UnderstandingTerrorNetworks

UNDERSTANDINGTERRORNETWORKS

MarcSageman

PENN

UNIVERSITYOFPENNSYLVANIAPRESS

PHILADELPHIA

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Sageman,MarcUnderstandingTerrorNetworks/MarcSageman.

p.cm.Includesbibliographicalreferencesandindex.ISBN0-8122-3808-7(cloth:alk.paper)

1.Terrorists–Socialnetworks.2.Terrorism.3.Jihad.I.Title.HV6431.S232004303.6′25–dc222003070524

Contents

Preface

ONETheOriginsoftheJihad

TWOTheEvolutionoftheJihad

THREETheMujahedin

FOURJoiningtheJihad

FIVESocialNetworksandtheJihad

Conclusion

Appendix:NamesofTerrorists

GlossaryofForeignTerms

Bibliography

Index

Acknowledgments

Preface

A new type of terrorism threatens the world, driven by networks of fanatics determined to inflictmaximumcivilianandeconomicdamagesondistanttargetsinpursuitoftheirextremistgoals.Armedwithmoderntechnology,theyarecapableofdevastatingdestructionworldwide.TheytargettheWest,buttheiroperations mercilessly slaughter thousands of people of all races and religions. Only a thoroughunderstandingofthesenewterrornetworksandtheirsocialmovementwillenabletheworldtomountaneffectivedefense.Asastep toward thatunderstanding, thisbookcombinesfactwith theory togobeyondtheheadlines

and journalistic accounts and stimulate a more sophisticated discourse on the subject. Based on thebiographiesof172terroristsgatheredfromopensources,itexaminesthissocialmovement,whichIcallthe global Salafi jihad. It excavates the ideological roots of the movement and traces its evolutionthroughout the world. The data, broken down in terms of social, personal, and situational variables,challengetheconventionalexplanationsofterrorism.Theysuggestinsteadthatthisformofterrorismisanemergent quality of the social networks formed by alienated youngmenwho become transformed intofanaticsyearningformartyrdomandeagertokill.Theshapeanddynamicsofthesenetworksaffectstheirsurvivability,flexibility,andsuccess.Ibringanunusualcombinationofexperienceandskillstobringtothestudyofterrorism.AsaForeign

Service officer, Iworkedwith Islamic fundamentalists on a daily basis during theAfghan-Sovietwar,from1986to1989.Theseinteractionsgavemesomeinsightintothemujahedin’sbeliefsandpractices.Ialsodevelopedanappreciationofthemashumanbeings,whichrancountertomediaportrayalsofthemintheaftermathofSeptember11,2001.Iwasintriguedanddecidedtolookintothisphenomenon.After leaving the Foreign Service in 1991, I returned to medicine and completed a residency in

psychiatry. I amnow inprivatepractice andkeepupwith the literatureof this rapidly changing field.Manyoftheoldpsychodynamictheorieshavebeenlargelydiscreditedinthemodernfieldofpsychiatryowing to lack of effectiveness or any empirical backing. Yet they still have an echo in the field ofterrorism, where most of the “psychological” commentators provide psychodynamic accounts. I am astrongsupporterofthenewmovementinmedicinetobaseitspracticeonempiricalscience,whichhasstarted to eliminate some of the harmful practices stemming from age-old but misguided traditions.Empiricismshouldalsoinformthesocialscienceofterrorism.Mysubspecialtyisforensicpsychiatry.Ihave extensive experience interviewing, analyzing, and writing and testifying aboutmurderers. I havelearned thatmanyofourpopularconceptsabout themaremistaken.Butnothing inmyexperiencewithsolitary murderers, even mass murderers, helps me understand the collective murder-suicides ofSeptember 11, 2001.Theirmotivations anddesire formartyrdomcannot be extrapolated fromwhat isknownaboutcommoncriminals.Duringmymedical training I also acquired a doctorate in political sociology. I studied large-scale

common good organizations such as political parties, unions, professional associations, and terroristorganizations.Thishelpsmefocusonlargersocialpatternseveninmypsychiatricpractice,whereItrytocombine the statistical and analytical tools of social sciencewith individual case study. Advances insocial network analysis provided valuable insight into some of the surprising aspects of this globalterroristnetwork.Inaddition,extensivescholarshipinthesocialpsychologyofgenocideperpetratorsoverthepastfour

decades has shed some light on this phenomenon. For several years I have taught a seminar at the

University of Pennsylvania on this topic, which has sensitizedme to the contributions of psychology,sociology,andsocialpsychologytoexplanationsofcollectiveviolence.Thefirstmeetingofmyseminaron “TheMoral Psychology of Holocaust Perpetrators” was held on September 12, 2001. During theseminar, theanalogybetween theNazisandglobalSalafi terroristsbecame increasinglyobvious tomystudentsandme.Thisbookisacontinuationofmyresearchintotheoriginsofcollectiveviolence.

Thedatainthisstudyarestrictlyderivedfrompublicsources.SinceIleftthegovernment,Ihaveneithersecurityclearancenoraccesstogovernmentconfidentialfiles.Muchofterrorismresearchisdoneunderthe cloak of secrecy. Often that is for legitimate national security reasons. However, research that isconductedinsecretandnotsubjecttorigorouspeerreviewmaybeflawedandreachconclusionsthataredeleterious in their practical implications.My past experience in the Foreign Service made me wellaware that the quality of “intelligence” is variable and depends on good sources and analysis. Thecompetitionandcollaborationthatmarkthescientificmethodaremostlyabsentinthegovernment,leadingofficialstoanunwarrantedsenseofconfidenceintheiranalyses.Seclusionoftheintelligence-gatheringprocess shelters it from criticism,which affects the validity and reliability of its conclusions (Taylor,1991:123).Thisbookisanattempttostimulatenewideasandperspectivesinthestudyofterrorism.Itraisesas

manyquestionsasitanswers.Itaimsattheoreticalinsightsandpracticalapplicationsforglobalsecurity.My hope is that it starts a fruitful conversation that will help both specialists and laypeople betterunderstand.

UnderstandingTerrorNetworks

ONE

TheOriginsoftheJihad

TheglobalSalafijihadisaworldwidereligiousrevivalistmovementwiththegoalofreestablishingpastMuslim glory in a great Islamist state stretching fromMorocco to the Philippines, eliminating presentnationalboundaries.Itpreachessalafiyyah(fromsalaf,theArabicwordfor“ancientone”andreferringtothecompanionsoftheProphetMohammed),therestorationofauthenticIslam,andadvocatesastrategyofviolentjihad,resultinginanexplosionofterrortowipeoutwhatitregardsaslocalpoliticalheresy.The global version of this movement advocates the defeat of the Western powers that prevent theestablishmentofatrueIslamiststate.AlQaedaisthevanguardofthismovement,whichincludesmanyotherterroristgroupsthatcollaborate

in their operations and share a large support base (see Burke, 2003). Salafi ideology determines itsmission,setsitsgoals,andguidesitstactics.WhatsetstheglobalSalafijihadapartfromotherterroristcampaignsisitsviolenceagainstforeignnon-MuslimgovernmentsandtheirpopulationsinfurtheranceofSalafiobjectives.

DefendingIslam:JihadLikeothergreat,long-establishedreligions,Islamisfullofcontentiousissues,especiallyaboutsomeofitscoreconcepts,suchasjihad,whichtranslatesroughlyas“striving”butdenotesanyformofactivity,eitherpersonalorcommunal,undertakenbyMuslimsinattemptingtofollowthepathofGod.Nosingledoctrineisuniversallyaccepted.In a world full of iniquities, the greater jihad is the individual nonviolent striving to live a good

Muslim life, followingGod’swill. It includesadhering to the fivepillarsof Islam:professionof faith(shahada); praying regularly; fasting during Ramadan; being charitable; and performing the hajj, thepilgrimagetoMecca.Itrequireslifelongdisciplineandconstantvigilance.The lesser jihad is the violent struggle for Islam.Traditional Islamic jurisprudence saw jihad as an

obligationinaworlddividedintothelandofIslam(daral-Islam)andthelandofconflict(daral-harb).TheMuslimcommunity,theumma,wasrequiredtoengageinajihadtoexpanddaral-Islamthroughouttheworldsothatallhumankindcouldbenefitfromlivingwithinajustpoliticalsocialorder.Oneschoolof interpretation diluted this belligerence by introducing the notion of the land of treaty (dar al-suhl),whichhadconcludedatrucewithdaral-Islamandwasnotsubjecttojihad.Therewasa furtherdistinctionbetweendefensiveandoffensive jihad.When infidels invadedaral-

Islamand threaten theexistenceof Islamand itspractices there,a legalopinion, fatwa,cansanctionastateofjihadagainsttheinfidels.Thisimpliesanindividualobligation(fardayn)forallMuslimstotakepart in this defensive jihad, either throughdirect fighting or through financial contributions, charity, orprayers.Incontrast,anoffensivejihadtoattackthelandoftheinfidels(daral-kufr)tosubmitittoSharia,thestrictQuraniclaw,impliesacollectiveobligation(fardkifaya),whichcanbeandoftenisdischargedbyMuslimgovernmentswithoutpersonalparticipationofindividualMuslims.WhentheSovietsinvadedAfghanistan inDecember1979,severalMuslimreligious leaders issuedfatwascompellingMuslims totakeupthejihadtorepeltheinfidels.ThisdefensiveversionofjihadfortheprotectionofIslamwasonethatSheikhAbdallahAzzampreachedwithgreatsuccessduringtheAfghanwar.

Azzam was one of the first Arabs to join the jihad against the Soviets. He met with the Afghanresistanceleadersandurgedthemtounifyagainsttheenemy.Buthismainsuccesswasinpromotingthecauseofthejihadworldwide.Hismessagewassimple;heissuedfatwasproclaimingthefightagainsttheSovietinvadersadefensivejihad.Therewasnoambiguity.TheAfghanjihadwasafardayn,apersonalobligation for each Muslim, and as such it overrode the need to get parental, religious, or spousalpermissiontojointhejihad.ManyyoungpeopleansweredhiscallandcametoPeshawarinPakistantojointhejihad.Throughouttheconflict,heremaineduncompromisinginhismessage:“Jihadandtheriflealone: no negotiations, no conferences, no dialogues.” To him, Afghanistan was the first step in aworldwidejihadtorecaptureMuslimlandslosttoinfidels,especiallyhisnativePalestine:

ThisdutyshallnotlapsewithvictoryinAfghanistan,andthejihadwillremainanindividualobligationuntilallotherlandswhichformerlywereMuslimcomebacktousandIslamreignswithinthemonceagain.BeforeusliePalestine,Bukhara,Lebanon,Chad,Eritrea,Somalia,thePhilippines,Burma,SouthYemen,Tashkent,Andalusia....OurpresenceinAfghanistantoday,whichistheaccomplishmentoftheimperativeofjihadandourdevotiontothestruggle,doesnotmeanthatwehaveforgottenPalestine.Palestineisourbeatingheart,itcomesevenbeforeAfghanistaninourminds,ourhearts,ourfeelingsandourfaith.(QuotedinKepel,2002:147)

Azzam was careful to confine this jihad to reclaiming formerly Muslim land lost to non-Muslimgovernments.HeneveradvocatedtheoverthrowofregimesinMuslimcountries.Indeed,hetriedhardtounifythevariouswarringAfghanfactionsagainsttheSovietsandtheCommunistAfghangovernment.HepreachedinmostMuslimcountriesbutneveradvocatedtheoverthrowofanyoftheirseculargovernmentsonthegroundsofapostasy.HisbiographyshowsthatherejectedinternecineMuslimfights,liketheBlackSeptember1970revoltinJordan.HeconsideredAfghanPresidentNajibullahtobeaCommunistandnotaMuslim,andsawnoproblemincontinuingthefightagainsthisgovernmentaftertheSovietswithdrew.Azzam’s advocacy of jihad was a traditional one, albeit an aggressive, one demanding the return offormerlyMuslimlands.

RestoringIslamicProminenceThehistoryofIslam,likethatofChristianityorJudaism,isfullofrevivalistmovements,restoringenergyand vitality to the faith. Islam views itself as the latest and perfect revelation of God’smessage; theProphethasbeendubbedthe“SealofallRevelation.”ImplicitinthismessageisthedestinyofMuslimstoleadhumanityandspreadGod’smessagethroughouttheworld.Yetafterafewcenturiesofspectaculargains,Islamreachedaplateauandenteredalongperiodofpoliticalandculturaldecline.Thedisparitybetween its self-appointedmission and reality generatedwaves of revivalistmovements to check thisdecadenceandrestoreitsgrandeur.Variousdiagnosesof thecausesof thisdecadencehaveeliciteda rangeof responses.These include

personal redemption, withdrawal (hijra in Arabic), imitation, accommodation, and confrontation.ImitationhasbeenapopularstrategyandincludesadoptionofsecularismandWesternizationtotransformMuslim societies. Accommodation and assimilation are programs of reform which include areinterpretation of Islam in light of modern conditions, allowing it to catch up to the West whilepreserving an Islamic core. More confrontational strategies include peaceful political activism and,finally,theuseofviolenttactics,jihad,indefenseofIslam.TheSalafistrategyisbasedonthefollowingdiagnosis:Islambecamedecadentbecauseitstrayedfrom

therighteouspath.Thestrengthoftheoriginalandrighteousummaflowedfromitsfaithanditspractices,fortheywerepleasingtoGod.RecapturingthegloryandgrandeuroftheGoldenAgerequiresareturntotheauthenticfaithandpracticesoftheancientones,namelytheProphetMohammedandhiscompanions.Traditionally, Islamic religious and legal interpretations are based on four prongs. The first is the

authorityoftheQuran.ThesecondisthewordsanddeedsoftheProphetasrecordedinstories(hadith)bypeoplewhoknewhim.Thethirdisanextensionofthefirsttwo,basedonanalogies,toarriveatsomeopinion to dealwith situations not encountered in theQuran or the hadith. The last is a consensus ofIslamic scholars on a particular issue. Salafists reject the last two Islamic traditions as innovations(bidah)thathavebeencorruptedbynon-IslamicinfluencesandthatdilutethewordofGod.Tothem,onlythefirst twoareauthenticmessagesfromGod,andtheonlylegitimatebeliefsandpracticesarestrictlyderived from them. This return to genuine Islam would please God who would once again bestowstrength, glory, and dignity upon the umma. They reject modern Muslim traditions and practices asdeviationsfromthepathofGodthatleadtodecadence.

Dawa

TheSalafidiagnosisandprescriptioncanaccommodateseveral strategies.Anonviolentpersonal formwasMuhammad Ilyas’s creation of Tablighi Jamaat (Society for the Propagation of Islam) in 1927 inIndia.Eschewingpolitics,IlyasadvocatedintensivereligiousdisciplinetobringbackMuslimswhohadsuccumbed to the temptationofHinduorWesternculture.Thisdiscipline isbasedon strict and literalimitation of the life of the Prophet and his companions as themodel of Islamic virtue. Through theseeverydaypractices,all formsof impious thoughtsandbehaviorcorrupting true Islamic lifewould fadeaway.This“bornagain”movementseekstobreakthelinksbetweenfaithfulMuslimsandtheircorruptingenvironmentandforgethemintotheauthenticummaofstrictsubmissiontoGod.ThisstrategyprovedtobesuccessfulinasettingwhereMuslimswereinaminority,asinIndiaorwheretheywereexpatriatesina non-Muslim land.With the urbanization of the second half of the twentieth century, it also becamepopularwhereyoungMuslimsmovedfromthecountrysidetocities,awayfromtheirtraditionalcustomsand into a more disorienting and secular lifestyle. In the late twentieth century, it became the mostimportantformofMuslimrevivalismworldwide,inWesternEuropeaswellasindevelopingcountries.LikeotherSalafimovements,theTablighimovementrejectedtraditionalworshipofsaintsortombs.It

is not well known because its adherents intentionally maintain a low profile. It advocates individualresponsibility in spreading Islam to the rest of society through one’s personal proselytism to convertothers. Ilyas urged his disciples to travelwidely throughout theworld and promote thedawa (call toIslam inArabic).Thiscalls for reaffiliatingMuslims to“true” Islamorconvertingnon-Muslims.Theyoperate informally at the grassroots level, shying away from undue publicity and staying away frompolitics. Theywander on foot in imitation of the Prophet fromone smallmosque to another, spendingadequatetimeamongthefaithfulandleavingatrailofreaffiliatedor“bornagain”Muslims.Overthree-quartersofacentury,ithasformedadensenetworkaroundtheglobeandhasbecomethemajorforceintwentieth-centuryMuslim revivalism. Itsheadquarters are locatednearLahore,Pakistan. It is apatientstrategyaimedattheslowtransformationofMuslimsocietyintoanauthenticumma(Khosrokhavar,1997:47-116). In recent years, Tablighi networks have become vulnerable to exploitation by more militantSalafists, who reject the unifying and nonviolent Tablighi vision of Islam rooted in the Indiansubcontinent.Tojumpahead,manyfuturealQaedarecruitsgotvisastoPakistanonthepretextofplanstostudyatTablighischoolstherewhileinreality,theyintendedtogotoAfghanistanforterrorismtraining(Kherchtou,2001:1109).

AsecondSalafistrategyispeacefulpoliticalactivismtochangesocietythroughstateorgans.DramaticdeclineoftheummaincomparisontoWesternsocietiesinthenineteenthcenturyandthefirsthalfofthetwentieth inspired this strategy. France directly conquered Muslim lands in North Africa. Britainestablished imperialdominationoverSouthAsiaandpartsof theMiddleEast.Economicexploitation,socialdiscrimination,andlackofindustrialdevelopmentcharacterizedthiseraofEuropeancolonialism.When colonial powers blocked various political venues to redress these humiliating trends,Muslimsturnedtoreligiontoregaindignity,pride,andpower.Politicalactivismgroundedinreligiousprinciplesis traditional in Islam, which does not recognize the Western separation of religion and politics sopainfullynegotiatedinEuropeasaresultofitscalamitousreligiouswars.Inthelatenineteenthcentury,Jamalal-Dinal-Afghani(d.1896)wasthevoiceofthispoliticalformof

Muslimrevivalism.OriginallyfromPersia,heresidedinAfghanistan,India,Egypt,Persia,Iraq,andtheOttoman Empire, often one step ahead of state arrest. In his travels, Afghani became disgusted at thewillingnessofMuslimstoacceptWesternideasanddomination.Hebelievedthatreligionwasapoliticalforce and tried to inspire them to unite to restore Islamic grandeur. He rejected godless Westernmaterialismbutadmiredmodernscienceandtechnology.HebelievedthatthestrengthofIslamresidedinthevaluesandpracticesoftheProphetandhispiouscompanions,purgedoflateraberrations.Hearguedthatacombinationofmodernscienceandthevaluesoftheancientpiousones(salaf)wouldrestoretheGoldenAgeofIslam.Heurgedapan-IslamicmovementofpoliticalsolidarityagainsttheWest(Hodgson,1974,3:307-310).More consistentwith Salafi revivalismwas the creation of Salafi political parties.Hasan al-Banna

(1906-1949)establishedtheMuslimBrotherhoodin1928inEgypt,andMawlanaabual-AlaMawdudi(1903-1979) founded theJamaat-i Islami(IslamicSociety) in1941 in India.The twomenheldsimilarbeliefs,namelytheunityofIslamasanall-encompassingguideforthelifeofthebelieverandhisorhercommunity.TheirdiagnosesandprescriptionswereSalafi.TheyadvocatedthecreationofatrueMuslimstatethroughimpositionoftheSharia,whichtheyviewednotonlyasthestrictQuraniclawbutalsoasthepracticesofthesalaf.ScienceandtechnologycouldbeharnessedinanIslamiccontext.ThisnewGoldenAgewouldrequirepersonalandcommunaljihadtochangethepracticesofthebelieversandbringaboutpolitical reforms, creating the social and political conditions for such all-encompassing practices. Tocarryoutthisprogram,eachcreatedhisorganizationasavanguardoftherighteouscommunitythatwouldserve as the nucleus of true “born again” Muslims spreading authentic Islam to the broader society.Violent jihad against the infidel colonizers was permissible, and these parties allied themselves withnationalistMuslimstryingtogainindependencefromthecolonizers.Mid-twentieth-centurydecolonizationrestoredMuslimstopowerandusheredinthepromiseofatrue

Islamist state. On the Indian subcontinent, the creation of Pakistan was based on the notion that trueMuslimscannotliveunderinfideldomination.ButthenewMuslimleaderschosetheimitationstrategy.Theirideasofsecularism,popularsovereignty,nationalism,women’srights,andconstitutionalismcameintodirectconflictwiththeSalafists,whoraisedquestionsabouttheirlegitimacyasMuslimleaders.Thisopposition betweenMuslim leaders and political Salafistsmade for an explosive situation. The stateresponded with a seesaw strategy of accommodation and repression. This strategy of peaceful SalafipoliticalreformsurvivestothisdayinEgypt,Morocco,andPakistan,buthasbeensuppressedinmanyothercountries.

SalafiJihad

RepressionbymodernMuslimstatesconvincedsomeSalafiststhatdawaandpoliticalreformswerenot

viablestrategiesfortheestablishmentofanIslamiststate.Butanyviolenceagainstthestatewouldspreadfitna(temptationortrial)inthecommunity.FitnareferstothechaosordisunityofthetwocivilwarsthattoretheMuslimcommunityapartwithinhalfacenturyoftheProphet’sdeath,resultingintheShia-Sunnisplit.Thecandidateeventuallyselectedascaliphspecificallyappealedtounity.ThosewhofollowedhimbecameSunniandthosewhorejectedhimbecameShia.Sunnitraditionsuniversallycondemnfitnawithintheumma.EvenabadSunnirulerwasstillbetterthanfitna.HowcouldgoodMuslimsrevoltagainstabadMuslimleaderwithoutcausingfitna?ThelegitimizationofsucharevoltliesinSayyidQutb’s(1906-1966)conceptofjahiliyya,thestateof

barbarismandignorancethatprevailedintheArabicPeninsulabeforeMohammed’srevelations.Qutb,anEgyptian ideologist for the Muslim Brothers, was imprisoned because of his opposition to PresidentNasser’ssecularpolicies.Hisviewsgrewmoreradical inprison.Althoughhewasnot thefirstonetousethisconcept,hewasthefirsttodrawitsradicalimplications.Intheeighteenthcentury,MohamedibnAbdal-Wahhab(1703-1791),anArabianPeninsulapreacher,

hadrejectedthedepravityoftheprevailingpopularbeliefsandpracticesofthetribesofthepeninsula.Heclaimedtheyhadrevertedbacktoastateofjahiliyya.Asidolaters,theydeserveddeathforabandoningIslam.HepreachedanaustereformofIslambasedonastrictinterpretationoftheQuran,purifyingIslamfrom later deviations. His central doctrinewasTawhid (the Unity of God in Arabic), condemning asidolatryallsignsofpossibleintermediariestoGod,suchassaintsorshrines.Heforgedanalliancewithalocaltribalchief,MohamedibnSaud,formingarevivalistpoliticalmovementtopurifyIslamandfulfillitsgodlypromise.ThechargeofjahiliyyawasthejustificationforwagingwaronfellowMuslims.TheWahhabi-Saudi alliance conquered most of the peninsula by the end of the eighteenth century. To thehorroroftheumma,itdestroyedall thesacredtombs,includingthetomboftheProphet,massacredtheMuslimsoftheHolyCities,andimposeditsownstandardsonMuslimpilgrims.TheOttomansintervenedand,usingWesternEuropeanmilitarytactics,pusheditbacktoitsancestralhomelandaroundRiyadh.TheWahhabi-Saudialliancesurvivedformore thantwocenturies.By1925, ithadreconqueredmostof thepeninsulaandfoundedthekingdomofSaudiArabia.IbnAbdal-WahhabhadbasedmanyofhisQuranicinterpretationsonthefatwasofTaqial-DinAhmad

ibnTaymiyya(1263-1328),whohadlivedinoneofthemostdisruptiveperiodsofMuslimhistory—theconquestofMuslimlandsbytheMongolswhohadpreviouslyconvertedtoIslam.Thequestionwasputto ibn Taymiyyawhether it was legitimate forMuslims to declare a jihad against otherMuslims. Herespondedthat,sincetheMongolscontinuedtofollowtheYasalegalcodeofGenghisKhaninsteadoftheSharia, theywerenot realMuslims,butapostateswhoshouldbepunishedwithdeathaccording to theSharia.Itwastheright, indeedtheduty,ofMuslimstowagejihadagainstthem.AlthoughoftenatoddswiththeMamlukrulersandearningshortprisonsentencesasaresult,ibnTaymiyyainhisotherwritingsnevercondonedrevoltingagainstthemdespitetheirallegeddepravedpractices(Sivan,1985:90-101).Mawdudihadresurrected theconceptof jahiliyya inhiswritingsasanabstract term todescribe the

systemofbeliefsandideasofthetimesinIndia.Therewasnohintthatheintendeditasajustificationforviolent revolt. Qutb took both ibn Taymiyya’s duty to wage jihad against apostates and Mawdudi’sconceptof jahiliyyaoutofcontextandcombined them inanovelway,extending ibnAbdal-Wahhab’sideasevenfurther.Sayyid Qutb’s influence on the Salafi jihad in general was crucial. Afghan resistance leaders like

BurhanuddinRabbani,whotranslatedhisworksintoDari,werehisdisciples.SomeofthefoundersofalQaeda—Aymanal-Zawahiri,AliAminAlial-Rashidi,andSubhiMuhammadAbuSittah—wereEgyptiandisciples who had sought refuge from political persecution in the Afghan jihad. Qutb’s writings laterfilledtheideologicalvacuumcreatedwhenthecatastrophic1967Arabdefeatdiscreditedimitationand

pan-Arabism as strategies for catching up to theWest. Qutb’sMilestones, published in 1964, is themanifestooftheSalafijihadanditslaterglobalvariant.Deeperanalysisofhisargumentsisnecessarytounderstandthisviolentideologyanditswidespreadappeal.QutbstartedbystatingtheSalaficreed.Mankindwasonthebrinkofaprecipice.Itwasdevoidofvital

valuesnecessary for itshealthydevelopmentand realprogress.Westerncivilizationcouldnotprovidethisguidance,forithadnosuchvalues.OnlyIslampossessedthem.Unfortunately,theumma—thatgroupofpeoplewhosemanners,ideasandconcepts,rulesandregulations,values,andcriteriaareallderivedfrom Islamic sources—had been extinct for years because later deviations had corrupted the originalteachings.ItwasnecessarytorestoretheummatoitsoriginalforminorderforIslamtoplayitsdecisiverole.Thegoalwasaspiritualandpracticalchangefromtheworldofjahiliyya.Bothcommunism,whichhumiliatedman,andcapitalism,whichexploitedhim,wererebellionsagainstGod’sauthorityanddeniedthe dignity God gave toman: “To attain the leadership ofmankind, wemust have something to offerbesidesmaterialprogress,andthisotherqualitycanonlybeafaithandawayoflifewhichontheonehandconservesthebenefitsofmodernscienceandtechnology,andontheotherfulfillsthebasichumanneedsonthesamelevelofexcellenceastechnologyhasfulfilledtheminthesphereofmaterialcomfort.And then this faith andway of lifemust take concrete form in a human society—in otherwords, in aMuslimsociety”(Qutb,n.d.:10).ToreviveIslam,avanguardwasnecessary torecapture themessageofGod.TrueIslamhadexisted

onlyduringthegenerationoftheCompanionsoftheProphet,whowereinspiredexclusivelybytheQuranandthehadith.Laterinnovationsdilutedthismessage.Thisresultedinjahilisociety,nolongerworthyofanycompromise.“Ouraimisfirsttochangeourselvessothatwemaylaterchangesociety.Ourforemostobjectiveistochangethepracticesofthissociety”(21).Thistaskdemandedgreatsacrifices.The fundamental question for this revived religionwas the relationship betweenGod andman.The

doctrineofTawhid,theUnityofGod,enshrinedinthefirstpartoftheIslamiccreed,“thereisnoGodbutGod,”addresses this relationship.Sovereigntycanbeascribedonly toGodandnot tohumans,be theyrulers,priests,orrichmen.TheoriginalCompanionswerepureandtherewasnoneedtoenforcelaws,“fornowconsciencewasthelaw-enforcer,andthepleasureofGod,thehopeofDivinereward,andthefear of God’s anger took the place of police and punishments”(30). Through Islam, they had attainedperfection.“All thiswaspossiblebecause thosewhoestablished this religion in the formofa state,asystem of laws and regulations had first established it in their hearts and lives in the form of faith,character,worshipandhumanrelationships”(21).ThisstateofperfectionpleasedGod.

WhenGodtriedthemandtheyprovedsteadfast,relinquishingtheirownpersonaldesires,andwhenGodMostHighknewthattheywerenotwaitingforanyrewardinthisworld,nowweretheydesiroustoseethevictoryofthismessageandtheestablishmentofthisReligiononearthbytheirhands,whentheirheartsbecamefreeofprideoflineage,ofnationality,ofcountry,oftribe,ofhousehold—inshort,whenGodMostHighsawthemtobemorallypure—thenHegrantedthemthegreattrust,theconsciousassumptionofbeingGod’srepresentativeonearth....Heknewtheywouldnotuseittobenefittheirownselvesortheirfamiliesortribeornation,butwoulddedicatethisauthoritypurelytotheserviceofGod’sreligionandlaws,astheyknewthatthetruesourceofauthorityisGodaloneandthattheywereonlytrustees.(31)

Islam was not just a theory but a way of life based on deep faith. It was this spirit of completesubmissiontoGodthattransformedmentoformtheumma.Thefirsttaskwastoimplantthisfaithinthe

heartsofmenandtranslatethisbeliefintoalivingreality.ByacknowledgingonlythesovereigntyofGodandhisShariainallspheresoflife,thecalltoIslam(dawa)freedmenfromservitudetoothermensothatthey might devote themselves to God and delivered them from the clutches of human lordship andmanmadelaws,valuesystems,andtraditions.So far, this was a traditional Salafi argument. But Qutb departed from his predecessors when he

insistedonjihadtoestablishthetrueMuslimstate.ThesecondpartoftheMuslimcreed,bearingwitnessthat“MohammedistheMessengerofGod,”wastheguidetotheformationofthetrueumma.TherevivalofIslamanditssocietyisbasedonthemodelof thisoriginalumma,whichundertheleadershipof theProphetstrovetobringpeopletoGod’ssovereignty,authority,andlaws:

ItcannotcomeintoexistencesimplyasacreedintheheartsofindividualMuslims,howevernumeroustheymaybe,unlesstheybecomeanactive,harmoniousandcooperativegroup,distinctbyitself,whosedifferentelements,likethelimbsofahumanbody,worktogetherforitsformation,itsstrengthening,itsexpansion,andforitsdefenseagainstallthoseelementswhichattackitssystem,workingunderaleadershipwhichisindependentofthejahilileadership,whichorganizesitsvariouseffortsintooneharmoniouspurpose,andwhichpreparesforthestrengtheningandwideningoftheirIslamiccharacteranddirectsthemtoabolishtheinfluencesoftheiropponent,thejahililife.(48)

TostriveforthecauseofGodis“toabolishallinjusticefromtheearth,tobringpeopletotheworshipofGodalone,andtobringthemoutofservitudetoothersintotheservants[sic]oftheLord”(56).ThisimpliedtheabolitionofthoseoppressivepoliticalsystemswhichpreventedpeoplefromfreelychoosingIslam.Islamcouldnotbeimposedbyforce,butthisdidnotmeanthatMuslimshadtotoleratepoliticalandmaterial powers that prevented people from accepting it. Islam freedman from servitude to othermen, for sovereigntybelonged toGod alone, and Islamchallenged all systems throughwhichmanhadusurpedthisdivineattribute.Qutbmaintainedthatdawa,orpreaching,couldnotbyitselfachieveGod’sdominiononearth.“Those

whohaveusurpedtheauthorityofGodandareoppressingGod’screaturesarenotgoingtogiveuptheirpower merely through preaching” (58-59). Only a vanguard Muslim movement could remove thepolitical,ideological,social,racial,andeconomicobstaclestodawa’sdissemination.“Thisistheonlywayinwhich‘thereligion’canbepurifiedforGodalone.Theword‘religion’includesmorethanbelief;‘religion’actuallymeansawayoflife,andinIslamthisisbasedonbelief”(61).Strivingthroughuseofthe sword (jihad bis sayf) must clear the way for striving through preaching. Jihad in its narrow ordefensivewarsensedistortedtheuniversalnatureofIslam,whichwasamovementtowipeouttyranny:“Ifwe insist on calling IslamicJihad a defensivemovement, thenwemust change themeaning of theword‘defense’andmeanbyitthe‘defenseofman’againstthoseelementswhichlimithisfreedom.Theseelementstaketheformofbeliefsandconcepts,aswellasofpoliticalsystems,basedoneconomic,racialor class distinctions. When Islam came into existence, the world was full of such systems, and thepresent-dayJahiliyyaalsohasvariouskindsofsuchsystems”(62).Islam’s universal mission is eternal and ubiquitous, not dependent on specific causes or “external

reasons” such as invasion and defensivewars. “It is in the very nature of Islam to take initiative forfreeingthehumanbeingsthroughouttheearthfromservitudetoanyoneotherthanGod;andsoitcannotberestrictedwithin any geographical or racial limits, leaving allmankind on thewhole earth in evil, inchaosandinservitudetolordsotherthanGod”(73).Themessageof Islam isuniversal: “Islam isnotaheritageofanyparticular raceorcountry; this is

God’s religion and it is for the whole world. It has the right to destroy all obstacles in the form ofinstitutionsandtraditions,whichlimitman’sfreedomofchoice.Itdoesnotattackindividualsnordoesitforce themtoaccept itsbeliefs; itattacks institutionsand traditions to releasehumanbeings from theirpoisonousinfluences,whichdistorthumannatureandwhichcurtailhumanfreedom”(75).ForSayyidQutb,Islamisnotmerelyasetofbeliefs,likeWesternreligions.Itisawayoflifeordained

byGodforallmankind.AsjahilisocietiesdonotallowtheconditionsfortheIslamicwayoflife,“itisthedutyof Islamtoannihilateallsuchsystems,as theyareobstacles in thewayofuniversal freedom”(75).Jihadissimplyanameformakingthissystemoflifedominantintheworldandimpliespracticalstepstoorganizeamovementforbringingitabout.“Thus,wheneveranIslamiccommunityexistswhichisaconcreteexampleoftheDivinely-ordainedsystemoflife,ithasaGod-givenrighttostepforwardandtakecontrolofthepoliticalauthoritysothatitmayestablishtheDivinesystemonearth,whileitleavesthematterofbelieftoindividualconscience”(76).Thisstruggleappliedagainstanyjahilisociety.“ThejahilisocietyisanysocietyotherthantheMuslim

society;andifwewantamorespecificdefinition,wemaysaythatanysocietyisajahilisocietywhichdoes not dedicate itself to submission to God alone, in its beliefs and ideas, in its observances ofworship,andinitslegalregulations.Accordingtothisdefinition,allthesocietiesexistingintheworldtoday are jahili” (80). It was clear that “all the existing so-called ‘Muslim’ societies are also jahilisocieties”becausetheirwayoflifeisnotbasedonsubmissiontoGodalone.“AlthoughtheybelieveintheUnity ofGod, still they have relegated the legislative attribute ofGod to others and submit to thisauthority,andfromthisauthoritytheyderivetheirsystems,theirtraditionsandcustoms,theirlaws,theirvaluesandstandards,andalmosteverypracticeoflife”(82).TheyhavecompletelyabandonedIslamintheirwayoflife.FullacceptanceofthesecondpartoftheMuslimcreed,witnessing,“MohammedistheMessengerofGod,”impliesimitationofMohammed’swayoflifeandobediencetoSharia,God’slaw.IslamicsocietyisnotoneinwhichpeoplecallthemselvesMuslimsbutinwhichShariahasnostatus.JustasIslamisnotconfinedtoideasalonebutincludesawholewayoflife,soisSharianotstrictlylimitedtolaws,but includes“principlesofbelief,principlesofadministrationand justice,principlesofmoralityandhumanrelationships,andprinciplesofknowledge”(107).BydeclaringpresentMuslimsocieties jahiliyya,SayyidQutbprovides the rationale for rejectionof

andviolent revolt (jihadbissayf)againstnominallyMuslimregimes,bypassing the issueof fitna.TherighteousMuslimswerenotfightingotherMuslims,butidolaters.ShortlyafterpublicationofMilestones,Nasser’s government rearrested Qutb for sedition and he was executed on August 29, 1966. Qutb’smartyrdombestowedinstantcredibilityuponhisideas.Hisdisciplesthenhadtoworkoutthepracticalstrategicimplicationsofhistheoreticalarguments.The

traditionalists tried to reconcilehis argumentswithdawa,holding thatpreachingalonewould lead thecorrupt Muslim society back to true Islam. Hasan al-Hudaybi, the leader of the Muslim Brothers,summarizedthisopinioninthetitleofhisbookPreachers,notJudges.Militantsacceptedtheargumentthatviolentoverthrowoftheregimewastheonlysolution.SalihSirriya,theleaderofaradicalMuslimBrotherhoodoffshoot called the IslamicLiberationParty, condemned thepolitical system for imposingthis state of jahiliyya.He viewed the decaying society at large as the victim of unscrupulous godlessleaders.AcoupoverthrowingthistopleadershipthereforewouldtriggeraspontaneouspopularuprisingrestoringtheIslamiststate.TheattemptedcouponApril18,1974,attheTechnicalMilitaryAcademyinCairowasquicklysubdued.Sirriyawasarrestedandlaterexecuted.AmoreinfluentialinterpretationofQutb’sideaswasthatofShukriMustafa,whodrewtheimplication

ofthedoctrineofjahiliyyatoitslogicalextreme.IfEgyptiansocietywasjahiliyyaandrottentothecore,then itmust be excommunicated (takfir, a lapsedMuslim, from theArabic root kufr for impiety).He

advocatedfollowing thestrategyof theProphet,who,whenfacedwith the jahiliyya inMecca,went inexile (hijra) toMedina inorder tobuilda societyofMuslims,gather strength,and return toMecca intriumph. Imitating theProphet,Mustafacreated theSocietyofMuslims(Jamaatal-Muslimin), righteouscommuneswithdrawnfromthecorruptsociety.Atfirst,hebuilthiscommunesincavesinUpperEgypt(thepresscalledthemovement“PeopleoftheCave”)beforeestablishingcommunalapartmentsincities.HehopedthatwithdrawalandisolationwouldprotectthecommunityfromtheimpioussocietyandallowittogrowstrongenoughtoeventuallyconquerEgyptandestablishatrueIslamistsociety.Tobelongtothesect, one had to abandonone’s ties to society, including family, former friends, state employment, andwhatwasconsidereduselesseducation.Communal living incityapartmentswasalsoopen towomen,andMustafa encouraged earlymarriage amonghismembers.This contrastedwith the rest ofEgyptiansociety,wherepovertypostponeddeparturefromtheparentalhomeandmarriage.ManyobjectionstotheSociety of Muslims came from parents whose daughters had disappeared to marry into the sect.Information about joining the sectwas spread through siblings and friends, asMustafawas prohibitedfrom publishing his ideas. The sect sustained itself through agricultural labor, petty commerce, andremittancesfrommemberssenttoworkinoil-richPersianGulfstates.Afteragovernmentcrackdownin1977,thissectdisappearedfromEgypt.Itsideassurvivedamongfutureglobalterrorists.By far, themost influentialdiscipleofQutbwasMuhammadAbdal-SalamFaraj (1954-1982),who

washeadoftheCairobranchoftheTanzimal-Jihad(JihadOrganization)thatkilledPresidentAnwaral-Sadat. Faraj articulated his ideas in a pamphlet, The Neglected Duty. He quickly built on Qutb’sargument:

TheestablishmentofanIslamicStateisanobligationfortheMuslims,forsomethingwithoutwhichsomethingwhichisobligatorycannotbecarriedoutbecomes(itself)obligatory.If,moreover,(sucha)statecannotbeestablishedwithoutwar,thenthiswarisanobligationaswell....ThelawsbywhichtheMuslimsareruledtodayarethelawsofUnbelief,theyareactuallycodesoflawthatweremadebyinfidelswhothensubjectedtheMuslimstothese(codes)....AfterthedisappearanceoftheCaliphatedefinitelyintheyear1924,and(after)theremovalofthelawsofIslamintheirentirety,and(after)theirsubstitutionbylawsthatwereimposedbyinfidels,thesituation(oftheMuslims)becameidenticaltothesituationoftheMongols.(Faraj,1986:165-167)

This analogywith theMongolsmade the fatwas of ibnTaymiyya relevant to the present day. FarajsimplystatedthattherulersofthisagewereinapostasyfromIslamdespitetheirprofessionoffaith,andtheIslamicpunishmentforapostasywasdeath(169).Hispamphletaddressedthetraditionalobjectionstothis argument. Faraj rejected out of hand the argument that benevolent societiesmight bring about theestablishmentofanIslamiststatethroughtheiractsofdevotion.Similarly,individualpietyandeducationofMuslimsabrogated thehighest formofdevotion,which is jihad (after theprescribed fivepillarsofIslam,ofcourse).HelikedIslamicpoliticalpartiesbetterthanbenevolentsocieties,“becauseapartyatleasttalksaboutpolitics”(184).However,eventhisstrategyfailedforitcollaboratedwithandtherebysupportedthe“pagan”state.Farajrejectedthestrategyofusingdawatobuildabroadbasethatwouldbringaboutthefoundationof

an Islamist state. The wicked state’s control of all means of mass communication prevented the trueimplementation of dawa. He repudiated the quest for knowledge without the use of violence as notaddressingtheneedsofthecommunity.FarajalsodismissedwaitingfortheliberationofformerMuslimlandslike“theliberationofJerusalem”ordefeatofimperialismbeforeoverthrowingone’sgovernment.

Muslimsmust give priority to “radical definitive” solutions. “To fight an enemywho is near ismoreimportantthantofightanenemywhoisfar”(192).Fightingthe“farenemy”wouldbenefittheinterestsoflocal“InfidelRule”andsetbacktheIslamistcausethroughthesheddingofMuslimblood.FightinghadtobeonlyunderthebannerofIslamandunderIslamistleadership:

ThebasisoftheexistenceofImperialismintheLandsofIslamare(precisely)theserulers.Tobeginbyputtinganendtoimperialismisnotalaudatoryandnotausefulact.Itisonlyawasteoftime.WemustconcentrateonourownIslamicsituation:wehavetoestablishtheRuleofGod’sReligioninourowncountryfirst,andtomaketheWordofGodsupreme....ThereisnodoubtthatthefirstbattlefieldforjihadistheexterminationoftheseinfidelleadersandtoreplacethembyacompleteIslamicOrder.Fromhereweshouldstart.(193)

FarajnotedthatIslamhadbeenspreadbythesword,showingthatjihadinIslamwasnotdefensive.HequotedtheQuranic“swordverses”tosupporthisview:“Whenthesacredmonthshavepassed,slaytheidolaterswhereveryoufindthem,andtakethem,andconfinethem,andlieinwaitforthemateveryplaceofambush”(Quran9:5).

WithregardtothelandsofIslam,theenemylivesrightinthemiddleofthem.Theenemyevenhasgotholdofthereinsofpower,forthisenemyis(noneotherthan)theserulerswhohave(illegally)seizedtheLeadershipoftheMuslims.Therefore,wagingjihadagainstthemisanindividualduty....Knowthatwhenjihadisanindividualduty,thereisno(need)toaskpermissionof(your)

parentstoleavetowagejihad,asthejuristshavesaid;itisthussimilartoprayerandfasting.(Faraj,1986:200)

Farajalsodismissedasadangerousrecentinnovationthedistinctionbetweenthegreatjihad(againstone’s soul) and the small jihad (against the enemy) because it reduced the value of fighting with thesword.Norwastheabsenceofacaliphanexcuseforpostponingjihad.Thismadeitallthemoreurgentto organize jihad activities to return Islam to Muslim nations. The price of neglecting jihad was the“lowness,humiliation,divisionandfragmentationinwhichtheMuslimslivetoday”(205).TherestofFaraj’spamphletisadiscussionofmilitaryethicsandtactics,suchasthelegalityofdeceit,

surprise attacks, and destruction of property, and specifies that the killing of children, women, andinnocentbystandersshouldbegenerallyavoided.Copiesof thepamphletwerediscoveredin thehousesof theperpetratorsduringthewaveofarrests

aftertheassassinationofPresidentSadat.Itwasclearthatthepamphletwasaclandestinedocumentforinternal andnot public consumption. Itwaspublishedonly after theEgyptiangovernment directedAl-AzharUniversityscholarstorefuteitstheses.ThedebatesaroundtheaccusationofjahiliyyaandtakfirgotothecoreofthedisputebetweentraditionalistandmilitantSalafistsaboutthemeaningofjihadandthelegitimacyofinternalviolentrebelliongiventheprohibitionagainstfitna.Themilitants,likeFaraj,usedselectivequotesfromtheQurantosupporttheirpositions.Forinstance,inhisuseofthe“swordverses,”he quoted only the first part. The Quran continues, “but if they repent and fulfill their devotionalobligationsandpay thezakat [tax foralms] then let themgo theirway, forGod is forgivingandkind”(Quran, 9:5). This last part undermines the militants’ advocacy of indiscriminate slaughter of Islam’senemies.The Salafi jihad is thus a Muslim revivalist movement advocating the violent overthrow of local

Muslimgovernment,the“nearenemy,”toestablishanIslamiststate.

GlobalSalafiJihad

The Afghan war against the Soviet Union was a watershed in militantMuslim revivalist movements.Militants from all over theMuslimworld finallymet and interacted for lengthy periods of time. Thecommonfightforgedstrongbondsamongthem.AftertheSovietswithdrew,themilitantsstartedtoanalyzetheir common problems with a more global perspective, transcending their countries of origin. SheikAbdallahAzzam advocated a traditional jihad to roll back Christian encroachment on formerMuslimlands.HerejectedinternalMusliminfightingasfitna.HesupportedconflictsinthePhilippines,Palestine,andevenSpain,butnotinMuslimlandssuchasEgypt,Jordan,andSyria.TheEgyptianSalafimujahedin(fromtheArabicroot jihad, jihadfighters; thesingular ismujahed), intoxicatedwith theideasofQutbandFaraj,soughthelpinoverthrowingtheirgovernmentandwantedtousetheAfghanjihadresourcestothatend.OsamabinLaden,Azzam’spopularandfabulouslywealthydeputy,graduallycametoespousetheirviews.AfterAzzam’sdeathin1989,theorganizationshehadcreatedsurvived,butlackedacommonenemytofocustheirenergies.ThischangedwiththeappearanceofU.S.troopsinSaudiArabiaandlaterSomalia,bothsolidMuslimlands.TheMuslimmilitants’ reaction to infidel troops onMuslim soilwas originally a call to traditional

jihadtothrowtheinfidelsoutofMuslimlands.Underthenowglobalgazeofthecommunityof“AfghanArabs”(alsoreferredtoas“ArabAfghans”)however,amoreglobalanalysisofIslam’sproblemswasgraduallytakingshape.LocaltakfirMuslimleaderswereseenaspawnsofaglobalpower,whichitselfwas now considered the main obstacle to establishing a transnational umma from Morocco to thePhilippines. This in effect reversed Faraj’s strategy and now the priority was jihad against the “farenemy”overthe“nearenemy.”WiththedemiseoftheSovietUnion,theonlysuchglobalpowerleftwastheUnitedStates.ThediscussionsleadingtothisanalysistookplaceduringalQaeda’sSudaneseexileinthe 1990s. Parallel discussions took place in New York, leading to the 1993 World Trade Centerbombing,andinAlgeriaandFrance,priortothewaveofbombingstherein1995-96.A step toward the global Salafi jihadwasOsamabinLaden’sAugust 8, 1996, declaration of “War

Against theAmericansOccupying theLandof theTwoHolyPlaces (Expel the Infidels from theArabPeninsula).”Asthesubtitleindicates,thisfatwakeptAzzam’snotionofdefensivejihadtoexpelinfidelsfromMuslimlands.ThebasisofthereversalofFaraj’sstrategyiscapturedinametaphor:“Thesituationcannot be rectified (the shadow cannot be straightenedwhen its source, the rod, is not straight either)unless the root of the problem is tackled.Hence it is essential to hit themain enemywhodivided theUmmahintosmallandlittlecountriesandpushedit,forthelastfewdecades,intoastateofconfusion.”BinLadenwent back to theMongol analogy and ibnTaymiyya’s fatwas in support of this strategy:

“PeopleofIslamshouldjoinforcesandsupporteachothertogetridofthemain‘Kufr’whoiscontrollingthecountriesoftheIslamicworld,eventobearthelesserdamagetogetridofthemajorone,thatisthegreatKufr.”TobinLaden,therewasnomoreimportantdutythanpushingtheAmericanenemyoutoftheHolyLand.Again,citing ibnTaymiyya,“to fight indefenseof religionandBelief isacollectiveduty;thereisnootherdutyafterBeliefthanfightingtheenemywhoiscorruptingthelifeandthereligion.”Ayearandahalf later,onFebruary23,1998, thefatwaoftheWorldIslamicFrontdeclaring“Jihad

against Jews and Crusaders” became the manifesto of the full-fledged global Salafi jihad. In thisdocument,binLadenextendedhispreviousconceptof jihadfromadefensive toanoffensiveone.TheglobalSalafijihadnowcarriedthefighttothe“farenemy”(theUnitedStatesandtheWestingeneral)onitsown territoryor in thirdcountry territory.The justification for thisnew typeof jihadwas thatU.S.“occupation” of Saudi Arabia, support for Israel, and the killing of Iraqi children was a “cleardeclarationofwaronAllah,hisMessenger,andMuslims”:

TherulingtokilltheAmericansandtheirallies—civiliansandmilitary—isanindividualdutyforeveryMuslimwhocandoitinanycountryinwhichitispossibletodoit....We—withAllah’shelp—calloneveryMuslimwhobelievesinAllahandwishestoberewardedtocomplywithAllah’sordertokilltheAmericansandplundertheirmoneywhereverandwhenevertheyfindit.WealsocallonMuslimulema,leaders,youths,andsoldierstolaunchtheraidonSatan’sU.S.troopsandthedevil’ssupportersallyingwiththem,andtodisplacethosewhoarebehindthemsothattheymaylearnalesson.(binLadenetal.,1998)

The clearest elaborationof this newglobalSalafi jihad isAyman al-Zawahiri’sKnightsUnder theProphet’s Banner (al-Zawahiri, 2001: part 11). Here al-Zawahiri declared that the new jihad was astruggle between Islam and hostile global forces: theWestern powers andRussia, using a “number oftools,” including “(1) The United Nations. (2) The friendly rulers of the Muslim peoples. (3) Themultinational corporations. (4) The international communications and data exchange systems. (5) Theinternationalnewsagenciesandsatellitemediachannels.(6)Theinternationalreliefagencies,whichareusedasacoverforespionage,proselytizing,coupplanningandthetransferofweapons.”OpposedtothisenemywasanewIslamistfundamentalistcoalition,consistingofthejihadmovementsinthevariouslandsofIslam.“ItrepresentsagrowingpowerthatisrallyingunderthebannerofjihadforthesakeofGodandoperatingoutsidethescopeofthenewworldorder.”Al-Zawahiridescribedthisasanewphenomenonofyoungmujahedin,whohadleft“theirfamilies,country,wealth,studies,andjobsinsearchofjihadarenasfor the sake of God.” In his view, there was no solution without jihad. The betrayal of the peacefulAlgerian fundamentalist movement demonstrated the futility of “all other methods that tried to evadeassumingtheburdensofjihad”(al-Zawahiri,2001:part11).Loyaltytoleadershipwasadutythatshouldnotbeallowedtodeteriorateintoapersonalitycult,for

sovereignty belongs only to God. “The loyalty to the leadership and the acknowledgement of itsprecedenceandmeritrepresentadutythatmustbeemphasizedandavaluethatmustbeconsolidated.Butif loyalty to the leadership reaches the point of declaring it holy and if the acknowledgement of itsprecedenceandmeritleadstoinfallibility,themovementwillsufferfrommethodologicalblindness.Anyleadership flaw could lead to a historic catastrophe, not only for themovement but also for the entirenation”(al-Zawahiri,2001:part11).MobilizationoftheMuslimmasseswascriticalfortheglobalSalafijihad,whichneededtogetclose

tothemasses,beintheirmidstorslightlyaheadofthem,andnotisolatedfromthem:

Thejihadmovementmustdedicateoneofitswingstoworkwiththemasses,preach,provideservicesfortheMuslimpeople,andsharetheirconcernsthroughallavailableavenuesforcharityandeducationalwork.Wemustnotleaveasingleareaunoccupied.Wemustwinthepeople’sconfidence,respectandaffection.Thepeoplewillnotloveusunlesstheyfeelthatwelovethem,careaboutthem,andarereadytodefendthem....Wemustnotblamethenationfornotrespondingornotlivinguptothetask.Insteadwemustblameourselvesforfailingtodeliverthemessage,showcompassion,andsacrifice.(al-Zawahiri,2001:part11)

Thismessagehadtobecommunicatedinsimpleterms,soallcouldgraspitsreligiousorigins.Thismeantastrongdawamission.Theummawouldnotparticipateinthejihadunlessitunderstoodtheslogansofthemujahedin.

Theonesloganthathasbeenwellunderstoodbythenationandtowhichithasbeenrespondingforthepast50yearsisthecallforthejihadagainstIsrael.Inadditiontothisslogan,thenation

inthisdecadeisgearedagainsttheU.S.presence.IthasrespondedfavorablytothecallforthejihadagainsttheAmericans.AsinglelookatthehistoryoftheMujahedininAfghanistan,Palestine,andChechnyawillshowthatthejihadmovementhasmovedtothecenteroftheleadershipofthenationwhenitadoptedthesloganofliberatingthenationfromitsexternalenemiesandwhenitportrayeditasabattleofIslamagainstinfidelityandinfidels....ThefactthatmustbeacknowledgedisthattheissueofPalestineisthecausethathasbeenfiringupthefeelingsoftheMuslimnationfromMoroccotoIndonesiaforthepast50years.Inaddition,itisarallyingpointforalltheArabs,betheybelieversornon-believers,goodorevil.(al-Zawahiri,2001:part11)

Al-ZawahirideclaredthatthejihadmustexposethetreasonoftheMuslimrulersandtheirapologists,whichisbasedontheirlackoffaithandtheirsupportoftheinfidelsagainsttheMuslims.Themovementmust establish an Islamist state in theMuslimheartland, fromwhich to launch its battle to restore theCaliphatebasedonthetraditionsoftheProphet.“IfthesuccessfuloperationsagainstIslam’senemiesandtheseveredamageinflictedonthemdonotservetheultimategoalofestablishingtheMuslimnationintheheartoftheIslamicworld,”heargued,“theywillbenothingmorethandisturbingacts,regardlessoftheirmagnitude, that could be absorbed and endured, even if after some time and with some losses” (al-Zawahiri,2001:part11).Thiswasnotaneasygoalthatcouldbereachedinthenearfuture.Patiencewasneededforthejihad

movementtobuilditsstructureuntilitwaswellestablishedwithenoughresourcesandsupporttoselectthe time and place to fight its battles. If local regimes uncover the movement’s plans and arrest itsmembers, withdrawal to the safety of a shelter should be sought “without hesitation, reluctance, orreliance on illusions.” Itwas better to be on themove than spend time in the humiliation of captivity.Since the goal of the jihad is comprehensive change, the path is a long one, full of sacrifices. Themovementmustnotdespairof repeatedsetbacksandrecurringcalamities,andmustnever laydownitsarmsregardlessofthecasualties.Ifretreatiscutoffandcollapseisimminent,themujahedshouldfight“sothatnobodyiscapturedorkilledfornothing.”Butsometimeshostilecircumstancesdictatedanotherstrategy.Ifforcedbylocalforcestofightunderadversecircumstances,“wemustrespondinthearenathatwechoose;namely, to strike at theAmericans and the Jews inour countries.”Thiswouldaccomplishthreethings.First,itwouldbeastrikeatthe“greatmaster”enemyhidingbehinditslocalagents.Second,itwouldhelpwinovertheMuslimpeoplebystrikingat“atargetitfavors,onethatitsympathizeswiththose who hit it.” Third, it would expose the regime before theMuslim people when it retaliates indefenseofits“U.S.andJewishmasters,thusshowingitsuglyface,thefaceofthehiredpolicemanwhoisfaithfullyservingtheoccupiersandtheenemiesoftheMuslimnation”(al-Zawahiri,2001:part11).Al-Zawahiripressedhiscasetotargetthefarenemy:

ThemastersinWashingtonandTelAvivareusingtheregimestoprotecttheirinterestandtofightthebattleagainsttheMuslimsontheirbehalf.Iftheshrapnelfromthebattlereachtheirhomesandtheirbodies,theywilltradeaccusationswiththeiragentsaboutwhoisresponsibleforthis.Inthatcase,theywillfaceoneoftwobitterchoices:EitherpersonallywagethebattleagainsttheMuslims,whichmeansthatthebattlewillturnintoclear-cutjihadagainstinfidels,ortheyreconsidertheirplansafteracknowledgingthefailureofthebruteandviolentconfrontationagainstMuslims.Therefore,wemustmovethebattletotheenemy’sgroundstoburnthehandsofthosewhoignitefireinourcountries.(al-Zawahiri,2001:part11)

Thus,al-Zawahiriargues,thestrugglefortheestablishmentofaMuslimstatecannotbeconfinedtoaregionalstruggleandcannotbepostponed:

ItisclearfromtheabovethattheJewish-Crusadealliance,ledbytheUnitedStates,willnotallowanyMuslimforcetoreachpowerinanyoftheIslamiccountries.Itwillmobilizeallitspowertohititandremoveitfrompower.Towardthatend,itwillopenabattlefrontagainstitthatincludestheentireworld.Itwillimposesanctionsonwhoeverhelpsit,ifitdoesnotdeclarewaragainstthemaltogether.Therefore,toadjusttothisnewrealitywemustprepareourselvesforabattlethatisnotconfinedtoasingleregion,onethatincludestheapostatedomesticenemyandtheJewish-Crusadeexternalenemy....ThemujahidIslamicmovementmustescalateitsmethodsofstrikesandtoolsofresistingtheenemiestokeepupwiththetremendousincreaseinthenumberofitsenemies,thequalityoftheirweapons,theirdestructivepowers,theirdisregardforalltaboos,anddisrespectforthecustomsofwarsandconflicts.Inthisregard,weconcentrateonthefollowing:1. Theneedtoinflictthemaximumcasualtiesagainsttheopponent,forthisisthelanguageunderstoodbythewest,nomatterhowmuchtimeandeffortsuchoperationstake.

2. TheneedtoconcentrateonthemethodofmartyrdomoperationsasthemostsuccessfulwayofinflictingdamageagainsttheopponentandtheleastcostlytotheMujahedinintermsofcasualties.

3. Thetargetsaswellasthetypeandmethodofweaponsusedmustbechosentohaveanimpactonthestructureoftheenemyanddeteritenoughtostopitsbrutality,arrogance,anddisregardforalltaboosandcustoms.Itmustrestorethestruggletoitsrealsize.

4. Toreemphasizewhatwehavealreadyexplained,wereiteratethatfocusingonthedomesticenemyalonewillnotbefeasibleatthisstage.(al-Zawahiri,2001:part11)

This was a battle that everyMuslimmust face to defend his creed, society, values, honor, dignity,wealth, and power. Tomobilize, themasses needed a leadership that they could trust, understand andfollow;aclearenemytostrikeat;andremovaloftheshacklesoffearandweaknessintheirsouls.Thejihadmovementmustgetitsmessageacrosstothemassesbybreakingthemediasiegeimposedonit.Al-ZawahiridescribedthebasicobjectiveoftheIslamicjihadmovement,regardlessofthesacrificesandthetimeinvolved,asfollows:“LiberatingtheMuslimnation,confrontingtheenemiesofIslam,andlaunchingjihad against them require aMuslim authority, established on aMuslim land, that raises the banner ofjihadandralliestheMuslimsaroundit.Withoutachievingthisgoalouractionswillmeannothingmorethanmereandrepeateddisturbancesthatwillnotleadtotheaspiredgoal,whichistherestorationoftheCaliphateandthedismissaloftheinvadersfromthelandofIslam”(al-Zawahiri,2001:part11).The foregoing makes it clear that the present wave of terrorism directed at the far enemy is an

intentionalstrategyofaMuslimrevivalistsocialmovement.ItsideologycomesfromEgypt,asitsmajorcontributorswereQutb,Mustafa,Faraj,andal-Zawahiri.ItfocusesoninternalIslamicfactorsratherthannon-Islamic characteristics. Unlike its portrayal in theWest, it is not based on hatred of theWest. ItcertainlypreachesamessageofhateforWesternvalues,andthementionofIsraelisarallyingpointforthemasses.ButthishatredisderivedfromaparticularIslamicversionofloveforGodandtrueMuslimsingeneral.ItsappealliesinitsapparentsimplicityandelegancethatresonatewithconcernedMuslimsnotwellschooledintraditionalMuslimteaching,whichitrejects.Thenextthreechaptersaddresshowthismovementevolved,whoparticipatesinit,andhowtheyjoined.

TWO

TheEvolutionoftheJihad

TheglobalSalafijihadispopularlyconceivedasa“blowback”(theallegedCIAneologismreferringtounintended consequence of covert operations) of theU.S. government training and support of “AfghanArabs” during the Afghan-Soviet war. This view appears again and again in themedia and in bookswrittenbyjournalists.“TheCIAhadfundedandtrainedtheAfghanArabsduringthewar,andnowtheirformer‘assets’appearedtobeturningontheiroldally”(Reeve,1999:55;seealsoHarding,2000:24;andmanyothers).Thereisatragicironytotheblowbackthesis,fromthehubrisof1980sU.S.policyforAfghanistan to the jihadi nemesis of September 11, 2001. Other commentators take the opposite tack,however,andaccusetheCIAofdoingtoolittleandblameitforfailuretopreventPakistanisupportandtrainingofmilitants,wholaterexportedjihadandterrorismaroundtheworld(Bergen,2001:67).OnlyacloselookatthehistoricalevolutionoftheglobalSalafijihadwillresolvethisdispute.

EgyptianOriginsManyofthefoundersoftheglobalSalafijihadcametoAfghanistaninthe1980sfromdifferentcountriesandwithoutpriorconnectiontoeachother.ThiswasnottrueoftheEgyptians,whohadknowneachotherfrom their antigovernment activities in Egypt before seeking refuge in Afghanistan. This network ofEgyptianswentontoconstitutetheleadershipoftheglobaljihad.ThehistoryoftheEgyptianSalafijihadisconfusing,notleastbecausethesamenamesarerecycledto

labeldifferentgroups, leadingthe inattentivereader toassumeanerroneousgenealogy.Onlybyputtinglabelsasideandstrictlyfollowingtheactualnetworkoftherelationshipsinvolvedcanwestarttoseetheorigins of thesemovements andhow the structure of thesenetworks influenceddoctrinal disputes, andlateralliances,thateventuallygaverisetoglobalorganizationssuchasalQaedaortheEgyptianIslamicJihad(EIJ).ThekeypersoninthisanalysisisAymanal-Zawahiri,theleaderoftheEIJ,andthedeputyofalQaeda.

Ayman al-Zawahiri was born on June 19, 1951, and came from one of themost prestigious EgyptianfamiliesinCairo.Hisfatherwasaprofessorofpharmacology,hismaternalgrandfatherheldprestigiousambassadorialpostsandacademicpositions,andanunclehadbeenthefoundingsecretarygeneraloftheArabLeague.Althougheducatedinasecularschool,al-Zawahiriwasdevoutandregularlywent tothemosquewithhisyoungerbrotherMohammed.AtanearlyagehewasstronglyinfluencedbythewritingsofSayyidQutb,andin1966,he,hisbrother,andthreehighschoolfriendsmadeasecretpacttoopposetheNasser regimealong the linesadvocatedbyQutb.The formationof suchclandestinegroupsamonghighschoolfriends,searchingforacausetogivemeaningtotheiryounglives,isacommonphenomenon.Usually,thesegroupsareunconnectedtoalargermovementandfadeovertime,aspeoplegrowupandgetonwiththeirlives.Inthiscase,circumstancesandal-Zawahiri’sobstinateperseverancesustainedthegroup.Thefriendsmetateachother’shomesandatthemosque.Theywantedtoberevolutionariesbutdidnotknowhowtoproceed.ManysuchgroupsformedalloverEgypt,madeupmainlyofrestlessandalienated students. They were small, disorganized and largely unaware of each other because therepressivepoliticalclimateofEgyptpreventedthemfromadvertisingtheirexistenceandreachingouttoeachother.

The humiliating defeat by Israel in 1967 completely discredited the Nasserite government and itssecularsocialistpolicies.Itfueledthealternativeview,that“Islamisthesolution.”Inhismemoirs,al-Zawahiri(2001)describedhowheandhisfriendsparticipatedintheensuingdemonstrationsprotestingthecatastrophe.Theyhaddecidedtostageademonstrationatamosquewheretheyheardayoungdeputyprosecutor,YahyaHashim, loudly challenge the government after services. Later, al-Zawahirimet andbefriended him. Al-Zawahiri went on to medical school, where he slowly continued to expand hisclandestine group, stressing secrecy and security. After Nasser’s death, Anwar al-Sadat’s governmentcourtedIslamicmovementstohelpconfrontremnantsofNasser’sleftistpolicies.HereleasedimprisonedMuslimBrothersandsponsoredIslamicassociationsorgroups(JamaatIslamiyya,usuallyreferredtointhe plural) at universities to challenge their leftist peers, who had control of university socialassociations.This new freedom inaugurated a period of extensive experimentation among Islamist groups, each

derivingitsownstrategytoachievetheIslamicstate.ThetraditionalMuslimBrotherspreacheddawainanefforttopeacefullytransformcivilsocietyintoamassmovementthatwouldsuccessfullydemandandimplementanIslamiststate.Hasanal-Hudaybi,theSupremeGuideoftheMuslimBrothers,championedthis long-term strategy from below. He repudiated Qutb’s call for violence in a book aptly titledPreachers,notJudges.ThevoiceforthisgroupwasthemonthlymagazineAl-Dawa,whichdemandedtheimmediateapplicationofShariabythestate.ItsanalysiswasthatthemainobstacletotheIslamiststatewastheJews.ThemagazineopposedpeaceovertureswithIsrael,crusadersandtheircolonialvariants,communists and their socialist variants, and finally secularists, like Mustafa Kemal Ataturk and hissecularprojectinTurkey.Impatientyoungermilitantswerenotsatisfiedwiththislong-termstrategyanddemandedamorerapid

creationoftheIslamiststatefromabove,throughtheactivitiesofavanguardofMuslimsasadvocatedbyQutb,who had become a legend after hismartyrdom.With the relaxation of repression afterNasser’sdeath, small groups of Islamistmilitants spontaneously surfaced in university towns throughout Egypt.EachpursueditsownstrategywithoutbotheringtocoordinateorevengathersupportfromotherJamaatIslamiyya.Somewereconvinced that an Islamic societywould formspontaneously if the iniquitous rulerwere

removed.Thiswas themessageofSalihSirriya, aPalestinianwhohadcome toEgypt fromJordan in1971,afterthefailureoftheBlackSeptembercouptherein1970.Hiseloquenceandpersuasivenessinreligious and political affairs attracted students fromCairo andAlexandria.He organized them into agroupcalledtheIslamicLiberationOrganization(ILO).Hisonlymessagewasthattheviolentoverthrowof thegodlessEgyptiangovernmentwould lead to theestablishmentofa righteousMuslimsociety.OnApril18,1974,aboutonehundredILOmembersstormedthearmoryattheTechnicalMilitaryAcademyandseizedweaponsandvehiclestogotothenearbyArabSocialistBuilding,whereSadatandothertopofficialswereattendinganofficialevent.The intentwas tokill themall, capture thenearby radioandtelevisionbuildings,andannouncethebirthoftheIslamicRepublicofEgypt.Securityforcesinterceptedthe conspirators before they were able to leave the school. The ensuing firefight killed eleven andwounded twenty-seven people. Ninety-five ILO members were arrested and tried; thirty-two wereconvicted.SirriyaandoneofhislieutenantswereexecutedonNovember9,1976.The ILO failure did not discredit the idea of a coup d’état from above. Hashim advocated such a

strategyandurgedthoseclose tohimtowageaguerrillawar.Al-Zawahiri tried todissuadehisfriendfrompursuingthisstrategy,whichrequiredplacesofsanctuaryfromthegovernment.Egyptwasbasicallya narrow river valley sandwiched between two deserts without any good places to hide. HashimperseveredandtriedtorecruittheimprisonedILOconspiratorsforhiscampaign.Usinghispositionas

deputy prosecutor, he planned their escape during a transfer between prisons. When the plan wasdiscovered,Hashimanda fewcompanionsfled toamountainousregion inUpperEgypt.Police forceseasilydiscoveredthem,andHashimwaskilledintheensuingfirefight.AnotherstrategywasthecreationofpureIslamiccommmunitieslivingoutsidetheimpuresociety,as

advocatedbyShukriMustafa.HisSocietyofMuslimsranafoulofthelawinNovember1976,afterafewmemberslefttoformtheirownindependentgroup.Declaringthemapostate,acrimepunishablebydeath,Mustafaledagroupofdisciplesinaraidtokillthem,probablytodiscouragefuturedissent.Thepoliceintervened,arrestedafewmembers,anddetained themwithoutcharging them.Mustafademandedtheirrelease,butthegovernmentignoredhim.Hisgroupearnedtheridiculeofthepress,whichportrayedthemasabunchoffanaticsorcriminalsandlatchedontothetwinconceptsofexcommunicationandexile(al-Takfirwa’lHijra). The label stuck and this is how the Society is remembered.Mustafa protested thecaricatureinpressreleaseswhichwereneverprinted.Outoffrustration,Mustafakidnappedaformerminister,Muhammadal-Dhahabi,onJuly3,1977,and

demanded the release of his followers, public apologies from the press, the publication of his bookexplaininghisphilosophy,theprintingoftheSociety’scommuniquésandamodestamountofmoney.ThegovernmentignoredthedemandsandMustafakilledhishostagetomaintaincredibility.Afterthecorpsewasfound,thepolicecrackeddownontheSocietyandseveralpeopleonbothsideswerekilledintheconfrontations. The government arrested and tried hundreds of members, but convicted only a few.Mustafa and fourotherswere sentenced todeath andexecutedonMarch19,1978 (Ibrahim,1980and1982;Kepel,1993).ThepresscoverageportrayedMustafaasafanaticcriminalwhosoughttooverthrowthe regimeandwhohaddupedyoung innocentpeopleunder thecloakof religion. InSalafi circles,hebecameacausecélèbre,andhisideaslaterbecameinfluentialamongsegmentsoftheglobalSalafijihad.Themainmovement for theestablishmentofanIslamiststatewas theJamaat Islamiyyaatprominent

universitiesinCairo,Alexandria,andtheprovincialcapitalsofAsyut,Minya,Sohag,Qena,andFayyuminUpperEgypt.TheseIslamicstudentassociationsorganizedservicessuchastransportationforstudents,cheap copies of course notes, and even summer camps. By 1977, the Islamists completely dominatedpolitical and social life in the universities. They controlled student newspapers and printed Islamistliterature,includingQutb’sMilestones,whichintroducedSalafiideastothestudentbody.Theiralliancewith Sadat’s government dissolved because of their opposition to the peace process with Israel. Theconclusion of the 1979 Camp David Accords added to their progressive disillusionment with thegovernment’s continuing secular policies and inspired the proliferation of clandestine Islamist cellspreachingdeedsoverwords.Al-Zawahiri’sgroupwasprobablytypicalofthisgradualradicalization.PerhapsinspiredbyHashim,

it focused on jihad and the necessity of a coup rather than the slow process of a mass movementestablishingan Islamist state.This strategyneededabsolute secrecyandsecurity toescapegovernmentnotice. But it also required military skills and access to weapons, and hence a way to infiltrate themilitary.The vigilance ofEgyptian counterintelligence servicesmade this strategy especially perilous.Al-Zawahiri’s group proceeded with great caution, using friendship or kinship ties to protect againstpotentialdenunciations.TherecruitmentofIssamal-Qamariillustratesthisplayoffriendshipandkinshipbonds.AmemberofthegroupwasUlwiMustafaUlaywah.HisbrotherMuhammadMustafaUlaywahhadgone to themilitary college,where he befriended al-Qamari.Al-Qamariwanted to play a role in theoverthrowoftheEgyptianregimeandhadpassedupopportunitiestogotomoreprestigiousschoolsandstudy for a more lucrative occupation in order to attend the military college and join the army.Withincreasedintimacyandtrust,MuhammadUlaywahandal-Qamaridiscussedtheirreligiousandpoliticalviews.ThroughtheUlaywahbrothers,al-Qamarijoinedthegroupandbecameveryclosetoal-Zawahiri.

Al-QamarirosequicklyintheranksoftheArmedCorps.Forhisclandestinegroup,hedrewupthemajorfoci of security and military presence in the capital upholding the regime and analyzed the mostvulnerable points. At the same time, his greater access to the military allowed him to divert someweapons from his base and store them in al-Zawahiri’s clinic.Othermembers of al-Zawahiri’s groupincluded his brother Mohammed al-Zawahiri and Sayyid Imam al-Sharif, another surgeon, who laterbecameknownasDr.al-Fadl.FourtosixsuchclandestinegroupscoalescedinCairoundertheoverallleadershipofMohammedAbd

al-SalamFaraj.Hisbookabouttheneglecteddutyofjihadprovidedtheircommonstrategyandthelabellaterappliedtothembytheauthorities,theTanzimal-Jihad(jihadorganization).Itisnotclearhowtheseclandestine groups found each other, but it appeared that Kamal Habib played a role. Faraj’s groupincludedsomemilitarymembers,suchasLieutenantColonelAbudal-Zumur,anintelligenceofficerwholedthemilitarywingofthegroup.Ratherthanconcentrateontheuniversities,Farajfocusedonrelativelydeprivedurbangroups.Hepreached inaprivatemosquebuilt forhimbyhis in-lawsandstressed thenecessityofarmedjihadtoestablishtheIslamiststate.Hisdisciplesinturnbroughtintheirfriendsandfamilies,expandingthegroup.EachCairogroupwasautonomous,buttheirleadersmetregularlytoworkoutageneralstrategy.AlthoughFaraj,likeal-Zawahiri,favoredrecruitmentofmilitaryofficers,al-Zumurdiscouragedanyspecialeffortsinthatdirectionforfearofexposuresinceheknewthatinternalsecuritywithinthemilitarywasveryvigilant.Someofficersdidjoin,buttheyhadtobecarefullyvettedthroughfriendsorfamily.Al-Zumur’sstrategywasapopularuprisingandrevolution,basedontheIranianmodelof1979.The militant groups of Upper Egypt (Said) were of different composition and had different aims.

Studentsconstitutedamajority(64percent)intheSaidigroups,asopposedtoaminority(43percent)intheCairocounterparts.KaramZuhdiinMinyawastheoverallleaderoftheUpperEgyptgroups.NajihIbrahimAbdallahSayyidwas the leader inAsyut;Mohammad al-Islambuli, the leader in the businessfacultyatAsyutUniversity;andHamdiAbdelRahman,theleaderinSohag.TheSaidigroupsremainedembedded in their society,an importantdistinctionwhichwillbeexamined inChapter5.UpperEgypthadtraditionallyresistedcentralgovernmentcontrolandmaintainedorderaccordingtoacodeofhonor,bloodfeuds,andvendettas.Socialgroupsfleeingfromcentralcontrolhadhistoricallyfoundrefugethere.Forinstance,theCopts,membersofaChristiansect,wereabletosurviveforcenturiesandconstitutedabout 20 percent of the population there in contrast to 6 percent nationwide. Islamists inUpperEgyptresented this group, whom they believed to be overrepresented in provincial business and politicalinstitutions.ThisconflictbetweenIslamistsandCoptsdegeneratedintoopenviolence.ForZuhdiandhiscolleagues, the priority was to wage jihad first against the Copts for they considered Christianproselytism the major obstacle to the propagation of Islam. In their view, the regime was under theinfluenceofthisChristiancabal.Peoplewhohad connections toboth theCairo andSaidi groups engineered a firstmeetingbetween

themaroundMarch1980.FarajtriedtoconvinceZuhdioftheimperativeofjihadagainsttheregimeandunveiledZumur’s plan to attack vital government installations and homes of public officials inCairo.Zuhdi advocated instead the purging of Christian influence from Egyptian society. Despite thisdisagreement,theydecidedtocontinuetomeetregularly,alternatingtheirsitesbetweenCairoandUpperEgypt.InJune1980,theydecidedtocoordinatetheiractivities,eachfactionretainingfreedomofactionwithin itsown region.Theyestablisheda twelvemember shura (council).Their ideology required thesanction of a mufti, certifying that their operations conformed to the precepts of the Quran. ZuhdiproposedtheblindSheikhOmarAbdelRahman,whohadjustreturnedtoFayyumfromSaudiArabiaandwhomhe knew fromhis student days in 1974when he had invited the sheikh to preach inMinya and

Asyut.SheikhOmaragreedtobecomethemuftioftheshurainthespringof1981andpromptlysanctionedrobberyandkillingofCoptsinfurtheranceofthejihad.TheoriginofTanzimal-JihadwasthereforebasedonthelooseassociationsoflocalgroupsfromCairo

andUpperEgypt.ThisexplainsthesurprisingtotalabsenceofAlexandrianmilitantsinitsmidst,despitethefactthatAlexandriahadbeenahotbedofIslamistactivitiesandhadbeenprominentinthe1974ILOuprising.Sirriya,theILOleader,hadtaughtinAlexandriaandhadbeenabletoattractmilitantslocally.Meanwhile, al-Zawahirihadcome intocontactwithAfghan resistance fighterswhenheacceptedan

invitationfromtheRedCrescentSocietytocareforAfghanrefugeesinPeshawarduringthesummerof1980. He had been preoccupied with the problem of finding a secure base fromwhich to launch theEgyptianjihadandhopedtofinditinPeshawar.Duringhisshortstaythere,hewasconvertedtothejihadagainsttheSovietinvadersandevencrossedintoAfghanistantowitnesssomeofthefighting.HereturnedtoCairothatfall,fullofstoriesaboutthe“miracles”takingplaceinAfghanistan.InFebruary1981,hisclandestinegroupsufferedasecuritybreach.Thepolicehadinterceptedandarrestedacouriercarryingweapons from al-Qamari along with his plans identifying military targets in Cairo. Al-Qamari wentunderground,andal-ZawahirireturnedtoPeshawarforatwo-monthtourofdutywiththeRedCrescentSociety.TheassassinationofPresidentSadatwastheresultofthesuddenappearanceofanirresistibletargetof

opportunityratherthanacarefullyplannedoperation.OnSeptember3,1981,SadathadcrackeddownonIslamists,whohadpreviouslyescalatedboththeirfightingagainst theCoptsandtheiroppositiontohisgovernment’s international and domestic policies. Among the 1,536 arrested was Mohammed al-Islambuli, the Asyut leader. His brother, Khaled, whose own activism was an attempt to emulate hisbrother,wasdistressedbythenewsofMohammed’sarrestandallegedtortureandsworetoavengehim.Khaledwasalieutenantinthemilitaryand,inthespringof1981,hadbeenpostedtoCairo,whereFarajhad invited him to join his group.Threeweeks after the arrests,Khaledwas selected to command anarmoredtransportvehicleintheupcomingOctober6victoryparadecommemoratingthe1973crossingoftheSuezCanal.KhaledimmediatelycontactedFarajandsuggestedthathecouldtrytokillthepresident.OntheeveningofSeptember26,Farajheldameetingwithsomeoftheleaders,includingZuhdiandal-Zumur,todiscussthispossibility.Therewasastrongdifferenceofopinions.Al-Zumurbelievedthattheassassinationwaspremature,foritcouldnotbefollowedbyapopularuprising.Hedoubtedtheabilityofhisgrouptotakeoverthesecuritynervecentersinthecapital.Zuhdiincontrastpromisedthathecouldtake control ofAsyut in the aftermath. The conspirators decided to go aheadwith al-Islambuli’s plandespite al-Zumur’s objections. The four members of the action commando unit met for the first timeshortlybeforetheoperation.The otherTanzim al-Jihad leaderswere informed of the plot shortly before its implementation.Al-

Zawahiri learnedabout it a fewhoursbefore it tookplace.The successful assassinationofSadat tooktheseleadersbysurprise.Reactingtothesituation,al-Qamariandal-Zawahiricontactedal-Zumurtotryto coordinate the aftermath. The three of them finally met for the first time the evening after theassassination. They planned to follow upwith another attempt during Sadat’s funeral to finish off thepoliticalleadership,butwerecaughtinthewaveofarrestsbeforetheycouldcarryouttheirplans.TheAsyut branch launched its insurrection on the morning of October 8, a holiday during which only askeleton crew protected security headquarters and armories. They controlled the city for a few daysbeforeparatroopersflowninfromCairocrushedtherebellion.TwotrialstookplaceintheaftermathofSadat’s assassination. The firstwas held in camera and consisted of the twenty-four suspects directlyinvolved in theassassination.Khaledal-Islambuli,his threeaccomplices,andFarajweresentenced todeathandwereexecutedonApril15,1982.Thesecondtrialconsistedof302defendantschargedwith

conspiracyandbeingmembersoftheillegalTanzimal-Jihadandlastedalmostthreeyears.In prison, cleavages developed among the defendants.On the one hand, theCairo branch under the

leadershipofal-ZumurmaintainedthatthecorrectstrategyforestablishinganIslamiststatewouldbeaviolentcoupcarriedoutbyasmall,dedicatedvanguardofIslamistmujahedintothegratefulacclamationofthenation.ThiswasanIslamistversionoftheputschscenarioadvocatedbyLeninistsandsuccessfullyexecutedbynationalistarmyofficers throughout theArabworldintheprecedingdecades.Ontheotherhand,theSaidigroupadvocatedamoretraditionalarmedresistancescenariofocusingonmobilizationofthepopulationtooverthrowthegovernment.Thisinvolvedacombinationofdawaandviolence,whichwouldbeusedtoprovokeevermorerepressivegovernmentalmeasuresagainstthepopulation,alienatingandmobilizingitagainsttheregimeuntilapopularuprisingwouldtoppleit.SheikhOmarAbdelRahmansidedwithhiscolleaguesfromUpperEgypt.Thefactionsbrokealongthelinesofpreviouslyestablishednetworks.TheCairenes,whoincludedal-

Zumur,al-Qamari,andal-Zawahiri,triedtodiscredittheSaidisbyarguingthatablindperson(referringto Sheikh Omar) could not lead a group of the faithful. The Saidis, who included Zuhdi, Talat FuadQasim,Mohammed al-Islambuli,OsamaRushdi,HamdiAbdelRahman, andRifaiTaha, replied that aprisoner,referringtoal-Zumur,couldnotleadsuchagroup.Theserivalnetworksneverreconciledinthecourseofthenexttwodecades.Indeed,therivalryresultedintwodistinctsurvivinggroups:theIslamicJihad (al-jihad islamiyya, referred to as the Egyptian Islamic Jihad, EIJ) under al-Zawahiri; and theIslamicGroup(jamaaislamiyya,insingular,referredtoastheEgyptianIslamicGroup,EIG)ruledbyashura.Duringthetrial,al-Zawahiribecameaspokesmanforthedefendantsbecauseofhiseloquenceandhisknowledgeofforeignlanguages.Thispushedhimintothelimelight.Thestateshoweditselflenientatthesecondtrial.Despitetheprosecutiondemandof299deathsentences,thejudgesgaveoutnone.Onlyfifty-eightprisonsentencesweregiven,despitethefactthattheAsyutrevoltresultedinthedeathofsixty-eightpolicemenandsoldiers.Exceptfortheseniorleadersintheshuraandactualperpetrators,mostofthedefendantswerereleasedafterthreeyearsinprison.ManyleftEgyptandwenttoAfghanistantojointhejihadagainsttheSoviets.

TheAfghanJihadPeriodandtheCreationofalQaedaIn 1985, al-Zawahiri left for Jeddah, where his brother Mohammed had fled, and then went on toPeshawarin1986.SayyidImamal-Sharif(a.k.a.Dr.al-Fadl)fromhisCairogroupjoinedhimthere.In1987theyestablishedtheEIJandpublishedamonthlymagazine,calledTheConquest(al-Fath)undertheleadership of al-Sharif. They expanded and includedAliAminAli al-Rashidi (a.k.a abuUbaydah al-Banshiri),aformerpolicemanwhowasthebrother-in-lawofAbdelHamidAbdelSalam,oneofSadat’sassassins.Al-Rashidihadbeenarrestedbutwasreleasedquickly.Hewent toAfghanistan in late1983and fought alongsideAhmad ShahMassoud in the Panjshir Valley (hence his Arabic nom de guerre).OthernewmembersincludedSubhiMohammedabuSittah(a.k.a,abuHafsal-MasriorMohammedAtef),whose past ismysterious, andAliAbdel SuudMohammedMustafa (a.k.a.AliMohammed), a formermilitaryofficerfromAlexandriawhowentontoenlistintheU.S.Army.WhiletheseniorleadershipoftheTanzimal-Jihadremainedinprison,severalofthemid-levelleaders

oftheSaidiswerereleasedandwenttoSaudiArabia,onthewaytoPeshawarandAfghanistan.AmongthemostprominentwereMohammedal-Islambuli,RifaiTaha,OsamaRushdi,MustafaHamza,andTalatFuadQasim.Althoughtheleadershipremainedinthehandsoftheimprisonedshura,thespiritualleaderwas still Sheikh Omar, and Qasim assumed the position of deputy leader. They reconstituted theirorganizationastheEIGandpublishedanewsletter,AlMurabitun.Thedisputesthathadariseninprison

resurfaced in Peshawar along the lines of their social bonds. The Saidis became the EIG, while theCairenes andAlexandrians became theEIJ.Bothmet the rest of theArab expatriate communitywhilefightingtheAfghanjihad.By the time theEgyptiansarrived inPeshawar,SheikhAbdallahAzzam,with thehelpofOsamabin

Laden,hadorganizedtheAfghanjihadforforeignMuslimvolunteers.TheyhadcreatedtheMekhtabal-Khidemat(ServiceBureau)tofacilitateadministrativeproblemsforthevolunteersandtheBaital-Ansar(HouseofSupporters)tohousethem.Atfirst,theyassignedallthevolunteerexpatriatemujahedintothefour fundamentalist Afghan resistance parties. The common Soviet enemy had united the variousmujahedin factions; eventually, itswithdrawal exposed theirdifferences.BothEgyptiangroupsviewedAfghanistan as temporary and dreamed about fomenting an Islamist jihad back in Egypt. It appears inretrospectthatal-Zawahiri’sstrategywastogetclosetobinLaden,thefundraiserfortheAfghanjihad,inorder to gain his exclusive support for theEIJ.Al-Zawahiri had an opportunity to care for binLadenmedically,andthroughthisrapport,graduallysuggestedtrustedmembersoftheEIJforkeypositionsinbinLaden’sgrowingorganization.Beginningin1987,AzzamandbinLadencreatedatrainingcampforthe foreignmujahedinnearKhowst, atAliKheyl in Jaji, andnamed itMasada (the lion’s den).WhenSovietforcesattackedMasadainthespring1987offensivebecauseitwassittingonthemujahedinsupplylines,binLadenandhissmallgroupheldtheirgroundandrepulsedseveralwavesofassaultsbySovietSpetznaz special forces.After the Sovietswithdrewwith heavy losses, bin Laden’s reputation spreadovertheMuslimworldandespeciallyhisnativeSaudiArabia.TheannouncementoftheSovietwithdrawalfromAfghanistaninearly1988wasaturningpointforthe

expatriatemujahedin community. In response toAzzam’s fatwa and recruitment efforts, they had comefromall over: coreArab countries, such asSaudiArabia andEgypt;MaghrebArab countries such asAlgeriaandMorocco;SoutheastAsiancountriessuchasthePhilippinesandIndonesia;andtheMuslimimmigrant community of theUnited States andEurope. The end of the Soviet presence inAfghanistaneliminatedthelegitimacyofthejihadinthetraditionalsenseandstartedadebateaboutwhattodonext.The consensus among the hardcore leaders of the expatriate mujahedin was to establish a base (al-qaeda),orasocialmovement,tocarryoutaworldwidejihad.Theydisagreedabouttheessenceofthisjihad,however.On themore traditional sidewereAzzamandmostof theexpatriatemujahedinhehadrecruited through theMekhtabal-Khidemat.Althoughmostdidreturnhomeafter thefulfillmentof theirindividual duties, some stayed on.Azzam suggested that they turn their attention to other areaswhereinfidels had conquered or threatened formerMuslim lands, like the Philippines, Kashmir, the centralSoviet republics, Bosnia, and Somalia. He proposed that the role of this socialmovement, al-qaeda,shouldbetoestablishaMuslimstateininfidellands.Azzam’sdreamofliberatingformerMuslimlandswouldshiftthejihadtotheperipheryoftheMuslimworld,suchasthePhilippines,centralAsia,Kashmir,and, of course, Palestine (al-Fadl, 2001;Kherchtou, 2001). Thosewho stayed to fight further becamedisillusionedwiththeAfghans’degenerationintoinfightingamongrivalfactions.Many,includingOsamabinLaden, reluctantly returnedhome (al-Banyan, 2001).Others, particularly theEgyptianswhosegoalwastheoverthrowoftheEgyptiangovernmentalongthelinesadvocatedbyFaraj,couldnotreturnhomebecauseoffearsofpoliticalpersecution.Byaprocessofelimination,therefore,themostradicalelementsremainedinAfghanistanorPeshawar.TheyfeltthatthetraditionaljihadadvocatedbyAzzam,however,would not advance their goal of overthrowing the Egyptian government. Azzam’s rejection of Faraj’sargumentsandrefusaltosanctiontheoverthrowofaMuslimgovernmentconflictedwiththeirstrategy.AzzamandtwoofhissonsweremurderedinPeshawaronNovember24,1989,byaremotecontrolled

carbomb.Hismurderisstillunsolved.InthehagiographieslaterdisseminatedonIslamistInternetsitesand in the public declarations of the leaders of the global Salafi jihad, it is difficult to re-create the

context of his death. I suspect it hasmuch relevance to the creation of the global Salafi jihad and itspresentvanguard,alQaeda.AzzamadvocatedunitywithintheMuslimcommunityanddislikedthenotionoftakfir,whichspreadfitnawithinthiscommunity.OsamabinLadenoriginallypursuedthisstrategyoftoleranceamongMuslims.HeexpelledfromCampMasadaanEgyptianfollowerofShukriMustafawhohadbrandedas takfirother traineesat thecamp.Yet thenotionof takfir is central to theargument thatnonpious Muslim leaders should be overthrown, as the Egyptians advocated. This doctrinal disputebetweenAzzamand theEgyptians ledbyal-Zawahiri iswell documented (al-Zawahiri, 2001;Rushdi,2001;al-Shafii,2001;al-Banyan,2001).TheremayalsohavebeendisputesovertheuseoftheMekhtabal-KhidematfundsandtheMasadacamp.TheEIJ,sensitivetonewsofEgyptiancrackdownsonIslamistmovements,wantedtousebothforaterroristcampaignbackhome.Azzamwasopposedtothisprogramof terrorism against Muslim governments and issued a fatwa stating that using jihad funds to trainterrorists would violate Islamic law (Gunaratna, 2002: 21-24). Azzam’s son-in-law, Abdallah Anas,accusedtheEIJofkillinghisfather-in-lawonthegroundsthatit“consideredSheikhAbdullahAzzamtobearoguewhohadstrayedfromtherightpathof thefaith. . . .SheikhAbdullahAzzamwasmurderedbecausehehadissuedafatwainwhichhestatedthatoncetheRussianswereejectedfromAfghanistan,itwould not be permissible for us to take sides” (al-Shafii, 2001). The death of Azzam deprived thenewborn al-qaeda social movement of its strongest advocate for a traditionalist jihad. The remainingleadersofthisvanguardwerenowallSalafimujahedin.EvenAzzam’sprotégé,OsamabinLaden,wasprogressivelybeingwonoverbytheEIJarguments.Atthetimeofhismentor’smurder,however,hewasbackinSaudiArabia.Saddam Hussein’s invasion of Kuwait in August 1990 was a turning point for the jihad. It further

divided the Muslim camp, which was caught between two unsavory choices. Salafi mujahedin hatedHussein,theepitomeofasecularistrulerwhorejectedIslam.Salafistseverywhereatfirstcondemnedtheinvasion.Shortlyaftertheinvasion,OsamabinLadenofferedtobringoverhisfaithfulmujahedintofightoff theapostateHussein.However, theSaudi royal familychose tocallon theUnitedStatesandothernon-Muslimforces todefendthekingdom,andthepresenceof infidelsonArabiansacredsoilwas toomuchforSalafistsandOsamabinLadentobear.Theyroundlycondemnedthispresence,andmanywhohadoriginallycondemnedHusseinnowralliedtohiscauseasthelesseroftwoevils.Meanwhile, the fighting in Afghanistan continued. Contrary to Islamist complaints, U.S. and Saudi

support continueduntil the fallofKabul in1992,aspartof theU.S.andSovietgovernments’positivesymmetryofsupportingtheirrespectivesides.MoreMuslimexpatriatesflockedtoAfghanistantoreceivemilitarytraining.Theexpatriatesnowhadatleastfourcampswheretheylearnedtheirskills.Theywereallied with three of the four Afghan fundamentalist factions, headed by Gulbuddin Hikmatyar, YunisKhalis,andAbdalRabbRasulSayyaf.Becausethetraditionalistmujahedinhadretired,theSalafistsnowdominatedthisgroup.TheyfoughtinAfghanistanagainstthecommunistforcesandspreadthejihadbackintheirhomelands.TheyjoinedtheirAfghanbrothersinattackingAfghangovernmentstrongholds,suchasJalalabad,Khowst,andKabul. Janjalani returned to thePhilippines,wherehe founded theAbuSayyafGroup against the Christian central government. Osama bin Laden seems to have been involved infomentinga jihad inSouthYemen.Kashmirbecamea favorite targetofsomePakistanimujahedin.TheIndonesianssecretlyformedtheJemaahIslamiyahtoestablishaMuslimstateinSoutheastAsiastretchingfromthePhilippinestoIndonesia.BoththeEIJandEIGstartedcampaignsofterrorismagainstEgyptianofficials; the EIG also targeted the Copts. At this point, the militant Islamist movement was not acoordinated global jihad but a collection of local jihads, receiving training and financial and logisticsupport from the vanguard of the movement, al Qaeda. Al Qaeda now became a formal organizationconsistingofaclusterofterrorists,thecentralstaffsupportingtheglobalSalafijihad,thereligioussocial

movement (see also Burke, 2003). There were very few full-time paid staff members of al Qaeda.Instead,thejihadfellowtravelersweregiventrainingandseedmoneytogoandcarryouttheirownjihad.TheythenhadtoraisetheirownmoneyorreceivesupportfromMuslimcharityorganizations.After the Soviet withdrawal, Peshawar lost its appeal as the central site for the Salafi jihad. The

centralstaffwasrestlessabouthavinglittletodolocallynowthatSovietshadleft.Therewasgrumblingabout the distance to theArabworld,where the Salafi jihadwas to take place (al-Fadl, 2001: 216).Meanwhile, theEIGwasstillcarryingoutoperations inEgypt. InOctober1990, it tried toassassinateInteriorMinisterAbdel-HalimMoussabutkilledParliamentarySpeakerRifaatel-Mahgoubbymistake.Togetclosertotheareasofstruggle,alQaedaleadersexploredtheoptionofmovingtotheSudan,wherean Islamic government under General Omar Hassan al-Bashir, in alliance with Hassan al-Turabi’sNationalIslamicFront,hadtakenpowerinJune1989.Afteravisitwithal-Turabi,theyresolvedtomovetheir headquarters to Khartoum in late 1990. Some infrastructure was left in Afghanistan in the areascontrolledby friendly localAfghanwarlordsand inPeshawaroutsidedirect federalPakistanicontrol.SometrainingsitesweremovedtoremoteareasofYemen.OsamabinLaden,whohadbeenunderhousesurveillanceafterhiscriticismoftheSaudi’srelianceonU.S.troops,wassenttoKabulinMarch1992tohelpstoptheinternecinefightingamongAfghanresistancefactions.InsteadofreturningtoJeddah,heflewtoKhartoum,completingthetransferofthemovementleadershiptotheSudanesecapital.Atthispoint,thereisnoevidencethatalQaeda,thebaseofthisreligiousmovement,wastargetingthe

“farenemy,” theUnitedStates. Itconcentratedonproviding trainingand logisticsandfinancialsupportforjihadàlaAzzamattheperipheryoftheMuslimworldandjihadàlaFarajagainstthe“nearenemy”inEgypt andYemen.There is no doubt that among alQaedamembers therewas a strong streak of anti-Westernandspecificallyanti-Americansentiment,whichstemsfromSalafiattitudes.Qutbwasstronglyanti-Americanasaresultofhistwoyears’experienceintheUnitedStates,buthesavedhisvenomfortheEgyptian regime. Faraj was also anti-American, but he nevertheless advocated the priority of jihadagainst the“nearenemy”over thatagainst the“farenemy.”DuringtheAfghanwar, futureglobalSalafijihadleaderswerealsohostiletotheUnitedStates,buttolerateditshelpinthejihadagainsttheSoviets.Only after the Sudanese exile did the virulent brand of anti-Americanism arise in the organization,culminatinginthe1996declarationofwar.

TheSudaneseExileThe1990-1991GulfWarbroughtU.S. troops to theArabianPeninsula.Themovement thatbecame theglobalSalafijihadmighthavefadedbutforthecontinuedpresenceofthesetroops.TheSalafimujahedininterpretedthispresenceasaninfidelinvasionoftheLandoftheTwoHolyPlaces.ItbecamethefocusofSalafi resentment against theWest and breathed new life into themovement. The appearance of U.S.troops inSomalia (aspartofaUnitedNationspeacemission toequitablyprovidefood to thestarvingpopulation) further fueled the fearsof alQaeda’s leaders, now innearbySudan, that this constituted aU.S.-ledsecretgrandstrategytoconquerMuslimlands.Theyreactedbysendingtrainers toSomaliatoteachtechniquesacquiredintheAfghan-SovietwartoforcesthatwerehostiletotheAmericanpresence.TheyalsoexploredthepossibilityofcarryingoutbombingsofWesterntargetsinKenya.Theirobjectiveat the timewas to attackWestern targets in theMiddleEast orEastAfrica to forceWestern forces towithdraw from Muslim lands. Their model was the 1983 Beirut bombings against U.S. and Frenchmilitary personnel that brought about their withdrawal from Lebanon (Mohamed, 2000: 27-30). InOctober1993, the shootingdownofaU.S.helicopter inMogadishu,using techniques from theAfghanwar,andtheconsequentandunexpectedU.S.withdrawalfromSomaliaputtheseplansonhold.

TheskirmishesagainsttheU.S.werestillaminoraspectofthejihadduringtheSudaneseexile.Mostof the effort was directed at liberating former Muslim lands (Kashmir and the Philippine island ofMindanao), resisting aggression against Muslim lands (Bosnia and Chechnya), and fighting secularMuslimgovernmentrepressioninEgyptandAlgeria.Theseeffortsseemtohavebeenmorereactivethanoffensive,andalQaeda’srolewastosupportandcoordinatelocalmovementsthatstartedspontaneously.These local movements included graduates of the Afghan jihad who had both military skills andconnectionswiththeirformerexpatriatemujahedin.TheAlgerianGroupeIslamiqueArmé(GIA,ArmedIslamicGroup)receivedaboostwhen, inJanuary1992, thegovernmentcancelled thesecondroundofelections,whichwouldhavebroughtanIslamistpartytopower.ThisplayedintothehandsoftheSalafijihadpositionthattryingtogainpowerthroughlegalmeanswasuselessbecausetheapostategovernmentwould never voluntarily relinquish power. The Egyptians in al Qaeda (and probably bin Laden) paidcloseattentiontodevelopmentsinAlgeriaandsupportedthenascentGIA.Manyoftheoriginalleadersofthisorganization—QariSaid,Tayyebal-AfghaniandDjafaral-Afghani—wereAfghanArabs.AlQaedaalsosupportedthepropagandabranchoftheorganizationwiththepublicationofAlAnsarinLondonandcontemplateddirectoperationalsupportforGIA,assomeofitsstaffmembersinNairobiweretaskedtocase potential French targets locally, in Djibouti and in Senegal (Kherchtou, 2001: 1220). There isevidencethatfundingforthewaveofbombingsinFranceinthesummerof1995camefromalQaedaaswell(MacintyreandTendler,1996).AlQaedaencouragedtheseterrornetworksthatarosespontaneouslyandlocallywithfunding,training,

and sometimes weaponry. Some members of these networks, especially the Egyptians, had dualmembershipintheirownorganizationsandalQaeda.DespitebinLaden’surgingthemtodoso,theydidnot coordinate their operations. They continued to squabble publicly even though bin Laden becameexasperatedwiththem,andsometimescutofftheirfinancialsupport.Therewasmuch fightingwithin the ranks of the twogroups aswell, especially theEIJ,whichwas

more removed froma strongpopular baseof support. In the early1990s, al-Zawahiriwonan internalpower strugglewithin theEIJand sidelined theprevious leaders.HisoldcompanionSayyid Imamal-Sharif(a.k.a.al-Fadl)stayedinYemenandwentintovoluntaryisolation.Theimprisonedal-Zumur,nowrejected by his own group, was invited to join the shura of the rival EIG in prison. This is the onlyinstanceIeverdiscoveredofsomeonefromonenetworkjumpingtoanother.In1992,anEIJleaderwascapturedwithacomputercontaining informationonall themembers inEgypt.More thaneighthundredmemberswerearrestedandtriedinthe“VanguardsofConquest”case.ThisdevastatingsetbackfurthersplittheEIJ.Al-Zawahiristayedinchargeoftheremnantsoftheorganization.AhmadUjaysahandOsamaAyyub,whohadbelongedtothesameterroristcellinBaniSuwayf,Egypt,stayedinYemenandformedanEIJsplintergroup.MohammedMakkawisupportedthembutdecidedtodevoteallhisenergytoalQaeda.TheEIJbecameincreasinglyinvestedinalQaeda,withmostofitshighest-rankingofficersalsodoublingasalQaeda’stopmanagement.TheEIGwasmore of amassmovement, socially embedded in the Said and better able to conduct

operations in country, especially against theCopts. It also targeted government officials, tourists, andsecular writers like Faraj Foda and even Naguib Mahfouz. This did not prevent it from conductingoperationsoutsideofEgypt, likeMustafaHamza’sattemptonPresidentHosniMubarak’s life inAddisAbabaonJune26,1995.BecauseoftheinvolvementoftheSudanesegovernmentinthisoperation, theUnitedNationscondemneditandimposedeconomicsanctionsagainstit.Another influential network of terror, connected to both alQaeda and the EIG,was that headed by

KhalidSheikhMohammed.Thisnetworkisdifficulttoclassifyforitspansseveralcountries.MohammedandhisnephewAbdulBasitKarimwereBaluchi,bornandraisedinKuwait,andtheystudiedabroad,in

theUnitedStatesandBritain,respectively.Theywerereligiousbutnotrigidlyso,andwillingtotastethesinsof theWest.TheycametoPeshawar,whereMohammed’sbrotherwastheheadofoneof themainMuslimrelieforganizations.Theirfriendlinesswascontagious.KarimbecamefriendswithJanjalaniandspentsometimeinthePhilippinestrainingthelatter’srecruits.Karimalsorecruitedhischildhoodfriendsintothejihad,whosetargetswerenotlimitedtoWesterninterests,butincludedPrimeMinisterBenazirBhutto and Iranian Shii aswell. In 1992, the followers of SheikhOmar, themufti of theEIG, invitedKarim to join them in NewYork to strike a blow against the United States. The result was the firstbombingoftheWorldTradeCenteronFebruary23,1993.TheextentofalQaeda’sinvolvementinthisplotisunclear.ThetwoleadersofthisnetworktraveledinthesamecirclesandstayedattheguesthousesfundedbyalQaeda.Mohammedprovidedthefunding(perhapsfromalQaeda),andKarimplannedandexecutedout theoperations.But theyboth seemed toounpredictableat the time tohavebeenpartof alarger,morerigidorganization.Indeed,Karim’sprematureattempttorecruitIshtiaqueParker,astranger,backfiredandresultedinhisarrest.Thefull-timestaffatthealQaedaorganizationconstitutedadifferentnetwork.Intheearlydays,they

appeared to domultiple tasks: raisingmoney through bin Laden’s enterprises in the Sudan, setting uplogistic support cells in Nairobi for potential operations in East Africa, and casing potential targets.High-rankingmembersofalQaeda,suchasAliAminal-Rashidi(AbuUbaydahal-Banshiri,thechairofalQaeda’smilitarycommittee),AliAbdelSuudMohammedMustafa(thetrainerofbinLaden’spersonalbodyguards) and Wadih el-Hage (bin Laden’s personal secretary) were personally involved in thisoperation and lived in Nairobi at various times. This Central Staff cluster was involved in hands-onoperationsatthetime,whichindicatesthattheorganizationwasveryfluid,withoutrigidorganizationalroles.AsalQaedagrew in importance, theCentralStaffclusterwouldneveragainbe involved in theday-to-dayoperationsinthefield.TheSudaneseexilewasmarkedbyfinancialconcerns.SincethefallofKabul,supportfortheAfghan

jihadhadfaded.Tokeepone thousandstaffmembersofalQaedaand tohouseandfeed their familieswould cost the organization $6million each year, leaving nomoney for operations.Osama binLadeninvestedheavilyinSudaneseindustryandrequiredhisstaffmemberstoworkinhiscompaniesinordertoraisemoney.Whenoperationswereplannedelsewhere,alQaedamemberswereagainrequiredtoraisethemoneyneededlocally.Newoperationsandnewgroupsweregivenseedmoneybutthenlefttofurtherfundtheiroperationsontheirown.SenioralQaedamemberswentonfund-raisingtours,includingthoseofal-ZawahiriinCaliforniainthespringof1993andAhmedSaidKhadrinTorontoin1994and1996.Ata1995generalmeetingofEIJinYemen,al-Zawahiriannouncedthattherewasnomoneyleftfortheirorganization.Heurgedhis subordinates tobecome financially self-sufficient.Manystarted towork forIslamicrelieforganizationsandusedtheirsalariestofundthejihad.AlargecontingentgatheredinTirana,Albania,wheretheyworkedforanIslamicnongovernmentalorganization.Meanwhile,thewarinBosniaattractedmanyMuslimvolunteersagainstSerbaggression.Azzam.com

advertisedtheoneswhocamefromSaudiArabia.ButmanycamefromMaghrebcountriesandFrance.PeoplewhowantedtocontinuethejihadworldwidecouldmeetandorganizeintheBalkans.ThemostsignificantterroristnetworktocomeoutofthiswarwastheonearoundFatehKamelfromMontreal,whohadconnections toboth theMontrealMaghrebnetworkand theRoubaixgang.Thiswouldbecome thekernelofwhatIcalltheMaghrebArabcluster.ItsmainlogisticsupportbasewasinMilanunderSheikhAnwarShaban,whohadbeensendingyoungpeopletotraininAfghanistanbeforetheeruptionofthewarnext door.Milanwas to remain themain logistic support cell in Europe for a decade, facilitating thetraveltoAfghanistanandsupportingoperationsinGermany,France,andItaly.InSoutheastAsia, theAbuSayyafGroup fell from favorwithbinLadenwhen itdegenerated intoa

criminal group interested primarily in kidnap for ransom. Instead, theMoro Islamic Liberation FrontbecamethefavoriteFilipinogroupwithalQaedaanditsallyinSoutheastAsia,theJemaahIslamiyah.Itprovided training camps for Southeast Asian recruits. The Indonesian network was tightly organizedaroundPesentrenLuqmanulHakiem,anIslamistboardingschoolinMalaysia,underAbuBakarBaasyirandAbdullahSungkar.MostofthefutureleadersoftheJemaahIslamiyahwerefacultymembers—RiduanIsamuddin(a.k.a.Hambali)andAliGhufron(a.k.a.Mukhlas,whosethreebrotherswerealsoinvolvedinthe2002Balibombing)—orstudentsthere—AbdulAziz(a.k.a.ImamSamudra),AmrozibinNurhasym,andAliImron(twobrothersofAliGhufron).AlQaedawas headquartered in the Sudan,with training camps inAfghanistan (themore advanced

ones), Bosnia, Yemen, the Philippines, and the Sudan. During the exile in the Sudan, its leaders heldintense discussions about the jihad. Globalists like Mamdouh Mahmud Salim argued that the mainobstacletotheestablishmentofaMuslimstateandthemaindangerfortheworldwideIslamistmovementwastheUnitedStates,whichwasseenasmovinginonMuslimlandssuchastheArabianPeninsulaandEastAfrica. Itwas the“headof the snake” thathad tobekilled.Heargued that thepriorityhad tobeswitchedfromthe“nearenemy”to the“farenemy.”This included theUnitedStatesandFrance,whichwasviewedasstandingbehindtheAlgerianpowerelite.TheGIAhadalreadycometothisconclusionand started operations against France in late 1994.Osama binLaden andAyman al-Zawahiri came toadoptthisnewstrategy.Membersdebatedtheseissues.TheEIGasagrouprejectedthisfocusonthe“farenemy,”repeatingFaraj’sargumentthattheprioritywasthe“nearenemy.”SomemembersoftheEIJwerealsoreluctanttotackletheUnitedStatesbecauseitsgreaterpowermightdefeatthemovement.In themid-1990s, twosignificantbombings tookplace inSaudiArabia.OnNovember13,1995, the

NationalGuardtrainingcenterinRiyadhwasbombed.FoursuspectsconfessedtohavingbeeninspiredbyOsamabinLadenandreceivingtraininginAfghanistanorBosnia.Saudiauthoritiesexecutedthefourbefore they could be interrogated byU.S. agencies. TheKhobarTowers explosion inDhahran,whichkillednineteenU.S.personnelonJune25,1996,wascarriedoutbyShiiteSaudis.Notmuch isknownabout the networks behind these two attacks.However, these explosions coincidedwith the change oftargetfromthe“nearenemy”oftheSalafijihadtothe“farenemy”oftheglobalSalafijihad.TheSudanlocation’sproximitytoEgypthelpedthetwoEgyptianorganizationsbut,intheend,hindered

furtheralQaedaoperationsbecauseofinternationalpressureontheSudan.EgyptprotestedtoSudaneseauthoritiesaboutalltheoperationsconductedfromitssouthernneighbor.The1995AddisAbabaattempton PresidentMubarak’s lifewas the last straw. It earned the Sudan international condemnation at theUnitedNations and economic sanctions.At the same time relations between the Sudanese intelligenceserviceandtheEIJsouredquicklywhentheSudanesehandedovertotheEIJforinterrogationthesonofanEIJleader,whohadbeencollaboratingwiththeEgyptianintelligenceservices.Al-Zawahiriorderedtheboy’sexecutionshortlyafterhisconfession.WhentheSudanesefoundoutabouttheexecutioninitsterritory,al-ZawahiriwasorderedtoleavetheSudanwithinafewdays.Tryingtorehabilitateitselfintheinternationalcommunity,theSudanesegovernmentputpressureonbinLadentoleavethecountry.InMay1996,OsamabinLadenwithabout150followersandtheirfamiliesreturnedtoAfghanistan.Manypeoplestayed behind and left the jihad,which they believedwas taking an uncomfortable turn. The return toAfghanistanwas the occasion for another large purging of alQaeda of its lessmilitant elements,whohesitatedtotakeontheUnitedStates,withwhomtheyhadnoquarrelandnolegitimatefatwa.ThetwolargemovementsoutofandintoAfghanistanin1991and1996,respectively,radicalizedtheorganizationthroughaself-selectingmechanismofkeepingthemostmilitantmembers.BinLadenquicklyestablishedacloserelationshipwithAfghanistan’snewruler,MullahMohammed

Omar, whom he publicly acknowledged as the Amir ul-Momineen (Commander of the Faithful). In

response, theTalibangovernmentallowedbinLadena freedom tomoveaboutandconductoperationsinsideAfghanistanthathehadneverhadintheSudan.Inthesafetyofhisnewrefuge,binLadenissuedalong fatwaonAugust23,1996,declaringwaragainst the“AmericansOccupying theLandof theTwoHolyPlaces(ExpeltheInfidelsfromtheArabPeninsula).”ThisfinalstepmarkedtheemergenceofthetrueglobalSalafijihad.

TheGlobalSalafiJihadfromtheAfghanRefugeThe return to Afghanistan allowed bin Laden to consolidate his grip on jihad activities worldwide.Organizationally,binLaden incorporatedmanyof the independentMuslim terroristorganizationsunderhis umbrella Salafi movement. He helped funnel new potential members through Zain al-AbidinMohammedHussein(a.k.a.abuZubaydah)inPeshawar,whoestablishedcontactwithmilitantMuslimsofMaghrebArab origin in Europe, first throughMustafa Kamel and later throughAmarMakhlulif. Thisgroup constitutes the Maghreb Arab cluster of the global jihad. Bin Laden invited Khalid SheikhMohammedtojointhemilitarycommitteeunderSubhiMohammedabuSittah(a.k.a.MohammedAteforabuHafsal-Masri).ThenatureofbinLaden’snetwork inSaudiArabia isstillunknown.Thegroupofterrorists joining the global jihad fromSaudiArabia,Yemen, and other orientalArab countries in the1990s constitute the Core Arab cluster of the jihad. Bin Laden also increased cooperation with theSoutheastAsianSalafimilitantsthroughOmaral-Faruq,Mohammed,andIsamuddin.TheSoutheastAsianmujahedin,mostlyfromIndonesia,Malaysia,andthePhilippines,makeuptheSoutheastAsianclusterofthe jihad. The global jihad propaganda arm was up and running in London with the quartet of YasirTawfiq al-Sirri, Khalid al-Fawwaz, OmarMahmoud Othman (abu Qatada), andMustafa Kamel (abuHamzaal-Masri).BinLaden also established greater control over the EIJ.After leaving the Sudan, al-Zawahiriwent

clandestinely tovisit formerSovietCaucasian republics.ARussianpatrolarrestedhim inDagestan inDecember1996.HestucktohiscoverstoryandwasreleasedinMay1997withouteverbeingidentifiedby the Russians. His followers chastised him for his carelessness, and bin Laden expressed hisdisapproval by reducing the subsidy for the EIJ to $5,000 for the sixmonths he was absent (Wright,2002:81).Thisleftal-ZawahirinochoicebuttomoveclosertobinLadeninordertoputEIJmembersonalQaeda’spayroll.Meanwhile,theEIGchosetheoppositepath.Thearrestoftheirmufti,SheikhOmar,inNewYorkinthe

summer1993andalQaeda’sinabilitytodoanythingtogethimoutofjailhadalienatedmanyEIGdualmembers,who left alQaeda as a result. The decision to change the priority fromEgypt to theUnitedStatesantagonizedothers.TheleadershipshurainprisonannouncedaunilateralceasefireinEgyptinJuly1997. They reasoned that the terrorist campaign in Egypt had been a failure, for it had turned thepopulation against them. Their strategy ofmobilizing the population to overthrow the government hadbackfired.Theoutsideleadershipofal-IslambuliandTaharejectedthisnewinitiative,butSheikhOmarsupported it fromhisU.S. prison cell.To force the handof the imprisoned leaders,Taha directed theLuxormassacre,whichkilledmorethansixtypeopleonNovember11,1997.Theleadershipcondemnedhimandinsistedontheceasefireinitiative.ThiswasthelastEIGterroristactivity.OsamabinLaden’sconsolidationoftheglobalSalafijihadwasproclaimed,onFebruary23,1998,in

theformationoftheWorldIslamicFrontdeclaringajihadagainstJewsandcrusaders,signedbyhimself,al-Zawahiri,andTahaonbehalfoftheEIJandEIG,respectively.Inthisfatwa,hesanctionedtheruling“tokill theAmericansand theirallies—civiliansandmilitary—isan individualdutyforeveryMuslimwho can do it in any country in which it is possible to do it.” The rank and file of both Egyptian

organizationsrebelledagainst their leaders.Tahapublishedaretractionwithinaweekofhissignature.TheshurareplacedhimaschairwithMustafaHamza,whosupportedtheceasefireinitiative.Al-Zawahirialso faced a rebellion of EIJmembers for signing onto bin Laden’s fatwa, sanctioning this change ofpriority from the “near” to the “far” enemy.At ageneralmeeting inQandahar,most criticizedhim forsigningthefatwawithoutconsultingthem.Hethreatenedtoresignbuteventuallystayedonastheirleader.Manymemberslefttheorganization,includinghisloyalbrotherMohammed,whowantedtomaintainthepriority against Egypt rather than the United States. Shortly thereafter, in early summer 1998, the EIJsufferedanothersetbackwiththearrestinAlbaniaandextraditiontoEgyptofmanyEIJmembers.Theyhad been under surveillance, and with the Kosovo crisis heating up,Washington had asked AlbanianauthoritiestoarrestthembeforethedeploymentofalargecontingentofU.S.troops.Theyweretriedthenext year in the “Returnees fromAlbania” trial, resulting in several death sentences, including one inabsentiaforal-Zawahiri.TheAugust7,1998,twinbombingsoftheU.S.embassiesinNairobiandDaresSalaammarkedanew

milestone in al Qaeda operations. Previously, it had targeted enemies on Muslim soil to force theirwithdrawal, as in Saudi Arabia or even Somalia. Here, the targets were in Kenya and Tanzania, notMuslimlands,andthevictimsweremostlycivilians,asthreatenedinthefatwa.TheseattacksmarkedashiftfromdefensiveoperationsonMuslimsoiltooffensiveoperationsonenemysoil.Inretrospect, thenextstepwasclearlytotakethefightontoU.S.ground.TheineffectualU.S.responsetotheattackonlyincreasedthepopularityofbinLadenin theMuslimworldandencouragedalQaedatocarryoutmoredaringoperations.BinLadengainedfameasthemanwhodaredtakeontheonlyremainingsuperpower.With the abandonment ofEgypt as a target and the decrease in intensity of theAlgerian civilwar, theglobalSalafijihadconcentratedontheWesterntargets,specificallytheUnitedStates.The East Africa operations, which inaugurated a worldwide wave of bombings and plots against

Westerntargets,involvedagreatdealofcentralplanningbythefull-timealQaedastaff.Thiswouldbeuniqueintheorganization’soperations.Overthenexttwoyears,operationsweremoredecentralized,andplanned with a great deal of local autonomy. Instead of direct participation, al Qaeda’s involvementconsistedoftrainingpotentialterroristsfortheirtasksinAfghanistan,givingthemseedmoneytogettheballrolling,andprovidingsomelogisticsupport.Theexacttargetsanddetailsoftheoperationswerelefttolocalinitiative.ForthreeyearsaftertheEastAfricaoperations,awaveofterroristactivitiesspannedtheglobe,untilU.S. forceseliminatedAfghanistanasa safeheaven foralQaeda.Chronologically, themajorplotswerethemillennialplotsinAmmanandtheLosAngelesairportinDecember1999;thetwoattacksagainstU.S.navalshipsinAden(USSTheSullivansandUSSCole)inJanuaryandOctober2000;the Christmas Eve 2000 bombings against churches throughout Indonesia; the bombings in Manila inDecember 2000; the Strasbourg Christmas market plot in December 2000; the September 11, 2001,airplaneattacksintheUnitedStates;theU.S.embassyplotinParisinthefallof2001;theshoebombingattemptinDecember2001;andtheSingaporebombingplotsinDecember2001.IhaveincludedthelasttwobecausetheywereplannedbeforealQaedalostitssanctuaryinAfghanistan.Theplotsinvolvedallthreeclustersofmujahedin:theMaghrebArabsbasedintheWesternworldwereinvolvedintheAmmanandLosAngelesmillennialplots,theStrasbourgChristmasmarketplot,theParisU.S.embassyplot,andintheshoebomberplot;theCoreArabsbasedintheMiddleEastandGermanywereinvolvedinthetwonaval vessel plots in Aden and in the September 11, 2001, events; and the Southeast Asians wereinvolved in the two December 2000 bombings in Indonesia and Manila as well as the SingaporeDecember2001plot.Thesamemajorcharacterswereinvolvedwithineachcluster.Zainal-AbidinHussein(abuZubaydah)

wasinvolvedinallfiveMaghrebArabplotsasthecentralcoordinatorforalQaeda.FatehKamelwas

hislinkforthetwomillennialplots.AmarMakhlulifgraduallytookoverhisroleasfieldcoordinatorforoperationsaround1999andwasinvolvedintheLosAngeles,Strasbourg,Paris,andshoebombingplots.Manyof the terrorists involved in theStrasbourg,Paris,andshoebombingplotskneweachotherfromLondon,after thecenterofglobalSalafi jihadoperations in theWestshiftedfromMontreal toLondon.TheCoreAraboperationsalso involved the samesetof charactersunderKhalidSheikhMohammed’sleadership.His lieutenantsmet inKuala Lumpur to put the finishing touches to their operations. TheyincludedRamzibinal-Shibh,Abdal-Rahimal-Nashiri,WaleedTawfiqbinAttash,Khalidal-Midhar,andNawafal-Hazmi.Al-NashiriandbinAttashwereprimarilyinvolvedagainstthenavaltargets,whiletheother threewere involvedin theSeptember11plot.TheSoutheastAsiansstarted theiroperationsaftertheirreturnfromtheirMalaysianexilefollowingthefalloftheSuhartoregime.TheoperationsinvolvedIsamuddin as the overall field commander,Omar al-Faruq, FathurRahman al-Ghozi, andFaiz bin abuBakarBafana.Themajorleadersweregenerallyinformedofthebroadoutlinesoftheplotsbutwerenotinvolved in the day-to-day operations, which their field lieutenants executed.Within each cluster, thearrestofonepersonmighthaveledtoothers,whowereplottingnewoperations.However,therewerenolinks between clusters with two known exceptions. TheMaghreb and Core Arab clusters intersectedthrough their common Syrianmembers,who knew each other from past decades: ImadEddinBarakatYarkas (a.k.a. abu Dahdah) in Madrid and Mamoun Darkazanli and Mohammed Heidar Zammar inGermany.TheCoreArabclusteralso intersectedwith theSoutheastAsiancluster through thepersonalbonds between Khalid SheikhMohammed and Riduan Isamuddin. The latter hosted the January 2000summitof theCoreArabprincipals inKualaLumpuratYazidSufaat’s condominium.MohammedalsosentMohammedMansur Jabarah tohelp the Jemaah Islamiyah coordinate theSingaporebombingplot.Otherwise,eachclusterwascompletelyindependentoftheothersandpenetrationofonewouldnothaverevealedoperationsbyanother.The evolution of the three main clusters followed a pattern of growth through friendship, kinship,

worship,anddiscipleship.InChapter4,IoutlinetheevolutionoftheMontrealandHamburgnetworks.Asimilar pattern holds for the rest of the Maghreb Arab cluster as well. Djamel Beghal, the fieldcommanderfortheParisplot,metKamelDaoudi,laterhisdeputy,atamosqueinasuburbofParis.TheybothdriftedtoLondon’sMaghrebcommunityaroundtheSalafipreachersOthmanandKamel.TheretheymetHabibZacariasMoussaoui,NizarTrabelsi,thebrothersDavidandJéromeCourtailler,andRichardReid. The two trained in Afghanistan around the same time, where they met Yacine Akhnouche. TheSoutheast Asian cluster continued to be connected to Abu Bakar Baasyir’s two boarding schools inMalaysiaandIndonesia.ThisconnectionmaybeuniquetoSoutheastAsia,whereextraordinarilystrongteacher-studentbonds,notseenelsewhereintheworld,areforged.The Core Arabs from Saudi Arabia are more difficult to trace because of the general lack of

informationfromthekingdom.Yet,eventhe“muscle”involvedintheSeptember11,2001,operationcanbelinkedthroughfriendshipandkinship.Salimal-HazmifollowedinthefootstepsofhisolderbrotherNawaf.Likewise,WailandWaleedal-Shehriwerebrothers.Theal-Shehribrothersandtheirtwofriends,Ahmedal-NamiandSaeedal-Ghamdi,sworeanoathtocommitthemselvestojihadinthespringof2000attheal-Shehrifamilymosque(SeqelyMosqueinKhamisMushayt).TheythenwentontoAfghanistanfortraining. Ahmed al-Haznawi al-Ghamdi was a cousin of two other hijackers, Ahmed al-Ghamdi andHamza al-Ghamdi.Majed al-Harbi and Satam al-Suqamiwere roommates atKing SaudUniversity inRiyadh. FayezAhmed al-Shehri (a.k.a. FayezRashidAhmedHassan al-Qadi Banihammad) studied atKingKhaledUniversityinAbha,inAsirProvince,alongwithMuhammadal-ShahriandAhmedal-Nami(thefriendoftheal-Shehribrothers).Theyallwenttotrainatal-FaruqcampinAfghanistan.Theimamofthe campwasAbdulAziz al-Omari, who became the last of the hijackers (Senott, 2002a and 2002b;

Khashoggi,2001aand2001b;MurphyandOttaway,2001;Lamb,2002;“Hijackerswere fromWealthySaudiFamilies,”2001;“TheHighwayofDeath,”2002).The9/11operationwasalsounique in that itwastotallyfundedbyalQaeda,freeingtheoperatorsfromhavingtoraisemoneythemselvesthroughpettycrimeandallowingthemtokeepalowprofile.This period constitutes the apogee of the global Salafi jihad.Osama bin Ladenwas finally able to

consolidatehisholdon theglobal jihadby incorporating theEIJ intoanewentitycalledal-Qaedaal-JihadinJune2001.Al-ZawahirihadweatheredtheinternalturmoiloftheEIJ.Hehadresignedasemirofthisorganizationinthesummerof1999,whenEIJmemberskeptuptheircriticismofhisleadershipinthefaceofcontinuedoperationaldisasters.Someadvocated thepeaceful initiativeof theEIG.Afterafewmonths,hisineffectivesuccessorrelinquishedhispostandal-Zawahiriresumedhisleadership,nowmorefirmlyincontrol.Withlittleoppositionfromhissubordinates,heengineeredthemergerwithalQaedatoresolvethefinancialproblemsoftheEIJ.Meanwhile,theEIGcompletelydisappearedfromthejihad,andthe imprisoned traditional leaders started preaching amore peacefulmessage and apologized for pastviolence. The exiled al-Islambuli publicly rejected this new initiative and defended the actions of hisbrotherinkillingSadat.SheikhOmarmayalsohavebelievedthatthetraditionalshurawasgoingtoofarandwithdrewhissupportfortheirinitiativeduringthesummerof2000.ThisphaseoftheglobalSalafijihadincludesitsmostambitiousoperations,mostofwhichfailed.Two

operationsbroughtonmassivecarnage(thebombingsofU.S.embassies inNairobiandDaresSalaamandthe9/11operations)andtwowereofquestionablesuccess(theDecember2000IndonesiaandManilabombings)becauseofthelownumberofdeathsdespitetheambitiousmultiplebombings.TheUSSColeoperationsucceededindisablingtheshipandkillingdozensofsailorsbutdidnotsink theship,whichwaslaterrestored.Theothersevenoperations,discoveredbeforeanydamagewasdone,wereoutrightfailures.

TheDecentralizedGlobalSalafiJihadThe success of the 9/11 operation backfired on al Qaeda. There is some evidence that al Qaedaleadership anticipated a limited U.S. response to the operation, on the order of the Clintonadministration’sresponsetotheEastAfricaembassybombingsanditslackofresponsetotheUSSColebombing. This turned out to be a seriousmiscalculation; theBush administration decided to freeze alQaeda funds and invadeAfghanistan to change its regime and deny alQaeda any refuge.U.S. forces,however,didnotsucceedineliminatingtheleadershipofalQaeda,whichescapedthroughalliedAfghanlines during Operation Anaconda. The capture of al Qaeda documents and videotapes in safe housesprovidedabetterunderstandingofthestructureanddynamicsoftheorganizationandhelpedfoilatleastthe Singapore plot in December 2001. U.S. forces dispersed the leadership, eliminated the trainingcamps,andgreatly reduced themeansofcommunicationamongmembers, their leaders,and thecentraloffice,whichhandledlogisticalsupportforlocaloperations.The absence of a sanctuary to train new recruits prevents the dissemination of terrorist skills and

tacticsfortheglobaljihad.Thefreezingorconfiscationoffinancialassetsdeprivesthejihadofneededresources. Mujahedin are being aggressively pursued and prosecuted worldwide. The only operationagainst an officialWestern target, the plot to strike at U.S. or British naval vessels in the Straits ofGibraltar in the summerof2002,wasdiscoveredbefore it gotoff thegroundand seems tohavebeenunraveling on its own because of communication difficulties between the field commander and morecentralcontrol.Alltheothermajoroperationswithgreatdamagepotentialinthisphaseofthejihadwereagainst soft targets: tourist destinations in the developing world (Djerba Synagogue, Bali nightclubs,

Mombasahotels,foreignhousinginRiyadh,andJewishandtouristsitesinCasablancaandIstanbul);andcommercialshipping(SSLemburg).Mostoftheseseemtohavebeeninitiatedlocally.Somegovernments,includingthoseofIndonesia,SaudiArabia,andMorocco,wereinitiallyhesitantto

aggressivelyprosecute thewaron terror.Theydenied that theyhadnative-bred terrorismon theirsoil.Thiscreatedlocalpocketsofsafetyforterrorism.Aftersufferingfromspectacularbombingoperations,however,theyfinallyjoinedthewarwithenthusiasmandhavefurtherdeniedrefugeandresourcestotheglobalSalafimujahedin.After theeliminationofalQaedaheadquarters inAfghanistan, the IndonesianJemaah Islamiyahwas

notsignificantlydisruptedbecausetheIndonesiangovernmenthesitatedtopursueapotentiallyunpopularpolicy. Indonesia is theworld’s largestMuslimcountry,and itspopulation issuspiciousofgovernmentclaims, after decades of Suharto’s regime. As a result, the global Salafi jihad was still able to offertrainingcampsinSulukuprovince,Indonesia,aswellasontheIslandofMindanao,inthePhilippinesrunby the Moro Islamic Liberation Front. The usually authoritative International Crisis Group issued acomprehensive briefing on terrorism in Indonesia onAugust 8, 2002, concluding: “Indonesia is not aterrorist hotbed. Proponents of radical Islam remain a small minority, and most of those are devoutpractitioners who would never dream of using violence” (International Crisis Group, 2002a). Thesituation changed drastically after the carnage of the Bali bombings inOctober 2002. The Indonesiangovernmentaggressivelypursuedtheperpetratorsandevenarrested,tried,andconvictedthepopularAbuBakarBaasyir.InDecember2002,theInternationalCrisisGroupcompletelyreverseditselfandissuedacomprehensivebriefing,“How the Jemaah IslamiyahTerroristNetworkOperates” (InternationalCrisisGroup,2002b).Likewise, despite the fact that fifteen of nineteen perpetrators of the 9/11 operation were Saudi

nationals,SaudiArabiarefusedtoacknowledgeitscitizens’involvementintheglobalSalafijihad.TheSaudis believed they were safe from terrorism on their own soil. They provided refuge for fleeingmujahedin, allowed business contributions to the jihad, and tolerated violent sermons from SalafipreachersinsupportofthejihadandcondemningtheWest.Theseconditionshelpedmaintainareservoirofpotential futuremujahedin.TheMay12, 2003,Riyadhbombing shattered this complacency, and thekingdom started to crack down on locally bred terrorism and began an internal discussion about thecontributionofitscultureandfinancestoterrorism.Moroccan authorities, at the forefront of the fight against terror, had detected and prevented the

Gibraltarplot.But theybelieved that terrorismwas just a foreign import, confined to the threeSaudisconvicted of the plot. TheMay 16, 2003, multiple bombings in Casablanca dispelled this belief andprompted the government to crack down on its locally bred Salafi jihad organizations, which hadperpetrated the bombings. TheMoroccan pattern was different from that of other global Salafi jihadoperations.Elsewhere,theterroristshadbeentrainedinAfghanistanbeforethecampswereeliminated.InCasablanca,thebombersreceivedonlyhastylocaltrainingoverweekendsinnearbycaves.Asaresulttheyhaddifficultymanufacturing theirbombs,whichwere tooheavyandunreliable.The leaderhad topostpone the operations. Finally, after finding a lighter andmore reliable formula on the Internet, theyquicklybuiltthebombsthedaybeforetheoperation.Theytriedtocarryoutasophisticatedplanoffivesimultaneousbombings,butfourofthemmoreorlessfailed,resultinginthedeathsofthebombers.Onlyonebombingresultedinmasscasualties.TheCasablancabombingmaybeapreviewofoperationstocomeduringthisphaseofthejihad.Some

oftheleadersarewelltrainedtoconductsophisticatedoperations,butareontheirowntotraintheirfootsoldiers. These may be enthusiastic but lack skills and knowledge of how to carry out operations,resultinginaseriousdegradationofthejihad’slethalcapability.Difficultieswithcommunicationanda

lack of support for training and logistics will further diminish their ability to carry out sophisticatedoperationsontheorderofSeptember11,2001.Theheightenedvigilanceofmostgovernmentseliminatesmujahedinmobility,especiallytraveltoWesternnationsfromcountrieswheretheycanmaintainarefuge.MonitoringofcommunicationsbytheWesthasalreadyresultedinthearrestofmultipleleaderswhousedcellphonestocommunicatewithsubordinates.Thefull-timepursuitofsafetybytheleadershippreventsthem from coordinating sophisticated large-scale operationswith local cells around theworld. Small-scale operations may never be eliminated because singletons with little training can execute them.Althoughsuchattacksmaybe lethal, theywillnot result inmasscarnage,whichrequirescoordination,skills,andresources.Thelackoftrainingfacilitieswilldiminishthelevelofskillofthepost-Afghanistancohortofmujahedin.ThecrackdownbyWesternandnowSaudibankingauthoritiesandArabstatesonprivate financial contributions to the jihad will further diminish its available resources. Heightenedvigilance at border entry points andmonitoring of communications worldwide diminish the ability toeffectively coordinate operations from a central point. Without any more spectacular successes, theappealofthejihadwillfadewithtime.

ConclusionTheglobalSalafijihadevolvedthroughaprocessofradicalizationconsistingofgradualself-selection,manipulationofresourcesfromabove,andrecognitionofthesinglecommontargetofthejihad.AttheendoftheAfghan-Sovietwarin1989, thetraditionalmujahedin,whocouldgoback,returnedhome.ThosewhoremainedinAfghanistanjoinedbydefault.ThesecondmilestonewasthemovetotheSudanin1991whenthemostmilitantactivelypledgedtheircommitmenttotheglobaljihad.DuringtheSudaneseexile,there was intense discussion leading to a gradual shifting of target from the near to the far enemy.WitnessesattheEastAfricanembassybombingstrialandthe“ReturneesfromAlbania”trialmentionedthat therewasthena targetcommontoall thedisparategroups.ThemovebacktoAfghanistanin1996was the third milestone. Only about 150 made the journey back. Many left the organization throughdisillusionment or rejection of the newmission against the United States.When the global jihadwasformallyannouncedinFebruary1998,theEIGquicklyrejecteditandtheEIJsplitoverit.Allthroughthisevolution the most militant component, as represented by Osama bin Laden, controlled the resources(Saudiwealth)andwasabletoguidethedirectionofthejihad.The evolution of the global jihad was also characterized by a succession of sites, which attracted

multiplemilitantnetworksofdiverseperspectives.Thesesmallnetworks interactedwitheachother inintense debates and generated excitement and a sense of purpose. These siteswere “where the actionwas.” Progressive ideological extremism and a heightened sense of commitment emerged from theseintense interactions (see Collins, 1998, for a similar argument about the importance of “scenes” inintellectualcreativity).Egyptianprisonsanduniversitycampusesinthe1970sweretheplaceswheretheconceptoftheSalafijihadwasdeveloped.InPeshawarinthelate1980s,militantMuslimsfromallovertheworlddebatedthefutureofaworldwidejihad.TheycontinuedthisdialogueinKhartouminthe1990sandfinalizedtheideologyoftheglobalSalafijihad.Therewerealsotheusual internaldisputes.In1991,al-Zawahiri tookover theEIJ,settingAbudal-

Zumuraside.HealsorenewedtheEIJ-EIGrivalrydespite theeffortsofsomeEIGmembers toforgeacommon bond between these organizations.He seems to have been themost contentious of the lot. In1993, there were more internal divisions within the EIJ because of the large-scale “Vanguards ofConquest”disaster.In1997,therewasanEIGsplitoverthenonviolentinitiative,withtheprisonersinfavorandtheoutsidersopposingit.In2001,theEIJmergedwithalQaeda.Thistypeofradicalizationis

similar to that of other terrorist organizations such as theAlgerianArmée Islamique duSalut,GroupeIslamiqueArmé,andGroupeSalafistepourlaPrédicationetleCombat.Despitetheirinternalproblems,theystillmanagedtoconductsuccessfuloperations.The loss of theAfghan sanctuary degraded the operational capability of the global Salafi jihad. Its

inabilitytostrikeofficialtargetsintheWestforcedittoshifttooperationson“softtargets”intheirownsanctuaries (Indonesia, Saudi Arabia, andMorocco). These bombings prompted the thus far reluctantgovernmentstocrackdownonthejihad,eliminatesomeofitslastareasofrefuge,anddiscourageprivatesolicitationofsupportforthejihad.Inthesummerof2003cameearlyindicationsthattheIraniansmightjointhewaronterrorthroughhousearrestofalQaedaleadersinIran.Thesedevelopmentswillfurtherdecentralizethejihadanddegradeitsoperationalcapabilities.

Blowback?Toreturntotheblowbackthesis,theaboveaccountshowsthattheglobalSalafijihademergedthroughaprocessofevolution.ThisimpliesthatthetraditionalAfghanArabsof1988werenotthesamepeopleorhadadifferentmentalityfromtheglobalSalafimujahedinof1998.Thisunderminestheblowbackthesis.TheglobalSalafijihadiswithoutdoubtanindirectconsequenceofU.S.involvementinthatAfghan-

Sovietwar.WithouttheU.S.supportforthatjihad,theSovietswouldprobablynothavewithdrawnfromAfghanistan.U.S.covertactionsupportedatraditionaljihad,whichincludedforeignMuslimvolunteers.Toward theendof thewar, theEgyptianSalafistssubverted theMekhtabal-Khidemat, theorganizationsupporting theparticipationof the traditional foreignmujahedin, andpossiblykilledAzzam, its leader,whostoodinthewayoftheirmission.Theycreatedtheirownorganizations,forwhichtheyrecruitedaminorityoftheforeignvolunteersandnoneoftheAfghanmujahedin,whohadbeentherealrecipientsofU.S.support.OnlyaftertheirreturnfromtheSudaneseexile,manyyearsaftertheendofU.S.supportfortheAfghanjihad,didtheessenceoftheglobalSalafijihademerge.AtnopointduringtheAfghanwarorsincewastheredirectU.S.supportfortheforeignmujahedin.The

U.S.government,throughtheCentralIntelligenceAgency,funneledallitsaidthroughthePakistaniInter-Services Intelligence Directorate (ISID). The U.S. government trained the Pakistanis, who trained themujahedin.ThePakistanis insistedthat theweaponsandmoneygothroughthem,andrightlyso,as theydidnotwanttohavepotentiallyunsavorycharacterstrainedbyaforeigngovernmentrunningwildintheirterritory.ThenotionthatU.S.personneltrainedfuturealQaedaterroristsissheerfantasy.TheauthorityonthistopicisBrigadierMohammadYousaf,whorantheISIDAfghanBureaufrom1983and1987andwasnofriendoftheUnitedStates.HewascategoricalaboutthefactthateverythingwentthroughISIDhands (Yousaf and Adkin, 2001). The foreign Muslim volunteers received support from the Afghanmujahedin,notfromISID,furtherremovingthemfromanydirectU.S.support.BinLadenandal-Zawahiri(2001:part2)deniedreceivinganyU.S.aid,support,ortraining.Peter Bergen, bin Laden’s biographer, is correct to point out that the Pakistanis favored the

fundamentalistmujahedin,butthereisnoevidencethattheylaterexportedjihadandterrorismaroundtheworld.TheseAfghanmujahedinwerequitedifferentfromtheforeignvolunteers.IamnotawareofanymajorAfghanparticipantintheglobalSalafijihadexceptforWaliKhanAminShah,apersonalfriendofOsamabinLaden.AlQaeda,EIJ,andtheiralliesintheglobalSalafijihadrecruitedexclusivelyfromtheforeignvolunteers:withtheexceptionofShah,noAfghan,nomatterhowfundamentalist,whowastrainedandsupportedbytheISIDlaterjoinedalQaeda.Indeed,AfghansareconspicuousbytheirabsencefromtheglobalSalafijihad,allthemoresurprisingsincealQaedakepttrainingcampsinAfghanistanformorethanadecade.BytheendoftheSoviet-Afghanwar,agreatdealofmutualantagonismexistedbetweenthe

Afghanmujahedinandtheexpatriates,whomtheAfghanscalledIkhwanis (Arabicfor“brothers,”as intheMuslimBrothersorganization)orWahhabis(apejorativetermfromtheirperspective).TheAfghansresentedtheforeigners,whoweretellingthemthattheywerenotgoodMuslims.Jumpingadecadeahead,thishostilityplayedanimportantroleinthequickU.S.victoryin2001whenAfghansturnedagainsttheseforeigners.NoU.S. official ever came in contactwith the foreignvolunteers.They simply traveled in different

circles and never crossed U.S. radar screens. They had their own sources of money and their owncontactswiththePakistanis,officialSaudis,andotherMuslimsupporters,andtheymadetheirowndealswiththevariousAfghanresistanceleaders.TheirpresenceinAfghanistanwasverysmallandtheydidnotparticipate inanysignificant fighting (al-Shafii,2001;Bearden,2001;BeardenandRisen,2003:243).Contemporaneousaccountsofthewardonotevenmentionthem.Manywerenotseriousaboutthewar.SomeSauditouristscametoearntheirjihadcredentials.Theirtourwasorganizedsothattheycouldstepinside Afghanistan, get photographed discharging a gun, and promptly return home as a hero ofAfghanistan. The major contribution of the more serious volunteers was humanitarian aid, setting uphospitalsaroundPeshawarandQuettaandprovidingfundsforsupplycaravanstotraveltotheinteriorofthecountry.Veryfewwereinvolvedinactualfighting.Formostofthewar,theywerescatteredamongtheAfghan

groupsassociatedwiththefourAfghanfundamentalistparties.ExamplesofthesefighterswereEssamal-Ridi, al-Rashidi, andAbdallahAnas.For themostpart,Afghanswelcomed them.Butwith time,moresectarianvolunteers(SalafiandWahhabi)came.TheystayedalooffromtheAfghansandcriticizedtheirhostsfornotbeinggoodMuslims.AfghanstraditionallypracticedaSufiIslam,whichisthoughttobeanabomination byWahhabis andSalafists alike.Afghans used the derogatory term “Wahhabi” to refer tothesenewcomersandbegantoavoidthem.TheironlysignificantfightingasagroupinthewarwasinthefightingaroundMasadainthespringof1987,whenOsamabinLadendistinguishedhimself.After theSovietwithdrawal fromAfghanistan, the foreignersmighthave inadvertentlyprolonged the

Afghan civil war and postponed for three years the fall of Kabul. When the Soviets withdrew, thetraditionalmujahedinwereontheirwaybackhomeandtheSalafistshadstayedon.Twooftheircampswere in thevicinityofJalalabad,and theybecame involved in thebattle for thecity that tookplace inMarch1989.The campaign startedwell for themujahedin,whocaptured several strategicpoints.TheCommunistgovernmentforceswereintheprocessofnegotiatingtheirsurrenderandguaranteeofsafetyintheusualAfghantradition.Anticipatingtheusualresolutionoftheseissues,severalgovernmentaltroopshad surrendered to the mujahedin after a token resistance. These prisoners were divided among thevariousfightinggroups.Aboutsixtyof themwent toacontingentof foreigners,whopromptlyexecutedthem,cutthemintosmallpieces,andsenttheremainsbacktothebesiegedcityinatruckwiththemessagethat this would be the fate awaiting the infidels (Akram, 1996: 272-277). This put an end to thenegotiationsofsurrender,despiteapologiesandassurancesofsafetyfromAfghanresistance leaders. Itrejuvenated the fighting spirit of the besieged and resulted in the firstmajor government victory. Thissuccess reversed the government’s demoralization from the withdrawal of Soviet forces, renewed itsdeterminationtofighton,andallowedittosurvivethreemoreyears.ThedepartureoftheSovietinfidelsinvalidatedthefatwasforthetraditionaljihad(al-Banyan,2001).

The new crops of volunteers responded to Salafi urgings. At that early stage of the Salafi jihad, thetraining consisted of regular guerrilla tactics—the use of assault rifles, land mines, and antiaircraftweapons (see al-Fadl, 2001;Kherchtou, 2001)—useful for fighting awarof insurgency.Terror tacticsusefulfortheSalafijihad—explosives,casingatarget,andanalysisofitsvulnerability—wereintroducedmuchlater,around1992(Mohamed,2000;Kherchtou,2001).Bythistime,newalQaedamemberswere

quitedifferentfromtheearlyvolunteers,whohadcometofightinthetraditionaljihad.Insummary,theUnitedStatesindirectlysupportedtheAfghanmujahedin,whodidallthefighting,paid

dearlyforit,anddeservedthefullcreditfortheirvictoryovertheSoviets.Theexpatriatecontributiontothisvictorywasminimalatbest,fortheyspreaddissensionamongMuslimresistanceranks.Usually,thevictorswritethehistory.FortheSovietAfghanwar,thereisnoAfghanaccount,perhapsduetothehighilliteracy rateor the laterdevelopments inAfghanistan. Instead, the foreignbystandersgot towrite thehistory.TheseforeignersexpropriatedthenativeAfghanvictoryovertheSovietUnion,createdthemyththattheyhaddestroyedasuperpowerbyfaithalone,andarguedthatthesamefatewouldlieaheadfortheonlyremainingsuperpower(al-Zawahiri,2001:part2).ThustheglobalSalafijihadwasabletohijacktheAfghanmujahedinvictoryforitsownends.

THREE

TheMujahedin

DefiningtheTerroristsandTheirOrganizationsTheglobalSalafi jihad is anewdevelopment in theannalsof terrorism. It combines fanaticism, in itsoriginalsenseof“excessiveenthusiasminreligiousbelief”(Taylor,1991),withterrorismagainsta“farenemy,”aglobaltargettobringaboutautopia.Thisfanaticismembracesaneagernesstodieandkillforthe cause. This glorification of the notion of shahada (literally the testimony of faith, but now alsomeaningmartyrdom) isan inherentaspectof thisnewformofglobal terrorism,andcanbeunderstoodonlyinitsreligiouscontext.Isubmit that thenewglobalSalafimujahedinaresufficientlydistinctfromother terrorists thatan in-depth studyof their specificcharacteristics,patternsof joining the jihad,andbehavior isneeded.So far, the statementsabout themarebasedonanecdotalevidenceor speculationsderivedfrompopularprejudiceandconventionalwisdomaboutevilpeopleingeneralandterroristsinparticular.Myaimistoprovideageneralempiricalstudyoftheseindividualstoaddtowhatisknownandtocorrectsomewidelydisseminatedmisconceptions.The discussion here includes only thoseMuslim terroristswho target foreign governments and their

populations,the“farenemy,”inpursuitofSalafiobjectives,namelytheestablishmentofanIslamiststate.Drawingtheseboundariesremovesmanyterroristsfromconsideration,butmyconcernisthatanoverlyinclusivesamplemayobscureimportantfactorsthatmighthelpustounderstandthisphenomenon.Specifically,Ieliminateallnon-Muslimterrorists,aswellasMuslimterroristsinvolvedindomestic

insurgencyandinurbanwarfareagainsttheirowngovernments.IdonotincludeMuslimsfightingforthe“liberation”ofKashmirorChechnya,fortheseseemtobestraightforwardjihads,liketheformerAfghanorBosnian jihads as defined byAzzam.Likewise,manyMuslims fighting inCentralAsia seem to befightinganinternalinsurgency,asimpledomesticSalafijihadratherthanaglobalone.AlgerianterroristswhoconfinetheiractivitiestoAlgeriaarelikewiseinvolvedinadomesticSalafijihad,whichresemblesan insurgency against their government based on a mixture of domestic grievances and religiousfanaticism.Idoinclude,however,thoseAlgerianswhocommittedterroristattacksagainstFrenchtargets,as inthewavesof terrorisminFrancein1995and1996.Theyclearlydidsonot tochangetheFrenchgovernmentbuttofightthe“farenemy”thatpreventedtheestablishmentofanIslamiststateintheirowncountry.The empiricalworld is rarely as tidy aswewant it to be. It does not easily fit into our analytical

categoriesandrequiresustomakedifficultdecisionsintheselectionofourdata.Palestineisonesuchdifficult choice. Azzam defined the struggle for the liberation of Palestine as a straightforward jihadrather than as an effort to establish a Salafi Islamist state. Indeed, many Palestinian terrorists havetraditionally been secular rather than religious, although religious fanaticism seems to be ascendant.Furthermore,thePalestinianstruggleinvolvescomplexsocial,economic,andpoliticalgrievancesaswellasthegoalof“liberation”ofaformerMuslimland.ToincludethePalestinians,therefore,wouldmuddythe more purely ideological waters of the global Salafi jihad. I suspect that Palestinian terrorism issignificantlydifferentfromtheglobalSalafijihadintermsofthepeopleitattractsandtheirbehavior.TheglobalSalafimujahedininmysamplehaveaverydifferentprofilefromthatoftheextensivesampleofPalestiniansuicideterroristsdescribedbyArielMerari(1990).

Perhaps the most controversial decision I made was to exclude from this analysis the imprisonedleadership of the Egyptian IslamicGroup (EIG). The EIG has been blamed formany terrorist acts inEgyptandabroadagainstEgyptiantargets.Theimprisonedleadershipapprovedoftheseoperations.ButitwasquiteclearthattheywerepartofasimpleSalafijihad.TheterrorizingoftouristsinEgyptinthe1990swasnot an end in itself but an attempt todiscredit the state.Bydemonstrating to theworld thegovernment’s inability to protect tourists, the terrorists succeeded in undermining the economy bydisrupting themajor national industry. The leadership believed that this campaignwould increase thehardship of the masses, who would blame the government and mobilize to overthrow it. When thisstrategybackfiredandturnedthepopulationagainst theEIG,theimprisonedEIGleadershiprecognizedtheirerrorandcompletelyreversedtacticsin1997,initiatinganonviolentstrategy,whichisstillholdingup.Intheprocess,theEIGleadershiphasevenabandoneditsjihadandhasbecomeclosertothedawastrategy.DespitetheexclusionoftheimprisonedEIGleadership,IhaveincludedtheexpatriateEIGleadership,

foritplayedanimportantroleintheideologicaldevelopmentoftheMuslimrevivalistmovementfromasimple jihad inAfghanistan toaSalafi jihad to theglobalSalafi jihad.Throughout thepastdecade theexiled EIG leaders have flirted with the global Salafi jihad at many points. They have supported itsoperations,met and plottedwith their global colleagues, and in turn received support from the globalSalafijihadintermsoffundsandlogisticsfortheirin-countryoperations.TheyhaddualmembershipinalQaedaandtheEIG.Thetargetingoftouristsstartedtobecomeanendinitself,becauseofboththeircorrupting effect on society and their financial support for the Egyptian government. When the EIGleadershipimprisonedinEgyptissueditsnonviolentinitiative,theexpatriateleadersrejectedit.Thereisevidence that the Luxor massacres that took place after this initiative were an attempt by the exiledleadershiptoundermineitandforcethecontinuationofthestrategyofviolence.Eventually,theyresignedfromtherulingcounciloftheEIGtomakeroomforleaderssupportingthenewstrategy.Theyearnedaplace in my sample, alongside their rivals from the Egyptian Islamic Jihad (EIJ), who had made thetransitionfromaSalafi jihad toaglobalSalafi jihad.TheEIJhasbeenasignificantpartof theglobalSalafi jihad. Its leader al-Zawahiri is the jihad’s main ideologist, and its leadership comprises themajorityofalQaeda’srulingcouncil(shura).Indeed,inJune2001,theEIJandalQaedamergedtoformal-Qaedaal-Jihad.The global Salafi jihad is an Islamic revivalist social movement. It consists of people and

organizations invariousdegreesof formalizationwhoshare the same ideologyandmission.AlQaedaandEIJarewell-definedorganizationswhoseleadershipsupportsterroristoperations.SoaretheJemaahIslamiyah in Indonesia and Malaysia, the Moro Islamic Liberation Front in the Philippines, and theGroupe Salafiste pour la Prédication et le Combat (GSPC) inAlgeria.Other groups such as theAbuSayyafGroupinthePhilippinesandtheGroupeIslamiqueArmé(GIA)inAlgeriahavelapsedintopurecriminalityand lost thesupportofalQaeda, thevanguardof thismovement.Lesswelldefinedare thesmallillegalMoroccanclustersaroundcharismaticpreachers,whichhavevariousnamesbutaregroupedunder theamorphoussocialmovementcalled theSalafiaJihadia.TheglobalSalafi jihadalso includesapparentlyunaffiliatedindividualswhopursuedthegoalsofthejihad,suchasAbdulBasitKarim(RamziYousef),whoreceivedsupportfromthejihadforhisoperations.Hisroleinthe1993WorldTradeCenterbombingandthe1995BojinkaplottoblowupairplanesoverthePacificleavesnodoubtthathewasapartofthisglobalmovementwithoutbeingaformalmemberofanyofitsorganizations.Withtheaboveconsiderationsinmind,IkeptthesamplefocusedexclusivelyontheglobalSalafijihad

inordertorevealsomespecificpatternsthatmighthavebeenobscuredbyamoreinclusiveselection(seePape,2003).

ProblemsinGatheringInformationCollectingdataonglobalSalafimujahedinpresentsaseriesofchallenges,mostlyresultingfromagenerallack of information. I included only those mujahedin on whom enough background information wasavailable to include them in empirical generalizations as to age, origin, religious commitment, andeducation.Althoughseveralhundredmujahedinhavebeenarrestedinthepastseveralyears,thereisnotenoughinformationto includemostof themin thisstudy.There isevidence that thoseonwhomenoughinformationexistsarenotarepresentativesampleoftherest.Thisinevitablyslantsthisstudyinspecificdirections,whichIwillshortlydiscuss,andaffectsthevalidityofsomeofmyconclusions.Mysourcesofinformationwereallinthepublicdomain.Ididnothavedirectaccesstothemujahedin

or to any government’s secret reports.Global Salafi jihad organizations like alQaeda are clandestineorganizations,verysecretiveabouttheirmembersandoperations.Often,theydenyorobfuscatetheirveryexistence and do not take official credit for successful operations. They do not grant access to theirmembers, and their leaders’ few interviews are well-orchestrated propaganda exercises with poordocumentary value. There are no available official documents on their members and organizations,makingitdifficult togatherrepresentativeinformation.Evencapturedmujahedinhavebeenreluctant tospeakfreelywithacademicsorjournalistsforfearofbetrayingtheircause,puttingthemselvesatriskofretaliationfromformercomradesorunderminingtheircriminaldefenseorpost-trialappeals.Theyrejectanysocialscienceprojectthatwoulddiminishthevalidityoftheirmission—jihadinthepathofGod.Butevenassumingno intent todeceive, the rareprison interviewsmustbeviewedwith skepticism.

Acceptanceofresponsibilitydoesnotprotectfromatendencytodistortthepasttomakeitconsistentwithone’spresentself-concept;“confessions”maynotaccuratelyreflecthistoricaleventsorstatesofmind.Nevertheless,whentranscriptsofsuchinterviewsexist,theycannotbeignoredbecauseoftheirpotentialtoshedlightonclandestineeventsandonstatesofmind.Governmentshavealsobeenreluctanttograntaccesstothosetheyhavecaptured.Theirprioritiesaretoprotectinformationthatmightbevitaltotheirfightagainst terror, includingtheextentof theirknowledgeabout terroristorganizationsandoperations,andtopreventcommunicationbetweentheprisonersandtheirformercomrades.My sources included the documents and transcripts of legal proceedings involving global Salafi

mujahedin and their organizations, government documents, press and scholarly articles, and Internetarticles.Theinformationwasofteninconsistent.Iconsideredthesourceof theinformationinassessingfacts. In decreasing degrees of reliability, I favored transcripts of court proceedings subject to cross-examination,followedbyreportsofcourtproceedings,thencorroboratedinformationfrompeoplewithdirectaccess to the informationprovided,uncorroboratedstatements frompeoplewith thataccess,andfinally statements from peoplewho had heard the information secondhand. “Experts” fall into the lastcategoryfortheirreliabilityassourcesofinformationdependsontheirdiligenceashistorians.The collected information suffers from several limitations. First, themujahedin selected are hardly

representative of the global Salafi jihad as awhole.Although the judicial systemmight prosecute allinvolved, journalists and scholars tend to focus on leaders, people they can investigate, and unusualcases.Leaderssetthetoneanddirectionforthesegroups,butusuallyarenotrepresentativeoftheoverallmembership.Lackofinvestigativeopportunityalsoslantsasamplebecauseoftheneglectofsignificantportionsofagroup.Little isknownabout theperpetratorsof theNovember13,1995,bombingsof theSaudiNationalGuard training center inRiyadh, the June 25, 1996, bombingof theKhobarTowers inDhahran,andtheSaudisinvolvedintheSeptember11,2001,atrocitiesbecausetheSaudigovernmenthasnot allowed independent investigation on its soil. Finally, by definition, unusual cases are notrepresentative.Forinstance,thepresenceofmembersoftheeliteandWesternconvertstoIslaminjihad

organizations arouses interest by challenging the conventional wisdom. Their inclusion in this sampledetracts from themoremundanemilitants.Sincemuchofmydata comes from journalists, the result issomewhatbiasedtowardleadersandunusualcases,andtendstoignorethosewhocannotbeinvestigatedanddownplaytherankandfile.Second,relianceonjournalisticaccountsisfraughtwithdanger.Thereismuchmisinformationinthe

press.Informationaboutclandestinegroupsistrulydifficulttoacquire.Manyjournalistsdonotseemtodistinguish explicitly between sourceswho had access to the information and thosewho did not. Forinstance,manyhaveaccusedtheU.S.governmentofdirectlyfundingoreventrainingtheoriginalglobalSalafimujahedininAfghanistan.ThisisbasedonacompletemisunderstandingoftheU.S.roleduringthewar.Asnotedinthepreviouschapter,theonlytwopeoplewhohadrealaccesstothistypeofinformationandwentpublicareBrigadierYousaf,headofthePakistaniISIDAfghanBureau,andMiltonBearden,theCIAchiefofstation in Islamabadat the time.Theybothcategoricallydenyanydirect linkbetween theU.S.governmentandtheearlymujahedin.Indeed,al-Zawahiri’sbookdeniesitaswell.Yetthishasnotstoppedmanyjournalists,whoshouldknowbetter,fromcontinuingtomakethisclaim.Lack of direct access to information feeds thewildest rumors.During theSoviet-Afghanwar,many

journalists in Peshawar retired to the USAID guesthouse, which was the only bar in town. Betweendrinks, they exchanged outlandish stories, some of which found their way into print later on. Whenchallengedonpublicationofastorywithoutadditionalconfirmation,oneofthemtoldme,“Thestoryistoo good to check.” The practice of interviewing other journalists or scholars with a similar lack ofaccessforconfirmationisnomorevalid.Thissecond“source,”morelikelythannot,hasheardthesameinformationfromthesameoriginalsource, leading toa falsesenseofconfirmationanda rehashof therumormill.Furthermore, journalists are born storytellers. Unfortunately, information is typically received in

fragments. There is a strong tendency to fill in the gaps between facts in order to construct a betternarrative,apractice that leadstomanyinaccuracieswhenthefillersassumelivesof theirowninlateraccounts.Thisuncomfortablydisjointednatureofanevolvingstorymayalsoleadtospeculations,whichlater turnout tobeerroneous. It is important to follow thedevelopmentsof a story to correctoriginalinaccuracies.For instance,AhmedRessam, theMillennialBomber (moreonwhom inChapter4), hadmade up a story ofmilitancy and imprisonment byAlgerian authorities to support his application forpoliticalasylumwhenhefirstcametoCanadatoavoiddeportationbacktoAlgeria.Laidi(2002:231-232)andGunaratna(2002:110),intheirotherwiseexcellentaccountsoftheglobaljihadinEuropeandaroundtheworld,uncriticallyrepeatedthistaleandaddedvariousdetails.Athistrial,Ressamadmittedthathemadeupthisstory(Ressam,2001:537),andBerntonandcolleagues(2002)convincinglyrefutedthepoliticaldiscriminationstoryinacomprehensiveinvestigationofRessam’slifeprior tohis leavingAlgeria.Likewise, in the post-9/11 hysteria, many people were arrested and suspected of terrorismmerely

becauseofoftenunwittingassociationwithknownterrorists.ManyMuslimsshareSalafibeliefsbutstopfarshortofviolence.OftenjournalistsandlawenforcementofficersdonotdistinguishbetweenTablighis,peacefullypreachingdawa,andmujahedinconductingviolentoperations.Althougharrestsarefront-pagenews, there is rarelyany fanfareaboutexoneration.More sinisterwas theuseof thishysteria to settlepersonalaccounts.AbderrezakBesseghir,abaggagehandlerattheParisCharlesdeGaulleairport,wassetupasaterroristbyhisin-lawsasretaliationforhispresumedinvolvementinhiswife’sdeath.Falseaccusationsofterrorismhavealsobeenusedincustodydisputes;insuchadisputedisguisedasaterrorcase,HanyKiareldeenwasincarceratedinNewJerseyfornineteenmonths.Noevidenceofwrongdoingwaseverpresented,ostensiblyforreasonsof“nationalsecurity”(Purdy,2003).Thesecasesunderlinethe

importanceoffollowingthedevelopmentsofastory.Third,amorepervasiveproblemIencounteredisrelianceonretrospectiveaccountsfromprincipals

andwitnesses,whicharesubjecttothebiasesofself-reportandflawedmemory.Evenwhenthereisanattempttoprovideinformationasfactuallyaspossible,accuracyislimitedbecauseofthereconstructivenatureofhumanmemory(Schacter,1995,1996,2001).Peoplereconstructtheirexperienceasnarrativesconsistentwiththeirpresentbeliefs,whichmaybeatvariancewiththeactualpast.Thisisusuallydoneinadvertently, due to the natural distortions ofmemory. Less innocent are the intentional distortions inself-presentation.Eventhemostracistpersondoesnotportrayhimselfasabigot.Ingatheringthedata,Ihave not encountered any admission of pure prejudice against the West, Jews, or the United States.Mujahedin and their sympathizers’ attitudes toward this trio are usually couched in terms of anunavoidabledefenseforceduponthembytheviolentexploitationofordiscriminationagainstMuslims.Theseself-servingretrospectiveaccountscontrastsharplywiththetranscriptsofterrorists’conversationsrecordedsecretlybythepoliceinMilan,Hamburg,andMontreal,inwhichtheviolenceofthewordsandtheprejudicesofthespeakersaredisturbing.Theseelementsdonotsurfaceinretrospectiveaccounts.Perhaps the greatest limitation on this inquiry is the lack of a relevant control group, specifically

Muslimswithsimilarbackgroundandactivitieswhodidnotparticipateinthejihaddespitehavinghadanopportunity to do so. Finding such a group would be extremely difficult in our present culture.Mostgovernmentshavetakenapunitivestrategytowardpeoplewhotoyedwiththeideaofjoiningthejihad.LiketheLackawannaSix,agroupofYemeni-AmericanmensuspectedofbelongingtoanalQaedaterrorcell inwesternNewYorkwhowere sentenced to a decade in prison, they have been prosecuted forsimplyundergoingtraininginalQaedacampsdespitethefactthattheyeventuallydecidedtowalkawayfrom the jihad. In thispunitiveenvironment, it isnot surprising that fewpeoplecome forwardand tellabouttheirpastassociationwiththejihad.Afocusonthisgroup,however,andanunderstandingofhowits members are systematically different from those who joined the jihad would be very relevant forcounteringthejihad.Althoughtheabsenceofacontrolgroupmeansthatanyfindingsandinterpretationsbasedonthedataarenecessarilysuggestivehypotheses,thereisstillagreatdealtobelearnedfromanempiricalexaminationoftheglobalSalafijihad.

ProfilesoftheMujahedinWhat sets global Salafimujahedin apart?On the surface, they are allMuslimswho accept the Salafiinterpretationof Islam.The temptation is therefore strong toblame Islam,or itsSalafivariant, for thistype of terrorism. But this common feature is based on the definition guiding my selection and itsexplanatoryvalueisthereforetautological.Thesearchforcommonfeaturesexplainingwhyindividualsbecomeinvolvedinglobalterrorismmay

be divided into three general approaches. The first is that the terrorists share a common socialbackground.Thesecondisthatterroristsshareacommonpsychologicalmake-up.Thethirdisthatsomepeoplebecameterroristsbecauseoftheirparticularsituationatthetimeofrecruitment.Therestofthischapterwillbeanempiricalanalysisofeachofthesesetsofvariablesasapotentialexplanationforwhypeoplejoinamovementofglobalterrorism.Theunavoidableprobleminthecommonfeaturesapproachtothestudyofterrorismiswhatmightbe

called the fundamental issue of specificity. Although numerous people share many of the postulatedindividualfeaturesorareexposedtothesamesocialfactors,veryfewgoontocarryoutterroristacts.The inability of specific factors, singly or in combination, to distinguish future mujahedin fromnonmujahedin limits our ability to make statements that are specific to terrorists. Identification of

variables specific to the creation, maintenance, and demise of terrorists requires comparison with arelevantcontrolgroupofnonterrorists.

SocialBackgroundThe focus on the background of themujahedin gives us the opportunity to empirically test the popularsocial explanations of global terrorism.The common stereotype is that terrorism is a product of poor,desperate, naïve, single young men from third world countries, vulnerable to brainwashing andrecruitment into terror.Unpackingthisformula, thegeographicaloriginsof themujahedinshouldbenotonlythethirdworld,butsomeofthepoorestcountriesofthethirdworld.Italsoimpliesthattheycomefrom the lowest socioeconomic strata. Their naïve vulnerable dimension implies that they either arebrainwashed early into hatred of the West or are relatively uneducated and susceptible to suchbrainwashingasyoungadults.Inthissense,theyarerelativelyunsophisticatedandlocalintheiroutlook.Abroadexperienceoftheworldmightbeprotectiveagainsttheallegedbrainwashingthatpresumablyledto their conversion to terrorism. The desperation implies that either they have no occupationalopportunitiesor theseareextremelylimited.Theyaresingle,foranystrongfamilyresponsibilitymightpreventtheirtotaldedicationtoacausethatdemandstheirultimatesacrifice.

GeographicalOrigins

Wherearethemujahedinfrom?Lookingatthesampleasawhole,abouttwo-thirdsofthe172mujahedininthesamplecomefromSaudiArabia(31),Egypt(24),France(18),Algeria(15),Morocco(14),andIndonesia (12). Parsed this way, we would be hard pressed to find a common pattern among them.Analyzingthevariouslinkagesamongtheterrorists,fourlargeclustersemergedinthepreviouschapterontheevolutionofthejihad.ThefirstconsistsoftheCentralStaffofalQaedaandoftheglobalSalafijihadmovement in general.The terrorists in this cluster form the leadershipof themovement.Most of themwere involved in the Afghan-Soviet war and were the founding members of al Qaeda. They are notusuallydirectly involved inoperations,but inspireandapprove themfromafar.Theyprovide training,some financing, and sometimes logistical support for the global Salafi jihad in general. They are alsoresponsible forpropaganda insupportof the jihad.Thesecond largecluster includes terroristscomingfromCoreArabstates(SaudiArabia,Egypt,Yemen,Kuwait).Thethirdclusterrepresentsjihadmemberscoming from North Africa, also known as theMaghreb (Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia) but also peoplewhosefamilieswerefromtheMaghrebbutwhowerebornandgrewupinFrance.ThefourthclusterisSoutheastAsianandconsistsofthemembersbelongingtotheJemaahIslamiyahcenteredinIndonesiaandMalaysia.Although I define these clusters geographically, assignment to a cluster is not based solely on

geographical origin. It is based on the pattern of interaction among the terrorists. For instance, fourmembersoftheHamburgcliquethatwasresponsibleforthe9/11operationwereMoroccans(Mouniral-Motassadeq,AbdelghaniMzoudi,SaidBahaji,andZakaryaEssabar).BecausetheyinteractedwithothermembersoftheCoreArabclusterandweresupportedbytheCentralStaffresponsibleforthiscluster,IclassifiedthemwiththeCoreArabs,despitethefactthatthreeofthemwerebornintheMaghreb.Therewasalotofinteractionamongmembersofthesamecluster,butalmostnonebetweenthemandmembersofdifferentclusters.IwillreturntotheemergenceandstructureoftheseclustersinChapters4and5.Reorganizing the data according to the pattern of interactions, the Central Staff cluster contains 32

members; theSoutheastAsiancluster,21;theMaghrebcluster,53;andtheCoreArabcluster,66.Each

clusterhasitsdistinctiveprofile,whichIwilldevelopinthischapter.Almosttwo-thirdsoftheterroristsformingtheCentralStaffcomefromEgypt(20,or63percent).The

restcomefromSaudiArabia(3),Kuwait(3),Jordan(2),Iraq,theSudan,Libya,andLebanon(1each).The Egyptian representation at the leadership level is notable because Egyptians constitute only 14percentoftheoverallsample.TheEgyptiansattheleadershipleveljoinedalQaedaduringitsformationinthelate1980sandearly1990s.TheyweremostlyIslamistmilitants,imprisonedaftertheassassinationof President Sadat (see Chapter 2). When they were released from prison, they went to Afghanistanbecauseofcontinuedgovernmentpersecution.Theywerealreadydedicated terroristsbeforecoming toAfghanistanas illustratedby their imprisonment forpolitical reasons.Of the firstcluster,15of26 (58percent)onwhomIhavedatahadbeenimprisonedpriortojoiningthejihad.Thiscontrastssharplywiththe other three clusters (only 9 of 118, or 8 percent). The Egyptian militants brought their QutbianideologywiththemandexpandeditintotheglobalSalafijihad.Theyalsoconstitutethebackboneoftheleadershipoftheglobaljihad,dominatinginnumbersandideastherestofthecadresofthismovement,who come almost exclusively from theCoreArabworld. Contrary to popular belief, the roots of theglobalSalafijihadarethereforenotSaudiorAfghan,butEgyptian.

Figure1.TheGlobalSalafiJihad

Indonesians (12 of 21) dominate the Southeast Asian cluster, which also includes Muslims fromneighboring states:Malaysia (3), Singapore (2), and the Philippines (2).Most of themembers of theJemaahIslamiyahwereconnectedtotwoIslamicboardingschoolsinIndonesiaandMalaysia,foundedbythegroup’sleaders.The largest clusters are from the twoArab regions.TheCoreArab cluster is dominatedby a large

Saudicontingent (28,or42percent)withsmallercontributions fromEgypt (4),Yemen(4),Kuwait(4),Morocco(4),England(3),Pakistan(2),Syria(2),theUnitedStates(2),Canada(2),andtheUnitedArabEmirates (2). The Maghreb Arab cluster comes from France (18), Algeria (15), Morocco (10), andTunisia(5).Mostof theFrenchcontingentconsistsofsecond-generationFrenchmenofMaghreborigin,althoughthereareafewFrenchconvertstoIslaminthisgroup.The global Salafi jihad has evolved over time. It originated in Egyptian Muslim militancy. The

Indonesian contingent is probably the second oldest and developed during its exile inMalaysia in the1990s. It conducted no significant terrorist operations until its return to Indonesia in 1999 after theoverthrow of the Suharto regime. The two Arab clusters came later to the jihad. TheMaghreb ArabclusterjoinedwhenitspeacefulpoliticalaspirationswerethwartedinAlgeria.AfteranIslamistvictoryinthefirst-roundlegislativeelectioninDecember1991,thesecondroundwascancelledinJanuary1992

to prevent an Islamist takeover of the legislative body. The Bosnian war in the early 1990s becameanother rallyingpoint for joining the jihad.Thiswaralso inspired theCoreArabcluster,although thatgroupseemstohaverespondedmoretothedirectappealofOsamabinLadeninthelate1990s.Beforeleavingthistopic,letuslookatthecountriesnotrepresented.Perhapsthebiggestsurpriseisthe

lackofrepresentationfromAfghanistan,withtheexceptionofWaliKhanAminShah,whowasapersonalfriendofbinLadenandAbdulBasitKarim.Afghanistanwasthesitewherethejihadstartedandtheplaceoftrainingandrefugeforthejihadformorethanadecade.Somehow,theglobalmujahedindidnotmixwith theAfghans. This underscores the fact that the global Salafi jihad is not anAfghan phenomenon.OthercountriesnotrepresentedintheglobaljihaddespitetheirlargeMuslimpopulationsincludeIndia,Bangladesh,Turkey,andPalestine(notcountingthePalestiniansfromthediaspora).Pakistan,thecountryof so many madrassas (Islamic schools), is also greatly underrepresented, with the exception of itsBaluchiminority,whoaregenerallyhostiletothePunjabimajority,andexpatriatePakistaniswhogrewupinBritain.Not surprising is the fact that Iranians andShiaMuslims ingeneral arenot represented at all in the

globalSalafijihad.ThisjihadisstrictlyaSunniaffairrunbypeoplewhoconsidertheShiatobeheretics.Thisdidnotprevent thegovernmentof Iranfromcollaboratingwith theglobal jihadnowand then,buttheirclashingideologiespreventedanyformalorsustainedpartnershipfromforming.

SocioeconomicStatus

The conventional wisdom is that terrorism is fueled by poverty in an asymmetrical power situation.Terrorism is the weapon of choice of the dispossessed and powerless against an all-powerful state.Although this argument arose in national liberation struggles, it has been too easily generalized indiscussionsofglobalterrorism.Ihavedividedmysampleintoupper,middle,andlowerclass,accordingtothesocioeconomicstatus

of the terrorists’ families of origin. Even taking into consideration all the information available, thisrequiredsometimescrudejudgmentsonmypart.Ofthe102peopleonwhomIwasabletogatherdata,18wereupperclass,56weremiddleclass,and

28 were lower class (Table 1). This overall pattern hides significant differences among the variousclusters.TheCentralStaffandCoreArabclustersaresimilarandskewedtowardover-representationofthe upper and middle classes. The leadership and the largest cluster of the jihad therefore comeprincipally from the upper and middle classes. The Southeast Asian cluster is solidly middle classwhereastheMaghrebArabclusterisevenlydividedbetweenthemiddleandlowerclasses.Mostofthepeoplewhocamefromthelowerclasseswerefromthe“excluded”secondgenerationfromtheMaghreborhademigratedfromtheMaghreb.TheconvertstoIslamalsocamefromthelowerclasses.Butoverall,aboutthree-fourthsofglobalSalafimujahedinweresolidlyupperormiddleclass,refutingtheargumentthatterrorismarisesfrompoverty.Theexceptionwasthe“excluded”MaghrebArabsinFranceandhalfoftheWesternCatholicconvertstoIslam.

Table1.SocioeconomicStatusofFamilyofOrigin

Education

AcommoncomplaintintheWest,directedespeciallyatPakistanandSaudiArabia,isthatbothcountriesencourageasystemofeducationthatpreacheshatredoftheWest,andmakesyoungpeoplesusceptibletotheSalafimessageofglobaljihadagainsttheWest.Inoursampleof137terrorists,only23(17percent)hadan Islamic religiousprimaryandsecondaryeducation (Table2).The restwent to secular schools.TheseschoolsinacountrysuchasSaudiArabiaincludeaheavydoseofIslamicpreaching.Inmostothercountries,however, theyare indeedsecular.Half (11)of thosewhohadan Islamic religiouseducationwereIndonesianswhowenttoprivateIslamicboardingschools,specificallythetwoschoolsconnectedwith Abu Bakar Baasyir and Abdullah Sungkar, the Pondok Ngruki in Indonesia and the PesentrenLuqmanulHakieminMalaysia.Halfof therestwent tomadrassas,because theyseemedtobe theonlyavailable school for poor people in their area of theworld (sub-SaharanAfrica and the Philippines).Again,thedatarefutethenotionthatglobalSalafiterrorismcomesfrommadrassabrainwashing,withtheexceptionoftheIndonesiannetwork.EvenifweaddtothissubsamplealltheSaudis,whoreceivealargedoseofreligiousteachingintheireducation,thetotal(56or41percent)stilldoesnotreachamajorityofthesample.

Table2.TypeofEducation

Anotherargumentlinkingeducationandfutureterrorismisthatthepotentialterroristswererelativelyignorant and therefore susceptible to later brainwashing by a terrorist organization (Table 3). In oursample,thereisinformationonthelevelofeducationof132terrorists:22(17percent)didnotgraduatefromhigh school; 16 (12 percent) graduated fromhigh school only; 38 (29 percent) had some type ofcollegeeducation;44(33percent)graduatedfromcollege;7(5percent)hadtheequivalentofamaster’sdegree;and5(4percent)hadtheequivalentofadoctoraldegree.Over60percenthavehadatleastsomecollegeeducation,whichmakesthem,asagroup,moreeducatedthantheaveragepersonworldwide,andespeciallymoreeducatedthanthevastmajorityofpeopleinthethirdworld.Fromaclusterperspective,theCentralStaffoftheglobalSalafijihadwasfairlywelleducated—88

percenthadfinishedcollegeand20percenthaddoctoratedegrees.TheSoutheastAsianclusterfeaturedmostly peoplewhohadgone to Islamic boarding schools, namely the two schools run byBaasyir andSungkar.Manywentontoteachandpreach.IntheCoreArabcluster,theSaudisweretheleasteducated.ThosewhowenttoEuropetopursueadvancedstudieswere,ofcourse,bettereducatedthanthosewho

stayedhome.TheMaghrebArabsweretheleasteducatedandmostlikelytohavedroppedoutofschoolprematurely.

Table3.EducationalLevelAchieved

ItappearsthattheglobalSalafimujahedinweremuchbettereducatedasagroupthantheirparents.Assuch, they aspired to rise above their original socioeconomic background; the majority had gone tocollege.Thisrefutestheimageofthisgroupasarelativelyignorant,naïvegroup,unsophisticatedintheways of the world. On the contrary, the data better support the opposite argument that this group iscomposedoftrulyglobalcitizens,familiarwithmanycountries—theWestaswellastheMiddleEast—and able to speak several languageswith equal facility. This refutes the hypothesis that ethnocentrismproducesterrorism.ItdoesnotmeanthattheglobalmujahedinwereequallyathomeintheWestandintheiroriginalcountries,asweshallseelateron.ButtheircosmopolitanoutlookunderminestheargumentthatignoranceofandlackofcontactwiththeWestwasapreconditionforterrorism.Onthecontrary,theirworldexperiencecontrastssharplywiththatofmostWesternstudents,whoarenotfamiliaratallwiththeMiddleEastandcouldbemoreaptlychargedwithethnocentrism.Itmightbeassumed that the terroristsweredrawnmostly fromfacultiesof religiousstudies.This is

true for the Southeast Asian cluster, asmost of its members were closely tied to one of two Islamicboarding schools. But most of the other terrorists came from technical faculties such as science,engineering,orcomputerscience,withlittlerepresentationfromthehumanitiesorsocialsciences.Eventheir ideologues were not trained clerics. Qutb was a journalist, Faraj an engineer, al-Zawahiri aphysician,andMustafaKamel(a.k.a.abuHamzaal-Masri)acivilengineer.ThisMuslimrevivalistsocialmovementreliedondirectinterpretationoftheQuranandhadith,unmediatedbyanytraditionalIslamicinterpretative school. This autodidact attitude toward the scriptures is encouraged by Salafi ideology,whichrejectscenturiesofIslamicthought.Thegreaterreligiousnessintechnical/scientificdisciplinesisconsistentwithsurveysoffaithamongfacultyintheWest(StarkandFinke,2000).Thedataonthesocioeconomicandeducationalbackgroundofthemujahedininthissampleempirically

refutethewidespreadnotionthatterrorismisaresultofpovertyandlackofeducation.Onthecontrary,theglobalSalafimujahedincamefromrelativelywell-to-dofamiliesandweremuchbettereducatedthantheaveragepopulation,bothintheirhomecountriesandintheWest.Thismiddle-class,relativelywell-educated background of the terrorists is consistentwith studies ofmany other forms of terrorism, andcontrary to popular conceptions.Merari’s sample of PLO terrorists captured during the 1982LebanonWar,however,camefrompoorrefugeecampsandwererelativelyuneducated(Merari,1990and1991).ThisdifferencebetweentheglobalSalafimujahedinandPalestinianterroristschallengestheassumptionthatterroristsarefundamentallysimilarandcanbelumpedtogetherforanalysis(seePape,2003).

FaithasYouth

Contrary to the notion that the mujahedin had been brainwashed into extremist religious beliefs from

childhood (the “green-diaper” baby theory), there might have been a shift in devotion to Islam fromchildhood toearlyadulthoodamong the individuals in thesample(Table4).Therewas informationonchildhoodfaithof117people;ofthose9wereChristians,whomustberemovedfromthesample.Oftherest, 53 (49 percent) were described as religious children. Breaking down this sample according toclusters,asexpectedintermsofconsistencywiththeirearlyreligiouslife,13of16globalSalafijihadCentralStaffwereconsideredreligiousaschildren.ThispatternisidenticaltothatoftheSoutheastAsiancluster, linked together by their attendance at two Islamic boarding schools. The Core Arab clustershowed religious devotion early, as 24 of 39 (62 percent) were described as religious. Theoverwhelming exception to thiswas of course theMaghrebArab cluster. France is a strongly secularcountry,objectingeventothewearingofveilsinschool.Likewise,thethreeMaghrebArabcountriesofAlgeria,Tunisia,andMoroccohavestressedsecularismoverIslam.Itisnowonderthenthatonly3of37(8percent)showedanyIslamicreligiousdevotionasyouths.Thisstrongsecularismcoupledwiththesizeof thisclusterskewstheoverallsampletoreject thegreen-diaperbabytheory.Theother threeclustersrobustlysupportthistheory,as50of71(70percent)weredescribedasreligiousasyoungmen.

Table4.DevotionAsYouth

Occupation

The popular wisdom on terrorists suggests that they were desperate people, with little economicopportunityorwithoutadecentoccupation.Inthissample,Icollectedoccupational informationon134people (Table 5). At the time they joined the jihad, 57 were professionals (physicians, architect,preachers, teachers), 44 had semiskilled occupations (police,military,mechanics, civil service, smallbusiness,andstudents),and33wereconsideredunskilled.Soonlyaquarterofthewholesamplecouldbeconsideredunskilledworkerswithfewprospectsbeforethem.Theseunskilledterroristswereheavilyconcentrated in theMaghrebArabcluster (20outof40)andmostwere involved inpettycrime (falsedocuments traffic, thefts, credit card fraud) in support of the jihad.The rest of the sample showed thesame typeofupwardmobility found in termsofeducational levels.Anargumentcanbemade that, farfrombeingaproductoffallingexpectations,thejihadwasmorearesultofrisingexpectationsamongitsmembers.

FamilyStatus

Thefinalsocialstereotypeaboutterroristsisthattheyaresinglemen,lackinganyattachmenttosocietyasa whole, which allows them to perform terrorist acts without being weighed down by theirresponsibilitiesorfearsofreprisalsontheirfamilies.

Table5.Occupation

Inthesample,maritalstatusinformationwasavailablefor114people:83(73percent)weremarriedand31single,includingonewhowasahomosexual.Again,thereseemstobeaclusterfactorinplay.OftheCentralStaffandSoutheastAsianclusters,all37terroristsinthesesamplesweremarried.Mosthadchildren.ThetwoArabclustersalsoshowedamarriedmajority,butsomemujahedinwerestilltooyoungtobeabletoaffordtomarry.ThishighrateofmarriageisconsistentwiththetenetsofSalafiIslam,whichencouragesitsfaithfulto

marry and have children.Most of the singlemen in the last two clusterswere single because of age,studentstatus,andfinancialinabilitytosupportafamily.Thosewhowerefull-timemujahedinlivingwithothermujahedinwere encouraged tomarry their comrades’ sisters anddaughters. Indeed, thesemutualmarriagessealedtheirreligiousandpoliticalrelationships.The nature of themarriages varied immensely.Although somewives helped their husbands in their

mission,mostof thesewerenotmarriages in theWesternsense.Thewifewassegregatedaccording toSalafiritesandoftenkept in thedarkaboutherhusband’sactivities.Aprototypical illustrationisMiraAugustina,theIndonesianwifeofOmaral-Faruq.ShehadbeenatanIslamicboardingschoolwhenshegotacallfromherfathertocomehomebecausetherewassomeonewhowantedtomarryher.Shearrivedthenextdayafteratwelve-hourbusrideandmarriedal-Faruqthatday.Shelatersaidthatherfathermusthavetrustedherfuturehusbandcompletely,otherwisehewouldnothaveallowedhimtomarryher.Sheneverknewthatal-FaruqcamefromKuwaitorwhathedid.Heleft thehouseearlyinthemorningandreturnedlate.Sheneveraskedwhathedidalldayandal-Faruqnevertoldher(Murphy,2003).Theyhadtwochildrentogether.HewasarrestedinJune2002onhiswaytothemosque.Shedidnothearfromhimagainanddidnotsearchforhim.Shelatersaid,“Whenwegotmarried,hemademepromisethatifhedisappeared one day, I would not go looking for him. So I kept my commitment and didn’t search”(Ratnesar,2002).ThismaritalstatusprofileisuniquetotheglobalSalafijihad.Studiesonothertypesofterrorismreport

thatmostterroristsareunmarriedandthatthosewhoaremarriedtendtoseverfamilytiesuponembarkingonaterroristcareer.

PsychologicalExplanationsAsecondsetofexplanationsfortheglobaljihadfocusesonindividualfactors,especiallypsychologicalexplanations.Suchpopularexplanationsarebasedonthebeliefthat“normal”peopledonotkillciviliansindiscriminately.Suchkilling,especiallywhencombinedwithsuicide,isviewedasirrational,basedonwidespreadfaith in thegeneralgoodnessofman.Thisfaith isbest relegated tophilosophical religiousdebates about human nature, for it is not amenable to empirical testing. But the hypothesis that thisaberrantbehavioristheresultofsomementalabnormalityorpathologycanbetested.Suchexplanationsfocus on the search for some special inner attribute of terrorists that distinguishes them from normalpeople and explains their behavior. Many proponents of psychological explanations of terrorism arethemselvesmentalhealthprofessionals,whoknowlittleabout terrorismingeneralandeven lessabout

theglobalSalafijihad.Lackofempiricaldataistheplagueofovertpsychologicalresearchonterroristsandleavesthisfield

opentowildspeculations.Inthissection,Iwillstayonsolidempiricalgroundandtestsomeofthemorefashionablepsychologicaltheoriesofterrorism.Thedetailedbiographicaldatanecessaryforsuchtestingwasnotavailablefortheentiresample,thereforeselectivebiographicalfragmentsonsomeindividualswillbeused.Ihavefocusedontenmujahedinonwhommorebiographicalinformationisavailableeitherfromcourt testimonyor extensive investigative reporting.Arranged chronologically from the time theyjoined the jihad, theyareOsamabinLaden,Aymanal-Zawahiri,MahmudAbouhalima,KhaledKelkal,AhmedOmarSheikh,AhmedRessam,KamelDaoudi,MohamedAtta,ZiadJarrah,andHabibMoussaoui.

MentalIllness

Themental illness thesisprovidesaquickandcomfortingexplanation for terrorism. In termsofmajormental disorders, as defined by the American Psychiatric Association’s Diagnostic and StatisticalManualofMentalDisorders(DSM-IV),thedataconfirmtheabsenceofmajormentaldisordersamongthe terrorists in the entire sample.Onehadprobablemildmental retardationorborderline intellectualfunctioning(StephaneAitIddir)andtwoothershadsomeformofpsychoticdisorderinearlyadulthood(WailMohammedal-ShehriandOthmanal-Omari).Thisisabouttheincidenceofthesedisordersinthegeneralpopulation.Avariantofthementalillnessthesisistheargumentthatterroristssufferfromovervaluedideas,like

peoplewithbodydysmorphicdisorder,whohaveanorexianervosa(McHugh,2001).ThisisanotherwayofsayingthattheglobalSalafimujahedinarefanatic.Butthisisnotamentaldisorder,butadefiningandguidingprincipleoftheirlives.Otherwise,wewouldhavetoincludeinthementaldisordersanystrongbeliefs,whethertheybereligious,political,vocational,orrecreational.Another variant of the abnormality thesis is that terrorists are sociopaths, psychopaths (Cleckley,

1941),orpeoplewithantisocialpersonalitydisorder(DSM-IV).Thesetermsaregenerallyusedtomeanthat terrorists are recidivist criminals, due to some defect of personality. By definition, the modernconceptofantisocialpersonalitydisorderhasitsantecedentsinchildhoodandrequirestheevidenceofconduct disorder before the age of fifteen. Out of sixty-one people on whom I had some fragment ofchildhooddata,onlyfourhadevidenceofaconductdisorder(Amrozi,MouloudBouguelane,andtwooftheChristianconverts,RichardReidandJosePadilla).Therestofthesampleseemtohavehadnormalchildhoodswithoutanyevidenceofgettingintotroublewiththelaw.Onalogicalbasis,althoughantisocialpeoplemightbecome individual terrorists, theywouldnotdo

wellinaterroristorganization.Becauseoftheirpersonalities,theywouldnotgetalongwithothersorfitwellinanorganization,whetherinthebusinessworld,thearmy,oraterroristcell.Theylackdedication,perseverance,andabilitytosacrificeforthecause,asmostspectacularlyrequiredinmartyrdom.Ingroupactivities, they cannot coordinatewith others and are disruptive and incapable of discipline.They areleastlikelytojoinanyorganizationthatmakesgreatdemandsonthemandwouldbeweededoutearlyifthey attempted to join.An examplemight beMoussaoui,who at his hearings has shownhimself to beunruly.ThesamequalitieswereapparenttoRiduanIsamuddin(a.k.a.Hambali)andSufaat,hishostsinMalaysia,whoaskedKhalidSheikhMohammedtorecallhim.InEnglandandtheUnitedStatesbeforehisarrest,hedemonstratedthesamepatternofbehavior.ThereisevidencethatMohammedandRamzibinal-Shibhcongratulatedthemselvesfornotincludinghiminthe9/11plotforfearthathisanticsmighthavejeopardizedtheoperation.TheperpetratorsofthehijackingsonSeptember11didnotshowtheslightestsignofbelligerence.Theywerenothostile,violent,ormachothroughouttheiryearlongstayintheUnited

States.Yet,whenthemomentcame,theykilledenthusiastically.Perhapstheargumentcanbemadethatinanorganizedoperationdemandinggreatpersonalsacrifice,thoseleastlikelytodoanyharmindividuallyarebestabletodosocollectively.Amorecommonpopularmeaningofthevariousantisociallabelsisthatterroristsaresimplycriminals.

This removes terrorism from the realm of politics to the realm of crime and law enforcement. Areterroristsjustpeoplewhobreakthelaw?Aboutonequarterofthesamplewereinvolvedinpettycriminalactivities,suchasforgery,document

trafficking,creditcardfraud,andmarijuanadealing.TheywereexclusivelytheMaghrebArabsinEuropeandNorthAmericawho acted in logistical support of the global jihad.Somehadprior petty criminalactivitiesandjoinedthejihadspecificallytoabandonthisuncleanlifestyle,whichwasoftencombinedwithdrugabuse.ThiswastheappealofSalafiIslamformanyoftheconverts.However,afterjoiningthejihad,theyreturnedtopettycrime—withoutthedrugabuse—insupportofthecausebutnotasasourceofpersonal profit, which is the common criminal motive. This small-scale criminal activity is formallysanctionedbyfatwasandisconsistentwiththenotionoftakfir.Therefore,itappearsthatterroristsarenotjustcriminalsintheusualsense;theybreakthelawinthepathofGodandnotforpersonalbenefit.One specific characteristic of terrorist activity, their suicide in the process of killing, immediately

raises thepossibilityofmental illness.Mostpeoplecanconceiveofkilling foracause,aspoliceandmilitaryarecalled todo.Butformost,suicide issimplybeyondthecallofdutyandthereforemustbeindicative of some sort of underlying pathology. Yet the type of self-sacrifice called for in the jihad,shahada, is the highest formof altruistic sacrifice for the cause.Like the Japanese kamikaze (Morris,1975;Ohnuki-Tierney,2002)andtheShi’itemartyr, theSalafishahadatakesplaceinaspecificsocial,historical,religious,andculturalcontextthatrejectssuicidebutlegitimizesandencouragesthenobilityofmartyrdom.Farfrombeingmentallyill,theglobalSalafishahidviewsitasanhonortosacrificehislifeforGodandisviewedaccordinglybyhiscompanionsandfriends.EventheChristianBiblerecognizesthe value of such sacrifice: “Greater love hath noman than this, that aman lay down his life for hisfriends”(John16:13).ThedesireformartyrdominthelatestphaseoftheglobalSalafijihadisindicatedbythenowcommonremarkdirectedattheUnitedStates:“Welovedeathmorethanyoulovelife.”This failure of mental illness as an explanation for terrorism is consistent with three decades of

researchthathasbeenunabletodetectanysignificantpatternofmentalillnessinterrorists.Indeed,thesestudieshaveindicatedthatterroristsaresurprisinglynormalintermsofmentalhealth.

TerroristPersonality

Despitetheaboveconsensus,someversionsofthementalillnessthesisstillsurviveamongmentalhealthprofessionals,whoseekanexplanationforterrorismintermsofpathologicalpersonalitydynamics.Suchpersonalitydisordersinvolveanenduringpatternofinnerexperienceandbehavior,includingcognitive,affective,interpersonal,andimpulsecontrolelements,whichdeviatesmarkedlyfromtheexpectationsofthe individual’sculture, ispervasiveand inflexible,hasanonset inadolescenceorearlyadulthood, isstableover time,and leads todistressor impairment.Atpresent, themost fashionableversionsof thisthesisstemfromneo-Freudiantheories(Post,1984,1986a,1986b,1990/1998).Whileacknowledgingthelack of major psychopathology in terrorists and substantially acknowledging their normality, thesesophisticated versions claim that terrorists suffer from some form of personality pathology due tochildhoodtrauma.Thatis,psychologicalforcescompelthemtocommitactsofviolence.Theseargumentstakethreeforms.

PATHOLOGICALNARCISSISM

All versions of the personality pathology thesis confidently assert that terrorists share commonpersonality characteristicswithout providing any supporting data.They are action-oriented, aggressivepeople,whoarestimulus-hungryandseekexcitement.Theircommonpsychologicaldefensemechanismsare“externalization”and“splitting.”These last twocharacteristics areoften found in individualswithnarcissistic personality disorder, as defined by neo-Freudian theorists like Otto Kernberg and HeinzKohut,whoarguedthatthecharacteristicsaretheresultofchildhoodnarcissisticwounds.Theessenceofthetheoryisthatnarcissisticwoundsatanearlyagesplittheselfintoagrandiose“me”

and a hated and devalued “not me” projected onto outside specific targets, which are blamed andtransformedintoscapegoats.Unabletofacehisowninadequacies,thepotentialterroristneedsatargettoblameandattack.Acknowledgingthe“paucityofdatatosatisfyeventheminimalrequirementofsocialscientists” and “the lack of a control group,” the champion of this thesis, Jerrold Post, cites thedescriptivestudiesofthe1970sGermanterroriststoshowthat“agreatdealhasgonewronginthelivesofpeoplewhoaredrawntothepathofterrorism,”namelytheloss,atanearlyage,ofoneorbothparents(25percent), severeconflictswithauthorities,and frequentepisodesofschoolandwork failure (Post,1990/1998: 28). Two types of inner dynamicsmight heal a fragmented identity, resolve the split, andenable the individual to be at onewith himself and society. The “nationalist-separatist” terrorists areloyaltotheirparents,whorejecttheregime:theyarecarryingonthemissionoftheirparents,whowerewounded by the regime. The “anarchic-ideologues” are disloyal to their parents’ generation,which isidentifiedwiththeregime.Throughterrorism,theyarestrikingattheirparents,seekingtohealtheirinnerwounds by attacking the outside enemy. Post’s followers (Pearlstein, 1991; Gilmartin, 1996; Volkan,1997; Akhtar, 1999) are mental health professionals with little experience with terrorism. Theirspeculations about childhood victimization leading to “pathological” or “malignant” narcissism (orpathologicalangeror rage)and terrorismlackPost’scarefulstatementsabout theabsenceofempiricalevidenceforthistheory.Post’s twindynamicsofdisloyalty toparentsor thestatefails,however, toexplain theglobalSalafi

jihad.Bydefinition,thisjihadisnotdirectedatthestate(nearenemy)wherethemujahedingrewupbutattheUnitedStatesortheWest(farenemy).Sotheycouldnotavengetheirparentsagainsttheirnativestateorstrikeoutagainsttheirparentsinthesymboloftheirnativestate.TheWestortheUnitedStatesdidnot“wound”theirparentsinthe“nationalistic-separatist”logic,andtheirparentsareoftenhostiletotheWestrather thanidentifyingwith it, in the“anarchic-ideologue”logic.Thelogicof theglobalSalafi jihadisaltogetherdifferent.I was able to gather some short descriptions of the childhoods of sixty-nine mujahedin. The vast

majoritywerepositiveorneutrallabels;shy,introverted,serious,quiet,bright,excellentstudent, loner,pleasant, easygoing, happy, gentle were recurrent descriptors. They were not indicative of anyantecedentsofanarcissisticpersonalitydisorder.Onthecontrary,thedatasuggestthattheseweregoodkidswho liked to go to school andwereoftenoverprotectedby their parents. It seems that the lonersslightlyoutnumberedtheoutgoingchildren.Searching childhood information on sixty-one people, I found no evidence of “childhood trauma”

describedbyself,friends,orrelatives.Ofcourse,psychologicaltraumaandhumiliationmightnotleaveanyoutsidetracethatcouldbenoticedbyfamilyorfriends.Butif thetraumawassignificant,someonewaslikelytohaveknownaboutit.Therewerethreewhosefathersdiedbeforetheywereten,twowholosttheirfathersasadolescents,andonewhosefathersufferedadebilitatingstrokewhenhewasten.Interms of family integrity, sixwitnessed a divorce or final separation of their parentswhen theywereyoung.Oneofthemsufferedthedoublemisfortuneofthefatherleavingthefamilytoitsownmeansand

themotherdevelopingpolio.Twootherswereabandonedbytheirparentsandgrewupinfostercare;theybothhadtroubledchildhoods(BouguelaneandRichardReid).Afewhadfathersworkingabroadwhiletheirmothersstayedintheiroriginalcountrieswiththeirownfamilies.Twosufferedphysicalabusebytheirfathers.Intermsofpersonalhardship,onebecameblindasaninfant;anotherhadaright-handbirthdefect;athirdhadanulcerasanadolescentrequiringconvalescenceawayfromhome.Asagroup, theyhadsurprisingly littlepersonal traumain their lives,giventheirorigin(thirdworld

withhighermortality rate than theWesternworldorexcluded segmentof theWesternworld).Anotherformofcollectiveexperiencethatmightbeconstruedasa“trauma”leadingtolong-termresentmentisthehumiliationofdiscriminationexperiencedwhilegrowingupinaforeigncountry.Outof158people,43(27percent)grewupinacountryasrefugees,secondgeneration,or“guestworkers.”ThevastmajorityoftheseweresonsofMaghrebArabsinFrance,PalestiniansintheMiddleEast,andPakistanisinKuwaitorEngland.Buteven in thesecases, theirhostilityshouldhavebeendirected to thehostcountryratherthantheUnitedStatesortheWestingeneral,accordingtothepathologicalnarcissismtheory.Intermsofthetenmoredetailedbiographies,thereisnoevidenceofpathologicalnarcissism.Ifanyone

hadit,itshouldhavebeentheleader,OsamabinLaden.Yet,oneofthemostattractivefeaturesabouthimis specifically his lack of narcissism, his humility, which impresses his followers and admirers—especiallybecausehehadthemeanstoliveluxuriouslyandchosetogiveupthatlifestyletolivesimply,amonghismujahedin.Hisstatementsarealsoself-deprecatingratherthangrandiose.Theonlytraumainhischildhoodisthefactthathisfatherdiedwhenhewasaroundten.Otherwise,helivedtheprivilegedlifeofaprince.Althoughal-ZawahiridoesnotsharebinLaden’shumility,thereisnoevidenceoftraumain his childhood. He does not mention any in his autobiography (al-Zawahiri, 2001). Abouhalimamentionednochildhoodtraumainhisinterviewswiththepressandresearchers.Kelkalalsosufferednotraumainhischildhood,whichhedescribedashappy.Hisfirstpossibletraumawashisarrestattheageofnineteen, too late tocause the typeofnarcissisticwounddescribedbyKernbergandKohut.AhmedOmarSheikhhadaratheridyllicchildhoodinprestigiousprivateschools.Hisinterestinpoliticscameatthe age of nineteen. Ressam’s childhood did not include any trauma, except for the development of astomach ulcer at the age of sixteen, for which he traveled to Paris and convalesced alone for a fewmonths.HewasnotyetpoliticalwhenheleftAlgeriaattheageoftwenty-fiveinsearchofadecentjob.KamelDaoudididsufferatthehandsofhisfather,whobeathimwithawoodenpaddlewhenhegotpoorgrades. Fortunately for him, he was an excellent student, who was described as the very model ofintegration in school. His rebellion came in early adulthood after a relatively apolitical and normalchildhood.MohamedAttasufferednochildhoodtrauma.Ifanything,hewasoverprotectedbyhismother.ZiadJarrahwasaveryhappychildwithoutanyhintoftrauma.HabibZacariasMoussaouimaybe theonlyonewith a traumatized childhood.His fatherphysically

abusedhisfamily,butnottheboys.HismotherleftherhusbandwhenMoussaouiwasfourandputhiminanorphanageforayear.Whenhewastwelve,theymovedtothesouthofFrance,wherefinancesweretight for two or three years. Moussaoui, however, seemed to have weathered the storm well, was apopularchild,anddatedablondegirl.Helikedtoparty,butreportedsomeracismatschool.HedidwelluntilhemovedtoLondoninhisearlytwenties.TherehegrewmoredistantfromhisfamilyandfriendsandgotinvolvedwithaSalaficrowd.Unlikemanypoliticalorganizations,Salafigroupsarecareful toavoidacultofpersonality, for they

believethateverythingbelongstoGod.Indeed,theytakeseriouslythenotionofIslamassubmission,andthis is not compatiblewith a narcissistic cult of personality,whichoftendegenerates into a pyramidalorganization,withall thecontrols lyingwith the leader.AlQaeda’s structure isquiteopposite,withalargedegreeoflocalautonomyandinitiative.

Avariantofthechildhoodtraumathesisistheargumentthatearlyexposuretoterrorismcanleadtothedevelopment of terrorism in the adult. This variant may or may not be combined with the notion ofrelativedeprivation.Thesampledoesnotsupport this thesis.Whilesuchanargumentcanbeadvancedforregionswithintractableconflictsandrefugeecamps,suchasPalestine,itisnotrelevantfortheglobaljihad. These terroristswere not exposed to terrorism as young people, and they came from relativelywell-offsocialbackgroundsontheaverage.

PARANOIA

A second variant of the personality pathology thesis reformulates the above dynamics to claim thatterroristssufferfromparanoidpersonalitydisorder,definedaccordingtotheDSM-IV.Specifically,theyexhibitapervasivedistrustandsuspicionofotherssuchthattheirmotivesareinterpretedasmalevolent(Robins and Post, 1997). But this clinical definition is quickly watered down to include a broaderdefinition of a personality style and outlook characterized by guardedness, suspiciousness,hypersensitivity, isolation, and especially the defensemechanism of projection. Theywarned that theywouldusethesetermsinterchangeably(5).TheDSM-IVatheoreticalperspectiveisfurtherleftbehindinaflurryoftheoreticalspeculation.Thecoredynamicof theparanoidpersonality is surprisinglysimilar to thatofmalignantnarcissism.

Ideasofpersecutionandgrandeurareashieldagainstuncomfortablefeelingsofdepletion, inadequacy,shame,andvulnerability.Thedynamicconsistsofatriadofinsatiablenarcissisticentitlement,inevitablyleadingtodisappointment,disillusionment,andfrustrationwhenthenarcissisticneedsarenotsatisfied,andproducingnarcissisticrageduetotherejectionoftheentitlementandasenseofbetrayal.Thisrageisprojectedontoscapegoats—hencetheneedtohaveenemies(Volkan,1994)-–andresultsinviolence.Thisisthecoreofthe“psychopoliticsofhatred”(RobinsandPost,1997).Theoriginofthisdynamicisthe“paranoid-schizoidposition,”aphaseofnormalchildhooddevelopmentaspostulatedbyMelanieKlein.Thisprimitivepsychological state is characterizedbya split between the idealizedgood,pleasurable,lovingobject(thegoodmother)andthebad,uncomfortable,persecutingobject(thebadmother).Indeed,thesetheoristsconsiderreligiousconceptsofGodandthedevilasprojectedrepresentationoftheseearlyfantasyobjects.Inthisstage,achild’sdistressconcerningtheaggressivehatredwithinhimselfisrelievedbysplittingoffandprojectingthebadpart(theinternalpersecutor)outwardontoothersandretainingthegoodparts inside, idealizing them.Paranoidpeoplenevermaturebeyond this stageor they revert to itunderstress,channelingaggressiontothescapegoat.Groupparanoia isviewed simplyas amanifestationof the leader’spathology.The followers suffer

froma deprecation of their blemished personalities and demonstrate a readiness to hate, to imitate, touncriticallybelieve,andtoattempttheimpossible.Religiousideologyprovidesarationaleforfollowerswhoyearnforacalling,agrouptojoin,aleadertofollow,inordertofleefromtheself(RobinsandPost,1997:100).Theirsenseofselfrestsupontheintegrityoftheirbeliefsystem,whichprotectsthemagainstpainfulpsychologicaldisintegration.Fromthisperspective,theiractionsaredefensiveaggressionagainstanenemychallengingtheirbeliefsystems,whichtherebythreatenstheirpsychologicalintegrity.Butitisnot the beliefs that generate the passion of their striking out. These beliefs are like a container forpowerfuldangerous feelings.Attacksuponsuchbeliefs threaten tobreak thiscontainerandoverwhelmthefollowerwiththesefeelings.Suchattacksthereforeprovokeapassionate,oftenviolentresponse.This account, which depends on mysterious internal forces that cannot be formally surveyed, is of

coursenotrefutable.Noneofthetenbiographiesofmujahedinmadeanymentionofapainfulsplitself,usingviolenceasaformofself-healing.Thedeprecationofreligionimpliedinthisaccountwouldgreatlyoffendanysubjectinthesample,andnotforthereasonssuggestedintheaccount.

Everyreligiousorpoliticalideologyprovidesawaytointerprettheworld.Itiseasytolabelanysuchinterpretation a conspiracy. Demonstrations that many political and religious movements containedelementsofaconspiracytheoryaretrivialandnotanalyticallyuseful.Whatneedstobeshownisthattheleadersandfollowers in thesemovementseithersuffer fromparanoidpersonalitydisorderorparanoiddynamic triad, rooted in arrested psychological development at the “paranoid-schizoid” position.Granted,suchademonstrationwouldbedifficultwithoutaccessto“inner”data,butuntilthen,thisthesisremainsaspeculationnotbackedbyanyempiricalevidence.Inthelargersampleunderstudy,Ididnotdetectapatternofparanoidpersonalitydisorderorlifestyle

beforejoiningthejihad.Thenatureofaclandestineorganizationimpliessomeconcernwithsecurityandsecrecy formere survival. This is realistic, not paranoid. Any politically violent group, whatever itsideology,would also demonize its opponent and stockpileweapons for the fight. This again is in thenature of the organization and does not imply paranoia.The onlymeaningfulway to detect clinical orlifestyleparanoia in terrorists is to lookat theirpsychologicaladjustmentbefore they joined the jihad.Sincethisadjustmentisbydefinitionoflongdurationwithrootsinadolescence,thispersonalitytraitordisordermusthaveprecededjoiningthejihad.In the tendetailedbiographies,onlyal-Zawahiri’shistorygivessomehintofparanoiaprecedinghis

joiningthejihad.Heformedhisownclandestinegroupwithhisfriendsandbrotherduringadolescence,morethantwentyyearsbeforefoundingalQaeda.Whileheexhibitedsomeofthebehaviorsdelineatedintheprecedingparagraph,itisdifficulttoknowwhethertoattributethemtohisinnatepersonalityortothenecessityofsurvivinginahostileenvironment.UnlikebinLaden’sleadershipstyle,however,whichwastopromote cooperation amongdisparate terrorist groups anddiscourage internal Islamist rivalries, al-Zawahiri’sstyle in theEgyptian IslamicJihadwas farmoreconfrontationaland led tomanysplitsandchallenges.Leaders of alQaeda and Jemaah Islamiyah never resorted to frequent purging of the innercircle,asymptomofparanoiaaccordingto theabovethesis(Post,RubyandShaw,2002aand2002b).Indeed, infightingamongMuslims(fitna) isagreat sinandspecificallyproscribedby theQuran.Suchinfightingisasourceofdiscomfortamongmanymujahedin,whoprefertostrikeatthetrueinfidel.Onewouldbehardpressedtofindelementsofparanoiainthepre-AfghanistanbinLaden.Abouhalima,

Sheikh,Ressam,Jarrah,andMoussaouiwerehappyyoungmen,devoidofanyhintsofparanoia.DaoudiandAttawereintrovertswhodidnotseemparanoid.Kelkalwasembitteredbyhisimprisonmentduetobeingcaughtinastolencar,buthedidnotseemparanoidbeforehisconversiontoterrorism.

AUTHORITARIANPERSONALITY

Amore recent publication (Post,Ruby, andShaw, 2002a and 2002b) tried to revive theAuthoritarianPersonalityprojectofthe1950s(Adorno,Frenkel-Brunswik,Levinson,andSanford,1950).Thisthesispostulatedthatpunitivechildraisingresultsinapersonalitystylecharacterizedbyconformity,submissionto authority, and aggression toward outsiders. In the tenmujahedin biographies, harsh child raising ispresent inonly twocases.For themajority, it seems that theoppositemightbe true; thechildrenwereoverprotectedinverycaringfamilieswithoftendotingparents,asillustratedbybinLaden,Sheikh,Atta,andJarrah.The revived Authoritarian Personality formulation results in a series of propositions characterizing

charismatic leader-follower relationships. It postulates that the group uncritically follows the leader’sdirectivesandthattheleaderhasahistoryofviolence.NeitheristrueoftheglobalSalafijihad,whichprominently features local initiative and decentralized decision-making. Bin Laden had no history ofviolencebeforejoiningthejihad.AuthoritarianismiscontrarytothetenetsofSalafism,whichpreachesthatonlyGodissuperiortomen,

whoshouldrelatetoeachotherasequals.QutbstressedthatallauthoritybelongstoGod.Intentionallyornot, the leadershipstyle inalQaeda isnotanauthoritarianone.There isnoconsolidationofdecision-makinginitsleader.Itsstructureisnothierarchicalormodeledafteramilitaryorganization,andtherehasbeennosplitasaresultofleadershipdecisions.Allthesefactorsareassumedtohavehighrelevanceinpredicting terrorism. They do not apply to the global Salafi jihad, which is characterized bydecentralization in decision-making, a horizontal fluid structure, and a surprising absence of periodicpurgesofleadershipthataresocommoninotherterroristorganizations.Themainproblemwiththepersonalitypathologyexplanationofterrorismisthelackofrelevantdata.

Thehypothesisisbasedonoutdatedtheories,whichdidnotsurvivetheempiricalscrutinyofpsychiatricconcepts following thepublicationof theDSM-III in1980andareno longer relevant topsychiatricorpsychologicalresearchandpractice.Allofthesecoreconceptspredatethisempiricalrevolutioninthefield.Thesurvivalofsuchnowquaint theoriesmightbedueto theinsularityof thisresearch,whichisshelteredfrompeerscrutinyandcriticism.WhentheseFreudianorneo-Freudianargumentsarepublishedin the terrorism literature,political scientistsdonotbelieve theyhave theexpertise tochallenge them.When they are published in the psychological literature, the references to mysterious “secret” datasupportingthesetheoriesintimidatepsychologists.The personality pathology thesis suffers from the fundamental problem of specificity. Concepts are

stretchedtobeall-inclusiveandlosetheiranalyticusefulness.Suchaccountsbecomepost-hocstoriesthathave no practical value. Conspiracy theories are a ubiquitous feature of human life, not particularlyindicativeofmentalpathologyanddefinitelynotspecifictoterrorists.Expertsonterrorismhavetriedinvain for threedecades to identify a commonpredisposition for terrorism.Themost extensive researchprojects focusedon formerGermanand Italian terrorists from the1970s.These studies concluded thatthere was no psychological profile for terrorism. In addition, recent comprehensive reviews of theevidentiarybasisofthisthesishavefoundittobecompletelyunfounded(Silke,1998;Horgan,2003).ThepersonalitypathologythesisisnotrelevanttotheglobalSalafijihad.

CircumstancesofJoiningtheJihadThesesocialandpsychologicalapproachestoterrorismneglectthesocialcontextaroundthedecisiontojointhejihad.Joiningthejihadisactuallyaprocessandnotasingledecision.TheformalinductionintoalQaeda often took place inAfghanistan,when the novice pledgedbaya, a formal oath of loyalty, toOsama bin Laden and al Qaeda. That there are no captured records of who joined and who did notpresentsaproblemforthisstudy.“Joiningthejihad”isunderstoodhereasthedecisiontogosomewherefor training,whetherAfghanistan (themost commondestination),Bosnia, thePhilippines,Malaysia,orIndonesia.Formalrecruitmenttookplaceatthesetrainingsites.Itisimportanttonotethatnoteveryonewhoparticipatedinthetrainingjoinedthejihad.Indeed,onlyaminorityofthetrainees,perhaps10to30percent,wereinvitedtojoin.

Age

Some analysts claim that terrorists join as immature naïve young men, vulnerable to indoctrination(Merari,1990and1991).Inmysample,theaverageageforjoiningthejihadwas25.69years.Intermsofclusters,theSoutheastAsianswereolderasaruleandaveraged29.35years.MuchoftheleadershipoftheJemaahIslamiyahhadbeenexiledtoMalaysiainthe1980sandconstitutedthecoreofmujahedinwhowere still directly involved in operations.TheCentral Staff cluster, however,was also older than the

averageat27.9years.ThetwoArabclusterswereyounger,withtheCoreArabbeingtheyoungestofall(23.75years).Thislastgroup’saverageagemightbeloweredbythe9/11groupfromSaudiArabia,whotendedtobeyoungerandhadjoinedthejihadafewmonthsbeforetheoperation.Theabovedoesnotsupporttheimmaturitythesis.Mostpeoplejoinedthejihadwellpastadolescence

when theywere responsible youngmen in theirmid-twenties and should have been able to resist anymysteriousbrainwashing.

PlaceofRecruitment

Outof165mujahedinonwhomthereisinformation,115(70percent)joinedthejihadinacountrywheretheyhadnotgrownup.Theywereexpatriates—students,workers,refugees,fighters(inthejihadagainsttheSoviets)—awayfromhomeandfamily.Another14weresecondgenerationinFrance,Britain,andtheUnited States, where they might have felt a strong pull for the country of their parents and not beencompletely embedded in the host society. In France, they were part of the “excluded” generation.Therefore, a remarkable 78 percentwere cut off from their cultural and social origins, far from theirfamiliesandfriends.Theremaining36(22percent)includedSaudiswhoparticipatedinthe9/11attacksand theMay2003Riyadhbombings, andMoroccanswhowere toopoor to travel anywhereandwereinvolvedinMay2003Casablancabombings.FortheCentralStaff,themostcommonplacewheretheconversiontotheglobaljihadtookplacewas

theSudan.Forlatercohorts,withtheexceptionsoftheSaudisfromthe9/11groupandthethemajorityofSoutheastAsians,conversionstotheglobaljihadtookplaceintheWest,mostlyinFrance,Germany,andEngland.TheIndonesianshadjoinedtheglobaljihadinMalaysia,wheretheeventualleadershipoftheJemaahIslamiyahhadbeenexiled.

Faith

TherewasadefiniteshiftindegreeofdevotiontoIslaminadulthoodbythemujahedin,precedingtheirrecruitment into the jihad.This isnot surprisinggiven the fact that theglobalSalafi jihad is aMuslimrevivalistorganization.Ofthe155mujahedinonwhomIcouldfindrelevantinformation,allbutonewereconsiderablymore devout right before joining the jihad than they had been as children.More than 99percentwereveryreligiousatthattime,oftendonningAfghan,Pakistani,ortraditionalArabicgarbandgrowingbeards,asopposedtothe49percentwhoweredevoutaschildren.ThelargestshiftwasintheMaghrebArabcluster,whichwentfrom8percentto100percentintermsoftheircommitmenttoIslam.ThisnewfaithwastheSalafiversionofIslamfor97percentoftheterrorists.Lonelypeoplelookforcompanionship.Inanexpatriatecommunity,especiallyinanunwelcomingnon-

MuslimWesterncountry,themostavailablesourceforcompanionshipwithpeopleofsimilarbackgroundis themosque.Disillusionedwith thesociety thatexcluded themand theemptypromisesof theLeft inFrance,second-generationorexpatriateMaghrebArabswenttothemosqueandmetnewfriends.Islamwasawaytorestoretheirdignity,gainasenseofspiritualcalling,andpromotetheirvalues.Weshouldbecarefulnottoascribeacausalrelationshiptothisincreaseddevotiononthepartoffuture

mujahedin.Thisshiftinfaithmayverywellbeareflectionofamoregeneralprocessofengagementinthejihad. In thiscase, itwouldbemore indicativeofaneffect rather thanacauseof thisprocess.At thispoint,theevidenceisstilldescriptiveanddoesnotyetjustifyconclusionsaboutthecontributionofthisincreasedfaithtotheprocessofjoiningtheglobaljihad.MuchhasbeenmadeinthemediaofsomeofthebehavioroftheSeptember11hijackersthatseemsto

beinconsistentwiththeirdevotion.ThebehaviorsreferredtoincludegoingouttosometoplessbarsinLas Vegas and Florida, drinking alcohol, and even hiring an escort service, right before the 9/11operation.Thisevidencedoesnotdisprovetheirdevotion.First,onecanbeasinnerandstillbedevout.Second,asentrytoparadiseisguaranteedtomartyrs,thereislittlecosttosinningonelasttime.Third,thesewerenotseriousviolationsofthecentraltenetsofIslam.FromtheaccountsIread,Ihavenodoubtsthat themujahedinweresincerelydevoutSalafists.However, thisbehaviormighthaveamoreominousmeaning,namelytheimpendingimmediacyofanoperation,andbeacauseforalarmforauthorities.

Employment

Althoughmostofthemujahedinhadstrongoccupationalskills(seeabove),fewwereemployedfull-time.ThemembersoftheCentralStaffclusterwerefull-timefightersinthejihadagainsttheSovietsatthetimetheydecidedtojointheglobaljihad.Theyremainedfull-timemujahedin.TheSoutheastAsianstaughtattheirIslamicboardingschoolinMalaysiawhilewaitingforthejihadtounfoldinIndonesia.TheMaghrebArabswerelikelytobeeitherstudentsorunemployed,involvedinpettycrimesandlivingonwelfare(32of 46, or 70 percent). TheCoreArabswere either students at home or involved in full-time terroristactivitiesabroad(30of55,or55percent),andfewhadfull-time jobs.Thediscrepancybetween theiractual jobs and their capability is best illustrated byWadih el-Hage.When he returned to the UnitedStatesfromfightinginthejihadagainsttheSoviets,hefoundonlytwopart-timemarginaljobs,inafast-food restaurantandasa janitor for thecity.He later joined theglobal jihadbybecoming thepersonalsecretarytoOsamabinLaden,whichwastheequivalentofavicepresidentforcorporatedevelopmentina large corporation.His job included a large office and controlling access to his boss, with frequenttravelandgreatresponsibilities(Swartz,2002).

RelativeDeprivation

The mujahedin’s lack of full-time jobs integrating them into their communities compounded theirloneliness while away from home. This underemployment must have been a definite grievance and asourceoffrustrationinthesegenerallygiftedindividuals.Thissupportstherelativedeprivationthesisofthe origin of terrorism (Gurr, 1970). These were, however, temporary circumstances leading to theirjoining the jihad, rather than structural relative deprivation in their original backgrounds. Theseindividualshadrisingexpectationscomparedtotheirfamiliesoforigin.The relative deprivation thesis should not be limited to thematerial dimension of life. Just before

embarking on the process of joining, the future mujahedin suffered from social isolation, spiritualemptiness(theimpetusfortheirincreaseindevotion),andunderemployment.Buttherelativedeprivationthesisalso runs into the fundamentalproblemof specificity.Manypeopleareunderemployed,butveryfew of them become terrorists. Relative deprivation would certainly increase the pool of potentialmujahedin,butcannotbyitselfexplaintheassociationwiththejihad.Althoughrelativedeprivation(perhapsinthecontextofrisingexpectation)isnotspecifictoterrorism,

it isprobablyanecessarycondition.Peoplewhoaresatisfiedwith lifeareunlikely to joina religiousrevivalistterroristmovement.Theywillcontinuetodowhattheyaredoingandnotsubjectthemselvestotheupfrontcosts,socialsanctions,andsacrificesinvolvedinsuchamovement.Asagloss, the immediatecircumstances leading to their joining the jihadmightbesupportiveof the

frustration-aggressionhypothesis.Thisproposedthatfrustrationleadstoaggressionandaggressionistheresultoffrustration.Again,thevalidityofthisapparenttruismdependsonhowfrustrationandaggression

aredefined.Further,thishypothesisisnothelpfulinpredictionofterrorism.Manypeoplehavefrustrationandveryfewbecometerrorists.Itsvalueisquestionableforitconsistsofposthocaccountsratherthanprospectiveones.Avariantofthishypothesisisthatfrustrationresultsinrage,whichleadstoaggression.Althoughthismightfitourpreconceptionofterrorism,anditwaswidelybroadcastinthenewsaccountsofthe9/11attacks,thereislittleevidencetoindicatethatglobalSalafimujahedinwereconsumedwithrage.Certainlytheinstructionsforthepreparationandtheexecutionoftheattacksleftbehindbyal-Omari(andwronglyattributedtoAttainthemedia)donotmentionangerorragedirectedatthetargets.The frustration-aggression hypothesis not only suffers from vagueness; it also implies a certain

reflexive element: aggression inevitably follows frustration. The global jihad operations are longpremeditatedandoftenwellplanned,asdemonstratedbythe9/11attacks,whichwereplannedovertwoandahalfyears.The1998U.S.embassybombingsinEastAfricatookaboutfiveyearstoplan.Thiswasno reflex action. This practice of long and deliberate planning seems to undermine the frustration-aggressionhypothesis.Howlongdoesthefrustrationlast?Doesiteverfadeaway?Thislongdurationisnotconsistentwiththeknownflexibilityofpeople’semotions,whichcanchangequickly.Ageneralstateof frustration may eventually lead to aggression, but any nonreflexive aggression is difficult tospecificallyexplainintermsoffrustration.

ConclusionThis chapter empirically tested some of the traditional theories of terrorist behavior, namely social,psychological, and situational. The findings seem to reject much of the conventional wisdom aboutterrorists.MembersoftheglobalSalafijihadweregenerallymiddle-class,educatedyoungmenfromcaringand

religiousfamilies,whogrewupwithstrongpositivevaluesofreligion,spirituality,andconcernfortheircommunities.Therewerefourgeneralpatternsdetected.TheCentralStaffconsistedofIslamistmilitantswhometandbondedtogetherduringtheSoviet-Afghanwarandwentontobecomefull-timeterrorists.TheSoutheastAsians,whowentontobecomemembersofJemaahIslamiyah,weremostlythedisciplesofthetwoleadersofthisorganization.TheMaghrebArabs,eitherfirst-orsecond-generationinFrance,grewup feelingexcluded fromFrench societyandweregenerallynot religiousasyoungpeople.Theywerestillupwardlymobilecomparedtotheirparents,butintheprocessofmovingupbecameisolatedandsoughtfriendshipsinlocalmosques.TheCoreArabs,whogrewupincoreArablands,camefromacommunalsocietyandbelongedtooneofthemostcommunalofallreligions.Theywereisolatedwhenthey moved away from their families and friends and became particularly lonely and emotionallyalienated in this new individualistic environment. The lack of spiritualism in a utilitarian culturewaskeenlyfelt.Underemployedanddiscriminatedagainstbythelocalsociety, theyfeltapersonalsenseofgrievanceandhumiliation.Theysoughtacausethatwouldgivethememotionalrelief,socialcommunity,spiritualcomfort,andcauseforself-sacrifice.Althoughtheydidnotstartoutparticularlyreligious,therewas a shift in their devotion before they joined the global jihad, which gave them both a cause andcomrades.Althoughnothinginthedatachallengestherationalactortheory,Iwillpostponeadiscussionofitto

Chapter5.Intermsofthesocialexplanations,themembersstudieddidnotcomefrompoorbackgroundsleadingtogrievancesagainsttheWest.Theireducationwasmodern(exceptfortheIndonesians)andtheywerenot“brainwashed”intofanaticismthroughamadrassaeducation.Mostbecamemoredevoutbeforejoining the jihad.Contrary tomostwritingon terrorists, the largemajorityof the individualsexaminedweremarriedandmosthadchildren.Yettheywerewillingtosacrificethemselvesforthecause.Except

fortheWesternconvertsandtheMaghrebArabs,whoindulgedinpettycrime,thereisnoevidencethattheterroristswerehardenedcriminals.In terms of psychological explanations for their participation, they did not seem to display any

psychiatricpathology.Therewasnopatternofemotionaltraumaintheirpastnorwasthereanyevidenceof any pathological hatred or paranoia when the facts are analyzed. This “pathological hatred” muchtalkedaboutinthepresscannotbefoundintheaccountsstudied.Fromalltheevidence,manyparticipantsjoinedinsearchofalargercauseworthyofsacrifice.In terms of social psychology, the frustration-aggression hypothesis is so vague that it cannot be

completelytestedorrefuted.Judgingfromtheirbackgrounds,themembersdidnotsufferfromlong-termrelativedeprivationor frompathologicalprejudice.Mostwere fromverywell-to-dobackgroundsandled livesmore consistentwith rising expectations than relative deprivation. TheCoreArabswere sowell-off that their families sent them to study abroad, where their radicalization began. In their hostcountries, they were alienated, underemployed, and perhaps discriminated against, and therefore in asituationofrelativedeprivation.IntermsofgeneratingacommonprofileoftheglobalSalafimujahed,thereareasmanyprofilesasthey

areclustersofmujahedin.TheSoutheastAsiansaredifferentfromtheCoreArabs,whoaredistinctfromthe Maghreb Arabs. The leaders of the movement, organized in the Central Staff, are unlike theirfollowers.Nevertheless,therearepatterns.Justbeforetheyjoinedthejihad,theprospectivemujahedinweresociallyandspirituallyalienatedand

probably in some form of distress. They would not have been the best candidates to form a tightlycohesivegroup,whosememberswerewillingtoperformtheultimatesacrificeinthenameofwhatthegroup stood for.Yet, this is exactlywhat happened.This transformation from isolated individuals to acommunityoffanaticsisthesubjectofthenextchapter.

FOUR

JoiningtheJihad

Becauseanyattempttofindacommonsocialfactororpersonalitypredispositionforterrorismrunsintothe fundamental problem of specificity, profiles based on such personal characteristics as age, sex,nationalorigin,religion,education,andsocioeconomicbackgroundareofverylittlevalueinidentifyingtrue terrorists. In the case of global Salafi mujahedin, however, there is one common element that isspecifictothemandtonooneelse,andthatisthefactthattheyhavemadealinktothejihad.Theselinksarekeytothedynamicsofterrornetworks.Tofurtherourunderstandingofthesenetworks,itiscriticaltounderstand how these links are formed. How does one go about joining the global Salafi jihad? Toexplore this question, let us examine the case histories of two terrorist cells, the plotters of theunsuccessfulmillennialbombingoftheLosAngelesairportandtheHamburgcellresponsibleforthe9/11attacks.

TheU.S.MillennialPlotAhmedRessamwasbornonMay9,1967,atBouIslamil,Algeria.Hisfather,BelkacemRessam,aherofromtheAlgerianWarofLiberation,ownedacoffeeshopandasix-bedroomhouse.HewasadevoutMuslim but did not demand that his family follow his practice, and his children were not religious.Ahmed,theoldestchild,wasashy,skinnyboyandadecentstudent.Atsixteen,hedevelopedastomachulcerandwenttoParisforalengthycourseoftreatment.Thissethimbackinhisstudies,andhefailedhisfinalbaccalaureateexaminations,endinghisopportunityforfurtherstudiesatuniversity.Heworkedathisfather’s coffee shop and lived a secular life. He wore designer jeans, drank wine, smoked hashish,frequented nightclubs, went out with girls, and had nothing to do with Islam. He was aloof from thenascentpoliticalstormsbrewingoverAlgeriainthelate1980sandearly1990s.OnSeptember5,1992,heboardedtheferryforMarseille,insearchofabetterlife(Ressam,2001;Berntonetal.,2002).Lackingproperpapers,RessamdriftedtoCorsica,wherehefoundworkpickinggrapesandpainting

housesandgotinvolvedintheundergroundmarketinfalsedocuments.HewasarrestedonNovember8,1993,foranimmigrationviolationandwasreleasedawaitinghishearinginMarch,1994.Notwantingtoreturn toAlgeria, he flew toMontreal onFebruary 20, 1994,with false documents identifying him asTaharMedjadi.Onarrivalattheairport,headmittedthathisdocumentswerefakedbutinventedastoryaboutmilitant engagement and false imprisonment in Algeria and asked for political asylum. He wasreleasedonbond,givenwelfarebenefits(forthreeyears)andscheduledtocomebackforahearing.AloneinMontreal,Ressamdriftedtoplaceswherehecouldmeetcompatriots.Oneofthemostpopular

wastheAssunaAnnabawiyahMosque,whichattractedabout1,500worshippersonFridays,mostlyfromtheexpatriateAlgeriancommunity.Asignificantportionofthiscommunitywasinvolvedinsmall-scalecrime,suchastraffickinginfalsedocuments,creditcardfraud,andpettytheft.Themosquewasoneofthecenters where people involved in these crimes met in order to fence their stolen goods. Young mencongregatedaroundthemosqueanditsconnectedbookstore,whichsoldSalafibooksandtapes.Ressam,whostill likedtodresswellandgotonightclubs,befriendedseveralofthemandgotinvolvedinpettycrime aswell.HemetMustaphaLabsi,who had come toCanada onApril 30, 1994, also asking forrefugeestatusonthebasisofamade-upstory.Thetwobecamebestfriendsandaccomplices incrime.

Theywere first arrested inAugust1994when they tried tograbanelderlywoman’shandbag.Ressampledguiltyandwassentencedtopayafinetoacharity.HeandLabsicontinuedtheircareersincrimeandspecialized instealing tourists’suitcases fromhotel lobbies, takingmoney,passports,andcreditcards.Ressamwasarrestedfourtimesinfouryears.Hewasconvicted,fined$100to$500,putonprobation,andordered to leaveCanada.Henever appeared at his deportationhearing. InOctober 1996, hewasarrestedagain forpickpocketing, fined$500,and releasedonprobation.Hemaintainedhis lifestyleofdressingwellandgoingtonightclubs.Inearly1996,LabsiandRessammovedintoanapartmentrentedbyAdelBoumezbeurandwerejoined

bySaidAtmani.Thefourwerenowpartofasmallgroupofthieves,organizedbyMustaphaKamel,whousedtheproceedstosupporttheglobaljihad.Atmani,alsoknownasKarim,wasofMoroccanoriginandhadfoughtinBosniaaspartoftheal-MujahedinBrigadeinZenica,wherehehadmetKamel.AfterthebrigadedisbandedincompliancewiththeDaytonAccords,KamelinvitedAtmanitocometoCanada.HearrivedasastowawayonSeptember26,1995,andreconnectedwithKamel.HebecameaskilledforgerandwaseventuallydescribedasKamel’sright-handmaninMontreal.When theywere not robbing tourists,Ressamandhis roommates spent their days idly.Theyplayed

soccer,smokedcigarettes,anddecriedthecorruptcultureofCanadaandtheWest,especiallyitsimmoraldress,music,andgodlesspursuitofwealth.TheirapartmentonPlacedelaMalicornebecamethecentralmeeting place ofKamel’s group. Regular visitors includedBoumezbeur’s brother and their childhoodfriendsfromAlgeria,theIkhlefbrothers,Kamel,andMokhtarHaouari,whoboughtKamel’strinketshopandsoldthestolengoods.Sometimesstrangers,suchasLaifaKhabou,whowasconnectedtotheFrenchRoubaix gang and acting as a courier to transport false passports to colleagues in trouble in othercountries, stayed at the apartment.Unbeknownst to the occupants, theCanadian federal authorities hadplaced listening devices in the apartment and were monitoring their conversations, which consistedlargelyofanti-Western fantasiesandplots.Thepolice referred to thegroupasBOG,“bunchofguys,”morepathetic thandangerous—unemployed,nogirlfriends, livingonwelfareor thievery,andcrammedintoanapartmentreekingofcigarettesmoke.Although theauthoritiesdidnot take themseriously, theywould talkaboutMuslimaffairs.Themost

respectedmembersof theircircleweremenwhohadundergonemilitary training inAfghancampsandhadactually fought the jihad inBosnia, likeKamel,Atmani, andAbderraufHannachi.HannachiwasaTunisianof little education,whohad also arrived inCanada in1994.Hewas a regular at theAssunaMosque,where he liked to entertainwith stories and jokes.Hewould loudly proclaim his hatred forWesternandU.S.culture.Inthesummerof1997,hereturnedfrommilitarytraininginalQaeda’sCampKhaldeninAfghanistan,braggedaboutwhathehadlearnedanddeclaredthathehadfoundmeaningasa“warrior.”LabsiandRessamdecidedtotryitoutforthemselvesandaskedHannachitoarrangefortheirtraining.HannachididsoviaHussein(abuZubaydah)inPakistan.Ressamandhis friend left forAfghanistanonMarch17,1998.Theystayed there forelevenmonths,

duringwhichtheylearnedsmallcaliberweaponstacticsatCampKhaldenandtookanadvancedcoursein explosives at Camp Toranta. They formed a small five-member cell with Fodail, abu Ahmed, andHakim.Atmaniwas to be the sixthmember of the cell. Fodailwas to be in charge in the field. Theydiscussedseveraloperationswiththecampcommandant,Makhlulif(abuDoha),Hussein,andabuJaffar,his deputy forAlgerianmujahedin. The planwas for them tomeet in Canada and conduct operationsagainst theUnited States from there.Ressam received $12,000 from abu Jaffar and returned safely toCanadavia thePacific, landingatLosAngeles InternationalAirportonFebruary7,1999.He took theopportunity to scout the airport, the objective of an attack planned to coincide with the millenniumcelebration.MeanwhileAtmanihadbeenarrestedinlateOctober1998inNiagaraFallsinpossessionof

stolen credit cards.Hewas deported toBosnia,which deported him to France,where hewas facingchargesconnectedwiththethe1996waveofbombingsinFrancecarriedoutbytheRoubaixgang.Labsiplanned to return to Montreal via Europe, but was prevented from going on to Canada at HeathrowAirport. Labsi stayed in LondonwithMakhlulif,who had been sent to London to oversee alQaeda’soperations in theWesternworld.Fodailwas likewisedetained inEuropeandunable to fly toCanada.NorcouldRessamturntoKamelforhelp;KamelhadbeenarrestedinJordaninApril1999anddeportedtoFranceforchargesinconnectionwithRoubaixgangbombings.TheunravelingofhisnetworkdidnotdiscourageRessam.Hedecidedtocarryouttheoperationonhis

own.PeoplewhoknewhimbeforehistriptoAfghanistannoticedachange.Heseemedmoreconfident,amanwillingtoriskhisfreedomorhislifeforGod.Heelicitedthehelpofhisfriends.MouradIkhlef,oneof the regulars at theMontreal apartment, had been implicated in a 1992 bombing at Algiers airport,whichkilledelevenandinjuredmorethanonehundred.IkhlefhelpedRessamwiththeplanningoftheLosAngelesairportbombing.Haouariprovidedsomemoney,falsecreditcards,andlogisticalsupport.SamirAit Mohamed helped as well. Abdel Majid Dahoumane, a friend since his first days in Montreal,promised help in building the bomb. He asked Ressam for help in joining the jihad and getting toAfghanistanformilitarytraining.Haouarialsohadachildhoodfriend,AbdelGhaniMeskini,whowantedto join the jihad and train in Afghanistan. Meskini might help Ressam deliver the bomb, for he wasalready living in Brooklyn, New York. Ressam had never met Meskini but Haouari vouched for histrustworthiness,astheyhadgrownuptogether.RessamcalledMakhlulif,whoapprisedhimoftheothers’inabilitytocometoCanada.Ressambroughthimuptodateonhisplantobombtheairportandaskedfortwovisas forPakistan forMeskiniandDahoumane, for trainingat analQaedabase.AbuJaffar, fromPeshawar, sent the visas to London, and Labsi forwarded them to Ressam. Ressam gathered up thenecessarymaterial,andinNovember1999heandDahoumaneflewtoVancouvertorentacarandmixsomeoftheexplosives.OnDecember11,1999,MeskiniflewtoSeattletomeetRessam.OnDecember14,1999,RessamputthematerialinarentedcarandtriedtocrosstheU.S.borderat

Port Angeles, Washington. An alert customs inspector, Diana Dean, noticed that he was sweatingprofuselyandnervousandaskedhimtopullover.ThechemicalsweresoondiscoveredandRessamwasarrested. Two days later, Canadian authorities identified Ressam, who was still resisting underinterrogation.Meskini,afterwaitingforafewdays,flewbacktoNewYork.FromthephonenumbersinRessam’spapers,theFBIwasabletotracebackthenetwork,andeventuallyMeskiniandHaouariwerearrested inNewYork andMontreal, respectively.Dahoumane fled toAlgeria,wherehewas arrested.MouradIkhlefwasdeportedtoAlgeria.

TheHamburgCellMeanwhile, in Europe, a strikingly similar process of affiliation with al Qaeda was taking place,involving thosewhowouldbe responsible for the9/11operations.TheHamburgcell emerged fromaconvergenceof ninepeople in anupper-middle-class expatriate student community.Thenucleusof thegroup formed aroundMohammadBelfas, amiddle-aged immigrant from Indonesia,Yemen, andEgypt,whohadlivedinGermanyillegallyforalmosttwentyyearsbeforebeinggivenlegalstatus.Heworkedfor the post office and conducted a study group at al-QudsMosque in Hamburg. Around 1996, threestudents from the TechnicalUniversity ofHamburg-Harburg (TUHH) began attending his study group.Mohamedal-AmirAwadal-SayedAttahadcometoGermanyin1992tostudyarchitectureatTUHH.Hemoved into the dorm and befriended German students. After a trip back to the Middle East, whichincludedapilgrimage toMecca in1995,hebegan tochangeandprobably joinedBelfas’sstudygroup

aroundthattime.MounirMotassadeqandAbdelghaniMzoudi,friendsfromMarrakech,cametoGermanyin1993andstartedanelectricalengineeringprogramatTUHHin1995.ItisnotclearwhofirstconnectedwithBelfas’sstudygroupatal-QudsMosque.Motassadeqathistrial

claimedthatMzoudiintroducedhimtoAttainearly1996becausehewaslookingforaplacetostayandAttaknewalotofpeopleatthemosque.AGermanstudentwhosharedMzoudi’sapartmentinlate1995said thatMzoudi was a lonely and privateman, who did not utter any radical comment.MotassadeqmovedinwiththeminDecember1995forafewmonths,andtheirconversationbegantoshowadherencetoradicalIslam.OnApril11,1996,thetwoMoroccanfriendswitnessedAtta’swill.Motassadeqmovedintoanapartment in thestudent-housingcomplexthatspringandstayedthere threeyears. Itbecamethecenter where militant Muslim students congregated when on campus, eating meals together from thecommonkitchen,anddiscussingreligionandpoliticsinthelivingroom.Theyalsoprayedtogetheratal-QudsMosque.TheyweresoonjoinedbyRamzibinal-Shibh,astudentfromYemen,whohadcometoGermanyunder

falsepapers,askingforpoliticalasylum.Binal-Shibhwasreligious,learnedintheQuran,charismatic,andcharming.HebecamethemostrecognizablememberoftheBelfasstudygroupatal-QudsMosque.HewaslearningGermaninordertolaterstudyeconomicsandpolitics.ThegroupgrewwiththeadditionofSaid Bahaji, whowas ofGermanMoroccan origin and had grown up inMorocco.He had started atTUHHin1996andmetMotassadeq,whotookhimtoamosqueforthefirsttime.Bahaji,whohadgrownupinasecularhousehold—hisfatherhadownedadiscothequeandhismotherwasaPrussianProtestant—quickly adopted the Salafi ideology of his friends. He publicly aired his extreme views and evenstartedlecturinghisGermanChristianauntaboutproperconductforwomen.In1997,thegroupexpandedagainwiththeadditionofZiadAmirJarrah,whohadcometoGermanyin

April 1996 and moved to Hamburg to study aeronautical engineering at the University of AppliedSciences (UAS) in the fall of 1997. Jarrah’s girlfriend later testified that he had grown homesick andbegan to attend conservativemosques.Hemetbin al-Shibh at al-QudsMosque in late1997andgrewclosertothecircleoffriendsaroundBelfas’sstudygroup.Inlate1997,Attaquithisjobandseemedtohavedisappearedforafewmonths.TheauthoritieslatersuspectedthathemighthavegonetoAfghanistanfortraining.Attheendoftheyear,MzoudidroppedoutofTUHHandswitchedtotheUAS,whereJarrahwas studying. In early 1998, Marwan al-Shehhi joined the group. He came from the United ArabEmirates,whichpaidforhisstudies.AfterastayinBonn,Germany,hecameinearly1998toHamburg,where he met the group at al-Quds Mosque. He went home for his father’s funeral and returned toHamburg,wherehegrewveryclose toAtta.The twowouldbecomealmost inseparable.Binal-ShibhmovedinwithBelfas.Duringthesummerof1998,Atta,Belfas,al-Shehhi,andbinal-Shibhallworkedinacomputerwarehouse,packingboxes.JarrahhadaninternshipattheWolfsburgVolkswagenplant,wherehemetZakaryaEssabar,aMoroccanstudentwhohadcometoGermanytheyearbefore.JarrahintroducedhimtothegroupandEssabarmovedtoHamburgthatfalltostudymedicaltechnologyattheUAS.InNovember1998,Atta,binal-Shibh,andBahajimovedintoanapartmentonMarienstrasse,which

theynamedBait al-Ansar, theHouse of theSupporters (of theProphet), the samename as alQaeda’sguesthouseinPeshawar,Pakistan,whereprospectiverecruits transitedontheirwayto trainingcamps.Baital-Ansarbecametheplacewherethegroupoffriendsmetandtalkedpolitics.Howevervirulentandextreme its discourse, a spirit of easy brotherhood prevailed within the group. The men sharedapartments,bankaccounts,andcars.Thegroupmembersstrictlyobservedthetenetsoftheirreligion;theyprayed five times a day, maintained strict Islamic diets, and even debated the proper length of theirbeards. They talked endlessly about the damage done by the Jews. For entertainment, they watchedbattlefield videos and sang songs aboutmartyrdom (Laabs andMcDermot, 2003).Visitors toBait al-

AnsarincludedMohamedHeidarZammar,anaturalizedGerman,originallyfromSyria,whohadfoughtintheAfghancivilwarandinBosnia.Hewasloudandradicalabouthisviewsanddidnotmakeasecretofhispast.Germanauthoritiesputhimundersurveillance,butdroppeditwithinafewmonthsforlackofevidence of any criminal planning.Hemet the group at al-QudsMosque and became close toBahaji.They were unaware that the German police had put in a microphone and monitored some of theirdiscussions, which became increasingly virulent with focused hatred against “world Jewry” and theUnitedStates.Talk aboutdefeating them through jihadandentry intoparadisebecamemoreprominentwithtime.Inearly1999,Bahaji,asaGermancitizen,didhismilitaryservice.Thegroupseemedonamission.

Atta finished his dissertation. Jarrah married his girlfriend at al-Quds Mosque. Al-Shehhi gainedadmission to TUHH.Motassadeqmarried a fellow student from Belorussia, who converted to Islam.Bahajimarriedaneighteen-year-oldreligiousMuslimTurkishgirl,whohaddroppedoutofhighschoolbecause it taught un-Islamic subjects like evolution. At Bahaji’s wedding in October 1999, the groupdemonstrated their fervor by loudly proclaiming their devotion to God and the jihad, to the shock ofBahaji’sfamilyandrelatives.WhenBahajimovedoutofBaital-Ansar,EssabarandMzoudimovedinwithAttaandbinal-Shibh.Theeightfriendswerereadytojointhejihad.Originally,theyhadplannedtogotoChechnyatofight

the Russians. Russian atrocities against Muslims in Chechnya motivatedMuslim militants to join thejihad.MohamadouOuldSlahi,thebrother-in-lawofacloselieutenantofOsamabinLadenandwhowasliving in Germany, discouraged them from going to Grozny and suggested instead that they go toAfghanistanfortraining.InNovember1999,Atta,binal-Shibh,al-Shehhi,andJarrahwentseparatelyinthe firstwave and regrouped at an alQaeda guesthouse nearQandahar,Afghanistan. There theywereselectedforthe9/11operation,whichhadbeenintheplanningstagesforafewyears.Whatwasmissingwere volunteers familiar with Western countries, able to solve complex problems and workindependently. Ideally, theywouldhavestudied inaWesterncountry,be technically skilled,andspeakperfectEnglish(FoudaandFielding,2003;MascoloandStark,2003).ThefourfriendsfromHamburgfitthe bill. Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, who had conceived the operation, approached them, and theyenthusiasticallyacceptedtheassignment.TheymetfellowconspiratorsHaniHanjour,Khalidal-Midhar,andNawafal-Hazmithereandplannedtheoperation.TheyreturnedtoGermanyandthesecondwaveofMzoudi,Motassadeq,Essabar,andBahajiwent toAfghanistan in thespringof2000.Al-ShehhimovedintoBaital-Ansarforafewmonths.Thefirst-wavemembersappliedfortheirU.S.visastogotoflightschool.Onlybinal-ShibhwasfrustratedinhisattemptstoobtainavisatoentertheUnitedStates.Afterthefourthrefusal,EssabartriedtoreplacehimandgetaU.S.visabutwasrefusedtwiceaswell.Binal-ShibhwastheliaisonbetweenKhalidSheikhMohammedandtheteaminthefield.Attawasinchargeinthefieldandal-Hazmiwashisdeputy.WithAtta,Jarrah,andal-ShehhiintheU.S.trainingandpreparingfortheiroperationandbinal-Shibh

travelingaroundcoordinatingitwithKhalidSheikhMohammedandtheSaudi“muscle”group,Mzoudi,Motassadeq,Essabar,andBahajiplayedsupportingroles,providingtheirfriendswithmoneyandtakingcareoftheiraffairsbackinGermany.OnAugust29,2001,Attacalledbinal-Shibhtotellhimthedateofthe operation in code. Within days, bin al-Shibh, Essabar, and Bahaji disappeared from Hamburg.Motassadeq andMzoudi stayed inHamburg andwere eventually arrested and tried. It is unclear howmuchBelfasandZammarknewabouttheplot.BelfasbecameaGermancitizenin2000andimmediatelytookatriptotheU.S.,wherehemighthavebeencasingpotentialtargets.Zammarwasprobablyshutoutoftheplansbecauseofhisbigmouth.HewasarrestedinMoroccoanddisappeared.ItissuspectedthatheisincarceratedinSyria.

SocialAffiliationFriendship

Astrikingelementinbothoftheseaccountsistheabsenceofbothtop-downrecruitmentandbrainwashingof the plotters, concepts which have been the mainstay of conventional explanations of al Qaedaterrorism.Inthemillennialplot,threeofthemainplottershadnotattendedtrainingcampsinAfghanistanandwerenotevenformallyaffiliatedwithalQaeda.(Twowerescheduledtogoaftertheplot.)Norweretheyparticularlyreligious.Meskinidrankbeer, lovedmovies,anddatedwomenhemetindanceclubs.TheHamburgplotterswerefarmoredevoutintheirbeliefsandpractices.Athemeinbothaccountsistheformation of a network of friendships that solidified and preceded formal induction into the terroristorganization.The sizeof thenetworkswas similar,witheightmembers ineachgroup:Ressam,Labsi,Atamani,Kamel, theBoumezbeur and Ikhlef brothers inCanada;Atta, bin al-Shibh, al-Shehhi, Jarrah,Motassadeq,Mzoudi,Essabar,andBahajiinHamburg.Some,suchastheBoumezbeurandIkhlefbrothers(alsoHaouariandMeskini) inCanadaandMzoudiandMotassadeqinHamburg,kneweachotherfromtheoldcountry.Theyhadgrownuptogetherandtrustedeachother.Aroundthemweresomeperipheralmembers:HaouariandHannachiinonecase,andBelfasandZammarintheother.Duringan incubationperiodofalmost twoyears, the intensityof theirbeliefsspiraledupward inan

apparentgameofoneupsmanship.Thistookplaceinwhattheyhopedwastheprivacyofarefuge,butitwasmonitoredbythepolice.TheCanadianpolicelabelof“bunchofguys”isappropriate.KayNehm,theGerman federal prosecutor, commented, “All the members of this cell shared the same religiousconvictions,anIslamic lifestyle,a feelingofbeingoutofplace inunfamiliarculturalsurroundings thattheyweren’tusedto.AtthecenterofthisstoodahatredofworldJewryandtheUnitedStates”(Williams,2002).Norwere the friends particularly discreet about their views.YazirMukla, aMoroccan studentwhowasoccasionallypartofthegroup,testifiedatMotassadeq’strialthatwhenhisfathercametovisithim,hewassoalarmedattheradicalatmosphereatal-QudsMosquethatheforbadehissontohaveanyfurther contact with the group. He eventually forced his son to return to Morocco in 1999 (Notz,Steinborn,andWilliamson,2003).Thisescalationofrhetoricalmilitancyandcondemnationof theWestwithinagroupofclosefriends

was also noted in Milan, where the Italian authorities had wiretapped the apartment of al Qaeda’sVarenesenetworkandmonitoredtheirconversationsforyears.TheItalianprosecutorStefanoDambruosospeculatedthattheir“chatter”aboutdestroyingtheworldwasessentialforkeepinguptheirmoraleandeggingeachotheron.“Thesearepeoplewithalotofproblems.Adaptingtothiscountryisdevastatingtothem.Inradical religiousactivity theyfoundrules,astructure. It’snot just religious, it’spsychologicaland personal. The talk helps them stay fanaticized, tomaintain theirmind and never relent” (Rotella,2002b).At some point, the friends were ready to join the global Salafi jihad. As the Canadian example

demonstrates, it was not simply because of piety and devotion. Although the Montreal group wassomewhat religious, itwasnot seriously so, like theHamburggroup. I suspect that therewasa strongdesireforadventuremixedwiththereligiousandpoliticalbeliefs.Butmoreinterestingisthefactthatthegroup of friends seemed to have initiated contact with the jihad. I detected only one instance of anyreluctancetojointhejihadinalltheaccountsIread.Thisexceptionisinstructive.Abdul Basit Karim (Ramzi Yousef) tried to recruit Ishtiaque Parker, a South African student at

Islamabad IslamicUniversity. Karim’s brother-in-law, a student at the same university,met Parker bychance and took an interest in his SouthAfrican citizenship. Two days later, he introduced Parker toKarim,whopouredonthecharmandexpressedaninterestinmarryingaSouthAfricangirlinordertoget

a South African passport. Karim met him again two or three times and carried on innocuousconversations.InDecember1994,Karimbrokecoverandtoldhimabouthisinvolvementwiththe1993WorldTradeCenterbombingandseveralotherbombings.HeaskedParkertotakeabagoverseasforhimin return for $10,000 and told him he would provide specific instructions later. Karim left for thePhilippinesandreturnedprecipitouslyafter thefire inManilaruinedhisplansfor theBojinkaplot.HecalledParker,whobythistimewasterrifiedofKarim.TheybothflewtoBangkok,whereKarimpackedexplosives in suitcasesanddispatchedParker to theairport to send themascargowithaU.S.carrier.Parkerwentandreturnedbutliedthatthesecuritywastootighttocarryouttheplan.TheybothreturnedtoIslamabad.Aftertheirreturn,KarimtoldParkerthathiscomputerhadfallenintothehandsofthepoliceinManila and thatParker’snamewas in it.This terrifiedParker evenmore.ThenextdayKarim toldParkertotakeasmallpackagetoaShiitemosquethefollowingday.Instead,ParkertelephonedtheU.S.embassy and revealed what he knew. On the basis of this information, a mixed U.S.-Pakistani forcearrestedKarimonFebruary7,1995(Reeve,1999).Theaboveaccountshowsthedangerofattemptingtoprematurelyrecruitastranger.Karimwasinmany

waysaloosecannon.Hedidwellwhenhereliedonchildhoodfriendsandkinsmen,buthisluckranoutwhenheexpandedhisoperationstostrangers.Friendsorkinsmenwhoknoweachotherforalongtimecanvouch for their loyalty.Usually, theprospectivemujahed took the initiative rather thanwaiting forsomeonetoaskhimtojointhejihad.Insteadofatop-downprocessoftheterroristorganizationtryingtorecruitnewmembers,itwasabottom-upprocessofyoungpeoplevolunteeringtojointheorganization.Manywanted to join, but didn’t knowhow to get in touchwith the jihad organization.Often itwas achancephenomenon.Meskini’s experience in themillennial plot is probably typical.After a few years of a life of petty

crime,MeskiniaskedhischildhoodfriendHaouaritohelphimjointhejihadandfightwithMuslimmeninChechnyaorAfghanistan(Adams,2001).HaouariintroducedhimtoRessam,whoaskedMakhlulifforavisa.HaouarivouchedforhischildhoodfriendandRessamvouchedforHaouari(Ressam,2001:565).Neither of the two accounts has a “recruiter” in the traditional sense of the term. The closest are

HannachiandallegedlyZammar.InRessam’stestimony,HannachiarrangedforLabsiandRessamtogotoanalQaedatrainingcampinAfghanistanbygettingamessagetoHussein(abuZubaydah)inPeshawar.Zammarhasbeenwidelyreportedintheworldpressasthe“recruiter”oftheHamburgcell,theonewhofacilitated their affiliationwith alQaeda. People familiarwith him, however, ridicule this hypothesisbecauseofhislimitedintellectandtendencytotalktoomuch.“ForpeopletosaythatZammarrecruitedAtta is like saying a first grader recruited a professor” (Hendawi, 2002). The president of the Al-Muhadjerin Mosque in Hamburg described him as “a little boy who talked too much” (McDermott,2002b).Ramzibinal-Shibh,whoseemsnottohavetakenhisstudiesseriouslyandappearstohavebeendevotedtothejihadfull-timeevenbeforehewenttoAfghanistanwiththeHamburgfirstwave,mayhavealreadybeenlinkedtothejihad.HewasacousinofKhalidal-Midhar’swife.ButassumingthatZammardidindeedmaketheconnectionbetweenalQaedaandtheHamburgcell,itappearsthat,likeHannachi,heplayedapassiverole,ratherthanthatofanactiverecruiter.Furthermore,neitherwasacorememberoftherespectivegroup.Formalaffiliationwiththejihadalsoseemstohavebeenagroupphenomenon.Friendsdecidedtojoin

thejihadasagroupratherthanasisolatedindividuals.ThefoundersofalQaedahadofcoursemeteachotheronthefieldsofAfghanistanandforgedstrongbondsinthefightagainsttheSoviets.Attheendofthewar,theydecidedtocreatealQaeda.ThisgroupphenomenonmaybeastrongfactorintheformationoftheglobalSalafimujahedin in general.AbdulBasitKarim (RamziYousef) plotted and executedmanyterroristactswithhisuncleKhalidSheikhMohammedandhischildhoodfriendsAbdulHakimMuradand

AbdulShakur.At theEastAfricanembassybombings trialL’HoussaineKherchtou testified thathehadjoined the jihadwith four friends fromMilan (Kherchtou,2001:1107).TheKelkalgroupconsistedoffriendswhohadgrownup togetherandparticipated together in thebombingsof thesummer1995.ThemembersoftheRoubaixgrouphadmetaroundthemosqueandhadgonetoBosniaasagrouptofight.Themembersofthe2001failedParisembassyplotalsojoinedasagroupoffriends.TherearehintsthattheSaudimujahedin involved in the9/11operationsalsocameasgroups.Although it isdifficult toobtaininformationfromSaudiArabia,whichhasbeenclosedtoinvestigativejournalists, ithasbeenreportedthatfourfriends(Wailal-Shehri,Waleedal-Shehri,Ahmedal-Nami,andSaeedal-Ghamdi),whowentonto becomehijackers,met at al-SeqleyMosque in the townofKhamisMushayt inAssir Province, andsworetocommittojihadinthespringof2000(Sennott,2002b;Lamb,2002;“TheHighwayofDeath,”2002).TheywenttogethertoalQaeda’sal-FarooqcampinAfghanistanandeventuallybecamepartofthe9/11 operation. Even the Lackawanna Six, close Yemeni American childhood friends who underwenttrainingatanalQaedacamp,didsoasagroup.TheMay16,2003,Casablancabombingswerecarriedoutbyfriendswholivedwithintwoblocksofeachother.From an empirical perspective, it is difficult tomake a statement about friendship bonds preceding

affiliationwith theglobal jihad.Peoplewhoprovideanaccountofhow they joineda revivalistgrouphaveatendencytoprivilegeideologicalfactorsasanexplanationfortheirconversionoraffiliation.Theyseldommention thecritical roleof friendship in thisprocess.Onlyprospectiveparticipantobservationstudiesshowtheimportanceofinterpersonalbondsinrecruitmentintocultsandsects(LoflandandStark,1965; Stark and Bainbridge, 1980). This difficulty is compounded by the fact that the sample data isderived from court testimony or journalists’ interviews, neither of which usually investigates theimportanceofsocialbondsinthesubject’spersonalhistory.My sample includes 150 subjects on whom I had some information about social bonds preexisting

formal affiliation with the jihad or with people who went on to join the global jihad. Preexistingfriendshipbondsplayedanimportantroleintheformalaffiliationof68percentofmujahedinonwhomtherewasadequate information.Mostof themjoined the jihad insmallclustersof friends.AlQaeda’sfoundershadforgedsuchbondsthroughtheircommonfightagainsttheSoviets.Formany,likeAhmedal-Kalaylah(a.k.a.abuMusabal-Zarqawi)andWaleedTawfiqbinAttash(a.k.a.Khallad), therewas justnotenoughinformation.Twoprovidedaccountsofreligiousconversionswithoutmentioningfriends.OnlyinthecaseofAhmedOmarSheikhwastherenohintoffriends,family,orreligiousreaffiliationthatmightexplainhisjoiningthejihad.

Kinship

Friendship is only one type of social bond thatmight foster affiliation to the global jihad.Kinship isanother.Inmysample,kinshipplayedaroleintheaffiliationof14percentofmujahedin.Somefamiliesseemeddedicatedtothejihad.KhalidSheikhMohammedandAbdulBasitKarim(a.k.a.RamziYousef,whoisMohammed’snephew)belongedtoanextendedjihadfamily.AhmedSaidKhadr,oftheCanadianKhadrfamily,workedwithMohammed’sbrotherinPeshawarin1984,foughtwithOsamabinLadenatAli Kheyl (Jaji) in 1987, and financed the Egyptian embassy bombing in Islamabad in 1995 for al-Zawahiri’s EIJ.His three sonsAbdallah,AbdelRahman, andOmarwere also involved in the globaljihad.AliGhufronandthreeofhisyoungerbrothers(Amrozi,AliImron,andAliFauzi)wereinvolvedintheBali nightclub bombing inOctober 2002, aswas their next-door neighborMubarak.These are thegreen-diapermujahedin. In themillennialplot, two setsofbrothersbelonged to theMontreal groupoffriends.The9/11perpetratorsincludedtwosetsofbrothers(al-Hazmiandal-Shehri)andthreecousins

(Hamza,Ahmed,andAhmedal-Haznawial-Ghamdi).Kinshipbondsalsoextendtoin-laws.YazidSufaatbecamemorereligiousthroughhiswife’surging.

HestudiedwithseniormembersoftheJemaahIslamiyah,whowereexiledinMalaysia,endedupjoiningthatorganization,andwas thehostfor theKualaLumpuralQaedaconference leadingto theUSSColebombing and the 9/11operations. Sufaat eventually personally participated in theChristmasEve2000wave of church bombings throughout Indonesia. Spouses also played an important role in convincingChristianconverts to join the jihad. JackThomas,anAustralian,wasmarried toan IndonesianwomanfromthetroubledSulawesiProvince.LuisJoséGalanGonzalez,aSpaniard,convertedtoIslamandtookthenameofYusufGalanwhenhemarriedaMuslimwoman.HejoinedthejihadaspartofYarkas’s(a.k.a.abuDahdah)logisticsgroupinMadrid.Marriageexposespeopletonewkinshipandfriendshipnetworks,whichmayinspireaffiliationwiththejihad.Forexample,el-Hagebroughthiswife,mother-in-law,andhernewhusbandtoPakistantofighttheSovietsinthe1980s.In-laws also provided links for prospectivemujahedin to join the jihad. Ramzi bin al-Shibhwas a

cousinofKhalidal-Midhar’swife.Inturn,Khalidal-Midharwastheson-in-lawoftheYemenileaderofal Qaeda. Marriages commonly cemented mujahedin into kinship relationships. Mujahedin and theirfamilieslivedinexilebecauseoftheirclandestineactivities,limitingtheirchoiceofmarriagepartners.Themost prominent of such bondswas themarriage of binLaden’s son to the daughter of abuSittah.Marriageswerealsotheidealwayofforgingpermanentalliancesbetweenmujahedinfamilies.Manyofthe accounts tell of intermarriages in the Sudan, Pakistan, and Afghanistan. Typical was Ahmed SaidKhadr’s attempt to convincehis eldest daughter,Zaynab, tomarry aSudanese terrorist inPeshawar in1995(Vincent,2002).InIndonesia,HarisFadillah,aMuslimmilitialeader,arrangedthemarriageofhisdaughtertoOmaral-Faruq,analQaedarepresentativeinSoutheastAsia,inoneday(Murphy,2003).Combining the friendship and kinship statistics and eliminating the overlap, about 75 percent of

mujahedinhadpreexistingsocialbonds tomembersalready involved in theglobal jihadordecided tojointhejihadasagroupwithfriendsorrelatives.

Discipleship

Athirdtypeofaffiliationforthejihad,discipleship,isuniquetotheSoutheastAsianclusterandaccountsforabout8percentofmujahedinwhojoinedthejihad.TheSoutheastAsianclustercentersaroundtwoIslamicboardingschoolsfoundedbyAbuBakarBaasyirandAbdullahSungkar,wholaterfoundedandledtheJemaahIslamiyahterroristgroup.AtPondokNgruki,inIndonesia,theytaughtabrandofmilitantSalafi Islam thatmade them run afoul of the Indonesian authorities.Rather than face a second term ofprison, they fled toMalaysiawhere they founded the second school,PesentrenLuqmanulHakiem, andcontinued theirwork. It isunclearexactlywhen theJemaahIslamiyahwas foundedandwhat itsactuallinkwithalQaedamaybe.JemaahIslamiyahisstillshroudedinmystery;mostarrestedmembersarenotcooperatingwithauthoritiesandhaverecantedwhateverconfessionstheyhavemade.Theyareprotectingtheir leader, as a manual discovered in the possession of one prescribes them to do. Some of thosearrested inSingaporeare fullycooperatingwithauthorities,however, and theydate thecreationof theJemaahIslamiyahto1993.InSoutheastAsia,teacherscommandstrongpersonalloyaltyfromtheirstudents.Thisloyaltymaybe

lifelong, as illustratedby the three Jemaah Islamiyahconvicts incarcerated inSingapore,who testifiedagainst their former teacher Abu Bakar Baasyir in June 2003. Despite their damning testimony, twospontaneouslystartedtocryatthesightoftheirteacher.Theyrepeatedthattheylovedhimbuturgedhimtotellthetruthabouthisactivities.

Worship

A common popular belief is that the global Salafi mujahedin were recruited at mosques, where theyunderwent somesortofbrainwashing.Placesofworshipdo figureprominently in theaffiliation to theglobal Salafi jihad, as it is part of a Muslim revivalist movement. Indeed, several mosques becameprominent in the process of affiliation to the jihad: inLondon, theFinsburyPark and theBakerStreetMosques under Mustafa Kamel (a.k.a. abu Hamza al-Masri) and Omar Mahmud Othman (a.k.a. abuQatada), respectively; the IslamicCultural Center inMilan, first underAnwar Shaban and then underAbdelQaderEsSayed;abuBakrMosqueunderImadEddinBarakatYarkasinMadrid;al-QudsMosqueinHamburg;al-DawahMosqueinRoubaix,France;AssunaAnnabawiyahMosqueinMontreal;al-SeqleyMosqueinKhamisMushayt,SaudiArabia;andal-FaruqMosqueinBrooklyn,NewYork.Thesemosques servedmany functions in the transformation of young alienatedMuslims into global

Salafimujahedin.Amosquewas an ideal place tomeet familiar people, namely fellowMuslims—animportantdesireinupwardlyandgeographicallymobileyoungmenwhomissedthecommunityof theirfriendsandfamily.Friendshipgroupsformedaroundthemosques,aswesawinthemillennialplotandHamburg cell accounts. Each new group became a “bunch of guys,” transforming its members intopotentialmujahedin, actively seeking to join the global jihad. In the sample of onehundredmujahedinwith adequate background information, thirteenprovided an account of affiliation to the jihad inspiredonlybytheirreligiousbeliefsandwithouttheinterventionoffriends.Thismayactuallyoverestimatethisgroup, since themujahedin traditionally account for joining the jihad as a religious revelationwithoutacknowledgingtheimportanceoffriends,kin,orteachers.SofarIhavefocusedontheprocessofassociationwiththejihad,andIhavearguedthatsocialbonds

predatingformalrecruitmentintothejihadseemtobethecrucialelementofthisprocess.However,theglobalSalafijihadisnotsimplyapoliticalmovement.Itisalsoareligiousrevivalistmovement,andthemosquesarewheretheintensificationofreligioussentimenttakesplace,transformingpotentialmujahedinintodedicated fanatics.The“bunchofguys” incubationgoesonlyso far; itmightbeenough tomakeadedicatedpoliticalmilitantoragangmember(seeJankowski,1991).Butitwillnotproduceareligiousfanatic,readytosacrificehimselfforthegloryofGod.Thisrequiresareligiousdimension,acquiredonlyinplacesofworship.Noteveryoneisresponsivetoreligiousappeal.Atheistswouldnotbeattractedtoarigorousreligious

ideology,norwouldtheygotothemosquetomeetfriends.Thosereceptivetoareligiousappealacceptthenotionofanactivesupernaturaldimension.Suchbelief isfacilitatedbyanintimatefamiliaritywithconceptsoffaith,asinapersonraisedinareligioushousehold.Presentdeepcommitmenttoareligion,however, would bar the development of a new commitment. All things being equal, people who aresatisfiedwiththeirreligionwillnotseekanewmoredemandingsect.Thosewhoarealreadycommittedtoaparticularsectarianoutlookmaysimplychoosetopursueitinanewsetting.Therefore,theMuslimsmostreceptivetoglobalSalafiideologygrewupwithreligionbuteitherwerenolongercommittedtoitoralreadyembracedSalafism.MostCoreArabswerecommittedtoaWahhabiorSalafiversionofIslamas children, whereas the Maghreb Arabs were essentially uncommitted to religion (see Chapter 3).Individuals in both clusters were familiar enough with Islam to seek people sharing this genericbackground.WhenshownpicturesofMuslimssufferingbecauseofwars, theybegan to feelacommonbond of victimhood based on Islam.Usually, peoplewill not seek new religious or social affiliationsexceptaftersomesignificantchangethatdisruptstheirsocialnetworks.Examplesofsuchchangescouldbeupwardorgeographicalmobility,anewschool,marriage,orimprisonment.Thelastonemayaccountforvarious“born-again”experiencesorconversionsinprison.Itouchedonmarriagesinthesectionon

kinship.Butmostof thesampleexperiencedsuchdisruptionsduetosocialorgeographicalmobilityoradmissiontoanewschool,oftenabroad.Religion isaboutone’s relationshipwithGod.Contrary tosomepopularbeliefsaboutsolitaryfaith,

this relationship is strongly grounded in social processes. Islam is one of the most communal of allreligions,withmanyorchestratedsharedrituals.Besidestheobviousconvivialityoffellowship,religionalso entails a commitment involving affective, behavioral, and cognitive components that mutuallyreinforce each other.Emotions are important in religion and are usually ordinary, natural and positiveemotions directed to God and the community of worshippers. Islam prescribes regular behavioralpracticessuchaspraying,ofteningroups,fivetimesdaily.Italsoproscribesmanypractices,dependingontheinterpretationsoneaccepts.SalafiIslamisverystrictinitscodeofconductandprescribesvariouscodesof appearance,dress,diet, andconduct, especiallyvis-à-visgender roles.Salafistsbelieve inaliteralinterpretationoftheQuranandthelifeoftheProphet,andinthenecessityofimposingShariainthestate and protecting the faithful from corruption byWestern values. The elegance and simplicity of itsinterpretationsattractmanywhoseekasinglesolutiondevoidofambiguity.Veryoftenthesepersonshavealready chosen such unambiguous technical fields as engineering, architecture, computer science, ormedicine.Studentsofthehumanitiesandsocialscienceswerefewandfarbetweeninmysample.Likemany religions, Islamdemands commitment toGod in termsof faith and trust.Adherents view

theirsacrifices in termsof thatcommitment.Faithandreligiousexplanationsarenourishedsocially,byothers’proclamationsoffaith.Totheextentthatpeopletrustsignificantothers,theyrelyontheirwisdom,experience, and testimony and accept their expressions of faith. They also place greater trust on thetestimonyofpeoplewhohavesacrificedintheserviceofGod.TheArabicwordforwitness,shahid,isalsothewordformartyr.Martyrdomisaprofessionoffaith,shahada.Atestimonialfromonewhohaslittletogainfromhisfaithonthisearthismostcredible.So,byhisactionsandlifestyle,OsamabinLadendemonstratedthestrengthofhisfaithbylivinginpovertyandhumility,andgivingupamoreluxuriousandleisurelylifeinthenameofGod.Likewise,MustafaKamel(abuHamzaal-Masri),wholost limbsandsightduringthejihad,andSheikhOmarAbdelRahman,whoisblind,arealsocrediblewitnessesbecausetheirpersonaltragediesdonotdeterthemfromproclaimingtheirfaithinGod.Participation in rituals builds faith and generates group solidarity and integration. Rituals reinforce

religiousexplanationsandfaithinGodandinthecommunityofbelievers.Prayersareactsoffaiththatbuild bonds of affection and confidencewithGod and the community of believers. In Islam, they arecommunal acts involving a sense of sharing and bonding. They bring spiritual phenomena to life,especiallywhenpeople feel thepresenceofGodduringprayers.Eachact reinforces the realityof themessage,thebondwithGodandthecommunity.Perceivedmiracles,suchasthedefeatofasuperpowerthroughfaithalone(theSoviet-Afghanwar),also increaseconfidencein therighteousnessof thecause.MysticalexperiencesduringprayersordreamsdemonstratetheexistenceofGodandreinforcefaith.Inavideotape in the fall of 2001 Osama bin Laden said that he had banned the reporting of dreams ofairplanesflyingintobuildingspriortoSeptember11forfearofrevealingtheplot.Ideology also played a central role in sustaining commitment to this version of Islam. Although

affiliationisasocialphenomenon, intensificationoffaithandbeliefs isastagecharacterizedbyactivepersonallearningaboutthenewfaith.Newadherentslistencarefullytopreachersandfriends,questionthem, and eventually reach some formof synthetic understanding of their new faith,which they finallychoosetoembrace.Thisperiodinvolvesareappraisaloflife,values,beliefs,andgoals.Theseekersdonotsimplysuccumbtopreaching.Theyprogressivelyacceptthenewfaithbecauseitmakessenseintheirnew interpretation of the world and their role in it. This learning process involves intense socialinteractions,butitalsorequiresintenseintrospection.Pastbiographicalexperiencesarereinterpretedin

accordancewiththenewfaithandprovidevividproofofitssuperiority.Thisdiscoveryofastrongfitofpasteventswiththenewinterpretationiscriticaltotheacceptanceofandfosterslong-termcommitmenttothenewfaith.Inthisongoingprocess,neweventsaremadetofitwiththenewideology.Socialsupportandinterpretationalsohelpthisprocess.Thisprogressiveparticipation inastrictandrigorous interpretationofIslambroughtaboutashift in

devotion in most of our sample through the various processes described in this section. ThisintensificationofreligiousfeelingsandconversiontoSalafiIslamtookplaceinastrongsocialcontext.Itmadetheprospectivemujahed’sreligiousaffect,behavior,andthinkingconformtothatofhisfriendsandkin.Thismadehimevenclosertohissocialgroup.Salafi behavioral prescriptions demand sacrifices for the sake of the group. Becoming a Salafist

involvesgreatpersonalcosts,oftenincludingrejectionbyone’sformerfriends,family,orevenemployer,iftheydonotapproveofthegrouporitsattitudes.Furthermore,Salafibehaviorisallhighlyvisibleforall to see. It is a proclamationof one’s faith inGod.Growingone’s beard, dressing like a traditionalMuslim, and giving up some of one’s pleasures are sacrifices for God and the true community. ThisdistancesnewdevoteesfromtheiroriginalnetworkoffriendsandfamilybutdrawsthemclosertootherSalafists,whosegoodopinionbecomestheironlyreference.Onlythemostmotivatedanddedicatedwillbewillingtobearthesocial,personal,andeconomiccostsofbecomingaSalafist.Thosewhofeelthatsocietyasawholehastheleasttoofferthemarethemostlikelytojoin.ThispointstotheimportanceofrelativeorsubjectivedeprivationincombinationwiththesocialisolationthesisdevelopedinChapter3.Disappointment with one’s social and economic condition combined with the relative lack of socialattachment to the world encourages participation in sectarian practices, especially in the presence ofunopposedstrongbondingtopeoplealreadyinthesect.Themoreactiveone’sparticipationinthesect,thestrongerwillbethebondswithothermembersaswellasone’sfaithandcommitmenttothenewsect.Only individualswith serious, albeit temporary distress,who feel that they have little to lose,wouldacceptsuchsevereupfrontcostsofjoiningandtoleratethestrictregimentationandstateofhightensionwith society that participation in the sect involves. This hardship, in turn, increases the emotionalcommitment to fellow members and fosters a sense of serenity, relieving the previous distress, fromspiritualacceptanceofsectarianbeliefs.Theprocessofbecomingamemberofareligiouscommunityhastraditionallybeenexplainedbymass

movement theories.The argument is that religiousorganizations, likeother socialmovements, gather afollowingthroughthestrengthofdirectideologicalappealstoatomizedandalienatedmassesofpeople.Autobiographical accounts of members tell stories of revelation and progressive acceptance of thespecific ideology.Butsuchretrospectiveself-reportsarebiased,aspreviouslymentioned.AvariantofthisideologicalappealthesisisaversionoftheMarxist“religionistheopiateofthemasses”argument.Itclaims that religion provides ideological and emotional compensation for themasses’ real social andeconomic deprivation. It therefore appeals to thosemost open to such compensation, especially thosebelievinginotherworldlyrewardsforpresentworldlydeprivation.Suchideologies,withtheirpromisesofheavenlycompensation,makedeprivationmorebearable.Theremaybesome truth in this thesis forsomepeople.Butagain,itrunsagroundonthefundamentalproblemofspecificity.Itdoesnotexplaintheformation of a global Salafimujahed, except perhaps in the statistical sense that at least a very smallrandomnumberofindividualsmightbemotivatedtocarrythisideologicalcommitmenttoitsextreme.Theideologicalappealthesisimpliesthatpeoplewouldrandomlyjointhemovementsimplybybeing

exposed to its ideology.The stronger the exposure, the greater the recruitmentwould be.Historically,joining alQaedawasdefinitelynot a randomprocess.Oneof its surprising featureswas its completefailuretorecruitmemberswhereitsheadquartersandtrainingcampswerelocated.Initsshorthistory,its

headquarterswerelocatedinAfghanistan,Pakistan,theSudan,andAfghanistanagain.Yet,noAfghansorSudanesejoinedtheorganizationwhenitwaslocatedinthesecountries.WaliKhanAminShah,theonlysignificantAfghantojointheglobaljihad(althoughnotformally,forhewaspartofAbdulBasitKarim’sgroup),wasapersonalfriendofbinLadenfromthe1980s,beforealQaedawasformed.TheSudanese,Jamalal-Fadl,hadjoinedtheorganizationbeforethemovetotheSudan.Therefore,thebondsofterrordidnotformspontaneouslybymereexposureasimpliedinthemassideologicalappealthesis.Theflawinthisthesisisitsindividualisticperspectivethatcannotcapturethesectarianphenomenon.

Revivalist socialmovements like theglobalSalafi jihadarevigoroussocialenterprises.Theyprovideimmediate social and emotional rewards of close community and a sense of totality and meaning.Religiousfaithandbeliefsaregroundedinsocialinteractions.Withfewexceptions,whichbytheirrarityattract attention, loners or even pairs of individuals are seldom able to sustain strong otherworldlycommitmentswithoutstrongsocialsupport.Intheabsenceofsuchsupport,beliefsandfaithfade.Duringthewaitforheavenlyrewards,areligiousrevivalistcommunitysustainsitsmemberswithstrongsocialand emotional benefits, which give a general sense of direction to their lives and opportunities forinvolvementinacause.

FormalAcceptanceTheprocessesofsocialaffiliationwithpotentialmembersofthejihadandintensificationofbeliefsandfaitharenecessary,butnotsufficientconditionsforjoiningthejihad.Thecriticalandspecificelementtojoiningthejihadistheaccessibilityofalinktothejihad.Withoutit,thegroupoffriends,kin,pupils,andworshipperswillundergoaprocessofprogressiveisolation.Theymaytrytoparticipateinthejihad,butwithout know-how or resources.Although lethal, their operations do not constitute a serious threat tosociety.Onlytheglobaljihad,withitsorganization,resources,andskills,posessuchadanger.Thesepatternsshowthatthepoolofpotentialmujahediniscomposedofsmallclustersofclosefriends,

relatives,worshippers, anddisciples,whoare connected through strongbonds.As such they all knoweachother’sclosefriends,whowouldalsobepartofthisgroup.Thispromotesintensesocialcohesionintermsofviewsand loyaltyandastrongsenseofcommunitywithmutualemotional support.Thegroupbecomes self-sufficient andclosed inon itself.This social isolationprotects thegroup,butprevents itfromlinkingwithothermovementsintheoutsideworld.Thisbecomesaweaknessifthegroupwantstojoinalargersocialmovement,liketheglobalSalafijihad.Notpossessinganyindependentbridgetothejihad(undertheidealconditions,allthefriendsarestronglybondedtoeachotherandnooneelse),theywillnotknowhowtojoin.Acquaintances,whoareweaklyconnectedtooneoranotherofthefriendsbutdo not really belong to the circle, provide access to other groups in theworld, for they are linked tootherswithwhomtheoriginalfriendshavenoties.HannachiandZammararegoodillustrationsofsuchbridgestotheoutsideworld.SowasKamalDerwish,whomadethearrangementfortheAfghantrainingoftheLackawannaSix.The“strengthofweakties”(Granovetter,1973and1983)playsanimportantroleinasocialmovementliketheglobal jihadthat linksmultiple independentclustersofcloselyconnectedfriendswhowanttojoinbutdonotknowhow.ThisperhapschanceencounterwithaformalmemberoftheglobalSalafijihadisthecriticalelement

leading to enrollment into the jihad. Without someone able to make arrangements to send him toAfghanistan, where senior members of the jihad could further evaluate him, a prospective candidatewouldremainasympathizerratherthanbecomeafull-fledgedmujahed.Formalacceptanceintothejihadtook place inAfghanistan,Malaysia, thePhilippines, or theSudan, after evaluation of the trainee in ajihadtrainingcamp.Fromtheavailableinformation,alQaedaofferedtheopportunitytojoinitsranksto

only10to30percentofthetrainees.Theformalceremonywastheoathofloyalty,baya,toalQaedaandOsamabinLaden.The Jemaah Islamiyahhad a similar ceremony inMalaysia.This formal acceptancemarkstheendofthethree-prongprocessthathadstartedwithsocialaffiliationtoagroupoflike-mindedfriends or family and the twin intensification of militancy and faith that took place in small, denselyconnectedgroups.TraininginAfghanistannotonlytaughtterroristicskills,butalsobuiltconfidenceandforgedanesprit

decorpsamongfriends,cementing their identitiesasglobalmujahedin.Thisconfidencewasvisible inRessamafterhisreturnfromAfghanistan.

RecruitmentTheconceptsofrecruitmentandbrainwashinghavenotsurfacedintheargumentsofar,partlybecauseIhavetakentheperspectiveofthepotentialmujahedin.Fromthispointofview,becomingamemberoftheglobaljihadisaprocessofjoining.Recruitmentisthesameprocess,fromtheorganization’sperspective.Thenotionofrecruitment impliesanactiveprocessthroughwhichanorganizational insidergetsanewperson to work for the organization. The account usually shows the “recruiter” in a heroic light,overcomingreluctanceonthepartofthetarget.Thepopularityofsuchaccountsprobablycomesfromthefactthatmanycommentatorsonterrorismhaveanintelligencebackground.Hererecruitmentmeansagentacquisition to provide clandestine foreign intelligence. This is dangerouswork, for if discovered, theagentwill faceyears inprisonifhe isnotkilledoutright.Mostpeoplearereluctant todoit.Themainthemesofanagentacquisitioncycleareclandestinespotting,assessing,developing,andformallypitchingtheagent.Foranintelligenceofficer,recruitmentleadstopromotion.Iamskepticalofthistypeofaccountofagentacquisition.Isuspectthatthemajorityofagentsarevolunteers,“walk-ins”inthejargon.Butsuchfactswouldnotadvancethecareerofacaseofficer.Sothedifficultyofagentacquisitionisemphasizedasaself-servingclaimforpromotionwithintheorganization.Bynow,ithasattainedmythicalstatus.It is a small jump togeneralizeagentacquisition from intelligenceorganizations to theglobal jihad.

The process of joining the jihad, however, ismore of a bottom-up than a top-down activity.A lot ofMuslim youngmenwant to join the jihad but do not know how. Joining the jihad ismore akin to theprocess of applying to a highly selective college.Many try to get in but only a few succeed, and thecollege’s role is evaluationandselection rather thanmarketing.Candidatesareenthusiastic rather thanreluctant.Sofar,IhavereadnoaccountsofsinisteralQaeda“recruiters”lurkinginmosques,readytosubvert naïve and passiveworshippers, although I have looked for them.Ressam twice described theprocessof joiningalQaeda.Forhisown formalaffiliation,heaskedHannachi,whohad just returnedfromtraining.Whenhehimselfreturnedfromtraining,twopeopleaskedhimtofacilitatetheirjoiningthejihad. One of them, Meskini, described the frustrations of his past failures to join the jihad to hischildhoodfriendHaouari(Adams,2001).Personalacquaintancesvouchedforthecandidatetomaintainthe security of the organization. The problem was that this process, which favored personal friends,acquaintances, relatives, and fellow worshippers, was not selective enough. It required a period ofobservationintrainingcamptoevaluatewhether thepotentialcandidatewasworthyofbeingofferedaspot.ZuhairHilalal-Tbaiti,whowasconvictedinMoroccoforhisplotagainstU.S.shipsintheStraitsofGibraltarin2002,admittedthathehadfirstbeenrejectedbecauseofhispoorperformanceinmilitaryandreligioustraining.HewasalsorejectedforasuicidemissiontotheUnitedStates,whichhebelievedmighthavebeenthe9/11operation.OnlythedispersalofalQaedaasaresultofU.S.bombingandtheoverthrow of the Taliban government gave him the opportunity to participate in an operation (Ilhami,2002).

Oneof the surprising aspects of the global Salafimovement, given its notoriety and ubiquity, is therelative lack of resources invested in any recruitment drive. I did not detect any active top-downorganizational push to increase al Qaeda’s membership. The pressure came from the bottom up.Prospectivemujahedinwere eager to join themovement. The proselytizing arm of Salafi Islam is thepeacefulTablighigroup,whichactivelyseekstoconvertyoungMuslimstoitsversionofIslam.TablighistudentscometoPakistantostudy.PerhapssomealQaeda“recruiters”cametotheTablighischoolstoinspiresomestudentstojointhejihadandsucceededinconvincingsomestudentstotakemilitarytrainingatalQaedacampsinneighboringAfghanistan.Afterassessmentat thecamp, theprospectivecandidatemight have been formally invited to join the jihad. But generally, these activities took place only inPakistan,Afghanistan,orperhapsSaudiArabia.Theywerenotpartofaworldwidetop-downcampaignto increasemembership.Noaggressive “publicity” campaigns targetedpotential recruits; nodedicatedrecruitment committee had full-time staff at al Qaeda headquarters (except a reception committee inPeshawarforpeoplealreadyontheirwaytothecamps),andnopowerfulrecruitmentprogramdrewonabudgetdedicatedtotheseactivities.This is surprising because Sheikh Abdullah Azzam had established such a successful campaign to

recruitmujahedinagainst theSoviets in the1980s.Indeed, theorganizationhecreated, theMekhtabal-Khidemat (the Service Bureau), a forerunner of al Qaeda,was in essence the institutionalization of apermanentrecruitmentcampaign.NothingcomparabletoAzzam’sworkexistsinthepresentglobalSalafijihad. Some audiotapes, videotapes, books, and magazines can be found in selected Salafi mosquebookstores. These mosques were listed above and are led by imams sympathetic to the jihad if notoutrightmembersof it.Thegroupsof friends spontaneously assembling in suchmosques constitute themain venue for joining the jihad. Their intense interactions facilitate the process of conversion,culminating in their readiness to join the jihad. But there is no evidence that this was an intentionalprocess, conceived, planned, and executed by al Qaeda. Themovement invested a surprisingly smallamount of resources in its expansion. So far, the concept of recruitment as an active organizationalprocessisnotrelevantfortheglobalSalafijihad.

BrainwashingBrainwashing is the second concept dominating the public discourse on joining the jihad. Thebrainwashingthesisisthecounterpartoftheideologicalappealthesis.Thechargeofbrainwashingisavalue judgment about an ideology couched in a pseudo-scientific argument. An appealing ideology isconsideredintrinsicallyattractivetoanyoneandable,byitspersuasiveforce,tomotivatesomeonetojoinits organization. In contrast, a singularly unappealing ideologywould never attract anyone in his rightmind, and only some form of coercion could explain its adoption. Brainwashing is this forcibleindoctrinationtoinducesomeonetoabandonhisbasicbeliefsandadoptlessdesirableonesinstead.Theargument implies deception and powerful techniques to overwhelmvictims’minds. It is the twentieth-century form of mind control, like the Middle Ages’ demonic possession, the eighteenth century’smesmerism,andthenineteenthcentury’shypnotism.The notion of brainwashing originated in the sense of betrayal the American public felt during the

Korean War when some American prisoners of war apparently proclaimed Communist doctrines,confessedtofalsecrimes,andrepudiatedtheirownpoliticalsystem.Technically,itdescribedthebrutaltechniquesof indoctrination involving torture, death threats, anddeprivationofwater, food, and sleep.Whilethebrutaltechniqueswerealltooreal,theirallegedresultstriggeredaself-flagellatingpanicintheUnitedStates.Eventheveryfewwhosuccumbedtothesetechniquesmightnothavereallybelievedthe

doctrines their captors tried to pound into them (Biderman, 1963). The scientific rationale was thatintolerablestressoverwhelmedone’sordinaryequilibriumandforcedthecollapseofthenervoussystemtoproducebizarrebehavior and suddenchanges inpersonality andbeliefs in suggestiblepeople.Thistheorywaslaterextendedtosuggesta“physiologyoffaith,”whereintensereligioncanassaultthemindandweakenit tothepointofmadness(Sargant,1971).Thisargumentexculpatesthedeviant,wholaterclaims to have been a victim of suchmind control. This argument, now usedmostly by relatives andfriends of cult members, is the basis of an entire new industry to deprogram “victims” back to theiroriginalstate(Singer,1996;Hassan,2000).Manyproblemssurfacewhen thenotionofbrainwashing is applied to theglobalSalafi jihad.First,

fromascientificperspective,fivedecadesofresearchhavefailedtoprovideanyempiricalsupportforthis thesis.Second, thebiographical accounts of those explaining their embraceof the ideology fail todescribe any coercive techniques leading to their final acceptance of the ideology. Third, like itsideological appeal counterpart, it is vulnerable to the fundamental problem of specificity. If so manypeopleareexposedtotheglobalSalafijihadideology,whydoonlyafewsuccumbtoit?Fourth,someincarcerated members now see the errors of their ways in pursuing violence in the name of God. Ifbrainwashingissopowerfulthatonlydeprogrammerscouldrestorevictims,whycansomedoitontheirown without apparent help, except for books supplied by their families? Fifth, no visitor to Salafimosqueshaseverreportedtheuseofcoercivetechniques.Sixth,peoplewhowerepartofthe“bunchofguys” groups also do not report coercive techniques. Finally, my arguments have explained thetransformation of potential candidates into dedicated global Salafimujahedinwithout recourse to thismysteriousbrainwashingprocess.Thereisnoneedforanadditionalandsuspectconcepttoexplainthistransformation.

EvidencefortheImportanceofSocialBondsBeforeconcludingthischapter,letmepresentthreelinesofevidencefortheimportanceofsocialbondsin joining the jihad.Onesetofevidencewillbea reviewof the in-depthresearchdoneona religiousrevivalistmovement,theUnificationChurch,fromthreeindependentteamsofresearchers,whocametosurprisinglysimilarconclusionsthatstronglysupportmypreviousarguments.ThesecondisareviewofthecomprehensivesocialandpsychologicalinvestigationofcapturedGermanandItalianterroristsfromthetroubled1970s.Again,theseindependentprojectsconcludedwithargumentssimilartomine.ThelastsetofevidencedealswiththeEgyptianSalafigroupsthatweretheforerunnersoftheglobalSalafijihad.

TheUnificationChurch

AlQaedaisnotonlyaterroristpoliticalorganization;itisalsoarevivalistreligioussocialmovement.Recruitment and conversion by these organizations have been the focus of intense research based oncareful prospective participant observations. This empirical project challenges the conventional massmovementthesesofdirectideologicalappealsandsupportstheimportanceofsocialbondsinrecruitmentandconversion.Ithas ledtoanewparadigminthesociologyofreligion(Bainbridge,1997;StarkandBainbridge, 1985 and 1996; Stark andFinke, 2000).Themost extensive fieldwork on this issuewasdone on Reverend Sun Myung Moon’s Unification Church. Three independent teams investigated theMoonies,asthemembersofthisorganizationarecalled:JohnLofland(1981)andRodneyStark(LoflandandStark,1965)from1962to1963inCaliforniaandOregon;EileenBarker(1984)from1977to1983inBritain,California,NewYork,andsomeScandinaviancountries;andMarcGalanter(1989)from1977to

1985inNewYork,Boston,California,andWashington,D.C.Theycameupwithconsistentfindingsandsimilarconclusions.Lofland’scarefulparticipantobservationsrefutedconverts’retrospectiveaccounts,whichstresstheir

own self-conscious search for the truth culminating in their experience of revelation with the newtheology. Such retrospective accounts fall prey to the distortions of memory, allowing people toreinterpretthepastinlightofthepresent(Schachter,1996and2001).Whenaskedwhytheyconverted,Mooniesinvariablyreportedtheirresistibleappealof thechurch’sDivinePrinciple, implyingthatonlythe ignorantcould reject suchobviousandpowerful truths.But theempiricalevidencedidnot supporttheir statements. The researchers had met the members at a time well before they had accepted thisdoctrineandwhen they regarded it asquiteodd.On thebasisof theirobservations,LoflandandStarkproposedthefollowingseven-steptheoryofconversion:“(1)Experienceenduring,acutelyfelttensions(2)withinareligiousproblem-solvingperspective,(3)whichleadshimtodefinehimselfasareligiousseeker;(4)encounteringtheD.P.[DivinePrinciple]ataturningpointinhislife,(5)whereinanaffectivebondisformed(orpre-exists)withoneormoreconverts;(6)whereextra-cultattachmentsareabsentorneutralized;(7)and,where,ifheistobecomeadeployableagent,heisexposedtointensiveinteraction”(LoflandandStark,1965:874).The first three elements are general background conditions, creating a pool of potential converts.

Reversing the first two facts, prospective converts generally are “religious” in the sense of imposingreligiousmeaningsonevents.Theymighthavebeenraisedinareligioustraditionbutwereunaffiliatedwith a specific congregation at the time. They experienced considerable tension, “a felt discrepancybetween some imaginary, ideal state of affairs and the circumstances in which they actually sawthemselves”(Lofland,1981:34).Theprospectiveconvertssoughtthesolutionofthistensioninreligion,becomingreligiousseekers.The next four elements in the Lofland-Stark theory are situational factors, where timing becomes

significant.Thefirstoftheseisthatshortlybeforeandconcurrentlywiththeirencounterwithmembersofthenewcult,allpre-convertshadreachedwhat theyperceivedasa turningpoint in their lives.Recentmigration,lossofemployment,lossofapartner,orthestartorendofschoolingwereusuallythecause.“Thesignificanceofthesevariousturningpointsisthattheyincreasedthepre-convert’sawarenessofanddesiretotakesomeactionabouthisproblems,atthesametimegivinghimanewopportunitytodoso”(LoflandandStark,1965:870).Againreversingthenexttwosteps,theprospectiveconvertswere“socialatoms”inthesensethattheyweredistantfrompreviousattachmentsthatmighthavepreventedaffiliationwiththenewgroup.Formanythetensiontheyexperiencedwaspreciselythislackofsocialties.Movingawayfromhomereducedtheinfluenceofformerfriendsandfamilytorestrainthemfromjoiningacult.Thenextstepisthecrucialoneintheprocessofconversion:thedevelopmentofastrongemotionalbondbridgingthegapbetweenfirstexposuretoandfinalandfullacceptanceofthedoctrine.“Thatis,personsdeveloped affective ties with the group or some of its members while they still regarded the D.P.perspectiveasproblematic,oreven‘wayout.’Inamannerofspeaking,finalconversionwascomingtoaccept the opinions of one’s friends” (Lofland and Stark, 1965: 871). This step involved a chanceencounter with someone involved with the movement, which escalated quickly into strong affectivebonds,despitethefactthattheprospectiveconvertshadstrongreservationsaboutthegroup’sdoctrines.Intheabsenceofstrongcountervailingoutsideties,whensuchbondsdeveloped,theprospectiveconvertjoinedthegroup;whentheyfailedtodevelop,hedidnotjoin.Doctrineplayedanegligibleroleat thisstage;manymovedinto theMooniecommunebecauseof theirattachment togroupmemberswhilestillopenlyexpressingrejectionoftheMoonideology.The last step is the true total conversion. Prospective converts who go through the first six steps

becomesympathetictothedoctrineoftheirfriends.Themasteringoftheirfriends’beliefscameafteralong period of intense day-to-day interactionswith them,which often required livingwith them. Thisgrouplivingintensifiedtheirbonds,whichbegantotakeonadepthanduniquenessbeyondtheirtiestooutsiders,eventheirgirlfriends(likeJarrahof theHamburggroup)orwives(inthetraditionalMuslimsense).Theirmarathondiscussionsinculcatedthemwiththereligiousdoctrines,trainedthemtoadoptthepracticesof thegroup,and instilledcommitment.The resultingsocial,emotional,andspiritualbenefitseliminatedthepreviouslyexperiencedtension.Attheendofthisprocess,theprospectwasafull-fledgedtotallycommittedconvert,loyaltohisnewfaithandhisnewfriends.Subsequent work on other revivalist movements has slightly modified this model. The notion of

preexistingtensions—somewhatvagueandsubjective—hascomeunderquestion.Everyoneexperiencessomefrustrationinhislife.Somepeoplemaybeattractedtoanewdoctrinejustbecauseofitsnovelty.Howeverexperienced,distressmotivatespeopletolookforhelp.Inlaterworks,Starkdistancedhimselffromthenotion thatprospectiveconvertssought relief fromdistress in religion.Heargued instead thatconvertswereveryseldomreligiousseekers;theydidnotsomuchfindanewfaithasthenewfaithfoundthem(StarkandFinke,2000:122).Butallsubsequentworkconfirmedthatinterpersonalrelationshipsaretheoneessentialelementinallrealisticmodelsofrevivalistreligiousrecruitment.Membershipspreadsthroughsocialnetworks,andfaithconstitutesconformitytothereligiousoutlookofone’sintimates(StarkandBainbridge,1980;Bainbridge,1997:177).WhileLoflandandStarkconductedtheirintensiveresearchonasmallgroupofindividualsduringthe

birthof amovement,Barker (1984) andGalanter (1989) independently studied the same,nowmature,movementtwentyyearslater.Theyfoundthatpeoplejoinedforavarietyofpositiveratherthannegativereasons.Only8to9percentofthoseapproachedeventuallyjoinedthegroup,andfewerthan5percentwere still members after two years.Most joiners were frommiddle-class families, with few outsidesocial ties. They were spiritual and concerned about the world. Barker noted that the people in hersamplehadexperiencedarelativedipinhappinessor“droop”inspiritualityrightbeforejoining.Theyhadhadhappynormalchildhoodsandhadcomefromhappy,slightlyoverprotective,religious,andcaringmiddle-classfamilies,whichhadinculcatedthemwithstrongvaluesofdecency,duty,andservicetothecommunity.These children in early adulthoodwere ill prepared to copewith lifeon their own.Whenconfronted with this adversity, the Unification Church provided them with the emotional support andspiritualsecurityofa“family.”ItalsoprovidedthemwiththefeelingofbeingspecialandbeingpartofamovementworkingaccordingtoGod’sprincipleandseekingtoimprovetheworld.MarcGalanter(1989),apsychiatristwhostudiedthementalhealthofthemembersoftheUnification

Church, found no evidence of increased incidence of mental illness. On the contrary, membershipconferred an emotional relief effect. Therewas an inverse relationship between feelings of emotionaldistress (alienation) andof closeness to thegroup.Thedistresswasusuallygenerated indealingwithoutsiders,suchasfamilyandformerfriends,whodisapprovedoftheirgroup.Thisdistresswasrelievedwhenmembers returned to the group.They interpreted this relief effect as dependent on loyalty to thegroup.Fullinvolvementinchurchactivitiesalsocoincidedwithrelieffromdistress.Thisledtofurthercommitmenttothecommunityandself-sacrifice.Socialcohesivenessandsharedbeliefsalsoresultedinafeeling of well-being. This helped maintain strong group loyalty even in conditions of isolation.Everythingbecameinterpretedthroughthesesharedbeliefs,creatingaselectiveandbiasedperceptionoftherealworld,afantasyworld.Onlyalackofsocialtiestooutsiders—socialalienation—distinguishedthosewhojoinedfromthosewhodidnot.Singer (1996) and Hassan (2000) challenge these empirical analyses and claim that these cults

“brainwash”members.Theypresentonlyanecdotalevidencebasedon theirclinicalworkwithhostile

former members of such cults. As argued earlier, retrospective accounts are of questionable validity.Neither Barker nor Galanter found any evidence of brainwashing in their extensive experience asparticipant observers.Galanter andBarker even interviewed formermemberswho voluntarily left theUnification Church, who denied any evidence of brainwashing. The findings of other participantresearchersstudyingmultiplereligiousorganizationsinvariouscountriesprovidenoempiricalevidenceofpossiblebrainwashingintheentirereligiousrevivalistliterature.Onthecontrary,thesetwostudiesofrecruitmentandconversionseemtoconfirmtheLofland-Starkmodel.

WestEuropeanTerrorism

TheglobalSalafi jihadisnot justareligiousrevivalistmovement; it isalsoa terroristmovement.ThemostextensivesocialpsychologicalstudiesofterrorismcamefromtheGermanandItalianexperienceswith terrorism in the 1970s. Although these movements were secular and directed against their owngovernments,thefindingsofthesetworesearchprojectscanbeevaluatedagainsttheargumentsproposedhere.

GERMANREDARMYFACTION

Attheendofthe1970s,theGermanFederalMinistryofDomesticAffairscommissionedalargesocialpsychologicalstudyof227left-wingterroristswhohadbeenarrested.Theycamefromtheuppermiddleclass,andtheirparentshadhighsocialandoccupationalhopesfortheirchildren.Butthereseemedtobea lot of friction with their families and absent parents in their childhoods. The terrorists’ level ofeducationwas above average, asmost attended university, but then themajority dropped out. Prior tobecomingterrorists,only35percenthadheldfull-timejobsatanytimeoftheirlives.Before joining a terrorist organization, the prospective member underwent a process of social

isolation.“Inthecourseofthisearlyphase,thedecisiveprocessesofdisassociationwithexistingsociallinks,suchastheparentalhome,family,partner,placeofresidence,andhabitualmilieu,tookplace.Thisprocessofdisassociationconsistsofseveralstages:first,thehithertoexistingsocialandemotionaltiesaregenerallycalledintoquestion;thenaphasefollowsinwhichthesetiesareloosenedandaprocessofalienationsetsin;and,finally,thereisatotalnegationofeverythingthatexistedearlierinlife.Ultimately,therefollowsatotalbreakwiththeexistingsocialmilieu”(Wasmund,1986:204).Thisvoidwasfilledwith new ties to groups in sympathywith terrorists. “Most terrorists, in fact, have ultimately becomemembersofterroristorganizationsthroughpersonalconnectionswithpeopleorrelativesassociatedwithappropriatepoliticalinitiatives,communes,self-supportingorganizations,orcommittees—thenumberofcouples,andbrothersandsistersisastonishinglyhigh”(204).Theiremotionallongingforacommunitythatwouldactasasubstitutefortheirfamilieswassatisfied

by these new countercultural groups or communes. Wasmund described these communities as “totalgroups” (205), for they were intense, tightly knit social groups that satisfied their members’ social,emotional, and spiritualneeds.This further isolated them from theoutside socialworld,which in turnrejected them.Originallyapolitical, someof thesegroupsgraduallybecame involved inpolitics.Theysympathizedwithimprisonedterrorists,whosharedtheirlifestyleandideas,andformedsupportgroupsfortheprisoners.Soon,theyidentifiedwiththeirnewfriendsandfeltasenseofsocialinjustice,inspiringthemtobecomemoreengagedpolitically.Theiractivitiesgraduallymovedthemfromasupportroletomore central activities, crossing over to illegality. At some point, they formally broke with the legalworldthroughanillegalact.Theresultwasaclandestinelife,whichfurtherincreasedtheirmaterialandemotionaldependenceonthegroup.Theideologyofthegroupbecamearationalizationforactionandput

them“atwar”withsociety.Socialinvolvementprecededideology;manyofthecapturedterroristsstartedreadingMarxonlyinprison(Wasmund,1986;Merkl,1995;dellaPorta,1992b).

ITALIANREDBRIGADES

Italy also underwent a serious terrorist threat around the same time. From a data bank based on courtrecordsof twelvehundred left-wingmilitants and twenty-eight in-depth interviews,dellaPorta (1988)indicated that, unlike their German counterparts, captured Italian terrorists had happy and serenechildhoodsandcamefromgenerally left-wingfamilies (confirmed inPasserini,1992). IndellaPorta’slargesample,70percentoftherecruitshadatleastonefriendalreadyinvolvedinaterroristorganization.Three-fourths of these had two or more friends involved, and 42 percent had eight or more friendsinvolved.

Decisionstojoinundergroundorganizationsweretakenbyclustersorcliquesofpeopleconnectedtoeachotherbyjointinvolvementsinmorethanoneactivity.Forexample,quitefrequentlynewrecruitswerenext-doorneighborswhoworkedinthesamedepartmentofabigfactory;schoolfriendswhousedtospendtheirvacationtogether;cousinswhobelongedtothesamevoluntaryassociation.Moreover,theintensityoftherelationsisalsoshownbythehighfrequencyofkinshipties:in298casesofmyquantitativesample,militantsinundergroundorganizationshadatleastonerelative—usuallyahusband/wifeorbrother/sister—whosharedtheircommitment....Participationinclandestinegroupsismorelikelywhenitisstrengthenedbypreviousaffectiveties.(dellaPorta,1988:158)

DellaPortaturnedtoherin-depthinterviewstointerpretthisdata.

Membershipinthesmalllegalpoliticalgroupwasofgreatimportanceintheirdailylives.Evenwherefriendshiptiesexternaltothepoliticalmilieudidexist,theirimportancetendedtodiminishaspoliticalsocializationdeveloped.Inaspiralingseriesofinterrelationships,astheamountoftimeamemberspentinpoliticalactivitiesincreased,sodidhiscontactswithpoliticalcompanions.Atthesametime,thestrengtheningoffriendshiptiesinsidethepoliticalenvironmentincreasedthevalueattachedtopoliticalinvolvementandencouragedpeopletodedicatemoreandmoretimetopoliticalactivities.Inthisway,othertieslosttheirpowertoexertcountervailingeffectsontheformationofthepersonality.(163)

Thisstrongaffectivenetworkimpliedthattherewasalreadyabuilt-insolidarityandloyaltytowardthegroup.Thiswascarried forthduringmembershipandhelpedmaintain thegroupduringadversity.Thissocial network also became the main source of information about issues relevant to the member. Itallowedforescalationtowardterrorism,asviolenceonthestreetledtoverbalescalation,withmilitarymetaphors replacingadiscourseofgrievance.Theseaffective tiesalsopromptedactivists tomake thetransitionfromnonmilitantgroupstotheunderground.Clandestinelivinginvolveddangerandisolation,which intensified the social bonds of the members. This led to a spiral of further isolation from theoutsideworld,thedevelopmentofacollectiveidentity,andtotalcommitmenttothegroup(dellaPorta,1988,1992a,1992b).BoththeGermanandItaliancasesindependentlydemonstratetheimportanceofsocialbondsinjoining

aterroristorganization.Inbothcases,socialbondscamefirst,andideologyfollowed.

EgyptianIslamicGroups

A third line of evidence supporting the importance of social bonds to joining the global Salafi jihadcomesfromindependentresearchontheEgyptianSalafimilitantorganizationsthatweretheforerunnersofalQaeda.Earlier,welookedattheirideologyandtheirevolution.Here,Iwanttolookattheprocessofrecruitment.Before the assassination of Egyptian President Anwar al-Sadat in 1981, Ibrahim (1980 and 1982)

studiedtwoEgyptianIslamicmilitantgroupsthathadbeenheavilyinfluencedbyQutb’sideas,theIslamicLiberationOrganization(ILO)(theTechnicalMilitaryAcademyGroup,seeChapter2)andtheJamaatal-Muslimin(theMuslimGroup,orMG,labeledbythepressal-Takfirwa’l-Hijra,seeChapter2).Intermsof recruitment, Ibrahim stated that both movements recruited among students or recent universitygraduates.“Three recruitmentmechanismswereemployed:kinship, friendship,andworship.”The ILOreliedon friendship andworship.TheMG relied heavily onkinship and friendship. Its leader, ShukriMustafa,beganwith close friends fromprisondaysand relatives, includinghisbrother andanephew.Theseinturnenlistedtheirclosefriendsandrelativesasmembersofthegroup(Ibrahim,1980:438).The profile of the members was “young (early twenties), of rural or small-town background, from

middle and lowermiddle class, with high achievementmotivation, upwardlymobile, with science orengineeringeducation,andfromanormallycohesivefamily....Mostofthoseweinvestigatedwouldbeconsideredmodel young Egyptians” (Ibrahim, 1982:11). Theirmobility had distanced them from theiroriginal familiesor friendsand,when theyweresocially isolated inabiguniversitycity, they foundafamily substitute in the MG. There was a progressive insulation from society at large and completeabsorptionandcommitment to thenewgroup.This totalcommitmentwascarriedoutwithzealandjoyandincludedpersonalsacrificeforIslam.Ibrahimcommentedonthesuperiorattractivenessofareligiousrevivalistorganizationoverasecularpoliticalone,namely thestrongsenseofcommunionthatMuslimgroups provided for their members. “The typical recruit is usually of recent rural background, anewcomertoahugeimpersonalcity....ThemilitantIslamicgroupswiththeiremphasisonbrotherhood,mutual sharing, and spiritual support become the functional equivalent of the extended family to theyoungsterwhohaslefthisbehind.Inotherwords,theIslamicgroupfulfillsade-alienatingfunctionforitsmembersinwaysthatarenotmatchedbyotherrivalpoliticalmovements”(Ibrahim,1980:448).Inthisreligious context, the interviewed militants viewed their prison sentences as an integral part of theirstruggle(jihad),asGod’stestoftheirfaithandperseverance.“Therewasdeepjoyindefyingsocietyandits physical means of coercion. Several who claimed to have been severely tortured reported havingimagesanddreamsofprophetsandsaintswelcomingthemtotheGardenofEden,orimagesofthejustIslamicsocietybeingestablishedupontheirmartyrdom”(Ibrahim,1982:12).TheTanzimal-Jihad,whichcarriedoutSadat’sassassination,wascreatedbythe1980mergeroftwo

clustersofIslamistgroups:aCairobranch,underMohammedAbdal-SalamFaraj,andaSaidi(UpperEgypt)branch,underKaramZuhdi.ThecompositionofthesegroupswassimilartothatoftheMG,andatfirst theyweremistaken for the remnant of theMG.Their recruitment patternswere slightly different.FarajusedtodeliverFridaysermonsinaprivatemosquethathadbeenbuiltbyhisin-laws.Duringtheensuingdiscussionswithhislisteners,hemanagedtoconvincesometojoininaclandestineorganizationtoeventuallywageviolentjihad.Theyinturnintroducedhimtotheirfriendsandrelatives,whobecameadditional recruits.TheCairobranchwascomposedof fiveorsixgroups, looselyconnectedandeachwithitsownamir(oneofwhomwasAymanal-Zawahiri).Theyhadautonomybutmetweeklytoworkouta general strategy. The Saidi branchwas composed of several groups, based in provincial universitytowns.Theyrecruitedheavilyaccordingtokinshipandtribalbonds,similartotheaboveMGrecruitment

pattern.WhiletheCairobranchwasnotorganicallylinkedtothepopulationofthecity,theSaidibranchwasstillembeddedinitssocialcontext.ThisenabledtheSaidibranch,butnottheCairobranch,tostageanuprisinginAsyutintheaftermathofSadat’sassassination(Kepel,1993).Kinshipbondsalsoplayedalargeroleinthemotivationandcompositionofthefourconspiratorswho

killedSadat.All evidence indicates that the plot originated as an unanticipated opportunity just a fewdaysbefore the operation. Itwas first suggested byKhaled al-Islambuli,whowas very upset that hisbrotherMohammed,aleaderoftheSaidibranch,hadjustbeenarrested.Al-Islambuli,amilitaryofficer,hadjustfoundoutabouthisparticipationintheupcomingOctoberVictoryParadebeforePresidentAnwaral-Sadat.Toroundupthenecessaryconspirators,al-Islambulibroughtafriendandkinsmanfromhome,aretiredarmyman.Farajenlistedthesupportoftwoactivedutysoldiers:onewasachildhoodfriendfromhomeandtheotherwasthebrother-in-lawofaclosefriendandseniormemberoftheorganization,whohadrecentlybeenarrested.Angeratthearrestsoftheirkinsmenfiguredprominentlyinthemotivationofatleasttwooftheconspirators(Ansari,1984:128;Guenena,1986).

In this chapter, I have described the process of joining the jihad, rejecting the common notions ofrecruitmentandbrainwashingtoaccountfortheprocess.Instead,Iargueforathree-prongprocess:socialaffiliation with the jihad accomplished through friendship, kinship, and discipleship; progressiveintensificationofbeliefsandfaithleadingtoacceptanceoftheglobalSalafi jihadideology;andformalacceptance to the jihad through the encounter of a link to the jihad. Relative deprivation, religiouspredisposition, and ideological appeal are necessary but not sufficient to account for the decision tobecome a mujahed. Social bonds are the critical element in this process and precede ideologicalcommitment.Thesebondsfacilitatetheprocessofjoiningthejihadthroughmutualemotionalandsocialsupport,developmentofacommonidentity,andencouragementtoadoptanewfaith.Allthesefactorsareinternaltothegroup.Theyaremoreimportantandrelevanttothetransformationofpotentialcandidatesintoglobalmujahedinthanpostulatedexternalfactors,suchascommonhatredforanoutsidegroup.Toanoutsider,theseinvectivesstandout.Butforaninsider,theyarenotwhatkeepsthegrouptogether.Asinallintimaterelationships,thisglue,in-grouplove,isfoundinsidethegroup.ItmaybemoreaccuratetoblameglobalSalafiterroristactivityonin-grouplovethanout-grouphate.

FIVE

SocialNetworksandtheJihad

The account of the globalSalafi jihad provided so far tries to capture its empirical nature. It is not aspecific organization, but a socialmovement consisting of a set ofmore or less formal organizations,linkedinpatternsofinteractionrangingfromthefairlycentralized(theEastAfricaembassybombings)tothemoredecentralized(thetwomillennialplots)andwithvariousdegreesofcooperation(theEgyptianIslamicJihadversustheEgyptianIslamicGroup),resultinginmoreorlessconnectedterroristoperations.Participants in the global jihad are not atomized individuals but actors linked to each other throughcomplexwebs of direct ormediated exchanges. In this chapter, I derive some practical insights fromanalyzingthedatainlightofsocialnetworkanalysis.

SocialNetworkAnalysisAgroup of people can be viewed as a network, a collection of nodes connected through links. Somenodes aremorepopular andare attached tomore links, connecting them toothermore isolatednodes.Thesemoreconnectednodes,calledhubs,areimportantcomponentsofaterroristnetwork.Afewhighlyconnected hubs dominate the architecture of the global Salafi jihad. The Central Staff, Core Arab,MaghrebArab,andSoutheastAsianarelargeclustersbuiltaroundhubs:OsamabinLaden,KhalidSheikhMohammed, Zein al-AbidinMohamed Hussein (a.k.a. abu Zubaydah), and Abu Bakar Baasyir (a.k.a.UstazabuSomad),respectively.After1996,theCentralStaffwasnolongerdirectlyinvolvedinterroristoperations, but the other three major clusters were connected to their Central Staff contacts by theirlieutenants in the field:Ramzi bin al-Shibh,WaleedMohamedTawfiq binAttash (a.k.a.Khallad) andAbd al-Rahim al-Nashiri (a.k.a. Abul Bilal al-Makki) for the Core Arabs; Fateh Kamel then AmarMakhlulif(a.k.a.abuDoha)fortheMaghrebArabs;andRiduanIsamuddin(a.k.a.Hambali)andlaterAliGhufron(a.k.a.Mukhlas)fortheSoutheastAsians.Eachofthesefieldlieutenanthubswasthenconnectedto the operational field commanders in charge of specific operations. For the Los Angeles airportmillennial plot, Ressam assumed the command of his operation when the appointed field commanderFodailwasunabletocometoCanada.HereportedtoMakhlulif,whofacilitatedlogisticsupportandkeptalQaedaawareofnewdevelopments.Atta,theoperationalcommanderforthe9/11operations,reportedtobinal-Shibh,whoalsofacilitatedlogisticsupportinthefieldandkepttheleadershipapprisedofnewdevelopments.FortheBalioperation,IsamuddinwasthelinkfromtheCentralStaffthatprovidedfundingfor theoperation;AliGhufronwas thefield lieutenant;andAbdulAziz(a.k.a. ImamSamudra)was theoperationalcommander.

Figure2.TheGlobalSalafiNetwork

NetworkCharacteristicsTheSmall-WorldNetwork

Terrorist networks are not static; they evolve over time. Fateh Kamel was the hub around which thenetwork responsible for the millennial plot grew. He was originally fromAlgeria and immigrated toCanadain1987.HeobtainedCanadiancitizenshipandfrequentedtheAssunaMosqueinMontreal,whereapparentlyeveryoneknewhim.Underthecoverofaninternationalbusiness,hetraveledextensivelyonbehalf of the jihad.Heunderwent training in anAfghan camp in the early 1990s and fought inBosniaseveraltimes.InCanada,hesetupanetworkofsupportersfortheBosnianjihadwithMohamedOmary.Ressam,Labsi,andBoumezbeurbecamepartofthisnetwork.DuringhiseighttripstoBosnia,KamelmetSaidAtmani,AbdullahOuzghar,ChristopheCaze,LionelDumont,andSaféBourada.InMilan,hehelpedset up a logistic support network around the Islamic Cultural Institute. After the DaytonAccords, theMujahedin Brigade in Bosnia was disbanded. Kamel invited Atmani and Ouzghar to Canada andsuggestedtoCazeandDumontthattheysetuptheirownlogisticcellsinRoubaix.InCanada,hesoldhisbusiness toHaouari and resumed hisworldwide organizing activities on behalf of the jihad.He soldstolencarsinTurkeyandorganizedoperationsinJordan,wherehewasarrestedin1999andextraditedtoFranceforhisroleinthe1996Roubaixviolence.HisphonenumberkeptsurfacingoncapturedmujahedinalloverEurope.Kamel was a typical hub, a charming and handsome man with a knack for making friends and

acquaintances. Everyone in the Maghreb community of Montreal seems to have known him and hisbeautifulCanadianwife,whohad converted to Islam. In network language, hewas a hubwith lots oflinks.Thebetterknownhebecame,theeasieritwasfornewcomerstofindhimandthemorepeoplehemet.Givenhisattractivepersonality,itbecamelikelythatnewpeoplesharinghisbeliefsconnectedwithhim.ThroughKamel,theMaghrebArabnetworkgrew.Inmore formal language, growth of this networkwas not a random process but one of preferential

attachment,meaningthattheprobabilitythatanewnodewillconnecttoanygivennodeisproportionaltothe number of its existing links. A network growing through this process of preferential attachmentevolvesintoa“small-world”networkstructure,similartothatoftrafficontheInternet,inwhichgigantichubslikeGoogle,Yahoo,andCNNreceivefarmorehitsthanmostotherwebsites.Thisapproximatesthe

structureofthetwoArabclustersoftheglobalSalafijihad.The structure of theSoutheastAsiannetwork ismorehierarchical than that of the other parts of the

global jihad.Fromtheevidence, itappears thatAbdullahSungkarandAbuBakarBaasyir intentionallycreatedtheJemaahIslamiyahfromaboveandstructureditalonghierarchical lines.Atthetopweretheamir and the consultative council. The Jemaah Islamiyah was divided into four mantiqis or regions:SingaporeandMalaysia;Indonesia;Sabah,Sulawesi,andtheSouthernPhilippines;andAustralia.Belowthe mantiqi were several wakalah (branches). The head of the branch was supported by a branchconsultative council towhich reported several staff units. One of these units was the operations unit,which further subdivided intooperationalcellsof four to fivepeople. Initiatives for theoperations,aswell as plans for their organization and execution, came from the top (seeMinistry ofHomeAffairs,2003; International Crisis Group, 2002b and 2003). The Jemaah Islamiyah in this sense is a fairlytraditionalterroristorganizationincontrasttotherestoftheglobalSalafijihad.

RobustnessoftheNetwork

Small-worldnetworkshaveinterestingproperties.Unlikeahierarchicalnetworkthatcanbeeliminatedthroughdecapitationofitsleadership,asmall-worldnetworkresistsfragmentationbecauseofitsdenseinterconnectivity.Asignificant fractionofnodescanbe randomly removedwithoutmuch impacton itsintegrity(Barabasi,2003).Randomattacks,suchasstoppingterroristsarbitrarilyatourborders,willnotaffect the network’s structure. These actionsmay stop individual terrorists from coming and operatinghere,buttheywillleavethenetworklargelyundisturbed.Whereasmall-worldnetworkisvulnerabletotargeted attack is at its hubs. If enough hubs are destroyed, the network breaks down into isolated,noncommunicating islands of nodes.Were the jihad to sustain such damage, it would be incapable ofmountingsophisticatedlarge-scaleoperationslikethe9/11attacksandwouldbereducedtosmallattacksby singletons. It is possible for such nodes to try to spontaneously regenerate some semblance of anetworkaroundthemtocarryoutoperations.AhmedRessamtriedtorecruitnewuntrainedcollaboratorsinthemillennialplotafterhisoriginalcoconspiratorswereunabletotraveltotheCanada.Theevidencesofaristhatsuchshort-termimprovisedoperationshavefailed.Butthesurvivalofpotentialbrokerstothejihadmayinthelongertermallowtherebuildingofanetworkonthesiteofanincompletelydestroyedone.Hubs in a social network are vulnerable becausemost communications go through them.By tracing

messages through good policework, law enforcement authorities should be able to identify and arrestthese human hubs. This strategy has already shown considerable success. The arrests of Baasyir,Isamuddin,andAliGhufronhaveseriouslydisruptedtheSoutheastAsiancluster.ThearrestsofZainal-Abidin Hussein (abu Zubaydah), Fateh Kamel, and Amar Makhlulif (abu Doha) have broken up theMaghrebArabcluster.LessisknownaboutthestructureoftheCentralStaffandCoreArabclusters.NodoubtthearrestsofKhalidSheikhMohammedandhisnephewAbdulBasitKarim(RamziYousef)andthedeathofSubhiMohammedabuSittah(MohamedAtef)havesignificantlyweakenedit.Butthesurvivalofmanycentralstaffers,suchasOsamabinLadenandhissonSaad,Aymanal-Zawahiri,andMohammedMakkawi(Sayfal-Adl)stillmakes theglobal jihadapotent threat.Future terroristoperationsaremostlikely to come from the Core Arab cluster (more or less sponsored by the Central Staff) or fromspontaneouslocalMaghrebArabclustersunderlessdirectcontrolbytheCentralStaffbutstillunderitsinspiration.The jihad is resilient to randomarrestsof itsmembersbut fragile in termsof targetedattackson its

hubs.Becauseofthenetwork’sabilitytospontaneouslygrowandself-organize,attacksagainstthelarge

hubsmustbeundertakensimultaneouslytobreakupthenetwork.Giventhatmanyhubsarelinkedtoeachother,degradationofthesystemintosmallunconnectedislandsofnodesoftenrequirestakingoutasmanyas5to15percentofallhubsatonce.Otherwise,withtime,newhubswilltaketheroleoftheeliminatedonesandrestorethenetwork’sabilitytofunction.Thepriceofitsrobustnessisitsextremeexposuretotargetedattacks.Incontrast,theJemaahIslamiyahisnotsorobustandisvulnerabletoconventionaldecapitationofits

leadership.Asthelocalcellsarenotusedtooperatingontheirownwithoutspecificordersfromthetop,theeliminationoftheleadershiporeventheintermediarywillhavestrongeffectsontheorganizationasawhole.The2002-2003arrestsofmuchoftheJemaahIslamiyahleadership,includingitsemirBaasyirandmostofthemantiqileaders,haveseriouslydegradeditsabilitytoconductlarge-scaleterroristoperations.Asoflate2003,onlythecentraltechnicalbombexpertsarestillatlargeandinhiding,anditisunclearwhethertheycanrebuildthenetworkbythemselvesinthenearfuture.TheJemaahIslamiyah,therefore,couldbeeradicated.

GeographicalDistribution

One significant aspect of a small-world topology is its suggestion of a spontaneous process of self-organizationrather than intentionalconstructionfromabove. Ihavealreadymentioned theabsenceofaformaloverallrecruitmentprogramintheglobaljihad,exceptperhapsfortheJemaahIslamiyahportionof it.This lackofacomprehensive recruitmentdrive left theglobal jihadat themercyofself-recruits,establishingclustersofmujahedinwhobuiltuponpreexistinglinkagestothejihad.This“natural”growthofthejihadtookplacewithinparticularsocialnichesthatweresusceptibletoitsmessage.Thesenichesincluded the expatriate andexcludedMuslimcommunities inEurope, boredmiddle-classArabyouths,andmorerecently,localdisenfranchisedyouthsintheMaghreb.Theexactstructureofthejihadisnotrandomlydistributedwithinthisniche.Forinstance,AbdelGhani

Meskini’seffortstojointhejihadfailedbecausehehadnobridgetoit.LivinginBrooklyn,heaskedhischildhoodfriendMokhtarHaouari,wholivedinMontrealandhadboastedaboutsomeconnectiontothejihad, to help him. Haouari was unable to do so until hemet Ahmed Ressam,who promised to help(Adams,2001).Potentialmujahedinhaveahardtimejoiningthejihadiftheydonotknowhowtolinkupwith the movement. The jihad must build on preexisting nodes. Locales where the jihad has alreadyestablished a foothold thus disproportionately contribute to the jihad. For example,Montreal, London,Milan,Madrid,Hamburg, and theSaudi province ofAsir have contributed heavily to the global jihadbecauseof thepresenceofmujahedinwhomight act as brokers for potentialmembers of the jihad. Incontrast, similarly prominent cities like Berlin, Rome, Barcelona, and Paris have not harbored manymujahedinowingtotheabsenceofsuchbrokersthere.Therobustnessofthenetworkandthefuzzinessoftheboundaryconditionofwhatisanodemakeitdifficulttocompletelyeradicatethejihadonceithassetrootinaplace.Peoplewhohavenotactivelyparticipatedinthejihadmaystillhelppotentialcandidatesestablishnewlinks to the jihad through theiracquaintancesamong themujahedin. Iwillsaymore laterabouttheimportanceoftheseweakbonds.So,centersthathavetraditionallysentpeopletothejihadwillcontinuetocontributenewmujahedinunlesstheyareseveredfrombrokeringconnectionstothejihad.Salafi mosques in Brooklyn, Milan, London, Montreal, Madrid, Hamburg, Roubaix, and Khamis

Mushayt in Saudi Arabia have produced large numbers of mujahedin in the past decade. Traditionalinstitutionalsettingshavebeenthelocusofemergenceofsocialmovements,andtheprominenceofthesemosqueshastodowiththefactthattheglobaljihadisforemostaMuslimrevivalistmovement.Muslimsengageinthejihadbecausetheysharecertainnorms,values,andworldviews.Thecreationandshaping

ofthesesocialidentitiesoccurthroughaprocessofsocializationatthesemosques,undertheguidanceofaSalafiimampreachingthebenefitsoftheglobaljihad.Socialinteractionsatthesemosquesbuildandreinforce ideological commitment to a particularly salient cause and in the process foster a commonsectarianidentity.Themosquesofferopportunitiesforpeopletomeetnewfriends,fosterthedevelopmentofanideologicalcommitmenttothejihad(whichtheseever-closernewfriendsfurtherencourage),andprovidelinkstothejihadthroughalready-connectedmembers.AlthoughafewSalafimosquesaresitesofemergentterrorism,mostfundamentalistmosquesarenot.

Mosques are as apt to constrain as to facilitate the global jihad.Mosques are generally conservativeinstitutionswithastrongemphasisonthestatusquo,noton“propagandabydeed”or“outrageforGod”(Ibrahim,1980:437),butonsubmissiontoGod’swillandrealizationofrewardsintheafterlife.SalafimujahedinrejecttheinterpretationsofthetraditionalMuslimclergy,whomtheyaccuseofbeing“pulpitparrots”(434)inthepayofthestate.TheSalafijihadflourishedinprivatemosques,unregulatedbythestate,where theirbrandof Islamwas theonlyacceptableone.Mosques,evenfundamentalistones,aregenerallynotsupportiveoftheglobaljihadeveniftheimamandthecongregationsympathizewithsomeofthegrievancesmotivatingthejihad—presenceofU.S.troopsintheArabianPeninsula,persecutionofPalestinians,andformerharshsanctionsagainstIraqichildren.The prominence of certain Salafi mosques comes from the retrospective analysis of mujahedin

trajectories.Their paths to the jihad started at specificmosques. It is important not togeneralize fromretrospectiveaccounts,whichcannotestimateprospectiverisksofafutureevent.Forinstance,ifthegreatmajorityofserialkillersaremale,itdoesnotmeanthatbeingmalepredisposesonetoserialmurder.ThekeyissuehereisnottocondemnMuslimfundamentalismingeneralbuttotrytounderstandhowtheveryfewmosquesthatfacilitatetheglobaljihaddoso.Theyaresiteswhereapro-jihaddiscoursetakesplace.Specifically,theyprovideaviewoftheworldwhereIslamisingravedangerandthejihadistheonlyopportunity to fight this urgent threat. This grand narrative fosters the development of an Islamiccollective identity.Thesemosquescontainsomebrokers to the jihad,whomaybe the imamhimselforanothermember of the congregation. Examples of such imamswereAbuBakarBaasyir, SheikhOmarAbdelRahman,SheikhAnwarShaban,and thenotoriousLondonpreachers.Therewerequitea fewinSaudiArabia,astheSaudigovernmentsuspendedonethousandindividualsfrompreachingaftertheMay12,2003,bombingsinRiyadh.Thepresenceofthejihadintheseplacesmaybeduetoeitherchanceorspecificcharacteristicsofthe

location.TheevolutionofMontreal,Milan,andMadridasearlycontributorstothejihadwasprobablyduetothechancemigrationofFatehKamel,ImadEddinBarakatYarkas(a.k.a.abuDahdah),andSheikhAnwarShabantotheserespectivecities.Theseindividuals’presencebecameakernelaroundwhichthejihad grew. A few years later, only Yarkas was still inMadrid, but the other two sites continued toflourishasstrongholdsofthejihaddespitethedeparturesoftheirfounders.InMontreal,Ressamtriedtorecruit newmembers after Kamel had been arrested in Jordan. InMilan, Abdel QaderMahmoud EsSayed,andEssidSamibenKhemaisbuiltontheworkofShaban.The riseofLondonas themain centerof the jihad inEuropewasprobablydue to its tolerant laws

allowing for sanctuary and its largepoolofpotentialmujahedin. It is close enough toAlgeria tohaveattracteda largenumberofAlgerianmujahedin fleeingpersecution in their country after protesting thecancellationofthe1992election.Francenolongerprovidedasanctuarywhentheviolencespilledoverto its territory. The arrival of the Salafi preachers Omar Mahmoud Othman (a.k.a. abu Qatada) andMustafa Kamel (a.k.a. abu Hamza al-Masri) attracted French people of Maghreb origins who weresearchingforamoremilitantformofIslam.Londonisalsoacenterforworldmedia,throughwhichtheteachingofthesepreachersiseasilypropagatedtotheMuslimworld.Theshiftofthecenterofinfluence

fromMontrealto“Londonistan”wasformallyrecognizedwiththearrivalofMakhlulif(a.k.a.abuDoha)to take field command of that cluster. This shift shows the dynamic topology of the global jihadrespondingtoachangingenvironment.Thisdistributionof theglobal jihadhas implications for itsability toaccomplish itsmission.As its

networkdependsonbottom-upself-selectioninplaceswherespecificmosquesandexistingbrokersarelocated,therearemanyareaswheretheglobaljihadhasnopresence.Aslongasitsmissionwastorepelaninvadinginfidelenemyoroverthrowthe“nearenemy,”alocationadjacenttoitstargetfacilitateditsmission. Having its headquarters in Peshawar was quite convenient during the Afghan-Soviet war.Likewise,beingintheSudanassisteditsmissionagainstEgypt.ThemovebacktoAfghanistan,however,seriouslyhamperedEgyptianoperations.ThedistributionoftheglobalSalafijihadassetsseriouslyaffectsitsmissionagainsttheUnitedStates

“farenemy.”Theself-organizingevolutionofthejihad,contingentonrandomencounterswithlocalhubsor availability of bridges to the jihad, leaves large gaps in its geographical coverage.The absence ofproselytismand recruitmentprogramkept its profile lowenough (despite its size) to avoid raising thealarmintheU.S.government.Atthisjuncture,theglobaljihad’smainweaknessistheinabilityofmostofthemujahedintogetclosetoitspreferredtarget,theUnitedStates.Specifically,itdoesnothavealargepoolofmembersable tooperateclandestinely in theUnitedStates, and thus is limited in its ability towagewaronU.S.soil.ItsonlyefforttoremedythisweaknesswastoidentifythefewtraineesalreadyinAfghantrainingcampswhocouldentertheUnitedStateswithvalidtraveldocumentsandoperatetherewithout raising suspicion (Mascolo and Stark, 2003). I found no evidence of any comprehensiverecruitmentdriveintheUnitedStates.ThelackofarecruitmentprogrampreventedtheglobalSalafijihadfromdevelopingnativeU.S.assets

uponwhich it could build its operations onAmerican soil. This gap in coverage could be filledwithtemporaryforeignvisitorswhowereabletoblendintoAmericansocietyandoperateonAmericansoil.As long as theU.S. authorities did not take this danger seriously, thiswas a viable strategy.After thesuccessofthe9/11operations,however,increasedvigilancemadeitmoredifficultforglobalmujahedinto get a visa to the U.S. or, if already in place, to operate without raising suspicion. Most globalmujahedinarefromMuslimcountries,physicallydistinguishableandrequiringavisatocometotheU.S.IamsurprisedthatthejihadhasnotusedpeoplefromIndonesiaorthePhilippinestoconductoperationsin the United States. European converts to the global jihad might also be a potential pool of globalmujahedinoperatinghere,butIsuspectthatmostareknowntoEuropeanintelligenceservicesthatmighthavealertedtheU.S.authorities.MuslimsbornintheUnitedStateswhomightbeattractedtotheglobaljihadagainstenemiesoftheummaintheperipheryoftheMuslimworld,mayhesitatetoperpetratelargeterroristoperationsagainst theirowncountry.TheLackawannaSixmighthavevolunteeredtodrivetheRussiansoutofChechnya,butthereisnoindicationthattheywerereadytostrikeattheirowncountry.Onthe contrary, theymayhavebeen surprised and repelledby the anti-Americanmessages at the trainingcampsinAfghanistan(PurdyandBergman,2003).

Embeddedness

Thetermembeddednessreferstotherichnexusofsocialandeconomiclinkagesbetweenmembersofanorganization and its environment. Being embedded in society encourages trust in ongoing interactions(Granovetter, 1985). It makes people sensitive to local criticism. If grievances are aired, they areanchored in concerns that are close to home.Being embedded in a segment of society promotes localcollective behavior on behalf of this segment. Social bonds also imply some sort of sensitivity and

responsiveness tomaintain them. The lack of such bonds frees people from these responsibilities andlocalconcerns.InChapter3,Iarguedthatpriortojoiningtheglobaljihad,futuremujahedinweresociallyalienated,ortemporarilydisembedded,fromtheirsocietiesoforigin.Here,Iwillarguethatthisabsenceofconnectionisanecessaryconditionforanetworkofpeopletojointheglobaljihadbycontrastingthetwo rivalEgyptianSalafi jihadist organizations: theEgyptian Islamic Jihad (EIJ),which embraced theglobaljihad,andtheEgyptianIslamicGroup(EIG),whichrejectedit.InChapter4, I showed that theEIGoriginated in the Islamicgroupsofupwardlymobilestudents in

provincialuniversitycitiesoftheSaid.Althoughtheyhadmovedoutoftheiroriginalhomes,theydidnotgo far and maintained their tribal, kinship, and friendship ties. Corruption, lack of meaningfulemployment, and disillusionment with secular socialist nationalism led them to militant Salafi Islam.Although their strategy for instituting the Islamist state was a mass uprising modeled on the IranianRevolution,theirimmediateconcernswerestilllocal,especiallytheapparentprominenceoftheCopts.UptotheAsyutuprisingshortlyaftertheassassinationofPresidentSadat,violentoutburstsagainstCoptsdominatedtheir illegalactivities.TheAsyutuprising,whichlastedseveraldays,waspossiblebecausetheSaidiswereembeddedinthesocialfabricoftheirsociety,andgothelpfromtheirtribesandfriendstocarryouttheuprising.TheEIJ,whichhaditsoriginsinCairoandlaterAlexandria,wascomposedofstudents,professionals,

andgovernmentofficials(leaders)andtheurbanpoorcomingtoworshipatprivateSalafimosques(therankandfile).Theyweremostlyyoungpeoplewhohadmigratedto the large, impersonalcitieswheretheylackedstrongsocialbonds.Theyadvocatedamilitarycoupthat,theyhoped,wouldtriggerapopularuprising.AftertheassassinationofPresidentSadat,theEgyptiangovernmentthrewthewholebunchintoprison,butwasratherlenientintheensuingtrial.OnlythefourdirectperpetratorsandFaraj,theleaderofthe Cairene branch, were condemned to death. In prison, sharp lines of rivalry surfaced between theCairenes,wholaterbecametheEIJ,andtheSaidis,wholaterformedtheEIG.SincemostoftheTanzimal-JihadleadershipwasSaidi,theygotlongerprisonsentencesthanthemiddle-rankmembers,whoweredischarged after three years. Most of these Islamist militants fled to Pakistan and Afghanistan whenofficialpersecutioncontinuedaftertheirrelease.Exiledistancedbothsetsofexpatriatesfromtheiroriginalsocialbondsandfurtherdisembeddedthem

fromtheiroriginalsociety.TheCaireneslostanyremnantofsocialconnectionwiththedistance,astheyhadnotgrownrootsinthecities.TheyreconstitutedthemselvesinPeshawarastheEIJ,withveryloosetiestotheirnominalimprisonedleader,Abudal-Zumur.TherealpowerseemstohavebeenAymanal-Zawahiri, whose leadership stylewas autocratic. The complete breakwith al-Zumur occurred around1991afteral-ZawahirigrabbedthereinsofpowerintheEIJ.Atthispoint,theEIJbecameafree-floatingnetworkwithoutanyrealtiestoitsoriginalsocietyortoitssurroundingsociety.Itwelcomedotherurbanexpatriatesasnewmembers,andsimilarlydisembeddedAlexandriansflockedtoitsranks.TheSaidisalsoreconstitutedthemselvesinPeshawarastheEIG,butwithstrongtiestotheimprisoned

collectiveleadership(theshura)andtheirmufti.Theyretainedsomeremnantsofthesocialbondstotheirsociety of origin despite their distance and were able to muster a strong following in the Said. Thedistance created a gap, however, between the imprisoned and expatriate leaders of the EIG. TheimprisonedleadersinEgyptmaintainedtheirclosenesstotheSaid.Whileinprisontheymarriedrelativesofothermembersandevenfatheredchildren.Theyreceivedfrequentvisitsfromfamilyandfriends.Theexpatriateswerefartherfromtheirrootsandclosertootherexiledmilitants.Assuch, theygot toknowtheseothermilitantSalafiexilesandtoyedwiththeirideas,strategy,andtactics.FromneighboringSudan,the EIG launched a wave of violence on Egyptian society and tourism in the first half of the 1990s,culminatingin theattemptonthe lifeofPresidentMubarakinAddisAbaba.Theeffectof thiswaveof

violenceonEgyptiansocietywastheoppositeofwhattheyintended.Insteadoffurtherpolarizingsocietyin preparation for a mass mobilization and uprising, it alienated the Egyptian masses from the EIG.Recognizing the failureof their strategyofviolencebecauseof their embeddedness in this society, theimprisonedEIGshurainitiatedaceasefirein1997torestoreitsclosenesswiththeSaidipopulation.Theexpatriateleadershipatfirstrejectedthisnewinitiativeandeventriedtoforcethehandoftheimprisonedleaderwiththe1997Luxormassacre,killingaboutsixtypeople.Aftertheirmuftiendorsedtheinitiative,however,theexpatriateleadersclosedrankswiththeirimprisonedcolleaguesandevenresignedfromtheshuratoleaveroomforproponentsofthisnewstrategy.Incontrast,nostrongbondsboundtheEIJleadership—allexiles—totheEgyptianpopulation.Norwas

their strategy dependent on mass mobilization. Therefore, it was detached from the demands of itspresumed constituency and free to pursue any strategy dictated by its ideology. The EIJ was morerepresentative of the rest of the global Salafi jihad. The Sudanese exile played a crucial role in theevolutionoftheglobaljihadideology.Theassembledmujahedin,whowerefromvariouscountriesandbackgrounds,hadlosttheircommonenemywhentheSovietswithdrewfromAfghanistanin1989anditspuppetregimecollapsedin1992.Theywereonthebrinkofseparationandbreakingupintosmallerlocaljihads,albeitundertheumbrellaofaloosesupportingorganization,alQaeda.AgreatdealofdiscussionduringtheSudaneseexileconcernedwhattodonext.MamdouhMahmudSalimfromIraqandOsamabinLadenfromSaudiArabia,bothofwhomhadlosttheirattachmentstotheirrespectivecountries,werethestrongestadvocatesfortheshifttoaglobaljihad(al-Fadl,2001).Thecreationofacommonenemy,theU.S.“farenemy”—the“headofthesnake”—redefinedthejihadandrevitalizedalQaeda.Suchashifttoanewmissionhelpsprolongtheexistenceofanorganizationthathasaccomplisheditsgoal.Theprogressivelossofbondstosocietytransformedthejihadintoatrulyglobalmovement,basedon

virtual bonds to abstractions such as God and the umma. Although the network as a whole wasdisembedded from an earthly constituency, itsmembers, or nodes,weremore tightly linkedwith eachother as they abandoned their bonds to the outside world. They became members of an “imaginedcommunity,”noton thebasisof anation (a challenge toAnderson, 1991)buton a “virtual,” sectarianbasis.Theiroperationsdidnothavetoberesponsivetoanyearthlyconstituencyandwereunrestrainedbysocialbondsfoundinembeddednetworks.ThisidealvirtualcommunityhasstrongappealtoalienatedyouthsexpatriatedintheWest,boredyouths

without any economic or social prospects inCoreArab countries, and disenfranchised youthswithoutmuch hope in Maghreb Arab countries. Many responded to the mass appeal of the call of “Islam indanger”duringtheU.S.invasionsofAfghanistanin2001andIraqin2003.ThiswasaspontaneousmassmobilizationofyouthstodefendIslam,asopposedtoamoreorganizedandformaljoiningoftheglobaljihad.Butthevirtualcharacteroftheirmotivationbecamequiteapparentoncetheseindividualswereinplace.Theirinsularityfromthelocalpopulationandtheirnaïveattractiontotheidealofavirtualjihadblinded them to the reality of the situation. The local population in both instances rejected their self-sacrifice and at times turned on them.Afghan forces from theNorthernAlliance and even theTalibanmurderedtheseexpatriatesorheldthemforransom(Abdallahetal.,2002).Iraqiforcesleft thevirtualrecruitsonthefrontlinetoconfrontU.S.troops(whiletheymeltedawayintotheirownsocieties),andthelocal population betrayed them (Stalinsky, 2003). Their travails make for somber and sober reading.Becauseoftheirinabilitytoconnectwiththeformaljihadmovement,theysimplybecamecannonfodderin thecynicalposturingof the leadersof theTaliban, Iraqigovernment,andglobal jihad todiscourageU.S. intervention.Their experience illustrates the fact that being part of a pool of potentialmujahedindoesnotautomaticallytranslateintoformalparticipationintheglobaljihad.In this section, I have argued that the lackof embeddednessof thenetworks in any society allowed

dramaticshiftsintheideologicalfocusofthejihadmovementinresponsetochangingsocialconditions.The mujahedin’s need to stay united and the difficulty of carrying out operations in their respectivecountries led them to choose a common and more available target, the U.S. “far enemy.” They alsoassumedthatthistargetwouldbeeasiertoattackowingtoitspreviousweakresponsestoprovocations.Unrestrainedbyresponsibilitytoanysociety,thisfree-floatingnetworkwasfreetofollowthelogicofitsabstractideologyandescalatethescaleofterror,culminatinginthe9/11operations.Thereisevidencethat the strongU.S. government response to this qualitativelyunprecedented terror attack took thembysurprise.Ironically, this section returned to the now discarded 1950s theories that radical mass protests

originatedamonggroupsthatwereatomized,disorganized,deviant,anddisoriented(Adornoetal.,1950;andArendt,1958).Theempiricalliteratureonsocialprotestmovementsfromthepastthreedecadeshasdiscredited these arguments. On the contrary, this research project has indicated that mobilization inprotest movements was facilitated by embeddedness in networks of friends already involved and inestablished social settings destined for later involvement (Diani and McAdam, 2003). At first, thisappearstocontradictmyargument.Butthisviewdoesnottakeintoaccountthetemporaldimensionofthatargument.Attractiontoaviolentabstractglobalmovementbasedonvirtualtiestoavirtualcommunityismorelikelyamongsociallyalienatedyoungmenbecauseoftheirlackofembeddednessintheirambientsociety.Atthisstage,thissupportsArendt’sargumentofatomizationasthepreconditionfordestructivemassmovements.ItispreciselythistemporarylossofembeddednessthatmakesthemvulnerabletodrifttospecificSalafimosquesandbecomeembeddedwithinthenexusofbondsthere.Atthisnextstage,myarguments about the importance of social bonds and established social settings are consistentwith theempirical evidence of social protest movement studies. They become embedded in a sociallydisembeddednetwork,which,preciselybecauseofitslackofanyanchortoanysociety,isfreetofollowabstractandapocalypticnotionsofaglobalwarbetweengoodandevil.

NatureoftheNodesFuzzyBoundaries

The global Salafi jihad has a very fuzzy boundary. The indistinctness of this boundary raises someepistemologicalissuesonagroupandindividuallevel:whatrepresentsanode,alink,oranetwork.ThejihadisadynamicsocialmovementthatformsandbreaksbondstovariousSalafiterroristgroups.Thenatureofthisbondmaybefinancialsupport,logisticalsupport,orcommonplanningforoperations.Someof the links have been permanent, such as alQaeda’s relationshipwith theEIJ and Jemaah Islamiyah.Othershavewaxedandwaned.Forinstance,afteraninitialperiodofenthusiasm,alQaedaseemstohavedisavowed its links to the Abu Sayyaf Group in the Philippines when it degenerated into banditry.Likewise,alQaedastronglysupportedtheAlgerianGroupeIslamiqueArmé,butletthislinkfadewhenthegroupstartedtocommitwidespreadatrocitiesagainstthecivilianpopulation.AlQaedaswitcheditssupporttothebreakawayGroupeSalafistepourlaPrédicationetleCombatinstead.Al-Tawhid,headedbyAhmedal-Kalaylah (abuMusabal-Zarqawi),maynotbe formallyconnected toalQaeda,probablybecauseofpersonalrivalries.BecauseitconductsterroristoperationsagainstWesterntargetsinEuropeandtheMiddleEast,itisnonethelesssolidlypartoftheglobaljihad.Onanindividuallevel,membershipinthejihadmaybedifficulttoassessattheboundary.Forinstance,

AhmedRessaminvitedAbdelGhaniMeskinitobecomeanimportantpartofthemillennialplotbeforethetwoevermet.Meskiniaccepted,buthehadnoknowledgeofwhatwouldbeaskedofhim.Whenhefailedto connect with Ressam in Seattle, he returned to Brooklyn and tried to fade away (Adams, 2001).

Although he was never formally inducted into the jihad and his only contacts with it were his long-distance friendship bondwithHaouari and the few vague phone conversationswith Ressam,MeskinimustbeconsideredpartoftheglobaljihadbecauseofhiswillingnesstocarryoutanundisclosedterroristattackagainsttheWest.Hiswasclearlyanoperationallink.OtherindividualsthathadstrongerlinkswiththejihadandunderwentformalterroristtraininginAfghanistanchosetodisappearfromthejihadwithoutanyintenttocarryoutterroristoperations.Forexample,theLackawannaSixarenotconsideredpartoftheglobaljihadbecauseoftheirlackofintent.Theywereofferedanoperationallinkbutchosetodeclineit.MoreambiguouscasesarepeopleinthenetworksoftheMaghrebArabclusterinCanadaandEuropewhoweresupportingthemselvesandthejihadthroughsmall-scalecrimes.Weretheytruemujahedinorjustpettycriminals?JuriesinDetroitandtheNetherlandshavemadethisdistinctionandexoneratedthemfrominvolvementinthejihad.OtherambiguouscasesarefinancialcontributorstoIslamiccharities,whosuspectbutdonotreallyknowwhetherthecharitiesalsosupportterroristoperations.

Cliques

Previously,Ihaveshownthatpeoplejoinedthejihadinsmallgroups.Severalindividualslivedtogetherforawhileandhadintensediscussionsaboutthejihad.Whenoneofthefriendswasabletofindabridgeto the jihad, they often went as a group to train in Afghanistan. Examples abound in my sample: theMontrealgroup,theHamburggroup,theKhamisMushaytgroup,theLackawannagroup.Thesearedense,smallnetworksoffriendswhocanvouchforeachother.Innetworkterminology,theyformcliques.Inaclique,everynodeisconnectedtoeveryotherone.Cliquesareoftenbuiltonhumansimilarities.Friendshipsreflectcommonbackground,education,and

beliefs, but the dense networks that members of a clique form are local and based on face-to-faceencounters, attraction, and development of long-term bonds. They are not global. Although a commonprofilecanbedrawnwithinacertainclique,itdoesnotgeneralizetoasocialmovementasawhole.ForamovementliketheglobalSalafijihad,thereareasmanyvalidprofilesastherearecliquesofsimilarfriends.Evenarelativelysmallnetworkcarryingoutcommonoperationsmaybecomposedofanumberofcliques,eachwithitsowndistinctiveprofile.Forinstance,theFrenchMaghrebArabswhoconductedfoursimultaneousoperationsinMoroccoinAugust1994includedatleastthreecliques.TheclosefriendsandrelativeswhogrewuptogetherinadjacentblocksinOrleans,France,werefrommiddle-class,wellintegratedbackgrounds andwereuniversity educated.Theclose friends fromLaCourneuvewere alsoraisedtogether,butinpovertywithlittleeducationandwereexcludedfromtheformalintegratedFrencheconomy.ThenascentgroupinBesançonallcamefromtheFacultyofPharmacyofthatcity.Despitetheirdifferentprofiles,membersofseparatecliquesweremixedintocommandosexecutingthe1994attempts(ErhelandLaBaume,1997).ThisshowsthedifficultyofgeneratingacommonprofileofaglobalSalafimujahed.Over time and space, cliques of friends may respond to various systematic sociopolitical appeals,

according toworldeventsoccurringat the timeand in thevicinity.ThegroupwhoansweredAzzam’sappealandwenttoAfghanistanduringtheSoviet-Afghanwarlooksdifferentasawholefromlaterwavesofmujahedin.Likewise, theMaghrebArabcliqueswereespeciallysensitive toevents thatoccurred inAlgeriaandMoroccointhe1990s.CliquesformingbothlargeArabclusterswerealsoquitemovedbytheeventsinBosniaandChechnyainthe1990s.TheJemaahIslamiyahrespondedtoeventsinIndonesiaandthePhilippines.Butevenwithintheselargeclusters,cliquesprovidedifferentprofiles.TheSaudisinvolvedinthe1995RiyadhSaudiNationalGuardtrainingcenterbombingcamefromarelativelypoorbackgroundandhadonlyelementaryeducation.Ontheotherhand,someoftheSaudicliquesinvolvedin

the9/11operationscamefromtheeconomicandsocialeliteofthecountry.Ascliquesbecomeconnectedto the jihad partly by chance, there can be no overall profile for global Salafimujahedin, only localprofiles.Cliques play a crucial role in transforming potential contributors into full-fledged mujahedin.

Revivalistreligiousmovements,likeanylarge-scalesocialmovements,sufferfromMancurOlson’sfree-rider paradox. Translated to al Qaeda’s case, this argument states that even if terrorism is a rationalstrategyforthegroupasawhole,itisnotsoforeachofitsmembers(Olson,1971).Eachwouldbebetteroffsteppingasideandallowingothermembersbearthenecessarycostsinvolvedwiththeseactivities.Ifthegroupsucceeds,eachmemberwouldenjoythebenefitsatnocost.Aterroristorganizationaimingtochangesocietyforthegoodofallisvulnerabletothepossibilitythateachofitsmemberswilltakeafreeride. The free-rider paradox suggests that participation in terrorism may not be based on utilitariancalculations.Game theorists have tried to rehabilitate the rationalist approach. They acknowledge that people’s

behaviordoesnotoccurinavacuum,buttakesintoaccountotherpeople’sbehavior.Gametheoristsshowvery elegantly that under conditions with a prospect of future interactions, the best strategy for anindividual is tit-for-tat cooperationwith others. Friends are presumed to join the jihad because of theveiledthreatofwithdrawaloffriendshipincaseafrienddoesnotjoin.Thisisnotaconvincingargument,however,fortworeasons.First, thepresumedthreatofwithdrawaloffriendshipissimplynotcredibleunlesstherelationshipmeansverylittletotheonedoingthethreatening.Second,andmoredevastatinginthiscase,suicideunderminestheassumptionoffutureinteractions.Tit-for-tatmodelingshowsthatiftheendofagame isknown, themost rational strategy is todefect justbefore theotherdoes, and take theresultingbenefits.Suicide,therefore,seemstounderminetherationalistapproach.Cliquessolvethisrationalistparadox.Theyarethesocialmechanismthatputspressureonprospective

participantstojoin,definesacertainsocialrealityfortheevermoreintimatefriends,andfacilitatesthedevelopmentof a sharedcollective social identity and strongemotional feelings for the in-group.Thisprocess,whichtakestimeandintenseface-to-faceinteraction,isnotwellstudiedempiricallybecauseitwould involve long-term observation of groups of friends, as opposed to short-term observations ofstrangers in psychological laboratories. Cliques literally transform lives and, in doing so, change themeaningandimpactoffriendshipbondsthatpavethewaytojoiningthejihad.Selectedeventsthatmightotherwise be largely independent and disconnected are linked through symbolic means that stresscontinuityandformaunifiedworldview.Forinstance,cliquememberslumptogethereventssuchastheU.S. presence inSaudiArabia andSomalia, cancellationof the election inAlgeria in 1992, Serb andRussian invasions of Bosnia and Chechnya, respectively, sanctions imposed on Iraq, discriminationagainst Palestinians, Christian aggression in Indonesia, and expansion of central government power toMindanao.Theyweaveagrandnarrative that Islam is indanger, implyingacommonfate thatbuildsacollectiveidentity.Social or religious activism is born in cliques and changes the value of friendship. Participation in

causestransformstheactivists’senseofthemselvesandtheirrelationshipwithothers(Gould,2003).ThehorrorsofitsterroristoperationsmaskageneralfactabouttheglobalSalafijihad,namelythatitdemandsa sacrifice, and often the ultimate sacrifice for the cause. Although outsiders focus on the terrorists’willingnesstokill,theinsidersfocusontheirwillingnesstodie.Becomingmartyrs,shahidiorwitnessesforGod,notkillers, iswhat they strive for.Their awarenessof theirown readiness to transcend theirself-interestfostersaspecialviewofthemselvesandotherslikethem.Ironically,itmaybetiedtothefactthatthejihadissusceptibletoOlson’sfree-riderparadoxandthetemptationtoreapitsbenefitswithoutactuallyparticipating.This flight fromegoismsymbolizedby theirconscious rejectionof this free ride

injectsasemblanceofvirtue into thewaytheyviewthemselvesand their friendswhohavechosen thesame path. Friendships cultivated in the jihad, just as those forged in combat in general, seemmoreintenseandareendowedwithspecialsignificance.TheiractionstakenonbehalfofGodandtheummaareexperiencedassacred.Thisaddedelementincreasesthevalueoffriendshipswithinthecliqueandthejihadingeneralanddiminishesthevalueofoutsidefriendships.Tofriendshoveringonthebrinkofjoininganincreasinglyactivistclique,thispromisedshiftinvalue

may be difficult to resist, especially if one is temporarily alienated from society. This happensprogressively and imperceptibly over a period of time. Peoplemay not be aware that they are beingdrawn into theclique.Butonce theybecomemembers, strongbondsof loyaltyandemotional intimacydiscourage their departure.This process is rarely a fully conscious one, as cliques donot start out asterroristgroups.Theyevolveinthatdirectionastheirmutualrelationshipsdeepen,inaspiralofgreaterloyalty, mutual devotion, self-sacrifice, and intimacy. The best descriptions of this progressive butultimately intense process are the three independent participant observations of Sun Myung Moon’sUnificationChurch(Barker,1984;Galanter,1989;Lofland,1981).Friendsmayjoinanactivatedcliquenotonlytocontributetothecausebutalsotoenhancethenatureoftheirfriendship.Insomecases,suchintenseemotionalfeelingsmaycompetewithandevenbestronger thanthoseof love.AtMotassadeq’strialAyelSenguentestifiedaboutherprogressivelossofherfiancéandlaterhusbandZiadJarrah’sloveto theHamburg clique (Laabs andMcDermott, 2003).Ziad Jarrah piloted the airplane that crashed inPennsylvaniaonSeptember11,2001.Thelossoflovetothistypeoffriendshipshowsthestrengthofthistransformedbond.Inmanywayssuchpositiveemotionsmaymotivatehumanbeingstocarryouthorrificactsmoreeasilythannegativeemotionsdo.Peoplearewillingtokillindefenseoftheirfamilies,friends,and countries. Fewer are willing to do so out of hate. Despite the popular accounts of the 9/11perpetrators in the press, in-group love rather than out-group hate seems a better explanation for theirbehavior.Thesame transformationof friendship thatexplains theprogressive intensificationof in-groupbonds

mayexplaintheweakeningofout-grouptiessooftenseenincliquesandinthejihad.Anout-groupfriendwhorejectsanopportunitytojointhecliquedoesnotjustrefusetosignupforthejihad.Healsorefusestobecomewhatthemujahedhasbecome:aviolentmilitantwithadeepcommitmenttoGodandtheSalafiinterpretationoftheQuran,whostrivesfortheestablishmentofanIslamiststateandiseagertobecomeamartyr. This account of the transformation of the nature of friendship brings us back to the rationalistargument,fornowtheimplicitwithdrawaloffriendshipbecomesacrediblethreat.Arefusaltojoinleadstoemotionaldistancing.Inthiscase,spurningaformerfriendshipislesscostlythanwasthecasebeforethe commitmentsdiverged. Itwill hurt the activatedcliquemember less than itwill hurt theout-groupfriendbecausethein-groupmemberislikelytoreplacethisfriendshipwithstrongerones.Such intense relationships are bound to strongly affect one’s sense of identity. This leads to the

developmentofasocialidentity,inwhichthefeelingofbelongingtotheglobaljihadcanbegraftedontothesenseofbelongingtothenowreligiouslyandpoliticallyactivatedclique.Thecliquebecomesclosedinonitselfandoperateslikeasubcultureorcounterculture,leadingtointensecohesioninbothemotionalties to thegroupandcognitiveviewof theworld.This transformationwasclear in theHamburggroupandespeciallynotedatBahaji’sweddingwhenfamilyguests,whowerenotpartofthecliqueandknewsomeofthememberspriortotheirjoiningtheclique,wereshockedbythein-groupmembers’utterancesandbehavior.Densenetworks like cliques commonlyproduce social cohesion and a collective identity and foster

solidarity, trust, community, political inclusion, identity-formation, andothervaluable social outcomes.Densesocialnetworksfosterintenseface-to-faceinteractionsinwhichcollectiveidentitiesareformed.

The“bunchofguys”phenomenonnotedinthewiretapsoftheHamburg,Milan,andMontrealapartmentsillustrated the conversations that shaped the social life of clique members by altering individual andcollectiveperspectives, transformingsocial ties,collectivelyprocessingeventsandgeneratingspecificmeanings and interpretations, and forging commitments to the clique and the jihad. This process oftransformationfromanalienatedindividual toacommittedactivist iscommonlyseeninreligioussectsandterroristgroupsandrequiresinvestmentinintenselengthyface-to-faceinteractions.Thisimpliesthatthe fear that vulnerable young Muslims may be recruited to the jihad through Internet messages isoverblown.Reading and sendingmessages about the jihad on the Internetmaymake these individualsreceptivetoitsappeal,butdirectinvolvementrequiresface-to-faceinteraction.This intense collective identification furthers both commitment to the clique and the integrity and

cohesionof the jihad.Thiscohesionalso leads togroupconformity in termsofbehavior,attitudes,andappearance.SalafistsgrowtheirbeardsandcommonlydressinAfghan,Pakistani,ortraditionalArabicoutfits.Lackofconformitymayalsoleadtointoleranceofandsometimespunitiveactionsagainstpersonsnotconformingtocliquenormsandrules.Thesetwoelementsofauthoritarianism—in-groupconformityandout-groupaggressiveness—maybeaproductof the intensityof activatedcliquecohesion, agroupphenomenonratherthanadimensionofsome“authoritarian”personality(Duckitt,1989).Letmeendthissectionwithanoteofcaution.Ihaveconsideredonlycliquesthatfurtherofthegoalsof

thejihad;theymayalsohinderit.Itmaybethatthecliqueisunitedinitsdesiretojointhejihadandthatitsmemberstravel toAfghanistan,wheretheyarefacedwithspecificstatementsanddemandsthat theyhad not anticipated. Individually, theymay suffer silently and perhaps succumb to the new vision anddemands. But as a group their friends may support them in their resistance to the new ideology anddemands. The clique may then be a strong factor in resisting the official ideology and official jihaddemands. This may be exactly what happened to the Lackawanna Six, who went as a group toAfghanistan.Theygainedstrengthfromeachotherandwereable to resistanti-U.S.propaganda,whichconflictedwith their personal experience of life in theUnitedStates. Future researchmay explore thefactorsdelineatingthecircumstancesunderwhichacliquefacilitatesorhindersinvolvementinasocialmovement.

NatureoftheLinksSocialnetworksarecomplexcommunicativenetworksthatcreatesharedworldsofmeaningandfeelings,which in turnshape identity,perceptions,andpreferences. In thissection, Iwillexamine the impactofdramatic changes in communication and information technology,ofnetwork topologyon flexibility andperformance,andofconnectedacquaintancesontheglobalSalafijihad.

NewCommunicationTechnology

Traditionally, religious terrorismhasbeenbasedon face-to-face interactions.Theseare stillnecessaryfor thegrowthof religious terroristmovements, for the transformation fromanoutsider to a dedicatedinsiderrequiresintenseintimateexchanges.Onceestablished,however,aterroristorganizationmaynotrequiresuchintensityaslongasregulartwo-waycommunicationreinforcesthemember’sdedicationwithemotional support and general guidance. Older communication technologies did not allow for suchinteractions, and themore isolated the fanatic, themore likely it was that his fanaticismwould fade.Enthusiasm for one’s task is difficult to preserve in a vacuum. The revolution in communicationtechnologyinthe1990shasdramaticallychangedthissituation.

ThisrevolutioncoincidedwiththeriseoftheglobalSalafijihad.WhenalQaedawascreatedontheborder of Afghanistan and Pakistan around 1990, its members complained about isolation from theirrespective countries.Moving to theSudanbrought themcloser to their theatersofoperations (al-Fadl,2001).DuringtheSudaneseexile,rapidchangesincommunicationtechnologyspreadaroundtheworld.The global Salafi jihadwas quick to grasp its possibilities. Osama bin Laden bought a new satellitetelephoneduringthattime.AlQaedaoperativesstartedtouselaptopcomputerstostoreinformationandsend e-mail to each other. Fax transmission was used to release communiqués in London sent fromundisclosedsites.Dedicatedwebsitesinformedmujahedinandtheirsupportersofnewdevelopmentsinthejihad.BythetimetheCentralStaffofthejihadreturnedtoAfghanistanin1996,itwasfullyintegratedintothenewglobalnetworkofcommunication,whichinturnmadetheglobaljihadpossible.Indeed,thiswas themain difference between the first Afghan phase of the jihad, when global aims were not yetpossible,andthesecondAfghanphase,whentechnologicaladvancesmadeitpossibletocontemplateaglobalstrategy.Thisnewtechnologyenabledaglobaljihadbasedonaloose,decentralizednetworkofmujahedin transcending the limitations of face-to-face interaction. After the return to Afghanistan, alQaeda’sCentralStaffwasabletooverseeatrulyglobal jihadthroughtheuseofsatellite telephone,e-mail, fax, and web sites. Its geographical isolation became a source of strength, for it provided asanctuaryandprotectedthestafffromeffectiveretaliationbytheWest.ComputershavebeenubiquitousamongtheglobalSalafimujahedin.ThecomputercapturedinManila

inJanuary1995belongedtoAbdulBasitKarimandprovidedtheoutlineoftheambitiousBojinkaPlot.DatafromtheharddrivesofcomputerscapturedinEurope,Asia,Africa,andtheMiddleEastprovideasignificantportionofwhatweknowabouttheglobalSalafijihad.YosriFouda’sportraitofRamzibinal-ShibhsittingonthefloorofaKarachisafehouse,surroundedbythreelaptopsandfivemobilephones,underscorestheimportanceofthistechnologytothejihad(FoudaandFielding,2003:36).Itallowedbinal-ShibhandhisbossKhalidSheikhMohammedtosupportanddirecttheirsubordinatesscatteredaroundthe world. E-mail was routine among the members of the Hamburg clique and helped them sustainemotionalclosenessandcommonbeliefsdespitephysicalseparationbycommunicatingsharedmeanings,past events, and internal jokes. In the past, letters fulfilled the same function. Through its speed ofexpression and response, e-mail goes a step further by reducing time spent waiting for the intimatepartner’sreply.And yet, too great a reliance on this new technology leaves the jihad vulnerable to sophisticated

monitoringofcommunicationand triangulationof its source. Interceptsofcellular telephonecallshavefiguredprominentlyinthecaptureofmajorleadersoftheglobaljihad.WhenbinLadenfoundoutthathissatellite phone conversationswere being intercepted, he stopped using this technology.Until the 2001U.S.offensivedeniedhimtheopensanctuaryofAfghanistan,hissubordinateswereabletofillthisdirectgapandmaintaincommunicationswithglobalmujahedinscatteredworldwide.Nowhisreluctancetousethis form of communication has greatly hampered his effectiveness as a leader. Documents found incomputershavealsoplayedamajor role in theconvictionof terrorists,as in the trialsofAbdulBasitKarim and the East Africa embassy bombings defendants in New York and Abdul Aziz (a.k.a. ImamSamudra)inIndonesia.The new advances in communication technology increase the organization’s vulnerability.As use of

satellitephonesandthelikebecomesdifficultbecauseofmonitoring,communicationswithCentralStaffbreakdownand theglobal jihadmayrevert toplotting localoperationswithoutmuchsupport fromthestaff.TheamateurismoftheMay16,2003,Casablancabombings(whenbombersgotlostontheirwaytothe targets) may indicate the new state of the global jihad, stripped of much of its communicationcapability.

ImpactoftheInternet

TheInternethasalsodramaticallyaffectedtheglobaljihadbymakingpossibleanewtypeofrelationshipbetweenanindividualandavirtualcommunity.Slightlyoldertechnologyhadalreadyshownitspotentialto effect religious and political changes in Iran, where the dissemination of cheaply replicatedaudiocassettesbroughtAyatollahKhomeini’smessagetothemasses.VideocassettesbroughtthewarsinBosniaandthehorrorsofAlgeriatoMuslimlivingroomsinEurope.Theyspreadthemythandpromiseof the jihad to alienated youngMuslims in search of a mission. They glamorized military training inAfghanistanandadvocateditasarequirementforbecomingagoodMuslim.TheregularappearanceandhumbledemeanorofOsamabinLadeninthesevideotapesalsoincreasedhisappealtoyoungMuslimsasamodeltoemulate,transcendingtheirlackofopportunitiesandexpectations.VideocassettesofpopularSalafi preachers, like Omar Mahmoud Othman (a.k.a. abu Qatada), have been commonly found inapartmentsofarrestedmujahedin.ThisdiffusionoftheSalafimessagebypassedlocalimams,whoareingeneralfarmoreconservativeanddonotapproveofthejihadbyviolentmeans.The Internet creates a seemingly concrete bond between the individual and a virtual Muslim

community. This virtual community plays the same role that “imagined communities” played in thedevelopmentofthefeelingofnationalism,whichmadepeopleloveanddiefortheirnationsaswellashate and kill for them (Anderson, 1991). Because of its virtual nature, the Internet community has noearthlycounterpartandbecomesidealizedinthemindofsurfers.Thiscommunityisjust,egalitarian,fullofopportunity,unifiedinanIslampurgedofnationalpeculiarities,anddevoidofcorruption,exploitation,and persecution. The appeal of this approximation of paradise can become irresistible, especially toalienatedyoungMuslimsandpotentialconvertssufferingfromisolationorfromordinarydiscrimination.The immediate responsiveness of Muslim chat rooms and the relevance of the messages bringconcretenessandreality to thisvirtualcommunity.Without therestraints fromreal interactionswith thesocialworld, thisvirtualworldallowsextremeviolenceagainst thepresumedconspiratorsagainst thevirtualumma.The nature of this relationship between individuals and the Internet favors the Salafimessage. The

Internetbothappealstoandfostersdisembeddedness.Ontheonehand,itappealstoisolatedindividualsbyeasingtheirlonelinessthroughconnectionstopeoplesharingsomecommonality.Ontheotherhand,itleads them to spend more time with this virtual community at the expense of interaction with theimmediatesocialenvironment.Thisencouragesaglobaloutlook.Thevirtualcommunityisnolongertiedtoanynation,aconditionthatcorrespondstothemythicalummaofSalafism,whichspecificallyrejectsnationalismandfosterstheglobalSalafijihadpriorityoffightingagainstthe“farenemy”ratherthanthe“near enemy.” Disembedded from any territory, the vague establishment of an Islamist state mustnecessarily come into conflict with the only remaining political, economic, cultural, and militarysuperpower—theUnitedStates.ThisreducestheprojectoftheummatoaglobalManicheanfightwiththeUnitedStatesinallthesearenasforhegemonyoftheworld,atrueclashofcivilizations.CommunicationsonInternetchatroomsareegalitarian,recognizingnoauthorityexceptthetextsofthe

Quran and hadith. Arguments that would appeal to all, regardless of their theological educationalbackground,arebound tobedirect and simple.These simplifiedpositionsnegate the sophisticationoffourteen centuries of commentaries on theQuran,which often include past responses to difficulties inapplying its teaching to contemporary problems.Again, this plays into the argument of Salafists, whoadvocateareturntothepracticesofthesalafandrejectanyinnovationsasWesterncorruptionofGod’smessage.InthisgreatcontestforthesoulofMuslimInternetsurfers,theelegantsimplicityandclarityofmilitantSalafismhasnorealcompetitionfrommoretraditional(andtoocomplicated)Islamictradition.

The mass nature of Internet communication encourages sound bites and other reductionist answers todifficult questions. Drawn to their logical conclusion, these views encourage extreme, abstract, butsimplistic solutions,without regard to the reality and complexity of life. The universal availability ofthesechatroomstendstoreducethelevelofdiscoursetothelowestcommondenominatorofthegroup.Asmost potential recruits to the jihad are not Islamic scholars, they are attracted by these simplisticviews. At the same time, they believe that they have acquired enough Islamic knowledge to guideimportantlifedecisionswithouthavingrecoursetomoretraditionalscholars.Indeed,SalafistsdominateMuslimInternetsites,mostofwhicharecreatedbyMuslimswhoarelivingintheWest,predominantlyintheAnglo-Saxonworld, andwho have immigrated, converted, or are temporarily studying there (Roy,2002:165-183).TraditionalIslamicschoolstendnottosponsorwebsitesorencourageparticipationinchatrooms.UseoftheInternethascertainrequirements.First,usersneedtohaveaccesstoit,whichimpliessome

familiaritywithacomputerinthepast.Althoughtheymighthavehadsuchaccessinschoolinamoderneducationprogram,mosthadpossessedoneoftheirown.Tobeabletoaffordevenausedcomputerwithaccess to theInternet, theycouldnothavecomefromthepoorestsocialclass in thedevelopingworld.The impoverishedAfghans studying inmadrassas on theAfghan-Pakistani border simply could not beconnectedtotheglobaljihad.Ofcourse,oncefamiliarwiththeiruse,themujahedincaneasilygotoanInternetcaféequippedwithcomputers.Theanonymityoftheseplacesprotectstheidentityoftheuser,andtheir proliferation enables communication even in the developing world. The use of the Internet alsoimpliesamoderneducationthatreliesoncomputersratherthantraditionalIslamicstudies.Indeed,mostmujahedin have a higher technical education rather than a classical one. Finally, they need to have acommonlanguagetobeabletodiscussthingsandexchangeinformation.ThemostcommonlanguageontheInternetisEnglish.Cliquemembersmaycommunicatewithoneanotherintheircommonlanguage;theHamburgcliqueexchangede-mail inGerman.But forcommunicationwith the jihadoutside theclique,EnglishorArabicismostcommon.The Internet can help bridge the gap from the isolated potential mujahed to the global jihad. An

interested person could find out the address ofmosques and some organizations thatmight eventuallymakesuchlinkstothejihadafteranappropriateprocessofvettingthecandidate.However,theInternetdoesnotprovideameans to contact the jihaddirectlynordoes it allow theorganization to assess thereliability of a potential candidate.There is no friendor kin to vouch for him, andhis commitment isuncertain. For the type of allegiance that the jihad demands, there is no evidence that the Internet ispersuasiveenoughbyitself.Sofar,noneofthepeopleinthesamplejoinedthejihadsolelyonthebasisofwhattheyhadreadontheInternet.ManyweresensitizedtoMuslimissuesontheInternetanddevelopedasenseofcollectivesocialidentitythroughit,butnonewentstraightfrominteractingontheInternettoanAfghan trainingcamp.SoalthoughtheInternetmaysocializeapotentialmujahed to the ideologyof theglobalSalafijihad,itisstilluncertainwhetherheiswillingtomakethesacrificesforthejihadandcanbesecurelycountedon.Hestillneedstoundergoanintenseperiodofface-to-faceinteractiontocheckforhiscommitmentanddevotion to thecauseandgeneratebonds thatwillpreventhim frombetraying thecause. The danger of prematurely bringing an acquaintance into the jihad was illustrated in thecircumstancesleadingtoAbdulBasitKarim’sarrest.Themujahedin’sexperienceinAfghantrainingcampsmaystrengthentheirdedicationto the jihad.In

theartificialsettingofthecamps,asemblanceofequalityandfraternitycaneasilybeapproximatedforthe duration of the training. The trainees live in a communal setting, where their normal liferesponsibilities are suspended and mutual care is encouraged. The camps re-create the ideals of themythical umma and give concrete life to the virtual community hinted at on the Internet. The camps

generate an esprit de corps for this ideal umma, for which the graduatemujahedmight be willing tosacrificehimself.

FlexibilityandPerformance

Inthissection,Iwanttoaddresstheimpactofnetworktopologyonitsflexibilityandperformance.Small-worldnetworksarecomposedofnodeslinkedtowell-connectedhubs.Hubsreceivethemost

communications from themore isolated nodes. Because of their larger numbers, innovations aremorelikelyinnodes.Thenodeslinktohubswho,inturn,sendtheinformationalongtheirnumerousotherlinks.If the appropriate hub likes the innovation, he will likely encourage it by communicating to theappropriatenodes.Thegenesisoftheplanbehindthe9/11operationsisacaseinpoint.AbdulBasitKarim’schildhood

friendAbdulHakimMuradbecameapilot in theUnitedStates in the late1980s.Hedreamedofusingairplanesasweapons,fillingthemupwithexplosivesanddive-bombingintothePentagonortheCentralIntelligenceAgencyheadquarters.AfterMuradbecameamemberofKarim’sterroristcellaround1993,KarimintroducedMurad tohisuncleKhalidSheikhMohammed,whobecamefascinatedwithMurad’sidea. In late 1994, they all went toManila to plot operations against the visiting Pope and PresidentClinton and devised theBojinka plot of blowing up eleven airliners over the Pacific in a day’s time.Karim’scomputer,captured inManila inJanuary1995,contained theoutlinesof theBojinkaplot.Onealternative to this plan was crashing the airliners into theWorld Trade Center, theWhite House, thePentagon,theJohnHancockTowerinBoston,theSearsTowerinChicago,andtheTransamericaTowerinSanFrancisco(FoudaandFielding,2003:99).In1996,MohammedproposedMurad’splantoOsamabinLaden,whoallegedlyreplied:“Whydoyou

use an ax when you can use a bulldozer?” Instead of a single chartered plane filled with explosivestargetingCIAheadquarters,binLadensuggestedthe“bulldozer”approachofhijackingseveralpassengerjetsandflyingthemintotheirtargetsasairbornebombs(MascoloandStark,2003).Mohammedexpandedhis plan to hijacking a dozen aircraft simultaneously on both coasts and even targeting nuclear powerplants(FoudaandFielding,2003:114).By1999,thedifficultyofcoordinatingsuchanambitiousattackforcedMohammedtosettleonthesimultaneoushijackingoffourpassengeraircrafttobeusedasflyingbombs.WhenhepassedthebatonfortheexecutionoftheoperationtoAttaandbinal-Shibh,thegeneraloutline of the plan was already sanctioned by bin Laden himself. Mohammed functioned as hubsclassicallydointhediffusionofinformation.Withtheirnumerouslinks,hubsareamongthefirsttonoticeandusetheexperienceofinnovators,Muradinthiscase.Theirconversiontothenewideaisthekeytolaunching it throughout the network. If they resist it, they prevent it from reaching others, and theinnovationwillfail.Iftheyacceptit,theyinfluencealargenumberofpeople.Inadditiontorapidlydiffusinginnovations,thetopologyofasmall-worldnetworkisalsoabletoadapt

to changing circumstances and solve unforeseen obstacles in the execution of general plans. Thisflexibilityisespeciallyusefulinterroristoperations.Whenaterroristnetworkembarksonamajornewoperation,thepeopleinvolveddonotknowexactlyhowtheyaregoingtodoit.Noroleisspecifiedinadvance.Eachmujahedstartswithageneralnotionofwhatisrequiredofhimandimproviseswithothermujahedin ashegoes along.Terrorist operations arenot so frequent that theybecome routine, for lawenforcement forceswould then catch on and be able to prevent them. These operations involvemuchuncertainty and many unanticipated obstacles. This state of affairs requires communication amongmutuallydependentmujahedin,inthesensethateachpossessesinformationandresourcesrelevanttotheother and none has enough to act in isolation. At this local level, the mujahedin form a network of

information processors, where the network handles large volumes of information efficiently withoutoverloading any individual processor. The self-organizing hubs and nodes topology of a small-worldnetworkorthedensetopologyofacliqueperformsthisfunctionverywell.Communicationsarepossiblehorizontallyamongmultiplenodes,allowingthemtosolvetheirproblemslocallywithouthavingtoreferthemupwardtoCentralStaffandoverwhelmingtheverticallinksofcommunication.This flexibilityand local initiativeofsmall-worldnetworksandcliquescontrastwith the rigidityof

hierarchies,whichdonotadaptwell toambiguitybutareexcellentatexertingcontrol. Inanoperatingterrorist hierarchy, the uneven burden of information processing jams the chain of command. Centralstafferswhotrytomicromanagewillbecomeoverburdenedandineffectiveindealingwithunanticipatedobstacles.Terroristorganizations advocate strict compartmentalization tomaintain security in a hostileenvironment. This implies a hierarchy with slow communications because of the vulnerability tointerception of faster ones. Slow communications prevent the network from responding to newdevelopmentsinatimelyfashionandwillfurtherdegradeitseffectiveness.AccordingtoGunaratna(2002:76-84),whohadanopportunitytoexamineseveralversionsoftheal

Qaeda trainingmanuals and theEncyclopediaof theAfghan Jihad, alQaedaprescribed the traditionalstrict hierarchical cell structure according to a need-to-know principlewith compartmentalization andsecure communication. This model was “composed of many cells whose members do not know oneanother,sothatifacellmemberiscaughttheothercellswouldnotbeaffectedandworkwouldproceednormally”(76).Likewise,operationsfollowedthreephases.First,targetintelligenceisobtainedbyoneteamandrelayedtoanattackteaminAfghanistanforplanningandrehearsing.Next,athirdteamcomestothe area of operations and organizes the logistical support: safe houses, vehicles, weapons, andexplosives.Last, theattack teamarrives,putseverything together,andconducts theattack. If it isnotamartyrdommission,itwithdrawsaftercompletionoftheoperation.Althoughthisstrategyensuressecrecyandsecurity,italsoencouragesfailure.Toovercometheinevitableobstaclesinherentinanylarge-scaleterroristorganization,theoperational

networkneedsgoodcommunicationatthelocallevel.The1998EastAfricaembassybombings,the2000USSCole bombing, the9/11operations, and the2002Balibombings succeededowing to the fact thatunanticipatedlocalproblemswereresolved.TheEastAfricanoperationwasveryunusualinthatitwasfive years in the making and the only one that involved the direct on-the-ground participation of theCentral Staff, includingAliAmin al-Rashidi (a.k.a. abuUbaydah al-Banshiri), the head of alQaeda’smilitary committee. Although it did follow the pattern outlined in the manual, it had enough time toanticipateandresolvemostobstacles.TheUSSColeoperationcameontheheelsofthefailedattackonUSSThe Sullivans ninemonths earlier. The local team’s success in escaping detection allowed it toadjusttothecircumstancesandblowalargeholeintheUSSColeonthesecondtry.Despitethedramaticsuccessof the9/11plan, carriedout by theHamburg clique, theoperation itselfwas characterizedbypoor tradecraft, allowing investigators to quickly identify the perpetrators. There was littlecompartmentalization,andeachcellmixedfreelywiththeothers.Attahadtheauthoritytochoosethedateof the operation and the targets. The operators met frequently in Las Vegas and Florida and traveledtogether.Indeed,theoperationsucceededbecausetheydidnotfollowtheirownrules.Becausemostofthe planners, including the field coordinator and principal executors, were from the same clique andinformallybenefitedfromthefreeflowofinformation,theywereabletoovercomethemyriadobstaclestheyencountered.Likewise,fourofthemajorparticipantsinthe2002Balibombingbelongedtothesamefamilyandanotherwastheirnext-doorneighborfromchildhood.Althoughthefieldcommanderwasnotpartofthistightlyknitgroup,henodoubtbenefitedfromtheinformalflowofinformationinthefamily.Thesuccessoftheseoperationsmaybeduetotheirviolationsoftheirownoperationalguidelines.

Otherglobal jihadoperationswerefailures: theDecember1999AmmanandLosAngelesmillennialplots,theDecember2000Strasbourgplot,ChristmasEve2000IndonesianchurchandManilabombings(eventhoughitcausedafewdeaths,thismustbeconsideredafailureduetopoorexecution),theJanuary2000USSTheSullivansplot; the fall2001ParisU.S.embassyplot; theDecember2001shoebomberandSingaporebombingplots;andsummer2002StraitsofGibraltarplot.Theperpetratorstriedtofollowtheguidelinesinthemanualbutranintounanticipatedproblems.Thelackofeffectivecommunicationsledtofailuresofexecutionortodiscoveryoftheplot.ArealdangeroftheglobalSalafijihadisitsinformal,decentralizedstructure.OsamabinLadenseems

to provide some upfrontmoney for various operations and leaves it to themujahedin to find the rest.Sometimestheseactivitiestoraisemoneythroughpettycrimealertlawenforcementofficials,wholaterdetectthemajoroperation.Thisforcesthemujahedintoimprovise.Theselastminutestrategiesoftenfail,astheLosAngelesmillennialandStraitsofGibraltarplotshowed.Butgivenadedicatedandmethodicalfieldcommanderwholeavesnodetails tochanceandisfullyfundedfromCentralStaffsoas toavoiddetection in raising money, the results of such local improvisation supported by good localcommunicationsamongtheplotterscanbedevastating.

TheStrengthofWeakBondsSofarIhaveconsideredtheinfluenceofclosefriendshipsonthetransformationofpotentialcandidatesintocommittedfanatics.Themostintensefriendshipswereformedincliques.Initspurestform,acliqueisadensenetworkofnodes,eachconnectedtoeveryotherone.Thedynamicsdescribedseemtopointtoaprocessofsocial implosion,with thecliqueasawholefoldingonto itself,withnoconnectionto theoutsideworld.Inthisextremeconditionsuchaclique,despitedesiringtojointhejihad,wouldhavenowayofdoingsosincenonodewouldhaveaccesstoalink.Yetifanodeweretohaveastronglinktoanoutsidebridgetothejihad,thisbridgewouldbesuckedintothecliqueandprogressivelygiveuphislinktothejihadsinceitwouldbeoutsidetheclique.Sohowdoesacliqueconnecttothejihad?Letus return to theMontrealandHamburgcliques. In theMontrealcase,RessamaskedHannachi,a

peripheralmemberofthatnetwork,toarrangetheformallinkwiththejihad.Thisinitselfissurprising,forRessamwasalreadywellacquaintedwithFatehKamel,theleaderofthenetwork.Inretrospect,Icanonly speculate about this reason. Ressam said that he got the desire to undergo military training inAfghanistanonlyinthesummerof1997afterHannachi’sreturnfromthecamps.Atthetime,Kamelwasalready traveling extensively, and it is possible that he was no longer available to make the bridge.Alternatively,Hussein(a.k.a.abuZubaydah)waspromotedtohispositionofwelcomingnewcandidatesonly in1996,afterOsamabinLaden’s returnfromtheSudan.Kamel,whohadundergone training longbeforethen,mightnothavebeenpartofthisnewnetworkbringingnewmembersintothejihad.HemaythenhavesimplycontinuedaschiefofthelogisticalsupportfortheMaghrebArabclusterwithnoroleinrecruitment.Afterhisarrest,MakhlulifreplacedhimandheldthedualpositionoflogisticssupportchiefandgeneralrecruiterfortheMaghrebArabcluster.In the Hamburg case, Mohamed Heidar Zammar, again a peripheral acquaintance of the clique, is

widelycreditedwithbeingthebridgebetweenthecliqueandthejihad.Somewentsofarastosuggestthatherecruitedthem,butthisisnotplausible.Incontrasttothewelleducatedandsophisticatedmembersof the clique,Zammarwas loud andboastedof his past exploits onbehalf of the jihad, in essence anadvertisementofhislinktothejihad.Instead,heprobablyhelpedthecliquemakethelink.Inbothcases,weakties to thecliquewere thebridge to the jihad.Inmanysocialprocessessuchas

gettingajob,learningaboutnewinformationandspreadingfadsorrumors,weaktiesaremoreimportant

than strong friends (Granovetter, 1973 and 1983). In a social world of cliques, strong friends lumptogetherintoseparategroups.Sofar,thereisnoconnectionbetweenthemandtheyareindangerofsocialimplosion, totallydisconnectedfromtherestof theworld.Whatkeeps thesecliquesconnected toeachotherareweakties,linkingcertainmembersofonecliquetoanother.Thesetiesarenotstrongenoughtoincludetheoutsideindividualsintheclique.Buttheyplayacrucialroleinbridgingthecliquetotherestof theworld.As in these two examples,weak ties play this crucial role in bringing enthusiastic newcandidatestothejihad.Thisisaself-generatingprocessfrombelowratherthanarecruitmentdrivefromabove.In our two case studies, bothHannachi andZammar shared characteristics thatmight be useful to a

broker-link into the jihad.Theyhadwidevisibility andprestige.Theywere loudmouthswithoutmuchregardforoperationalsecurity.Theirprestigecamefromthefactthatbothhadfoughtinwarsaftertheirtraining. Such combat experience showed life-risking commitment for the jihad. War is also moreacceptablethanterrorismbecauseofthefactthatciviliansaretraditionallynotintentionaltargets.Theyweremodels that youngmilitantMuslimswanted to emulate.Members of theMontreal andHamburgcliquesgavethenamesofthesetwohighlyvolublebutperipheralindividualsastheirmaininspirationtojoin the jihad rather than themuchmore important and activemembers of the jihad they knew, FatehKamelandMohamadouOuldSlahi,respectively.TheHamburgcliquewantedtofightinChechnyaratherthantraininAfghanistan.SlahipersuadeditsmemberstogotoAfghanistaninstead.Thereseemstobeacontrastbetweenthemoresecretiveandbrainytypes,whogointoterrorismand

avoid publicity about their exploits, and the less discreet and unsophisticated broker types,who bragabout their doings. Because of their lack of discretion, the brokers are unlikely to be trusted forinvolvement in true clandestine operations. A potential broker must both be highly visible and havesuperficial contacts with others rather than be discreet with strong commitment to others. Theirunintentionalbutorganizationallyimportantrolesmaybeconfinedtobeingapassivebridgetothejihad.Theywerefarfromtheactiveandpersuasiverecruiterspostulatedbymostcommentatorsofthejihad.Thisprocessofcliquesjoiningthejihadasgroupshasstrongimplicationsforitsrateofgrowth,which

dependsonitsabilitytoforgelinkswiththepoolofpotentialmembers.Thestructureofthispoolaffectsthis rate. If the pool is composed of isolated individuals, its growthwill be slow, for each potentialmemberwillneedhisownbridge.Ifthepooliscomposedofcliquesoffriends,families,orworshippers,however,thejihadwillexperienceexplosivegrowthasonelinkbringsclustersofnewfighters,eachofwhomcanthenserveasanefficientweaktietonewpotentialmembers.The degree of ambient hostility or tolerance to the jihad also affects its rate of growth. In tolerant

countrieswherepeoplelikeZammarcanpublicly“advertise”theirconnectiontothejihad,applicantscanreachouttothemtomakethebridge.Thiscongenialatmosphereoftolerancebasedontheprinciplesofreligious tolerance and free speech characterized Western Europe and the United States prior toSeptember11,2001.ThiswasalsothecaseuntilrecentlyinSaudiArabia,Yemen,Malaysia,Indonesia,and a bit more subtly in Salafi mosques sympathetic to the cause. Given the worldwide post-9/11clampdowns on global Salafi mujahedin, with credible threats of incarceration for even peripheralinvolvementwiththejihad,humanbridgestothejihadhavebecomereluctanttorevealtheiraffiliation.Thisslowsdownconsiderablytheexpansionofthejihad.The bridge to the jihad seems to have determinedwhere the newmujahedwould be deployed. If a

Maghreb Arab had made the arrangement, the candidate would train with other Maghreb Arabs andeventuallybeinacellwithotherMaghrebArabs,underthesupervisionofAbuZubaydah.Iftheoriginallink was through a Core Arab, the eventual mujahed would be in the Core Arab cluster, under thesupervisionofKhalidSheikhMohammed.SotheHamburgcellbelongedtotheCoreArabclusterdespite

the fact that half the cell consisted of Arabs who were originally from the Maghreb. Likewise, theJordaniansintheJordanmillennialplotmadecontactthroughaMaghrebArabandendedupbeingapartof the Maghreb Arab cluster. These clusters seemed to be compartmentalized, with their respectiveoperations depending on different logistical support. Although the mujahedin were richly connectedwithin their own cluster, they were separated from those in the other clusters. There were very fewexceptionstothisrule.TheSyrians(Yarkas,Darkazanli,andZammar)kneweachotherandspannedtheCoreandMaghrebArabclusters.Moussaouicrossedallthreeclusters.HestartedoutwiththeMaghrebArabsinEngland,gotinvolvedwiththeCoreArabclusterinAfghanistan,whodispatchedhimforflighttrainingtoMalaysia,wherehemettheSoutheastAsians.HewaslinkedtotheCoreArabclusterthroughbinal-Shibhwhenhewasarrested.KhalidSheikhMohammedandhisprotégéMohammadJabarahalsobridgedtheCoreArabsandSoutheastAsianclusters.

ConclusionIn conclusion, the final shape of the global Salafi jihad consists of fourmajor clusters surrounded byinnumerableislandsconsistingofcliquesandsingletonsofpotentialcandidates.AtthetopistheCentralStaffcluster,whichconnectstotherestoftheclusters.Thestructureofthisclusterisdifficulttodescribe.Itisbothaninformalself-organizinggroupoffriendsandacquaintancesforgedduringtheSoviet-AfghanwarandahierarchicalorganizationwithOsamabinLadenasitsemir,supportedbyashuracomposedofaboutadozenmembersanddominatedbyEgyptians.Thestaffisdividedintofourcommittees,consistingof finances, military affairs, religious affairs, and public relations. There is nomention of personnel,recruitment, intelligence, or logistics. I presume that the first function probably falls under finances,whereasthelasttwocomeunderthemilitarycommittee.Recruitmentisstillamystery.ThetwoArabclustersapproximatesmall-worldnetworks.TheSoutheastAsianclusterconsistsofthe

JemaahIslamiyah,whichismorehierarchicallyorganized.Therearemultiplealliancesamongseparateorganizationsinthejihad.ClosetotheMaghrebArabclusteraretheGroupeSalafistepourlaPrédicationet le Combat and formerGroupe IslamiqueArmé, theMoroccan Salafia Jihadia, and various smallerviolent jihad organizations. The Core Arab cluster is close to the Egyptian Islamic Jihad (in fact, alQaeda is now officially merged with this organization), the Egyptian Islamic Group, al-Tawhid, andvarioussmallerYemeniorganizations.TheIndonesianJemaahIslamiyahiscloselyalliedwiththeMoroIslamicLiberationFront.Theseorganizationsarethetipoftheicebergofthosewhosympathizeandmaywanttoparticipateinthejihad.Thismuchlargerdisconnectedandunorganizednetworkconsistsofsmallcliquesandsingletonswhowanttojointhejihadbuthavenotbeenabletodoso.Thispoolofpotentialcandidatesmay increase or decrease according to sociopolitical events in the world. But in order toformallyjointhejihad,theseindividualsstillneedtofindabridge.Thisnetworkisthepictureemergingfrommydata.ValdisKrebs(2002aand2002b)publishedanearly

map of the network of the 9/11 terrorists based on preliminary data. The resulting mapping showsinaccurate linksandneglectsothermuchmore importantones.Hewason the right track,but rushed topublish too early. This present picture fits better what we have now learned about the structure anddynamicsofthenetworks.This informal social network analysis allowsus tomake statements that noother perspective in the

fieldof terrorismventures to state.These canbe empirically tested. In this chapter, Imade statementsabouttheself-organizingevolutionofsomeoftheclustersandhowtheyaffectedstructure,robustnesstorandomattacks,vulnerabilitytotargetedattack,distributionandabilitytocarryonthefightintheUnitedStates,andtheimpactonitsoperationallimitsofthelackofsocialembeddednessofthenetwork.Ialso

madestatementsabout thenatureof theparticipants inthejihad, theirfrequentorganizationsincliques,which have a transformational effect on their members, and the lack of a common profile of themujahedin. I analyzed the impact of the new communication technology and the Internet on the jihad;argued that the topologyof thenetwork affects its flexibility andperformance; and concludedwith thecrucialroleplayedbyweakacquaintancesthatprovidedthecriticalbridgestothejihad.OsamabinLaden’smostbrilliantstrokemaywellhavebeentoallowtheglobalSalafijihadnetwork

toevolve spontaneouslyandnaturally, andnot interfere toomuchwith its evolution, except toguide itthroughincentivesbecauseofhiscontrolofresources.Thesystemdevelopedintoasmall-worldnetworkwith robustness and flexibility and became more militant and global for both internal and externalreasons. Bin Laden’s relatively hands-off policy and repeated pleas for Islamist unity before the “farenemy” is unusual. The commonwisdom in the field of terrorism is that terrorist leaders suffer from“malignantnarcissism”(Post,Ruby,andShaw,2002b:118).Asapracticingpsychiatrist,Idonotknowofany reliable, agreedupondefinition of this vague term.But it seems that terrorist leaders thrive onpowerandcontroloftheirorganizations.OsamabinLadenseemstobetheopposite.Heispubliclyself-effacingandseemscontent to relinquishcontrolofanorganization (whichwouldhave impliedamorehierarchical structure) for the sake of efficacy. He shows his disapproval not by killing his potentialrivalsbutsimplybywithdrawingfundsfromthemuntiltheycomebacktohisfold.Thistypeofleadershipis rare and may well account for the robustness of the global Salafi jihad, its ability to respond tochangingconditions,anditswidespreadappealtoMuslimyouths.A more common pattern of leadership is that exercised by Abu Bakar Baasyir. Although the more

hierarchical Jemaah Islamiyah escaped detection far longer than al Qaeda, it is now in danger ofdisappearing. In2000, the Indonesiangovernmenthadnot reactedagainst theambitiousChristmasEvechurchbombings.The2002Balibombingsgalvanizedthemtoaction.NowmostoftheJemaahIslamiyahleadership is in jail.Theimprisonedmemberswillbedifficult toreplace,althoughsomeother leadersarestillat largeandmaybecapableofrebuildingthenetwork.Likewise, thegovernmentofSingaporewasabletoeliminatetheJemaahIslamiyahthreatbecauseitswell-orderedstructurewascreatedfromthetop insteadof evolving from thebottom. In contrast, the topologyof the rest of theglobalSalafi jihadallowedittosurviveafarmoredevastatingblowfromaU.S.governmentmobilizedbythehorrorsofthe9/11operations.

Conclusion

The global Salafi jihad is a threat to the world. Its theater of operations spans the globe, and itsapocalypticvisionmeltsawayanybarrierstoitsplannedatrocities.Itwillnothesitatetouseweaponsofmassdestructiontofurtheritsmission.Eliminationofthismovementisimperative.Thewaronthistypeof terrormust be fought onmany fronts. Some of themacro-level factors that influenced thisMuslimrevivalist social movement, such as Western policies toward Muslim countries, social policies ofimmigrationandeducationintheWesternworld, lackofoccupationalopportunitiesintheMiddleEast,and state policies toward religious practices are beyond the scopeof this book.Several other authorshavealreadyandverycompetentlycoveredthelargersocial,cultural,economic,andpoliticalfactorsthatencourage the jihad (Khosrokhavar, 1997 and 2002; Kepel, 2002; Roy, 2002). In conclusion, I shallconfinemyremarkstopracticalrecommendationsdrawnfrommyempiricalfindings.

LawEnforcementIssuesInthewaronterror,theUnitedStatesandmanyothercountriesarealreadydoingmanythingsright.Manyofthefollowingrecommendationssimplyamounttogoodpolicework.Thesocialnetworkanalysisgivesitatheoreticalframe.

Nodes

ThenatureofthenetworksofthevariousclusterscomposingtheglobalSalafijihaddictatesavarietyofstrategies.Thesmall-worldapproximationoftheMaghrebandCoreArabnetworkimpliesacoordinatedattacktargetedagainstitssocialhubs.Theyareparticularlyvulnerablebecausemostcommunicationsandhumancontactsgothroughthem.Arrestingtheseindividualswoulddegradethesenetworksintoisolatedunits, singletons or cliques, who would consequently be incapable of mounting complex large-scaleoperationsowingtolackofexpertiseandlogisticalandfinancialsupport.Small-scaleoperationswouldbevery hard to eradicate completely, butwithout spectacular successes to sustain theirmotivation forterrorism, isolatedoperatorswill lose theirenthusiasm.Thesesmall-scaleoperationscanstillbequitedeadly,asshownintheCasablancabombingsin2003.Buttheseshouldbetreatedasstraightforwardlawenforcementmatters.Thiswillreduceterrorismtosimplecriminalityandnotallowterroriststopromotetheiragendaofjihad,whichmightfurtherinspirealienatedyoungmentotakeupthecause.Winningthemediawartolabelterroristsascriminalsratherthanbravemujahedinisespeciallyimportanttoeliminatethe appeal of self-sacrifice for a cause and discourage potential terrorists from engaging in suchbehaviors.Random arrests of low-level individuals (nodes) at border points will not degrade the network.

Increased vigilance will stop terrorists from coming to the United States and prevent them fromconducting operations onAmerican soil. This is a good thing, but this protection comes not from theactualarrestsoftheterrorists,butfromthefearofarrestthatdiscouragesothersfromtryingtocomehere.Nevertheless,itdoesnoteliminateterrorism;itdisplacesittosofttargetsinmoreaccessiblecountries.The post-9/11 wave of bombings in traditional places of sanctuary, such as Saudi Arabia, Indonesia,Morocco, Yemen, Pakistan, and Afghanistan, seems to be an implicit admission of weakness fromterrorists. These operations provoked responses from those countries, which had previously been

reluctant topursueorprosecute terrorists in their territory.Thiscrackdowndenies terrorists the refugethey previously enjoyed and further degrades their network. The new enthusiasm of Indonesia, SaudiArabia, and Morocco for the war on terror is a direct result of the terrorists’ violation of thesegovernments’ previous implicit policy of live and let live. Britain,which has traditionally acted as asanctuary formany terroristswhowere tried and sentenced in other countries,maybe at great risk ofterroristattacksnowthataccesstoothertargetsisdenied.The nature of the Jemaah Islamiyah networks dictates a different strategy. The Jemaah Islamiyah is

structuredalonghierarchicallines,andthenetworkcanbedegradedthroughdecapitation,thearrestofitsleaders.Aneffort toroundthemuphasbeenunderwaysincethe2002Balibombings,andtheJemaahIslamiyah could be eliminated if the leaders remaining at large cannot rebuild it from the top down.Operational planning and support was always top-down, with little evidence of local initiative. Thenetworkwasbuilton theprincipleofdiscipleship,withmostof itsmemberscomingfromtwoIslamicboardingschools,wheretheywereindoctrinatedwithglobalSalafiideology.Theseschoolsneedtobeclosed down to prevent further education of terrorists. TheMalaysian government has already closeddownthePesentrenLuqmanulHakiem.TheIndonesiangovernmentneedstodothesameforthePondokNgruki. Since Jemaah Islamiyahmembershipwas so closely linked to these schools, their faculty andstudentsoverthepast twodecadesshouldbetrackeddownandinvestigated.ThiswouldnarrowdownthefieldconsiderablyinIndonesia.Fromapragmatic lawenforcementperspective,ashift indevotionmayprovideaclue to impending

illegaloperations.Byprescription,Salafistsadoptastrictcodeofbehavior,dress,andappearance,andarethereforeeasilyrecognizable.Theyabstainfromalcoholandlewdness,growbeards,anddressinatraditional Muslim style. Sudden abandonment of this lifestyle should raise an alarm. Shaving theirbeards,dressinginaWesternway,orusingperfumeatairportsmaysignal that theyaretryingtoblendwith the surrounding society or conceal something from authorities. Indeed, any sudden change from aSalafitoaWesternappearanceshouldimmediatelybeinvestigated.Theoddsarethatitisafalsealarmand not grounds for arrest, but it should raise the index of suspicion about the reason for the change.Intelligence“eyesandears”intheSalaficommunityshouldalerttheauthoritiesofthechangeandprompturgentinvestigation.Likewise,thedemandforanewpassportfromaSalafiMuslimshouldraisetheindexofsuspicion.It

was commonpractice for thosewhocould travel to theWest to report their passports lost inorder toeliminate any trace of previous travel to Afghanistan or Pakistan thatmight trigger scrutiny at borderpoints.Thisattempttoconcealpasttravelmaybeanindicationofmalevolentintentions.

Links

One of the major conclusions of this study is that social bonds play a more important role in theemergenceoftheglobalSalafijihadthanideology.Friendsandrelativesofidentifiedterroristsneedtobepursuedandinvestigatedwherevertheyreside.Especiallyimportantarethosewhowerefriendsofaterroristjustbeforehestartedactsinfurtheranceofthejihad,suchastravelingtoAfghanistanfortraining.ThesefriendshelpedtransformhimfromanalienatedMuslimintoadedicatedglobalSalafimujahed.Astheywereclosefriends,probablypartofaclique,thesefriendsareprobablyalsomujahedinthemselvesor strong supporters of the global jihad. Because of the amount of time members of a clique spendtogetherandthedensenetworkofrelationshipstheyrepresent,itshouldnotbeverydifficulttoidentifyallthemembersofaclique.Eachshouldbecloselyinvestigatedforformallinkswiththejihad.Relatives,includingin-laws,especiallyofconverts,shouldnotbeoverlookedinthisprocess.

Peripheral social acquaintances were crucial to the process of joining the jihad. These need to beidentified and investigated as well, as they were the ones who made the introduction.Without thesebridges,potentialcandidateswouldnothavebeenabletojointhejihad.Theseindividualswillbemoredifficult to identifybecause theywerenotpartof thedensenetworkof thecliques.However, theyareprobablywherethemembersofthecliquefoundthem,namelyaroundthemosquesthattraditionallysendpotentialcandidatestoAfghantrainingcamps.Thesefewmosquesneedtobecloselymonitoredorshutdown.Previoussiteswherelinkstothejihadhavebeenmademustbeinvestigated,intheeventabridgeislyinglowinthevicinity.Hemayalsohavemoved;thesearchshouldfocusonindividualswhowerearound at the timeof the contactwith the jihad in addition to any suspicious longtimemembers of thecongregation.Thethreatofincarcerationcreatesahostileenvironmentandpreventsthesehumanbridgesfrom freely advertising their connection to the jihad and facilitating the enrollment of new members.Thesehumanbridgesmightalsobemoreusefulforpotentialcollaborationwithintelligenceagenciesthanmembersofaclique,whosestrongemotionalbondsdiscouragebetrayal.The importance of intercepting andmonitoring terrorist communications through satellite telephone,

landline phone, e-mail, facsimiles, and Internet chat rooms has already been established. With goodinternational police cooperation, these activities have led to the arrest of many important terrorists.Implanting listening devices in places frequented by terrorists has also provided a window on theirinteractions. Even when these links are not monitored, the fear that they might be hinders terroristcommunications because they revert to slower, more securemeans of exchanging information such aslettersorface-to-facecontact.Thisdegradestheirabilitytosuperviseworldwideoperations.ThefailureoftheplottobombnavalvesselsintheStraitsofGibraltarinthesummerof2002waspartlyaresultofsuchdifficultiesincommunicationbetweenthefieldactioncommandoandthelieutenantoverseeingtheoveralloperation.The elimination of easily accessible training camps prevents potential candidates from learning

terroristskillsandfindingresourcestocarryoutoperations.ThishasbeendoneinAfghanistanandthePhilippines. There may still be some areas where training can take place, outside the reach ofinternational governments, in the Philippines, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Indonesia, Yemen, Palestine,Lebanon,Chechnya,andCentralAsianMuslimstates.Somefailedstatesthatdonotexercisecontrolovermuchof their territoriesarepotential sites forsuchcamps.Theremoteness thatprovidessecurity fromeffective governmental interference, however, also prevents easy access for potential candidates.Nevertheless, suspicious movements, especially by Muslim fundamentalists, need to be monitored todetect theestablishmentofnewcamps.RemoteareasofIraqwitheasyaccesstoIran,Turkey,orSyriamaybefuturesitesforsuchcamps,asthepresenceofU.S.troopsinIraqwillactasamagnetforglobalSalafiterrorists,whowillnaturallytargetwhattheyseeastheinfidelinvadersofMuslimlands.TheintenseinternationalvigilanceafterSeptember11,2001,makestheestablishmentofsuchtraining

sitesdifficult. I suspect that in the future, the trainingofglobalSalafimujahedinwill bedone locally,where the candidates volunteer. If so, the experience inMoroccomay be thewave of the future. TheperpetratorsoftheCasablancabombingswentonweekendorweek-longcampingtripsincavesorforestsin thevicinityof largecities,where they followedmilitarydisciplineand learnedaboutbombmakingfrom local “experts,”whohadbeenpreviously trained inAfghanistan.Thequality of the trainingwaspoor,buttheireffortsstillresultedinsignificantcarnage.

PenetrationoftheGlobalSalafiJihadThegreatestprioritynowshouldbeextensivepenetrationofthejihad.Recruitmentofagentsinplaceisa

difficulttaskbecauseofthestrongemotionalbondsamongmembersofthejihad,makingthemreluctanttobetray their friendsand their faith.Thebestavenueforpenetration lies in recruitment fromthepoolofthosewhowentthroughthetrainingbutdecidednottojointhejihad.Althoughthereisnoevidencethatthese people are actively involved in terrorist operations, they are being prosecuted for providingmaterialsupportandresourcestothejihad.Beforeprosecutingthem,alleffortsshouldbemadetotrytoturnthemaroundandhavethemgobackandjointhejihad.TheirabilitytooperateclandestinelyintheUnited States makes them attractive recruits for the jihad. At present, however, they are unlikely tovolunteer the fact that they have undergone training in Afghanistan for fear of prosecution. Perhaps apolicyofimmunityinexchangeforagood-faithefforttohelpfightthejihadmayhelpconvincesometovolunteer.Theimplicationfrommyexaminationofthebackgroundandcircumstancesofthemujahedinisthatit

willbedifficulttorecruitanagentinplacebecauseofhiscommitmenttohisfaithandstrongemotionalbondstohisfellowterrorists.Thereisalwaysthepossibilitythatsomemujahedinbecomedisillusionedwith their organizations. Most will try to disappear and keep a low profile—the strategy of theLackawanna Six. Somemay be willing to provide information in exchange for consideration in theirprosecution. This was the case of al-Fadl and Kherchtou, who testified at the East Africa embassybombingstrial in2001.Thesourceofdisillusionmentwaslackofsupportfromtheorganizationinonecase and discovery of embezzlement in the other. The government should be ready to try to turn themaroundandconvincethemtoreturntothejihadasagentsinplace,atleastforawhileiftheyhavenotyetburnedtheirbridges.Ifaterroristorganizationgoesfromfailuretofailure,disillusionmentmaysetinforatleastsomemembers,whocouldbecomesusceptibletodealswithprosecutors.Thegovernmentshouldadvertise a program of consideration on a case-by-case basis for people wishing to volunteer theirservicestoencouragesuchdefectionsanddesiretoworkinplace.Eliminationofthethreatofterrorismshouldtakepriorityoverprosecutionsaimedatmakingexamplesofpastterrorists.If,asreportedin thepress, theLackawannaSixwerenotplanningany terroristattacks, theaggressivepolicyofprosecutingthemwithoutexploringwaystousethemforpenetrationofthejihadwasamishandledopportunityinthewar on terror. Here, I am arguing for a carrot (generous consideration of one’s cooperation andwillingness to take risks in fighting terrorism in sentencing) and stick (aggressive prosecution ofterrorists,collaborators,andactivesupporterstoeliminatethepublicbridgestothejihad)approach.Intelligenceagenciesareunlikelytorecruitanagentinplacesimplythroughacoldpitchorthroughthe

classicalagentacquisitioncycle.Theyaremorelikelytofindsuccessiftheyidentifyaterrorist,thengoandrecruitsomeoneclosetohimbutnotpartofthejihad.Thispersonmaybemorelikelytocooperatewith the government and then approach his relative or friend. These prior social bondswill help theintermediateagent to reach the terrorist,probe forvulnerability,andprogressivelysuggestcooperationwiththegovernmentiftheterroristisvulnerableandsusceptibletothispitch.Thisindirectapproachhasagreaterlikelihoodofsuccessthanadirectapproach.Imamsofconservativeorfundamentalistmosqueswhorejectterrorismcouldbeexcellentsourcesof

informationon theircongregations.Theywouldbevaluableallies to recruit in thewaron terror.Theymayknowwhichmembersoftheircongregationsarerelativesorformerfriendsofsuspectedterrorists.Suchpersonscanbecomeintermediaryagentswhocanprobetheterrorist.Again,prematurearrestmayfoilthemuchgreaterpriorityofhavingapenetrationoftheterroristorganization.

DecreasingthePoolofPotentialTerroristsThe war against global Salafi terror also requires active support from American and other Muslim

communities.Interactingwiththemrequiresskillandculturalsensitivity,asdoesrecruitmentandhandlingof Muslim agents. I would suggest the creation of a special cadre of case officers, with strongbackgroundsinMuslimculturesandperhapslanguage,tohandlethesepopulationsandagents.Thiscadrecould even be subdivided according to expertise in Southeast Asian, Core Arab, andMaghreb Arabcommunities.Strong-armgovernmentaltacticsantagonizingMuslimcommunitiesintheUnitedStateswillnotearntheirsupportinthefightagainstthejihad.U.S.governmentagenciesurgentlyneedtoimplementactivemeasures to restore their previous good relationship with theMuslim community and elicit itssupport.NotallMuslimfundamentalistsare thesame.JustasEuropeansocialistsactedasabulwarkagainst

Sovietcommunisminthetwentiethcentury,peacefulfundamentalistMuslimgroupssuchastheTablighiJamaat may help to promote a conciliatory message and repudiate terrorist violence. Their help isessential toefforts toneutralize terroristnetworks, for theyattract thesameclustersofalienatedyoungmen as the global Salafi jihad andmay provide themwith a peaceful alternative to terror.Many suchorganizations have been penetrated by the global jihad andmaywelcome outside help to regain theirpuritybyunmaskingandeliminatingthosethatsubverttheirmessage.TheglobalSalafijihadfeedsonanti-Westernandanti-Americanhatespeech.Suchvirulentdiscourse

isanecessaryconditionforthejihadandprovidesajustificationforit.Itisimportanttoeradicateitandencourage civil discourse in Muslim communities. I believe that it is necessary to establish aninternational anti-defamation league to monitor such hate speech and work with the respective press,religiousorganizations,governments,andjusticesystemstocontrolandcondemnit.ThisshouldtargetnotonlyMuslimradicalism,butanyformofintolerantextremismthatpreachesviolenceinsteadofdialogue.TheU.S.governmentshouldshowstrongsupportforsuchaprogramtopromoteuniversaltoleranceandpeace.Anti-Americanoranti-Westernhate speech isnotacceptable.TheBritishhavealreadyadoptedthis position and banned some extremist imams from preaching. There are indications that the Saudigovernment isstarting toreassess theroleofextremistWahhabipreaching inmotivating terrorismaftertheRiyadhbombingsin2003.Thispolicyshouldbeencouraged,butthereisagreatdealmoretodo.ThiscampaignfortoleranceshouldenlistthesupportofmanycourageousMuslimswhochallengetheextremistWahhabi interpretation. The firing of Saudi journalist JamalKhashoggi shows that there is still strongresistancetosuchchallengeinthekingdom.TheU.S.governmentshouldstronglyprotestthisdismissaltotheSaudisandencouragethemtoopenuptheirsterilepresstomorefreedom.Anti-Americanism and anti-Westernism should also be actively countered through the media

worldwide.Magazines and newspapers presenting credible news should bemadewidely available tocountersomeoftheegregiousrumorspropagatedbytheextremistpress.Televisionnewsorganizationscan provide a more balanced perspective to the Middle Eastern populations and encourage realdiscussionsabouttheirsocialandeconomicproblems.TheU.S.interventioninIraqhaschangedtheMiddleEastlandscape,makingtheUnitedStatesadirect

participant inMiddle Eastern politics.Now thatU.S. troops are in Iraq, that conflict has become thelitmus test of our role in theMiddle East and will determine the size of the pool of potential youngvolunteersforthejihad.IfU.S.effortstorebuildIraqfail,itwillbeaboostfortheglobaljihadandtheUnited States must anticipate an increase in terrorist operations. If Iraq can develop a responsivegovernmentforitspeopleandallowthemtolivewellinprosperityandregaintheirpastculturalglory,itwill be amodel for the rest of theMiddleEast to follow. Iraq is a great opportunity but also a greatdanger.Thesedevelopmentswilltakedecades.Thenextfewyearsarecritical.Iraqmayalsoattractallpotentialanti-Westernmujahedinwantingtofighttheinfidelwhohasinvaded

Dar al-Islam. Our presence in Iraq is widely viewed as an occupation now that the liberation from

SaddamHusseinisaccomplished.ThegatheringofaninternationalgroupofmujahedinisreenergizingtheglobalSalafijihad,whichhadbeenfadingawayinthepost-9/11era.Iraqhasthepotentialofbecomingasite, like Peshawar orKhartoum,where the ideology of the global jihad is further developed and theexcitementforthejihadisrenewed.Despitesomemajorvictories,wehavenotyetdefeatedtheglobalSalafijihad.Givenitsstructure,if

werelaxourvigilance,itwillspontaneouslyreconstituteitself.Wemustcontinueourfightbasedonanunderstandingofitsnetworkanddynamics.Withgoodpoliceandintelligenceworkcombinedwithmoreglobalmeasures,internationalassistance,andaneffectivepolicyinIraq,wecanconclusivelyeliminateit.Letmeendbyanticipatinganobjectiontomyanalysis.MyaccountoftheglobalSalafijihadismostly

thatofaself-generatednetworkwithunusualcharacteristicsofrobustnessandflexibilityratherthanonecreated by the intention of binLaden (the intentionalist argument). This perspectivemay trouble somepeople because this weak structuralist account may appear to mitigate his guilt and that of the otherterrorists.Inmydefense,Ipleadthatthisstructuralistflavorisnecessaryatpresenttocounterthestrongintentionalistbiasinthefield.Idonotrejecttheintentionalistargument.Themujahedinwereenthusiastickillers, not robots simply responding to social pressures or group dynamics.While their successwaslargelyduetothedynamicsoftheirnetworks,theleveloffervorandcommitmentwastheirown.Muchofthe success of the 9/11 plot was due to the dedication of Atta, bin al-Shibh, and Khalid SheikhMohammed,andtheinspirationofOsamabinLaden.Thesocialforcesmighthavebeendifficulttoresist,buttheterroristsmustbeheldaccountableforthechoicebetweenenthusiasmandreluctance.Beyondacertainpoint,though,itsimplydoesnotmatter.Subtledegreesofguiltarelostintheseaofdevastation.Any subtle differences in criminal responsibility were obliterated by the tidal wave of blood onSeptember11,2001.LettherebenodoubtthatIregardtheglobalSalafiterroristsasmaximallyguiltyoftheirenormouscrime.

Appendix:NamesofTerrorists

Nameslistedbycluster,inchronologicalorderofjoiningthejihad.Name Alias Date&PlaceofBirth

CentralStaffofalQaeda

OsamabinLaden AbuAbdullah 1957,SaudiArabia

Aymanal-Zawahiri AbdelMuiz,Dr.Nur 1951,Egypt

AliAminAlial-Rashidi AbuUbaydahal-Banshiri Egypt

ShubhiMohammedabuSittah AbuHafsal-Masri,MohdAtef 1957,Egypt

SheikhOmarAbdelRahman 1938,Egypt

MohammedShawqial-Islambuli 1955,Egypt

Zainal-AbidinMohdHussein AbuZubaydah 1971,SaudiArabia

MohammedIbrahimMakkawi Sayfal-Adlal-Madani 1945,Egypt

MustafaAhmedal-Hawsawi 1968,SaudiArabia

RifaiAhmedTaha AbuYasir 1954,Egypt

TalatFuadQasim 1956,Egypt

OsamaRushdi 1960,Egypt

MustafaAhmedHassanHamza 1957,Egypt

KhalidSheikhMohammed 1965,Kuwait

KhalidAbdelRahmanal-Fawwaz 1962,Kuwait

AhmedFadlal-Kalaylah AbuMusabal-Zarqawi 1966,Jordan

Mohammedal-Zawahiri 1954,Egypt

OmarMahmoudOthman AbuQatada 1960,Jordan

MamdouhMahmudSalim AbuHajeral-Iraqi 1958,Iraq

Hamidal-Fakhiri Ibnal-Sheikhal-Libi 1971,Libya

AhmadHusseinMustafaUjayzah 1962,Egypt

JamalAhmedMohdal-Fadl 1963,Sudan

OsamaSiddiqAliAyyubMuntasir 1966,Egypt

Wadihel-Hage AbuAbdullahal-Lubnani 1960,Lebanon

Saidal-SayyidSalamahKhalid 1963,Egypt

AhmedSaidKhadr AbuAbdurrahmanal-Kanadi 1948,Egypt

YasirTawfiqal-Sirri AbuAmmar 1962,Egypt

Sulaymanabu-Ghayth 1965,Kuwait

MustafaKamel AbuHamzaal-Masri 1958,Egypt

TharwatSalahShitahih 1960,Egypt

AdilMohdAbdal-Majid Abdal-Bari 1959,Egypt

Abdal-AzizMusaal-Jamal 1955,Egypt

CoreArabCluster

WaleedMohdTawfiqbinAttash Khallad Yemen

MahmudAbouhalima 1959,Egypt

AliAbdelSuudMohdMustafa AliMohammed,Jeff 1952,Egypt

Khalidal-SayyidAliabual-Dahab SheikhAdam 1964,Egypt

AbdulBasit MahmoudAbdulKarim RamziYousef 1968,Kuwait

AbdulHakimMurad 1968,Kuwait

WaliKhanAminShah Osama 1967,Afghanistan

AbdulShakur 1972,Pakistan

AbdulAzizFahdNasser 1970,SaudiArabia

RiyadHajir 1970,SaudiArabia

MuslihShamrani 1970,SaudiArabia

KhaledAhmedSaid 1970,SaudiArabia

L’HoussaineKherchtou AbuSaidMaghrebi 1964,Morocco

MohammedSadeekOdeh AbuYasser 1965,SaudiArabia

AbdallahMohammedFazul HarounFazul 1973,Comoros

KhalfanKhamisMohamed 1973,Tanzania

AhmedOmarSheikh 1973,England

MohamadouOuldSlahi 1970,Mauritania

AbdalRahimal-Nashiri AbuBilalal-Makki 1966,SaudiArabia

MohamedHeidarZammar 1961,Syria

MohamedRashidDaoudal-Owhali 1977,England

MamounDarkazanli AbuIlyas 1958,Syria

MohammadbinNasserBelfas 1946,Indonesia

Mouniral-Motassadeq 1974,Morocco

AbdelghaniMzoudi 1974,Morocco

SaidBahaj 1975,Germany

Mohamedel-AmirAwadel-SayedAtta AbuAbdulRahmanal-Masri 1968,Egypt

RamziMohdAbdullahbinal-Shibh 1972,Yemen

ZiadAmirJarrah AbuTareqal-Lubnani 1975,Lebanon

Marwanal-Shehhi AbuQaqaaal-Qatari 1978,UnitedArabEmirates

ZakaryaEssabar 1977,Morocco

HaniHanjour Orwahal-Taifi 1972,SaudiArabia

Nawafal-Hazmi Rabiaal-Makki 1975,SaudiArabia

Khalidal-Midhar Sinan 1974,SaudiArabia

Saleemal-Hazmi Bilalal-Makki 1979,SaudiArabia

MajedMishanal-Harbi Majed,Moqed,al-Ahnaf 1979,SaudiArabia

WailMohdal-Shehri AbuMosaebal-Janoubi 1975,SaudiArabia

WaleedMohdal-Shehri AbuSalman 1980,SaudiArabia

Hamzaal-Ghamdi Julaibeebal-Ghamdi 1981,SaudiArabia

AhmedIbrahimal-Ghamdi Ikrimahal-Ghamdi 1980,SaudiArabia

AhmedIbrahimal-Haznawial-Ghamdi IbnJarrahal-Ghamdi 1981,SaudiArabia

AbdulAzizal-Omari Abu-lAbasal-Janoubi 1978,UAE

SatamMohdal-Suqami Azmi 1976,SaudiArabia

FayezAhmadal-Shehri AbuAhmedal-Emarati,BaniHamr 1977,SaudiArabia

Muhannadal-Shehri Omaral-Azdi,Mohandal-Shehri 1977,SaudiArabia

Saeedal-Ghamdi Moataz 1980,SaudiArabia

Ahmedal-Nami AbuHashem 1980,SaudiArabia

ZuherHilalMohammedal-Tbaiti 1976,SaudiArabia

JosePadilla Abdullahal-Muhajir 1970,UnitedStates

AdnanGulshairMohdel-Shukri-Jumah Jafaral-Tayer 1975,SaudiArabia

KamalDerwish AhmedHijazi 1973,UnitedStates

MohammadMansurJabarah Sammy 1982,Kuwait

AbdulRahmanMansurJabarah 1980,Kuwait

ShadiAbdullah 1977,Jordan

OmarKhanSharif 1976,England

AsifHanif 1981,Pakistan

JamalAhmedMohdal-Badawi AbuAbedal-Rahmanal-Badawi Yemen

Fahdal-Quso AbuHathayfahal-Adani Yemen

KhaledMohammedJehani 1974,SaudiArabia

AbdallahKhadr 1980,Canada

AbdelRahmanKhadr 1982,Bahrain

OmarKhadr 1986,Canada

AliAbdalRahmanSaidal-Faqasial-Ghamdi AbuBakral-Azdi 1974,SaudiArabia

OthmanHadiMakbouldal-Mardial-Omari 1966,SaudiArabia

MuhammadOthmanal-Shehri 1972,SaudiArabia

TurkiMishalDandani 1976,SaudiArabia

SoutheastAsianCluster

AbuBakarBaasyir UstazabuSomad 1938,Indonesia

AbdullahSungkar 1937,Indonesia

RiduanIsamuddin EncepNurjaman,Hambali 1964,Indonesia

AliGhufronbinNurhasym Mukhlas 1960,Indonesia

FikiruddinMuqti MohammedIqbal,abuJibril 1959,Indonesia

AbduragakAbubakarJanjalani AbuSayyaf 1961,Philippines

Omaral-Faruq 1971,Kuwait

YassinSyawal Indonesia

FathurRahmanal-Ghozi 1971,Indonesia

AbdulAziz ImamSamudra 1970,Indonesia

EnjangBastaman Jabir Indonesia

AmrozibinNurhasym 1962,Indonesia

AliImronbinNurhasym 1972,Indonesia

YazidSufaat 1965,Malaysia

AgusDwikarna 1964,Indonesia

JackThomas JihadThomas 1974,Australia

HashimbinAbbas 1961,Singapore

MohammedNazirbinAbbas 1969,Malaysia

FaizbinabuBakarBafaba 1962,Malaysia

JafaarbinMistooki 1961,Singapore

SaifullaYunos Muklis 1972,Philippines

MaghrebArabCluster

AbdillahZiyad Rachid 1958,Morocco

MohamedZinedine Said 1959,Morocco

StephaneAitIddir Said 1973,France

RadouaneHammadi 1973,France

TarekFalah 1974,France

KhaderabuHoshar 1965,Jordan

RachidRamda 1970,Algeria

AliTouchent Terek 1957,Algeria

SaféBourada 1970,France

KhaledKelkal 1971,Algeria

KarimKoussa 1972,France

NasserdineSlimani 1971,France

BoualemBensaid Banabas,Mehdi 1967,Algeria

SmainAitAliBelkacem 1969,Algeria

FatehKamel 1960,Algeria

ChristopheCaze Walid 1969,France

LionelDumont AbouHamza 1971,France

RachidSouimdi 1971,France

OmarZemmiri 1966,France

HocineBendaoui 1977,France

MouloudBouguelane 1970,France

KarimSaidAtmani 1966,Morocco

AbdellahOuzghar 1964,Morocco

AmarMakhlulif Doctor,AbuDoha,Haydar 1966,Algeria

RaeedHijazi AbuAhmedal-Amriki 1969,UnitedStates

AhmedRessam 1967,Algeria

MustafaLabsi 1969,Algeria

AbderraoufHannachi 1950,Tunisia

MohammedBensakhria Meliani 1968,Algeria

AeurobuiBeandali 1975,Algeria

LamineMaroni 1971,Algeria

FouhadSabour 1965,France

AbdelQaderMahmoudEsSayed 1962,Egypt

EssidSamiBenKhemais Saber,OmartheTraveler 1968,Tunisia

TarekMaaroufi 1965,Tunisia

ImadEddinBarakatYarkas AbuDahdah 1960,Syria

HabibZacariasMoussaoui Sahrawi 1968,France

DjamelBeghal 1965,Algeria

KamelDaoudi 1974,Algeria

RichardColvinReid AbdulRauff 1973,England

NizarTrabelsi 1970,Tunisia

DavidCourtailler 1976,France

JéromeCourtailler 1974,France

YacineAkhnouche 1975,Algeria

HervéDjamelLoiseau 1973,France

NizarbenMohdNasrNawar Sayfal-IslamEttounsi 1978,Tunisia

MohamedRafiki AbuHafs 1974,Morocco

MohamedDamir 1972,Morocco

MehdiDamir 1980,Morocco

Mohamedal-Omari 1979,Morocco

RichardPierreAntoineRobert AbuAbderrahmane,Lhaj 1972,France

MohamedHassouna 1981,Morocco

Mohamedal-Mehini 1978,Morocco

GlossaryofForeignTerms

bayaformaloathofloyaltybidahinnovations(considerednon-IslamiccorruptionsdilutingthewordofGod)daral-harblandofconflictdaral-IslamlandofIslamdaral-kufrlandofinfidelsdaral-suhllandoftreatydawacalltoIslamfardaynindividualobligationfardkifayacollectiveobligationfitnatemptationortrial;discordwithinMuslimcommunityhadithstoriesrecordingthewordsanddeedsoftheProphetbypeoplewhoknewhim.hijraexile;withdrawaljahiliyyathestateofbarbarismandignorancethatprevailedintheArabicPeninsulabeforeMuhammad’srevelations.jahili,adj.jihadstrivingjihadbissayfstrivingthroughthesword;violentrevoltkufrinfidelMaghrebNorthAfricanIslamiclandsmantiqiregion(Indonesian)mujahed,pl.mujahedinjihadfightersalafancientone;companionoftheProphetshahadaprofessionoffaith;alsomartyrdomshahidwitness;alsomartyrShariastrictQuraniclawshuracounciltakfirexcommunicated;alapsedMuslim,fromtheArabicrootkufrforimpiety.tawhidunityofgodummaMuslimcommunitywakalahbranches(Indonesian)

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Index

Abouhalima,Mahmud,80,86AbuDahdah.SeeYarkas,ImadEddinBarakatAbuDoha.SeeMakhlulifAbuHafsal-Masri.SeeAbuSittah,SubhiMohammedAbuHamzaal-Masri.SeeKamel,MustafaAbuMusabal-Zarqawi.Seeal-Kalaylah,AhmedAbuQatada.SeeOthman,OmarMahmoudAbuSayyafGroup,38,44,64,151AbuSittah,SubhiMohammed(a.k.a.abuHafsal-MasriorMohammedAtef),35,46,113,141AbuSomad,Ustaz.SeeBaasyir,AbuBakarAbuZubaydah.SeeHussein,Zainal-AbidinMohammedAfghanArabs,18,25,41,56Afghanistan,18,32,34–39,45,46–51,56–59,72–73,102,149–50Al-Adl,Sayf.SeeMakkawi,MohammedAl-Afghani,Djafar,41Al-Afghani,Jamalal-Din,6Al-Afghani,Tayyeb,41Al-Banna,Hasan,7Al-Banshiri,abuUbaydah.Seeal-Rashidi,AminAliAl-Dhahabi,Muhammad,29Al-Fadl,Dr.SeeSayyidImamal-SharifAl-Faruq,Omar,46,49,79,113Al-Fawwaz,Khalid,46Al-Ghamdi,Ahmed,50Al-Ghamdi,Ahmedal-Haznawi,50Al-Ghamdi,Hamza,50Al-Ghamdi,Saeed,50Al-Ghozi,FathurRahman,49Al-Harbi,Majed,50Al-Hazmi,Nawaf,49,50,107Al-Hazmi,Salim,50Al-Hudaybi,Hasan,14,27Al-Islambuli,Khaled,32–33,135Al-Islambuli,Mohammad,31,32,34,35,47,51,135Al-Kalaylah,Ahmed(a.k.a.abuMusabal-Zarqawi),151Al-Makki,AbulBilal.Seeal-Nashiri,Abdal-Rahim),138Al-Masri,abuHafs.SeeabuSittahAl-Midhar,Khalid,49,107,113Al-Motassadeq,Mounir,70Al-Nami,Ahmed,50Al-Nashiri,Abdal-Rahim(a.k.a.AbulBilalal-Makki),49Al-Omari,AbdulAziz,50Al-Omari,Othman,81AlQaeda:creation,34–38;mergerwithEIJ,63;formalinductioninto,91,121;recruitment,123Al-Qaedaal-Jihad,51,63Al-Qamari,Issam,29–30,33Al-QudsMosque,Hamburg,104–6Al-Rashidi,AminAli(a.k.a.abuUbaydahal-Banshiri),34,42,58,166Al-Ridi,Essam,58Al-Shahri,Muhammad,50Al-Sharif,SayyidImam(a.k.a.al-Fadl,Dr.),30,34,41Al-Shehhi,Marwan,105–7Al-Shehri,FayezAhmed(a.k.a.Banihammad,FayezRashidAhmedHassanal-Qadi),50Al-Shehri,WailMohammed,50,80Al-Shehri,Waleed,50

Al-Sirri,YasirTawfiq,46Al-Suqami,50Al-Takfirwa’l-Hijra.SeeJamaatal-MusliminAl-Tawhid,151Al-Tbaiti,ZuhairHilal,122Al-Turbani,Hassan,39Al-Wahhab,MohamedibnAbd,8–9Al-Zawahiri,Ayman:andAfghanresistancefighters,32;arrestinDagastan,46;roleinassassinationofPresidentSadat,33–34;background,26–27;andbinLaden,35,46–47;andEgyptianIslamicJihad,34,41,47,51,55,63,148;andEgyptianmilitantgroups,29–30;embeddedness,148;fundraising,43;KnightsUndertheProphet’sBanner,20–24;functioninnetwork,141;inPeshawar,34–35;psychology,80,86,89;andalQaeda,63

Al-Zumur,Abud,30,32–34,41,55,148Amman,millennialplot,48,167AmrozibinNurhasym,44,81“Anarchic-ideologue”terrorists,84–85Anas,Abdallah,58ArabAfghans.SeeAfghanArabsArmedIslamicGroup.SeeGroupeIslamiqueArméAssunaAnnabawiyahMosque,Montreal,100AsyutRevolt,32–34,147Atef,Mohammed.SeeabuSittah,SubhiMohammedAtmani,Said(a.k.a.Karim),101,102,139Atta,Mohamedal-AmirAwadal-Sayed,80,86,104–38,165Augustina,Mira,79Ayyub,Osama,41Aziz,Abdul(a.k.a.ImamSamudra),44,139Azzam,SheikhAbdullah,2–3,18,35–37,56,123

Baasyir,AbuBakar(a.k.a.UstazabuSomad),44,50,53,74,113,137,140,141,144Bahaji,Said,70,104–7Baital-Ansar,Hamburg,105–6Baital-Ansar,Peshawar,35Balibombing,53,166–67Banihammad,FayezRashidAhmedHassanal-Qadi.Seeal-Shehri,FayezAhmedBarker,Eileen,126,128–29Bearden,Milt,58,66Beghal,Djamel,50Belfas,Mohammad,103–5,107Besseghir,Abderrezak,67BinabuBakarBafana,Faiz,49Binal-Shibh,Ramzi,49,104–7,110,113,138,165BinAttash,WaleedTawfiq(a.k.a.Khallad),49,138BinLaden,Osama:inAfghan-Sovietwar,58;useofcommunicationtechnology,159–60;andevolutionofalQaeda,35–36,44–45,46–48,51,55;embeddedness,149;faith,117;fatwas,18–19;fundingofterroroperations,167;kinship,113;functioninnetwork,137,141,172;oathofloyaltyto,121;psychology,80,86;andterrorplots,164

Blowback,25,56–59BojinkaPlot,64,164Bombings.SeenamesofindividualbombingsandindividualplotsBouguelane,Mouloud,81,85Boumezbeur,Adel,101,139Bourada,Safé,139Brainwashing,124–25

Casablancabombings,53–54,111,160Caze,Christophe,139CentralStaffCluster,42–43,70–72,137–41Cliques,152–58,168–71Communicationtechnology,158–60Copts,31CoreArabcluster,46,48,50,70–72,115,137–41

Courtailler,DavidandJérome,50

Dahoumane,AbdelMajid,103Dambruoso,Stefano,108Daoudi,Kamel,50,80,86Darkazanli,Mamoun,49Dawa,5–7Dean,Diana,103DellaPorta,Donnatella,131–33Derwish,Kamal,121Discipleshipbonds,113–14DSM-IV,80–81,87Dumont,Lionel,139

EastAfricaembassybombings,42,47–48,166Egyptianmilitantgroups,25–34,133–35;EgyptianIslamicGroup(EIG),34–35,41–42,44,46–47,51,55,62–63,147–48;EgyptianIslamicJihad(EIJ),26,34–35,41,44,46–47,51,55,63,147–49,151El-Hage,Wadih,43,94,113Embeddedness,31,146–51Essabar,Zakarya,70,105,107

Fadillah,Haris,113Farenemy,16,44–45,61–62,149,150Faraj,MuhammadAbdal-Salam,15–17,30–31,33,76,134–35Free-riderparadox,153–55Friendshipbonds,107–112Frustration-aggressionhypothesis,95–96

GalanGonzalez,LuisJosé(a.k.a.YusufGalan),113Galanter,Marc,126,128–29Geographicaldistributionofnetworks,142–46GermanRedArmyFaction,130–31Ghufron,Ali(a.k.a.Mukhlas),44,112,138,141“Green-diaper”babytheory,76,112GroupeIslamiqueArmé(GIA),40–41,44,64,151GroupeSalafistepourlaPrédicationetleCombat(GSPC),64,151GulfWar,40

Habib,Kamal,30Hambali.SeeIsamuddin,RiduanHamburgcell,103–7,168–69Hamza,Mustafa,35,47,103–7Hanjour,Hani,107Hannachi,Abderrauf,101–2,110,120,122,168–69Haouari,Mokhtar,101,103,110,122,139Hashim,Yahya,26,28Hikmatyar,Gulbuddin,38Hubs,137,139,140–60Hussein,Saddam,37–38Hussein,Zainal-AbidinMohammed(a.k.a.abuZubaydah),46,49,102,110,137,141

IbnTaymiyya,Taqial-DinAhmad,8–9Ibrahim,SaadEddin,133–34Iddir,StephaneAit,81Ikhlef,Mourad,101,102–3Ilyas,Muhammad,5Imron,Ali,44Indonesiachurchbombings,ChristmasEve2000,112InternationalCrisisGroup,53Internet,160–64

Inter-ServicesIntelligenceDirectorate(ISID),56Isamuddin,Riduan(a.k.a.Hambali),44,46,138,141Islamicdecline,4;responses,4–5;Salafistrategy,4–5IslamicLiberationOrganization(ILO),27–28,133IslamicLiberationParty,14ItalianRedBrigades,131–33

Jamaatal-Muslimin(a.k.a.al-Takfirwa’l-Hijra;MuslimGroup;PeopleoftheCave;SocietyofMuslims),14–15,28–29,133Jamaati-Islami,7JamaatIslamiyya,27,29Janjalani,AbduragakAbubakar,38Jarrah,Ziad,80,86,105–7,156JemaahIslamiyah,38,44,52,64,70,72,89,92,113–14,120,140,142,151,177Jihad:evolution:Egyptianorigins,25–34;Afghanincubation,34–39;Sudaneseexile,40–45;Afghanrefugephase,46–51;post-9/11phase,51–54;globalSalafi,18–24;greater,2;lesser,2–3;Salafi,7–17

Journalists,66

Kamel,Fateh,43,49,138,139,141,144Kamel,Mustafa(a.k.a.abuHamzaal-Masri),46,50,76,101–2,114,117,145Karim.SeeAtmani,SaidKarim,AbdulBasit(a.k.a.RamziYousef),41–42,64,109,111,112,141,164Kelkal,Khaled,80,86,111Khabou,Laifa,101Khalis,Yunis,38Khallad.SeebinAttash,WaleedMohamedTawfiqKherchtou,L’Houssaine,111KhobarTowersbombing,44,66Kiareldeen,Hany,66Kinshipbonds,112–13Klein,Melanie,88KnightsUndertheProphet’sBanner(al-Zawahiri),20–24KualaLumpurconference,49,112

Labsi,Mustapha,100–103,110,139LackawannaSix,68,111,120,146,152,158Links,158–67,168–71,178–79Lofland,John,126–28London,46,47,144–45LosAngelesairportmillennialplot,99–103Luxormassacre,47,63,148

Madrassas,74MaghrebArabcluster,43,46,48,49,70–72,115,137–39,141Makhlulif,Amar(a.k.a.abuDoha),46,102–3,110,138,141,145Makkawi,Mohammed(a.k.a.al-Adl,Sayf),41,141Manilabombings,48Martyrdom,116–17Massideologicalappealthesis,119–20Massoud,AhmadShah,34Mawdudi,Mawlanaabual-Ala,7,9Mekhtabal-Khidemat(ServiceBureau),35,56,123Merari,Ariel,62,76Meskini,AbdelGhani,103,107,110,122,151–52Milestones(Qutb),9–14Mohamed,SamirAit,103Mohammed,Ali.SeeMustafa,AliAbdelSuudMohammedMohammed,KhalidSheikh,41–42,46,49,106,110,112,137,141,164–65Montrealcell,100–103,168MoroIslamicLiberationFront,44,52,64Mosques,114–15,143–44Motassadeq,Mounir,104,106–7,108

Moussaoui,HabibZacarias,50,80,81–82,86–87Mubarak,Hosni,45,148Mukhlas.SeeGhufron,AliMurad,AbdulHakim,111,160MuslimGroup.SeeJamaatal-MusliminMustafa,AliAbdelSuudMohammed(a.k.a.AliMohammed),35,42Mustafa,Shukri,14–15,28–29,133Mzoudi,Abdelghani,70,104–7

NationalGuardTrainingCenterbombing,44“Nationalist-separatist”terrorists,84–85Nearenemy,16,44–45NeglectedDuty(Faraj),15–17Nehm,Kay,108Nodes,151–52,160,175–77

Olson,Mancur,153–54Omar,MullahMohammed,45Omary,Mohamed,139OperationAnaconda,52Othman,OmarMahmoud(a.k.a.abuQatada),46,50,114,145Ouzghar,Abdullah,139

Padilla,José,81ParisU.S.embassyplot,48,167Parker,Ishtiaque,42,109PeopleoftheCave.SeeJamaatal-MusliminPesentrenLuqmanulHakiem,44,74,113,177PondokNgruki,74,113,177Post,Jerrold,84–91Psychologicalexplanationsofterrorism,80–91;authoritarianpersonality,90–91,157;mentalillness,80–83;paranoia,87–90;pathologicalnarcissism,83–87;personalitydisorders(psychopath,sociopath,antisocial),81–83;traumaticbackground,84–85

Qasim,TalatFuad,35Quran:swordverses,16–17Qutb,Sayyid,8–14,76,90

Rabbani,Burhanuddin,9Rahman,HamdiAbdel,31,34Rahman,SheikhOmarAbdel,31,34,35,46–47,51,117,144Rationalistparadox,154,156Recruitment,121–24Reid,Richard,50,81,85.SeealsoShoebombingattemptRessam,Ahmed,67,80,86,99–103,110,122,138,139,141,144“ReturneesfromAlbania”trial,47Riyadhbombing,53Roubaixgang,43,102,111,139Rushdi,Osama,34,35

Sadat,Anwar,15,17,27,28,32–33,134–35Said,Qari,41SalafiaJihadia,64Salam,AbdelHamidAbdel,34Salim,MamdouhMahmud,44,149Samudra,Imam.SeeAziz,AbdulSaud,Mohamedibn,8Sayed,AbdelQaderEs,114,144Sayyaf,AbdalRabbRasul,38Sayyid,NajihIbrahimAbdallah,31September11,2001,operations,48,50–51,66,103–12,150,164,166–67ServiceBureau.SeeMekhtabal-Khidemat

Shaban,SheikhAnwar,43,114,144Shah,WaliKhanAmin,57,72,119Shakur,Abdul,111Sheikh,AhmedOmar,80,86,112ShiaMuslims,73Shoebombingattempt,48,167.SeealsoRichardReidSingaporebombingplots,48,167Sirriya,Salih,14,27–28Slahi,MohamadouOuld,106Smallworldnetwork,139–40,164Socialnetworkanalysis,137–39SocietyofMuslims.SeeJamaatal-MusliminSources,64–68SoutheastAsiancluster,46,49,70–72,113–14,137–40,141Stark,Rodney,126–28StraitsofGibraltarplot,53,167StrasbourgChristmasmarketplot,48,167Sudan,39,40–45,71,93Sufatt,Yazid,112SufiIslam,58Suicide,82–83Sungkar,Abdullah,44,74,113,140

TablighiJamaat,5–6,123Taha,Rifai,34,35,47Taliban,45Tanzimal-Jihad,15,30–31,134Tawhid,8,10TechnicalMilitaryAcademycoup,14,28Terrorists:ageattimeofjoining,92;devotion,92–94;education,74–77;employment,94;faithasyouth,77–78;familystatus,78–80;geographicalorigins,70–73;occupation,78;placeofrecruitment,92–93;relativedeprivationthesis,95–96;socioeconomicstatus,73–74

Thomas,Jack,112–13Tit-for-tatstrategy,154Trabelsi,Nizar,50

Ujaysah,Ahmad,41Ulaywah,MuhammadMustafa,30Ulaywah,UlwiMustafa,30UnificationChurch,126–30UnitedStates:astarget,44,45,145–46;roleinAfghanjihad,56–59USSCole,48,112,166USSTheSullivans,48,166

“VanguardsofConquest,”41,55

Wahhabism,8–9,58Wasmund,Klaus,130–31Weakbonds,168–71WesternEuropeanterrorism,130–33WorldIslamicFront,47WorldTradeCenterbombing(1993),42,64WorldTradeCenterbombing(2001).SeeSeptember11,2001,operationsWorshipbonds,114–20

Yarkas,ImadEddinBarakat(a.k.a.abuDahdah),49,113,114,144Yousaf,Mohammad,57,66Yousef,Ramzi.SeeKarim,AbdulBasit

Zammar,MohammedHeidar,49,106–7,110,120,168–69Zuhdi,Karam,31,32–34,134

Acknowledgments

Thisbookcouldnothavebeenwrittenwithouttheencouragementandcollaborationofagreatnumberofpeople.When I began my investigations of the 9/11 terrorists, multilateral online discussions with anumber of distinguished colleagues stimulated ideas and eventually led to an invitation from PhilipZimbardo to participate in a panel discussionon terrorismat theAmericanPsychologicalAssociationConventioninChicagoinAugust2002.ColleaguesattheUniversityofPennsylvaniaalsoencouragedmetopursuethistopicandinvitedmeto

presentmyfindingsintheirvariousstages.Theircommentsshapedtheevolutionofmythoughtsonthissubject.MostprominentamongthesesupporterswereMarkLiberman,CynthiaMacLemore,andWilliamLabovattheInstituteforResearchinCognitiveScience,andClarkMcCauley,PaulRozin,andespeciallyJonathanDrummondattheSolomonAschCenterfortheStudyofEthno-politicalConflict.For their insightfulcommentsandquestions,encouragementandcollaboration, Iamalso indebted to

AndrewSilkefromtheHomeOffice,London;JohnHorganatUniversityCollege,Cork,Ireland;PhilipZelikow,SusanGinsburg,DouglasMacEachinandTomDowlingattheNationalCommissiononTerroristAttacks Upon the United States; Rohan Gunaratna at the Institute of Defense and Strategic Studies,NanyangTechnologicalUniversity, Singapore;GillesKepel at the Institut des Sciences Politiques andOlivierRoyattheCentreNationaldeRecherchesScientifiques,Paris,France;GeroldYonas,BenjaminWu, Wendell Jones and Nancy Kay Hayden at the Sandia National Laboratory; Hsinchun Chen andJennifer Xu, Artificial Intelligence Lab, University of Arizona; Henry Schuster from CNN; DavidHammon,CleteDiGiacomo,andJeffreyMilsteinfromtheDefenseThreatReductionAgency;andStevenBrookeandRobertLeikenfromtheNixonCenter,Washington,D.C.Afteroneofmypresentations,PeterAgreeoftheUniversityofPennsylvaniaPressencouragedmeto

writeabookonthistopic.Withouthissupport,thisprojectwouldneverhavereacheditspresentform.Also at the Press, Noreen O’Connor providedmany wise editorial suggestions, for which I ammostgrateful. Imust also thankDeborahFromstein,my research assistant, for her help.Very special thanksmust be extended to Randall Collins and Elisa Bienenstock for reading the whole draft and makingexcellentsuggestionsforimprovingthelogicandflowoftheargument.However,mygreatestcollaboratorhasbeenmywife,whomIthankforreadingandrevisingmanyof

mydrafts,andwhosesuggestionsandsupportthroughoutthisprojecthavebeeninvaluable.Finally,Iamindebtedtomysonforhismosthelpfulcooperation,withoutwhichthisbookcouldnothavebeenwritten.Itismyhopethatthisworkwillcontributetoanunderstandingthatwillleadtoamorepeacefulworldforallofhisgeneration.