be defined by two motifs. First, that the

responsibility for the region and the actions within it against piracy all but remain solely in the

hands of the states within the region and second, that the impatience is slightly growing in light of

the inaction on the matter. Clause 9 is essentially the only new addition to this resolution, in

comparison to that of resolution 2018, but unfortunately its content is rather vague thus shrouding

it in a fog. One engages in the mental exercise of pondering over the nature, origin and detailed

intention of the resources that should be mobilized, and thus even the necessity of it.

Measures Thus Far by UNSC or other relevant Committees As can be witnessed by the resolutions issued by the United Nations Security Council and their

analysis above, their impact has been resultantly relatively minimal. However the International

Maritime Organization has been more proactive in its measures, as one would hope and expect,

though their success is also debatable. Resolution A. 1069(28) as passed by the assembly in

December 2013 creates, most promisingly an International Maritime Organization West and

Central Africa Maritime Security Trust Fund towards the improvement of national and regional

capabilities pertaining to maritime governance within their jurisdiction, the prevention, in

accordance with international law, acts of piracy and finally towards the interdiction and bringing

to justice of alleged perpetrators of crimes of piracy.


11

This measure is promising as it has been supported by various states generously already, however

the utilization of these funds has not yet been fully assessed, thus one would have to see if the

funds are appropriately utilized for the intended matter and whether benefits can be reaped, and

that too whether benefits can be reaped in the short-‐term.

The International Maritime Organization has also issued the "New Industry Guidelines for Owners,

Operators and Masters for Protection against Piracy in the Gulf of Guinea Region" as recently as

October 2014. These guidelines should be read in conjunction with the Best Management Practices

(BMP4) guidelines issued by the International Maritime Bureau of the International Chamber of

Commerce. Those guidelines refereed more to the issue in general or in regards to the Gulf of Aden

piracy matter, and thus this extension was issued by the International Maritime Organization.

Unfortunately few other genuine measures have been undertaken by relevant bodies, and thus we

rest with these. Also, though it is true individual states have conducted measures, their

effectiveness remains still questionable. The region bodies, pertaining to West Africa and Central

Africa have each set up maritime coordination centers, however only some parts of it have

reported success, and unfortunately the success is doubtful due to the increase in piracy activities

being noted.19

Policy Options for the UNSC Policy options are numerous, but naturally have advantages and disadvantages in each. They are

must also be considered in relevance to a time-‐frame. Note that your author has not mentioned all

issues to be considered, but just a few to initiate your thinking process, and that this list is hardly

exhaustive.

A) Provide the mandate for an International Maritime Task-‐Force which would jointly coordinate

actions in the region and effectively control the waters. Aspects to note:

• This would have to be a short-‐term solution and thus should ideally run with a mandate that

would have to be renewed annually


12

• Approval and permission by all relevant states would have to be sought, as none of the states

involved could be considered wholly a failed state

• Mechanisms for when alleged perpetrators are apprehended

• Limits would have to be discussed

• Concordance with international law would have to be ascertained

B) Encourage a mandate amongst the states involved for a singular Maritime Task-‐Force, instead

of being split up into sub-‐regional ones, that jointly coordinates actions in the whole region and

effectively controls the waters, but is thus limited to naval forces of states within that region.

Aspects to note:

• This would have to be a short-‐term solution and thus should ideally run with a mandate that

would have to be renewed annually

• Approval and permission by all relevant states would have to be sought, as none of the states

involved could be considered wholly a failed state

• Mechanisms for when alleged perpetrators are apprehended

• Limits would have to be discussed

• Concordance with international law would have to be ascertained

C) Refer capacity building support pertaining to judicial processes and law enforcement to the

United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime who have versed experts within the field. Aspects to

note:

• Are the concerned states interested?

• Is the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime the correct body to refer to?

• Do they have the relevant expertise?

• Is this long-‐term solution going to help in the short term at all? Or do we accept that?

D) Refer to the International Maritime Organization to increase coordination and monitoring

efforts to evaluate the situation further. Aspects to note:

• Is that a viable option?

• Will it solve matters?

• But if we have an information shortage, perhaps it's what needs to be done?


13

E) Continue on the existing path of the United Nations Security Council, emphasizing the

responsibility of the states, but also their sovereignty and continue encouraging them to take

measures pursuant to the resolutions 2018 and 2039. Aspects to note:

• Is the current path effective?

• Is the current path sufficient?

• Are measures being undertaken?

• Is there a loss to your state, thus does it even matter to your diplomatic mission?

• Is this a long-‐term or a short-‐term solution?

F) Rest upon the matter due to the lack of need, as perceived by your diplomatic mission to act

upon this topic at all.

G) Innovative solution?

Notes/Bibliography

Eduard William Bovill, The Golden Trade of the Moors: West African Kingdoms in the Fourteenth

Century (Princton: Wiener, 1995).

Control Risks, Riskmap Report 2015 (London: Control Risks Group Limited, 2014) 122.

Matthew Fiorelli, Piracy in Africa: The Case of the Gulf of Guinea (Kofi Annan International

Peacekeeping Training Centre Occasional Paper 37, 2014).

International Maritime Bureau, International Maritime Bureau Annual Piracy Report 2012

(International Maritime Bureau of the International Chamber of Commerce, 2013).

IPI, Insecurity in the Gulf of Guinea: Assessing the Threats, Preparing the Response (International

Peace Institute, 2014).

Edward Lucie-‐Smith, Outcasts of the Sea: Pirate and Piracy (London: Grosset & Dunlap, 1978).

Eero Tepp, The Gulf of Guinea: Military and Non-‐Military Ways of Combatting Piracy (Baltic Security

and Defence 14:1, 2012) 181-‐204.


14

United Nations, United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (United Nations, 1982).

United Nations Secretary General: Ban Ki-‐Moon, Report of the United Nations assessment mission

on piracy in the Gulf of Guinea (United Nations, 2012).20

1 Bovill 1995 2 United Nations 1982 3 Lucie-‐Smith 1978 4 Fiorelli 2014 5 Ibid. 6 Ibid. 7 Ibid. 8 International Maritime Bureau 2013 9 Fiorelli 2014 10 Ibid. 11 Tepp 2012 12 United Nations Secretary-‐General: Ban Ki-‐Moon 2012 13 Ibid. 14 IPI 2013 15 Ibid. 16 Ibid. 17 Control Risks 2014 18 Fioreli 2014 19 United Nations Secretary General: Ban Ki-‐Moon 2012


15

Topic B: The situation in Iraq and Syria and the international fight against ISIL.

Introduction The situation in Iraq and Syria remains unstable and vulnerable with large areas of these countries

controlled by the terrorist organisation ISIL. Since the withdrawal of the American troops from Iraq

in 2011 ISIL has taken over control of large parts of northern Iraq and northwestern Syria. Due to

the ongoing civil war in Syria the country is now de-‐facto controlled by three different parties.

Kurds in the northwestern parts of Iraq and Syria have resisted attacks by ISIL so far. An

international coalition led by the USA with participation from many Middle Eastern countries as

well has taken military actions against ISIL and supported the Kurds with light weaponry.

The United Nations Security Council has adopted Resolution S/Res/2170 in August 2014

condemning several terroristic actions taken by ISIL in Syria and Iraq. In Presidential Statements

S/PRST/2014/20 the Security Council urged all member states to participate in the international

coalition against ISIL. An official and binding UN backing for the US-‐led coalition is not in place so

far.

The situation involves three individual but interrelated conflict zones. Firstly, the ongoing civil war

in Syria, secondly, the spreading of ISIL, and finally, the unclear situation of the Kurds in Iraq, Syria

and Turkey. Delegates should be aware of the evolution of all three of these conflicts and have a

detailed knowledge of UN actions taken over time.


16

Figure 1 -‐ Situation in the region by 31. Dec 2014. (Wikipedia, Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant

2015)

The color-‐coded regions are controlled by the following forces: grey – ISIL, purple – Iraqi

government, green – Kurds, red – Assad regime, light green and white – Syrian rebels.

Current Situation/Involved Parties ISIL. There are various transcriptions of the original Arabic name of ISIL, including the most

common ones Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) and Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL).21

The UN official uses ISIL; therefore we will use this abbreviation in the following. Whenever it is

necessary, we will clarify on what is meant in detail. However, the organisation renamed itself in

Islamic State (IS) in summer 2014. This name has been condemned by the international community

and should not be used in official documents of UN related bodies, and for the purpose of LIMUN

conference.

The organisation was originally founded in 2004 as a branch of Al-‐Qaeda during the US and UK war

in Iraq. It became one of the major enemies of the US and its allies during that war. With the

withdrawal of the American troops from Iraq and the beginning of the Syrian Civil war, both in

2011, ISIL started to gain power in both countries and started collaboration with several rebel

groups in Syria. With its increasing military success in summer 2014 it became internationally


17

judged as one of the biggest threats to international peace and security.22 ISIL holds control of large

areas in northern Iraq and northwestern Syria today. The terroristic organisation is said to murder

women and children brutally and has executed American journalists. It has been reported that ISIL

destroys cultural heritages in Syria on large scale.

Figure 2 -‐ The Flag of ISIL. (Wikipedia, Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant 2015)

Kurdish Regions. The Kurdish regions in Iraq, Syria and Turkey are gaining for an independent

Kurdish state in that area. In Iraq, they achieved a largely autonomous region in the north east of

the country. The relationship between the Turkish Kurds and the Turkish government remains

tense and had impacts on the involvement of Turkish armed forces in the conflict.

The Kurdish regions in Iraq in Syria were the first successfully defeating ISIL troops approaching

their territory in northern Iraq. They were able to secure their territory but came under growing

military pressure and asked the international community for military support. With this support

granted the Kurds fight together with the US-‐led coalition against ISIL.

Iraq. With the withdrawal of the American troops from Iraq in 2011 the situation in the country

became increasingly unstable. Due to ongoing military actions between the Iraqi government and

Islamist groups the current situation is even referred to as Iraqi insurgency. However, in June 2014

ISIL – still a remaining branch of Al Qaeda in Iraq -‐ started to take over military power in wide

northern Iraqi areas with the Iraqi governmental forces unable to defeat it. Parallel, the political


18

power of the country was strongly restricted by political standoff. Eventually, after months of

political deadlock, Fuad Masum became President of the country with large international backing.23

Syrian Rebels. With the beginning of the Syrian civil war in 2011 a broad coalition of rebels against

the Assad regime enjoyed political and military support from major western countries. With the

advance of ISIL into Syria parts of the rebel groups joined the ISIL forces. Thus those rebel groups

became military enemies of the US-‐led coalition which includes several states that had been

supporting these groups before the advance of ISIL in 2014.

Turkey. With the advance of ISIL and the growing support of western countries for the Kurdish

regions in Iraq and Syria the Turkish government was forced into a complex situation. Fighting

between Kurdish and ISIL troops came close to the Syrian-‐Turkish border in summer 2014 and

forced the Turkish government to take action. Since the Kurds in Turkey (alongside with the Kurdish

regions in Iraq and Syria) have been making affords for an independent state, the Turkish-‐Kurdish

relationship was stressed. Eventually the Turkish government authorized military action against ISIL

in Syrian towns close to its southern border. Therewith, the Turkish troops where fighting

alongside the Kurdish citizens in the towns in Syria.

USA/US-‐led coalition. With the immense military success of ISIL the USA started Operation

Inherent Resolve as a combined Joint Task Force with a large numbers of countries participating in

its operations in both Syria and Iraq. These include a wide range of western countries as well as

Morocco, Bahrain, Jordan, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the UAE as well as Iraqi and Kurdish forces. Even

though it has wide international backing there is no UN mandate for the intervention to date.

History The report on the evolution of the conflict starts with the Iraqi war from 2003. It is worth taking a

look in the developments before that date gaining for a deeper understanding of the groups

involved.

During the war in Iraq 2003 – 2011 the US and UK troops fought against Al Qaeda and several of its

branches including ISIL, called ISI at this time. Over the time, ISI became one of the major


19

opponents of the US and UK troops.24 With the end of the war and the eventual withdrawal of the

American troops in 2011 the responsibility for peace in security within the country devolved to the

Iraqi government. Prime Minister of Iraq at this time was Nouri al-‐Maliki who took office in 2006.25

The Kurdish Autonomous region in Iraq as well as the Kurdish regions in Syria and Turkey are

gaining for an independent Kurdish state for quite some time. However, the situations of each of

these regions are different. In northern Iraq, the Kurds evolved state-‐like structures called Iraqi

Kurdistan whereas this development has been depressed in Turkey.

During the Arab spring in 2011 the civil war in Syria begun. The Assad regime brutally ended

peaceful demonstrations. With growing military actions taken by both sides the situation in Syria

became more and more unstable eventually leading to a civil war in the country of increasing

brutality. Government forces were fighting against rebel forces. Lots of the rebel forces where

judged as moderate rebels and supported by western states, i.e. the USA, the EU and others. In

August 2013 the USA and the UK discussed taking military actions after the Assad regime had used

chemical weapons against civilians in Syria. Without backing of the UN and the national parliaments

this military actions were never realized. Without any effective external measures taken the conflict

in Syria has frozen more and more over time.

With the raise of ISIL in Iraq at the beginning of 2014 the situation started changing again.

Beginning in June 2014 ISIL started successfully to militarily take over large parts of northern Iraq

and also started military activity in Syria supported from several rebel groups. Quickly ISIL got

control of critical infrastructure including the Mosul dam in Iraq supplying major parts of Iraq with

electricity and water. Iraqi forces were not able to stop the raise of ISIL; and the heavily weakened

military forces of the Assad regime in Syria were not able to defeat the terrorist organisation either.

When ISIL reached the Kurdish areas in Iraq and Syria the Kurds were able to resist the attacks of

ISIL and to secure their grounds. However, under growing military pressure the Kurds asked

western countries for weapons and military support.

Western states, including the USA and EU, came under growing pressure to take action in the

conflict, as the end of the ISIL’s raise was not conceivable. With the United Nations Security Council

not able to pass a substantive resolution on counteractions against ISIL a broad coalition of states

including several Arabic ones decided to take military actions against ISIL in Syria and Iraq. Under

the US Operation Inherent Resolve those states started supporting the Kurds with military


20

equipment and to fly airstrikes in Syria in Iraq.26 With that operations ISIL could be weakened

substantially, as the U.S. Department of Defense reports in early January 2015.27

In the regions controlled by ISIL it is reported to rule brutally. Two American journalists have been

executed and the videos of the execution have been published online. Women and Children are

reported to be executed and whole villages have been destroyed by the advancing ISIL troops.

Role of the United Nations Security Council The UNSC has been involved in all three sub-‐conflicts in the region.

UNSC resolutions on Iraqi Kurdistan have been past in the 1980s and 1990s. However, there are no

direct relations between those actions taken by the UN and the role the Kurdish regions have taken

today.

The UNSC failed to pass a strong resolution on the conflict in Syria. Proposals for an US-‐led air strike

operation after the usage of chemical weapons by the Assad regime have been defeated by the

Russian veto. However, resolutions on the humanitarian situation have been passed successfully

and actions have been taken by NATO to secure the Syrian-‐Turkish-‐boarder.

Since the military success of ISIL the UNSC passed S/Res/2170 on sanctions against al-‐Qaeda and

condemning the international recruitment of ISIL.28 A resolution on the international coalition has

not been passed. However, presidential statements of the UNSC are urging member states to

participate in the US-‐led Operation Inherent Resolve.

Relevant UNSC Resolutions and Presidential Statements.

This section provides a brief summary of the relevant UNSC papers on the topic. However,

delegates should also have a detailed look at the documents themselves as well as on other related

UN and UNSC documents.

S/Res/2170 (15th August 2014). The resolution expresses the concern of the UNSC about the land

takes by ISIL and the Al Nusrah Front (ANF) that had taken place at this time, the kidnapping and

hostage taking by this groups and also mentions the increased use of the internet by these

organisations. It condemns both groups as well as associated Al-‐Quaida bodies. The resolution

demands an immediate of any violence taken by ISIL, ANF and other terrorist groups. It further calls

upon the UN member states take action within the boarders of international law to counter the


21

actions taken by those groups. It addresses the international recruitment of ISIL, ANF and others

and calls upon the member states to work against that in their own boarders. It also recalls asset

freeze and financial embargos on Al Qaida and others and takes them further with a detailed list of

heads of Al-‐Qaida and others to by sanctioned.

S/PRST/2014/1 (10th January 2014). This Presidential Statement is the very first action taken by the

UNSC against the recent raise of ISIL. IT condemns early action that were limited to Northern Iraq

and calls upon Iraq to take counter measures accordingly. It recalls asset freeze and bans against Al-‐

Qaida and associated organisation from 2001.

S/PRST/2014/18 (28th July 2014). In this Presindential Statement the UNSC reacts on increasing

land taking by ISIL in the Northern Iraq and Syria. It reaffirms the sovereingty and terretorial

integrity of both countries. It expresses the UNSC’s concern of oilfields under control of ISIL that

might generate income for terrorists. It recalls asset freezes and fincial bans.

S/PRST/2014/20 (19th September 2014). This Preseidential Statements reacts on the newly formed

Iraqi geovernment and welcomes the end of the political deadlock in the country. It asks for

support by the member states for the new Iraqi geovernment and the policy implementations at

hand. It underlines the importance of international cooperation in the fight against ISIL and urges

the international community to support Iraq in its measures against ISIL and other associated

forces.

Issues the resolution should address With several resolutions on particular issues of the conflict the Security Council still lacks for a

comprehensive resolution on the overall situation. This resolution should address the following

points.

Military Actions. Is there a chance to give an UN backing for the ongoing process? If so, which

guidelines are important for this operation to be efficient and according the UN charter? Which

military actions can be taken to reach further progress in defeating ISIL?

Counterterrorism. How can the growing risk of counter-‐terroristic attacks be addressed?

ISIL Recruitment. S/Res/2170 addresses this topic. How can further measures against ISIL

recruitment in all member states of the UN be taken?


22

Cultural Heritage. Due to the ongoing political conflicts in Syria and by targeted actions of ISIL

several cultural heritages have been destroyed in Syria and Iraq. How can the cultural heritage in

this region be secured?

Political Situation in Syria. Which steps can be taken to restore peace and security in Syria? Which

impacts does the fight against ISIL have on this process? How can the new situation change the

international views on the conflict in Syria?

Political Situation of the Kurds. Is the collaboration with the Kurds in the fight against ISIL a starting

point for new debates for the autonomy of the Kurds? If so, which measures can be taken and

which role does Turkey play in this issue?

Weaponry in the region. How can the growing number of weaponry in the region be controlled? In

which ways should the military support to allied forces of the international community be given?

Refugees. How can the issue of refugees in bordering countries be addressed, both in short-‐term

and in long-‐term?

Bibliography Allen, John. Degrading and Defeating ISIL. Report, Washington, D.C.: US Department of State, 2014.

Khatib, Lina. Why the Islamic State Will Continue to Exist in 2015? Report, Carnegie Middle Eastern

Center, Beirut: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2015.

The Meir Amit Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center. ISIL: Portrait of a Jihadi Terrorist

Organization. Report, Israel: Israeli Intelligence & Heritage Commemoration Center, 2014.

U.S. Department of Defense. Operation Inherent Resolve. January 9, 2015.

http://www.defense.gov/home/features/2014/0814_iraq/.

United Nations Security Council. S/PRST/2014/1. Presidential Statement, New York: United Nations,

2014.

United Nations Security Council. S/PRST/2014/14. Presidential Statement, New York: United

Nations, 2014.

United Nations Security Council. S/PRST/2014/20. Presidential Statement, New York: United

Nations, 2014.

United Nations Security Council. S/Res/2170. Resolution, New York: United Nations, 2014.

Wikipedia. History of Iraq (2011–present). January 9, 2015.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_Iraq_(2011–present).


23

—. Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant. January 9, 2015.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Islamic_State_of_Iraq_and_the_Levant.

21 Wikipedia, Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant 2015 22 The Meir Amit Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center 2014 23 Wikipedia, History of Iraq (2011–present) 2015 24 The Meir Amit Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center 2014 25 Wikipedia, History of Iraq (2011–present) 2015 26 Allen 2014 27 U.S. Department of Defense 2015 28 United Nations Security Council 2014

United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Study Guide© London International Model United Nations 2015...

Documents

Transcript of United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Study Guide© London International Model United Nations 2015...