UNIT III: MONOPOLY & OLIGOPOLY Monopoly Oligopoly Strategic Competition 7/12.

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UNIT III: MONOPOLY & OLIGOPOLY • Monopoly • Oligopoly • Strategic Competition 7/12
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Transcript of UNIT III: MONOPOLY & OLIGOPOLY Monopoly Oligopoly Strategic Competition 7/12.

Page 1: UNIT III: MONOPOLY & OLIGOPOLY Monopoly Oligopoly Strategic Competition 7/12.

UNIT III: MONOPOLY & OLIGOPOLY

• Monopoly

• Oligopoly

• Strategic Competition

7/12

Page 2: UNIT III: MONOPOLY & OLIGOPOLY Monopoly Oligopoly Strategic Competition 7/12.

Monopoly

• Market Structure• Monopoly• Multiplant Monopoly: 1 Firm – 2 Plants• Price Discrimination: 1 Firm – 2 Markets• Next Time: Review

Page 3: UNIT III: MONOPOLY & OLIGOPOLY Monopoly Oligopoly Strategic Competition 7/12.

Market Structure

So far, we have looked at how consumers and firms make optimal decisions (maximize utility and profits) under constraint. Then we looked at how those individual decisions are coordinated via the market.

Under Perfect Competition, we assume an infinite number of infinitely small price-takers, and we know that the competitive market equilibrium is Pareto-efficiency.

Now want to consider other market structures (e.g., monopoly; duopoly) and characterize the corresponding equilibria; what are the welfare consequences of these market structures?

Page 4: UNIT III: MONOPOLY & OLIGOPOLY Monopoly Oligopoly Strategic Competition 7/12.

Market Structure

Market structure is related to market concentration and competitiveness. Perfect Competition is a polar case (low conc; high comp), where rational decision-making at the individual level (consumer; firm) adds up to optimal outcomes at the social level – The Invisible Hand Theorem of Welfare Economics.

Once we move away from the perfect case, firms can exploit market power: their behavior can influence prices (and profits). Monopoly is the case where a single firm has market power. Later we will consider what happens when several firms have power in the market (oligopoly). Here, competitive strategy comes to the fore.

Page 5: UNIT III: MONOPOLY & OLIGOPOLY Monopoly Oligopoly Strategic Competition 7/12.

Market Structure

Perfect Comp Oligopoly Monopoly

No. of Firms infinite (>)2 1

Output MR = MC = P ??? MR = MC < P

Profit 0 ? Yes

Efficiency Yes ???

POINT 1:

Under every market

structure, all firms attempt to maximize profits, s.t., MR = MC.

POINT 1:

The number of firms in the market is

determined by entry

conditions.

Page 6: UNIT III: MONOPOLY & OLIGOPOLY Monopoly Oligopoly Strategic Competition 7/12.

Market Structure

Perfect Comp Oligopoly Monopoly

No. of Firms infinite (>)2 1

Output MR = MC = P ??? MR = MC < P

Profit 0 ? Yes

Efficiency Yes ???

POINT 1:

Under every market

structure, all firms attempt to maximize profits, s.t., MR = MC.

POINT 1:

Profits signal entry. For a firm to remain

profitable, there must be

barriers to entry (or the market is too

small for a second firm).

Page 7: UNIT III: MONOPOLY & OLIGOPOLY Monopoly Oligopoly Strategic Competition 7/12.

Market Structure

Perfect Comp Oligopoly Monopoly

No. of Firms infinite (>)2 1

Optimality MR = MC = P ??? MR = MC < P

Profit 0 ? Yes

Efficiency Yes ???

POINT 2:

Under every market

structure, all firms attempt to maximize profits, s.t., MR = MC.

Page 8: UNIT III: MONOPOLY & OLIGOPOLY Monopoly Oligopoly Strategic Competition 7/12.

Market Structure

Perfect Comp Oligopoly Monopoly

No. of Firms infinite (>)2 1

Optimality MR = MC = P ??? MR = MC < P

Profit 0 ? Yes

Efficiency Yes ???

POINT 2:

… but under perfect

competition P = MR

and under monopoly P > MR.

Page 9: UNIT III: MONOPOLY & OLIGOPOLY Monopoly Oligopoly Strategic Competition 7/12.

Market Structure

Perfect Comp Oligopoly Monopoly

No. of Firms infinite (>)2 1

Optimality MR = MC = P ??? MR = MC < P

Profit No ? Yes

Efficiency Yes ???

POINT 3:

Thinking about market

structure raises welfare

questions.Perfect

competition implies

efficiency.

Page 10: UNIT III: MONOPOLY & OLIGOPOLY Monopoly Oligopoly Strategic Competition 7/12.

Market Structure

Perfect Comp Oligopoly Monopoly

No. of Firms infinite (>)2 1

Optimality MR = MC = P ??? MR = MC < P

Profit No ? Yes

Efficiency Yes ???

POINT 3:

What are the welfare

implications of other market structures?

Page 11: UNIT III: MONOPOLY & OLIGOPOLY Monopoly Oligopoly Strategic Competition 7/12.

Market Structure

Perfect Comp Oligopoly Monopoly

No. of Firms infinite (>)2 1

Optimality MR = MC = P ??? MR = MC < P

Profit No ? Yes

Efficiency Yes ? ???

Page 12: UNIT III: MONOPOLY & OLIGOPOLY Monopoly Oligopoly Strategic Competition 7/12.

Market Structure

• Firms are price-takers: can sell all the output they want at P*; can sell nothing at any price > P*.

• Homogenous product: e.g., wheat, t-shirts, long-distance phone minutes

• Perfect factor mobility: in the long run, factors can move costlessly to where they are most productive (highest w, r).

• Perfect Information: firms know everything about costs, consumer demand, other profitable opportunities, etc.

Perfect Competition

Page 13: UNIT III: MONOPOLY & OLIGOPOLY Monopoly Oligopoly Strategic Competition 7/12.

Market Structure

• Firms are price-setters: one firm supplies entire market, faces downward-sloping demand curve.

• Homogenous product: necessarily so for a single firm.

• Barriers to entry: no perfect factor mobility. E.g., patents; licenses; franchises.

• Perfect Information: firms know everything about costs, consumer demand, other profitable opportunities, etc.

Monopoly

Page 14: UNIT III: MONOPOLY & OLIGOPOLY Monopoly Oligopoly Strategic Competition 7/12.

Monopoly

Barriers to Entry: The number of firms is determined by entry conditions.

As we have learned, profits are the incentive for entry. The only way a firm can remain profitable (and a monopoly) is if there are very strong barriers to entry, or if the market is too small for a second firm.

• Some of these barriers are natural (technology)

• Some are created by regulators (franchise, license)

• Some are created by the monopolist to deter entry by potential rivals (competitive strategy)

Page 15: UNIT III: MONOPOLY & OLIGOPOLY Monopoly Oligopoly Strategic Competition 7/12.

Monopoly

Remember that a perfectly competitive firm can sell all it wants at the market price. This means that any time it wants to increase revenues, it needs only to produce more output. For this reason in perfect competition marginal revenue and price were equal, MC = MR = P.

Since a monopolist necessarily faces the entire market demand, it faces a downward sloping demand curve. This means that, if the firm wishes to increase revenues it must lower price. If it wishes to sell less it must raise price. As it turns out this means that, for a monopolist marginal revenue is different from market price,

MC = MR < P.

Page 16: UNIT III: MONOPOLY & OLIGOPOLY Monopoly Oligopoly Strategic Competition 7/12.

Monopoly

Marginal Revenue the additional revenue from a unit increase in output.

Remember, the firm must sell it’s entire output at the same price. Therefore, marginal revenue will be the price of that extra unit minus the change in revenue on all earlier (inframarginal) units

MR = dTR/dQ = d(PQ)/dQ = P + Q(dP/dQ)

= P + P(Q/P)(dP/dQ)=

= P[1 + Q/P(dP/dQ)] = P(1 + 1/E)

dP/dQ is neg, for downward sloping demand curve

Page 17: UNIT III: MONOPOLY & OLIGOPOLY Monopoly Oligopoly Strategic Competition 7/12.

Monopoly

Marginal Revenue the additional revenue from a unit increase in output.

Remember, the firm must sell it’s entire output at the same price. Therefore, marginal revenue will be the price of that extra unit minus the change in revenue on all earlier (inframarginal) units

MR = dTR/dQ = d(PQ)/dQ = P + Q(dP/dQ)

= P + P(Q/P)(dP/dQ)=

= P[1 + Q/P(dP/dQ)] = P(1 + 1/E)

E = P/Q(dQ/dP) price elasticity of demand

Page 18: UNIT III: MONOPOLY & OLIGOPOLY Monopoly Oligopoly Strategic Competition 7/12.

Monopoly

Marginal Revenue the additional revenue from a unit increase in output.

Remember, the firm must sell it’s entire output at the same price. Therefore, marginal revenue will be the price of that extra unit minus the change in revenue on all earlier (inframarginal) units

MR = dTR/dQ = d(PQ)/dQ = P + Q(dP/dQ)

= P + P(Q/P)(dP/dQ)=

= P[1 + Q/P(dP/dQ)] = P(1 + 1/E)

> -1; MR < 0 E = -1; MR = 0

< -1; MR > 0

Page 19: UNIT III: MONOPOLY & OLIGOPOLY Monopoly Oligopoly Strategic Competition 7/12.

$

$

D

Q Q

Monopoly

TR = PQ

Price-Taker Price-Setter

D: P = AR

Q Qo Q1 Q2 Q

P0

P1

P2

P1Q1

P2Q2

P0Q0

TR

Page 20: UNIT III: MONOPOLY & OLIGOPOLY Monopoly Oligopoly Strategic Competition 7/12.

$

$

TR

D: P = AR

= MR

Q Q

Monopoly

TR

Price-Taker Price-Setter

D: P = AR

Q Q

MR

MR > 0 (Elastic)

MR < 0 (Inelastic)

Page 21: UNIT III: MONOPOLY & OLIGOPOLY Monopoly Oligopoly Strategic Competition 7/12.

$

$

TR

D: P = AR

= MR

Q Q

AC

Monopoly

TR

D: P = AR

Q Q

A monopolist will never

produce at an

inelastic portion

of the demand curve

MR > 0 (Elastic)

MR < 0 (Inelastic)

Page 22: UNIT III: MONOPOLY & OLIGOPOLY Monopoly Oligopoly Strategic Competition 7/12.

Multiplant Monopolist

Now consider a monopolist who operates several plants.

Plant A Plant B Market qa q qb q Q Q

$

P

mca MCmcb

MR

D

MCa = MCb = MR

Not to scale

Page 23: UNIT III: MONOPOLY & OLIGOPOLY Monopoly Oligopoly Strategic Competition 7/12.

Perfect Competition

Competitive equilibrium. Firms are producing at the efficient scale. P* = acmin; = 0.

$

P*

q* q Q* Q

$

LRS

mc

ac

D

What would happen if a monopolist owned all the

plants?

Page 24: UNIT III: MONOPOLY & OLIGOPOLY Monopoly Oligopoly Strategic Competition 7/12.

Multiplant Monopolist

Monopoly equilibrium. Prices rise, total market quantity falls …

$

Pm

P*

q* q Qm Q* Q

$

mc

ac

D

MCsr

Not to scale

Page 25: UNIT III: MONOPOLY & OLIGOPOLY Monopoly Oligopoly Strategic Competition 7/12.

Multiplant Monopolist

Monopoly equilibrium. Plants are producing at less than efficient scale. P* > ACmin; > 0.

$

Pm

P*

qm q* q Qm Q* Q

$

mc

ac

D

There is no supply curve (Q = f(P)) for a monopolist

Not to scale

MR

Page 26: UNIT III: MONOPOLY & OLIGOPOLY Monopoly Oligopoly Strategic Competition 7/12.

Multiplant Monopolist

Monopply equilibrium. Plants are producing at less than efficient scale. P* > ACmin; > 0.

$

Pm

P*

qm q* q Qm Q* Q

$

mc

ac

D

Not to scale

Profit

MCsr

Page 27: UNIT III: MONOPOLY & OLIGOPOLY Monopoly Oligopoly Strategic Competition 7/12.

Multiplant Monopolist

Monopoly equilibrium. Plants are producing at less than efficient scale. P* > ACmin; > 0.

$

Pm

P*

qm q* q Qm Q* Q

$

mc

ac

D

Not to scale

Profit

Dead Weight Loss

Max SS – Actual SS

DWL

MCsr

MR

Page 28: UNIT III: MONOPOLY & OLIGOPOLY Monopoly Oligopoly Strategic Competition 7/12.

Monopoly

If the firm has access to many identical plants: Plants

are producing at their efficient scale. P* > ACmin; > 0.

q* q Qm Q* Q

$

mc

ac

D

DWLProfit

MClr

$

Pm

P*

MR

Page 29: UNIT III: MONOPOLY & OLIGOPOLY Monopoly Oligopoly Strategic Competition 7/12.

Monopoly

Natural Monopoly. Sometimes, one large firm can

produce more efficiently than many small ones. $

P*

q* q Q* Q

$

mc

ac

D

tc = 100 + q2 QD = 1000 – 10P

MR

Page 30: UNIT III: MONOPOLY & OLIGOPOLY Monopoly Oligopoly Strategic Competition 7/12.

Monopoly

Natural Monopoly. Sometimes, one large firm can

produce more efficiently than many small ones. $

P*

q* q Q* Q

$

mc

ac

D

acm

QD = 1000 – 10P tcm = 1000 + 2q

MR

Page 31: UNIT III: MONOPOLY & OLIGOPOLY Monopoly Oligopoly Strategic Competition 7/12.

Monopoly

Natural Monopoly. Sometimes, one large firm can

produce more efficiently than many small ones. $

Pm

P*

$

mc

ac

D

acm

MC

qm q* q Qm Q* QMR

tcm = 1000 + 2q

mcm = 2

QD = 1000 – 10P P = 100 - .1Q

MR = 100 - .2Q

= MC = 2

Qm = 490

Page 32: UNIT III: MONOPOLY & OLIGOPOLY Monopoly Oligopoly Strategic Competition 7/12.

Monopoly

Natural Monopoly. Sometimes, one large firm can

produce more efficiently than many small ones. $

Pm

P*

$

mc

ac

D

acm

MC

qm q* q Qm Q* QMR

tcm = 1000 + 2q

mcm = 2

What are the welfare implications?

Page 33: UNIT III: MONOPOLY & OLIGOPOLY Monopoly Oligopoly Strategic Competition 7/12.

Price Discrimination

When a firm has market power, it will attempt to capture as much of the consumer surplus as it can.

Goods susceptible to price discrimination:

– Personal services (e.g., hair cuts)– Utilities (e.g., water; electricity)

Page 34: UNIT III: MONOPOLY & OLIGOPOLY Monopoly Oligopoly Strategic Competition 7/12.

Price Discrimination

3rd Degree (Market Segmentation): Now consider a monopolist who sells in several markets.

Market A Market B Firm qa q qb q Q Q

$

Pa

da

MC

MRbMR

Pb

MRa

MRa = MRb = MC

db

Higher price in the less elastic market

Page 35: UNIT III: MONOPOLY & OLIGOPOLY Monopoly Oligopoly Strategic Competition 7/12.

Price Discrimination

2nd Degree (Block Pricing): Firm charges different price for different units; all consumers face the same price schedule.

$

10

8

5

100 150 Q

0-100 $10

101-150 8

151- 5

CS

CS

CSPS

CS

PS

D

Page 36: UNIT III: MONOPOLY & OLIGOPOLY Monopoly Oligopoly Strategic Competition 7/12.

Price Discrimination

1st Degree (Perfect): Firm charges different price for to different consumers and different price for different units to the same consumer.

$

Q

D

Entire area under demand curve capture

by producer

What are the welfare

implications?

MC

Page 37: UNIT III: MONOPOLY & OLIGOPOLY Monopoly Oligopoly Strategic Competition 7/12.

Market Structure

POINT 1: The number of firms in the market is determined by entry conditions. Profits signal entry. For a firm to remain profitable, there must be barriers to entry (or the market is too small for a second firm).

POINT 2: Under every market structure, all firms attempt to maximize profits, s.t., MR = MC. But under perfect competition P = MR and under monopoly P > MR.

POINT 3: Thinking about market structure raises welfare questions. Perfect competition implies efficiency. What are the welfare implications of other market structures?

Page 38: UNIT III: MONOPOLY & OLIGOPOLY Monopoly Oligopoly Strategic Competition 7/12.

Next Time

Perfect Comp Oligopoly Monopoly

No. of Firms infinite (>)2 1

Output MR = MC = P ??? MR = MC < P

Profit No ? Yes

Efficiency Yes ? ???