UNICEF After Action Review – Tropical Cyclone … · UNICEF After Action Review – Tropical...

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Sophia Dunn

Independent Consultant

UNICEF After Action Review –

Tropical Cyclone Pam & Typhoon

Maysak

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Table of Contents

Executive Summary ............................................................................................................. viii

1. Background .................................................................................................................... 1 1.1. Context .................................................................................................................................................................................................... 1 1.2. UNICEF organizational set up in the Pacific ........................................................................................................................... 1 1.3. UNICEF response strategy ............................................................................................................................................................. 1

2. Introduction ................................................................................................................... 3 2.1. The After Action Review ................................................................................................................................................................. 3

2.1.1. UNICEF Core Commitments for Children in Humanitarian Action......................................................................... 3 2.1.2. UNICEF Level 2 Emergency Procedure .............................................................................................................................. 3 2.1.3. UNICEF Procedure for County and Regional Office transfer of resources to CSOs ........................................... 4

3. Methodology .................................................................................................................. 5

4. Findings of the After Action Review ................................................................................ 8 4.1. The L2 declaration and the utilization of L2 emergency procedures ......................................................................... 8

4.1.1. UNICEF Headquarters and EAPRO support ..................................................................................................................... 9 4.1.2. UNICEF Pacific............................................................................................................................................................................. 9

4.2. Resource mobilization ................................................................................................................................................................... 10 4.3. UNICEF response to TC Pam in Vanuatu ............................................................................................................................... 12

Vanuatu Field Office preparedness ............................................................................................................................................ 12

Operational management ............................................................................................................................................................... 13 4.3.1. UNICEF’s operational commitments ................................................................................................................................ 14

Media and communications ........................................................................................................................................................... 14

Human resources ................................................................................................................................................................................ 15

Finance and administration ........................................................................................................................................................... 16 4.3.2. UNICEF’s programme commitments ................................................................................................................................ 19

Rapid assessment ............................................................................................................................................................................... 19

Monitoring and reporting ............................................................................................................................................................... 21

Supply and logistics ........................................................................................................................................................................... 22 4.3.3. Partnership and coordination ............................................................................................................................................. 23

Partnership and coordination with the Government of Vanuatu ................................................................................. 23

Partnership and coordination with other partners ............................................................................................................ 25 4.4. UNICEF response to TC Pam in Kiribati, Solomon Islands and Tuvalu .................................................................... 26

4.4.1. Tuvalu ........................................................................................................................................................................................... 27 4.4.2. Solomon Islands ........................................................................................................................................................................ 28 4.4.3. Kiribati ......................................................................................................................................................................................... 28

4.5. UNICEF response to Typhoon Maysak in Federated States of Micronesia ............................................................. 29

5. Conclusions .................................................................................................................. 30

6. Recommendations for improving UNICEF Pacific’s disaster preparedness and response . 33

7. Bibliography ................................................................................................................. 38

8. Annexes ........................................................................................................................ 41

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List of Tables

Table 1: Overview of UNICEF emergency response in Vanuatu ..................................................................................................... 2 Table 2: Mandatory deliverables for a newly designed L2 emergency ....................................................................................... 4 Table 3: Key actions taken in advance of TC Pam ............................................................................................................................... 8 Table 4: Financial and administration emergency preparedness (EWEA Key Action 15) – Vanuatu Field Office .. 17 Table 5: AAR recommendations and action plan .............................................................................................................................. 34

List of Figures

Figure 1: CO workflow processing arrangement – commenced 4 May 2015 ......................................................................... 18 Figure 2: Humanitarian architecture, Vanuatu ................................................................................................................................. 24

List of Annexes Annex 1: After Action Review Terms of Reference ____________________________________________________________________ 41 Annex 2: UNICEF response timeline – TC Pam & Typhoon Maysak __________________________________________________ 47 Annex 3: List of key informants (semi-structured interviews) _______________________________________________________ 51 Annex 4: Semi-structured interview guide for key informant interviews ____________________________________________ 53 Annex 5: After Action Review - Workshop Agenda (Vanuatu Field Office) __________________________________________ 55 Annex 6: After Action Review - Minutes of plenary (Vanuatu Field Office) __________________________________________ 57 Annex 7: After Action Review - Preliminary Recommendations (Vanuatu Field Office) ____________________________ 60 Annex 8: After Action Review - Workshop Agenda (Suva Multi-Country Office) ____________________________________ 61 Annex 9: After Action Review - Minutes of Suva Multi-Country Office Workshop ___________________________________ 63 Annex 10: After Action Review - Preliminary recommendations (Suva Multi-Country Office) _____________________ 68 Annex 11: CMT initial review of recommendations (Vanuatu & Suva) ______________________________________________ 69 Annex 12: Standard Operating Procedure - Business process: PA pool (Vanuatu office - Emergency Response) __ 71 Annex 13: Simplifications put in place by L2 designation ____________________________________________________________ 73 Annex 14: Lessons learned re Office in a Box _________________________________________________________________________ 76 Annex 15: Country division of UNICEF HAC funding requirements for TC Pam response ___________________________ 77 Annex 16: Departure and arrival dates of supplies from Suva to Vanuatu, Kiribati and Tuvalu ___________________ 77

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Acronyms

AAR After Action Review

CCC Core Commitments for Children

CDC Community Disaster Committee

CERF (UN) Central Emergency Response Fund

CFO Chief of Field Office

CMT Country Management Team

COHA Cash On Hand Account

CSO Civil Society Organization

DGMWR Department of Geology, Mines and Water Resources

EAPRO East Asia Pacific Regional Office

EMOPS Emergency Operations

EPF Emergency Programme Funds

EPR Emergency Preparedness and Response

EWEA Early Warning Early Action

FSM Federated States of Micronesia

GSSC Global Shared Services Centre

HAC Humanitarian Action for Children

HAP Humanitarian Action Plan

HPM Humanitarian Performance Monitoring

HR Human Resources

IMO Information Management Officer

IND Immediate Needs Document

IOM International Organization for Migration

L2 Level 2 (Emergency)

MCO Multi-Country Office

MEYS Ministry for Education, Youth and Sport

MoET Ministry of Education and Training

MoH Ministry of Health

MoU Memorandum of Understanding

NDMO National Disaster Management Office

NYHQ New York Headquarters

OCHA (UN) Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs

OSM Operations Staffing Matrix

PA Programme Assistant

PCA Partnership Cooperation Agreement

PDC Provincial Disaster Committee

PERT Pacific Emergency Response Team

PHT Pacific Humanitarian Team

PMO Prime Minister’s Office

RD Regional Director

REMT Regional Emergency Management Team

SIFO Solomon Islands Field Office

SOP Standard Operating Procedures

SSFA Small scale funding agreement

TC Tropical Cyclone

TEIMS Tuvalu Education Information Management System

UN United Nations

UNDAC United Nations Disaster Assessment & Coordination Team

UNDSS UN Department of Safety and Security

UNICEF United Nations Children’s Fund

VFF Vanuatu Football Federation

VFO Vanuatu Field Office

VHT Vanuatu Humanitarian Team

WASH Water, sanitation and hygiene

WFP World Food Programme

WHO World Health Organization

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Map 1: UNICEF presence in the Pacific

Source: http://www.unicef.org/pacificislands/about_15922.html

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Map 2: Path of Tropical Cyclone Pam – Vanuatu – March 2015

Source: OCHA (2015) Flash Appeal1

1 OCHA (2015) Flash Appeal – Emergency response plan for Vanuatu Tropical Cyclone Pam (March-June 2015)

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Executive Summary

The purpose of this After Action Review (AAR) was to examine UNICEF Pacific’s use of disaster preparedness and emergency response systems for a Level 2 (L2) emergency, and to identify both successes and areas for improvement.2 UNICEF Headquarters developed the L2 procedures in 2013 and this was the first time that an L2 emergency was declared in the Pacific, the first time the L2 procedures were used by UNICEF Pacific, and the first time the L2 procedures had been utilized within the East Asia and Pacific Regional Office (EAPRO).

The AAR adopted a utilization-focused approach in order to boost participation and ownership of the process. The key components of the review were a home-based desk review, semi-structure key informant interviews with UNICEF and external partners, and workshops with UNICEF personnel in Vanuatu and in Suva, Fiji. The primary audiences are the UNICEF Pacific offices in Vanuatu, Solomon Islands, Kiribati, and the multi-country office in Suva, Fiji. The principle objective of the review is to share findings on what worked well and to provide guidance on how to better utilise UNICEF systems for preparedness and response to emergencies. The secondary objective is to provide feedback to the EAPRO and UNICEF HQ on which procedures worked well and which may need refinement.3

One of the aspects of the UNICEF response that consistently received positive reviews during the AAR was the early action of the Country Representative and the EAPRO Regional Director. Early involvement of key UNICEF departments both in the EAPRO and in HQ, preparedness actions by the Suva Office, and the early deployment of an experienced Emergency Coordinator/Acting Head of Office (Vanuatu) and a Communications Specialist resulted in an immediate start to the response. However, the AAR found a lack of preparedness by the Vanuatu Field Office and identified problems associated with having a preparedness system in place (EWEA) for which there is limited ownership and knowledge within the team. In future, Chiefs of Field Offices need to ensure that their Emergency Preparedness and Response Plans are reviewed, updated, actioned and shared with their team members.

TC Pam struck Vanuatu on the night of 13 March causing widespread damage across the archipelago. Before making landfall in Vanuatu, TC Pam caused damage in the Solomon Islands, Tuvalu and Kiribati, from sea surges, flooding, rain and winds. The Governments of Vanuatu, Tuvalu and Solomon Islands declared States of Emergency after TC Pam; the Government of Kiribati did not. Then, between late March and May 2015, the Federated States of Micronesia (FSM) was hit by three super typhoons (Maysak, Noul and Dolphin), cumulatively affecting more than 25,000 people, many, repeatedly. The Government of FSM declared a State of Emergency after both Maysak and Dolphin.

Once TC Pam made landfall, the UNICEF L2 emergency procedures were quickly activated. It is clear that the emergency procedures made a significant positive difference to the UNICEF response: in particular, the release of the Emergency Programme Funds (loan mechanisms), fast tracking of human resources through multiple channels, immediate support from UNICEF Supply Division in Copenhagen, and the use of simplified procedures designed for use in emergencies.

The involvement of headquarters level emergency fundraising ahead of the Government and OCHA appeal, and the presence of the Communications Specialist in Vanuatu, has contributed to an immediate start of a successful fundraising campaign. By late August, UNICEF Pacific had received 90% of the requested funding in the revised HAC 4 and had repaid the global Emergency Programme Funds. However, earmarking of funds by donors, including National Committees, and to some extent the UNICEF NY earmarking of funds for Vanuatu did not reflect the reality of the Pacific being a multi-country office, responding to an emergency situation in multiple countries. It was therefore difficult for UNICEF Pacific to find funding to support a response in the other affected countries.

2 UNICEF Pacific (2015) Terms of Reference for an After Action Review of UNICEF Pacific’s preparedness and response to Cyclone Pam and Typhoon Maysak. 3 Ibid. 4 US$919,0911 received as at 28 August 2015, out of US$10,170,000 requested in revised HAC.

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The UNICEF response in all the affected countries focussed on coordination, distribution of supplies and the provision of technical assistance to Government counterparts. This strategy leveraged UNICEF’s long-term relationship with the affected countries governments, and the human resources/field presence of CSOs and various government ministries.

Providing surge support to the Fiji Office and to Vanuatu required cooperation between HQ, the EAPRO, and the UNICEF Pacific HR teams. This cooperation worked well, and surge support was provided in a timely manner through multiple channels. With few exceptions, the surge support was experienced and with appropriate expertise for the work required.

While the L2 procedures were quickly activated at the initiative of the EAPRO they were not fully utilized by UNICEF Pacific. The AAR found that many UNICEF Pacific staff that participated in this AAR did not know what an “L2 emergency” was or what procedures accompanied it even at the time of the AAR. This caused tensions between the Fiji Office and the Vanuatu Field Office when experienced surge personnel were deployed to Vanuatu, more familiar with the procedural simplifications than the Suva-based staff. This tension was exacerbated by a lack of clarity of management roles and reporting lines, specifically the relationship between the Emergency Coordinator, the Chiefs of Field Offices and the Chiefs of Sections. These management and reporting lines need to be clarified as a priority before the next emergency.

UNICEF Pacific also encountered multiple issues with financial and administrative procedures. Simplified systems were not utilized immediately in the Suva Office, resulting in delayed payments to some vendors in Vanuatu. Similarly, VISION5 access and authority was clearly an issue with financial transaction authority remaining in the Fiji Office and not being devolved to the Vanuatu Office. This ties in with the lack of clarity on the role of the Chiefs of Section vis-à-vis emergency staff in the field during an emergency. UNICEF should explore ways of making this possible in future.

Prior to TC Pam, UNICEF Vanuatu worked directly with the Government of Vanuatu, and had no prior contingency agreements with the private sector or with civil society organisations. This meant that once TC Pam hit, UNICEF started looking for partners for logistic support and for programme implementation. As a result of lack of training, the UNICEF Pacific team continued using the standard procedures, which were time consuming, had a higher administrative burden, and required authorization from Suva. When the new SSFA guidance became effective on 1 April, they provided a clear decision-making tree for the type of instrument that should be utilized. The new guidelines allowed for lower documentation requirements and for authorization at the field level, and as a result, were timelier than the standard PCA process. SSFAs were well utilized, and proved invaluable in the early days of the response when UNICEF was looking for new partnerships.

Going forward, the new guidelines will be useful for UNICEF as they provide suggestions for preparedness commitments and activities. UNICEF offices in areas prone to emergencies are encouraged to put in place contingency agreements with non-governmental organisations that have humanitarian capacity, that can be quickly activated when an emergency occurs. If UNICEF Pacific also develop some specific emergency operating procedures relating to their financial and administrative procedures, these, together with the SSFA guidelines and training on emergency procedures should see the offices in a better position to respond more quickly and efficiently to the financial and administrative requirements of future emergency responses.

Given the distances between countries in the Pacific, it was a good idea for UNICEF to have pre-positioned stock in multiple locations, as these were immediately distributed to affected communities. However there is no certainty that in future emergencies, that stock can easily be moved from one pre-positioned location to another. A strategic review of contingency stocks is therefore required, including consideration of incorporating contingency agreements with Pacific suppliers and/or suppliers in Australia or New Zealand. Discussion with other stakeholders with an interest in emergency response in the Pacific (including the Australian, New Zealand, French governments, UNICEF National Committees and other partners) would

5 UNICEF’s financial and other business transaction system, linked to results.

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be a good first step. This would enable the development of a more strategic approach to regional preparedness in the event of another emergency requiring a rapid logistics and supply response.

UNICEF is in a unique position to build on the relationship with the Government of Vanuatu and the governments of other Pacific nations and continue to play interlocutor between government, national Red Cross Societies and Civil Society Organizations. There are multiple opportunities for UNICEF to support the Government of Vanuatu and its Strategic Action Plan including incorporating emergency preparedness and response work into previously agreed developed work.

The lessons learned in Vanuatu will be useful for future emergencies in Pacific countries. It will also be important for UNICEF Pacific, together with other emergency partners such as OCHA and the Regional Pacific Humanitarian Team, to think strategically on how best to respond to emergencies in countries without permanent UNICEF (or UN) presence and/or limited communication infrastructure.

The following eight recommendations relate to areas prioritized by key informants and workshop participants as having the potential to make the most difference to future emergency responses. It is recommended that action to address these recommendations start immediately with a view to completing the required actions within three months, six months or one year/ongoing.

Priority 1: Completion by end of January 2016 (three months)

i. All UNICEF Pacific offices to review and update their EWEA scenarios and re-examine their preparedness plans and identified actions, ensuring that all team members are aware of key actions to be taken in the event of an emergency.

ii. UNICEF Pacific to clarify, articulate and share SOPs outlining clear roles and responsibilities of key UNICEF management staff during an emergency (both for countries with a Field Office, and for those without).

iii. UNICEF Pacific to review its processes for financial transaction authority during emergencies to enable decentralization to the Field Offices. This should include ensuring there is at least one VISION user with approval authority and one VISION user with transaction creation authority in the affected Field Office during the emergency response.

iv. NYHQ to review their financial tracking/management/fundraising and reporting systems to reflect UNICEF Pacific as a multi-country setting, especially when disasters affect more than one country.

Priority 2: Completion by end of April 2016 (six months)

v. UNICEF Pacific, with support from EAPRO to develop a comprehensive Emergency Training Strategy to ensure that all staff, including field office staff has access to basic emergency training. The training strategy should take into account existing UNICEF Emergency Preparedness and Response training provided by EAPRO and include practical scenarios, emergency procedures and a broad understanding of UNICEF’s mandate and commitments during an emergency.

Priority 3: Completion by end of October 2016 (one year) or ongoing actions required.

vi. UNICEF Pacific to identify predictable humanitarian partnerships and ensure that contingency agreements are in place with civil society organisations, private sector and other relevant actors.

vii. UNICEF Pacific, with support from Supply Division and other actors, should strategically review their emergency logistics and supply capacity to ensure that good quality supplies can be provided quickly and efficiently.

viii. UNICEF Pacific in collaboration and coordination with humanitarian partners, to continue building the capacity of Pacific Island governments on emergency preparedness and response in maternal and child health, nutrition, education, child protection (including gender-based violence and violence against children). This should include a review of NDMO and line ministry emergency preparedness

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and response plans and capacity, and the development of relevant Standard Operating Procedures SOPs) covering both preparedness and response.

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1. Background

1.1. Context

The Pacific is one of the world's most disaster-prone regions.6 People living in Pacific island countries are vulnerable to a wide range of natural hazards, including floods, droughts, cyclones/typhoons, earthquakes, volcanic eruptions, king tides and tsunamis. As at mid-2015, there had already been seven typhoons (northern Pacific) and six cyclones (southern Pacific). In addition, the current 2015-2016 El Niño event is forecast to be the worst since 1997-1998, with drought already declared in areas of Fiji, Tonga and Vanuatu.

Tropical Cyclone (TC) Pam struck Vanuatu on the night of 13 March 2015. The Category 5 cyclone caused widespread damage across Vanuatu and the eye passed close to Efate Island, where the capital Port Vila is located. Winds were estimated to have reached 250kmph with gusts of 320kmph. As a result, an estimated 166,600 people (more than half the population) required urgent humanitarian assistance. The Government of Vanuatu declared a State of Emergency in affected areas, with a request for international assistance.

Before making landfall in Vanuatu, TC Pam and other storms caused damage in the Solomon Islands, Tuvalu and Kiribati resulting in damage from sea surges, flooding, rain and winds. The Governments of Tuvalu and Solomon Islands declared States of Emergency, however the Solomon Islands did not request international assistance.

Soon after TC Pam, between late March and May 2015, the Federated States of Micronesia (FSM) was hit by three super typhoons (Maysak, Noul and Dolphin), cumulatively affecting more than 25,000 people. The Government of FSM declared a State of Emergency after both Maysak and Dolphin.

1.2. UNICEF organizational set up in the Pacific

UNICEF Pacific is a multi-country office responsible for 14 countries and territories: Cook Islands, Fiji, Kiribati, Marshall Islands, FSM, Nauru, Niue, Palau, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tokelau, Tonga, Tuvalu, Vanuatu (Map 1).

In addition to the Fiji Multi-country Office, UNICEF Pacific has Field Offices in three countries, three of which were affected by TC Pam: Vanuatu, Solomon Island and Kiribati, and has field based staff in Samoa and Tuvalu, which was also affected by TC Pam. Prior to TC Pam, UNICEF had been operating in all the affected countries through direct partnerships with various government ministries and departments.

The UNICEF Regional Office for East Asia and the Pacific (EAPRO) in Bangkok supports the multi-country office, which is based in Suva, Fiji.

1.3. UNICEF response strategy

In response to TC Pam, UNICEF suspended its regular programmes in Vanuatu and focused specifically on emergency activities that were agreed with the government counterparts and their emergency partners. Regular UNICEF programmes continued in all other countries, including Kiribati, Tuvalu, and Solomon Islands albeit at a reduced pace, as emergency response activities took precedence. In some countries this required an expansion of activities into other sectors where UNICEF has a commitment through the CCCs. For example, in Tuvalu, emergency health and WASH supplies were distributed, even though UNICEF usually has an education focus.

To ensure UNICEF added value to the overall emergency response, a coordination and supply strategy was agreed. The strategy utilized UNICEF’s existing relationships with the governments of the affected countries (coordination), and leveraged the capacity of the Supply Division in Copenhagen and the capacity of Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) or the relevant line ministries to distribute supplies to the affected

6 http://www.adb.org/publications/disaster-risk-reduction-and-management-pacific

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areas (supply). The same strategy was employed across all the countries affected by TC Pam: Vanuatu, Tuvalu, Solomon Islands and Kiribati.

The Government of Vanuatu’s Humanitarian Action Plan (HAP) covers the time period from 1 May to 30 July 2015. The timeframe was set by the Government of Vanuatu to allow for all life-saving humanitarian needs to be addressed through the HAP and to ensure an effective transition into the Government Strategic Action Plan (SAP). The SAP would then focus on medium and longer-term recovery and reconstruction.7 The scale of the response required in Vanuatu meant that well-documented plans and targets were developed for work in each sector (Table 1). This was not the case for the other affected countries.

Table 1: Overview of UNICEF emergency response in Vanuatu

Sector Targets

Total affected population: 166,000

Total affected children (<18): 82,000

Total population to be reached (2015): 129,350 including 82,000 children

WASH

70,000 people provided with safe drinking water per agreed standards

70,000 people provided with sanitation and hygiene supplies

70,000 people benefiting from hygiene and sanitation promotion messages

Health

25,000 children immunized against measles

31 national cold room and cold storage facilities restored

25 primary health facilities provided with adequate new-born care kits and services

Nutrition

12,500 children <5 years receiving micronutrient supplementation

6,500 caregivers of children 0-23 months counselled on appropriate infant and young child feeding practices

Child Protection

20,000 children access safe spaces for trauma relief through socialization, play and learning

Education 22,500 school-aged children access quality education (through school supplies, temporary learning spaces, clean water, sanitation and restoration of solar power)

Source: UNICEF Humanitarian Action for Children (March 2015)

Within the HAP, the Government of Vanuatu’s exit strategy from humanitarian interventions was noted as a replacement of Cluster Coordination with Government –led Sectoral Coordination in order to strengthen the sustainability and resilience of community programmes and infrastructure by “building back better” and strengthening the capacity of local institutions. 8 Similarly, UNICEF initially planned to return to their development work as quickly as possible after the HAP period was finished. However, in Vanuatu, this was not entirely possible as UNICEF Pacific began responding to El Niño-related disasters from mid-2015.

7 Government of Vanuatu (2015) Tropical Cyclone Pam - Humanitarian Action Plan. May 2015 8 Ibid.

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2. Introduction

2.1. The After Action Review

This After Action Review (AAR) is intended to be an internal review, primarily as a learning exercise for UNICEF. The knowledge and recommendations from this review are expected to be particularly relevant to preparedness and response in other small island states, which are increasingly vulnerable to more frequent and higher impact natural disasters.

In Vanuatu, review exercises were carried out by every Humanitarian Cluster, as well as by the Vanuatu Humanitarian Team (VHT),9 the Pacific Humanitarian Team, and by various CSOs. In these, substantive areas of the TC Pam preparedness and response were reviewed, including results and outcomes for affected people. This AAR therefore mainly examines UNICEF Pacific’s use of disaster preparedness and emergency response systems for a Level 2 (L2) emergency, and by doing so, identifies both successes and areas for improvement.10

UNICEF Headquarters developed the L2 procedures in 2013. TC Pam was the first time that an L2 emergency was declared in the Pacific and therefore the first time the L2 procedures were used by UNICEF Pacific. It was also the first time the L2 procedures had been utilized within the EAPRO.

UNICEF has a number of procedures that guide their emergency response. These include the Core Commitments for Children in Humanitarian Action, specific procedures related to Level 2 and Level 311 emergencies, and guidelines for small-scale funding agreements (SSFAs) effective as of 1 April 2015 that can be utilized in emergencies of any level. The UNICEF L2 emergency procedures are the main focus of this review.

2.1.1. UNICEF Core Commitments for Children in Humanitarian Action

UNICEF’s Core Commitments for Children in Humanitarian Action (CCCs) is the pivotal policy document that defines UNICEF’s emergency response. The CCCs are a global framework for humanitarian action, guided by International Human Rights Law, in particular the Convention on the Rights of the Child. In complex emergencies, International Humanitarian Law,12 and International Disaster Response Law also provide guidance.

The CCCs promote predictable, effective and timely collective humanitarian action, realised through partnerships with governments, humanitarian organizations and others, and mobilizing both domestic and international resources.13 The CCC sector-specific programme commitments form part of a collective programmatic response for children affected by humanitarian crisis and are designed to support wider interagency cluster coordination. UNICEF has both operational and programme commitments within the CCCs.

2.1.2. UNICEF Level 2 Emergency Procedure

UNICEF defines L2 emergencies as situations where the magnitude of the emergency is such that a Country Office needs additional, prioritized support from other parts of the organization14 to respond, and for which the Regional Office (RO) must provide dedicated leadership and support. A determination of what constitutes a L2 emergency is based on analysis of five criteria: scale, urgency, complexity, capacity and reputational risk.

9The Vanuatu Humanitarian Team (VHT) is a network of agencies committed to effective humanitarian coordination, disaster preparedness and humanitarian response. 10 UNICEF Pacific (2015) Terms of Reference for an After Action Review of UNICEF Pacific’s preparedness and response to Cyclone Pam and Typhoon Maysak (Annex 1). 11 Classification of emergencies is done on the basis of scale, urgency, complexity, capacity and reputational risk. 12 UNICEF (2010) Core Commitments for Children in Humanitarian Action. New York. 13 Ibid. 14 Headquarters, Regional and other Country Offices

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The 2013 UNICEF Procedure for Level 2 Emergencies15 is designed to ensure that the UNICEF Country Programme’s response is timely, appropriately assessed, and designed and executed according to the CCCs. To facilitate a timely response, an L2 declaration activates a number of changes to operational procedures: • Prioritized support from UNICEF Headquarters, Supply Division, and the Regional Office • Fast tracking of human resources • “Quick and easy application of Programme Cooperation Agreements “(PCAs)16 • Simplified operational (financial and administrative) procedures • Automatic issuance of a US$2 million Emergency Programme Fund (EPF)17 • Deployment of RO staff, Emergency Response Team or similar, as required.

CO leadership remains accountable for the L2 response but the RO plays a lead role in coordination of support and their usual oversight role is reinforced. A Regional Emergency Management Team (REMT) must be formed, that brings together relevant HQ divisions, the RO and CO. The role of UNICEF headquarters (HQ) is therefore also enhanced and support and coordination to the RO and CO is prioritized. The L2 declaration also requires some specific, mandatory deliverables as noted in Table 2 below.

Table 2: Mandatory deliverables for a newly designed L2 emergency

Action Responsibility

REMT ToR developed (including frequency of meetings) Regional Emergency Advisor

Integrated Programme Response Plan (supported by Operational Staffing Matrix and Supply Plan)

Country Representative

2-3 Advocacy priorities defined and shared Regional Director

L2/3 Humanitarian MoRES (Humanitarian Performance Monitoring) implemented including SitReps with at minimum, monthly monitoring and reporting.

Country Representative

Updated key messages and UNICEF statement Country Representative

Source: Adapted from UNICEF (2013) UNICEF Procedure for L2 emergencies18

At the time that TC Pam hit, UNICEF was in the final of developing new guidelines for small scale funding agreements (SSFAs). From 1 April 2015 the new guidelines became effective, superseding the 2009 PCAs and SSFAs Guidelines.19

2.1.3. UNICEF Procedure for County and Regional Office transfer of resources to CSOs

The new UNICEF Procedure for Country and Regional Office transfer of resources to CSOs20 outlines the requirements governing relationships between UNICEF and CSOs. Partnerships with CSOs that involve a transfer of UNICEF resources can be formalized using only the following two instruments: • Programme Cooperation Agreement (PCA) - for when the transfer of UNICEF value is over $50,000. • Small Scale Funding Agreement (SSFA) - used when the total cash transfer of UNICEF resources is

$50,000 or less in a twelve months period. In a humanitarian response a SSFA may also be used to transfer to a CSO up to 3 months of supplies.

15 UNICEF (2013) UNICEF Procedure for Level 2 Emergencies – Annex 1 to CF/EXD/2013-003 16 Ibid. 17 The EPF is a global, revolving UNICEF fund, aimed to provide countries in crisis with immediate funds. 18 UNICEF (2013) UNICEF Procedure for Level 2 Emergencies – Annex 1 to CF/EXD/2013-003 19 UNICEF (2009) PCAs and SSFAs Guidelines (CF/EXD/2009-011) – FRG/PROCEDURE/2015/001 20 UNICEF (2015) UNICEF Procedure for County and Regional Office transfer of resources to Civil Society Organizations

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The new UNICEF guidelines allow for sub-office, field level authorization and reduced documentation and reporting. This makes the processing more timely than the previous process of documentation, and CO review and authorization.

3. Methodology

This review is the first AAR conducted by UNICEF in the East Asia Pacific Region following the activation of L2 procedures and the second evaluation conducted in the Pacific following a disaster.21 This AAR was funded and managed by UNICEF Pacific.

An Independent Consultant conducted the AAR between 7 September and 12 October 2015, with support from an Evaluation Management Team (EMT) consisting of the UNICEF Pacific Country Representative, Regional Emergency Advisor, Regional Evaluation Advisor, and the UNICEF Pacific Planning Specialist. The Terms of Reference (ToR), which define the objectives and tasks of the consultant, are presented as Annex 1.

The overall impact of UNICEF emergency programming is being considered through other, multi-agency processes. Instead, this review focused on UNICEF processes with a focus on learning around disaster response management, including preparedness for future responses. The review focused on the response to TC Pam in Vanuatu as the largest response conducted by UNICEF Pacific in many years. Typhoon Maysak was also included in order to consider the particular challenges of responding where UNICEF has no presence, in the north Pacific.

The scope of this review is more comprehensive than a traditional AAR as it covers multiple UNICEF responses (TC Pam and Typhoon Maysak) and covers both the preparation and response phases in all five countries where UNICEF provided a response.

The key questions of the AAR are: • What worked well? • What could have gone better? • How can we improve?

The review adopted a utilization-focused approach in order to boost participation and ownership of the process. The primary audiences are the UNICEF Pacific offices in Vanuatu, Solomon Islands, Kiribati, and the multi-country office in Suva, Fiji. The principle objective of the review is to share findings on what worked well and to provide guidance on how to better utilise UNICEF systems for preparedness and response to emergencies. The secondary objective is to provide feedback to the EAPRO and UNICEF HQ on which procedures worked well and which may need refinement.22

The review was carried out six months after TC Pam, and there was already considerable documentation and lessons learned activities carried out for the Vanuatu response, including a UNICEF Mid-Year Review and various cluster reviews. The key findings of those reviews have been incorporated into this AAR where relevant. The timing of the key lessons learned activities in Vanuatu can be found in the timeline in Annex 2.

The key components of the AAR were as follows: • A comprehensive, home-based desk review including key UNICEF programme and fundraising

documents and existing lessons learned reviews. • Key informant semi-structured interviews (n=58) were conducted throughout the review period (in

person or by telephone or Skype) (Annexes 3 & 4). These included UNICEF personnel23 at all levels (n=43), as well as external stakeholders (n=15). It total, they included 26 women (44.8%), and 32 men (55.2%). UNICEF Pacific prepared an initial list of key informants and other names were added during

21 The first evaluation in the pacific was of UNICEF’s Response to Tropical Cyclones Vania & Atu, Vanuatu. 22 UNICEF Pacific (2015) Terms of Reference for an After Action Review of UNICEF Pacific’s preparedness and response to Cyclone Pam and Typhoon Maysak. 23 Including staff, consultants, temporary appointments, and surge support from standby partners

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the review, as key points emerged that needed further investigation or verification. The full list of key informants can be found in Annex 3.

• The consultant travelled to Vanuatu and to Suva and conducted two, half-day AAR workshops with UNICEF staff: o In Port Vila, Vanuatu on 22 September with 12 participants. The AAR Consultant and the Regional

Evaluation Advisor facilitated the workshop jointly, with support from the UNICEF Pacific Planning Specialist. The workshop agenda, notes from the plenary session and the list of participants, and the preliminary recommendations can be found in Annexes 5,6 & 7.

o In Suva, Fiji on 29 September with 25 participants. The AAR Consultant, the Regional Evaluation Advisor and the UNICEF Pacific Planning Specialist facilitated this workshop jointly. The workshop agenda, notes from the plenary session and the list of participants, and the preliminary recommendations can be found Annexes 8,9 & 10.

o The workshops provided a forum for data collection and to validate findings from the key informant interviews. They also enabled the preliminary drafting of Specific, Measurable, Accountable, Reasonable and Time bound (SMART) recommendations.

• Small group discussions were also held with UNICEF personnel who could not attend the workshops or who wished to further discuss issues arising from the workshops.

• Following the Suva AAR workshop, the Country Management Team met with the consultant to discuss and agree on the key findings and preliminary recommendations, and to start the development of an action plan (Annex 11).

• Throughout the review period, the Consultant had regular communication and support from the EMT.

The key activities conducted during both the Vanuatu and Suva AAR workshops were as follows: • Preparation of a timeline of key events (Annex 2) to build consensus on timing. • Small group discussions on each of the key areas of the response that were affected by the L2

declaration: human resources, finance and fundraising, logistics and supply, and operational management. Participants were also given an opportunity to discuss any other topics of importance.

• Plenary discussion on the key points from the above activity to identify key issues and to build a common understanding.

• Prioritization of points by participants to understand the most critical areas for improvement. • Use of the prioritized points to develop preliminary recommendations for improving emergency

preparedness and response.

Where possible, data was triangulated using the multiple data collection methods. Additional documentary evidence from secondary sources was also gathered throughout the review, in order to help validate findings. Evidence included UNICEF operational documents including financial and fundraising data, human resource matrices, and supply data.

Discussions with senior staff in both Vanuatu and Suva also helped build consensus on the findings. Findings and recommendations were then developed, validated, and prioritized by the consultant, with support from the EMT.

Limitations

• The time frame for conducting face-to-face interviews in Vanuatu and Suva was limited (5 days and 2 days respectively). Conducting key informant interviews by Skype and/or providing input by email helped to address this.

• The AAR took place more than 6 months after TC Pam therefore many of the staff deployed in the first stages of the response had left the region and could not participate in the workshops. To address this, some key surge personnel were identified for key informant interviews and handover notes were included in the desk review.

• Government of Vanuatu representatives were contacted to arrange key informant interviews while the AAR Consultant was in Vanuatu. However, the timing coincided with ongoing humanitarian and recovery response (El Niño and TC Pam) therefore some representatives did not respond to the initial request. Follow up emails including the key AAR questions were sent, and some input was received in

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this way. However, some sectoral gaps remain including the Ministry of Education and Ministry of Youth Development, Training and Sport.

• There were very few key informants for the response to TC Pam in Kiribati, Solomon Islands and Tuvalu, and likewise for the Typhoon Maysak response in FSM.

• There was no contact with affected communities to discuss the effectiveness of UNICEF programming, since this was covered during Cluster reviews and other lessons learned exercises.

Ethics

The methodology for this AAR was designed to provide a forum for UNICEF emergency personnel to discuss the preparedness and response in a non-judgmental, confidential way. Key informant interviews were carried out privately and without the presence of UNICEF management or staff when possible.

The Independent AAR Consultant conducted the majority of interviews, which provided an opportunity for key informants to speak in an unbiased forum. The UNICEF Regional Evaluation Advisor and/or the UNICEF Pacific Planning Specialist also carried out or were present in some of the interviews.24 Given that neither had been involved in the emergency response they were also able to discuss the response without bias.

Key informant interviews were not recorded and no attribution has been made to any of the points raised. Although quotes from the key informant interviews can be found throughout this report, they are not attributed to a specific individual. In addition, the Vanuatu AAR workshop was carried out without the presence of senior management to provide an opportunity for open discussions about operational management and leadership.

The AAR Consultant declares that she has no conflict of interest in conducting this review.

Report structure

The findings discussed in this report are based on the key informant interviews, the AAR workshops, and relevant findings from the other lessons learned activities conducted after TC Pam.

The majority of this report focuses on the response in Vanuatu (Section 4.3). For ease of reading, the report is organized by UNICEF’s CCCs. The first section (Section 4.3.1) focuses on some of UNICEF’s operational commitments: media and communications, human resources, and finance and administration. The second section (Section 4.3.2) looks at some of UNICEF’s programme commitments: performance monitoring, rapid assessment and supply and logistics, as well as partnerships with the Government of Vanuatu and with external stakeholders. Under each topic, aspects that were repeatedly identified by key informants or workshop participants as being useful or in need of improvement have been highlighted.

The UNICEF response to TC Pam in Tuvalu, Solomon Islands and Kiribati is discussed in Section 4.4 and the UNICEF response to Typhoon Maysak in the Federated States of Micronesia is discussed in Section 4.5.

The conclusions and recommendations encompass the key learning from the UNICEF response to TC Pam and Typhoon Maysak.

24 The UNICEF Regional Evaluation Advisor and/or the UNICEF Pacific Planning Specialist carried out or were present in 10 out of the 58 interviews (17%).

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4. Findings of the After Action Review

4.1. The L2 declaration and the utilization of L2 emergency procedures

“Visionary leadership from the Country Representative pushed the Regional Office to be ready, which triggered early and immediate action.”

The presence of cyclones or storms often comes with early warning. In the case of TC Pam, early warning services indicated a week in advance that it would be a strong cyclone. This gave UNICEF Pacific the opportunity to contact the EAPRO Regional Director (RD) and discuss potential scenarios and discuss the way forward. Both the Country Representative and the RD have significant emergency experience and this enabled an early recognition of the potentially serious nature of TC Pam and the possibility that it might hit Vanuatu. They also recognized that the Vanuatu Field Office (VFO) lacked a Chief of Field Office (CFO)25 and had limited emergency experience. As a result, some key decisions and actions were taken in advance of TC Pam making landfall through a ‘no regrets’ strategy.

UNICEF Pacific started preparedness activities on 8th March (Table 3), contacting the EAPRO and HQ, providing a number of formal updates and activating an organization-wide alert before TC Pam made landfall. This early engagement enabled an immediate response to be activated.

Table 3: Key actions taken in advance of TC Pam

Action Date

UNICEF Pacific alerted EAPRO and HQ to the potential emergency 8 March

Approval given for Emergency Coordinator/Acting Head of Office to be deployed to Vanuatu on a ‘no regrets basis’

8 March

Initial surge deployment list of EAPRO staff and the Regional Rapid Response Roster is developed by EAPRO and shared with UNICEF Pacific

9 March

Pacific Emergency Response Team (PERT) meets in Suva to coordinate preparations and response planning.

9 March

An experienced Communications Specialist is deployed to Vanuatu from UNICEF Pacific. 10 March

The Emergency Coordinator (with WASH expertise) arrives in Vanuatu. 12 March

OIC contacts Regional Office Deputy Regional director for first teleconference 12 March

1st and 2nd UNICEF internal updates circulated 12 March

OIC activates organisation-wide alert through EWEA 12 March

The set up of an emergency specific structure in system to enable immediate receipt and allocation of funds

13 March

“Adopting a ‘no regrets’ strategy and sending in an experienced Emergency Coordinator to be in Vanuatu just in case, was one of the best decisions of the response.”

25 The former Chief of Field Office passed away suddenly in February 2015.

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4.1.1. UNICEF Headquarters and EAPRO support

An L2 emergency affects office functioning at HQ, RO and CO levels, and in the case of the Pacific, down to the Field Office level. An L2 declaration also activates immediate access to emergency funding, fast tracking of human resources, and procedural simplifications to support the timeliness of the response.

It is clear that at HQ and EAPRO levels, the L2 procedures were well understood. The early notification of the EAPRO and HQ meant that once TC Pam landfall, the relevant personnel were alerted and the necessary UNICEF emergency systems were immediately activated including: • The release of emergency programme funding (US$1 million) on 14 March, in advance of an official

emergency declaration (based on earlier request). • REMT has first meeting on 14 March. • UNICEF Pacific was prioritized for support from EAPRO/NY and SD. • Human resource mobilisation was fast tracked through multiple channels. • Within the EAPRO, personnel involved in the emergency response now reported directly to the RD in

order to ensure oversight of the situation. • The RD provided ongoing support to the Country Representative and Deputy Country Representative

(initially acting as Officer in Charge). • Back up support was provided to the EAPRO by NYHQ including drafting of documents on RDs behalf

and attendance at REMT teleconferences as required.

The formal L2 declaration was made on 20 March less than a week after TC Pam made landfall in Vanuatu (see timeline in Annex 2).

“The L2 procedures made all the difference. Without them UNICEF’s contribution would have been much smaller.”

4.1.2. UNICEF Pacific

The emergency expertise within UNICEF Pacific was much more limited than at EAPRO and HQ level, as the Country Representative was one of only a handful of staff with significant emergency response experience. As a result, the oversight and support role played by the EAPRO was all the more important. Regular communication, and guidance and support from the RD in particular, provided a strong sense of leadership and confidence that UNICEF’s strategic direction for the response was sound.

While the L2 procedures were quickly activated at HQ and EAPRO level, they were not fully utilized by UNICEF Pacific. The AAR found that most UNICEF Pacific personnel contributing to this evaluation did not know what an “L2 emergency” was or what procedures accompanied it even at the time of the AAR. Likewise some senior staff were not initially aware of the specific, mandatory deliverables that accompany an L2 emergency until told by UNICEF HQ in early April (Table 2). However, with support from the EAPRO, HQ and the Pacific Emergency Response Team, all the mandatory deliverables were completed as required.

Some UNICEF Pacific staff had attended Emergency Preparedness and Response training run by the EAPRO in Bangkok in 2012. The training includes the emergency procedures, as well as a simulation exercise and broader discussion of UNICEF’s emergency mandate and responsibilities. This training helped staff respond more quickly, however not enough staff had attended. Similarly, although NYHQ provided training on the L2 procedures (through a webinar) in May, it was too late to have an impact on the initial response and most staff did not attend due the time difference and/or due to their ongoing emergency response commitments.

The lack of awareness of the L2 allowable simplifications by some staff in the Fiji Office caused tension with the VFO when experienced surge support personnel arrived in Vanuatu, more familiar with the procedural simplifications and the flexibility that the L2 allows than some of the staff based in Fiji. Some of the issues faced in this regard are highlighted in the sections below.

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Aspects to be replicated:

• Early, regular communication between Country Representative, Deputy Representative (initially acting as Officer in Charge) & Regional Director – enabling early formation of the REMT and readiness at all levels of UNICEF.

• Early deployment of experienced emergency staff on a ‘no regrets’ basis, especially to offices with limited emergency expertise.

• NYHQ support to EAPRO for administrative processes and ensuring endorsement of L2 memo.

Suggested improvements:

• Training from HQ and EAPRO for more UNICEF Pacific staff on L2 and other emergency procedures including the specific, mandatory deliverables. This would help ensure full utilization of emergency procedures from Day 1.

• UNICEF Pacific to develop and document simplified Standard Operating Procedures to be utilized during emergencies.

4.2. Resource mobilization

An Immediate Needs Document (IND) was published on 14 March for US$1 million, and updated/revised on 15 March for US$2 million. The IND facilitated immediate alert to UNICEF partners locally and globally, including National Committees. Given the expected intensity of TC Pam, and the likelihood of an L2 emergency, the EAPRO provided US$100,000 to UNICEF Pacific as immediate start-up funds on 14 March. The L2 emergency procedures also enabled an advance of US$2 million from the EPF the first tranche of which was available to the CO on 14 March (US$1 million).

The United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) in collaboration with humanitarian partners launched the initial Flash Appeal for Vanuatu on 24 March, 10 days after TC Pam made landfall. The Flash Appeal requested US$29.9 million for a three-month emergency response (24 March to 24 June 2015) to support the Government of Vanuatu. The UNICEF component of the Flash Appeal was US$4.8 million, the second largest request after the World Food Programme (WFP).26

On 27 March, US$5 million was released from the UN Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF). UNICEF received the second largest allocation of the CERF funds (US$1,716,903), after WFP. 27 The funding was for water, sanitation and hygiene (WASH), education, protection and health projects.

In order to undertake a longer response covering both relief and recovery activities, and include the other affected Pacific countries, UNICEF Pacific prepared and issued a resource mobilisation strategy and donor mapping and launched a Humanitarian Action for Children (HAC) appeal for funding on 31 March. The original HAC was for US$7.72 million which was revised to US$10.17 million at the mid year review and revision in July/August. The review is a standard procedure for all countries/emergencies in the HAC.

Rapid onset natural disasters tend to attract a rapid inflow of funds, particularly from private donors. Media coverage showing the situation on ground is therefore particularly important. In this regard, a number of UNICEF actions positively impacted the fundraising efforts: • Early involvement from NYHQ and EAPRO communications/fundraising teams. • Presence of the UNICEF Pacific Communication Specialist in Vanuatu before and immediately after

TC Pam made landfall, doing podcasts and conducting multiple interviews with global media. This resulted in National Committees (and citizens of Australia and New Zealand) being aware of the situation early on and immediately starting to fundraise.

• Presence of Country Representative in Regional Management meeting in Cambodia in March (at time of TC Pam) provided an opportunity to have direct contact with key, high-level UNICEF decision makers, including the Executive Director.

26 The WFP component requested through the Flash Appeal was US$8,268,373. 27 WFP allocation from the CERF funds was US$1,831,984.

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• Direct engagement by OIC with local missions (Japan, France, UK, DFAT, MFAT).

These actions combined to enable significant immediate fundraising, and ensured that money was raised rapidly. This was all the more important when the Nepal earthquake happened just a month later (25 April), which brought national committee fundraising for the Pacific Islands nearly to an end.

Despite the influx of donations for Vanuatu, it was a challenge to raise money to support a response in Tuvalu, Solomon Islands and Kiribati, as they were less affected than Vanuatu and the media and national committee messages were almost exclusively focused on the Vanuatu situation. Funding for a response was only made possible by UNICEF Pacific bilateral fundraising efforts with the Governments of Japan, Estonia and Australia (DFAT).

The positive fundraising results were however constrained by donor and to some extent, UNICEF NY earmarking of funds for Vanuatu not reflecting the reality of the Pacific being a multi-country office, responding to an emergency situation in multiple countries, despite documented attempts by the Representative and Deputy to encourage allocations to “Pacific cyclone emergency”.

When Super Typhoons Maysak, Noul and Dolphin hit FSM, fundraising and the earmarking of funds again become problematic. FSM was not included in the HAC so no global fundraising was done. When the HAC had its annual review, UNICEF Pacific took the opportunity to modify the Pacific Islands HAC and identify the need for support in FSM and the potential need to response to the impact of El Niño in Vanuatu, Fiji and Tonga. As a result of this experience, and joint advocacy by UNICEF Pacific and the EAPRO, UNICEF HQ has recently endorsed the continuation of a sub-regional HAC profile for the 2016 HAC.

By late August UNICEF Pacific had received over US$9 million in funding for the TC Pam response but nothing for the Typhoon Maysak response. However the Office was able to repay almost all of the $2 million advanced EPF. The difficulties in raising funds for the Typhoon Maysak response resulted in agreement from the RD and EMOPS that UNICEF Pacific could keep (not repay) up to US$300,000 of the EPF for an emergency response in FSM.


• Readiness of the NYHQ and national committees for fundraising due to the early formation of the REMT.

• Early deployment of a Communications Specialist supported fundraising and media visibility.


• Consider engaging a Financial Management Specialist during an L2 emergency to liaise with NYHQ on earmarking and financial tracking of donations, and/or UNICEF Pacific and NYHQ to discuss and agree on the procedures ahead of time.

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4.3. UNICEF response to TC Pam in Vanuatu

This section of the report specifically reviews the UNICEF response in Vanuatu. As with the sections above, actions that worked well and therefore could be replicated in future emergencies are highlighted, as are suggested areas of improvement.

Vanuatu Field Office preparedness

TC Pam was the first Category 5 cyclone to hit Vanuatu in recorded history, therefore beyond what anyone could have foreseen or prepared for. However, the response highlighted critical gaps in the VFO emergency response plans that need to be rectified.

UNICEF’s main preparedness tool is a platform called Early Warning Early Action (EWEA). The EWEA was introduced in 2009 replacing the former Emergency Preparedness and Response Plans and includes two main components: • Early warning: enables assessment of risks to guide preparedness • Early action: focuses on preparedness actions

The EWEA system identifies 20 key actions for preparedness, of which ten are mandatory. The system is however, simply a tool to facilitate office planning and discussion around emergencies. Once gaps are identified in EWEA, it is the responsibility of each office to take action and rectify the gaps. The VFO last updated its EWEA in September 2014 and identified a number of gaps. However, it appears that no action was taken to address them.28

Although UNICEF Pacific, the EAPRO and HQ were discussing early preparedness actions, very little preparedness occurred in the VFO. The Business Continuity Plan (BCP) – Key Action 4 in EWEA - had not been updated since December 2008 and it was noted in June 2014 that an overall review was needed. In 2008 none of the areas for action met the standards.29 Without the guidance of a CFO, and with limited staff training and awareness of the required actions, the office struggled to prepare themselves. The arrival of the Communications Specialist from the Fiji Office motivated the VFO to take action, and some office preparation took place including a post-cyclone meeting place and time organized.

The issues related to financial and administrative preparedness are discussed in Section 4.3.1 Financial and administrative procedures.

Key office preparedness activities for next time:

• Ensure generator is functioning • Ensure adequate fuel is available for generator and cars • Ensure there is an undated inventory of contingency stock • Protect office equipment and contingency stock • Ensure adequate telecommunications equipment, SIM cards and phone credit is available for personnel

(including potential surge support) • Ensure staff have adequate time for personal preparedness: protection of homes, water storage, cash,

food supplies etc.


• Allow time for staff personal preparedness. • Identification of a staff meeting point and time after an emergency. • Organization of a communication tree between UNICEF personnel.

28 This could not be completely verified as the former Chief of Field Office had passed away. 29 UNICEF Vanuatu Field Office Business Continuity Plan – Key Performance Indicators. EWEA, 27 June 2014

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• All CFOs to revisit their emergency preparedness plans and ensure they are up to date and actioned. • All CFOs to ensure that the EWEA system is regularly updated and appropriate action taken to rectify

gaps. • Ensure offices have a clear and widely understood Business Continuity Plan. • Ensure clearly defined and widely understood roles and responsibilities of key staff members in the

event of an emergency. • Ensure team members are aware of emergency plans on a regular basis.

• Regularly update the inventory of contingency stocks.

Operational management

The operational management of the Vanuatu response had two distinct phases: the first five weeks, when the roles of Emergency Coordinator and (Acting) Head of Office, were both filled by the same person – deployed in advance from New York; and a longer second wave of support when the two positions were filled by two people.

There is no doubt that the presence of an experienced Emergency Coordinator/ Acting Head of Office immediately after TC Pam was critical to the response. The Emergency Coordinator/ Acting Head of Office provided direction and leadership to the Vanuatu team, supported by more junior surge staff from EAPRO. This arrangement worked well. However, when a new temporary CFO arrived, along with a replacement senior Emergency Coordinator management issues arose and staff were confused about if and how their day-to-day management lines had changed: Did all programme staff in Vanuatu still report to the Emergency Coordinator? Did they maintain a relationship to the Chiefs of Section in Suva for reporting or for technical advice only? Was the Emergency Coordinator still in charge, or did the Chief of Field Office have a leadership role during the emergency response?

This lack of clarity resulted in tensions and frustrations at both the Fiji Office and the VFO that had not been fully resolved at the time of the AAR. This issue was raised in multiple key informant interviews and during both the Vanuatu and Suva AAR workshops.

During the difficult first stages of the response, visits to Vanuatu by the RD and multiple trips by the Country Representative and Operations Officer played a critical role in the motivation of the field staff. Their presence showed concern for the staff and helped assure staff that high-level leadership were aware of their situation and ready to listen to their concerns and discuss any issues as they arose.


• Early deployment of an experienced Emergency Coordinator to the affected country. • Visits by Senior CO and RO staff to affected country/ies.


• Clear documentation of roles and responsibilities of management personnel including any differences between countries where there is a UNICEF Field Office, and where there is not.

• Clear distinctions between the role of the CFO and the Emergency Coordinator when two people take the roles.

• Clear roles and responsibilities of the Chiefs of Sections during an emergency and their relationship to management staff in the affected country/ies.

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4.3.1. UNICEF’s operational commitments

Media and communications

As previously noted, the UNICEF Pacific Communications Specialist was deployed into Vanuatu ahead of TC Pam. The Communications Specialist conducted an average of 80 international interviews a day during using two phones and Skype. During this time, invaluable support was provided by the Communications Team at UNICEF New Zealand, and by the EAPRO. A subsequent review30 found that UNICEF led global coverage of the cyclone, with 34% of international coverage (compared to other agencies) and nearly 800 news articles in the first month, as well as 14,140 twitter mentions in the first 48-72 hours.

The National Disaster Management Office (NDMO) in Vanuatu also had a communication plan in place that was supported by the Communications Specialist. The plan included: • Radio: pre-recorded messages for national radio • TV: advertisement for airing on national television once functional • Mobile phones: 166 Emergency text messages with updated information were sent to all users of both

Telecom Vanuatu and Digicel.

The Communication Specialist was also providing support to the NDMO on other issues including handling of international media, communication challenges, opportunities for strengthening linkages and information flow from Community Disaster Committees (CDCs) to Provincial Disaster Committees (PDCs) and to NDMO, and for better understanding of the coloured alert system, strengths of cyclone categories, and location of Evacuation Centres and support services.

Aside from the media and external communication work described above, UNICEF staff was also involved with Communication for Development to support widespread multi-media and interpersonal campaigns to inform affected families on essential precautionary measures to protect their health and safety.

UNICEF partnered with a local youth media group, ‘Further Arts’ to interview 100 children affected by the cyclone. These videos form the basis for child-centred advocacy and communications, and were also featured at the World Humanitarian Summit Pacific consultations. UNICEF also recently appointed the Vanuatu Women’s Beach Volleyball team as UNICEF ambassadors to help raise awareness of UNICEF’s aims, objectives and priorities. UNICEF and the Vanuatu Football Federation (VFF) are also collaborating through the ‘Just Play’ programme to use existing networks and sport to assist with emergency relief activities in Vanuatu.

The main concerns related to external communication raised during the AAR were as follows: • Insufficient advice given from the EAPRO or HQ in terms of the exact UNICEF requirements for

communications after an emergency. This would have been helpful during the preparatory lead-time. • With the UNICEF Pacific Communications Specialist in Vanuatu, there was a gap in communications

in the Fiji Office. • Insufficient communication equipment to enable videoing, uploading etc. in a context of low Internet

capabilities.

The EAPRO communications/fundraising team were able to fill the gap left in Suva, liaising between Vanuatu and HQ and managing the different expectations regarding the information coming out of Vanuatu. Significant support was also provided in terms of editing and formatting.

Required kit for communications personnel in future: • Satellite phone (including charger and car charger), fully charged and with key phone numbers entered

in advance. • SMART phone for communication and podcasts, photos, videos etc. • Power bank • Began or similar to be able to send documents and videos without telecommunications

30 UNICEF (2015) Snapshot report: Cyclone Pam online media, broadcast and social media. 26 May 2015.

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• Waterproof bag


• Early deployment of communications personnel to support fundraising efforts. • Support from NZ National Committee and EAPRO for editing, formatting etc. • Regular calls involving all UNICEF communications teams – UNICEF Pacific EAPRO, HQ and

National Committees.


• A clear brief on specific communication outputs required. • Provision of dedicated communication kit to ensure that required information can be provided in all

conditions. • Surge support or agreements in place with photographers, videographers and writers. • Inclusion of more community and children’s voices in external communications.

Human resources

“L2 becomes most effective when you have a highly trained core set of skilled and trained staff who are able to be deployed at short notice.”

Prior to the TC Pam response, the VFO operated with nine staff, with limited experience of emergency responses. Emergency surge support was therefore critical.

UNICEF has multiple avenues for providing staff including surge support to an L2 emergency including from the Emergency Response Team in New York, internal deployment of experienced UNICEF staff from the EAPRO, a Regional Rapid Response Roster, multiple international standby partners with people who are ready to deployed to emergencies, engagement of consultants or individual contractors through the emergency roster, or external recruitment of people on temporary appointment.31

Providing surge support to the Fiji Office and to Vanuatu required cooperation between HQ, the EAPRO, and the UNICEF Pacific HR teams. This cooperation worked well, and surge support was provided in a timely manner. With few exceptions, the surge support was experienced and with appropriate expertise for the work required. Within the first week, surge support was provided through the immediate release of regional roster personnel from the EAPRO and from multiple Country Offices in the region.32 Immediate deployment of support from Supply Division, and extension or change in deliverables for consultants in Vanuatu also contributed to surge support being available within a few days of the cyclone.

Support coming in from other channels took longer. A review of the Operations Staffing Matrix (OSM) shows an average of 8 days between CO request for staff and the selection of candidate,33 and a further 18 days on average between selection and deployment.34

The main concerns related to Human Resource support highlighted during the AAR workshops were as follows: • UNICEF Pacific operations staff, including HR did not feel they had adequate basic emergency training • Some surge support did not have adequate contextual knowledge of the Pacific and therefore what

items would be appropriate, and what programmatic direction the emergency should take. • The NYHQ HR department reported that they refer all surge deployees to review

www.unicefinemergencies.org before their deployment, both for UNICEF structure and procedures, CCC’s e-learning and links to information of the country they are deploying to. However, lack of

31 UNICEF (2010) Recruitment and staffing in emergency situations - CF/EXD/2010-005. 32 Regional roster support was provided by UNICEF Philippines, Thailand, Papua New Guinea, Indonesia, and Myanmar. 33 UNICEF Operation Staffing Matrix – Cyclone Pam workbook, version at as 27 April 2015 34 Ibid.

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induction was an ongoing finding of the AAR. Similarly, a briefing package was developed by UNICEF Pacific but not issued to all incoming staff (and did not include procedural aspects).

• Lack of handover notes from all surge personnel left gaps in institutional knowledge. • The OSM proved too complex and time-consuming for the limited UNICEF Pacific capacity to maintain

daily. To compensate, the CO designed a simplified matrix that was efficient at keeping track staffing and HR requests and was well utilized.

Despite the above issues, the dedication and commitment of the response personnel is clear. In many cases, the experienced surge support provided learning experiences and counter-parting opportunities for existing staff that was greatly appreciated.

Another positive aspect of the HR response was the presence of a staff counsellor in a private space within the VFO, provided by the UN Department of Safety and Security (UNDSS). Staff found this service invaluable, particularly because the counsellor was a foreigner (and therefore not known to family or friends) and the informal mechanism for uptake (no appointment needed). Although free counselling was also available to Suva staff it was available through a more formal (local) mechanism and had zero uptake.


• Fast tracking of HR procedures with cooperation at all levels of UNICEF. • Experienced, technical staff deployed through multiple avenues of surge support. • Utilization of existing personnel in country with Pacific experience and knowledge. • Utilization of in-situ consultants with change of ToR and deliverables. • Utilization of the services of a staff counsellor using an informal mechanism for visits. • Regular updating and sharing of the simplified HR matrix designed by UNICEF Pacific.


• UNICEF Pacific to conduct an annual revision of emergency skill set within the team in order to quickly identify potential HR requirements in the event of an emergency.

• UNICEF Pacific to provide opportunities for Field Office staff to attend UNICEF Program, Policy and Procedures training.

• HQ, EAPRO and UNICEF Pacific to provide clear and widely circulated ToRs to Field Offices for all incoming people (surge, UNICEF staff, consultants…).

• UNICEF Pacific to ensure additional HR and administrative support is provided for the Suva Office if there is another L2 emergency.

• EAPRO to ensure that Regional Rapid Response Roster includes a wide range of skills including coordinators, information officers, reporting officers and communication staff.

• Establish SOPs for surge staff handover processes (including briefing and handover notes).

Finance and administration

“At the Country Office level there was not enough flexibility to allow for the level of reactivity that is required in an emergency.”

Financial and administrative preparedness

Prior to TC Pam, UNICEF Vanuatu worked directly with the Government of Vanuatu, and had no prior agreements, or contingency agreements with the private sector or with CSOs. This meant that once TC Pam hit, UNICEF had to start looking for partners for logistic support (including transporters, warehouse, casual labour etc.) and with civil society organizations, for programme implementation.

The EWEA outlines a number of specific actions to be taken under Key Action 15 – Financial and administrative emergency preparedness. These include internal control measures, pre-establishing cash resources, and identifying alternative office arrangements in the event of an emergency. However, as with office preparedness, the VFO has completed the review in the EWEA system (September 2014) but it

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appears to have been only ‘a paper exercise’, as the team were not aware of the simplified procedures available. As a result, when power and telecommunications went down, and banks, including ATMs closed, the office had limited opportunities for purchasing items required for operations. Even in normal times, Vanuatu does not have mobile money facilities as in other countries of the world, which further constrains options for moving cash.

A Cash on Hand Account (COHA) of US$5,000 was authorized for the first incoming Emergency Coordinator/Acting Head of Office on 17 March however the process for the release of funds was inappropriate for an emergency context, especially when banks are closed: a cheque prepared in Suva, that needed to be signed and cashed at a bank in Vanuatu. The requirement of multiple signatories further complicated this process, when local signatories were away conducting rapid assessments.

Without access to cash, UNICEF could only operate in the early stages through the good will of UNICEF staff and consultants who utilized their own funds for the response, and through the good will of local suppliers/business owners and casual labourers (for loading and unloading) who agreed to provide services and goods based on informal, verbal credit agreements. Even when banks opened, reducing the need for COHA in Port Vila, cash was still needed – for payment to vendors without bank accounts, especially for casual labour payments outside of Port Vila.

“Emergency response requires experienced, judgement-based decisions in a cash-based context.”

Table 4 below shows the specific actions outlined in the EWEA under Key Action 15, whether they were “actioned” in EWEA and what action was actually taken.

Table 4: Financial and administration emergency preparedness (EWEA Key Action 15) – Vanuatu Field Office

EWEA Specific Actions Done pre-TC Pam?

Action taken

Internal control mechanisms

Fast tracked issuance of TAs in emergencies (to be done in 1 hour max)

Y Done

Table of Authority identified and pre-approved

Y ToA was amended and those concerned were informed accordingly.

Manual financing system available Y Staff not aware but utilized to some extent because of experience of Emergency Coordinator

Systems are pre-agreed for issuance of new phone and IT equipment for surge staff and consultants

Y Action done through good will of telecommunications company on informal verbal agreement post-cyclone.

Cash resources

Petty cash account pre-established up to US$1000

Y Petty cash available up to a value of 70,000 Vatu (US$700)

A special cash account pre-established for between US$1000-10,000

N/A COHA account up to US$5,000 approved for Emergency Coordinator. However, it was a cheque that required multiple signatories and needed to be cashed when banks were not open.

A special cash account pre-established for between US$10,000+

N/A

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Third party cash providers pre-identified

N/A

Emergency field office establishment

Guest-houses/locations pre-identified Y Done

Draft lease established for alternative office

Y The two pre-identified locations were affected by TC Pam and not able to be used. An alternative location was identified (the Melanesian Hotel) and utilized with agreement with the management. Agreements are pre-established for

the relocation of staff to these offices Y

An office in a box is available with all necessary IT equipment

N Office in a Box was ordered and delivered but was found unsuitable for Vanuatu context. No emergency IT equipment in place.

One of the EWEA specific activities (Table 4) is a readiness to fast track issuance of travel authorizations (within 1 hour). However, when this did not happen and the Fiji Office utilized the same process as in normal times, instead of delaying programme implementation, staff, consultants and surge staff in the VFO utilized their own funds for travel. This situation became critical when Air Vanuatu declared that it would no longer be accepting local procurement orders and would be requiring cash payments for air travel.

The CO procedures for handling emergency requests from the FO were simplified in early May with a Finance Officer becoming an “Emergency Workflow Manager” and the work of the Programme Assistants (PAs) was rearranged. Using the new workflow system (Figure 2), financial requests could be more easily tracked, and the Vanuatu team had a single focal point for enquiries.

Figure 1: CO workflow processing arrangement – commenced 4 May 2015

Source: UNICEF (2015) Standard operating procedures - Business process – PA Pool (Vanuatu Office, Emergency response) DRAFT. V.1

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Between 4 May and 28 September, the new workflow arrangements averaged a processing time of 3.5 days.35 In future emergencies, consideration should be given to modifying the new workflow arrangement to include PAs dedicated to the emergency response while others continue with the normal work. The current Standard Operating Procedures for this aspect of the response can be found in Annex 12.

Financial authority

In normal times, financial transaction authority is held in Suva. Chiefs of Sections have financial responsibilities for the programmatic spend within their sector and this continued during the emergency. When experienced emergency support surged into Vanuatu, the lack of financial authority at field level led to a myriad of issues that hindered operations and resulted in frustrated, disempowered staff in Vanuatu.

VISION (UNICEF’s financial and other business transaction system, linked to results) access and authority was one such issue and was citied in both the Suva and Vanuatu AAR workshops. There was also a general concern of a perceived disconnect between programme budgets (held in Suva with the Chiefs of Section) and programme planning and implementation (done at field level). This ties in with the lack of clarity on the role of the Chiefs of Section vis-à-vis emergency staff in the FO during an emergency as mentioned earlier.

Partner Cooperation Agreements (PCAs) and Small Scale Funding Agreements (SSFAs)

The L2 procedures enable simplification of the PCA and SSFA procedures (Annex 13). The new SSFA guidance 36 , which officially became effective on 1 April, provided UNICEF Pacific with documented procedures that could be used in the emergency response. These guidelines were utilized earlier than their official start date and provided a clear decision-making tree for the type of instrument that should be utilized. Since the new guidelines enable lower documentation requirements and authorization at field level, they were more timely that the PCA process. SSFAs were therefore well utilized, and proved invaluable in the early days of the response when UNICEF was looking for new partnerships.


• Utilization of the new guidelines on SSFAs. • Utilization of the revised workflow management process for financial tracking.


• Establish contingency agreements or agreements with contingency clauses with potential implementing partners as part of preparedness.

• Clearer (and common) understanding of PCA simplifications for UNICEF Pacific staff. • Explore options for decentralizing fund management and positioning VISION rights and access in the

affected FO. • Consider deploying PAs to affected country immediately to help give the response team access to

programming details.

• UNICEF Pacific to develop customised financial and administrative SOPs.

4.3.2. UNICEF’s programme commitments

Rapid assessment

Multiple rapid assessments were carried out in Vanuatu after TC Pam including aerial assessments, community assessments, and provincial assessments. Supported by the United Nations Disaster Assessment and Coordination (UNDAC) team, the NDMO organized and conducted a Joint Rapid Needs

35 UNICEF Pacific – SOP - PA pool Vanuatu emergency response monitoring sheet (version as at 28 September 2015). 36 UNICEF (2015) UNICEF Procedure for County and Regional Office transfer of resources to Civil Society Organizations

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Assessment.37 Some clusters and working groups including Telecommunications, Utilities, Agriculture, WASH and Infrastructure also carried out detailed technical assessments. UNICEF provided support to the Vanuatu Humanitarian Team and contributed staff and consultants to the NDMO led assessment process.

There was a general agreement within the humanitarian community that coordinated assessments were preferable, in order to reduce assessment fatigue for respondents and communities and to increase the speed of implementation. UNICEF contributed to the UNDAC and WASH technical assessments by providing sectoral assessment tools. This was possible because UNICEF had pre-prepared rapid assessment questionnaires and had conducted training of enumerators in a number of sectors.

The cluster lessons learned exercises highlight a number of common challenges to the assessment process.38 • The need for coordination between clusters • The need for consistent methodology across assessment forms to make consolidation easier • The need to ensure greater involvement from Provincial Authorities and CDCs • Logistical constraints for transporting assessment teams to affected islands

The challenge of inconsistent and out of date community level baseline data was highlighted by a number of clusters. Although there is a plethora of information available, personnel were not aware of where to find it or what figures to use. In most provinces, census data had not been updated, even by simple projection, and this led to challenges in determine appropriate response targets. While there was an opportunity to update programme targets in the HAC in July/August, not all sectors took up this option.

Within UNICEF, programme staff felt that they had utilized the assessment data well for programme planning and design. Like the clusters, UNICEF also recognized they needed to have greater levels of communication and coordination between sectors and ensure that all responses (and supply orders) are based and designed on verified needs assessments.

The need for strong Information Management Systems was another key area of learning by the clusters. Some clusters prioritized information management staff, and these clusters had stronger information management and information consistency.39In future responses, information management and information dissemination systems must be strengthened to enable clusters to make informed programming decisions and provide clear guidance for transitioning from relief to recovery.

Lastly, there was a clear interest in making greater use of mobile technologies for assessments. Other clusters admired the WASH smart phone system, providing opportunities for UNICEF to engage with other clusters on similar systems.


• Preparation of sectoral assessment forms/questions ahead of time. • Pre-emergency training of government and UNICEF staff on rapid assessment tools. • Participation in joint assessments. • Use of mobile technology for assessments (WASH Cluster).

Suggestions for improvement:

• Updated population data at hand to enable swift initial response while assessments are ongoing. • Greater focus on information management during both preparedness and response. • Better utilization of verified assessment data to update the HAC during its annual review.

37 OCHA (2015) End of Mission Report - United Nations Disaster Assessment and Coordination Team (UNDAC) – Tropical Cyclone Pam, Vanuatu 16 March – 4 April 2015. 38 Government of Vanuatu, National Disaster Management Office - Lessons learned presentation 39 For example, the WASH and Shelter clusters

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Monitoring and reporting

The programme commitments of the UNICEF CCCs in humanitarian action are premised on corresponding benchmarks derived from global standards in the respective programme areas. The benchmarks are the globally accepted performance levels for humanitarian response drawn inter-agency standards, including International Network for Education in Emergencies (INEE) Minimum Standards, the Sphere Standards, and the outcomes of discussions in inter-agency and cluster forums.40

During emergencies, UNICEF’s CCCs outline the indicators for Humanitarian Performance Monitoring (HPM). HPM surge personnel into Vanuatu immediately after TC Pam provided support to all programme sections ensuring that HPM was used from the beginning of the programme. Key indicators for each sector, along with both Cluster and UNICEF targets, were incorporated into the HAC and followed by all programme sections. In Vanuatu, partner CSOs were assisted by UNICEF staff in their monitoring of UNICEF supported projects to ensure that UNICEF targets and indicators were used.

Aside from HPM, for the TC Pam response, UNICEF engaged field monitors for the first time, in order to ensure that UNICEF supplies reached affected children and families and were utilized. It was widely recognized that field monitoring was an important part of UNICEF’s emergency response. However, the design and management of the field monitors needs to be reconsidered in future.

• A clear field monitoring strategy is needed ahead of time that defines the scope for monitors, together with clear objectives.

• Draft monitoring tools are needed that can quickly be adapted as required. • Local personnel should be utilized as much as possible in order to maximise acceptance and

communication with affected communities. International personnel should only be considered for coordination roles, if at all.

• A monitoring template, developed in collaboration with the relevant programme sections would be useful, to enable programme staff to follow up on monitoring findings.

• Field monitoring and all related activities should be managed by a trained M&E focal point.

UNICEF reporting requirements during an emergency are significant. Regular, detailed situation reports (SitReps) are required. UNICEF templates are available for the SitRep to ensure that all information required by the different levels of UNICEF, for fundraising, communications, programming etc. is available. These templates were utilized, but to complete the SitReps in a timely manner, to the standard required, is a full time job but this was not recognized during the TC Pam response. In future responses a full time Reporting Officer should be employed. Ultimately, the UNICEF SitReps have been well received, both internally and externally, and the UNICEF format and information was copied by other agencies and even by NDMO.


• Sharing and utilization of UNICEF SitReps. • Support to CSOs for reporting on UNICEF targets and indicators to enable utilization of HPM from the

beginning of the response. • Presence of UNICEF field monitors responsible for distribution and programme monitoring.


• Engage a full time Reporting Officer in future L2 emergencies. • Prioritise third party monitors from Day 1 and utilize local capacity where possible. • Increase the capacity of the office and the field monitoring teams on HPM and field monitoring.

40 UNICEF (2010) Core commitments for children in Humanitarian Action. UNICEF, New York

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Supply and logistics

“There were some delays getting appropriate goods into Vanuatu. Partner agencies had structured their plans around our incoming supplies but they might have been quicker if running independently.”

Logistics in the Pacific is very difficult and expensive as there are large distances between countries, limited locally available transport for fast movement of supplies between islands and limited logistic infrastructure and resources. Prior to TC Pam, UNICEF Pacific had limited logistics and supply capacity and no dedicated logistics/supply staff in Vanuatu. There was only a small storage space, and no identified warehouse space or agreement in place to use one in an emergency. There were also no agreements with any logistics services such as transporters or forklifts, or casual labourers.

However, very early in the response, UNICEF decided that it could make the biggest contribution to the overall response by utilizing the services and expertise of the UNICEF Supply Division (based in Copenhagen) and having the supplies distributed by CSO partners and/or government ministries. Supply Division responded to the UNICEF Pacific request and quickly provided surge staff both to the Fiji Office and to the VFO. Experienced logistic support followed in April through a standby partner (MSB).41 Both the support from Supply Division and MSB were instrumental to the success to the UNICEF response. With this support in place, UNICEF was able to review contingency stock, work on supply plans, establish a large warehouse in Vanuatu, establish systems for stock management, and develop a system of supply tracking. It also freed up the time of programme staff to be able to concentrate of the programme planning and implementation.

UNICEF had some contingency stock pre-positioned in a number of locations including Vanuatu, Fiji, the Solomon Islands, and Kiribati, and this was distributed immediately, while awaiting additional supplies. Ultimately, additional supplies arrived into Vanuatu through Supply Division, from Manila and from Suva but not without incident. In some cases, inappropriate supplies were ordered, supply arrival was delayed, and some poor quality supplies arrived, much of which was not distributed. Goods also arrived without distribution plans in place, making dispatch difficult. Some goods also arrived into Vanuatu that was inappropriate for the Pacific context (see example in Annex 14). In future Pacific emergency responses, Supply Division and other UNICEF offices sending goods need to be aware of the specific Pacific context: • Restricted size of airports and seaports • Absence of bulk unloading equipment at seaports and at airports • Recognition that items will be transported to affected islands by small boats • Limited in-country capacity for fast transport • Limited logistical infrastructure and equipment.

UNICEF Pacific had initially requested WFP support on logistics and believed that Supply Division and WFP could collaborate on logistics and supply. However this did not happen, and resulted in some duplication of efforts and parallel logistics and supply systems being established.

Some CSOs were able to obtain stock faster than UNICEF because they had agreements in place with governments such as Australia, New Zealand or France to pre-position supplies and utilize military assets. Most also had distribution plans in place when ordering their stock, which speeded up their dispatch and distribution process.

UNICEF (and other UN entities) did not have any such agreements, and therefore missed opportunities to bring in stock through government channels. When strong sea surges caused delays in the arrival of goods being transported by ship, CSO partners distributed their own stock with a view to eventually replenishing when UNICEF stocks arrived.

To support the government with incoming supplies UNICEF provided logistics support to the NDMO and to the Central Medical Stores of the Ministry of Health. The relevant government representatives positively reviewed both these roles during the AAR. The government was overwhelmed by the large quantities of

41 Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency

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unsolicited goods coming into the country so the ongoing support to NDMO logistics and emergency support to the MoH was much appreciated.

It was a risk for UNICEF to employ a supply strategy when the logistics and supply capacity of UNICEF Pacific and the Vanuatu Field Office was weak. However, the supply strategy has worked well and in general, partners42 spoke highly of the UNICEF logistic effort during the AAR.


• Contingency stock located in multiple Pacific locations for immediate distribution. • Immediate request for support from Supply Division to support logistics and supply. • Follow up request to standby partners for logistics and supply support


• Increase understanding of specific logistic issues in the Pacific. • Review prepositioning of contingency stocks with other stakeholders taking into consideration quality

of the goods and ease and speed of transport into the Pacific. • Identify logistic suppliers and service providers and prepare contingency agreements ahead of time. • Identify service providers in multiple locations that can do pre-packing of supplies. • Ensure linkage of supply ordering with programme distribution plans.

4.3.3. Partnership and coordination

Partnership and coordination with the Government of Vanuatu

UNICEF has a long-term relationship with the Government of Vanuatu, and works closely with a number of Ministries and Departments.43 Over the years, UNICEF has seconded staff into various Government ministries and departments, some of which are now fully paid by the Government. UNICEF also provides direct funding to ministries and departments, based on agreed work plans that are updated annually.

In Vanuatu, UNICEF is the focal point for UN agencies in emergencies as it has the largest UN footprint. UNICEF is also one of the few UN agencies in Vanuatu to work in both emergency and development contexts. As a trusted government partner, UNICEF was able to build on their relationship with the Government and support the design and implementation of emergency programmes in a number of key sectors: WASH, Health and Nutrition, Education and Child Protection. In addition, UNICEF made significant effort to communicate directly with the Prime Minister’s Office and with the NDMO for general emergency coordination.

Government representatives, and external agencies were certainly appreciative of the efforts UNICEF staff went to in supporting the government in cluster coordination, and to coordinate the emergency response in general. To this end, the presence of an experienced Emergency Coordinator in Vanuatu during and immediately after TC Pam was vital.

“The importance of having an experienced Emergency Coordinator on the ground who could provide some leadership and guidance to the government, cannot be overstated.”

The NDMO, OCHA and the VHT activated the cluster coordination mechanism in Vanuatu in 2011. The Government of Vanuatu leads each cluster, co-lead by a UN or CSO partner (Figure 2). The Cabinet of Vanuatu (formerly known as the Council of Ministers), reports to the Prime Minister’s Office. UNICEF is heavily involved in multiple clusters and working groups in Vanuatu. UNICEF co-leads (with Ministry of

42 Multiple government ministries and departments and CSO partners 43 Including the Ministry of Health, Ministry of Justice, Ministry of Education and the Ministry of Land, water, resources and the Ministry of Interior. Within these Ministries, UNICEF works closely with the Department of Geology, Mines and Water Resources, the Department of Nutrition, the Department of Reproductive Health and the Civil Registry.

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Lands, Water and Natural Resources) the WASH Cluster and shares the co-lead (with Ministry of Education and Training) responsibilities for the Education Cluster with Save the Children. UNICEF also leads the Nutrition Working Group (under the Health Cluster, co-led by Ministry of Health and WHO) and the Child Protection Working Group (under the Gender and Protection Cluster). UNICEF’s attendance and active participation in these multiple clusters and working groups gave them a strong platform for engagement with the cluster system, enabling them to quickly establish working relationships with many emergency partners.

Figure 2: Humanitarian architecture, Vanuatu

Source: Government of Vanuatu (2015) Humanitarian Action Plan

A number of these clusters have already completed lessons learned workshops,44 so the findings described here, are a compilation of findings from the cluster reviews, key informant interviews and the Vanuatu and Suva AAR workshops.

The lessons learned documents indicate that some clusters worked better than others. It appears that some government officials were unaware/not interested in humanitarian architecture until it was required. High government staff turnover also meant that despite multiple emergency preparedness training by the VHT and others, 45 some key government staff, particularly those with decision-making authority and responsibility, did not understand humanitarian architecture, how it was activated, and the coordination role that would follow. However, once activated, with support from the co-leads, the clusters played a critical role in coordinating humanitarian response.

The work of the WASH, and Health and Nutrition Clusters among others, were considered lifesaving and therefore prioritized by the Government and by UNICEF. These clusters were therefore necessarily coordinating and responding more quickly than others. Other sectors such as Education and Child Protection responded, but more slowly. Likewise, there were differences in coordination between the clusters, with notably less actors in education and child protection, and less specific funding.

44 The full list of lessons learned documents can be found in the bibliography. 45 Training was done by OCHA, UNICEF, SPC, and INGO led trainings (including through the VHT)

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A review of the cluster lessons learned documents reveals some common findings between clusters: • The importance of early deployment of cluster coordinators • A need for greater level of information sharing between clusters • A need for greater level of information sharing between working groups within same cluster • A need for greater engagement with provincial level governments including developing the capacity of

Provincial Disaster Committees (PDCs) and CDCs. • A need to revisit NDMO and Cluster disaster response plans with a view to –

o Including consideration and preparedness for larger scale disasters o Including guidelines within the plans with practical and achievable action points o Ensuring that trainings and simulations are conducted regularly o Preparing for preferred supplier agreements for goods, services and works that can be

activated after a disaster.

In addition to specific cluster support, UNICEF provided ongoing support to ministries on emergency programming including emergency nutrition and birth registration that were outside their usual work.


• UNICEF efforts to collaborate and coordinate with both the Prime Minister’s Office and the NDMO. • UNICEF technical support to key line ministries in emergency programming. • UNICEF engagement in multiple interagency meetings. • UNICEF involvement in multiple clusters and working groups. • Collaboration between the Department of Geology, Mines and Water Resources and UNICEF for

WASH Cluster Coordination. • Early support to government by WASH Cluster Coordinator. • Independence of WASH Cluster Coordinator. • Deployment of Information Management Officer for WASH Cluster. • UNICEF role as interlocutor between government and CSOs and between the government and other

UN agencies.


• Continue to work with government on cluster coordination including developing cluster SoPs covering both preparedness and response.

• Consider ways to embed disaster risk reduction into ongoing development work. • Continue to liaise with both Prime Minister’s Office and NDMO regarding opportunities to support

emergency preparedness and response. • Review government emergency capacity and skills on an annual basis to ensure that key decision-

makers are included in training and scenario simulations. • Inclusion of provincial level government (PDC and CDC) personnel in training. • UNICEF and Save the Children to discuss coordination of the Education Cluster and how it can be

handled better next time. • Pre-crisis data and templates agreed with NDMO. • Ensure all UNICEF programme design is done in collaboration with line ministries.

Partnership and coordination with other partners

The Pacific Humanitarian Team (PHT) was established by OCHA in 2008 to ensure that regional responders work together to deliver timely and appropriate humanitarian assistance to disaster-affected people across the Pacific. The PHT operates under the co-leadership of the United Nations Resident Coordinators in the Pacific, and consists of UN agencies, regional and bilateral organizations, national and international non-government organizations, faith-based and community based organizations and donor

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partners. UNICEF is a long-standing member of both the PHT (Suva) and the VHT,46 and has solid working relationships with multiple external partners.

In Vanuatu, UNICEF’s relationship with the government put them in a unique position to act as interlocutor between the government and various agencies, both UN and CSOs who had a lesser presence in Vanuatu prior to TC Pam. UNICEF attendance and input into other emergency meetings (OCHA, Heads of Agency meetings) also quickly resulted in an awareness of what other agencies are doing and their plans for responding to the emergency.

The partnerships between UNICEF and CSO have been mentioned elsewhere in this report, including in the sections on PCAs and SSFAs, and logistics and supply. Overall, despite the time taken to establish PCAs and the issues for CSOs resulting from delayed arrival of UNICEF goods, CSO partners reviewed UNICEF’s work during the TC Pam response positively. They recognized UNICEF’s relationship with the Government of Vanuatu, and their capacity to bring in larger quantities of supplies than CSOs could. They also recognized the potential for further partnerships and collaborations with UNICEF that would leverage both UNICEF’s position with the Government, and the CSOs human resource capacity at the community level.


• Strong working relationships with multiple external partners. • Partnerships with CSO for supply distribution and monitoring.


• Advance regional MoUs or standby agreements (contingency PCAs) between RO and regional offices of key partners (Red Cross and humanitarian CSOs) would help mobilise country level responses.

4.4. UNICEF response to TC Pam in Kiribati, Solomon Islands and Tuvalu

In addition to responding to TC Pam in Vanuatu, UNICEF was one of the few agencies to work in the other countries affected by TC Pam. In total, the impact of TC Pam and other storms in Kiribati, Solomon Islands and Tuvalu affected an estimated 50,000 people.47

UNICEF is the focal UN agency in Kiribati and UNDP is the focal UN agency in the Solomon Islands. At the time, UNICEF had a presence in both these countries but no full time UNICEF staff based in Tuvalu. One staff member from the Suva office was in Tuvalu on temporary assignment at the time.

As in Vanuatu, UNICEF opted for supply-based strategy, and given their established relationship with the governments, continued to work closely with the NDMOs and sectoral ministries of the affected countries. UNICEF had pre-positioned supplies in Solomon Islands and Kiribati, and they were distributed as part of the relief response. Supplies from Suva were sent to Tuvalu and to Kiribati.

Although a State of Emergency was declared in both Solomon Islands and Tuvalu, only the Government of Tuvalu requested international assistance. The HAC requested US$253,000 for a response in Kiribati, Solomon Islands and Tuvalu (Annex 15). However, the challenges noted previously related to the media focus on Vanuatu, and the earmarking of funds specifically for Vanuatu, made fundraising for the other affected countries very difficult. Bilateral discussions with donors in Suva were required, and resulted in a

46 Oxfam convenes the VHT and the members include the Vanuatu Red Cross, French Red Cross, Vanuatu Association of NGOs, UNICEF, Oxfam, CARE International, Save the Children Australia (SCA), the Adventist Development and Relief Agency (ADRA), the World Health Organization (WHO), Peace Corps, World Vision and Act for Peace, IOM and OCHA. 47 Estimates from International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies in each affected country: Tuvalu (4,613), Kiribati (1,500) and Solomon Islands (44,096)

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total of US$170,000 being made available by the Governments of Japan, Estonia and Australia for a response in the other three countries.

The Fiji Office made contact with each affected country on a daily basis when possible. However, communication and transport challenges between islands in the affected countries, particularly in Kiribati made assessment difficult, and assessment findings were not available until a few weeks after the cyclone. For some countries, communication with the Fiji Office is an ongoing challenges due to the low Internet capacity and lack of a UNICEF focal point.

Key informant interviews with UNICEF personnel who worked in Kiribati, Solomon Islands and Tuvalu indicate that the UNICEF response was smaller than required to meet all the needs of the affected children in the Solomon Islands and Tuvalu, but provided valuable support to the affected governments.

A summary of the UNICEF response in each country can be found below.


• Inclusion of all affected countries in UNICEF HAC appeal. • Regular communication between affected countries and the Fiji Office. • Availability of baseline data (Tuvalu) made it relatively easy to design emergency programmes. • Pre-prepared rapid assessment formats for data collection. • Partnerships between UNICEF and NDMOs, government ministries and CSOs. • Prepositioning of stock in different locations. • Immediate distribution of contingency supplies.


• Support Field Offices to do an annual review of their Emergency Preparedness Plans. • Ensure Field Office staff have basic emergency training. This is especially important in offices with few

staff, as they will need to take on multiple roles during an emergency. • Take measures to improve communication between Field Offices and the Fiji Office.

• Earlier focus on psychosocial support to children.

4.4.1. Tuvalu

UNICEF has a strong partnership with the Ministry of Education, Youth and Sports (MEYS) through a DFAT funded programme and with the NDMO, working in the area of disaster risk management.

The Government of Tuvalu has no clear humanitarian architecture in place and therefore required support for the assessment and coordination of the emergency response. At the time TC Pam affected Tuvalu, a UNICEF Pacific Education Specialist was in Tuvalu on temporary assignment, and became the UNICEF focal point for the response. Even though Tuvalu did not activate a cluster-approach to the response till a few weeks into the emergency, UNICEF became the cluster-lead for education as it has the most significant interaction with MEYS in Tuvalu of all the development partners. Clear instructions were given from Suva about the expectations, and roles and responsibilities in reporting back to the Fiji Office.

Tuvalu did not have pre-positioned contingency stocks so the Fiji Office sent an emergency health kit, along with education supplies to Tuvalu, which arrived on 13 April (Annex 16). These were then distributed in a timely manner directly through the MEYS with support from the Education Specialist. If UNICEF staff had not present, it is likely that these items would not have been distributed for some time, due to the small human resource and logistic capacity within MEYS.

Education baseline data was available through the Tuvalu Education information Management System (TEIMS) with disaggregated information on students and teachers. However there was limited education baseline data on infrastructure of school and existing facilities (to be addressed in TEIMS in 2015) as well

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as an absence of information on available stocks of educational materials and supplies. UNICEF supported MEYS with needs assessment data analysis and became the first Ministry to provide a detailed sub-sector report to the NDMO on the situation. The report format was utilized by other Ministries to report on the situation and response on different islands.48

While UNICEF made a positive contribution in supporting the work of the MEYS, an earlier focus from the Child Protection team by providing opportunities for psychosocial support to affected children might have also made a difference. This work was about to be rolled out in Tuvalu at the time of the AAR.

In addition to the work with MEYS, UNICEF proactively offered support and engaged with the NDMO from the beginning of the response. UNICEF was invited to all NDMO meetings, including those that were initially limited to Ministry officials, thereby making it easier to report on situation frequently and comprehensively to the Fiji Office.

UNICEF Pacific provided ongoing technical support and made regular enquiries on the situation on the ground, emerging needs and informed PERT so they could tailor the UNICEF response.

Overall, the response in Tuvalu was felt to be effective, particularly in the Education Sector, although there is recognition that the outer atolls have not been well served.

4.4.2. Solomon Islands

The Government of Solomon Islands declared a State of Emergency but did not request international assistance as they had direct funding from their own government budget and bilateral donors. The NDMO conducted their own assessment and released a rapid assessment report on 4 April stating that 30,000 people were affected.

The SIFO worked closely with the NDMO and tried to respond to their requests. The SIFO had assessed and prepared emergency readiness plans and programmes had identified key pre-positioned WASH, Education and Child Protection emergency items, which are kept in stock. In the immediate aftermath of TC Pam, these items were distributed and monitored in partnership with World Vision and the provincial authorities. Education communication materials were also requested for the response but did not arrive until June/July.

In future, the SIFO has requested UNICEF Pacific to support a review of its Emergency Preparedness Plan, provide refresher training on emergency procedures and replenishment procedures of their contingency stocks.

4.4.3. Kiribati

UNICEF Kiribati has a permanent field office, with staff positions for Child Protection, WASH and Education personnel. The Chief of Field Office left at the end of march, and was replaced temporarily by staff from the Suva Office with limited emergency experience.

In Kiribati, there is no clear humanitarian architecture in place, resulting in a lack of coordination and leadership on assessment and logistic procedures. Unlike the other affected countries, the Government of Kiribati did not declare a State of Emergency although the NDMO coordinated an internal response.

The Australian High Commission and the Government of New Zealand conducted an assessment that was mainly concerned with damage to infrastructure. The assessment took considerable time to complete because of the distances between islands. No information was included on child protection or other children’s issues. To fill in these gaps, three weeks after TC Pam, UNICEF managed to organize Air Kiribati to provide transport between islands, to do a rapid assessment throughout the country (2 hours per island).

48 TC Pam response in Tuvalu notes by Education Specialist.

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Some pre-positioned WASH and Health contingency stock was present in Kiribati and the Ministry of Health immediately distributed it. Additional supplies provided by the Fiji Office arrived in Kiribati on 23 March (Annex 16).

4.5. UNICEF response to Typhoon Maysak in Federated States of Micronesia

In early April, the Governors of both Chuuk and Yap, in FSM declared a State of Emergency after five people were killed and up to 80 percent of homes were damaged or destroyed by Typhoon Maysak. In late April, Typhoon Noul passed near Yap, where typhoon warnings were issued and heavy rainfall occurred. Then in late May, Pohnpei was hit by Typhoon Dolphin causing heavy damage on Kosrae and Pohnpei. After Typhoon Dolphin, the Governor of Pohnpei declared a state of emergency.

The United States Agency for International Development (USAID), estimated that 29,000 people were directly affected by the storm and damage throughout the FSM amounted to US$8.5 million.

UNICEF does not have a permanent presence in FSM but they recognized that the country had been seriously affected and were in need of support. WHO and IOM have permanent presence in FSM and WHO is the focal point for emergencies. The FSM Office of Environment and Emergency Management coordinated the emergency response.

FSM was not part of the L2 declaration or the UNICEF HAC appeal, as none of the three typhoons had happened before TC Pam. Typhoon Maysak was recorded as a Level 1 Emergency with the response handled internally by UNICEF Pacific.

UNICEF was one of the few outside agencies to support the Government of FSM. USAID through IOM conducted a needs assessment, with a focus on infrastructure and UNICEF maintained regular communication with WHO and IOM and the Government of FSM to understand the situation and needs. As with the TC Pam response, UNICEF adopted a supply-based strategy, sending micronutrient powder, oral rehydration solution and a water quality testing kit to the Chuuk Department of Health. In addition, a direct cash transfer is pending to the Ministries of Education in Chuuk and Yap in order to support activities in the Education Sector. UNICEF Pacific is currently awaiting a proposal from the Department of Education, in order to determine appropriate programming for the funds.

The UNICEF Pacific Country Representative provided support to FSM through a visit to Chuuk, Yap and Kosrae from 7-14 May 2015. UNICEF also deployed an Immunisation Consultant, who visited all States giving technical advice.

With all the UNICEF fundraising focus on Vanuatu, it was impossible for UNICEF to raise funds for the Typhoon Maysak response. Through discussions with the Regional Director and EMOPS Director, it was agreed that the Country Representative could retain up to US$300,000 from the EPF to be utilized for an emergency response in FSM.

Overall, the international response in FSM has been minimal. Representatives from OCHA felt that the international community had failed FSM and that they would need to rethink how to respond to emergencies in areas without significant UN presence.

FSM is currently reviewing its disaster response. The review involves representatives from the four states of FSM and partners, including the Secretariat of the Pacific Community and the European Union. Each state is expected to develop a disaster response work plan for the following 12 months.

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5. Conclusions

TC Pam was the first Category 5 cyclone to hit Vanuatu in recorded history. It could therefore not have been predicted or fully prepared for, neither by government nor any humanitarian partner. Although UNICEF had the largest UN presence in Vanuatu, the scale of damage and the size of the response required, was well beyond the response capacity of its Vanuatu Field Office, and all of UNICEF’s Government counterparts needed considerable assistance. This meant that additional support was required from all levels of UNICEF.

One of the aspects of the UNICEF response that consistently received positive reviews during the AAR was the early action of the Country Representative and the Regional Director. Early involvement of key UNICEF departments both in the EAPRO and in HQ, preparedness actions by the Suva Office, and the early deployment of an experienced Emergency Coordinator and a Communications Specialist have resulted in preparedness actions in Vanuatu and an immediate start to the response. The AAR has however, highlighted the lack of preparedness of the VFO and the problems associated with having a preparedness system in place (EWEA) for which there is limited ownership and knowledge within the team. In future, Chiefs of Field Offices need to ensure that their Emergency Preparedness and Response Plans are reviewed, updated, actioned and shared with their team members.

Once TC Pam made landfall, the UNICEF L2 emergency procedures were quickly activated. It is clear that the emergency procedures made a significant positive difference to the UNICEF response: in particular, the release of the EPF (loan mechanisms), fast tracking of human resources through multiple channels, immediate support from UNICEF Supply Division in Copenhagen, and the use of simplified procedures designed for use in emergencies.

The involvement of headquarters level emergency fundraising ahead of the Government and OCHA appeal, and the presence of the Communications Specialist in Vanuatu, has contributed to an immediate start of a successful fundraising campaign. By late August, UNICEF Pacific had received 90% of the requested funding in the revised HAC49 and the office repaid the global emergency fund. However, subsequent earmarking of funds by donors, including National Committees, and to some extent the UNICEF NY earmarking of funds for Vanuatu did not reflect the reality of the Pacific being a multi-country office, responding to an emergency situation in multiple countries. It was therefore difficult for UNICEF Pacific to find funding to support a response in the other affected countries.

Providing surge support to the Fiji Office and to Vanuatu required cooperation between HQ, the EAPRO, and the UNICEF Pacific HR teams. This cooperation worked well, and surge support was provided in a timely manner through multiple channels. With few exceptions, the surge support was experienced and with appropriate expertise for the work required. Within the first week, surge support was provided through the immediate release of regional emergency staff and regional roster personnel from EAPRO and from multiple Country Offices in the region.50 Immediate deployment of support from Supply Division, and extension or change in deliverables for consultants in Vanuatu meant that surge support was available within a few days of the cyclone.

While the L2 procedures were quickly activated at HQ and EAPRO level, they were not fully utilized by UNICEF Pacific. The AAR found that most UNICEF Pacific staff did not know what an “L2 emergency” was or what procedures accompanied it even at the time of the AAR. This caused some tensions between the Fiji main Office and the Vanuatu Field Office in the months following TC Pam when experienced surge personnel arrived in Vanuatu, more familiar with the procedural simplifications than the staff based in the Pacific. This tension was exacerbated by the lack of clarity of management roles and reporting lines after the initial Emergency Coordinator/Acting Head of Office left. The relationship and reporting lines between staff and the subsequent Emergency Coordinator, the Chief of Field Office and the Chiefs of Sections was unclear. The relationship between the Emergency Coordinator position and the other management positions therefore needs to be clarified and formalized.

49 US$919,0911 received as at 28 August 2015, out of US$10,170,000 requested in revised HAC. 50 Regional roster support was provided by UNICEF Philippines, Thailand, Papua New Guinea, Indonesia, and Myanmar.

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UNICEF Pacific encountered multiple issues with administrative and financial procedures. When the banking system in Vanuatu was closed, consultants and surge staff utilized their personal funds in order to ensure programme activities were implemented.

The procedures for handling emergency financial requests in the Suva Office were initially time consuming and complex. These procedures were simplified in early May, with the assignment of an “Emergency Workflow Manager” enabling financial requests to be easily tracked, and providing the Vanuatu team with a single focal point for enquiries. Although the workflow system worked well, and reduced tension between the Fiji Office and the VFO, the model for financial processing for UNICEF is going to change in 2016 with the launch of the Global Shared Services Centre (GSSC) in Hungary. It is therefore important that UNICEF Pacific prepare for the change and have a workable emergency financial tracking system in place so that future emergency operations are not compromised by the GSSC difference in time zone, their proposed less frequent processing and updating of systems and their proposed payments in US dollars.

VISION access and authority was also clearly an issue with financial transaction authority remaining in the Fiji Office and not being devolved to the Vanuatu Office. This ties in with the lack of clarity on the role of the Chiefs of Section vis-à-vis emergency staff in the field during an emergency as mentioned earlier. Not having VISION access and rights at the field level was a common concern, and UNICEF should explore ways of making this possible.

Prior to TC Pam, UNICEF Vanuatu worked directly with the Government of Vanuatu, and had no prior agreements, or contingency agreements with the private sector or with civil society organisations. This meant that once TC Pam hit, the office started looking for partners in both the private sector for logistic support (including transporters, warehouse, casual labour) and with civil society organizations, for programme implementation. Although the L2 procedures enable simplification of the PCA and SSFA procedures, some of the Suva team continued to request additional documentation, which was time consuming, had a higher administrative burden, and required authorization from Suva.

The new SSFA guidance provided a clear decision-making tree for the type of instrument that should be utilized. Since the new guidelines enable lower documentation requirements and authorization at field level, they were more timely that the PCA process. SSFAs were therefore well utilized, and proved invaluable in the early days of the response when UNICEF was looking for ways to contribute to the response, and required new partnerships.

Going forward, the new guidelines will be useful for UNICEF as they provide suggestions for preparedness commitments and activities. UNICEF offices in areas prone to emergencies are encouraged to put in place contingency agreements with non-governmental organisations that have humanitarian capacity, that can be quickly activated when an emergency occurs. This includes signing agreements with required programme documents in advance.51 If UNICEF Pacific also develop some specific emergency operating procedures relating to their financial and administrative procedures, these, together with the SSFA guidelines and training on the L2 procedures should see the offices in a better position to respond more quickly and efficiently to the financial and administrative requirements of future emergency responses.

The UNICEF response strategy in all the affected countries focussed on supporting Governmental coordination and on supplies, leveraging UNICEF’s long term relationship with the affected countries governments, and the human resources/field presence of CSOs and various government ministries. Although it was an organizational risk for UNICEF to employ a supply strategy when the logistics and supply capacity of UNICEF Pacific was weak, taking the risk has paid off, and in general, partners52 spoke highly of the UNICEF logistic effort during the After Action Review.

Given the distances between countries in the Pacific, it was a good idea for UNICEF to have pre-positioned stock in multiple locations, as these were immediately distributed to affected communities. However there

51 UNICEF (2015) UNICEF Procedure for County and Regional Office transfer of resources to Civil Society Organizations 52 Multiple government ministries and departments and CSO partners

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is no certainty that in future emergencies, that stock can easily be moved from one pre-positioned location to another.

A strategic review of contingency stocks is therefore required, including consideration of incorporating contingency agreements with Pacific and/or suppliers in Australia or New Zealand. Discussion with other stakeholders with an interest in emergency response in the Pacific (including Australia, New Zealand, French governments, UNICEF national committees and other partners) would be a good first step. This would enable the development of a more strategic approach to regional preparedness in the event of another emergency requiring a rapid logistics and supply response.

UNICEF is in a unique position to build on the relationship with the Government of Vanuatu and the governments of other Pacific nations and continue to play interlocutor between government and civil society organizations. Once the humanitarian work is over (both TC Pam and El Niño), UNICEF has an opportunity to reconsider their longer-term role in Vanuatu. The Government of Vanuatu has recognized the added value of UNICEF during the emergency response, which may provide opportunities for strategic discussions on the direction of the future partnership.

There are multiple opportunities for UNICEF to support the Government of Vanuatu and its Strategic Action Plan. Specific capacity building for key line ministries, both on areas identified during this AAR and through the other lessons learned activities, together with improved coordination within and between clusters will be key for improving future emergency responses. The Government indicated in its Humanitarian Action Plan that it would like to transition from Cluster Coordination to a Government-led Sectoral Coordination role - from the HAP into the Strategic Action Plan (SAP). Incorporating emergency preparedness and response work into previously agreed developed work might therefore be an option to consider. The commitment shown in the ongoing recovery work to ‘’build back better’’ and integrate resilience-building components will be critical to ensuring that scarce resources are used for the optimal benefit of children. This work may require both upstream work with Governments, as well as with children and their caretakers.

In the meantime, the Education Cluster coordination with Save the Children needs to be discussed and a strategy agreed for subsequent emergencies. Save the Children and UNICEF both have child-focused mandates and so there may also be ways to collaborate on other child-related projects with the government.

The lessons learned in Vanuatu will be useful for future emergencies in Pacific countries. Preparedness will be critical, as will more awareness and guidance of simplified financial and administrative procedures. It will also be important for UNICEF Pacific, together with other emergency partners such as OCHA and the Regional Pacific Humanitarian Team, to think strategically on how best to respond to emergencies in countries without permanent UNICEF (or UN) presence and/or limited communication infrastructure.

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6. Recommendations for improving UNICEF Pacific’s disaster preparedness and response

The key recommendations from the AAR are presented below. The full list of AAR recommendations and the specific actions required can be found below in Table 5. The recommendations have been prioritized and those recommended for immediate action have been highlighted.

The following eight recommendations relate to areas prioritized by key informants and participants during the AAR workshops, as having the potential to make the most difference to future emergency responses. It is recommended that action to address these recommendations start immediately with a view to completing the required actions within a timeframe of three months, six months or one year/ongoing.

Priority 1: Completion by end of January 2016 (three months)

i. All UNICEF Pacific offices to review and update their EWEA scenarios and re-examine their preparedness plans and identified actions, ensuring that all team members are aware of key actions to be taken in the event of an emergency.

ii. UNICEF Pacific to clarify, articulate and share SOPs outlining clear roles and responsibilities of key UNICEF management staff during an emergency (both for countries with a Field Office, and for those without).

iii. UNICEF Pacific to review its processes for financial transaction authority during emergencies to enable decentralization to the Field Offices. This should include ensuring there is at least one VISION user with approval authority and one VISION user with transaction creation authority in the affected Field Office during the emergency response.

iv. NYHQ to review their financial tracking/management/fundraising and reporting systems to reflect UNICEF Pacific as a multi-country setting, especially when disasters affect more than one country.

Priority 2: Completion by end of April 2016 (six months)

v. UNICEF Pacific, with support from EAPRO to develop a comprehensive Emergency Training Strategy to ensure that all staff, including field office staff has access to basic emergency training. The training strategy should take into account existing UNICEF Emergency Preparedness and Response training provided by EAPRO and include practical scenarios, emergency procedures and a broad understanding of UNICEF’s mandate and commitments during an emergency.

Priority 3: Completion by end of October 2016 (one year) or ongoing actions required.

vi. UNICEF Pacific to identify predictable humanitarian partnerships and ensure that contingency agreements are in place with civil society organisations, private sector and other relevant actors.

vii. UNICEF Pacific, with support from Supply Division and other actors, should strategically review their emergency logistics and supply capacity to ensure that good quality supplies can be provided quickly and efficiently.

viii. UNICEF Pacific in collaboration and coordination with humanitarian partners to continue building the capacity of Pacific Island governments on emergency preparedness and response in maternal and child health, nutrition, education, child protection (including gender-based violence and violence against children). This should include a review of NDMO and line ministry emergency preparedness and response plans and capacity, and the development of relevant Standard Operating Procedures SOPs) covering both preparedness and response.

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Table 5: AAR recommendations and action plan

Priority Recommendation Action Responsibility By When

UNICEF HEADQUARTERS & EAPRO

1

NYHQ to review their financial tracking/management, and reporting systems to reflect UNICEF Pacific as a multi-country setting, especially when disasters affect more than one country.

Review communications to National Committees and set up labelling of system for intake and allocation of funds. This should ensure that funds are not earmarked for one country when multiple countries are affected

NYHQ TBD by Management Response

1

UNICEF Pacific to strategically review their emergency logistics and supply capacity.

Conduct a desk review of existing information in the Pacific on suppliers, shippers/transporters (international air, sea, land, inter-island)

Supply Division

2

Determine if a Logistics Capacity Assessment is required and conduct one if necessary.

Supply Division (with possible support from WFP).

2

All levels of UNICEF HR to ensure that all staff/ consultants/ stand-by partners receive induction on the emergency context and on UNICEF procedures.

Preparation of a short guidance note on UNICEF and L2 procedures for all standby partners

EMOPS

3

NYHQ HR department to develop a simplified OSM that can be used in countries with low HR capacity.

Consider adopting the simplified staffing matrix developed by UNICEF Pacific.

EMOPS HR Department

3

UNICEF to develop a clear brief on the specific communications products required during and after an emergency.

Brief developed and shared with UNICEF Pacific.

HQ/EAPRO Communication and fundraising teams

3

All levels of UNICEF HR to ensure there are stronger mechanisms in place for surge staff handovers.

Develop a handover template for surge support that all surge staff must complete before leaving the emergency placement country

EMOPS/EAPRO

3

Ensure Office is ready and able to brief incoming short-term staff, consultants and visitors on mission, about the country, the situation and the Office governance and procedures.

Briefing of all surge personnel (standby partners, consultants, UNICEF staff from other offices) conducted within 72 hours of arrival.

EAPRO, UNICEF Pacific, and affected Field Offices

3 Ensure HR surge staff is one of the first staffing responses

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UNICEF PACIFIC – Fiji Office

LEADERSHIP AND MANAGEMENT

1

UNICEF Pacific to clarify and share Standard Operating Procedures outlining clear roles and responsibilities of key UNICEF management staff during an emergency, and ensure they are followed in future emergencies.

• For countries with a Field office

• For countries without a Field office

Senior management to develop a memoranda detailing reporting lines during an emergency and the authorities that will be devolved to the affected Field Office/s.

This should include a clear organogram showing reporting lines and SOPs for the following positions:

• Chief of Field Office • Chiefs of Sections • Emergency Coordinator

UNICEF Pacific CMT

FUNDRAISING

2

NYHQ to review their fundraising systems to reflect UNICEF Pacific as a multi-country setting, especially when disasters affect more than one country.

UNICEF Representative to write to OCHA Pacific and RC/HC requesting that in the future, when a disaster affects more than one country, the FTS be set up for a multi- country appeal, not solely for one affected country.

UNICEF Pacific Country Representative

HUMAN RESOURCES

1

UNICEF Pacific to develop a comprehensive Emergency Training Strategy.

Emergency Training Strategy developed.

UNICEF Pacific

All staff, not only PERT members, to be provided with access to basic emergency training.

Annual scenario training conducted including staff from Fiji Office and Field Offices.

3

All staff/ consultants/ stand-by partners receive induction on the emergency context and on UNICEF procedures.

Preparation of a short guidance note on UNICEF structure and systems in the Pacific, with particular information on emergency procedures.

UNICEF Pacific (DepRep and Operations Team)

3 Update and finalise the draft induction package on the Pacific context and UNICEF Pacific.

UNICEF Pacific (Human Resource section)

3

UNICEF Pacific to regularly review the emergency skills available within the team.

Annual review of emergency skills including identification of local emergency focal points/team leaders.

UNICEF Pacific including Fiji Office and all Field Offices

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FINANCE AND ADMINISTRATION

1

UNICEF Pacific to review its processes for financial transaction authority during emergencies to enable decentralization to the Field Office.

UNICEF Pacific senior management to agree on financial transaction authority arrangements during an emergency, ensuring at least one VISION user is in the FO during emergency.

UNICEF Pacific CMT

Standard Operating Procedures developed with roles and responsibilities clearly articulated.

• For utilizing VISION • For programme budgets

1 UNICEF Pacific to identify predictable humanitarian partnerships.

Contingency agreements in place with CSOs, private sector and other relevant actors.

UNICEF Pacific

(Operations team)

MEDIA AND COMMUNICATIONS

2

UNICEF Pacific to invest in an emergency communications kit.

Kit purchased and available for deployment.

UNICEF Pacific (Operations team together with Communications)

SUPPLY AND LOGISTICS

2 UNICEF Pacific to strategically review their emergency logistics and supply capacity.

Temporarily appoint an Emergency Supply and Planning position or hire a consultant

UNICEF Pacific

2

Identify regional/local suppliers and service providers able to provide consistent, quality goods in a timely manner.

UNICEF Pacific (Operations team)

3

Invest in the modernization of systems for supply and logistics information management in across the Pacific.

Logistics and supply systems updated.

UNICEF Pacific together with other emergency partners

MONITORING AND REPORTING

3

Increase the capacity of UNICEF Pacific on humanitarian performance monitoring, field monitoring, follow up and reporting.

Provide training to all staff on Humanitarian Performance Monitoring (HPM) and reporting.

UNICEF Pacific (Planning Specialist) with support from EAPRO as required

3 Ensure HPM and reporting support is quickly provided in future L2 emergencies.

UNICEF Pacific (HR)

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3 Ensure that UNICEF Pacific has the capacity to meet the reporting requirement of an L2 emergency.

Provide training to relevant staff on SitRep requirements.

UNICEF Pacific

3 Quickly engage a full time Reporting Officer in future L2 emergencies.

UNICEF Pacific (HR)

PARTNERSHIP WITH GOVERNMENT AND EXTERNAL PARTNERS

1

UNICEF Pacific to continue to build the capacity of Pacific Island governments on emergency preparedness and response in maternal and child health, nutrition, education, child protection & gender-based violence.

Review NDMO and relevant line ministry emergency preparedness and response plans and capacity (including Ministry of Health, Ministry of Justice, Ministry of Education and the Ministry of Land, water, resources)

UNICEF Pacific (with governments)

Develop WASH and Education cluster SoPs covering both preparedness and response.

UNICEF Pacific together with Save the Children (Education)

2

Discuss with both the Prime Minister’s Office and with NDMOs regarding additional opportunities to support emergency preparedness and response.

UNICEF Pacific and Chiefs of Field Offices

3 Conduct annual reviews of government partners’ capacity.

3

Include government representatives in National cluster coordination and information management training, including how to calculate targets by age, sex and special groups e.g. pregnant and lactating women, people with disabilities)

3

Support the preparation and updating of baseline data for each of the key humanitarian indicators in the relevant countries.

UNICEF PACIFIC – Field Offices

DISASTER PREPAREDNESS

1 All UNICEF Pacific offices to review their EWEA and re-examine their preparedness plans.

Ensure the mandatory 10 key actions in EWEA are updated, gaps identified and appropriate actions completed.

UNICEF Pacific – Chiefs of Field Offices

1 Ensure the key EWEA procedures are shared widely with team members.

UNICEF Pacific – Chiefs of Field Offices

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7. Bibliography

Asian Development Bank: Disaster Risk Reduction and Management in the Pacific: http://www.adb.org/publications/disaster-risk-reduction-and-management-pacific

UNOCHA CERF: http://www.unocha.org/cerf/cerf-worldwide/where-we-work/vtu-2015

Flash Appeal: https://fts.unocha.org/pageloader.aspx?page=emerg-emergencyDetails&emergID=16569

HAP Appeal: https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/en/system/files/documents/files/vanuatu_tc_pam_hap.pdf

UNICEF HAC appeal: http://www.unicef.org/appeals/pacific_islands.html

General documentation

• Government of Vanuatu (2015) Tropical Cyclone Pam - Humanitarian Action Plan. May 2015 • Government of Vanuatu (2015) Vanuatu Post Disaster Needs Assessment. • Government of Vanuatu, National Disaster Management Office (2015) - Lessons learned presentation • Humanity Road (2015) Social Media 3W Report #4 - 25 March 2015. • OCHA (2015) End of Mission Report - United Nations Disaster Assessment and Coordination Team (UNDAC) –

Tropical Cyclone Pam, Vanuatu 16 March – 4 April 2015. • OCHA (2015) Flash Appeal – Emergency response plan for Vanuatu Tropical Cyclone Pam (March-June 2015) • SCF, Care, Oxfam and WVI (2015) One Size Doesn’t Fit All Tailoring the International Response to the National

Need Following Vanuatu’s Cyclone Pam. • UNDAC (2015) End of Mission Report - United Nations Disaster Assessment & Coordination Team: Tropical

Cyclone Pam, Vanuatu [16 March to 04 April 2015] • UNICEF (06/2015) Key lessons After four months of the humanitarian response to cyclone Pam (Vanuatu,

Solomon Islands, Kiribati, Tuvalu) Prepared for Dan Toole. June 2015 • UNICEF (2011) Evaluation of UNICEF’s Response to Tropical Cyclones Vania & Atu, Vanuatu. Vanuatu Field

Office, UNICEF. • UNICEF Pacific – Vanuatu Update – August 2015 • UNICEF Pacific (2015) Terms of Reference for an After Action Review of UNICEF Pacific’s preparedness and

response to Cyclone Pam and Typhoon Maysak (Annex 1). • World Humanitarian Summit (2015) Regional Consultation for the Pacific – Auckland 20 June – 2 July 2015. Final

Report

UNICEF L2 Procedures

• L2 Presentation (Fr. And Eng. Versions) • L2 Recommendation Memo by EAPRO to HQ (19 March 2015) • Recruitment and Staffing in Emergency Situations. • UNICEF (2009) PCAs and SSFAs Guidelines (CF/EXD/2009-011) – FRG/PROCEDURE/2015/001. • UNICEF (2010) Core commitments for children in Humanitarian Action. UNICEF, New York • UNICEF (2010) Recruitment and staffing in emergency situations - CF/EXD/2010-005. • UNICEF (2013) UNICEF Procedure for Level 2 Emergencies – Annex 1 to CF/EXD/2013-003 • UNICEF (2015) UNICEF Procedure for County and Regional Office transfer of resources to Civil Society

Organizations • UNICEF Procedure for Level 2 Emergencies. Annex 1 to CF/EXD/2013-003.

UNICEF Pacific internal documents

• End of Mission Reports or Handover Notes: Andrew Parker, Patrick Shing, Tom Ziraguma, Marisa Riccardo, Briony Stevens, Astrid Dionisio, Bill Fellows, Mioh Nemoto, Mark Choonoo

• EWEA downloads – Vanuatu Field Office

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• Trip reports: Anthea Moore (Vanuatu), Rasika Sridhar Sethi (Tuvalu) • UNICEF - Pacific Cyclone Pam Emergency Timeline (March – April 2015) • UNICEF (2015) Emergency Response Proposal - UNICEF Pacific - Submitted to the Government of Japan:

Emergency response to children and their families affected by Cyclone Pam – Vanuatu, Tuvalu, Solomon Islands, Kiribati

• UNICEF (undated) Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) - Regional Rapid Response Mechanism for deployment of Emergency Human Resources. East Asia and the Pacific Region

• UNICEF Operation Staffing Matrix – Cyclone Pam workbook, version at as 27 April 2015 • UNICEF Pacific – Funding overview for Cyclone Pam – data as at 28 September 2015 • UNICEF Pacific – SOP - PA pool Vanuatu emergency response monitoring sheet (version as at 28 September

2015). • UNICEF Vanuatu Field Office Business Continuity Plan – Key Performance Indicators. EWEA, 27 June 2014

UNICEF Updates and Situation Reports

• UNICEF Pacific Island Countries Storms update #1- 12 March 2015 • UNICEF Pacific Island Countries Storms update #2- 12 March 2015 • Tropical Cyclone Pam Preparedness and Response - Update 3: 13-14 March 2015 • Humanitarian Situation Report 1 (14 March 2015) • Humanitarian Situation Report No. 10 (25 – 26 March 2015) • Humanitarian Situation Report No. 11 (27 – 28 March 2015) • Humanitarian Situation Report No. 12 (29 March – 1 April 2015) • Humanitarian Situation Report No. 13 (2 – 4 April 2015) • Humanitarian Situation Report No. 14 (8 April 2015) • Humanitarian Situation Report No. 15 (8 – 13 April 2015) • Humanitarian Situation Report No. 16 (14 – 21 April 2015) • Humanitarian Situation Report No. 17 (22 – 27 April 2015) • Humanitarian Situation Report No. 18 (28 April – 5 May 2015) • Humanitarian Situation Report No. 19 (6 – 16 May 2015) • Humanitarian Situation Report No. 20 (17 – 30 May 2015) • Humanitarian Situation Report No. 21 (31 May – 13 June 2015) • Humanitarian Situation Report No. 22 (14 - 27 June 2015) • Humanitarian Situation Report No. 23 (28 June – 14 July 2015) • Humanitarian Situation Report No. 24 (15 – 31 July 2015)

OCHA Situation Reports

• Situation Report No. 2 (as of 16 March 2015) • Situation Report No. 3 (as of 17 March 2015) • Situation Report No. 5 (as of 19 March 2015) • Situation Report No. 6 (as of 20 March 2015) • Situation Report No. 8 (as of 22 March 2015) • Situation Report No. 13 (as of 27 March 2015) • Situation Report No. 14 (as of 30 March 2015) • Situation Report No. 17 (as of 8 April 2015) • Situation Report No. 18 (as of 15 April 2015)

NDMO Situation Reports

• Situation Report No. 5 (from 17 March 2015) • Situation Report No. 8 (from 20 March 2015) • Situation Report No. 13 (from 27 March 2015) • Situation Report No. 15 (from 31 March 2015) • Situation Report No. 16 (from 1 - 3 April 2015) • Situation Report No. 20 (from 9 April 2015) • Situation Report No. 21 (from 16 April 2015)

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Vanuatu Tropical Cyclone Pam lessons learned documentation53

• Emergency Response from Cyclone Pam. Shefa Province Lessons Learned Workshop. 11 June 2015. Ministry of Lands, WASH Cluster, & UNICEF.

• Emergency Response from Cyclone Pam. Tafea Province Lessons Learned Workshop. 5 June 2015. Ministry of Lands, WASH Cluster, & UNICEF.

• Emergency Response to Cyclone Pam. National WASH Lessons Learned Workshop. 22 June 2015. (Draft). Ministry of Lands, WASH Cluster, & UNICEF.

• Gender and Protection Cluster Tropical Cyclone Pam Lessons Learned Workshop Report. 5 May 2015. Melanesian Hotel, Port Vila. Care International & Ministry of Justice & Community Services.

• Lessons Learned from TC Pam: Health & Nutrition Cluster. 21 May 2015 o Health Cluster Lessons Learned Workshop. Assets and Infrastructure Working Group. 21 May 2015. o Health Cluster Lessons Learned Workshop. Foreign Medical Teams. 21 May 2015. o Health Cluster Lessons Learned Workshop. Health Cluster Coordination. 21 May 2015. o Health Cluster Lessons Learnt Workshop. Expanded Program on Immunization. 21 May 2015. o Health Cluster Lessons Learnt Workshop. Information, Education & Communication. 21 May 2015. o Health Cluster Lessons Learnt Workshop. RMNCAH Working Group. 21 May 2015. o Health Cluster Lessons Learnt Workshop. Surveillance. 21 May 2015.

• Lessons Learnt from Tropical Cyclone Pam for Tafea Provincial Disaster Committee. June 2015. Tafea Provincial Disaster Committee and Care International Vanuatu.

• Logistics Cluster Lessons Learned and WFP Recommendations to NDMO. • TC Pam: Women in Emergency Response and Recovery Forum. Port Vila, 9 – 10 June 2015. • UNICEF (2015) Snapshot report: Cyclone Pam online media, broadcast and social media. 26 May 2015. • UNICEF (2015) “Making do”: Communications challenges in Vanuatu in the wake of Cyclone Pam. Presentation

for Emergency Media and Public Affairs Conference. Auckland, New Zealand, July 2015. • UNICEF (2015) Field monitoring – Vanuatu Cyclone Pam response – Lessons learned – 28 July 2015 • UNICEF (2015) UNICEF Pacific mid-year review meeting, 13-15th July 2015. Suva, Fiji • Vanuatu Education Cluster Tropical Cyclone Pam Response Lessons Learned. 16 June 2015. • Vanuatu Shelter Cluster. Tropical Cyclone Pam Response Lessons Learned. June 2015. Prepared by International

Federation of Red Cross for the Shelter Cluster. (Draft)

53 Most of the documents listed are available via the link: https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/en/operations/vanuatu/health/documents?search=&page=1

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8. Annexes

Annex 1: After Action Review Terms of Reference

Requesting Section: Deputy Resentative’s office (PME) Date: June 2015

Each year, UNICEF Pacific assists with the preparation for and response to tropical cyclones and typhoons in the Pacific. In 2015, UNICEF has already responded to two Category 5 events, Cyclone Pam and Typhoon Maysak. Cyclone Pam was declared a Level 2 emergency54, triggering the use of UNICEF simplified emergency operating procedures. UNICEF Pacific is seeking a consultant(s) to lead a mixed-methods review including two after action review workshops of UNICEF’s preparation for and response to Cyclone Pam and Typhoon Maysak, focusing on the utilisation of internal UNICEF processes and recommendations for future responses.

Partners, particularly in Vanuatu, have conducted a number of reviews of the impact and effectiveness of the emergency response to cyclone Pam. In May 2015 the Vanuatu National Disaster Management Organization (NDMO) and line Ministries began a process of reviewing the response. These reviews also addressed the interagency accountability of the Humanitarian Coordinator and the clusters. UNICEF provided technical support to the WASH, Education and Child Protection Review processes at the national and sub-national levels. The focus of these reviews and evaluations on the impact and effectiveness of the response create a context for the proposed UNICEF review to focus on internal UNICEF processes.

Purpose and Objective

The purpose of the review is to examine UNICEF Pacific’s use of disaster preparedness and emergency response systems for a Level 2 emergency, and by doing so, to identify both successes and also areas for improvement in terms of disaster preparedness and response. This review is taking place in the context of many other agency and Government led cluster reviews of the impact of the response. Therefore this is an internal review intended primarily as a learning exercise for UNICEF. The knowledge and recommendations from this review are expected to be particularly relevant to preparedness and response in other small island states, which are increasingly vulnerable to more frequent and higher impact natural disasters.

The principle objective of the review will be to share knowledge on what worked well and to provide guidance on how to better utilise UNICEF systems for preparedness and response to emergencies for UNICEF Offices in Vanuatu, Solomon Islands and Kiribati Offices and the UNICEF Pacific Multi-Country Office (the primary audience). The secondary objective is to provide feedback to the East Asia and Pacific Regional Office (EAPRO) and UNICEF Headquarters (HQ - the secondary audience) on which UNICEF procedures worked well and which may need refinement.

Mandate

UNICEF’s Core Commitments for Children in humanitarian action (CCCs) outline agency wide obligations to children affected by disaster. These commitments are the full range of obligations that UNICEF will

54 UNICEF designation Cyclone Pam a Level 2 Emergency means that “the Country Office needs additional and prioritized support from other parts of the organization (HQ, RO and COs) to respond and that the RO must provide leadership and support.”

UNICEF Pacific

TERMS OF REFERENCE FOR AN AFTER ACTION REVIEW OF UNICEF PACIFIC’S PREPAREDNESS AND RESPONSE FOR CYCLONE PAM AND TYPHOON MAYSAK

42

advocate for with government and other partners. It is usually the role of the country office to ensure the CCC’s are prioritized during a response and that children are identified as an extremely vulnerable group.

The designation of a Level 2 Emergency triggers simplified operating procedures and increases global, particularly regional, support to the affected country office(s) to meet the coordination, technical, operational and resource mobilisation scale-up needed to allow UNICEF to meet the CCC’s as well as interagency cluster obligations. This review will draw out credible lessons learned that to enhance UNICEF’s emergency preparedness and response in the Pacific as well as informing region and global good practice for Level 2 responses.

Context

The Pacific is one of the most disaster-prone regions on earth. Climate change is contributing to increase in intensity and frequency of tropical cyclones, floods, and droughts as well as rising sea levels, which have resulted in chronic emergency conditions55. This also increases people of the Pacific Island Countries (PICs) vulnerability to the impacts of natural disasters, especially the poor, who are more exposed, thus less able to reduce risk and to recover from disasters. Each year UNICEF Pacific supports disaster preparation in the Pacific region though: disaster risk reduction and resilience building programming; early warning early action systems; prepositioning response supplies; training UNICEF and national governments staff; contracting arrangements; and other measures. Over the first half of 2015, these preparations have been utilised for two responses to large tropical storms.

Cyclone Pam

On 19 March 2015, UNICEF declared Cyclone Pam to be a Level 2 Emergency. While UNICEF responded to Cyclone Pam in four countries (Kiribati, Solomon Islands, Tuvalu and Vanuatu), the highest level of damage and the focus of the response was in Vanuatu. There were 11 reported deaths and approximately 166,000 persons affected in the initial assessment. More than 70% of the largely traditional housing stock was destroyed together with a significant percentage of the public services buildings; in hardest hit areas, up to 90% of crops were destroyed. The Government declared a state of emergency on 15 March and a wide range of bilateral, regional and other humanitarian donors immediately committed international assistance.

The Level 2 designation was adopted to enhance UNICEF Pacific’s response by:

• Enabling a number of additional simplifications and fast-tracking measures to complement simplifications already available per existing UNICEF rules and regulations related to Human Resources, Administrative and Financial Regulations and Supply emergency procedures;

• Securing prioritized, enhanced support to a country-led response from the Regional Office and Headquarters and;

• Bolstering the Regional Office technical support.

UNICEF Response

UNICEF and partners are assisting the Governments of the cyclone-affected PICs in providing affected children with life-saving emergency interventions and early recovery to normality. Integrated into the response are activities that strengthen resilience for mitigating the impact of future natural disasters. Examples are water safety and security plans for affected communities that are dependent on only one water source, and integrating disaster risk reduction (DRR) lessons learned into psychosocial counselling sessions for children, caregivers and teachers so that they can improve preparedness measures and lower the risk of future disasters. UNICEF is also supporting and strengthening Government coordination mechanisms as the Government’s cluster co-lead for water, sanitation and hygiene (WASH), and supporting the National Disaster Management Office, Ministries of Education, Health, Justice, and Lands and Natural Resources (for Water) with both cyclone response and disaster risk management measures. UNICEF’s provision of WASH assistance will be part of the overall sector’s response to an affected

55 Reference: short history of natural disasters in the Pacific, prepared by Per Becker, DRR specialist, UNICEF Pacific.

43

population of some 110,000 people of which UNICEF directly targets 70,000 with access to safe water, sanitation facilities, improved hygiene practices, and identification of alternate water sources as part of DRR. UNICEF sought to provide kits including soap, household water treatment and dignity kits for girls and women. UNICEF worked with key partners to provide emergency health services to prevent and treat childhood illnesses including the re-establishment of cold-chain capacities, the immunization of some 25,000 under-5 children against measles, and the restoration of other health services for mothers, pregnant women, new-borns and children, with a focus on leading causes of under-five mortality identified through sentinel surveillance. The nutrition situation is concerning; almost one in three children are chronically malnourished as a result of long-term nutritional deficiencies and inadequate infant and young child feeding practices and which put them at high risk for acute malnutrition, especially in communities where water is contaminated and food scarce. UNICEF is supporting government efforts to reach emergency-affected populations through both community and clinic-based interventions including identifying acute malnutrition cases for referral and treatment as well as infant and young child feeding counselling, and distribution of micronutrients. UNICEF support also includes resumption of education for 22,500 affected children through establishment of temporary and safe learning spaces and provision of teaching and learning materials. In addition, this programme incorporates psychosocial support and lessons learned to reduce risk, reaching young and adolescent children, as well as caregivers and teachers affected by the cyclone in order to minimise damaging effects of trauma.

For the latest reporting on the results of UNICEF programming please see the Situation Reports at http://www.unicef.org/pacificislands/1831_23761.html.

Reviews and Evaluations of the Response to Cyclone PAM

A number of reviews of the impact and effectiveness of the emergency response have been conducted. In May 2015 the Vanuatu National Disaster Management Organization (NDMO) and line Ministries began a process of reviewing the response. These reviews also addressed the interagency accountability of the Humanitarian Coordinator and the clusters. UNICEF provided technical support to the WASH, Education and Child Protection Review processes at the national and sub-national levels.

NOTE: As indicated in Purpose and Objectives, the focus of these reviews and evaluations on the impact and effectiveness of the response create a context for the UNICEF AAR workshops to focus on internal UNICEF processes. It is intended that the consultant should review the outcomes of the other evaluations as part of a desk review process.

Typhoon Maysak

From 29 to 31 March, Typhoon Maysak caused extensive damage across the Federated States of Micronesia (FSM). Yap and Chuuk states were the worst affected with all five reported fatalities occurring in Chuuk. The United States Agency for International Development (USAID), estimated that 29,000 people were directly affected by the storm and damage throughout the FSM amounted to USD 8.5 million. This was a Level 1 Emergency with the response handled internally by UNICEF Pacific.

Management of the Review

The overall responsibility for organizing and conducting the review will be under the supervision of the evaluation management group that will provide guidance to the consultant and quality assure key deliverables. UNICEF Pacific in Suva, Fiji will lead the review in close collaboration with the field office in Port Vila, Vanuatu. Field offices in the Solomon Islands and Kiribati, as well as UNICEF staff in Tuvalu will also be consulted.

Scope of the review

The review will cover the preparation and response phases for Cyclone Pam and Typhoon Maysak in all countries where UNICEF provided a response. The overall impact of UNICEF emergency programming is being considered through other, multi-agency processes. Instead, this review will focus on UNICEF

44

processes with a focus on learning around disaster response management, including preparedness for future responses.

There will be a focus on the response to Cyclone Pam in Vanuatu as the largest response conducted by the Pacific Multi-Country Office in several years. Typhoon Maysak is included in order to consider systemic issues and the differing challenges facing sub-regions of the Pacific.

Key Review Questions

The key review questions are:

• What worked well? • What didn’t work well? • How can we improve?

While other issues may be identified through the desk review, the preliminary interviews and the workshop, it is expected that the key review questions will be applied to the following key topics:

• Utilisation of UNICEF processes for disaster preparedness by various levels of the organisation (Country, Regional office, HQ divisions and units)

• Focus on measures that can be taken in the lead up to cyclone season and in the days/hours prior to a cyclone/typhoon

• Particular interest/special attention will be given to review: a) emergency clauses in suppliers/partners contracts; b) prepositioning of supplies; c) training of staff and placement of staff

• Utilisation of UNICEF emergency procedures 56activated by the Level 2 emergency • Clear guidance for future responses • Concrete recommendations with clear accountabilities for better: • Preparedness; and • Use of Level 2 procedures by the Pacific Office. • Targeted recommendations to the Regional Office and Headquarters on Level 2 procedures.

Methodology

The review is to be carried out through: a desk review; a linked set of two after action review workshops (the first in Port Vila, Vanuatu and the second in Suva, Fiji); key informant interviews; analysis and synthesis of these inputs; and presentation of a final report including recommendations.

Desk Review

The first step will be to conduct a thorough review of relevant documents including but not limited to: UNICEF Level 2 simplified operating procedures; relevant UNICEF policies and guidance; situation reports; reporting from other reviews of Cyclone Pam, particularly those in which UNICEF participated; UNICEF Pacific Early Warning Early Action materials; UNICEF timeline of the first 30 days of the response; handover notes and exit reports from deployed staff, initial key lessons document prepared by the Pacific Office.

Background literature and materials as well as key information sources will be provided upon commencement of the contract.

56 UNICEF procedures will be provided as part of background materials upon commencement of the contract

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After Action Review (AAR) workshops

Two AAR workshops are to be conducted. The first should take place in Port Vila, Vanuatu (August, dates to be confirmed). This will focus solely on preparedness for and the response to Cyclone Pam in Vanuatu.

The second will should take place in Suva, Fiji (August, dates to be confirmed). This will be broader, looking at the response to Cyclone Pam and Typhoon Maysak in all relevant countries. The second workshop should be informed by and build upon the first workshop.

It is expected that each AAR workshop will be between 1 and 2 days in duration.

Key informant interviews

These should be conducted prior to or after the first workshop, but should be largely completed prior to the second workshop. It is anticipated that most of the interviews will be with relevant UNICEF staff/contractors/stand-by-partners involved in the responses. However, UN, governments and implementing partners may also be interviewed where appropriate. Interviews should be conducted with personnel in Vanuatu, the Solomon Islands, Kiribati, FSM, Tuvalu, Fiji and EAPRO. It is recommended that face-to-face meetings are done in Vanuatu and Fiji only. For other interviews, telephone or Skype or other online methods are recommended.

Suggested contact persons and contact details will be provided upon commencement of the contract.

Ethical Considerations

The UNICEF Procedure for Ethical Standards In Research, Evaluation, Data Collection and Analysis will be provided, the contractor should ensure compliance with all relevant provisions. Where appropriate, informants should be assured confidentiality. The Consultant’s proposal must include a section identifying anticipated or actual ethical issues throughout the process as well as the measures and methods anticipated or adopted to address or mitigate against these issues.

Work Assignment

The consultant will review all existing documentation; manage interviews; provide qualitative and quantitative data analysis findings; and recommendations to the required standards.

Throughout the review process, the consultant(s) will be responsible for ensuring the quality of the information collected as well as ensuring that all data collection activities are in compliance with the UNICEF procedures and evaluation standards. The consultant(s) is responsible for ensuring that key informant interviews and particularly the AAR workshops are properly documented. This may include sub-contracting additional personnel for documentation and note taking.

Work Schedule

The contract will commence during the first week of August and payment will be based on up to 5 weeks (25 days) of paid work over a period of up to 6 weeks, depending on the final scheduling of the two AAR workshops.

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Detailed work schedule and deliverables

Weeks Activities Deliverables

1 - 2

Desk review

Preparation of workshops

Preparation of schedule of key informant interviews

Review work plan including:

Detailed draft AAR workshop agendas including participative activities and clear processes for recording and documentation

Schedule of key informant interviews

Questions for key informant interviews

Draft table of contents for the Final Report

3 – 4

AAR workshop Vanuatu

Key informant interviews (can begin before the AAR in Vanuatu)

AAR in Fiji

Weekly email update of progress

Finalised AAR workshop agenda

Documentation of the first (Vanuatu) AAR to be provided within 3 working days of the AAR

5

Analysis and synthesis of information

Preparation of final report

Presentation of recommendations through email, Skype and/or meeting

Final report including:

A text report with clearly presented SMART strategic and operational recommendations for the field offices and UNICEF Pacific office to be better prepared to respond to future disasters,

As per UNICEF Procedures, the report must include a section identifying anticipated or actual ethical issues throughout the process as well as the measures and methods adopted to mitigate against these issues.

Annex of one page feedback each for UNICEF EAPRO and Head Quarters

Annexes with documentation of both workshops and key informant interviews

A brief power point presentation of the key recommendations.

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Annex 2: UNICEF response timeline – TC Pam & Typhoon Maysak

March April May June July

Key actions in advance of TC Pam

Early warning for TC Pam - Solomon Islands, New Caledonia, Vanuatu 4-7

Early warning for TC Pam - Solomon Islands and Vanuatu 6-11

Authorization to deploy Emergency Coordinator and Communications Specialist to Vanuatu 8

1st meeting of Pacific Emergency Response Team (PERT) in Suva 9

Initial surge deployment list developed 9

"Heads up message" to EAPRO 8

1st and 2nd UNICEF internal updates 12

Teleconference with EAPRO at request of OIC 12

Creation of specific results and coded activities structure in system 12

Alert registered in EWEA 12

TC Pam made landfall (Vanuatu) 13

UNICEF HQ, EAPRO and Suva Office

3rd UNICEF internal situation update 14

Engagement to provide support to EAPRO and CO 14

Pacific included in HQ fast tracked recruitment 14

First REMT Meeting 14

First joint HR (EAPRO/CO) - agree on surge/staff deployment plans 14

L2 triggers mandatory regular teleconferences with all levels of UNICEF – HQ/SD/EAPRO/CO. 15

First HQ coordination meeting 16

Draft supply plan (UNICEF Pacific) 18

Recommendation memo for L2 goes to HQ from EAPRO RD 19

Approval of L2 status (HQ) 20

Agreement that deployments should be at least 2 months 21

Draft programme strategy 25

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Fundraising

Issuance of Immediate Needs document by Pacific Office 14

EPF for US$1 million approved 14

Issuance of updated (plus one million) immediate needs document 15

Provision of initial USD$200,000 16

EPF US$1million received 21

New PCA format (including SSFAs) 24

EPF US$1million received 21

Flash Appeal prepared 22

Flash Appeal launched - USD 29.9 million [UNICEF Appeal for USD 4.8 million] - launched 24th March 24

CERF launched 27

UNICEF HAC launched 31

Resource mobilisation strategy shared 2

UNICEF HAC revision

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March April May June July Aug Sept V

AN

UA

TU

Context

Preparedness activities specific to TC Pam by the UNICEF Vanuatu Office 11-13

UNICEF Vanuatu Office closed 12

TC Pam made landfall (Vanuatu) 13

Humanitarian Action Plan starts 1

Human Resources

Communications Specialist arrived 10

Chief of Field Office/Emergency Coordinator arrived 12

Initial check on Field Office staff 14

First wave of surge support arrive through RRM and from Supply Division 16

Assessments UNDAC assessment 16.03 - 04.04

Logistics and supply

First shipment of supplies from Copenhagen 17

Supplies arrive from Noumea 18

First supplies arrived from Fiji 26

Warehouse set up in Vanuatu 3

WASH supplies airlifted to Tanna

WASH supplies handed to Provincial Government (Tanna)

1st supplier SSFA in place (logistics)

Communications Regular media interviews

Reporting

First UNICEF SitRep 14

Daily SitRep

SitRep frequency reduced to weekly 8

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KIRIBATI

Early warning information (TC Pam) available 6-11

Kiribati affected 11-12

Preparedness measures 11-12

Distribution of pre-positioned items

Shipment of supplies arrive 23

Assessment done 6

SOLOMON ISLANDS


Solomon Islands affected 11-12

Distribution of pre-positioned items

TUVALU


Tuvalu affected 11-12

Airlift of emergency supplies with French charter 19

Sea shipment of additional supplies arrives in Tuvalu 13

FSM

Typhoon Maysak affects FSM 31

Supplies sent to FSM 10 7

Visit by Country Representative 7-14

Visit by Immunization Specialist

March April May June July Aug Sept Oct

Lessons learned activities

Gender and Protection Cluster 5

Health and Nutrition Cluster 21

Communications lessons learned 26

Tafea Province WASH 5

Shefa Province WASH 11

Education Cluster 16

National WASH 22

National lessons learned (NDMO) 24

UNICEF Mid Year Review 13

Field monitoring lessons learned 28

UNICEF After Action Review 07.09- 12-10

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Annex 3: List of key informants (semi-structured interviews)

Name Position

UNICEF Headquarters

1 Jens Grimm Supply Division

2 Odile Bulton EMOPS focal point for Cyclone Pam

3 Lauren Cheshire HR/Stand-by roster (New York)

UNICEF East Asia Pacific Regional Office

4 Dan Toole Regional Director

5 Carmen von Heese EAPRO Regional Advisor, Emergencies

6 Mioh Nemoto Surged to Vanuatu as Emergency Coordinator

7 Andy Brown Media attention, fundraising

8 Pelle Verlandia EWEA Specialist

UNICEF MULTI-COUNTRY OFFICE, Pacific Island Countries

9 Karen Allen Country Representative

10 Isabelle Austin Deputy Country Representative

11 Devraj Daby Chief of Operations

12 Dorette Yee-Mar Human Resource Specialist

13 Alice Clements Communications

14 Anthea Moore Planning Specialist

15 Dhiraj Singh Finance Assistant

16 Sandeep Prasad Finance Officer

17 Filomena Ratumaibuca Programme Budget officer

18 Simon Molendijk Education Specialist

19 Iosefo Volau Education Specialist

20 Niki Abrishamian Chief of Section: Education

21 Amy Clancy HIV/AIDS Specialist

22 Mark Overmars WASH Specialist

23 Brooke Yamakoshi WASH Specialist

UNICEF Vanuatu Field Office

24 Ketsamay Rajphangthong CFO Vanuatu FO

25 Andrew Parker Former Emergency Coordinator (now CFO)

26 Mark Choonoo Emergency Coordinator

27 Kim Claveau Logistics Officer

28 Julie Dolton Warehouse Manager

29 Briony Stevens Nutritionist

30 Marissa Ricardo Child Health Specialist

31 Patrick Shing Humanitarian Performance Monitoring Specialist

32 Tom Ziraguma Supply specialist

33 Joemela Simeon Child Protection Officer

34 Rosyln David UN Affairs Officer

35 Rebecca Olul M&E Officer/Communications/C4D Officer

36 Simone Akua Administrative Assistant

37 Hilson Taulau WASH Programme Officer

38 Shyam Pathak Health and Nutrition Programme Officer

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UNICEF NZ

39 Hamish Linsday Program Manager, UNICEF NZ

40 Justin Kemp Program Officer, UNICEF NZ

Kiribati, Solomon Islands, Tuvalu

41 Yun Jong Kang Chief of Field Office, Solomon Islands

42 Laisani Peterson

Child Protection officer (was acting chief of Kiribati field office)

43 Rasika Sethi Education officer, previously in Tuvalu

Government of Vanuatu

44 Shadrack Welegtabit Director, NDMO

45 Apisai Tokon Reproductive Health, Ministry of Health

46 Louisa Tokon Nutrition Office, Ministry of Health

47 Ericson Sammy

Director, Department of Geology, Mines and Water Resources (DGMWR)

48 Brecht Mommen WASH Specialist - UNICEF/DGMWR

49 Benjamin Shing Director, DSPPAC

50 Ettienne Ravo Civil Registry Office

External stakeholders

51 Osnat Lubrani

Resident Coordinator for UN System’s Operational Activities

52 Sune Gudnitz Head of Office, OCHA Regional Office for the Pacific

53 Vincent Omuga

Humanitarian Affairs Officer, OCHA Regional Office for the Pacific

54 Tom Skirrow Country Director, Save the Children

55 Michael Wolfe Country Director, World Vision

56 Jake Ward WASH Team Leader, Oxfam

57 Colin Collette Van Rooyen Country Director, Oxfam

58 Daniel Vorbach Associate Country Director (External Goals), Oxfam

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Annex 4: Semi-structured interview guide for key informant interviews

UNICEF Key Informants

Preparedness measures: • What (if any) preparedness measures did UNICEF make before TC Pam hit?

o Check prepositioning of supplies; o Check training of staff and placement of staff

• Do you think they made a difference to the response? How? • Any suggestions for improving preparedness for next time?

L2 declaration and procedures: • Understand each KI’s interpretation/understanding of key changes brought about by L2

declaration • How (if at all) did it impact your role? • What were the main L2 related changes that the programme team had taken to utilise the

corporate emergency activation procedure (CEAP) to its maximum and to do business differently?

• How did these changes improve UNICEF’s response? • Any parts of L2 procedures that were inappropriate/impractical • Any suggestions for changing the L2 procedures (understand the parts to be kept, plus any

additions, changes, removals)

Overall response: • In your opinion, how effective was the UNICEF response to TC Pam? • What were the specific elements of the response that made it effective? (e.g. timeliness,

plans, resources e.g.DM tools, HR, finances, structure). • What were the main challenges for UNICEF in delivering the programmatic response to TC

Pam? • What do you think was the most important contributing factors to TC Pam response

successes? (e.g. personnel, communications, operational plans, DP plans, reputation, partnerships, etc.)

• In what ways could the response be more effective? • How did UNICEF ensure that its responses were relevant and appropriate?

Kiribati/Tuvalu/Solomon Islands/FSM

• UNICEF response in affected countries

• How/why were they included in the TC Pam Appeal?

• Did level of response meet needs? • Challenges faced • Support received vs. support needed

Government of Vanuatu

• In your opinion, how effective was the overall response to TC Pam? • How did UNICEF contribute to the government response? • What were the specific elements of the UNICEF response that made it effective? (e.g.

timeliness, plans, resources, tools, HR, finances, structure…) • In what ways could the UNICEF response be more effective? • Do you feel that UNICEF contributed to the government’s response in any way? • Can you comment on UNICEF’s role within the clusters?

o WASH cluster lead o Presence in Education, protection clusters

• How appropriate was support you received from UNICEF in response to TC Pam? o Was the provision of supplies timely and appropriate?

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o Was the provision of coordination support (human resources) timely and appropriate?

• How easy was it to do business with UNICEF for the TC Pam response in comparison to: o Regular UNICEF programming o Other UN agencies?

• Were the any elements of the UNICEF response that affected your organization or

communities POSITIVELY? o Elaborate


communities NEGATIVELY? o Elaborate

• Do you think that work UNICEF did during the TC Pam response will affect future disaster

management programming or initiatives? How? • What could UNICEF do differently/better?

External partners

• What is your position/function? • What was your role in the TC Pam response? • What was the relationship between your organization and UNICEF during the TC Pam

response?

• How did UNICEF contribute (if at all) to your organizations response?

o Check on emergency clauses in suppliers/partners contracts • Were the any elements of the UNICEF response that affected your organization or

communities POSITIVELY? o Elaborate


communities NEGATIVELY? o Elaborate

• What were the specific elements of the UNICEF response that made it effective? (e.g.

timeliness, plans, resources, tools, HR, finances, structure…) • In what ways could the UNICEF response be more effective?

• Do you feel that UNICEF contributed to your response in any way? • How appropriate was support you received from UNICEF in response to TC Pam? • How easy was it to do business with UNICEF for the TC Pam response in comparison to:

o Regular UNICEF programming o Other UN agencies?

• Looking ahead, what aspects of the UNICEF TC Pam response should be built upon both at a program level and at structural level?

• Can you comment on UNICEF’s role within the clusters?

o WASH cluster lead o Presence in Education, protection clusters

• Do you think that work UNICEF did during the TC Pam response will affect future disaster

management programming or initiatives? How? • What could UNICEF do differently/better?

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Annex 5: After Action Review - Workshop Agenda (Vanuatu Field Office)

After Action Review Workshop Agenda

Tuesday 22nd September 2015

Port Vila, Vanuatu

Facilitators: Sophie Dunn (Consultant) and Riccardo Polastro (Regional Advisor, Evaluation, UNICEF East Asia Pacific Regional Office) Note Taker: Anthea Moore (Planning Specialist, UNICEF Pacific Multi-Country Office)

Timing Session Purpose & method

9.00-9.15

Welcome by the Chief of Field Office

Introduction to the workshop, ground rules, and handling sensitivities (Riccardo)

Brief presentation on the L2 procedures, the purpose of the workshop and the agenda (Sophie)

Activity: Introduction of participants

Build common understanding of why we’ve come together.

9.15-9.30

What happened and when? Building a common understanding of the timeline

Activity: Key events

- Reflecting back on key points in the response (external events and dates of key UNICEF activities)

Whole group wall exercise.

Participants each receive on key event to place on a blank timeline.

Additional events contributed by group members (internal or external events that made a difference to their roles).

9.30 – 11.15

What went well? What could have gone better?

Activity: Brainstorming on key themes that have emerged as priority areas of focus from the document review and AAR interviews

Key themes to be discussed (15 minutes each)

• Human Resources • Finance • Logistics and supply

Group splits into small groups (3-4 people)

Flip chart for each topic is on the wall divided into four equal sections: What went well (preparedness), What went well (response), What could have gone better (preparedness), what could have gone better (response).

Each group is provided with sticky notes.

Once brainstorm time is complete, groups should stick their points onto the wall into the appropriate section (what went well/ what could have gone better/ preparedness/ response

Morning tea break

Continuation of activity:

• Management • Other topics

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For each theme, small groups to think about:

- What worked well?

- What could have gone better?

- Are the points related to preparedness or response?

11.15 – 11.45

Plenary discussion of each topic

Group discussion to ensure that participants are clear on meaning of all points.

11.45 – 12pm

Prioritization of points

Activity: Prioritization

All participants given an opportunity to vote on the points that need to be taken further as recommendations by the AAR.

Each participant receives five star stickers. Participant to choose the most important point on each topic that would have made the most difference to the response � Give it a star.

12-1pm Drafting of recommendations on prioritized points

Plenary discussion on the ways to make a difference in order to improve the challenges faced by the group.

Group consensus of wording of recommendations

Still to be discussed (in discussion with management).

- Who would be involved, leading? - What timescale to do this?

The three points with the most stickers on each flipchart are selected for preliminary recommendation drafting.

1 – 2pm Lunch

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Annex 6: After Action Review - Minutes of plenary (Vanuatu Field Office)

AAR Workshop Vanuatu

22 September 2015

Human Resources

a. What worked well?

• Alice arrived a week before and Drew arrived a day before • There were staff in most programme areas (not nutrition) prior to TC Pam that new/surge staff

could plug into

b. What could have gone better?

• Lack of induction to UNICEF o Staff didn’t know either standard processes or the L2 processes o Many new staff with no induction

• Lack of logistics and supply staff with adequate skills prior to TC Pam • Lack of SoPs on how the FO and CO should work together. This was already an issue

(unclear/difficult) prior to TC Pam. Once TC Pam made landfall, the issues were exacerbated. • Continuity of Rapid Response staff (duration of some surge deployments was too short)



• Some contingency stocks were in place o WASH – enough for 2,000 people in Vanuatu, but brought in supplies for 70,000 people o Education, pre-positioned supplies arrived quickly from Fiji

• Some warehousing available before that was suitable for small emergencies • A strong logistics team was set up reasonably quickly after TC Pam � reduced the burden on

sections


• Pre-positioned supplies were not based on any consistent plan • Consensus on a larger permanent warehouse needed (3 cards) • Stronger documentation of existing stocks and plans (stock report) • Some supplies were not suitable to the context

o Small boats can’t carry large tent boxes o Stocks end up not reaching communities as they can’t be delivered (e.g. tarpaulins

would have been easier to deliver than larger tents)

Finance


• The new SSFA guidelines (April 2015), especially the increase of funds from $10,000 to $50,000 cap

• Financial updates prepared by Suva WASH Section and shared with Vanuatu WASH Team - Good practice that can be replicated by other sections in future?


• Payment of invoices took several months in the first few months o Payment of invoices by Suva are getting better since August

• Field offices not enabled to manage finances

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o Processing/VISION access all done in Suva • Needed a greater amount of both petty cash and Cash On Hand Allocation (COHA) in Vanuatu • Greater clarity at field level (Vanuatu) on how much money is available for programme � would

enable better planning

Management


• The existence of a field office in Vanuatu meant that the response was well rooted • Once workflow manager in place – tracking of requests/payments worked better (Workflow

manager in Suva - Sandeep – KII?)


• There was a Vanuatu Emergency Response Plan (EWEA) o Didn’t follow the plan/ staff weren’t aware of it/ hadn’t been updated for some time

• Consensus on the need for communication/coordination between the CFO and emergency coordinator (4 cards)

• Clarity on procedures within the office

Other DRR/Other Topics


• “Blanket” UNDSS Travel Authoritzation • Some contingency stock available (NFIs) • External communications • WASH cluster work before TC Pam meant WASH cluster was ready to start work quickly • Development of psychosocial support materials (C4D)


• IT network access (local) • Different levels of urgency between Field Office and Country Office • Contingency communication equipment was needed (short wave radio, satellite phones…) • Field monitoring & feedback of results to programmes • Gender/protection mainstreaming with other sectors • DRR messaging needs to be mainstreamed with other sectors • School awareness of DRR messages • Community level sensitization and training on cyclone preparedness and warnings • Payment of TA/DSA • Field Office needs greater influence of Country Office • Visibility of UNICEF

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List of Participants – Vanuatu AAR workshop

Name Position

Andrew Dow WASH Engineer

Antoine Kanegai Emergency Driver and Messenger

Christina Lulu-Karae Education Consultant

David Sezikeye Emergency Child Protection Specialist

Julie Dolton Warehouse Manager

Kim Claveau Logistics Officer

Matthew Kalotiti Driver and Messenger

Olivia Mahit Emergency Administrative Assistant

Rebecca Olul M&E Officer/Communications/C4D Officer

Samson Busai Emergency Health and Nutrition Supplies Consultant

Sarafina Kaloran Logistics Support Officer (Warehouse)

Simone Akua Administrative Assistant

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Annex 7: After Action Review - Preliminary Recommendations (Vanuatu Field Office)

Human Resources

1. All staff/consultants/stand-by partners receive induction on UNICEF processes (including L2) prior to arrival and/or briefing within first 72 hours of arrival in country

a. Handbook of procedures b. Face to face briefing

2. More field office staff to attend regular UNICEF training (PPP) 3. Surge deployments to be a minimum of 1 month for initial deployment and subsequent deployments

to be a minimum of 3 months with overlap and handover

Logistics/Supplies

4. Suva based staff position for emergency preparedness and response logistics for the Pacific a. Map, identify and train local partners b. Emergency plans

i. Pre-positioning ii. C4D materials iii. VHF radios and other emergency communications

c. Contingency stocks d. Arrange warehousing e. LTAs, including procurement

Finance

5. Financial control and decision making delegated to the FO a. Knowledge of budgets

6. Financial procedures are in place and staff are empowered to respond faster to the needs of children a. Training of FO staff

Management

7. Clarify the roles and responsibilities between CFO, emergency coordinator and chiefs of section (Suva)

8. Standard operating procedures giving a clear division of labour for emergencies focused on field offices

a. IT network authorization to be local

Other

9. Better data (locations, populations, schools etc.) readily available and shared prior to the emergency

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Annex 8: After Action Review - Workshop Agenda (Suva Multi-Country Office)

After Action Review Workshop Agenda

Tuesday 29th September 2015

Suva, Fiji

Facilitators: Sophie Dunn (Consultant), Riccardo Polastro (Regional Advisor, Evaluation, UNICEF East Asia Pacific Regional Office) and Anthea Moore (Planning Specialist, UNICEF Pacific Multi-Country Office) Note taker: Anthea Moore (Planning Specialist, UNICEF Pacific Multi-Country Office)

Timing Session

8.00-8.40am

Welcome by the Country Representative (Karen Allen)

- Quick introduction of participants and facilitators - Introduction to the workshop, ground rules, and handling sensitivities - Brief presentation on the L2 procedures, the purpose of the workshop and the

agenda

Facilitator: Riccardo

What happened and when?

Objective: Building a common understanding of the timeline

Activity: Key events

- Reflecting on key points in the response (external events and dates of key UNICEF activities)


8.40-8.50am

Recap of the key points from the Mid Year Review

Objective: Ensure a common understanding on what discussions have already been had.

Facilitator: Anthea

8.50-10.15am

What went well? What could have gone better?

Objective: Building a common understanding of successes and challenges of preparedness and response

Activity: Brainstorming on key themes that have emerged as priority areas of focus from the document review and AAR interviews

Key themes to be discussed (15 minutes each)

- Human Resources - Fundraising and Finance - Logistics and supply - Leadership and management - Any other topics that participants feel need to be discussed

Facilitator: Sophie

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MORNING TEA (10.15-10.30am)

10.30 – 11.15am

Plenary discussion of each topic

Facilitator: Sophie

Note taker: Anthea

11.15 – 11.30am

Prioritization of points

Activity: Prioritization

Facilitator: Sophie

11.30-12.00pm

Sharing of Vanuatu workshop recommendations

Facilitator: Sophie

12.00-12.45pm

Drafting of recommendations on prioritized points

Plenary discussion on how to overcome the identified challenges so that UNICEF can be better prepared, and better respond to future disasters.

Co-Facilitators: Riccardo & Sophie

Note taker: Anthea

12.45 - 1pm

Next steps and closing remarks


LUNCH (1-2pm)

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Annex 9: After Action Review - Minutes of Suva Multi-Country Office Workshop

Karen Allen – Introduction to workshop

This is an important exercise. This was the largest response ever by UNICEF Pacific. Over $9m raised. New partnerships entered into. Use of cluster system. Amount of supplies. 4 countries simultaneously affected by Pam and one more by 3 typhoon. Huge learning for ourselves and our partners. I have lost count of the number of lessons learnt exercises. But we haven’t had a deep reflection on how we of UNICEF did, particularly in using the L2 procedure.

Cyclone Pam did not qualify as an L2. I was in Cambodia at a meeting with access to Tony Lake and the Regional Director. This allowed us to obtain an exception. This is the first L2 in EAPRO.

Please take it seriously and engage actively. This could be a global quality evaluation, which is a learning experience in itself. The facilitation is designed around small group work so you are encouraged to participate. This is part of a larger process.

Riccardo – Introduction to process

For L2 the focus is on the capacity of the office to respond. An AAR is compulsory for an L2.

Sophie Dunn - Plenary

Human Resources – What went well – Preparedness

• Alice and Drew • Training (WASH, CP, Nutrition) • Suva staff on regular missions to Vanuatu were able to assist • Vanuatu staff given time off work and many warnings

Human Resources – What went well – Response

• Dispatch of staff (Suva, global, regional) • PA pool (from May) • Good planning on HR needs • HR roster • Local recruitment (additional support in Vanuatu) • Salary advance to Vanuatu office • Good communication with regional office • Changed the job descriptions of existing consultant in Vanuatu to address the emergency

needs (very early)

Human Resources – What could have gone better – Preparedness

• Training of Pacific staff in emergency to reduce dependence on surge deployments • Lack of clarity on who was needed on surge, particularly for programme support • Access to the emergency roster before emergencies, at any time, so COs know what skills

are available • More pre-drafted ToRs

Human Resources – What could have gone better – Response

• Lack of clarity of roles with surge staff • Sense of loss of control as surge staff ‘took over’ processes, but CO staff have to deal with

the consequences • Surge staff acting beyond their authority eg supplies and committing CO funds • Lack of handover to CO staff

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• Some personality issues with surge staff • Lack of focus on capacity building and partnerships • Lack of understanding of the way a multi-country office works, treated Vanuatu as a country

office • All of this confused decision making and cause conflicts • Need closer management • Lack of experienced cluster leads (education), StC had been agreed as co-lead with the

MoE in Vanuatu before, but lacked the capacity and staff to fulfil this role • Also for the protection cluster, NGO was leading a sub-cluster. It would have been better

to send in a cluster co-ordinator. Better to separate the cluster staff person from other staff roles

• Need to be more assertive where we know the leadership by other agencies/NGOs is wea •

Finance – What went well – Preparedness

• EPF facility – got money on day 1 • CERF is difficult for CP and Edu – strong support from country rep for this • Established strong partnerships with key donors and national committees

Finance – What went well – Response

• Flexibility of L2 procedures • PA pool • built on existing streamlining to bridge gaps in communications • Helped where sections were understaffed • Financial tracking was established form day 1

Finance – What could have gone better – Preparedness

• Lack of experience in proposal writing for emergencies

Finance – What could have gone better – Response

• PA pool • Some instances communication wasn’t going through the correct channels • The balance wasn’t necessarily correct, not enough on supply • Need better regulation of workload • Also had to deal with regular programming • Clarity in fund dispersement to sections, decentralisation of funds management • At the beginning, there was an EPF which set the budget • Sections chiefs did not feel like they had strong ownership over the EPF and HAP proposals • Drafted in Vanuatu, Suva had little time to check – links back to HR • Guidance drafted in Suva was not respected by drafters in Vanuatu • There was a revision at mid-year • These are foundational documents and if it is not done well it throws everything else off

(programming, monitoring, reporting) • Needed greater consistency – compounded by the Suva/Vanuatu and CO/surge staff • The appeals are based on guesswork as we do appeals prior to assessments being

completed • HQ instructed on how to allocate, but it didn’t work in this situation. Would have preferred

to have it allocated directly to the programmes • On the HAC appeal, as a MCO with many countries affected, it was difficult to include

countries other than Vanuatu

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Logistics and supply – What went well – Preparedness

• Some prepositioning • Online supply calculator which was used by pre-positioning • Training from supply team 2 weeks before -> good supply plan

Logistics and supply – What went well – Response

• Support from supply division • Quick ordering • Some warehousing • SD personnel did know what was where (globally)

Logistics and supply – What could have gone better – Preparedness

• Clearer planning on what is needed • Bigger warehouse identified • LTAs • We have these disasters every year, why don’t we have more supplies available closer to

us?

Logistics and supply – What could have gone better – Response

• Information on supplies • Lack of information about what was going out and stocks depleted • Information that does exist is not always shared • Improved after Kim and Julie arrived – May • Supply people from Supply Division (SD) set up wonderful systems, but didn’t build the

capacity of local staff or hand over the systems to the Pacific. Programme staff also need to have an understanding.

• SD personnel are a very tight knit, were sometimes bypassing the CO management and programme chiefs and making decisions that couldn’t be changed

• Some supplies that were ordered were not appropriate

Leadership and management – What went well – Preparedness

--

Leadership and management – What went well – Response

• Support of Regional Director

Leadership and management – What could have gone better – Preparedness

• More pre-drafted ToRs

Leadership and management – What could have gone better – Response

• Overlapping roles

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Strategic issues – What went well – Preparedness

--

Strategic issues – What went well – Response

Regional Director took a personal interest

Strategic issues – What could have gone better – Preparedness

More pre-drafted ToRs

Strategic issues – What could have gone better – Response

• Adhering to Government guidelines during emergencies, NGOs directly approaching communities, not respecting coordination and leadership

• L2 procedures shared late from what was available on the interne • Confusion over cluster leadership and issues • Supply driven support

Other Issues – what went well?

• Good team spirit • Programmes knew what to do • Psycho-social support for staff in Vanuatu • Staff association support

Other Issues – what could have gone better?

• Better deployment kits • Better plans • Fundraising strategies in the competitive environment (we were lucky this time) • Response • Self-care and debriefs • Compulsory time off • Streamlining of process

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List of participants – Suva AAR workshop

Name Position

Alice Clements Communications Specialist

Amanda Bissex Chief of Section – Child Protection

Amy Clancy HIV/AIDS Specialist

Christine Calo-oy Senior Supply Assistant

Devraj Daby Chief of Operations

Dhiraj Singh Finance Office

Donna Hoerder Communications Specialist

Dorette Yee Mar Human Resource Specialist

Emmaline Veresoni Senior Executive Assistant - Admin Support

Evon Narruhn Programme Assistant - Dep Rep/Operations

Filomena Ratumaibuca

Programme Budget Officer

Iosefo Volau Education Specialist

Isabelle Austin Deputy Country Representative

Josephine Wainiqolo Programme Assistant-WASH

Julie-Ann Driso Programme Assistant-Child Protection

Karen Allen Country Representative

Karen Mannan Programme Assistant - Communication, Social Policy and Planning

Laisani Petersen Child Protection Officer

Marc Overmars WASH Specialist

Niki Abrishamian Chief of Section – Education

Patrick Kamsoo Senior ICT Assistant

Sandeep Prasad Finance Officer

Seini Kurusiga Nutrition Specialist

Simon Jan Molendjik Education Specialist

Venina Ratulevu Programme Assistant - Education

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Annex 10: After Action Review - Preliminary recommendations (Suva Multi-Country Office)

Human resources

• Annual revision of emergency skill set and team, including local staff members as emergency coordinators

• Develop and emergency training strategy for staff • All staff to be provided with access to basic emergency training • Scenario training, including field offices and Suva based staff • National cluster training to extend skills to our partners • Simplified HR matrix (the required template was too complex for an L2 in a smaller office

context) • More surge staff should be requested earlier including HR, administration and

communications • Emergency supply planning personnel • Stronger mechanisms for surge staff handover processes (including briefing and handover

notes)


• Identifying service providers in multiple locations that can do pre-packing of supplies • Current system of supply and logistics information management in Vanuatu is documented

and replicated across the Pacific

Finance

• Greater decentralization of funds allocation and budget management to programme sections

• The same as for previous Level 1 emergencies?

Leadership and Management

• Clarification, articulation and sharing of roles and responsibilities including surge and existing staff

• With a field office • Where there is no field office

Strategic Issues

• Build government capacity in Cluster Coordination • Customised SoPs for emergencies at the CO and FO levels • Pre-crisis data and templates agreed with NDMOs • Annual review of emergency response plans

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Annex 11: CMT initial review of recommendations (Vanuatu & Suva)

Recommendation Action Responsibility By When

HUMAN RESOURCES

All staff/ consultants/ stand-by partners receive induction

Timely briefing and short guidance notes on L2 procedures

EMOPS TBD by Management

Response

Timely briefing and short guidance notes on L1 procedures

Pacific

Orientation package for stand-by partners and consultants

EAPRO/Geneva

Induction pack for the Pacific Pacific

Annual revision of emergency skill set and team, including local staff members as emergency focal points/team leader

Develop a comprehensive Emergency Training Strategy

Strategy Developed UNICEF Pacific

All staff to be provided with access to basic emergency training

UNICEF Pacific

Scenario training, including field offices and Suva based staff

UNICEF Pacific Continue annual scenarios with other agencies

National cluster training to extend skills to our partners

UNICEF Pacific

(all sectors) and Global

Simplified HR matrix (the required template was too complex for an L2 in a smaller office context)

Department of Human Resources, Emergency Unit

More surge staff should be requested within the first week including HR, administration, finance and communications

UNICEF Pacific learning for next time

Emergency supply planning personnel

6-12 month consultancy/TA UNICEF Pacific

Supply Division, EMOPS to have a roster of appropriate HR

Supply Division, EMOPS

Stronger mechanisms for surge staff handover processes (including briefing and handover notes)

Handover template EMOPS

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Recommendation Action Responsibility By When

SUPPLY AND LOGISTICS

Identifying more suppliers and service providers able to provide consistency and quality

Continue current research, develop LTAs etc

UNICEF Pacific

Strengthen capacity and modernise systems for supply and logistics information management in across the Pacific

UNICEF Pacific

Greater understanding of and use of Asia-Pacific logistics and suppliers

Understanding of regional logistics capacity (eg. airstrip and port capacity)

Supply Division

Better coordination with WFP Supply Division

FINANCE

Greater decentralisation of funds allocation and budget management to programme sections

The same process as for previous Level 1 emergencies

UNICEF Pacific

EAPRO & HQ (All large COs with multiple field offices)

VISION processing hub to be considered for level 2 (admin, decision making and responsibility)

LEADERSHIP AND MANAGEMENT

Clarification, articulation and sharing of roles and responsibilities including surge and existing staff

• With a field office • Where there is no field office

UNICEF Pacific

STRATEGIC ISSUES

Build government capacity in Cluster Coordination

UNICEF Pacific

Customised SoPs for emergencies at the CO and FO levels

UNICEF Pacific

Improved preparation and use of data

Prepare baseline data for each of the key humanitarian indicators in advance

UNICEF Pacific

Assessment templates agreed with NDMOs

UNICEF Pacific

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Annex 12: Standard Operating Procedure - Business process: PA pool (Vanuatu office - Emergency Response)

1. Purpose

The purpose of the SOP is to set up a structure PA pool for the Vanuatu Office emergency response to TC PAM, whereby there will be certain staff allocated specifically to carry out a particular process in order to speed up the administrative process. There will be 3 hubs

• Supplies and raising of contracts including SSA • Travel Administration (TA’s) and Workshop arrangements • DCT’s and payments.

Supplies and raising of contracts including SSFA

This hub will include all matters relating to supplies for the respective sections, it will also be responsible for processing of contracts requests including SSFA’s.

Travel Administration (TA’s) and Workshop arrangements

This hub will include raising TAs for programme staff and all issues related to it. It will also include arranging for workshop for all sections and prepare for it accordingly

DCTs and payments.

This hub will include all DCT request including liquidations and also all payments requested for programme sections

A Workflow Manager (WM) (with an alternate) will be the focal point for all processes and all requests will be directed to him. The WM will then route relevant requests to the hub concerned. There will be dedicated PAs to each Hub. The allocation of tasks to PA’s will be dependent on each request. If there are 2 dedicated staff for a particular pool then there will be a ticketing system used whereby the task will be assigned to the PA who hasn’t been allocated a task in the previous request. Example if task A is assigned to PA X then task B will be assigned to PA Y and Task C will be assigned to PA X again and so forth. The maximum turnover time is 2 days from the date of request. i.e., if the request is made today than it should be completed by the next day COB.

2. Scope

This SOP is intended for Programme Assistants who are involved in processing of transactions for the Vanuatu Field office Emergency Reponse.

3. Responsibilities

• WM – receives all requests for transactions and then delegates to respective PA for necessary action

• PA – TA – raises all TA’s and arrange for all workshops etc as the need arises • PA – Supplies - process all supplies related tasks and raising of contracts including SSA’s • PA – DCT/Payments – raise all programme related payments and also process DCT

request and monitoring of liquidations

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4. Procedure

No/Flow Activity Time Frame

1 SC/CFO/ PO sends request for TA/DCT/Payments/Workshops/Contracts/SSFA’s to WM

2 WM enters all the requests in the monitoring sheet - and notifies the relevant PA to take further action

30 Min – 1 Hour

3 PA then performs tasks assigned and updates the monitoring sheet status as “in progress’ , initials it and notifies WM

1/2 day to 1 day

4 WM then advices budget owner( requestor) of the same and updates the monitoring sheet

30 min – 1 Hour

5 PA follows through and ensures that the tasks is completed right till the end and once the whole process is complete –PA selects the status as “completed” in the monitoring sheet

1 Hour

6 WM then checks with Budget owner (requestor) of the status of the job and once satisfied, choses the status as “completed and closed”. This will end the process.

30 Min – 1 hour

2 days maximum turnaround time

5. Acronyms

• CFO – Chief Field Office • FO – Field Office • WM – Workflow manager • PO – Programme Officer • PA – Programme Assistant • SC – Section Chief • FA – Finance Assistant

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Annex 13: Simplifications put in place by L2 designation

Change Responsible/Approval

Fast tracked human resource procedures

Emergency Response Team – NY can deploy Emergency Coordinators within 48-72 hours (max deployment 4-6 weeks) [Requires formal request from Head of Office as all costs are paid by receiving office].

Head of Office to request

Temporary internal redeployment of staff - pre-screened staff members expected to deploy immediately in the event of an emergency [up to 3 continuous months].

Engagement of consultants and individual contractors – contracting will be done in accordance with the HR Policy. Offices can request the DHR business partner for emergencies to source candidates via the emergency roster.

Recruitment of external candidates on temporary appointment (TA) – selection process done in accordance with staff selection policies, however approval authority changes as per para 3.7

Standby partners – UNICEF has Standby Arrangements with a number of external partners who maintain a standby roster of emergency personnel. When requesting standby personnel:

• Technical capacities of existing staff are inadequate to respond to the emergency • The service of standby personnel are only required for a short period (3-6 months usually) • Standby personnel should be full integrated into the UNICEF operation [UNICEF is responsible for office, logistics, supply support] • Request for standby personnel should be sent to EMOPS Geneva

Programme Cooperation Agreements (PCAs)

Disburse funds to implementing partners with direct cash transfer for periods of 6-9 months.

Head of Office • Release cash transfers to implementing partners for periods of up to 3 months at a time. • Second transfer can be made on request of implementing partner towards end of first 3 month implementation period (even if financial

reporting has not been done) • Funds can be distributed to an offshore partner account if no local bank account (or if not operational) • Re-programme unutilized funds as relevant/possible in the context of revised work plan.

• The country office can decide to adopt a flat percentage of PCA indirect costs at any level up to 25% of total operating costs (instead of passing through each relationship to determine individualized percentages).

Country Office

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Simplified operational (financial and administrative procedures)

Authority to sign a lease agreement (warehouse, office, guesthouse) for periods up to 6 months without prior approval of Division of Finance and Administration Management (DFAM).

Head of Office

Staff can arrange travel directly, on reimbursement arrangement, if a travel agency is not accessible. [lowest airfares] Staff, on specific request of the receiving Country Office or supervising RO. [and security clearance]

If finance/admin system cannot be accessed directly:

• Revert to manual accounting system to prevent delays • Delegate to another office a specific budget allotment as to allow issuance of requisitions/commitments.

Head of Office

• Third party cash providers (including UN agencies and well-established organizations) may be used to make payments or to replenish cash accounts with approval from DFAM.

DFAM

• Bank accounts: If there are less than three staff members with delegated financial authority, a single signatory bank account can be used with DFAM approval.

DFAM

A UNICEF representative can change the way the Contract Review Committee (CRC) works to help expedite the review process, including:

• Location • Composition • Quorum of CRC • Frequency of meetings • Addition of other UN agency staff

UNICEF Representative

Automatic issuance of a US$2 million EPF

The allocation (to the CO or RO) is to be used for the UNICEF programmatic response. A portion should be used to build CO capacity for cluster coordination, information management and humanitarian performance monitoring.

In multi-country emergencies – there is only one US$2million EPF for the whole emergency.

The automatic allocation will not apply to countries that have received an EPF allocation during the six weeks preceding their designation as L2 emergencies, and/or countries that appear on the list of L2 countries for the second or third consecutive time.

If automatic allocation is not sufficient, a normal EPF application is necessary.

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The automatic allocation is reimbursable by the concerned office as funds become available. [Uncommitted funds will be automatically recovered after 3 months].

Deployment of RO staff, ERT or similar capacity

The RO will make staff available within 48 hours as needed

The CO will be offered possible deployment of ERT or equivalent for a minimum of one week during the first few weeks of the response

This capacity can be deployed to RO or CO

Other changes

CO leadership remains accountable for the L2 response

RO role in leading the coordination of support is unchanged but reinforced.

HQ Divisions are required to organize themselves to provide enhanced and prioritized support and coordination to the RO and CO.

A Regional Management Team (REMT) that brings together relevant HQ Divisions, RO and CO should be established to cover L2 emergencies.

HQ divisions have a role to overs and provide support so that critical gaps in the emergency response are addressed.

The RD tracks follow up of CO/RO requests

Capacity to respond will depend on resource availability and personnel. If additional capacity needs are identified, surge should be prioritized both to affected COs as well as relevant ROs

Source: Adapted from UNICEF (2013) UNICEF Procedure for Level 2 Emergencies – Annex 1 to CF/EXD/2013-00

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Annex 14: Lessons learned re Office in a Box

Issue Experience Recommendation

Logistical costs Very high airfreight costs Limit airfreight to situations where alternatives are absent and all other deployment criteria (suggested below) are assessed positively

Logistical constraints

Adequate handling / lifting / transport equipment required at: - Port of entry

- Transit to site

- Erection of unit

Given the high costs and logistical implications, recommend SD impose a pre-order checklist for COs to ensure / determine suitability of equipment / transport / site prior to issuance of the PO and local office / accommodation alternatives. It is highly recommended that the kits be labeled “this way up” for those unfamiliar with them

Suitable road / site access for transport

“right way up” – to avoid unnecessary damage and challenges of righting kits

Asset status Unless ordered as programme assets with clear counterpart consignee specified, OiBox are considered office assets and require PSB for disposal / donation.

Ensure COs ordering OiBox give due consideration to the status of the units and definition of appropriate consignees.

Construction Contractors engaged to assemble the OiB found the instructions overly basic.

Detailed step by step instructions with associated pictures

The kits lacked tools for assembly. Example: The silicone provided required a specific gun for application

Include toolkits in the OiBox Supply standardized consumables

Variation Two different OiBox received. a] Internals - All inclusive within the box - [Separate boxes for furniture

(lower quality furniture) / generator / a-con etc.

b) Structure differed – but same instructions for each

Inclusive within box of higher quality and better packaged ‘All in one’ preferred and recommend attention to instructions

Source: Email communication from CO to SD

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Annex 15: Country division of UNICEF HAC funding requirements for TC Pam response

Country 2015 requirements (US$)

Vanuatu 7,467,000

Solomon Islands 155,000

Kiribati 68,000

Tuvalu 30,000

TOTAL 7,720,000

Source: UNICEF (2015) Humanitarian Action for Children (Pacific Countries)

Annex 16: Departure and arrival dates of supplies from Suva to Vanuatu, Kiribati and Tuvalu

COUNTRY ETD ETA REMARKS

Vanuatu

Southern Moana 267 vessel departed Suva port on 21 March

Arrived Port Vila port on 26 March

5 x 20ft containers of emergency supplies

Vanuatu

Southern Moana V268 vessel departed Suva port on 11 April

Arrived Port Vila port on 14 April

2 x 20ft containers of emergency supplies

Tuvalu Southern Pearl Voyage 99 vessel departed Suva port on 9 April

Arrived Funafuti on 13 April 1 x 20ft containers of emergency supplies

Kiribati Southern Pearl Voyage 98 vessel departed Suva port on 11 March

Arrived Tarawa port 23 March 2 pallets

Source: UNICEF shipment details worksheet – emergency supplies to Vanuatu, Kiribati and Tuvalu

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