Understanding Privatisation Policy: Political Economy and Welfare Effects
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Transcript of Understanding Privatisation Policy: Political Economy and Welfare Effects
Understanding Privatisation Policy:Political Economy and Welfare Effects
Workpackage 2
The Determinants of Privatisation Policy
Humberto Llavador and Paolo PinottiUniversitat Pompeu Fabra
Barcelona, UPP Kickoff MeetingFebruary 24, 2006
WP2: The determinants of privatization policy
Combined theoretical and empirical approach. Modeling political competition and the institutional framework. Data collection on political institutions and political orientation. Political fragmentation, ideology and privatization.
Expected outcomes Guidelines for data collection on political institutions (July 2006) Database on political institutions and political orientation (April
2007) Two to four theoretical papers (Feb. & Nov. 2007) Two empirical papers (July & Nov. 2007)
Understanding and modeling political competition and voting behavior.
Searching for a political competition model for parliamentary (proportional representation) and multiparty political systems. The role of parliaments, coalitional governments and
the opposition parties in policymaking and its influence in electoral outcomes.
A distinctive feature is that parties and voters care about margins of victory.
Understanding and modeling political competition and voting behavior.
Incumbency advantage and legislature irresponsibility
Western democracies present high re-election rates. How much do incumbents choose their policy actions to gain
electoral support? The political science literature has been careful to recognize that
answering this question and measuring the true incumbency advantage is not as stratigtforward as one may think.
Understanding incumbency advantage and its causal relationship with legislature irresponsibility has direct implication on the understanding of the policy choices made by incumbents.
Privatization, political fragmentation, and ideology
political fragmentation privatization “common pool” problem “war of attrition” model
ideology privatization distributional and welfare consequences
privatization ideology strategic privatization (Biais & Perotti AER 2002)
contribution
1. provide comprehensive database approx. 40 countries (including all OECD) over privatization period (1977-200…)
2. use it to test empirical implications of political economy models relevant to privatization
political fragmentation, ideology timing of privatization
privatization methods ideology
database:issues
qualitative indexes
binary/discrete vs. continuous measures trade off between descriptive power and discretion
accuracy of data government composition (ok) parliament composition (low) electoral results (low)
database:political fragmentation
existing measures: government and parliament
binary: cohesive vs. fragmented
simple number of parties concentration indexes
elections binary majoritarian vs.
proportional
our proposal government and parliament
concentration indexes elections
continuous dis-proportionality index
parties as basic cohesive political players
database:political fragmentation
effective number of parties (gov. and parl.)
electoral dis-proportionality
database:political fragmentation
database:ideology
existing measures
defined only for executive
binary/discrete indexes
arbitrary
our proposal
define measure for single parties
continuous measure
based on expert surveys Huber & Inglehart (1995) Laver and Hunt (1992) Castles and Mair (1984)
aggregate by weighted average (weights = %seats)
database:sample & sources
sample: 21 OECD countries over 1977-2002
sources: Liphart (1994) Banks, Day & Muller (2002) Electoral Studies (review, various issues) Elections Around the World (web site)
cross-checking among the different sources
database:accuracy
empirical test:timing of privatization
successful reform is public good political fragmentation affects distribution of
political, social and economic costs of reform war of attrition model:
less fragmentation: faster reform more fragmentation: longer time to reform
parallel literature on public debt / deficits a remark: “war of attrition” has predictions for timing
empirical test:timing of privatization
empirical test:timing of privatization
work in progress…
expand the sample
conclude the analysis about the determinants of the timing
define a proper empirical test for the Biais & Perotti (2002)