Understanding and Valuing KnOWlTIj

The deveiopmentof intrinsic vaiuing

of inteliectuaiactivities

stands to providethe firmest basis

for sustaininginteilectuaimotivation

CONNECTING WHAT STUDENTS [XI in school towhat they w ill do in life after schdol is a mat-ter ot increasing concern on niLiltiple tronts,hut the issue can be deflected until it comes toa head at the college level. K-12 educatorscan, and comiiKinly do, cite as their tibjectiveproviding students with the skills they willneed to meet the demands they will encounterat the next level ot schooling—the demandsthat elementary schoitl students will encounterin middle school, middle schools students inhigh school, and high school students in col-lege. Is there an implicatiim for how studentsthcmscK'es Linderstand the piirpo.se ot whatthey 1.I0 in school.'

I recently asked Robbie, a tenth-grader atan outstanding suburban high school, whatuse his current schoolwork would be to him inhis a<,lult lite. He hesitantly mentioned writing

skills, which hisschool emphasizes,

but then had a sudden insight: "Oh, and Latinwill be helpful for my SATs." When I clarifiedthat 1 was talking about his life after he finishedhis schooling, he could come up with m)thingturther. Mike, a ninth-grader from the sameschool said he didn't see his studies being ofiny later use "unle.ss you just want to ha\'e facts

to make yourselt look good in a con\ ersation.Like now we're studying the Ming dynasty; whyelse would you need to know this?"

Students like Robbie and Mike have grownup in privileged families and communities inwhich the future benefits of education—bothprestige and material gain—have long andconsistently been made clear to them. The re-sponses quoted above suggest it is not clear tothem why this is so, but this probably doesn'tworry them much. These boys are clearly "col-lege bound." At this stage in their lives, dothey need to be aware oi-any more exaltedpurpose to what they are doing' Unlike manyof their less-privileged counterparts, they atleast see school as having some purpose. Be-lieving that school is a path to success can't besuch a bad thing, for students of any age or so-cial background.

DEANNA KUHN is professor of psychology and edu-

cation at Teachers Coilege, Columbia University.

16 LiBEfiAL EDUCATION SUMMER 2003

Developmental GoalsDEANNA KUHN

Yet there arguably is a downside. The prob-lem is that the relatioti betweeti school andlife is essentially an instrumental one: Invest-ment and outcome—means and end—bearonly an arbitrary connection. Tbere is no in-trinsic logic as to wby intellectual pursuits{rather than, say. athletic or tnusical accon:i-plishment) should be the object ot society'sapproval and reward. Any of tbese couid aswell serve as the means to tbe desired end otsocial recognition and reward. Wbcthcr it is

Columbia University intellectual activity, then, or sotne otber ac-tivity, its value derives from its role in ameans-end relationship that is arbitrary. Herelies the downside. Once an activity becomesidentified a.s merely a means to an end, it be-comes easy to devalue it as without significancein its own rigbt. One undertakes it because itproduces some totally different dividend tbatis valued.

The value of an intrinsically valued activity,in contrast, lies in the activity itself. Tbe ben-efits of the acti\-ity ettianate directly frotn it.One engages in tt because it is experienced as\'aluable in its own rigbt. Tbe advantage isclear: Continued comtiiitment to the activityis ensured. It is not dependent on externalmaintenance-ot a relation between the activ-ity and some independently valued outcome.

For this reason, it can be argued, the devel-opment of intrinsic valuing of intellectual ac-tivities stands to provide the fitrnest basis forsustaining intellectual motivation throughchildhood and adolescence and into adult-ht)od. Students experience for themselves tbevalue of tbe intellectual activities tbey engagein. This experience leads to increasing levelsof time and energy devoted to them and ulti-mately an explicit comtmitment to them as away of lite. Tbis characterization begins toM)unJ like every educators vision—the pro-duction ot intrinsically motivated, self-directedleamL'r^—and yet, one tbat bas proven difficultto impletnent and certainly fragile to maintain.What makes it happen?

How does one know?An answer I propose here is that students' de-veloping understanding oi what it means tolearn and to know is a key component of tbeprocess. It is by no means the only one. Cer-tainly, tbe kinds of educational environmentsthat students experience are crucial. But oftenoverlooked is the meaning they attribute totbese experiences. Tbeir school experiences aretor most students tbe primary basis for the un-derstandings they construct of what it means toleam and know and, not incidentally, whetherinx'esting one's ttme and eftort in such pursuitsis worthwhile.

The study of students' developing epistemo-logical understanding bas blossomed in thelast decade (see Hofer and Pintricb 1997.2002, tor review), with the result that we nowhave a fairly con\-ergent picture of a series ofsteps that mark de\-elopment toward moremature epistemological understanding in theyears from early childhood to early adulthood.(SeeT^blel.)

Prescbool age cbildren are realists. They re-gard wbat one knows as an immediate readingof what's out there. Beliefs are faithful copiesot reality. They are received directly from tbeextertial world, ratber tban constructed by theknower. Hence, tbere are no inaccurate ren-derings of events, nor any possibility of con-flicting beliefs, since everyone is perceivingthe same extemal reality.

Not until about age four does a knower beginto emerge in children's conceptions of know-ing. Children become aware that mental rep-resentations, as products of the human minddo not necessarily duplicate external reality

18 LIBERAL EDUCATION SUMMER 2003

Before children achie\'e a concept of false be-lief, they are unwilling to attribute to anotherperson a belief that they themselves know tobe false {Perner 1991). Once they attain thislevel, the knower, and knowledge as mentalrepresentations produced by knowers, come tolife. The products ot knowing, howe\'er, are stillmore firmly attached to the known object thanto the knower Hence, while inadequate or in-correct information can produce talse beliefs,they are easily correctable by reference to anexternal reality—the known object. If you andI disagree, one oi us is right and one is wrong,and resolving the matter is simply a matter offmding out which is which. At this absolunstlevel ot epistemological understanding,knowledge is regarded as an accumulating bodyof certain facts (Table 1).

Eurther progress in epistemological under-standing can be characterized as an extendedtask of coordinating the subjective with theobjective elements ot knowing. At the realistand absolutist le\'els. the objectix'e domitiates.By adolescence typically comes the likelihoodof a radical change in epistemological under-standing. In a word, e\'eryone now becomesright. The discovery- that reasonable people—even experts—disagree is the likely source of

recognizing the uncertain, subjective aspect ofknowing. This recognition initially assumessuch proportions, however, that it eclipsesrecognition of any objecti\'e standard that couidscn.'e as a basis for evaluating conflicting claims,Adolescents typically tall into "a poisonedwell of doubt" (Chandler 2003), and they fallhard and deep. At this multiplist (sometimescalled relativist) level of epistemological under-standing, kntnvtedge consists not of tacts butoi opinions, freely chosen by their holders aspersonal possessions and accordingly not opento challenge. Knowledge is now clearly seenas emanating trom knowers, rather than theknown, but at the signiticant cost oi any dis-criminability among competing knowledgeclaitiis. Indeed, this lack ot dtscrtminability isequated witb tolerance: Because e\ eryone has aright to his or her opintr>tT, all opinions areequally right. That ubiquitous slogan ot adoles-cence-—-'•u'hate\"er"—holds sway.

E\'idetice suggests that hoisting oneself outot the "whatever" well ot multiplicity and in-discriminability is achieved at tnuch greatereftort than the quick and easy tall into itsdepths. By adulthood, many, though by nomeans all, adolescents will ha\-e reintegrated theobjective dimension ot knowing and achie\ ed

Table 1 Levels of Epistemological Understanding

Level Assertions Knowledge

Realist Assertions are COPIESof an external reality.

Knowledge comes from anextemal source and is certain.

Critical Thinking

Critical thinking isunnecessary'.

Absolutist Assertions are FACTS thatare correct or incorrectin their representationof reality.

Knowledge comes from anextemal source and is certainbut not directly accessible,producing false beliefs.

Critical tbinking is avehicle tor comparingassertions to reality anddetermining their truthor falsehood.

Multiplist Assertiom are OPINIONSfreely chosen by andaccountable only totheir owners.

Knowledge is generated byhuman minds and therefore

Critical thinkingis irrelevant.

uncertain.

Evaluativist Assertions are JUDGMENTSthat can be evaluated and

• compared according tocriteria of argument andevidence.

Knowledge is generatedby human minds and isuncertain but susceptibleto evaluation.

Critical thinking is valuedas a vehicle that promotessound assertions and en-hances understanding.

SUMMER 2OO3 LIBERAL EDUCATION 19

the understanding: that while everyone has atight to his or her opinion, some (>pinions arein fact better than others, to the extent theyare better supported hy argument atui evidence.Justification tor a belief becomes more thanpersonal preference. "Whatever" is no longerthe automatic response to any assertion—there are now legitimate discriminations andchoices to be made. Rather than facts or opin-ions, knowledge at this evaluativist level ofepistemological understanding consists of)udgmcnts, which require support in a frame-work of alternatives, evidence, and argument.

From beliefs to valuesThis cognitive evolution cannot by itself yieldthe sort of intellectual valuing pointed to earlieras an essential bridge between education andlife. Values have an affective, as well as cogtii-tive, component. But the evolution just de-scribed ser\'es as a necessary condition for thedevelopment of intellectual \'alues. Adoles-cents v\'ho ne\'er progress beyond the absolutistbelief in ccrtaui knowledge, or the multtplist'sequation of knowledge with personal preference,lack a reason to engage in sustained intellec-tual inquiry. If facts can be ascertained withcertainty and are readily a\-ailable to anyonewho seeks them, as the absolutist understands,or if any claim is as valid as any other, as themultiplist utiderstands, there is little point toexpending the mental effort that the evaluationof claims entails. Only at the evaluativist levelare thinking and reason recognized as essentialsupport for beltefs and actiotis. Thinking is theprocess that enables us to make infonned choicesbetween conflicting claims. Understanding thisleads one to value thinking and to be willing toexpend the effort that it entails (Table 1).

In my research on intellectual values I havefound striking differences across cultural groupsand subcultural groups within the U.S. iti theresponses of parents and children to severalquestions like this one:

Many social issues, like the death penalty,gun control, or tnedical care, are pretty muchmatters of personal opinion, and there is nobasis for saying that one person's opinton isany better than another's. So there's notmuch point in people having discussionsabout these kinds of issues. Do you stronglyagree, sort of agree, or disagree?Reasons respondents offer for disagreement

are similar atid tefer to values of discussion in

enhancing individual and/or collective under-standing, solving problems, atid resolvingconflicts. Reasons offered for agreement, how-ever, tend to he of two distinct types. Someparticipants re.spond along these lines, sugges-tive of the multiplist level of epistemologicalunderstanding: "h's not worth it to discuss ithecause you're not going to get anywhere;everyone has a right to think what they wantto." Others take this position, suggestive ofthe absolutist's equation ot knowledge withright answers: "It's not worth it to discuss itbecause it s not something you can get a defi-nite answer to."

Parents and children within the culturesand subculture.s we have studied respond simi-larly to one another. Middle-schoolers andhigh-schotilers in Atnerican ethntc subcultures,however, show some movement away fromtheir parents' response pattems in the directionof those of their American peers. These resultssuggest that parents do matter in transmittingintellectual values to their children, but, at thesame time, that children to a significant degreeconstruct these \-alues anew tn a context oitheir peer culture, especially when the valuesof the culture outside the home deviate fromthose withui the home.

r\'c made a case thus far for the importanceof understanding and valuing knowing as devel-opmental goals. A final challenge is to connectthese values to school experience, which is byno means automatic. Even teens Uke Rohbieand Mike, who come from a prixileged commu-nity in which parents and children are the mostlikely to ha\'e achie\'ed a mature le\'el of epis-temologtcal understatiding atid to endorse the\'alue oi intellectual engagement, may not seetheir school lives as having much to do withthe intrinsic, in contrast to the instrumental,\'aluc of intellectual engagement. Herein liesthe challenge for educators at every level.

Setting the stageThe transitions from realist to absolutist tomultiplist portrayed in Table 1 don't seem torequire a great deal of tending by those wish-ing to scaffold children's de\-elopment. Unlessthe child's experience is unusually restricted,children become aware that people's beliefsvary and they must figure out a way of under-standing this state of affairs. The vast majoritytake at least a brief dip, and more often a pro-longed one, into the well of multiplicity. The

20 LIBERAL EDUCATION SUMMER 2003

last major transition, however,from multiplist to evaluativist,is another story. It is helpinj^young people climb out oi themultiplist well that requires theconcerned attention of paretitsand educators, especially it itis this progression that providesthe necessary foundation torintellectual s'alues.

The goal will not be achievedby exhortation—by tellingstudents that a particular kind oi activity isvaluable, or even how or why it's \-aluable.A more promising adult role is that ot intro-ducing young people to acti\'ities that have avalue that becomes selt-evident in the courseof engaging them and developing the skillsthey entail. By serving as a guide, or coach,as students engage such acti\'ities, the adultmodels his or her own commitment to the ac-tivity and belief in its worth. As students' skilland commitment and self-direction increase,the coach's role diminishes.

Much of what we ask students to do in schoolsimply does not have these characteristics. Inthe seventh-grade social studies class I obsen'edat Robbie and Mike's school, I was surprisedto hear a student \-enture the question, "Whydo we have to learn the names ot the thirteencolonies?" The teacher responded withouthesitation, "Well, we're going to learn all fittystates by the end ot the year, so we may as wellleam these thirteen now."

In my own work (Kuhn, forthcoming), wehave been experimenting with in\'olvingmiddle-school students in activities that webelieve have this crucial characteristic of re-vealing their intrinsic value as they are en-gaged in. These activities fall under the broadheadings of inquiry' and argument, and we areable to follow students' progress microgeneti-cally as they develop these two families ofskills by engaging in exercise of them. Throughtheir involvement in such activities, we hopestudents will discover for themselves thatthere is something to find out and a point toarguing, sufficient to make the effort worth-while. It is only their own experiences thatwill lead them to the conviction that inquiryand reasoned argument offer the most promis-ing path to deciding between competing claitns,resolving conflicts, solving problems, andachieving goals.

The collegeexperience has beenwidely noted as an

occasion forintellectual, as well as

personai-social,unmooring^ upheaval,

and hopefuilyreintegration

By the time students entercolleges or universities, if theydo, their ideas and valuesabout thinking and knowingwill have been years in theni;iking. Still, the college ex-perience has been widelynoted as an occasion for intel-lectual, as well as personal-so-cial, untnooring, uphea\'al,and hopefully reintegratton.Encountering reasonable argu-

ments tor competing claitns becomes ubiqui-tous, impossible to a\'oid. The ideas 1 ha\'eproposed, then, regarding the educational ex-periences of younger students I would argueare no less applicable at the college le\'el. Theintellectual endea\ ors that college studentsundertake must re\'eal their intrinsic value ina way that is accessible to the student and canbe embraced as worth the eftort entailed. It isa criterion that those ot us who teach ct.illegestudents would do well to keep in mind as weplan our course outlines. D

To respond co this article, e-mail:liberaled@aacu.org, with the author's name onthe suhjecl line.

WORKS CITEDChandler, M., and C. Lalonde. 2003.

rional diversity redux. Paper presented at the bL'n-nial meeting of the Society tor Research in ChildDevelopment, Tampa, FL.

Hofer, B. and P. Pinrrich. 1997. The de\elopment utepistcmoloyical theories: Beliefs about kno\vledt;eand knowing and theit relation to leamint:. Rei'it U'of Educational Research, 67: 88-40.

Hofer, B. and P. Pinttich. eds. 2002. Epistemology:The psychoLi^ of beliefs ahout knotvkdge and Iciidii'ing.Mahwah, NJ: Etlbaiim.

Kuhn, D. (forthcoming). Education for thinking.Cambridge MA: Har\'Lird Unnersity Press.

Kuhn, D., R. Cheney, and M.Weinstock. 2001.The development of eptstemological understanding.Cogtiitive Development, 15: 309-328.

Perner,J. 1991. Understanding the representatu malmind. Cambridge, MA: MIT Ptess.

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